Securing Civilization?: The EU, NATO and the OSCE in the Post-9 11 World

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Securing Civilization?

The Changing Character of War Programme is an inter-disciplinary research group located at the University of Oxford, and funded by the Leverhulme Trust.

Securing Civilization? The EU, NATO, and the OSCE in the Post-9/11 World

Alexandra Gheciu

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3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Alexandra Gheciu 2008 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2008 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk ISBN 978–0–19–921722–9 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

Contents

Acknowledgements

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1. Introduction—Thinking about Security in the Twenty-First Century

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2. The EU—Who are ‘We’ and Where is the Enemy?

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3. Of Friends and Foes in the Fight Against Terrorism: NATO and the Politics of Norm Promotion in the Twenty-First Century

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4. The OSCE: Inclusive Security Practices and Their Limits

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5. Conclusion

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Notes Bibliography Index

193 226 240

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Acknowledgements

In researching and writing this book, I acquired many intellectual and personal debts that I would like to acknowledge. This book was written under the auspices of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War, and I would like to thank the Programme and the Leverhulme Trust for their very generous support. During the time I spent in Oxford, I benefited greatly from the encouragement, assistance, friendship, and advice of all the CCW Programme members. I am very grateful to all of them. In particular, I would like to thank Audrey Cronin, Adam Roberts, Henry Shue, Hew Strachan, and Sarah Percy. In addition, I would like to express my gratitude to members of the Department of Politics and International Relations at Oxford for their unwavering support. Over the years, I have learned a great deal from Andrew Hurrell, Neil MacFarlane, Yuen Foong Khong, Lois McNay, Kalypso Nikolaïdis, Anne Deighton, Avi Shlaim, and David Williams. I thank them all and look forward to more stimulating conversations with them in the future. In Oxford, I was very lucky to also have an affiliation with Somerville College. The college was a wonderful ‘home away from home’, and I would like to thank all its fellows for their very kind hospitality. Above all, I would like to thank Jennifer Welsh for her generous friendship and for her extraordinary professional and personal support. I also remain deeply grateful to my teacher and mentor, Peter Katzenstein, from whom I have learned so much about international relations, and whose work remains a constant source of inspiration. My engagement with the international security issues addressed in this book has also benefited greatly from conversations with Fiona Adamson, Emanuel Adler, Theo Farrell, Keith Krause, Janice Stein, and R. B. J. Walker, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank them all. More recently, I have benefited from the friendship and support of my colleagues at the Graduate School for Public and International Affairs, University of

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Acknowledgements

Ottawa. I am grateful to all of them, and most especially to Roland Paris. I thank him for his generous advice, encouragement and astute comments. I also owe a great debt of gratitude to Michael C. Williams, who read this manuscript in its entirety and offered a series of extremely helpful comments. In the course of my research, I was extremely fortunate to have the support of numerous NATO, EU, and OSCE officials, who played a very important role in helping me gain a deeper understanding of those organizations. As they prefer to remain anonymous, I am not able to acknowledge them individually—but I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all of them. Special thanks also go to the reviewers at Oxford University Press for their extremely valuable comments and to Dominic Byatt at Oxford University Press for his enthusiasm and wonderful support. On a more personal note, my heartfelt thanks go to my family for their love, constant encouragement, advice, and extraordinary patience in the long process of writing this book. I could not have researched and written this book without the generous support of so many individuals. Of course, the final product remains entirely my responsibility.

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1 Introduction—Thinking about Security in the Twenty-First Century

Once upon a time—or, for those more inclined to be prosaic, almost two decades ago—the Cold War ended and a ‘new world order’ of peace, international security, and freedom seemed to be upon us. According to many scholars and (particularly Western) practitioners of international politics, the peaceful resolution of the superpower confrontation was going to lead to a higher form of international relations, in which interactions organized around conflictual forms of the self/other dialectic could be replaced by the peaceful expansion of the Western security community, and, more broadly, by the international promotion of norms and values of human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. Today, at a time of renewed, complex conflicts in the Middle East, continued violence in a series of African countries, and a nearly worldwide set of activities conducted in the name of the fight against international terrorism, the promise of a new world order seems like a distant, impossible dream. It has become almost a cliché in many Euro-Atlantic political and academic circles to argue that the September 11 attacks in the USA and subsequent terrorist acts conducted by transnationally organized groups on European soil clearly demonstrate that we are now facing a new and highly dangerous security environment. In the twenty-first century, we are often told, the transatlantic security community that defines itself around liberal-democratic values is facing a particularly dangerous set of challenges, and must find ways to adapt to a situation in which unconventional, non-state enemies have the capacity and certainly the will to inflict upon its people, territory, and institutions the kind of destruction that was previously available only to powerful states. But, the question is, what has this meant in practice? In particular, what are the dynamics and implications of the security policies and practices aimed at addressing 1

Thinking about Security in the 21st Century

the (allegedly) new threat of international terrorism? This book examines the practices enacted by three key institutions of the transatlantic security community—the European Union, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—in the name of combating international terrorism, and analyses the ways in which those practices have both been affected by and have contributed to changes in the field of security. I argue that contemporary attempts to respond to the perceived threat of internationally organized (largely) Islamist terrorism reflect a particular ethos of risk-management and involve a combination of two different— an inclusive and an exclusionary—logics of security. The inclusive logic is instantiated in practices targeting those identified as vulnerable (but still socializable) subjects. Practices of inclusion are aimed at shaping such vulnerable actors into rational, self-disciplined selves and polities—that is, the kinds of actors seen as worthy of the full respect of, and inclusion into, the security community of liberal democracies. By contrast, activities governed by the logic of exclusion involve efforts at identifying and displacing beyond the boundaries of the Euro-Atlantic security community— or at least excluding from its normal socio-economic and political life— those seen as particularly dangerous enemies of civilization. They are identified as individuals and groups who, by virtue of their alleged refusal to evolve into rational, self-disciplined liberal actors, and their perceived commitment to the destruction of the values, people, and institutions of modern civilization, are seen as a key source of threat to European and international security in the twenty-first century. Not surprisingly, the terrorist attacks of September 11 and subsequent developments, particularly actions taken in the name of fighting international terrorism, have generated a wave of academic works aimed at explaining these developments, and, in some cases, providing policy prescriptions to the governments of the Western world. Several themes have been especially prominent in the books and articles published over the past few years. At the broadest level of the debate, a series of analysts have tackled a fundamental International Relations question: do developments such as the rise to prominence of actors like Al Qaeda mark a fundamental transformation in patterns of international conflict? While many insist that a fundamental change has indeed occurred in international security, other scholars claim that the conflicts that occurred in the first years of the twenty-first century constitute a reaffirmation of the eternal (largely realist) security concerns and state-based power politics.1 In the particular setting of the Euro-Atlantic world, a series of scholars have participated in debates over the question of whether recent 2


disagreements between the USA and different European states, especially in the context of the war in Iraq, have generated a permanent rift within the transatlantic security community (seen by students and practitioners of international politics as the community that exists among states in the Euro-Atlantic area that, on the basis of common liberal-democratic values and norms, share a sense of identity and regard war with one another as inconceivable).2 For example, in an influential article under the title of ‘Beyond the West: Terrors in Transatlantia’, Michael Cox has suggested that the transatlantic relationship is in deep crisis—a crisis that has its roots in developments that preceded the 9/11 attacks but that has acquired new dimensions due to the war in Iraq.3 According to Cox, the 9/11 attacks did not simply rally NATO allies around a common threat; rather, far more problematically for the alliance, the attacks have also brought to light new and deep cleavages over the question of how to address that common threat. For Cox, the Iraqi crisis dealt such a blow to the transatlantic alliance that ‘a Rubicon of sorts has been crossed’.4 In Cox’s words, ‘it is doubtful’ whether we can talk of a transatlantic security community ‘with the same degree of confidence’.5 While agreeing with Cox that the transatlantic relationship has been under considerable strain in recent years—and most particularly though not exclusively over Iraq—other scholars insist that it would be inaccurate to speak of the transatlantic security community as a defunct social fact. For example, in a persuasive reply to Cox’s article, Vincent Pouliot has argued that obituaries for the transatlantic community are premature. According to Pouliot, such assessments of the situation are informed by an inadequate understanding of the concept of security community. After all, as explained by Karl Deutsch, what characterizes a security community is not the absence of conflicts among its members, but, instead, their peaceful resolution.6 Conflicts and the exercise of power are normal occurrences in a security community. But, importantly, such conflicts and the constant exercise of power do not result in violence.7 Instead, conflicts are resolved by peaceful means, normally by institutionalized procedures, and power is exercised in non-violent ways. Thus, power in a security community is ‘primarily the institutional power to include and exclude, to legitimize and authorize’.8 From this perspective, it is possible to conclude, as Pouliot does in his reply to Cox, that the recent tension in the transatlantic relationship does not necessarily signal the demise of the security community. After all, while disagreements among members of that community are real and significant, the use of physical violence as a means to resolve those conflicts has never been contemplated.9 3


Thomas Risse, Vincent Pouliot, and other scholars who adopt this line of argument are correct to point out that, whatever their differences and disagreements may have been, members of the transatlantic security community have not contemplated the use of force as a way to resolve those disputes. It would thus seem premature to speak of the death of the security community. Besides, whatever one might think about their effectiveness and normative merits, we cannot ignore the fact that a significant number of activities and new institutional tools have been created precisely to strengthen the transatlantic security community. To a significant extent, such new activities—in areas ranging from public diplomacy to cooperation in the fields of defence and policing—were designed to enable the members of the security community to resolve or minimize the tensions that came to light over the war in Iraq, and to enhance their ability to address the most important dangers facing the members of the community in the twenty-first century. Under these circumstances, instead of participating in the debates about the prospects for survival of the transatlantic security community, it might be more useful to seek to gain a better understanding of the dynamics and implications of those specific practices conducted in response to (what is perceived as) a key threat to security. This book seeks to do precisely that, specifically by examining the practices that have been enacted by three key institutions of the security community in the name of combating a phenomenon that has come to be identified as a fundamental threat in the twenty-first century: internationally organized terrorism. In my analysis of practices conducted in the transatlantic community in response to the perceived threat of terrorism, I seek to go beyond the relatively narrow focus on the actions of a particular member of the community, and beyond the (by now familiar) arguments regarding the discrepancy between American and European approaches to combating international terrorism. Indeed, in my view, while disagreements between the USA and some of its European allies were real and significant, the picture of a simple dichotomy between the USA and the Europeans in the fight against terrorism—a picture often presented in comparative studies of Western approaches to contemporary international terrorism— overlooks important debates within Europe over this issue, and fails to pay attention to the fact that, for all its emphasis on militarized responses to the perceived threat of international terrorism, even the USA has expressed support for different kinds of non-military measures aimed at preventing societies from becoming breeding grounds for terrorists. Furthermore, Washington has participated in a broad range of NATO and 4


(to a lesser extent) OSCE activities aimed at combating terrorism, ranging from measures designed to enhance the security of travel documents to efforts of rehabilitating the Afghan society, in an effort to prevent it from becoming a breeding ground for terrorism. Contrary to some popular claims that everything has changed since 9/11—and, in equal measure, contrary to arguments that nothing fundamental has changed in the realm of international politics—I seek to understand various dynamics of change and continuity in the security practices enacted by the institutions of the transatlantic security community. For instance, it is particularly interesting to examine the ways in which, in response to 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks, new methods and technologies of law enforcement and defence have been grafted upon existing technologies, giving rise to complex practices that challenge prevailing IR categories for understanding security. This book seeks to place empirical observations within an analytical framework that can explain the interplay between the different logics of security instantiated in policies and practices adopted in the name of fighting international terrorism. I shall also reflect on ways in which some of the contemporary security practices contribute to a process of (re)constitution of the Euro-Atlantic security community. As we shall see, many of those practices involve attempts at deepening and expanding the Western ‘zone of peace’ by promoting the identification of people from a broad Euro-Atlantic region with a security community of liberaldemocratic values, beyond their particular national or sub-national identities. At the same time, new forms of exclusion of ‘dangerous others’ have emerged, involving a multitude of technologies and practices that target individuals and groups accused of types of behaviour that place them beyond redemption. I suggest below that some of those practices raise considerable normative challenges for the community that defines itself around the norms of liberal democracy. This is not to say that the book offers an exhaustive examination of all activities conducted by actors from the Euro-Atlantic area in the name of fighting international terrorism. It would be impossible to do that within the space of just one book. In a similar vein, I do not claim to offer a detailed study of each and every action taken by the EU, NATO, and the OSCE in the name of fighting international terrorism. Rather, my aim is to explore emerging patterns of security practices enacted by those institutions, to shed light on the images of threat and self/other relations that underpin such practices, and to examine their dynamics and implications. In particular, I am interested in examining the ways in 5


which practices conducted by Euro-Atlantic security institutions in the name of fighting international terrorism contribute to the creation of particular forms of inclusions and exclusions in the twenty-first century. Why focus on the EU, NATO, and the OSCE? The 9/11 attacks were marked by affirmations of solidarity within the transatlantic security community; such affirmations were accompanied by statements professing the commitment of its member states to use their international institutions in a multidimensional fight against international terrorism. In hindsight, of course, we know that the plot did not unfold as predicted in the days and months that followed 9/11, and that many disagreements, even crises, have since emerged within the institutions of the security community. Nevertheless, in parallel to those disagreements and crises, states in the liberal-democratic security community have continued to affirm the importance of preserving and expanding their zone of peace based on shared values. They have also stressed the importance of transcending their differences, enhancing their cooperation, and strengthening their institutions in order to respond effectively to changes in the field of security, and particularly to the growing prominence of internationally organized Islamic terrorism. Many of the recent initiatives aimed at enhancing the ability of the transatlantic community to fight international terrorism have occurred within the framework of the EU, NATO, and the OSCE, as key security institutions in the Euro-Atlantic world. For their part, all three institutions have identified the fight against international terrorism as an undisputed priority on their agendas in the twenty-first century. The activities carried out by the EU, NATO, and the OSCE in the name of combating international terrorism have had a significant impact on the field of international security—ranging from the development of new combinations of war-fighting and reconstruction, as in the case of NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, to the transformation of relationships between policing/defence functions. They have also contributed to broader changes in the political life of the security community, for instance, by participating in the process of blurring the boundaries between the public/private spheres, and (re)constituting categories of protector and protected by assigning new responsibilities of security provision to ordinary citizens and private corporations in the Euro-Atlantic area. Through their practices, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE have also raised new and difficult questions about the acceptable limits of exceptional treatments targeting individuals and groups deemed as enemies of the security community based on liberal-democratic values. 6


Practices enacted by NATO, the EU, and the OSCE are embedded in— and further extend—norms, rules, and legal and institutional arrangements that transcend particular member states. However, one cannot escape the fact that the capacity of institutions like NATO, the OSCE, and even the EU10 to act as effective players in the field of security has been affected by the nature and degree of cooperation among their member states. In the context of the fight against international terrorism, contrary to the gloomy predictions of some pundits, these three institutions have continued to act as forums in which many Euro-Atlantic security policies have been formulated and implemented. Through their norms, rules, and institutional procedures, they have continued to facilitate cooperation among their members, and to help resolve or minimize some of their most important disagreements. A case in point is the 2003 NATO crisis over Iraq, where the allies were able to overcome the paralysis caused by the French, Belgian, and German opposition to the provision of support requested by Turkey by taking the issue to the Defence Planning Committee, instead of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the alliance’s highest political body. Thus, in February 2003 the Defence Planning Committee authorized the deployment of NATO Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACs), and missile, chemical, and biological defences to Turkey. This seems to confirm Pouliot’s argument that, for all its problems and tensions, the security community is still ‘alive and well’.11 Even at the height of that crisis, NATO allies continued to consult and cooperate within the framework of allied missions (e.g. in the Balkans and, via Operation Active Endeavour, in the Mediterranean), and, as we shall see, have since used NATO’s mechanisms and rules in an effort to heal (or at least minimize) the rift. At the same time, however, in several instances each of these institutions—albeit in different ways—has been affected by disagreements among member states. Those disagreements tend to reflect different, often conflicting, interpretations of the correct application of (and limits to) the shared liberal norms in the face of new, unconventional kinds of enemies. The activities of institutions like the OSCE and NATO remind us that, as Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore have explained, international organizations are important international actors that, on the basis of the authority vested in them, perform functions that cannot be reduced to the agendas and activities of their member states. International organizations ‘enjoy . . . rational-legal authority but also draw authority from other sources, notably from their moral standing, their expertise and their delegated tasks. With this authority they are able to use discursive and 7


institutional resources in order to get other actors to defer to them’.12 Thus, international organizations enjoy authority because states have put them in charge of certain tasks (delegated authority), are created to embody and protect some widely shared values and principles (moral authority), and embody specialized knowledge necessary to perform those tasks (expert authority). However, as Barnett and Finnemore point out, authority is not a fixed attribute of international organizations; rather, it is constructed—and needs to be reproduced—within particular social relations. To the extent that international organizations appear not to be serving their delegators, or to deviate from the pursuit of the common principles embodied in them (e.g. by appearing to serve the interests of a particular subset of strong states, at the expense of common principles such as respect for sovereignty or democracy), they stand to lose their authority, and with it their ability to act as key players in a given domain of international relations. In our case, we shall see that the OSCE, NATO, and even the EU are facing some serious challenges, in particular to their moral authority. In many cases, those challenges are related to criticisms that one or more of those institutions have failed to adequately protect the values and principles on which they are based. In turn, those challenges threaten to diminish their ability to fulfil their mandates, including in the area of anti-terrorism. In essence, a study of the practices enacted by NATO, the EU, and the OSCE enables us to examine some of the key dynamics as well as the limits of this collective effort to respond to the challenge of international terrorism, and to do so in a manner that strengthens and expands the liberal-democratic security community. Thus, in the empirical chapters we shall examine not only the nature but also limits of cooperation among the members of these institutions, the collective effort to adapt to a changing security environment, and, at the same time, the disagreements that have emerged within the EU, NATO, and the OSCE over the issue of the relative balance between—and the proper application of—the inclusive and exclusionary security practices. In a broader perspective, this study builds on critical International Relations accounts of institutions as not just sites for the coordination of interest or the reduction of transaction costs, as rationalist theories tend to argue, but also sites for the production of identity and for the exercise of cultural and symbolic power.13 As we shall see, in and through the activities conducted in an attempt to address what they all identify as a key threat of the twenty-first century—international terrorism—these

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institutions are implicated in attempts to (re)produce the transatlantic security community. In examining the practices enacted by the EU, NATO, and the OSCE, the book relies on qualitative methods of analysis, and uses a strategy of empirical triangulation. The main idea behind triangulation is to balance various evidentiary sources obtained through a combination of methods in an effort to obtain a systematic corroboration of the arguments. The particular combination I use in this study involves data obtained from an analysis of primary texts (e.g. strategic documents and action plans formulated by the EU, NATO, and the OSCE, as well as the texts of relevant treaties and related legal instruments), secondary sources, and in-depth interviews with officials from each of these institutions. In the first instance, my aim is to shed light on the intersubjective understandings that prevail within these institutions with respect to the nature and intensity of danger posed by internationally organized terrorism. Through a close reading of primary sources, I show that one of the common features of documents and statements on contemporary threats to the transatlantic community is a discursive construction of internationally organized terrorist groups—particularly those influenced by an extremist reading of Islam—as a category of especially dangerous, immoral enemies. These actors, often characterized as ‘barbarian’, ‘premodern’, and ‘uncivilized’, are cast in direct opposition—and represented as a source of constant, infinite danger—to the values, institutions, and people of the liberal-democratic security community, depicted in NATO, EU, and OSCE discourses as ‘modern’, ‘civilized’, highly ‘ethical’. Building on that analysis of representations of the security situation articulated by the three institutions, I use a combination of primary and secondary texts coupled with interviews to explore the prevailing shared ideas concerning appropriate measures for dealing with the new, unconventional enemies. I show that representations of an ethical dichotomy between friends and enemies of civilization, and images of participants in or supporters of terrorism as barbarian, immoral, and pre-modern, have been systematically mobilized by all three institutions to justify particular sets of exceptional measures of risk-management. I include an analysis of relevant legal instruments in an effort to gain a better understanding of the nature of mechanisms aimed at controlling and excluding the unconventional but highly dangerous enemies (terrorists). Through a close reading of actual security practices conducted by the EU, NATO, and the OSCE, I also hope to shed light on the particular logics

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of security that underpin measures designed to combat internationally organized terrorism. To obtain data about those practices, I rely on reports of activity issued by the three institutions themselves, secondary sources (e.g. academic analyses as well as reports issued by well-known NGOs or think tanks), as well as interviews with participants in those activities. Drawing on all those sources of information, I explore the emergence of new techniques of surveillance and monitoring technologies targeting allegedly dangerous groups and individuals, the emergence of new practices of policing and border protection, involving a partial fusion of inside/outside security apparatuses, as well as efforts to develop new military capabilities and new rules of interaction between military and civilian agencies engaged in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction operations. On the basis of that analysis, I then examine some of the normative dilemmas and challenges generated by the fight against terrorism in a community that defines itself around liberal-democratic values.

The Western Security Community and the Post–Cold War Dream of a New Era of Peace and Stability Following Emanuel Adler, I suggest that, since the end of the Cold War, through systematic practices aimed at diffusing liberal-democratic values and norms, and constructing self-restraint subjectivities, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE have been involved in efforts to spread the Western-based security community, and in so doing to enhance regional and international stability.14 Adler refers to security communities as one type of communities of practice; as he put it, a community of practice is a ‘configuration of a domain of knowledge that constitutes like-mindedness, a community of people that “creates the social fabric of learning”, and a shared practice that embodies the “knowledge the community develops, shares and maintains”’. ‘Shared practices’, he notes, ‘are sustained by a repertoire of communal resources, including routines, sensibilities and discourse.’15 Adler’s argument is that the successful expansion of a security community from a core of Western states to Central and East European countries during the 1990s, and the subsequent (less successful) attempts to broaden the community even further, were facilitated by a cooperative security community of practice, which, growing from the Helsinki Process, endowed European institutions, in particular the EU and NATO, with the practices necessary for the spread of social structures.16 Thus, 10


following the end of the Cold War, the practice of cooperative security, inaugurated by the OSCE’s predecessor, the CSCE, through the Helsinki Process, replaced the discourse and practice of confrontation and powerbalancing in the Euro-Atlantic area, and increasingly became part of the mandate and activities of all European security institutions. To put this in a broader perspective, the new practices carried out by the institutions of the Western security community occurred in the context of the reconfiguration of the field of security, which led decisionmakers in the Euro-Atlantic area to understand the diffusion of knowledge and dispositions of self-restraint as the key to long-term regional and international stability. As Michael Williams has persuasively argued, following the end of the Cold War, that reconfiguration of the field of security involved a partial devalorization of military factors, and a new emphasis on culture as a source of security.17 The concept of field is used in a Bourdieuan sense, as analogous to a game in that it is a socially constructed, historically specific domain of activity that is governed by a specific set of rules.18 The social space of a field is in important ways shaped by the distribution of capital among its players. Capital consists of the resources that actors can mobilize in order to act successfully in a given field, and in particular to exercise symbolic power. Thus, according to Bourdieu, fields are loci of symbolic power: ‘the power to constitute the given by stating it, to act upon the world by acting upon the representation of the world.’19 Each field is characterized and shaped by particular forms of capital: a field, in short, is a structured space of positions, in which the positions and their interrelations are determined by the distribution of different kinds of resources or ‘capital’. It might be tempting to think that the notion of capital refers exclusively to economic resources. But, in Bourdieu’s view, the concept needs to be understood in a broader sense, involving different forms of capital endowed with various degrees of value. As Thompson has pointed out, ‘there are many different forms of capital: not only “economic capital” in the strict sense (i.e. material wealth in the form of money, stocks and shares) but also “cultural capital” (i.e. knowledge, skill, and other cultural acquisitions, as exemplified by educational or technical qualifications), “symbolic capital” (i.e. accumulated prestige or honour), and so on’.20 The field of international security is the domain where authoritative definitions of the culture of security—that is, a common system of intersubjective, socially constructed meanings about ‘what frightens’ in international politics, or the ‘face of the enemy’—are shared by a given 11


community of agents.21 In the field of security, only a limited number of actors have the necessary authority to participate in the social construction of threats and enemies. As explained by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, international security ‘is thus very much a structured field in which some actors are placed in positions of power by virtue of being generally accepted voices of security, by having the power to define security’.22 In the post–Cold War environment, Western states (represented by their security elites, particularly top officials and diplomats), and securityrelated international organizations based on Western norms, played a particularly prominent role in the field of international security. As such, they were able to speak authoritatively about international threats, and they did so in a way that departed from conventional wisdom about inimical states and geo-strategic rivalries. In the field of security, the collapse of communism led to the rise to prominence of a Kantian-inspired democratic peace set of ideas, practices, and institutional arrangements, and the privileging of non-military forms of capital seen as necessary for the enactment of those practices. Thus, the end of the Cold War was widely interpreted as marking the triumph of liberalism over communism—that is, the triumph of allegedly universally valid liberal-democratic norms and values over the anti-values of the communist world—and the start of a process of creating, in President Bush Sr.’s words, a ‘new world order’ of democratic peace.23 The period of 1990–1 was a time when several scenarios were being discussed in the West regarding the role of different security institutions in Europe. But debates regarding the relative value of those scenarios occurred against the framework of common understandings regarding the dramatic decline in the danger of military confrontation between the West and inimical state(s). While conventional threats seemed to be declining, there was a growing concern about the increase in the probability of a different, multifaceted, and hard-to-contain type of risk. In the European context, security was becoming indivisible. The spotlight was beginning to be on extant or potential domestic problems, associated particularly with the former communist countries. It was argued that domestic instability generated by problems of transition towards post-communist institutions threatened to be one of the key—if not the key—sources of instability in Europe.24 In a situation in which there was no clearly identified enemy state, but in which developments within the transient and (potentially) unstable former communist countries threatened to undermine international security, the consensus emerged that the promotion of ‘good’, 12


liberal-democratic norms and institutions within those states would be vital for security promotion in the new era. The Western discourse on international security articulated in the early 1990s depicted the triumph of liberal democracy (particularly against ‘flawed’, ‘dangerous’ pro-communist projects) as the source of progress, freedom, and stability in and among Euro-Atlantic states. By extension, it presented the projection of the same values in the former Eastern bloc as a solution to the problems of ex-communist states, and, at the same time, a key to broader European security. The new emphasis on ‘good’ norms and institutions as a source of international stability was accompanied by a privileging of cultural and symbolic forms of capital, and a relative decline in the value of traditional military capital in the field of security. In other words, those actors that were recognized to possess knowledge/expertise regarding the (re)production of those ‘good’ (liberal-democratic) norms, and the authority to decide who does and who does not deserve inclusion in the liberal security community, acquired significant power in the reconfigured field of security. As Michael Williams has argued, ‘By defining security in terms of forms of culture, itself a generative product of the habitus prevailing in Western security institutions, the field of security was transformed into one where cultural and symbolic forms of capital became vital—and one in which these forms of capital were dominantly possessed by Western states, societies, and security organizations.’25 The reconfiguration of the field of security was accompanied by the rise to prominence of a particular practice of othering, or a particular structure of self/other relations, which can be summarized as one of conditional inclusion of others into the institutions of the self.26 That involved a departure from practices of othering that revolve around rigid self/other oppositions and assume, ab initio, that the dangerous other (the enemy) has to be physically separated from, deterred, and/or, if necessary, defeated by the self via the application of military force. Rather, conditional inclusion revolves around the idea that all others— including, in that case, former communist enemies—could and should aspire towards a liberal-democratic identity. And, to the extent that states do evolve into stable liberal democracies, they become reliable friends, worthy of inclusion into the structures of the liberal-democratic security community. In the 1990s, all former communist countries were seen as, in principle, capable of achieving the liberal-democratic identity, thereby qualifying for inclusion in the Western security community. That view, however, was coupled with the argument that, in practice, not all were yet ready for full inclusion into the superior community of liberal democracy. 13


Under those circumstances, the processes of deciding what changes were necessary for various transitional polities to become eligible for inclusion into the structures of the Western security community, guiding their transformation and assessing the degree to which the required reforms had been successfully achieved, rested in the hands of the West. Casting themselves as members of a security community that, by embracing liberal-democratic principles, had managed to transcend a past marked by violent conflicts, Western states and their organizations were insisting that they had the necessary expertise—and the duty—to help the less advanced former communist states evolve into similarly rational and peaceful polities. The emerging Western consensus around the importance of pursuing international security through the construction of a particular type of institution within potentially problematic states of Central/Eastern Europe found expression in the key documents, conventions, and charters of European reconstruction signed in the early 1990s. Powerful expressions of the post–Cold War Western consensus around that view of security can be found not only in declarations issued by individual Western leaders at the time but also in collective statements embedded in the basic documents of all the important European institutional forums, from the Council of Europe to the European Community/Union, the Conference/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as NATO. As Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell argued, the early 1990s witnessed the process of collective writing of Europe’s ‘new Constitution’, which established democratic pluralism, human rights, and the rule of law as the key pillars of legitimate domestic governance.27 With the series of treaties, conventions, and other agreements signed in the early 1990s, the establishment or maintenance of a political system that did not respect these principles was delegitimized as incompatible with the normative foundation of the new Europe.28 Against the background of intersubjective understandings regarding the cultural foundation of security, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE—as recognized expert institutions that embodied the accumulated material, cultural, and symbolic capital of the security community—initiated a series of practices of socialization aimed at expanding the Western security community into the former Eastern bloc. In other words, in the 1990s, the EU, NATO, and the OSCE assumed important roles in promoting the norms of liberal democracy—and the disposition of self-restraint underpinning liberalism—in potentially vulnerable ex-communist polities. In particular, 14


they launched a series of programmes aimed at diffusing to partner states background knowledge, expectations, and dispositions of self-restraint— which underpin cooperative security, and, in a broader perspective, are at the heart of disciplined subjectivities on which liberal constitutionalism is based.29 Or, to put it differently, they initiated a series of programmes aimed at projecting in countries emerging from communism a new kind of habitus based on liberal self-restraint, which was seen as a key ingredient in the democratic (re)construction of those polities and the expansion of the transatlantic security community. Simultaneously, the EU, NATO, and the OSCE took a series of steps designed to guide transitional polities in the construction of institutional arrangements that embodied that particular habitus. As Bourdieu argued, habitus plays a fundamental role in the reproduction of a given field. Bourdieu defined habitus as ‘a system of durable and transposable dispositions which, integrating all past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions, and makes it possible to accomplish infinitely differentiated tasks, thanks to the analogical transfer of schemata’.30 In essence, as John Thompson has explained, the habitus represents a set of dispositions that ‘generate practices, perceptions and attitudes which are regular without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any rule’.31 The dispositions that are at the heart of a given habitus are acquired via a process of ‘inculcation’ through a multitude of processes of training and learning. While habitus does not determine action in a mechanical way, it does shape the way in which participants in a given field perceive and act in the world. Michael C. Williams’ analysis of the nature and role of habitus is particularly helpful: ‘The habitus is thus both individual and collective, applying to all those who share similar positions in terms of their acquisition of a particular habit and occupation of a similar position within the social field. At one level, it can be spoken of in terms of the acquisition of particular conceptual frameworks or worldviews. But the concept is broader than simply epistemic. The habitus is the entire ensemble of relations to the world, from bodily orientations (ways of standing, speaking, etc.) which Bourdieu terms bodily hexis, to the acquisition of a disparate but cohesive set of ethical precepts, behavioral dispositions, etc.’32

In the long term, habitus contributes to the reproduction of a specific social order through processes of self-censorship and self-limitation on the part of individuals. Thus, the system of meanings and dispositions associated with a particular habitus becomes part of the taken for granted ‘rules 15


of the game’ (or doxa) by which everyone else in a given social context acts. A group habitus has the effect of producing among those who share it a ‘common-sense world, whose immediate self-evidence is accompanied by the objectivity provided by consensus on the meaning of practices and the world’.33 In the context of liberal-democratic societies, habitus is especially important for maintaining and reproducing social order, for the norms of democracy and extensive individual freedoms require the formation of self-disciplined individuals, able and willing to exercise those freedoms in a ‘responsible’ way, which does not undermine the key institutions of their society. As Mitchell Dean has explained, ‘liberalism is as much concerned with the appropriate normalizing practices to shape the exercise of the citizens’ political freedom as it is with guaranteeing their rights and liberties’.34 In our case, there is significant evidence that Euro-Atlantic security institutions enacted a multitude of practices aimed at promoting in former communist countries new conceptual and practical dispositions intended to help turn them into good, reliable members of the liberaldemocratic security community.35

From the Promise of the New World Order to the Task of Risk-Management Over the past few years, however, the dream of a new world order began to give way to a far more pessimistic set of assessments about the state of the world. In particular, following the terrorist attacks in the USA, and later in Madrid and London, and in the context of the US-led ‘war on terror’, the prevailing discourses on security in the Euro-Atlantic area depict a new kind of existential threat, international Islamic terrorism, that allegedly endangers not only the people and territory of the Western security community but also, more fundamentally, the key values of civilization. What is more, the new type of threat is seen to originate within as well as outside the Western security community. Gone are the early post–Cold War days when the Euro-Atlantic security community was seen as a haven of democratic peace, stability, and prosperity, and all security challenges were associated with the outside realm. As we shall see, in today’s fluid security environment, there is a new sense that enemies operate both within and outside the borders of the Western security community. The sense of a new and major threat has been expressed most forcefully in American decision-making circles, but it is worth pointing 16


out that the USA is far from being alone in identifying international (religious-inspired) terrorism as a key threat to security in the twentyfirst century. The new concern with internationally organized terrorism is reflected in the documents and statements issued by many other member states of the security community, and, especially importantly for us, in the documents issued by NATO, the EU, and the OSCE. As we shall see in the following chapters, while disagreements persist within NATO, the OSCE, and even within the EU as regards the best way to prevent and combat terrorism, those disagreements occur against the background of a shared understanding that international terrorist groups/networks and the states that condone them are the new enemies of the West, indeed, of the world. For example, in the first strategic document of the EU, the 2003 European Security Strategy, international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are identified as strategic threats to European security in the twenty-first century. According to the ESS, ‘The most recent wave of terrorism . . . is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernization, cultural, social and political crisis, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also part of our society’ (ESS, p. 3). In a similar vein, over the past few years, NATO has repeatedly portrayed international terrorism as a key threat to the allied security. For instance, the North Atlantic Council stated at its June 2003 meeting in Madrid its commitment to the fight against international terrorism. It is worth quoting the Council’s statement at length, for it represents a clear expression of NATO’s new approach to international security: Terrorism continues to pose a grave threat to Alliance populations, forces and territory, as well as to international peace and security. It also poses a threat to the development and functioning of democratic institutions, the territorial integrity of states, and to peaceful relations between them. . . . To fight terrorism effectively, our response must be multi-faceted and comprehensive. (Paragraph 11)36

For its part, in December 2001 the OSCE adopted a Resolution on Combating Terrorism, and an Action Plan to Combat Terrorism. As stated in that Action Plan, The 55 participating states of the OSCE stand united against terrorism, a scourge of our times. The barbaric acts of terrorism that were committed against the US on 11 September 2001 represented an attack on the whole of the international community. . . . These heinous deeds, as well as other terrorist acts in all forms and manifestations, committed no matter when, where or by whom, are a threat to international and regional peace, security and stability. There must be no safe

17

Thinking about Security in the 21st Century haven for those perpetrating, financing, harbouring or otherwise supporting those responsible for such criminal acts.37

Not only do contemporary NATO, EU, and OSCE discourses portray an unconventional threat—international terrorism—as one of the major security challenges for the transatlantic security community, but they also portray the fight against this new threat as a difficult, multi-faceted struggle, with no end in sight. Vis-à-vis the new kinds of dangers posed by internationally organized terrorist groups, the OSCE, NATO, and the EU have been united in arguing that novel solutions and innovative methods of pursuing security need to be adopted. To understand those solutions, and the assumptions on which they rely, it is helpful to use the concept of risk-management developed by sociologists and criminologists and recently applied to international politics by a series of critical IR scholars. In essence, in the face of a highly elusive and mobile enemy that combines ‘modern technology and radicalism’, and, instead of being confined to a spatially distant realm is ‘also part of our [liberal-democratic] society’, there has been a tendency to move away from a conceptualization of security as a stable positive outcome (the ‘new world order’ enunciated by President Bush Senior), and towards a more pessimistic view of security as a constant process of risk-management.38 The concept of risk-management is at the heart of a series of works by prominent sociologists and anthropologists concerned with a general sense of insecurity that, they argue, prevails in our ‘late modern’ era.39 In their view, the current international concern with risk is largely a product of globalization, and a related sense of vulnerability in being part of a world system in which old protections (usually provided by nationstates) are increasingly becoming obsolete. According to sociologists like Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, an unprecedented anxiety about risks is common to what they call ‘second modernity’ or ‘late modernity’—that is, a period when humanity is more sober about progress and about the future. Thus, while many accept that things may still progress, they also recognize that there is a price to be paid—for instance, in terms of global, often unanticipated consequences of our actions. As Ernest Gellner, among others, has explained, risk emerged as central to our mode of thinking and acting once we entered a global society; globalization has undermined our self-contained national or local communities, bringing us together into a larger world that offers none of the old protections. Global risks cannot be delimited spatially (think, for instance, of Chernobyl or the threat of a nuclear attack), just as they 18


cannot be delimited in time, for actions taken today can have unforeseen consequences affecting future generations.40 Risk society, argued Ulrich Beck in 1996, ‘is not an option which could be chosen or rejected in the course of political debate’.41 Instead, it represents an inescapable structural condition of advanced industrialization where the produced hazards of that system ‘undermine and/or cancel the established safety systems of the provident state’s existing risk calculation’.42 Beck invokes contemporary hazards associated with nuclear power, chemical pollution, and genetic engineering when he argues that these cannot be limited in time and space, cannot be grasped through rules of causality, and cannot be safeguarded, compensated, or insured against. For our purposes, it is particularly interesting to note the claim advanced by risk theorists that terrorism represents yet another manifestation of the ‘world risk society’.43 From Beck’s perspective, September 11 demonstrated that we now live in a world risk society, a society in which we have to face unpredictable dangers that defy the traditional approach to the management of risk: that is, insurance. Terrorism, it is argued, is a risk that goes ‘beyond the realm of rational calculation into the realm of unpredictable turbulence’.44 According to Beck, the concept of risk assumes decisions that seek to make the unforeseeable consequences of civilizational decisions foreseeable and controllable.45 On this logic, the problem for late modern societies is that the very activities that make it function (e.g. global economic and social flows) also present a risk to that society and its inhabitants. Under these circumstances, events that have not yet occurred become the object of current action. Thus, ‘the object of politics is not the present, because the present structures are not going to last. In times of change, one must act on the basis of a vision of the future, a scenario of where our present processes will lead us and our environment’.46 Political life in a risk society is marked by the ‘presence of the future’, as risk transcends temporal reality. Accordingly, the process of risk-management is focused on possible events in the future; thus, events which may—or may not—happen at some point in the future motivate actions today. In the contemporary world, risks, as side effects of modernization, are seen and addressed in ways that differ significantly from the approach to risk that prevailed in an earlier stage of modernization. Thus, in the industrial society, decision-makers were focusing their attention on the production and distribution of wealth; risks, seen as unintended-yet-tameable side effects of industrialization, were mitigated through insurance schemes formulated and implemented on the basis of scientific expertise and 19


predictions. By contrast, in the global risk society that, according to Beck, is upon us, the main role of decision-makers has shifted towards the prevention of negative events. The notion involved here is that there is a growing awareness in the global risk society that risks such as pollution and the damage to the ozone layer are so important—with potentially catastrophic, irreversible effects upon the lives of humans, plants, and animals—that they cannot be regarded as the tameable side effects of modernization.47 That is, these risks are so grave that they cannot be mitigated or compensated for through conventional (insurance) schemes. At the same time, risks in contemporary society are very hard to predict, not least because many of them are not recurring events. Under these circumstances, in Beck’s words, in risk society ‘Believed risks are the whip used to keep the present day moving along at a gallop.’48 The irony, however, is that making decisions in the present to take a particular course of action in the name of managing a risk creates new risks; in the process of pre-empting the unfolding of a virtual scenario, decision-makers in a risk society can create a very real quagmire. This is what Beck called the ‘boomerang effect’: the effects of the decision taken at present in the name of acting on a future risk may come back to haunt their authors, as the attempt to recapture certainty—that fundamental goal of modernity— gives rise to a spiral of uncertainty. Thus, ‘[T]he more we attempt to “colonize” the future, with the aid of the category of risk, the more it slips out of our control.’49 The essence of risk is not that an event is happening, but that might be happening. Risks are, in other words, manufactured, not only through the application of technologies but also in the process of making sense of that potential harm, danger, or threat. The immateriality and invisibility of threats that suffuse risk society mean that all knowledge about it is mediated and as such dependent of interpretation.50 In risk society, no one possesses the information that might enable them to provide a fully accurate picture of the nature of threats; therefore, the politics of riskdefinition becomes extremely important. They highlight the contested nature of who is defining the nature of a risk, and how. As various experts compete with one another in an attempt to offer authoritative interpretations of the situation that might arise, risks have become a considerable force of political mobilization.51 Thus, to the extent that a particular definition of risk becomes accepted as authoritative in a given social group/community, its proponents acquire significant power to prescribe the kinds of measures needed in order to prevent a particular event from happening. In other words, processes of securitizing 20


issues become even more important (and, arguably, more intensely contested) in a situation in which actors engaged in securitization do not even have to demonstrate that a certain actor/trend/process represents a clear and present danger, but only that it might, one day, give rise to a significant threat to security. As we shall see, such processes of securitization in a world of uncertainties are important to each of the Euro-Atlantic security institutions examined in the book, as they seek to provide diagnostics of probable security scenarios, and to cast themselves as relevant—if not the most relevant—institutions in terms of possessing the necessary expertise in the context of the fight against international terrorism. In the field of international security, consistent with the ethos of riskmanagement and in contrast to the promise of a peaceful new world order that was so popular in the early years of the post–Cold War period, recent developments have inspired highly cautious statements about the future. Those developments include the rise to prominence of international terrorism and organized crime, the perceived danger that some of these actors might acquire WMDs, the apparently intractable instability in the Middle East and parts of Africa, and the ability of non-state actors to take advantage of the logic of globalization and, directly or indirectly, challenge the established rules of international society. In the twentyfirst century, there is little talk about definitive solutions to security challenges and a stable, peaceful new world order. Instead, the emphasis is on security as a process of risk-management, in a situation in which, as Jef Huysmans has argued, ‘uncertainty is the primary threat’ in today’s world.52 The main approach to security issues is now preventive defence against a multitude of dangers, most of which are ill-defined and abstract. Instead of a clearly defined, negative other (the enemy), the institutions of the transatlantic security community, it would seem, must now take preventive action on a global scale, targeting actors—be they states or non-state actors—that are perceived as a source of actual or potential risk to European and international security. Not surprisingly, a series of IR scholars have already argued that numerous aspects of the present fight against international terrorism can be understood as instantiations of the ethos of risk-management.53 In the case of institutions analysed here, the actions taken by the EU, the OSCE, and NATO in an attempt to adapt to the new security environment and respond to new security challenges reflect, in interesting ways, the ethos of risk-management. This involves a new focus on confronting an ill-defined, diffuse threat, the perceived need to fight non-conventional 21


enemies, which organize themselves in elusive networks that can operate across state boundaries, taking advantage of processes associated with globalization. In the fight against international terrorism, the focus is on precautionary action, with no clear prospect of closure. While it is very helpful to draw on the work of Beck in order to make sense of contemporary developments in the field of security, I suggest that in applying the concept of risk-management we need to take distance from certain aspects of his influential treatment. In particular, he tends to portray a uniform picture of risk and risk-management, and fails to see that risks and risk-management processes do not have the same features in all spheres of life (e.g. the environment, energy, security, medicine).54 In contrast to that uniform view of risk society, we need to explore the particular, highly political dynamics of social construction of particular problems as certain kinds of risks in different fields of society. We also need to pay attention to the ways in which particular representations of risk that result from those processes of social construction justify the employment of particular methods and technologies to manage those risks. In our case, as we shall see, in the discourses of NATO, the EU, and the OSCE there has been a systematic portrayal of contemporary, Islamic-inspired terrorism as an extraordinary kind of risk (given the extreme uncertainty regarding potential perpetrators, coupled with the danger of catastrophic damage, should terrorists acquire weapons of mass destruction).55 This representation has been mobilized to legitimize the development of technologies and extensive methods of control of large numbers of ‘risky’ individuals and groups. It is reasonable to argue that in the absence of successful representations of international terrorism as an extreme form of risk, some of those measures—particularly those that involve significant limits to or partial suspensions of liberal norms— would have been very difficult to justify. There is another aspect of Beck’s treatment of risk-management that needs to be transcended if we are to fruitfully apply the concept of risk to the study of contemporary practices of NATO, the EU, and the OSCE. According to Beck, the late modern world in which we live is a society of risks that cannot really be known or predicted—and is also marked by a recognition of that condition of uncertainty. That view, however, underestimates the insatiable thirst for knowledge—and the power exercised by those who claim to provide even limited knowledge—in the management of extreme risks.56 In the cases of NATO, the EU, and to a lesser extent the OSCE, there has been an interesting mix of statements that acknowledge the need to accept a significant degree of uncertainty and 22


unpredictability, and an endless quest for knowledge about risky subjects and risky situations—again, justified in terms of the need to do whatever it takes to minimize the risk of potentially catastrophic terrorist attacks. This has translated into an unprecedented mobilization of a plurality of (public and private) actors in an attempt to gain and implement such knowledge, and, as a corollary to that, the partial redefinition of key categories in the field of security, most notably the nature and relationships between protector and protected. I suggest that practices of risk-management carried out by NATO, the EU, and the OSCE in the name of combating international terrorism have taken the concept of preventing harm far beyond its conventional understanding of acting to minimize the risk of particular accidents/incidents. Indeed, risk-management has come to represent an extremely complex, ambitious project: to turn as many individuals and communities as possible into the kinds of responsible (liberal, self-disciplined) actors that are unlikely to be a source of threat to international security—that is, unlikely to engage in or support international terrorism. Over the past few years, there has been a reassertion of the (Kantian) project of building self-disciplined selves and polities, the project that became so powerful in Euro-Atlantic political circles following the end of the Cold War. In the new context, practices of building responsible subjectivity that were so influential in the 1990s (in particular practices of expansion of the Western security community through the socialization of former communist subjects into the norms of liberalism) were not only built upon but also combined with newer methods and technologies (e.g. practices intended to ‘deepen’ the security community by enhancing the commitment to the norms and values of liberal democracy of vulnerable individuals and groups that reside within the community). This approach has been accompanied by a more exclusionary set of practices, aimed at identifying, containing, and, ideally, displacing beyond the space of normal politics of liberal-democratic polities those who are deemed ‘beyond salvation’, that is, those who allegedly refuse to evolve into such rational, selfdisciplined subjectivities. All those practices cross established boundaries between the public/private sphere, military/policing, high/low politics and create an assemblage of methods and technologies for the monitoring and guidance of a multitude of subjects—all in the name of reducing (though not eliminating) the risks posed by a new type of enemies of civilization. In their strategic documents and policy statements, as well as in the actual practices enacted over the past few years, NATO, the EU, and 23


the OSCE have continued to stress the importance of spreading the liberal-democratic norms of the Euro-Atlantic security community to potentially vulnerable groups and polities. In other words, albeit in different ways and to different degrees, they have continued to act as security community-building institutions, seeking, through a variety of practices and forums, to disseminate a habitus emphasizing liberal selfrestraint. However, in the post–9/11 environment, the diffusion of liberal concepts and practical dispositions has been accompanied by a new preoccupation with the need to formulate and implement exceptional security measures in response to the perceived threat posed by a particular category of illiberal enemies. This preoccupation has been reflected in practices aimed at producing and diffusing—within and beyond the borders of the security community—novel knowledge about and practical dispositions for identifying and excluding from liberal relations of community those individuals and groups seen as involved in international terrorism. In the transatlantic security community, those actors are widely regarded as particularly dangerous due to their tendency to combine an illiberal, pre-modern (religious) ethos with late modern technology capable of inflicting massive destruction upon democratic societies. There are, to be sure, significant differences between the ideas and practical dispositions advocated by each of these institutions; nevertheless, those differences occur against the background of a common insistence on the need to promote new conceptual and practical dispositions that challenge conventional boundaries in the field of security, such as the boundaries between the public/private spheres and those between defence/policing, and to recognize new duties of good citizenship in promoting domestic and international security. Consequently, a series of initiatives have been launched by the EU, NATO, and the OSCE aimed, for instance, at promoting new types of cooperation between public and private actors, redrawing the boundary between defence and lawenforcement mechanisms and procedures, and enhancing the involvement of citizens and other private actors in public efforts to identify, contain, and defeat international terrorism. Through such practices, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE have contributed to processes of (re)shaping the security community, helping to (re)define the nature of subjects and polities that deserve the full respect of/inclusion into liberal relations of community, and identifying common ways of defining and excluding groups of dangerous ‘others’. While, according to the discourses articulated by all three institutions, 24


new practices of anti-terrorism can and should be perfectly compatible with the promotion of liberal-democratic norms, in practice—as we shall see—some of the ideas and practices of exclusion associated with antiterrorism have raised difficult questions and normative problems for the Euro-Atlantic security community. Before going any further, it might be helpful to note that while the EU, NATO, and the OSCE claim to promote the values and norms of the transatlantic security community (to act as security community-builders), they remain significantly different institutions—in terms of membership, structure, mandates, and resources. As we shall see, those differences have had a significant effect on the types of activities that the three institutions have conducted in the fight against international terrorism. In an analysis of the differences between them, perhaps the most obvious starting point is the observation that while both the EU and NATO are supposed to only incorporate states that are committed to the liberal values and norms of the transatlantic security community, the OSCE is more diverse in its membership.57 Although OSCE documents are similar to those of NATO and the EU in their affirmation of the values and norms of the security community, and while the Organization is officially engaged in efforts to strengthen and expand that community, it remains the case that in contrast to the EU and NATO, dependable expectations of peaceful change are not (yet) prevalent in the entire OSCE area. As Emanuel Adler has explained, many of the states that joined the Organization after the end of the Cold War have yet to internalize the liberal-democratic norms and practices that can ensure the ascendance of the entire OSCE region into a mature security community.58 As we shall see later in the book, this has generated particular problems in the context of the fight against international terrorism—and has led to questions about the ability of the OSCE to continue to act as a security community-building organization. In addition, there are profound differences in the organizational structures, resources, and mandates of NATO, the EU, and the OSCE. The EU, of course, occupies a unique place among international institutions by virtue of the fact that it combines the logic of intergovernmental cooperation (embodied especially in the Council) with the logic of supranationalism (most notably in the Commission). Indeed, the degree of integration among EU member states is such that the Union is often regarded as a sui generis institution, something that is more than an international organization but less than a state. At the risk of pointing out the obvious, let us briefly note that in addition to intergovernmental 25


arrangements and instruments, the EU possesses a series of supranational tools and a range of resources (especially in the civilian area) that are simply unavailable to other international institutions. The combination of two logics and the availability of a broad menu of resources has been reflected in efforts to combat terrorism, as the Union has acted via its intergovernmental as well as supranational bodies, and has mobilized a variety of resources in enacting a broad set of practices aimed at combating terrorism—both within and outside the territory of the EU. Thus, the Union’s supranational as well as intergovernmental bodies have been involved in efforts to both promote coordination and cooperation among member states and simultaneously create unique European arrangements designed to combat internationally organized terrorism. For example, as part of EU efforts to prevent terrorism, both the Council and the Commission have taken steps to promote coordination among the prevention policies of member states (e.g. seeking to harmonize policies designed to prevent the use of media for radicalization), while at the same time seeking to define and disseminate a unique ‘European best practice’ and to create unique European tools in the area of counter-terrorism. In addition, various European bodies have been engaged in efforts to enhance the Union’s ability to disrupt terrorist activities and pursue terrorists across national borders. In that area, the Council as well as the Commission have been involved both in promoting coordination among member states and in efforts to construct unique European tools—often involving the transfer to Brussels of functions more traditionally associated with sovereign states. For instance, efforts to harmonize standards and national procedures designed to prevent the abuse of the Union’s liberal socioeconomic freedoms by terrorist groups have been accompanied by a quest to create a set of unique tools (e.g. the European Arrest Warrant) that add interesting dimensions to the process of European integration. Meanwhile, in its interactions with the outside world, the EU has again benefited from a unique menu of resources and on this basis has sought to enhance its global involvement in efforts to combat terrorism. In the name of preventing and combating terrorism, the Union, working through its supranational as well as its intergovernmental bodies, has launched or expanded a large number of initiatives, ranging from projects designed to improve the ability of neighbouring states to protect their

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borders, to counter-terrorism capacity-building programmes, cooperation with partner states in preventing the financing of terrorist organizations, and contributions to post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan. Moreover, the EU has also embarked on a process of building up its military muscle—for instance, via the creation of battle groups—mobile combat units for possible use in crises, including terrorist attacks, anywhere in the world. In contrast to the EU, NATO is an international institution that does not have supranational bodies, and relies exclusively on inter-allied consensus to build new tools for addressing international security challenges, including terrorism. Moreover, in contrast to the EU’s comprehensive role in participating in the governance of political, socio-economic, and environmental issues within its territory, and the economic tools (e.g. aid or sanctions) the Union can wield in relations with the outside world, NATO is primarily a security organization, with a far narrower mandate, few non-military resources, and limited civilian expertise for use in its missions. Since the end of the Cold War, the alliance has taken significant steps to adapt, including by adopting a package of measures specifically aimed at combating terrorism by non-military as well as military means. Those measures, though potentially very important in helping NATO to adapt to the new security environment, have not turned—nor were they meant to turn—the alliance into the kind of organization that could adopt the comprehensive, holistic approach characteristic of the EU. On the other hand, as an institution with significant military capabilities and expertise in protecting its members from a broad set of threats and risks, as well as a strong and clear set of norms and procedures for cooperation and building trust among the allies, NATO has been able to assume a role in the security/defence aspect of counter-terrorism (e.g. via its mission in Afghanistan) that the EU simply could not perform. Finally, in stark contrast primarily to the EU but also to NATO, the OSCE has a far weaker organizational structure, and far fewer material capabilities at its disposal. As we shall see in Chapter 4, the OSCE emerged out of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and only acquired a formal organizational structure in the 1990s. The OSCE can only reach decisions if there is consensus among its very diverse members, is characterized by a very loose structure, and has neither the EU’s economic capabilities nor NATO’s military might to confer significant material benefits upon ‘good’ actual or potential members or, conversely, to apply (or at least threaten) physical coercion upon

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the perceived enemies of its participating states. In accordance with its philosophy of inclusive, comprehensive, and cooperative security, and arguably in recognition of its limited material capital, the OSCE has defined its role in combating terrorism as primarily one of prevention: by promoting good governance and democracy, the Organization claims to be in a strong position to contribute to the establishment of conditions under which terrorist groups are unlikely to flourish and recruit supporters. In the post–9/11 world, in a situation marked by the rise to prominence of a new type of enemy, the EU, NATO, and the OSCE have all faced the pressure to adapt to a changing security field. They have had to reposition themselves along the liberty/security spectrum, to devise new combinations of normal liberal practices/exceptions to those practices in an effort to enhance their capacity to combat that new type of enemy. That pressure generated by a changing security field, however, did not predetermine the actions of any of the three institutions. Interestingly, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE have each been able to draw on various forms of capital in order to (re)position themselves in the field of security. In that process of adaptation and repositioning, the OSCE, NATO, and the EU have both cooperated and competed with one another. Through cooperative efforts, they have collectively sought to diffuse shared knowledge about, and common practices of security in—and even beyond—the Euro-Atlantic area. At the same time, each institution has sought to secure a privileged position in the field of security, in part by seeking to demonstrate that it has unique skills and/or material capabilities, which render it particularly valuable in the contemporary world. In an attempt to secure the trust of their audiences (both among member states and in partner countries), each of these institutions has mobilized and sought to enhance its cultural-symbolic capital (i.e. expertise and prestige) as well as various forms of material capital (military and non-military capabilities). In other words, they have tried to present themselves as institutions that possess the expertise, skills, prestige, and capabilities to effectively adapt to the needs of the new security environment, to provide accurate diagnostics of security challenges, and identify as well as implement viable solutions to those challenges. Competition has occurred in two interrelated ways: each institution has sought to enhance its cultural and material capital vis-à-vis the other institutions (particularly in the case of NATO vs. the EU), and secondly, each has sought to (re)valorize particular forms of capital within the field of security in ways that would improve its status.

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Between Socializable Subjects and ‘Lost Souls’ in the Fight Against International Terrorism I would like to suggest that the new focus on fighting international terrorism has exacerbated a long-lasting liberal preoccupation with drawing boundaries between those who can be governed through a system of liberal freedoms and those who cannot be included in that category, and who, therefore, need to be governed by illiberal measures. Liberalism, as critical political theorists have pointed out, involves a commitment to govern via limited state involvement and the promotion of certain kinds of free, self-governed activities, which, in turn, requires the cultivation among the governed of suitable principles and habits of self-regulation (or a particular habitus).59 The challenge, for liberal thinkers and practitioners, has long been to find ways to deal with individuals or groups and areas of conduct that seem impossible to govern via liberal methods. In essence, what is required for the liberal government of the population is the capacity to distinguish between those who can be governed via the promotion of liberty and those who must be governed in other ways. It is revealing that Immanuel Kant, one of the most famous liberal advocates of the capacity for self-improvement through the exercise of reason, argued in favour of distinguishing between those who were capable and willing to exercise freedom in a self-disciplined way and those who had not (yet) reached that stage. He also advocated different treatments for these different categories of subjects.60 As Michael Williams has argued, Kantian individuals are moral agents, engaged in a mutually recognizable struggle to create liberal selves by disciplining the irrational and violent sides of themselves, and to establish liberal polities.61 Based on this vision of reason and the need for (and capability of) discipline, there emerges a political project to establish the broad structures of political life that follow from such a commitment. From the self-recognition of the need for limitation and a corresponding vision of institutional limits flow the (liberal) principles of the rule of law and, more broadly, the checks and balances that reflect a disciplined subjectivity.62 It is this achievement that constitutes the key criterion of moral judgement, the delineation of inclusion and exclusion within the moral community.63 While, in a Kantian world, people are obliged to recognize others as individuals, they are under no obligation to grant them full respect. But those whom liberals respect, and with whom they identify,

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are those who exercise the self-discipline of adopting the moral law that liberal individuals and communities recognize themselves as having achieved. In a Kantian world, the liberal self is placed in a relationship of moral superiority towards those who deviate from its norms and disciplinary practices. Those who fail to live up to the demands of liberal subjectivity may be tolerated, but that is a tolerance granted by liberals, on their terms. Importantly, such tolerance has limits: those who deviate from the liberal norm can only be tolerated so long as they are not perceived as a threat to the liberal selves and their communities. This tolerance is informed by the idea that, as rational, moral agents, all individuals should in principle adhere to the moral precepts of liberalism and the discipline demanded by those precepts. From the point of view of the liberal security community, in the context of the contemporary fight against international terrorism, it would appear that in order to promote international security, it is particularly important to differentiate between those who can and should be governed by liberal means and included in liberal relations of community and those ‘others’ who, by virtue of their refusal to evolve into liberal self-disciplined subjects, pose a serious threat to liberal-democratic societies. This is because the fight against international terrorism is not seen as an ordinary conflict conducted in the name of limited objectives. Rather, we are told, we are in the middle of a confrontation between civilization and barbarity, as Al Qaeda and its supporters threaten to undermine the key principles and values upon which the (‘civilized’) liberal-democratic world is based. Recall, for instance, the Declaration on the EU Response to the London Bombings, which is indicative of the way in which contemporary international terrorism is regarded in the transatlantic security community. The European Council ‘considers that the attacks are an affront to universal values on which the European Union is based. Central to those values is a commitment to democratic and open institutions and societies governed by the rule of law within which people of all faiths and backgrounds can live, work and prosper together. The terrorists who reject that commitment and seek to use violence to impose their ideas will be defeated.’64 This portrayal of terrorism relies upon a dichotomy between good and evil, rational order and disorder. It could be argued that the perceived threat of international terrorism is particularly problematic in the liberal political imagination because it challenges, or at least raises questions about, some of the fundamental assumptions about the foundations of modern political order, and appears 30


to entail the risk of a (re)lapse into the kind of violence motivated by the ethic of conviction that was characteristic of the pre-modern era. Indeed, as we shall see, in statements and documents about international terrorism—ranging from documents concerning the situation in Afghanistan to statements regarding the danger posed by Al Qaeda within the security community—the image presented in the EU, NATO, and OSCE discourses is one of exceptional risk of disruption of normal (modern) order due to the actions of groups that subscribe to pre-modern or anti-modern beliefs.

Contemporary International Terrorism as a Challenge to Modern Order Let us briefly cast our minds back in time, specifically to the moment symbolically considered as the marker of the emergence of the modern state system, the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. The reconfiguration of world politics in the early modern era occurred in the context of a historically specific set of concerns about the possibility of constructing political order and limiting conflict in the world. More broadly, the attempt to establish the sovereign right to draw the distinction between normal/unacceptable modes of behaviour within the territorial state and to make decisions about friends and enemies (the essence of the principle of sovereignty) was linked to concerns about the dangers associated with transcendental claims to truth and multiple definitions of enmity.65 The early modern era was marked by a quest for certainty, and an emphasis on creating the conditions of possibility of political order— including limited, manageable conflict. This occurred against the background of religious conflicts, involving clashes between different definitions of the ‘good life’, which were often accompanied by absolute commitments to defending those views. As Steven Toulmin has noted, at the very heart of modernity was a ‘quest for certainty’, which was in no small part generated by the violence of the time. In his view, the ‘seventeenth century “Quest for Certainty” was a timely response to a specific historical challenge—the political, social and theological chaos embodied in the Thirty Years’ War’.66 According to Toulmin, as the conflict over the ‘true faith’ in Europe became ever more intense, ‘For many of those involved, it ceased to be crucial what their theological beliefs were, or where they were rooted in experience, as 16th century theologians would have demanded. 31


All that mattered, by this stage, was for supporters of Religious Truth to believe, devoutly, in belief itself.’67 Abandoning absolute visions of truth, and devaluing teleological claims that certain persons had access to the absolute truth, provided the foundation for tolerance and the basis for attacks on visions of hierarchy and authority based on innate features.68 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the emerging (liberal) ‘possessive individualism’ was part of an attempt to construct new principles of political order and duty, in response to conflict and change, and away from feudal justifications of rights and privilege.69 It is, indeed, revealing that some of the most famous classical liberal thinkers, such as the social contract theorists, insisted upon the definition of individuals primarily in material terms, as instrumentally rational persons concerned with their (physical) selfpreservation. To take a famous example, in the vision of Thomas Hobbes—who was writing against the background of the English Civil War in the seventeenth century—a belief in non-material entities was a recipe for irrationalism and conflict. Defining reality, including people, in material terms was, in his view, necessary in order to liberate them from the conflict associated with concerns with eternal salvation, in a situation in which the criterion for salvation was a matter of conscience, beyond empirical demonstration. In Hobbes, the social contract represents ‘a shrinking of historical time and human practice to an ahistorical moment of utilitarian calculation informed by reason and fear’.70 And, in spite of all the differences between them, Hobbes and Locke agreed that the main purpose of the state is the physical protection of individuals defined in abstraction from particular social or religious identities, and of their property. According to these liberal thinkers, it is the ability of citizens to engage in rational (cost–benefit) calculations that enables them to reach consensus regarding the importance of establishing a state, and it is to this rationality that the state appeals in defining the rights and duties of citizenship.71 Fear of uncertainty, pain, loss of property, and death is the key impetus leading liberal individuals to establish political authority, and to reconstitute themselves as citizens of particular, spatially bounded political communities. In that political context, defining threats in material terms was seen as a pacifying move, as it sought to remove a central source of social conflict and thus to secure individuals and the political order from the potentially endless violence arising from the particular beliefs of different individuals

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or groups.72 As Williams explains, on the liberal logic, domestic threats to security came to be defined as material threats to the state, rather than threats articulated in terms of the personal belief (religious or political beliefs) of citizens. In contrast to the pre-modern period, the thoughts and even statements articulated by citizens in the political domain did not (again, at least in principle) make them threats subject to violence by the state. In a similar vein, when applied to the international domain, the liberal logic of security entailed a move away from essentialized, pre-given, and fixed definitions of enmity. Thus, other political entities were potential sources of threat to the liberal state, but they were not necessarily and unchangeably so. In contrast to the logic of religious warfare, another sovereign entity could or could not be an enemy, and its status as dangerous enemy was to be empirically established. Those ideas were not just abstractions invented by early modern liberal thinkers, but came to be inscribed in the basic institutions of the modern international system. Thus, for example, one of the key ‘rules of the game’ of the modern international system is a prohibition on religious wars. As R. B. J. Walker has pointed out, ‘The Treaty of Westphalia is said to affirm the promises of a secular modernity that can keep all religious convictions in check, subordinate their authorizations under the authority of earthly sovereignties.’73 That is why the Peace of Westphalia is conventionally seen as the founding moment of modern international politics: through the principle of sovereignty affirmed in that Peace, the primacy of religious authorities was challenged in the name of secular political communities. Since then, at least in principle, one of the defining ambitions of modern politics has been to avoid equating politics with any particular ethic of conviction. In contrast to the absolute religious conflicts, modern visions of international politics rest on the assumption that it is possible to ameliorate conflict by establishing secular institutions and forms of statecraft based on prosaic forms of material self-interest and pragmatic accommodation. In practice, of course, the separation between politics and religion was never absolute, as various forms of religious or quasi-religious (e.g. ideological) motives often had a significant impact on what were supposed to be secular politics (nationalist conflicts being a case in point).74 Nevertheless, visions of modern international politics have rested on the assumption that the structures of the modern system of secular sovereign states would be strong enough to prevent a complete

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relapse into religious/quasi-religious conflicts fuelled by the ethics of conviction. The problem, however, is that September 11 and subsequent events have raised doubts about the possibility of sustaining such a vision of politics, not least because Al Qaeda and its supporters explicitly reject attempts to base international as well as domestic politics on secular foundations. In the fight against international terrorism, one of the key difficulties, from the point of view of the liberal world, is that one of the most important aspects of the politics of identity in the modern international system—the definition of political identity away from religious beliefs—seems to be under threat by those who use the forces of globalization (by organizing themselves in fluid transnational networks) to affirm a form of political identity that privileges religion over secular politics. Indeed, (suspected) terrorists who draw on radical interpretations of Islam to justify their actions are seen as actors who refuse the basic modern idea of politics of self-restraint, via their absolute commitment to particular religious beliefs, and their conception of those beliefs as the guiding principles both for this life and in the afterlife. Recall, for instance, NATO’s characterization of Al Qaeda and its supporters as actors that pose a threat not only to particular Western targets but also to civilization itself on the basis of their willingness to commit ‘unacceptable acts of violence without precedent in the modern era’. This ‘underscores the urgency of intensifying the battle against terrorism, a battle that the NATO countries—indeed, all civilized nations—must win’.75 In a similar vein, as we have seen, EU member states collectively defined the acts of violence committed by internationally organized, religious terrorists as ‘an affront to the universal values on which the European Union is based’. It is not difficult to see how a set of actors that challenge the most basic ideas and assumptions of modern (liberal) political life can create all kinds of problems for the liberal world. For example, how can modern actors deter enemies who regard the afterlife as more important than this life, and, hence, are not afraid of any kind of pain or secular punishment, including death? Alternatively, how can institutions representing governments even hope to reform Islamic-inspired terrorists, to persuade them that what they do is wrong and that they should refrain from terrorist activities, when those actors often do not recognize the authority of the governments of their countries of residence/citizenship, and claim to act on the basis of a higher, divine truth? In other words, it is this particular representation of Al Qaeda and its allies as the new enemies of civilization—benefiting from the late modern technology and freedoms, 34


but committed to pre-modern principles and forms of political identity— that informs the image of extreme risk posed by international, Islamicinspired terrorism. In this context, it is particularly important—from the point of view of liberal polities—to identify, exclude from relations of community, and defeat those who embrace the cause of international religious terrorism. At the same time, it is important to seek to (re)shape individuals and communities seen as vulnerable to—but not yet adepts of—networks like Al Qaeda. In this context, as we shall see, the EU, NATO, and the OSCE have enacted complex practices of exclusion of those deemed dangerous others by virtue of their (alleged) commitment to international terrorism, while at the same time seeking to strengthen and expand the liberal security community, to include in it as many of those vulnerable-but-not-yet-lost actors as possible. Ironically, and arguably worrisome for many in the Euro-Atlantic world is the fact that some policymakers in the most powerful country of the Western world, the USA, seem to reflect a parallel affirmation of religion as a key motivating factor in political life—or, to use a Weberian terminology, they seem to affirm the primacy of the politics of conviction over the politics of responsibility. The concern to dissociate themselves from religious politics, and particularly from any image of a religious crusade, has led the EU, the OSCE, as well as NATO to insist that they do not seek to fight against any particular ethnic or religious group per se. For instance, as we shall see, each of these institutions has insisted that the war against international Islamic terrorism does not and must not be allowed to amount to a war on Islam and all those who practise it. The anxiety about the contemporary threat posed by international Islamic terrorism is exacerbated by the view that, as a result of recent technological developments, it would be enough for a few individuals to gain possession of WMDs for them to be able to inflict the kind of violence that was previously available only to states.76 This rise in the power of non-state actors can be seen as part of a broader trend, identified by Ulrich Beck as the ‘individualization of war’: rather than complying with the conventional logic of security, in which states wage war against other states, individuals, organized in fluid networks, now seem to wage wars against states and their populations, and vice versa: states begin to wage wars against particular groups of individuals— as reflected in the recent strategic documents, which portray terrorist groups as a key source of threat to the transatlantic security community, indeed to international security in general. Identifying, controlling, and ideally defeating these fluid enemies requires a reconfiguration of 35


the security apparatus: in contrast to the conventional modern principle of distinction between internal and external security agencies, dealing with separate issues (national security as distinct from domestic policing), international security institutions like NATO, the EU, and the OSCE have responded to the perceived change in the nature of enemies and security threats by seeking to blur the boundary between internal/external security. As we shall see, in the past few years, often in the name of fighting terrorism, the EU, NATO, and the OSCE have sought to redefine their roles and mandates in ways that increasingly include functions of policing conventionally attributed to domestic security apparatuses. Interestingly, as we shall see, the partial individualization of war was accompanied by a series of efforts to devolve some of the responsibilities for managing the risks of terrorist attacks to non-state actors, ranging from firms to particular religious/ethnic communities and individuals. In this respect, some of the practices conducted in the name of fighting terrorism are part of broader neoliberal practices and focus on enhancing individual responsibility as a strategy of risk-management.77 In particular, developments associated with the fight against international terrorism build on practices that, as criminologists have argued, became especially important in liberal societies in the late twentieth century. Mariana Valverde and Michael Mopas, among others, have noted that in the nineteenth and early-mid twentieth centuries, policing in liberal societies was aimed at normalizing if not each individual offender then at least the population of offenders.78 However, towards the end of the twentieth century, ‘neoliberal and managerial moves to displace therapy, to cut back state budgets, and to impose new knowledges more amenable to performance assessment, found the new logic of “risk” more useful than the older, more ambitious and totalizing logic of “discipline”’.79 Risk-management in the penal field emerged as part of a broader shift in governance towards, to borrow Valverde’s phrase, targeted governance: a specific, information-driven dream of governance which assumes that the intelligence and expertise provided by managers and experts make it possible to target resources efficiently by identifying and devoting particular attention to ‘problem spaces’, ‘problem populations’, and ‘risky activities’. According to Valverde and Mopas, the liberal ‘normalization project’, aimed at identifying problem individuals and improving biopolitical aggregates, has not really been abandoned. But, in the context of the rise of neoliberal and neoconservative projects to transform practices of governance, to roll back the state, and to cut public spending, new 36


ways of conceptualizing and dealing with individuals and groups deemed as ‘deviant’ emerged.80 In a world of risk-management, the focus is on establishing ‘risk profiles’ (on the basis of different risk factors), using categories developed by experts and data gathered from a multitude of public and private sources, and then formulating strategies for managing those risk factors. In previous decades, information and decisions concerning spaces/ people/activities deemed as particularly ‘risky’ were monopolized by the state. But, in the neoliberal world, which relies on local authorities and non-state actors, state agents are no longer given the monopoly over the task of securing the community. Rather, non-state actors, including businesses as well as private individuals or groups, are involved in providing information about/helping to classify ‘risky’ subjects and objects (that is, subjects who deviate from liberal norms) and in taking steps to exclude such subjects from the normal political and socio-economic life of the liberal community. In a world of ‘targeted governance’ private actors (particularly in the corporate world) are regarded as having the right, even the duty, to take their own measures to minimize the risks posed by ‘deviant’ individuals and groups.81 In the context of contemporary attempts to manage the risk of terrorism, while assumptions about the possibility of establishing reliable risk profiles have been questioned (due to the perception of extreme uncertainty that we noted above), the quest for ever more information about potentially risky individuals and situations has only grown more intense. In other words, risk-management in the contemporary world is associated with a move towards a partial individual responsibilization: private individuals are enjoined to become active providers of their own security, as well as contribute to the overall risk-management exercises in their communities (for instance, by keeping an eye on individuals whose suspicious behaviour suggests they might be involved in terrorist activities). Thus, we have, for example, the proliferation of crime prevention initiatives that encourage citizens to monitor developments—in themselves, their families/friends, and strangers they happen to come across—that might one day pose a risk to their security as well as the security of their society. What is involved here is a blurring of the boundary between the public/private spheres, as activities traditionally attributed to state agents are now, in part, being transferred to private actors. Linked to this, one can speak of a securitization of a broad spectrum of societal activities (e.g. banking, Internet activities, processing refugees and asylum seekers, governing cross-border economic activities). 37


For our purposes, let us just note that in the face of the new threat of international terrorism, there has been a tendency within the EuroAtlantic world to place such societal activities under special surveillance and in some cases to regulate them through extraordinary measures, justified in terms of the high degree of risk allegedly associated with them (for instance, the risk of cyber-terrorism, or the risk of taking advantage of global economic flows to finance terrorism, or even the risk of allowing terrorists to slip into the space of Western states under the guise of asylum seekers). As we shall see, all three Euro-Atlantic security institutions— including NATO, conventionally seen as merely a military alliance—have become deeply involved in the performance of such practices of surveillance and regulation that blur the boundary between the public/private spheres. In the processes of identifying and dealing with people and spaces on the basis of the risk they are seen to pose—particularly by reference to potential involvement in international terrorism—these institutions have relied on some neoliberal techniques of (partially) devolving responsibility for security to non-state actors, as well as relying on private actors to provide expertise about and help deal with different categories of risk. In other words, these institutions have been involved in establishing and working within hybrid security networks, encompassing public as well as private actors. Let us, then, turn to an analysis of the ways in which the enactment of risk-management practices has led to the development of hybrid security structures, and has blurred conventional boundaries in the field of security. We shall begin, in Chapter 2, with the case of the EU.

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2 The EU—Who are ‘We’ and Where is the Enemy?

This chapter examines the security practices enacted by the EU in response to the perceived threat of Islamic-motivated international terrorism. Based on the view, inscribed in EU documents and statements, that the risks of terrorist attacks are characterized by extreme uncertainty and potential for catastrophic destruction, the argument put forward in the Union’s security discourse is that actors like Al Qaeda and their allies pose a new kind of strategic threat to Europe. In other words, there is an interesting conceptual move in the EU discourse: the urgency and emphasis on the need for extraordinary measures—conventionally legitimized within the framework of discourses about clearly defined strategic threats—are now mobilized to justify the launch and enhancement of a broad set of practices of risk-management, aimed at addressing a non-conventional challenge to European security. The EU has adopted a two-pronged approach to that perceived threat. To begin with, those actors seen as vulnerable to, but not yet fully corrupted by, the anti-liberal ideas promoted by terrorist organizations are to be supported, monitored, and guided in an attempt to transform them into self-disciplined, ‘responsible’ liberal subjects. Thus, in the contemporary security environment, the EU has sought to enhance its ability to construct liberal individuals and polities, both in Europe and abroad and, in so doing, also to expand the broader Euro-Atlantic security community of liberal-democratic values. These inclusive practices are accompanied by attempts at enhancing the collective ability of members of the Union to identify and exclude from their territory— or at least contain and place beyond the realm of normal politics and normal economic life—individuals and groups with suspected links to international terrorism. This combination of inclusive and exclusionary 39

Who are ‘We’ and Where is the Enemy?

practices is identified in the EU security discourse—a discourse articulated both in intergovernmental documents and statements and in documents issued by the Commission—as the best recipe for managing risks in an uncertain world. It is a combination that is designed to make it easier for the EU to prevent the unfolding of a multitude of potentially catastrophic scenarios (presumably) planned by Al Qaeda and its supporters. As we shall see, in the security discourse articulated in the European Security Strategy and related documents and statements, those actors are regarded as groups that pose a threat not only to specific targets within the Union but also, more broadly, to the universal values of human rights and democracy embodied in the EU. Seen in this light, the fight against international terrorism to which the EU has committed itself represents an effort to protect civilization itself against the irrational and unethical forces of international terrorism. I examine here the interplay between inclusive and exclusionary practices adopted by the EU in the name of fighting international terrorism, and explore the different (spatial and temporal) processes of othering associated with them. I also examine the tensions that have emerged in the course of attempts to combine two different logics of security. This chapter is not meant as a comprehensive catalogue of each and every counter-terrorist action carried out by the EU. Rather, my aim here is to examine the categories of self, other, and danger articulated in the EU discourse on international terrorism, and to analyse the broad patterns of practices justified by reference to that discourse. I suggest that the practices enacted in the name of fighting international terrorism are particularly interesting through the challenge they pose to prevailing categories of friend/enemy, inside/outside, domestic law enforcement/international security, and public/private arenas. From a normative perspective, those practices raise important and difficult ethical questions and problems, as, in some instances at least, they seem to depart from some of the key liberal principles and explicit domestic and foreign policy goals of the EU. A close analysis of EU documents and statements reveals a common discursive structure: according to this discourse, the Union represents a united community acting against a new type of enemy. However, as we shall see in the concluding section of this chapter, that image is not entirely accurate. The effort to fight international terrorism has, indeed, found expression in a series of important EU legislative and institutional initiatives that transcend the agendas and actions of any 40


particular EU state or set of states, and have a powerful impact on all members of the Union, as well as on their partners. Nevertheless, the implementation of some of the measures promoted by the Union has been limited by disagreements grounded in domestic politics, lack of trust, and problems of coordination among several member states. Moreover, in a couple of instances, member states have raised specific questions about, and challenges to, the authority of the EU in the area of anti-terrorism.

International Terrorism as the ‘Existential Threat’ to the EU EU security documents and statements issued after 9/11 identify international terrorism as a key threat to the Union—and to the values of civilization itself. As a corollary to that, EU member states have collectively affirmed their determination to develop the methods and build the resources needed to fight the new type of existential threat. At first glance, at least, the European security documents aimed at identifying the steps needed to prepare the Union for dealing with a world of fluid, diffuse security problems seem to reflect a clear attempt to transcend the rigidities of traditional security thinking, which conceptualized security threats in terms of the danger of military confrontation with inimical states. The key EU strategic document, the European Security Strategy (ESS)—entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ and adopted in December 2003—says, ‘large scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable’, but Europe faces new threats ‘which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable’. In particular, ‘terrorism . . . poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties.’1 According to the 2003 European Security Strategy and a series of related documents and statements, in the face of these non-conventional threats, the EU must respond with a mix of political, military, judicial, and economic instruments. In particular, in the fight against the new brand of international terrorism, it is important to avoid an exclusive reliance on military means, and to place a heavy emphasis on addressing the root causes of terrorism via a combination of socio-economic, political, and military means. As stated in the 2002 Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, EU members define terrorism very broadly: committing or threatening to cause extensive damage to a government or public 41


facility transport system, infrastructure facility, or private property likely to result in major economic loss, which may damage a government or international organization, constitutes a terrorist offence when committed with the intent either to compel the organization to perform or abstain from any act or to seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or social structure of a country or international organization.2 The Framework Decision defines a terrorist group as a structured organization consisting of more than two persons, established over a period of time, and acting in concert. And, according to the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Islamic terrorism, as represented by ‘Al Qaeda and the groups it inspires’, is ‘the type of terrorism [that] currently represents the main threat to the Union as a whole’.3 The view of the contemporary period as one of flux is clearly reflected in the European Security Strategy’s assessment that ‘the new threats are dynamic’. The notion involved here is that one cannot afford to wait until potential dangers evolve into actual threats, because by then it would be too late to address them. The ESS claims that ‘left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and organized crime spread if they are neglected—as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and crisis prevention cannot start too early’.4 Under these circumstances, it is necessary to constantly monitor risks and to take preventive action in order to avoid the unfolding of a multitude of hard-to-predict but potentially catastrophic scenarios. One of the key concerns in this context is that, should terrorists acquire weapons of mass destruction, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for states and armies.5 The ESS also identifies a series of related security challenges: organized crime, which can finance terrorism, and state failure or regional conflicts. The notion involved in that document is that, in addition to being a significant source of regional instability, collapsed, failing, or war-torn states could also become breeding grounds for extremism and potentially terrorism; as such, those states are to be treated as prime targets in the EU’s efforts to prevent and combat international terrorism. In other words, the security discourse of the EU—with its focus on dynamic threats, multiple, fluid, and ill-defined enemies, and the perceived need to prevent the unfolding of a plethora of potential scenarios— reveals a concern to develop the tools and methods necessary for

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an ongoing process of risk-management. There is, thus, an interesting contrast between the perceived threat and the nature of the response deemed as appropriate. On the one hand, there is the idea that international terrorism represents an existential threat—that the fight involved is an absolute confrontation between two conflicting projects: the modern, liberal-democratic, progressive project of order represented by the EU and the Western world more generally and an irrational, fanatical, extremely violent project represented by Al Qaeda and its allies. Thus, Fighting terrorism . . . is also an ideological struggle because terrorism has the potential to subvert the very founding principles of the EU. Although Europe has experienced many different types of terrorism in its history, the main threat currently comes from terrorism that is underlined by an abusive interpretation of Islam.6

On the other hand, however, given that the actors involved in international terrorism are members of fluid, dynamic, largely hidden networks, no single, decisive confrontation is possible between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Rather, what is needed is an ongoing process of risk-management. It is this definition of the threat of terrorism as, at once, absolute in terms of its magnitude and fragmented—as well as uncertain—in terms of its forms of manifestation that has informed the two-pronged approach by the EU. Thus, risk-management is to be achieved through a combination of practices of inclusion and exclusion. To begin with, there is new emphasis on accelerating the integration (or at least partial integration) of potentially vulnerable selves and groups into the structures of the liberaldemocratic union, thus making them immune to the appeals of terrorist networks. This involves, in part, the diffusion of liberal-democratic conceptual schemas and practical dispositions to vulnerable and in some cases alienated Europeans. Simultaneously, there has been a sustained effort by the Commission and the Council to devise more effective ways of identifying, excluding from liberal-democratic relations of community and defeating the new type of dangerous others. As part of this enhanced focus on exclusion, the EU has launched a series of new practices aimed at disseminating within and also beyond the boundaries of the Union common representations—and, based on those representations, shared practices of monitoring and control—of the non-conventional enemies that are seen as an exceptional risk to liberal-democratic polities.

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Who are ‘We’ and Where are the ‘Others’? In the statements and documents issued by the EU, there is a noticeable conflation of security referents, as the Union casts itself as an actor that can and should play an important role in protecting a whole set of subjects and objects, ranging from its territory and citizens to the key values and ‘way of life’ of the Western world, which are more broadly defined as the values of civilization. Following the September 11 attacks, the European Council was quick to represent international terrorism as a source of threat to the key building blocks of the European Union: democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. According to a statement issued in December 2001, The European Union is founded on the universal values of human dignity, liberty, equality and solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is based on the principle of democracy and the principle of the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States. Terrorism constitutes one of the most serious violations of those principles. (The European Council, 6 December 2001)

This view was reiterated in the statement issued by the then President of the European Council, Bertie Ahern, who argued in March 2004 that ‘Terrorism is not just undemocratic. It is anti-democratic. It is not just inhuman. It is an affront to humanity. It runs counter to all the values on which the EU is founded’.7 Further, in a declaration on the EU Response to the London Bombings issued in the summer of 2005, the European Council stated that it ‘considers that the attacks are an affront to universal values on which the European Union is based’.8 And in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2005 it was claimed that ‘Terrorism is a threat to all States and all peoples. It poses a serious threat to our security, to the values of our democratic societies and to the rights of freedoms of our citizens, especially through the indiscriminate targeting of innocent people. Terrorism is criminal and unjustifiable under any circumstances’.9 International terrorism is thus represented as an exceptional threat, creating a situation in which, as stated in the Hague Programme, ‘the security of the European Union and its member states has acquired a new urgency in the light of the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September, 2001, and in Madrid on 11 March 2004’10 (Brussels, 13 December 2004). A similar interpretation of the situation can be found in the Report on ‘The

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Fight Against International Terrorism’ issued by the Assembly of Western European Union, where it is stated that: terrorism constitutes the main threat to security for democratic countries in the coming decades. The 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States and those of 11 March 2004 in Spain serve to demonstrate that this threat, far from being either remote or imaginary, is real and present. They show that we are facing a new form of terrorism characterized by a massive onslaught leading to the loss of hundreds, even thousands of lives, with the aim of destroying or at least destabilizing democratic nations as a necessary stage in the process of establishing religious totalitarianism throughout the world. They also bear the stamp of fanaticism and suicidal commitment on the part of the perpetrators.11

In essence, the discourse on contemporary international terrorism revolves around a dichotomy between good and evil and rational order and disorder. The contrast between the EU, as a rational and ethical union embodying and promoting the universal values of civilization, and those (‘fanatical’) unethical actors engaged in international terrorism could not be more stark. As a consequence, no compromise in the fight between ‘us’ and those dangerous, unethical ‘others’ is possible, and no weakness is permissible. However, in this self/other dichotomy the definition of the self is not given within the usual parameters of modern security projects. Thus, the self to be protected is not defined in nationalist terms, nor is it confined to the geometry of spatially defined entities. Rather, EU statements, as noted above, suggest that, in protecting its people and institutions, the Union is also acting to secure the fundamental values of modern civilization. What is involved in this process of protection is not an attempt to safeguard all people that happen to reside in the space of the Union. In contrast to the conventional cartographic images of protection, with their emphasis on the defence of all people within a given territory by the (state) authorities, the EU statements depict a situation that is much complicated by the fluidity of the actors that could pose a terrorist threat. Accordingly, as a Union that embodies the universal values of civilization (democracy, the rule of law, and human rights), the EU is seen as, simultaneously, a major target of international terrorism, a key player in the fight against international terrorism, and a potential source of international terrorism. The notion involved here is that some individuals/groups might try to use the freedoms offered by the Union to carry out terrorist attacks; under these circumstances, the citizens and residents of the Union cannot

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necessarily be assumed to be ‘friends’. Unless and until proven otherwise, the suspicion persists that some of the apparently innocent civilians who claim to lead normal lives as citizens of the Union are actually planning to fight against the people, values, and institutions of the EuroAtlantic world. This view, as we shall see, has had important—and in some ways problematic—implications for practices of policing within the EU. A first glance at EU statements concerning international terrorism would suggest that there is a significant difference between the Union’s representation of international terrorism—as a form of crime12 —and the language of war employed by the USA. Thus, according to the EU discourse, ‘Acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable under any circumstances.’13 Furthermore, as we shall see, many of the counterterrorist initiatives adopted by the Union fall under the category of law enforcement. However, in practice, elements of the war paradigm are also present in the discourse and practices of the EU. There are, to begin with, statements issued by senior EU officials that use the language of war— recall, in this sense, Javier Solana’s argument that the Union needs to fight ‘an intelligent war on terror’. And in the European Security Strategy, as we have seen, international terrorism is defined as the key threat facing the Union in the twenty-first century. Thus, given the advances in technology and the willingness of terrorist groups to commit ‘fanatical’ suicide missions, there is the danger that, should such groups acquire WMD, they could inflict upon the Union and its partners the kind of destruction that was previously available only to states. As a corollary to that, EU security documents state that member states should be prepared to use all necessary means—including, if necessary, military force—in the fight against international terrorism.14 Accordingly, one of the priorities identified in the ESS is the development of the Union’s military muscle, for possible use in future EU operations. In practice, several steps have been taken by the EU to enhance its military capital, and thus to transcend a traditional area of weakness for the Union. In so doing, the EU has sought to place itself in a strong position in the international campaign against terrorism, casting itself as an actor who possesses the various forms of capital needed in preventing and combating a key threat to security in the twenty-first century. In brief, EU security documents reflect a combination of two— traditionally distinct—paradigms: war and law enforcement. While this may seem to be a logical response to a novel and complex threat to security, the combination is not unproblematic. Above all, the modern 46


crime/law enforcement paradigm is, at least in principle, underpinned by an ethic of care for the community, including the protection of criminals (seen as members of the community, and entitled—again, at least in principle—to legal rights and protections). By contrast, the war paradigm is based on a rigid dichotomy self/inimical other, in which the defeat of the other through the use of force is permissible (subject only to limits that are far more relaxed than the restrictions of law enforcement). Or, to look at this from a slightly different angle, the crime/law enforcement paradigm is, in principle, based on the recognition and protection of mutual rights of the community and of criminals—something that is far less present in war. In practice, this combination of paradigms has meant that while, on the one hand, the EU has taken a series of steps underpinned by an overt ethic of care, and aimed at building and protecting communities both within and beyond its boundaries, it has also taken the view that, should individuals or groups within ‘communities in danger’ become involved in terrorism, they would constitute a threat not only to that community but also to international security in general. As such, the argument goes, they could and sometimes should become the target of extreme measures—becoming subject to exceptional regimes (inside or outside the Union), and potentially the use of force. The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy encompasses four categories or strands of activity: prevention (aimed at preventing people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to radicalization and recruitment, in Europe and internationally); protection (measures designed to protect citizens and infrastructure and reduce the Union’s vulnerability to attack, including through improved security of borders, transport, and critical infrastructure); pursuit (to pursue and investigate terrorists across the Union’s borders and globally, to impede travel, planning, and communications; to disrupt support networks, to cut off funding and access to attack materials, and to bring terrorists to justice); and, finally, response (measures aimed at preparing the members of the Union to manage and minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack, based on the idea that the risk of a terrorist attack cannot be reduced to zero).15 The aim of the EU Strategy is both to facilitate and improve European cooperation (and thus also to strengthen national capabilities) and to develop collective capability— that is, to ensure EU level capacity to understand and formulate collective responses to the terrorist threat. In addition, the Counter-Terrorism Strategy calls for enhancing cooperation with other international 47


organizations and key third countries in the fight against contemporary terrorism. In the remainder of this chapter, I analyse the dynamics and implications of practices of inclusion and exclusion carried out under the categories of prevention, protection, and pursuit, as identified in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Although I also briefly touch on the category of response, I focus primarily on the first three categories, for the most interesting EU counter-terrorist activities fall within them.

Strengthening and Expanding ‘Our’ Community: The Quest to Prevent Radicalization and the Project of European Identity-Building At the heart of the ESS and the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy lies the idea that preventing radicalization and recruitment by groups like Al Qaeda is absolutely crucial in EU efforts to fight terrorism. As stated in the CounterTerrorism Strategy: Terrorism can never be justified. There can be no excuse or impunity for terrorist acts. The vast majority of Europeans, irrespective of belief, do not accept extremist ideologies. Even amongst the small number that do, only a few turn to terrorism. . . . We must identify and counter the methods, propaganda and conditions through which people are drawn into terrorism. (p. 7)

In a similar vein, the EU Declaration on Combating Terrorism states that ‘the European Council calls for the development of an EU long-term strategy to address all the factors that contribute to terrorism’ (Section 3), and, even more specifically, the European Council Declaration on the EU Response to the London Bombings ‘underlines the importance of preventing people turning to terrorism by addressing the factors that contribute to radicalization and recruitment to terrorist groups’ (Section 5, emphasis added). In a situation in which terrorism is regarded as linked to a process of alienation, the solution is seen to lie, at least in part, in the quest for integration and a meaningful life in a way that disrupts or prevents the emergence of identification with, and loyalty to, transnational (criminal) groups. Thus, as noted in the ESS, ‘the most recent wave of terrorism . . . is linked to religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernization, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This 48


phenomenon is also part of our own society.’16 The EU discourse, in other words, seeks to securitize the problem of alienation. Thus, in the context of a growing danger of terrorism linked to religious extremism, the failure to integrate minority groups in mainstream society is cast as not just a socio-political problem and possible source of domestic disorder, but, more importantly, as a potential source of threat to international security. According to the ESS, the challenge of combating radicalization and terrorist recruitment lies primarily with member states (e.g. by promoting integration ensuring that the voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism, and disrupting the activities of those that play active roles in radicalization).17 However, EU-level work, including the contribution of the European Commission, is intended to play an important role in promoting the coordination of national policies in this area; sharing and disseminating knowledge about the sources of, and solutions to, radicalization; and determining ‘good practice’ for all member states. In practice, the EU has launched—and in some cases enhanced—a series of initiatives that can be seen as an attempt to build a shared new conceptual framework and corresponding practices among the Europeans involved in the prevention of radicalization. The concern to prevent terrorist recruitment has been repeatedly invoked in EU circles as an important motivating factor behind a series of initiatives aimed at facilitating and accelerating the integration of vulnerable individuals and groups into mainstream European societies. For instance, the European Commission has created an Expert Group on Violent Radicalization, and has expressed its commitment—under the framework of the Hague Programme—to take action to promote more vigorous integration policies within member states for third-country nationals, based on the implementation of the Common Basic Principles on Integration adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council in November 2004. Further, to facilitate integration, the Commission has proposed a European Fund for the integration of third-country nationals aimed to cover targeted actions in this area. Indeed, the idea of integrating minorities, teaching them the liberal-democratic values of their host societies, has been repeatedly put forward as a way of preventing radicalization and recruitment into terrorist organizations.18 This is informed by the view that disenchanted members of minority groups (particularly immigrants or the children of immigrants) are especially vulnerable to the radical ideas disseminated by terrorist groups. 49


An interesting example of this approach can be found in the 19 November 2004 agreement by EU justice and interior ministers that member states should promote societal integration by requiring new immigrants to embrace the European values of democracy, rule of law, and liberal rights—and by assisting them towards meeting this goal.19 The notion involved here is that the adoption of liberal-democratic schemas of thought and action (or habitus) would help immigrants integrate in their new countries, thereby also enhancing the security of those countries. EU governments, it would seem, have been invoking the threat of international terrorism in seeking to redefine the relationship between governments and particular segments of society: as migration is increasingly securitized, immigrants acquire special duties to learn the culture of their societies, and to speed up their integration into that culture.20 Promoting good citizenship, on this logic, is a key strategy in the fight against international, religious-inspired terrorism. Linked to that, the EU has been involved in a series of educational and cultural activities aimed at strengthening a sense of shared European identity among the people of the Union.21 For example, starting from the idea that programmes targeted at youngsters in their most formative years can have very fruitful outcomes, the Commission argued that the ‘Youth Programme’ it sponsors contributes towards preventing violent behaviour from taking root in young people. A key objective of that programme is to develop an understanding of the common values of Europe, ‘thus helping to promote respect for human rights and to combat racism, antiSemitism and xenophobia’.22 In a similar vein, its ‘Culture Programme’ finances activities linked to the promotion of intercultural dialogue, as well as the common values of Europe. At the same time, the Commission is carrying out many projects under the ‘Socrates Programme’, which seeks to identify and inculcate in Europeans shared understandings of European citizenship and intercultural understanding that ‘enable people coming from different backgrounds to share a common European identity’.23 In addition, a series of school and adult education actions—carried out under the Commission’s ‘Comenius’ and ‘Grundtvig’ programmes— seek to address the problem of violent radicalization of marginalized and ‘hard to reach’ groups in society. The Commission also launched a proposal to adopt a new programme, ‘Citizens for Europe’, to promote active European citizenship. If adopted, the Union would provide financial assistance to organize events and create networks that celebrate Europe’s

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fundamental values and major achievements, thereby contributing ‘to the array of soft measures against violent radicalisation’.24 Further, the Commission launched a proposal to establish 2008 as the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue, aimed at making Europeans sensitive to the questions related to cultural differences as well as common values, and at using better EU programmes in promoting the positive values resulting from such a dialogue. In essence, many of the recent EU initiatives are aimed at helping vulnerable, disaffected, alienated individuals and groups to refuse extremist, violent types of (religious) identity, and defining their identity around the core shared liberal-democratic values and norms of the European Union. The project of preventing radicalization and recruitment involves, in other words, an effort to help individuals and groups to transcend a state of alienation—a state often cast as inferior, and potentially dangerous— and to achieve the condition of true Europeans. To put this slightly differently, what is involved here is an emphasis on the process of guiding vulnerable residents of the Union in their evolution towards full integration in mainstream European societies, and, more broadly, towards— to borrow a Kantian term—the superior law of reason, in which people govern themselves according to universally rational principles. This quest to prevent radicalization and terrorist recruitment has become part of a wider, ongoing project of European identity construction. Thus, the unprincipled terrorist groups are invoked as a negative other through which the Union can be cast as the embodiment of a superior, rational order—in other words, the image of the irrational and unethical terrorist ‘other’ has been mobilized as the latest tool in attempts to accelerate the construction of a sense of European identity. In this instance, the emphasis is on instilling that sense of European identity particularly in the vulnerable, previously excluded or marginalized Europeans—especially Muslim Europeans. As reflected in the discourse and educational/cultural activities promoted by the Commission, EU citizens and residents must learn to conceptualize their national, ethnic, or cultural differences against the background of a shared identity defined around the common values of democracy, human rights, equality, and rule of law. They must be educated to collectively define themselves in radical opposition to Islamic terrorists, and must join forces in order to defeat this new type of enemy. While this particular ‘other’ (Islamic terrorism) is relatively new in the European security discourse, processes of othering have—in various ways

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and under multiple guises—long been important features in processes aimed at constructing a European identity. In fact, as many analysts have argued, one of the most interesting aspects of the process of European integration has been the definition of the EU as a ‘normative power’, occupying the high moral ground in relation to a variety of others, and seeking to ‘shape conceptions of the normal’ of many of those others.25 In the European self-definition, the EU is committed to placing universal norms and principles at the centre of its relations with its member states . . . and the world.26 The notion involved here is that, by virtue of its historical evolution—particularly its foundation on principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law, and its success in transcending violent nationalism and conflict in Europe—the EU has a special normative basis for its relations with the world.27 Many of the debates about Europe as a normative power revolve around the important questions of its empirical status and its consistency, both in terms of respecting those norms within the Union and promoting them abroad.28 But what is also interesting is the way in which the concept of normative power is used in attempts to construct a European identity. This aspect of European identity construction has been nicely captured in Thomas Diez’s analysis; in his words: ‘the most interesting question about normative power is not whether Europe is a normative power, but how it is constructed as one.’29 On this view, the EU’s self-defined role as international promoter of universal values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law performs a dual role: trying to change other polities, and, simultaneously, constructing the EU as a superior ‘self’. Thus, ‘the narrative of normative power Europe constructs the Union’s identity, as well as the identity of others, in ways which allow EU actors to disregard their own shortcomings’,30 and, we could add, to downplay the significant differences that persist within Europe by inviting European citizens to imagine themselves as members of a higher, ethical community. In the context of the contemporary fight against international terrorism, the other is seen as particularly dangerous because it is highly elusive, operating both inside and beyond the borders of the EU, hiding among ordinary citizens, and taking advantage of the logic of global socio-economic flows to plan their attacks, seeking to destroy not only individuals and economic targets but also the ‘founding principles of the EU’. Moreover, their (‘fanatical’) willingness to carry out suicide missions,

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coupled with new technological developments—particularly the prospect that non-state actors could acquire weapons of mass destruction—means that such actors are seen as capable not only of limited domestic disturbance but also of massive, catastrophic destruction. In the confrontation with this absolute (yet hidden) other, operating both within and outside the EU, it is especially important to ‘save’ as many vulnerable individuals and groups—actors who are seen as still redeemable, but vulnerable to the appeals or pressure of extremists—and to find better ways of guiding them in the process of becoming good members or partners of the Union. It seems that this is to be achieved, to a significant extent, by socializing them into a liberal-democratic worldview and corresponding practical dispositions. Vis-à-vis such vulnerable actors, danger is defined on a temporal rather than spatial axis: the emphasis is not on pre-defined enemies that can or should be physically excluded from the Euro-Atlantic community, but, rather, on individuals and groups that still have the potential to evolve into rational, self-disciplined liberal selves and polities, but that are particularly weak/unstable, and thus in danger of falling into the ‘wrong camp’, that is, becoming supporters or even members of terrorist organizations. Based on this definition of danger, the focus of this security discourse and associated practices is on controlling the process of becoming of such vulnerable individuals and societies, seeking to prevent their evolution into a source of threat to international security, and to guide them towards evolving into responsible, liberal-democratic actors. In other words, the vision behind those programmes is one of mobilization of vulnerable individuals and communities, and their re-definition as protectors of the EU and of modern civilization, rather than mere subjects of protection. The EU’s concern to enhance the commitment of vulnerable groups to the values of liberal democracy—and to integrate those groups in liberal relations of community—does not end at the Union’s borders. Rather, EU leaders have argued that, in a situation in which terrorism arises out of the pressures of modernization, cultural, social, and political crises, the Union must focus in particular on promoting good governance and the rule of law around the world in order to prevent and combat terrorism, more broadly, to prevent the emergence of conditions likely to give rise to violent extremism.31 As Javier Solana put it, ‘We do not want the benefits of the Union to end abruptly at its external borders. Nor do we want the benefits of the Union to be reserved just to those

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countries that are current or future members. Why not? Because the Union cannot exist as an island of peace, prosperity and stability in a wider sea of turmoil.’ In Solana’s words: ‘borders matter less, and, while the extent of states has become less relevant, so the content of states has become more important.’32 In a similar vein, the Commission has argued that ‘Development assistance can help erode the support base for terrorist networks and movements through a focus on reducing inequalities, support for democratization, and respect of human rights in addition to actions on good governance, the fight against corruption, and security system reform. Furthermore, steps must be taken to prevent state fragility at an early stage, before a possible breeding ground for terrorism might emerge’.33 In essence, the perceived need to address the root causes of terrorism has given new impetus—and new dimensions—to EU programmes aimed at promoting liberal ideas about, and practices of, good governance. In the name of preventing fragile states becoming (or re-becoming) breeding grounds for terrorism, the EU became involved in missions as far afield as Afghanistan. Within the framework of the November 2005 Joint Declaration by the EU and Afghanistan, the Union finances a series of programmes of security sector and justice reform; and provides development assistance and support for developing structures for political and economic governance. In addition, several Provincial Reconstruction Teams are led by EU states, and many EU countries participate in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force. In an attempt to enhance the Union’s role in Afghanistan, in February 2007, the Council also approved the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission to Afghanistan in the field of policing, and with linkages to the wider rule of law. The mission will work towards helping to build an Afghan police force that respects human rights and operates within the framework of the rule of law. The Council insisted that particular attention should be paid to ensure complementarity and mutual reinforcement between the ESDP mission and the Union’s efforts to promote reform of the justice sector. The justice programme aims to professionalize the judicial and public prosecution services, and could also assist in the development of a new national legal aid system designed to improve Afghan citizens’ access to justice.34 But the EU’s main international focus has continued to be on European neighbours of the Union, for, as stated in the ESS, ‘Even in an era of globalization, geography is still important. It is in the 54


European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed’ (p. 12). The systematic involvement of the EU in the political and socioeconomic life of the ex-communist Central and East European states, its role in the reconstitution of those countries around liberal-democratic norms particularly through the process of enlargement, is well-known and need not be rehearsed here.35 Particularly interesting in this context is the extent to which the EU has become involved in the promotion of norms of good governance even in the more problematic, often war-torn countries of Europe, such as some of the former Yugoslav republics. The Union’s involvement in that region certainly pre-dates the 9/11 attacks, and is not confined to anti-terrorism efforts. But, while the events of 9/11 were not the reason that the Union became systematically involved in efforts to project liberal-democratic norms in its ‘neighbourhood’, the concern to prevent and combat international terrorism in the post-9/11 world has given new impetus, and a new twist, to norm diffusion practices. As a senior EU official pointed out, ‘the Union certainly does not want countries that might be a breeding ground for terrorism in its neighbourhood’.36 Given their proximity to the Union, and their troubled recent past, the countries in the Balkans have been key targets of EU norm-diffusion efforts. According to EU foreign policy statements, the future of the Western Balkans lies in Europe, even though these countries are expected to carry out massive liberal-democratic reforms before they can qualify for accession to the Union. The EU is especially heavily involved in the reconstruction of war-torn Bosnia and Kosovo. For instance, the launch of Althea, the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has marked the beginning of a new phase in the development of the Union’s crisis response capability, aiming at an integrated civil-military, peacebuilding approach in support of the long-term perspective of EU integration. More broadly, in Bosnia and in Kosovo, the EU assumed a key role within the framework of international processes of state rebuilding, involving the reconstruction of domestic political institutions, the promotion of new liberal laws, and massive programmes aimed at teaching liberal-democratic norms to Bosnians and Kosovars.37 In addition, in an attempt to avoid the creation of rigid divisions between the Union and its neighbours, the EU carries out a ‘good neighbourhood’ programme (primarily around the European Neighbourhood Policy), which includes anti-radicalization measures, but also, more broadly, seeks to promote good governance in neighbouring states. This 55


programme builds on the Union’s experience with international democratization and liberalization gained during the accession of several Central and East European states to the EU, but is aimed at those countries that are not on a path to EU membership.38 In the words of Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, ‘our neighbours are not just citizens of “third countries”, they are our close partners and friends. We share practical interests, ideals and aspirations, and we face common challenges to our security. Our first priority is thus to share the enlarged EU’s peace, stability and prosperity with our neighbours.’39 The European Neighbourhood Policy was conceived as a tool that enables the construction of a special relationship with the EU’s neighbours (Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and the Palestinian Authority), and seeks to ‘build on mutual commitments’ to common values in the fields of good governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, the principles of market economy, and sustainable development. It offers assistance in the process of strengthening the institutions protecting democracy, the rule of law, human rights and market economy, and promises a series of benefits, such as enhanced preferential trade relations, increased technical and financial assistance, and even ‘deeper integration with the EU, for instance via gradual participation in the EU’s internal market’, to those states that take concrete steps towards implementing the values and norms of the Union. The promotion of human rights and democracy has also been incorporated into the broader networks of the EU’s regional agreements, presumably based on shared values and objectives. For example, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the Central Asian republics start with a declaration on general principles, which states that respect for democracy, principles of international law and human rights . . . underpin the internal and external policies of the Parties and constitute an essential element of partnership.40 In defining its relationships to its neighbours in terms of values, the EU is, once again, performing a double exercise in identity definition by the ‘normative power Europe’: at the same time as the Union casts these states as having the potential to evolve into ‘well-governed’ liberaldemocratic polities, and takes steps to guide them in that process of becoming, it portrays itself as the repository of the ‘universal values’ of civilization. As such, the EU claims the role of authoritative guide and 56


judge of the progress made by neighbouring states in the process of becoming well-governed states. In parallel to efforts to promote norms of liberal democracy in vulnerable polities, the EU has recently put significant emphasis on aiding counter-terrorism efforts in such countries. In practice, this has meant that the Union’s relations with its neighbours have been complicated by the insertion of specific, normatively problematic counter-terrorism provisions in bilateral arrangements. Thus, since 2001, EU agreements with third countries systematically include counter-terrorism clauses and provisions of law enforcement that grant a framework for cooperation, and for the provision of assistance designed to enhance the capacity of other countries to fight terrorism (e.g. judicial capacity building, police and law enforcement work, border management security). For example, the revised Cotonou Agreement between the EU and African, Caribbean, and Pacific States includes important provisions concerning security, particularly anti-terrorism.41 The new Agreement comprises security clauses that include an express commitment by the parties to cooperate in combating terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and mercenary activities.42 To this end, parties agree to exchange information on terrorist groups (and supporters) operating on their territory, and to exchange experiences in relation to the prevention of terrorism. Relatedly, the parties also agree to cooperate in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including by establishing effective national export controls, and effective sanctions for breaches of export controls. Finally, they also agree to establish a regular political dialogue to accompany and consolidate their cooperation in this area. In other words, the revised Cotonou Agreement establishes new duties for APC countries to prevent terrorism and WMD proliferation, and to inform and cooperate with the EU in this area. In a similar vein, cooperation in the fight against terrorism is being mainstreamed into other EU external agreements, including in the Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct against Terrorism, and the Draft Agreement on CounterTerrorism with Pakistan.43 Thus, the EU has been involved in providing anti-terrorism support even to a government with dubious democratic credentials, such as the government of Pakistan, because it regards that country as an important ally in the fight against terrorism. Since 2004, the EU has initiated counter-terrorism capacity-building initiatives with Algeria, Indonesia, and Morocco, bringing together aid projects financed by member states and the Commission. The new Stability Fund will presumably 57


enable the Union to significantly increase its counter-terrorism capacitybuilding assistance to third countries. Furthermore, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans extensively cover terrorism—again, providing for cooperation with and assistance to EU neighbours in combating terrorism. The EU has even adopted a series of joint agreements in this area with Russia—seen as a key ‘strategic partner’. Thus, the EU–Russia Common Spaces of External Security and of Freedom, Security and Justice have a strong emphasis on terrorism. The Common Spaces are meant to enable the EU and Russia to reach the full potential of cooperation on many specific issues, including money laundering/terrorist financing, border management/migration, for instance via the strengthening of relations between Russia and Europol.44 In short, these programmes seem designed to disseminate shared knowledge and practical habits of cooperation in the fight against a common enemy. In principle, all these measures of cooperation and counter-terrorism capacity-building involving third countries are to be fully consistent with the protection of human rights and the rule of law, and with the promotion of democratic reforms. These measures are portrayed as part and parcel of EU efforts to help turn vulnerable, transitional polities into reliable democracies, worthy of inclusion into liberal relations of community. In practice, however, the situation is more problematic. For instance, human rights groups have repeatedly criticized Russia for its depiction of the crisis in Chechnya in terms of a fight against Islamic terrorism, and for its adoption of legislation that effectively allows human rights violations in the name of fighting terrorism.45 Or, in recent years, a combination of EU concerns with international terrorism and energy has meant that the Union has been unwilling systematically to criticize human rights abuses, particularly in Chechnya, and to pressure Russia to abandon its anti-democratic measures designed to extend state control over civil society.46 Indeed, as noted above, Russia, an important ‘strategic partner’ in the fight against terrorism, now cooperates with the EU in a series of law enforcement/border control programmes. In a similar vein, motivated by the dual concern of fighting terrorism and maintaining access to the region’s energy resources, in recent years the EU has provided substantial aid to the Central Asian Republics, thus, in effect, tolerating (and potentially reinforcing) governments that are engaged in repeated violations of human rights and democratic norms.47

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Of Fences and Flows in the Fight Against International Terrorism Over the past few years, practices that follow the logic of conditional inclusion into European structures have been coupled with practices that follow a more exclusionary logic of security, involving territorial and juridical technologies aimed at keeping the new existential (terrorist) enemies beyond the space—or at least beyond the realm of normal socioeconomic and political life—of the European Union. In regard to nonEuropeans, exclusionary practices have focused heavily on attempts to reinforce Union borders. In the case of ‘inside’ enemies (individuals or groups who already reside in the Union), attempts at exclusion have often involved efforts at placing perceived enemies beyond the realm of normal liberal politics and economic life, and making it more difficult if not impossible for them to abuse the freedoms provided by the Union and to hurt or corrupt others. In contrast to the inclusive approach, these practices are not aimed at transforming others into like-minded liberal actors who deserve inclusion into the liberal-democratic security community. Rather, security is associated with the identification, control, and exclusion of those others who are seen as ‘beyond redemption’, as enemies that pose an existential threat to the community of liberal-democratic values. Those individuals/groups are regarded as actors who have already made the decision to embrace or at least condone international terrorism, and, on the basis of their refusal to evolve into self-disciplined liberal actors, do not deserve the respect of the community of liberal democracies. Vis-à-vis such actors, the challenge for the liberal-democratic security community is not to become more inclusive but, conversely, to find new methods and technologies for their identification and exclusion, in a situation in which many groups/networks (allegedly) involved in religious-motivated international terrorist activities are seen as highly mobile, sophisticated, and quite skilful in taking advantage of the liberal freedoms of the Western world. This view is inscribed in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which states that, in addition to prevention, a key strand of work for the Union is protection. Policies that fall into this category aim ‘to protect citizens and infrastructure and reduce our vulnerability to attack’, including through improved security of borders.48 In the post-9/11 world, the threat of international terrorism has been invoked to justify—and enhance—a series of border protection measures that could be seen as quite controversial. In

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the new, extremely fluid security environment, the threat that borders must guard against is not the invading army of an enemy state, but the terrorist groups or individuals that might seek access to the EU territory in order to plan and/or carry out attacks against the Union. Under these circumstances, many of the efforts to enhance border protection rely heavily on biometrics. Especially relevant in this respect are the development of a Visa Information System (VIS), and a new generation of the Schengen Information System (SIS II). In 2003, the European Commission, having carried out the feasibility study on the necessary investment costs, reconfirmed the high priority already given at the European Councils of Laeken and Seville to the development of, among others, the following policy guidelines and objectives: the Visa Information System, as a future tool that would become a pivotal part in the plan to combat illegal immigration, and biometric identifiers technology for the overall efficiency and accuracy of the projected system.49 Following these policy guidelines, the Thessaloniki European Council Conclusions called for the establishment of a ‘coherent approach on biometrics identifiers or biometric data, which would result in harmonized solutions or documents for third-country nationals, EU citizens’ passports and information systems (VIS and SIS II)’.50 On 1 June 2005, the European Commission published proposals to upgrade the Schengen Information System (SIS II) to incorporate the new member states and include new functions. As the European Commission itself has acknowledged, the SIS II could in the near future become not only a reporting system but also an investigation system.51 The new system is designed to contain biometric data, and is to be used to store and disseminate information on extradition, third-country nationals refused entry to the EU, as well as individuals subject to a European Arrest Warrant or under surveillance by the police. Interestingly, the targets of these policy initiatives and databases are not just foreigners, but broader categories of ‘terrorist suspects’ (including EU citizens), individuals who are under police surveillance, ‘violent troublemakers’, people who should be under protection, and people whose identity may be fraudulently used as an alias by others. Taken together, the SIS II and VIS could potentially introduce the close surveillance of the movement of EU citizens, residents, as well as third-country nationals, visa entrants, and irregular migrants, and the storage of their personal data on an unprecedented scale. As Ayse Ceyhan has explained, there are several key features of the EU visa regime.52 To begin with, the regime establishes a common visa 60


processing system aimed at avoiding ‘visa-shopping’ within the Union by potentially dangerous foreigners. In addition, it establishes a common ‘black list’ of risky countries, whose nationals must possess a visa when crossing the external borders of the Union. Finally, through the creation of the Schengen Information System, it creates an important database, bringing together national lists of individuals to be excluded into a single network which can be accessed online by visa officers and border police. Although the question of who is allowed to access this database is still under discussion, the aim is to create different levels of access and to allow the online access of different agencies such as Europol, Eurojust, public prosecutors, asylum and immigration authorities, security and intelligence services. In essence, what seems to be involved in these measures is the attempt to reassert the traditional role of borders—to keep out dangerous others— but to do so by adapting that role to the challenges generated by a fluid security environment. The perceived challenge, in this context, is not to turn Europe into a fortress, but rather to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate cross-border activities, between trusted and risky travellers, and to facilitate the movement of the former while becoming more effective at keeping out the latter. The EU’s response to that challenge is to create new, shared knowledge about risky travellers, and to develop common, effective practices of surveillance and filtering out those travellers. Thus, the increasing reliance on biometrics can be seen as an attempt to create the perfectly portable border, condensing time and space as biometrics (supposedly) enable the authorities to gain immediate access to a whole set of data about each individual anywhere in the world attempting to enter the EU space, and, on this basis, to instantly place that individual into a particular category of ‘riskiness’, and treat him/her accordingly.53 With the establishment of complex databases and visa regimes, border controls become partially detached from territorial frontiers: frontiers become more fluid, enacted in the country of origin or residence of migrants by a hybrid network of actors that encompass consulates, customs officials, airport check-in desks, etc.54 One of the most important implications of the enactment of flexible border control in the fight against dangerous foreigners has been a blurring of boundaries between the public and private arenas. Thus, private actors have been increasingly involved in practices aimed at controlling Europe’s internal and especially external borders via identifying—and excluding—individuals and groups suspected of involvement in organized crime and terrorism. An interesting example in this respect is the introduction of carrier liability 61


that enables EU governments to conduct ‘policing at a distance’. Thus, at check-in counters at airports around the world people are classified, decisions are made regarding the risk posed by foreigners, and those deemed undesirable and/or potentially dangerous are excluded from European soil before they can even board a plane to Europe.55 The duties of protection assigned to private actors are likely to be extended if the new counter-terrorism package proposed by the European Commission in November 2007 is approved by the Council. In the name of ‘stepping up the fight against terrorism’—identified as the ‘main threat to society’—the Commission has proposed an ambitious set of initiatives, including the adoption of a European Passenger Name Record (PNR), requiring all EU member states to have an air passenger information storage system which their security services would be able to access.56 It would appear that the new system would be similar to the US PNR, as it would require airlines travelling to or from the EU to transmit nineteen pieces of personal data on each of their passengers—including names, travel dates, full itinerary, billing data, and baggage information—to analysis units in charge of assessing travellers’ terrorist risk in the first EU state where the plane is to land. Each passenger’s data would be subjected to a risk assessment, which could lead to refusal of entry for that passenger. That data would be kept for five years and then for a further eight years in a ‘dormant’ database. In other words, under this plan, European security services would have permanent access to private passenger data—and that would require carriers to not only obtain and store (likely extensive) data about their passengers but also communicate that data to the authorities in order to sustain practices of identification of risky passengers. The plan has already been heavily criticized by human rights groups and Members of the European Parliament, who worry that these proposals will bypass parliamentary scrutiny and judicial oversight and might be adopted based on undemocratic assessments of their potential merits.57 Especially problematic, according to critics, is the fact that the new plan would endanger the passengers’ rights, especially the right to privacy as it does not incorporate sufficient provisions for the protection of that data. In a press release issued on 3 December, the Civil Liberties Committee of the European Parliament argued that ‘Governments and EU institutions have often responded to terrorist attacks by adopting laws that have been insufficiently discussed and sometimes in violation of basic human rights such as the right to privacy or to a fair trial. . . . ’ Analysing recent initiatives related to the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy, MEPs expressed a 62


particular concern regarding the potential misuse by authorities of the personal information contained in numerous databases, including the PNR, and Visa Information Systems, ‘to create profiles through datamining techniques’.58 For its part, the Association of European Airlines has been quick to criticize the Commission for imposing upon the airlines extremely onerous duties of data collection and reporting as part of a proposed system that would involve significant costs and amount to a ‘bureaucratic and operational nightmare’.59 Moreover, the Association has castigated the Commission for failing to take into account the industry’s expertise and advice on how to enhance the security of air travel without imposing such extensive new duties. According to the Secretary General of the Association of European Airlines, ‘It is not for us to decide whether such a system would actually enhance security in Europe . . . But we do know how to transport passengers safely, and how to conduct operations accordingly. So we are hugely disappointed that none of our concerns were taken into account by DG Justice, Liberty and Security.’60 The pattern that seems to be emerging in this area is one of growing mobilization of private actors in exceptional practices of risk-management within the framework of hybrid security networks. The PNR would contribute to the construction of new knowledge and habitual practices of cooperation between public and private actors in the monitoring of the population and the identification and exclusion of risky individuals. While private actors are expected to be fully mobilized and to accept extensive new duties in pursuit of the common good (security for EU citizens), mobilization is conducted on terms set by the Council and the Commission. Those institutions invoke both their responsibility to protect the citizens of the EU against the extraordinary risk of a terrorist attack61 and their privileged knowledge/intelligence about that risk to justify measures that suspend or limit civic freedoms and bypass normal procedures of democratic scrutiny. Simultaneously, measures such as the PNR establish rigid terms of cooperation between public and private actors. In essence, those terms involve the former’s subordination to the latter, for public agencies are deemed as possessors of privileged knowledge about security risks, and loci of special responsibility to protect the citizens of the EU. In this sense, through measures such as the PNR, the EU seems to be involving private actors in the performance of practices of surveillance, profiling, and control of the population that escape the democratic scrutiny and accountability supposed to govern policymaking in democratic polities. 63


The logic behind these measures of surveillance through technological developments and the transnationalization of police information is not fundamentally new. Rather, they can be seen as the extension and acceleration of a logic of control of social and economic flows that was inscribed in proposals that can be traced back to the beginning of the Trevi and Schengen Groups. In this sense, the image of an absolute yet unconventional enemy has served to legitimize measures of control that, previously, might have been regarded as inconsistent with the core values and freedoms of the EU, and, as such, unacceptable. Efforts to construct comprehensive shared knowledge about risky individuals, and to take steps to effectively monitor and exclude them from the liberal-democratic community, are likely to gain new momentum following the agreement, under the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, to transfer police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to the first pillar of the EU. This change will enable the Union to make decisions in these matters on the basis of majority voting (as is already the case with asylum and immigration policies), and will also give the Commission and the European Court of Justice important roles in governing police and criminal justice affairs. In plain language, this means that from 2009 most JHA (justice and home affairs) issues will be treated as ‘normal’ EU business. There are, however, limits to this change. Since many of the issues at stake are sensitive, the EU has added an ‘emergency brake’ that allows each government to halt discussions on a JHA measure that could conceivably threaten its national legal system. If the country in question cannot reach a compromise with its EU partners, it is free to opt out of the measure. In addition—and perhaps we should add despite the availability of this safeguard—the British government has negotiated an opt-out from all JHA policies: that is, Britain will have the right to pick and choose whether to take part in JHA legislation. Ireland, with which the UK has a common travel area, will also follow this arrangement. Nevertheless, following the conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty, it is reasonable to expect more EU-wide efforts to produce knowledge about—and use that knowledge to create more mechanisms for the control and exclusion of—individuals suspected of involvement in acts, including terrorism, that are seen as a threat to the people, values, and institutions of the Union. Whatever one may think about their security merits, from the point of view of the liberal-democratic values and principles that the Union claims to embody, the development of databases such as the Schengen Information System is problematic not only due to their impact on 64


the protection of privacy and the maintenance of a boundary between the public–private realms but also because they seem to entail the categorization of people, including EU residents, in terms of the potential risk they pose for the Union. Monitoring implies the discrimination of people on the basis of the idea that they are likely to abuse free movement to commit violent acts. This practice, however, is in tension with founding principles of liberal-democratic polities: the principle of non-discrimination in application of the law, and the presumption of innocence (everyone is to be assumed innocent until and unless proven guilty). As numerous analysts and human rights organizations have argued, the danger seems to be that, in the name of protecting the people, values, and institutions of the European Union from terrorism, European authorities may adopt special measures that threaten precisely those values and institutions.62 There is also an interesting tension between the logic of control and exclusion embodied in these measures and the Kantian logic of conditional inclusion emphasized, as we have seen, in other security policies promoted by the Union. The new measures of exclusion, by targeting particular groups, seem to suggest that, by virtue of their specific definitions of (especially religious) identities, some actors are less likely than others to exercise reason and evolve into trustworthy, selfdisciplined selves. Another important dimension of the pursuit of European security via the strengthening of borders aimed at the exclusion of dangerous others can also be found in the Union’s policy vis-à-vis its neighbours. We noted above that, in the name of preventing the emergence of new dividing lines within Europe, the EU initiated programmes such as the ENP aimed at enhancing cooperation and promoting the (conditional) integration of neighbours in various EU policy areas. However, this has been accompanied by more exclusionary security practices, aimed at strengthening the Union’s external borders, and mobilizing neighbouring states in efforts to prevent those (allegedly) involved in international terrorism and organized crime from crossing into the EU space.63 According to the European Security Strategy, while the Union’s neighbours hold the potential to evolve into self-disciplined polities who adhere to the liberal norm, at present their weakness, or/and the deviation from liberal precepts by some of these neighbours, constitute a potential threat to the Union. According to the European Security Strategy, ‘Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.’64 Thus, ‘The outbreak of 65


conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent.’65 In addition, one of the most problematic recent developments, according to EU strategic documents, is the growth of transnational networks of organized criminals within weak or failed states—the ‘Balkan criminal networks’ and Afghanistan are particularly mentioned in the European Security Strategy. The notion involved here is that, particularly in the context of EU enlargement and, as a corollary to that, changes in Union boundaries, these networks threaten to bring within the space of the EU the disorder and criminality characteristic of the inferior realm of otherness. From this perspective, what is needed vis-à-vis these problematic neighbours is the (re)creation of strong boundaries, which can keep away from the Union the dangers generated by deviations from, or at least imperfect applications of, liberal norms. Security, therefore, is to be pursued, at least in part, via the logic of spatially defined difference between sameness/otherness, and the confinement, or displacement, of otherness beyond ‘our’ borders. In the language of the ENP, it is increasingly important to take effective action against ‘organized crime and immigration. [Therefore] efficient and secure border management will be essential both to protect the shared borders and to facilitate legitimate trade and passage . . . Securing European borders against smuggling, trafficking, organized crime (including terrorist threats) and illegal immigration (including transit migration) will be of crucial importance’.66 Through the discursive fusion of terrorism, organized crime, and illegal migration in this representation of dangers to the European territory and people, the EU discourse justifies a series of measures aimed at creating a quasi-buffer zone around the Union. What is involved here is the invocation of the (alleged) threat of international terrorism to securitize the issue of illegal migration, and thus to build up—and legitimize—a series of measures designed at keeping out of, the Union a large number of individuals, by portraying them not just as (potential) illegal migrants, but as a possible threat to the security of the people and territory of the EU by virtue of their suspected involvement in international terrorism. The illegal migrants are thus to be fenced off, and the Union’s neighbours cannot qualify as ‘good’, well-governed polities if they allow such undesirable others to transgress borders. Thus, according to the ENP, it is the duty of neighbours to keep out of the EU those individuals and groups—both their citizens and third-country nationals—that the EU member states consider personae

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non gratae. This is to be carried out through exchanges of information, monitoring migration flows, strengthening borders, as well as signing and implementing readmission agreements. In this respect, the ENP reiterates the aim of improving removal and repatriation of undesirable others that was articulated in a series of EU security documents, including the Hague Programme, which called for ‘the establishment of an effective removal and repatriation policy based on common standards’.67 In a situation in which border controls, and the whole set of practices aimed at monitoring and preventing ‘undesirable others’ (as identified by the EU) from entering the space of the Union, are regarded as important in the effort to minimize threats of terrorist attacks on the EU, those countries that fail to cooperate with the Union—in the terms set by the Union—run the risk of being (re)defined as a source of threat to the Union, and being treated accordingly. Thus, at a meeting in June 2004, EU Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs made it clear that ‘the Southern Mediterranean and those countries whose cooperation is deemed insufficient to tackle terrorism will risk a loss of aid and trade’.68 One of the potential risks associated with these policies is that in the name of their friendship with Europe, governments in neighbouring states may lose domestic support—as they are required to take coercive actions against their own nationals. Furthermore, these policies may also compromise cooperation between neighbouring states and with third countries. In other words, the ENP embodies a contradiction: on the one hand, it is explicitly aimed at preventing the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe, and on the other hand, in the name of securing borders and excluding dangerous others from the territory of the Union, it seeks to create new types of (albeit more mobile) fences around the EU, and between partners of the Union and third countries.

Crime and Punishment Across Borders? As noted above, a third major pillar, or strand of work, of the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy concerns the pursuit and investigation of terrorists ‘across our borders and globally’. The aim is ‘to impede planning, travel and communications; to disrupt support networks; to cut off funding and access to attack materials, and bring terrorists to justice’.69 The enhanced emphasis on practices aimed at identifying, controlling, and excluding dangerous individuals from the space, or at least from

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the normal life, of the Euro-Atlantic community can be understood as part of a process identified earlier in the book as the individualization of war. Recall that, according to the EU security discourse, internationally organized terrorist groups, with the aid of modern technology, could potentially inflict upon the Western world the kind of damage that was previously available only to states. Under these circumstances, one of the key priorities, as stated in the Counter-Terrorism Strategy, has been to devise more effective methods to make it impossible for terrorists and their supporters to take advantage of the economic freedom of the liberal world in order to finance their activities. In other words, both within the EU and in relations between the Union and its partners, there has been an explicit focus on excluding individuals and groups suspected of involvement in terrorist activities from the normal socio-economic life of the Union. What is involved here is a process of securitization of economic life: activities that occur in the economic sphere (e.g. financial transactions, the establishment and promotion of charities) are now seen to have important security implications. As a corollary to that, actors engaged in those activities are no longer regarded as mere participants in private transactions, but also individuals or groups who contribute to the security (or insecurity) of the Union. Under these circumstances, participants in economic transactions require special supervision and exceptional measures of control. Those measures are aimed at identifying and excluding potentially dangerous actors, while at the same time enabling the others to pursue their normal activities. In other words, as in the case of travel/migration, security needs are seen to require the systematic control and management of flows— and, therefore, demand the development of tools that make it possible to achieve that control. Over the past few years, a plethora of EU regulations have been adopted with the aim of enhancing the control of economic flows throughout the Union. These regulations create new duties for member states to adopt common practices of monitoring financial transactions that take place within their territory, and to identify and exclude from the normal economic life of the Union those individuals or corporations suspected of involvement in organized crime or terrorism.70 As in the area of migration, one of the most interesting consequences of the renewed emphasis on identifying, excluding, and punishing dangerous individuals and groups has been the blurring of the conventional boundary between the public and private spheres, the protector/the protected, as private actors have been increasingly involved in efforts to 68


secure Europe. Thus, in the context of the struggle against international terrorism, the EU has been witnessing a particular version of a move towards ‘responsibilization’71 : the adoption of measures that are based on the notion that we are all responsible for our own safety and security, and that the fight against such an elusive enemy requires that responsible citizens engage in a broad cooperation with public agencies—but, again, on the terms set by those agencies. In the words of the European Commission: ‘The battle against terrorism requires the mobilisation of all citizens to guarantee freedom and security for all.’ 72 In the post-9/11 EU security discourse, there is an emphasis on the need to construct new conceptual and practical dispositions in the field of security, to transcend boundaries between the public/private sphere, security/economics, and to establish systematic forms of cooperation between a plurality of actors. In practice, this has entailed the establishment of new duties for private European actors, be they individuals or corporations, to do their part in the fight against the new enemy, to act as ‘good citizens’ of Europe, and to join forces with their governments in monitoring and combating terrorist threats. For instance, the EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism states that private companies (particularly in the financial sector) are to enhance their transparency and take on new duties involving the reporting of activities perceived as suspicious. In the 2005 updated Plan of Action, it is stated that ‘With a view to improving the traceability and transparency of movement of funds by terrorists, the [European] Council agreed on a general approach on a proposal for a Directive aimed at preventing the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering or terrorist financing. This proposal extends the scope of reporting obligations also to transactions which could be related to terrorist financing.’73 In a similar vein, as part of an effort to combat terrorist financing, the European Council approved a series of measures designed to enhance transparency, tighten control of financial transactions among private actors, and strengthen the duties of non-state actors to report suspicious activities. For example, in addition to decisions to adopt a new Regulation on Wire Transfers, a new Laundering Directive and the Regulation on Cash Control (to control the movement of funds, and prevent individuals or groups financing terrorists by carrying cash in/out of the Union), the Council agreed to combat terrorist financing by establishing a Code of Conduct to prevent the misuse of charities by terrorists.74 Another relevant example of the blurring of the boundary between the public and private realms in the performance of security duties can be 69


found in recent EU initiatives aimed at protecting cyberspace. The Internet, of course, has no borders, making it difficult to locate and prosecute cyber terrorists, computer hackers, or other attackers. Moreover, the heavy dependence on computer-based infrastructures has turned effective cyber security efforts into a critical aspect of EU security. In response to these developments, the EU has undertaken a variety of cyberspace security measures, mainly aimed at forging partnerships between governments and private business to ensure that vital industries and networks are protected from cyber attacks. For instance, in 2002, the EU’s Dependability Development Support Initiative drafted an action plan for critical infrastructure protection that called for better collaboration between the European Commission, individual nations and private industry. The plan asked the private industry to develop best practice for information security management, install security technologies, and develop investment tools to promote good security practices. European concerns in the area of cyber security also led to the establishment of the European Network and Information Security Agency, aimed at assisting member states and European institutions to improve the security of networks and information systems, by developing more extensive public–private partnerships, new risk-assessment and risk-management strategies.75 In addition, in February 2006, the Council adopted a Directive on Retention of Telecommunications Traffic Data (based on a 2005 Commission proposal). This Directive creates new duties for Internet providers operating within the Union to keep extensive records of private exchanges in cyberspace.76 The recent moves designed to address cyber threats reflect a double challenge to conventional security categories: not only are the new threats to be dealt with via networks that encompass both public and private actors, but also the boundary between physical/virtual space is blurred to an unprecedented degree. In an era in which attacks on computer systems could rapidly and massively affect the socio-economic and military capabilities of a country, physical space cannot be secured without also protecting the virtual space. The image of unknown groups of potential terrorists that could reside anywhere in the world and, via their actions in cyberspace, could bring down the economy and/or defences of EU countries is, perhaps, one of the most powerful illustrations of the complexities involved in managing security risks in the twenty-first century. In essence, the transformations carried out in the name of enhancing the ability of the EU to fight international terrorism have contributed to a development identified in Chapter 1 as the diversification of the 70


security field. In a diverse security field, security is the responsibility of not only public agencies but also state and corporate actors, private security companies, groups, and individuals. The distinctions between private and public security are being blurred and reconfigured, generating networks of institutions and practices, or, to borrow Johnston’s phrase, ‘hybrid security structures’.77 As part of the development of hybrid security structures, the view— emphasized in EU security documents and statements—that the new type of dangerous others, Islamic terrorists, are actors that operate both within and outside the Union and pose a threat both to the Union and to the civilized world itself has informed an effort to create new legal and institutional mechanisms and bodies designed to facilitate cooperation among member states, and thus to enhance their collective ability to combat terrorism. For example, in addition to the introduction of a single European Arrest Warrant valid in the entire Union, in 2002, EUROJUST was established as the first permanent network of judicial authorities in the world, intended to facilitate cooperation between competent authorities in member states on criminal matters, in particular by facilitating the execution of international mutual legal assistance and the implementation of extradition requests. The experience of a large-scale terrorist attack by Al Qaeda on European soil, in March 2004 in Madrid, led to new measures aimed at countering terrorism and organized crime that might finance terrorism. These measures, approved by the European Council on 25 March 2004, include: the creation of a counter-terrorism coordinator to oversee European anti-terrorist activities; the integration of an intelligence structure on terrorism within the Council Secretariat; the reinforcement of the role of Eurojust and Europol (the EU law enforcement organization, whose main priority has become the fight against terrorism); and the establishment of a European Borders Agency (which was inaugurated in June 2005, with the aim of coordinating activities of national border guards at the external border of the enlarged EU, carrying out threat assessments, assisting in the training of guards, and providing technical support and other forms of assistance in joint return operations).78 In addition, the December 2005 Justice Council reached agreement on a framework decision for a European Evidence Warrant, aimed at creating a standard form warrant for obtaining objects, documents, and data in cross-border cases. Relatedly, and in contrast to the conventional modern principle of distinction between internal and external security agencies dealing 71


with separate issues (law enforcement vs. defence), the Europeans have responded to the change in the nature of enemies and security threats by seeking to blur the boundary between the two domains of security. As a series of analysts have pointed out, in the past few years, often in the name of fighting terrorism, EU members have adopted measures aimed at de-differentiating policy and military functions, institutions, and practices in Europe.79 Relevant examples of this partial de-differentiation include the increasingly close linkages between law enforcement and foreign intelligence, as agencies that were conventionally concerned with security threats that belonged to different spatial domains are now increasingly cooperating in pursuit of a common enemy that operates both inside and outside the Union. As foreign intelligence services have been increasingly required to cooperate with the services of other European states and taken on internal security threats (e.g. combating organized crime within EU member states), they have also been engaging in closer collaboration with law enforcement bodies. Conversely, law enforcement agencies are increasingly concerned with activities that do not stop at their borders, for groups and individuals involved—or suspected of involvement—in terrorism or organized crime in a given EU country often have links to groups operating beyond the borders of that country. Nowadays, national police forces and public prosecutors make frequent use of the European Arrest Warrant, and various national security and intelligence services within the EU contribute to (and draw on) the threat assessments produced by the EU Joint Situation Centre. In turn, the Joint Situation Centre’s assessments are meant to inform decisions across the range of the EU’s policies.80 Meanwhile, national customs officers have become involved in joint counter-terrorism exercises, as have rapid intervention units of national police forces.81 While the Europeans have focused for the most part on the development of non-military means of combating terrorism, the Union’s security discourse has insisted that it is also important to strengthen the EU’s military capabilities, in case the use of force becomes necessary in the fight against the new, unconventional enemies. The perceived threat of internationally organized terrorism is invoked as one of the main reasons why, according to the ESS, Europe needs to build up highly mobile forces able to act effectively against elusive enemies. At the same time, it is argued, the EU needs to develop a coherent strategic culture of early and ‘robust intervention’, which would presumably enable the Union to ‘act effectively in cases where military intervention becomes necessary’.82 As 72


stated in the European Security Strategy, in the contemporary context ‘the first line of defence is often abroad’. This means that, if the Europeans do not act effectively against dangerous others wherever those actors operate, if they do not stop them in time, then terrorist networks will become more and more powerful, and the territory and people of the EU itself could soon become the victims of their operations. The EU’s military weakness has been repeatedly identified as a problem that needs to be addressed, and in recent years a growing emphasis has been placed on the need for the Union to build up its military muscle, because it might need that muscle in operations outside of the territory of the Union.83 EU leaders have pointed out that in some instances it might be necessary to use military power against terrorists and those ‘who support them’, including, the implication seems to be, states that support them. In addition, interventions—including military interventions—may also be needed ‘to put failed states back on their feet’.84 Civilian power, it would seem, is no longer enough, even if military force should only be used within the framework of international law and on the basis of a UN mandate.85 Rather, it will be recalled, EU security documents state that, in a situation in which ‘global terrorism, often nourished by violent extremism ready to use unlimited violence in a context of increasingly open borders, poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe’, dealing with terrorism could require ‘a comprehensive approach based on intelligence, policy, judiciary, military and other means’.86 After 9/11, the EU began to envision the ESDP as one of the tools in combating terrorism. This was first made clear in the EU’s official reaction to the attacks, on 14 September: ‘These tragic events oblige us to take urgent decisions on how the European Union should respond to these challenges . . . We shall make the European Security and defence Policy operational as soon as possible.’87 In a similar vein, the Seville European Council on 21–22 June 2004 outlined the comprehensive approach to anti-terrorism, including contributions by military means within the framework of the ESDP.88 In recent years, the Europeans have taken a series of institutional steps aimed at empowering the EU to play a greater role in the military area of security. A relevant example in this sense is the 2004 decision by the Council of Ministers to include the battlegroup concept in the Headline Goal 2010. The aim was to create a European rapid reaction capability of up to 13 separate battlegroups, some single-nation forces, other multinational, and each 1,500 men/women strong.89 The battlegroups are seen as an important European contribution to international interventions in 73


failed states: for example, by enabling the Union to play a greater role in UN-mandated missions (such as via the creation of EU-commanded ‘modules’ within larger UN missions).90 More broadly, the Headline Goal 2010, building on the Helsinki Headline Goal, commits the Union to be able by 2010 to respond to a crisis with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union. Although questions remain regarding the willingness and ability of some EU member states to effectively participate in multinational battlegroups, the very adoption of the concept of battlegroup reflects a clear desire to take the EU beyond its traditional civilian power role and build up its ability to project military power in the international arena. Again, the decision to build up the EU’s military muscle was not simply inspired by the desire to combat international terrorism. Rather, the events of 9/11 gave new impetus to already existing efforts to empower the Union to play a greater role in the field of security, including, when necessary, through the use of force. For instance, the perceived need to enhance the Union’s ability to conduct (UN-mandated) forceful interventions in failed states acquired a new sense of urgency in light of the view that such states could turn into breeding grounds for terrorism. In addition, several EU initiatives in the military area are specifically aimed at combating international terrorism. To give just an example, the Union’s database of military assets and capabilities for the protection of civilians is being expanded to cover all human-caused as well as natural disasters, and the terrorist threat has been incorporated in all the relevant illustrative scenarios used for identifying the assets and capabilities needed for EU-led crisis management operations.91 Thus, according to the 2005 Conceptual Framework on the ESDP Dimension of the Fight Against Terrorism, it is important to develop military capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations by incorporating the terrorist threat in all relevant illustrative scenarios in the framework of the Headline Goal 2010. The development of the corresponding military requirements should be included in the elaboration of the Requirements Catalogue 2005. Work in this field should take into account possible preventive and protective measures. Possible measures related to the prevention of the terrorist threat, including maritime and airspace control-type operations, should be considered.92

The idea that military force might be exercised by the EU in the fight against international terrorism raises interesting questions regarding the potential scenarios in which such force might be used. According to the 74


2005 Report issued by the Assembly of the Western European Union, ‘the armed forces will need to adapt in order to be able to combat transnational terrorist groups within and outside the homeland’.93 The argument in that Report is that the armed forces’ involvement is ‘unavoidable when— irrespective of where the action is—there is a serious and imminent risk to homeland security. The most obvious example would be the threat of a plane being blown up by being flown into a building. Second, the use of the armed forces would be fully justified when the terrorist capability it is sought to neutralize is superior to that of the security forces’.94 In other words, what seems to be suggested in that Report is the application of the war paradigm against non-state enemies, even when they are located within the territory of the Union. And, as noted above, in the Conceptual Framework on the ESDP Dimension of the Fight Against Terrorism, it is stated that military force may be needed even at the prevention stage: ‘Prevention is one of the three main objectives identified by the Declaration on solidarity against terrorism, for which all Member State resources should be mobilized, including military ones.’95 Thus, ‘scenarios involving maritime and airspace control-type operations should be envisaged’.96 Under these scenarios, the politics of exclusion from the EU of dangerous others could take an extreme form, involving, quite possibly, the death of those others. It is still unclear what kind of military force might be seen as acceptable—and used—should ‘an imminent risk to homeland security’ be identified, and it is also unclear what kind of evidence would be needed to determine the existence of such an imminent threat. Nevertheless, envisaging the use of military force in the name of preventing a terrorist attack is bound to be problematic for it entails the possible suspension of the most basic right supported by the EU, the right to life— not only concerning those suspected of involvement in terrorism but also of innocent individuals who might be caught in the cross-fire.

The Limits of Anti-Terrorism Cooperation Within the EU There are, however, limits to the communitarian logic that is inscribed in EU documents and in the measures aimed at fighting international Islamic terrorism. The EU initiatives discussed in this chapter—from the new European Arrest Warrant to the legislative and institutional reforms aimed at enhancing control over financial transactions and over Europe’s 75


borders, and to measures aimed at military capability development—have reshaped in important ways the European field of security, establishing new security mechanisms and rules, blurring the boundary between the public and private arenas and between law enforcement and defence, and creating new duties for EU actors (public and private), as well as for the Union’s partners. But the implementation of some of these measures has been far from unproblematic. Indeed, in several instances and in various areas, the implementation of new EU regulations has been delayed or complicated by problems of coordination among member states, by lack of trust among the institutions of member states, and even by explicit challenges to the authority of the EU in the field of anti-terrorism. In some instances, failures or limits of cooperation threaten to undermine some of the core principles and values of the Union. For instance, the protection of the basic rights of the individual should be a key consideration in any security measure adopted by the EU. But, as explained by Thierry Balzacq and Sergio Carrera, the lack of political agreement within the Council of Ministers on the proposal for a framework decision on certain procedural rights of suspected terrorists in criminal proceedings throughout the EU sheds light on the member states’ hesitation towards having more Europe in this area.97 The danger associated with this situation is that the principle of legitimacy and the rule of law may be endangered, as cooperation in this area continues to be conducted mainly on an intergovernmental basis, falling outside the Community method. This prevents a direct and transparent involvement by the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. Or, as Balzacq and Carrera argue, the European Parliament should be included in the decision-making procedure, in order to guarantee the democratic accountability of the legal instruments being adopted and implemented in the Union.98 In addition, as pointed out by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, while numerous legislative and institutional reforms have been carried out in order to enhance terrorism-related intelligence-sharing at the EU level, cooperation in this area remains limited.99 Thus, a series of problems—ranging from lack of trust to differences in procedure and institutional cultures—continue to make systematic coordination and cooperation quite difficult, both at the national and at the EU levels. In relations between member states and European bodies, one problem is that some member states have yet to fully comply with the EU’s Decision 2005/671/JHA, which creates a duty for Union member states to provide information related to terrorist offences to Europol and Eurojust. At the 76


EU level, although Europol and Eurojust are now working together more closely, they continue to operate within different legal frameworks. What is still needed is a strong structural link between these agencies in order to enable Eurojust to fully benefit from Europol’s capacity in terms of criminal analysis. And, perhaps even more worryingly for the EU, lack of trust in some member states’ judicial and legal systems has even given rise to a process of legal contestation of the European Arrest Warrant, seen as an important tool in the collective European fight against terrorism. A case in point is the legal challenge brought by Germany before its Constitutional Court, questioning the compatibility of the European Arrest Warrant with its constitutional legal setting.100 In July 2005, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany actually ruled the act implementing the EAW into German law as void. These problems raise difficult questions regarding the extent of European cooperation in the area of freedom, security, and justice. It is unclear if and how the Union will address these questions in the near future. In the meantime, while the EU policies and mechanisms for fighting terrorism will probably continue to expand, the Europeans will also continue to rely, in all likelihood, on separate intergovernmental forms of cooperation and specific national measures. It is reasonable to assume that the combination of these different layers of counter-terrorism instruments will continue to give rise to tensions. Meanwhile, in the military area, the process of developing a coherent European strategic culture is likely to be a long and highly complicated process—if, indeed, it is to occur at all. Moreover, it is far from clear that all member states are ready to delegate to the EU the authority to ‘speak’ and enact coherent European defence policies. Indeed, it seems reasonable to argue that countries like the UK and some of the newer members from Central/Eastern Europe would resist any dramatic moves in that direction—at least in the foreseeable future. Following the divisions that came to light in the context of the war in Iraq, EU officials have been keen to invoke stories of cooperation and solidarity among member states. But, again, the reality has been more problematic. For example, the EU claims to be strongly committed to Afghanistan, based on the idea that the Union must do its best to ensure that the country does not re-emerge as a safe haven for Al Qaeda and their supporters. But, even in that case, serious disagreements regarding the acceptable use of force persist, as reflected in the very different national caveats under which various European states operate within ISAF.101 While, institutionally, this is more of a problem for NATO (which leads ISAF) than it is for the EU, the disagreements 77


among European states that persist in this area do suggest that the construction of a common European strategic culture is not going to be easy. In this chapter, we have explored the ways in which EU efforts at addressing the perceived threat of international terrorism involve a combination of inclusive and exclusive security practices. In parallel to EU attempts to enhance its role in the field of security, NATO and the OSCE— as key players in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture—have also been engaged in efforts to adapt their roles and broaden their mandates, as they have sought to cast themselves as relevant actors in the fight against the (perceived) new threat to civilization, international terrorism. It is now time to turn our attention to the ways in which NATO has sought to adapt to the perceived demands of the new fight against international terrorism. In the next chapter, we examine the practices and policies of the alliance that is now recasting itself as a security-management organization, and we discuss the ways in which NATO, too, has been seeking to combine— albeit in different ways—inclusive and exclusionary security practices.

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3 Of Friends and Foes in the Fight Against Terrorism: NATO and the Politics of Norm Promotion in the Twenty-First Century

Just as, more than a decade after the end of the Cold War, debates about NATO’s ongoing relevance were beginning to subside, September 11 and the subsequent US-led ‘war on terror’ forced the Atlantic Alliance back to the blackboard in an (yet another) attempt to redefine its role, and to refute claims that it was (again) facing an existential crisis. Over the past few years, the challenge for NATO has been to transform itself into a highly flexible and complex institution, designed to manage a plurality of complicated, often ill-defined risks. As we shall see, NATO has sought to respond to perceived new dangers, particularly international terrorism, via a dual approach, combining inclusive and exclusionary security practices. To begin with, there has been a renewed effort to deepen and expand the Western security community via the promotion of liberaldemocratic norms. The inclusive, security community-building approach has been accompanied by a more exclusionary set of practices. Those are aimed at identifying, excluding from relations of liberal-democratic community, and defeating, if necessary via the use of force, a range of (mostly unconventional) actors who, by virtue of their alleged commitment to the destruction of liberal-democratic values and polities, are identified as (the new) existential threats to the NATO allies and their partners. This chapter examines the nature of the particular combination of inclusive/exclusionary practices enacted by NATO in the first years of the twenty-first century, and analyses the different images of otherness and—as a corollary to that—the different relations between self/other that

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NATO and the Politics of Norm Promotion in the 21st Century

underpin those practices. I examine the ways in which practices enacted in the name of fighting international terrorism challenge conventional IR wisdom about international security. Finally, I argue that significant tensions have emerged between some of these practices and the alliance’s claim that it acts in the name of promoting liberal-democratic norms and values. I also analyse the ways in which NATO has mobilized and sought to strengthen its symbolic and material capital in an attempt to justify its persistence, to cast itself as a key (if not the key) Euro-Atlantic security institution, uniquely able to perform the full gamut of missions needed in the twenty-first century.

The End of the Cold War and the Dream of Expanding the Western Security Community From its creation in 1949, NATO defined itself as the security arm of a community of liberal-democratic norms and values, regarded as the core values of the Western world. Thus, in the eyes of its members, what made the North Atlantic Treaty Organization different from previous military alliances was its explicit expression of, and support for, a security community of liberal-democratic values—democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.1 For the first forty years of NATO’s existence, its political dimension, built around Article 2, was often subordinated to—though never completely subsumed by—the military dimension.2 The end of the Cold War, however, led the allies to focus on Article 2 to an unprecedented degree, in a situation in which NATO embarked on a process of adaptation to the new environment. To a large extent, NATO’s efforts at reinventing itself involved a strengthening of its political dimension, as the allies insisted that their security organization had never been just a military alliance against the Soviet Union. It is revealing that, in his argument about the ongoing relevance of NATO, the then Secretary General Manfred Wörner argued immediately following the end of the Cold War: The Treaty of Washington of 1949 nowhere mentions the Soviet Union, but stresses instead the need for a permanent community of Western democracies to make each other stronger through cooperation, and to work for more peaceful international relations. The Alliance has played a major role in reconciling former adversaries, in counteracting neo-isolationism within the world’s greatest power and in promoting new standards of consultation and cooperation among its members. All these elements would still have been fundamental to security and prosperity in Europe even in the absence of the Soviet threat.3

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In the 1990s, instability in some of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union led NATO to the conclusion that, in order to fulfil its traditional role of protecting its members, it had to become an exporter of democratic security, to help stabilize Europe and prevent the spread of violent nationalist politics.4 This occurred in a situation in which, as noted earlier, following the end of the Cold War, a (Kantian-inspired) democratic peace discourse came to prevail in Western decision-making circles. According to that discourse, the best way to ensure long-lasting international peace and stability involves the establishment and maintenance of liberal-democratic polities, rather than the creation of particular geo-strategic arrangements (e.g. balances of power), as conventional International Relations theory would have us think. At the heart of the early post–Cold War NATO discourse was the idea that the main threat to the allies was not one of aggression by an inimical state, but rather the instability that could result from the socio-economic and political problems of transition experienced by ex-communist states.5 On this logic, by promoting democratic stability in the former communist bloc, the alliance would not only help the Central/East Europeans but would also enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Again, the statements issued by then NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner are particularly revealing: ‘NATO must play its part alongside other Western institutions in extending the security and stability we enjoy to all European nations.’ In his words, in the post–Cold War era, the alliance ‘was needed more than ever—to sustain the trans-Atlantic link, to prevent Europe from sliding back into nationalism, and to address new conflicts beyond NATO’s borders’. In the new context, the alliance’s principal mission should be ‘to project stability to the East’.6 As some analysts have even argued, it was ‘almost as if NATO, after having defeated attempts in 1990–91 to create an all-European collective security organization under CSCE auspices, is gradually transforming itself into an entity comparable to such a body—a mutual supervisory agency for the EuroAtlantic region’.7 In fact, NATO became far more than a supervisory agency. Given the importance attached by the Western allies to the democratic transitions of former communist countries, NATO did not simply limit its involvement in Central and Eastern Europe to a process of monitoring the progress of reforms. Rather, the alliance became deeply involved in reshaping ex-communist polities. In particular, NATO enacted a complex set of practices aimed at socializing Central and East European political and 81


military elites into the norms, principles, and rules of Western liberal democracy, particularly in the field of security, and helping them build new institutions around those norms.8 Casting themselves as members of a security community who, by embracing liberal-democratic principles, had managed to transcend a past marked by violent conflicts, the allies insisted that they had the necessary expertise—and the duty—to help the less advanced former communist states to evolve into similarly rational and peaceful polities. As a corollary to that view of security, the relationship between the members of the Western security community and former enemies (members of the ex-communist bloc) was not defined in terms of a fixed, rigid dichotomy between self/dangerous others. Rather, those others were seen as potential friends: societies that, with the right guidance, had the capability to evolve into Western-like polities.9 In that context, the most important dimension of the relationship between self/other was not spatial (e.g. reinforced boundaries between them), but rather temporal, focusing on the potential future evolution of others into selves. The key relationship between the allies and their former foes, therefore, was one of (conditional) inclusion: the aim was to help those others achieve Western standards of liberal-democratic subjectivity, thereby qualifying for partnership with and eventual integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, particularly NATO. Indeed, as NATO launched its post–Cold War enlargement process, it insisted that only those candidates that could demonstrate commitment to liberal-democratic norms were eligible for admission.10 Those (Kantian) ideas about international security found expression in NATO’s post–Cold War strategic concepts, as well as the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement. Specifically, according to those documents, all former enemy polities had the potential to learn liberal-democratic norms, and thus to evolve into the kind of societies worthy of the full respect of/integration into the Western security community. But it was their responsibility to make the necessary reforms (under Western monitoring); it was, in other words, for them to accept the duty to evolve into ‘good’ societies that deserve integration into the West.11 The ‘open door’ principle adopted by the alliance in the mid-1990s implied that integration was not a matter of Western whim or selfish geo-strategic calculations, but entirely a matter of merit. On this logic, the failure to recognize the importance of working towards such a transformation was proof of a lack of self-discipline on behalf of ex-communist societies. Those guilty

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of such lack of self-discipline were to be excluded from Western relations of community and treated as potential sources of danger—based on the assumption that their domestic problems could spill beyond their borders and create instability in the region.12 But, again, that exclusion was seen as exclusively the responsibility of recalcitrant former communist states.

The Politics of Managing Risks in an Uncertain World As noted by senior NATO officials,13 in hindsight the first decade of the post–Cold War period was a relatively simple and progressive period. That was a time when, as the winning side in the Cold War, the Western security community—seen as a haven of freedom, security, and prosperity— had high hopes regarding the establishment of a ‘new world order’ of peace and cooperation through the international diffusion of its norms and values. However, that changed dramatically with the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, followed by the attacks in Madrid and London. In response to September 11, NATO acted quickly to invoke, for the first time in its history, the mutual defence clause (Article 5). The alliance then proceeded to redefine its role in the new world of elusive threats to international security. NATO’s senior officials pointed out that the organization would have to adapt to a new environment—an environment in which many threats come from non-conventional sources (e.g. non-state terrorist actors, possibly in possession of WMDs, operating across national boundaries).14 In the new security environment, addressing terrorism has been identified as ‘a core mission for NATO’.15 Indeed, the North Atlantic Council (NATO’s key decision-making body) stated at its June 2003 meeting in Madrid its commitment to the fight against terrorism. In its words: Terrorism continues to pose a grave threat to Alliance populations, forces and territory, as well as to international peace and security. It also poses a threat to the development and functioning of democratic institutions, the territorial integrity of states, and to peaceful relations between them. . . . To fight terrorism effectively, our response must be multi-faceted and comprehensive. (Paragraph 25)16

NATO’s post–September 11 defence agenda revolves around a new definition of the enemy as highly elusive, often ‘hidden among us’, and taking advantage of the transnational flows of a globalizing world to

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operate both within and outside of the Euro-Atlantic area. According to the NATO defence ministers, the alliance must adapt in order to meet new challenges in an ‘uncertain world’, in which many of its enemies are hard to identify.17 The notion involved here is that, in the new context, NATO must be prepared to deal with an enemy that is ‘like cancer’, operating anywhere and, potentially, everywhere, simultaneously attacking the West in different ways and on multiple fronts. The ‘enemy’, in other words, consists of ‘those groups that threaten our social order, blurring the boundaries between war and non-war’.18 In fact, NATO’s post-9/11 security documents reflect a vision of security that assumes what Zygmunt Bauman called ‘the end to the era of space’.19 In addition to the immediate threat posed by organizations like Al Qaeda, a series of developments occurring around the world, for instance, the rise of organized crime in weak or failed states, are seen as a serious source of danger, especially given their potential association with and support for international terrorism. Under these circumstances, it is argued, NATO must be increasingly able and willing to adopt a preventive approach to security, ‘preventing instability from growing into crises and managing crises before they get too out of hand . . . if we wish to prevent the organized crime spawned by these conflicts from darkening our doorsteps’.20 What is more, there is no end in sight to this new preventive approach, for it is not clear when or how there might be a definite end to the struggle against the new enemies.21 Thus: What has changed—and what has changed dramatically—is the way in which [our] common values are threatened, and the manner in which we have to defend them. In the face of threats from terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failing states, a reactive approach is simply no longer good enough. These new and complex threats call for much more active engagement, including well away from our own borders—and that is what the NATO Alliance is very much geared towards these days.22

NATO’s recent emphasis on preventive action wherever necessary in response to fluid, non-conventional enemies, and the insistence on security as a process with no end in sight seem to conform to the principles of risk-management. In contrast to the promise of a peaceful ‘new world order’ that was so popular in the early years of the post–Cold War period, current NATO statements and documents reflect a more cautious view of security. In the twenty-first century NATO discourse, there is little talk about definitive solutions to security challenges and

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a stable, peaceful new world order. Instead, the emphasis is on security as a process of risk-management, in the face of a plurality of fluid security challenges. Chris Donnelly, then Special Adviser to the NATO Secretary General, captured quite nicely this sense of uncertainty when he noted, in 2003, that ‘we know where we are coming from, but we don’t quite know where we are going’.23 The sense of uncertainty was also evident at the alliance’s Riga Summit in November 2006. Thus, the Comprehensive Political Guidance—the key strategic document produced by the allies at that summit—states that NATO must be prepared to face ‘unpredictable challenges’ that ‘arise at very short notice’. Under these circumstances, the priority for the alliance is to develop procedures and capabilities that enable it to ‘respond quickly to unforeseen circumstances’, for instance, by launching and sustaining ‘concurrent major joint operations and smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response on and beyond Alliance territory, on its periphery and at strategic distance’.24 And the danger of boomerang effects, ever present in an era of risk-management, is a source of additional concern to NATO. For instance, if the allies are not very careful, they run the risk of introducing new security mechanisms (in an attempt to deal with the new security challenges) that would ‘take away our democracy, and undermine our market economy’.25 In the new security environment, the view of a new type of enemies, operating both within and outside the Euro-Atlantic area, represents a sharp departure from the optimistic NATO discourse of the early years of the post– Cold War, when the Western security community was seen as a haven of security and freedom, threatened only by developments beyond its borders. In response to recent developments, NATO, like the EU, has adopted a dual approach to the pursuit of security. This involves an attempt to broaden and deepen the Western security community by inclusive practices aimed at cultivating or enhancing support for liberal norms both within and outside the allied territory, and, on the other hand, exclusionary practices aimed at identifying, excluding from liberal relations of community and defeating those who allegedly refuse to subject themselves to the principles of liberal rationality. In the words of a senior NATO official: of course we must continue to nourish and spread democratic norms. That is at the heart of our security strategy. But we have also become more aware of the fact

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NATO and the Politics of Norm Promotion in the 21st Century that, no matter what we do, certain individuals and groups will try to destroy those norms and those who support them. These [individuals and groups] continue to pose a serious threat to us, and we must act in a determined way to root them out, to keep them from harming us.26

In essence, contemporary NATO practices rely on a combination of two types of practices: othering/excluding and transforming/including. These two types of practices are different but also related to each other, not least because practices of exclusion of dangerous enemies are deemed to be necessary not only for the security of established liberal subjects and communities but also for the protection of vulnerable individuals and groups that are the target of practices of socialization into liberal norms. The tension between the two types of practices of othering is represented in the alliance’s discourse as productive, since it presumably enables the alliance to address a variety of security challenges and tailor appropriate practices to different kinds of actors. However, as we shall see, the tension between inclusive and exclusionary security practices has generated a series of political and normative problems that NATO has yet to solve. In essence, NATO’s approach is interestingly similar to that of the EU— although, predictably, differences between these institutions persist as regards the instruments they have at their disposal, the nature and degree of inclusion of vulnerable-but-still-redeemable actors, and their particular combinations of coercive/non-coercive forms of exclusion of ‘dangerous others’. In the case of NATO, there has been a renewed emphasis on the politics of conditional inclusion of countries that are (seen as) less mature/advanced than NATO allies, but still redeemable—by virtue of their commitment to learn liberal democracy. Vis-à-vis such societies, the approach adopted by the alliance has been one of guidance and monitoring, intended to help transform vulnerable-but-still-socializable others into like-minded liberal actors. On the other hand, a very different type of relation is envisaged vis-à-vis those who (allegedly) reject, quite wilfully, the principles of civilization and are ready to carry out, or at least support, ‘barbaric’ acts against the people, values, and institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community of liberal democracy. Those ‘enemies of civilization’ are to be excluded from liberal relations of community, and defeated—if necessary, through the use of force. NATO’s contemporary concern to differentiate between ‘good’ liberal subjects and dangerous others (in this case, in particular, terrorists and those who support them) can thus be understood as yet another 86


instantiation of the far broader (Kantian) liberal view concerning the different types of relations that should exist among actors who embody liberal ideas of rationality, as compared to relations between liberal selves and those others who allegedly live in an unlawful state of nature, and who wilfully reject processes aimed at bringing them closer to the lawful state of reason. In an especially revealing paragraph in his ‘Perpetual Peace’, Immanuel Kant insisted that subjects who refuse to govern themselves according to rational (liberal) principles simply cannot be trusted by liberal polities. In his words, man (or an individual people) in a mere state of nature robs me of any such security and injures me by virtue of this very state in which he coexists with me. He may not have injured me actively (facto), but he does injure me by the very lawlessness of his state (statu iniusto), for he is a permanent threat to me, and I can require him either to enter into a common lawful state along with me or to move away from my vicinity.27

The problem faced by the liberal security community in the contemporary environment is that, in a world of global transportations and communications, even if its enemies were to move to a different neighbourhood, that would not necessarily make them less dangerous. The Kantian logic would seem to suggest that, in a world of globalization and transnational movements, it has become particularly important for the liberal community to differentiate between actors that could, with the proper training and monitoring, evolve into self-disciplined liberal selves, and those actors that refuse to accept the duty to evolve into such rational selves. As a corollary to that, it could be argued that in such an environment the liberal community must find more effective ways of reforming individuals and groups that still exist in an (illiberal) state of nature, in an effort to turn them into trustworthy members of the liberal world. Simultaneously, vis-à-vis those individuals or groups that refuse to undergo a process of liberal (self-)reform, the liberal community must find more effective ways of expanding beyond its border special, effective mechanisms and practices of control and exclusion. This Kantian idea has found expression in the contemporary NATO discourse, which insists that in the fight against international terrorism it has become particularly important to differentiate between responsible actors and dangerous, illiberal individuals and groups. Thus, the concern is that, given the complexities of the technology now available to small groups and even individuals, and the willingness of groups like Al Qaeda 87


to carry out suicide missions, even a handful of such elusive, ‘noncivilized’ others could inflict serious damage upon Western societies.28 Under these circumstances, one of NATO’s priorities, as identified at the Riga Summit, must be to enhance ‘the ability, through appropriate procedures and equipment, to identify hostile elements, including in urban areas’.29

Seeking to Broaden and Deepen the Western Security Community Let us briefly examine NATO’s recent practices aimed at strengthening the Western security community by ‘nourishing’ its key values and norms within the allied territory and projecting those values beyond its borders. To begin with, building on the experience gained in the 1990s, NATO has renewed its effort to shape transitional, potentially unstable polities in an attempt to turn them into ‘like-minded’ liberal-democratic countries, and to keep them from becoming breeding grounds for organized crime and terrorism. The aim behind those practices is to expand the democratic zone of peace and to help construct polities that deserve the respect of/integration into the Western security community. The focus, in other words, is on guiding a process of becoming—and rewarding those states that accept the responsibility to undertake such a process along the lines prescribed by NATO (or, to borrow a Kantian terminology, to evolve from an ‘unlawful state of nature’ to a ‘lawful state’, governed by rational principles). In the words of a NATO official, ‘we may not be able to bring everyone onboard, but the more we help countries to develop stable democratic institutions, and to work with us in common security endeavors, the more stability we are likely to have . . . At the very least, we can count on strong democracies not to offer sanctuary to people like Bin Laden.’30 In the name of helping build self-disciplined, democratic states, NATO has continued to carry out a plethora of socialization practices. Those practices, initiated in the 1990s and dramatically expanded over the past few years, are aimed at cultivating NATO-prescribed conceptual and practical dispositions (or habitus) in partner states. The aim behind such practices is not only to change particular forms of behaviour but also to instil in people from targeted countries new common-sense understandings about security (e.g. involving democratic control of the military in the domestic arena, and a preference for cooperative security in the 88


international arena).31 NATO’s efforts at international norm promotion have involved, in particular, a series of initiatives designed to build up the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme, and to continue the process of NATO enlargement. The PfP includes a vast programme of practical activities, such as training and common planning, and pursues five objectives: (1) facilitating transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes; (2) ensuring democratic control of defence forces; (3) maintaining the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE; (4) developing cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises; and (5) developing forces that are better able to operate with those of the alliance (NATO 1994: §3). In joining PfP, each partner country made a number of far-reaching political commitments to preserve democratic societies, comply with principles of international law, fulfil obligations under the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, and international disarmament and arms control agreements, to respect existing borders and refrain from the threat or use of force, and to settle disputes peacefully. In order to take full advantage of the regular consultations and contacts on practical cooperation activities, each partner country was invited to establish a liaison office at NATO headquarters. In addition, a Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) to coordinate peacekeeping operations was created at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons. Isabelle François, of NATO’s Defence Planning and Operations Division, has underlined the usefulness of practical cooperation: ‘Through education, training and exercises, NATO exported its way of doing business to countries interested in developing closer ties to the alliance—even to those that did not necessarily hope for eventual membership.’32 NATO’s explicit aim of spreading the alliance’s ways of thinking and acting, and its emphasis on the usefulness of programmes that teach people from partially or non-democratic states Western-defined norms and rules, are powerful indicators of the importance attached by the alliance to the construction of self-disciplined liberal subjects who can presumably act as ‘like-minded’ partners and potential future members of the Western security community. NATO’s 2002 Prague Summit, called the ‘NATO transformation summit’, expressed a renewed enthusiasm for partnerships (it also issued membership invitations to seven new members). A new practical mechanism, Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP), was introduced to bring 89


together the various cooperative practices through which each partner interacts with NATO; it focuses, most significantly, on domestic reform.33 In addition, a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism was established to coordinate anti-terrorist efforts between the allies and their partners, and to ‘provide assistance to EAPC States’, at their request, ‘in dealing with the risks and consequences of terrorist attacks’.34 The Plan welcomed the participation of Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) countries in workshops, seminars, and other activities on a case-by-case basis (ibid. §15). The Prague Summit also decided to ‘upgrade substantially the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue’ (established in 1994 with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, with Algeria joining in 2000) as ‘an integral part of the Alliance’s cooperative approach to security’.35 The Istanbul Summit of June 2004 was especially important for NATO partnerships with the Mediterranean and the so-called Broader Middle East (including the Caucasus and Central Asia). The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) was extended to interested countries of the broader Middle East region, especially the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council,36 in order ‘to foster mutually beneficial bilateral relationships and thus enhance security and stability. The initiative focuses on practical cooperation where NATO can add value, notably in the Defense and security field’.37 At Istanbul, NATO also decided ‘to elevate the MD to a genuine partnership’ (NATO 2004: 4). This is to be accomplished through ‘greater emphasis on practical cooperation’ on the model of PfP tools (ibid. §8). In addition to allowing participation, on a case-by-case basis, in appropriate PfP exercises, the alliance also suggested the establishment of a liaison between MD countries and NATO at NATO Headquarters and the Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons. The ICI and an enhanced MD supplement NATO’s activities in Afghanistan and are thus part of NATO’s post-9/11 strategy to use partnership and region-building practices to stabilize and—according to the allies—spread democratic norms to the broader Middle East. In addition, NATO has reaffirmed its commitment to the ‘open door’ policy, and has sought to (re)shape the countries that are currently queuing to join NATO in the next wave of enlargement. If candidates accept the responsibility to evolve into stable liberal democracies, they can expect to receive NATO’s guidance in the process of preparation for accession, and eventually to be rewarded with inclusion into the Western security community. At present, three countries—Albania, Croatia, and

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the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—are part of NATO’s Membership Action Plan (a programme designed to provide guidance and monitor the performance of countries wishing to join the alliance). Ukraine and Georgia have also stated their ambition to become NATO members, but are not yet part of the Membership Action Plan. In the course of consultations and accession dialogues with those states, NATO officials have insisted that enlargement decisions will be heavily influenced by the democratic credentials of candidates.38 Within the framework of the Membership Action Plan, candidate states have been subjected to repeated assessments of their reform processes, and have been receiving systematic advice on the reforms they still have to carry out in order to become eligible for admission into the NATO club. Vis-à-vis third-wave candidates, the alliance has sought to enhance its ability to carry out continuous surveillance and guidance of candidate states by initiating a series of institutional innovations, such as the establishment of NATO Headquarters in those countries. Reform programmes formulated within the framework of MAP involve comprehensive plans for democratic transformation in a host of areas, ranging from the fight against corruption and organized crime, strengthening the rule of law, enhancing the independence and efficiency of the judiciary, to defence reforms (primarily aimed at promoting transparency, efficiency, and strengthening of democratic control of the military).39 In essence, in various ways and through diverse forums, NATO has been involved in spreading Western-prescribed liberal concepts, norms, and corresponding practical dispositions of self-restraint beyond its borders, thereby seeking to contribute to the construction of liberal polities. This effort is based on the assumption that the establishment of stable liberal democracies is an important dimension of the quest for international security—and a key ingredient in the fight against international terrorism. But this is not a development without its tensions, particularly in the context of the contemporary fight against international terrorism. To begin with, it is interesting to note that prevailing NATO definitions of what constitute acceptable liberal norms—and what are the acceptable exceptions to those norms—have undergone a significant transformation over the past couple of years. This development reflects broader moves to redefine the balance between freedom and security in many countries in the Western world. Thus, while the alliance has continued to stress the importance of norms of transparency, democratic accountability, and

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judicial independence, evidence regarding the 2004 wave of enlargement suggests that, in the context of the perceived threat of international terrorism, there was a certain willingness to allow a series of compromises and exceptions to liberal norms in the name of protecting the Euro-Atlantic world from the threat of international terrorism. To take just one example, in 2001–02, some of the candidates to the second wave of enlargement introduced new laws on state secrets, which were criticized by human rights organizations as constituting infringements on the freedom of speech of citizens. Yet, the acceding governments consulted with NATO and, with its approval, brought the legislation into force.40 Interestingly, those are precisely the kinds of instances of moves to enhance executive power vis-à-vis civil society that NATO would have criticized sharply before the 9/11 attacks. It is not yet clear what NATO’s final position in the current wave of enlargement will be, but there are some preliminary indications that a limited application of liberal norms may again be tolerated. Thus, some NATO officials have expressed concern that the alliance is not exercising sufficient pressure on candidate states to address some key problems of democratic governance. For instance, it has been suggested that much more needs to be done to ensure de facto transparency and accountability in the ministries of defence and interior in some candidate states. Yet, it is not certain that NATO will not issue invitations to the candidates unless and until all the allies are satisfied with the democratic record of those states. It has been suggested that some of the allies, and especially the USA, might push for a decision in favour of broad enlargement based more on the role played by candidates in NATO’s missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo, as well as antiterrorism efforts in the Mediterranean, than a full, systematic analysis of their democratic reforms.41 This can be understood as yet another way in which the renewed concern with security in the context of the fight against terrorism has come to permeate numerous areas of life in the Euro-Atlantic world, having a significant influence on elements regarded as constitutive of liberal-democratic politics, including executive accountability, a public sphere of free discourse and interaction, and legislative scrutiny. One cannot help but notice that the new democracies that have recently joined—and those that are soon likely to join—NATO, with their long history of authoritarianism, could easily fall into the trap of doing too much in the name of strengthening the state for the fight against terrorism. This, in turn, could undermine some of the key individual freedoms that a liberal-democratic polity should protect. Ironically, in 92


some instances at least, it would seem that, in the post–September 11 context, NATO is prepared to tolerate in its future members deviations from liberal-democratic norms that in certain ways are similar to features inherited by those countries from the communist era. That is, in some ways, the alliance now seems to be supporting or at least accepting the kinds of features that, in the 1990s, were regarded as inconsistent with the liberal-democratic identity of the Western community, and, as such, an obstacle to accession to NATO. The tension between, on the one hand, the alliance’s commitment to the promotion of liberal-democratic norms abroad, and on this basis the extension of the Western security community, and, on the other hand, its willingness to tolerate some significant exceptions in the context of the struggle against international terrorism, raises questions about the credibility of NATO as a consistent norm promoter. At a deeper level, it also raises difficult questions about the ability of the Western security community to avoid the kind of boomerang effect (undermining its own constitutive norms and values) that the allies have collectively promised to avoid. The situation is further complicated by instances of NATO failure to take a firm stand against serious violations of human rights and democratic norms by some of the countries that participate in the PfP. For instance, in response to governmental repression of opposition movements in partner states like Belarus and Uzbekistan, human rights groups and even some of the allies called for independent international enquiries into human rights violations, and punitive measures, including (particularly in the case of Uzbekistan) suspension from the PfP. NATO’s Secretary General and other senior officials criticized those actions, calling them unacceptable violations of the partners’ commitments to NATO.42 But the alliance did not go much further than that in taking actions against partner states violating their commitments to democratic norms. The tension between NATO’s principled commitments and its deeds was revealed—to give just one example—in the allies’ failure, in June 2005, to even agree to call for a transparent, independent, international probe into the killings of hundreds of Uzbekistan protestors by government forces. Many European allies had been keen for NATO to take a firm stand on this issue. But, in a situation in which Uzbekistan was regarded as an important ally in the ‘war on terror’, American defense officials blocked the demand for an international probe, for fear that Uzbekistan would react by cutting off US access to its military bases.43 In the Uzbek case, disagreements among the allies over the balance between human rights norms and reasonable exceptions to those norms 93


in the context of the fight against terrorism paralysed the alliance and raised questions among the allied publics regarding NATO’s credibility as an institution that embodies the values of liberal democracy. In those instances, the Kantian-inspired project aimed at promoting international security through the expansion of the community of liberal-democratic values seems to have subordinated to a realist approach, which stresses the need for strategic arrangements and justifies the suspension of normal moral judgements in the context of a fight against a dangerous enemy. Some NATO officials continue to argue that, while the alliance’s present position may be problematic, continuing interaction with partner states with undemocratic records is likely to facilitate, in time, the (slow) diffusion of democratic ideas and values, and thus contribute to the eastward expansion of the Western security community.44 But, at this point in time, it is unclear how, or even if, that long-term process of diffusion of democratic norms will take place, particularly if some NATO members continue to insist on the need to cultivate allies in the ‘war on terror’, regardless of the democratic record of those allies. The practices that, at least in principle, are aimed at expanding the Western security community have been accompanied by a series of initiatives designed to strengthen that community from within. Thus, in response to the perceived threat posed by elusive others who ‘hide in our midst’, renewed emphasis has been placed on the need to ‘nourish’ liberaldemocratic values and norms within the allied space, and in so doing to mobilize societal actors in the fight against international terrorism. In the words of the NATO Secretary General, ‘the best way to safeguard our values is by nourishing them—by upholding our values at home’, by ‘believing in the power of open, democratic systems and liberal economic systems’, as well as ‘advocating them abroad’.45 In NATO’s redefinition of the security situation—and of its role in that situation—we find a striking similarity with the EU’s insistence that the rise of a new type of non-conventional enemies generates the need to transcend conventional boundaries between public/private activities, security/economics, and defence/policing. As a corollary to that, the fluid, unpredictable nature of Al Qaeda and its allies is invoked to justify arguments about the need to create new mechanisms that can effectively monitor activities in a wide set of areas, and to mobilize a plethora of private, as well as public, actors in the fight against international terrorism. Or, to put this slightly differently, the discourse—and related practices— developed by NATO in the face of the perceived extreme risk of terrorism 94


are part of the larger processes of securitization of Euro-Atlantic societies in particular ways. Thus, it is revealing that the alliance’s declarations regarding the new security requirements in the post–September 11 era are accompanied by the insistence that it is important to strengthen the commitment of private groups and individuals to the defence of liberaldemocratic values, and to involve those actors in the new struggle against terrorism. For example, in his recent analysis of the new security challenges, Chris Donnelly, former NATO Secretary General’s Special Adviser for Central/East European Affairs, argued: It is no longer possible to draw a clear distinction between external security and internal security. . . . Security today takes in social development and it demands the involvement of all elements of society.46

On this view, just as private actors now have to assume new duties to cooperate with their governments and with NATO in identifying threats, the allies have a collective duty to increase their efforts to educate the population ‘to understand the new needs of security so as to ensure their support through the democratic process’.47 According to then Secretary General Lord Robertson, NATO leaders have to redouble efforts to bring the wider public along. One of the characteristics of this new security environment is that our security policies . . . are changing faster than the perceptions of our publics. As a result, the task of explaining what NATO is and what it is doing is becoming ever more demanding. We must, therefore, exercise additional effort to ensure that public understanding of the new NATO remains widespread, strong and supportive.48

In response to the perceived need for more efficient campaigns to ‘win hearts and minds’, in 2003, NATO established a new Public Diplomacy Division, designed to improve understanding of—and enhancing support for—the new allied policies and practices, and more broadly for the values and norms that the alliance claims to embody. Since its creation, the Public Diplomacy Division has been running activities aimed at informing audiences in NATO countries of the alliance’s main policies, promoting debate and seeking to cultivate common thinking about the new security issues faced by the allies, and devising more efficient strategies for promoting public support for the alliance and healing the wounds provoked by the Iraq War. For instance, NATO has carried out a series of public relations activities, both within and beyond its territory, designed to enhance the awareness of/support for the alliance’s liberal-democratic values among private groups and individuals (including university students 95


and schoolchildren), and to explain the importance of the common struggle to preserve those values against the threat posed by international terrorism.

Of Borders and Enemies: NATO’s Politics of Exclusion in the Twenty-First Century Over the past couple of years, initiatives designed to strengthen and broaden the Western security community have been accompanied by a series of NATO practices of exclusion of a new type of dangerous others. In the new security context, those others are seen as state and nonstate actors who, by their (‘barbaric’) actions, have placed themselves beyond the realm of humanity. They are those who ‘pose a threat to civilization itself’ due to their (alleged) refusal to transcend their irrational behaviour (as reflected in the ‘mindless slaughter of so many innocent civilians’), and their ‘willingness to commit acts of violence without precedent in the modern era’.49 Vis-à-vis such actors (e.g. Al Qaeda and their supporters, both non-state and state actors), NATO’s self-defined role is not that of a guide in the process of transition from an unlawful state of nature to—borrowing a Kantian term—a ‘lawful state’ (i.e. a state governed by liberal norms). Indeed, those actors’ wilful acts of violence ‘against civilization’ have made such a course of action impossible: according to the NATO discourse, terrorists and their supporters not only insist on living in an ‘unlawful state’, but they also explicitly seek to destroy the ‘lawful’ world. Therefore, it is argued, it is necessary to find the right coercive measures to ‘combat this scourge’, and thus to prevent terrorists and their sponsors from harming the ‘civilized nations’.50 In the words of Lord Robertson, then NATO Secretary General, in the twenty-first century it is particularly important for the alliance to find effective ways to protect its citizens ‘from criminal terrorists and criminal states, especially when they are armed with weapons designed for massive and indiscriminate destruction’.51 In the new security environment, NATO’s aim must be to maintain the will and the capabilities . . . to root out and defeat [criminal terrorists and criminal states] . . . NATO played the key role in defeating the threats of the Cold War and the instability that followed it. We must now transform our Alliance so it can play an equally pivotal part in the war against terrorism and the dangers of weapons of mass destruction.52

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The opposition between the Western security community and this type of others is presented as absolute; no compromise is possible, and no form of tolerance (not to mention respect and inclusion in liberal relations of community) is justified. Indeed, it could be argued that one of the ironies of the current security environment is that while the fight against international terrorism— identified by NATO as a key priority—relies on the image of a boundless arena, all kinds of borders and boundaries (between us/them, friend/enemy, the realm of those entitled to substantial liberal rights vs. the dangerous others who must be placed under special regimes, etc.) are at the heart of its operations. It is important to note, however, that, contrary to conventional wisdom about International Relations, those boundaries and the exclusionary practices that sustain them need not coincide with boundaries of the state.53 Rather, the perceived challenge for NATO is to draw boundaries between the good liberal (or at least emerging liberal) individuals and groups, whose security, liberties, and ‘way of life’ must be protected, and, on the other hand, the elusive, dangerous others—those ‘criminal’ individuals, groups, and states— who, it is argued, by their very existence threaten liberal-democratic polities. The enemies targeted in this context are (allegedly) located within as well as outside the NATO territory. Gone are the optimistic days of the early post–Cold War era, when the NATO allies did not see any existential threats on the horizon, and when the Euro-Atlantic world was regarded as a haven of security. The notion of an existential threat and the perceived need to fight a war against it are back—though in a form that differs from the existential threats of the Cold War era. The new focus on enemies and boundaries is instantiated in practices of direct war (though, interestingly, not wars directed at the entire population of a state), and in the use of judicially sanctioned or extrajudicial incarceration, as well as the use of special measures aimed at excluding from the normal political and socioeconomic life of the liberal-democratic security community those individuals/groups suspected of involvement in organized crime and terrorism. NATO statements and documents that call for an intensified anti-terrorist struggle also state that this should be done with minimal disruption to the socio-economic activities and political life of the citizens of member states and their partners.54 In a situation in which the new dangerous others are seen as unusually elusive, operating ‘like cancer, everywhere’, one of the priorities for NATO has been to develop new technologies, going well beyond the mandate of 97


a military alliance, and to acquire new powers of identification, surveillance, and exclusion of dangerous individuals and groups. One of the key aspects of this has been the blurring of the boundary between performing defence-related functions and carrying out law enforcement operations. In this sense, developments within and around NATO can be seen as part of a broader trend in the Euro-Atlantic area, a trend that involves the process of breaking down the boundaries between internal and external security agencies and their respective functions. Didier Bigo’s treatment of this evolution is particularly cogent. As he pointed out, Now, particularly after the end of bipolarity, external security agencies (the army, secret service) are looking inside the borders in search of an enemy from outside . . . Internal security agencies (national police forces, police with military status, border guards, customs) are looking to find their internal enemies beyond the borders and speak of networks of crime (migrants, asylum seekers, diasporas, Islamic people who supposedly have links with crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational organized crime).55

At the Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO leaders endorsed a whole package of measures and initiatives, most of which can be considered as designed to combat terrorism. In reforming NATO to address the new challenges of the twenty-first century, the allies have placed particular emphasis on the need to improve intelligence sharing both within and outside of the Euro-Atlantic area, with particular emphasis on intelligence concerning organized crime and potential terrorist activities within member and partner states. The allies made a commitment to review current intelligence structures at NATO, and to strengthen the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit at NATO HQ in Brussels. This Unit, which was created after September 11, has now become permanent and will analyse general terrorist threats, as well as those more specifically aimed at NATO. However, so far, progress in the area of intelligence sharing has been limited, not least because the alliance still lacks an integrated analytical staff, resulting in confusion and compartmentalization, and because in several instances there was reluctance even among close partners to share intelligence that might deter or even endanger the lives of sources.56 Nevertheless, more developments are expected in this area in the future, and many analysts have expressed high hopes regarding the prospects for cooperation within (and around) the new NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre, established at RAF Molesworth, in October 2006.57 In a similar vein, the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (endorsed by allies and partners in 2002) provides for the development of 98


an EAPC/PFP Intelligence Liaison Unit designed to enhance information sharing and improve cooperation among the intelligence agencies of interested EAPC countries, and to facilitate the surveillance of groups deemed as dangerous. The Plan also provides for the enhancement of allied/partner cooperation in the area of border control, aimed primarily at providing assistance and training to partners in their struggle to prevent illicit movement of people and material across international borders. And in other areas, too, NATO has taken a series of steps designed to enable it to assume some of the functions traditionally attributed to domestic law enforcement agencies, thereby further blurring the boundary between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ realms. For example, at NATO’s June 2004 Istanbul Summit, the allies agreed on a Policy on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. Describing human trafficking as a ‘modern day slave trade’ that fuels organized crime and potentially finances terrorism, the allies made a commitment to ratify and accept the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, to review national legislation and report on national efforts to meet all obligations under the Convention and relevant Protocol, to exchange information and cooperate with the EU and other international institutions in order to ensure maximum effectiveness of the new policy, to identify and punish all those responsible for organized crime.58 Meanwhile, Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean also illustrates the evolution of NATO into an organization that combines military and policing functions. Operation Active Endeavour evolved out of NATO’s immediate response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. NATO initially deployed its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in October 2001, in a demonstration of allied resolve and solidarity. Together with the dispatch of Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACs) aircraft to the USA, it was the first time that NATO assets had been deployed in support of an Article 5 operation (the operation was launched just before the start of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan). The initial aim of the operation in the Mediterranean was to provide a deterrent presence and surveillance in strategic international waters at a key moment. In March 2003, Active Endeavour was expanded to include providing escorts through the Straits of Gibraltar to merchant ships from allied states that requested them. This extension of the mission was designed to help prevent terrorist attacks such as those on the USS Cole in 2000. In May 2004, the escorts were suspended as a result of a declining number of requests—but with the understanding that they may be reactivated at any time. In April 2003, NATO further expanded the 99


mission and began boarding suspect ships (with the compliance of the ships’ captains and flag states). In October 2004, NATO put in place a new operational pattern. Since then, the focus has been on gathering and processing information and intelligence so as to target specific vessels of interest. Over the past couple of years, Active Endeavour has increasingly become an information and intelligence-based operation through the sharing of data gathered at sea by allies and Mediterranean-rim partners. NATO is also developing an experimental networking system to enable allied and partner countries to exchange information about merchant shipping in the basin more effectively. While the initial mandate of Active Endeavour is focused on deterring and detecting terrorist-related activities, NATO claims that the operation has had a broader, highly visible effect on security and stability in the Mediterranean that is beneficial to trade and economic activity.59 It is estimated that more than 80,000 ships have been ‘hailed’ since the operation started, more than 100 boarded, and 488 non-combatant escorts have been conducted through the Straits of Gibraltar. Also, as part of its expanded operation, which now covers the entire Mediterranean, NATO has been involved in civilian emergencies (e.g. helping to rescue civilians on stricken oilrigs and sinking ships), and has become involved in efforts to combat illegal migration in that region. Allied officials also claim that the experience that NATO has accrued in Active Endeavour has given the alliance unparalleled expertise in the field. That expertise is relevant to wider international efforts to combat terrorism, particularly in the area of proliferation and smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, but also, perhaps more surprisingly for NATO, in controlling international criminality (e.g. illegal migration). In other words, these changes seem to reflect precisely the kind of paradigm shift in allied thinking about security that former Special Adviser to the NATO Secretary General Chris Donnelly referred to when he argued that ‘it is no longer possible to draw a clear distinction between internal security and external security’. As a corollary to this, it is often argued, security henceforth requires the systematic coordination of ‘external’ and ‘internal’ ministries and agencies, and the ability of international security institutions to perform some of the functions (e.g. surveillance, policing, emergency services, disaster relief) traditionally performed by domestic agencies.60 In the new security context, as we noted above, the need to blur the boundaries between internal/external security is accompanied by a perceived need to dilute the boundary between the public–private arenas, and mobilize society in the struggle against the new threat: international 100


terrorism. That emphasis on societal mobilization has translated into a growing involvement of non-state actors in the identification of ‘dangerous others’. That is, as in the case of the EU, NATO has been engaged in processes of redefinition of categories of protector and protected. Private individuals and corporations, conventionally regarded as subjects of protection, are now redefined as participants in processes of securing the Euro-Atlantic area, thereby also contributing to the promotion of international security in general. Thus: The change in the nature of security, however, has created a new imperative: the need to break down the barriers not only between government agencies but between those agencies and the corporate world . . . Today, business can provide governments with intelligence that they cannot easily get from other sources.61

In a similar vein, recent resolutions of NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly call for the systematic involvement of the private sector in helping allied societies fight international terrorism. There are, for instance, calls for the member governments to focus on destroying the financial networks of terrorism, in part by mobilizing banks to adopt ‘know-your-customer’ rules and report suspicious activities, demanding stricter controls for non-standard traditional banking and financial structures, and taking measures to ensure that charities do not underwrite terrorist activities.62 In addition, the 2002 Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism and new Individual Partnership Plans contain commitments by the partners to enhance cooperation between the public and private sector in the fight against organized crime and terrorism. Even NATO’s scientific programmes are now, to a significant extent, designed to enhance cooperation between allied governments and private actors (in this case, primarily scientists) in an effort to better identify and mitigate the new threats. In today’s security environment, actors such as bankers, for example, are seen as playing ‘a crucial frontline role in preventing the misuse of the global financial architecture for terrorist purposes’.63 Under these circumstances, the argument goes, it has become necessary to improve cooperation between the banking sector and public authorities, mobilizing the former in the process of monitoring ‘suspicious financial transactions’64 and, where necessary, excluding suspicious individuals/groups from the normal global financial flows, thereby undermining their ability to finance terrorism. Finally, in recognition of the prevailing view in NATO that ‘9/11 transformed terrorism from a domestic security concern into a truly international security challenge’,65 NATO has sought 101


to improve its ‘out-of-area’ policing functions, particularly in the context of failed states where, it is argued, domestic-organized crime might be associated with, or at least help finance, international acts of terrorism. Thus, for instance, in Kosovo, the NATO-led international security force (KFOR) seeks to perform important law enforcement functions, ranging from riot control and protection of ethnic minorities to the fight against organized crime, paramilitary groups, and terrorist activities.66 In order to enhance its ability to perform these functions, KFOR has enhanced its surveillance and investigative capabilities, has already arrested several suspected terrorists with alleged links to the Al Qaeda network, has taken steps to purge from the Kosovo Protection Corps67 individuals suspected of involvement in organized crime or terrorism, and is continuing to investigate the activities of foreign nationals who came to the region as volunteer soldiers during the fighting, and who appear to have remained in the province after the end of the conflict.68 And, in addition to training Kosovar security actors (e.g. the Kosovo Protection Corps), and helping to enforce the new laws, KFOR has worked with the local media and educational authorities to disseminate norms of democratic governance, particularly in the area of minority rights. The language used by NATO/NATO-led KFOR vis-à-vis Kosovar actors is highly normative: Kosovars, it is argued, have the duty to transcend their irrational impulses, to learn to govern themselves according to universally valid (liberaldemocratic) norms of governance, and to exclude from their institutions, and more broadly from the political and socio-economic life of Kosovo, all those individuals and groups who fail to accept that duty (e.g. those involved in organized crime and/or terrorism or in the illegal paramilitary organization).69 From an analytical perspective, it is worth noting that the redefinition of NATO’s mandate to include policing functions, which blur the boundary between the public and private arena, and require the systematic mobilization of corporate actors and individuals in the struggle against a fluid and ill-defined enemy is very far from conventional IR representations of NATO as nothing more than a military alliance engaged in the eternal game of power-balancing in the anarchic international environment. More broadly, this evolution challenges mainstream categories for thinking about international security, which rely on assumptions of rigid separation between inside/outside and, as a corollary to that, the view of a clear boundary between domestic security (law enforcement) and, on the other hand, (defence) apparatuses and practices targeting external enemies. 102


In an analysis of exclusionary practices targeting the new type of dangerous ‘others’, NATO took a series of steps aimed at enhancing its ability to apply effective military force (in defensive as well as offensive operations) against terrorists and those state or non-state actors ‘who harbour them’.70 For the NATO allies, the nature of contemporary (terrorist) threats is such that, in certain conditions, it may be necessary to apply military force in order to prevent terrorists from bringing violence ‘to our doorstep’. At their Reykjavik meeting in May 2002, NATO foreign ministers agreed that: ‘To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.’71 This inspired a new capabilities initiative, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), aimed at improving, among other things, the alliance’s terrorism-related capabilities and in general at ensuring that allied militaries are equipped to move faster and further afield, to apply military force more effectively and to sustain themselves in combat.72 It includes eight fields: intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence; command, control, and communications; combat effectiveness; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refuelling; and deployable combat support and combat service support units. In addition, the NATO Response Force, another Prague initiative, is designed to reflect the new realities in which the Western allies might have to respond to surprise attacks—or threats of attack—carried out by enemies anywhere in the world, and possibly using unconventional weapons. Thus, the idea behind the NATO Response Force is to give the alliance a new capability to respond quickly to an emergency, wherever that emergency might occur. Furthermore, NATO’s Military Command Structure is being transformed, including via the creation of a strategic command in the USA responsible for the continuing transformation of alliance military capabilities. By developing new military and non-military instruments, practices, and technologies, NATO has sought to strengthen—and has repeatedly invoked—its various forms of capital, in an attempt to secure continued recognition as a privileged security institution in the Euro-Atlantic area. The argument constantly put forward by NATO officials is that, for all its alleged problems, NATO remains the only forum that effectively links the two sides of the Atlantic in the provision of security for the Western world. According to the then NATO Secretary General: 103

NATO and the Politics of Norm Promotion in the 21st Century I know, of course, that since September 11th, some have questioned whether the United States needs or even wants to act together with its Allies. This debate is completely off the mark. Over a dozen NATO Allies are militarily engaged alongside the U.S. in Afghanistan, either in the hunt for Al Qaeda or bringing stability to Kabul. Their ability to work with the U.S. and with each other is a product of one thing: decades of experience in NATO. This is the most powerful argument against the critics.73

Indeed, NATO has systematically tried to secure the trust of Western/allied publics in its (presumably unique) ability to act as an efficient provider of security in the post–September 11 context. The alliance has tried to secure that trust by invoking its (allegedly superior) knowledge, resources and expertise—that is, by portraying itself as the organization that is uniquely qualified to respond to the new challenges to Western security. This effort at trust-building involves a two-dimensional move by NATO: in its quest to justify its ongoing relevance, and to secure a privileged position in the new security field, the alliance has invoked not only its material resources but also its symbolic capital. Particularly revealing in this sense is the attempt by NATO’s senior officials to dismiss criticism of the organization as an outdated military alliance, and to portray the material capabilities of the alliance as well suited to respond to the new threats to allied security. According to Lord Robertson, there is an ongoing need to focus on material capabilities: This subject may come across as old-fashioned to some, yet it is a most timely subject. Because capabilities still matter. In the Cold War, the relevance of military power was well understood. After the end of this unique period, however, there were hopes that, from now on, ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ power would determine our security . . . These illusions were swiftly shattered . . . In Kosovo, we learned the [. . . ] lesson [that] our military competence was essential in preventing a humanitarian tragedy. Today, in Afghanistan, military capabilities are once again demonstrating their importance. Military prowess has not only crushed Al Qaeda. It has also crushed the myth of invulnerability that surrounded Osama Bin Laden and his henchmen. . . . These dramatic changes were not brought about by soft power or moral appeals. They were brought about by military force—applied in a determined and bold fashion, and embedded in what amounts to a political masterstroke: an almost global coalition against terror. . . . There can be no doubt, therefore, that effective military means will remain a precondition for our security . . . 74

On this view, NATO is particularly well equipped to protect and enhance the ability of its members to apply military force—not least because it provides a time-tested forum with established norms and rules that enable 104


the allies to articulate their concerns, collectively identify enemies and define threats, as well as to combine their efforts, and secure political legitimacy in dealing with those threats. In this sense, the material capabilities embodied in NATO are not the only important element in the new security equation; to understand the full value of the organization in protecting the allies, one has to also take into account the whole normative framework within which the allies act to project their combined might in the name of defending their community of values. Again, Lord Robertson’s statement on this issue is particularly revealing: There can also be no doubt that military force is best applied in a coalition. If you have allies, you can maximize your political impact, while sharing costs and risks. You also increase the political legitimacy of an operation. And the collective sharing of responsibility can make things easier if something goes wrong. With 19 member countries and 27 Partner countries, NATO is the world’s largest permanent coalition. It remains the most effective way to organize our security.75

Further to the claim that it possesses superior military capabilities, NATO senior officials have repeatedly argued that the alliance has also demonstrated its special expertise and potential to develop the kind of mobility/flexibility that is required in the new security environment. The notion involved here is that, in a context marked by the need ‘to be innovative’, to show ‘open-mindedness’ and ‘flexibility’, the NATO allies ‘have already shifted gear.76 They are working hard to enable the Alliance to deal with the full spectre of 21st century security challenges’. In the words of Lord Robertson, NATO has demonstrated its ability to act quickly, effectively, and in imaginative ways in response to the complex crises in the former Yugoslavia—including, more recently, in the FYR Macedonia—where ‘we were successful because we dispatched the right people, at the right moment, with the right mandate’.77 Similarly, ‘NATO’s uniqueness derives from its ability to translate political decisions quickly into military action. This is the NATO that we want— and need. Because no other institution in our toolbox of transatlantic security can offer this unique combination.’78 According to NATO statements, the reforms approved at the Prague Summit in 2002, as well as expertise in performing policing functions that NATO has developed particularly in the course of its various missions in the Balkans, show that the alliance is up to the task of dealing with the full spectrum of security challenges of the twenty-first century. That view regarding the unique assets of NATO was recently reiterated by its current Secretary General, who argued in July 2006 that: 105

NATO and the Politics of Norm Promotion in the 21st Century NATO is a unique institution. It features, first of all, an exceptional political consultation mechanism that is geared towards consensus. This consensus process is sometimes perceived as slow and cumbersome. But it has distinct advantages. It creates a sense of predictability. And it fosters both a responsibility and a predisposition among the Allies—big and small—to seek common solutions to problems. NATO also has an integrated multinational military structure to implement these common decisions. Over the years, the militaries of our member nations have become highly interoperable and capable of working together effectively under the most demanding circumstances. And that military potential is another unique feature of the Alliance. What also makes NATO unique is its transatlantic dimension. There is simply no other forum that brings Americans, Canadians and Europeans closer together.79

In essence, in addition to invoking the alliance’s material capabilities, NATO officials have also invoked its cultural-symbolic capital, portraying the latter as a key asset which enables the alliance to act as an authoritative security institution in the Euro-Atlantic area. By virtue of its special institutional knowledge and mechanisms of cooperation and consultation that it embodies—and, as a corollary to that, its prestige and its long history of building trust among the allies—NATO is portrayed as a unique organization, representing the main institutional expression of the liberal-democratic security community. According to the logic of the NATO discourse, its complex institutional structure and the norms and procedures it embodies enable the alliance to overcome (or at least mitigate) the differences that might arise among the allies, to build agreement around definitions of threats and solutions to those threats, and in so doing to act as an effective institution in addressing the evolving challenges to international security.80 In the present context, NATO senior officials insist, the alliance can mobilize its unique symbolic and material capital to extend the inter-allied trust to new areas, and build up the kind of network of domestic and international agencies across the Euro-Atlantic area that is needed in the comprehensive struggle against the new enemies of the allied values and way of life. Thus, NATO could have a unique role to play. NATO is the international institution par excellence for developing networks of trust between individuals from different countries and different agencies. It is precisely on the basis of trust that information and intelligence is most readily shared. It is pointless for governments to legislate for information exchange if the basis of mutual trust is absent. It is now very important that we evaluate how to develop and enhance the model of trustgenerating mechanisms of the NATO system so that we can improve the capability for information exchange.81

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In an attempt to avoid major future disagreements over the possible use of force, and in so doing to avoid a major source of potential credibility crisis for the alliance, NATO members have sought to provide a clearer common vision regarding the potential uses of force in the new security environment. For instance, as noted above, in October 2003, they formulated NATO’s Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism. In that Concept, the NATO member states agreed that there are four possible roles for military operations for defence against terrorism: anti-terrorism (essentially defensive measures), consequence management, counter-terrorism (primarily offensive measures), and military cooperation. With respect to offensive military actions, the allies agreed that terrorists should not be allowed to base, train, plan, stage, and execute terrorist attacks, and that, given that it is preferable to deter or prevent terrorist attacks than to deal with their consequences, if the threat is severe enough, it would be justified to act against terrorists and those who harbour them, as and where required, as decided by the North Atlantic Council.82 According to the new Military Concept, it is important to combine potential applications of offensive force with measures aimed at winning the trust and support of the local population through Psychological Operations and Information Operations. And, as stressed by senior NATO officials, any counter-terrorist actions would need to be accompanied by a broader international development and democratization effort, aimed at undermining public support for terrorism and preventing weak/failing states from becoming breeding grounds for terrorism.83 In other words, in its new Military Concept, NATO has adopted the same dual approach, combining practices of exclusion and inclusion. For the alliance, one of the main operations in which many of the new procedures and capabilities are being mobilized is the mission in Afghanistan. NATO took over command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2003, in an operation that represents the first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area in NATO’s history. The idea underpinning NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan is that only a comprehensive mission, combining military and non-military dimensions, can promote stability and keep the country from (re-)emerging as a safe haven for terrorism. In other words, the operation in Afghanistan cannot be understood as simply the expression of a re-militarization of NATO. Rather, ISAF needs to be seen as part of a larger effort to develop military as well as non-military methods and technologies needed to manage a plurality of risks to allied (and international) security. ISAF’s role is to assist the Government of Afghanistan and the international 107


community in maintaining security within the force’s area of operations. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), small teams of military and civilian personnel, are the leading edge of NATO-ISAF’s presence in Afghanistan. The PRT concept marries the presence of a military force to provide security (primarily by helping government forces to fight Taliban insurgents and other illegally armed groups) with direct involvement in nation-building tasks, such as the construction of schools and hospitals and the digging of wells. They are meant to be a key component of a three-part strategy for Afghanistan—security, governance, and development—seeking to help spread stability across the country. As part of its mission, NATO is involved in training the Afghan army, and providing guidance in the process of defence reform and institution-building (ostensibly around democratic norms of transparency and democratic accountability). In the words of Lt. Gen. Richards, the former NATO commander in Afghanistan, the alliance puts great emphasis on improving cooperation with Afghan actors, and that can only be achieved by winning the hearts and minds of the local population.84 At the same time, he insisted that he would ‘not hesitate to use appropriate measures against those disruptive elements opposed to democracy and the rule of law in Afghanistan, including military force if necessary’.85 Indeed, as it turned out, the fight that erupted between, on one hand, NATO and Afghan government forces, and, on the other hand, Taliban fighters and their supporters is the most intense that the alliance has known in its history. In other words, NATO’s vision of its role in Afghanistan revolves around the idea of identifying and defeating those Afghans seen as the enemies of modern civilization, by virtue of their opposition to the norms of human rights, the rule of law and democracy, and, simultaneously, helping and training the other Afghans, teaching them to build good institutions of governance and, more broadly, to build a modern, reliable polity. The civilian population is thus seen as both the referent of security (since one of the key aims of ISAF is ‘to create conditions under which the Afghans can enjoy representative government and self-sustaining peace’86 ) and the source of threat—as certain individuals/groups within the population support the Taliban and potentially Al Qaeda and as such pose a threat both to the Afghan government and the process of state reconstruction, and to international security. Under those circumstances, the identification of such ‘enemies’ by the ISAF and Afghan government forces is seen as a key priority and, at the same time, extremely hard to achieve without the active support of ordinary Afghans. 108


This takes us to the third role assigned to the Afghan population: active participants in the provision of domestic and international security. Indeed, in Afghanistan, NATO relies heavily on civilians to identify ‘the enemy’. In the words of a senior NATO officer, ‘we don’t really know who is hostile to us, and who is not, nor do we know if those who attack us are local or foreign groups or individuals. That is why it is so important to win the trust of the population—they can tell us who supports the Taliban and or Al Qaeda.’87 In essence, the Afghanistan mission constitutes yet another example of the way in which NATO (in this case, in the context of ISAF) enacts practices that challenge conventional categories of security, as they blur the boundaries between defence/domestic law enforcement and between the public and the private arenas, mobilizing a variety of private actors in the provision of a diversity of (broadly defined) security functions, ranging from the process of identifying/providing knowledge about enemies to the reconstruction of failed states. Looking at the Afghanistan operation from a different perspective, what is striking is the discrepancy between the NATO discourse on the ‘enemy’, which constructs a highly normative dichotomy between the (ISAF) actors and their partners, cast, as we have seen, as the forces of progress and civilization, and the barbaric forces, those who seek to keep Afghanistan trapped in a violent pre-modern age (‘the Middle Ages’), and, on the other hand, the reality—as many analysts would argue—of a highly fluid, diverse, and ill-understood collection of local and international actors. When ISAF forces are engaged in a violent clash, there is a tendency, in NATO’s official statements, to represent that as a confrontation with Taliban insurgents. Yet, there is little evidence that ISAF commanders know exactly who they are fighting, and whether those ‘insurgents’ are the Taliban, Al Qaeda, or local war lords fighting for largely secular reasons.88 The view that ISAF represents the values of civilization seems to lead too hastily to the debatable conclusion that those who oppose the international mission must also be opposed to civilization itself. On this logic, the conflict in Afghanistan represents a clash between a universally valid political project and its enemies—not a set of confrontations between different particular projects of political order. If the ISAF mission represents universal values (as ISAF claims), then it would seem that no legitimate opposition is possible. The highly normative dichotomy between (what are seen as) the progressive forces of modernity, embodied in the ISAF and the government of Hamid Karzai, and, on the other hand, the dangerous actors who would like to keep Afghanistan in a dark pre-modern era, is illustrated 109


in the assessment of ISAF’s role provided by NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, Ambassador Daan Everts. Building on the ISAF Commander’s argument concerning the need to fight ‘disruptive elements’ that ‘oppose democracy and the rule of law’, Ambassador Everts insisted that prior to the international intervention, Afghanistan was at the brink of total collapse, implosion. It was relegated to the Middle Ages . . . So if we can create more secure conditions for individuals . . . proper access to justice and proper law enforcement [in addition to democratization and infrastructural reconstruction] then I have the feeling that this NATO mission will have done a tremendous contribution to bringing a country from . . . basically the Middle Ages to if not the twenty-first century, at least to the twentieth century.89

The problem with that representation of the situation in Afghanistan is that, analytically, it fails to grasp the significant differences in the identity and agendas of the various actors it confronts. In a more practical sense, that limited understanding of the complexity of the conflict can have serious counter-productive implications. Thus, by depicting the conflict in terms of a confrontation between good/evil, forces of civilization/medieval-like, violent otherness, NATO is likely to pay insufficient attention to the ways in which its own actions, especially the aggressive tactics justified by reference to the magnitude of the threat posed by those seen as ‘opposed to civilization’, may in fact produce more enemies. For instance, civilians caught in the cross-fire and alienated by the ISAF’s apparent tolerance for collateral damage may come to support the Taliban, or at least turn to them for protection. In private, several NATO officers have expressed concern that some of the ISAF’s actions have in fact alienated a large number of Afghans and have led to a radicalization of important factions of the population.90 Particularly problematic seems to have been the repeated use of force resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties, as well as NATO’s failure to adopt a coherent detainee policy in accordance with the principle of respect for human rights. Such actions have apparently also pushed the Taliban closer to Al Qaeda, as factions of the Taliban that were previously relatively moderate and concerned with local issues seem to have become more ideologically motivated, and to have forged links with Al Qaeda. It is also interesting to note that the complicated, de facto uncertain status and affiliation of ‘enemies’ has meant that, in practice, the boundary between the ISAF mission and the separate US-led counter-terrorism operation in Afghanistan is more blurred than their official mandates would have suggested. While both operations were supposed to help prevent 110


Afghanistan from re-emerging as a safe haven for terrorists, the ISAF was not supposed to involve specific counter-terrorism operations. Rather, the idea was that the US-led mission would focus on that, while the ISAF would adopt a broader approach of helping the Afghan government to provide security and good governance—if necessary, including by fighting Taliban insurgents. But, in a situation in which it is unclear who those who attack ISAF forces are, and, contrary to its initial expectations, the ISAF has been using massive military force (with a high cost in terms of civilian casualties), it is far from clear that the Afghan population will continue to give its support to ISAF and will recognize the distinction, repeatedly invoked in allied circles, between a campaign designed to help them reconstruct their country, and the narrower American-led counterterrorism operation. The mission in Afghanistan is often portrayed by allied officials as evidence that the divisions caused by the war in Iraq have been healed, and that the allies can, once again, act together in the name of defending not only their territory and their people but also the core values of liberal democracy around which NATO defines its identity. The crisis over Iraq—including the very harsh exchanges and open disagreements within NATO—was particularly problematic because, above and beyond the immediate issues that were on the table, it indicated a growing concern among some allies that the USA was trying to use the alliance purely as a hegemonic tool, in violation of the shared principles and goals (of collective defence) inscribed in the alliance. That crisis, in other words, marked a moment of significant challenge to the moral authority of NATO, as several allies openly expressed doubts that the alliance was still acting in accordance with the principles and values of the community of liberal democracy. Within NATO circles, and more generally among Western decision-makers, the months and years that followed the invasion of Iraq witnessed a sustained effort to restore the moral authority of the alliance. Thus, over the past couple of years, there have been almost ritualistic affirmations of continued solidarity on the basis of shared principles and values, as the allies and their partners have insisted that they stand together in the fight that has pitted the dark forces of religiousinspired international terrorism against the forces of civilization.91 However, while the allies have been in agreement as regards the need to fight the ‘scourge of terrorism’, in practice, their unity has been far more problematic. In particular when it comes to the application of force, the problem is that many of the contemporary crises and conflicts involve a lot of uncertainty regarding the nature and intensity of threat, as well as 111


the identity of alleged enemies. Under these circumstances, the allies have had—and are likely to continue to have—different interpretations regarding the best strategy, and, from a more normative perspective, the extent and modalities in which an alliance that defines itself around liberaldemocratic values is justified in applying military force in an uncertain environment, even at the risk of significant casualties, including civilian casualties and casualties among their own troops. Such differences in interpretation clearly came to light in NATO’s operation in Afghanistan. While the overall rules of engagement for the ISAF mission are quite robust, many contributing nations are operating under so-called national caveats, which reflect different understandings of the extent to which NATO should use hard power in Afghanistan. Apparently, these reflect both different views of acceptable risk to allied soldiers and to civilians, as well as more general disagreements regarding the proper balance between coercive measures and actions aimed at winning ‘hearts and minds’.92 The national caveats add up to a series of detailed instructions that limit NATO forces’ willingness to accept certain types of mission (particularly if they involve significant use of military force against suspected insurgents), even if allied commanders on the ground regard those missions as crucial to the provision of security for the local population and international aid workers. Significant problems have also emerged in connection with disagreement among the allies over the proper treatment of detainees. Apparently, there was a contentious debate among the allies over the December 2005 final communiqué guiding NATO’s treatment of detainees in Afghanistan.93 Most of the allies were critical of US abuse of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay, accusing the Bush Administration of serious violations of the Geneva Convention governing treatment of prisoners taken in combat. Consequently, those allies insisted that the communiqué explicitly address the issue of treatment of prisoners. The final document contains the statement: ‘In addition to NATO’s agreed detention policy for ISAF, which is and remains consistent with international law, we welcome initiatives by Allies to assist the Afghan authorities in the implementation of international standards for the detention of prisoners.’ However, that assistance to be provided to the Afghan authorities has been interpreted differently by different allies, and, in general, ISAF has apparently failed to take steps to ensure the consistent protection of basic rights of the detainees. Linked to that, there are allegations that Afghan officials have tortured detainees turned over to them by ISAF forces.94 This situation, which reflects persistent disagreements 112


among the allies regarding the proper rules for the application of coercion against alleged insurgents, has further undermined NATO’s ability to secure the trust of the population. Thus, the lack of coordination among the allies and apparent lack of concern for the protection of detainees’ rights has only fuelled the perception that the alliance lacks the ability and will to act consistently on the basis of the values and norms it claims to embody. If this situation persists, it could result in a decline in NATO’s moral authority and symbolic capital needed to win hearts and minds in Afghanistan. In turn, that would likely make it far more difficult for ISAF to achieve its major goals in that country. The problems experienced in Afghanistan are compounded by the fact that, given the Bush Administration’s continued reliance on, and explicit support for, unilateral policies, trust among the allies has not been fully restored. In fact, several European allies continue to express a certain degree of scepticism as regards the ability of NATO to continue to act as the expression of the Euro-Atlantic security community, in pursuit of shared liberal-democratic principles.95 In particular, NATO has recently witnessed some intense debates over the question of whether the alliance should be transformed into a kind of ‘global policeman’, in response to the alleged globalization of risks such as terrorism. While the USA continues to push for such a redefinition of NATO’s role, several European allies remain quite reluctant to embrace a change that could translate into an open-ended—potentially very costly and normatively controversial—role for the alliance.96 From the perspective of those European allies, attempts to turn the alliance into a body that could, under US leadership, forcefully intervene in crises around the world, possibly in the absence of UN authorization, could amount to a serious departure from the principles and values that NATO claims to embody. On a related note, the problem of diverging ‘national caveats’ in Afghanistan is a permanent reminder of the failure of the allies to reach agreement over the question of acceptable use of force and reasonable risks to the allies’ own soldiers in an outof-area mission that embodies the complexities of fighting an elusive enemy while also guiding the Afghans in the process of (re)construction of their country around democratic norms. The problems experienced in Afghanistan indicate serious challenges to the authority of NATO as the forum for interpreting situations and defining common solutions when it comes to war-fighting by the allies. In conclusion, the fact that, following 9/11, NATO’s members and partners continued to recognize it as a key Euro-Atlantic security institution— as the main transatlantic forum, in spite of all its problems, for 113


articulating and implementing security policies in the Western security community—has enabled NATO to identify common allied priorities, identify problems, define solutions to those problems, and help implement those solutions, including in the area of preventing and combating terrorism. This, as we have seen, has translated in the launch or strengthening of a plethora of new mechanisms, programmes, and practices, ranging from war-fighting and post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan, to involvement in various forms of policing, for instance in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean. Interestingly, for all the recent tensions between Moscow and the West, even Russia has at least implicitly recognized the unique expertise and material capital of the alliance, and, on this basis, has agreed to cooperate with NATO in counter-terrorism operations, most notably within the framework of Operation Active Endeavour, and in counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, NATO’s ability to act as the forum for ‘speaking’ and enacting security—that is, for exercising symbolic power by defining situations, pronouncing Euro-Atlantic security policies and mobilizing the combined forces of the allies—has come under some strain in recent years. One of the main problems has been a certain loss of moral authority in the eyes of allied publics as well as in partner states, in part because of the alliance’s (perceived) willingness to tolerate or actively support significant exceptions to liberal norms. In addition, as noted above, some European NATO members have resented what they regard as attempts by the USA to turn the alliance into a hegemonic tool. Should this situation persist in the future, it could easily lead to deeper questions and challenges to the moral authority of the alliance—not only in the particular area of out-of-area war-fighting but also in all (or most) of NATO areas of operation. That, in turn, could significantly undermine the ability of the alliance to act as a key player in the contemporary field of security. More than a decade following the end of the Cold War, and contrary to the gloomy expectations of some policymakers and (realist) scholars— but also in contrast to the highly optimistic predictions made by some analysts in the 1990s—NATO continues to evolve, and to inspire intense debates about its future. In the context of a security environment seen as highly fluid, marked by the rise of non-conventional, elusive enemies that operate across national boundaries, NATO has sought to transform itself into a more complex institution that pursues security via a combination of inclusive and exclusivist practices, blurring conventional boundaries between international security and domestic law enforcement, between

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the public and the private spheres, and operating both within and outside the Euro-Atlantic area. At the moment, on the basis of its functional and geographic expansion, NATO continues to play important (albeit sometimes controversial) roles in a multitude of aspects in the field of security. But it is still unclear what the future holds for the organization that emerged more than half a century ago as the embodiment of the Western security community. Far from ensuring a smooth, unproblematic transition, some of the recent NATO policies and practices have generated a series of problems and tensions, raising questions about NATO’s ability to honour its commitment to adapt to the new security environment while remaining true to the liberal-democratic norms around which it defines its identity. Above and beyond questions and potential problems of efficiency, the analysis provided above suggests that recent developments raise difficult questions about the authority of NATO as the locus for articulating and implementing Euro-Atlantic security policies. On a deeper level, there are also normative questions about the strength and evolving nature of the liberaldemocratic security community that the alliance claims to embody. These, of course, are not limited to NATO; indeed, they reflect larger questions in the Euro-Atlantic area concerning the contemporary meaning of liberal democracy, and the new boundaries between friend/enemy, acceptable/unacceptable behaviour, liberty/security, the norm/the exception. In the case of NATO, some of these questions have already been raised, directly or indirectly, as the allies have tried to redefine relations with (undemocratic) partners, to acquire law enforcement powers, and to combine fighting with post-conflict reconstruction in weak or failed states. In one way or another, these (largely unresolved) questions are likely to come back to haunt the allies in the coming months and years. Whether or not the allies will then be in a stronger, more united position to address them remains to be seen.

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4 The OSCE: Inclusive Security Practices and Their Limits

The OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), with its roots in the Helsinki Process and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, emerged after the end of the Cold War as the Euro-Atlantic security institution with a clear and innovative mandate to promote a new, cooperative, and inclusive model of security in its area. As reflected in its Charter of Paris and in related documents, the security discourse articulated by the OSCE following the end of the Cold War is based on the assumption that the establishment of stable liberal democracies is a key recipe for regional stability and international security. In that sense, the OSCE’s approach has been similar to—and in many ways a source of inspiration to—the EU and NATO.1 In contrast to the EU and NATO, however, the OSCE adopted from the start an unambiguously inclusive approach: instead of setting and enforcing membership conditions, the OSCE espoused and acted upon the view that it was desirable to grant membership even to the ex-communist EuroAtlantic polities that were far from having demonstrated a commitment to liberal democracy. As Emanuel Adler has cogently argued, the OSCE’s strategy was from the start to establish an ‘imagined security community’. This involved incorporating even problematic transitional polities—as if they were already like-minded liberal democracies—and then engaging in systematic socialization practices aimed at helping them to evolve into reliable members of the Euro-Atlantic security community based on liberal-democratic values.2 In the early days of the twenty-first century, and in particular in response to the 9/11 attacks, the OSCE, like the EU and NATO, moved quickly to identify international terrorism as a key threat to the EuroAtlantic area and to international security more generally, and set out 116

The OSCE: Inclusive Security Practices and Their Limits

to enhance its capacity to play an important role in combating that threat. The contemporary focus on combating terrorism has translated into a renewed emphasis on the importance of carrying out security community-building practices. Given its mandate, institutional expertise, and lack of military resources, it is perhaps not surprising that, to an even greater degree than NATO and the EU, the OSCE has adopted an approach stressing prevention and, more broadly, non-military means of combating terrorism. This chapter examines some of the key OSCE initiatives adopted in the name of combating international terrorism, showing how the OSCE has tried to build on its symbolic capital achieved during and immediately following the Cold War, in order to cast itself as a relevant and in some ways uniquely competent security institution in the context of the fight against international terrorism. Thus, the OSCE has sought to act—and secure continued recognition—as the organization that can build shared knowledge about, and common (best practice) approaches to, combating international terrorism in the Euro-Atlantic area. In the post-9/11 security environment, the OSCE has repeatedly invoked and sought to reinforce the inclusive security logic that it embodies. It has stressed the importance of avoiding or transcending dividing lines between insiders and outsiders by expanding the Euro-Atlantic security community of liberal-democratic values, and has insisted, by virtue of its special expertise in the diffusion of norms of good governance in a broad region, that the OSCE can and should play an important role in this process. At the heart of the contemporary security discourse articulated by the OSCE lies the idea that, in order to effectively combat international terrorism, it is important to address the conditions likely to generate support for groups like Al Qaeda. And, the argument goes, through its good governance programmes, the OSCE can help vulnerable polities that run the risk of becoming breeding grounds for terrorism. Following an examination of the dynamics—and limits—of some of the main practices enacted by the organization in the name of preventing and combating terrorism, I conclude by arguing that one of the ironies of the OSCE’s role is that, though the Organization has sought to strengthen its involvement in the area of (liberal-democratic) security community-building in the name of fighting international terrorism, over the past few years its credibility as a community-builder has been severely undermined. The OSCE, as a loose intergovernmental institution with a weak structure, depends very heavily on consensus among participating states; only on the basis of significant consensus can the 117


Organization fulfil its mandate of promoting Euro-Atlantic security. The problem is that, over the past few years, participating states have had an attitude that can be described as, at best, ambivalent vis-à-vis the OSCE. Thus, on the one hand, they have agreed—at least in principle—to adopt measures designed to enhance the capital of the OSCE, and in so doing to place the Organization in a stronger position in the contemporary field of security. For instance, they have sought to strengthen and expand the expertise and institutional capabilities of the OSCE through the creation and/or extension of programmes and initiatives designed to diffuse shared knowledge and (liberal-democratic) practices in the broad Euro-Atlantic area, and in so doing to play a stronger role as security community builder. On the other hand, however, over the past few years, several participating states have raised serious questions about— and in some instances even expressed explicit opposition to—the actual implementation of those programmes. In particular, Russia and some other former Soviet republics have accused the OSCE of having become the tool of Western countries and institutions. In their view, far from fulfilling its mandate of transcending East/West divisions and promoting common, comprehensive security in the Euro-Atlantic area, the OSCE is currently pursuing the narrow, selfish agenda of a few powerful states. Simultaneously, other participating states have accused the Organization of condoning—under the influence of Russia—violations of its main constitutive norms, for instance by failing to take decisive action, or even a clear moral stand, in the ‘frozen conflicts’ in countries of the former Soviet Union. Those criticisms and challenges by participating states have significantly undermined the delegated and moral authority of the OSCE and, in so doing, have raised difficult questions about the ability of the Organization to play a significant role in Euro-Atlantic security in the twenty-first century.

The OSCE as a Community-Building Institution The CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) was created in 1975 through the Helsinki Final Act, which was signed by Canada, the USA, the Soviet Union, and all European states (except Albania). The Helsinki Act encompassed three broad ‘baskets’: the first basket contained guidelines for a cooperative security system, which emphasized confidence-building measures, disarmament, and mechanisms for the

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peaceful settlement of disputes. In later years, that basket was broadened to include provisions concerning the protection of human rights and international terrorism. The second basket established the framework for economic, scientific, and environmental cooperation. Finally, the third basket, focusing on the ‘human dimension’, involved a commitment by participating states to cooperate on humanitarian issues, enhance basic human freedoms, and encourage human contacts across geo-strategic borders. During the Cold War, the CSCE helped the two politico-military blocs to manage their confrontational situation and to overcome it, at least in part, by establishing a framework for continuous dialogue and elaborating a comprehensive set of principles and commitments, followed by practical steps for their implementation. Indeed, the CSCE’s evolving normative acquis proved to be a major agent of peaceful change in the transition from authoritarian communist regimes to democratic rule.3 Following the end of the Cold War, the CSCE embarked upon a process of reinventing its mandate and became deeply involved in efforts to prevent violent conflict from breaking out in various transition countries, and to contribute to ending hostilities where they could not be prevented. With its 1990 Charter of Paris, the 1992 Helsinki Document ‘The Challenges of Change’ and the 1994 Budapest Decision ‘Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era’, the CSCE created a complex toolbox of instruments for conflict prevention, crisis management, and postconflict rehabilitation. Furthermore, following the collapse of the Cold War, participating states agreed to transform the CSCE into a formal institution, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Although it has its origins in the CSCE, the OSCE is significantly different from its predecessor—in character, structure, and aims. To begin with, its essential function is different: instead of promoting détente, as the CSCE did, the OSCE placed at the heart of its agenda the pursuit of regional and international stability through cooperative security and the promotion of democratic transformation of the former communist states in Central/Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Its aims— as defined in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and subsequent documents—are democracy based upon human rights, (liberal) economic freedoms, the rule of law, and equal security for all member states.4 The principles inscribed in the Charter of Paris marked a significant expansion of the CSCE’s normative foundation: with the end of

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communism and the disappearance of the ideological confrontation between East/West, liberal democracy came to be recognized as the proper normative foundation for the entire OSCE area. The Paris Charter enshrined the agreement of participating states with regard to two key principles of liberal democracy: multi-party democracy and the market economy. In brief, there is a significant difference between the principles agreed upon within the framework of the CSCE in the 1970s, and those recognized as the foundation of the OSCE in the early 1990s. During the Cold War, the CSCE had inscribed an agreement between two different systems that had to compromise. By contrast, in the early 1990s, liberal-democratic principles had come to be shared by the participating states. Notice, for instance, the sense of normative agreement and enthusiasm for cooperative security that can be found in the language of the Charter of Paris: We, the Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, have assembled in Paris at a time of profound change and historic expectations. The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth our relations will be founded on respect and co-operation . . . Ours is a time for fulfilling the hopes and expectations our peoples have cherished for decades: steadfast commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; prosperity through economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all our countries . . . We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations . . . ’5

Apart from committing the participants to democracy and free markets, the Charter of Paris also provided for the establishment of standing institutions like the Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna, the Office for Free Elections (now ODIHR) in Warsaw, and a permanent Secretariat. Furthermore, the Charter established several main political bodies designed to help participating states to improve their habits of cooperation, and build the consensus needed to project democratic stability in the broad OSCE region. As stipulated in the Charter of Paris and related documents, key strategic decisions regarding the future of the OSCE are now taken at the Organization’s summits—periodic meetings of Heads of State or Government of OSCE participating states that set priorities at the highest political level. During periods between summits, decision-making and

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governing power lies with the Ministerial Council, whose members are the Foreign Ministers of the OSCE participating states. In addition, the Permanent Council meets weekly in Vienna, serving as the regular negotiating and decision-making body. The Permanent Council is led by the Chairman-in-Office (CiO), who holds the position of Chairman for one year. While all these institutional developments were important, one should not assume that the OSCE was designed as a highly structured, militarily powerful security organization. In fact, the OSCE was built upon a series of politically binding agreements, rather than formal legal treaties, and does not possess military resources to implement its decisions. As a result, to implement its decisions, the OSCE depends on political consensus among its participating states and on the diplomatic skills of its officials and the staff of its field missions (given that the Organization operates largely on the basis of the consent of states where OSCE field missions are deployed).6 Nevertheless, in the context of unprecedented degrees of cooperation and normative agreement of participating states around the nature of ‘good’ norms of governance, the OSCE rose to significant prominence in the decade following the end of the Cold War. Indeed, it can be argued that, in the early 1990s, by building on its expertise and invoking its authority as the first security forum to uphold the principles of cooperative, indivisible, comprehensive security, the CSCE/OSCE became a key player in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.7 As explained by Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, the OSCE’s innovative practices became: the epitome of a redefined understanding of international security. Seen thusly, security is increasingly ‘comprehensive’, for it links classic security elements to economic, environmental, cultural and human-rights factors. It is also ‘indivisible’, in the sense that one state’s security is inseparable from that of other states. Most important, it is ‘cooperative’, i.e. security is based on confidence and cooperation, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the work of mutually reinforcing multilateral institutions.8

In the 1990s, the OSCE also expanded its normative function in the area of socialization and implementation of OSCE (liberal-democratic) norms. In essence, as Emanuel Adler has argued, the OSCE became an explicit and distinct security community-building institution.9 In particular, the OSCE launched a comprehensive set of pedagogic practices aimed at

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expanding the Euro-Atlantic region comprised of sovereign states that share a commitment to a common set of (liberal-democratic) norms and a sense of ‘we-feeling’, and maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change. Thus, following the end of the Cold War, OSCE practices have been helping to increase the interdependence and transactions between East and West and to lay the foundation for a liberal transnational collective understanding in the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. By means of seminar diplomacy [ . . . ] which integrates academic expertise and diplomatic discourse and practice, and other innovative means of cooperation, the OSCE and other post-Cold War European security institutions have been making significant political efforts to change the intersubjective knowledge through which identities are defined.10

In brief, since 1990, the OSCE’s approach to security has relied heavily on practices of socialization of individuals and groups from transitional polities into the liberal-democratic norms of the Euro-Atlantic security community. The key assumption underlying that effort is that the establishment of stable liberal-democratic polities, which protect the rule of law, individual, and minority rights and have functioning market economies, helps to promote not only domestic freedom and well-being but also international stability. Based on that assumption, as stated in the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the heads of state of CSCE participating states agreed to ‘undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government for our nations’, and stated that ‘full respect for human rights is the bedrock on which we will seek to construct the new Europe’. While NATO and the EU have also been involved in pedagogic practices aimed at promoting liberal-democratic norms into former communist polities, and in so doing expanding the Euro-Atlantic security community, the OSCE adopted, from the start, a different approach. Thus, instead of setting conditions for membership, and accepting only those candidates that had demonstrated a certain degree of compliance with the (liberaldemocratic) norms of the community, the OSCE has from the start incorporated all states that were willing to state their intention to live up to the norms and standards of the community.11 By treating the entire region as an ‘imagined security community’, first including transitional countries and then teaching and encouraging them to comply with the same norms and develop the same kinds of habits/practices, the OSCE set out to create an environment characterized by shared meanings, trust, increased cooperation, and a sense of common identity. 122


A Renewed Emphasis on the Logic of Inclusion: The OSCE’s Approach to Preventing and Combating International Terrorism The OSCE embarked on yet another process of redefinition in the early days of the twenty-first century. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, like NATO and the EU, the OSCE identified international terrorism as a new major threat to international security, and sought to redefine its mandate and develop new tools and mechanisms for addressing that new threat.12 In response to the 9/11 attacks, the OSCE adopted the Bucharest Plan of Action, which identified terrorism as ‘a threat to international peace and security, in the OSCE area and elsewhere’, and affirmed the commitment of participating states to act collectively within the framework of the Organization, and to cooperate with other international institutions, both regional and global, to combat this threat.13 The Bucharest Plan stresses that there could be no neutrality in the fight against terrorism, while at the same time stating that this fight is not a war against particular religions or peoples, and reaffirming the commitment to protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.14 Under the Plan, OSCE participating states agreed that the respective UN Conventions and protocols, as well as the UN Security Council Resolutions, should constitute the basis of the global legal framework for the fight against terrorism. The Bucharest Plan also provided the mandate for establishing the Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU) in the OSCE Secretariat, to serve as the focal point for the Organization’s activities in this area. The ATU is tasked with coordinating and facilitating the OSCE counter-terrorist activities, including capacity-building assistance programmes and training and contingency-preparedness workshops. One of the main aims of the Unit is to address existing gaps in the anti-terrorism capabilities of the participating states and the work of the international community. Building on the Bucharest Plan, at the 2002 Porto Ministerial Council, the OSCE sought to strengthen its anti-terrorist regime by adopting two documents: the OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism15 and the Decision on Implementing the OSCE Commitments and Activities on Combating Terrorism (MC Decision no. 1/2002). Porto Decision no. 1 calls on all OSCE participating states, bodies, and institutions to continue the implementation of the Bucharest commitments, and recognizes the danger posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists. In addition, the Decision named four strategic areas for preventing 123


and combating terrorism: policing, border security, anti-trafficking, and suppressing terrorism financing. Consistent with its long-standing emphasis on conflict-prevention, and arguably in recognition of its lack of military resources, the OSCE has adopted its own version of risk-management in the fluid security environment of the twenty-first century. Thus, the OSCE proposes to manage the plurality of fluid, ill-defined risks posed by transnationally organized terrorist groups via measures aimed at addressing ‘various social, economic, political and other factors, including violent separatism and extremism, which engender conditions in which terrorist organizations are able to recruit and win support’.16 More specifically, according to the OSCE documents and declarations, the Organization’s counter-terrorism initiatives seek to combine three dimensions: (1) helping participating states to adopt and implement the necessary legislative framework concerning action against terrorism (including their accession to all UN Conventions and protocols in this area); (2) creating of mechanisms and programmes intended to help prevent terrorist recruitment or movement by terrorist groups within the OSCE area, including assistance by the organization to participating states in the development of effective monitoring and border control systems; (3) coordinating and promoting international cooperation in combating terrorism, including exchange of information between participating states, trans-border judicial cooperation, and the identification of links between terrorism and other threats to security, for example, various forms of organized crime, as a first step in the formulation of a comprehensive strategy designed to prevent terrorism.17 The 2003 Maastricht Ministerial Council continued the OSCE’s effort to enhance its capacity to prevent terrorism through the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Network, entrusted with strengthening the coordination of counter-terrorism measures and information-sharing among OSCE participating states, by facilitating the exchange of information in counter-terrorism programmes, training, and legal developments. At the Ministerial Council in Sofia, 2004, participating states reaffirmed their commitment to step up OSCE activities to prevent terrorism, primarily by addressing the factors that engender conditions in which terrorist groups are able to recruit and win support. A series of new decisions were also adopted at that meeting, including the Decision on Combating the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes (MC Decision no. 3/04). In a similar vein, the 2005 Ljubljana Ministerial Council adopted decisions on Enhancing Legal Cooperation in Criminal Matters Related to Counter-Terrorism (MC Decision no. 4/05); Combating the Threat of 124


Illegal Drugs (MC Decision no. 5/05); and Promoting Tolerance and NonDiscrimination by and within participating states (Decision no. 10/05). Similarly, the 2006 Brussels Ministerial Council adopted decisions on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes (MC Decision no. 7/06), and also adopted the OSCE Work Programme for 2007 on Preventing and Combating Terrorism (PC Decision 756). That work programme, like previous ATU programmes, places a strong emphasis on steps aimed at mobilizing a host of public and private actors in combating violent radicalization, fighting incitement to terrorism, and enhancing the ability of the OSCE to support participating states in ratifying antiterrorist legislation and preventing terrorist attacks. Similar to the discourses formulated by the EU and NATO, OSCE documents and statements on international terrorism combine the language of an existential threat allegedly posed by non-conventional enemies— particularly should they acquire weapons of mass destruction—with an emphasis on the need to combat this threat in a manner consistent with the protection of the key norms and values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Thus, at the OSCE’s 2002 Porto Ministerial Council (where the Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism was adopted), participating states recognized the danger posed by WMDs in the hands of terrorists.18 In a similar vein, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly referred to the terrorism carried out by organizations like Al Qaeda as a ‘blatant attack on the most elementary human rights and on the international legal order, because it constitutes an intolerable violation of the “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations (Art. 38(I) of the Statute of the UN International Court of Justice”’.19 Further, in its Washington Declaration, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly20 noted ‘the horror of historically unprecedented terrorist violence—with the purpose to kill and massacre, to die in order to kill more people, to practice the cult of death, and express personal desperation only through death’.21 Given that ‘today’s suicide terrorists prefer to attack defenceless and unarmed civilians, children and women, in order to inculcate in the minds of individuals and the masses a total, in many respects worse than racist, aversion to the “enemy/infidel”, and to totally dehumanize conflicts’, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly considers that, in light of the provisions sanctioned by the Statute of the International Criminal Court, ‘it must be agreed that suicide attacks of the terrorist nature constitute “crimes against humanity”’.22 At the same time, the Assembly considers that ‘every action to combat terrorism must be taken in respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as stated in the 125


Resolution on Human Rights and the War on Terrorism adopted by the OSCE Assembly at its Berlin session in July 2002’.23 The emphasis placed by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly on the need to combat terrorism in a manner consistent with the Organization’s commitment to human rights is very similar to the position adopted in the OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism, which states that the OSCE participating states ‘consider of utmost importance to complement the ongoing implementation of OSCE commitments on terrorism with a reaffirmation of the fundamental and timeless principles on which OSCE action has been undertaken and will continue to be based in the future’.24 Importantly, while identifying acts of international terrorism as ‘a threat to international and regional peace and security’,25 and affirming its determination to contribute to the ‘global fight against terrorism’, the OSCE discourse on terrorism insists that military force, by itself, cannot succeed in combating international terrorism. Instead, as reflected in the 2002 Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism, the OSCE depicts international terrorism as a complex phenomenon, which can only be combated through political and socio-economic measures aimed at creating conditions under which organizations like Al Qaeda are unlikely to gain support. There is, in particular, a concern to avoid a highly dangerous ‘boomerang effect’: the emergence, through anti-terrorism discourses and related practices, of rigid self/other dichotomies defined on the basis of religion. Should such dichotomies triumph in the Euro-Atlantic space, they would only enhance the alienation of the most vulnerable individuals and groups, thereby increasing the risk of their conversion to the cause of terrorism. That is why, according to the OSCE discourse, it is particularly important to address the risks of terrorism primarily through methods designed to enhance the inclusion of ‘at risk’ groups into liberal relations of community. Thus, the OSCE participating states are convinced of the need to address conditions that may foster and sustain terrorism, in particular by fully respecting democracy and the rule of law, by allowing all citizens to participate fully in political life, by preventing discrimination and encouraging intercultural and inter-religious dialogue in their societies, by engaging civil society in finding common political settlement for conflicts, by promoting human rights and tolerance, and by combating poverty.26

To put the analysis in a broader perspective, one of the most interesting aspects of the OSCE’s approach to the fight against international terrorism is its attempt—as revealed in the Organization’s key documents and 126


initiatives—to portray terrorism as the kind of security challenge that the OSCE is uniquely qualified to address. In other words, in response to a changed security environment—and the rise to prominence of international terrorism as a security challenge that is widely perceived as a key threat to Euro-Atlantic security in the twenty-first century, the OSCE has formulated a discourse that claims a key role for the Organization in addressing this threat. It has done so by invoking the OSCE’s (allegedly) unique institutional resources and expertise in dealing with comprehensive security issues both during and immediately following the end of the Cold War. There is an interesting similarity between this discourse and the CSCE’s attempt in the early 1990s to cast itself—and secure international recognition for its role—as the institution that had the expertise, experience, and membership to address a new type of comprehensive security problems that could not be adequately addressed by a system of rival alliances. The Organization’s contemporary discourse clearly recognizes that the OSCE does not have the capabilities needed to carry out serious military operations in the name of fighting international terrorism (as, for instance, NATO has done in Afghanistan). But, according to the OSCE, this is not a major problem—for it takes more than military power to fight terrorism, and the organization that first formulated a comprehensive concept of security in the Euro-Atlantic area has the knowledge and resources required to address this new threat. Thus, as stated in the OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism, ‘the prevention of and fight against terrorism must be built upon a concept of common and comprehensive security’.27 And, while the Bucharest Plan of Action declares the need for collaboration with other security organizations (particularly the EU and the UN), it also reaffirms the comparative advantage of the OSCE in addressing a threat as complex and multidimensional as that of international terrorism. On this view, the OSCE is an institution with a long history of defining security in a broad sense, encompassing not just the traditional dimension of military security but also economic aspects and human rights. The OSCE never tires of reminding both its members and its international audience that as far back as the Cold War—at a time when all other international institutions pursued narrow, geo-strategic definitions of security based on rigid us versus them dichotomies—the CSCE was promoting a different, far more comprehensive, and inclusive security agenda. That broad definition of security, it is argued, also enabled the OSCE to become a key player in the post–Cold War security environment, 127


initiating a wide range of activities, primarily aimed at preventing conflict and/or facilitating post-conflict reconciliation. In short, according to the OSCE security discourse, ‘The OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security gives the Organization a comparative advantage in addressing factors that may engender terrorism across the three OSCE dimensions.28 On this view, the CSCE/OSCE has always embodied a strong commitment to avoid tensions associated with dividing lines between insiders/outsiders. Moreover, the Organization has acquired significant expertise in early warning and conflict prevention, as well as post-conflict reconciliation and (re)building of democratic institutions.29 In fact, the notion involved in the Bucharest Plan of Action—and reiterated in subsequent documents and statements—is that the OSCE is already active and proficient in several areas that are relevant to the fight against international terrorism, including police training and monitoring; legislative and judicial reforms aimed at promoting democracy, human rights, and intercultural dialogue and tolerance; and border monitoring. As in the cases of NATO and the EU, it is helpful to explain the OSCE’s attempt to reposition itself in the changing Euro-Atlantic field of security by drawing on Bourdieu’s categories of capital (the resources that actors can draw upon to act in a given field). The discourse articulated by the OSCE claims a privileged position for the Organization in the post-9/11 security environment by invoking—and seeking the participating states’ support for further enhancing—its special capital. Particularly important in this context is the OSCE’s cultural capital (knowledge and expertise in responding to comprehensive security needs due to its institutional profile and experience in the Cold War and early post–Cold War era), and its related symbolic power (the ability to speak the truth about current international security challenges—to identify problems and formulate solutions to those problems). Related to that, the OSCE claims to embody a strong culture of human rights/human security that can be embraced by all, and that has been shown to work in the past. Based on that special capital, according to the OSCE discourse, the Organization was able to build an extensive network of field missions and offices—including in areas still excluded from or at least marginalized by NATO and the EU. Through those missions, it is argued, the OSCE has already taken steps to prevent terrorism. As noted above, the notion involved here is that ‘many OSCE field activities are already directly or indirectly addressing factors that can contribute to violent extremism and the emergence of terrorism’.30 Simultaneously, the OSCE discourse seeks to delegitimize

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approaches that rely primarily on the kind of capital that the Organization does not possess (in particular military capabilities), by disputing the idea that success in the campaign against international terrorism can be achieved primarily by military action. In other words, the OSCE has sought to play down the importance of conventional material capital (military capabilities) in the contemporary field of security. This, it could be argued, is crucial if the Organization is to be recognized as still relevant, given that it certainly does not have the resources to carry out military operations in the name of fighting terrorism. According to the OSCE, no matter how much military force a state or alliance of states might possess, it cannot rely on those capabilities to ensure a lasting victory against international terrorism. This is due to the fact that: No circumstance or cause can justify acts of terrorism. At the same time, there are various social, political and other factors, including violent separatism and extremism, which engender conditions in which terrorist organizations are able to recruit and win support. The OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security provides comparative advantages in combating terrorism by identifying and addressing these factors through all relevant OSCE instruments and structures.31

From the point of view of the OSCE, while the differences between the Cold War and post–Cold War periods (including the post-9/11 era) are acknowledged, the underlying assumption is that all these differences in the nature of security challenges occur against the background of a theme of continuity, concerning the comprehensive nature of security. The notion involved here is that, just as in the context of Cold-War threats of military confrontation it was necessary to adopt a comprehensive security approach, and just as in the early days following the end of the Cold War it was important to act in the area of prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, in today’s world, only a multi-dimensional, holistic approach, which can support structures and practices of good governance, can be effective in combating terrorism and promoting international stability. This leads us to the idea that lies at the heart of the OSCE security discourse: in its effort to help combat terrorism, the Organization can and should continue to do what it has always done: promote good (democratic) governance and cooperation, both in problematic domestic settings and internationally.32 Notice, for instance, some of the key OSCE anti-terrorism initiatives outlined in the Bucharest Plan of Action:

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ODIHR will continue and increase efforts to promote and assist in building democratic institutions at the request of states; participating states, ODIHR and the High Commissioner on National Minorities will promote and enhance tolerance, coexistence, and harmonious relations between ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other groups; and, drawing on all its capacities, the OSCE will continue and intensify work aimed at early warning and appropriate response, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation; will strengthen its ability to settle conflicts; will increase efforts to find lasting solutions to unresolved conflicts, including through promotion of the rule of law and crime prevention in such conflict zones through increased cooperation with the United Nations, the European Union and other international organizations; and will further develop its rapid deployment capability (REACT) in crisis situations.33

Importantly, as stated in OSCE documents, the Organization should reinforce its inclusive security approach. In the highly fluid security environment of the twenty-first century, the OSCE should continue to include (and, we could add, treat as members of an ‘imagined security community’) not only those states that are clearly committed to liberaldemocratic values and norms but also the more problematic countries of the former communist bloc, including former Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In so doing, this logic of inclusion suggests, the OSCE can help socialize those societies into norms of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, steering them away from the danger of (re)becoming failed states and potential breeding grounds for terrorism. This is important in a situation in which, according to the OSCE security discourse, ‘today’s weak states can easily turn into tomorrow’s failed states, which could attract terrorists like flies around a carcass’.34 In the name of promoting long-term good governance in problematic transitional states, the OSCE has performed a slight shift in its geographical focus. Thus, over the past few years, the OSCE has been more involved in those regions of Eurasia where ‘democratic institutions are least visible, where economic and environmental conditions are most impoverished, and where the worlds of Islam and Orthodox Christianity have often collided throughout centuries, namely Central Asia and the Caucusus’.35 Simultaneously, as P. Terrence Hopmann has noted, ‘the OSCE since 9/11 has increasingly emphasized the long-term conflict prevention activities associated with good governance and social integration, as opposed to more immediate conflict prevention, management, and resolution activities that constituted its central focus throughout 130


the decade of the 1990s’.36 While Central Asia and the Caucasus have not actually replaced the Balkans as the primary focus of attention,37 following the 9/11 attacks, they did come to occupy a significantly larger proportion of the OSCE’s time and attention.38 For instance, there has been growing concern about Central Asia, as a place where there is a significant risk that radicalism might take root due to unresolved minority issues (e.g. in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan), the lack of political unity, problems surrounding the area’s economic resources, and resentment due to restrictions to fundamental freedoms.39 The Central Asian republics that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union have had a poor record as regards the development of democratic institutions and respect for human rights. Under these circumstances, in recent years, the OSCE has set up centres in all of those countries in an effort to encourage more political openness and greater respect for fundamental human rights. In those transitional polities, the main focus of OSCE activities has been on ‘seminar diplomacy’—that is, a monitoring of the situation of human rights and democratic reforms, coupled with efforts at norm diffusion via a plurality of pedagogic practices. In fact, the OSCE has concentrated mostly on stimulating education about democratic practices, governance, the rule of law and other human dimension issues. This is part of an institutional division of labour in the region [in which] the International Monetary Fund and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development have taken the lead in economic development initiatives, the European Union has emphasized technical assistance programmes to promote governmental capacity-building, NATO has brought the four countries (except Tajikistan) into its Partnership for Peace and the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council in the realm of military security and the UN took the lead in conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Tajikistan, supported by the OSCE mission, after a peace accord was signed in May 1997.40

Thus, the OSCE has been at the forefront of international efforts to organize seminars and other educational activities with local political elites and civil society actors. Those are aimed at diffusing shared knowledge about—as well as developing common solutions to—problems of democratization in Central Asian republics. In addition, the OSCE has been involved in teaching conflict management skills and facilitating dialogue between the government and the opposition in particularly sensitive areas (e.g. concerning the situation of minorities in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan); raising awareness about the special needs concerning 131


the protection of human rights and democracy in multiethnic communities; supporting and advising NGOs (often threatened by governmental repression); and the protection of human rights.41 In a similar vein, the OSCE has increased its involvement in the Caucasus region in the post-9/11 period. In addition to conducting seminars on the rule of law, democracy, and respect for human rights, the Organization has been responsible for a number of initiatives designed to secure and implement lasting agreements between parties to secessionist conflicts, and thus facilitate the resolution of those conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh.42 For instance, the OSCE has sought to encourage the Russian Federation to live up to its earlier promise to close its military bases and withdraw its troops from Moldova and Georgia. Furthermore, OSCE representatives have been involved in monitoring the border between Georgia and the Russian Federation (particularly the border with Chechnya), in an effort to restrict the flow of arms and people across the border.

Teaching ‘Good Norms’ as Part of the Effort to Combat Terrorism In addition to the above-mentioned general activities aimed at promoting good governance in vulnerable countries in its region, the OSCE has also launched a series of initiatives more specifically aimed at helping to combat terrorism. Consistent with its long-term emphasis on seminar diplomacy, not only the ATU, in particular, but also other OSCE bodies initiated numerous pedagogic activities aimed at diffusing shared ideas about and common practical approaches to preventing and combating internationally organized terrorism. Indeed, most of the activities organized or coordinated by the ATU involve workshops, seminars, courses, and meetings that seek to identify ‘best practices’ in the area of preventing and combating international terrorism, and spreading those best practices in the entire OSCE region. In the OSCE security discourse—and in pedagogic activities informed by that discourse—there has been a heavy emphasis on the principle that all actions designed to combat terrorism must be consistent with the norms of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. As regards the substance of pedagogic practices aimed at diffusing shared knowledge and common practice in the OSCE area, many of those are explicitly aimed at promoting greater inclusiveness within societies, 132


thereby avoiding (or redressing) the marginalization and alienation that, arguably, might lead some individuals to embrace the cause of international terrorism. Indeed, the ATU’s work plans reflect an emphasis on teaching participating states shared practices of inclusion into liberaldemocratic relations of community of vulnerable actors, and on methods of prevention of activities (e.g. incitement to hatred and violent extremism) that draw sharp boundaries between self/other, dehumanize the other, and on this basis justify terrorism. For instance, the OSCE has organized expert workshops on fighting incitement and combating the use of the Internet for violent radicalization, as part of a follow-up to expert workshops on ‘Combating the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes’ (October 2005), and ‘Preventing Terrorism: Fighting Incitement and Related Terrorist Activities’ (co-organized with the Council of Europe, October 2006).43 In addition, in the name of enhancing the capacity of participating states to prevent and combat terrorism, the ATU has been involved in organizing a series of conferences and workshops that seek to identify best practice as regards the role of non-governmental organizations, civil society, and businesses in cooperating with governments in the area of counter-terrorism.44 In the course of those events, participants— both state officials and private actors, including members of the business community and NGOs—have reasserted the importance of public– private partnerships in this area. In a more practical sense, they have also discussed potential new steps aimed at strengthening public–private networks, thereby enhancing their ability to protect the critical infrastructure of OSCE participating states, and to ensure the transparency of the financial system in order to prevent its abuse by terrorist groups. One of the most important issues addressed at those conferences was the issue of persisting gaps in public–private coordination and cooperation. Based on a shared understanding of the necessity to build up public– private networks in the fight against terrorism, participants examined potential steps to address such gaps. These included proposals to assign new powers but also new duties to private actors to monitor and report to public authorities suspicious activities on the Internet, and also to involve private actors to a greater extent in the provision of transport security (including container security), supply chain security, countering terrorism financing, and the formulation of procedures and mechanisms designed to avoid human rights abuses in the fight against terrorism.45 In other words, similar to NATO and the EU, the OSCE has launched a series of practices that are aimed at transcending the conventional 133


boundary between the public–private spheres, and constructing hybrid security structures by systematically mobilizing civil society to participate in preventing or resisting incitement to extremism (e.g. via a responsible use of the Internet) and, simultaneously, helping the authorities to identify potential terrorists by reporting instances of suspicious behaviour by risky individuals or groups. The OSCE has thus been contributing to the broader Euro-Atlantic processes of redefinition of the categories of protected/protector, by assigning certain responsibilities of protection to individuals and private groups that would conventionally be regarded as mere subjects of protection. The importance of this process of partial individualization of responsibility was repeatedly stressed in the official statements issued by the Action against Terrorism Unit. The notion involved here is that: [t]he primary responsibility for preventing and countering terrorism, as well as for managing the consequences of terrorist acts, rests with states. However, given the nature and scale of today’s constantly evolving terrorist threat, states alone cannot successfully counter terrorism without the deployment of all elements of national power, drawing on the business community and civil society as a whole.46

According to the OSCE discourse, the need to foster public–private partnerships is one more reason why the Organization should be seen as a key player in the contemporary field of security. Thus, the OSCE has once again invoked its special cultural-symbolic capital to argue that it is uniquely qualified to perform functions that are central to the pursuit of security in today’s world.47 In this case, the relevant capital is associated with the OSCE’s allegedly unique knowledge and experience, given that the OSCE has from its inception accorded particular importance to non-state actors, and has systematically relied on cooperation with NGOs and other civil society groups to advance a comprehensive security agenda. According to the then OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, the public–private conferences organized in recent months: ‘illustrate the unique role of the OSCE in the crafting of international and national networks across the OSCE area to address one of the most troubling questions of our times—how to combine forces in the struggle against terrorism’.48 In addition, other OSCE units have been engaged in activities aimed at socializing public and private actors in participating states into common knowledge and practical dispositions in the area of preventing and combating terrorism. In particular, the Bucharest Plan of Action tasked the ODIHR to offer technical assistance and advice (at the request of 134


interested participating states and where appropriate) on the implementation of international anti-terrorism conventions and protocols; facilitate contacts between national experts to promote exchange of information and best practice on counter-terrorism legislation; strengthen domestic legal frameworks and institutions that uphold the rule of law; and address factors which engender conditions in which terrorists may recruit and win support. The overall aim of the ODIHR Human Rights and Anti-Terrorism Programme is to strengthen compliance with OSCE commitments as well as to strengthen democratic institutions in the context of preventing and combating violent extremism and terrorism. ODIHR activities are organized against the background of a concern, clearly inscribed in the OSCE discourse, that ‘there is a risk that counter-terrorism measures and laws may be employed to unduly restrict human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to silence legitimate dissent by political opposition parties, minority or religious groups, NGOs and journalists’.49 In other words, the OSCE discourse reveals an awareness of the danger of a boomerang effect associated with the practices of risk-management carried out in the name of fighting the elusive, non-conventional enemies (terrorist groups) that operate both within and outside the Euro-Atlantic area. As OSCE officials have repeatedly argued, not only would measures that unduly restrict human rights be inconsistent with the OSCE’s normative commitments, but, by generating resentment (and potentially a sense of alienation) among targeted groups in participating states, they might also produce even more support for terrorist organizations. Over the past few years, and often in cooperation with the ATU, as well as (sometimes) the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the OSCE Representative for the Freedom of the Media, the ODIHR has provided technical assistance and advice to participating states in order to cultivate in the broad Euro-Atlantic area shared understandings about the counter-terrorism and common legislative solutions to those problems, in conformity with the UN conventions in this area. Particular emphasis has been placed on guiding states in reviewing and (if necessary) drafting new legislation necessary to implement international anti-terrorism conventions and protocols in a manner consistent with the norms of human rights and the rule of law. In addition, a training programme on the protection of human rights in the fight against terrorism aimed at senior public officials was developed in 2005 with activities held in Kyrgyzstan and Vienna. That programme has continued with a series of training sessions, for instance, in Belgrade (14–16 June 135


2006) and in Astana (5–7 September 2006). Using scenarios and practical cases involving an interactive approach, the training was designed to provide public officials with knowledge as well as practical insights into the major challenges concerning the protection of human rights in counter-terrorism, and to help build new habits of appropriate behaviour in the face of such challenges.50 More training sessions are planned for the future, in cooperation with OSCE field missions. In parallel with its training programme, the ODIHR Human Rights and Anti-Terrorism Programme is also developing a Manual on Human Rights Protection in Counter-terrorism. The manual is not only intended to supplement the training modules but also to act as a stand-alone guide to all participating states, and should be finished by the end of 2007. In a similar vein, there has been a strong emphasis on training law enforcement agencies to conduct policing activities in a manner consistent with the rule of law and human rights—and in so doing to protect (rather than endanger) the relevant community, and avoid alienating minorities and/or particular religious/ethnic groups.51 Comprehensive and country-oriented capacity building police assistance/development programmes and projects have been organized/managed by the Field Operations and supported by the Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU), with the aim of enhancing the competence of participating states in combating all forms of crime, including terrorism, without violating OSCE norms of human rights and the rule of law.52 The SPMU has continued its support to the process with the implementation of the Police Assistance Programs (PaPs) in several countries in transition in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In particular, the SPMU has assisted with the implementation of the OSCE PaPs to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Short-Term Assistance Project in Georgia. These OSCE Police Assistance Programs/Projects focused mainly on helping states in the Caucasus region to build up their national community policing policies, and strengthening their police training capacities. In addition, the SPMU has formulated a new PaP for Georgia which is to be implemented in late 2007. This PaP envisages the provision of assistance to the Georgian Police Academy, introducing international ‘best practice’ in community policing.53 As stressed in the OSCE security discourse, police services cannot be successful in combating terrorism ‘if they fail to build partnerships with the community they serve thus generating insufficient support. Therefore, community-based policing as part of a broader concept of democratic

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policing has been supported and promoted by the SPMU’.54 The notion involved here is that a community policing philosophy is a valuable way of developing trust and sharing information with citizen organizations, which would enhance the community’s response in reporting suspicious behaviour in their neighbourhood.55 Based on this idea, the OSCE has organized regional police expert symposiums, aimed at defining the correct principles and identifying best practice of democratic policing. Over the past few years, the Organization has significantly expanded its socialization efforts in this area. In particular, ODIHR has conducted seminars and other pedagogic activities with public officials working in the areas of justice and home affairs, with the explicit aim of disseminating a habitus that is consistent with human rights principles in the fight against terrorism. According to Susie Alegre, ODIHR adviser on anti-terrorism issues and one of the trainers involved in these programmes, In the light of recent terrorist attacks in the OSCE region and elsewhere, there is a lot of pressure on policy-makers to be seen to be taking firm action against terrorism. . . . In such a climate there is a risk that fundamental freedoms and human rights could be sacrificed in the name of protecting the public.56

In light of this concern, dozens of training sessions have been conducted under ODIHR auspices, targeting especially though by no means exclusively participating states that are still in the process of democratic transition (including some of the former Soviet republics and former Yugoslav republics emerging from conflict). In the course of those training sessions, ODIHR officials seek to teach ‘students’ from participating states specific principles of human rights protection in the context of the fight against terrorism (e.g. banning torture and illegal detention), and often invoke historical evidence in support of their claim that the support of communities is vital in any effort to identify, contain, and apprehend individuals or groups involved in terrorism, and that such community support can only be obtained by gaining the respect and trust of the local population. In turn, that requires that the authorities refrain from violations of human rights and avoid excessive applications of violence.57 As Susie Alegre has pointed out, ‘It is important to ensure that developing law and practice complies with human rights. We not only look at how human rights violations can be avoided in counter-terrorism work but also show

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how the promotion of human rights, especially in relation to allowing the development of civil society, can act as a tool for preventing terrorism.’58 Furthermore, the SPMU, in cooperation with police experts from the OSCE participating states, has produced a Guidebook on Democratic Policing, explaining the correct principles of policing. This is consistent with the OSCE insistence that anti-terrorism measures should not be used as an opportunity to ‘restrict certain fundamental freedoms by targeting, for example, minority or religious groups, NGOs and journalists’.59 Facilitating and sharing best practices and lessons learned by the participating states is another role of the SPMU; to this purpose, the Unit designed the OSCE Policing On-line Information Systems, a webbased, multilingual resource that seeks to consolidate all aspects of law enforcement activities in the OSCE area, including police assistance and techniques for police training. The aim is to make this storehouse of information available to interested participating states, and to create a virtual community of policing experts. It is also worth noting that out of 19 OSCE Field Operations, 11 have a policing component, and most of them are active in field police training—again, with the aim of building efficient police units that comply with the rule of law and human rights norms. In the training activities carried out within the framework of the OSCE Field Operations, emphasis is placed not only on teaching anti-terrorist techniques but also on promoting cooperation between the police and the community. In this emphasis on the importance of cooperation between private individuals/groups and the authorities in the field of policing we find, yet again, echoes of the concern with the individualization of war that is inscribed in EU and NATO documents and practices. Thus, if individuals or small groups are seen as posing a threat not only to domestic order but also to international security (especially through their potential access to WMDs), then it becomes the responsibility of all good citizens to contribute to efforts to identify, exclude from the life of the polity, and defeat such dangerous actors. The community is thus defined as not just the focus of protection but also the potential locus of threat both to its members and to outsiders. As such, it is to be the subject of systematic monitoring—not only by public authorities but also by other members of the community. In essence, the community has a duty to act in conjunction with the authorities, to monitor and if necessary to help contain and defeat terrorists in order to protect not only itself but also the entire international community. 138


Identifying and Teaching Practices of Exclusion of Dangerous Others In parallel to pedagogic practices aimed at strengthening democracy and enhancing the ability of societies, particularly transitional societies, to avoid or redress problems of exclusion/alienation that might foster extremism, the OSCE has also taken a series of initiatives intended to enhance the collective capacity of participating states to identify and exclude—from their territory or at least from the normal socio-economic life of their societies—those individuals and groups suspected of involvement in international terrorism. As noted above, the OSCE has always defined itself as the most inclusive security institution in the EuroAtlantic area, working to bring into relations of security community and to promote shared democratic norms and practices in all its participating states—that is, even in countries that are still excluded from NATO and the EU. Interestingly, in the present security environment, that effort to construct shared ideas and common practices in a broad Euro-Atlantic area has been broadened to encompass, in conjunction with the norms and practices of inclusion, a growing emphasis on building shared knowledge and practices of exclusion of those who, far from being just vulnerable groups in need of guidance and support, have allegedly placed themselves beyond the boundaries of democratic relations of community due to their (suspected) support for the cause of terrorism. Boundaries are thus reaffirmed and accorded renewed importance in the context of the fight against international terrorism. But what is involved here is not a reaffirmation of strong borders in a traditional geo-strategic sense; rather, these are boundaries that need to be drawn between civilized/non-civilized, ethical/non-ethical individuals and groups operating in the whole EuroAtlantic area. In essence, what is involved is a new emphasis on using the OSCE as a forum in which participating states can collectively formulate categories of individuals and groups based on the degree of risk they allegedly pose, and can develop the common tools needed to monitor and place individuals/groups in appropriate categories. Individuals and groups deemed as risky are then to be subjected to (exceptional) forms of exclusion from the territories or at least the normal socio-economic relations of participating states. As in the cases of NATO and the EU, in the present international context, the dangerous others that are to be subjected to practices of exclusion are identified as non-conventional, highly elusive enemies: they are the supposedly uncivilized groups and networks who 139


are (allegedly) involved in international terrorism, or at least activities that support/finance international terrorism, such as transnational organized crime. Through their activities, those actors are accused of involvement in ‘unprecedented terrorist violence’, and thus deemed as a threat to domestic as well as international stability. In fact, as noted above, in 2002, the OSCE Ministerial Council identified several ‘strategic choices’ for the OSCE, including border security, antitrafficking, and suppressing terrorist financing—that is, precisely activities aimed at enhancing the ability of participating states to exclude from their territory and/or socio-economic life and to defeat actors suspected of involvement in international terrorism. For instance, the OSCE has undertaken several efforts directed at undermining the ability of terrorist groups to gain access to weapons. In 2000, the OSCE adopted a Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), aimed at slowing the flow of small arms across national borders.60 In an attempt to reinforce the implementation of the SALW Document—and in so doing to limit access to weapons by terrorist groups—the OSCE participating states have taken additional steps, in particular concerning export control and documentation. In 2004 alone, the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (the main body within the politico-military dimension of the organization) adopted three decisions covering different areas of SALW exports; these decisions reflect agreement among participating states as regards the principles of export control and brokering in small arms and light weapons, and embody a commitment to incorporate these principles into national practices and policies.61 In addition, in January 2004, 44 participating states attended a workshop organized by the ATU, which focused on the provision of technical advice on tightening security around airports against MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defence Systems). It is expected that more such activities will take place in the future. The OSCE has also been involved in the area of border monitoring and border protection. For example, OSCE participating states have used the Forum for Security Cooperation in efforts to enhance their collective ability to protect their territory from undesirable others, particularly terrorist groups. According to the Border Security and Management Concept (MC.DOC/2/05), which was adopted at the Ljubljana Ministerial Council, OSCE contributions to participating states can range from facilitation (such as workshops designed to promote shared knowledge about, and identify best methods for, border control and confidence-building measures), to general types of contribution (in particular technical assistance in enhancing the effectiveness of border structures via sharing 140


best practice), and finally to possible specialized assistance in the field of combating illegal migration and illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons and their means of delivery. Meanwhile, the Border Concept states that participating states share a commitment to work within the OSCE framework to protect and promote normal socio-economic practices—including the free and secure movement in the economic field—for the individuals and groups that are not seen as risky. In other words, like the EU and NATO, through practices in areas such as border protection the OSCE has sought to act as a forum for identifying and helping to implement exceptional practices of exclusion of risky individuals. As a corollary to that, the Organization has initiated activities aimed at disseminating shared conceptual and practical frameworks (or ‘best practices’) seen as needed in order to sustain such practices in the OSCE region. At the same time, the Organization has claimed that it can continue to play an important role in protecting and promoting normal (liberal) freedoms and corresponding activities in the Euro-Atlantic area.62 Consistent with its focus on human security, the OSCE has linked the renewed emphasis on border control in the post-9/11 environment with a normative commitment to limit human trafficking. According to the OSCE discourse, ‘Preventing and countering trafficking in human beings is increasingly a priority activity for the OSCE that undercuts across all dimensions. The connection between trafficking in human beings and terrorism resides in the role of organized crime, corruption, money laundering, and close interaction between criminal and terrorist groups.’ The OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the TwentyFirst Century places a heavy emphasis on the need to improve border security not only in the name of preventing the movement of terrorists but also in order to cut down on other illegal cross-border activities, particularly trafficking in women and children—which, above and beyond the potential to finance international terrorism, constitute fundamental violations of basic human rights.63 In the particular area of human trafficking, it could be argued that the OSCE has used the current concern with international terrorism to galvanize action in an area that has always been central to the organization: human security. The OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings was endorsed at the Ministerial level in 2003 as an annex to MC Decision no. 2/03. The Ministerial Decision established an OSCE Mechanism, under the aegis of the Permanent Council (the main regular decision-making body of the Organization), to further assist the participating states in the implementation of commitments and full usage 141


of recommendations provided by the Action Plan.64 The Mechanism consists of two parts: a Special Representative, and an Anti-Trafficking Assistance Unit in the OSCE Secretariat. In June 2006, the dual structure of the Mechanism was fully integrated into the Secretariat to become known as the Office of the Special Representative/Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. Furthermore, since 2004, the OSCE has been involved in projects aimed at teaching police experts in participating states techniques and measures needed to successfully obtain sufficient evidence to prosecute individuals accused of human trafficking. The ODIHR, with its Anti-Trafficking Program, has been implementing a number of projects, including on trial monitoring, access for victims to a fair trial, and the promotion of international legal standards, particularly concerning the protection of victims of trafficking. The OSCE’s explicit aim in this area has been to integrate the rights-based approach to trafficking in human beings into the activities prioritized in the context of the post-9/11 security environment.65 However, there is the danger of a serious boomerang effect associated with this move. Thus, it could be argued that, in effect, the OSCE has contributed to an acceleration of processes of securitization of migration by invoking the link between one of the most problematic aspects of migration—human trafficking—and terrorism. As a result, the danger is that the most vulnerable victims of trafficking could find themselves more easily stigmatized and subjected to an exceptional treatment of exclusion from liberal-democratic societies on the basis of their alleged association with the danger of terrorism. Should that happen, the approach adopted by participating states may not involve an affirmation—and implementation—of the basic human rights of victims of human trafficking but, rather, their exclusion from the liberal community and potential punishment as ‘accessories’ or potential accomplices of particularly dangerous groups. To look at this from another angle, it is worth noting that, as in the case of NATO and the EU, the OSCE approach in the area of border protection does not involve the creation of fortresses. Rather, the metaphor of the filter is more apt, as the idea is to develop shared knowledge and common, more efficient mechanisms and practices designed to enable participating states to identify and filter out dangerous individuals and groups (especially those suspected of involvement in international terrorism) without dramatically disrupting the normal socio-economic exchanges needed by liberal economies. This is reflected not only in border monitoring and border-protection activities but also in attempts to exclude terrorist 142


organizations from the socio-economic life of Euro-Atlantic polities. A special emphasis has been placed on enhancing the collective ability of OSCE states to limit the ability of terrorist groups to use normal socioeconomic activities to finance their illegal activities. Thus, the OSCE has sought to diffuse ‘best practice’ in combating money laundering and the use of fraudulent travel documents, including through the introduction of biometrics. To give an example: the OSCE launched the Travel Documents Security Programme, and organized a series of conferences and workshops in this area. Among these, a major international conference in Vienna in March 2004, which was aimed at senior national officials working on travel document security; five regional workshops on combating the use of fraudulent and counterfeit travel documents in 2003/2004 in Ohrid, Bishkek, Zagreb, Tallinn, and Tashkent; two regional workshops on security standards for handling and issuing passports, held in 2005 in Sofia and Almaty; and visits by experts to provide technical advice and recommendations to requesting participating states with regard to new security features and acceptable standards for travel documents.66 In the area of suppressing terrorist financing, as noted above, the OSCE Ministerial meetings in Bucharest, Porto, Maastricht, and Sofia have all stressed that it is important for the Organization to support OSCE participating states’ efforts to strengthen their ability to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism. Here, again, the OSCE’s emphasis has been on diffusing to participating states shared knowledge about—and common practices (‘best practice’)—in combating the financing of terrorism. As a direct implementation of the Programme of Action endorsed at the Bishkek International Conference on Enhancing Security and Stability in Central Asia, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Global Programme against Money Laundering and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activity (OCEEA) started to cooperate in 2002 on actions that seek to combat money laundering and suppress the financing of terrorism in the OSCE region.67 In cooperation with the UNODC, the OSCE has organized a series of national workshops on combating money laundering and suppressing terrorism financing. Those workshops largely focus on developing common methods and legal and institutional mechanisms—as well as the knowledge and practical dispositions needed to sustain them—in order to help participating states to identify and subject to an exceptional (illiberal) treatment those individuals and groups suspected of involvement in terrorism. The first phase of the workshops involves exercises in awareness-raising and needs-assessment; the second phase involves the development of the 143


legal framework seen as necessary to combat financing for terrorism, assistance in implementation (which includes a mentorship programme), and capacity building (with specific training elements). These workshops bring together international and local experts, as well as representatives from the respective ministerial financial and judicial government bodies. To date, nine first phase workshops have been organized with the governments of Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro, Romania, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The OSCE workshops have resulted in a number of recommendations, and, in several instances, the drafting of relevant legislation for participating states.68 In addition, a series of workshops have been organized with the aim to spread best practice and enhance legal cooperation among participating states in criminal matters related to terrorism (e.g. concerning the investigation and possible extradition of those suspected of involvement in international terrorism). To take just a couple of examples, in partnership with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the ATU organized two largescale, OSCE-wide expert workshops in Vienna (April 2005 and March 2006), each bringing some 150 senior officials from participating and Partners for Cooperation states. The focus of the first event was on the sharing of best practices, as well as strategies for addressing ongoing problems in mutual legal assistance and extradition in terrorism and organized crime-related casework. The second, while also discussing issues of extradition and mutual legal assistance, was centred on the promotion of technical assistance tools.69 Since 2005, the ATU has also organized national training workshops for judges, prosecutors, and other judicial officials, intended to teach/provide guidance to those officials as regards the universal legal framework for international legal cooperation in criminal matters, and also, more specifically, to provide guidance on the implementation of OSCE commitments in this area.70

The OSCE’s Credibility Crisis In essence, following the 9/11 attacks, the OSCE identified international terrorism as a key threat to regional and international security, and claimed that, by virtue of its identity and institutional expertise, it could play a special role in the global effort to combat this threat. In particular, the OSCE discourse has invoked the Organization’s special culturalsymbolic capital derived from its history to argue that the OSCE can and 144


should continue to rely heavily on policies that follow a logic of inclusion, working to spread shared (liberal-democratic) norms, and thus include more individuals and groups in relations of community. According to the OSCE, this approach is important because it enables the transcendence of divisions between insiders and outsiders in the Euro-Atlantic area. As a corollary to that, the OSCE has continued and even enhanced efforts to conduct pedagogic practices aimed at diffusing shared conceptual and practical dispositions of self-restraint (or habitus) that underpin liberal democracy, while simultaneously working to guide participating states in constructing institutions that embed those liberal dispositions. On the basis of its inclusive identity and expertise gained both during the Cold War and in the first decade of the post–Cold War era, the OSCE has claimed it is quite well-equipped to contribute to the international campaign against terrorism. In particular, the notion involved in the OSCE discourse is that, through its actions, the Organization can help address (or prevent the emergence of) conditions that might engender terrorism. At the same time, reflecting a growing preoccupation with exceptional practices in the field of security, the OSCE has also launched a number of specific programmes aimed at constructing a Euro-Atlantic community of anti-terrorist practice by diffusing shared knowledge and common practical dispositions for identifying and excluding from the OSCE territory, or at least from its normal socio-economic relations, those individuals/groups accused of involvement in terrorism. The question is, how (if at all) do these activities matter? Can they really place the OSCE in a strong position in the international fight against terrorism, and hence in a strong position in the changing field of security? Over the years, many analysts and politicians have been quite dismissive of the OSCE; as an institution with a very large and diverse membership and few institutional resources, the OSCE has sometimes been seen as irrelevant to international security. However, there is significant evidence that since its creation the CSCE/OSCE has played a significant role in promoting regional and international stability. As scholars like Emanuel Adler and Daniel Thomas have demonstrated, by promoting East–West dialogue, establishing the foundations of a common normative structure for the entire OSCE region, and applying constant pressure on states to implement their normative commitments, the OSCE contributed to the diffusion of tensions, the establishment of civil societies in the East, and then to the peaceful end of the Cold War.71 Following the end of the Cold War, it is reasonable to argue that the OSCE did play a significant 145


(if sometimes less visible) role in several instances of conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation.72 More broadly, though the OSCE has not always been successful in its attempts at diffusing norms of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law to transitional polities, by means of its extensive seminar diplomacy, in the 1990s, the Organization did play a significant role in creating shared understandings about appropriate domestic and international behaviour, providing guidance in the area of legal/institutional reforms needed for democratization, and establishing new patterns of cooperation (including in the military sphere) between former enemies.73 As Adler has persuasively argued, When assessing and measuring the influence of the OSCE’s practices, we cannot simply look at this institution’s regulative tasks or short-range activities, because what matters most is the long-range effectiveness of its practices and activities as constitutive of community identity and bonds. For example, when the OSCE sends a mission to Tajikistan or Estonia, organizes a seminar on military doctrines or confidence-building measures (CBMs), or, as part of its CBM regime, requires states to open up their military activities for inspection, what matters most is not the short-range success of the mission, seminar or inspection, but the construction of a foundation for community practice and behavior.74

It may be, then, that contemporary practices carried out by the OSCE as part of its contribution to the fight against international terrorism will have a significant long-term impact. Thus, it may be that the OSCE will play an important role in helping to construct a broad Euro-Atlantic community of practice that combines extensive ‘normal’ liberal-democratic values, norms, and practices with exceptional security measures aimed at controlling and excluding dangerous illiberal actors, especially individuals and groups involved in international terrorism. At this point of time, it could be argued that there are some positive early signs regarding the role of the OSCE in helping to diffuse common knowledge and a specific type of shared practices in the area of combating terrorism. In particular, through practices designed to raise normative awareness and provide judicial and technical advice in the implementation of international norms concerning the fight against terrorism, the Action Against Terrorism Unit has reportedly had some success in guiding participating states in the process of ratification of UN anti-terrorism conventions and travel document security.75 It may be that, in the long term, the OSCE will play an even greater role in fostering systematic counter-terrorism cooperation while continuing to promote norms of democratic governance in the 146


broad Euro-Atlantic area. Thus, it could be argued that it takes a long time for pedagogic practices to have a tangible effect, but, in the long term, the OSCE will indeed contribute to the strengthening and expansion of the Euro-Atlantic community of shared security practices. At present, however, the problem for the OSCE is that it is not at all clear that the Organization is consistently playing the norm-diffusion role around which it defines its identity and mandate. One question that arises is whether the specific actions taken by the ATU and other bodies in the area of counter-terrorism are always compatible with the broader normative agenda of the OSCE. The explicit idea behind OSCE initiatives is, as we have seen, that counter-terrorism must be conducted in strict accordance with respect for the rule of law and human rights. But this may be more problematic in practice, particularly in a situation in which some OSCE participating states have invoked the threat of terrorism to suspend or limit important human rights in their societies. In recent years, many participating states, particularly in Central Asia, have been more enthusiastic about OSCE activities that are very specifically focused on counter-terrorism training and support (e.g. regarding border control and prevention of terrorism financing) than about broader OSCE democracy-promotion activities.76 The desire of some participating states to shift the focus of OSCE practices towards the control and exclusion of suspected terrorists and minimize the Organization’s involvement in democracy promotion was revealed, most recently, by the OSCE’s Ministerial Council on 29–30 November 2007. That Council was the scene of open confrontation between, on one hand, the USA and several West European states and, on the other hand, Russia and some former CIS states, as the latter insisted that the OSCE should place a far heavier emphasis on security issues, including fighting terrorism via border control, transport security, and prevention of terrorist financing, and should drastically limit its democracy-promotion agenda. In other words, on this view, in order to help manage the risk of terrorism in the Euro-Atlantic area, the OSCE should evolve into an organization that formulates and helps implement (exceptional) measures of control and exclusion of dangerous individuals/groups, while significantly reducing its involvement in the promotion of norms and values of liberal democracy (and the conceptual as well as practical dispositions of self-restraint that underpin liberalism). Such a re-articulation of the OSCE’s role away from the promotion of a liberal habitus and institutions and towards a greater emphasis on exclusion and exceptions to liberal norms in the name of counter-terrorism would seem to run counter to the OSCE’s 147


self-defined mission to support liberal-democratic values and freedoms. The Russian proposal was opposed by Washington, Canada, and the EU countries on the grounds that democracy-promotion has always been and should continue to be a principal pillar of the OSCE.77 Yet, there is no evidence that the Western participating states were able to persuade Moscow to change its stance. The 2007 Ministerial Council is only the latest in a long series of examples that reflect the problems experienced by the OSCE in promoting its normative agenda of liberal-democratic governance (as defined in the Charter of Paris and related documents). Given its weak institutional structure, and hence its heavy reliance on consensus among participating states, the OSCE has become increasingly the victim of unilateral policies by key members (or coalitions within the OSCE) that violate the norms and principles embodied in the Organization. Since the 9/11 attacks, many of those normative violations have been justified by participating states by reference to the threat of terrorism. Moreover, the (allegedly) permanent risk of a serious terrorist attack has been effectively invoked by those states to defuse OSCE criticism of their normative deviations. For instance, following the 9/11 attacks, the priority attached by the USA to fighting terrorism—almost by any means—has meant that the OSCE has not been able to take a strong stand against human rights violations by Russian troops in Chechnya. As Hopmann has noted, Moscow’s claim that some members in the Chechen resistance movement have connections with international terrorist networks has convinced the USA and other OSCE members not to criticize the Russians too strongly.78 And in 2004, the Central Asian Republics, together with Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States partners, issued the Moscow Declaration (on 3 July) and the Astana Appeal (on 15 September), asking for a stronger emphasis on very specific anti-terrorism projects, more activities in the economic field, and respect for the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of participating states.79 It would seem that what is involved here is an attempt by those countries to use the discourse of terrorism in order to justify turning the OSCE into a different kind of organization, taking it away from its core normative foundation. The recent focus on fighting terrorism, in short, has created more problems for the OSCE’s agenda of promoting good governance than its discourse might lead us to suspect. According to the OSCE discourse, specific anti-terrorist measures designed to identify and control ‘risky’ individuals are to be exceptional measures justified by a unique security situation—and those measures are to take place in parallel to practices 148


designed to promote normal liberal-democratic freedoms and the norms that sustain those freedoms. Yet, in recent years, the ability of the OSCE to conduct such practices of promoting normal liberal-democratic freedoms and the norms that sustain them (rather than focus heavily on promoting exceptions to those norms) seems to have declined. All in all, the OSCE’s recent record in the area of democracy-promotion has been less than impressive. Consequently, its moral authority, its credibility as a normative organization, as opposed to an institution strictly subordinated to the narrow, selfish agendas of particular states, has come under threat. It will be recalled from previous chapters that the OSCE’s plight in this area is not unique; in the cases of NATO and the EU, too, we noted certain tensions between those institutions’ discourse and practices of promoting human rights, the rule of law, and democracy, and some of the (exceptional) practices enacted in the name of fighting international terrorism. But this normative tension is particularly serious in the case of the OSCE, which is, par excellence, a ‘soft security’ institution with extremely few material resources at its disposal. In contrast to the EU and NATO, the OSCE really cannot claim to do much in the contemporary security environment except use its moral authority as a principled organization and its limited amount of cultural capital (e.g. technical expertise) to exercise symbolic power. It is on the basis of that cultural capital that the OSCE can hope to get participating states to accept a particular diagnostic of security problems and to adopt a corresponding set of practices of good governance as a way to prevent, not just fight terrorism. In its official statements, we have seen, the OSCE insists that such practices can play an important role in preventing and combating terrorism, and that the Organization remains an important forum for disseminating norms, principles, and practices of democratic governance. But one of the most serious problems faced by the OSCE is that it is not clear that it can continue to act as an effective promoter of norms of good governance. Should its moral authority disappear, should its normative credentials be severely challenged, it is unclear what role the OSCE could still play in the contemporary field of Euro-Atlantic security. At the moment, it is hard to see how the Organization can escape its plight, particularly in a situation in which, given its highly inclusive logic and weak institutional structure, the OSCE depends on consensus among a very wide and diverse set of participant states, and cannot even punish those countries that choose to deviate from the liberal-democratic norms to which they committed themselves when they signed the Charter of Paris. 149


A very good illustration of the OSCE’s recent inability to fulfil its normative mandate can be found in the Organization’s attempts to promote norms of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Central Asia and the Caucasus. As noted earlier, in recent years, the OSCE has insisted that it could and should increase its involvement in weak, vulnerable transitional polities, including in Central Asia and the Caucasus. At the heart of the OSCE security discourse, it will be recalled, lies the idea that, by promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and by helping to resolve frozen conflicts, the Organization can help prevent the kind of conditions under which terrorist groups are more likely to gain supporters. In practice, however, the OSCE has been far from acting as a strong, effective norm-promoter in that part of the world.80 While the OSCE has continued to monitor the evolution of human rights and democratic reforms (or lack thereof) in those countries, to conduct seminars aimed at promoting human rights and the rule of law, and produce reports and express concern in response to violations of those rights, it is unclear that those actions have made a significant difference. In fact, it would appear that in some countries, particularly in Central Asia, conformity with principles of democratic government and respect for human rights has significantly deteriorated since the late 1990s.81 In many Central Asian states, presidents have gained wide powers to rule by decree, in violation of principles of human rights and the rule of law, while parliaments and courts have been weakened, and in some cases ignored.82 According to human rights groups, the situation deteriorated in a particularly serious way in Turkmenistan, where, in late 2002, the OSCE invoked the ‘Moscow Mechanism’ (when ten states requested information about grave threats to human rights following a government crackdown in response to an assassination attempt against dictatorial President Niyazov). However, Turkmenistan’s government denied the OSCE Rapporteur access to the country.83 And, while in 2003, the OSCE Chairman in Office did arrange a meeting with President Niyazov to express the OSCE’s concern over the human rights situation, it is unclear that those expressions of concern had a serious impact on Turkmenistan’s human rights policy. The problems with democratization and human rights violations in Central Asia can be seen as reflections of the limits of a security institution that is heavily structured around an inclusive logic. Thus, as an organization that does not set/enforce conditions of admission, but, rather, relies on an ‘imagined security community approach’ by first admitting transitional countries and then socializing them into the norms 150


of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, and that does not even have a strong mechanism to punish deviant members, the OSCE has not been able to do much in response to norm violation by members of that imagined community. Equally problematic is the fact that Russia’s growing departure from democratic norms and particular commitments made within the framework of the OSCE has been met with a high degree of toleration by the Organization. Over the last few years, Russia has been increasingly critical of the particular ways in which the OSCE has sought to translate its principles into action, and, in response, has taken steps that effectively violate the commitments its own government had made within the framework of that organization. Yet, the OSCE has been unable to take a firm stand in response to such normative violations. One of the key challenges to the credibility of the OSCE is related to its inability to resolve the frozen secessionist conflicts in Moldova and Georgia. Those conflicts have root in attempts at a territorial secession whose strength was due to military support from a third party, Russia. One of the main obstacles to the resolution of those conflicts is that, with the OSCE’s blessing, Russia has been enacting two—mutually incompatible—roles: as a party to those conflicts as well as an international mediator.84 Thus, Russia assumed the role of mediator, together with the OSCE, in South Ossetia (Georgia), and with Ukraine and the OSCE in Transnistria (Moldova). But, far from adopting an impartial stance, Moscow has provided strong political, economic, and military support to the self-proclaimed (and internationally unrecognized) entities of Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. The Transnistrian leadership consists mainly of Russian citizens, many of whom are apparently connected to the Russian intelligence services and military establishment.85 And, following massive granting of citizenship to Georgians, approximately 80 per cent of the citizens of South Ossetia as well as Abkhazia have become Russian citizens. It would seem that one of the major interests informing Russian policy in that region is to secure the southern flank of the Russian Federation via a long-term military presence in Georgia, and to transform Moldova into an outpost military base at the doorstep of NATO.86 In spite of its close association with, and support for, the breakaway regimes of Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, Russia has continued to be regarded by the OSCE as an official mediator. This has occurred against the will—and despite the protests—of the states that have experienced secession.87 Russia’s failure to live up to the commitments its own government made at the OSCE’s Istanbul Summit of 1999 both reflects and compounds the 151


problems faced by the Organization in its attempts to resolve ‘frozen conflicts’. As part of the so-called Istanbul commitments, Moscow accepted that it would destroy and withdraw its armaments limited by the CFE Treaty in Moldova by the end of 2001 and complete the withdrawal of its troops stationed there by the end of 2002.88 Similarly, Russia promised to reduce the amount of its CFE-related military equipment in Georgia by the end of December 2000, to complete negotiations in 2000 regarding the duration and functioning of the Russian military bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki, and to disband and withdraw from its military bases at Gudauta (Abkhazia) and Vaziani (near Tbilisi) by July 2001. The process of withdrawal and destruction of Russian conventional armaments and equipment limited by the CFE Treaty in Moldova was achieved even before the deadline, in November 2001. In Georgia, the Vaziani base was also closed ahead of schedule, but the Gudauta base was not closed on the grounds that the population of Abkhazia did not approve the departure of Russian troops. Meanwhile Russia failed to fulfil the other Istanbul commitments regarding Moldova and Georgia. As a result, Russian troops remain stationed within the territory of other OSCE participating states, against the wishes of the governments of those countries. Subsequently, Russia even refused to acknowledge its Istanbul withdrawal commitments (in spite of the fact that those commitments were made at the level of heads of state and government). Russia’s course of action constitutes a violation of the territorial integrity of its participating states—yet, the OSCE has failed to take decisive action in this area, or even to systematically put pressure on Moscow to fulfil its obligations. In a move that reflected the constraints associated with its institutional structure and rules (particularly the reliance on consensus), and that severely undermined the credibility of the Organization as a norm-promoter, at the Porto Ministerial Council in 2002 the OSCE softened Moscow’s obligation to respect the Istanbul commitments by doing no more than taking note of Russia’s intention to achieve withdrawal from Moldova ‘provided the necessary conditions are in place’. In a similar vein, the OSCE noted Moscow’s and Tbilisi’s ‘desire to complete negotiations regarding the duration and modalities of the functioning of the Russian military bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki, and the Russian military facilities within the territory of Georgia’.89 As Victor-Yves Ghebali has pointed out, ‘such formulations totally contradicted the implementation agenda and the unconditional character of the Istanbul commitments. The OSCE realized too late that its complacency actually amounted to condone Moscow’s reneging of the Istanbul 152


commitments as regards Moldova and Georgia.’90 In May 2005, an agreement was finally reached under which Russia made a commitment to withdraw its troops from Georgia and to close by 2008 its bases in Georgia (but not Gudauta). However, no similar agreement was reached regarding the Russian troops and military equipment in Transdniestria. Russia’s refusal to seriously cooperate on this issue has meant that subsequent OSCE ministerial meetings (and other consultations) did not lead to a firm, viable OSCE policy in this area—or even firm statements reaffirming the validity of the Istanbul commitments and clearly criticizing Russia for its violation of OSCE principles. For instance, in 2006, the Special Envoy of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, Pierre Chevalier, repeatedly travelled to Moldova and reiterated the Organization’s basic position on Moldova—a negotiated, peaceful settlement that respects the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Moldova and ensures a special status for the Transnistrian region. However, he did not even manage to secure the support of all the participants in the ‘5+2’ negotiations91 to accept a package of suggestions on a new peacekeeping mission under an international mandate (instead of a Russian ‘peacekeeping mechanism’), and on elements of a statute for Transnistria within the Republic of Moldova. Also, the Chairman-in-Office was unable to get the settlement process back on track in Georgia.92 The OSCE’s inability to help make progress in the settlement of those ‘frozen conflicts’, or even to shame and put pressure on the party (Russia) that is clearly in violation of OSCE norms and of international principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, raise serious questions about the Organization’s ability to act as an effective actor in the peaceful settlement of disputes and the promotion of norms of good governance. In other words, it is unclear that the OSCE can actually play a significant role in one of the main areas in which, according to its own discourse, the Organization can and should make a unique contribution to the pursuit of international security in the fluid security environment of the twenty-first century. In the last three chapters, we have explored ways in which the OSCE, NATO, and the EU have enacted a combination of practices of inclusion and exclusion in an attempt to prevent and combat international terrorism, and in so doing to demonstrate their continued relevance as key players in the contemporary international security environment. In spite of their differences, these institutions have all stressed common themes, depicting the campaign against international terrorism as an existential confrontation between the forces of civilization and an unconventional, particularly violent, and unprincipled others, and insisting on 153


the need to use a combination of methods and pursue a comprehensive security agenda in an effort to manage the risks posed by those others. Each of the three institutions has also insisted that, in this existential confrontation, they would need to reach out to, and closely collaborate with, other actors, including other international security organizations. In other words, in depicting their role in the confrontation with international terrorism, each of these institutions has engaged in a double move: invoking and seeking recognition as a uniquely competent actor, and simultaneously pledging to work with other actors, including other EuroAtlantic security institutions in pursuing international stability. It is thus interesting to take a closer look at ways in which the three institutions have related to each other in their (theoretically joint) effort to prevent and combat transnationally organized terrorism. As we move towards a conclusion of our analysis, it is also worth reflecting on the lessons to be learned—and the conclusions to be drawn—from the particular combinations of practices of inclusion and exclusion that we have examined in the last three chapters.

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We have seen in this book that, in the context of a fluid security environment, the OSCE, the EU, and NATO have enacted a complex combination of inclusive and exclusionary security practices aimed at managing the risk of international terrorism. Over the past few years, the perceived risk of terrorism has been invoked to justify the development or strengthening of a variety of methods and technologies of control and protection. The practices supported by those methods and technologies seek to guide vulnerable (but still redeemable) individuals and groups towards becoming reliable, self-disciplined actors, worthy of inclusion into liberal relations of community, while simultaneously identifying and excluding from such relations of community a new type of (perceived) dangerous ‘uncivilized’ others, who allegedly pose a serious threat to the Euro-Atlantic world. The emphasis on the Kantian-inspired approach to security that rose to prominence in political and academic circles following the end of the Cold War has continued to be highly influential. In the transatlantic security community, long-term peace and stability is still primarily associated with the existence (and diffusion) of liberal-democratic norms and institutions, rather than, say, power balancing. As a corollary to that, the possession of authoritative knowledge and expertise in the (re)production of liberal democracy has continued to operate as an important form of capital in the field of security. The EU, NATO, and the OSCE have systematically invoked that capital—and have sought to further enhance it—in the course of extending their activities aimed at promoting liberal norms of self-disciplined subjectivity within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic region. But, in contrast to the first decade of the post–Cold War period, there has been a partial shift away from the dream of a new world order of peace, democracy, and prosperity. In particular, following the 9/11 events,

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there has been a sense—further reinforced by subsequent terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, and more broadly by what is widely seen as a rise in (Islamic) extremism—that even the liberal-democratic security community is no longer just the embodiment of universal ‘good values’, but simultaneously also a potential source of threat. As a consequence, a new emphasis has been placed on devising mechanisms that make it possible to identify and exclude from the space—if not the physical space, at least the socio-economic and political space—of liberal-democratic polities those individuals and groups deemed to be a threat to modern civilization itself due to their suspected involvement in a particularly dangerous type of terrorist activity. In the context of an individualization of war, given the growing power of individuals to organize transnationally, access modern technology, and potentially inflict upon Western societies the kind of damage that was previously available only to states, the EU, NATO, and the OSCE have been engaged in an effort to diffuse both within and beyond the transatlantic security community a new set of conceptual frameworks, (exceptional) ethical precepts, and behavioural dispositions of exclusion of suspected terrorists. These conceptual and practical dispositions rely upon specific collective representations of the nature and degree of risk posed by this new type of unconventional enemies (international, religious terrorists). By reference to those representations, NATO, the EU and the OSCE have justified and promoted the formation of hybrid security networks that bring together particular sets of public and private actors. As a consequence, contemporary security practices enacted by the three institutions have led to a blurring of conventional boundaries between categories of public/private sphere, defence/domestic law enforcement, and security/economy. This has entailed a (re)definition of duties of citizenship, as ordinary citizens as well as private corporations are now increasingly cast as active participants in complex practices of protection, with special duties to monitor the behaviour of suspect neighbours or clients, and to work with public authorities in containing the potential threats posed by a multitude of ‘risky’ individuals and groups. While in principle these transformations are seen as perfectly compatible with, indeed necessary for, the protection of liberal-democratic norms and values, in practice a series of difficult normative tensions have emerged between some of the new anti-terrorism practices and the values and norms of liberal democracy. These tensions can be seen as reflections

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of broader and important transformations in the field of security. In particular, since the 9/11 attacks there has been a growing importance attached to the need to develop exceptional security mechanisms targeting illiberal individuals and groups, particularly members and supporters of groups like Al Qaeda. As a consequence, the relationships between liberty and security, inclusion and exclusion, liberal norms and practices and acceptable exceptions to those practices are being redefined in the liberal-democratic world—and those processes of redefinition are reflected in the practices of each of the three institutions examined here. In this book, I have explored the dynamics of the (re)articulation of the relationships between inclusion/exclusion, normal/exceptional norms and practices in the cases of NATO, the EU, and the OSCE, and I have analysed the dilemmas and challenges that this process of change poses for each institution. While I have sought to reflect on the ways in which such dilemmas and challenges may affect the future activities of these institutions, I have not attempted to make any specific predictions about the particular way in which NATO, the EU, and the OSCE will (or will not) address those challenges. To do so would be to marginalize important aspects of agency, in particular concerning the various ways in which each of these institutions can adapt to a changing environment, and can take steps to reposition itself in specific ways in the highly dynamic field of security. Linked to this, the ability of each institution to address its problems and challenges will be affected by the nature and degree of future cooperation among their members. That, in turn, will be informed by a complex set of contingent dynamics, including domestic politics in each member state—and those dynamics are well beyond the scope of this book. What we can say at this stage is that an analysis of practices enacted by the EU, NATO, and the OSCE in the first years of the twenty-first century reveals a particularly interesting pattern of institutional response to a changing security field. Thus, each of these institutions has invoked and worked to enhance its symbolic and material capital in an effort to cast itself as a key player in the context of a fight against unconventional enemies. For example, in the case of the EU, the security discourse instantiated in both Council and Commission documents and statements reveal repeated references to the Union’s special expertise and unique capital in the domain of democracy-promotion, its institutional and economic capabilities in a broad set of issue areas, and its high moral status as a ‘normative power’ that acts in compliance with international

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law and in cooperation with the UN. By invoking that special symbolic and material capital, EU statements and documents present the Union as an actor that can and should play a key role in preventing and combating international terrorism. At the same time, the EU—via the Commission as well as the Council—has invoked the exceptional risk of terrorism to justify measures designed to expand the Union’s mandate and the creation of more institutional tools (‘more Europe’) in the areas of justice and home affairs as well as in the area of defence. The notion involved in the Union’s discourse is that such tools are absolutely necessary if contemporary risks, especially risks of catastrophic terrorist attacks posed by elusive internationally organized groups, are to be minimized. For its part, NATO has once again been faced with the challenge of redefining its mandate, and proving that it is still an important security organization in a changing security environment. Under these circumstances, NATO has sought to secure recognition—among its allies as well as partners—of its continued relevance by arguing that it is uniquely well-qualified to protect Euro-Atlantic and international security. This, according to NATO’s discourse, is due to the fact that the alliance possesses more military capital than any other Euro-Atlantic security arrangement, and also because it is the repository of significant culturalsymbolic capital—as the locus of significant expertise, and the longstanding authoritative forum for articulating and implementing security policies in the Euro-Atlantic area. In parallel to that, NATO has sought to enhance its expertise and develop new institutional capabilities in the areas of law enforcement and reconstruction, and in so doing to demonstrate that it can act effectively as a security institution that can respond to a multitude of interlinked security challenges in a fluid security environment. Meanwhile, the OSCE has been facing growing challenges derived, in part, from its weak institutional structure and the lack of significant material (military as well as civilian) capital. In the face of numerous criticisms articulated by policymakers and analysts alike, the OSCE discourse has sought to secure recognition of the Organization as a still-relevant institution by invoking its special capital, involving a combination of knowledge/expertise and institutional capabilities (especially those associated with its field missions). At the heart of the OSCE’s strategy for securing recognition as a significant security organization lies a twostep effort: to secure the participating states’ recognition of (and further enhance) its special capital and to argue that this particular form of capital 158

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should be highly valued in the present security environment. The OSCE discourse centres around the claim that what is needed, above all, in any international campaign against terrorism is prevention: an effort to prevent the emergence of conditions under which terrorist groups can gain more support. This, according to the OSCE, involves a systematic promotion of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the protection of minorities—that is, activities in which the Organization specializes and has significant expertise. As the institution that placed the idea of indivisible security on its agenda long before any other Euro-Atlantic body, that has enacted practices of comprehensive security in various situations since its creation, and that, through its inclusive membership, can help foster cooperation and consensus between Western states and countries like Russia and the CIS, the OSCE has sought to cast itself as a well-qualified player in the contemporary security environment. Moreover, through its imagined security community approach, the OSCE claims to be particularly well placed to promote shared knowledge and common practices in the broad Euro-Atlantic area, including in some highly vulnerable polities (e.g. in Central Asia) that have been relatively neglected by other international institutions. Linked to that, the OSCE claims that, through its missions and offices in former communist countries, it has gained unique expertise and institutional capabilities in the areas of conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation. In addition, since the 9/11 attacks, the OSCE has sought to enhance its symbolic stature and institutional capabilities that are directly relevant to combating terrorism, for instance via the creation of the Anti-Terrorism Unit, the Counter-Terrorism Network, and the launch of a plethora of pedagogic programmes aimed at identifying and diffusing shared knowledge and common anti-terrorism best practice in all the OSCE participating states.

Between Inter-Institutional Cooperation and Competition in Combating Terrorism In their discourses, the EU, NATO, and the OSCE express the belief that broad cooperation among regional and global institutions is needed in combating contemporary security threats, particularly international terrorism, and pledge to work with one another in the new security environment.1 The question that arises, however, is to what extent has this commitment translated into actual practices of cooperation among 159

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the OSCE, NATO, and the EU? I suggest that, while instances of cooperation and joint action are real and significant, they have been accompanied by elements of competition, particularly between the EU and NATO, as each has sought to secure a privileged position within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The question of the relationship between the EU and NATO is, of course, an old one. In practice, particularly since the end of the Cold War, there have been numerous initiatives to define the respective roles of—and the relationship between—different Euro-Atlantic security institutions, particularly to (re)articulate the relationship between NATO and the EU. In the early years of the post–Cold War era, the process of redefining that relationship was shaped by an assumption regarding the distinction between internal and external security practices and apparatuses. The distinction between internal/external security (or between, on one hand, security via law enforcement in the domestic arena, and, on the other hand, defence from military threats originating beyond the boundaries of a given community) is tied to broader assumptions, which are central to modern political imagination and political practices. Those assumptions regard the distinction between the inside realm (the realm of politics within state boundaries) and the outside arena of international anarchy.2 In the first years of the post–Cold War period, although security was being redefined in broadened terms, it retained a residual conceptual distinction between internal/external security. For our purposes, it is interesting to note that in the process of defining the new security architecture for the Euro-Atlantic area, and particularly in the context of the debates surrounding the proper roles of NATO and the EU/Western European Union (WEU), ‘security’ and ‘defence’ were seen as separable, even as they remained under the same conceptual umbrella. In institutional terms, this was important because it allowed a definition of the respective roles of NATO and the EU/WEU as complementary, rather than mutually incompatible. At the insistence—it would appear— of those who wanted to develop the security role of the EU while also protecting the Atlantic connection, that conceptual distinction became key to the articulation of the relationship between the EU and NATO, and the formulation of Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.3 The EU was thus able to develop a security identity, and the WEU was able to claim a security role, without it appearing to undermine NATO. In fact, the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992, which formulated the WEU’s security role, revolved around this particular distinction between 160

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security and defence. According to that Declaration, the WEU’s main security tasks were defined as: humanitarian aid and rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management, including peacemaking, while Western decisionmakers recognized NATO as the key organization entrusted with the defence of the Euro-Atlantic community.4 In other words, the division of labour between the EU/WEU and NATO re-articulated the distinction between domestic security and international defence, but with a particular twist. The EU assumed, primarily, a broadened version of policing— not only its own space but also, in certain conditions of breakdown of domestic order, the space of other countries. Thus, the division of labour between NATO and the EU reflected a certain distinction between security and defence, but sought to adapt that distinction to a new and fluid security environment. Most notably, against the background of the assumption that instability in transitional countries could pose a real threat to the security of liberal-democratic European polities, there was an effort to blur the distinction between the space of the Union and the external space, by extending beyond its borders certain EU practices of policing/law enforcement conventionally associated with domestic order. In spite of the expansion of its security functions, the EU was not expected to perform the conventional function of international security: the defence of Europe against (potential) enemies inhabiting the ‘outside’ realm. The agreements reached in the 1990s identified NATO as the institution in charge of defending the Euro-Atlantic community against such threats.5 That solution enabled the development of a stronger European security structure within NATO, in a situation in which both the EU and NATO defined themselves as institutions that embodied and protected the same set of Western liberal-democratic values and norms. Rather than being rendered irrelevant by the end of the Cold War, or subordinated to the EU as the key security arrangement in the new Europe, NATO was able to mobilize the new logic of security and to present itself as the embodiment of a community whose members were not just strategic allies, but who also shared values and a common liberaldemocratic identity. In that sense, the NATO community dovetailed with that of the EU. It was this spirit of mutual support that found expression in NATO’s Copenhagen Declaration of June 1991. While stressing the importance of the transatlantic link and stating the importance of transforming NATO so as to enhance its ability to address the new security challenges, the Declaration insisted that the development of a European security identity, ‘reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the 161

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Alliance’.6 Thus, according to the Declaration, an important basis for the transformation of NATO in the new era ‘is the agreement of all Allies to enhance the role and responsibility of the European members’ (para 1), while at the same time strengthening the transatlantic link, identified as crucial to the defence of the Euro-Atlantic community. While NATO was broadening its role, and in some cases performing new functions that came closer to policing (e.g. assuming a temporary role in the provision of domestic security post-intervention in the Balkans), it was still seeking to maintain a certain distinction between policing/defence. Thus, the alliance was far from seeking to assume sweeping law enforcement functions—as revealed, for instance, in its position on terrorism in the 1990s. It is true that NATO’s Strategic Concept adopted in 1999 indicated that ‘Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources . . . ’.7 Nevertheless, as Christopher Bennett pointed out, prior to 11 September 2001, ‘the Alliance gave terrorism little collective attention. This was largely because there was no consensus on NATO’s role in what were seen by most Allies as internal security problems. As a result, there was little or no sustained discussion of the nature of terrorism, of its sources, or its implications for Alliance concepts, policies, structures or capabilities.’8 However, that situation changed dramatically after 9/11; indeed, the past few years have witnessed a significant process of blurring boundaries between internal/external security or policing/defence. In the new context, we have already seen, both NATO and the EU have sought to enhance their ability to perform a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from law enforcement to military interventions. In policymaking as well as in academic circles, this has raised new questions about their relative roles and relations between them. And, as far as the EU and NATO themselves are concerned, changes in the security environment have prompted new efforts to improve cooperation with each other, but have also fuelled a certain degree of competition between them. For example, intense negotiations between the EU and NATO resulted in the Declaration on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) issued on 13 December 2002. The Declaration covers what are known as the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements (para 10 of the 1999 Washington Summit Declaration), which comprise four elements: assured EU access to NATO operational planning; presumption of availability to the EU of NATO capabilities and common assets; NATO European command options for 162

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EU-led operations, including the European role of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR); adaptation of the NATO defence planning system to incorporate the availability of forces for EU operations. In addition, NATO–EU relations were further developed through the establishment of regular NATO–EU joint meetings and consultations, including at the level of Foreign Ministers, since 2001. And—particularly relevant for our study—on 14 March 2003, Lord Robertson and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, George Papandreou, on behalf of the EU Presidency, signed the NATO–EU Agreement on Security of Information. This Agreement, which is the result of discussions between NATO and the EU on how to deal with classified information, establishes common security standards designed to enable the two organizations to share sensitive information, and to consult and cooperate on security issues, including terrorism and organized crime. The Agreement has been welcomed by both parties as a key step in the development of the NATO– EU strategic partnership in crisis management and conflict prevention.9 In redefining its relation vis-à-vis the EU, NATO appears to be seeking a cooptation of the former, by tying it ever closer to the alliance, and claiming that, in the new era of complex security needs, the EU cannot act effectively in NATO’s absence. According to the alliance’s discourse, the EU lacks the capacity to operate on a global level and to combine the extensive military and political assets required in the struggle against the new security challenges. Particularly relevant in this sense is the statement issued by the then NATO Secretory General, Lord Robertson. According to him, should NATO be weakened and turned into a purely political organization, the Euro-Atlantic community would lose a key—irreplaceable— security arrangement. In a similar vein, Chris Donnelly, former Special Adviser to the NATO Secretary General, argued that ‘the ESDP cannot in the foreseeable future provide an alternative to NATO because most EU members have not reformed their armed forces to provide credible expeditionary capability. In addition, for independent actions, the EU will have to develop intelligence and logistics capabilities it does not currently have’.10 According to the NATO discourse, the alliance remains the only forum that effectively brings together the two sides of the Atlantic in the provision of security for the Western world. Recall, for instance, Lord Robertson’s insistence: I know, of course, that since September 11th , some have questioned whether the United States needs or even wants to act together with its Allies. This debate

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Conclusion is completely off the mark. Over a dozen NATO Allies are militarily engaged alongside the U.S. in Afghanistan, either in the hunt for Al Qaeda or bringing stability to Kabul. Their ability to work with the U.S. and with each other is a product of one thing: decades of experience in NATO. This is the most powerful argument against the critics.11

And, according to NATO, that pre-eminence in the field of security is being enhanced through the development of new military tools and expertise (e.g. via the alliance’s involvement in Afghanistan), in addition to the new civilian capabilities for policing and post-conflict reconstruction. Again, one of the core claims put forward in the NATO discourse is that, although it can and does cooperate with the EU, especially within the framework of the Berlin Plus Agreement, the alliance retains unique symbolic and material capital. On this logic, its special capital places NATO in a privileged position as regards the provision of security in the Euro-Atlantic area. In the particular area of counter-terrorism, it is interesting to note, for instance, that in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, where the EU and NATO have worked together within the framework of international administrations, it is NATO, not the EU, that is responsible for anti-terrorism. The complexity of the relationship between NATO and the EU in the context of international administrations is particularly clearly illustrated in Bosnia. The EU military mission (Althea) in Bosnia-Herzegovina started on 2 December 2004; at that point in time, NATO’s SFOR mission (itself a continuation of the IFOR mission implementing the Dayton Peace Accords from 1995) came to an end. The EU operation is now carried out with recourse to NATO assets according to the Berlin Plus Agreement.12 Its key objectives are to provide deterrence and to contribute to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment in Bosnia.13 In spite of the fact that the EU has the main stabilization role under the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement, NATO kept its Headquarters in Sarajevo, with the task of helping with the process of defence reform in Bosnia, and preparation of the country for the PfP. The maintenance of the NATO HQ in Sarajevo has a high symbolic value, as it is intended to reassure a population whose apparent distrust of the EU’s ability and willingness to provide security is fuelled by memories of the Europeans’ failure to protect Bosnians in the 1990s.14 From NATO’s point of view, Operation Althea represents an opportunity to demonstrate its ability and willingness to cooperate with the EU, while also highlighting the alliance’s unique symbolic and material capital (as

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it clearly enjoys the trust of the population, and possesses special military capabilities and expertise).15 That special capital, the argument goes, places NATO in a strong position in the provision of security in Bosnia— even in a situation in which the EU now has overall responsibility in that country. For its part, for the EU Operation Althea can be seen as clear evidence that the Union is able to cooperate with NATO in enhancing regional stability. Simultaneously, the fact that it was able and willing to assume overall command responsibility in that country indicates the EU’s unique ability to combine a multitude of instruments in order to provide comprehensive security solutions. It will be recalled that the EU already had a large number of programmes and institutional arrangements in Bosnia before December 2004, most notably the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). This, according to the EU security discourse, is consistent with the Union’s comprehensive approach to security, which involves a multitude of non-military and even some military instruments. Thus, even before the launch of EUFOR, it was clear that ‘in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU would simultaneously deploy military, police and other civilian instruments in pursuit of a single objective—the continued stabilization and transformation of a post-conflict society into one which in due course could become part of European integration’.16 From the EU’s perspective, as we have seen, it is precisely this combination of methods that places the Union in a particularly strong position to promote regional and international security, including by stabilizing failed/weak states. That process of stabilization is seen as extremely important because it strengthens vulnerable societies, making them less likely to become sources of regional conflict. Simultaneously, stabilization is seen as a crucial aspect of the campaign to prevent (or limit) processes of radicalization of the population, thereby minimizing the risk of terrorist activity in those territories.17 In essence, instances of cooperation between the EU and NATO are real and significant, but, simultaneously, a dynamic of competition and uncertainty regarding the allocation of security tasks remains a persistent feature of their relationship.18 For instance, the relationship between the NATO Response Force and the EU Battle Groups remains ambiguous,19 and could potentially generate tensions and disagreements between (and within) the two institutions over the question of who should do what in potential future cases of use of force by NATO and/or the EU. A certain degree of confusion and potential if not actual competition also persists in the case of EU/NATO cooperation within the framework of international administrations. In Bosnia, apart from the broad parameter 165

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of the division of labour set out in formal terms in the exchange of letters between the EU and NATO, much of the delineation of daily tasks had to be worked out at the operational level. In the area of hunting terrorists and war criminals, to take an example that is particularly revealing, a degree of creative ambiguity persists, as it is not entirely clear how much the EU is or should be involved in these operations. In theory, while NATO has the main responsibility for hunting war criminals and terrorists, the EU can also ‘contribute’ in this, while retaining the overall command responsibility. But the EU Council’s Factsheet of 29 November 2004 conveys a different impression: NATO is nowhere mentioned in the context of cooperation of the EU mission with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)20 —in a move that could be interpreted as an attempt by the EU to assert a stronger role vis-à-vis NATO in Bosnia. This ambiguity indicates that, in part, the relationship between the EU and NATO can be seen as an interesting example of the kind of competition that occurs between key players within a given social field. As actors operating in the field of security on the basis of shared definitions of the ‘enemy’, the EU and NATO have sought to both adapt and contribute to the (re)valorization of different forms of capital in their field. In so doing, they have sought to enhance their prestige and power as key players in the provision of security in the Euro-Atlantic community. Many EU officials are keen to convey the impression that all major questions concerning the relationship between NATO and the Union have been addressed—or at least that the Berlin Plus Agreement provides a framework for addressing such questions in a smooth, cooperative manner in the future. In the words of a senior EU official, perceptions of tensions and disagreement between NATO and the EU are rooted in the past. Today, all EU members recognize the merits but also the limits of the ESDP. The ESDP is about crisis-management, not collective defence. The EU simply does not have the military capabilities to act as a credible defence organization— that is NATO’s role. At the same time, there is now a new emphasis within the Union on developing military tools because Europeans recognize that they must play a greater role in crisis-management, especially in Europe, including crises that might be caused by terrorists. For instance, the new battlegroups are designed to respond to crises, not to fight conventional wars, because the resolution of crises might sometimes require the use of military force in addition to the comprehensive civilian resources possessed by the Union.21

Such statements would seem to indicate that a clear and unproblematic division of labour has been established between the EU and NATO. 166

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But there are indications that the situation might not be quite so simple. To begin with, this representation of the relationship between the two institutions assigns a very limited role to NATO—as a collective defence alliance. In so doing, it avoids the difficult and yet unanswered questions concerning the relationship between the two institutions that have emerged following the alliance’s redefinition of its mandate and its involvement in complex crisis-management operations, including in the name of combating terrorism. In those operations, as we have seen, NATO has mobilized different types of material (military and civilian) as well as symbolic capital, and has performed functions that bring the alliance closer to areas in which the EU also claims a privileged position. Simultaneously, recent developments within the EU reveal a vision—albeit not a very clearly defined one—of the Union as an ever more important player in the field of security in ways which could bring it closer to functions performed by NATO. Most notably, the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon (the Treaty for the Reform of the Union, designed to replace the Constitutional Treaty) includes a mutual defence clause—that is, a clause that seems similar to the provision that is at the heart of the Washington Treaty upon which NATO is based. In the case of the Lisbon Treaty, the defence clause states that, in the event of armed aggression on the territory of one member state, the other members of the Union shall have a duty to come to its aid by all means in their power.22 With specific reference to potential terrorist attacks, the new treaty states: The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by Member States to: prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack. [Art. 188 R(1)]

In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon lays the foundation for an expanded definition of crisis-management activities that the EU might carry out. Thus, as stipulated in Art. 28 B paragraph 1, The tasks in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks,

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Conclusion military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and postconflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

The inclusion of all these provisions in the new treaty could significantly complicate the Union’s relationship with NATO, as it is no longer clear that the alliance will remain the predominant institution for organizing and carrying out collective defence actions in the case of an attack (conventional or terrorist) upon an EU member state. It is true that, according to the Treaty, commitments and cooperation in the area of defence ‘shall be consistent with the commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation’ [Art. 28A (c) para 7]. This qualification, however, fails to clarify the division of labour between NATO and the EU that would be expected in the case of a potential collective defence action. Furthermore, the abovementioned provisions concerning the possible role of the EU in expanded crisis-management and counter-terrorism operations, both on its territory and abroad, seem to suggest that, in principle at least, the EU could one day carry out missions with an important military dimension—similar, perhaps, to NATO’s current mission in Afghanistan. At the time of writing this book, the Lisbon Treaty has just been signed by EU heads of state and government, and it is still unclear precisely how far the member states intend to push this provision concerning mutual defence.23 Nevertheless, its very inclusion in the treaty aimed at reforming the Union seems to indicate a growing ambition in Europe to strengthen the EU’s role in the field of security, including, it would seem, in the area of military defence. It is reasonable to argue that, should the EU ever acquire the material and cultural-symbolic capital (i.e. military capabilities, together with relevant expertise and prestige) needed to perform a collective defence function, such a development would probably refuel debates about the relevance of the alliance, and that could significantly undermine NATO’s position in the field of security. The Lisbon provisions concerning mutual defence arrangements also raise new, potentially difficult questions about the balance between the military and symbolic capital of the EU. The EU’s security discourse stresses the Union’s preference for and heavy reliance on non-military tools, and insists that any resort to military force would be limited, carried out in strict compliance with international law, and never used 168

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for possession goals (e.g. material gains for the Union). However, as noted in Chapter 2, some of the steps taken by the EU in recent years in order to enhance its military muscle have already raised concerns that the Union’s international standing as a normative power (and, hence, its symbolic capital) might be diminished as a result.24 According to Karen Smith and Andrew Moravcsik, for instance, the EU’s focus on defence arrangements distracts Europe from its comparative advantage in the nonmilitary sphere. From that perspective, Europe could be an effective and credible instrument of modern European statecraft and get its way more often—and without a bigger army.25 Those concerns are likely to become more acute if the EU takes significant steps towards acquiring the kind of military capital that would be needed to implement a mutual defence provision. Such steps would probably generate the perception, both within and outside the EU, that the Union is not (or is no longer) that different from an organization with a clear coercive dimension, willing to use military force in response to a crisis—such as NATO. That, in turn, might undermine the EU’s authority (and symbolic power) as an actor that can be trusted, by virtue of its special expertise and its unique nonmilitary instruments, to contribute to the resolution of crises in which the presence of military capital can be seen as more of a problem than a solution. If the relationship between NATO and the EU is characterized by a complex mix of cooperation, competition, and ambiguity, equally interesting—albeit quite different—dynamics can be observed in the OSCE’s relationships with NATO and the EU. The OSCE, we have seen, claims a privileged position in some areas of the field of security on the basis of its wide membership. It casts itself as a unique institution in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture by virtue of the fact that, far from being just another Western institution, it brings together a plethora of different states and enables them to work together towards the fulfilment of shared normative commitments. In practice, not surprisingly, the situation is more complicated. For instance, the evolving relationship between the OSCE and the EU has compounded the OSCE’s credibility crisis in the eyes of several participating states, most notably Russia. The institutionalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the ESDP has led to the development of autonomous EU capacities for civilian crisis management and conflict resolution—that is, areas that are also core OSCE competencies. In the official discourses of both the EU and the OSCE, the two are expected to cooperate closely with each other and with other regional and global bodies in order to enhance 169

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European and international security.26 At first glance, the cooperation between the EU and the OSCE would appear to be a fait accompli, not least because of the similar philosophies that underpin their policies. Thus, both the EU and the OSCE pursue multilateral, comprehensive, and cooperative approaches to security, relying primarily on non-military means to accomplish their goals. Both institutions identify as a priority the fight against international terrorism, and insist that civilian tools and the long-term promotion of good governance are especially important in this fight. And, particularly within the framework of its new Neighbourhood Policy, the EU has explicitly expressed growing interest in and enhanced commitment to the promotion of good governance in some of the countries that were neglected by the West for a long time, but that are at the heart of the OSCE agenda (e.g. Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova). Yet, in some respects, cooperation between these two key players in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture has been more elusive and fraught with difficulty than one might have anticipated. One of the most problematic aspects of the relationship between the OSCE and the EU has to do with the fact that, in the eyes of some participating states, the latter has become increasingly involved in trying to shape the OSCE agenda in particular ways. At present, EU members represent more than half of OSCE participating states, and provide about 70 per cent of the Organization’s budget and personnel.27 In addition, four successive OSCE Chairmanships have been/will be held by EU member states between 2005 and 2008 (Slovenia, Belgium, Spain, and Finland). Given its explicit interest in ‘well-governed neighbours’, the EU has been supportive of the OSCE’s conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the Balkans and in some of the former Soviet republics. There is close cooperation between the OSCE and the EU in democracypromotion efforts in Croatia, Macedonia, and in Bosnia and Kosovo (where the two institutions are part of the web of actors responsible for reconstruction). Particularly in the Bosnian case, in a situation in which the EU is increasingly involved in shaping the reform process, the OSCE can be seen as a player that contributes to an international effort largely influenced by the Union.28 In addition, the European Commission funds a large number of projects set up by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Central Asia. For instance, the European Commission and ODIHR have signed an agreement on a joint programme for advancing human rights and democratization in Central Asia, financed by the former and including technical assistance projects in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.29 170

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In essence, operating in a security field that highly values cultural capital, the EU has mobilized and strengthened its capital in that area, and in so doing seems to have sought to place itself in a privileged position vis-à-vis the OSCE. It has done so, in part, by expanding its activities in some of the traditional areas of OSCE competence and linking itself to OSCE expertise (e.g. by financing OSCE activities in the area of democracy promotion), while simultaneously invoking its unique ability (by virtue of its stronger economic capital and institutional capabilities) to perform a powerful, comprehensive role in the provision of European security.30 The EU’s growing interest in, and practical support for, the OSCE’s human security dimension, combined with the former’s apparent reluctance to support the latter’s attempts to play a significant role in the economic and environmental areas,31 has been interpreted by some OSCE participating states, particularly Russia and other former Soviet republics, as yet another indication of the Organization’s increasing Western bias. According to Moscow, instead of acting as a genuine transatlantic organization, the OSCE has evolved into an institution that seeks to act as a tool of Western influence, pushing forward an agenda of excessive intrusion and potential destabilization in Russia’s neighbourhood. As noted in Chapter 4, from Moscow’s point of view, the OSCE is ‘turning into a mechanism for serving the interests of other organizations [the EU and NATO] which do not always consider it necessary even to inform the OSCE and consult with it’.32 And, according to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, the OSCE was ‘erecting a wall within itself’, dividing its members into EU/NATO states and the rest, and confining itself to a role of monitoring ‘the adoption of these organizations’ values by countries that have remained outside the EU and NATO’.33 Under these circumstances, over the past few years, Moscow has been largely disengaged from the OSCE, reneging (as we have seen) on its commitments and, by and large, seeking to pursue its agenda of projecting greater influence in Europe through bilateral arrangements.34 For their part, the Central Asian states have expressed disappointment with OSCE involvement, perceiving it as a stigma (because it signals tension in that area), and, like Russia, have criticized the Organization’s focus on human dimension matters, which they regard as excessive interference in their domestic affairs.35 What about the relationship between the OSCE and NATO? To begin with, recall that, in the early years of the post–Cold War period, NATO successfully opposed attempts to cast the OSCE as the key security institution in the Euro-Atlantic area, and managed to secure recognition— among its members and in the international arena—that the alliance 171

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itself should play that role. It did so, in part, by adopting and adapting OSCE cooperative security practices, and also including and capitalizing on the defence guarantees that the OSCE simply could not provide.36 By mobilizing a combination of symbolic and material (especially military) capital, NATO became the security institution of choice not only for Western states but also for most of the former communist countries of Central/Eastern Europe, and some former Soviet republics. The international recognition of NATO as the key security institution of the transatlantic security community in turn enhanced the ability of the alliance to develop new institutional tools for the new era, and to broaden its international socialization programmes aimed at promoting liberal-democratic norms in transitional countries. It also facilitated the process of securing the support—among members and partners—needed for NATO to embark upon peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction missions, in so doing further encroaching upon traditional OSCE territory. This, then, is a story involving NATO’s successful mobilization and further enhancement of both material and symbolic capital in order to place itself in a privileged position vis-à-vis the OSCE in the changing field of security. The relationship between NATO and the OSCE has been significantly complicated due to the politics of the alliance’s enlargement into former Soviet territory. It is certainly no secret that the accession of the Baltics as part of the second wave of NATO enlargement and the ongoing discussions concerning the possible inclusion of Georgia into a future wave of enlargement have caused serious anger in Russia. Moscow tends to regard such moves as indicative of a persisting lack of respect for— potentially even hostility towards—Russia. NATO’s aggressive expansion into the former Soviet Union has thus enhanced the tension between Russia on the one hand and the USA and other Western states on the other hand—that is, between key OSCE members. That, in turn, has further complicated an already difficult situation within the OSCE, making it extremely difficult for the Organization to transcend its problems, achieve normative consensus among participating states, and on this basis (re-)emerge as a more influential actor in the field of security. In other words, problems associated with dynamics of NATO enlargement demonstrates that in certain instances the alliance and the OSCE have partly undermined each other. Nevertheless, the OSCE, NATO, and the EU have also cooperated, in some instances reasonably effectively, particularly within the framework of international administrations in Bosnia and Kosovo. There, NATO forces helped to provide a secure environment in which the OSCE could 172

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operate. Although NATO did have to step in and perform a variety of civilian functions in the early days of international administration, the understanding was from the start that other actors, including the OSCE, would assume the key civilian functions as soon as possible. This was based on an understanding within NATO decision-making circles that the OSCE possessed special assets and institutional expertise (e.g. concerning the organization and monitoring of elections, protection of national minorities, rebuilding civil society) that the alliance simply did not have.37 Furthermore, the OSCE’s lack of an explicit military dimension was apparently recognized within NATO circles as a source of symbolic capital, if correctly fused with the capabilities and expertise of the alliance and deployed carefully. Thus, the OSCE’s inability to apply military force in response to a crisis was seen as important in that particular situation, for it could be presented as a guarantee—particularly to the more sceptical groups in Kosovo—that the international mission was acting in pursuit of its stated goal of peaceful post-conflict reconstruction, as opposed to seeking to advance the narrow geo-strategic interests of a particular set of states. By associating itself with the OSCE, NATO could claim a similar position of symbolic power: it could make a (more) credible case that it was operating in Kosovo in pursuit of peace and democracy—indeed, that its presence in the province was necessary if actors like the OSCE were to be able to fulfil their mandate. Linked to that, from NATO’s perspective, the alliance’s ability to act—and be seen to be acting—in tandem with an inclusive, cooperative security organization like the OSCE represented an important source of capital for yet another reason. Thus, NATO officials regarded that instance of cooperation as evidence in support of their claim that the alliance was a relevant and highly effective security organization, fully capable of adapting to an altered security environment by virtue of its ability to perform a multitude of tasks in addition to its traditional collective defence function.38 Today, we have noted, in an effort to spread liberal-democratic norms and help to construct self-disciplined subjects, both the OSCE and NATO are engaged in a broad set of socialization practices in the Euro-Atlantic area. Not surprisingly, differences between the two institutions persist, in geographical focus (e.g. the OSCE is much more involved in Central Asia than is NATO), in the substance of their pedagogic activities (NATO tends to place particular emphasis on defence reforms, whereas the OSCE’s focus is broader), and in the degree and timing of their processes of inclusion of transitional polities. Nevertheless, those differences occur against the background of a shared concern with the socialization of individuals 173

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and groups into good (liberal-democratic) norms of governance as key to the promotion of long-term security, including minimizing the risk of terrorist attacks. More problematic, from a normative point of view, is the fact that, in spite of their normative commitments, both institutions have at least implicitly condoned exceptions and/or suspensions of the rule of law and/or human rights in the name of that fight against terrorism. In the near future, it will be interesting to watch the evolving relationship between NATO and the OSCE, as the latter has just agreed (at its November 2007 Ministerial Council) to step up its engagement with Afghanistan, with a particular emphasis on intensifying OSCE action in training the Afghan police, supporting the fight against drug and illegal arms trafficking, and enhancing border control security. At the moment, the details of the OSCE involvement in Afghanistan have yet to be worked out, and it is still unclear how (if at all) the Organization will cooperate with NATO in training Afghan officials in charge of fighting illegal drug/weapons trafficking and border control. Nevertheless, the OSCE’s ambition seems to be to expand its norm-dissemination activities to one of the most problematic fragile states, Afghanistan. Its claim is that, by drawing on its special cultural-symbolic capital (i.e. its experience, expertise, and prestige), the OSCE can make a significant contribution to international efforts to stabilize and (re)build that country around norms of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.39 Just how successful the OSCE can be in socializing Afghans in such an insecure environment remains to be seen. It also remains to be seen to what extent the Organization will be able to work with NATO, given the latter’s predominant role in that country and its heavy use of military force in addition to its socialization activities as part of its strategy to stabilize Afghanistan. It could be that NATO and the OSCE will establish an effective relationship of cooperation, in which they will combine their material and symbolic capital in a joint effort to enhance the ability of the international mission to promote security and facilitate reform in Afghanistan. However, there is also the danger that, instead of cooperating, each institution will invoke, mobilize, and seek to build its unique capabilities in an attempt to position itself in a privileged position (vis-àvis the other institution) in a particular area of post-conflict reconstruction. Should such a competitive relationship emerge, its impact could be quite negative, not least because this would compound an already serious problem of inadequate coordination and mutual support among the actors already engaged in Afghanistan. 174

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The ‘Fuzzy Borders’ of the Euro-Atlantic Security Community As we have seen, the EU, NATO, and the OSCE have all been on an explicit mission to promote liberal-democratic norms in the countries emerging from communist regimes and in so doing to expand the security community of liberal democracy. The assumption underlying this approach is that such normative transformations are key to the promotion of longterm stability and security, including (relative) security from terrorism. Simultaneously, the discourses of NATO, the EU, and the OSCE have all stressed the importance of avoiding the (re)creation of rigid geostrategic boundaries between members of the security community of liberal democracies and other states. The question is, how consistent have these institutions been in their efforts to expand the community of liberal democracy, and how have they approached, in practice, the question of borders of that community? As discussed in the empirical chapters of this book, building on a concept of cooperative security first articulated by the CSCE/OSCE, following the end of the Cold War, the EU and NATO also embraced the aim of avoiding geo-strategic dividing lines, and finding new methods of inclusion or at least partial inclusion (e.g. via partnerships and associations) of transitional polities into the Western security community. The OSCE has gone furthest in that direction, by adopting an ‘imagined security community’ approach. This involved granting full membership to a plethora of states that had yet to demonstrate their commitment to the values and norms of liberal democracy, based on the view that this would facilitate the socialization of those countries into the norms of the security community. Through its policy of full inclusion of transitional polities, and through its active and systematic engagement with those polities (e.g. via its field missions, as well as through the ODIHR and the High Commissioner for National Minorities), the OSCE sought to place itself in a strong position to disseminate in those countries a security community habitus. If successfully implemented, such a habitus would dispose political elites and civil society actors to exclude as unthinkable any practice that departed from democratic principles of governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and cooperative security in the international arena. Through such practices of habitus diffusion, the OSCE sought to contribute to the expansion of the security community even in areas that were largely ignored by the more exclusive NATO and the EU. However, in particular over the past few years, that process of community-building via socialization into shared, liberal norms has been 175

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filled with problems. At present, the norms of liberal democracy inscribed in the OSCE’s Charter of Paris and in related documents remain more of an aspiration than a reality in many participating states—worse, in some of those states the norms of liberal democracy are openly flouted. Ironically, it would seem that these days the OSCE is more successful in disseminating in participating states shared knowledge and practices in areas such as preventing the use of the financial system for terrorist purposes and enhancing travel/border security to minimize the risk of terrorist attacks than in disseminating norms and habits of democratic governance and respect for human rights. It is still unclear that the OSCE can and will help change that situation in the foreseeable future. Indeed the Organization seems to be trapped in a vicious circle: in order to enact fundamental change in its norm-diffusion policies, it would need to achieve consensus among participating states. Yet, it is precisely because of the growing disagreements regarding reasonable normative commitments that such a consensus has become so elusive. In the meantime, the OSCE remains the forum of a plurality of states with different political systems and visions of ‘good government’, with its members sharply and openly divided over the question of how far the Organization should go in seeking to project democratic norms in participating countries. The new emphasis on terrorism has, in important ways, complicated those disagreements, and has arguably made it more difficult for the OSCE to act as an effective liberal-democratic communitybuilder. Over the past few years, some of the participating states, most notably Russia, have argued that the OSCE should focus more specifically on anti-terrorism projects and measures, and should move away from the Western agenda of democracy-promotion. Under these circumstances, the dream of a community united around shared norms of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and cooperative security practices stretching from Vladivostok to Vancouver is, arguably, further from rather than closer to implementation today than it was when the OSCE was created out of the CSCE process. In particular, the divisions between, on the one hand, liberal-democratic NATO and EU member states, and, on the other hand, Russia and some of the other former Soviet republics, currently poses significant challenges to the OSCE’s credibility and its ability to act upon its founding normative principles. Paradoxically, the new emphasis on terrorism may offer the OSCE a way forward—but one that comes with a very high normative price, and thus with significant practical costs related to the loss of symbolic capital. The pedagogic activities carried out by the OSCE with the aim of improving 176

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border control, enhancing travel document security, tackling terrorism financing, and controlling the illegal export of small arms/light weapons have been greeted with significant enthusiasm by the usual critics of the Organization—despite the fact that some of those activities are financed by the USA or the EU.40 But this apparent success presents the OSCE with a difficult normative dilemma: on the one hand, it would seem that one of the most promising avenues open to the Organization is precisely anti-terrorism. Thus, the support provided in this area by even its harshest critics suggests that the OSCE has the potential to play a significant role in the future by diffusing new (exceptional) conceptual and practical dispositions of security in the broad Euro-Atlantic area. On the other hand, however, this avenue is filled with ethical and political problems, largely stemming from recent violations of the core norms (democracy and human rights) around which the OSCE defines itself. In a situation in which several participating states have consistently invoked the threat of terrorism to justify exceptional measures against their citizens as well as foreigners, and in which it is far from clear that all those who attend the Organization’s anti-terrorism workshops will implement any new measures in a manner consistent with the OSCE’s underpinning norms of respect for human rights and democracy, the danger is that the OSCE might find the recipe for its revival in a series of practices that depart from—and could undermine—its very normative foundation. The risk associated with such a trajectory is that, particularly in the absence of a more sustained effort and more visible successes in the promotion of liberal-democratic norms in transitional polities, the OSCE might diminish its only significant source of power: its cultural-symbolic capital. Again, the OSCE is certainly not alone in experiencing a difficult tension between the promotion of ‘normal’ liberal-democratic conceptual and practical dispositions, and, on the other hand, the cultivation of exceptional measures designed to identify and control illiberal, particularly dangerous enemies. In a changing security field, in which there is a far greater emphasis on exclusion and extremity than there was in the pre-9/11 world, the fluid, ambivalent relationship between security and liberalism is reflected in the practices of all three institutions examined in this book. For all their differences in structure, mandate, and the various types of capital at their disposal, each of the institutions has sought to reposition itself as part of the liberty/security nexus, and, precisely in the name of defending the values, norms, and people of the democratic world, to devise new exceptional methods for addressing the risk posed 177

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by international terrorism. But the OSCE has had a particularly difficult time in combining normal and exceptional practices. For all the problems they have experienced, so far the EU and NATO have been more successful in portraying themselves as institutions that can continue to promote ‘normal’ liberal norms and practices, even if they also have to adopt some exceptional measures (allegedly) needed to protect the liberal-democratic world. In the case of the OSCE, growing disagreements among participating states coupled with its weak institutional structure have meant that the Organization seems to have become quite weak in promoting ‘normal’ liberal-democratic knowledge and practices, even as it has achieved some success in the promotion of exceptional practices. Should this imbalance between the norm and the exception grow stronger in the future, the prestige and symbolic power of the institution that defines its mandate primarily around the promotion of norms of good (democratic) governance, human rights, and the rule of law might suffer irreparable damage. For its part, the EU has pursued the process of enlargement aimed at (potentially) absorbing transitional European polities, and in so doing also expanding the broader Euro-Atlantic security community built on liberal-democratic norms. Simultaneously, and more controversially, the Union has pursued processes of partial inclusion into European relations of liberal-democratic community via a growing web of associations, in particular with (an ever expanding number of) neighbouring states. The relatively recent European Neighbourhood Policy, for instance, is a perfect illustration of this approach. In principle, the ENP is still governed by the traditional EU logic of conditional inclusion: to the extent that they can demonstrate their commitment to liberal democracy, evolving into selfdisciplined liberal actors, neighbouring polities will be ever more closely integrated into the economic and political life of the Union. According to the EU discourse, ‘The ambition and the pace of development of the EU’s relationship with each partner country will depend on its degree of commitment to common values, as well as its will and capacity to implement agreed priorities.’41 The asymmetric relationship between the EU and its neighbours is evident in the use of benchmarks to assess the progress of neighbours towards the achievement of the ENP’s objectives. In principle, the neighbours should be part of the decision-making process surrounding benchmarks: ‘Benchmarks should be developed in close cooperation with the partner countries themselves, in order to ensure national ownership and commitment’ (COM (2004)373 final). In practice, however, this possibility is limited—indeed, it applies only ‘whenever possible’.42 178

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The ENP can be seen as a tool developed by the EU as part of an effort to find ways of promoting (conditional) inclusion into the European community of liberal democracies without offering formal membership into the Union. It is, in other words, an attempt at balancing between the perceived need to avoid creating new dividing lines in Europe, and the recognition that EU expansion cannot be unlimited. Thus, while EU officials have presented the ENP as a way of offering much deeper cooperation and progressive integration of neighbouring states into various policy areas of the Union, they have also stressed that the ENP is not an enlargement policy.43 For all the claims of progressive integration into the Union, at least in the near future this policy is likely to lead to the creation of ‘fuzzy’ EU borders—intermediate spaces between the inside and the outside of the Union.44 In the long term, it seems to me that the EU will come under pressure, particularly from those European neighbours that evolve into stable, internationally recognized liberal-democratic polities. Those states are likely to claim that, consistent with the Union’s own logic of conditional inclusion, the ENP should be used as the basis for a new wave of EU enlargement. In other words, it is far from clear that the ENP can achieve its intended purpose of maintaining a stable balance between inclusion into/exclusion from the Union of neighbouring states. More likely, it will lead to a situation in which pressures to tip the balance one way or another will become quite strong. Should the Union refuse to embark on a process of further (conditional) enlargement rather than just partial inclusion of those European states, it could trigger resentment vis-à-vis the EU (and possibly domestic pressures to take some distance from the Union and the values and principles it embodies), thereby undermining Europe’s neighbourhood partnership programme, and diminishing Brussels’s ability to act as an effective norm-promoter in its own backyard.45 Simultaneously, in deciding how far to push the expansion of the Union, the EU faces the challenge of finding a unanimous voice vis-à-vis Turkey, historically one of Europe’s defining ‘others’,46 and also a longstanding candidate for accession. To the extent that Turkey successfully completes the democratic reforms set by the EU as preconditions for membership, the Union will face accepting it, or losing credibility as a forum that respects the logic of merit-based inclusion, rather than narrow self-interest and arbitrary discrimination (in this case, on the basis of religion). Yet, at present, it is far from clear that the EU leaders will be able or willing to reach a consensus on this issue in the foreseeable future. The current anxiety about religious-inspired terrorism only seems to have 179

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reinforced the view that was already quite strong in some key member states that a Muslim nation cannot be trusted to become ‘truly European’, and should, therefore, be excluded from the EU. Needless to say, this is highly unlikely to help in the campaign to win Muslim hearts and minds, both within and outside the Union, and to gain their support in the campaign against terrorism inspired by radical readings of Islam. On the contrary, such images and arguments of exclusion are more than likely to strengthen, rather than dispel, the perception of an anti-Muslim bias in EU (and more generally Western) foreign policies. As for NATO, we have seen that the alliance has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to an ambitious programme of norm-diffusion and expansion of the Western security community. NATO, of course, has played an important role in the expansion of that community into Central and Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War. In the years following the 9/11 events, NATO has also reasserted the logic of conditional inclusion, most recently by stating that in the third wave of enlargement, as in previous enlargements, the democratic credentials of candidate states will be carefully examined in order to determine eligibility for membership. As discussed earlier in the book, however, serious questions persist as regards the consistency between different sets of practices in the area of enlargement, in particular in the context of the fight against terrorism. Meanwhile, NATO’s extensive partnerships with a plethora of states, such as the partnerships with Mediterranean countries and the ‘broader Middle East’, reflect a highly ambitious aim to expand the security community well beyond the alliance’s traditional area of operation. Yet, those partnerships raise another difficult set of questions, and it is not entirely clear that the allies have fully considered those questions. For instance, this expanded system of partnerships seeks to build on the experience gained by the alliance in the 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe. The problem that it faces is that some of the Arab countries that have more recently been invited to partner with NATO and other Western institutions seem to be suspicious of cooperative security practices and, fearing neocolonialism, tend to question their legitimacy.47 As a corollary to that, in contrast to the Central/East European partners of the 1990s, which regarded NATO as an authoritative normative guide in the process of reconstruction of their countries, some of the newer partners are unlikely to be as easily socializable by the alliance. NATO could thus face a significant challenge to its credibility as a security community-building institution, as its socialization practices in those partner countries may well fail to have the expected effect. 180

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At the same time, it is quite conceivable that some of the new partners may try to invoke their formal links to NATO to push for greater commitment to/protection by the alliance in the context of what seems to be a rapidly worsening security situation in the Middle East. Thus, NATO may have inadvertently contributed to the creation of a particularly difficult kind of ‘fuzzy area’ between inclusion and exclusion in the security community—an area of formal institutional links but little de facto normative agreement and partnership in the processes of promoting liberaldemocratic norms. Moreover, should some of those new partners seek greater involvement and/or military protection by NATO, for instance by invoking the risk of terrorist attacks, they might fuel even more tensions between the established members of the security community, as several European allies would probably be reluctant to make such commitments. Should such a scenario ever come to unfold in the future, it might bring to light and reinforce disagreements among the allies as regards the desirable boundaries of the security community. As a corollary to that, it might also lead to a situation in which the ‘fuzzy region’ of partial inclusion into the security community could undermine cooperation among the established members of that community.

Constructing Internal Boundaries, Enacting Exceptions to Liberal Norms: The Politics of Excluding ‘Risky’ Individuals from the Security Community In parallel to practices aimed at expanding the liberal-democratic security community through the construction of self-disciplined (liberal) subjects, the EU, NATO, and the OSCE have, in the name of combating international terrorism, also been keen to develop new methods and technologies to build effective boundaries against non-conventional ‘civilizational’ enemies that (may) operate inside as well as outside the space of EuroAtlantic liberal-democratic polities. As we have seen, this has translated into the establishment of new (or enhanced) filters, which mobilize hybrid networks of public and private actors and are designed to identify and exclude from liberal relations of community those individuals and groups suspected of involvement in international (Islamic-inspired) terrorism. However, against the background of a common understanding concerning the importance of devising more effective methods of identifying (suspected) terrorists and preventing them from taking advantage of liberal freedoms to carry out attacks, significant differences and 181

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disagreements have emerged within the security community as regards the kinds of practices of exclusion targeting alleged terrorists that are consistent with the normative commitments of liberal-democratic polities. An interesting case which reveals the depth of disagreements over the politics of exclusion of alleged terrorists concerns CIA practices of extraordinary rendition and secret detention centres in Europe. Those practices have raised difficult questions about whether or not it is acceptable to suspend liberal norms in order to deal with the (allegedly) exceptional risks posed by the individuals suspected of involvement in international terrorism. Reports issued by human rights organizations and the Council of Europe as well as the European Parliament over the past couple of years paint a highly complicated (if provisional) picture regarding the transport and treatment (including torture) of alleged terrorists. If those reports are correct, what is involved here is an extensive collusion between American and several European governments in the practice of illegal apprehension and detention of individuals suspected of involvement in international terrorism.48 This seems to have occurred without the knowledge of the publics in those countries, and against the express opposition and criticism of human rights organizations and several EU bodies. However, some key EU actors, including the EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and former Counter-Terrorism coordinator Gijs de Vries, as well as NATO, have been accused of support for the CIA extraordinary rendition activities. In response to reports published in the Washington Post about the existence of secret prisons, the foreign ministers of allied countries confronted the US Secretary of State at a NATO meeting on 8 December 2005, demanding an explanation. At that meeting, Condoleezza Rice assured them that the USA did not interpret international humanitarian law differently from its allies, and that all American interrogators were bound by the UN Convention on Torture, whether they worked in the USA or abroad. In her words, ‘We all recognize—as stewards of our own political systems—that we have an obligation to protect innocent life. We talked about the need as countries who respect the rule of law to do that in a lawful way.’49 Following that discussion, NATO foreign ministers from Europe declared themselves ‘very satisfied’, while simultaneously reiterating the importance they attached to the principle of respecting human rights and the rule of law in the fight against international terrorism. There is, however, preliminary evidence to suggest that NATO may have acted as a forum that condoned (and possibly helped to coordinate) suspensions of those normative commitments. According to the Council 182

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of Europe investigation, which was concluded in June 2007, within weeks of the 9/11 attacks, NATO signed an agreement with the USA that allowed civilian jets used by the CIA during its so-called extraordinary rendition programme to move across member states’ airspace.50 If that report is correct, it means that NATO has been involved in coordinating exceptions to liberal-democratic rules—in this case, forms of exclusion of alleged terrorists from the normal legal regimes of democratic polities. Developments surrounding the extraordinary rendition programme can be seen as a powerful illustration of the way in which NATO’s activities instantiate the tension between ‘normal’ practices of liberal-democratic norm-promotion, and practices involving the suspension of those norms vis-à-vis particularly problematic, deviant individuals and groups. Thus, while continuing to cast itself as a key player in the protection and international projection of normal liberal-democratic practices and norms, and continuing to conduct complex practices designed to disseminate those norms, NATO also appears to have become involved in the politics of exceptionality that are cast as an intrinsic part of liberal security practices. As noted in the first chapter, liberalism relies upon the principle of separation between individuals/groups that can be governed by liberal methods (sustained by habits of rational self-regulation), and those who must be governed by exceptional (illiberal) means, given their alleged inability or unwillingness to govern themselves according to rational principles. Moreover, the task of distinguishing between rational, selfdisciplined subjects and dangerous others has come to be seen as particularly important in a situation in which the ‘deviant’ individuals and groups are seen as actors that, due to their (alleged) involvement in international, religious-motivated terrorism and their access to late-modern technology, pose a serious threat to the key values and institutions of liberal-democratic polities. In this context, NATO’s involvement in exceptional security measures that target groups suspected of involvement in terrorism constitutes a potentially disruptive development. Thus, those measures could undermine the credibility of the alliance as a norm-promoter and, as a corollary to that, could diminish its symbolic capital. Not surprisingly, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, and human rights groups have been quick to strongly criticize NATO for what they regard as its willingness to violate basic human rights norms in the name of fighting international terrorism, as well as for its failure to cooperate with the Council of Europe investigation.51 According to the 2007 Council of Europe Report, ‘strict observance of the rules of confidentiality laid 183

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down in the NATO framework’ helped keep the CIA programme secret for too long.52 At first glance, NATO’s unwillingness to collaborate with the Council of Europe in an investigation that concerns basic human rights violations can only be seen as a serious blow to the alliance’s credibility as a security institution that claims to promote liberal-democratic norms and values. Such behaviour, one might argue, can only lead to a corresponding decline in NATO’s authority (and symbolic capital) in the field of security. This is perfectly possible, particularly since many groups and individuals within the alliance’s member states have long been critical of NATO’s alleged willingness to violate human rights (e.g. in the war in Kosovo). For those groups and individuals, any involvement in the CIA programme of extraordinary rendition can only be interpreted as evidence that NATO cannot be trusted to act as a security institution that protects and promotes the values of the liberal-democratic community. Yet, paradoxically, that very willingness to suspend normal liberal rules and resort to exceptional measures targeting alleged terrorists might just constitute a productive move for NATO, potentially serving to enhance rather than undermine its symbolic capital. Thus, strict rules of confidentiality that allegedly enabled allied governments to ‘keep the CIA program secret’, and that were, understandably, the target of severe criticism by the Council of Europe and European Parliament, could also be invoked by NATO supporters as an important asset in the context of the fight against exceptionally dangerous terrorist groups. NATO officials and supporters of the alliance within member states could conceivably make a case that NATO has once again demonstrated its continued relevance and ability to adapt to a changing environment by combining normal and exceptional practices. Thus, it could be argued that not only has the alliance expanded its practices of liberal-democratic norm-promotion (e.g. via its enlargement policies, partnership programmes, and post-conflict reconstruction missions), but it has also acted as a forum for formulating and implementing exceptional measures aimed at suspected terrorist groups (and involving special measures of exclusion from liberal relations of community). A case could be made that even if, in the particular case of rendition programmes, the allies took the politics of exceptionality a step too far, the important conclusion to be drawn from those events is that NATO’s rules of confidentiality have demonstrated yet again their value, facilitating debate among the allies and demonstrating that the alliance can act as an effective forum for the formulation and coordination of exceptional security measures. NATO supporters could argue that, though 184

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one might debate the merits of particular exceptional policies, it is still the case that the security community will need some such policies, in addition to normal liberal policies and practices, if liberal-democratic polities are to be protected from the unconventional threats of the twenty-first century.53 NATO, in other words, could use such instances of inter-allied cooperation as part of a strategy to cast itself as an institution that has the necessary cultural-symbolic capital—knowledge, expertise, and prestige— to enact an effective combination of normal (liberal) and exceptional practices in the liberal-democratic community in the twenty-first century. It is too early to determine if NATO’s alleged support for CIA practices of extraordinary rendition has been disruptive or productive, not least because investigations into those events continue in a number of allied states. At this point of time, however, it is reasonable to argue that the final impact of that saga on NATO’s authority and symbolic power will depend, at least in part, on the extent to which the allied governments will be able to persuade publics in member states that the alliance’s actions, while arguably problematic when judged by normal ethical standards, were nevertheless within the range of exceptional measures that are proportional to the degree of risk posed by internationally organized terrorist groups. Interesting dynamics involving the tension between liberal norms/ practices and the exception are also at play within the EU. In December 2005, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) adopted a resolution expressing the European Parliament’s wish to conduct its own parliamentary enquiry on the alleged CIA flights and detention camps in Europe. The European Parliament expressed a wish to examine whether the CIA has been involved in ‘extraordinary renditions’ and transport of ‘ghost [abducted] detainees within the EU territory’; whether such practices are legal according to EU law on fundamental rights and the EU–USA agreement on extradition; whether EU citizens were among the detainees; and whether member states were involved or complicit in the illegal deprivation of liberty of individuals. Furthermore, the Parliament declared that if investigations carried out by the Council of Europe confirmed the allegations that any member state has given assistance, it would open the procedure under Article 7 Treaty of the EU, which foresees a sanctions mechanism when there is a serious and persistent breach of Union rules by a member state. Its application could lead to the loss of certain rights for a given member state, including the right to vote in the European Council.54 MEPs reiterated their belief that the fight against international 185

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terrorism must be fought by legal means and respecting international law.55 The view of MEPs is that such practices of rendition are inconsistent with the EU principles of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In Europe, the drama intensified with the publication of a report issued by an investigator from the Council of Europe. According to that report, over a dozen European governments colluded with the CIA to create a global ‘spider’s web’ of secret detention centres and to facilitate the unlawful transfer of terrorist suspects. As specified by Dick Marty, the Chair of the Council of Europe’s Legal Affairs and Human Rights Committee, seven countries allowed the CIA to seize suspects on their soil, and other countries—Cyprus, Germany, Spain, and Turkey—acted as ‘staging posts’ for rendition operations. Another group of states—Britain, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal—stand accused of allowing ‘stopovers’ by CIA planes carrying abducted suspects. Marty also claimed that evidence pointed to secret detention centres having existed in Romania and Poland, despite strong denials from both countries. In September 2006, President Bush acknowledged that the CIA had been operating a number of secret prisons for suspected terrorists, and argued that such prisons represented an important, acceptable tool in the ‘war on terror’. In response, EU Justice Commissioner Franco Frattini called on all EU governments to investigate the possible presence and operations of secret CIA prisons in Europe. In contrast to President Bush, EU officials continued to insist in their public discourse that secret prisons and extraordinary rendition operations would constitute a departure from the norms of liberal democracy. In reaction to President Bush’s statement in September 2006, Poland again denied that any of its facilities have ever hosted terrorism suspects, and Romania said there was no proof that such a facility existed on its territory.56 But, in 2007, the European Parliament approved the report by the Committee on CIA Activities in Europe, which accused Britain, Germany, Italy, and other EU countries of turning a blind eye to CIA flights carrying terrorist suspects in Europe.57 The report reiterated the view that the US intelligence agency may have operated secret jails for terrorism suspects at different bases around Europe (including in Poland and Romania), and accused EU foreign policy chief Solana of failure to fully cooperate with the investigation. In a similar vein, as we have noted, in June 2007, the Council of Europe investigation concluded that the CIA had run secret prisons in Poland and Romania between 2003 and 2005, using those facilities as 186

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bases where terrorism suspects could be interrogated free of US legal restraints. The Council of Europe investigators claim that none of the prisoners had access to the Red Cross, and many were subjected to what President Bush has called enhanced interrogation but critics have condemned as torture.58 Dick Marty claimed in his report that ‘the highest state authorities were aware of the CIA’s illegal activities on their territories’, and accused European countries and EU bodies as well as NATO of not only violating national and European laws concerning the protection of human rights but also obstructing the search for truth by invoking the concept of state secrets.59 According to Dick Marty, collaboration by European states allies was critical to the secret detention programme, which took place within the framework of NATO’s security policy. The Council and the European Parliament claim that in several instances, senior NATO and EU officials as well as representatives of member governments have not only failed to inform (let alone consult) the public and national legislatures of their roles in supporting rendition programmes but have also refused to cooperate with the European investigations into renditions. In its 2007 Report, the Council of Europe castigated the USA and several European countries for their involvement in practices of illegal detention and transfer of terrorism suspects, and also deplored what it termed ‘obstruct[ion]’ by many of the governments implicated in the abuses, who ‘have done everything to disguise the true nature and extent of their activities and are persistent in their uncooperative attitude’. In this respect, the report singles out the USA, Poland, Romania, Macedonia, Italy, and Germany for criticism.60 Simultaneously, as noted above, the Council of Europe report also castigated NATO and the EU foreign policy chief for their silence on this matter, and for what it regards as refusal to cooperate with the Council in its investigation. In a similar vein, in September 2007, the European Parliament’s Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) heavily criticized EU member governments, the European Council, and the Commission, accusing them of refusal to take action to follow up on the conclusions drawn in the European Parliament’s report concerning clandestine CIA operations in Europe.61 In a statement that reveals the MEPs’ frustration with the Commission and European Council’s silence on this matter, and with their lack of legal power in the area of security, a senior MEP, Ignasi Guardans, ALDE coordinator in the former CIA temporary committee, declared: 187

Conclusion The report of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe raised serious accusations against some Member States of the EU and the Council regarding their knowledge or complicity with such events. But instead of acting and addressing the concerns raised, the Council remains silent, like a defendant in a Court of Law relying on the shield of silence as their sole means of defence. . . . Unfortunately, the European Parliament does not have the legal means to make the Council talk, but history will shed light on this shameful silence.62

The reports and statements issued by the Council of Europe and European Parliament reflect the deep discomfort that many citizens in the Euro-Atlantic security community feel vis-à-vis the exceptional security measures taken in the name of fighting international terrorism, and their view that such measures are inconsistent with the very values that are supposed to be protected in this fight. At the same time, however, the fact that those reports and criticisms have so far failed to have a major impact on the Euro-Atlantic field of security reflects the extraordinary power that the discourse on the risk posed by international terrorism has had in shaping contemporary practices of security. While agreeing, in principle, that the fight against international terrorism had to be conducted on the basis of respect for human rights and the rule of law, NATO and EU bodies, as well as individual governments, have invoked the doctrine of necessity to shield themselves from scrutiny and criticism of their involvement in such controversial aspects of the fight against international terrorism. In this sense, it could be argued that practices enacted by the EU and NATO replicate and amplify the politics of exceptionality that have occurred in their member states in the post-9/11 environment. That involves in particular the expansion of executive power vis-à-vis legislatures, and more broadly the marginalization of normal mechanisms of democratic control on the grounds that exceptional security threats demanded extraordinary measures.63 The argument usually put forward in those circumstances is that, given their privileged access to information about the continued high risk posed by terrorist groups, and considering their fundamental duty to protect the public, both national authorities and international security institutions simply have to take such extraordinary steps.64 The irony for the EU and NATO, as well as for their member states, is that by invoking the exceptional risk of terrorism they seem to have become involved in supporting or condoning practices of suspensions of human rights that only a decade ago would have been widely regarded as unacceptable and inconsistent with the liberal-democratic identity. 188

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In the context of the fight against terrorism it would seem that NATO, the European Council, and the Commission have acted as forums for coordinating and enhancing exceptional security measures in the broad (and even beyond) the Euro-Atlantic area, and, on the basis of their rules and procedures, have helped to shield member governments from democratic scrutiny by national legislatures and the European Parliament. And, although criticisms of those exceptional measures and debates concerning their acceptable limits persist, so far there is little evidence to suggest that the reports issued by the Council of Europe, European Parliament, and human rights groups have led to a radical change in Euro-Atlantic security policies and practices in a way that would preclude a repetition of the CIA rendition saga. In fact, NATO, the Commission, and senior EU officials have continued to claim their innocence and to be (at best) reluctant interlocutors in European investigations into practices of rendition. In a similar vein, several of the governments accused by the European Parliament and the Council of Europe of complicity with the CIA in illegal anti-terrorist operations have implicitly (re)asserted their right to engage in extraordinary practices of detention by failing to sign the recent UN Convention against Enforced Disappearances. On 6 February 2007, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly by consensus in December 2006, was opened for signature at a ceremony hosted by the French Government in Paris. Fifty-seven states signed the Convention on the opening day, including eighteen African states, nineteen European states, eleven Latin American states, and six states in Asia and the Pacific. Not included, however, were the USA and a series of European states: the UK, Germany, Spain, and Italy. The Convention seeks to establish rules and mechanisms designed to enhance the ability of the international community to monitor, and if necessary take action to try to redress, state practices in the area of detention, in an effort to put an end to extraordinary practices in this area, and to minimize the risk of torture and death. For instance, the Convention outlaws secret detention and requires that states hold all detainees in officially recognized places, maintain up-to-date official registers and detailed records of all detainees, and allow them to communicate with their families and counsel. Each state that is party to the Convention must submit to the ten-member independent expert Committee a report on the measures taken to give effect to its obligations under the Convention. The Committee will then issue comments, observations, and recommendations on the state’s report, and if necessary it can also request 189

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further information of the state party.65 The Committee has the power to visit the territory of a state party if it receives reliable reports of grave violations of the Convention, and has the power to bring indications of a ‘widespread or systematic’ practice of enforced disappearance to the attention of the UN General Assembly via the UN Secretary General. According to human rights groups, the Convention constitutes an important legal step in the direction of protecting human rights, including in the context of the fight against international terrorism. The problem, however, is that several of the states accused of involvement in extraordinary practices of detention and rendition targeting suspected terrorists have expressed their refusal to accept international constraints and scrutiny in this area by remaining outside the legal framework of the Convention.66 When I began to write this book, many of the initiatives that are now included here were no more than vague ideas (if they figured at all) on the agendas of the EU, NATO, and the OSCE. As the manuscript is going to press, the field of security is as dynamic as ever, with more measures and legal instruments almost constantly being initiated or enhanced in an effort to address what is still widely perceived as one of the key security challenges of our time: internationally organized terrorism. Under these circumstances, concluding thoughts on this topic cannot reasonably claim the status of definitive statements. Yet, even in such a fluid phase in the evolution of the field of security, a study of practices enacted by NATO, the EU, and the OSCE in the name of fighting terrorism reveals certain trends and patterns of activity that are analytically fascinating and politically important (if also worrisome). As we have seen, in spite of their differences, these institutions have been united in placing the fight against terrorism at the heart of their agendas, and have sought to respond to the perceived new challenges posed by internationally organized terrorist organizations via complex practices of risk-management that involve a combination of inclusive and exclusionary practices. In their quest to (a) deepen and expand the transatlantic community of liberal democracy and (b) identify and exclude from relations of community a new type of dangerous enemies, they have adopted a series of new legal instruments, enhanced their symbolic and material capital, created new institutional arrangements, and launched practices that have had a profound impact not only on the field of security but also on political life both within and beyond the transatlantic community. In the name of fighting an enemy deemed as particularly dangerous due to its ability to combine late modern technology and pre-modern (religious) ethos, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE have enacted 190

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practices that have contributed to the diversification of the field of security. In parallel to the blurring of the boundary between internal/external security technologies, all three institutions have played important roles in the establishment of hybrid security networks that bring together public and private actors that share responsibilities of risk-management. More broadly, the EU, NATO, and the OSCE have contributed to the process of blurring the boundary between the public and the private sphere, and to the establishment of new duties of good citizenship legitimized by reference to the (alleged) exceptional security situation. In the new security environment, a host of private actors have been mobilized in efforts to monitor broad sections of the public, to produce knowledge about, and thus profile, risky individuals, and exclude those seen as particularly dangerous from liberal relations of community. Yet, contrary to the expectations of some theorists of risk society, the new emphasis on practices of risk-management and the inclusion of private actors in such practices has not necessarily translated into increased democratization of debates about reasonable security measures. Rather, in many instances the exceptional risk of terrorist attacks has been invoked to legitimize the marginalization or suspension of normal procedures of democratic accountability in the formulation of security policies. In essence, practices enacted by NATO, the EU, and the OSCE have— albeit in different ways—instantiated an interesting normative tension. Thus, while continuing to carry out practices of socialization involving the dissemination of normal conceptual and practical dispositions of liberal-democratic governance, each of these institutions has also conducted specific anti-terrorism practices that contribute to the promotion of new knowledge and (exceptional) behavioural dispositions involving the suspension or limitation of human rights and democratic procedures to a degree that, in the pre-9/11 world, would have been unacceptable. While all three institutions have sought to portray the tensions between normal liberal-democratic principles/practices and exceptional measures as vital to the protection of democratic polities from the threat of terrorism, from a normative perspective, some of those exceptional measures have been quite problematic. Consequently, they have given rise to new challenges to the credibility of NATO, the OSCE, and to a lesser extent even EU bodies as promoters of democratic norms, and have generated some serious political tensions and discontent within the transatlantic security community. It is not yet clear what, if any, impact those tensions and discontent will have on the future practices of the EU, NATO, and the OSCE. 191

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In my view, critics have a point when they argue that it is important for all actors who claim to protect liberal democracy, including international institutions, to move away, at the very least, from the most extreme exceptional practices (e.g. extraordinary renditions) if they are to avoid undermining the very values they claim to be protecting in combating international terrorism. They are also right to argue that liberal polities need to engage in a more systematic debate not only about the desirable limits of exceptional policies per se but also, more fundamentally, about the legitimate locus of decisions about exceptionality. Yet, whether or not such developments will occur in the foreseeable future remains to be seen. But, whatever the future may bring, at this point of time, we can say that the practices enacted by the EU, NATO, and the OSCE have already contributed to significant transformations in the field of security. More broadly, those practices have become part of the politics of making decisions about the kinds of exceptional policies that should be promoted in a liberal-democratic community in response to new, unconventional threats. As such, they have complicated questions about the procedures, mechanisms, and principles on the basis of which a liberal community can make legitimate judgements about the kinds of exceptions that can be justified in the name of security. All these transformations suggest that we need to think about the world of Euro-Atlantic security in new, imaginative ways, and in so doing to transcend some of the rigid categories and dichotomies—domestic/international politics, private/public sphere, policing/defence issues, to name but a few—which have characterized so much of the thinking about international relations for such a long time.

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Chapter 1 1. Particularly interesting in this sense are the contributions to the volume edited by Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); as well as Barak Mendelsohn, ‘Sovereignty under Attack: International Society Meets Al Qaeda’, Review of International Studies, 31 (2005), 45–68; and Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, ‘A Parallel Globalization of Terror: 9-11, Security and Globalization’, Cooperation and Conflict, 37 (2002), 323–49. 2. The concept of security community was made famous by Karl Deutsch, who, in a 1957 study, defined it as a group of people who have become integrated to the point that there is a real assurance that the members of that community will settle their disputes by peaceful means. See his Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. For highly influential, more recent accounts, see in particular Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities; and Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). For analyses of contemporary dynamics within the Euro-Atlantic security community, see, for example, Heinz Gartner and Ian Cuthbertson (eds.), European Security and Transatlantic Relations after 9/11 and the Iraq War (London: Palgrave, 2005); Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Years (Paris: EU Institute for European Studies, 2004); David Andrews (ed.), The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress: US-European Relations after Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Matthew Evangelista and Vittorio Emanuele Parsi (eds.), Partners or Rivals? European-American Relations After Iraq (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2005). 3. Michael Cox, ‘Beyond the West: Terrors in Transatlantia’, in European Journal of International Relations, 11/2 (2005), 203–33. See also Vincent Pouliot’s reply, ‘The Alive and Well Transatlantic Security Community: A Theoretical Reply to Michael Cox’, in European Journal of International Relations, 12/1 (2006), 119–27. 4. Cox, ‘Beyond the West’, p. 208. 5. Ibid. p. 209. 6. Deutsch, Political Community, p. 5.

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Notes 7. See Pouliot, ‘The Alive and Well Transatlantic Security Community’. See also Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, ‘Studying Security Communities in Theory, Comparison and History’, in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 413–41; Janice Bially Mattern, ‘Power in Realist-Constructivist Research’, in International Studies Review, 6/2 (2004), 343–61; and Michael C. Williams and Iver Neumann, ‘From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia and the Power of Identity’, in Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 29/2 (2000), 357–87. 8. Emanuel Adler, ‘Imagined (Security) Communities’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 26/2 (1997), 261. 9. In a similar vein, Thomas Risse has argued that security communities rest on three constitutive elements: identity, interdependence, and institutions. According to Risse, although the institutional fabric of the community has been affected and now needs to be repaired, the first two constitutive elements have not been fundamentally undermined by the Iraqi crisis. See his ‘Beyond Iraq: The Crisis in the Transatlantic Security Community’, in David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds.), American Power in the 21st Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 181–213. 10. In contrast to NATO and the OSCE, the EU encompasses supranational arrangements in addition to its intergovernmental bodies. This issue is revisited below. 11. Pouliot, ‘The Alive and Well Transatlantic Security Community’. 12. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 20. 13. See, for instance, Adler, ‘Seeds of Peaceful Change: the OSCE’s Security Community-building Model’, in Adler and Barnett (eds.), Security Communities; Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, ‘The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations’, International Organization, 53/4 (1999), 699– 732; Michael C. Williams, Culture and Security. 14. Emanuel Adler, ‘The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint and NATO’s Post-Cold War Transformation’. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention, 2 March 2007, Chicago. 15. Adler, ‘The Spread of Security Communities’, p. 6. See also his ‘Communities of Practice in International Relations’, in Emanuel Adler (ed.), Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations (London: Routledge, 2005), 3–28. 16. Adler, ‘The Spread of Security Communities’, p. 4. 17. See Williams, Culture and Security, especially Chapter 4. 18. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, translated by R. Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). For helpful analyses of Bourdieu’s work, see also Mark

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19.

20. 21.

22. 23. 24.

25. 26.

Haugaard, The Constitution of Power (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); and Williams, Culture and Security. Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant, ‘The Purpose of Reflexive Sociology (The Chicago Workshop)’, in Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J. D. Wacquant (eds.), An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), p. 116. Thompson (1991: 14), also quoted by Williams, Culture and Security, p. 32. I draw here on Vincent Pouliot, ‘La Russie et la communauté atlantique: Vers une culture commune de sécurité?’ Etudes internationales, 34/1 (2003), 25–51. However, Pouliot restricts the definition of threats to those arising from rivalries among states. In my view, the field of security now needs to be defined in a broader sense, to encompass a broad set of non-state threats and enemies. On the field of security, see also Didier Bigo, Polices en réseaux: l’expérience européenne (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po., 1996). Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 31. For a more detailed analysis, see Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the ‘New Europe’. For different visions of desirable security scenarios that were being articulated at that time, and their shared focus on the need to strengthen political and cooperative solutions, rather than military/confrontational ones, see, for example, David Mutimer, Chaos and Constitution in the European Security Order: A Study in International Change, Ph.D. thesis (unpublished manuscript), York University, Canada, 1995; and Ingo Peters (ed.), New Security Challenges: The Adaptation of International Institutions: Reforming the UN, NATO, EU and CSCE Since 1989 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996). For the US perspective, see also James Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 232. On the pro-CSCE scenario, particularly as seen from the French perspective, see Mitterrand’s biography by Alain Genestar, Les Peches du Prince (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1992). For a view of a CSCE-centred security system articulated on the other side of the former divide, see Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (London and Toronto: Doubleday, 1996). Williams, Culture and Security, p. 40. This refers to practices of identity construction in which the political ‘self’ is constructed in and through differentiation from (sometimes opposition to) one or more actors (the ‘others’). The attributes ascribed to others are used to justify a particular treatment by the self. For instance, representations of particular others as uncivilized, inherently violent actors have historically been used to justify extreme measures of violence (e.g. in some cases of colonial occupation), in a situation in which such measures would have been seen as illegitimate in interactions with ‘civilized’ others. Arguments about identity construction around self/other representations have been used extensively in the constructivist literature as part of a critique of mainstream (rationalist) IR approaches, which assume that the identities of actors are pre-given, defined in abstraction from social interactions. To give just a couple

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27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36.

37.

38. 39.

40.

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of examples in an increasingly rich literature, see Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: ‘The East’ in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell, ‘Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: the CSCE, Norms, and the “Construction” of Security in Post-Cold War Europe’, International Organization, 53/3 (1999), 505–35. Ibid. See Adler, ‘The Spreading of Security Community’. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, p. 26. John Thompson, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, to Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 12. Michael C. Williams, Culture and Security, p. 25. Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 58. Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (London: Sage, 1999), p. 122. Adler, ‘Seeds of Peaceful Change’; Gheciu, NATO in the ‘New Europe’; Trine Flockhart, ‘Masters and Novices’. ‘Socialisation and Social Learning in NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly’, International Relations, 18/3 (2004), 361–80. Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held in Madrid on 3 June 2003, available online at: http://www.nato.int/ docu/pr/2003/p03-059e.htm. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Ministerial Council Declaration, ‘OSCE Statement on Terrorism and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism’, Bucharest, 4 December 2001 (para 1). On this, see Rasmussen, ‘A Parallel Globalization of Terror: 9-11, Security and Globalization’ and The Risk Society at War. For particularly interesting analyses, see Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). See also Coker, Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-First Century: NATO and the Management of Risk, Adelphi Paper no. 345, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 2002; Rasmussen, ‘A Parallel Globalization of Terror’ and The Risk Society at War; and Michael J. Williams, ‘The Politics of Risk: The US, Europe and Proactive Security for the Twenty-First Century’, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, 5 March 2005. In criminology, particularly influential has been Richard Ericson and Kevin Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). On this, see, for example, Coker, Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-First Century.

Notes 41. Ulrich Beck, ‘World Risk Society as Cosmopolitan Society? Ecological Questions in a Framework of Manufactured Uncertainties’, Theory, Culture and Society, 13/4 (1996), 28. 42. Ibid. p. 31. 43. Ulrich Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited’, in Theory, Culture and Society, 19/4 (2002), 39–55. 44. Idem. p. 43. 45. Ulrich Beck, ‘The Silence of Words: On Terror and War’, Security Dialogue, 34 (2004), 255–67. See also Mikkel Rasmussen, ‘It Sounds like a Riddle: Security Studies, the War on Terror and Risk’, Millennium, 33/4 (2004), 381–95. 46. Beck cited by Mikkel Veby Rasmussen, ‘ “A Parallel Globalization of Terror”: 9-11, Security and Globalization’, Cooperation and Conflict, 37/3 (2002), 328– 9. 47. See Beck, Risk Society, p. 13. 48. Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 137. On this, see also Michael J. Williams, ‘Risky Business: the European Union and International Security in the 21st Century’, Paper presented at the 2004 Standing Group on International Relations Conference, The Hague, September 2004. 49. Beck, World Risk Society, p. 139. 50. See in particular Barbara Adam, Ulrich Beck, and Joost Van Loon (eds.), The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory (London: Sage Publications, 2000). It should be noted, however, that Beck adopts a somewhat ambiguous position as regards the status of risk—as something that is both given in the world and constructed through particular cultural categories. In his view, while risks exist out there (realist ontology), they are selected for treatment and dealt with via particular social and cultural categories (a constructivist epistemology). For a very interesting discussion of Beck’s oscillation between a realist and constructivist position, see Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, ‘Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future’, European Journal of International Relations, 13/1 (2007), 89–115. 51. It is interesting to note that Beck assumed that the risk society could reinvent politics along more democratic lines, with expert knowledge being deliberated in public forums. See, for instance, Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992); and Beck, World Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). 52. Jef Huysmans, ‘Security! What Do you Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier’, European Journal of International Relations, 4/2 (1998), 226–55. 53. See in particular Coker, Globalisation and Insecurity; Rasmussen, ‘A Parallel Globalization of Terror’; and Yee-Kuang Heng, ‘Unravelling the “War” on Terrorism: A Risk-Management Exercise in War Clothing?’, Security Dialogue, 33/2 (2002), 227–42. Also relevant is Didier Bigo’s discussion of the proactive

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54. 55.

56. 57.

58. 59.

60. 61.

62. 63. 64. 65.

66.

67. 68. 69. 70.

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practices of security professionals in the name of preventing the occurrence of dangers in the future. See Bigo, ‘Identifier, catégoriser et contrôler: Polices et logiques proactives’, in Laurent Bonelli and Gilles Sainati (eds.), La Machine à punir: pratiques et discours sécuritaires (Paris: L’esprit frappeur, 2004). For a very interesting analysis of this problem, see Aradau and Van Munster, ‘Governing Terrorism Through Risk’. As Aradau and Van Munster have argued, practices of management of the risk of terrorism rely upon a view of ‘double infinity’ of terrorism, involving ‘its catastrophic effects and the uncertainty of its occurrence’ (Aradau and Van Munster, ‘Governing Terrorism Through Risk’, p. 108). On this, see, again, Aradau and Van Munster. As Adler has argued, the North Atlantic Security Community is materially and Symbolically represented by Institutions, like the EU and NATO. See his Imagined (Security) Communities. See Adler, ‘Seeds of Peaceful Change: The OSCE’s Security Communitybuilding Model’. For an excellent recent analysis, see Barry Hindess, ‘Liberalism: What is in a Name?’, in Wendy Larner and William Walters (eds.), Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces (London: Routledge, 2004). Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’, in H. Reiss (ed.), Kant’s Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). Michael C. Williams, ‘The Discipline of the Democratic Peace: Kant, Liberalism, and the Social Construction of Security Communities’, European Journal of International Relations, 7/4 (2001), 525–53. See Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’. Williams, ‘Discipline of the Democratic Peace’. Council of the European Union, ‘Council Declaration on the EU Response to the London Bombings’, Brussels, 13 July 2005 (EU Document no. 11116/05). On this, see in particular R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and John Gerrard Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations’, International Organisation, 47/1 (1993), 139–74. Steven Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (New York: Free Press, 1990), p. 70; also cited by Michael Williams, Culture and Security, p. 6. See also Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). Toulmin, Cosmopolis, p. 54. For a splendid analysis of this, see Williams, Culture and Security, Chapter 1. See, for example, James Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 82. R. B. J. Walker, ‘History and Structure in the Theory of International Relations’, Millennium, 18/2 (1989), 163–83.

Notes 71. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, and John Locke, Two Treatises of Government. 72. See Williams, Culture and Security, Chapter 1. 73. R. B. J. Walker, ‘Lines of Insecurity: International, Imperial, Exceptional’, Security Dialogue, 37/1 (2006), p. 70. 74. See R. B. J. Walker’s analysis in ‘Lines of Insecurity’. 75. North Atlantic Council, ‘NATO Statement in Response to the 9/11 Attacks on the US’, 11 September 2001. 76. See, for instance, the European Security Strategy. 77. In a broader perspective, these developments reinforce broader transformations in the practices and institutional arrangements involved in the provision of security, particularly the rise to prominence of neo-liberal economics and methods of governance in the final decades of the twentieth century. That led to the diversification and fragmentation of the security sector, encouraging the outsourcing of functions previously seen as falling exclusively within the purview of the state (e.g. airport security, prisons). On this, see, for example, Les Johnston, The Rebirth of Private Policing (London: Routledge, 2000). 78. Mariana Valverde and Michael Mopas, ‘Insecurity and the Dream of Targeted Governance’, in Larner and Walters (eds.), Global Governmentality. 79. Ibid. p. 238. 80. See also David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2001). Also relevant are Richard Ericson and Kevin Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997); and Mariana Valverde, ‘Targeted Governance and the Problem of Desire’, in Richard Ericson and A. Doyle (eds.), Risk and Morality (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003). 81. See, for example, Ericson and Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society.

Chapter 2 1. European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, pp. 6–7. 2. Council of the European Union, Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 13 June 2002, Brussels; published in the EU Official Journal of the European Communities L 164/3 (Acts adopted pursuant to Title VI of the Treaty on European Union) (2002/475/JHA). 3. Council of the European Union, The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted at the Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 1 December 2005, p. 7. 4. Idem. p. 11. 5. Ibid. 6. See Commission of the European Communities, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council concerning Terrorist Recruitment’, Brussels, 21 September 2005, COM(2005)313 final, p. 2.

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Notes 7. Bertie Ahern, Speech at a Press Conference after EU leaders adopted a Declaration on Combating Terrorism, Brussels, 25 March 2004 (available online at: http://www.eu2004.ie/templates/news.asp?sNavlocator=66&list_id=462. 8. Council of the European Union, ‘Council Declaration on the EU Response to the London Bombings’, Brussels, 13 July 2005 (EU Document no. 11116/05). 9. Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, approved at the Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 1 December 2005, p. 6. 10. Council of the European Union, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the EU, Brussels, 13 December 2004 (http:// ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/doc/hague_programme_en.pdf). 11. The Fight Against International Terrorism: Defence Aspects, Report prepared by the Defence Committee of the Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly, adopted at the 51st session of the Assembly of Western European Union, 14 June 2005 (Document A/1900). 12. See the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy. 13. Council of the EU Secretariat, Factsheet, The European Union and the Fight Against International Terrorism (Brussels: Press Office of the Council of the European Union, 9 March 2007). 14. See, for instance, the European Security Strategy, approved by the European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003 (http://www.consilium. europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf); and the Conceptual Framework on the ESDP Dimension of the Fight against Terrorism, adopted by the Brussels European Council in December 2004 (online at: http://www. eu2005.lu/en/actualites/documents_travail/2005/03/18defterr/). 15. See the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, December 2005. 16. European Security Strategy, p. 3. 17. Ibid. 18. European Security Strategy, Declaration on Combating Terrorism, and Council of the EU, Revised Action Plan on Terrorism: Update Brussels, 27 June 2005. 19. The EU Justice and Home Affairs Council agreed on common basic principles for immigrant integration policy in the Union, and stated that everyone in the EU must ‘adhere closely to the basic values’ of the Union. See Council of the EU Press Release, 2618th Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, 14615/04, Brussels, 19 Nov. 2004. 20. Again, the securitization of migration, including within the EU, is not a new phenomenon. Rather, what is involved here is an intensification of preexisting processes of securitization of migration, achieved by linking migration to the extreme risk of terrorism. On the securitization of migration see, for example, Didier Bigo, ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease’, in Alternatives, 27 (2002), 63–92; Claudia Aradau, ‘The Perverse Politics of Four Letter Words: Risk and Pity in the Securitisation of Human Trafficking’, in Millennium, 33/2 (2004), 251–77. For broader

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21.

22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27.

28.

29. 30. 31. 32.

analyses, see also Jef Huysmans, ‘A Foucaultian View on Spill-Over: Freedom and Security in the EU’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 7/3 (2004), 294–318; and Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Rienner, 1998). See Declaration on Combating Terrorism, and Revised Action Plan on Terrorism. See also the European Commission’s Communication to the European Parliament and the Council Concerning Terrorist Recruitment, Brussels, 21 September 2005, Com (2005) 313 Final. Commission Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, com (2005) 313 Final, p. 5. Ibid. Idem. p. 6. See in particular Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40/2 (2002), 235–58. Manners was building on previous work on this topic, most notably François Duchene, ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’, in Richard Mayne (ed.), Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead (London: Fontana, 1972). While Duchene was referring to Europe as a ‘civilian’ rather than normative power, Manners noted that Duchene was also interested in the normative power of the EC as an idée force. Also interesting is Mark Leonard’s view of the EU as a ‘transformative power’ [see his ‘Ascent of Europe’, Prospect, 108 (March 2005), 34– 7]. For another interesting perspective on processes of othering in the EU’s self-definition, see also Bahar Rumelili, ‘Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation’, Review of International Studies, 30/1 (2004), 27–47. See Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe’, p. 241. Ibid. 252. On the connection between the EU’s discourse and its external policies, see also Ole Waever, ‘Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-war Community’, in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). See, for instance, Karen Smith, ‘The EU, Human Rights and Relations with Third Countries’, in Karen Smith and Margot Light (eds.), Ethics and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). See also Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Robert Howse, “‘This is my EUtopia”: Narrative as Power’, in Journal of Common Market Studies, 40/4 (2002), 767–92. Thomas Diez, ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering “Normative Power Europe”’, in Millennium, 33/3 (2005), p. 626. Ibid. 626–7. See the EU’s Hague Programme on Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union. Solana, The Limits of Integration, Presentation to the Europa Forum, Vienna, 19 November 2004.

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Notes 33. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council, COM (2005) 313 Final, p. 9. 34. See Council of the European Union, Press Release 6039/07, 2780th Council Meeting, General Affairs and External Relations, Brussels, Press Office, 12 February 2007, p. 11. 35. In a rich literature, see, for example, Judith Kelley, Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Frank Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 36. Interview with EU official, London, 10 June 2006. 37. On the role of international administrations in rebuilding the war-torn Yugoslav territories, see in particular William Bain, Between Anarchy and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Richard Caplan, ‘International Authority and State Building: the Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Global Governance, 10/1 (2004), 53–65; Alexandra Gheciu, ‘International Norms, Power, and the Politics of International Administration’, Geopolitics, 10/1 (2005), 121– 46. 38. For a recent analysis of the ways in which the ENP builds on democracypromotion policies development in the context of enlargement, see Judith Kelley, ‘New Wines in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44/1 (2006), 26–55. 39. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, ‘Europe’s Neighbours—Towards Closer Integration’, Presentation given to the Brussels Economic Forum, Brussels, 22 April 2005. 40. The texts of these Partnership Agreements can be found on the Commission’s website: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ceeca/pca/index.htm. 41. Relations between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states are governed by the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000. The Cotonou Agreement was meant to introduce ambitious objectives, while preserving the ’acquis’ of 25 years of ACP–EU cooperation. It is based on five interdependent pillars with the underlying objective of the fight against poverty: an enhanced political dimension, increased participation, a more strategic approach to cooperation focusing on poverty reduction, new economic and trade partnerships and improved financial cooperation. The Cotonou Agreement provides for a revision clause which foresees that the Agreement is adapted every five years. In accordance with this clause, negotiations to revise the Agreement were launched in May 2004 and concluded on 23 February 2005. 42. For a brief overview of the revised Agreement, see the Commission’s ‘Information Note on the Revision of the Cotonou Agreement’, at: http://ec.europa. eu/development/ICenter/Pdf/negociation_20050407_en.pdf. For more details regarding the initial and revised Cotonou Agreements, see the European

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43. 44.

45.

46.

47.

48. 49.

50. 51. 52.

53.

54. 55. 56.

Commission’s website, http://ec.europa.eu/development/Geographical/ Cotonou/CotonouDoc_en.cfm. See EU Council, Factsheet, ‘The European Union and the Fight against Terrorism’, p. 6. European Commission, ‘Freedom, Security and Justice: International Dimension’, Brussels, March 2006 (http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/ international). See, for example, Human Rights First, ‘Russian Counter-Terror Law Threatens Chechen Human Rights Group’, 22 September 2004, New York (online at: http://humanrightsfirst.org/defenders/hrd_russia/alert092204_ terror_law.htm). The EU–Russia Summit of May 2007 seems to constitute a partial departure from that stance, as EU officials were far more vocal in their criticism of Russian violations of human rights and the rule of law. However, it remains to be seen if that summit actually marked the beginning of a new type of cohesive, principled EU approach vis-à-vis Russia. See Alexander Warkotsch, ‘The Rhetoric-Reality Gap in the EU’s Democracy Promotion in Central Asia’, in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Forum, 5/1 (2007), 13–16. European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, p. 3. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council in view of the European Council of Thessaloniki, Brussels, 3 June 2003, COM(2003)323. See page 3 of the Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki European Council, 19– 20 June 2003. COM 2001 720, 18 December 2001. Ayse Ceyhan, ‘Policing by Dossier: Identification and Surveillance in an Era of Uncertainty and Fear’, in Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (eds.), Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement Into and Within Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005). On this, see also Huysmans, ‘Minding Exceptions’, and, for a broader analysis of surveillance as ‘social sorting’, see David Lyon, Surveillance after September 11th (London: Polity, 2003), and Lyon (ed.), Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk and Digital Discrimination (New York: Routledge, 2003). See Ceyhan, op. cit., and Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild, ‘Policing at a Distance: Schengen Visa Policies’, in Bigo and Guild (eds.), Controlling Frontiers. See in particular Didier Bigo, Police en réseaux: L’expeerience europeenne (Paris: Presses de Science Po, 1996). See EU Press Release, ‘Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes’, MEMO/07/449, Brussels, 6 November 2007 (http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction. do?reference=MEMO/07/449&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en). For the foreseeable future, the EU PNR would rely on national authorities in each member state to collect the information, rather than a

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57.

58.

59.

60. 61.

62. 63.

64. 65. 66. 67.

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central European agency, but senior Commission officials have expressed hope that in time the function of collecting and analysing the data might be performed by Europol. According to human rights critics, if approved (as it is likely to be), this measure would place everyone under surveillance and make everyone a ‘suspect’ without any effective right to know how the data is used, how it is further processed, and by whom. See, for example, Dutch Liberal MEP Sophie in ’t Veld’s critical statement, cited in the EurActiv report, ‘EU seeks access to private passenger data to combat terrorism’, 7 November 2007 (available online at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/eu-seeks-accessprivate-passenger-data-combat-terrorism/article-168160). European Parliament, ‘Fighting Terrorism Can Never be an Excuse to Violate Human Rights, say MEPs’, Press Release, European Parliament Press Service, Brussels, 3 December 2007. ‘European Airline Body Dismayed at Proposal for EU-PNR System’, Statement issued by the Association of European Airlines, Brussels, 8 November 2007 (available at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/nov/eu-pnr-airlinesreactions.pdf). ‘European Airline Body Dismayed at Proposal for EU-PNR System’. See Franco Frattini, European Commissioner responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security, ‘EU Counter-terrorism Strategy’, Speech given to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 5 September 2007 (on the web at: http:// europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/505&format= HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en). According to Commissioner Frattini, ‘All sources indicate that the threat of new terrorist attacks continues to be high.’ And, although the authorities ‘have been able to prevent a number of attacks’, the very fact that such attacks continue to be planned demonstrates that ‘there is no room for complacency or letting our guard down’. For an interesting analysis, see Jef Huysmans, ‘Minding Exceptions’. On the different border policies enacted by the EU, see also Eiki Berg and Piret Ehin, ‘What Kind of Border Regime is in the Making? Towards a Differentiated and Uneven Border Strategy’, Cooperation and Conflict, 41/1 (2006), 53–71. Berg and Ehin point to the contrast between the EU Regional Policy, with its emphasis on cross-border cooperation, the Schengen Agreement and Justice and Home Affairs, which focus on strict control of external borders, and the ENP and Enlargement, which stress conditional openness and (partial) integration. European Security Strategy, p. 7. Idem. p. 3. Communication from the European Commission, Paving the way for a new Neighbourhood Instrument, COM(2003)393 final, Brussels, 1 July 2003. Hague Programme, 13 December 2004.

Notes 68. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 17–18 June 2004 (available online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/ pressData/en/ec/81035.pdf). 69. EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, p. 3. 70. Among these regulations, some of the most important are Council Regulation no. 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism; Directive 2001/97/EC of 4 December 2001 amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering; Council Decision of 27 December 2001 establishing the list provided for in Article 2(3) of Council Regulation no. 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism; Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the execution in the EU of orders freezing property or evidence; Regulation of 26 October 2005 on controls of cash entering or leaving the Community (Regulation (EC) no. 1889/2005). See European Commission, Commission Activities in the Fight against Terrorism, Brussels, 12 September 2006 (http://www.libertysecurity.org/article1095.html). 71. For a broader analysis of ‘responsibilization’, see in particular David Garland, The Culture of Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 72. European Commission, ‘The EU Fights against the Scourge of Terrorism’, Brussels, March 2006 (http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/fsj_ terrorism_intro_en.htm). 73. EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism—Update, 14 July 2005, p. 4 (emphasis added). 74. Council Declaration on the EU Response to the London Bombings. Regarding the regulation of fund transfers, in September 2005, the Council adopted the third Money Laundering Directive, which extends the existing provisions to terrorist crimes. It provides that suspicious transactions of C15,000 or more must be reported to special national financial intelligence units by the bodies covered by the directive (e.g. financial institutions, accountants, lawyers, estate agents, and casinos). 75. See Erkki Liikanen, European Network Security, Stonesoft EMEA Partner Meeting, Helsinki, 10 October 2003. 76. See Commission Activities in the Fight against Terrorism, 2006. 77. Les Johnston, The Rebirth of Private Policing (London: Routledge, 1992). 78. See the Declaration on Combating Terrorism, adopted by the European Council on 25 March 2004. 79. See in particular Didier Bigo, ‘When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitisations in Europe’, in Morten Kelstrup and Michael Williams (eds.), International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration (London: Routledge, 2000); and Derek Lutterbeck, ‘The Convergence of Internal and External Security in Western Europe’, Security Dialogue, 36/1 (2005), 231–53.

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Notes 80. See the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, p. 10. 81. See Gijs de Vries, ‘The Fight Against Terrorism—Five Years after 9/11’, presentation at the Annual European Foreign Policy Conference, London, 30 June 2006. 82. European Security Strategy, p. 11. 83. Idem. p. 18. For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of the EU’s military capacity, see, for instance, Jolyon Howorth, ‘From Security to Defence: the Evolution of the CFSP’, in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds.), International Relations and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 84. European Security Strategy, pp. 6–7. 85. Among students of the EU, this issue is at the heart of an interesting debate over the question of whether or not military force is compatible with the ‘civilian power’ status of the EU. Many argue that a significant defence capacity would transform the EU from a civilian power ‘by default’ to a civilian power ‘by design’ [see, for example, Larsen, ‘The EU: A Global Military Actor?’, in Cooperation and Conflict, 37 (2002), 283–302]. Stavridis also argues that military means are necessary, as a last resort, to uphold civilian values [see ‘ “Militarising” the EU: The Concept of Civilian Power Europe Revisited’, International Spectator, 41 (2001), 43–50]. Others, however, claim that military integration repudiates a potential civilian power Europe role. According to Karen Smith, for instance, enhancing the EU’s military resources would close off the path of fully embracing civilian power. And ‘this means giving up far too much for far too little’ (Karen Smith, ‘The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?’, The International Spectator, 35 (2000), 28). 86. Conceptual Framework on the European Security and Defence Policy Dimension of the Fight Against Terrorism, December 2005, p. 3. 87. Joint Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the EU, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission and the HR-CFSP, Brussels, 14 September 2001, CP 51, p. 147. 88. Seville European Council, 21–22 June 2002, Presidency Conclusions, Annex V, Draft Declaration of the European Council on the contribution of the CFSP, including ESPD, in the fight against terrorism, CP 57, p. 272 (online at: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/72638.pdf). 89. For a useful analysis, see, for example, Burkhard Schmitt, ‘Europe Capabilities—How Many Divisions?’ in Nicole Gnessotto (ed.), European Security and Defence Policy: the First Five Years (Paris: EUISS, 2004). 90. The battlegroup concept is part of a broader effort to strengthen the EU in the military field. Thus, at the European Council in December 1999, the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) was conceived as a broad ‘force catalogue’ from which to draw appropriate resources for a range of potential EU missions. The HHG committed the EU by 2003 to be able to deploy within 60 days and to sustain

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91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97.

98. 99.

100. 101.

for up to a year a force of up to 60,000 personnel, capable of undertaking the full range of Petersberg Tasks. It was also decided to create a Political and Security Committee (PSC) to provide strategic guidance during crises, together with a Military Committee (EUMC), consisting of national chiefs of defence staff or their representatives, together with a military staff. For a chronology of key developments in this area, see Julian Lindley-French and Kaja Flückiger, A Chronology of European Security and Defence, 1945–2005 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2005). Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting, Implementation of the Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, p. 9. Conceptual Framework on the ESDP Dimension. Assembly of the Western European Union, The Fight Against International Terrorism: Defence Aspects, p. 12. Ibid. Conceptual Framework on the ESDP Dimension of the Fight Against Terrorism, p. 7. Ibid. Thierry Balzacq and Sergio Carrera, ‘The EU’s Fight against International Terrorism: Security Problems, Insecure Solutions’, Centre for European Policy Studies, Policy Brief no. 80, July 2005, p. 2. Idem. p. 3. Gijs de Vries, ‘The Fight Against Terrorism’. See also Gilles de Kerchove, ‘Implementation of the EU Counter-terrorism Strategy’, Brussels, 23 November 2007. Balzacq and Carrera, ‘The EU’s Fight against International Terrorism’. More on this in the following chapter.

Chapter 3 1. See, for example, Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947–1949 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977). On NATO as the institution of the Western security community, see also Thomas RisseKappen, ‘Collective Identity in a Democratic Community’, in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 2. See Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the ‘New Europe’ (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 3. Wörner cited in Michael Williams and Iver Neumann, ‘From Alliance to Security Community’, Millennium, 29/2 (2000), p. 368. 4. See Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door; How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

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Notes 5. See NATO, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (approved by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council), Rome, 8 November 1991. 6. Manfred Wörner, ‘Opening Statement to the NATO Summit Meeting’, London, 5 July 1990. 7. David Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security (Washington: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1998), p. 161. 8. See Frank Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the ‘New Europe’; and Trine Flockhart, ‘ “Masters and Novices”: Socialization and Social Learning through the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’. 9. On this type of othering, see Ole Waever, ‘European Security Identities’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34/1 (1996), 103–32. 10. On the dynamics of the enlargement process, see Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, and James Goldgeier, Not Whether but When: The US Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1999). 11. See in particular The Study on NATO Enlargement (Brussels: NATO Press Office, 1995). 12. See NATO, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Rome, 23–24 April 1999, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm. 13. Interviews with the author, Brussels, London and Oxford, May–July 2006. 14. See Chris Donnelly, Special Adviser to the NATO Secretary General, ‘Security in the 21st Century’, June 2003, online at: http://www.nato.int/ docu/speech/2003/s030605a.htm. 15. NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, speech to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Towards the Prague Summit’, 15 November 2002. 16. Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held in Madrid on 3 June 2003, available online at: http://www.nato.int/ docu/pr/2003/p03-059e.htm. 17. Informal NATO Defence Ministers Meeting, Warsaw, 24–25 September 2002 (http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0209-wrsw.htm). 18. Donnelly, ‘Security in the 21st Century’, p. 7. 19. Zygmunt Bauman, ‘Reconnaissance Wars of the Planetary Frontierland’, Theory, Culture and Society, 19/4 (2002), 81. 20. Former NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, ‘International Security and Law-Enforcement’. 21. See NATO Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism, endorsed by the NATO Heads of State and Government at the Prague Summit, November 2002 (http://www.nato.int/terrorism/index.htm#c). 22. Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Albanian Parliament, Tirana, 6 July 2006 (online at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/ 2006/s060706a.htm).

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Notes 23. ‘Special interview with Chris Donnelly’, NATO HQ, 5 June 2003 (available online at NATO Speeches, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/ s030605b.htm). 24. Comprehensive Political Guidance, endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006 (online at: http://www.nato. int/docu/basictxt/b061129e.htm). 25. ‘Interview with Chris Donnelly’. 26. Interview with the author, 15 June 2005, Brussels. 27. Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’, in H. Reiss (ed.), Kant’s Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) p. 98. I would like to thank Michael Williams for helping me develop this point. 28. Statement by the North Atlantic Council, NATO Press Release PR/CP (2001)122, 11 September 2001. 29. Comprehensive Political Guidance, para 16(g). 30. Interview with the author, 15 June 2005, Brussels. 31. For a detailed analysis, see Gheciu, NATO in the ‘New Europe’. 32. Isabelle, François, ‘Partnership: One of NATO’s Fundamental Security Tasks’, NATO Review (Web edition), 48/1 (2000), p. 1. 33. Robert Weaver, ‘Continuing to Build Security through Partnership’, in NATO Review (Web edition), 52/1 (2004), p. 2. 34. NATO, Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, Prague, 22 November 2002 (http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122e.htm). 35. NATO, ‘Prague Summit Declaration’, Press Release 127, 21 November 2002 (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm §10). 36. More specifically, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 37. NATO, ‘Istanbul Summit Communiqué’, Press Release 096, Istanbul, 28 June 2004 (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm §37). 38. See, for instance, the Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Albanian Parliament, Tirana, 6 July 2006 (online at http://www. nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060706a.htm). 39. Interviews with two NATO officials, London, 15 January 2007. For an analysis of the kinds of non-military as well as military reforms that NATO expects of candidate states, as well as some of the steps the alliance has taken to monitor and guide those reforms, see also the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report, The Three Adriatic Aspirants: Capabilities and Preparations, prepared by the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities, Brussels, 2007 (report 165 DSCFC 07 E rev 1). A summary of that report is available at: http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1167. 40. See, for instance, the Romanian example: Steven Woehiel et al., NATO Applicant States: A Status Report, Congressional Research Services Report for Congress. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2003.

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Notes 41. Communications to the author, May–June 2007, London and Oxford. For an examination of the reforms carried out by Albania, Croatia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and some of the problems encountered in those reform processes (e.g. in promoting democratic control over the military, judiciary independence, and democratic elections), see the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report, The Three Adriatic Aspirants: Capabilities and Preparations. 42. Statement by NATO Secretary General on the situation in Belarus, NATO Update, 19 July 2006. 43. Apparently, there was a deep disagreement between the State Department and defence officials over how to handle that crisis, with the State Department supporting the call for an international probe. But, in the end, the Defense Department won. For more details, see Jeffrey Smith and Glenn Kessler, ‘US Opposed Calls at NATO for Probe of Uzbek Killings’, Washington Post, 14 June 2005, A15. In the event, in 2005, the Uzbek government asked the USA to close its military bases there—and promptly turned to Russia for its security needs. 44. Interviews with three NATO officials, London and Brussels, summer 2006. 45. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer speech to the Albanian Parliament, 6 July 2006. 46. Chris Donnelly, ‘Security in the 21st Century: New Challenges and New Responses’, p. 4. 47. Donnelly, p. 10. 48. Lord Robertson, ‘Transforming NATO’, in NATO Review (web edition) (Spring 2003), p. 3. 49. NATO, ‘Statement by the North Atlantic Council (in Response to the 9/11 Attacks on the US’, Press Release PR/CP(2001)122, Brussels, 11 September 2001. 50. Ibid. 51. Opening Statement by Lord Robertson at the NATO Defence Ministers Meeting, Warsaw, 24–25 September 2002 (http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/ 0209/doc11htm). 52. Ibid. 53. For an excellent analysis, see Vivienne Jabri, ‘War, Security and the Liberal State’, Security Dialogue, 37/1 (March 2006), 47–64. 54. See, for instance, NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s policy recommendations and statements, including the Declaration of the Fight Against Terrorism issued after 9/11, and Resolution 319 on Terrorism Financing, 2002 (available on the web at http://www.nato-pa.int). 55. Didier Bigo, ‘When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitisations in Europe’, in Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (eds.), International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 171. 56. Interview with NATO official, 23 Nov. 2006, London. 57. Interviews with NATO officials, fall–winter 2006–07, Brussels, London and Oxford.

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Notes 58. See ‘NATO Policy on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings’, NATO Policy Document, 29 June 2004 (http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06istanbul/docu-traffic.htm) accessed on 17 August 2004). 59. See NATO, ‘Operation Active Endeavour’, 15 June 2007 (available on the web at: http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Operations/ActiveEndeavour/ Endeavour.htm). 60. Chris Donnelly, ‘Security in the 21st Century: New Challenges and New Responses’, June 2003, online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/ 2003/s030605a.htm. 61. Ibid. 62. See, for example, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 319 on Terrorism Financing, 2002 (http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?shortcut=282). 63. NATO Parliamentary Assembly Mission Report, ‘Financial Aspects of the Fight Against Terrorism’, EAPC/PFP Conference, 14–15 October 2004. 64. Ibid. 65. Lord Robertson, ‘Transforming NATO’, p. 2. 66. See International Crisis Group Europe Report no. 174, An Army for Kosovo?, 28 July 2006; and ICG Report, Collapse in Kosovo, 22 April 2004 (available on the web at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm). See also Artan Mustafa and Jeta Xharra, ‘Kosovo Officers Under Investigation’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report, London, 11 December 2003. 67. After the end of the NATO/Yugoslavia war in June 1999, the former Kosovo Liberation Army was transformed into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a civilian agency charged with providing emergency response and reconstruction services. The KPC’s mission is to protect the Kosovo population against natural or man-made disasters and to assist in the rebuilding of the province. 68. See Christopher Bennett, ‘Aiding America’, NATO Review, 49/4, winter (2001), available online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0104-01.htm. 69. See, for example, North Atlantic Council, ‘Final Communiqué’, Ministerial Meeting Held in Madrid on 3 June 2003. 70. See NATO’s Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism. 71. See Christopher Bennett, ‘Combating Terrorism’, in NATO Review, Spring 2003, at: http://www.nato.int.docu/review/2003/issue1/english/art2_pr.html. 72. See ‘Prague Summit Declaration’. See also Christopher Bennett, ‘Combating Terrorism’. (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020517a.htm). 73. Lord Robertson, ‘Defence and Security in an Uncertain World’, 17 May 2002, p. 2 (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020517a.htm). 74. Keynote speech by Lord Robertson, ‘Defence and Security in an Uncertain World’, 17 May 2002 (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020517a.htm). 75. Ibid. italics added. 76. Lord Robertson, ‘Meeting Today’s Security Challenges’. 77. Lord Robertson, ‘Meeting Today’s Security Challenges’.

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Notes 78. Lord Robertson, ‘Defence and Security in an Uncertain World’, http://www. nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020517a.htm. 79. Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Albanian Parliament, 6 July 2006. 80. For an analysis of the ways in which, on the basis of shared norms, NATO has facilitated the resolution of tensions/disagreements and has promoted cooperation among the allies since its creation see Gheciu, NATO in the ‘New Europe’, and Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies. 81. Chris Donnelly, ‘Security in the 21st Century’. 82. NATO Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism. 83. Interview with senior NATO official, 15 May 2006. See also Monthly briefing by NATO Secretary General, July 2006 (http://www.nato.int/docu/ speech/2006/s060624a.htm). 84. NATO Update, New Chapter for NATO in Afghanistan, 4 May 2006 (online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/05-may/e0504a.htm). 85. Ibid. 86. See, for instance, the Statement by the NATO Defence Ministers, Seville, 8–9 February 2007 (http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2007/02-february/e0208a. html). 87. Interview with senior NATO officer, 23 November 2006, London. 88. Interviews with NATO military officers, 2006–2007, Brussels, London, Oxford. 89. Ambassador Daan Everts, ‘NATO’s Afghanistan Priorities’, 2 November 2006, NATO Speeches collection, online at http://www.otan.nato.int/docu/ speech/2006/s061102b.htm. 90. Communications with ten NATO officers, 2006–07. The link between the ISAF’s activities and the radicalization of sections of the Afghan population, including the apparent forging of links between the Taliban and Al Qaeda, was also noted by former governmental officials from Afghanistan, as well as representatives of Afghan civil society groups who participated in the conference entitled Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, Ottawa, 10–11 December 2007. 91. Recall Lord Robertson’s words in ‘International Security and LawEnforcement’, as well as the NATO Concept for Defence against Terrorism. 92. Interviews with three NATO officers, November–December 2006. 93. Ibid. See also Paul Gallis, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, Report for the US Congress, RL33627 (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2007), available online at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/ crs/row/RL33627.pdf. 94. See Paul Gallis, NATO in Afghanistan. 95. In a presentation given at Oxford University in November 2006, a senior NATO official talked about the concerns expressed by several NATO allies visà-vis what they perceive as Washington’s attempt to turn the alliance into a global policeman, acting narrowly in pursuit of a hegemonic agenda—at

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Notes the expense of the shared liberal-democratic principles and values that NATO claims to embody. 96. Interviews with NATO officials, 2006–07, Brussels, London, Oxford.

Chapter 4 1. See in particular Emanuel Adler, ‘Seeds of Peaceful Change: the OSCE’s Security Community-Building Model’, in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities. 2. Ibid. 3. See Daniel Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). See also Victor-Yves Ghebali, La Diplomatie de la Détente: La CSCE, d’Helsinki à Vienne (1973–89) (Brussels: Bruylant, 1989). 4. See Alexandra Gheciu, Chapter 2 in NATO in the ‘New Europe’; and P. Terrence Hopmann, ‘Managing Conflict in Post–Cold War Eurasia: the Role of the OSCE in Europe’s Security Architecture’, International Politics, 40 (2003), 75–100. 5. Charter of Paris for a New Europe, signed at a Meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Paris, 19–21 November 1990, p. 3 (available online at http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1990/11/4045_en.pdf). 6. OSCE missions and field activities are the front line of the OSCE’s work, as they are designed to give the Organization an active presence in countries that require assistance and are the vehicle through which political decisions are translated into action. The mandates, composition, size, duration, and operation of missions and other field activities are varied. However, for all missions, human dimension issues, democracy, and building the rule of law are meant to be central tasks. Field missions are expected to cooperate with the host country authorities, international organizations and non-governmental organizations in their areas of work. Currently, the OSCE has nineteen missions or other field activities in seventeen countries in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. 7. On this, see, for example, Victor-Yves Ghebali, The OSCE Between Crisis and Reform: Towards a New Lease on Life, Policy Paper no. 10, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva, 2005. 8. Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, ‘Constructing a Mediterranean Region: A Cultural Approach’, Paper presented at the Conference on The Convergence of Civilisations?, Arrabida Monastery, Fundacao Oriente, Lisboa, Portugal, 6–9 June 2002, p. 12. 9. Adler, ‘Seeds of Peaceful Change’. 10. Ibid. p. 121. 11. Ibid. p. 133.

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Notes 12. It is interesting to note that as far back as the 1970s the CSCE’s agenda included a concern with terrorism—though in that context the concern was to avoid support for terrorism that might overthrow the regime of one of the participating CSCE states. During the Cold War, the issue of terrorism was inscribed in the Helsinki Decalogue of 1975, in the context of the commitment by the participating states to refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, or other activities directed against the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating state (principle VI, para 4, Helsinki Decalogue). The concern with terrorism was also enshrined in the concluding Documents of the second and third Follow-up Meetings in Madrid, 1983 (where the parties condemned terrorism, including terrorism in international relations, seen as a threat to basic human rights and freedoms), and in Vienna, 1989. In the early years of the post–Cold War period, terrorism was included in para 6 of the Code of Conduct on PoliticoMilitary Aspects of Security of 1994, and in para 4 of the Istanbul Charter for European Security of 1999. In practice, however, not much emphasis was placed on measures designed to combat terrorism until the 9/11 attacks. 13. Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, MC(9) DEC/1, Bucharest, 4 December 2001, para 1 (available on the web at: http://www.osce.org/ documents/cio/2001/12/670_en.pdf). 14. Ibid. paras 2–3. 15. OSCE, OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism, MC (10)JOUR/ 2, 7 December 2002, Porto (available on the web at: http://www.osce. org/documents/odihr/2002/12/1488_en.pdf). 16. Ibid. para 9. 17. On this, see also Maria Raquel Freire, ‘The OSCE’s Post-September 11 Agenda, and Central Asia’, Global Society, 19/2 (April 2005), 189–209. 18. See OSCE, Action against Terrorism Unit, Field References for OSCE AntiTerrorism Efforts, Vienna, 23 February 2007 (SEC.GAL/35/07), p. 9 (available on the web at: http://www.osce.org/publications/atu/2006/01/18124_ 530_en.pdf). 19. OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Resolution on Terrorism by Suicide Bombers’, Washington Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Washington, DC, 1–5 July 2005, p. 17. 20. The Charter of Paris called for the creation of an assembly involving members of parliaments from all CSCE participating states, and the first formal session of the Parliamentary Assembly was held in Budapest in July 1992. Parliaments of all OSCE states are entitled to be represented in the Parliamentary Assembly according to the size of the population of the country. The Assembly’s primary task is to facilitate inter-parliamentary dialogue, in the name of enhancing democracy in the OSCE area. 21. ‘Resolution on Terrorism by Suicide Bombers’, Washington Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

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Notes 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. On the emphasis on the need to respect human rights in the fight against terrorism, see also the Field References for OSCE Anti-Terrorism Efforts. 24. OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism, para 5. 25. Ibid. para 3. 26. Idem. para 20. 27. OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism, para 17. 28. Field References for OSCE Anti-Terrorism Efforts, p. 17. 29. The Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, especially para 2. 30. Field References for OSCE Anti-Terrorism Efforts, p. 17. 31. Bucharest Plan of Action, para 9. On this, see also the Washington Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, para 20. 32. On this, see also P. Terrence Hopmann, ‘The OSCE Response to 9/11’, in Heinz Gärtner and Ian M. Cuthbertson (eds.), European Security and Transatlantic Relations after 9/11 and the Iraq War (London: Palgrave, 2005); and Maria Raquel Freire, ‘The OSCE’s Post-September 11 Agenda and Central Asia’. 33. Bucharest Plan of Action, para 14. 34. ‘OSCE: Foreign Ministers Adopt Broad-Ranging Action Plan to Combat Terrorism’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 5 December 2001. 35. P. Terrence Hopmann, ‘The OSCE Response to 9/11’, p. 206. 36. Ibid. 37. In fact, the OSCE’s largest field operation remains the one in Kosovo. For a survey of the OSCE field operations, see the OSCE Secretary General’s Annual Report on OSCE Activities in 2006 (Vienna: Press and Public Information Section, Office of the Secretary General, 2007). 38. See Terrence Hopmann, ‘The OSCE Response to 9/11’. 39. See Maria Raquel Freire, ‘The OSCE’s Post-September 11 Agenda’. 40. Hopmann, p. 210. 41. On this, see also W. Hoynck, ‘The OSCE in Central Asia—On the Right Track?’, Helsinki Monitor, XIV (2003), 303–5. 42. For details, see the OSCE’s Annual Report, 2006. 43. For more details regarding such activities, see the OSCE’s Field References for OSCE Anti-Terrorism Efforts. 44. The latest OSCE conferences on public–private partnerships in countering terrorism were organized in March, and 30 May to 1 June 2007 (see the OSCE’s Field References for OSCE Anti-Terrorism Efforts, p. 13). See also, Action Against Terrorism Unit, Report on OSCE Political Public– Private Partnership Conference: ‘Partnership of State Authorities, Civil Society and the Business Community in Combating Terrorism’, Vienna, 1 June 2007, CIO.GAL/81/07/Corr.1 (http://www.osce.org/documents/html/ pdftohtml/26118_en.pdf.html).

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Notes 45. Author’s interviews with participants in the March and June conferences (two governmental officials and three representatives of civil society groups), Vienna, 2 June 2007. 46. Action Against Terrorism Unit, ‘Public–private Partnerships’, on the web: http://www.osce.org/atu/25898.html. 47. Ibid. 48. OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Remarks at the Conference on Public–Private Partnerships in Combating Terrorism, Vienna, 31 May to 1 June 2007 (http://www.osce.org/atu/25898.html), emphasis added. 49. OSCE’s Field References for OSCE Anti-Terrorism Efforts, pp. 17–19. 50. Ibid. 51. The OSCE’s Bucharest Ministerial Council Decision on Police-related Activities affirmed that effective policing is essential to uphold the rule of law and to defend democratic institutions. It also stressed the importance of cooperation by participating states in police-related matters in order to combat international terrorism. See OSCE Ministerial Council, ‘Decision on Police-Related Activities’, MC (9)DEC/9, in Bucharest Ministerial Declaration: Decision on Combating Terrorism and the Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, Bucharest, 3–4 December 2001 (on the web at: http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/2001/12/4173_en.pdf). 52. Field References for OSCE Anti-Terrorism Efforts, p. 20. 53. Ibid. pp. 20–1. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. Susie Alegre, ‘Upholding Human Rights in the Fight Against Terrorism’, statement issued on 29 November 2005 in Vienna (available online at: http://www.osce.org/item/17108.html). 57. Author’s communication with two officials who were involved in several training sessions organized by ODIHR in an effort to protect human rights in the context of the fight against terrorism, London, 15 June 2007. 58. Susie Alegre, ‘Upholding Human Rights in the Fight Against Terrorism’. 59. OSCE, Action Against Terrorism Unit, Field References for OSCE AntiTerrorism Efforts, 2004, p. 22. 60. The SALW Document is a very broad agreement that commits all participating states to a range of norms, principles, and measures which, if fully implemented, could help prevent the diversion of arms into the illegal market. The Document addresses issues such as: controls over production and racing of small arms; procedures and documentation for export and import; cooperation in law enforcement; and standards for the security of weapons storage. 61. OSCE, Field References for OSCE Anti-Terrorism Efforts, p. 24.

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Notes 62. OSCE, Ministerial Council, Border Security and Management Concept, Ministerial Council Meeting, Ljubljana, 6 December 2005 (available at: http://194.8.63.155/documents/mcs/2005/12/17436_en.pdf). 63. On this, see also Terrence Hopmann, ‘The OSCE Response to 9/11’, p. 208. 64. OSCE, Field References for OSCE Anti-Terrorism Efforts, p. 23. 65. On the OSCE’s insistence on a rights-based approach in this area see the Field References for OSCE Anti-Terrorism Efforts, pp. 23–4. 66. OSCE Secretariat, Action Against Terrorism Unit, Passport and Travel Document Security (http://www.osce.org/atu/13060.html) [11 May 2007]. 67. OSCE, Field References for OSCE Anti-Terrorism Efforts, p. 19. 68. Ibid. p. 20. 69. OSCE Secretariat, Action Against Terrorism Unit, Legal Cooperation in Criminal Matters, http://www.osce.org/atu/17701.html [17 May 2007]. 70. For instance, one such workshop was organized in Belgrade in December 2005 and one in Yerevan (Armenia) in June 2006. 71. Emanuel Adler, ‘Seeds of Peaceful Change’, and Daniel Thomas, The Helsinki Effect. 72. As Victor-Yves Ghebali has noted, the OSCE has been fairly successful in several cases of conflict prevention. The major OSCE preventive interventions, aimed at preventing a worst-case scenario of internal destabilization, possible civil war, and potential external intervention, have occurred in the Baltics (Estonia and Latvia), Macedonia, and Ukraine. The OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities also intervened to defuse tensions involving Russian minorities in the Baltics, Albanians in Macedonia, and Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia. The OSCE has also played important post-conflict reconstruction roles in the Balkans, especially within the framework of international administrations in Bosnia and Kosovo. However, the OSCE has been largely unsuccessful in conflict resolution attempts, failing to play a significant role in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia (Georgia), Chechnya or Transdniestria (Moldova). For a detailed analysis of the OSCE’s role in all those areas, see Victor-Yves Ghebali, The OSCE Between Crisis and Reform. 73. Ibid. 74. Adler, ‘Seeds of Peaceful Change’, p. 121. 75. See Wolfgang Zellner, in consultation with Alyson Bailes, Victor-Yves Ghebali, Terrence Hopmann, and Andrei Zagorski, Managing Change in Europe: Evaluating the OSCE and its Future Role, Working Paper no. 13, Centre for OSCE Research, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, 2005. As explained in the August 2007 ATU Report The Status in the OSCE Area of Universal Anti-Terrorism Conventions, today 95 per cent of participating states are party to all twelve universal anti-terrorism legal instruments, up from 65 per cent of the participating states that were party to all those legal instruments in 2001. In its efforts to promote support for the universal anti-terrorism conventions

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Notes

76. 77.

78. 79. 80.

81.

82.

83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88.

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among OSCE participating states, the ATU has conducted a broad range of (largely pedagogical) activities, ranging from monitoring the existing legislation to identify potential problems, to technical assistance in the process of drafting new legislation and ratification of universal conventions on anti-terrorism. See the ATU, Status in the OSCE Area of Universal Antiterrorism Conventions and Protocols as Well as Other International and Regional Legal Instruments Related to Terrorism or Cooperation in Criminal Matters, Vienna, 27 August 2007, SEC.GAL/43/07/Rev.2, available online at: http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/17123_en.pdf.html. See Warkotsch, ‘International Socialization in Difficult Environments’. See, for example, Jean-Christophe Peuch, ‘Russia: Moscow Plays Its Cards Well At OSCE Madrid Meeting’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 3 December 2007 (on the web at: http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article. aspx?m=12&y=2007&id=3CFAFFD0-6A65-48B9-A787-3360B74877E6). Ibid. p. 213. Ibid. p. 498. On this, see Aaron Rhodes and Paula Tscherne-Lempiäinen, ‘Human Rights and Terrorism in the Central Asian OSCE States’, Helsinki Monitor, 13/1 (2002), 36–51. See Alexander Warkotsch, ‘International Socialization in Difficult Environments: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Central Asia’, Democratization, 14/3 (June 2007), 491–508. As Warkotsch notes, it is important to keep in mind that there are significant differences between those countries. While Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan form a semi-authoritarian tier, the countries of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan form a southwestern tier of authoritarianism. Nevertheless, the deterioration in democratic and human rights standards is, apparently, common among those countries. See Warkotsch, ibid. See Hopmann, ‘The OSCE Response to 9/11’, p. 208. See Victor-Yves Ghebali, The OSCE Between Crisis and Reform. Ibid. Ibid. See Victor-Yves Ghebali, ‘The 2005 Ljubljana Ministerial Council Meeting’, in the Helsinki Monitor, 17/1 (2006), 4–18. The original Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was negotiated and concluded during the last years of the Cold War, and entered into force on 17 July 1992. The Treaty established comprehensive limits on key categories of conventional military equipment in Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals), and mandated the destruction of excess weaponry. The Treaty proposed equal limits for the two ‘groups of states-parties’, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty is a post–Cold War adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed on 19 November 1999 during the OSCE’s

Notes

89. 90. 91.

92.

1999 Istanbul Summit. The main difference with the earlier treaty is that the troop ceilings on a bloc-to-bloc basis (NATO vs. the Warsaw Pact) would be replaced with a system of national and territorial ceilings. Furthermore, the Adapted Treaty would provide for more inspections and new mechanisms designed to reinforce states parties’ ability to grant or withhold consent for the stationing of foreign forces on their territory. The Adapted Treaty will enter into force when all thirty states parties have ratified the agreement. The process of ratification, however, has been suspended due to the fact that NATO member states linked their ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty with the fulfilment by Russia of the political commitments it undertook at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit to withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova. Russia has heavily criticized this linkage, which it considers artificial, and has on several occasions questioned the relevance of the Adapted CFE Treaty, given its continued non-ratification by NATO states. President Putin threatened a moratorium on the treaty in his 26 April 2007 address, and then raised most of its demands for rewriting the treaty during the Extraordinary Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, held in Vienna on 11–15 June at Russia’s initiative. As his demands were not met during that conference, Putin issued a decree intended to suspend the observance of its treaty obligations on 14 July 2007, effective 150 days later, stating that it was the result of ‘extraordinary circumstances (. . . ) which affect the security of the Russian Federation and require immediate measures’, and notified NATO and its members. The suspension applies to the original CFE treaty, as well as to the follow-up agreements. Porto Ministerial Council Statements, cited by Ghebali, ‘The 2005 Ljubljana Ministerial Council Meeting’, p. 18. Ibid. The participants in the ‘5+2’ negotiations include the three mediators (the OSCE, Ukraine, and Russia), the two parties to the conflict, and the EU and the USA as observers. For a discussion of OSCE efforts—and their limits—in Moldova and Georgia, see the OSCE, OSCE Annual Report, 2006, Vienna, 23 April 2007, pp. 9–12 (available on the web at: http://www.osce.org/item/24112.html).

Chapter 5 1. This commitment to cooperation can be seen as a reaffirmation (and adaptation) of the belief expressed in the early days of the post–Cold War period that the best way to address security challenges was to create a Euro-Atlantic security architecture in which various institutions could play complementary roles. That approach to security was inscribed in several documents in the 1990s. For instance, in ‘The New Transatlantic Agenda’, it is stated that

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2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

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‘We are committed to the construction of a new security architecture in which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, the Western European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe have complementary and mutually reinforcing roles to play’ (The European Union and the United States of America, ‘The New Transatlantic Agenda’, also cited by Julian Lindley-French, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: The Enduring Alliance (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 77. For one of the most influential statements of the inside/outside division, and its role in the theory and politics of international relations, see R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). In particular, during debates surrounding the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Community, the British government under the leadership of John Major insisted on maintaining a distinction between security and defence, and excluded the latter from the European Community’s agenda. In so doing, it was seeking to avoid being faced with what it perceived as the unacceptable choice between inclusion in a new European Defence Community that would undermine foreign policymaking autonomy or exclusion and isolation in Europe. On NATO and the ESDI debate, see, for instance, Michael Fortman and David G. Haglund, ‘Europe, NATO and the ESDI debate: In Quest for Identity’, in David G. Haglund (ed.), From Euphoria to Hysteria: Western European Security after the Cold War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). See the Western European Union Council of Ministers, ‘WEU Contribution to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference of 1996’, Madrid, 14 November 1995, Brussels: Press and Information Service, 1995. See NATO’s Copenhagen Declaration, 1991. See Para 1 of the Declaration. This process of developing a European security identity while protecting the transatlantic link was taken further at the Brussels Summit of 1994, and the Berlin Summit of June 1996. NATO’s Strategic Concept, adopted at the Washington Summit in 1999, quoted by Christopher Bennett in ‘Combating Terrorism’, NATO Review, Spring 2003, p. 1. Ibid. pp. 1–2. ‘NATO–EU cooperation taken to a new level’, NATO Update, 17 March 2003, http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/03-march/eo317a.htm. Chris Donnelly, ‘Security in the 21st Century’, p. 6. This view was reiterated by two senior NATO officials in interviews with the author, January 2007. Lord Robertson, ‘Defence and Security in an Uncertain World’, 17 May 2002, p. 2. See EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR-Althea), ATH/03 (update 3), 29 November 2004, p. 2.

Notes 13. The UN Security Council’s peacekeeping mandate for Bosnia was renewed in UNSC Resolution 1551 of 9 July 2004. This is a robust mandate, allowing for the use of ‘all necessary measures’, as insisted upon by the EU. UNSC Resolution 1575 of 22 November 2004 further elaborated this mandate and stated that the EU would have ‘the main stabilization role under the military aspects’ of the Dayton Agreement, as specified in the Annexes of Dayton. Para 10 of the Resolution refers to an exchange of letters delineating the tasks between the EU and NATO in Bosnia after 2 December; those letters were sent to the Security Council on 19 November (EU–NATO exchange of letters of 17 and 18 November 2004 on delineation of tasks, UN Doc.S/2004/915 and S/2004/916, 19 November 2004). Also Operation Althea-Military Advice on Delineation of Tasks, Council Doc.14770/04, 16 November 2004 (classified). 14. Communication with senior NATO official, 17 Nov. 2006, Oxford. 15. Interviews with three senior NATO officers, January–March 2006. 16. European Council Doc.6574/04, 20 February 2004, p. 5, para 9. 17. Communication with Commission official, 30 Nov. 2007, Ottawa. 18. It is worth noting that the relationship between the EU and NATO has long been a topic of debate, and sometimes disagreement, within the Union. France, for instance, has traditionally argued that the EU should do more in the area of defence in order to avoid excessive dependence on NATO. The St. Malo Declaration of 1997 marked a significant moment in European developments in the area of security, as the UK and France agreed that the EU needed to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO’s European pillar, or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework). However, particularly in the context of US concerns, also echoed in some of the European capitals, to avoid problems of duplication of efforts or diminution of NATO, the solution eventually arrived at (in 2004) was to establish a civilian/military cell within the EU Military Staff at the Supreme HQ Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), together with formal liaison arrangements between NATO and the EU Military Staff, including an operations centre. EU leaders agreed, in June 2004 at the EU’s Brussels European Council, that the operations centre would not be a standing HQ, that the main option for autonomous military operations remains national HQs. (See European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, European Defence: NATO/EU Consultations, Planning and Operations, 17 and 18 June 2004, http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/81742.pdf.) For a more detailed account of the key moments in EU–NATO relations, see Julian Lindley-French, A Chronology of European Security and Defence. 19. On this, see Lindley-French, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, p. 117. 20. Council, EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFORAlthea), ATH/03 (update 3), 29 November 2004, p. 2. See also Martin Reichard, The EU–NATO Relationship, p. 258.

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Notes 21. Senior EU official, communication with the author on 27 November 2007, Ottawa. Similar views about the potential role of the ESDP in crisismanagement were expressed by several other EU officials, both from the Commission and the Council, in interviews conducted by the author in London and Brussels between January and March 2007. 22. Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Brussels, 3 December 2007 (available on the web at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00014.en07.pdf), Article 28A (c), para 7. 23. In the area of defence, decisions will continue to be made on the basis of consensus in the Council. See Art. 27(2) and Art. 27(7) in the new treaty. 24. Again, this is the source of debate among EU experts, in a situation in which civilian has always been interpreted by some analysts and practitioners as meaning good or principled. Many academics and politicians continue to argue that the Union should retain its civilian power status, but disagree over the question of whether or not that is possible in a situation in which the Union is seeking to strengthen its military muscle. While some analysts argue that the acquisition of military tools (e.g. battlegroups) does not constitute a departure from the EU’s norms and the principle of civilian power, but, rather, a reassertion of the commitment to protect those norms (i.e. multiple means might be needed to protect civilian ends), others suggest that, by adopting military means, the EU is undermining its status as a unique, principled civilian power on the international stage. For an account of this debate see, for instance, Jan Orbie, ‘Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debates’, in Cooperation and Conflict, 41/1 (2006), 123–8. See also Karen Smith, ‘The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?’, The International Spectator, 35 (2000), 11–28. 25. See Andrew Moravcsik, ‘How Europe Can Win Without an Army’, in Financial Times, 3 April 2003; Karen Smith, ‘Still Civilian Power EU?’, working paper, 2004, available at http://www.area.uio.no/cidel/WorkshopOsloSecurity/ Smith.pdf. 26. See, most recently, the Treaty of Lisbon, Art. 10. 27. See Wolfgang Zellner, Managing Change in Europe, p. 14. 28. On the growing role of the EU in Bosnia, see also David Chandler, ‘Bosnia: From Dayton to Europe’, International Peacekeeping, 12/3 (2005), 322–35. 29. See Maria Raquel Freire, ‘The OSCE’s Post-September 11 Agenda’, p. 200. 30. In the words of a Senior European Commission official, ‘the OSCE simply doesn’t have the resources to be as active as we are in promoting security’. Communication to the author, 27 Nov. 2007, Ottawa. 31. See Zellner, Managing Change in Europe, p. 14. 32. Statement by Yevgeny P. Gusarov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, 5 October

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33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40.

41. 42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

2001, quoted in Pal Dunay, The OSCE in Crisis, Chaillot Paper no. 88, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, April 2006, p. 70. Lavrov cited by Dunay, OSCE in Crisis, p. 70. For a more detailed account of the evolution of the Russian position vis-à-vis the OSCE, see Dunay, ibid. Freire, ‘The OSCE’s Post-September 11 Agenda’, p. 201. On this, see Adler, ‘Seeds of Peaceful Change’. Interview with senior NATO officials involved in planning the alliance’s role in post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, Brussels, 10–11 May 2000. Ibid. See OSCE, Ministerial Council Press Release, ‘OSCE Ministers Agree Chairmanship Bids, Greater Engagement in Afghanistan’, Madrid, 30 November 2007 (available on the web at: http://www.osce.org/item/28621.html). It is revealing that, since 2001, Russian representatives have consistently argued that the OSCE’s anti-terrorism efforts should be the organization’s top priority. On this, see Zellner, Managing Change in Europe, p. 12. COM (2004), 373 final, p. 8. It is noteworthy that the evaluation of the ENP is mostly carried out by the EU. Monitoring will take place within the bodies set up under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements or Association Agreements. Partner countries will be asked to provide detailed information as a basis for this joint monitoring exercise. The Commission will draw up periodic reports on progress; these reports can serve as a basis for the Council to decide the next step in contractual relations with each partner country. See, for instance, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: Helping Ourselves Through Helping Our Neighbours’, Presentation at the Conference of Foreign Affairs Committee Chairmen of EU Member and Candidate States, London, 31 October 2005 (available on the web at: http://www.europaworld.org/week244/speechferrero41105.htm). On fuzzy borders, see also Thomas Christiansen, Fabio Petito, and Ben Tonra, ‘Fuzzy Politics around Fuzzy Borders: the European Union’s “Near Abroad” ’, in Cooperation and Conflict, 35/4 (2000), 389–415. See also Thomas Christiansen, ‘Constitutionalizing the European Union: Constructing EU Borders’, in Christopher Browning, Remaking Europe in the Margins (London: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 69–84. In private conversations, some senior EU officials have actually started to express reservations about the ENP precisely for this reason (author’s communication with two senior EU officials, one from the Commission and one from the Council, Ottawa, 27 November 2007). See Iver Neumann, Uses of the Other: The ‘East’ in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

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Notes 47. Alani cited in Emanuel Adler, ‘The Spread of Security Communities’, unpublished paper, p. 31. 48. See, for instance, Kathleen Moore, ‘War on Terror: European States “Colluded” with CIA Abductions’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7 June 2006; ‘Global Jurist, EU Probe of CIA Prisons May Ask Cheney, Rumsfeld to Testify’, 26 January 2006. 49. ‘Rice Allays CIA Prison Row Fears’, posted on the BBC News website (http://news.bbc.co.uk), 8 December 2005. 50. Fred Attewill, ‘Report Claims US Ran Secret Prisons in Europe’, in The Guardian, 8 June 2007. 51. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, ‘Council of Europe: Secret CIA Prisons Confirmed’, 8 June 2007 (available at: http://hrw.org/english/ docs/2007/01/08/usint16108.htm). 52. Ibid. 53. In private, a couple of NATO officers have suggested that, although they did not condone rendition practices, they nevertheless believed that sometimes tough decisions were needed in the fight against actors like Al Qaeda and their supporters, and that it was important for the allies to have a forum where they could get together to discuss such matters in confidence and seek to build some consensus in this area. Author’s communications with senior NATO officers, January–June 2007. 54. For details, see the information posted by the European Parliament on its site: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news. 55. ‘MEPs welcome the decision to set up a temporary committee on alleged CIA flights and detention camps in Europe’, 15 December 2005 (posted on the European Parliament’s site, see above). 56. ‘Brussels Wants Investigations into CIA Prisons’, posted on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7 September 2006 (http://www.rferl.org). 57. ‘EU Countries Ignored CIA Terror Suspect Flights, Report Says’, in The Guardian, 14 February 2007. 58. Fred Attewill, ‘Report Claims US Ran Secret Prisons in Europe’, The Guardian, 8 June 2007. 59. Ibid. It should be noted, however, that at present European politicians from the states accused of collusion with the USA still reject the findings of the investigation—as does the CIA. 60. Human Rights Watch, ‘Council of Europe: Secret CIA Prisons Confirmed’. 61. The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe is a centrist political group in the European Parliament, which brings together 106 MEPs from 22 countries, representing Liberal and Democratic parties across the EU. 62. Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, Press Release, ‘Shameful Silence of Member States on CIA Detentions’, Strasbourg, 26 September 2007. 63. See, for instance, the reports issued by Human Rights Watch since 9/11, documenting the expansion of powers of surveillance of ‘risky’ individuals

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Notes and groups in ways that violate basic human rights and freedoms, the implementation of policies of extradition that do not conform with established judicial procedures and undermine human rights, etc. Among the numerous reports published by Human Rights Watch in recent years, note in particular ‘France: Terror Expulsions Policy Lacks Basic Safeguards and Undermines Human Rights’, 5 June 2007; ‘Banning CIA Flights Won’t End European Complicity in Torture’, 18 January 2007; ‘Sweden: UN Confirms Sweden Violates Torture Ban’, 1 June 2005, all available on the Human Rights Watch website: http://www.hrw.org. See also Shami Chakrabarti (director of the civil liberties organization Liberty) and Gareth Crossman, ‘The First Victim of War . . . Compromising Civil Liberties’, in Britain and Security, 2007 (available on the website of Liberty: http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk). 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. On this, see Amnesty International, ‘AI Urges States to Ratify Convention Against Enforced Disappearance’, The Wire, March 2007 (available on the web at http://web.amnesty.org/wire/March2007/disappearances).

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Index

NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization OSCE = Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Abu Ghraib 112 Adler, Emanuel 10, 25, 116, 121–2, 145–6 Afghanistan civilians, role of 109–10, 112–13 detainees, treatment of 110, 112–13 European Union 54, 66, 77 modernity 109–10 national caveats to rules of engagement 112–13 NATO 107–14, 173–4 OSCE 173–4 post-conflict reconstruction 108, 174 Provincial Reconstruction Teams 108 Taliban 108–11 Ahern, Bertie 44 air transport airport security 140 European Union 62–3 Passenger Name Record (PNR) 62–3 OSCE 140 Al Qaeda civilization, as threat to 34–5 European Union 39–40, 42–3, 48, 71, 77 liberal-democratic norms 30 NATO 102, 108–9 OSCE 125, 126 Alegre, Susie 137 alienation 48–9, 51, 133 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 187–8 ALTHEA (EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina) 55 anti-Semitism 50 arrest 71–2, 76–7 Balkans 55–6, 66 Balzacq, Thierry 76

240

banks, know your customer and reporting rules for 101 Barnett, Michael 7–8 battlegroup concept 73–4 Bauman, Zygmunt 84 Beck, Ulrich 18–20, 22, 35 Benett, Christopher 162 Berlin Plus arrangements 162–4, 166 Bigo, Didier 98 Bin Laden, Osama 88 biometrics 60–1 border control European Borders Agency 71 European Union 71, 142 NATO 99, 142 OSCE 140–2, 177 Bosnia and Herzegovina ALTHEA (EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina) 55, 164–5 European Union 55, 164–6, 170 NATO 164–6 OSCE 170 Bourdieu, Pierre 11, 15, 128 Bush, George H. W. 12, 18 Bush, George W. 113, 186 Buzan, Barry 12 capacity building 57–8, 136 capital culture 13, 128, 144, 149, 171–2 European Union 28, 46, 155–8, 169 forms of capital 11 military capital 172 NATO 28, 106, 155–8, 172–4, 183–5 norms 13 OSCE 28, 128–9, 134, 144, 149, 155–9, 171, 172–7 Carrera, Sergio 76 carrier liability 62

Index Central and Eastern Europe Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 119–20 European Union 12–15, 55–8, 77 Georgia 151–2 liberal-democratic norms 12–13, 149–51 Moldova 151 NATO 14–15, 81–3, 172, 180 OSCE 14–15, 116, 118–20, 130–2, 136, 149–51, 159, 172 Police Assistance Programs (PAP) 136 radicalism 131 Russia 151, 159 seminar democracy 131 Western security community 10–11, 13–14 Central Asian Republics aid 58 European Union 56, 58, 170–1 human rights 170–1 OSCE 170–1 partnership and cooperation agreements 56 Ceyhan, Ayse 60–1 Chechnya 58, 148 citizenship 32, 50–1 Cold War European Union 160 liberalism, triumph over Communism 12–13 NATO 80–3 new world order 1 OSCE 119–20, 122, 127–9, 145 Western security community 10 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 11, 116, 119–20, 122, 127 Committee on CIA Activities in Europe 186 Common Foreign and Security Policy 160, 169–70 Communism and Communist countries see also Central and Eastern Europe; Central Asian Republics; Cold War; Russia Balkans 55–6, 66 European Union 12–13 liberal-democratic norms 12–13 NATO 81–3, 172 OSCE 116, 118–20, 130, 159, 172 Western security community 13–14 communities of practice, security communities as 10 competition between institutions 28, 160, 162–3

conflict prevention 42, 127–8, 170 cooperation see also NATO and European Union, cooperation between; OSCE and NATO, international cooperation between economic, scientific and environmental cooperation 119 criminal matters, legal cooperation in 144 intergovernmental cooperation 25–7 limits of 75–6 public and private actors 24 cost-benefit analysis 32 Cotonou Agreement between EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific States 57 Council of Europe 183–9 Cox, Michael 3 Crawford, Beverly 121 criminal matters, legal cooperation in 144 crisis management 54, 74, 167–8 culture capital 13, 128, 144, 149, 171 European Union 28, 50–1 European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 51 NATO 28, 106, 158, 185 OSCE 28, 128, 144, 149, 171 Western security community 11–12 cyberspace 70 de Brichambaut, Marc Perrin 134 de Vries, Gijs 182 de Wilde, Jaap 12 Dean, Mitchell 16 defence law enforcement and, boundaries between 102, 109 police and, boundaries between 24 security, separation of 160–1 definition of international terrorism 46 democracy see also liberal-democratic norms Bosnia 170 European Union 40, 51–2, 56, 157–8, 170, 186, 189 NATO 80, 91–2, 107–8, 113, 189 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 170 OSCE 125, 129–32, 138–9, 145–50, 159, 170, 175–8 Dependability Development Support Initiative 70

241

Index detention Abu Ghraib 112 Afghanistan 110, 112–13 European Union 185–90 extraordinary rendition 182–9 Guantanamo Bay 112 human rights 182 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances 2007 189–90 NATO 110, 112–13 secret detention 182, 185–90 transport of ghost detainees 185–6 Deutsch, Karl 3 development assistance 54, 58 Diez, Thomas 52 disappearances 189 discrimination 65 Donnelly, Chris 85, 95, 100, 163 economic life, securitization of 68 education and training Afghanistan 174 Comenius programme 50 European Union 50–1 Grundtvig programme 50 human rights 135–6 liberal-democratic norms 132–45, 147, 176–7 NATO 95 OSCE 132–45, 147, 176–7 enemies, treatment of Abu Ghraib 112 detainees NATO 110, 112–13 secret detention 182, 185–90 transport of 185–6 disappearances 189–90 European Union 6–7, 76, 185–6 extraordinary rendition 182–9 Guantanamo Bay 112 internal and external security 160 law enforcement 160 NATO 6–7, 110, 112–13 OSCE 6–7 secret detention 182, 185–90 environment 20 EU see European Union, international terrorism and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/PfP Intelligence Liaison Unit 99 Euro-Atlantic security community see Western security community

242

EUROJUST 71 Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct against Terrorism 57 European Arrest Warrant 71–2, 76–7 European Borders Agency 71 European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals 49 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 55–6, 58, 65–7, 178–9 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 54, 73–5, 162–3 European Security Strategy 40–2, 46–8, 54–5, 65–6, 72–3 European Union, international terrorism and 6–7, 39–78 see also NATO and European Union, cooperation between; OSCE and European Union, cooperation between Afghanistan 54, 66, 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific States 57 Al Qaeda 39–40, 42–3, 48, 71, 77 Algeria, capacity-building initiatives with 57 alienation 48–9, 51 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 187–8 ALTHEA (EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina) 55 anti-Semitism 50 Balkans 55–6, 66 Battlegroup concept 73–4 benchmarks 178 biometrics 60–1 border protection measures 59–62, 65, 67 Bosnia and Herzegovina 55 capacity-building with third countries 57–8 capital 28, 46, 155–8, 169 carrier liability 62 Central and Eastern Europe 12–15, 55–8, 77 Central Asian Republics 56, 58 charities, code of conduct on misuse of 69 Chechnya 58 citizenship, promoting 50–1 Cold War 160 Commission 26, 43, 49–51, 54, 62–3, 70, 157–8, 187 Committee on CIA Activities in Europe 186 Common Basic Principles on Integration 49 Common Foreign and Security Policy 160, 169–70

Index competition 28, 160 Conceptual Framework on the EDSP Dimension of the Fight against Terrorism 74–5 conflict prevention 42 cooperation 25–8, 75–8, 159–74 Cotonou Agreement between EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific States 57 Council 26, 43, 76, 157–8, 187 counter-terrorism 44, 47–8, 57–63, 67–8, 75–8 crime/law enforcement 46–7 crisis management and prevention 42, 54, 74 culture 28, 50–1 cyberspace 70 Declaration on Combating Terrorism 48 defence policing, boundaries between 24 security, difference between 160–1 definition of international terrorism 46 definition of terrorist group 42 democracy 40, 51–2, 56, 157–8, 186, 189 Dependability Development Support Initiative 70 detainees, transport of ghost 185–6 development assistance 54, 58 disappearances 189 discrimination 65 diversification of security field 70–1 economic life, securitization of 68 educational programmes 50–1 enemies, treatment of 6–7, 182–9 enlargement 25, 55, 66, 178–80 ethic of care 47 EUROJUST 71 Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct against Terrorism 57 European Arrest Warrant 71–2, 76–7 European Borders Agency 71 European Evidence Warrant 71 European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals 49 European identity-building, project of 48–58 European Neighbourhood Policy 55–6, 58, 65–7, 178–9 European Parliament 76, 183–9 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 54, 73–5 European Security Strategy 40–2, 46–8, 54–5, 65–6, 72–3

European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 51 EUROPOL 71 exceptional threat, terrorism as 44–5, 188–9 exceptions to liberal-democratic norms 187–8 existential threat to EU 41–3, 59 Expert Group on Violent Radicalization 49 external activities 53–62, 65–73, 161, 178–9 extraordinary rendition 182–9 Fight Against International Terrorism. Defence Committee of the Interparliamentary European Security and Defense Assembly 45 financial transactions, monitoring of 68 financing terrorism 68–9, 71 foreign intelligence services and law enforcement, links between 72 Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism 41–2 Freedom, Security and Justice, Area of 77 ‘fuzzy borders’ 179 globalization 54–5 good and evil dichotomy 45 Grundtvig programme 50 Hague Programme 44–5, 49, 67 Headline Goal 2010 73–4 human rights 40, 50–2, 56, 58, 62, 183, 186, 188 identity, promotion of shared 50–2 illegal migrants 66 inclusive and exclusionary practices 36, 39–40, 43, 48–59, 71–2, 155, 160–1, 179, 190–1 individualization of war 156 Indonesia, capacity-building initiatives with 57 information, exchange of 57, 66–7 integration of vulnerable individuals and groups 49–54 intergovernmental cooperation 25–7 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances 2007 189–90 International Security Assistance Force (NATO) 54 Islamic terrorism 17–18, 35, 39, 42, 45, 48–60, 73, 77 Joint Situation Centre 72 Kosovo 55

243

Index European Union (cont.) law enforcement 46–7, 72, 161 liberal-democratic values 24–5, 30, 39–40, 43–5, 49–57, 61, 64–5, 155–7, 175–82, 188, 191–2 logics of security 40 London bombings 30, 44, 48 Madrid bombings 71 member states coordination 7–8, 26–7, 49, 71, 75–8 disagreements between 41 enlargement 55, 66, 178–80 integration 25 migration 66, 68–9 military capabilities, development of 46, 72–5, 169 money laundering 69 monitoring 67–8 moral authority 8 Morocco, capacity-building initiatives with 57 mutual legal assistance 71 NATO 77–8, 160–1, 183–7 Neighbourhood Policy 55–9, 65–7, 178–9 normative power, EU as 52, 56, 157–8 OSCE 78, 116, 142, 149, 153, 176 organized crime 65–6, 72 other 35, 44–8, 52–3, 61, 66–7, 71, 75, 179–80 Pakistan, Draft Agreement on Counter-Terrorism with 57 Passenger Name Record (PNR) 62–3 Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism 69 policing 24, 71, 161 prevention 21–2, 26, 42, 47–60, 67 prisons, existence of secret 185–9 private actors, involvement of 63, 68–70, 181, 191 private and public areas, blurring of 24, 38, 61–2, 65, 68–70, 156 private companies, reporting of suspicious activities by 69 protection 47–8 radicalization, prevention of 48–58 rapid reaction capability 73–4 rational order and disorder 45, 51 recruitment 48–9, 51–2 redefinition of relationships 160 religious extremism 48–54, 59, 179–80 religious politics, disassociation from 35 response 47–8 responsibilization 69

244

risk management 39, 43, 70 rule of law 21–3, 51–4, 56, 58, 76, 186, 188, 190–1 Russia 58, 176 sanctions 185–6 Schengen Information System (SIS II) 60, 64–5 secret detention 185–9 securitization 68 September 11, 2001 attacks on United States 6, 44, 55, 69, 73–4 societal activities, surveillance of 38 Socrates Programme 50 Stability Fund 57–8 statements on terrorism 44–6 supranationalism 25–7 surveillance 38, 60–4 suspects, rights of 76 terrorist group, definition of 42 triangulation 9 Turkey 179–80 United States 4 Visa Information System 60–1, 63 visa shopping 61 war, language of 46–7 weapons of mass destruction, terrorist acquisition of 42, 46, 53, 57 Western European Union (WEU) 160–1 Western security community 10, 39, 161, 178 xenophobia 50 Youth Programme 50 European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 51 EUROPOL 71 Everts, Daan 110 Expert Group on Violent Radicalization 49 existential threats 41–3, 59, 77, 97, 125 extradition 144 extraordinary rendition 182–9 Farrell, Henry 14 Ferrero-Waldner, Benita 56 financing terrorism 68–9, 71, 101, 143, 176–7 Finnemore, Martha 7–8 Flynn, Gregory 14 Forum for Security Cooperation 140 François, Isabelle 89 Fratini, Franco 186 Freedom, Security and Justice, Area of 77 Gellner, Ernest 18–19 Georgia 151–2

Index Germany, European Arrest Warrant and 77 Ghebali, Victor-Yves 152 Giddens, Anthony 18 globalization 18–19, 34, 54–6, 85, 87, 113 good and evil dichotomy 45 Grundtvig programme 50 Guantanamo Bay 112 Guardans, Ignasi 187 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 90 habitus 15–16, 88, 175 Hague Programme 44–5, 49, 67 Headline Goal 2010 73–4 Helsinki Process 10–11, 116, 119 Hobbes, Thomas 32 Hopmann, P. Terrence 130–1, 148 human rights Central Asia 170–1 Chechnya 148 detention 182 European Union 40, 50–2, 56, 58, 62, 170–1, 183, 186, 188 NATO 93–4, 108, 182–4, 188 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 170 OSCE 119, 122, 125–6, 128, 130–2, 135–6, 145–50, 159, 170–1, 175–8 training programmes 135–6 Uzbekistan 93–4 human trafficking 99, 141 Huysmans, Jef 21 identity, promotion of shared 50–2 illegal migration 66, 141 ‘imagined security community’ concept 116, 122, 130, 175 inclusive and exclusionary practices European Union 36, 39–40, 43, 48–59, 71–2, 155, 160–1, 179, 190–1 logic of security 2 NATO 36, 79–80, 85–6, 96–115, 155, 160, 162, 170, 181, 190–1 OSCE 36, 117, 139–41, 144, 154–5, 160, 190–1 Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP) 89–90 individualization liberty 80 possessive individualism 32 responsibility, of 36–8, 134 war, of 35–6, 38, 156 Indonesia 57 information, exchange of 57, 60–7, 124, 163

integration 49–54, 82 intelligence 72, 98–100 international conflict, changes to pattern of 2 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances 2007 189–90 international organizations, authority of 8 international terrorism see also European Union, international terrorism and; international terrorism; NATO, international terrorism; OSCE, international terrorism and barbarity and civilization, confrontation between 30 civilisation, as threat to 34–5 definition 46 exclusive and inclusive logic of security 2 impact of 1–2 liberal-democratic norms 30–1 logic of security 2, 9–10 modern order, challenge to 31–8 risk management and risk society 19–22 securitization 38 United States 4–5 international terrorist groups see also Al Qaeda construction 9 Islamic terrorist groups, construction of 9 liberal-democratic security community, as a danger to 9 recruitment 48–9, 51–2, 124 Western security community 35–6 Internet 70, 133 Iraq, invasion of NATO 7, 111 Western security community, rifts in 2–4, 7 Islamic international terrorism see also Al Qaeda European Union 17–18, 35, 39, 42, 45, 48–60, 73, 77 Expert Group on Violent Radicalization 49 Islam, disassociation from war against 35 London bombings 30, 44, 48 Madrid bombings 71 NATO 16–18, 35 new world order 16–17 OSCE 17–18, 35 pre-modern or anti-modern beliefs 31 reform 34–5 response to 2 risk management 18–19

245

Index Iraq, invasion of (cont.) terrorist groups, definition of 9 United States 16–17 weapons of mass destruction 35 judicial independence 92 Kant, Immanuel 12, 23, 29–30, 51, 81–2, 87–8, 94, 96, 155 Kosovo 55, 102, 170, 173 Lavrov, Sergei 171 law enforcement crime 46–7 defence and, boundary between 102, 109 enemies, treatment of 160 ethic of care 47 European Union 46–7, 72, 161 foreign intelligence services and law enforcement, links between 72 NATO 102, 109 war, language of 56–7 legislative framework against terrorism, helping states to adopt and implement 124, 125, 135, 144–5 liberal-democratic norms 16, 29–31 Al Qaeda 30 Central Asia and Caucasus 150–1 civilization and barbarity, confrontation between 30 Cold War 12–13 Communism, triumph over 12–13 education 132–45, 147, 176–7 European Union 24–5, 30, 39–40, 43–5, 49–57, 61, 64–5, 155–7, 175–82, 188, 191–2 exceptions 183–4, 187–8 integration 49–50 internal/external security 156 international terrorism 9, 30–1 moral superiority 30 NATO 24–5, 79–82, 85–94, 111–15, 155–7, 173–85, 188, 191–2 OSCE 24–5, 116–18, 120, 122, 130–51, 155–7, 173–8, 181–2, 191–2 others 13–15, 30 redefinition 157 Russia 151 self-discipline 29–30 socialization 191 tolerance 30 Locke, John 32 logics of security 2, 9–10, 40, 161 London bombings 30, 44, 48

246

Macedonia 105, 170 Madrid bombings 71 manufactured risk 20 Marty, Dick 186–7 mass destruction, weapons of see weapons of mass destruction Mediterranean 90, 99–100, 180 Middle East 181 migration 66, 68–9, 141, 142 military capabilities European Union 46, 72–5, 169 NATO 103–8, 114, 169, 172 OSCE 129, 172 Western security community 3–4 modernity certainty 31–2 challenges to modern order 31–8 NATO 109–12 politics and religion, separation of 33–4 possessive individualism 32 pre-modern or anti-modern beliefs 31 religious conflict 31–4 risk society 19–20 Treaty of Westphalia 33 Moldova 151 money laundering 69, 142–3 Mopas, Michael 36 Moravcsik, Andrew 169 Morocco 57 mutual legal assistance 71 NATO and European Union, cooperation between 4–7, 85–6, 94, 162–70 Berlin Plus arrangements 162–4, 166 Bosnia and Herzegovina 164–6 competition with 160, 162–3 crisis management, Treaty of Lisbon and 167–8 defence and security, separation of 160 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), declaration on 162–3 information sharing 163 joint meetings 163 military force 169 mutual defence clause in Treaty of Lisbon 167–8 Operation Althea 164–5 redefinition of relationships 160 Response Force 165 Stabilisation and Association Process 165 Treaty of Lisbon 167–8 NATO, international terrorism and 79–115 see also NATO and European Union,

Index cooperation between; OSCE and NATO, international cooperation between Abu Ghraib 112 accountability 91–2 Afghanistan 107–14 Al Qaeda 102, 108–9 banks, know your customer and reporting rules for 101 border control 99 capital 28, 106, 155–8, 183–5 Central and Eastern Europe 81–2, 180 civilization, as threat to 34–5 Cold War, end of 80–3 competition 28, 160 Comprehensive Political Guidance 85 confidentiality 183–5 cooperation 7–8, 24, 28, 159–60, 185 institutions, between 28, 159–60 member states, between 7–8 public and private actors 24 Copenhagen Declaration 161–2 Council of Europe, cooperation with 183–7 culture 28, 106, 158, 185 defence/policing, boundaries between 24 Defense Planning Committee 7 democracy 80, 91–2, 107–8, 113, 189 detainees, treatment of 110, 112–13 Eastern bloc 14–15 education 95 enemies, treatment of 6–7, 182–9 enlargement 82, 89, 90–4, 172 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/PfP Intelligence Liaison Unit 99 European Union 183–4 exceptions to liberal-democratic norms 182–92 existential threats 77, 97 extraordinary rendition 182–9 financing of terrorism 101 former Communist states, threats from 81–3 ‘fuzzy area’ between inclusion and exclusion 181 globalization 85, 87, 113 Guantanamo Bay 112 Gulf Cooperation Council 90 habitus 88 human rights violations 93–4, 108, 182–4, 188 inclusive and exclusionary security practices 36, 79–80, 85–6, 96–115, 155, 160, 162, 170, 181, 190–1

individual liberty 80 individualization of war 156 Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP) 89–90 information sharing 163 integration 82 intelligence 98–100 Iraq, invasion of 7, 111 Islam, disassociation from war against 35 Islamic terrorism 16–18 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) 90, 99 Istanbul summit 90 judicial independence 92 Kosovo 102 law enforcement and defence, boundary between 102, 109 liberal-democratic norms 24–5, 79–82, 85–94, 111–15, 155–7, 175–85, 188, 191–2 logic of security 161 Macedonia 105 Mediterranean 90, 99–100, 180 membership 25, 89, 90–4 Middle East 181 Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism 107 military force 103–8, 114 modernity 109–12 moral authority 8 mutual defence clause 83 new world order 83–5 non-military means of combating terrorism 27 North Atlantic Council 83, 107 OSCE 116, 142, 149, 153, 176 open-door principle 82, 90–1 Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean 99–100 organised crime 84–5, 91, 98–100, 102 others 35, 79–80, 82, 86–7, 94, 96–115 out of area policing functions 101–2 Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism 98–9 Partnership Coordination Cells (PCC) 89, 90 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 89, 93, 99 partnerships 89, 90, 93, 98–9, 180–1 policing functions 102, 114, 162 Policy on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings 99 Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) 103–4 Prague Summit 90, 98, 105

247

Index NATO, international (cont.) pre-modern or anti-modern beliefs 31 preventive action 21–2, 84–5 private actors, participation of 94–5, 101, 181, 191 Provincial Reconstruction Teams 108 Psychological Operations and Information Operations 107 Public Diplomacy Division 95–6 public/private spheres, boundaries between 24, 38, 100–2, 156 radicalization 110 rapid response 103 rationality 85–7 reform processes for candidates for membership 91–2 religious politics, disassociation from 35 Response Force 21–3, 103, 190–1 risk management 83–8 rule of law 80, 108, 110, 182–3, 188 Russia 172, 176 securitization of societies 95 self-discipline, lack of 82–3 selves, evolution of others into 82 September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States 6, 83, 92–5, 99, 104, 162 socialization into liberal norms 85–9, 180, 191 Soviet Union 80–1 state secrets, laws on 92 Strategic Concept 162 surveillance 38, 98–9 suspicious transactions, monitoring of 101 technology 97–8 Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit 98 trafficking in human beings 99 transparency 91–2 triangulation 9 trust and support of local population, winning 107, 113 Turkey 7 UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 99 uncertainty 85 United States 4–5, 112–13 Uzbekistan, human rights in 93–4 Warsaw Pact 81 weapons of mass destruction 84–5, 96 Western security community, expansion of 10, 80–3, 88–96, 158, 162, 164, 166, 180 Yugoslavia, former 105

248

Neighbourhood Policy of European Union 55–9, 65–7, 178–9 neoliberalism and neoconservatism 36–8 new world order 1, 16–17, 21, 83–5 norms see liberal-democratic norms OSCE and European Union, cooperation between 169–71 Bosnia, promotion of democracy in 170 Central Asia, advancing human rights in 170–1 Common Foreign and Security Policy 169–70 competition 160 conflict prevention 170 cultural capital 171 defence and security, separation of 160 democracy promotion 170 enemies, treatment of 6–7 good governance, promotion of 170 human rights 170 Kosovo, promotion of democracy in 170 Macedonia, promotion of democracy in 170 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 170 post-conflict reconstruction 170 redefinition of relationships 160 Russia 169, 171 Western security community 169–70 OSCE and NATO, international cooperation between 171–4 Afghanistan 173–4 capital 28, 155–8, 172, 173–4 Central and Eastern Europe 172 civilian functions 173 Communist countries, former 172 competition 28, 160 cooperation 7–8, 24, 28, 159–60 cultural capital 28, 174 enlargement of NATO 172 Kosovo 173 liberal-democratic norms 173–4 military capital 172 peacekeeping 172 post-conflict reconstruction 172, 173–4 Russia 172 socialization into liberal-democratic norms 173–4 United States 172 Western security community 171–4 OSCE, international terrorism and 4–7, 116–54 see also OSCE and European Union, cooperation between; OSCE

Index and NATO, international cooperation between Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU) 123, 125, 132, 134, 140, 144–5, 159 Action Plan to Combat Terrorism 17–18 airport security 140 Al Qaeda 125, 126 alienation and marginalization 133 best practice 117, 138, 140, 142–4 border monitoring and protection 140–2, 177 Bucharest Plan of Action 123, 127, 129, 134–5 Budapest Decision 119 capacity building 136 capital 128–9, 134, 144, 149, 158–9, 176–7 Central Asia and Caucasus 14–15, 130–2, 136, 150–1, 159 Charter of Paris 116, 119–20, 122, 176 Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism 126–7 Chechnya 148 Cold War 119–20, 122, 127–9, 145 Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 116, 119–20, 122, 127 Communist states, former 116, 118, 119–20, 130, 159 community-building institution, as 118–22 conferences 133, 143 conflicts, prevention of 127–8 conventions and protocols 123, 135 cooperation, coordinating and promoting international 124, 140, 145–6 cooperative security system, guidelines for 118–19 Counter-Terrorism Network 124, 159 credibility crisis 144–54 criminal matters, legal cooperation in 144 cultural capital 128, 144, 149 decisions, adoption of 124–5 defence/policing, boundaries between 24 democracy 125, 129–32, 138–9, 145–51, 159, 175–8 economic, scientific and environmental cooperation 119 education in liberal-democratic norms 132–45, 147, 176–7 European Union 78, 116, 142, 149, 153, 176 existential threats 125 expert workshops 133

extradition 144 field missions and offices 128–9, 138 financing of terrorism 143, 176–7 Forum for Security Cooperation 140 frozen conflicts, resolving 152 Georgia 152 good governance and democracy, promoting 28, 148–9 habitus 175 Helsinki Process 116, 118–19 human rights 119, 122, 125–6, 128, 130–2, 135–6, 145–51, 159, 175–8 illegal migration 141 ‘imagined security community’ concept 116, 122, 130, 175 inclusion, logic of 123–32 inclusive and exclusivist security practices 36, 117, 139–41, 144, 154–5, 160, 190–1 individualization of responsibility 134 individualization of war 156 information, exchange of 124 institutions, establishment of standing 120–1 Internet for radicalization, combating use of 133 Islam, disassociation from war against 35 Islamic terrorism 17–18 legislative framework against terrorism, helping states to adopt and implement 124, 125, 135, 144–5 liberal-democratic norms 24–5, 116–18, 120, 122, 130–51, 155–6, 175–8, 181–2, 191–2 Manual on Human Rights Protection in Counter-Terrorism (ODIHR) 136 membership 25, 116 migration 141, 142 military action 129 Ministerial Council 121, 123–5, 140, 148 Moldova 151–3 money laundering 142–3 moral authority 8, 149 movement of terrorists, prevention of 124 NATO 116, 142, 149, 153, 176 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 135–7, 142, 175 organized crime 141 others 35, 128 Parliamentary Assembly 125–6 Permanent Council 121 police assistance programs 136–7, 141–2

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Index OSCE, international (cont.) Porto Ministerial Council 123–4, 125 police 136–8 post-conflict reconciliation 128–9 pre-modern or anti-modern beliefs 31 preventive role 21–2, 28, 117, 123–32, 159 programmes and initiatives 118 public/private actors, network of 133–5, 138, 181, 191 public/private sphere, boundaries between 24, 38, 133–4, 156 radicalism 131, 133 recruitment, prevention of 124 religious politics, disassociation from 35 risk management 21–3, 124, 135, 190–1 rule of law 122, 125, 130, 132, 146–51, 159, 175–8 Russia 118, 132–3, 148 , 150–3, 159, 176 securitization of migration 142 seminar democracy 131 September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States 6, 123, 148 Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) 140 socialization into liberal-democratic norms 122, 175–6, 191 Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) 136–7 Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in 21st Century 141 structure 27, 117–18 summits 120 surveillance of societal activities 38 technical assistance and advice 134–5 trafficking in humans 141 training on human rights 135–6 Travel Documents Security Programme 142–3 triangulation 9 UN conventions, protocols and resolutions as global legal framework for combating terrorism 123 UN Office on Drugs and Crime 143–4 United States 4–5, 147–8 UNODC (UN Office on Drugs and Crime) Global Programme against Money Laundering 143 Washington Declaration 125 weapons, access to 123–4, 140 weapons of mass destruction 123–4 Western security community 10, 117–18, 121–2, 125–6, 135, 139, 144–6, 149 workshops 133, 140, 143–4

250

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 135–7, 142, 170, 175 organized crime European Union 65–6, 72 NATO 84–5, 91, 98–100, 102 OSCE 128 UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 99 other conditional inclusion 13 European Union 35, 44–8, 52–3, 61, 66–7, 71, 75, 179–80 liberal-democratic security community 13–14, 30 NATO 35, 79–80, 82, 86–7, 94, 96–115 OSCE 35, 128 practice of 13–14 rational subjects and, distinguishing between 183 Turkey 179–80 Pacific states 57 Pakistan 57 Papandreou, George 163 partnerships Central Asian Republics 56 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/PfP Intelligence Liaison Unit 99 NATO 89–90, 93, 98–9, 180–1 OSCE 133–5, 138 Passenger Name Record (PNR) 62–3 Peace of Westphalia 1648 31, 33 peaceful dispute resolution in Western security community 3–4, 7 peacekeeping 172 penal field, risk management in the 36–7 police Central Asia and Caucasus 136 European Union 161 EUROPOL 71 NATO 102, 114, 162 OSCE 136–8, 141–2 Police Assistance Programs (PAP) 136–7 On-Line Information Systems 138 trafficking in humans 141–2 politics of risk definition 20 Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) 103–4 prediction, risk society and 20 prevention European Union 21–2, 26, 42, 47–60, 67 NATO 21–2, 84–5

Index OSCE 21–2, 28, 117, 123–31, 159 radicalization 48–58 Western security community 21–2 private actors, involvement of European Union 63, 68–70, 181, 191 NATO 94–5, 101, 181, 191 OSCE 181, 191 private companies, reporting of suspicious activities by 69 private and public areas, blurring of European Union 24 38, 61–2, 65, 68–70, 156 NATO 24, 38, 100–2, 156 OSCE 24, 38, 133–4, 156 Psychological Operations and Information Operations (NATO) 107 Public Diplomacy Division (NATO) 95–6 racism 50 radicalization 48–58, 110, 131, 133 rapid response 73–4, 103, 165 rationality 7–8, 45, 51, 85–7, 183 reconstruction 108, 170, 172–4 recruitment 48–9, 51–2, 124 religion see also Islamic international terrorism conflicts 31–4 extremism 48–54, 59, 179–80 globalization 34 identity 34 modernity 31–4 Peace of Westphalia 33 politics, disassociation from 33–5 United States 35 responsibilization 36–8, 69, 134 Rice, Condoleezza 182 Richards, David 108 risk see risk management; risk society risk management European Union 21–2, 39, 43, 70, 190–1 globalization 18–19 individual responsibility 36–8 Islamic terrorism 18–19 NATO 21–3, 83–8, 190–1 neoliberalism and neoconservatism 36–8 new world order 21 non-state actors 36–8 OSCE 21–3, 124, 135, 190–1 penal field 36–7 risk profiles 37 risk society certainty 19–23 definition 20–1 environment 20

international terrorism 19–20 manufactured risk 20 modernity 19–20 politics of risk definition 20 prediction 20 securitization 20–1 social construction 22 Robinson, George 95–6, 104–5, 163 rule of law European Union 51–4, 56, 58, 76, 186, 188 NATO 80, 108, 110, 182–3, 188 OSCE 122, 125, 130, 132, 145–9, 159, 175–8 Russia Central Asia and Caucasus 151, 159 Chechnya 58, 148 European Union 58, 169, 171, 176 Moldova 151 NATO 172, 176 OSCE 118, 132–3, 148, 150–3, 159, 169, 171–2, 176 United States 172 Schengen Information System (SIS II) 60, 64–5 secret detention 182, 185–90 securitization economic life 68 European Union 68 international terrorism 38 migration 142 NATO 95 OSCE 142 risk society 20–1 societal activities 37–8 security communities as communities of practice 10 self-discipline 29–30, 95 September 11, 2001 attacks on United States European Union 6, 44, 55, 69, 73–4 NATO 6, 83, 92–5, 99, 104, 162 OSCE 6, 123, 148 Western security community’s response 2–3, 5 Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) 140 social construction of risk 22 social order, reproduction of 15–16 socialization of liberal-democratic norms 85–9, 122, 173–6, 180, 191 Socrates Programme 50 Solana, Javier 46, 53–4, 182, 186 Soviet Union 80–1 see also Russia

251

Index Stabilisation and Association Process 165 Stability Fund 57–8 state citizenship 32 cost-benefit analysis 32 Peace of Westphalia 33 secrets, laws on 92 sovereignty 33 states as enemy, other 33 threats to the 32–3 supranationalism 25–7 surveillance 38, 60–4, 98–9 Taliban 108–11 technology 70, 97–8, 133–5 terrorism see European Union, international terrorism and; international terrorism; NATO, international terrorism and; OSCE, international terrorism and 116 terrorist groups, definition of 42 Thomas, Daniel 145 Thompson, John 11, 15 torture 182, 187 Toulmin, Steven 31–2 trafficking in human beings 99, 142 training see education and training transatlantic security community see Western security community transparency 91–2 travel documents Travel Documents Security Programme 142–3 Visa Information System 60–1, 63 visa shopping 61 Treaty of Westphalia 33 trust and support of local population, winning 107, 113 Turkey 7, 179–80 UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 99 UN Office on Drugs and Crime 143–4 United States see also September 11, 2001 attacks on United States Abu Ghraib 112 conviction, problems of 35 Council of Europe, cooperation with 183–7 European Union 4–7, 182–9 extraordinary rendition 182–9 Guantanamo Bay 112 Iraq, invasion of 2–4, 7, 111 Islamic terrorism 16–17

252

NATO 4–5, 112–13, 172 OSCE 4–5, 147–8, 172 religion in politics 35 secret detention, places of 182, 186–7 torture 182, 187 use of force see military capabilities Uzbekistan 93–4 Valverde, Mariana 36 Visa Information System 60–1, 63 Waever, Ole 12 Walker, R. B. J. 33 war individualization of war 35–6, 38, 156 language of 46–7 Warsaw Pact 81 weapons see also weapons of mass destruction access to 123–4, 140 OSCE 123–4, 140 Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) 140 weapons of mass destruction European Union 42, 46, 53, 57 NATO 84–5, 96 OSCE 123–4 Weber, Max 35 Western European Union (WEU) 160–1 Western security community 10–16 see also European Union capital 11 Central and Eastern Europe 10–11, 13–14 Cold War, end of 10 communities of practice, as a 10 CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) 11 Communist countries, former 13–14 culture 11–12 European Union 169–70 ‘fuzzy borders’ 175–81 Helsinki Process 10–11 individualization of war 36, 68 international terrorist groups 35–6 Iraq War, rifts over 2–4, 7 NATO 10, 80–3, 88–96, 158, 162, 164, 166, 171–4, 180 OSCE 10, 117–18, 121–2, 125–6, 135, 139, 144–5, 149, 171–4, 179–80 peaceful dispute resolution 3–4, 7 preventive action 21–2 reconfiguration of field of security 11 rift in 2–4, 7

Index September 11, 2001 attacks on United States, response to 2–3, 5 subjectivity, building responsible 23 use of force to settle disputes within community 3–4 Western zone of peace 5–6 Williams, Michael 11, 13, 29 Williams, Michael C. 15 Wörner, Manfred 80, 81

xenophobia 50 Youth Programme 50 Yugoslavia, former Bosnia and Herzegovina 55, 164–6, 170 Kosovo 55, 102, 170, 173 Macedonia 105, 170 NATO 105

253

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Securing Civilization?: The EU, NATO and the OSCE in the Post-9 11 World

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