Revolutionary Ideology and Islamic Militancy: The Iranian Revolution and Interpretations of the Quran (International Library of Iranian Studies)

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY Najibullah Lafraie is a lecturer at the Department of Politics, Universi...

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY

Najibullah Lafraie is a lecturer at the Department of Politics, University of Otago, New Zealand. He has a PhD in Political Science from the University of Hawaii, USA, and served as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in Afghanistan, 1992–6.

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY The Iranian Revolution and Interpretations of the Quran NAJIBULLAH LAFRAIE

Tauris Academic Studies LONDON • NEW YORK

Published in 2009 by Tauris Academic Studies, an imprint of I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 www.ibtauris.com In the United States of America and in Canada distributed by Palgrave Macmillan a division of St. Martin’s Press 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 Copyright © 2009 Najibullah Lafraie The right of Najibullah Lafraie to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. International Library of Iranian Studies 13 ISBN: 978 1 84511 063 5 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Printed and bound in India by Thomson Press camera-ready copy edited and supplied by the author

To my late parents with love and respect, And to Hashmatullah—a victim of the Soviet atrocities, And to Asadullah—a victim of the Taliban atrocities, And to millions of other victims of oppression, occupation and tyranny

CONTENTS

Preface

xi

Introduction

1

1

Ideology, Revolution, and Revolutionary Ideology An Historical Review of the Uses of Ideology Definitions of Revolution Conceptual Framework: A Model of Revolutionary Ideology

5 5 11 13

2

The Ideology of Revolution in the Holy Quran Political Consciousness Criticism of Existing Social Arrangements Quranic Set of Values Outline of the Good Society Program of Action Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience Simplification Claim to Truth and Rationality

20 22 25 27 32 41 46 47 51 54

3

Revolutionary Ideology in the Works of Imam Khomeini Political Consciousness Criticism of Existing Social Arrangements Set of Values Outline of the Good Society Program of Action Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence

58 58 62 67 68 70 75

viii

CONTENTS Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience Simplification Claim to Truth and Rationality

77 78 78

4

Revolutionary Ideology in the Works of Ayatollah Taleqani Political Consciousness Criticism of Existing Social Arrangements Set of Values Outline of the Good Society Program of Action Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience Simplification Claim to Truth and Rationality

80 80 83 85 86 92 94 95 96 96

5

Revolutionary Ideology in the Works of Ayatollah Mutahhari 98 Political Consciousness 98 Criticism of Existing Social Arrangements 102 Set of Values 102 Outline of the Good Society 103 Program of Action 105 Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence 107 Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience 109 Simplification 110 Claim to Truth and Rationality 110

6

Revolutionary Ideology in the Works of Engineer Bazargan Political Consciousness Criticism of Existing Social Arrangements Set of Values Outline of the Good Society Program of Action Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience Simplification Claim to Truth and Rationality

112 112 117 118 119 120 120 122 123 123

7

Revolutionary Ideology in the Works of Dr Shariati Political Consciousness

126 126


ix

Criticism of Existing Social Arrangements Set of Values Outline of the Good Society Program of Action Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience Simplification Claim to Truth and Rationality

137 139 140 141 147 149 150 153

8

Revolutionary Ideology in the Works of Bani Sadr Political Consciousness Criticism of Existing Social Arrangements Set of Values Outline of the Good Society Program of Action Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience Simplification Claim to Truth and Rationality

158 158 162 164 165 167 170 172 172 172

9

Islamic Revolutionary Ideology: An Overview The Leaders’ Contribution to the Ideology of Revolution Revolutionary Ideology in the Quran and the Works of the Iranian Leaders—a Brief Comparison

174 174

10 The Ideology of Islamic Revolution, Terrorism and the “Clash of Civilizations” A Clash with the “West” or with Arrogance, Oppression and Injustice? Al Qaeda, Islamic Militancy and Islamic Revolutionary Ideology “Islamic Terrorism”: A Contradiction in Terms

178 187 188 193 203

Conclusion

214

Notes Bibliography Index

221 253 261

PREFACE

The Islamic Revolution in Iran in the late 1970s set off a new era of Islamic militancy that has continued unabated ever since. The Islamic resistance against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the emergence of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the intifada and the rise of Hamas in Palestine, the liberation movement in Kashmir, anti-Russian insurgency in Chechnya, acts of terrorism by al Qaeda, and the insurgencies against the US occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan are prime examples of such militancy. Undoubtedly, the socioeconomic and political conditions experienced by Muslims are the main factors pushing them in that direction. The role of religion cannot be discounted, however. Islam is the religion of about one and half billion people and has a very rich history. It has manifested itself differently in various societies and at different epochs. This diversity has led some scholars to argue that there is not one Islam, but many Islams. At the other end of the spectrum are those who see Islam as a monolithic religion—for example, blaming all violence committed by Muslims on their religion and vilifying the Quran for inciting it. The truth seems to lie somewhere in between. Islam is certainly not monolithic, as can readily be observed. There is, however, a core of beliefs and precepts the denial of which will disqualify a person from being considered a Muslim. Muslims’ holy text, the Quran, is open to multiple understandings like any other text. The Quran recognizes this when it reports God Almighty telling Moses, on receipt of the Tablets containing the Decalogue: “Take and hold these with firmness, and enjoin thy people to hold fast by the best in the precepts” (Chapter 7, verse 145, emphasis added). This is also why classical Muslim scholars established a very rigorous method for the interpretation of the Quran. Today, however, the appropriateness of that

xii

PREFACE

methodology is contentious because it restricts ordinary Muslims from accessing the holy text.1 This is not the place to resolve that issue. It is important to note, though, that the Quran itself provides guidance on the way it should be approached. Firstly, it strongly rejects selective use of holy texts to justify particular actions. It warns believers, “Do you believe in some parts of the divine writ and deny the truth of other parts?” (2:84). It also encourages Muslims to use their reason for understanding and judging whatever they hear and read: “Give, then, glad tiding to [those of] my servants who listen [closely] to all that is said, and follow the best of it” (39:17–18). Furthermore, Muslims generally agree that the Quran is, as Muhammad Abduh—a late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Muslim intellectual and scholar—puts it, “its own best commentary.” In other words, “its real meaning can be grasped only if we correlate every one of its statements with what has been stated elsewhere in its pages, and try to explain its ideas by means of frequent cross-references, always subordinating the particular to the general and the incidental to the intrinsic.”2 In seeking to understand the ideology of revolution in the Quran, I have approached the holy text with these principles in mind. An analysis of the ideology of revolution in the works of the Iranian revolutionary leaders confirms that my understanding is not unique or idiosyncratic. As I note in Chapter II, the aim of this study is not to “interpret” the Quran and discover its meaning. Rather, I accept the translations and interpretations offered by well-established commentators on the Quran and seek to understand their significance for the ideology of revolution. In the final chapter, I relate Al Qaeda’s ideas to the ideology of revolution in the Quran. Bin Laden is certainly a committed Muslim, and much of what he says in various interviews, statements and declarations is based on Islamic teachings. Thus, he seems to be motivated by the ideology of Islamic revolution. However, he crosses the line of what is acceptable to majority of Muslims when he advocates targeting innocent civilians, whom he considers guilty by association. As I discuss in Chapter X, he has failed in his quest to find religious justification for this. It is important to lay out my own biases at the outset. I am a practicing Muslim who believes that Islam, particularly the Holy Quran, provides guidance to its followers on how to live a meaningful life. This guidance is not limited to individual conduct but includes the social, political and economic spheres as well. I have approached the Quran as a Muslim seeking to explore the extent of its revolutionary potential. The initial


xiii

motivation for this study was an intellectual curiosity to see if the Quran really had such a potential and also to gain a deeper insight into the Islamic Revolution in Iran. With continuation of Islamic militancy, I found the original study useful in understanding subsequent developments. While I do not claim value-neutrality, I have always tried to maintain an open mind—as much as humanly possible, to be meticulous in my analysis, and to honestly report my findings. I have brought the same attitude to the study of Al Qaeda and terrorism from an Islamic point of view. The bulk of the research for this study was done at the University of Hawaii, USA, as part of a PhD dissertation. I would like to express my thanks and gratitude to the chairman of my dissertation committee, Prof Robert Stauffer and its other members, Dr George Kent and Dr Oliver Lee, for their support and guidance. It is the University of Otago’s Department of Politics in New Zealand that has allowed me to transform that research into a book. I offer my sincere thanks to all the staff of the Department for an excellent collegial atmosphere, particularly to Prof Robert Patman for his encouragement to undertake this project and to Prof Marian Simms and Prof Philip Nel for their continuous support. I also acknowledge my gratitude to Prof William Maley, Prof Amin Saikal and Dr Haider Reza for their friendship and their kind help whenever I needed it. Dr Paul Sorrell did an excellent job in copy-editing the text. Special thanks to him for his work and for his valuable suggestions. I am also grateful to my brother Lutfullah who played an important role in acquiring the Iranian revolutionary leaders’ works used in this study. Last, but not least, I would like to express my earnest appreciation to Zarghona, Amina, Sumayyah, Sajida and Hashmat for their generous and selfless love and care and for putting up with my long hours of absence from home. The book is dedicated to my late parents who taught their children not only the value of education—four of them earning doctoral degrees—but also values of commitment, care, compassion, equity and equality. It is also dedicated to my two brothers and all other victims of oppression, occupation, injustice and tyranny around the world.

Introduction

Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, Your Majesty, and to your leadership and to the respect and the admiration and love your people give to you.1 On the very eve of the 1978 revolution, US President Jimmy Carter praised the Shah of Iran in these fulsome words. A year later waves of revolution were raging all over Iran. Millions of those who were supposed to have given all their “respect and … admiration and love” to the Shah were shouting death to him and toppling his statues. The Shah was planning to go into exile to save his life with the total support of the Carter administration. Two years later, the revolutionary government had full control in Iran; the Shah was unable to find refuge anywhere in the world; and the humiliated Carter administration seemed powerless to rescue the American hostages held in its embassy in Tehran. The Iranian Revolution did not catch only President Carter unawares— it took the whole world by surprise. At the time Carter made his complacent comments, the Shah’s regime seemed one of the most stable governments in the Third World. Economically, Iran had one of the highest growth rates in the world. Enormous oil revenues financed not only the Shah’s military procurements, but also his “development” programs. Moreover, billions of dollars of foreign investment were pouring into the country. Politically, the Shah seemed to have curbed all opposition to his regime. His dreaded secret police, SAVAK, trained and equipped by the CIA, seemed to have penetrated all strata of Iranian society and removed any opposition to the regime by bribery, threat, and imprisonment. Iran had one of the largest and best-equipped military

2


forces in the Third World and the loyalty of the military to the Shah was beyond any doubt. The Shah seemed so sure of himself that at the suggestion of the American government he began encouraging limited political freedom. In spite of all this, on January 8, 1978,2 an apparently minor incident set in motion a revolutionary avalanche which swept over the whole country. As a contemporary publication put it, “Never before in the development of any popular and revolutionary movement has there been such a high percentage of the population actually involved in street demonstrations and uprising as in Iran. As many as 10 to 15 million people [were] in the streets against the Shah’s regime.”3 The significance of the Iranian revolution goes beyond the deep sociopolitical changes it brought about in Iranian society and the complete overhaul of the geo-strategic situation in the Gulf. It entailed a rethinking of the theory of revolution as well. Many scholars saw the Islamic Revolution as an “anomaly” that did not readily fit existing theories of revolution. Among other oddities was the salient role that ideology had played in making the revolution. Although students of revolution had noted the significance of ideology as far back as Alexis de Tocqueville, by the late 1970s the focus had shifted to structural factors, relegating ideology to the margins. The Islamic Revolution in Iran brought ideology back into the limelight.4 The first major student of revolution to acknowledge the importance of ideology in the Iranian Revolution was Theda Skocpol, whose monumental work States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China had just been published when the revolution in Iran broke out. In an article that appeared just three years after the publication of her book, in which she had almost totally ignored the role of ideology, she acknowledges that “this remarkable revolution … forces me to deepen my understanding of the possible roles of idea systems and cultural understandings in the shaping of political action.”5 Thus, she redefined “social revolution” to include the notion of “ideology”,6 and went on to note that, “if there has been a revolution deliberately ‘made’ by a mass-based social movement to overthrow the older order, the Iranian Revolution against the Shah surely is it.”7 And in a subsequent article she sought to incorporate “ideology” into her general theoretical framework of “social revolutions.”8 The significance of ideology in the Islamic Revolution in Iran has also been underlined by Iranian students of the Revolution with firsthand knowledge of its ideological aspects.9 However, it is intriguing that despite

INTRODUCTION

3

this, in the quarter of a century since the Revolution there have been only a few studies which have focused on that ideology. Even more lacking is a systematic analysis of the contents of the ideology. Hamid Dabashi’s book Theology of Discontent: the Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran is one of the few books devoted to the study of the ideology of the Revolution. He presents detailed accounts of the works of the eight “most important ideologues of the Islamic Revolution.” Though a very impressive study, due to a lack of a specific analytical framework the book is more a presentation of the writings of the revolutionary leaders and the author’s comments on them than a systematic analysis of the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The same observation applies to a number of other otherwise valuable works on the thought of the Iranian revolutionary leaders.10 To appreciate the diverse aspects of revolutionary ideology and to meaningfully compare the ideological works of various revolutionary leaders, there is a need to develop a theoretical framework for the study of revolutionary ideology which can then be applied to the works of the leaders discussed below. This is part of what I intend to do in this book. But I also want to study the ideology of revolution as it is presented in the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. This task is important not only for a deeper insight into the Islamic Revolution in Iran—which still retains its scholarly lure as witnessed by the number of books published in recent years11—but also for a better understanding of the Islamic militancy that has been going on since the 1980s in Afghanistan, Palestine, Algeria, Kashmir, Chechnya, Iraq and many other parts of the Muslim world. As David Albert notes, “[various] factors may explain misery, oppression, and degradation, but they do not explain the creation of hope, faith, patience, or fortitude, the stuff of which revolutions are made.”12 Although the creation of these attributes is part of the revolutionary ideology, it goes much further. In chapter 1 I develop a model—a conceptual framework—of revolutionary ideology which includes a discussion of the elements that make up an “ideal type” of revolutionary ideology. First, however, the chapter presents brief reviews of the terms “ideology” and “revolution” and clarifies the definitions adopted in this study. The second chapter deals with Islam and revolution, and asks the question whether the original sources of Islam—the Holy Quran and the traditions of the Prophet—can provide the basis for generating an

4


ideology of revolution. Because the literature on the Iranian Revolution focuses on the Shia school of thought, I approach these sources particularly from a Sunni perspective. Determining the “ideal type” of revolutionary ideology in the Quran will establish the paradigm from which most subsequent Islamist revolutionary ideology has emerged. Although it would also be desirable to discuss the conditions under which such an ideology might be popularized among the masses and lead to a successful revolution, these considerations lie beyond the scope of this study. The literature on revolution, however, already provides clues to such circumstances.13 Chapters three to eight will analyze a selection of the writings and speeches of Iranian revolutionary leaders within the proposed conceptual framework. The leadership can be divided into two groups of Ulama (religious scholars) and lay intellectuals. Three of the leaders discussed are from the first group and three from the second, their prominence during the revolutionary upheavals forming the basis for their selection. They include Ayatollahs Khomeini, Taleqani and Mutahhari; Engineer Mehdi Bazargan, Dr Ali Shariati and Dr Abul Hasan Bani-Sadr. Chapter nine presents a summary of the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and compares and contrasts its various versions in the works of the leaders under study. Chapter ten deals with the notion of “the clash of civilizations,” the current Islamic militancy, and the issue of terrorism. Samuel Huntington suggests that, in the aftermaths of the Islamic Revolution in Iran “an intercivilizational quasi war developed between Islam and the West.”14 This assessment prompts some major questions. Is there really a clash of civilizations? Are Islamic militants inspired by the ideology of revolution found in the Quran? Does their use of terrorism as a tactic conform to most Muslims’ understanding of the teachings of their religion? The last chapter seeks to answer these questions.

1 Ideology, Revolution, and Revolutionary Ideology

In this chapter, my first task is to present a brief historical review of the use of the term “ideology”, as well as various definitions of “revolution” in the literature, and clarify the definitions adopted in this study. After defining the term “model”, I offer a model of revolutionary ideology that I hope will act as a guide throughout the text. An Historical Review of the Uses of “Ideology” A cursory look at a group of dictionary definitions of “ideology” from the mid twentieth century to the present demonstrates the multifaceted and changing use of the term.1 The scholarly use of the concept is even more diverse. As Michael Freeden notes, “The study of ideology is torn between various approaches that have emerged out of different conceptualizations of ideology, causing disarray and confusion among scholars.”2 Unfortunately, this confusion seems to be prevalent in the study of the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran as well. It gets even more confusing when some scholars seem to be using various notions of ideology in the same study.3 To avoid adding further confusion of my own, I will first discuss various conceptualizations of “ideology” and then specify the definition to be used in this study.4 a. Ideology as science of ideas There is general agreement among scholars that the term ideology was first used by a group of French intellectuals called “ideologues” in the late 18th century. Destutt De Tracy, a prominent member of the group, has been credited with coining the term. For De Tracy and other French ideologues, ideology had a positive connotation and meant “the study of

6


the origin of our ideas about the world in sense experience.”5 They contrasted this new science of ideas with the old metaphysics and considered it as “the answer to the unscientific past. … The new science of ideas was intended to be the basis of an entirely new society and economic order.”6 To achieve this aim, the ideologues “designed a program of popular education to underpin the progressive achievements of post-revolutionary government in the way that the teachings of Roman Catholic Church had, in their view, underpinned the repressive institutions of the ancient regime.”7 At the beginning, the ideologues were able to win the favor and support of Napoleon Bonaparte for their programs and coopt him as an honorary member of their National Institute. But the emperor later decided to restore the influence of the Catholic Church and “dismissed the ideologues as annoying, tiresome theorists.”8 In his attack on the ideologues, Napoleon was the first to give a derogatory connotation to the term “ideology.” b. Ideology as false consciousness and apology Although De Tracy coined the term ideology, it was due to Marx’s use of the word that it found its way into scholarly discussions and popular usage. Most of the writers on the subject of ideology—Marxists and nonMarxists alike—believe that for Marx ideology meant false or distorted consciousness. H.M. Drucker, however, distinguishes two different meanings in Marx’s concept of ideology: “When Marx says of a theory that it is ideological, he is commenting on either (a) the ‘false consciousness’ which has led the author of the theory to speak in this mistaken way, or (b) the way the theory functions—or is supposed by its author to function—to serve the interests of the class.”9 Bourgeois ideology, which stems from its material existence, becomes the dominant ideology of society because the bourgeoisie controls the “means of mental production” as well as the means of material production. It should be noted that, in The German Ideology, Marx seems to denote the whole superstructure of society as ideological. This has led many scholars to conclude that: “What [Marx and Engels] … call ‘ideology’ include not only the theory of knowledge and politics, but also metaphysics, ethics, religion, and indeed any ‘form of consciousness’ which expresses the basic attitude or commitments of a social class.”10 According to Jorge Larrain, however, since The German Ideology was written at a period when Marx was undergoing major shifts in his intellectual evolution, the book contains ambiguities and does not represent his

IDEOLOGY, REVOLUTION, AND REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY

7

mature “scientific” achievement. He holds the view that, “ideology for Marx, as a distorted consciousness, has a particular negative connotation whose two specific and connected features are, firstly, that it conceals social contradictions and, secondly, that it does it in the interest of the dominant class. Hence, ideology is a restricted kind of distortion. … Nonideological consciousness can still be erroneous for reasons other than the concealment of contradictions in the interest of the dominant class. … These two meanings should not be confused.”11 c. Ideology as class worldview According to H.M. Drucker, there are two types of Marxists: “philosophical”—such as Herbert Marcuse and Shlomo Avineri—and “political”—such as Isaac Deutscher and Lenin. For the first group ideology means false consciousness—as discussed above. “Political Marxists”, however, “are inclined to emphasize the function of ideas, especially the enemy’s ideas, in a class struggle.”12 For them, therefore, ideology refers to the worldview of a class. In this sense, they speak not only of “bourgeois ideology,” but also of “proletarian ideology” or “socialist ideology;” because in their political struggle against the bourgeoisie, they criticize its ideology from the point of view of the proletariat, and this critique itself is considered ideological. Lenin, who was probably the first to conceive ideology in this sense, states, for example: “Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by the working classes themselves, in the process of their movement, the only choice is—either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for mankind has not created a “third” ideology, and moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms, there can never be a non-class or above class ideology). …”13 Lukacs and Gramsci are other Marxists who adopt this concept of ideology in their writings. According to Jorge Larrain, “When ideology becomes weltanschauung, its validity tends to vary according to the imputation of a class background. … The concept may now encompass distorted as much as true forms of consciousness and, therefore, does not by itself entail a negative meaning.”14 d. Ideology and the sociology of knowledge Karl Mannheim uses the concept of ideology in the context of the sociology of knowledge. He distinguishes between two different meanings of the term which he calls “particular” and “total.” The particular concept

8


of ideology resembles Napoleon’s and Marx’s use of the term as “distortion”, which, according to Mannheim, ranges “from conscious lies to half conscious and unwitting disguise; from calculated attempts to dupe others to self-deception.”15 This occurs at the individual level when people are suspicious of the ideas of their opponents. The total conception of ideology, however, refers to “the ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social group, e.g., of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group.”16 This resembles Lenin’s concept of ideology as a class worldview. In this sense, for Mannheim, ideology approaches the sociology of knowledge. “It points … to a research interest which leads to the raising of the question when and where social structures come to express themselves in the structure of assertions, and in what sense the former concretely determine the latter.” But since Mannheim believes a “moral or denunciatory intent” has become part of the concept, he proposes to “as far as possible, avoid the use of the term ‘ideology’.”17 e. Ideology as action-oriented irrational idealization The popular use of the word “ideology” is a relatively recent phenomenon of the second half of the twentieth century. The first edition of the Encyclopaedia of Social Science in 1937, for example, had no entry for the term “ideology” and failed to list it in the index. By contrast, a later edition of the International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences (1968) devoted two articles and several pages to the term “ideology.” The popular use of the term appears to reflect the rise to power of “totalitarian ideologies” not only in Russia but, more importantly, in Germany and Italy. This provoked a debate on what had gone wrong in those countries, and how the Western “democracies” could save themselves from such calamities. One of the immediate results of this focus on totalitarian ideologies was the imputation of a strong negative connotation to the term ideology. The use of the term by “political Marxists” to characterize their own belief systems—as well as those of their enemies—seems to have influenced its extension to communism, fascism, and Marxism. But whereas for them ideology meant a class world view—as discussed above—for the opponents of totalitarianism, whether liberal or conservative, it came to mean action-oriented belief systems which were fundamentally irrational. One member of this group defines ideology as “selected or distorted ideas about social systems or a class of social systems when these ideas purport to be factual, and also carry a


9

more or less explicit evaluation of the ‘facts’. … Ideologies consist only of those parts or aspects of a system of social ideas which are distorted or unduly selective from a scientific point of view.”18 Hannah Arendt, Raymond Aron, Daniel Bell, Edwards Shils, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Lewis S. Feuer are among the proponents of this concept of ideology. Most of the social scientists mentioned above advocated the notion of “the end of ideology” in the late 1950s and early 1960s. As Gould puts it, “The target has been the belief patterns which have supplied extremist and totalitarian movements. The aim has been to trace the decline of enthusiasm for such patterns among intellectuals against the background of economic growth and social change.”19 But the rise of the new left and anti-establishment movements in the late 1960s put an end to the notion of the end of ideology. f. Ideology as a system of ideas, beliefs, and values The same factors that influenced the previous conceptualization of ideology—the rise of Nazism and fascism to power—also produced a neutral meaning of the term similar to the “class worldview,” but eliminating the notion of class from the definition. Richard Cox, in his book Ideology, Politics and Political Theory, provides a historical review of how the new meaning developed in Europe and America.20 Ideology in this neutral sense—i.e., without either positive or negative connotations—has been defined in different ways. One restricted historical conception of ideology defines it as “any general pattern of ideas which a) embodies an inclusive interpretation of human history, b) incorporates a highly articulated theory of the social order, c) inculcates these ideas by means of an educational system, d) possesses mass allegiance, and e) is identified with the policy and interests of a major power.”21 At the other end of the spectrum, we have the broad definition of ideology as “an organization of opinions, attitudes and values—a way of thinking about man and society.”22 Feliks Gross offers a middle-range definition which would satisfy most of those who use the concept in a neutral sense.23 A wide range of social scientists and philosophers—including some Marxists—adopt this concept of ideology. They include Feliks Gross, Theodore Adorno, Richard Burks, Robert Lane, Joseph Lapalombara, L. H. Garstin, John Plamentz, George Rudé, H. M. Drucker, C.B. MacPherson, Karl Loewenstein, Willard Mullins, David W. Minar, Leon

10


Dion, Samuel Barnes, Irving Kristol, David Bouchier, William Bluhm, and Jack Goldstone. g. Ideology as a system of meaning Closely related to the above definition of ideology is the cultural or anthropological conception of the term. According to Robert Wuthnow, “Culture may be defined as the entire array of symbols, including objects, acts, utterances, and events, with which reality is apprehended, giving meaning, internalized and communicated. Ideology may then be regarded as any subset of systematic constructions which, in fact, serves as a vehicle for the expression and transmission of collectively shared meanings.”24 This notion of ideology was first conceptualized by Clifford Geertz in his celebrated article “Ideology as a Cultural System,” where he considers ideologies as “schematic images of social order” which attempt “to render otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful, to so construe them as to make it possible to act purposefully within them.”25 This review of the uses of the term ideology is not intended to be comprehensive. For example, it does not cover the uses of ideology by structuralists and linguistic analysts. Nonetheless, it outlines the major uses of the term as it has evolved over time in response to specific historical and cultural circumstances and shows that we cannot talk of a (or the) concept of ideology, but rather of concepts of ideology. Which concept one uses depends upon the nature and interest of the question being pursued. In this work, I use the term ideology in the neutral sense conceptualized by the scholars in group (f) above. In accordance with that conceptualization, I define ideology as a more or less consistent set of political, economic, and social values and beliefs which, in the words of Abbas M. Milani, “can galvanize man into action—or inaction—and turn necessities, preferences, and ideas relating to social issues and social relations into levers of action—or modes of inaction—to change or maintain the status quo.”26 Ideology as defined here has several elements: “1) a set of moral values, taken as absolute, 2) an outline of the ‘good society’ in which those values would be realized, 3) a [more or less] systematic criticism (or, in the case of status quo ideology, affirmation) of the present social arrangements and the analysis of their dynamics, 4) a strategic plan of getting from the present to the future (or, in the case of status quo ideology, how continued progress is built into the system).”27


11

Definitions of Revolution Definitions of the term “revolution” are as diverse as those of “ideology.” More than 75 years ago, Dale Yoder observed that: “The term ‘revolution’ is one of the most used and, one suspects, one of the most misused of words. Both within and without the literature of the social sciences it has acquired a variety of meanings which make it as adaptable to personal purposes as is the chameleon’s skin.”28 As with the definition of ideology, subsequent work on revolution has made the concept more confusing, rather than clarifying it. In this section, I first provide a selection of definitions of “revolution” as it is applied to political change in the state, and then specify the definition to be used in this text. Revolution has been variously defined as: a forcible intervention, either to replace governments, or to change the process of government (Peter Calvert). a sudden and violent overthrow of an established political order (Carl Friedrich). that kind of social change which occurs when the basic institutional values of social order are rejected and new values accepted (Rex Hopper). an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another (Mao Zedong). a sweeping, fundamental change in political organization, social structure, economic property control and the dominant myth of social order, thus indicating a major break in the continuing of a development (Sigmund Newman). Only when [the] pathos of novelty is present and where novelty is connected with the idea of freedom are we entitled to speak of revolution (Hanneh Arendt). Social revolutions … are rapid, basic transformations of a country’s state and class structures, and its dominant ideology (Theda Skocpol, 1982).

12

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY Political revolution is the transformation of power [which] aims to change the style of politics based on the state’s monopoly of armed violence. It aims at the dissolution of the state (Krishan Kumar). A revolution is a fundamental change of social structure brought about in a short period of time (Johan Galtung).

The common element in all these definitions is the idea of change. But what kind of change characterizes a revolution? Responses vary, some being so broad as to include even coups; and others so narrow that they exclude some widely recognized revolutions. The recent definition by Jeffery Paige is both comprehensive and practical: “A revolution is a rapid and fundamental transformation in the categories of social life and consciousness, the metaphysical assumptions on which these categories are based, and the power relations in which they are expressed as a result of widespread popular acceptance of a utopian alternative to the current social order.”29 According to this definition, if a change or rotation in the leadership of a state—no matter how quickly it takes place—does not affect the social structure, it is not considered a revolution. Neither is it any superficial change in social life; rather, it should be “fundamental.” Moreover, the change involved should take place in a relatively short period of time; changes evolving over a long period are not considered revolutions. The transformation undergone should also include “categories of consciousness,” which fits well with the subject matter of the present study. Furthermore, by considering revolution “a result of widespread popular acceptance of a utopian alternative to the current social order,” Paige’s definition seems to accommodate the distinction between “revolution as a content” and “revolution as a mode.”30 It is important to note two more points about Paige’s definition. First, it is “neutral,” attaching neither positive nor negative connotation to the concept. Whether someone views a particular revolution as “good” or “bad” depends on personal values and on the type of changes that the revolution brings about. Second, although bringing about “a rapid and fundamental transformation in the categories of social life and consciousness” is highly likely to involve violence, violence is not part of the definition of revolution as such. Paige’s definition leaves the door open for non-violent revolutions. Such a revolution may seem improbable; it is not impossible or inconceivable, however. For example, if Salvador Allende’s regime had not been toppled by the CIA, or if


13

military intervention had not prevented the democratically elected FIS from assuming power in Algeria, both Chile and Algeria may well have had “peaceful” revolutions.31 Conceptual Framework: A Model of Revolutionary Ideology Before constructing a model of revolutionary ideology, a brief description of a model is necessary.32 a. The model and its functions Wright Mills defines a model as “a more or less systematic inventory of the elements to which we must pay attention if we are to understand something. It is not true or false; it is useful and adequate to varying degrees.”33 It is important to note that a model—as defined here—is not a hypothesis. Neither is it a description of reality or an average type. Rather, it is a heuristic device, a constructed picture of an “objectively possible” world that provides certain constellations of elements which are only approximations of empirical reality. According to Weber, a model is formed “by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sided emphasized view points into a unified analytical construct.”34 Both inductive and deductive methods are used in the construction of a model. A model is not an end in itself; rather it is a means for ordering and understanding empirical reality. On the other hand, as mentioned, a model is not a description of the real world; rather it is a “utopia.” In its construction we approach the empirical phenomenon in question from a particular point of view and build our model by logical reasoning. Mills’s definition considers “understanding something” as the purpose and function of model construction. Understanding something involves making explicit the unique character of a social phenomenon and exploring the motives of the individual actors who brought it about. But understanding is not the only function of a model. According to Weber, the model “offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses.”35 Thus, generation of hypotheses can be another function of a model. A third major use of the model is in comparative studies. According to John McKinney, “A scientific function of the [model] is to order the concrete data so that they be described in terms that make them comparable, so that the experience had in one case, despite its uniqueness, may be made

14


to reveal with some degree of probability what may be expected in others.”36 b. A model of revolutionary ideology Despite the emphasis on the importance of ideology in the literature on revolution, very little work has been done on the study and analysis of revolutionary ideology. Two of the exceptions are George Rudé’s Ideology and Popular Protest and David Bouchier’s Idealism and Revolution. Rudé concentrates on the sources of ideology and studies the popular ideologies of the seventeenth-, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European revolutionary movements. Bouchier’s work, which is of more relevance to this study, develops a model of revolutionary ideology and applies it to the “new ideologies of liberation in Britain and the U.S.” Bouchier summarizes his model, which includes “three capacities which all radical ideologies in social movements possess to varying degrees,” as follows: 1 The radical ideology must identify areas of deprivation or strain and present an attack on the legitimating mechanisms which are associated with them. This attack will embody alternative values, relevant experience, empirical knowledge and theory; and this whole process … will be labelled de-legitimation. 2 Closely related to de-legitimation must be an interpretation of the world which provides an alternative blueprint, a new cognitive universe and an explanation of how the group can act to produce the desired changes. This process … will be called dis-alienation. 3 Finally, the radical ideology, must … ‘find an audience’—it must be communicable as a realistic alternative interpretation. But, more than this, it must be at least minimally flexible, and able to deal with responses, new ideas and new situations, in order to maintain credibility with its audience. To the process I have attached a new name, commutation.37 There are at least two problems with this model. First, Bouchier claims that Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge and recent theories based on phenomenology have contributed to the formation of his model. Although he provides a brief review of those theories, their relation to the model is not clear—except for some extent to the first element, de-


15

legitimation. Second, as can be seen from the above quotation and the subsequent description of the model by Bouchier, he amalgamates several different components and features of radical ideologies in one group. This obscures the importance of those features and produces confusion. I believe a better model of revolutionary ideology can be formulated on the basis of the definition of the concept while bearing in mind the basic elements of ideology. Adapting Abbas M. Milani’s definition of ideology and Jeffery Paige’s definition of revolution, we can define revolutionary ideology as: A more or less consistent set of political, economic, and social values and beliefs which galvanize people into action and turn necessities, preferences, and ideas relating to social issues and social relations into levers of action in order to bring about a rapid and fundamental transformation in the categories of social life, consciousness and power relations. As for the elements of ideology, we saw above that Robert Haber characterized these as: (1) a set of moral values, taken as absolute; (2) an outline of the “good society” in which those values would be realized; (3) a systematic criticism or affirmation of present social arrangements and an analysis of their dynamics; and (4) a strategic plan for getting from the present to the future or for continuing progress under the existing system. Haber further argues that an ideology must have a number of additional characteristics in order to be effectively linked to a political movement— essential for a revolutionary ideology—and for the movement to develop a mass following. Those characteristics are: “(1) the ideology must be easily communicated, which usually involves their simplification and sloganization, (2) they must establish a claim to truth [i.e., ‘a basis of authority—divine, institutional, charismatic’], and (3) they must demand commitment to action.”38 We are now in a position to formulate the following model—ideal type—of revolutionary ideology based on the above definition of the concept and description of the elements of ideology: 1

Political consciousness: The first task of a revolutionary ideology is to foster political consciousness in society. Political consciousness is a prerequisite to “a systematic criticism of the present social arrangements.” “The politically conscious individual” has been

16

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY defined by Johan Galtung as “the person who questions the ability of the social structure to satisfy his own needs and those of the larger group with which he identifies, and wants changes of structure. Personal satisfaction, ‘success,’ is not enough.”39 Unless a significant number of people in a given society develop the capacity to question the existing order and to look beyond their self-interest to the interests of the community as a whole, no revolutionary movement can take off. The importance of “class consciousness” in Marxist theory of revolution is an indicator of this. Bouchier also emphasizes the importance of political consciousness: “If we look at radical movements from the inside, that is, from the viewpoint of committed activists, we can see that the problem facing those who wish to change the social order … is that they must change people’s consciousness.”40 Certainly praxis plays an important role in bringing about political consciousness, but political education is also important. Thus a revolutionary ideology must contain some elements of political education to bring about political consciousness.

2

Criticism of existing social arrangements: According to Galtung, the “systematic criticism of the present social arrangements”—which he calls “data, leading to an image of the rejected present”—composes 20 to 90 percent of “a typical revolutionary ideology.”41 To criticize the present conditions means, in Bouchier’s words, to identify “areas of deprivation or stress, and to present an attack on the legitimating mechanisms which are associated with them.”42 Legitimacy denotes “a condition of positive valuation, validity and acceptance enjoyed by individual rulers, political institutions and movements, and by systems of authority by the reason of [their] accordance … with some law, principles, or source of authorization.”43 A revolutionary ideology would first specify the areas of deprivation and strain and then seek to remove the conditions of positive valuation and validity of the rulers and institutions responsible for them.

3

New set of values: As Hagopain and many other theorists of revolution maintain, revolutions “are not just against something, but they are for establishing something radically new.”44 Criticism of the present social arrangements will introduce some new values, but revolutionary ideology will not limit itself to this. It will introduce new sets of values which will form the basis of the whole revolutionary struggle


17

and the ideal future society. The term “value” is used here as defined by Milton Rokeach: “A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end state of existence.”45 4

Outline of the desired society: In addition to a new set of values, revolutionary ideology presents “an outline of the ‘good society’ in which values can be realized.” This entails a draft of the political, economic and social system of the desired society. While the presentation of such an outline is necessary in order to encourage the people to work for changing the existing system, it need not be detailed and fixed. As Mostafa Rejai argues, “there is a necessary ambiguity in revolutionary ideology, which is inherent in the nature of the phenomenon itself—if only due to its comprehensiveness.” He further maintains that “ambiguity must be deliberately cultivated … [and] the ideology must be diluted” in order to be able to capture wide popular appeal.46 In other words, not only is it impossible for revolutionary ideology to rid itself of ambiguity, it also needs it in order to leave the door open for flexibility.

5

Program of action: “A strategic plan for getting from the present to the future” involves two stages: (a) destruction of the present system, and (b) building the new society. The detailed plan for the second stage can be postponed until the revolutionary movement gains power. A program of action for the first stage, however, will be included in revolutionary ideology. It will specify the forms of action necessary, the key targets of change that the struggle should focus on, and the key agents that will bring about the change.

6

Commitment to action: The revolutionary struggle cannot get started and the program of action cannot be undertaken unless the people are confident of themselves and sure of their victory. According to Robert Michels, “the classes representing a past economic order continue to maintain their social predominance only because the classes representing the present or future economy have as yet failed to become aware of their strength, of their political and economic importance, and of the wrongs which they suffer at the hands of society.” Effective action is inhibited because “a sense of fatalism and

18

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY a sad conviction of impotence exercise a paralysing influence in social life.”47 Therefore, revolutionary ideology calls for commitment to action to eliminate the condition which Bouchier calls “alienation—a sense of powerlessness/meaninglessness, a subjective feeling of helplessness in the face of an all-pervasive social control.”48 Revolutionary ideology provides a sense of mission and selfconfidence to the group of revolutionaries—which can include the whole population.

7

Self-sacrifice and revolutionary patience: Although violence is not part of the definition of revolution, in most revolutionary struggles violence will be unavoidable, because those in power will not give up easily and will use violence at least as a last resort. Since the government controls the means of coercion—the armed forces—the revolutionaries will certainly suffer heavy losses. Even if there is no violence, other forms of revolutionary struggle—such as strikes and civil disobedience—will call for economic and other types of sacrifice on the part of revolutionaries. This point is emphasized by Lenin as well: “For revolution it is essential … that a majority of the workers (or at least a majority of the class-conscious, thinking, politically active workers) should fully understand that revolution is necessary and be ready to sacrifice their lives for it.”49 Thus revolutionary ideology demands sacrifice either through painting a picture of a future society that makes the present privations worthwhile or by appealing to the higher values noted above. Moreover, it calls for revolutionary patience and forbearance in the face of prolonged suffering and sacrifice.

8

Simplification: A revolutionary ideology should be pitched at a sufficient level of complexity and logical coherence to appeal to intellectuals and the educated strata. At the same time, it should be simple enough to appeal to the masses who have been denied a proper education and prevented from developing their understanding of the political process. One of the most effective ways of simplifying revolutionary ideology is to sloganize its main values or those values which attract the masses—e.g., “liberty, equality, and fraternity;” or “peace, land, and bread.” Another means of simplification involves the use of allegories, myths, and symbols.

IDEOLOGY, REVOLUTION, AND REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY 9

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Claim to truth: And last, but not least, a revolutionary ideology—like any other ideology—must establish its “claim to truth.” It goes without saying that no one will accept the criticism offered by a revolutionary ideology of present conditions, its values and outline for the ideal society, and its call for action and sacrifice unless he or she believes them to be true and justified. To be accepted as such, the revolutionary ideology in question must validate the origins of its beliefs and aims in an authoritative source—“God,” “science,” “philosophy,” “tradition,” or a “charismatic leader.” Moreover, it should not contradict people’s life experience, but rather be confirmed by it. It should also seem “rational.” A revolutionary ideology will be more successful in establishing its claim to truth if it can show examples of the embodiment of its values and ideals either in other societies or in individuals.

This concludes the discussion of the model of revolutionary ideology. The model presented here is certainly incomplete, omitting as it does consideration of the sources of ideology and its propagation. I believe, however, that the outline I have given here is adequate for the purpose of this study, i.e., analyzing and understanding the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. It can also serve as a basis for comparative study of revolutionary ideologies as well as for generating hypotheses about factors contributing to the success of revolutions in general.

2 The Ideology of Revolution in the Holy Quran

In his well-known commentary on the Holy Quran, the renowned Muslim scholar Maulana Abul Ala Mawdudi sets out a method for using the Quran as a research tool: If one desires to know the Quranic solution of a certain human problem, he should first make a study of the relevant literature, both ancient and modern, and mark down the basic issues. He should also make use of the research so far done into the problem and note down the issues at point. Then he should study the Quran with a view to finding out the answers to those issues. I can say from my personal experience that when one studies the Quran with a view to making research into any problem, one will find an answer to it even in those verses which one had skipped over without even imagining that it was there.1 Is Mawdudi right? Can one find revolutionary ideas in the Quran? Based on an extensive review of the scholarly literature on ideology and revolution2, in Chapter 1 I presented a model of revolutionary ideology. The model is “neutral” in the sense that it can be used for studying both “liberating” revolutionary ideologies—for example the “liberation theology” of Latin America—and “dominating” revolutionary ideologies such as fascism. In this chapter, I want to explore whether the Quran provides the basis for any revolutionary ideology and, if so, of what type. Does the Holy Quran try to foster political consciousness? How? Does it delegitimize oppressive conditions? What values does it promote? What kind of a social, economic and political system, if any, does it support?

THE IDEOLOGY OF REVOLUTION IN THE HOLY QURAN

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Does it suggest a program of action for revolutionary change and, if so, what is it? Does it call for a commitment to action to eliminate the conditions of powerlessness and meaninglessness discussed in Chapter 1? Does it provide a sense of mission and confidence? How does it encourage its adherents to self-sacrifice and revolutionary patience and forbearance? Is it possible to simplify any revolutionary ideology it might embody by “sloganization” and the use of allegories and symbols? How does it establish its claim to truth? Is it rational? These are the questions for which I intend to seek answers in the Quran, which is the basic source of the religion of Islam and which provides “a firm basis of undoubted authenticity” for the Muslims.3 Occasionally I will use Hadith—the Sayings of the Prophet Muhammad— to clarify or explain some points. Although many orientalists, and some Muslims, doubt the authenticity of Hadith, the great majority of Muslims consider it as the “second source” of Islam. In this chapter I will not present a new interpretation of the Quran, since I am concerned not so much with its “meaning” but rather with its “significance.” The distinction between “meaning” and “significance” has been particularly developed by E. D. Hirsch Jr., the eminent theorist of hermeneutics. According to Hirsch, “The term ‘meaning’ refers to the whole verbal meaning of a text, and ‘significance’ to textual meaning in relation to a larger context, i.e. another mind, another era, a wide subject matter, or an alien system of values, and so on.”4 “Interpretation” involves an explanation of the author’s verbal meaning as understood by the commentator. The “significance” of texts is elucidated by “criticism” which “is not identical with significance, but rather refers to it, talks about it, describes it.”5 While Hirsch is in favor of “critical freedom”—setting aside specific rules and regulations for criticism—he emphasizes the importance of “valid interpretation,” because “from the standpoint of knowledge, valid criticism is dependent on valid interpretation.”6 Hirsch further notes, Usually we cannot even understand a text without perceiving [some relationship between a verbal meaning and something else]. … Nevertheless, we certainly can isolate or at least emphasize a particular goal for our activity. We can decide at a given moment that we are mainly interested in constructing what the author meant rather than in relating that meaning to something else. … On the other hand, we could assume that we have already rightly

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY understood what the author meant and could devote our attention entirely to placing that meaning in some context or relationship.7

Although I do not believe that the meaning of the Quran has ever been completely understood by any of its commentators, I have neither the capability nor the opportunity to present a new interpretation here. Thus, for the purpose of this study I will assume that “we have already rightly understood” the meaning of the Quran and devote my attention entirely to placing that meaning in relationship to the issues raised above. In this study I use the translations and interpretations of the Quran by Abdullah Yusuf Ali8 and Marmaduke Pickthall.9 The use of two translations instead of one will help draw out the various shades of meaning of the original Arabic words that the two translators choose to emphasize. There are two reasons for selecting these two translations in particular. First, they are done by Muslims and in this study I am concerned with the significance of the Quran for revolutionary ideology for Muslims. Second, the fact that both works have undergone numerous reprints in various countries since their original publication in the 1930s is evidence of the fact that Muslims widely consider them as valid interpretations. The rest of this chapter is devoted to a study of the Quran in relation to the individual components of revolutionary ideology identified in Chapter 1. As noted above, references to the Sayings of the Prophet will be minimal. Political Consciousness Previously, “the politically conscious individual” was defined as “the person who questions the ability of the social structure to satisfy his own needs and those of the larger group with which he identifies, and wants changes of structure. Personal satisfaction, ‘success,’ is not enough.”10 Thus, to bring about political consciousness, a revolutionary ideology needs to fulfill three social aims. First, it should “create” new needs among the people; it should not only turn people’s attention to their unfulfilled basic needs, but also to higher needs and values. Second, it should foster a sense of community among the people so that they identify with a larger group and strive for common ideals; and third, it should provide a framework for the popularization of these higher needs and values and for the creation of a sense of community. A study of the Quran shows that it provides for all these elements:

THE IDEOLOGY OF REVOLUTION IN THE HOLY QURAN a

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The most basic concept of Islam is Tawhid which literally means unity and oneness, and in its religious sense it refers to the oneness of God and the unity of mankind. The oneness of God is emphasized throughout the Quran,11 and is expressed supremely in the maxim that “There is no god (entity worthy of worship) but God (the Supreme and Perfect Being).” This dictum, together with the proclamation that “Muhammad is God’s Messenger,” forms the “first pillar” of Islam. Thus, belief in one God is the highest value in Islam and serves as the basis of all Islamic teachings—including its political teachings. A cursory look at the Quran shows that the concept it mentions most often is God—either in the form of His proper name of “Allah” or in the form of one of His attributes. Every Quranic passage turns the reader’s attention towards God in one way or another. Moreover, according to the Quran, the purpose of human creation is to serve God (51:56); thus “serving God” is the supreme goal towards which humanity should strive. Yusuf Ali sums up Muslims’ understanding of the meaning of “serving God” as follows: “Creation is not for idle sport or play [the Quran, 21:16]. God has a serious plan behind it, which in our imperfect state, we can only express by saying that each creature is given the chance of development and progress towards the Goal, which is God. God is the source and the center of all power and all goodness, and our progress depends upon our putting ourselves into accord with His Will. This is His service.”12 “Serving God” certainly has political implications. “God’s Will” as revealed in the Quran is concerned not only with our moral and spiritual well-being and development, but it also embodies clear socio-political directives. As we will see later in this chapter, the Quran emphasizes the principles of equity, equality, justice, freedom and liberation, and social responsibility. Working for the promotion of these principles will require political action. Moreover, according to the Quran, the apostles who were sent by God to various peoples not only preached monotheism but also asked the people to rise up against exploitation, corruption and oppression and led them in their struggles. The Quran also tells believers that the purpose of relating these stories is that they reflect upon them (7:176). Such reflection would certainly lead to the development of political consciousness.

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b

The Quran also aims to develop a sense of community among Muslims. First of all, it stresses the unity of mankind. According to the Quran, the creation and final resurrection of humanity “is in no wise but as an individual soul” (31:28). Mankind lived as “one single nation” at the beginning but later fell out among themselves, and one of the reasons why God sent Messengers was to settle the differences among them (2:213, 10:19). Belief in a common origin and destiny, and the imperative to live as a single nation, is a powerful incentive to develop a sense of community. Such beliefs should motivate people to care more about one another and work for the common good rather than for self-interest. Although ideally all mankind should live as a single brotherly community, obviously this is far from the present reality. According to the Quran, the only way mankind can reach that ideal is by adherence to God’s revelation: “And hold fast, all together, by the Rope which God (stretches out for you), and be not divided among yourselves; and remember God’s favor on you; for ye were enemies and He joined your hearts in love, so that by His Grace, ye became brethren” (3:103). The Quran puts great emphasis on the community and brotherhood of those who adhere to its teachings and ideology: “The Believers are but a single brotherhood” (49:9). “The Believers, men and women, are protectors one of another: they enjoin what is just, and forbid what is evil …” (9:71). And the Prophet has said, “The believers are like one body. If its eye complains, the whole (body) complains; and if its head complains, the whole (body) complains.”13

c

Islam recognizes the importance of organization and enjoins Muslims to work together in an organized manner (the Quran: 61:4).14 Moreover, it has established institutions which—in addition to their other functions—serve to develop a sense of community among Muslims and to popularize its political teachings. Congregational prayer is one such institution. Praying five times a day is a religious duty for all Muslims—with some specific exemptions. Although they can perform these prayers individually, they are encouraged by the Quran and the Prophet to perform them in community.15 At least one weekly prayer—at Friday noon-time—must be performed communally (the Quran, 62:9). Thus, not only do Muslims interact frequently and develop a sense of community, but the place where


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regular congregational prayer is held—the mosque—becomes a center for community affairs. Moreover, in prayer Muslims are exposed to passages from the Quran which remind them of their social and political obligations. Furthermore, the Khutba (speech or sermon) which is an integral part of Friday Prayer and Eid Prayer (larger gatherings held twice a year) provides religious leaders with a great opportunity for political education of the masses and for developing their political consciousness. Hajj (pilgrimage to Makkah) is congregation on a grand scale. In recent years over two million Muslims from different corners of the globe have assembled in Makkah to perform Hajj. The Quran states the purpose of Hajj in general terms: “That they [i.e., the pilgrims] may witness the benefits (provided) for them” (22:28). Commenting on this verse, Yusuf Ali writes, “There are benefits both for this our material life and for our spiritual life. Of the former kind are those associated with social intercourse which furthers trade and increases knowledge. … Of both kinds may be considered the opportunity which the Pilgrimage provides for strengthening our international Brotherhood.”16 Thus, Hajj intensifies Muslims’ sense of community and increases their knowledge of, and concern with, their common good. Criticism of Existing Social Arrangements In general, the Quran distinguishes between two types of social systems. One is characterized as “evil”, while the other is moral and just— established by God’s prophets and righteous rulers. The prime example of an evil social system for the Quran is Egyptian society under the Pharaohs, where Moses rose up to liberate “the Children of Israel.” The Pharaonic system was characterized by: 1

Arrogance: “Pharaoh and his chiefs … behaved insolently: they were an arrogant people” (the Quran, 23:46).

2

Oppression and tyranny: “The people of Pharaoh” set the Israelites “hard tasks and punishments, slaughtered [their] sons and let [their] womenfolk live” (2:49).

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3

Discrimination and division into classes: “Pharaoh exalted himself in the earth and made its people castes. A tribe among them he oppressed …”* (28:4).

4

Luxury and waste: “Pharaoh was verily a tyrant in the land, and lo: he verily was of the wanton”* (10:83).

5

Corruption and indecency: Pharaoh “transgressed beyond bounds in the lands and heaped therein mischief (on mischief)” (89:10-12).

6

Traditionalism and conservatism: Pharaoh and his chiefs rejected Moses’ invitation to change the social system because they did not want to break off their traditional way of life. They told Moses: “Hast thou come to us to turn us away from the ways we found our fathers following?” (10:78).

7

Exploitation: Pharaoh—together with his chiefs—had exploited the inhabitants of Egypt to the extent that he claimed the ownership of the land: “And Pharaoh proclaimed among his people, saying: ‘O my people: Does not the dominion of Egypt belong to me, (witness) these streams flowing underneath my (palace)’?” (43:51) Pharaoh and his chiefs had also enslaved the Israelites. In response to Pharaoh’s mentioning his “favors” to him, Moses replied, “And this is the favor with which thou dost reproach me—that thou hast enslaved the children of Israel?” (26:22)

According to the Quran, these characteristics were not limited to Pharaoh’s Egypt. They are found—more or less—in every society that is not based on moral and just principles. Other examples of evil social systems are those of Noah’s people, and the tribes of Ad, Thamud, and Madian, whose stories are also told in the Quran.17 They were all marked by one or more of the characteristics identified above. Examples of moral and just social systems include the kingdoms of David and Solomon and that of “Zul-Qarnain,” a righteous leader who captured large territories, tried to eliminate wrong-doing and oppression, encouraged righteousness, and protected the weak against the unjust (the Quran, 18:83–98). Does the existence of the abovementioned characteristics of “evil” systems in an Islamic society lead to the delegitimization of political authority? The evidence is mixed. As Beverley Milton-Edwards rightly


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observes, “There is plenty of evidence of medieval jurists and theologians cautioning against internal strife with figures such as al-Ghazali preferring the domination of an unjust tyrant to the unknown dangers of civil conflict.”18 Nonetheless, as Maxim Rodinson notes, “The history of Islam is misrepresented to mystified Muslims and mystical spirits as bathed in perpetual submission. It could actually be much better described as permanent revolution.”19 Milton-Edwards agrees that this has been the case, at least in recent years: “In more contemporary times … Islamist radicals, reformists and moderates have all looked anew at governance and leadership in their own domain, and where they have found them wanting, they have advocated change and protest.”20 3. Quranic Set of Values A comprehensive study of the values promoted in the Quran would need a separate book. The list presented here is based on a study of the very limited and incomplete index to Yusuf Ali’s translation and commentary on the Holy Quran.21 The values noted are listed according to their frequency of occurrence: 1

Belief in God and God-consciousness: These seem to be the most important values for the Quran. Not only is the name of God mentioned several times on each page of the Quran, but it frequently enjoins believers to fear, remember, and worship God—all of which implies belief in God and God-consciousness.

2

Success and salvation: Statistically, this is the second most important Quranic value. It seems to refer to both salvation in the Hereafter and success in this world.22

3

Sharing, charity, generosity: Sharing and charity seem to be the most important social values in the Quran—and they also imply generosity at the personal level. Many passages enjoin Muslims to spend freely the bounties that God has given them. Many others consider openhandedness and Zakat23 as a characteristic of a believer, while other passages condemn covetousness.

4

Activeness (in doing good deeds): According to the Quran, belief by itself is not good enough, and must lead to good deeds to be considered authentic. This explains why, in many places in the Quran, belief in

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY God is coupled with doing good deeds. “If any do deeds of righteousness—be they male or female—and have faith, they will enter Heaven, not the least injustice will be done to them” (4:124). This value is highly regarded in the Quran.

5

Patience and perseverance: The Quran considers patience and perseverance acts of righteousness and characteristics of a believer. It refers to these qualities mostly in the context of Jihad and struggle in the cause of God.

6

Truthfulness and sincerity: Islam—like all religions—enjoins honesty and sincerity and condemns lying and hypocrisy. In general, the Quran takes the honesty of believers for granted and only in a few places does it emphasize the importance of truthfulness and sincerity. There are many passages, however, that condemn hypocrisy and hypocrites.

7

Piety and self-restraint: The Arabic word for piety is Taqwa which according to Yusuf Ali signifies “(1) the fear of God; … (2) restraint or guarding one’s tongue, hand and heart from evil; (3) hence righteousness, piety, good conduct.”24 Although in the Arabic text all these ideas are implied by the term, in his translation Yusuf Ali indicates only a single meaning according to the context. The number of passage in which Taqwa has been translated as righteousness or piety would rank this concept seventh in the list of Quranic values.

8

Equality and brotherhood, unity, companionship: According to the Quran, as we have seen, mankind has a common origin. People are thus equal to one another regardless of race, language, color, worldly possessions, family background, etc. Moreover, all those who adhere to Islam are considered as a single brotherhood. They are described as friends and protectors of one another and are commanded to remain united. The values of equality, unity, and companionship are instilled by, and manifested in, Islamic congregational prayer and Hajj. These qualities are also emphasized in the Quran.

9

Militancy (in the cause of God and the oppressed): Unlike some other religions, Islam permits its followers to take up arms and fight in their


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own defense, the defense of their religion, and the defense of oppressed people. “To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight), because they are wronged;—verily, God is most powerful for their aid” (22:39). Although in the Western literature and journalism Islamic militancy is referred to as Jihad, the Quranic term for it is Qital (fighting). Jihad, as we will see later, has a wider range of meaning. 10 Devotion and self-sacrifice: Struggle in the cause of God and the oppressed requires devotion and self-sacrifice. These values are also emphasized in the Holy Quran. “Think not of those who are slain in God’s way as dead. Nay, they live, finding their sustenance from their Lord. … They rejoice in the Grace and the Bounty from God” (3:169–171). 11 Justice and equity: The Holy Quran considers justice and harmony as a universal law of creation. At the social level, it considers the establishment of a just society as a major mission of the prophets. And at the personal level, it asks believers to judge with justice even if the outcome proves harmful to themselves or to those close to them (4:135). 12 Courage and self-confidence: Courage and self-confidence are also required in the struggle in the cause of God and the oppressed, and are frequently enjoined by the Quran. 13 Liberation and freedom: The Holy Quran links the cause of God with the cause of those who are oppressed (4:75). In more than 30 instances it commands believers to strive and fight in the cause of God—which also implies the struggle against oppression. Moreover, large sections of the Quran are devoted to the story of Moses, whose mission was to liberate the Israelites from Egyptian domination and guide them on the right path. 14 Kindness and compassion: Like other religions, Islam enjoins kindness to parents, relatives, neighbors, and those in need. 15 Obedience (to divine authority and righteous leaders): Obedience is considered a prime value by the Quran only in reference to divine

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY authority. Occasionally it refers to obedience to worldly leaders or parents, but even that is conditional on their obedience to God and the Apostle.

16 Keen observation, reasoning, reflection: These qualities are all recommended in the Holy Quran. In over 75 instances in the Quran, natural phenomena are referred to as “Signs of God.” Moreover, according one scholar, “repeated about fifty times in the Koran is the verb aqala which means ‘connect ideas together, reason, understand and [conduct] intellectual argument.’ Thirteen times we come upon the refrain, after a piece of reasoning: a fa-la taqilun, ‘have ye then no sense?’”25 All these references imply the importance of reasoning and rationality and mankind’s keen observation of, and reflection upon, natural phenomena. 17 Dependability: The Quran requires believers to be dependable and trustworthy. It enjoins them to fulfill their contracts and obligations, not to betray their trust, and to stand firm in their testimony. 18 Jihad (exerting one’s utmost): The Quran invites believers to Jihad over and over again. Yusuf Ali translates Jihad as “strive,” and notes in explanation: It may require fighting in God’s cause, as a form of self-sacrifice. But its essence consists in (1) a true and sincere Faith, which so fixes its gaze on God that all selfish or worldly motives seem paltry and fade away, and (2) an earnest, and ceaseless activity, involving the sacrifice (if need be) of life, person, or property, in the service of God. Mere brutal fighting is opposed to the whole spirit of Jihad, while the sincere scholar’s pen or preacher’s voice or wealthy man’s contribution may be the most valuable forms of Jihad.26 The wider meaning of Jihad is evident from the Hadith of the Prophet where he describes “the best Jihad” as the utterance of the truth before a tyrant.27 19 Chastity: Chastity is valued in the Quran, and believers—both men and women—should avoid indecency and shameful deeds.


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20 Humility: The Quran condemns arrogance and admires humility. “And swell not thy cheek (for pride) at men, nor walk in insolence through the earth, for God loveth not any arrogant boaster” (31:18). 21 Mobility in the search for knowledge: The Holy Quran instructs its readers to travel around the world in order to study past civilizations and the origins of creation (e.g. 30:9, 29:20). It also states, “Do they not travel through the land, so that their hearts (and minds) may thus learn wisdom and their ears may thus learn to hear” (22:46)? 22 Forgiveness: The Quran allows retribution but commends forgiveness. It also enjoins believers to turn away evil with good (13:22). 23 Firmness and steadfastness: Although the quality of “perseverance,” which was mentioned above, implies steadfastness as well, there are several instances where the Quran explicitly commends firmness and steadfastness as values in themselves. 24 Moderation: The Quran enjoins moderation not only in consumption of food and drink, in spending wealth, and in one’s bearing and speech, but even in religion. “O People of the Book! Commit no excess in your religion: nor say of God aught but the truth” (4:171). 25 Frugality: The Quran condemns wastefulness and commends wise management of economic resources. 26 Self-defense: The Quran enjoins Muslims to defend themselves when they are attacked by an enemy. “Will ye not fight people who violated their oaths, plotted to expel the Apostle, and attacked you first? Do ye fear them? Nay, it is God whom ye should more justly fear, if ye believe!” (9:13). 27 Courtesy: The Quran enjoins believers to be courteous to one another and to avoid mockery, backbiting, defaming, and slandering. 28 Peace: Despite its emphasis on militancy, Islam places a high value on peace. First of all, the word “Islam” itself means peace, in addition to

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY its other meanings.28 Secondly, according to the Quran, the Muslim salutation Salamun Alaikum (“Peace on you”) will be the greeting of the Righteous in the Hereafter (7: 46, and several other places). And thirdly, the Quran promises those who believe and do righteous deeds that God will “grant them in the land, inheritance (of power) … and that He will change (their state), after the fear in which they (lived), to one of security and peace” (24:55).

29 Social responsibility: The values of sharing, militancy, liberation, justice, activeness in doing good and self-exertion to the utmost all imply social responsibility. But there are some instances in which the Quran directly commands believers to fulfill their social responsibilities by enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong. 30 Tranquility: The Quran considers serenity and peace of mind as both valuable qualities in themselves and a gift from God. “[Guided are] Those who believe, and whose hearts find satisfaction in the remembrance of God: for without doubt in the remembrance of God do hearts find satisfaction” (13:28). Other qualities placed towards the end of the list include independence and self-sufficiency, cooperation, seriousness, excellence, discipline, cleanliness, caution, and—last but not least—the importance of consultation. Outline of the Good Society Numerous books and articles have been written on the social, political and economic teachings of Islam and their implementation in an ideal Islamic society. I do not propose to offer a detailed treatment of the subject here, however. As far as the ideology of revolution in the Quran is concerned, an outline of the hoped-for good society will suffice. In Chapter 1, I cited Mostafa Rejai’s observation on the “necessary ambiguity in revolutionary ideology, which is inherent in the nature of the phenomenon itself.”29 Whether as a result of such “ambiguity” or Islam’s recognition of the dynamics of “permanence and change,”30 the Quran certainly does not provide a simple blueprint of the ideal society. What it does provide are: (1) the main values—listed in section 3 above—which should not only be cherished by individual Muslims but should also prevail in Islamic society


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at large; and (2) the basic general principles upon which the social, political and economic systems of the ideal Islamic society should be built. The Quran grants Muslims the prerogative and responsibility of devising the details of their social, political and economic systems on the basis of those general principles and in such a way that Islamic values prevail. Thus, there can be more than one Islamic social, political and economic system; but the values they embody and their basic principles would be the same. Some of the general principles which can contribute to the ideal Islamic society are discussed briefly below. 1

Islamic law as the law of the land: Controversy is rife among Muslim intellectuals whether Islamic law—Sharia—should form the fundamental law of the land in Muslim societies—especially after the crimes committed by the Taliban in Afghanistan in the name of Sharia. This is not the place to resolve that debate. A study of the Holy Quran, however, seems to confirm the view that Sharia or Islamic law should be the basic law of an Islamic society. According to the Quran, God prescribed a code of law to the followers of each of the prophets: “… to each among you have We prescribed a law and an Open Way …” (5:48). Each prophet and his followers were commanded to rule and judge according to the Divine Law: “… If any do fail to judge by (the light of) what God hath revealed, they are (no better than) unbelievers; … they are (no better than) wrong doers; … they are (no better than) those who rebel” (5:47–50). What is Sharia? This is an important question that lies at the heart of the debate on the issue. In the view of one eminent Muslim scholar, Muhammad Asad: Because it is restricted to commands and prohibitions expressed in self-evident terms in Quran and Sunnah [i.e., the tradition of the Prophet], the real Shariah is extremely concise, and therefore, easily understandable; and because it is so small in volume, it cannot—nor … was it ever intended to—provide detailed legislation for every contingency of life. Consequently, the Law-Giver meant us Muslims to provide for the necessary, additional legislation through the exercise of our Ijtihad (independent reasoning) in consonance with the spirit of Islam.”31 This view, however, is not shared by the majority of Sunni Muslims—both religious scholars and laymen—who consider the corpus of law developed by the scholars of early Islam as Sharia and

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY believe that the doors of Ijtihad are closed. However, there is nothing in the Quran to support this view. On the contrary, the view that “independent reasoning” should be used to legislate for new laws— on the basis of the teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah (tradition of the Prophet), and in areas where no clear ruling can be found in those sources—finds support in the Sayings of the Prophet. For example, When [Muadh ibn Jabal] was being sent [as a governor] to the Yemen, the prophet asked him: ‘How will you decide the cases that will be brought before you?’ Muadh replied: ‘I shall decide them according to the Book of God.’—‘And if you find nothing concerning [a particular matter] in the Book of God?’—‘Then I shall decide it according to the Sunnah of God’s Apostle.’— ‘And if you find nothing about it in the Sunnah of God’s Apostle?”—‘Then,’ replied Muadh, ‘I shall exercise my own judgment [ejtahidu bi-ray] without the least hesitation.’ Thereupon the Prophet slapped him upon the chest and said: ‘Praised be God, who has caused the messenger of God’s Messenger to please the latter.’32

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Sovereignty belongs to God: According to the Quran, “The Command rests with none but God” (6:57, 12:40). Thus, ultimate authority belongs to God, and Muslim rulers and the Muslim population in general cannot make any laws and rules which run counter to the teachings of the Quran and the Prophet. As another verse puts it: “Is it not fitting for a Believer, man or woman, when a matter has been decided by God and His Apostle, to have any option about their decision: if any one disobeys God and His Apostle, he is indeed on a clearly wrong Path” (33:36).

3

The basis of legitimacy: An Islamic government can claim the loyalty and allegiance of the members of the society it represents on the basis of the following verse of the Quran: “O ye who believe! Obey God, and obey the Apostle, and those charged with authority among you.” (4:59). But as noted earlier, the legitimacy of the government is conditional on its compliance with the teachings of the Quran and the Prophet.


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4

The functions of government: The Holy Quran has nothing specific to say about the functions of government. It can be assumed, however, that since (as I have argued) the Divine Law should be the law of the land, the main function of an Islamic government will be to implement that law in society. It should also provide for the legislation of new laws based on the Divine Law. The other main function of an Islamic government will be to provide the conditions so that Islamic values prevail in society—especially justice and equity, for the establishment of which the prophets were sent (the Quran, 57:25).

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Consultation as the chief principle for decision-making: According to the Quran, one of the characteristics of Muslims is that they carry out their affairs on the basis of mutual consultation and counsel: “[Believer are those] who (conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation” (42:38). As Muhammad Asad notes, “This nass [definite ordinance] injunction must be regarded as the fundamental, operative clause of all Islamic thought relating to statecraft. It is so comprehensive that it reaches out into almost every department of political life, and it is so self-expressive and unequivocal that no attempt at arbitrary interpretation can change its purport.”33 However, no guidelines are given as to how consultation should be carried out in practice.

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Criteria for the appointment of leaders: Since the implementation of Islamic law is one of the main functions of an Islamic government, Muslim scholars agree that the head of an Islamic government should be a Muslim. This is one important criterion for the appointment of leaders. The other important criterion is piety and righteousness. This is based on the verse of the Quran that, “Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of you” (49:13). Two other criteria are mentioned in the story of Talut’s (Saul’s) appointment as leader of the Israelites. They are knowledge and physical health and strength (2:247). The story clearly rejects financial status as a criterion, and its context shows that “knowledge” does not refer to religious knowledge. Moreover, exclusive leadership of the Ulama (religious scholars) has never been claimed in Sunni Islam due to a lack of institutionalization of religious scholarship.

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY On the question of the method of appointment of the leadership, the Quran is silent. The principle of consultation mentioned above suggests that all the members of a given society should have a voice. Moreover, some Muslim scholars translate the phrase Uolel amri minkum in verse 59, chapter four of the Quran as “those in authority from among you” and interpret it to mean that the leader should be elected from among the Muslim population.34 But still the question remains: how should the leader be elected and for how long? There is no answer to this question in the Holy Quran and the traditions of the Prophet.

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Rights and responsibilities of citizens: As noted above, it is a prerogative of Muslims to live in a society where the government provides the conditions for the fulfillment of Islamic values. Moreover, it is a right and a responsibility of Muslims to be concerned with the affairs of their government and to make constructive criticism. This principle is based on the verse of the Quran that, “You are the best of the Peoples evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in God” (3:110). The Prophet has also been reported as saying, “Nay, by God, you must enjoin right and forbid wrong, and you must stay the hand of the wrong doer, bend him to conformity with justice (al-haqq) and force him to do justice—or else God will set the hearts of you all against one another.”35 Based on another verse (4:60) of the Quran, it is the duty of citizens to obey the decrees of government. This obedience is not unconditional, however. The text itself sets the limits to obedience by reiterating the word “obey” while referring to “God” and “the Apostle” and omitting it when referring to “those charged with authority.” Another verse (60:12) is more unequivocal. It is a remarkable text which confirms the political rights of women by discussing their right to approach the Prophet (the leader of the Islamic state at the time) and take an oath of allegiance—which is certainly a political act. It also notes what the oath should include: “… that they will not associate in worship any other thing with God … and that they will not disobey thee in any just matter” (emphasis added). Since Muslims could never imagine the Prophet giving unjust orders, the verse signifies the fact that no leader—not even the Prophet himself, and certainly not husbands and fathers—can expect blind obedience by any member of the Islamic community.


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As Yusuf Ali notes in his commentary on the verse, “Islam requires strict discipline but not slavishness.”36 The Hadith of the Prophet also emphasizes this point: “no obedience is due in sinful matters: behold, obedience is due only in the way of righteousness (filmaruf).”37 And “No obedience is due to him who rebels against God.”38 8

Adherence to faith as the basis of social solidarity: Islamic society is a society of the faithful. In such a society the basis of social solidarity is a common belief rather than common blood or race or language (3:103). In such a society there should be a harmony of interest among all its members because all work for the same goal, that is, to serve God. In such a society each member should love for the others what he loves for himself. The Prophet has said, “No one has real faith unless he desires for his brother that which he desires for himself.39 In such a society there should be mutual cooperation among its members at all levels—rather than continuous conflict among different interest groups. Again the Prophet Muhammad is reported as saying, “The Faithful are to one another like [parts of] a building—each part strengthening the others.”40 And the Quran commands, “O ye who believe! Fulfill (all) obligations. … Help ye one another in righteousness and piety, but help ye not one another in sin and rancour” (5:1, 3).

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The family as an important social institution: Islam puts great emphasis on the family as a basic social institution. The Quran enjoins Muslims: “Marry those among you who are single, or the virtuous ones among your slaves, male or female: if they are in poverty, God will give them means of His grace” (24:32). Numerous passages in the Quran are also devoted to the discussion of norms and rules of marriage, relations between husband and wife, relations between children and parents, and the laws of inheritance. From this detailed treatment of the subject in the Quran—and also the emphasis on it in the traditions of the Prophet—it is clear that Islam considers the upholding of the family as both a religious duty and a cornerstone of society.

10 The mosque as another important social institution: Mosques play a very important role in the life of Muslims. Each neighborhood has its

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY own mosque which serves not only as a place of worship but also as a community center. Several neighborhoods have a larger mosque as their meeting place which brings them together at least once a week on Fridays. Each Muslim city has one or more mosques where all the people of the city meet at least twice a year on the occasions of Eid. And then there is the Grand Mosque in Makkah which brings together millions of Muslims from different corners of the globe at least once a year during Hajj. The importance of the mosque in the life of believers has also been stated in the Quran (9:18).

11 Zakat as an important financial institution: The Quran commands Muslims to pay Zakat (regular charity) and makes it clear that it is additional to their occasional charitable giving (2:177). The Quran also includes “those employed to administer the (funds)” among the recipients of Zakat (9:60). This shows clearly that Zakat should be collected and distributed in an organized form, and in early Islamic society it was the government that undertook this task.41 The Quran specifies the areas of expenditure for the Zakat fund (9:60), but not the rate at which it should be set or the financial threshold over which it should be paid. Generally the threshold and rates set by the Prophet have been taken as universally applicable.42 12 Trusteeship from God as the basis of ownership: According to the Quran, “To God belongeth all that is in the heaven and on earth” (2:284, 4:126). “And what cause have ye why ye should not spend in the cause of God? For to God belongs the heritage of the heavens and the earth” (57:10). Thus, the absolute ownership of property is not vested in any individual or group; it belongs to God—and therefore to the community. Commenting on the verse that “To those weak of understanding make not over your property, which God hath made a means of support for you …” (4:5), Yusuf Ali writes: “This applies to orphans, but the wording is perfectly general. … Your property: Ultimately all property belongs to the Community, and is intended for the support of you, i.e., the community. It is held in trust by a particular individual.”43 The individual should not abuse this trust or spend it unwisely, as stated in the verse quoted above and elsewhere: “And do not eat up your property among yourselves for vanities, nor use it as bait for the judges, with intent that ye may


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eat up wrongfully and knowingly a little of (other) people’s property” (2:188). This verse—along with several others and many Sayings of the Prophet—also shows that property cannot be acquired by unlawful means. Lawful property enjoyed within the limits of the trust by which it is held, however, is inviolable.44 13 Equitable distribution of wealth: An Islamic government should manage the national resources in such a way that it brings about an equitable distribution of wealth in society. This principle is based on this verse of the Quran: “What God has bestowed on His Apostle (and taken away) from the people of the township belongs to God, to His Apostle [that is, the Islamic state] and to kindred and orphans, the needy and wayfarer, in order that it may not (merely) make a circuit between the wealthy among you.” (59:7, emphasis added). The Quran also condemns the hoarding of wealth: “And there are those who bury gold and silver and spend it not in the Way of God: announce unto them a most grievous penalty” (9:34). The interpretation of this verse, however, has been a subject of controversy from the early days of Islam. One writer puts the controversy in a nutshell: “Ibn Omar [one of the companions of the Prophet] said, ‘All wealth whose Zakat dues have been paid cannot be described as hidden treasures, even if it is buried in the ground.’ Abu Zar [another companion of the Prophet] said: ‘All wealth which is in excess of the needs of its owners is the cursed wealth deemed hidden treasure.”45 Although the first view has prevailed among Muslims for centuries, the second view seems more plausible in the light of the following verse of the Quran: ‘They ask thee how much they are to spend; say: ‘What is beyond your needs’” (2:219). It should be noted that equitable distribution of wealth is not the same as complete economic equality. The Holy Quran recognizes natural differences among people, but it enjoins those who are better endowed to do more good: “It is He [God] who hath made you (His) agents, inheritors of the earth: He hath raised you in ranks, some above others: that He may try you in the gifts He hath given you: for thy Lord is quick in punishment: yet He is indeed Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful” (4:165). 14 Ban on usury and fraud: As a means of eliminating exploitation in society, Islam bans usury and fraud. The Quran strongly condemns

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY fraud: “Woe to those that deal in fraud—those who, when they have received by measure from men, exact full measure, but when they have to give by measure or weight to men, give less than due …” (83:1–3). Its condemnation of usury is even stronger: “Those who devour usury will not stand except as stands one whom the Evil One by his touch hath driven to madness. That is because they say: ‘Trade is like usury,’ but God hath permitted trade and forbidden usury” (2:275). The Quran even goes as far as declaring war against usurers and the system of usury (2:279). There is a difference of opinion on the definition of usury, however. Many Muslim scholars consider usury to include the interest paid by a bank. Some others—including Yusuf Ali—hold the view that it excludes interest.46

15 Seeking knowledge as a duty: As noted earlier, the Quran puts great emphasis on the study of natural phenomena and of history.47 The Quran also emphasizes man’s mastery over the forces of nature. It states, for example, “… It is He [God] Who hath made the ships subject to you, that they may sail through the sea by His Command; and the rivers (also) hath He made subject to you. And He hath made subject to you the sun and the moon, both diligently pursuing their courses; and the Night and the Day hath He (also) made subject to you” (14:32–33). Commenting on these verses Yusuf Ali writes, Man can understand and control the forces of nature so as to bring them to his own service. … He has been made [God’s] Vicegerent on earth (11. 30): God commanded the highest creatures to bow down to Adam (11. 34). Man, by God’s command, can use rain to produce food for himself, make ships to sail the seas; use rivers as highways, and cut canals for traffic and irrigation. Not only this, but even the heavenly bodies can (by God’s command) contribute to his needs. … Because there are laws here, which man can understand and calculate, he can use such things for his own service, and in that sense the heavenly bodies are themselves made subject to him by God’s command.48 It is also interesting to note that the first verses of the Quran revealed to Muhammad mentioned reading, teaching and the pen: “Read: In the name of thy Lord who createth, createth man from a clot. Read:


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And thy Lord is the Most Bounteous, who teacheth by the pen, teacheth man that which he knew not. Nay, but verily man is rebellious; that he thinketh himself independent”* (96:1–7). We can appreciate the significance of these verses more when we remember that the Prophet himself was illiterate and lived in a society where only a handful of people could read and write. All this demonstrates the importance of knowledge and science from the Quranic point of view. It seems that the Quran considers it a duty of Muslims—individually and collectively—to search for knowledge and to work for gaining mastery over the forces of nature. Some of the Sayings of the Prophet express this duty explicitly: “[The] search for knowledge is a sacred duty [faridah] imposed on every Muslim man and woman;”49 “Search knowledge though it be in China.”50 Program of Action I noted in Chapter 1 that a program of action for revolutionary transformation “will specify the forms of action necessary, the key targets of change that the struggle should focus on, and the key agents that will bring about the change.”51 Each element of this proposed program of action will be studied from the Quranic point of view: a

Forms of action: According to the Quran, those who want to bring about changes in society must start with themselves. They must first change their values and the attitudes and behaviors based upon those values. In the words of the Quran, “Lo! Allah changeth not the condition of a folk until they (first) change that which is in their hearts”* (13:11).52 The reason for this position is that for the Quran, “Whatever misfortune happens to you, is because of the things your hands have wrought” (42:30). Commenting on this verse, Yusuf Ali writes, “All evil, all sorrow, all pain and affliction, are things not normal, things twisted from the pure and holy nature as created by God’s hands. As far as man is concerned, his misfortunes are but the consequences of the things he has done. He must bear personal responsibility for them and not throw the blame on others.”53 Thus, if there is oppression in a society, it is because there are some people who oppress and others who accept oppression. Except in extreme cases, physical weakness does not justify the inaction of the oppressed from the Quranic point of view (4:97–98). The Quran

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY describes true believers as those “who when an oppressive wrong is inflicted on them, (are not cowed but) help and defend themselves” (42:39). At the same time, the Quran realizes that fighting oppression could lead to further oppression. Thus, it warns that, “The recompense for an injury is an injury equal thereto (in degree): but if a person forgives and makes reconciliation, his reward is due from God: for God loveth not those who do wrong” (42:40). After a individual or group have transformed themselves so that they neither accept oppression nor oppress others, the second stage for a Muslim program of political action is invitation and propagation. When Moses received enlightenment and found the courage to stand up to Pharaoh and his chiefs, his first action was to persuade them to liberate the Israelites, and at the same time he invited both the Egyptians and his own people to accept his liberating message (the Quran, 20:42–67, 26:10–69). Other prophets whose stories have been told by the Quran also used invitation and propagation as a technique. The Prophet Muhammad—and thus Muslims in general—was instructed by the Quran: “Invite (all) to the Way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue them in ways that are best and most gracious” (16:125). This verse provides a general guideline for the formulation of specific policies and procedures. Inviting “with wisdom” means that the sociopolitical situation of the society in question should be carefully studied. In the words of Yusuf Ali, it involves “meeting people on their own ground and convincing them with illustrations from their own knowledge and experience, which may be very narrow, or very wide. Our [invitation] must be not dogmatic, not self regarding, not offensive, but gentle, considerate, and such as would attract their attention. Our manner and arguments should not be acrimonious, but modeled on the most courteous and the most gracious example.”54 In the course of the invitation and propagation process, the oppressive regime will certainly resort to the persecution of those who oppose it. In this situation, “revolutionaries” can—and should— do two things: (1) patiently persevere and continue their peaceful resistance against the regime, and (2) develop clandestine means of organization and resistance. The Quran refers to both courses of action in the case of the liberation struggle by Moses and his people: “Said the chiefs of Pharaoh’s people: ‘Will thou leave Moses and his people, to spread mischief in the land, and to abandon thee and thy


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gods?’ He [Pharaoh] said: ‘Their male children will we slay; only their females will we save alive; and we have over them (power) irresistible.’ Said Moses to his people: ‘Pray for help from God, and (wait) in patience and constancy: for the earth is God’s, to give as a heritage to such of His servants as He pleaseth; and the end is (best) for the righteous’” (7:127–28). “We [God] inspired Moses and his brother, (saying): ‘Appoint houses for your people in Egypt and make your houses oratories, and establish worship. And give good news to the believers’”* (10:87–88).55 Sooner or later, the oppressive regime will threaten the very existence of the “revolutionary” movement. If the movement is not ready for direct confrontation, the Quran advises withdrawal: “O My [God’s] servants who believe! Truly, spacious is My Earth: therefore serve ye Me—(and Me alone)” (29:56). “To those who leave their homes in the cause of God, after suffering oppression,—We will assuredly give a goodly home in this world; but truly the reward of the Hereafter will be greater. If they only realize (this)” (16:41)! In some cases the purpose of this flight or withdrawal is to escape from the oppression altogether—as in the Exodus of the Israelites from Egypt. In other cases it involves finding a place of refuge in order to carry on the struggle against the oppressive regime. The Quran is clear on this point: “Those who believed, and adopted exile, and fought for the faith, … as well as those who gave (them) asylum and aid,—these are (all) friends and protectors one of another” (8:72, emphasis added).56 As it is clear from the last verse quoted, the Quran allows armed struggle as a form of revolutionary action. There are many verses, however, which warn against excesses by “revolutionaries”: “Fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for God loveth not transgressors” (2:190). According to the Quran, armed struggle is justified because structural violence is more oppressive than direct violence:57 “And slay them [the enemies] wherever ye catch them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out; for tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter” (2:191). Does Islam allow guerrilla warfare and/or terrorism as forms of revolutionary action? Guerrilla warfare is different from terrorism. In the former, a revolutionary movement engages in fighting against an oppressive regime and seeks to damage its interests and crush its power. Terrorism, on the other hand, involves the sporadic,

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY indiscriminate use of violence which endangers the lives of innocent people in order to achieve political goals. A revolutionary movement may resort to terrorism in order to engender terror among both the general population and the ruling group, and thus undermine the latter’s legitimacy. When the Quran urges believers to leave the place where they live under oppression and launch a struggle against the oppressive regime, it appears to be advocating guerrilla warfare rather than terrorism. The issue of terrorism will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter.

b

Targets of change: The targets of change are clearly the oppressive situations discussed above. The revolutionary struggle will be focused on those responsible for these situations. In general, the Quran identifies two responsible groups: 1

The power elite: According to the Quran, whenever God’s Messengers went to a people to preach monotheism, to eliminate oppression, and to establish justice, it was the “leaders” and “chiefs” who opposed and resisted them (7:60, 66, 75, 88, 109; 23:24, 33, 46). Thus “the chiefs”—or the power elite—are responsible for oppression and should be the target of revolutionary struggle. Ironically, according to the Quran, the power elite unknowingly plants the seeds of its own destruction by its oppressive measures: “… Thus have We placed leaders in every town, its wicked men, to plot (and burrow) therein: but they plot only against their own souls, and they perceive it not” (6:123).

2

The economic elite: The other group considered responsible for the creation of deprivation and oppression—and thus targets of revolutionary struggle—are the “wealthy ones” or the economic elite (34:34). This conservative group opposes any kind of change lest it damage its privileged position: “… Just in the same way, whenever We [God] sent a Warner before thee [Muhammad] to any people, the wealthy ones among them said: ‘We found our fathers following a certain religion and we will certainly follow in their footsteps’” (43:23). The Quran also considers the economic elite and its crimes responsible for the destruction of whole societies and civilizations (121:1216; 17:16).

THE IDEOLOGY OF REVOLUTION IN THE HOLY QURAN c

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Agents of change: The agents of change consist of the revolutionary leaders and the people who join them. 1

The leaders: According to the Holy Quran, in the past it was the Apostles and Messengers appointed by God who provided leadership of the religio-ideological movements that sought to eliminate corruption and oppression and to establish monotheism and justice. In their absence, it is the duty of those who believe in their Message—and specifically those who believe in the Message revealed to Muhammad—to undertake the task: “Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong; they are the ones to attain felicity” (3:104). The criteria for judging right and wrong have been set forth in the Quran. As noted above, oppression, tyranny, corruption, and exploitation are considered wrong and indeed evil in the Quran and it is the duty of Muslims to oppose them. The Prophet has said, “If any of you sees something evil, he should set it right by his hand; if he is unable to do so, then by his tongue; and if he is unable to do even that, then within his heart—but this is the weakest form of faith.”58 Thus it is the duty of all Muslims to struggle against such evils according to their capabilities and the circumstances that they find themselves in. Those who have a better opportunity to undertake this duty should initiate the struggle and provide leadership.

2

The followers: The Quran addresses its Message to an-Nas—“the people.”59 Thus for the Quran all people—regardless of social class, economic strata, race, nationality, blood and tribal affiliation, and sex—have the potentiality for accepting its message, and the struggle against the evils of oppression and corruption is not restricted to any particular nation or class. A close study of the stories of the prophets, however, indicates that most of those who joined their revolutionary movements came from among the weak and the oppressed. For example, “the chiefs of the Unbelievers among [Noah’s] people said: ‘We see (in thee [O Noah]) nothing but a man like ourselves: nor do we see that any follow thee but the meanest among us …” (11:27). “The

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY leaders of the arrogant party among [Salih’s] people said to those who were reckoned powerless—those among them who believed: ‘know ye indeed that Salih is an apostle from his Lord?’ They said: ‘We do believe in the revelation which hath been sent through him’” (7:75, emphasis added to both verses).

Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence The Holy Quran places great emphasis on eradicating attitudes of fatalism, apathy, and powerlessness. It seeks to encourage a commitment to action and to eliminate “alienation” in a number of ways: a

The Quran seeks to inculcate the qualities of activism, militancy, Jihad, and self-defense in believers, as noted in section (3) above.

b

The Quran equates lack of faith with low morale and a willingness to retreat when resisted in situations of conflict: “They will do you no harm, barring a trifling annoyance: if they come out to fight you, they will show you their backs, and no help shall they get” (3:111). It elevates this principle into a sociological law: “And if those who disbelieve join battle with you they will take to flight, and afterwards they will find no protecting friend nor helper. It is the law of Allah which hath taken course aforetime. Thou wilt not find for the law of Allah aught of power to change”* (48:22-23). The Quran also condemns the efforts and schemes of those lacking faith as futile and likely to rebound against them: “The parable of those who take protectors other than God is that of the Spider, who builds (to itself) a house; but truly the flimsiest of houses is the Spider’s house;—if they but knew” (29:41). “Do then those who devise evil (plots) feel secure that God will not cause the earth to swallow them up, or that the Wrath will not seize them from directions they little perceive” (16:45)?

c

According to the Quran, those who engage in corruption, oppression, injustice and exploitation are doomed to destruction. Over and over, it tells how those who committed these evils in the past, and rejected the “right path,” were destroyed, and how those who rose up against them were saved.60 It also encourages its readers to travel widely and study past civilizations, and so discover the evidence for this


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themselves.61 If this is the case, then no matter how strong the forces of evil, believers should not despair or lose hope. d

e

According to Islam, “God is the Greatest.”62 He is far above anything or anyone that man knows or can imagine. He is Almighty, Most Powerful, Irresistible. He is “Lord of the Throne of glory, doer (without let) of all that He intends” (85:15-16). “To God belong the forces of the heavens and the earth, and God is Exalted in Power, Full of Wisdom” (48:7). Therefore, according to the Quran, “on God let the Believers put their trust” (64:13); “and put thy trust in God, and enough is God as a Disposer of affairs” (33:3). “If God helps you, none can overcome you: if He forsakes you, who is there, after that, that can help you? In God, then, let Believers put their trust” (3:160). This putting trust in God does not imply inaction, however. The Quran mentions at least three conditions for believers to appropriate God’s help: 1

True and strong faith: “So lose not heart, nor fall into despair: for ye must gain mastery if ye are true in Faith” (3:139).

2

Taking action: “God will certainly aid those who aid His (cause)” (22:40; 47:7). “Be not weary and faint-hearted, crying for peace, when ye should be uppermost: for God is with you, and will never put you in loss for your (good) deeds” (47:35).

3

Remaining firm and steadfast: “Verily those who say ‘Our Lord is God,’ and remain firm (on the path),—on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve” (46:13, 41:30). “O Apostle! Rouse the Believers to the fight. If there are twenty amongst you, patient and persevering, they will vanquish two hundred …” (8:65). “How oft, by God’s will, hath a small force vanquished a big one? God is with those who steadfastly persevere” (2:249).

The Quran reminds Muslims of the early days of Islam—the time when believers were a small and weak group but could overcome seemingly invincible enemies (8:26). In the same way that He helped them before, God promises them “many gains that [they] shall acquire; … that it may be a Sign for the Believers” (48:18-20).

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Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience The significance of the qualities of self-sacrifice, perseverance, firmness and steadfastness in the Quran has already been noted. It is important to remember that these values are mostly mentioned in the context of Jihad and struggle in the Way of God. In this section, some methods by which the Quran seeks to inculcate a commitment to these values will be briefly discussed. a

The Quran considers this life as a test for believers to prove that they are worthy of God’s trust. As part of the test, believing men and women should show a readiness to sacrifice their lives and their belongings in the Way of God and to persevere in hardship and adversity: “Be sure We [God] shall test you with something of fear and hunger, some loss in goods or lives or the fruits (of your toil), but give glad tidings to those who patiently persevere,—who say, when afflicted with calamity: ‘To God we belong, and to Him is our return.’ …” (2:155-57). “Do men think that they will be left alone on saying, ‘We believe,’ and that they will not be tested? We did test those before them, and God will certainly know those who are true from those who are false” (29:1-2). “And We shall try you until We test those among you who strive their utmost and persevere in patience” (47:31). Thus, according to the Quran, sacrifice and perseverance are duties enjoined on believers by God: “Say: Truly, my prayer and my service of sacrifice, my life and my death, are (all) for God, the Cherisher of the Worlds; no partner hath He: this am I commanded, and I am the first of those to bow to His Will’” (6:162-63). “Go ye forth, (whether equipped) lightly or heavily, and strive and struggle, with your goods and persons, in the Cause of God. That is best for you, if ye (but) knew” (9:41).

b

The stories of the prophets and those who followed their teachings contain remarkable lessons in sacrifices and perseverance. Such stories are found throughout the Quran.63 The following passage presents the lessons they teach in a nutshell: How many of the Prophets fought (in God’s way), and with them (fought) large bands of godly men? But they never lost heart if they met with disaster in God’s way, nor did they


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weaken (in will) nor give in. And God loves those who are firm and steadfast. All that they said was: ‘Our Lord! Forgive us our sins and anything we may have done that transgressed our duty: establish our feet firmly, and help us against those that resist Faith.’ And God gave them a reward in this world, and excellent reward of the Hereafter. For God loveth those who do good (3:146-48). c

The Quran considers sacrifice, steadfastness, and perseverance as preconditions for victory: “O ye who believe! When ye meet an army, hold firm and think of Allah much, that ye may be successful”* (8:45). “Lo! With hardship goeth ease” (94:6).

d

According to the Quran, those who sacrifice their lives and property in the Way of God and show steadfastness will get the highest reward from God: “To him who fighteth in the cause of God,—whether he is slain or gets victory—soon shall We give him a reward of great value” (4:74). “Say: ‘Can you expect for us (any fate) other than one of two glorious things—(Martyrdom or victory)’” (9:52)? “Think not of those who are slain in God’s way as dead. Nay, they live, finding their sustenance in the Presence of their lord; they rejoice in the Bounty provided by God” (3:169-70). The Quran considers this sacrifice of life and property not as an irrational action but as part of a great bargain with God: “O ye who believe! Shall I lead you to a bargain that will save you from a grievous penalty?—That ye believe in God and His Apostle, and that ye strive (your utmost) in the Cause of God, with your property and your persons: that will be best for you, if ye but knew! He will forgive you your sins, and admit you to Gardens beneath which rivers flow, and to beautiful mansions in Gardens of Eternity: that is indeed the supreme achievement. And another (favour will He bestow), which ye do love,—help from God and a speedy victory. So give the Glad Tidings to the Believers” (61:10-13).64

e

In the same way that self-sacrifice and perseverance lead to victory and great reward, withholding these attributes will lead to severe punishment in this world and in the Hereafter. According to the Quran, the reason why the Israelites had to wander in the wilderness for 40 years was that they lacked the courage to face the enemy and

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY accept suffering and sacrifice (5:22-29). The Quran also warns believers: “O ye who believe! What is the matter with you, that when ye are asked to go forth in the Cause of God, ye cling heavily to the earth? … Unless ye go forth, He will punish you with grievous penalty, and put others in your place; but Him ye would not harm in the least. For God hath power over all things” (9:38-39).

f

Comparing life in this world to salvation in the Hereafter, the Quran attaches greater importance to the latter. This makes it easier for believers to forsake their life in this world and their worldly belongings to attain higher values: “What is the life of this world but play and amusement? But best is the Home in the Hereafter, for those who are righteous. Will ye not then understand” (6:32)? “Those who desire the life of the Present and its glitter,—to them We shall pay (the price of) their deeds therein,—without diminution. They are those for whom there is nothing in the Hereafter but the Fire: vain are the designs they frame therein, and of no effect are the deeds that they do” (9:15-16).

According to the Quran, while love of material things is part of human nature, people should strive for higher values: “Fair in the eyes of men is the love of things they covet: women and sons, heaped up hoards of gold and silver; horses branded (for blood and excellence); and (wealth of) cattle and well-tilled land. Such are possessions of this world’s life; but in nearness to God is the best of the goals (to return to)” (3:14). “And were it not that (all) men might become of one (evil) way of life, We would provide, for everyone that blasphemes against (God) Most Gracious, silver roofs for their houses, and (silver) stair-ways on which to go up, … and also adornments of gold. But all this were nothing but conveniences of the present life: the Hereafter, in the sight of thy Lord, is for the righteous” (43:33-35). This Quranic emphasis on the Hereafter does not mean, however, that a believer should withdraw from the life of this world and reject all material things. The Quran is clear on this point: “But seek, with the (wealth) which God has bestowed on thee, the Home of the Hereafter, nor forget thy portion in this world” (28:77). “And there are men who say: ‘Our Lord! Give us good in the world and good in the Hereafter, and defend us from the torment of the Fire!’ To those will be allotted what they have earned; and God is quick in account” (2:201-202). “O Children


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of Adam! Wear your beautiful apparel at every time and place of prayer: eat and drink: but waste not by excess. … Say: Who hath forbidden the beautiful (gifts) of God, which He hath produced for His servants, and the things, clean and pure, (which He hath provided) for sustenance? Say: They are, in the life of this world, for those who believe, (and) purely for them on the Day of Judgment” (7:31-32). The Holy Quran also considers monasticism not to be a part of Jesus’ original teachings, but a later innovation (57:27). Simplification An ideology can be presented in a simplified manner by the use of slogans, stories, and symbols, and Islamic ideology is no exception. a

Use of maxims: As noted above, the “first pillar” of Islam is belief in, and utterance of, the maxim that: “There is no god (entity worthy of worship) but God, and Muhammad is God’s Messenger.” This dictum encapsulates the main values and some leading themes of Islamic belief and ideology: 1

Belief in God and worship of Him are the supreme values.65

2

Adoration and allegiance are due to God alone.

3

All false gods—be it idols made of wood or stone or human authorities who demand adoration and allegiance—should be rejected.

4

Muhammad has brought God’s Message to mankind.

5

It is by following that Message that man can truly liberate himself from the forces of evil, can worship God, and can achieve success and salvation.

Another maxim emphasized in Islam is: “God is the Greatest.” A Muslim repeats this phrase at least one hundred times every day during daily prayers. In addition to its spiritual significance, this dictum endows a believer with great courage. No matter how great the odds stacked against him, a believer should not fear because God is with him and “God is the Greatest.” The Muslim greeting, “Peace

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY be with you,” can also be seen as a motto of sorts. It emphasizes the value of peace and elimination of the factors that agitate the mind and ultimately bring about violence, both direct and structural. The phrase “In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful” can also be seen as a maxim. It prefaces almost all the chapters of the Quran, and a Muslim is supposed to start any endeavor with its utterance. It emphasizes the values of compassion, mercy and graciousness.66 Many other phrases from the Quran are in common use as maxims. For example: “Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of you” (49:13). “And hold fast, all together, by the Rope which God (stretcheth out for you), and be not divided among yourselves” (2:1203). “The Believers are but a single Brotherhood” (49:10). “Tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter” (2:191). “Help from God and a speedy victory” (61:13)! “And think not of those slain in God’s way as dead” (3:169).

b

Use of stories and parables: It is already become clear in this chapter that the Quran makes extensive use of stories to elaborate its “ideology.” The Quran contains 15 major narratives each of which is elaborated in 10 verses or more. The most detailed story— covering more than 350 verses—is that of Moses, his struggle against Pharaoh, and his relations with his people. The story of Moses is in most part the story of the struggle for liberation of the weak and oppressed. The story of Abraham with 127 verses comes next. His story is a tale of devotion, of rising up against falsehood, readiness to offer sacrifices, and perseverance in hardship. Joseph is a model of piety and self-restraint as well as wisdom and perseverance. His story—which also refers to the importance of economic planning—covers 98 verses. The stories of Noah, Salih, and Hud are all tales of struggle against arrogant political and economic elites who rejected God’s guidance and sought to continue their repressive rule by sticking rigidly to tradition. Their stories cover respectively 84, 69, and 61 verses. Lut (Lot) (59 verses) devoted himself to struggle against corruption and indecency, while Solomon (48 verses) established a moral and just order and worked to spread God’s Message. Jesus (45 verses) was appointed to correct the distortions and excesses introduced by the Jews in the Message revealed to Moses and the prophets who came after him. Mary— Jesus’ mother—(28 verses) has a chapter named after her, and is a


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symbol of devotion and chastity for Muslims. The story of “The Companions of the Cave” (16 verses) tells of a group of youths who refused to serve a tyrant king. David (15 verses) was an apostle and a king who ruled with justice, while “Zul-Qarnain” (15 verses) was a righteous ruler who traveled over large territories and worked for the elimination of oppression and evil and the protection of the weak. Although the prophet Jonah (13 verses) suffered hardship as the result of an error of judgment, after he had repented he was sent on a mission “to a hundred thousand (men) or more” who believed in him and prospered. Finally, Shuaib (11 verses) was a prophet who rose up against exploitation and corruption. c

Use of symbols: According to its own testimony, the Quran uses both literal and symbolic language (3:7).67 However, we are not concerned here with Quranic symbolism in general, but with whether the Quran provides symbols to convey its ideological teachings. The stories and parables mentioned above certainly serve that purpose. In a few cases, the Quran itself refers to historical figures as examples and models. Pharaoh is one such figure (79:25); he symbolizes arrogance, tyranny, oppression and injustice as well as the end that awaits such behavior. Pharaoh’s wife and Mary—Jesus’ mother—have been mentioned as exemplars of believing and righteous women (66:11-12).68 The wife of Noah and the wife of Lot, both of whom were associated with righteous leaders but chose evil, are by contrast exemplars of unbelief and wickedness (66:10). Abraham has been noted as a model to be followed (16:120); he symbolizes devotion and sincerity, courage and integrity, sacrifice and perseverance. And the Prophet Muhammad is considered as “a beautiful pattern of conduct” (33:21). He was not only the Messenger of God, but also an ideological and moral teacher, a political leader, a military commander, a family man, and a friend and companion to Muslims. He is the figure many Muslims strive to emulate. Not only historical figures are mentioned as symbols in the Quran, but also specific places and rites. For example, the Kaabah—the cubic building in Makkah towards which Muslims face during prayer—is a symbol of the common goal of all Muslims as well as of their unity (2:148). The sacrificing of animals during Hajj and on an Eid day is a symbol of dedication, piety, and self-sacrifice (22:33). Safa and Marwa—two small hills near the Kaabah between which pilgrims run

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY seven times in commemoration of the search for water by Abraham’s wife—are symbols of endurance and perseverance (2:158). And Hajj itself is a symbol—and manifestation—of the equality of mankind (2:198-99).69

Claim to Truth and Rationality The Islamic ideology of revolution—as expounded in this chapter—is an integral part of the Quran’s general worldview and religious teachings and, as such, claims to be part of the truth revealed by God to the Prophet Muhammad. This is not the place to discuss philosophical questions such as the nature of truth, the existence of God and the roots of religious belief. The fact that more than a billion people adhere to Islam—and all Muslims believe in the Quran as divine revelation—is evidence of the fact that the Quran has been able to establish its claim to truth to them. Here I want to examine how the Quran seeks to establish its claim to truth and its position on rationality. a

Claim to truth: The Holy Quran proposes at least five types of argument in support of its claim to truth: 1

Provision of guidance: The Quran considers its teachings as a guide for those who believe and do righteous deeds (2:2, 41:44). It is a guide that befits human nature (30:30) and leads to success and prosperity (2:5). Anyone who uses his God-given faculties and earnestly seeks to understand the Quran will be able to follow it and will come to believe in it (47:24, 34:6), although arrogance (7:146, 16:22) and worship of one’s own “passion” and “vain desires” (30:29, 25:43) may blind some people to this fact. Nonetheless, “Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from error” (2:256).70

2

Confirmation of previous revelations: The Quran does not claim to be the first revelation from God. Rather, according to the Quran, God has sent Messengers to each nation (10:47, 13:38, 16:36). Muhammad’s predecessors such as Noah, Abraham, Moses, and Jesus brought fundamentally the same Message. The Quran confirms their original teachings (5:51, 2:41) and “explains to [their followers] most of the matters in which they disagree”


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(27:76). Thus, “the people of the Book” will readily recognize the truth of the Quran once they come to know about it (2:146). Although some would knowingly hide their views (2:146), others would testify to its similarity to their own scriptures and come to believe in it (46:10). There were learned Jews and Christians at the time of the Prophet who accepted Islam, and contemporary Muslims can also point to many examples of such conversions.71 3

Internal consistency: According to the Quran, it is a Book “consistent with itself, (yet) repeating (its teachings in various aspects)” (39:23); and God has “allowed therein no crookedness” (18:1). Thus, the Quran challenges those who disbelieve: “Do they not consider the Quran (with care)? Had it been from other than God, they would surely have found therein much discrepancy” (4:82).

4

The form and the content of the Quran: The Quran also repeatedly challenges its readers to produce anything like it: “And if ye are in doubt as to what We [God] have revealed from time to time to our servant [Muhammad], then produce a Sura [i.e., chapter] like thereunto; and call your witnesses and helpers (if there are any) besides God, if your (doubts) are true” (2:23; also 10:38, 11:13, 17:88). Commenting on this verse, Yusuf Ali writes, How do we know that there is revelation, and that it is from God? Here is a concrete test. The Teacher of God’s Truth has placed before you many suras. Can you produce one like it? If there is any one besides God, who can inspire spiritual truth in such noble language, produce your evidence. Or is it that your doubts are merely argumentative, refractory, against your own inner light or conscience? All true revelation is itself a miracle, and stands on its own merits.72 Other verses in the Quran indicate that this challenge refers both to the Quran’s form (52:34) and its content (28:49).

5

The Prophet: The Quran also refers to the Prophet Muhammad as evidence of its truth. First, although Muhammad was illiterate, he

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY was able to produce the Quran: “And thou wast not (able) to recite a Book before this (Book came), nor art thou (able) to transcribe it with thy right hand: in that case, indeed, would the talkers of vanities have doubted” (29:48). As Yusuf Ali explains, The holy Prophet was not a learned man. Before the Quran was revealed to him, he never claimed to proclaim a Message from God. He was not in the habit of preaching eloquent truths as from a Book, before he received his Revelation, nor was he able to write or transcribe with his own hands. If he had those worldly gifts, there would have been some plausibility in the charge of the talkers of vanities that he spoke not from inspiration but from other people’s books, or that he composed the beautiful verses of the Quran himself.73 Moreover, according to the Quran, Muhammad possessed “an exalted standard of character” (68:4). He dealt gently with believers—avoiding severity and harshness—(3:159), was “ardently anxious” over them and most kind and merciful to them (9:128), and did not ask for any rewards (25:57, 34:47). All this bears witness to his sincerity.

b

Rationality: The importance of reasoning and rationality from the Quranic point of view has already been noted in section (3) above, and the rational approach of the Quran has also been abundantly demonstrated throughout the chapter. The basic premise of the Quran is “belief in the Unseen” (2:3), but it does not demand blind faith. As noted earlier, natural phenomena are considered as signs from God which indicate the existence of a Power beyond human sense perception. The Quran turns the attention of its reader to the complexity and perfection of creation which is overwhelming to mere mortals: “No want of proportion wilt thou see in the Creation of (God) Most Gracious. So turn thy vision again: seest thou any flaw? Again turn thy vision a second time: (thy) vision will come back to thee dull and discomfited, in a state worn out” (67:3-4). Moreover, man can find the signs of God both within himself (521:21) and in God’s revelation (2:129, 29:49).


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Once a person believes in the “Unseen,” according to the Quran, he will realize that there cannot be more than one God, “else would each God have assuredly championed that which he created, and some of them would assuredly have overcome others”* (23:91); and the result would have been chaos and disorder (21:22). Nor can God have sons and daughters: “How can He have a son when He hath no consort?” (6:101) Thus, the Quran instructs believers, “Say: He is God the One and Only; God, the Eternal, Absolute; He begetteth not, nor is He begotten; and there is none like unto Him” (112:1-4). Belief in such a God and the Messenger whom He has sent will logically lead to adherence to the “set of political, economic, and social values and beliefs which galvanize believers into action and turn necessities, preferences, and ideas relating to social issues and social relations into levers of action in order to bring about a rapid and fundamental transformation in the categories of social life;” that is, it will lead people to adhere to the revolutionary ideology taught by the Quran. This concludes our discussion of the ideology of Islamic revolution. It should be emphasized that what has been presented here is an “ideal type.” Although the Quran contains elements of revolutionary ideology, these do not always lead to revolution. Islam has manifested itself in so many forms that some scholars suggest that “there are many Islams,” not “a single Islam.”74 Muslim intellectuals, however, emphasize the core beliefs and practices shared by all Muslims and argue that the religion itself allows diversity.75 Either way, Islamic revolution—which needs to be anchored in religious spirituality in order to qualify as “Islamic”—is only one manifestation of Islam which appears under certain sociopolitical conditions. Even then, its ideology may not contain all the elements of the “ideal type” identified here. To study the workings of Islamic revolution in practice, the following chapters are devoted to an analysis of the works of six Iranian revolutionary leaders.

3 Revolutionary Ideology in the Works of Imam Khomeini

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini is a prolific writer and lecturer: one source lists 25 books written by him or prepared from his lectures.1 Most of his works deal with religious subjects, notably Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), Akhlaq (ethics), and Irfan (Gnosticism). According to his English translator, “Imam Khomeini’s first public statement of a political nature came in a book published in 1941, Kashf al-Asrar [Secrets Exposed]. The book is essentially [a] detailed, systematic critique of an anti-religious tract, but it also contains numerous passages that are overtly political and critical of the Pahlavi rule.”2 Most of Khomeini’s political works, however, are in the form of speeches and declarations delivered and issued since 1962— when he launched his movement against the Shah’s regime. His bestknown work, Islamic Government (also known as The Guardianship of the Jurist), consists of a series of lectures delivered in Najaf, Iraq, in the early 1970s.3 This book, along with a number of his speeches and declarations, have been selected for analysis in this study, which follows the structure outlined in the previous chapter.4 Political Consciousness Imam Khomeini’s lectures on Islamic Government are a systematic effort to develop the political consciousness of the group to which they were addressed—the Ulama or religious scholars. In chapter 2 we noted the importance for revolutionary ideology of ‘creating’ new needs among the people and turning their attention to higher needs and values; developing a sense of community to strive for common ideals; and providing a framework for the popularization of these two goals in order to create political consciousness.5 Khomeini does not concern himself much with

THE WORKS OF IMAM KHOMEINI

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the third point, probably because the framework for such popularization already existed in Iran in the mosques, Madrasas (religious schools), Husainiyas (religious lecture halls), Hajj, and other Islamic institutions. He emphasizes, however, the political potential of religious gatherings and institutions. The forms of worship practiced in Islam are usually linked to politics and gestation of society. For example, congregational prayer, the gatherings on the occasion of Hajj, and Friday prayer, for all their spirituality, exert a political as well as moral and doctrinal influence. Islam has provided for such gatherings so that religious use might be made of them; so that feelings of brotherhood and cooperation may be strengthened, intellectual maturity fostered, solutions found for political and social problems, with jihad and collective efforts as the natural outcome.6 He also argues against the separation of religion and politics and opposes religious leaders staying aloof from political activities. “This slogan of the separation of religion and politics and the demand that Islamic scholars not intervene in social and political affairs have been formulated and propagated by the imperialists; it is only the irreligious who repeat them. Were religion and politics separate at the time of the prophet [and the caliphs]? Did two separate authorities exist?”7 Moreover, Khomeini seeks to foster a sense of community among the Ulama by making them realize that they face common challenges and have duties which require unity and collective action. In the lectures on Islamic Government, he emphasizes the following obligations of the Ulama: a

The obligation to promote the genuine teachings of Islam and to expose opponents’ schemes: Khomeini believes that the enemies of Islam have plotted to destroy it.8 Thus, he considers the duty to preserve Islam and promote its genuine teachings as the most important obligation incumbent upon Muslims in general and upon the scholars in particular. He goes as far as arguing that “it is more necessary even than prayer and fasting.”9 He also condemns Taqiya (dissimulation or expedient concealment of one’s views), which is considered valid by Shiites and had become an excuse for inaction. He contends that this practice “relates to the branches (furu’) [as opposed to the roots] of religion. … But when the chief principles of Islam and its welfare are

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY endangered, there can be no question of silence or taqiya.”10 Moreover, he quotes a tradition stating that “believers who are fuqaha [jurists] are the ‘fortresses of Islam,’” and argues that, If a faqih sits in the corner of his dwelling and does not intervene in any of the affairs of society, neither preserving the laws of Islam and disseminating its ordinances, nor in any way participating in the affairs of the Muslims or having any care for them, can he be called “the fortress of Islam” or the protector of Islam?11 He argues that the religious scholars had abandoned their duties to the people, and exhorts his audience: In whatever way you deem most beneficial … instruct people about the problems Islam has had to contend with since its inception and about the enemies and afflictions that now threaten it. Do not allow the true nature of Islam to remain hidden, or people will imagine that Islam is like Christianity (nominal, not true Christianity), a collection of injunctions pertaining to man’s relations to God, and the mosque will be equated with the church.12

b

The need to struggle against oppression, exploitation, and injustice— which Khomeini emphasizes even more than the obligation to promote and defend the faith. His views on this point are well illustrated by the following quotation: The scholars of Islam have a duty to struggle against all attempts by oppressors to establish a monopoly over the sources of wealth or to make illicit use of them. … If the good is enjoined and the evil is forbidden, the oppressors and their agents will be unable to usurp the people’s property and dispose of it according to their own whims; they will be unable to squander the taxes taken from the people. For he who enjoins the good and forbids the evil actively calls man to Islam by remedying injustice and opposing the oppressor.13

THE WORKS OF IMAM KHOMEINI c

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The obligation to establish an Islamic government ruled by Fuqaha (the jurists): Probably few, if any, religious scholars would have disagreed with Khomeini on the duty to preserve Islam and to oppose oppression and injustice. His views on establishing an Islamic government headed by religious scholars, however, ran totally counter to the conventional wisdom of the Shiite Ulama.14 Because of this, Khomeini devoted a whole lecture to “The Necessity of Islamic Government” and referred to the subject in numerous other passages.15 The methods he uses to establish his arguments are discussed below. Here I present some of his themes. First Khomeini argues for the need for just government: If the ordinances of Islam are to remain in effect, if encroachment by oppressive ruling classes on the rights of the weak is to be prevented, … if the Islamic order is to be preserved and all individuals are to pursue the just path of Islam without any deviation, … if the influence of foreign powers in the Islamic lands is to be destroyed—government is necessary. … It is a righteous government, of course, that is needed, one presided over by a ruler who will be a trustworthy and righteous trustee.16 He mentions “the knowledgeability of the ruler or caliph, i.e., his knowledge of the provisions and ordinances of Islam,” and “his justice, i.e., his excellence in belief and morals” as the two qualities that the leaders of “a righteous government” must possess.17 Certainly the Prophet and the Imams had these qualities and this explains why the government belonged to them. But what about the period after the occultation of the last Imam (over a thousand years ago)? On this point Khomeini challenges the view of the majority of Shiite Ulama who believe that any government during this period— which extends into the present—is illegitimate. Rhetorically he asks: “Now that no particular individual has been appointed by God, Exalted and Almighty, to assume the function of government in the time of Occultation, what must be done? Are we to abandon Islam? Do we no longer need it?”18 The implication is clear: Muslims still need a government ruled by knowledgeable and just individuals. These qualities “are present in countless fuqaha of the present age,”

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY Khomeini argues. “If they would come together, they could establish a government of universal justice in the world.”19

d

The need for the army to join the people: Whereas the lectures on Islamic government are addressed to the Ulama, and are aimed at fostering political consciousness among them, Khomeini’s declarations and speeches are addressed to the people in general and sometimes to specific groups.20 One group that received special attention during the process of revolutionary upheaval is the army. As early as 1964 Khomeini had argued that American influence and the capitulatory rights granted to the U.S. were destroying the dignity of the army. “What self-respect will remain for the army when an American errand boy or a cook has priority over one of our generals? If I were in the army, I would resign. … I would not agree to be disgraced.”21 He follows the same theme in his speeches and declarations of 1978-79: Proud soldiers who are ready to sacrifice yourself for your country and homeland, arise! Suffer slavery and humiliation no longer! Renew your bonds with your beloved people and refuse to go on slaughtering your children and brothers for the sake of the whims of this family of bandits! … Army commanders, do you not want to be independent? Do you want to be the servant of others? My advice to you is to enter the ranks of the people and to add your voice to their demand for independence. … Members of the armed forces, Islam is better for you than unbelief, and your own nation is better for you than the foreigners. …22

Criticism of Existing Social Arrangements Imam Khomeini focuses his criticism in this area on the domination of Iran by Western imperialism and its attempts to extirpate Islam. The list of socio-politico-economic conditions that come in for criticism, however, is a long one.

THE WORKS OF IMAM KHOMEINI a

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Domination by Western imperialism: The foreign domination of Iran is one of the main targets of Khomeini’s criticism of existing conditions in the country in his lectures on Islamic government. This criticism, however, had been voiced much earlier in a more dramatic way in a speech opposing the granting of capitulation rights to the USA: I cannot express the sorrow I feel in my heart. My heart is constricted. … Iran no longer has any festival to celebrate; they have turned our festival into mourning. … They have sold us, they have sold our independence. … They have reduced the Iranian people to a level lower than that of an American dog. … Are we to be trampled underfoot by the boots of America simply because we are a weak nation and have no dollars? America is worse than Britain; Britain is worse than America. The Soviet Union is worse than both of them. They are all worse and [more] unclean than each other! But today it is America that we are concerned with. …23 Khomeini argues that the Shah had “transformed Iran into an official colony of the U.S.” and had established friendly relations with a country that was “in a state of war with the Muslims,” that is, Israel.24 Foreign domination over Iran, however, is not a recent phenomenon, according to Khomeini. It is, rather, the fruition of centuries-old schemes by imperialists and Zionists, the aims of which are not merely religious or ideological but, first and foremost, economic. Their plot is to keep us backward, to keep us in our present miserable state so they can exploit our riches, our underground wealth, our land, and our human resources. … If you [the Ulama] pay no attention to the policies of the imperialists, and consider Islam to be simply a few topics you are always studying and never go beyond them, then the imperialists will leave you alone. Pray as much as you like: it is your oil they are after—why should they worry about your prayer? They are after our minerals and want to turn our country into a market for their goods.25

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY It should be noted that Khomeini is not only concerned with foreign domination over Iran, but over the Muslim world as a whole. He considers the division of “the Islamic homeland’ into numerous nation-states a result of plots by the imperialists and talks about “the unity of the Islamic Umma [brotherly community].” He also argues that the establishment of an Islamic government in Iran is imperative “in order to liberate the Islamic homeland from occupation and penetration by the imperialists and their puppet governments.”26

b

An unjust economic order, exploitation, and plundering of resources: Closely related to Khomeini’s criticism of foreign domination over the Muslim world is his critique of the existing economic order. In one of his lectures on Islamic government he argues: Through the political agents they have placed in power over the people, the imperialists have also imposed on us an unjust economic order, and thereby divided our people into two groups: oppressors and oppressed. Hundreds of millions of Muslims are hungry and deprived of all form of health care and education, while minorities comprised of the wealthy and powerful live a life of indulgence, licentiousness and corruption27 He repeats the same theme over and over in different contexts. A passage from another lecture on Islamic government indicates the depth of his understanding of economic conditions under the Shah’s regime. In the following excerpt he refers to a verse of the Quran which condemns religious scholars who fail to forbid “the consumption of what is forbidden” (5:63). Since the range of thought of some people is confined to the mosque we are now sitting in and is incapable of extending any further, when they hear the expression “consumption of what is forbidden,” they can only think of some corner grocer who is (God forbid) selling his consumers short. They never think of the whole range of more important forms of “consuming what is forbidden,” of plunder. Huge amounts of capital are being swallowed up; our public funds are being embezzled; our oil is


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being plundered; and our country is being turned into a market for expensive, unnecessary goods by the representatives of foreign companies, which makes it possible for foreign capitalists and their local agents to pocket people’s money. A number of foreign states carry off our oil after drawing it out of the ground, and the negligible sum they pay to the regime they have installed returns to their pockets by other routes. As for the small amount that goes into the treasury, God only knows what it is spent on. All of this is a form of “consumption of what is forbidden” that takes place on an enormous scale, in fact on an international scale. It is not merely an evil, but a hideous and most dangerous evil.28 c

Misery, hunger, deprivation: The unjust economic order and the exploitation that accompanies it have certainly resulted in misery and deprivation for the majority of the Iranian people. This point is also highlighted by Khomeini: [G]o take a look at the south of the city—go look at those Pits, those holes in the ground where people live, dwellings you reach by going down about a hundred steps into the ground; homes people have built out of rush matting or clay so their poor children can have somewhere to live. I am talking about Tehran, not some distant village or town. … They don’t have drinking water. … Picture some poor woman in the middle of the biting winter climbing up and down those [hundreds of] steps to fetch water for her children.29 He believes that “the injunctions of Islam … provide a solution for the problem of poverty.” The imperialists and their agents who “want us to remain afflicted and wretched, and our people to be trapped in their misery,” however, are preventing the implementation of Islamic teachings.30

d

Oppression and tyranny: An unjust economic order cannot be maintained without oppression and tyranny. Khomeini criticizes the oppressive conditions in Iran, together with the unjust economic order and its accompanying exploitation, in his lectures on Islamic government.31 He places greater emphasis on these concerns,

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY however, in the speeches and declarations made at the time of the revolution: In order to deceive the people, they [i.e., the government] mount empty speeches about freedom at a time when their jails still overflow with religious leaders and university students, with merchants and politicians, with workers and peasants. Religious and political leaders have been banished to remote parts of the country for the crime of speaking the truth and demanding freedom.32

e

Luxury and waste, incompetence, and bureaucratization: Khomeini strongly criticizes the luxurious way of life of the Shah and the upper class. His targets include “profligate royal ceremonies” and “reckless spending;” government incompetence which had undermined the country’s economy, agriculture, education, and human resources; and “superfluous bureaucracies and the system of file-keeping and papershuffling that is enforced in them.” He considers all of these “totally alien to Islam.”33

f

Corruption, immorality, and materialism: Khomeini argues that “Islam has laid down no laws for the practice of usury, for banking on the basis of usury, for the consumption of alcohol, or for the cultivation of sexual vice, having radically prohibited all these. The ruling cliques, therefore, which are the puppets of imperialists and wish to promote these vices in the Islamic world, will naturally regard Islam as defective.”34 He also criticizes the Shah’s regime for promoting “corruption on earth,” which includes such practices as “girls and boys wrestling together,” placing “people’s innocent daughters under young men at school,” and the “scandalous uncovering of women.”35

g

Un-Islamic and anti-Islamic laws and policies: Khomeini considers the 1907 constitution of Iran to be null and void because it was drafted by agents of Britain under instruction from their colonial masters, and was based on Belgian and French as well as British legal codes. “True, they added some of the ordinances of Islam in order to deceive the people, but the basis of the laws that were now thrust upon the people was alien and borrowed.”36 He holds similar views on judicial


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law and criticizes the judicial system as time-consuming, inconsistent, illogical, and embodying wrongful procedures which promote corruption.37 He also attacks the Shah’s anti-Islamic policies and measures. According to him, “the people see that His Majesty is against whatever they attach value to. He is against the Islamic calendar. To be against the Islamic calendar is to be against Islam itself. … Fayzia Madrasa [a religious school in Qum] has been closed for several years now. They plundered the Madrasa and robbed its students; they burned the turbans of the tulab [students of religion] and even burned their books! They insulted the Quran itself!”38 h

The monarchy regime and illegitimate government and Parliament: Although all the criticisms listed so far are attempts to de-legitimize the Shah’s regime, there are a number of passages in Khomeini’s lectures and speeches that deal directly with the issue of legitimacy. In his speech against the grant of capitulatory rights to the USA, Khomeini seeks to prove the illegitimacy of the Parliament which approved that measure.39 Furthermore, he argues, “This is high treason. … All the members of both houses who gave their agreement to this affair are traitors.40 In that speech and other speeches in the early 1960s, Khomeini refrains from attacking the legitimacy of the monarchy as such. In the lectures on Islamic government, however, he categorically states that “Islam proclaims monarchy and hereditary succession wrong and invalid.”41 Khomeini launched his strongest attack against the monarchy in a speech delivered in February 1979 on his return to Iran from exile— at a time when the Shah had left the country and had appointed Bakhtiar as Prime Minister. To delegitimize the Shah, he argues that “A monarchical regime is … contrary to all rational laws and precepts as well as human rights.” Furthermore, “the Pahlavi monarchy was illegal … from the time of its very formation … [because] the Constituent Assembly [which voted for it] was convened at bayonetpoint, without the least participation in its affairs by the people.”42 He also interprets the massive popular demonstrations of 1978-1979 as a vote “against Muhammad Riza and the monarchical form of government.”43 As for Bakhtiar’s government, he rhetorically asks, “Can someone who has been appointed by an illegal Shah and illegal Majlis be in any way legitimate?”44

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Set of Values The values emphasized by Imam Khomeini in his speeches and writings— as well as by other Iranian revolutionary leaders—can be categorized into three groups: spiritual values, social values, and personal values. In the material covered by this study, Khomeini seems to emphasize social values more than the other two. a

Social values: Khomeini emphasizes justice and equity more than any other values. These are followed by liberation and freedom, and struggle and Jihad. Other social values given prominence include independence, unity and brotherhood, security, and social responsibility. He also mentions cooperation, love and mutual affection, self-reliance, public welfare, consultation, peace, and selfdetermination.

b

Personal values: Khomeini notes more personal values than other types of values, though with less emphasis than the previous ones. Courage and fearlessness, true happiness and tranquility are at top of the list. They are closely followed by fortitude and steadfastness, activeness, self-confidence, militancy and moral virtue. Khomeini also mentions diligence, dignity, piety, trustworthiness, a readiness to defend oneself, hope, commitment to truth, self-reliance, perfection, strength and preparedness, decisiveness, honesty, intelligence, determination, resourcefulness, and seriousness.

c

Spiritual values: Because the texts covered in this study were selected for their sociopolitical significance, they are not representatives of Khomeini’s work as a whole and less emphasis on spiritual values is found in them. The only spiritual values given much emphasis are dedication and self-sacrifice—which certainly have social significance as well. Other spiritual values promoted are belief in God, success and salvation, and asceticism. 45

Outline of the Good Society According to Imam Khomeini, an Islamic government is a constitutional government in which sovereignty and legislative power belong exclusively to God. Thus, “The law of Islam, divine command, has absolute authority over all individuals and the Islamic government. … In Islam, then, government has the sense of adherence to law; it is law alone that rules


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over society. Even the limited powers given to the Most Noble Messenger (upon whom be peace) and those exercising rule after him have been conferred upon them by God.”46 Khomeini believes such an arrangement to be the best and most popular form of government, because, “[t]he body of Islamic laws that exist in the Quran and the Sunnah [tradition of the Prophet] has been accepted by the Muslims and recognized by them as worthy of obedience. This consent and acceptance facilitates the task of government and makes it truly belong to the people.”47 As noted above, Khomeini argues that during the occultation of the last Imam—which includes the present—the leadership of an Islamic government belongs to the Fuqaha (Islamic jurists). Once a Faqih is able to establish an Islamic government, it is the duty of the people and other Fuqaha to obey him. Such a Faqih will have the same governmental authority and power as the Prophet Muhammad and other early Islamic leaders.48 Not every Faqih is qualified as a leader, however. According to the traditions and arguments that Khomeini presents, such a Faqih must not only possess knowledge of Islamic law and be just, but must also be trustworthy and righteous, intelligent, have administrative abilities, “refuse to submit to others or fall under the influence of foreigners,” and live a simple life.49 For Khomeini, rule and command are not a matter of merit or status, but “a means for fulfilling the duty of implementing the law and establishing the Islamic order of justice.” He also notes that the head of the Islamic state and other officials should have a share in the public income equal to ordinary citizens.50 Khomeini recognizes three branches of government—executive, legislative and judicial—similar to the “forms of government that have emerged in recent centuries.”51 But for him, a “planning body takes the place of the legislative assembly. … This body draws up programs for the different ministries in the light of the ordinances of Islam and thereby determines how public services are to be provided across the country.”52 Elsewhere he calls this planning body a “consultative assembly” and proposes that it be composed of “consultants and advisors who are experts in different fields.”53 Beyond this, the nature of the consultative assembly is not elaborated in his lectures and speeches. Khomeini does not elaborate much on the judiciary either, merely noting that, “The position of judge … is reserved for those who possess three qualifications—being a leader, and being knowledgeable and just.” Since only a Faqih can be knowledgeable in Islamic law, “the function of judge belongs exclusively to the just faqih.”54 In contrast to the existing judicial

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laws—which he claims “have brought our people nothing but trouble, causing them to neglect their daily tasks and providing the occasion for all kinds of misuse”—Khomeini claims that “the method established by Islam for enforcing people’s rights, adjudicating disputes, and executing judgment is at once simple, practical, and swift.”55 He also strongly supports the Islamic penal code and attacks those who criticize it as being too harsh.56 In regard to the executive, Khomeini argues that “it is not necessary for all officials, provincial governors, and administrators to know all the laws of Islam and be fuqaha; it is enough that they know the laws pertaining to their functions and duties.”57 The functions and duties of government receive more attention in his lectures. For Khomeini, the aim of an Islamic government and the implementation of Islamic law is to create “conditions conductive to the production of morally upright and virtuous human beings” and to establish “justice in the society, a means for man’s intellectual and moral reform and his purification … a just society that will morally and spiritually nourish refined human beings.”58 Program of Action As we noted in chapter 1, a program of revolutionary action specifies the targets of change that the struggle should focus on, the agents who bring about the change, and the forms of action that are necessary. a

Targets of change: For Imam Khomeini, foreign domination in general and the anti-Islamic schemes and campaigns associated with it are the first targets of the revolutionary struggle. Because of the United States’ active role in the recent history of Iran, he singles it out as the greatest enemy: Let the American President know that in the eyes of the Iranian people, he is the most repulsive member of the human race today because of the injustice he has imposed on our Muslim nation. Today the Quran has become his enemy, the Iranian nation has become his enemy. Let the American government know that its name has been ruined and disgraced in Iran.59 The next target on which the struggle should focus is the system of monarchy in general, and Iran’s ruling cliques, government, parliament, and the Shah in particular—all of whom are agents of


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imperialism according to Khomeini.60 Therefore, he proclaims, “it is our duty to continue this movement until all elements of the Shah’s regime have been eliminated and we have established a Constituent Assembly based on the votes of the people and the first permanent government of the Islamic Republic.”61 Certain elements of the Shiite religious establishment in Iran and Iraq also come under severe attack by Khomeini. He mentions the propaganda by “foreign agents … that Islam has nothing to offer, that Islam consists of a few ordinances concerning menstruation and parturition, and that this is the proper field of study for the akhunds [religious scholars].” He argues, There is something of truth here, for it is fitting that those akhunds who have no intention of expounding the theories, injunctions, and world-view of Islam and who spend most of their time on precisely such matters, forgetting all the other topics of Islamic law, be accused and attacked in this manner. They too are at fault; foreigners are not the only ones to be blamed. For several years, as might be expected, the foreigners laid certain plans to realize their political and economic ambitions, and the neglect that has overtaken the religious teaching institutions has made it possible for them to succeed.62 Thus, he proposes, “the religious teaching institutions must be reformed. The syllabus and methods of propagation and instruction must be improved.”63 He labels those religious scholars who oppose reform, who reject involvement in politics, and who cooperate with the Shah’s regime as “pseudo-saints.” He tells his audience, “First, we must advise these pseudo-saints and try to awaken them.” If they fail to wake up and assume their responsibilities, “it will be obvious that the cause of their failure is not ignorance, but something else.” In that case, “They must be exposed and disgraced so that they may come to lose whatever standing they enjoy among the people.”64 b

Agents of change: For Khomeini the Ulama must play the leading role in bringing about an Islamic revolution. The ultimate success of the revolution, however, will depend on the participation of the people in general. He notes, for example, “We must end all this plundering and usurpation of wealth. The people as a whole have a responsibility in

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY this respect, but the responsibility of the religious scholars is graver and more critical. We [Ulama] must take the lead over other Muslims in embarking on this sacred jihad, this heavy undertaking; because of our rank and position, we must be in the forefront.” He further argues that “the expression of opposition and the expounding of God’s teachings and ordinances that stand in contradiction to [religious] innovation, oppression, and sin … make the masses aware of the corruption of society and the wrong-doings of the treacherous, sinful, and irreligious rulers. The people will then rise up in revolt and refuse to collaborate any longer with the tyrants or to obey corrupt and treacherous ruling powers.”65 In his lectures on Islamic government, Imam Khomeini emphasizes the important role of the “young generation” of religious scholars in bringing about revolutionary change.66 In his speeches made during the time of revolutionary upheaval, in addition to the religious scholars, he calls upon the “Iranian army,” “Iranian politicians,” “Iranian merchants,” “scholars” and “students” to undertake revolutionary action.67 He also tells the Ulama: “You must address yourselves to the university people in particular, the educated class.”68

c

Forms of action: The forms of revolutionary action recommended by Khomeini range from passive protest to active armed struggle. A long list of such actions can be made from his lectures and speeches and categorized into the following groups: 1

Self-development: Although Khomeini devotes a separate lecture which is not included in this study to the subject of selfdevelopment,69 he notes the significance of self-development as a precondition of revolutionary activity in his lectures on Islamic government as well. He tells his audience that “apathy, laziness, despair, and lack of self-confidence must be replaced by diligence, endeavor, hope and self-confidence. … Rid yourselves of your depression and apathy … and resolve to establish an Islamic government.”70 At the same time, he quotes a tradition which states—among other things—that the activist should not be “prompted by rivalry for political power, nor by a search for wealth and abundance.”71 He emphasizes the point elsewhere: “We must improve ourselves spiritually and improve our way of life. We must become more ascetic than before and completely


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shun the goals of this world. All of you must equip yourselves to protect the divine trust that has been vested in you. Become worthy trustees, and hold the world in less esteem.”72 2

Passive resistance: Khomeini labels the religious scholars who join the state apparatus as “evil Ulama,” and advises that the least they, and people in general, could do is to refrain from supporting the oppressive regime.73 He also proclaims, “Let us overthrow tyrannical governments by: (1) severing all relations with governmental institutions; (2) refusing to cooperate with them; (3) refraining from any action that might be construed as aiding them; and (4) creating new judicial, financial, economic, cultural, and political institutions.”74 All of these measures can be construed as forms of passive protest and resistance.

3

Propaganda and instruction: Khomeini puts great emphasis on the role of propaganda and instruction in preparing the ground for revolutionary change. He starts his lecture entitled “A Program for the Establishment of an Islamic Government” with the statement: “It is our duty to work toward the establishment of an Islamic government. The first activity we must undertake in this respect is the propagation of our cause; that is how we must begin.” He also notes that “Propagation and instruction … are our two fundamental and most important activities.”75 As means of teaching and propagation, he lists written materials and printed books, speeches, religious talks and sermons, vocal protest, demonstrations, and strikes.76 He also recommends that, “In order to counteract [the oppressors’] press and propaganda apparatus, we must create our own apparatus.”77 As for the content of such propaganda materials, Khomeini emphasizes dispelling “the doubts about Islam that have been created” and acquainting “the people with the world-view, social institutions, and the form of government proposed by Islam.” He hopes that “by presenting the system of government and political and social principles of Islam to broad segments of humanity, we will create a strong new current of thought and a powerful popular movement that will result in the establishment of an Islamic government.”78 He expresses his belief that the people are “dissatisfied and unhappy with the state of affairs.

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY They are living now in the shadow of the bayonet, and repression will let them say nothing. They want someone to stand up and speak out.” And he enjoins: “So, courageous sons of Islam, stand up! Address the people bravely; tell the truth about our situation to the masses in simple language; arouse them to enthusiastic activity, and turn the people in the streets and bazaar, our simple-hearted workers and peasants, and our alert students into dedicated mujahids [fighters in a holy war]. The entire population will become mujahids.”79 Khomeini is also well aware of the importance of international public opinion. Therefore, he instructs, Our struggling brothers should establish as much contact as possible with foreign newsmen and make them understand that it is the Shah himself and his government that are responsible for the continuing repression and violation of the Constitution. … Furthermore, they should expose the false propaganda directed against our Islamic movement from abroad.80 4

Collective protest: According to Khomeini, the various forms of collective protest would not only have a propaganda value but would also influence the actions of the oppressors. “If a collective protest were made against the oppressors who commit an improper act or crime, if several thousand telegrams were sent to them from all the Islamic countries telling them to desist, to relinquish their errors, they certainly would desist. …”81 Other types of collective protest noted by Khomeini include general strikes, demonstrations, organizing meetings in mosques and other public places, and “uttering thundering cries of protest” after congregational prayers.82 He emphasizes unity of action in undertaking such protests and warns that, “Any divisionary voice that is raised, by no matter whom, is satanic; it benefits the oppressive rulers and harms Islam and the nation.”83

5

Organization and creating new institutions: Khomeini’s strategy of creating “new judicial, financial, economic, cultural, and political institutions” as a means to “overthrow tyrannical governments” was noted above.84 He also recommends taking advantage of the assemblies and gatherings that form part of Islamic worship in order to “propagate and teach religion and to develop the


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ideological and political movement of Islam.”85 Furthermore, he recommends organizing more such gatherings and meetings “[a]t every available opportunity and on every occasion … on an even wider scale than before.”86 6

Long-term planning: Imam Khomeini warns Muslim revolutionaries against impatience and expecting to see the fruits of their endeavors right away. “No reasonable person expects our activities of propagation and instruction to lead quickly to the formation of an Islamic government. … Ours is a goal that will take time to achieve.” Thus, revolutionary activities will need considered, long-term planning. “Great men, with broad horizons of thought … continue making plans for the advancement of their cause. Either they will carry out their plans themselves, or if they are not granted opportunity, others will follow their plans, even if it is two or three hundred years later. The foundations of many great movements in history were laid this way.”87

7

Armed struggle and jihad: Although Khomeini sees armed struggle against the oppressors as a last resort, he regards it as a natural outcome of revolutionary activity. He argues that when the people “rise up in revolt and refuse to collaborate any longer with the tyrants or to obey corrupt and treacherous powers,” those in power have two alternatives: either to bow to the wishes of the people and correct themselves, or to oppose the revolutionary movement. If they choose the second option and “attempt to silence [the opposition] by force of arms, they will, in effect, have engaged in armed aggression against the Muslims and acquired the status of a rebellious group (fi’a baghiya). It will then be the duty of the Muslims to engage in an armed jihad against that ruling group.”88 For this reason Khomeini believes that Ulama need to acquire “armed power.”89

Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence Imam Khomeini uses various arguments to inculcate a sense of commitment to action and self-confidence in his audience. According to him, the present weakness of Islam in Iranian society, and the ascendancy of corruption and the agents of imperialism, can mainly be blamed on the

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apathy of the Ulama in the past. He tells his audience that prayer alone is insufficient to counter the plots of the imperialists. He rejects the suggestion that “[p]olitics is all dirty, lying, and viciousness” and thus should be avoided by the Ulama. Such propaganda “is undertaken by the political agents of imperialism only to make you shun politics, to prevent you from intervening in the affairs of society and struggling against treacherous governments and their anti-national and anti-Islamic policies.”90 He believes that to struggle against a “regime of oppression and exploitation” for the establishment of “a government of divine justice … is one of the greatest forms of worship.”91 Khomeini exhorts the Ulama to have confidence in themselves and to eschew “all forms of apathy, weakness and despair.” Rid yourselves of your depression and apathy. … An Islamic government will definitely be established; have confidence in yourselves. You have the power, the courage, and the sense of strategy it takes to struggle for national liberty and independence, you who succeeded in waking the people and inspiring them to struggle, causing imperialism and tyranny to tremble. Day by day, you are accumulating more experience and your ability to deal with the affairs of society is increasing. Once you have succeeded in overthrowing the tyrannical regime, you will certainly be capable of administering the state and guiding the masses.92 To impress upon the Ulama that they are “capable of administering the state,” he asks them: “What are the qualifications of those who now rule the Muslim countries? What gives them the ability to rule that we allegedly lack? Who among them has any more ability than the average man?”93 Actually, he argues, Ulama are more qualified than anyone else “for the supervision and supreme administration of the country, the dispensing of justice, and the establishment of equitable relations among the people [because] these are precisely the subjects that the faqih has studied.”94 Another argument by which Khomeini seeks to encourage commitment to action is to remind the Ulama of their Islamic duty to oppose and destroy oppressive, exploitative, and corrupt systems; to teach and safeguard Islam; and to establish an Islamic government.95 He also reminds them that God is with those who strive to fulfill their duties. But if the religious scholars fail to undertake their responsibilities and are silent “in the face of the policies of the oppressors, they … are reproached and


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condemned by God.” And the same is true for Muslims in general.96 Khomeini also uses historical arguments in an attempt to rid his audience of feelings of apathy and powerlessness. He tells them to “[l]ook at the history of the prophets” and mentions the successful struggles waged by Abraham, Moses and Muhammad.97 Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience As noted in section (3) above, Imam Khomeini places a high value on self-sacrifice and fortitude. He seeks to inculcate these qualities in his followers in a number of ways: a

The example of the prophets and Imams: According to Khomeini, to make sacrifices for the sake of achieving one’s goal “is in conformity with the customs of the prophets.”98 He mentions the examples of Abraham, Moses, and especially Muhammad as models of selfsacrifice and forbearance. He also commends the examples of Imams Ali, Husain, Musa ibn Jafar, and Riza. “There is no blood more precious than that of Imam Husain, yet it was shed for the sake of Islam, because of the precious nature of Islam. We must understand this matter well and convey it to others.”99

b

The courage and perseverance of genuine scholars: Khomeini argues that a true Faqih (Islamic jurist) is a scholar who “refuses to submit to others or fall under the influence of foreigners … even at the cost of his life.”100 He sees participation in protests, resisting repression, showing courage and embracing martyrdom as signs of vitality, of the people “proving how alive they are.” He calls such people “the true sons of Islam.” He also notes that “courageous youths” repeatedly return to their struggle after being imprisoned and banished because “it is Islam that has trained them.”101

c

Success depends on steadfastness: Khomeini emphasizes fortitude and steadfastness as vital to achieving victory. He argues that “all religions and schools of thought have advanced and progressed in this fashion: they started with nothing but a plan, which came to fruition later because of the fortitude and dedication of the respective leaders and prophets.”102 During the revolutionary upheavals of 1978-79, he encouraged his supporters to further efforts by reminding them: “We

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY have suffered, suffered greatly, during this recent period, but we have also gained certain victories that are, of course, great.”103

Simplification Imam Khomeini frequently refers to the stories of the prophets and Imams, characterizing both them and their opponents as models and symbols. In one place he makes explicit the exemplary nature of these stories: “We constantly read in the Quran that the Pharaoh acted in a certain way and Moses in another way, but we don’t think about why the Qur’an tells us all this. It tells us this so that we may act like Moses toward the Pharaohs of our age; let us pick up our staffs and oppose this vile Shah.”104 Not surprisingly, Khomeini refers most often to the story of Moses and Pharaoh. For him, Moses is a symbol and a model of rebellion against oppression, as well as of determination, resourcefulness, and seriousness. Pharaoh, on the contrary, is a symbol of tyranny, oppression, and corruption.105 The Prophet Muhammad, as we saw above, along with some other prophets and Imams, is regarded by Khomeini as a model of commitment to action, self-sacrifice and forbearance106 and is further commended as a symbol and model of Islamic justice and leadership. Imam Ali, however, is praised even more frequently in this regard. Ali and a number of other Imams are also picked out as symbols of militancy.107 Khomeini frequently refers to the Shah and other tyrannous rulers of Muslim countries as Taghut, a Quranic term which Hamid Algar explains as “one who surpasses all bounds in his despotism and tyranny and claims the prerogative of divinity for himself, whether explicitly or implicitly,”108 The term became a popular expression during, and in the aftermaths of, the upheavals of 1978-79. Claim to Truth and Rationality Imam Khomeini bases his claim to truth on the Holy Quran, the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad, the traditions of various Shiite Imams, the practice of earlier prophets and early Muslims, and the work of previous scholars.109 It is logical reasoning, however, that plays the most important role in his attempt to establish his claim to truth. He frequently poses questions which challenge the position of those scholars whose views conflict with his own. In regard to the necessity of an Islamic government, for example, he asks those who believe there can be no legitimate government during the absence of Imams:


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From the time of the lesser Occultation down to the present … is it proper that the laws of Islam be cast aside and remain unexecuted, so that everyone acts as he pleases and anarchy prevails? Were the laws that the Prophet of Islam labored so hard for twenty-three years to set forth, promulgate, and execute valid only for a limited period of time? Did God limit the validity of His laws to two hundred years? Was everything pertaining to Islam meant to be abandoned after the Lesser Occultation?110 Another interesting example of his use of logic to repudiate the views of his opponents is the argument he mounts against those, misusing a saying of the Prophet, consider the Shah to be “the shadow of God.” Yes, the Islamic ruler is the shadow of God, but what is meant by shadow is something that has no motion of itself. Your shadow does not move by itself; it moves only when you move. Islam recognizes a person as the “shadow of God” who abandons all individual volition in the sense that he acts only in accordance with the ordinances of Islam, so that his motion is dependent, not independent. The Messenger of God (peace and blessings be upon him) was indeed a true shadow of God’ but is this vile Shah a shadow of God?111 This is also a good example of the way in which Khomeini uses logical reasoning to expound the traditions of the Prophet and the Imams. Among the “sources of truth” mentioned above, the traditions of the Prophet and the Imams are the most frequently quoted. A major portion of the lectures on Islamic government is devoted to expounding some of these traditions.112 In regard to the Holy Quran, although Khomeini quotes it less often than the traditions of the Prophet or the Imams, he makes it clear that it commands greater authority. He rejects, for example, the position of those Ulama who seek out traditional support for their view that Muslims should wait for the Occulted Imam to “come himself to remedy our affairs.” In Khomeini’s view, “such traditions are contrary to the Quran. They have not read the Quran. Even if they can find a hundred such traditions, they will still be beating their heads against the wall, because such traditions are contrary to the custom of the prophets [mentioned in the Quran].”113 His dependence on other “sources of truth” —the practice of earlier prophets and early Muslims, and the work of

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previous scholars—is minimal, in keeping with their secondary authority in relation to the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad and the Imams. They are used only as supplements to these primary sources.114

4 Revolutionary Ideology in the Works of Ayatollah Taleqani

Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleqani began his educational and political career in the early 1940s by “conducting clandestine sessions for the teaching of the Quran.”1 This concern with presenting the genuine teachings of Islam and the Quran to Iranian society remained a preoccupation throughout his life. In one of his writings he observes, “Neither the world that is totally absorbed in science and invention nor the bankrupt world of the Muslims imagines that the Qur’an has any place in our lives.”2 Thus, he saw it as his duty to return the Quran from “antiquity” and the “graveyard” back to the heart of the social, political, and economic life of society. It is thus not surprising that most of his speeches, articles, and books deal with the exposition and interpretation of the Holy Quran. Taleqani has delivered countless speeches and sermons and has written numerous articles and a number of books. His earliest and most well-known book is Islam wa Malikyat (Islam and Ownership) which was first published in the early 1950s and was revised and expanded in the early 1960s, while he was in prison.3 This book and a number of his lectures and sermons have been selected for analysis in the study that follows.4 Political Consciousness In Islam wa Malikyat Ayatollah Taleqani offers a profound analysis of the human condition, with important implications for political consciousness. He believes that the roots of mankind’s tendency towards socio-political domination (and its opposite, subjugation) lie in its condition of mental and psychological servitude. Mankind has instincts and impulses which promote self-centeredness and lead to the search for pleasure and material gain. Those in power seek to harness this natural tendency and make man

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a slave to his selfishness and lust in order to “ride him like an animal.” While these instincts and impulses are important for human survival, they are not the only force at work in mankind. Humanity is also endowed with great and unlimited potentialities and an infinite capacity to actualize them. To work for the realization of those potentialities involves a continuous movement towards Absolute Perfection or God. To accomplish this, mankind must establish a balance between its instincts and impulses (the source of his self-centeredness), on the one hand, and lofty principles (the source of self-sacrifice), on the other. This means that the instincts and impulses, which are easily provoked, must be continually held in check to prevent their total domination. To achieve this, mankind needs a faith which will turn its attention towards—and attach it to—the entities which Taleqani characterizes as Absolute Truth, Strength, Life, and Perfection.5 The first principle of Islamic belief and the real meaning of the call to Tawhid [unity, monotheism] is exactly this faith in Absolute Power and Perfection. Only such a belief can be the source of [a person’s] transformation from being self-seeking to seeking for perfection. … [At the same time,] attachment to the Source of Goodness and Mercy can elevate a person and broaden their perspective to such an extent that they regard all people from a single perspective. Over a period of time, such an attitude would make the person into a source of mercy and goodness which would gush from their heart and flow from their deeds.6 In addition to its moral and spiritual—not to say mystical— significance, this argument has clear political import. It is one way in which Taleqani seeks to focus the attention of his audience on higher needs and values and thus foster political consciousness. He also believes that the acts of worship prescribed by Islam influence our relations with our fellow human beings. He argues that those acts “consciously strengthen, develop and fix human interests in such a way that the fulfillment of [our] responsibility to [our] fellow human beings and to society becomes more significant than personal gain or loss. It is then that man enters the stage of higher human consciousness. At this stage, good is done for the sake of goodness; services are performed for the sake of serving; wealth is spent in the pursuit of human perfection; and everything is done for the sake of God and His eternal and Wise Will.”7 Mankind’s

THE WORKS OF AYATOLLAH TALEQANI

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status as God’s Khalifa (vicegerent and representative), which is noted in the Quran (2:30), also bestows great responsibility.8 Moreover, Taleqani emphasizes three obligations based on the teachings of Islam: 1

The responsibility to struggle in the Way of God and against Taghut: Taleqani considers Jihad (struggle) in the Way of God and against illegitimate and tyrannous regimes as an important Islamic duty. It is so important, he notes, that in Islamic jurisprudence Jihad is discussed under the heading of “Acts of Worship.” Explicating the meaning of “Jihad in the Way of God,” he notes, God’s way is the way which leads to the well-being of human society as a whole—the way of justice, the way of truth, the way of human freedom—so that a few, a certain class, cannot gain dominance over the powers and capacities of mankind so as to block the intellectual movement of human society and keep people from appropriating for themselves the natural resources that the God of the universe has placed at the disposal of everyone. … It is “God’s way” that all people should enjoy their full capabilities and the full potential of nature alike.9 This is the positive aspect of “jihad in the Way of God.” The negative aspect involves the fight against Taghut: So the negative aspect is that you must remove the things that obstruct people’s lives; you must sweep aside the authorities, the classes that deny the rights of the people and stifle free thought. … Those centralized powers that deceive a weakened people, that set them at one another’s throats, that lead them away from the Creator toward the created …—these disruptive forces must be swept away from the path of human evolution.10

2

The duty to establish social equity: Based on a verse of the Quran (57:25), Taleqani argues that the purpose of the prophets’ mission was to make people stand up for Qist, that is, to rise up and establish equity. According to Taleqani, Qist means that “each person with their peculiar capabilities and talents occupies the appropriate position that they deserve. They obtain the rights and fulfill the duties which have

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY been recognized for each human being on this planet Earth [with all its resources].”11 Taleqani argues that Qist not only means economic justice but also implies the idea of freedom. He sees liberty and equity as the joint aims of all revolutions, aims for which not only the Iranian people, but mankind in general, aspire.12

3

The duty to enjoin right and forbid wrong: Again based on a verse of the Quran (3:110), Taleqani considers enjoining right and good and forbidding wrong and evil as one of the most important duties of a Muslim. This obligation makes every Muslim responsible for the actions of other members of society. Therefore, one should first get to know what is right and wrong, good and evil, obligatory and prohibited. After this, Muslims have both a right and a duty to get involved in public affairs, to express what they see as good and fitting, to vote, and to oppose wrong-doing even if committed by a caliph or a ruler. This sense of general responsibility, Taleqani believes, “is the secret of the superiority of Islamic society and the brotherly community of Islam [over other societies].”13

Taleqani focuses his efforts on reminding the people of their higher needs, values and responsibilities. He does not concern himself much with the two other components of “political consciousness” we have identified—fostering a sense of community and creating a framework for the popularization of the loftier qualities. Like Khomeini, Taleqani was already able to utilize an institution provided by Islam—the mosque—and saw no need to create a new structure. Moreover, he had observed a strong sense of community among Muslims as a whole and among the Shiites in Iran in particular.14 However, this does not prevent him from making occasional references to the significance of community.15 Criticism of Existing Social Arrangements a

Foreign domination: Like Imam Khomeini, Ayatollah Taleqani observes that for centuries imperialism has plotted “to dim the light of faith in the hearts and consciences of believers and to extinguish it forever, since this was the only way it could reach its goals for the exploitation of the material and non-material resources of the Middle East and Muslim countries.”16 Unlike Khomeini, however, he does not focus his attention on this phenomenon. He seldom talks about foreign


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influence; and when he does, he often names specific countries— almost always the USA and Israel. Taleqani believes that Iran’s relationship with America is one of domination and servitude. “The US thinks of the Iranian people as a lamb from which it can cut a piece of fat any time it wants.” He also notes the Iranian army’s domination by the CIA and Israel.17 He criticizes the USA for following the same path which the European countries took after the abolition of slavery in their own countries, namely, shifting their focus to the enslavement of foreign countries.18 In a speech made in 1963, Taleqani denounces the Shah’s regime for establishing relations with Israel. According to him, “Today Zionism is second kin of colonialism; colonialism was defeated in its initial form, and then it re-emerged in the form of Zionism. Zionism came forth in the shape of Israel.” He believes “Israeli agents … have flung to the wind the moral of this country, the virtue of this country, the economy of this country, the spiritual being of this country, the very life of this country.” And he describes them as “the greatest menace we face.”19 b

The ruling clique: Taleqani considers Iranian society under the Shah’s rule to be “upside down, because the most corrupt, the most shameless, and the most stupid are placed at the top.” He characterizes the regime as “corrupt, corrupting, imposed (from outside), dictatorial, exploitative and plundering—any one of which would suffice to undermine the legitimacy of a regime.” He accuses the Shah of lying when he claimed that he would act according to the constitution. He also accuses him of attempting to sow dissension and disunity among the people—a goal opposite to that of the prophets.20 Unjust economic relations in Iranian society are also criticized. Taleqani believes “the wealth, belongings, life and talent of the Iranian nation have been plundered,” as while one group works, another parasitic element not only consumes the fruits of its labor but also hoards it in the banks and sends it abroad.21

c

Materialism, immorality and confusion: According to Taleqani, the elevation of wealth and profit-seeking into goals in themselves— rather than being sources of welfare and the evolution of humanity towards perfection—lies at the root of all economic problems, not only in Iran but in the world as a whole. He argues that while the nation’s rulers are dominated by the love of wealth, they will be

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY unable to solve the real problem of production and distribution.22 On the social level, materialism results in “aimlessness, confusion, frustration, instability, disorder, violence, and war—to all of which planet Earth and its inhabitants are subjected today.”23 He also notes the negative impact of materialism on personal well-being: Now why are we glum-looking? It is because we have no aim. Since we have no [higher] aims, we imagine it is all a matter of achieving wealth and power, by any means possible. When we do not achieve them, we grow bitter, our faces grow gloomy. … The economic situation is bad. Everyone is despondent; everyone is tired; everyone is sad. This is because we are dominated by the world [i.e., materialism].24 Closely related to materialism is immorality, which is encouraged by the oppressive regime. “This stimulation of lust, these movie theatres, these nightclubs, these casinos, these so-called ‘art festivals’—these are all for degrading men and women. They are all there to trap them into slavery: to make them first slaves to their desires and, once they become like animals, to ride them.”25

d

Islam misunderstood and neglected: Taleqani finds Islam a misunderstood religion in Iran. “Even now [in 1979] Islam finds itself amidst superstitions, fantasies, distortions, and false interpretations caused by the influence of various philosophical traditions and the customs of many nations. It has still not been explained to most Muslims as it should be—especially to our youth.”26 Moreover, he complains, the genuine teachings of Islam are not being implemented in society. “If they were,” he believes, “all our problems would have been solved.”27

Set of Values Almost all the values emphasized by Ayatollah Taleqani are social; he emphasizes few spiritual values and does little more than note some personal ones. a

Social values: Equity and justice top the list of Taleqani’s values. He seems, however, to consider freedom and liberty equally significant. More than once he notes, “for mankind nothing is more desirable


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than freedom.”28 He also emphasizes Jihad (struggle), unity and brotherhood, equality, cooperation, and charity. Other social values commended by Taleqani include the practice of good deeds, peace, independence, self-reliance, education, respect, sharing, and harmony. b

Personal values: Truthfulness and contemplation head Taleqani’s list of personal values. They are closely followed by piety, responsibility, self-awareness, foresight, wisdom and the readiness to defend oneself. Other personal values he mentions include strength, perfection, kindness, self-control, fortitude, well-being and happiness, action, dignity, honor, friendship, victory, willpower, alertness, and knowledge.

c

Spiritual values: Faith, self-sacrifice, and evolution (towards perfection) are the chief spiritual values singled out by Taleqani in the works covered by this study.29

Outline of the Good Society In his description of the ideal society, Ayatollah Taleqani focuses on economic conditions. But since the economy cannot be separated from other aspects of life in Islam, he is drawn into discussing Islamic society and government as well. a

Islamic Law: According to Taleqani, the good society is pre-eminently one in which Islamic law is honored. “Government belongs to God. The Prophet, the Imams, and, after them, the Mujtahid [Islamic scholars] and the whole body of Muslims are the executors of the divine laws.”30 He argues eloquently for the superiority of divine law over man-made laws: Society is composed of individuals who willingly accept social laws and contracts and mutually bind themselves to respect and guarantee them. … The strength of the laws and their power of execution depend upon belief in the goal [to which they point] and on the moral and conscientious responsibility of the individuals who make up society. Therefore, the law-giver must:

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY First—be knowledgeable about the ultimate goal of life for both individuals and society so that there is no stagnation at any stage of development and evolution; … Second—have a full knowledge of human psychology, desires and values so that the laws can be comprehensive; … Third—be free from the [negative] influences of the social environment, class relations, and selfish desires so that the laws are legislated for the well-being of all the members of society. Fourth—the members of society must have faith in the laws and in the status of the legislator so that the principles of the law have the power of execution in themselves, and that the majority of the people feel themselves responsible for its implementation.31 Taleqani criticizes man-made laws as failing to fulfill any of these conditions and concludes that it is only the divine laws revealed through God’s Messengers that fit these criteria. Islamic law, which constitutes the final divine revelation, “provides principles and ordinances … in an absolute and abstract form. ... By connecting the active intellect with divine and other sources of law and dynamic Ijtihad (independent reasoning), Islamic jurisprudence is—and should be—always in development and evolution.”32

b

Qualifications for leadership: Unlike Khomeini who emphasizes knowledge of the law as one of the most important qualifications for leadership of an Islamic government, Taleqani refers to this only indirectly, quoting a tradition of Imam Husain about the marks of a leader. The first qualification is Al-hakim bil-Kitab (ruling by the Book). Taleqani notes one implication of this: that the leader himself is subject to the laws of the Book and cannot be above or beyond it. Another clear implication is that the ruler must be knowledgeable about the laws of the Book—otherwise how could he rule by them? Taleqani does not make this point explicit, however. In another lecture, he argues that an Islamic government is not government by the Akhunds (religious scholars) for two reasons. Firstly, religious scholars do not constitute any particular class; and secondly, even if


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they did so, in an Islamic state no class or social stratum has the right to dominate the government and deprive others of involvement.33 Based on the tradition of Imam Husain, the qualification that Taleqani emphasizes the most is Al-qaeim bil-qist (standing in equity). He interprets this as meaning that the leader establishes justice in society, and remains vigilant so that each individual receives his due rights, there is no discrimination, and everyone occupies the position they deserve. The third qualification is that the leader is not obliged to anyone in any way; and the fourth is that “he curbs himself in the Will of God,” which implies moral and spiritual excellence to guard himself against selfish desires; and that his thoughts, words, and actions are all directed towards ascending to God.34 c

Responsibilities and authority of government: According to Taleqani, the Islamic ruler has two basic duties: to enact the explicit principles and ordinances of the Islamic law, and to derive from them secondary ordinances and apply them to the cases at hand. Moreover, the ruler has the authority to freely dispose of public resources, to exercise complete supervision over production and distribution, and to take charge of public and government revenues. He is also responsible for providing for the sustenance of individual members of society when required.35

d

Social relations: Taleqani emphasizes that Islamic society is a society of Qist (equity) where everyone has the opportunity to develop their talents and potentialities, and where everyone occupies the social position that they deserve. In other words, In such a society every individual is like a seed which requires the proper conditions for development and the realization of its potential. Such conditions must be provided [by the government]. Moreover, the arena of proper and useful action should be open to each individual, and the reward of their mental and physical activities should return to them. That is, individuals owns their labor—no exploitation, no colonization, no alienation. All are human beings, without exception.36 It is in such a society that “cooperation and assistance for survival—which is man’s ideal—replaces struggle for survival—which is a remnant of his animal background and his life in the wilderness.”37 According to Taleqani, the realization of such a

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY community and society is not a mere utopia. “Islamic assemblies such as congregational prayer, Friday prayer, and Hajj all demonstrate the superiority of Taqwa [piety and God-consciousness]; the sovereignty of God and His laws; the equality of all human beings; and the abolition of all kinds of discrimination, class domination and their mental and psychological effects.”38 Moreover, the early Islamic society established by the Prophet is an embodiment of the ideal society. Taleqani devotes many pages to describing the society of the Prophet and notes that although it did not last very long after his death, the struggle for its re-establishment was first championed by Ali and then continued by others. Furthermore, “if we look at the Muslim populace in general [throughout Islamic history] and compare it to other societies, we see that there was much less oppression and violation of rights among the Muslims. In the long centuries from the beginning of Islam to the emergence of imperialism, the landowners of the Islamic territories did not resemble the feudal lords of other countries nor were their businessmen like the capitalists of other nations. …”39

e

The Islamic Economy: As we have seen, the focus of Taleqani’s book Islam wa Malikyat (Islam and Ownership) is on the Islamic economy. A detailed discussion of his views on the subject is beyond the scope of this book. To allow us to form a picture of economic relations in his ideal society, I offer the following summary of his views on ownership, production, distribution, consumption, and the role of government and public finance. 1

Ownership: Absolute ownership belongs to God, and the right of utilization of God’s property belongs to all the people. Thus, in an Islamic society private ownership is “limited, restricted, temporary, and custodial.” Some ordinances can be derived from this general principle: Land and natural resources do not belong to anyone (neither individuals nor society). The Islamic leader has the right of supervision over them in order to ensure that they are managed according to the public interest. Within the limits imposed by useful development and fruitful work, individuals have a special right to utilize the land and


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natural resources. Within the same limits, they also have ownership rights to the fruits of their labor. No one is entitled to the ownership of profits and properties gained from illegal transactions (such as usury, gambling and lotteries) and from the production and sale of harmful or useless commodities. Mentally retarded and immature persons do not have the right of disposition over their properties.40 2

Production: According to Islamic principles and ordinances, individuals are free and independent agents, and the government does not have the right to restrict their freedom. People enjoy freedom of choice to put to work their talents and their physical and mental capabilities in order to fulfill their material needs. Once individuals act to seek wealth and to utilize it, however, their actions are subject to limitation by certain ordinances and the requirements of the public interest. This is a distinguishing feature of the Islamic economy which prevents exploitation and the concentration of wealth on the one hand, and nurtures individual responsibility within society on the other.41

3

Distribution: Freedom of distribution, like production, is the natural and innate right of the person whose labor is involved. Neither a capitalist class nor the state can have a monopoly over production and distribution. The limits and legal restraints on the rights of utilization and ownership secure the regulation of distribution and prevent unlimited profits. Islam recognizes commerce and trade as a useful and legal occupation. However, “Islamic ordinances … have prohibited exchanges in which no useful act is performed. … In addition to forbidding usurious and quasi-usurious transactions, the specific provisions of Islamic jurisprudence have ruled out those instances in which profiting on nullity without useful work may creep in.”42 Given [the] kind of limited freedom of exchange [that Islam prescribes], and the government inspection of goods, the principle of supply and demand—in the capitalist sense— cannot govern exchanges. … According to Islamic jurisprudence … demand arises from need. Accordingly,

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY goods are offered and made available to the extent required to satisfy the necessities of life. The market is not to become the plaything of greed, as it is under capitalism, where the way is open to pseudo-needs and oppressive profiteering (“squandering on nullity”).43 4

Consumption: In the same way that Islam has prohibited usury, which involves profit without work and results in the concentration of wealth, it has unequivocally prohibited the accumulation of gold and silver. It also warns against the accumulation of wealth in general.44 On the other hand, Islam has prohibited any type of consumption that does not contribute to the promotion of public life or to the advancement of the causes of faith, thought, and science. There are explicit legislations against some instances of useless or harmful consumption; examples are drinking alcohol, gambling, procuring the means of frivolous amusement, laying up gold or silver vessels, partaking in base and illicit pleasures and lusts, and supporting corrupting art forms. Some fall under more general ordinances, to the effect that the procurement, import, buying and selling of whatever is determined to be useless and harmful, and dissipation, must be prevented. From another standpoint, no religion has encouraged and urged the expenditure of wealth for the sake of public life, charitable works, and uplifting thoughts and morals as Islam has.45

5

Government supervision and public finance: Although the people are free to engage in economic activities within the limits of the law, the government has both the authority and the responsibility to provide general supervision of these activities. One of the principles that authorizes government interference in individuals’ economic activities is that of La dharara wa la dharaara fi-l Islam (“there is no harming of others in Islam”); that is, no one can engage in an activity which proves harmful to individuals or to society. Moreover, the Islamic ruler has the right to supervise the use of natural resources and to dispose of private property on the basis of the public interest. Nonetheless, he cannot exceed the limits set by the law.46 The Islamic


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government also collects and spends taxation revenues for the benefit of taxpayers and for the public welfare. Islam provides for a number of religious taxes, some with fixed rates and some variable. If there is a need, the Islamic ruler can levy additional taxes.47 Program of Action Ayatollah Taleqani does not concern himself much with outlining a program of revolutionary action. Nonetheless, the following targets of change, agents of change, and forms of action can be identified in his writings and lectures. a

Targets of change: The only well-defined target of change in his work is the Shah and the corrupt and oppressive ruling clique that supports him. While Taleqani attacks the Shah explicitly in his 1979 lectures, he refers to him as “Taghut” (an illegitimate and oppressive authority) in his earlier lectures and writings. He also condemns foreign domination over Iran and names the USA and Israel as the two countries responsible for the Shah’s oppressive rule and for the exploitation of the Iranian people. Moreover, he identifies Bahais as a target because they have overstepped the bounds of their Dhimi (a religious minority living in Muslim society) status.48

b

Agents of change: Taleqani puts a strong emphasis on the role of the people in bringing about revolutionary change. He argues, The Quran [referring to the establishment of equity] says: Li yaquman-nas “the people [must] stand up themselves.” … It says “Nas”, that is, people who have attained [political] consciousness; not a particular stratum, not a particular class, not a particular group; but the people, the masses of the people—not even a particular party. In countries where a party makes a revolution … when it comes to power, the dictatorship of the oppressive regime is replaced by the dictatorship of the party. Again new problems [arise]! … But the Quran says that all the people—each and every one of you—are responsible.49 He notes, however, that there is a need for leadership to organize and direct the people. Although his discussion of the qualifications of an Imam (leader) indicates that leadership should come from the Ulama,

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY he refrains from explicitly stating that leadership belongs to this group. He advises his audience to follow the person whom they think has the qualifications set by teachings of Islam. He adds, though, “The most important point is that you get together and move yourselves forward. Do not accept anything blindly from me or from anyone else. Rather, recognize your way by using the criteria and the measures that the Quran has set up.”50

c

Forms of action: As we saw, Taleqani considers mankind’s internal psychological servitude as the source of its external subjugation. He holds up the example of the prophets, who wrought great revolutionary changes in their societies, as individuals freed from their psychological and instinctual shackles—the heritage of man’s animal background—as well as from domination by tradition, social environment, and the slavish imitation of others.51 Since the prophets are models for believers, Muslims who want to bring about revolutionary change in their societies should follow their example.

The second step for revolutionaries, after securing their sociopsychological freedom, is to foster a broad consciousness in society. Interpreting a verse of the Holy Quran, Taleqani argues that the prophets’ first task was “to illuminate the people; to deliver mankind from confusion and doubt about truth and falsehood and about itself; to free it from alienation; to enlighten it about its direction, its relationship to its Creator and with the creation, and its responsibilities in life.” To instill this idea in his audience, he repeats it over and over again in different forms. He also warns his audience that “while socio-political campaigns, demonstrations and slogans are important, they should not make our youth neglect ideas, reflection, mental development, strengthening faith and belief, and understanding their goals and ideologies.”52 After the people are enlightened, they will rise up themselves. They should not, however, engage in armed struggle right way. “It is the duty of every Muslim to give guidance to the tyrant, to speak to him charitably, to say ‘tyranny is not in your best interest; it is not in the best interest of the country or society. No bandit and tyrant has ever come to a good end.’ He must be counseled. If he does not accept the counsel, then the ranks must be closed and a force to oppose him must be created.”53 While this situation will inevitably mean organization and armed struggle, there are two further conditions to be met before an armed struggle, or Jihad, can be


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pursued. The conflict should be waged under the leadership of “a just Imam”, and it should be undertaken “in the Way of God.” This second condition ensures that “the people’s intentions are purified” before they engage in armed struggle. “Otherwise, however much importance Islam gives to jihad and warfare, it places an even greater value on human lives.”54 Taleqani introduces a new kind of non-violent resistance, namely, Mazloumyat (being innocently victimized by a brutal aggressor) and advocates it as a form of revolutionary action. He considers Mazloumyat as the sharpest and most effective weapon the revolutionaries have available to them, and urges them to rely on it instead of fighting back against the army. “The victories we have had so far are all the result of Mazloumyat. [The soldiers] would shoot and we would reply, “Allahu Akbar” (God is the Greatest). … It was such cries that pricked the consciences of those who had become no more than the wolves of imperialism.”55 Taleqani also emphasizes the importance of unity as the revolution unfolds. He asks the revolutionaries to avoid any action that would create division in their ranks, and to increase their levels of cooperation in order to defeat the Shah’s plots and government propaganda aimed at creating fear and disunity. He tells them, “We are all one Iranian family. If there is not enough food, we will eat just once a day. If I have food but my neighbor does not, I will sacrifice and share mine with him. No one tells parents that they should eat less when their children are hungry; it is natural to do so. This is the way Islam wants [all believers to act towards one another]. When you reach this point, [you will] know that you can solve most of your problems.”56 Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence For Ayatollah Taleqani, people are at the center of all the changes that shape a given society. “The form of society and the movement of history originate with mankind.”57 Mankind has great potentialities and is dutybound to work for their realization. Humanity’s other obligations, as we have seen, include struggle in the Way of God—which is also the way of the people—opposition to illegitimate authorities, the establishment of equity, and encouraging good and forbidding wrong.58 Those who set themselves to realize all these goals can never remain apathetic and inactive. Moreover, according to Taleqani, people should not wait for a leader in order to act.

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY One of the problems of underdeveloped nations is that the people always expect their leaders … to move first; then they will follow them blindly. The Quran teaches against such a view. [According to the Quran,] each human being is responsible for taking action and relying on themselves, so that if the leader is lost the people can continue on track. … If you are not organized into a group, rise up two by two; and if you cannot do even that, then rise up one by one. It is after the uprising that reflection and philosophizing will be activated.59

Taleqani tells his audience that the power of God and the Truth will support those who rise up to establish equity.60 He also reminds the revolutionaries of the significance and consequences of their action. “This [Revolution] is not the concern of a single nation, confined within certain borders. It is an issue that will change the destiny of the Middle East and the whole world. With the commitment of our nation and the vigilance of each and every man and women, young and old, this movement will keep moving forward. Hopefully it will open up a new system of logic and a new school of thought for a world which is frustrated by all other systems and schools of thought.”61 Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience Ayatollah Taleqani believes that “sacrifice” and “resistance” are the chief message to the world of the Iranian revolutionary movement that began in 1978. In one of the lectures delivered at the Hidayat Mosque in Tehran, he declares: Brothers and sisters! Take this message of ours to everyone. We are engaged in a grave and critical struggle. … [The enemy] cannot frighten us. You have become aware and vigilant. … The same youth which yesterday had sunk into corruption is today standing against imperialism and domestic tyranny and despotism, with all its artillery and tanks. … This [revolution] is a matter of great historical importance and [will determine] the destiny of our generation. … We should not behave in such a manner that will make future generations curse us.62 Taleqani also encourages self-sacrifice by arguing that to achieve martyrdom is to witness to the Truth. “If someone is effaced in the Truth,


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forgets himself in the way of the Truth or for the sake of the Truth, and gives himself over to be killed in witness of the Truth or to uphold the Truth, he is called a martyr.” He tells his audience that “God values the blood which has been shed in His way, not even a drop would be wasted;” and that “sacrifice serves evolution.”63 He frequently reminds them of the early martyrs of Islam—especially those who were martyred with Imam Husain in Karbala—and invites them, “Come, let us become martyrs; let us dominate the world [of materialism]; let us rise above the world! This is what it means to be a believer.”64 Simplification Since Ayatollah Taleqani is chiefly concerned to describe the ideal Islamic society—especially in his book on Islam and Ownership—he frequently refers to the early history of Islam as the embodiment of that society. The Islamic state established by the Prophet in Madina is the prime example, but he also cites the Caliphs Omar and Ali.65 In regard to martyrdom and sacrifice, he emphasizes the story of Imam Husain and his companions who were martyred by the army of Yazid in the Karbala desert in 682 A.D.66 In order to counter the Shah’s propaganda and to underline the illegitimacy of his regime, Taleqani compares his propaganda directed against the religious scholars to Yazid’s polemic against Imam Husain.67 Taleqani cites the phrases “Allahu Akbar” (God is the Greatest) and “La ilaha illallah” (there is no entity worthy of worship but God) as “the most frequently repeated mottoes” of the revolutionaries. He also quotes a number of verses from the Quran as mottoes for brotherhood, cooperation, charity, and Jihad.68 Claim to Truth and Rationality Ayatollah Taleqani is first and foremost a commentator on the Quran. Thus, the Holy Quran constitutes the basic source of truth for him. He also frequently refers to the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad and some of the Imams. History in general and Islamic history in particular is another source on which he relies heavily to support his views. Taleqani also refers occasionally to the works of non-Muslim scholars and philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau.69 Rationality and logical reasoning play an important role in Taleqani’s writings and lectures. His arguments for the superiority of divine law have already been presented, albeit in summary form. He devotes many pages to questions such as the shortcomings of man-made laws, Islamic

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understandings of human nature which must be considered preliminary to legislation, and the effectiveness of Islamic law.70 He also applies logic to his interpretation of the Quran, resulting in much more comprehensive readings than the works of most other commentators and allowing him to explore more thoroughly the meaning of each word and the interrelationship of the words in a given verse. 71 Taleqani also seeks to establish his claim to truth by attacking the rival ideologies of capitalism and communism. Since the Shah’s economic policies were based on a capitalist model, it was natural for capitalism to be a target of his criticism. Communism was critiqued in order to dissuade Iranian youth who were susceptible to its influence. Taleqani considers both capitalism and communism to be outcomes of the economic and industrial fluctuations experienced by Western countries in recent centuries, rather than true reflections of the realities of human life. Since both ideologies have their origins in the industrial revolution, their economic theories focus on the problems of industry and industrial production. “They do not provide any clear, decisive, and equitable solution to questions involving the disposition and distribution of natural resources, a solution that would be acceptable to the original and true owners of these resources [that is, the people as a whole] and would safeguard their rights; and at the same time expand, develop, and increase production of those resources.” Moreover, both capitalism and communism “idolize” wealth and its accumulation and “regard mankind solely as a tool for production, distribution and consumption.”72 Taleqani also argues that the absolute ownership of private property under capitalism has resulted in exploitation, oppression, the accumulation of wealth, the emergence of the capitalist class, and the deprivation of the workers. The total abolition of private property under communism, on the other hand, leads to the curtailing of human freedom and individual liberties and to the establishment of the dictatorship of a particular class.73 The implication is that only the “custodial” concept of ownership advocated by Islam can lead to the creation of an equitable society.

5 Revolutionary Ideology in the Works of Ayatollah Mutahhari

Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari is a very prolific writer and lecturer. One source lists 50 books either written by him or edited from his collected articles and lectures, as well as 27 articles published separately in periodicals.1 Most of Mutahhari’s works deal with Islamic philosophy and theology, and he also pays attention to Islamic history, gnosis, and jurisprudence. He has written a book on Islamic economics as well. While none of his works can be considered “political” as such, many contain elements of political thought.2 Political consciousness In most of his published writings and lectures, Ayatollah Mutahhari’s major aim—like Ayatollah Taleqani’s—is to turn mankind’s attention from its immediate selfish concerns to higher ideals and goals. He couches his discussion in a religio-philosophical language which is aimed at creating not only philosophical and religious awareness but also political consciousness. Mutahhari’s ideals and goals for mankind are based on his view of human nature. He argues that, “in the process of the general and substantive movement of the universe, man emerges with additional dimensions [to those of animals]. … The basis and pillar of man’s personality and character, the sources of his thought and higher ideals, is 3 laid down within his nature.” Unlike the animals, however, man is not born with a fixed personality. “Man is born a potential creature who moves according to his faculties towards a special set of needs and tendencies under the guidance of innate forces and in the light of external conditions. He would receive the actuality he deserves—namely, humanity—should he develop his potentials. On the contrary, he would

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turn out [to be] a ‘metamorphosed’ [alienated] creature, if he accepts the existence imposed on him by external forces.”4 In addition to those intangible qualities which “enable mankind to extend his sphere of activities beyond the limits of the material world towards sublime moral and spiritual horizons,” mankind is equipped with the power of intellect and will. Thus, “he is able to resist his selfish desires, liberate himself from their domination, and gain mastery over them. Man can put all his desires under the direction of his intellect, allocate a certain range of fulfillment to each, and thus achieve ‘moral or spiritual’ freedom, which is the most valuable type of freedom. This great capacity—which is a characteristic of man but is lacking in animals—qualifies man for undertaking ‘responsibility’. It grants man the right to ‘choose’, and makes him a 5 genuinely ‘free’ being enjoying ‘freedom of choice’.” Mutahhari’s philosophical thought is not independent of his religious thought. According to him, one of Islam’s strengths is the attention it pays to knowledge of the “self”—not physical properties, but the real human self as created by God with all its potentialities. It is the “self” which is called the “spirit of God.” By knowing that “self,” mankind will feel dignity, honor, and a sense of the sublime. It will consider itself too noble to submit to humiliation and debasement. It will discover its sanctity and will also find meaning and value in the moral and social virtues. The Quran … [tells mankind] that it has a mission and a responsibility. Certainly humans are the strongest and the most powerful creatures on planet Earth. … [But] they should realize their real position in the universe. They should know that they are not exclusively earth-bound; rather, there is a ray of Divine Spirit in them. Mankind should know that it is the trustee of God. It should know it has not been granted superiority by chance or in order to practice tyranny and despotism, grabbing everything for itself and disregarding any duty or responsibility.6 Like Taleqani, Mutahhari notes that the Quran praises man as God’s trustee and Khalifa (vicegerent and representative); while it considers him higher than the angels, it also condemns him as “lower than the low.” This

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is not a contradiction, and neither does it imply that mankind is a creature of two natures, one admirable and the other blameworthy. According to the Quran, mankind contains all perfections within itself, but as potentialities which must be realized. Mankind is its own architect and builder. The primary condition for mankind’s achievement of its potential perfection is “faith.” Faith leads to Taqwa (piety, God-consciousness), good deeds, and struggle in the Way of God. It is faith which transforms science and knowledge from a tainted tool marked by mankind’s passions and selfish desires into a useful tool [for its movement towards perfection].7 Faith brings responsibility and action along with it. Mutahhari argues that “the teachings of the Quran are all based on the notion of responsibility, both at the individual and social levels. The command to enjoin right and forbid wrong is an instruction to the individual to rebel against the corruption and tyranny of society.” He also notes that “Islam considers the struggle against tyranny and oppression a sacred responsibility and permits Jihad, which is the same as armed struggle under certain conditions.” Such circumstances exist when an individual or a group are deprived of their rights and when “weak and helpless people are trapped in the claws of oppressors.” He also argues that Islam contains “a comprehensive message which is orientated towards justice, equity, purity, morality and spirituality, love, goodness, and the struggle against oppression.” He believes the message of Islam is capable of giving rise to a profound revolutionary movement: “a divine and human revolution in which the divine zeal, spiritual happiness, divine beauty, and human values shine and glow—a revolution whose manifestations we have repeatedly witnessed throughout human history, with the Islamic revolution [of the 8 Prophet Muhammad] being the most glorious.” Mutahhari emphasizes mankind’s awareness of self and the world as a preliminary to political consciousness. “Mankind is both self-conscious and world-conscious, and loves to increase its awareness of both. In fact, mankind’s evolution, development, and prosperity depend upon this consciousness of itself and the world.”9 He distinguishes eight types of consciousness: (1) primordial natural consciousness, (2) philosophical consciousness, (3) world-consciousness, (4) class consciousness, (5) national consciousness, (6) human consciousness, (7) Gnostic consciousness, and (8) prophetic consciousness. Of primary interest here

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is his discussion of human consciousness which deals with “a sense of community among the people which leads them to identify with a larger group and strive for common ideals.”10 (As for the other types identified, primordial consciousness is intrinsic to the individual self; prophetic consciousness is limited to a small number of individuals; and the philosophical, “world” and Gnostic varieties are mostly restricted to individuals and do not lead to social commitment. Although class and national consciousness certainly foster social commitment and a sense of community, they are concerned with particular groups rather than with humanity as a whole and lack a moral emphasis.11) Mutahhari defines human consciousness as self-consciousness in relation to the whole human race. Human consciousness is based on the principle that all mankind forms a single unit and enjoys one “collective human conscience.” Humanitarianism and humanism exist in all members of humankind. … When people attain such a consciousness, their sufferings will be the sufferings of all mankind; their hopes and aspirations will reflect those of mankind; all their efforts will be directed towards [serving] mankind, and their friendships and animosities will all be for the sake of mankind. They will be a friend of humanity’s friends— science and knowledge, culture, health, welfare, liberty, justice, and love. They will be hostile to humanity’s enemies—ignorance, poverty, oppression, disease, repression, and discrimination.12 Mutahhari also holds that humans are social creatures by nature. “In order to attain the perfection for which it has the potential, mankind has a social propensity.”13 Mankind’s social life is natural—rather than contractual or imposed—not only because humans are social by nature, but also because God has created them with different—and complementary—physical, spiritual, intellectual, and emotional talents and capabilities. Thus people have a natural need for one another and tend to club together in common endeavors. “Common social needs and the special requirements of human relationships bring people together and unify their lives in such a way that individuals in society can be compared to passengers in an airplane or a ship traveling towards the same destination. Either they will all reach their destination together or they will all have their journey cut short. They face their common perils together 14 and find a unified destiny.”


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Criticism of Existing Social Arrangements The works of Ayatollah Mutahhari covered in this study contain no critique of the existing social arrangements in Iran, and indeed in none of his works he seems to present any criticism of the Shah’s regime or the prevailing social, political, and economic conditions. Some critics have charged that “Mutahhari dealt conservatively with political issues and the nation’s struggle during the trying conditions [of the Shah’s rule].”15 It may be unfair, however, to attribute this silence to indifference or fear. The testimony of his close friends—well-known people like Ayatollah Muntazeri, Dr Behishti, and Hashemi Rafsanjani—show that he was politically active at least from the early 1960s.16 The reason for his abstention from criticism may be reflected in some remarks by one of his colleagues: “After Imam Khomeini was exiled to Turkey in late 1343 [1964], Hai’at-e Mo’talefa [an Islamic-oriented political party] considered shifting its activities from educational and ideological to political and military. … [Mutahhari, a leading member of the party, opposed this move.] He was one of those who argued that ‘we still have not formulated an authentic and systematic ideology. We have not provided our youth with the education needed to clarify various concepts for them. Our youth are motivated by emotion, and their knowledge of Islam is meager and 17 insignificant. …’” Thus, Mutahhari seems to have believed that he could better fulfill his duty by educating Iranian society about the authentic teachings of Islam, especially the youth, than by criticizing the regime and risking being silenced.18 Set of Values In general, Ayatollah Mutahhari refers to fundamental values less often than the other Iranian revolutionary leaders examined in this study. And, unlike the others, he emphasizes spiritual and personal qualities, but without entirely neglecting social values. a

Spiritual values: Faith heads the list of the values prized by Mutahhari. He also emphasizes martyrdom (self-sacrifice)—which is also a social value—evolution (towards perfection), and devotion and worship. Love, God-consciousness, purity (of soul), and beauty are some other spiritual values noted.

b

Personal values: Knowledge and responsibility are important personal values for Mutahhari. He also emphasizes awareness and

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY consciousness, reflection and intellect, freedom of choice, willpower, strength, honor, dignity, and truth. Other personal values mentioned include moral virtue, piety, courage, welfare and prosperity, sincerity, fortitude, and zeal.

c

Social values: Among social values commended, Mutahhari emphasizes good deeds, freedom, justice and equity, and Jihad (struggle). He also mentions independence, culture, charity, equality, and the desire for Hijra (migration).19

Outline of the Good Society In none of the works covered in this study does Ayatollah Mutahhari provide a systematic outline of the ideal society. This does not mean, however, that he ignores this important component of the ideology of revolution. He has written a book on Islamic economics and has delivered numerous lectures on the topic. His lectures also include discussions of the principle of consultation, education, women’s rights, international relations, and leadership in Islam. Taken together, these sources offer a detailed picture of his vision of the ideal Islamic society. The following 20 points are drawn from a number of his lectures. a

The form of Islamic government: Mutahhari proposes that an Islamic government should take the form of an “Islamic republic” in which the government is elected by the people, regardless of sex, color, and creed. The only criterion for voters will be maturity and mental competence. Under a republic, the government will serve a finite term, to be either re-elected or replaced by popular mandate. As an “Islamic” government, it will be bound to rule according to Islamic laws and principles.

b

Islamic law: Based on his concept of human nature, Mutahhari argues that although the human species does not change, neither does it remain static but is subject to a dynamic process of social evolution. Because of this, mankind needs both permanent principles which will demarcate his evolutionary path, and temporary rules which will govern its behavior at different evolutionary stages. While Islamic law is not intended to apply to these temporary stages, but rather to the evolutionary process as a whole, it nonetheless provides necessary


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guidelines for these stages. Islam provides both fixed laws for mankind’s permanent needs and variable rules for its changing needs. c

The role of the Faqih (senior jurist, leader): According to Mutahhari, in an Islamic state—that is, a society where the majority of the people have accepted Islam as an ideology and committed themselves to follow it—the Faqih will play the role not of ruler but of ideologue. The duty of an ideologue is to supervise the proper implementation of Islamic ideology. In addition, he will review the eligibility of the executive and candidates for the presidency, and ensure that they carry out their duties within the framework of Islamic ideology. The Faqih will also be elected by the people.

d

Justice: Mutahhari emphasizes the place of justice in an Islamic society and argues that the success and continuation of human evolution will depend on the government’s pursuit of justice. Justice involves the elimination of class differences, bridging the economic gap, the abolition of all kinds of discrimination, and the prevention of maltreatment to all citizens—even the criminal who is sentenced to death.

e

Islamic brotherhood: According to Mutahhari, an Islamic society will be organized on the basis of love and Islamic brotherhood. This means that the people will be ready to sacrifice their own comfort and interests for the sake of others. Early Islamic society provides the best model for this type of relationship.

f

Freedom: An Islamic society will be characterized by genuine freedom of thought and expression. Again drawing on his conception of human nature, Mutahhari argues that genuine freedom involves restricting man’s “animal” side and selfish desires and liberating his true humanity—the potentialities that distinguish mankind from the animals. These latter include the human capacity for rationality and our higher attributes such as the search for and devotion to truth, moral virtues, beauty and aesthetics.

g

Independence: Mutahhari notes that an Islamic government will be completely independent—politically, economically, culturally, and ideologically.

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Program of Action Since Ayatollah Mutahhari does not offer a critique of existing conditions in Iranian society, it is hardly surprising that he fails to specify the targets of change on which any struggle should focus. It is remarkable then that he discusses in detail the agents responsible for revolutionary change and the forms of action that are necessary. a

Agents of action: Mutahhari notes that the message of the Quran, which itself contains revolutionary teachings, is addressed to An-nas, that is, “the people” as a whole. He criticizes those scholars and activists who translate An-nas as “the masses” and argue that Islam is an ideology of the oppressed. While Mutahhari concedes that most of the followers of the prophets were from the Mustadhaf (weak and oppressed) group, and that Islam is oriented towards the interests of the Mustadhafeen, he rejects the view that Islam polarizes society into two classes of Mustadhaf and Mustakber (“the arrogant ones”) which are respectively revolutionary and counter-revolutionary in orientation. Presenting evidence from the Quran, he argues that revolutionary believers have been found in the Mustakber class, while not every section of the Mustadhaf class has always been included among the “revolutionaries of Tawhid (monotheism, unity).” According to Mutahhari, it is attachment to God and to human conscience that fosters commitment and responsibility—not membership of a deprived group. To be receptive to the revolutionary message of the Quran, a person should be pure, untainted, and alive to his true nature; he should also feel a sense of responsibility towards creation. The reason why most of the prophets’ followers came from the oppressed group lies in the fact that wealth and a luxurious way of life disfigure authentic human nature and engender a commitment to the status quo. By the same token, young people, whose nature is still pure, are more receptive to 21 the revolutionary teachings of Islam than the older generation.

b

Forms of action: On the basis of verse 8:11 of the Quran (“Lo! Allah changeth not the condition of a people until they (first) change that which is in their hearts”), Mutahhari argues that Islam gives priority to the moral foundations of a society over its material base, although the latter is not to be neglected. According to him, the first type of

THE WORKS OF AYATOLLAH MUTAHHARI consciousness that Islam seeks to remembrance of its origins and destiny.

engender

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mankind’s

Where did you come from? Where are you now? Where are you going? Where did the world come from? Which stages has it passed through? Which direction is it going? The prime sense of responsibility fostered by the Messengers was directed towards the totality of creation and Being. The sense of social responsibility is part of that concern. … This deep-rooted consciousness, which extends to the depths of human nature, creates in human beings such an enthusiasm for the defense and expansion of their beliefs that they are ready to sacrifice [everything] for its sake. Thus, the Messengers started from what we now call the “superstructure” and moved onto the “infrastructure.” … Any religious movement today would be well advised to use a similar method.22 The second type of consciousness to be promoted by Islam is “human consciousness”, which involves directing mankind’s attention to the nobility and dignity of its essential nature.23 “In this school [of Islam] … mankind is a ray of the Divine spirit. The angels have prostrated themselves before it and call upon it from the heights of the Empyrean. Despite its animal tendencies to lust, evil, and corruption, in this creation [i.e., mankind] there is a pure essence which, by its very nature, is incompatible with evil, bloodshed, lying, corruption, meanness, humiliation, and toleration of oppression and injustice.”24 At the third level, Islam aims to engender a consciousness of social rights and responsibilities. Mutahhari quotes the Holy Quran on the obligation to fight for the freedom of the oppressed and in legitimate self-defense, and the Muslim’s duty to oppose injustice. He emphasizes that Islam considers these responsibilities as human values to strive for. “The Quran never relies upon [utilizing] psychological complex nor does it incite envies, lusts, and selfish motives. …”25 Mutahhari does not provide a detailed account of the methods to be used to fulfill these responsibilities or to foster the different types of consciousness. He merely notes that, in the initial stages, guidance, encouragement, reinforcement and logical reasoning should be used. “From the point of view of the Quran, these methods can completely change people and the direction of their lives. They can change their

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character and bring about a moral and spiritual revolution in them.” He believes an innate humanity can be found even in the most cruel and tyrannical ruler, such as the Egyptian Pharaoh at the time of Moses. Thus, a tyrant should be first given advice and urged to change before other action is taken against him.26 If these methods fail to produce the desired results, then, according to Mutahhari, Islam considers “struggle, Jihad, and the use of force moral and ethical.”27 He argues that physical weakness can never be an excuse for inaction. “In the same way that an ignorant individual or society which has reneged on its responsibility to acquire awareness is responsible to God, … a weak individual or society which fails to acquire power and strength is held responsible by God.” If the enemy is too strong and direct confrontation is impossible, the revolutionaries have no responsibility to fight back. They are responsible, however, for working hard to build up their strength and force.28 Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence Based on his notion of an innate human nature, Ayatollah Mutahhari presents a philosophy of history in which man plays the central role and which encourages commitment to action and self-confidence in at least two ways. It views mankind as the maker of its own destiny, and considers that ultimate victory belongs to those who fight in the cause of Truth. The following is an attempt to present his philosophy of history in a nutshell.29 First, as we have seen, Mutahhari stresses mankind’s social nature, a propensity that will help it “attain the perfection for which it has the potential … This propensity prepares the ground for a collective spirit which serves as a means for taking mankind to its ultimate perfection." If this is the case, then the individual and society are both essential to one another. Society is fundamental because “Individual human beings, each of whom enters social life with their innate resources as well as the resources which they acquire from nature, merge together in their spirits and ideas and find a new spiritual identity which can be called a ‘collective spirit.’” But this “new compound” does not dissolve its individual 30 components, and thus, “the individual is also fundamental.” Mutahhari further argues that if society is fundamental, then it has its own character and life, and certain laws governing it. He quotes the Holy Quran to show that this view is supported by Islamic tradition. “The Noble Quran makes it clear that communities and societies—by virtue of their being not merely collections of individuals, but communities and


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societies—have certain laws, and rise or fall on the basis of those laws.”31 From his study of the Quran, he derives four main factors which contribute to the rise or fall of civilizations: justice versus injustice; unity versus disunity; the implementation or neglect of the social duty to enjoin right and forbid wrong; and moral uprightness versus wrong-doing and moral corruption.32 Civilizations rise and fall. In this process, according to the Quran, “The scum is cast away, but that which is of use to man remains on earth” (13:17). Thus, human society moves ahead and evolves. The motor of history, according to Mutahhari, is again the potentialities latent in human nature: Mankind has some characteristics which enable its social life to evolve. One of those characteristics and potentialities is its ability to gather and record experiences and experiments that will form the basis of future experiments. Another potentiality is the ability to learn through speech and writing. … [Thus] the experiences and experiments of one generation are transferred through both oral and written communication to future generations. … The third characteristic is the fact that mankind is equipped with the power of intellect and invention. … Its fourth characteristic is a natural interest in and attraction to novelty. Thus, human beings not only possess the potential to invent and create whatever they need, but by their very nature they are drawn to innovation, invention, and creativity.33 Mutahhari is optimistic about the future direction of humanity. For him, human history is in the process of evolving “towards unity and uniformity. … The future of human societies is a single universal community in which all human values are realized and in which mankind attains its real perfection, genuine prosperity and, finally, its authentic humanity.” This will entail “the victory of faith over faithlessness, the victory of piety and God-consciousness over moral laxity, the victory of righteousness over corruption, … and the ultimate victory of those fighting for the cause of Truth.”34

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Mutahhari argues that, from an Islamic point of view, an acceptance of the causality of history and the necessity of laws to regulate society does not imply historical and social determinism. Mankind’s “nature endows it with such possibilities and freedom that enable it to rebel against social impositions.” Yet mankind’s capacity for freedom is limited by external factors such as the social environment, history, heredity, and the geographical and natural environment. Although mankind can never completely sever its relationship with these factors, it can free itself from their shackles to a considerable extent, however, and can make them conform to its will. Humanity can achieve this “by its powers of intellect and knowledge on the one hand, and its powers of will and faith on the other.” Knowledge and science enable humans to construct their society and their future in whatever way they want. Faith, on the other hand, shows them how to construct a future that will be better both for themselves and for their society. “Faith makes people, and people make the world by the power of science and knowledge. Were science and faith 35 to combine, both mankind and the world would prosper.” Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience Self-sacrifice and revolutionary patience are minor themes in the works of Ayatollah Mutahhari. However, in a lecture entitled “The Martyr” Mutahhari seeks to instill these values in a number of ways: 1

He considers martyrdom the highest achievement a person can aspire to. The martyrs and the Mujahids (warriors) who long for martyrdom are the chosen friends of God and will have the highest status in paradise.36

2

A martyr is like a candle “whose job is to burn out and get extinguished, in order to shed light for the benefit of others.” The blood of a martyr is never wasted. “Every drop is turned into hundreds and thousands of drops, nay into tons of blood, and is transfused into the body of his society.” Thus, the martyr “revives the spirit of valor and fortitude, courage and zeal, especially divine zeal, 37 among the people who have lost it.”

3

The spirit of martyrdom and zeal for Jihad are necessary for the security of an Islamic state. “A Muslim community equipped with the spirit of jihad, cannot be vulnerable to the enemy’s assaults.”38


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4

If a person rejects Jihad and martyrdom, “Allah will clothe [him] with a garment of humiliation.” This is so because “Jihad, or at least a desire to take part in it, is an integral part of the doctrine of Islam. One’s fidelity to Islam is judged by it.”39

5

Mutahhari quotes the examples of early Muslims, including Imam Ali and Imam Husain, who possessed “the spirit of longing for martyrdom.” He argues that, “We always have Imam Ali’s name on our lips and claim to be devoted to him. … But, true Shia’ism requires us to follow in his footsteps, too.”40

6

Mutahhari also quotes several passages from the Quran and numerous traditions of the Prophet, Imam Ali, and Imam Husain about the importance of jihad and martyrdom.41

Simplification Because Ayatollah Mutahhari considers the educated strata as his target audience, in most of his works he makes little if any effort to simplify his teachings by means of stories, symbols, and slogans. In some others, however, he does refer to stories and notes phrases which could be used as slogans. In “The Martyr” for example, we find a number of mottos: “The Martyrs are the candles of society,” “Jihad is a door to paradise,” and “Jihad is the garment of piety.”42 It would be fair to say that Mutahhari’s limited use of stories and slogans reflects the nature of the topic under discussion rather than any concern about the educational level of his audience. Claim to Truth and Rationality Because Ayatollah Mutahhari is first and foremost a philosopher, he uses logical reasoning as a basic tool to establish his claims to truth. As we have seen, he seeks to build a comprehensive, coherent, and consistent theory of human history and society on the basis of his principle of an innate human nature. Mutahhari’s philosophical arguments are not separate from his faith, however. His premises are mostly derived from the Holy Quran—his concepts of an innate human nature and the causality of history are prime examples. He also cites the Quran in support of particular arguments—for example, his contention that the ultimate victory, and the inheritance of the earth, belong to the righteous servants 43 of God.

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Mutahhari also frequently uses logical reasoning in his critiques of rival ideologies. Unlike Taleqani, who criticizes both capitalism and communism, Mutahhari focuses his criticism on Marxism alone. Marxism was extremely popular and fashionable in the 1960s and 1970s among the educated Iranian youth who formed a large proportion of Mutahhari’s audience. Thus, he devotes many pages of his books and several of his lectures to the topic. In Jahanbini Islami, he takes more than 50 pages to refute “historical materialism”44 in a polemical tour de force that demonstrates both his deep understanding of Marxism and his powers of argumentation. He ends his critique with the observation: “I cannot conceal my amazement as to how such a baseless and unscientific theory could become famous as a scientific theory. The art of propaganda is indeed capable of working wonders!”45 Mutahhari seldom uses the traditions of the Prophet and Imams or historical evidence in support of his arguments. This is in sharp contrast to Imam Khomeini and Ayatollah Taleqani, who both rely heavily on them. More often, however, Mutahhari draws on the works of both Muslim and non-Muslim philosophers and scholars. In the works covered in this study, for example, he cites the works of authorities as diverse as Allama Tabatabaie (a prominent Iranian philosopher), Dr Mohammad Iqbal, Montesquieu, William James, Raymond Aron, and Mahatma 46 Gandhi in support of his arguments.

6 Revolutionary Ideology in the Works of Engineer Bazargan

Hamid Algar observes that it is only after the Second World War that “we see a beginning of an Islamic development [in Iran] in thought and expression that is separate from the traditional concerns and institutions of the Shi’i ulama.”1 Engineer Mehdi Bazargan was a pioneer and leading figure in that new development. He began his religio-political activities with the establishment of the Students’ Islamic Society in Tehran University, “which was by no means a simple students association but concerned itself with the propagation of Islam in the contemporary idiom.”2 Thereafter, he participated in a number of Islamic associations and societies and co-founded the Liberation Movement of Iran, with Ayatollah Taleqani, in the early 1960s. Most of Bazargan’s published works are the edited versions of speeches delivered to various Islamic societies in the mid to late 1940s and the late 1950s and early 1960s. He has written relatively few books.3 Political Consciousness While recognizing that Islamic thought emphasizes socio-political activism and selflessness, Eng. Bazargan found his fellow Iranian Muslims to be individualistic and selfish. Nevertheless, he sees the historical evolution of humankind as moving towards the fulfillment of Islamic ideals and seeks to foster political consciousness by informing his contemporaries of the authentic teachings of Islam and the truth about mankind’s social evolution. a

Islam a social religion: Bazargan argues that Islam views the individual as a member of “a collectivity.”

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY Moreover, worship in Islam—while focusing on the individual—has social dimensions. The Quran also explicitly commands mutual consultation among Muslims, the formation of community, and social discipline. In Islam, individuals are responsible not only for their own improvement and development, but also for the affairs of their society.4 Bazargan criticizes Iranian society—including the religious establishment before the emergence of Imam Khomeini’s movement—for failing to “understand Islam and its great social dimension. … We are locked up in the narrow shell of personal affairs. We think individualistically, live individualistically, and act individualistically.”5 He invites his audience to emerge from that shell and, “at the command of the Quran, to think and act broadly, socially, and universally. We should know that [as the Prophet has said], ‘The Hand [i.e., support] of God is with the community.’”6 Bazargan invites the religious scholars to become involved with the socio-economic problems of the country and the world, and to change their methods of working.7 He also repeatedly emphasizes the two social duties of social criticism (enjoining right and forbidding wrong) and struggle against oppression.8

b

The common boundary between religion and politics: Bazargan observes that religion and politics are two very significant and powerful factors in the life of a society as well as the destiny of a nation. Whether or not people believe and participate in them, they will certainly be affected by them. Religion and politics have a common boundary which is not always respected. In practice, either religion has the upper hand and determines political allegiance, or politics is dominant and shapes people’s beliefs. This imbalance has accelerated in the modern world, where the power of governments has increased rapidly: “now, unlike the past, the government controls all the affairs of a country.” Official interference in religion is becoming very marked in the case of Iran and Bazargan fears that if religion does not control politics, politics will overcome religion and destroy it.9 According to Bazargan, a major factor in the contemporary predicament of Muslim nations is the withdrawal of religious people from positions of leadership in government and society and the

THE WORKS OF ENGINEER BAZARGAN

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relinquishment of these posts to the mean and the ignorant. Bazargan condemns the implicit agreement between the religious establishment and the government by which the former refrains from interference in politics in the hope that the government will not interfere in its affairs. But, as Bazargan argues, “The more [the religious establishment] absents itself from politics and leaves it to operate unchecked, the more the government will usurp power and authority and increase its dominance.”10 As a result, every Muslim is duty bound to be concerned with, and actively participate in, the political process. To fulfill this duty properly, Muslims should closely monitor the activities of their government and be knowledgeable about the socio-political issues of both their country and the world as a whole.11 Bazargan frequently refers to the lives and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and the Imams to demonstrate their active involvement in political and social affairs. He emphasizes the examples of Ali and Husain and quotes the Prophet as saying, for example, “The person who wakes up in the morning and shows no concern for the affairs of Muslims is not a Muslim.”12 c

God as the ultimate goal of a Muslim: Eng. Bazargan argues that the existence of God validates mankind’s loftiest values: “The reality and truth of God’s existence is related to the reality and truth of all values. If there is absolute truth and value, God must also exist. On the other hand, if God or Truth is not absolute, how can we believe in values such as beauty, love, humanism, and sacrifice?” According to him, the attributes which the prophets have ascribed to God and have set as mankind’s ideal are the values that have been most cherished by the leaders of mankind throughout history. The prophets have also taught that God has put all the forces of creation at mankind’s disposal to use for its own development. God has promised mankind that it can aspire to God’s own attributes and can even attain infinity. The acts of worship prescribed by religion are meant as training exercises to prepare mankind to achieve the ultimate goal of “meeting” God.13 Bazargan also emphasizes Muslim belief in the Hereafter and notes its significance in this context: What [belief in the Hereafter, and the preparation for it] means is neither withdrawing from the world nor giving oneself up to it. It means doing good deeds and serving the people. What kind

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY of service? Abstaining from oppression, aggression, and treachery; respecting the rights of others—even those of animals; showing love, kindness, and charity. … In short, [it means] constructing the world of others.14

d

The historical evolution of mankind: Bazargan identifies three kinds of evolution in human history: the trend towards democracy and humanism, the broadening scope of human activities, and the development of “social gods.” Each will be discussed briefly. 1

According to Bazargan, humans lived at a “sub-animal” level for tens of thousands of years, having lost their original free state bestowed by nature and placing themselves in servitude to members of their own species—something which, according to Bazargan, even animals do not do. After a long period, Slowly mankind groped towards freedom, liberty, and an understanding of democracy—as a result of which social cooperation and rapid advancement became possible. With mankind’s recognition of human rights and the character of the individual, it rapidly ascended to the heights of science and [the] perfection [of knowledge]. … In the present, more than ever, it is determined to correct the deviations and weaknesses that it has brought upon itself. With a view to its enormous potential and great responsibility, mankind is also determined to assign an absolute value and special rights to individual human personality.15 Bazargan’s views on democracy and contemporary civilization seem ambiguous. In one place he argues that democracy has become prevalent in recent centuries and has produced liberty, human dignity, and justice which in turn have caused “human potentials to fully manifest themselves and the lofty palace of civilization to be built.” On the next page, however, he notes that under the bourgeoisie, democracy brought about human slavery to capital and industry, and consequently led to a reduction in productivity. “Thus, it became necessary to establish a relationship between a worker’s product and his personality, spirit, and heart. This was the second step towards recognizing


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human status and worth. In addition to the right to equality, comfort, democracy and bourgeoisie [sic], man was granted the right to choose and to attain dignity.” He goes on to criticize American society which “regards the individual human being as a dollar-producing animal or machine. All factors and all material and spiritual means are employed so that a person delivers the maximum profit to American society. There is little concern with the individual’s personal well-being, education and dignity.”16 2

Bazargan asserts that in today’s world the scope of human affairs has outgrown the individual, family, tribal, and even the national levels. [Human relationships] have expanded and developed enormously. Slowly everything has become internationalized. Geographical, historical, economic, and intellectual boundaries have been removed, and now the time has come for political and military boundaries [to be removed]. … No country has an independent economy. … Military defense at the local or national level is regarded as absurd. Adopting an ideology or regime is no longer the prerogative of a single nation.17 According to Bazargan, in authoritarian regimes this situation produces a feeling of impotence and fatalism. In genuine democracies, however, because individuals “see that they have a role to play and the right to express themselves freely, they will come to love and honor society and also to consider themselves worthy of respect and responsibility.18

3

Bazargan also traces the evolution of what he calls “social gods”—which he defines as any being, concrete or abstract, that replaces God in people’s minds or is equated with God. He believes that the first “social god” was the paternal head of the family in ancient India, Greece and Rome. In the second stage, the father was replaced with tribal chiefs (e.g., among the Arabs) and feudal lords and princes (e.g., in medieval Europe). Soon after that, however, the “social gods” underwent a transformation from powerful individuals to non-material and

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY general concepts and social symbols such as central government, patriotism, and nationalism. Later on, the concept underwent a further evolution into “ideological symbols, such as liberalism, capitalism, socialism, and communism. … Such has been the evolutionary process of social idols or the deities created by the human mind. The final stage of this process can be nothing but [belief in] the Creator and sustainer of the world.”19

Criticism of Existing Social Arrangements While Eng. Bazargan does not present a systematic critique of the socioeconomic and political system under the Shah’s regime, his occasional remarks on the subject can be categorized into three groups: a

Criticism of society: Bazargan not only condemns his fellow Iranians as individualistic and selfish, but he also describes contemporary Iranian society as “shaky and stagnant, empty of noble and higher goals and ideals.” He goes on to say, “We lack will, initiative, innovation and progress. We have no intellectual, artistic or economic products.” In such circumstances, he finds “luxury, leisure, and extravagance extremely improper. They will lead only to weakness and destruction.”20 Bazargan asserts that “Muslims as a whole live in a shameful condition of weakness, poverty, and backwardness. We are far from what is ideal for us and satisfactory to God.” He enumerates a number of factors which he links to the predicament of Muslims in general and Iranian society in particular: (1) tribal and national attachments; (2) worldly ambition and the accumulation of wealth: (3) royal luxury and extravagance; (4) withdrawal from society, apathy, inactivity; (5) division and disunity; (6) emphasis on the ritualistic and formal aspects of worship and neglect of its real meaning and significance; (7) self-righteousness, excessive pride in one’s own religion, and smugness about one’s own salvation; (8) exploitation of religion for achieving socio-political goals; and (9) a lack of selfreliance, manifested in seeking help from outside and courting foreign loans and advisers.21

b

Criticism of the regime and the government: In addition to condemning royal luxury and extravagance, Bazargan criticizes the institution of monarchy as a “sub-animal” form of government that arose after mankind had relinquished its life in a free and natural state. He also


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describes the motto of the Shah’s regime—“God, the King, the Homeland”—as a form of trinity and therefore polytheism.22 Bazargan characterizes those holding the reins of power under the Shah as “ignorant, impious, illiterate, and charlatan,”23 and describes government bureaucracy as “wasteful and useless.”24 c

Criticism of living standards: Speaking about his trip to the USA in the late 1950s, Bazargan implicitly criticizes living conditions in Iran. “In America … you can clearly see that the basic necessities of life—and all the conveniences—are easily available. Great efforts have been made so that people do not face the smallest difficulty in their travel and movement, housing, food, work, leisure, medical care, research and other areas of life. For any Iranian who goes there, the comparison is indeed astonishing.”25

Set of Values While Eng. Bazargan places some emphasis on spiritual values, he gives most of his attention to social values. A number of personal values are mentioned, but without particular emphasis. a

Social values: Charity and service, work and action, and love and kindness are the leading social values for Bazargan. They are closely followed by justice, knowledge and education, freedom, struggle, evolution and progress, and social responsibility. He also notes the virtues of cooperation, humanism, consultation, discipline, and equality.

b

Personal values: Among the personal values he admires, Bazargan refers most often to prosperity, strength, and freedom. Other personal values commended include dynamism, hope, courage, dignity, honesty, thoughtfulness, firmness, foresight, perfection, creativity, beauty, generosity, humility, forgiveness, cleanliness, and moderation.

c

Spiritual values: Bazargan refers to God-consciousness more often than any other spiritual value. He also emphasizes piety and asceticism and self-sacrifice and martyrdom, and notes in passing salvation, faith, and supplication.26

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Outline of the Good Society While Eng. Bazargan fails to present an outline of the social, economic and political structures of the good society that would replace the Shah’s regime, he refers briefly to the role of religious scholars and the function of politics in the ideal society, and alludes to his vision of “genuine democracy.” a

The role of religion and religious scholars: According to Bazargan, while religion should both establish the principles and set the goals of government, it should not interfere in its everyday workings. Although in the relationship between religion and politics Bazargan grants the upper hand to religion, he nonetheless believes that “religion and politics [as normally understood] should not mix with each other. A boundary should be observed between the two. Each should have its own freedom and independence.”27 He also proposes that “the selection of those in charge [i.e., the government] and the way the administration functions should not be subject to the direct supervision of the religious authorities. Neither have the religious scholars any right to interfere in the appointments and procedures [of government] by virtue of their religious position.”28

b

The purpose of politics: Quoting a Quranic phrase, Bazargan believes that “politics should be only for the sake of God.” For him, this means that the political system should be at the service of the people. He says: “In many verses of the Quran ‘for the sake of God’ is synonymous with—or at least implies—‘for the sake of the people.’ The aim of politics is the good and prosperity of the people [both in this world and in the Hereafter].”29

c

Genuine democracy: Although Bazargan does not regard democracy as his ideal system, he demonstrates a special affection for it. He describes Imam Ali—his ideal leader—as “the most democratic head of state and ruler in the world.”30 He singles out a number of democratic values and procedures that marked Ali’s leadership: no compulsion to vote for him, lenience toward his opponents (who even continued to receive their regular stipend from his government), freedom of expression and freedom of dissent, consultation with the people, and respect for the majority decision.31 Bazargan also defines genuine democracy as characterized by equality (equal rights for all),


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social justice (where everyone benefits equally regarding goods and privileges), and government by the people for the people (liberation from servitude to others).32 Program of Action Despite his active engagement in establishing Islamic associations and forming political parties, Eng. Bazargan nowhere presents a program of action for bringing about revolutionary change and establishing a new society. The works covered in this study contain only a few references to what may be regarded as components of such a program. One of these is his emphasis on the struggle with one’s lower self. Since Islam argues that reform of a given society must be preceded by the reform of its individual members, individuals have a responsibility to change themselves.33 Bazargan also proposes that any work for social reform should begin with the formation of small groups.34 He exhorts members of the Islamic student societies: You, the Islamic societies, have the ability to initiate great reforms and revolutions both in this country and in the Muslim world. You could easily achieve this as long as you do not limit yourselves to mere talking, verbal propaganda, and superficial and short-term meetings. You should continue your mutual relationships and your meetings, especially after your graduation, so that you can carry out broader services and activities. Join general and professional Islamic societies, and do not be just nominal members. Pay your membership fees regularly, and with firm determination work sincerely and actively for reaching the common goal.35 Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence In his writings and speeches, Eng. Bazargan makes great efforts to encourage his audience to realize their potential, to have confidence in themselves, and to be active and dynamic agents of change. In accordance with Islamic teachings, Bazargan stresses that mankind’s potentialities are infinitely great, and that it has been slowly acquiring the qualities which believers attribute to God. “The Noble Messenger [Muhammad] reports God’s Message: ‘My servant! Obey Me so that I can make you like Myself (or a manifestation of Myself).’ In this ordinance God has promised mankind that it can attain infinity and acquire divine

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attributes—including creativity and the power to carry out whatever it wills.”36 Bazargan also argues that, Humans are such beings that they can do and be whatever they want. Mankind is the one who makes everything—including itself— and employs everything. [Self-reliance has always produced] geniuses and great movements from among individuals and nations. Those who have relied on outside sources—or have expected help from them—have been doomed to fail.37 Bazargan warns against the negative impacts of apathy and feelings of powerlessness. He argues that once individuals label themselves impotent and incapable of making their own decisions, they will lose hope, their sense of responsibility, and even their character.38 He also warns against extreme asceticism and mysticism—which have led to apathy and inaction among Muslims in the past.39 Bazargan tries to inspire self-confidence and activism in his audience by reminding them of Islamic teachings. He notes, for example, “A Muslim is not a man of belief only. He is also a man of action—positive, fruitful, and effective action. … When your heart and mind are fixed on God’s religion, the Omnipotent God will suffice to solve all problems and difficulties.”40 He also reminds his audience of Imam Ali’s example. “We usually associate piety and holiness with selfrestraint, which involves a great deal of caution. This is followed by withdrawal and resignation, leading to indolence and uselessness. … Although Ali was ‘the Master of the pious ones,’ he was also the most diligent, hard working, and prolific of them all.”41 Bazargan also seeks to combine his engineering knowledge with Islamic teachings in order to instill activism in his audience. For example, he applies a formula from the field of thermodynamics to social life in order to demonstrate how Islam revives and rejuvenates its followers. To put his argument in a nutshell: On the basis of his formula (W=U-TS), Bazargan argues that a person’s capacity for rejuvenation—which equates to W (the factor of effective and active energy [work], or the realized element of a person’s ability and potentiality)—is dependent on an increase in the factor U (innate energy in thermodynamics, or the measure of a person’s love, wants, and desires) and a corresponding decrease in both S (entropy, or the amount of belongings that a person accumulates) and T (the measure of heat, or of someone’s material wealth). He notes seven factors prescribed by Islam—and religions in general—that contribute to an


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increase in U and a decrease in S and T: (1) charity, (2) asceticism (valuing material goods not as an end in themselves, but as a means for spiritual growth), (3) piety and fasting, (4) patience and self-sacrifice, (5) love and service to the people, (6) proscription of pomposity and arrogance, and (7) prayer and supplication. Therefore, Bazargan concludes, The result of following the authentic, divinely-inspired religions— including Islam—is that people’s hopes and attention will be focused on God. They will draw benefits from the source of the highest blessings and then spend what they have acquired in the service of the people. … The higher the level of a person’s searching, activity, acquisition, their level of gnosis [spiritual knowledge] of their Creator, and charity and kindness to the downtrodden, the higher will be their level of productivity and efficiency, and the closer they will move to the infinite.42 Self-Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience As we have seen, Bazargan considers self-sacrifice and martyrdom as factors contributing to the renewal of faith. He quotes the Quran to demonstrate that, according to Islam, the sacrifice of wealth and even of one’s life is not a loss but will lead, rather, to perpetual life. Again, he seeks to prove this point by borrowing a formula from thermodynamics.43 He also exhorts his audience: “One of the characteristics of believers, and one of the keys that God has given them to achieve victory, is patience, perseverance, steadfastness, and diligence. [As the Quran states:] ‘And God is with those who are patient and steadfast.’” 44 Bazargan criticizes his fellow Shiites for misunderstanding the real meaning of the commemoration of Imam Husain’s martyrdom: Instead of trying to follow his example, which consists in accepting self-sacrifice and rising up against oppression and injustice, we assume that his actions will be sufficient for all the epochs of Islam [and thus exempt us from responsibility]. Under the pretext of Taqya (dissimulation), we prevent ourselves and our families from engaging in any action, any opposition, and any struggle against tyranny and corruption. … [The way we behave, it seems] as if the [Quranic] verse ‘And do not reckon those who are slain in the Way of God as dead, but they are alive’ was applicable and true only for the day of Ashura, when the third Imam [Husain] was martyred. [It seems as if]

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giving up one’s wealth and life in the Way of God is death and destruction.45 Simplification Couching his ideas in simple language, and with numerous examples drawn from everyday life, Eng. Bazargan has little need to simplify his message. Occasionally he refers to the examples of the Imams and the Prophet as models to be followed, emphasizing Imams Ali and Husain in particular. He introduces Imam Ali as a man of practical action, a man of war, an exceptional orator, and a man of politics and government as well as an ascetic, pious, and God-fearing person and a man of prayer and devotion.46 In regard to Imam Husain, he emphasizes his struggle against oppression and injustice and his acceptance of martyrdom and selfsacrifice.47 Claim to Truth and Rationality Eng. Bazargan support his views and arguments through references to many sources: the Holy Quran, the traditions and Sayings of the Prophet and Imams, the lessons of history, the writings of Western scholars, and scientific principles and formulas, as well as by rational reasoning. Bazargan refers extensively to the Quran. In one speech, “The Social and Universal Muslim”, he cites around 60 verses of the Quran. Only occasionally, however, does he present the Quran as the ultimate source of truth in order to establish his claims by its authority.48 In most cases, he quotes the Quran in support of his claim that it appeals to rationality, the social evolution of human history, and “scientific formulas.”49 Bazargan’s references to the traditions and sayings of the Prophet and the Imams are much less frequent, except for those speeches, such “Ali and Islam,” which deal specifially with the subject.50 Bazargan refers to history in very general terms. He notes, for example, that “history values and respects those people … who were not selfish and did not work for personal gain; rather, they pursued a goal, an ideal, and a virtue which was beneficial to mankind and raised the value and status of humanity.”51 In another place he exhorts Iranian youth: “Construct a new Iran and a new pure, strong, and prosperous Islamic society. Everything is possible through the power of God and the bounty and potentialities he has granted to man. There are repeated precedents in human history— especially in the history of religions.”52 His references to Islamic history are in a similar vein.53


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Since Bazargan had studied in the West and frequently addressed Western-oriented audiences, it is not surprising that he often refers to Western scholars in his writings and speeches. In some cases these references are extensive. In one speech, for example, he cites (and quotes from) an American author (W. J. Reilly), two French scholars (George Ville and Gaston Berger), and a British philosopher (Bertrand Russell).54 Other speeches, however—such as “Ali and Islam”—lack any reference to Western writers. In most cases, references to Western sources are only occasional.55 We have already noted Bazargan’s application of a scientific formula to the social realm as a way of illustrating Islam’s capacity to invigorate its followers.56 In the same speech, he also introduces the principle of accelerating entropy and the theory of evolution as signs of God’s activity and evidence of His continuing involvement with His creation.57 His rather lengthy discussion seeks to illustrate that, In the physical world the ‘arrow of time’ seems to point toward an inevitable increase in entropy as the atoms and molecules that make up the world tend toward their most probable configuration, and disorder increases. Life, however,—from the first appearance of life itself to the development and evolution of complex human societies—represents a decrease rather than increase in entropy, a movement from disorder to increasing order. The second law of thermodynamics seems to imply that the universe will eventually ‘run down,’ whereas life is movement in the opposite direction.58 These contradictory movements, Bazargan argues, can proceed simultaneously only on the assumption of Divine Will and Power.59 Bazargan occasionally tries to support his position by logical reasoning. He criticizes the Shiites who believe that legitimate authority belongs only to the Occulted Imam and that believers must await his return when he will bring about any necessary changes. He argues, In practice, this means that liars, oppressors and usurpers can do whatever they want; we should not say or do anything—even in selfdefense. … We cannot establish congregational prayer either, because only the Occulted Imam is the perfect and just leader of congregational prayer. … Neither should teachers teach any lessons,

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because only he [the Occulted Imam] is the perfect and legitimate scholar. Judges should not issue any verdicts either!60 In one speech, Bazargan seeks to prove God’s existence through logical reasoning—a task in which philosophers seem to have failed. He pursues two lines of argument. The first, which he bases on the question of values, becomes in the end more an exposure of the logical inconsistency of those who subscribe to lofty values without belief in God than a real proof of God’s existence.61 Bazargan also regards the efforts of the prophets throughout human history as a proof of God’s existence. They labored to help mankind mature and ascend to divinity. He asks: Why did they take upon themselves such an enormous task and how did they come to know God, with all His noble attributes—attributes which sum up the highest ideals of humanity? Bazargan argues that the attempt to find an answer to this question will inevitably lead us to God. He concludes by quoting a Persian proverb, “Sunshine is evidence of the sun’s existence.”62 Whether his arguments would convince an atheist of the existence of God is an open question.

7 Revolutionary Ideology in the Works of Dr Shariati

Dr Ali Shariati is undoubtedly “one of the major figures in the [Islamic] Revolution [in Iran], second only to Ayatullah Khomeini himself.”1 Iranian youth referred to him as “the Martyred Teacher of the Revolution” during the revolutionary demonstrations of 1978-79, and Western specialists on Iran consider him “the major ideologue of the Islamic Revolution.”2 Shariati is also probably the most prolific figure among the leaders of the Revolution—especially considering his relatively short career as an activist. An incomplete list of his works includes some 200 books, articles, seminar papers, and lecture series.3 He has written and translated relatively few books. Most of his published works originally took the form of lectures which were tape-recorded and transcribed by his students.4 Political Consciousness The fostering of political consciousness among the Iranian people, and Iranian youth in particular, seems to be the main focus of Dr Ali Shariati’s efforts. He seeks to accomplish this task in a number of ways: by formulating an original concept of humanity and the perfectibility of human nature; presenting a new vision of the Islamic “Ummat” (fraternal community); reminding his audience of the characteristics of “monotheistic religions” and their responsibilities as members of the intelligentsia; introducing a new concept of Shahdat (martyrdom); and by identifying himself with the oppressed throughout human history. a

The concept of human nature: The English word “man”—and related terms used in a generic sense—has two equivalents in Arabic and

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY Persian: Bashar and Insan. Although in ordinarily usage these terms are regarded as interchangeable, Dr Shariati makes a distinction between the two. From his reading of the Holy Quran, he argues that, By using Bashar, the Quran is talking about the two-footed creature that emerged at the end of the evolutionary chain. … Bashar is that particular being that contains physiological, biological, and psychological characteristics which are shared by all men. … On the other hand, Insan is that unique and enigmatic being that has a special definition that does not apply to any other phenomenon in nature. … Bashar is a “being” while Insan is a “becoming.”5 Thus, according to Shariati, all human beings are Bashar by virtue of their biological and psychological make-up and their human potentiality. They become Insan, however, to the extent that they develop their God-given capabilities and move towards perfection. For Shariati, as for Mutahhari, “moving towards perfection” entails acquiring divine characteristics. Citing a verse of the Quran which calls mankind God’s vicegerent on earth, he interprets this to means that “man is a creature who is capable, unlike nature, of utilizing and nourishing God’s sublime attributes in himself and continuing to evolve.” He also refers to “the famous saying of the prophet Muhammad … [which] tells us that we must assimilate the Lord’s attributes.”6 In his treatment of Insan, Shariati notes three divine characteristics for which mankind must continuously strive: self-consciousness, freedom of choice, and creativity. He defines self-consciousness as “perceiving one’s quality and nature, perceiving the quality and the nature of the universe, and perceiving one’s relationship with the universe.” Thus, “we are Insan to the extent that we are conscious of these three principles.”7 In regard to freedom of choice, Shariati states, “Man is a chooser; namely, he is the only being who is not only capable of revolting against nature and the order which is ruling over him, but can revolt against his own natural, physical and psychological needs.” Referring to the story of Adam in Islamic theology, he argues that Adam was not an Insan before he had sinned, while still in Heaven. It was only after his revolt against God’s order that he became “a new creation in the universe, capable of attaining

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salvation by obeying God and praying to Him by his own choice.” He also quotes the French philosophers and writers René Descartes, André Gide and Albert Camus on what makes a human being know that he “is”. He finds the statement of the existentialist Camus that “I revolt, therefore I am” as the most meaningful and embodying “the most exalted becoming, peculiar to man.”8 It is important to remember the circumstances under which these statements in praise of revolt were made—the oppressive conditions of the Shah’s regime. It would be surprising if any of Shariati’s students missed the point. As for creativity, Shariati notes that “man is a creature who creates.” Mankind’s creativity, however, is not limited to basic tasks such as tool production. “Unlike [the views of] some [thinkers] who define man as an animal who makes tools, it is only man who can make things that go beyond tools.” Mankind is not content with what nature offers it. During his evolutionary process, man reaches a point when “his needs and feelings evolve beyond the totality of nature’s powers, creativities, and possibilities. … [He] realizes that his genus is different than its materialistic nature and that he is different from other animals. He feels that he is attracted towards ideals which do not exist in nature.” Technological innovation is one way in which man puts his creativity to work. “He wants to fly but nature did not give him wings; he begins to build a ship, plane, satellite, or spaceship.” A second way in which mankind manifests its creativity is through artistic creation, which Shariati describes as “an ultra-natural activity.”9 But humanity’s story is not one of untrammeled freedom and aspiration. According to Dr Shariati, in the process of becoming Insan, mankind must free itself from four universals determinants or “shackles”—nature, history, society, and self. Although Shariati acknowledges that the factors hypothesized by naturalists, biologists, historicists, and sociologists as shaping humanity’s character contain some truth, he argues that all these theories disregard the very important fact that “man is capable of choosing.” By this power of choice and through developments in the natural sciences and technology, mankind can overcome the shackle of nature. Likewise, it can overcome sociological and historical determinism through the scientific study of the laws that govern human society and history.10 Mankind can also overcome the shackles of self, but not through science. “The last prison, one’s self, is the worst of all since it is the

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY one which has rendered man the most helpless prisoner.” This is a prison that a person carries within themselves. “Here, the prisoner and the prison are the same; that is, the disease and the patient have merged together. This is why getting rid of the malaise is so arduous!”11 The only way we can cast off this set of shackles is through the power of love. “What is love?” Shariati asks. “By love I mean an Almighty force (which is beyond my rational and discretionary faculty) in the very depth of my being that can blow me apart and help me to rebel against my self. Since the prison is in me, my insides should be set aflame.”12 For Shariati, this powerful, transforming love manifests itself in self-sacrifice. “Love consists of giving up everything for the sake of a goal and asking nothing in return. … It is a love which, beyond rationality and logic, invites us to negate and rebel against ourselves in order to work towards a goal or for the sake of others.” And he concludes, “It is at this stage that a free man is born, and this is the most exalted level of becoming Insan.”13

b

The Concept of Ummat: Shariati views the Islamic community in the same way as he considers mankind: not as “being” but as “becoming.” The word used in the Holy Quran for the Islamic community is “Ummat” which Dr Shariati notes is derived from “umm”, meaning “straight path,” “departure,” “journey,” “migration,” and “moving ahead.” Thus, he defines Ummat as “a society of committed individuals who think the same, share the same goals, and are comrades and companions to one another—individuals who are moving towards a single, direct, clear, firm and common purpose.”14 For Shariati, the application of this term to the ideal Islamic society is very significant, because its root demonstrates its existential philosophy. According to him, the goal of human societies throughout history has generally been welfare and prosperity—to “be happy”—a goal which he compares to a hotel. The philosophical thinking that underlies Islamic society, however, is better compared to a caravan—something that is continually moving towards a goal, “becoming good.” In the first case, anything that disturbs the comfort and pleasure of the group is rejected. But for Islam, any factor that contributes to collective movement towards the common goal and guarantees the group’s safe and speedy arrival is welcomed as valuable and sacred—even if it may be unpleasant, uncomfortable,


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harsh, and (for some members) dangerous. The goal towards which an Islamic community should move is “perfection.”15 According to Shariati, each Ummat is responsible for making its own destiny. He quotes a verse of the Quran (2:134) and interprets its message for Muslims: “You the [Muslim] Ummat who suffer from slavery and misery today cannot blame your problems on earlier generations or on other nations. … If you consent to the miseries which have been imposed on you [or the ones you have inherited], it is the same as if you created them yourselves. Thus, you will be punished for your consent.”16 But for Shariati the responsibility of the Islamic Ummat exceeds even this—it is responsible not only for its own evolution (or movement towards perfection), but for the evolution of humanity as a whole. 17 Unlike other social systems, in an Islamic community this responsibility is not entrusted to a particular administrative clique or group. As soon as a Muslim reaches the age of “maturity,” he becomes “responsible for the salvation of humanity” in the same way that he becomes responsible for conducting regular prayer.18 To demonstrate the wider responsibility of the Muslim Ummat, Shariati cites examples from early Islamic history. He notes that “The Prophet of Islam never limited himself to geographical, racial, or national boundaries in his political, military, and social struggles to crush the forces of injustice and to work for the establishment of an Islamic government and an Islamic Ummat.”19 He also cites the response of a Muslim soldier offered gifts by the commander of the Sassanid Persian troops before Muslim forces overran Persia in 636 A. D. When asked why the Muslims had come to Iran, the soldier rejected the offer of material gifts and replied: “We have come to liberate you from slavery to one another to servitude to God, … from the baseness of the earth to the heights of sublimity, and … from the oppression of religion to the justice of Islam.”20 c

Characteristics of monotheistic religion: According to Shariati, human history is the scene of a continuous struggle of “religion against religion.” He notes that the impulse to worship an external power and belief in the sacred are innate in mankind. The universality and continuity of these impulses are evidence of their instinctive character and explain why, throughout history, all human societies have adopted religious beliefs and practices. All human religions, however,

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY are not the same. There are two types of religion: the religion of Tawhid (oneness, unity, monotheism) and the religion of Shirk (contradictions, polytheism).21 Shariati discusses the characteristics of each type in detail. In a nutshell, the religion of Shirk originates from man’s fear of the forces of nature and is based on ignorance. It divides human societies into different groups and classes, privileging the few against the majority. It justifies this oppressive situation through an appeal to metaphysical beliefs, and encourages resignation and inaction among the people.22 By contrast, the religion of Tawhid has the following positive characteristics: 1

It originates from mankind’s innate need for consciousness, love, a goal and purpose in life, for the appreciation of Absolute Perfection and Absolute Beauty, and the need to perceive a sense of direction in the whole creation.23

2

It is based on mankind’s aspirations towards freedom, idealism, equity, equality, the establishment of justice and goodness, and the abolition of all evils.24

3

It invites people to focus their attention on “One Direction” in creation and to believe in only “One Effective Force” in the universe. It also invites them to worship only “One Power” and to put their faith in only “One Source” of life. This invitation to monotheism has a material and “this-worldly” dimension as well, implying belief in the oneness of mankind—of all races, families, and individuals—and the unified character of all human rights and values.25

4

While the religion of Tawhid asks people to submit themselves to God, it also invites them to rebel against any competing power or authority. Thus, a basic characteristic of the religion of Tawhid is its combative and revolutionary attitude. It teaches its followers to adopt a critical outlook to life in all its dimensions, whether material, spiritual, or social. It gives them the responsibility to reject what they consider as falsehood and to replace it with what they judge to be the truth.26 These characteristics of the religion of Tawhid are clearly displayed in


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the lives of the prophets of the three “Abrahamic faiths”— Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. 27 d

The responsibility of the intelligentsia: Shariati’s audience consisted mainly of educated youth—university students and graduates—who considered themselves as “Roshan Fikr” (intellectual, freethinking, literally “an enlightened thinker”). Shariati takes great pains to convince this group that they cannot become progressives merely by adopting the label or sitting in coffee-houses discussing subjects which are far removed from the social realities of Iranian society. For him the term means “a person whether literate or illiterate, a scholar or a layman … who has ‘social consciousness’ and is aware of his ‘age’ and what it requires—a person who feels a direct and serious responsibility for his relationship to his society and to its destiny.”28 Thus, social consciousness and social responsibility are the defining characteristics of a progressive. Shariati focuses on the two principal social responsibilities of any progressive thinker—promoting genuine Islam to the people, and enjoining “Maroof” (right, good) and forbidding “Munkar” (wrong, evil). 1

The duty to promote genuine Islam: Dr Shariati believes that Islam is the perfect manifestation of the religion of Tawhid and Shiism embodies the best understanding of Islam. However, he notes with regret that what is practiced as Islam both by the masses and by scholars in the Iranian society of his time is far removed from genuine Islam. For Shariati, Islam is first and foremost a “mission,” a “message,” and a “school of guidance and liberation.” Far from being a branch of philosophy, science, art, or literature, it is rather a type of ideology.29 Shariati argues that Muslim progressives have the same responsibility as the early prophets—to introduce the religion of Tawhid to the people and to put it into practice.30 This is not an easy task. “Today’s Shiism has taken such a form that anyone who speaks out about reviving an authentic and fervent Shiism will be sacrificed by his friends [i.e., those who call themselves ‘Shiites’] before his enemies can get to him.”31 Despite these obstacles, Shariati exhorts his audience to do their best to learn about Islam and make it known to others. 32

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The duty to enjoin Maroof and forbid Munkar: Shariati considers these twin imperatives as the chief responsibility of every Muslim and especially of a Muslim progressive. This responsibility includes not only “what today’s progressive and committed intellectuals … propose as their social responsibility and commitment towards the people,” but goes well beyond it.33 He notes that “the language which Islam chooses to describe the ‘social responsibility’ of its followers is a religious language—so that it is a living language and plays a leading role at all stages of [Islamic] history, in all social systems, and in all forms of struggle.”34 The Islamic concepts of Maroof and Munkar are general and comprehensive. Understanding their particular meanings and applying them to different societies and eras will demand a flexibility that takes account of the conditions of each society and the level of understanding of its people. “The greatest Munkar is that we limit the scope of enjoining Maroof and forbidding Munkar to some ‘secondary and personal’ issues and confine [their meaning] to some fixed phenomena.”35 Continuing this discussion, Shariati expounds the verse of the Quran which states, “You are the best Umma evolved for mankind, enjoining Maroof, forbidding Munkar and believing in God” (3:110). Why does the Quran put social responsibility before belief in God? Shariati asks. His reply is that the Holy Quran avoids repeating the obvious; it is concerned, rather, to say something new, to teach a lesson, to provide guidance, and to preclude future distortions. The subject of the verse is the Ummat or “committed group.” Involvement in social activity and the responsibility to enjoin Maroof and forbid Munkar for the sake of the liberation of the people sums up the existential philosophy of an ummat. By emphasizing this, the Quran wants to convey the amazing truth that an Ummat cannot fulfill their calling without such a responsibility and without an active commitment to the fate of the people. It tells us that, without a primary focus on social responsibility … and without striving in the cause of Maroof and struggling against Munkar, you can become a divine philosopher, a


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pure mystic, a perfect Gnostic, and an ascetic devotee—but you cannot become a Muslim. 36 For Shariati, the fact that the Quran adds “belief in God” to social responsibility is also significant. This leads him to the conclusion that, “Only those people can form ‘the best Ummat’ in the world—and only that Ummat can ‘truly and with total sincerity’ rise up for the people—who have liberated themselves from all personal, material, and spiritual attachments … and ‘have faith in God.’”37 Shariati emphasizes that Islam places the social responsibility of enjoining Maroof and forbidding Munkar alongside other religious duties—having the same significance and to be carried out at the same time. He reasons that “in Islam, an individual constructs himself with and through the construction of his society. While he seeks to encourage beauty [Maroof] and struggle against ugliness [Munkar] through thought, experiment, confrontation, and perseverance, he himself is also being made. He gains spiritual power, awareness, self-consciousness, and God-consciousness. Thus, every day he becomes ‘more Muslim’ by ‘acting as a Muslim.’”38 This theological position, according to Shariati, runs contrary to the views of both traditional scholars and modern intellectuals who separate the thinking process from action and believe that the latter should follow the former. Shariati strongly criticizes this way of thinking and considers it a justification for evading responsibility.39 e

The concept of Shahadat (Martyrdom): Shahadat enjoys a high value in Islamic culture—especially in the Shiite tradition. Generally it is understood to mean sacrificing one’s life in the Way of God. But by studying the etymology of the word and examining its usage in the Quran, Shariati concludes that its meaning is in fact much broader. Literally Shahadat means “witness,” “serving as a model,” and “being present.” Each of these meanings is applicable to Islamic Shahadat in general and to the Shahadat of Imam Husain and his companions in Karbala—which plays a central role in the Shiite tradition—in particular. Shariati’s arguments can be summarized as follows:40

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Witness: Imam Husain went to Karbala and accepted martyrdom there in order to be a witness in the criminal court of human history in favor of oppressed people everywhere—“in favor of those who have never had any witnesses, in favor of those who have always died silently and defenselessly.” Imam Husain took his young child along with him in order to bear witness that “in the system of oppression, tyranny, and crime [which runs throughout history], the cruel executioner does not have mercy even on infants.” He took the female members of his family with him to bear witness that, in that same system, women have the choice “either to accept slavery and become playthings in the harems or to stay free [but lose all their loved ones].” And by his own martyrdom, Imam Husain bears witness to “how heroes must die in the regimes of tyranny and crime.”

2

Model: Imam Husain is also a model for his Shiite followers. He is a model not only because he is a Shaheed (martyr, model), but also because Shia means “follower” and anyone who claims to be “Husain’s Shiite” must follow his example. The legacy of his celebrated last words means that his example must also be followed by those who love him. After he had lost all his companions in battle and was facing the enemy alone, Imam Husain cried, “Is there anyone to help me?” His rhetorical question is addressed to the future of human history. “It is addressed to all of us. This question demonstrates Husain’s expectations of those who love him. It is an invitation to martyrdom to all those who cherish and extol the martyrs.” The great lesson that Imam Husain teaches us by his martyrdom relates to our attitude towards tyranny and oppression. He teaches us that our inability to match the power of an enemy does not exempt us from Jihad. The martyrs choose their own “red death” as the only weapon they have to defend the great values that are being destroyed. They die in order to demonstrate their love for the truth that is also dying. They do this not in the expectation of immediate victory, but rather overcome the enemy through their deaths. If they cannot defeat the enemy by military means, they hope to defeat him by defaming (and thus delegitimizing) him.

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f

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Being present: According to tradition, Imam Husain broke off the Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) he was undertaking and rushed to embrace martyrdom in Karbala. There is another great lesson in this. By his actions, Husain shows that the martyr is present in all the arenas of struggle between truth and falsehood, between oppression and liberation. He wants to tell us that “if you are not present at the scene of confrontation between truth and falsehood, and if you are not a Shahed (model) for your age and a Shaheed (witness) to both the truth and falsehood of your society, then wherever you are, it all amounts to the same thing. Whether you are standing for prayer [strongly encouraged in Islam] or sitting drinking alcohol [firmly prohibited], both would have the same value.” The Shahadat of Imam Husain also means that he is spiritually present in all ages and among all generations. “In the eternal struggle of history, the whole earth is the setting for Karbala [where Husain was martyred], every months is the month of Muharam [the lunar month in which Husain was martyred], and every day is the day of Ashura [10th of Muharam, the day of Husain’s martyrdom].” Thus, each of the faithful must choose between emulating either Husain himself—by sacrificing his life—or his sister Zainab—by conveying the message of the martyrs to one’s contemporaries and to future generations. The alternative is to become one of the companions of Yazid—the tyrant responsible for Husain’s martyrdom.

Solidarity with the oppressed throughout history: Shariati’s lecture “On the Plight of the Oppressed” is a masterly lesson in the creation of a sense of community among the people—a vital component of political consciousness. In this lecture, Shariati identifies himself— and thus invites his audience to identify themselves—with the slaves who died building the Egyptian Pyramids some 5000 years ago. Shariati tells his audience how his views about the Pyramids changed after he had discovered the graves of slave laborers crushed under heavy rocks during the construction process. I then went to those graves and sat down feeling very close to the people buried in those ditches. It was as if we were of the

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY same race. It is true that each of us came from different geographical areas, but these differences were inconsequential when viewed as a basis for dividing mankind. … I looked back to the Pyramids and realized that despite their magnificence, they were so strange to and distant from me! … I felt so much hatred towards the great monuments of civilization which throughout history were raised upon the bones of my predecessors.41 According to Shariati, slavery has continued in one form or another over the past 5000 years. Although its forms and methods have changed, its effects on its victims have remained the same. Casting himself in universal guise, Shariati speaks of his experiences, hopes, and disappointments over 5000 years in a letter he addresses to “his brother”—an anonymous slave buried near the Pyramids. He says of the present situation: “My friend, I live in a society where I face a system [capitalism] that controls half of the universe, maybe all of it. Mankind is being driven into a stronghold of slavery. Although we are not in physical slavery, we are truly destined to a fate worse than you! Our thoughts, hearts, and will-power are enslaved. …”42 Thus, Shariati identifies himself with both the oppressed throughout history and the victims of capitalist exploitation in the contemporary world.

Criticism of Existing Social Arrangements Shariati delivered his lecture “On the Plight of the Oppressed” at a time when preparations were under way to celebrate the 2500th anniversary of the Iranian monarchy and the “Great Civilization” of Iran. Although Shariati avoids explicit references to the Shah, it was clear to all—except perhaps to the obtuse SAVAK agents monitoring Shariati at the time— that his lecture was an indictment of the Shah’s regime. The Shah had based the legitimacy of his government on Iran’s 2500-year-old tradition of monarchy and the “Great Civilization” it had produced. Shariati, on the other hand, condemns all the great civilizations as a curse, on the grounds that they are inevitably built “at the expense of the flesh and blood” of the oppressed. As he writes to his slave “brother:” “My friend, you have left this world, but we are carrying the load for the great civilization. … Others [take] the pride and credit for the work we did. No mention has ever been made of our contributions.”43 He delves into Iranian history in order to condemn what the Shah and his followers seem so proud of.


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Shariati criticizes the ancient Persian monarchy—with which the Shah identified—as oppressive and exploitative. Directing attention to the “closed classes” of the Sassanid dynasty, he notes that power and wealth was monopolized by the two princely and clerical classes, and that it was impossible for anyone from the lower classes to enter their ranks.44 He criticizes the ancient Persian Prophet Zoroaster for “disregarding our [i.e., oppressed people’s] mourning and the scars from the lashes inflicted on our bodies by the masters” and for aligning himself with the king. He criticizes Mobedans—the ancient Persian religious class who were royal allies—for exploitation and pushing “us as slaves into war to protect their power and rule from their enemies.” And he criticizes Shahnama—a verse narrative of ancient Persian history regarded as their “Bible” by the advocates of the “Great Civilization” ideology—for making “no mention of our class except once in all of [its] 60,000 couplets.”45 According to Dr Shariati, with a few notable exceptions, a single ruling regime has dominated human history. It is a regime “which manipulates politics, economics, religion, art, philosophy, ideas, feelings, ethics, and humanity in order to sacrifice mankind for the sake of its selfish desires. It utilizes everything [possible] as a base for its rule of oppression, tyranny, and crime.”46 The leaders of this universal regime have all been equally bloodthirsty. “There is no difference between Genghis Khan who was ruling over the wild tribes, the great emperors who were ruling over the great civilized societies and those individuals who are at the present reigning over the great civilizations.”47 Shariati also seeks to delegitimize the Shah’s regime by criticizing the economic system he had adopted—namely, capitalism. Most of Shariati’s works contain a critique of capitalism, whether direct or indirect. He considers capitalism the latest manifestation of the “single ruling regime of human history.” It is an inhuman system, even worse than the earlier regimes which were less sophisticated and thus less effective. Capitalism, however, is “a mixture of economics, culture, politics, sociology, and military power which transforms … people both from within and from without like a cancerous network.”48 Thus, according to Shariati, the circumstances of those living under capitalism are even worse than the conditions endured by slaves in ancient Egypt. In his letter to his slave brother he writes: My friend, knowing that you were a slave, you could identify your master. You could endure the lashes of the whip on your body. …

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We are facing the same destiny as you, but unable to know why it exists. Who is making us slaves in this century? From where are we being invaded? Why do we submit to misleading thoughts? Why are we engaged in worldly worship? Like animals, we have become victims of exploitation—even more so than your era and race! … We are more deprived than you! The cruelty and discrimination we experience are more severe than that of your time!”49 Shariati devotes several lectures to critiquing the way Islam in general and Shiism in particular was understood in Iran in his time. In one, he argues that the youth who abandon Islam to embrace either the looseness of the Western lifestyle or leftist ideologies are not to blame. Rather, the problem lies with the way their elders and the “religious scholars” have presented Islam to them.50 In another lecture, he argues that there is not one Shiism but two. The original Shiism (“Alavid Shiism”), which is based on the models of Imam Ali and Imam Husain, is totally different in its principles from the “Safavid Shiism” which arose during the Safavid dynasty (although its first stirrings had started much earlier). Alavid Shiism is a “movement” while the Safavid variety is an “institution.” The first starts with a resounding “No!”51—challenging the existing conditions of oppression, tyranny, aristocracy, and discrimination—while the second starts with a “Yes”—justifying the status quo and teaching quiescence. The latter even distorts major events in the history of Shiism and the facts surrounding the lives of the Imams.52 Shariati considered the “Safavid Shiism” which he saw all around him as “the root of all our problems and the main enemy of ‘Alavid Shiism’.”53 Set of Values Although Dr Shariati assigns an equal emphasis to social and personal values, he notes more of the latter. He also underscores a number of spiritual values. a

Social values: Statistically at least, social responsibility is the most important value for Shariati, with “martyrdom”—which also of course implies social responsibility—a close second. Jihad, justice and equity, freedom, liberation, and activism are other important social values; and Shariati also mentions equality, unity, charity, and consultation.


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b

Personal values: The movement towards perfection is the most important personal value for Shariati. Activism and consciousness are also very important. They are followed by rebelliousness (against wrong), perseverance, freedom of choice, commitment, creativity, wisdom and sincerity. Other personal values and attributes mentioned include contemplation, hope, morality, idealism, prosperity, success, objectivity, power, determination, a critical outlook, an aesthetic sense, productivity, and ingenuity.

c

Spiritual values: Shariati considers self-sacrifice as a manifestation of spiritual love, a major step towards perfection and the ultimate fulfillment of social responsibility. Thus, it tops his list of spiritual values. He also emphasizes faith and love, and notes piety, salvation, thankfulness, and trust in God.54

Outline of the Good Society Although Dr Shariati does not present a systematic outline of the good society that would replace the Shah’s regime, glimpses of it can be seen in his lectures. In his discussion of the concept of Ummat, for example, he touches on the questions of the goal of the ideal society, it social relations, and its leadership. a

The goal: The goal of the ideal society, like the goal of the individual believer, lies in its continuing progress towards “perfection.” This movement will not be limited to the ideal society itself which will also feel a responsibility to prepare the ground so that the whole of humanity can move in the same direction. Thus the ideal society will work for the liberation of the oppressed wherever they are, and will seek to imbue them with political consciousness and provide them with leadership.55 The establishment of justice in the ideal society is a prerequisite for the pursuit of these goals.56

b

Social relations: Shariati emphasizes equality and cooperation among the members of the ideal society in pursuit of their common goal. Moreover, every individual in society is a responsible agent and a “combatant.”57 Shariati promotes Madina under the leadership of the Prophet as the embodiment of the ideal society’s social system, but he fails to provide further details (at least in the works covered by this study). 58

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c

Leadership: According to Shariati, “the Ummat (brotherly community) which subscribes to an existential philosophy of ‘continuous collective movement’ in a ‘straight path towards a common goal’ has an absolute need for a guide and leader—i.e., an Imam.”59 On the disputed question of succession to the leadership—whether by election, as Sunnis believe, or by selection by a predecessor—as Shiites hold in the case of the twelve Imams—Shariati presents a new thesis. He argues that the consultation of the people and their freedom to express their allegiance and consent to a leader are undisputable Islamic principles. On the other hand, Islamic society after the death of the Prophet was not ready for an ideal Islamic democracy and needed “revolutionary leadership” until it had become qualified to elect its own leader. The process of selection established by the Prophet and the Imams was an exception to the rule and a temporary measure which lasted for only 250 years.60

d

Ownership: In a discussion of the concept of “An-Nas” (the people, the masses), Shariati touches on the question of ownership in an Islamic society. According to Shariati, the Holy Quran uses the words “God” and “the people” interchangeably in the context of social and economic issues. Thus, the statement “Property belongs to God” also means that “property belongs to the people”—that is, to all the people, not to particular groups or individuals.61

Program of Action Unlike some of the other activists examined in this study, Dr Shariati discusses in detail the forms of action required to bring about revolutionary change. He also identifies both the targets and the agents of change. a

Targets of change: Shariati has a long list of what he labels “today’s greatest evils:” “international imperialism, world Zionism, the old and the new colonialism, exploitation, despotism, class conflict, cartels and trusts [transnational corporations?], racism, cultural imperialism, and westernization.”62 Although these are the main targets of change, Shariati adds “the religion of Shirk” to the list. He observes that “it is true that religion has been the opium of the masses in order to make them submit—internally and decisively—to conditions of


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humiliation, misery, helplessness, ignorance, and stagnation. …”63 But this has been the effect of the religion of Shirk against which the religion of Tawhid has always fought. According to Shariati, “the root of the religion of Shirk is economics. Its root is ownership by a minority and deprivation of the majority.” The factors that sustain it are ignorance, discrimination, and class stratification.64 The groups responsible for the promotion of this false religion—that is, those who benefit from it—are the wealthy, corporate capitalists, the power elite, and the religious leaders themselves.65 Thus, these groups can also be considered as targets of change. b

Agents of change: Shariati assigns the greatest role in bringing about revolutionary change in society to “Roshan fikr” (intelligentsia), a term which he uses with considerable flexibility. For him, “the committed intelligentsia who understands Islam” plays a “leadership role” among his people.66 Citing a Saying of the Prophet, he argues that today’s Muslim scholars have the same responsibility as the early Prophets and equates “Muslim scholars” with “Muslim Roshan fikr.”67 In another context, however, Shariati uses the term “Roshan fikr” to refer to socially conscious Western-educated youth, Iran’s liberal intelligentsia.68 Yet elsewhere his definition of the term includes not only the scholars and other educated people and but also “laymen” and even “illiterates” who are endowed with a “special consciousness.”69 Although Shariati believes that leadership has a very important role to play in any revolutionary movement,70 he also notes that “Islam does not consider the fundamental factor in social change to be personality, accident, or overwhelming and immutable laws”— although it recognizes that these elements can affect the destiny of a society.71 For Islam, the fundamental factor in social change is an-Nas (the people, the masses). “Islam is the first school of social thought to recognize the masses as the basis, the fundamental and conscious factor in determining history and society—not the elect as Nietzsche thought, not the aristocracy as Plato claimed, not great personalities as Carlyle and Emerson believed, not those of pure blood as Alexis Carrell imagined, not the priests or intellectuals, but the masses.”72 However, as a translation of “An-nas,” the term “masses” is not an antonym of “elite;” it means, rather, “the people as such, without any particular class or social form.”73

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY Considering the different socio-economic classes that make up society, Shariati believes that the middle class has the most active role to play in a revolutionary situation. The upper class is sunk in the quagmire of exploitation, luxury, and pleasure-seeking, while the lower classes are deprived of the means of taking action. In the middle class, however, “there is more opportunity for remaining human than in the nobility, and more opportunity for growth and development than in the deprived class which has been reduced to the level of intellectual slavery and moral degeneration.”74 The full success of the revolution and the establishment of the ideal society, however, depend on the intellectual and moral development of the masses.75

c

Forms of action: Dr Shariati considers “revolutionary self-construction” as essential to the creation of revolutionary change in society. However, he does not regard “self-construction” and “social construction” as two separate and unconnected stages. As he puts it, “in Islam, an individual engages in a personal construction [that lies] at the heart of social construction”76 Shariati proposes a three-point program for revolutionary self-construction: 1

Worship (Ebadat): For Shariati “worship” is not restricted to the performance of certain rituals and formalities. Examining the root of the Arabic word Ebadat, he argues that “worship is an existential issue which basically means self-construction.” Through giving way to lust and distorted desires, human beings have adopted various perverted and selfish habits. Those tendencies need to be ‘filtered, cleansed, and purified’ under the direction of human consciousness and will-power and through a harsh and strict regimen. [Mankind] must achieve Ikhlas (sincerity) which constitutes his existential oneness in the path of faith, in the path of noble human values, in the path of total submission to God, and in the path of the masses. [The sincerity which comes from true worship means] proving one’s existence by negating the self.77


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2

Work: Shariati notes that Islam places strong emphasis on work and action which includes not only religious activity but also material and productive activity. In addition to its significance for socio-economic production, work is extremely important for self-construction. “Work is the objective realization of man’s special will-power, desires, and values. Man is born in work and made through work. Work transforms man’s subjectivity into objective reality and in the meantime polishes and perfects his existential essence.”78 From a revolutionary perspective, work liberates man from the shackles of family and class. Middle-class intelligentsia can liberate themselves from “the evils of the bourgeoisie which are accompanied by narrow-mindedness and baseness” only through work. Work will “broaden their social horizons and will bring about deep revolutionary changes in character. It will polish and purify their human essence despite their living conditions and class background.”79

3

Social struggle: Shariati believes that humans are political as well as social animals. Indeed, mankind’s capacity for political thought and action is its distinguishing characteristic. This means that humans have an outlook and a propensity which binds them to the fate of the society in which they live. This bond is a manifestation of mankind’s will-power, consciousness, and choice. It is only humans who can sense their social position in the same way that they can sense their natural position. In other words, humans are aware of their position in nature and in society and can interfere in it. They can approve it, rebel against it, or take action to change its structure. Therefore, a non-political person is someone who has left the highest manifestation of their special capacity half-dormant.80 Social and political struggle is especially important for intelligentsia, who cannot become revolutionaries by hiding behind their study desks and among piles of books or by engaging in abstract arguments. The only way they can “improve

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY their thinking and recover from the disease of verbiage” is through political struggle. By so doing “they can test themselves out and assess their own competence, intelligence, speed of action, courage, degree of self-sacrifice, and even the level of their sincerity, purity, and piety.” Moreover, political struggle will put intelligentsia in touch with their people’s needs, wishes, ideals, weaknesses, and strengths. It will destroy the “invisible and impenetrable wall” that usually exists between the liberal intelligentsia and the masses of the people.81 In addition to self-construction, Shariati emphasizes some other forms of action for bringing about revolutionary change: 1

Education and awareness: According to Shariati, social change does not occur on the basis of the dialectic factor or historical determinism alone. Awareness is an essential factor: our subjectivity must be affected by contradictions in order to prompt change. People must sense and recognize their enemy before they can take action against them. This being so, it is the duty of intelligentsia to bring education and awareness to the masses. In order for them to do so, however, they should understand their society as well as their own ideas. They should have a firm grasp of the broader historical context in which their own society is situated, and should learn from those who have already covered the same ground. They should know their “people’s language,” and should have developed an effective political methodology. Shariati criticizes the Iranian Marxists and other intelligentsia “who are in effect living back in the 13th century, although their words, thoughts, and ideas are borrowed from Western European intellectuals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This is the reason they cannot find an audience.”82

2

Significance of ideology: According to Shariati, any progressive who seeks to bring about revolutionary change must have an ideology. Shariati defines ideology as “a world-view and a school of thought … the goal of which is to guide, to stimulate consciousness, to move, and to liberate the people. An ideology presents a particular way of life, an ideal form of human


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character, and certain ideals [for all] humankind or [for certain] nations.”83 Shariati considers Islam as a type of ideology. In his comparison of “today’s progressive ideology” with Islam, Shariati finds “a common language” shared between the two. But he believes that Islamic ideology is superior because, after a certain point, “secular ideology falls silent while Islamic ideology still has more to say.”84 3

Establishment of an Islamic party: On the basis of a verse of the Quran (3:104), Shariati argues that “under any conditions, in any system, and in every society, Muslims must—as a collective duty—form ‘a special socially responsible group’ from among themselves.” While, according to Islam, social responsibility is the duty of every Muslim, “this particular group, however, will consist of Muslims who will not have social responsibility as one duty among the many other duties of life. Rather, they will pursue it as the guiding philosophy of their lives.” That is, they will totally commit themselves to the task.85 For Shariati such a special group equates to a “party.” Like all other parties, he argues, the Islamic party would have an ideology, a goal or mission, slogans and mottoes, a class basis, class orientation, political orientation, a method for struggle, strategies, tactics, and an organization behind it.86

4

A method for introducing social change: According to Shariati, “Any school [of thought] which is not based upon the cultural foundations of a given society is like a good book in a library which is used only by a small group of students and professors. Even if thousands of such books are printed, they will have no effect upon the masses.”87 This does not mean, however, that the revolutionaries should conform themselves uncritically to the cultural norms of their societies, but rather that they should avoid alienating the masses and isolating themselves from them. The question then becomes: How can one bring about revolutionary change without alienating the people? Shariati believes this goal can be achieved by following the method that the Prophet Muhammad used: retaining the form of social customs while transforming their content and meaning. “The Prophet preserves the form, the container of a custom which has

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY deep roots in society [and to] which people have gotten used from generation to generation. … But he changes … the content. [He changes] the spirit, direction and practical application of this custom in a revolutionary, decisive and immediate manner.”88 As an example of this method, Shariati mentions Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) which had been practiced by Arabs for centuries before the advent of Islam. The Prophet retained the ritual form of Hajj but changed its meaning and significance in a revolutionary manner.89 5

Jihad and the war of liberation: Dr Shariati advises that, “In solving social problems we must not think of the shortest way, rather, we must think of the more correct way … the most logical way that leads us to our objective.”90 For Shariati, “the most logical way” can include Jihad and the war of liberation. The concept of Jihad is not restricted to fighting; it is, rather, “a comprehensive, unremitting, sincere, and faithful striving or struggle to the last breath—not with the hope of ‘victory’ but in the power of ‘responsibility.’ Such a Jihad could be waged with sword, with pen, with soul, or with wealth.”91 He criticizes the Muslim “apologists” who argue that “Islam” means peace and peaceful coexistence and justify warfare only in the case of foreign invasion. “These people cannot distinguish an aggressive war from a war of liberation.” There is certainly a difference between the imperialistic wars which seek power and revolutionary wars which are waged for the liberation of people from oppression and injustice.92 Since Muslims’ social responsibility is not confined to their own nation or territory, they may resort to Jihad not only to liberate themselves but also to liberate other oppressed peoples.93

Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence Dr Shariati believes that thought and action are not two separate processes, but rather that there is dialectical relationship between the two. To illustrate this dialectic, he quotes a verse of the Holy Quran: “And those who strive in Our (Cause)—We will certainly guide them to Our [God’s] Path” (29:69). Shariati observes that this statement runs counter to our ordinary logic—which is Aristotelian formal logic. We think God should first show His Path to mankind, and that after people have


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familiarized themselves with the Path, they can then “strive” in it. But divine logic places action and effort first, and only then promises guidance onto the Path. What this underscores is the significance of action: “And this is the truth which the great committed intelligentsia have discovered today.”94 Shariati develops his argument, based on this same verse: To an individual, a group, a party, or a nation which sacrifices whatever it has in the Path and Way of God … and moves ahead … God will continuously show His much more detailed, definite, closer, and clearer Path lying at the heart of activities, events, difficulties, and confrontations. … With the power of steadfastness and with the miracle of [God’s] help, people can make bridges out of the rocks thrown in their way. They will find [new] life, tranquility, and confidence with the divine power of trust. 95 Shariati considers religious determinism or fatalism to be a characteristic of the religion of Shirk. “Fatalism means accepting the existing situation as it is and the future as it will happen.” He blames Maaweya—an early Muslim ruler who adopted monarchy system—for introducing this to the Muslim world in order to deter Muslims from undertaking their responsibilities and directing criticism against his unIslamic regime.96 The view of the Quran is categorically against fatalism. It states very clearly that “a nation which does not change itself mentally and psychologically, a nation which does not take steps to qualify itself for rewards and power, and a nation which does not struggle to earn what is good and to reject what is evil, will never have its destiny changed by God … as a reward for ‘belief in Him.’”97 Shariati has developed a philosophy of history which has its roots in the origins of the human story. “History is without doubt a reality, just like all other realities in the world. It began at a certain point, and must inevitably end at a certain point. It must have an aim and a direction.”98 Shariati explores the implications of the traditional Islamic philosophy of history, whereby history begins with the struggle between the two sons of Adam, Cain and Abel. Abel symbolically represents “the age of pastoralism, hunting and fishing—the spirit of brotherhood and true faith.” Cain, on the other hand, represents “the age of agriculture and the establishment of the system of private ownership, together with religious trickery and transgression against the rights of others.” The struggle between Cain and Abel signaled the beginning of “a permanent war … so

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that the whole of history became the stage for a struggle between the party of Cain the killer, and Abel, his victim; or in other words, the ruler and the ruled.”99 Because Cain killed Abel, Cain has had the upper hand throughout history. Thus, Cain’s religion—the religion of Shirk—has always been a reality in human history and has ruled all societies—with a few exceptions, and for only brief periods (such as the society of Madina at the time of the Prophet Muhammad). Conversely, Abel’s religion—the religion of Tawhid—has always been the victim. However, “the desire to avenge the blood of Abel has been inherited by succeeding generations of his descendants—the subjected people who have fought for justice, freedom and true faith in a struggle that has continued, in one way or another, in every age.”100 For Shariati, the struggle between the parties of Cain and Abel and their respective religions still continues. He argues that when he speaks about religion and its potential for effecting social change, he does not mean the dominant religion of Cain, but the opposing faith of Abel. He considers it “the responsibility of humanity to replace the self-justifying, intoxicating, polytheistic religions with the religion of Tawhid as announced by the Messengers of Tawhid. Thus, our reliance on religion is not a return to the past. It is a continuation on the path of history.”101 He believes God and human history are on the side of the religion of Tawhid and the descendants of Abel.102 Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience According to Dr Shariati, “each revolution has two faces: the blood and the message,” and each involves its own peculiar mission. The mission of blood is carried out by the martyr who sacrifices his life in the course of achieving his goal. “The second mission is the mission of the message. It is the mission of taking the message of martyrdom to the people of the world. It is the mission of being the speaking tongue for the hot blood and cold bodies among moving corpses. … Those who have the boldness to choose their own death have made a great choice. But the task of those who remain alive is much more onerous and difficult.”103 Thus, each revolutionary must be ready for self-sacrifice and must possess great revolutionary patience. Shariati argues that Islam—and belief in God in general—is a more appropriate and logical foundation for sacrificing oneself in the cause of liberation than non-religious ideologies.


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A ‘worshipper of God’ who sees the universe as possessing responsiveness, consciousness, accountability, and logic—and who considers himself as an eternal ‘act’ which will not be lost—will understand death in the course of his commitment and for the life of the masses so naturally and so easily that he will not even feel like a hero in choosing it. With the strength that he obtains from [belief in] ‘God’ and ‘Maad’ (Resurrection), he will consider confrontation with death something that does not even require any [special] courage.104 Shariati considers martyrdom as “one of the greatest and most rejuvenating assets in the history of Shiism.” It is rejuvenating because a martyr injects his blood into the dead body of a society “in which people have lost faith in themselves, … a society which has surrendered itself [to oppression and tyranny], a society which has forgotten the sense of responsibility, a society which has become dormant and stagnant.” Thus, “The Martyr is the heart of history.”105 Shariati also argues that “the martyr is the manifestation and symbol of life and dignity.” He enjoys eternal life, not only in the Presence of God but in the hearts of the people as well. In contrast to the martyr’s glory, “those who submit to every kind of humiliation in order to stay alive are the mute and evil corpses of history.”106 Simplification Even a cursory study of Dr Shariati’s works would demonstrate that his success and popularity as a revolutionary figure was due not only to what he said, but to how he said it. While Shariati is a master of symbolism, he also frequently refers to the stories of the prophets and Imams and their opponents. Moreover, his lectures and writings are marked by a distinctive literary style which includes the use of satire. He is also exceptionally successful in summarizing his ideas in concise statements which can be used as maxims and slogans. a

Symbolism: Because he never directly condemned the Shah’s repressive regime, Shariati was able to continue lecturing while surrounded by SAVAK agents. Rather, his critique operated through the use of symbols. We have already noted the symbolism he employed in the speech “On the Plight of the Oppressed” and his condemnation of the Shah’s celebration of “Great Civilization”.107 Another example is

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY Shariati’s speech on “Martyrdom” in 1972, delivered, as his biographer puts it, “at the very time when the Shah’s tyrannous regime had massacred the Iranian revolutionaries; … when the mountains, the deserts, the streets, mosques, shops, factories … everywhere had been reddened with the blood of the martyrs.”108 Although the speech was ostensibly delivered to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Husain, it also acknowledges the Iranian martyrs of the Shah’s tyranny. Shariati says, for example, while eulogizing Husain: “Now the martyrs have died, and we [walking] corpses are still alive. The martyrs spoke their words, and we deaf people are their audience. Those who had the courage to choose death when they could not live [with dignity] are gone, and we shameless people are still here.”109

b

Stories: Shariati frequently refers to great historical figures and their opponents to elucidate his arguments. The former are introduced as models to be followed while their enemies are held up as symbols of evil to be rejected. The Prophet Muhammad is the chief model of commitment, activism, and the struggle for truth and against falsehood.110 The Islamic community of Madina under the leadership of the Prophet is held up as the model of the ideal society.111 Imam Ali is presented as a paragon of activism, leadership, toughness, and commitment to the “School of Thought, Unity, and Justice.”112 Imam Husain is a model of self-sacrifice and struggle against oppression, tyranny, and corruption.113 Zainab—Husain’s sister—is an exemplar of resistance against repression.114 Abudhar—the Prophet’s famous companion—exemplifies the struggle against luxury and exploitation and for truth and justice,115 while Moses embodies the struggle for liberation.116 On the other side, Pharaoh is a symbol of oppressive political authority,117 while Croesus exemplifies excessive and illegitimate wealth.118 And Balaam Baura—a cleric who justified Pharaoh’s oppressive regime—is a prime symbol of the leadership of the religion of Shirk.119

c

Satire: A great orator, a skilful writer and poet, Shariati is also a master of satire. While a full treatment of his diverse literary skills is beyond the scope of this study, the following passage from his 1970 lecture “On the Plight of the Oppressed” illustrates his effective use of satire.


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Probably there are such “individualistic ways,” “short-cuts,” and “easy solutions” to reach salvation without suffering all the problems and pain involved in commitment and responsibility towards the people. Probably people can become as innocent and pure as they were born by laying out some money at the end of their lives. Probably they can ward off God’s scales of justice by repeating some words and rituals and receive the reward of not one, not ten, but seventy martyrs … even without leaving their store or bed. Unfortunately, such methods were not available [in the early days of Islam]. Apparently the Imams, the companions of the Prophet, and the great Mujahideen (people engaged in Jihad) knew nothing about them. Otherwise they would never have accepted death with the hope of receiving the rewards of just a single martyr. Had that been the case, Imam Husain would never have taken his children and all his loved ones to the place of sacrifice. … In those days, practicing religion was every bit as difficult as the conduct of [secular] life. … [It is only today that everything has become automatic.] Thus, you lie down on the sofa, “get into the mood,” repeat some phrases—and suddenly, without knowing what happened and why, you are plucked from your sofa and taken up to “the highest level of paradise!” Thus, chosen from among a group of usurious, unscrupulous, parasitic, and carefree colleagues, and pulled out from the swamps of a dirty life achieved at the cost of ignorance, evasion, treachery, lies, participation in oppression and exploitation, silence in response to tragedies and appeals for justice, and the disregarding of all responsibilities—without any hard work or suffering—suddenly you find yourself among the family of the Prophet. You find yourself together with Ali, Fatima, and Husain seventy steps ahead of the front row of the most glorious martyrs the world has seen! Oh God! What an amazing trick!120 d

Slogans: Many of the popular slogans used during the huge demonstrations of 1978-79 were drawn from the lectures and books of Shariati. While he adapted some of his axioms from the Quran and

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY the sayings of famous Muslim figures, others were his own formulations. Examples include: “Book, Balance, Iron” (symbols for ideology, justice, and political power respectively, derived from a verse of the Quran [57:25]);121 “Life is nothing but faith [commitment] and struggle” (attributed to Imam Husain);122 “Neither East nor West” (a characteristic of the Islamic Ummat);123 “The martyr is the pulsating heart of history;”124 “Only those who can have a good [i.e., meaningful, dignified] death can have a good life;”125 “The whole earth is the setting for Karbala, every month is the month of Muharam, every day is the day of Ashura” (referring to the place, month, and day of Imam Husain’s martyrdom).126

Claim to Truth and Rationality Dr Shariati bases many of his arguments on the Holy Quran and on the traditions of the Prophet, his companions, and the Imams. He also appeals to history, “academic surveys and research,” factual observations, the views of “today’s committed progressives,” and both Third World and Western scholars to support his point of view. Occasionally, he mentions his own background and activities as evidence of his qualifications and sincerity. He also resorts to logical reasoning to establish his argument. a

The Holy Quran: Shariati’s use of the Quran is not uniform throughout his work. In some works, he relies heavily on the Quran,127 while in others he refers to it only occasionally. 128 The Quran is used by Shariati to accomplish two main tasks: to establish the validity of his ideas to those who already accept its authority, and to demonstrate the Quran’s validity and relevance to present social conditions to those who are not firm believers. Many examples of the first kind of use have been canvassed in this chapter. The following will serve as an example of the second usage: How wonderfully this Quran speaks! And what [wonderful lessons] it teaches! Oh, if only they [the enemies of Islam] had not taken this book away from us! It is a divine book, containing words of revelation from the tongue of a prophet who was a totally divine individual and at the same time an Ummi (illiterate, one of the masses). [How amazing that] in its treatment of social issues and its analysis of history and human dialectics it utilizes such a scientific point of view—such an absolutely rational


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perspective—and such purely logical analysis! It relies so much on objective and practical facts, material factors and natural causes; and is so utterly ‘realist!’129 b

Traditions and sayings: Using a “system of typology,” Shariati developed a method for the comparative study of religions consisting of the “identification of five distinguishing aspects or characteristics common to every religion,” and then comparing them across the spectrum of world faiths. These five distinguishing characteristics are: the god or gods worshipped in each religion, its prophet, its holy book or scriptures, the circumstances of its appearance, and “those choice individuals each religion nurtures and produces—the representative figures it has trained and then presented to society and history.”130 When applying this method, Shariati compares the Prophet of Islam to the prophets of other faiths in order to demonstrate how his life and traditions are the most relevant to the social reality of both Iranian society and the contemporary world in general.131 On other occasions, however, he treats the Prophet Muhammad in his own right, seeking not only to demonstrate the superiority of the Prophet’s thoughts and deeds, but also to support his own arguments.132 Even more often than the Prophet, Shariati refers to the traditions of Imam Ali, Abudhar Ghaffari, and Imam Husain whom he regards as the most “representative figures” that Islam has nurtured, trained, and presented to history. He chooses Imam Husain because he grew up in the household of the Prophet and sacrificed his life in defense of Islamic values and principles. He chooses Imam Ali and Abudhar because “no other cultural, environmental, or religious elements had a hand in molding their exceptional characters other than Islam. Whatever they had, they received from Islam. Abudhar was a Bedouin who came from the desert. Ali accepted Islam at the age of eight or ten and grew up in the Prophet’s own household.”133 Shariati refers to the traditions surrounding these three both to support his own perspectives and also to demonstrate the weightiness of Islamic teaching.134

c

History: Shariati is a student of sociology and history and presents historical evidence to support his arguments.135 In many cases,

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY however, his historical statements are pitched at a very general level.136

d

Academic research: Dr Shariati has a high regard for academic inquiry and research. On many occasions he seeks to establish his claim to truth by referring to the breadth of his research. In his lecture on “Shiism: A Complete Party” he notes, for example: “After studying all schools of thought, all ideologies, all societies, all revolutions, all movements—after reviewing history, sociology, and the sociology of Islam—and after investigating the factors that make for cultural degeneration and social and intellectual deviations … I have come to the final conclusion that ‘Shiism is a complete party.’”137 Academic “objectivity,” however, does not mean value neutrality to Shariati. Social commitment and responsibility are more important to him than any concept of “scientific objectivity.”138 He spends many pages explaining why he cannot follow the methods of the great researchers and scholars who engage in a logical, detached and scientific study of issues, avoiding the harsh tone and sharp tongue that might hurt people’s feelings.139

e

Factual observation: Shariati occasionally supports his arguments with factual observations of the world around him. Echoing the Quran, he argues for example that “if those who do not believe in God have the capacity for survival and for gaining power and mastery on earth, God will grant them what they are qualified for. But if you who believe in God give yourselves over to weakness, humiliation, and degeneracy, God will not grant you what you are not qualified for.” In support of this contention, Shariati recalls the “horrible and bitter fact” that while Muslims live in misery, hunger, disease, and ignorance, “atheists and polytheists” enjoy the material and spiritual bounty that God has created for mankind.140

f

The viewpoint of the progressive intelligentsia: On many occasions, Shariati notes that Islamic teachings—which are also his own views—are either in accordance with or superior to what he calls “the views of today’s committed progressives.” It seems that Shariati wants to establish his claim to truth against those with leftist tendencies—the self-appointed liberal intelligentsia and disciples of European social thinkers.141


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g

The writings of Western and Third World scholars and thinkers: The work of foreign intellectuals had a great impact on the Western-oriented youth who formed an important part of Shariati’s audience. This may explain why Shariati frequently refers to the works of such celebrated writers and philosophers as René Descartes, André Gide, Albert Camus, Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Jean Isolet, Radha Krishnan, Emile Durkheim, Montgomery Watt, Alexis Carrell, George Gurvitch, and Fyodor Dostoyevsky.142

h

Criticism of rival ideologies: Shariati’s critique of capitalism has already been noted.143 On the other side of the ideological divide, he reserves strong criticism for Marxism in general and Iranian Marxists and leftists in particular.144 He also criticizes other Western ideologies such as “materialism,” “naturalism,” “existentialism,” “historicism,” “sociologism,” and “biologism.”145

i

Autobiographical elements: Shariati invokes autobiographical data as evidence of his sincerity and qualification to speak on certain subjects. He notes, for example, his rural background and his close ties with ordinary people. “The things which the progressives, writers, scholars, and ideologues think about and understand [theoretically], I have experienced as a part of the profound conscience of my society. …”146 Shariati also mentions his religious education and his deep understanding of his culture and society. “I have first-hand knowledge of what goes on in our society and in our time. I have personally witnessed the confrontation of today’s culture with yesterday’s religion.”147 He frequently refers to his Western education148 as well as his love for “the Prophet’s household, Fatima’s home, and the traditions of both Ali and the Shiite martyrs.”149 Shariati reminds his audience that by drawing attention to the place of religion in solving Iran’s social problems he does not expect—nor has he received—any material (or even psychological) reward or benefit. On the contrary, while the traditional religious class chastises him as a distorter of religion, the liberal intelligentsia dismiss him as a reactionary who has betrayed the younger generation. Shariati disassociates himself from the former, stating that he cares little what they think of him.150 He is sympathetic, however, to the progressives and, while he shows some concern over their accusations, he blames

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY their attitude on their misunderstanding of religion. They rightly oppose the religion of Shirk but fail to distinguish it from the religion of Tawhid.151

j

Logical reasoning: While Shariati’s lectures and writings have a very strong emotional appeal,152 he does not disregard logic and reason. He argues, for example, that Islam is fundamentally an “ideology” rather than a “science” or a “philosophy.” To support his argument, he first outlines the differences between ideology on the one hand and science and philosophy on the other. For those knowledgeable about Islam, this comparison might itself be sufficient to establish his point. Shariati, however, goes a step further, comparing the “basic idioms” of Islam with what he considers “contemporary secular ideology in its most advanced and comprehensive form.” He seeks to demonstrate how “the two share a common language and [how] their idioms are identical—some in their significance and some even literally.”153 Many similar examples of sophisticated argument can be found in Shariati’s works.154

8 Revolutionary Ideology in the Works of Bani-Sadr

Abul Hasan Bani-Sadr began his activities against the Shah’s regime in Tehran in the mid 1950s, but produced most of his ideological work in France as a leading member of the anti-Shah Islamic movement in Europe in the 1970s. He has written several books and many journal articles— both in Persian and French—and has delivered numerous speeches and lectures.1 Political Consciousness Bani-Sadr views humans not as helpless toys in the hands of fate, but as active agents determining their future by the way they deal with their social reality. Thus, he considers mankind the maker of its own destiny. “Mankind has the potentiality either to grow in its various dimensions towards infinity, or to become a prisoner of the absolutes [that it creates for itself]. In the latter case, it becomes a ‘thing’ and, like all other ‘things’, it will not remain the same; rather, it will rot and make its surroundings rotten.”2 In order for people to avoid becoming “things” and to be able to grow towards infinity, Bani-Sadr argues, they should undertake a number of practical actions: crush the “cult of personality,” establish relations with others based on a relationship with God, and join the struggle for freedom and against censorship. a

The Cult of Personality: For Bani-Sadr, the “cult of personality” involves an individual claiming divinity and receiving adoration. Such a cult, however, is not limited to dictatorships. “In reality, the cult of personality has a more complex identity and its spread is total and complete.”3 It emerges in an environment of differential power

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY relationship based on the division of human society into different groups, classes, and nations. Such power relationships lead to inequality and to the further concentration and accumulation of power. Power—be it social, political, economic or cultural—will grow increasingly larger, like an avalanche coming down a mountainside, as soon as it starts the process of concentration and accumulation. … Such power will need increasingly more resources and skills as it responds to pressure building up from two directions—one resulting from its own contradictions, and the other from the resistance of society. Thus, in the process of its concentration and accumulation, power will grow so large that it will seem absolute, unlimited, and uncontainable. From this point on, people will be honored according to their rank and position on the social ladder. Social status and distinction will become the first and primary value. The most distinguished social position will elevate its holder to the status of “god of gods” in the hierarchy of power.4 According to Bani-Sadr, the cult of personality has existed throughout human history and in all human societies. Its domination has not gone unchallenged, however; from time to time, the underdog chooses to fight and survive rather than to rot away and die. Moreover, the religion of Tawhid has been struggling against the cult of personality throughout history. These challenges have failed, however, because the components of power are always able to reconfigure themselves and perpetuate the cult in a new form.5 Beni-Sadr considers the relentless struggle against the cult of personality to be the duty of every committed human being, whether Muslim or not.6 However, only adherence to the “fundamental values of Islam”, he argues, can lead to success. He notes five such values—Tawhid, Be’that, Imamat, Adalat, and Maad— which correspond with the five tenets of Shiism. Bani-Sadr’s understanding of these terms, however, differs from the traditional Shiite understanding. 1

Tawhid (unity, oneness, monotheism): Traditionally, Tawhid refers to the Oneness of God—primarily a theological concept, although

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certainly having social implications. Bani-Sadr emphasizes the social aspect of Tawhid: seeking empathy with others and a more comprehensive identity between the self and the other through an emphasis on fraternity and mutual support. He notes that Islam recommends this value instead of its alternative—seeking supremacy over others by trying to destroy them.7 2

Be’that (consigning, commission, delegation): Traditionally, Be’that refers to God’s sending of divine Messengers for the guidance of mankind. According to Bani-Sadr, the term means rather “a perpetual movement in which people develops their talents and potentials together with the community so that they free themselves from the worship and servitude of false authorities. Thus, their forces and creative power will be directed towards infinity.”8

3

Imamat (leadership): In Shiite tradition, Imamat refers to the leadership of Imam Ali and his eleven descendents. For BaniSadr, it means: organizing the Be’that of a community in order to achieve Tawhid. Imamat is the kind of leadership which inspires the self-sacrifice of the community (self and others) in order to achieve a common identity. In Imamat there is no place for a despotic leader followed by apathetic masses. … In Imamat, each individual will be a representative of the power of the community, the will of the community, the knowledge of the community, and the identity of the community.9

4

Adalat (Justice): Traditionally, Adalat refers to both the justice of God and the justice of the Imams. For Bani-Sadr, it refers to people’s “activity and relationship” in society. “The members of a community are just when they are all equally active and when they consider—and place—themselves in relationship, not to each other but in relation to their common goal which is the achievement of a single identity.” Thus, Bani-Sadr argues, Islamic justice is dynamic. It means that the members of a society organize their activities in such a way that they do not result in

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY the domination of some over others or in the advancement of some and the backwardness of others. Rather, the more privileged members of society elevate the less privileged so that, in their Islamic identity, all are in balance with one another.10 5

Maad (Resurrection): In Islamic thought, Maad traditionally refers to the concept of life after death. For Bani-Sadr, it is the model for a future which Islam holds up as a guideline for action. “Mankind’s efforts today should enhance present and future possibilities. … The individual will work for the community and the community will work for the individual so that people flourish in the various dimensions of their humanity.”11

b

God-based relationships: According to Bani-Sadr, all human relationships—whether with the self, fellow human beings, nature, the universe, or God—are based on the concept of balance, which can manifest either positively or negatively—or as a mixture of the two.12 In the first case (“positive balance”), individuals or groups regard others merely as “variables” of their own needs and wants. This is a type of power relationship and will usually result in inequality, because establishing equilibrium is extremely difficult in such circumstances.13 In the second case (“negative balance”), where people set their sights on God and give up self-interest, the relationship with God is the primary one, and all other relationships are its reflection. This will result in a dynamic and perpetual movement towards perfection and infinity, because all a person’s skills and resources—rather than being wasted in confrontation—will be aligned in the same direction—towards God.14

c

Struggle against censorship: Bani-Sadr values freedom of thought and action very highly and he exhorts his audience to resist any type of censorship that limits freedom. For him, censorship is not limited to a ban on freedom of expression or political activity by a government, but includes any action that directly or indirectly discourages freedom of thought and action or encourages the habit of blindly following others.15 According to Bani-Sadr, Islamic Jihad, in all three of its traditional forms, is to be directed against censorship. “Armed Jihad” becomes a duty when the existing authorities create obstacles for the propagation of the Divine


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Message. “Superior Jihad” (defined as “uttering the truth to a tyrant,” according to a Saying of the Prophet) becomes a duty when a tyrant demands that his subjects “worship” him. “Greater Jihad” (“fighting against one’s own lower self,” according to another Saying of the Prophet) becomes a duty “when your mind becomes a relentless censorship police-force, inciting you to engage in destructive activities against yourself and others.”16 Criticism of Existing Social Arrangements Bani-Sadr is well aware of the significance of delegitimization as a precondition for toppling the Shah’s regime. In one speech he notes, for example, that “the task of our people in their struggle for liberation will become easier only when we are able to destroy the regime’s legitimacy. [We must] demonstrate that the regime can base its legitimacy neither on religion, nor on some [noble] purpose, nor on the support of the people. It rules only by force, by oil revenues, and by [the support of] foreign military forces.”17 Living abroad, Bani-Sadr is at liberty to explicitly criticize the Shah’s regime, and sometimes he does so.18 More often, he presents his analysis and critique in general terms, but the implications are always clear. a

Iran under the Shah: Bani-Sadr considers the Shah’s regime as an oppressive tyranny “unprecedented in history.” He rejects the Shah’s claim that repression is necessary for social and economic growth. On the contrary, he argues, the extreme repression experienced in Iran is the result of “the incalculable growth in the plundering of our country’s natural resources and the ruling clique’s unbearable dictatorship.”19 He blames the Shah’s despotism on Iran’s dependence on the West in general and on the USA in particular. According to Bani-Sadr, the world’s major powers and the multinational corporations based in them pursue their goal of domination and exploitation in weaker countries across the globe with the help of local elites. “Those goals cannot be realized without the imposition of a social system in which [some] groups relate to— and find common interests with—the dominant [country]. Thus, the existence of such groups depends upon their organic ties with the ruling groups in the dominant societies.”20 This leads to the concentration of power into a few hands and to the deformation of the whole social structure of the dominated society. Thus, “in the

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY process of a merger with the dominant foreign power, the government and the military become increasingly identical. … [This leads to] the transformation of law into a means for the implementation of general repression and for the suppression of any protest by the victimized people of the country concerned.”21 In the economic sphere, as a result of this unequal relationship, the center of productive activity and decision-making moves abroad. Production and consumption are based on the economic interests of the dominant country. The national economic system is broken up into unrelated sectors which are merged into their equivalent areas in the dominant economy. These unequal relations also lead to the destruction of economic potential in different areas and to increasing reliance on a single commodity. All this results in the intensification of social and economic inequalities within the dominated country as well as in further inequality between the dependent and the dominant countries.22 In the social sphere, bureaucracy grows rapidly both within the government—because of the reliance on oil revenues and foreign loans—and in the private sector—around the export/import axis. The alienation of the dependent class leads to social disintegration.23 The workforce is restricted to menial work in factories, fields, or offices, and is largely cut out of the two other major areas of human endeavor—ingenuity and creativity on the one hand, and organization and management on the other. The educational system becomes increasingly westernized and concentrated on training skills for use in the West. The dominant countries become centers for the accumulation of skills as well as the export of their own culture. In general, the dominant/dependent relationship transforms people who should be makers of history into mere objects of history. It transforms the creative individual into a destructive one.24

b

Capitalism: Bani-Sadr considers capitalism responsible for the domination of Iran by the West. He argues that capitalism has created an industrial economy that requires continuous production. Since a halt in production causes the system to experience crisis, it continually needs to find more sources of raw materials and more markets for its products. “Of course, there must be an army to take the energy from [Iran] and the iron from Africa and impose the consumption of their goods by force.” In Iran, the Shah’s regime


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serves the role of the capitalists’ army. Capitalism also exploits the mass media—and even church and mosque—in order to transform each “mental sign” into a measurable “material sign.” Thus, it encourages an insatiable urge for consumption and transforms man into a “consuming animal.” Furthermore, capitalism increases existing inequalities not only because it must exploit labor in order to accumulate capital, but also because capital must continuously expand just in order to survive in the market.25 c

The cult of personality: Bani-Sadr considers that his analysis of the cult of personality is eminently applicable to the contemporary world—and certainly to Iran. In our time, more than ever, the individuals who lay claim to divinity have dominated mankind’s life by the force of the bayonet and the power of propaganda. … The process of the accumulation and concentration [of wealth] on a global scale afflicts the oppressed with total and ever-increasing poverty. In this overall process, the dominated as well as the dominant party are in grave danger of being deprived of every dimension of their humanity.26

Set of Values Social values seem to be the most important values for Bani-Sadr. He also mentions a number of personal values—emphasizing some—but notes only a few spiritual values. a

Social values: Freedom and liberty top the list of Bani-Sadr’s values, especially freedom of thought and expression. Tawhid (unity, oneness) also enjoys high status as a social value. They are followed by Adalat (justice), independence, equality, and Jihad. He also emphasizes Be’that (social evolution), Imamat (leadership), and work and action. Other social values and goals mentioned include the elimination of poverty, social responsibility, co-operation, charity, consultation, solidarity, and security.

b

Personal values: The possession of a critical outlook is the leading personal value for Bani-Sadr. It is followed by creativity, love and

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY friendship, growth towards perfection, and sincerity. He also mentions knowledge, activism, courage and firmness.

c

Spiritual values: Bani-Sadr uses the term Tawhid in two senses: human social unity or community (noted above as a social value), and the Oneness of God. This second understanding of Tawhid, and the piety it elicts, is the leading spiritual value noted by Bani-Sadr. He also mentions self-sacrifice, Taqwa (piety or God-consciousness), belief in God, and seeking God’s will.27

Outline of the Good Society Bani-Sadr names his ideal society the “Society of Tawhid” and gives detailed consideration to the social, political, and economic relations that should mark that society. Before arriving at that point, however, there is a need for an interim government—to be called “the Islamic Republic”—to be set up in the aftermath of the Shah’s downfall. a

The Society of Tawhid: Bani-Sadr’s ideal society is truly utopian. Based on the description of the Hereafter in the Holy Quran, it will embody the establishment of perfect justice. For Bani-Sadr, however, it will also mean “the elimination of all power relations and the elimination of government as the means of regulating power relations.”28 Thus, Bani-Sadr advocates an anarchic society in which “there will be no concentration of economic, political, or intellectual power, no class, and no dominant ideology.”29 In such a society, everyone will be an Imam (leader). 30 The elimination of force as the basis of social relations will be accompanied by people’s becoming “active and relational,” not only in comparison to others but also with regard to themselves. As a result of this there will be no socio-political “absolutes.” Each and every member of society will be active in developing themselves, actualizing their potential and moving further towards a state of perfection and infinitude.31 As for economic relations, in the “economy of Tawhid” the accumulation and concentration of wealth and power will not—and cannot—take place.32 In such a society, value will be placed on both individual and community ownership, but “ownership by the community as the primary viceregency of God always takes precedence to that of the individual.”33

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The Islamic Republic: In Bani-Sadr’s ideal society of Tawhid, all humanity forms a single unit with one common identity. Nevertheless, he recognizes that mankind has a long way to go to realize such an ideal state and thus proposes an outline of an interim “Islamic Republic” which will replace the Shah’s regime in Iran. “The Islamic government will not be an absolute government. [Rather,] its goal will be to eliminate the state as a dominant power and absolute ruler over the country’s destiny.” In order to achieve that goal, the government will seek to prepare the ground for “its replacement by the forces which will represent the next stage of society’s transformation towards the society of Tawhid.”34 The interim Islamic government will be responsible for eliminating the causes of social degeneracy. It will also be responsible for enhancing individuals’ prospects by stimulating social and political consciousness and expanding the possibilities of action for both mind and body.35 In the envisaged Islamic Republic, the “dividing line” between citizens and government will be eliminated. Public meeting places such as mosques and Madrasas (traditional religious schools) will be restored as dynamic and “living centers for evaluation, criticism, and decision-making.” People will actively participate in their own liberation so that “a new person” will be created—“a person who has found their true nature and has returned to their real self.” This requires that the principle of Ijtehad (independent study of the Divine Law) be generalized at the societal level. It also requires that monopolization of intellectual inquiry and practical invention by a small minority is prevented.36 In the Islamic Republic, religion will play a leading role. Through Ijtehad, it will answer the ever-changing needs of a society which is moving towards perfection. Religion will also serve as the principal factor for communal solidarity and unity and as a vehicle for the exchange of views and beliefs. Thus, it is important that religion does not become “official” or a tool in the hands of political elite and thus a means for religious dictatorship.37 Through the establishment of the Islamic Republic, individual and social liberties will increase. “Law will not be a tool in the hands of the powerful to be used against the weak. Rather, it will rule as an expression of [people’s] rights and obligations [in order to] equalize opportunities and outcomes.”38 Moreover, the people will elect the judges, removing them from the reach of political power.39 In the process of the transfer of power to the masses, the army will be freed

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY from foreign domination, leading to a total change in its function and organization. On the domestic front, it will no longer be used against the people and, in foreign relations, it will not be used to implement expansionist policies. The army will be reorganized to defend national independence and integrity as well as civil rights. All the people will take part in national defense.40 Bani-Sadr envisages fundamental reform of the national economy as well as foreign relations. The main aim of these changes will be self-reliance, economic growth, decentralization, equitable distribution, and the establishment of a new pattern of consumption. Economic growth will cease to be an end in itself. “People will no longer be [only] a means for [the creation of] economic growth. Rather, the ultimate goal of economic growth will be mankind’s liberation from the domination of nature as well as from social domination.”41 In foreign relations, relationships based on “positive balance” will be replaced with those based on “negative balance.” This means that the Islamic government will neither dominate others nor passively accept domination.42 It will establish closer relations with other Muslim countries and will “undertake the role of a model for people’s liberation” on a worldwide scale. 43 Elimination of foreign domination will affect the cultural life of society as well. An Islamic government will shut the door on “antivalues” imported from—and imposed by—the West, creating a cultural atmosphere favorable to the growth of a healthy society. People will be encouraged to think for themselves and learn the skills of critical evaluation.44 The mass media will communicate authentic thinking, knowledge and information to the masses. The media will be independent of both the government and the private sector and will be controlled by public companies. Cultural dualism will be brought to an end. “[Islam], as a social and intellectual system, [will] be placed at the center of society. [It will serve] as a yardstick of thought and action so that mankind can free itself from the shackles of the past and advance with quickening steps towards the infinite horizon of Tawhid.”45

Program of Action In addition to identifying several targets and agents of change, Bani-Sadr also proposes some forms of action for bringing about revolutionary change.


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a

Targets of change: In accordance with his theories on the subject, Bani-Sadr identifies the cult of personality as his main target of change. In addition to individuals who claim divinity, whether literally or metaphorically, two particular groups within the current system are singled out as special targets: those who provide the material infrastructure of government—the bureaucrats, the military men, and the “directors”—and a support group that fulfils the regime’s non-material needs—“clergy, (religious) scholars, and scientists.”46 Since the system built around the cult of personality has distorted religion, which has become a tool for justifying the system, it too becomes a legitimate target of change.47 Bani-Sadr’s criticism of capitalism and censorship shows that he considers them as targets as well.48

b

Agents of change: Bani-Sadr emphasizes the role of two groups in bringing about revolutionary change: 1

Youth: Bani-Sadr believes that the dynamic energy of youth not only gives life to a society and provides for the continuation of its special identity, but that “it is also charged with the great task of the growth of society. … [The younger] generation constructs tomorrow and the future by its work today.”49 Thus, he exhorts “the committed younger generation”—which he also calls “the generation of thought and action”—to “persist in its great struggle” to liberate Iran from the clutches of the Shah’s regime.50

2

The oppressed: According to Bani-Sadr, the leadership of any revolution falls to the oppressed. They possess “a force that cannot be contained in any social receptacle. They must become more conscious of this fact, change themselves, and change the world.”51 Bani-Sadr does not assign responsibility for raising the political consciousness of the oppressed to any outside agency, since the contradictions inherent in the current system will eventually allow them to take control. According to him, although the intensification of tyranny will initially turn the oppressed into tools in the hands of the powerful, their experience of being used in power struggles among the ruling elites will make them “realize their own power as well as the

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY weaknesses of the ruling groups and the flimsiness of their spider web.” Thus, “when the time has come for the great resurrection, the contradictions which burden the powerful will have grown so large that [finally] the oppressed will take the initiative and lead the world towards Tawhid.”52

c

Forms of action: Bani-Sadr notes that in order to “create a new mankind and for a new humanity to flourish”—which is the goal of an Islamic revolution—Islam emphasizes “fundamental change in people” as much as it emphasizes “structural change in society.”53 Thus, BaniSadr focuses on what he calls “cultural resurrection” and “changes in perception” as forms of revolutionary action. He also notes the need for unity, taking action to delegitimize the regime, going into exile, and different forms of Jihad. 1

Cultural resurrection: For Bani-Sadr, “a political revolution begins with cultural resurrection.” By this he means that the revolutionaries should first overcome their fear and “liberate their wills,” understanding that people have a significant role in making their own destiny. They should liberate themselves “from the bonds and shackles of the existing system” both in thought and action, including “obedience to anti-values.” To act in this way, they need to “wage the greater Jihad”—the struggle within themselves—part of which involves self-criticism and continuous correction of one’s actions.54 The revolutionaries should also bring about cultural transformation in society. Bani-Sadr considers “ideas which do not have any relationship to reality” as the “greatest opium of our age;” such ideas are “injected into the minds of our youth through different means to intoxicate them and make them forget that Iran is being ruined.” Thus, it is the task of the revolutionaries to liberate the younger generation from the grip of such destructive ideas.55 They should also wage a struggle against censorship which habituates the mind to obedience and prevents people from joining the revolution.56 Moreover, they should encourage “people’s active participation in innovative and creative work.” No revolution can be successful without the general participation of the people in such activities.57


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2

A change of perception: Bani-Sadr believes that so long as power relationships constitute the dominant form of relations among members of a given society, “revolution will [always] be transformed into anti-revolution.”58 Thus, the revolutionaries must first change their own perceptions and reject the concept of power relationships. He warns his audience: “If you want to abolish this power-centeredness [under the Shah], you should not become power-centered yourselves. … If you become like the regime, even if you overthrow it, nothing will [really] change. One form of force will simply replace another.”59 He asks that they become “negative opponents”—opponents who are the reverse of the regime—opponents who struggle for the fundamental destruction of the system rather than for merely gaining power. Only then, Bani-Sadr argues, will the people have a real alternative to the Shah’s regime.60

3

Unity and co-operation: Bani-Sadr notes that a movement cannot make headway without the general participation and cooperation of the members of the society in which it operates. “The greater the degree of integration, unity and oneness of identity in the collectivity, the greater will be the size of the movement and faster its progress.” This explains why, according to Bani-Sadr, Islam places such a high value on unity and cooperation.61

4

Passive resistance and Jihad: In addition to the “greater Jihad”, which he identifies with “cultural resurrection”, Bani-Sadr mentions two other forms of Jihad, as we saw above: “superior Jihad”, which involves speaking out against oppression and tyranny, and “armed Jihad”, which entails resistance against those who impede the propagation of truth.62 However, he does not specify the circumstances and details of waging such Jihads. Bani-Sadr also notes the significant role that “hunger strikes and other forms of campaign to free political prisoners” can play in the delegitimization of a regime, again without going into detail. 63 He also mentions going into exile or “emigration to a place where a person can become active in organizing the struggle.”64

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Commitment to Action and Self-Confidence Bani-Sadr seeks to encourage a commitment to action and to boost the self-confidence of would-be revolutionaries by underlining the concept of mankind as the maker of its own destiny and by presenting a philosophy of history in which the ultimate victory belongs to the oppressed. a

Mankind the maker of its own destiny: According to Bani-Sadr, Islam has brought about a revolution in mankind’s perceptions of the future by understanding the future as the outcome of human action rather than as something that happens by chance.65 “People affect the character of the social system [in which they live] by their willpower, their actions, and their struggles.”66 Moreover, by exercising this free will, mankind has the potentiality “to free itself from the bonds and shackles of the ruling system and to transform itself into a revolutionary force.”67 Thus, Islam is categorically opposed to determinism and considers “mankind the builder of [its own] destiny.”68 Moreover, Islam considers “fear of the secular powers as polytheism” and a failure of the will.69 Referring to the revolutionary situation in Iran in 1978-79, Bani-Sadr observes that “the leadership of Khomeini should make it possible for Iran to regain its morale, its will to live, and its will to struggle.”70 He also exhorts Iranian youth to resist any “inferiority complex,” to show courage in their struggle, not to be afraid of hardships and difficulties, and not to fear “bayonets, whether overt or concealed.”71

b

Philosophy of history: Like Shariati, Bani-Sadr sees history as the scene of a continuous struggle between the oppressed and the forces of absolute power. He argues that the ongoing concentration of power into fewer and fewer hands will lead to two inevitable consequences. On the one hand, it will intensify the internal contradictions already apparent in the ruling elites. On the other hand, it will force the oppressed to make a choice between the intolerable circumstances they face—which is a living death—and armed resistance. It will also make the oppressed aware of their own power. Thus, in the very process of its concentration and accumulation, “power will finally reach the stage of its own destruction. … The oppressors dig their graves with their own hands.”72 Bani-Sadr acknowledges that past revolutions have not led to the abolition of oppression and absolute power, which usually re-


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emerge in new forms. He argues, however, that in this process, both the “sight and insight” of the oppressed will become clearer and they will be able to distinguish the leadership of Tawhid from that of Shirk. “The ultimate victory belongs to the adherents of Tawhid, provided that they persevere with their unremitting [cultural] resurrection and fight against the polytheists until all oppression is eliminated, and mankind is freed from the yoke of oppression and attains Tawhid.”73 Sacrifice and Revolutionary Patience Bani-Sadr refers to the significance of self-sacrifice and revolutionary patience only occasionally.74 Addressing a group of protesting students, he asserts that only those persons are qualified for “leading the people to freedom who do not consider work, struggle, prison, loss of loved ones, torture, and execution as painful. Rather, they accept all of them [happily] for the sake of their goal.”75 He also refers occasionally to the martyrdom of Imam Husain, noting that what he achieved amounted to much more than “sacrifice.” While people usually sacrifice something that they love and value, Imam Husain “loved nothing but faith. Or, to put it in better words, he loved everything in faith—even life.”76 Simplification Bani-Sadr uses stories from the Holy Quran extensively to illustrate his views on the cult of personality. Many examples can be found in his book on the subject, Kaysh-e Shakhseyyat. Some of the protagonists in those stories are also used as symbols. Pharaoh, for example, symbolizes the “god of absolute power,”77 while Croesus stands for the “god of capital”78 and Pharoah’s minister Haman is the “sheepdog of power.”79 On the other side of the symbolic ledger, Moses represents “the leadership of the pioneering force of the oppressed.”80 In his other works, however, BaniSadr only occasionally refers to stories and symbols81—although, where he does so, he gives numerous examples so as to reinforce the message.82 Claim to Truth and Rationality In some of his works, such as Kaysh-e Shakhseyya, Bani-Sadr cites and quotes numerous passages of the Quran—amounting to several hundred verses in some cases. In other works, however, he rarely—if ever—refers to the Quran.83 His references to the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad and the Imams are rare as well.84 Occasionally he marshals

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the views and writings of Imam Khomeini to support his own arguments.85 Mostly, however, Bani-Sadr seems to believe that general references to “Islam” and “religion” are sufficient to establish his claim to the truth.86 He also frequently cites what he calls “objective evidence” and “examples” to establish his arguments. In his analysis of conditions in Iran under the Shah, Bani-Sadr often refers to statistics and other empirical evidence, although he rarely provides references for the sources of his information. Sometimes he seeks to support his views by citing examples or illustrations and using rational argument. Although his reasoning is generally sound, the examples he chooses are often redundant and simplistic.87 Bani-Sadr seems to consider his two books on “the cult of personality” and “the characteristics of contemporary Iran” (Bayanya-e Jamhuri Islami), and his speech on “The Relationship Between Materialism and Idealism,” as “academic” or empirically based—or at least as written “with the help of empirical methodology.”88 He does not emphasize, however, the role of empirical scholarship as a source of authority for his views. Neither does he emphasize an understanding of history or the views of Western thinkers in this regard.89 Occasionally Bani-Sadr falls short of establishing his claim to truth and comes up instead with an interpretation that is all his own. His interpretation of the terms Be’that, Imamat, Adalat, and Maad is a good example—his understanding of these concepts differs markedly from that of Muslims in general and of Shiite scholars in particular. He makes no attempt, however, to justify his own idiosyncratic interpretation.90 Bani-Sadr’s anarchist tendencies also run counter to the conventional wisdom among Muslims. The method he uses to rationalize his position—by taking the Quranic description of the Hereafter as a model of the ideal society91—would be unacceptable to many Muslims.

9 Islamic Revolutionary Ideology: An Overview

The contribution of the Iranian revolutionary leaders to the ideology of revolution certainly goes much beyond what is presented in this study, the analysis of which is limited to a few speeches, lectures and books chosen from their works. A comprehensive survey of their contributions to the Revolution and its ideology would include not only the full range of their writings and speeches, but their revolutionary activities in general.1 The modest aim of this study, however, has been to provide a framework for an analytical study of the ideology of revolution in the works of the Iranian revolutionary leaders as well as in the Holy Quran which proved an inspiration for so many of them. My intention in this chapter is to assess the contributions of the various leaders to the formulation of revolutionary ideology and to compare their ideologies to one another and to the Quran. The Leaders’ Contribution to the Ideology of Revolution Among the revolutionary leaders included in this study, Imam Khomeini seems to have formulated the most comprehensive revolutionary ideology. His teachings strongly relate to all nine components of the ideal type of revolutionary ideology presented here. He goes to great lengths to foster political consciousness—especially among the Ulama, who despised politics despite their powerful position in Iranian society. Khomeini presents a detailed criticism of socio-politico-economic conditions under the Shah and seeks to delegitimize the Shah’s regime as well as the system of monarchy. He emphasizes values neglected in his society but necessary for bringing about revolutionary change—justice and equity, liberation and freedom, Jihad and struggle, self-sacrifice, and courage. He also

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presents an outline of the good society that he desires to see in Iran. The program of action he outlines is very comprehensive. Khomeini presents powerful arguments to encourage commitment to action and uses a variety of approaches to impart the values of self-sacrifice and revolutionary patience. He uses stories and symbols to simplify his message and is very careful to support his arguments by presenting evidence from the Quran and other authoritative sources as well as by logical reasoning. Ayatollah Taleqani’s work is focused on stimulating political consciousness and presenting an outline of the good society. He also emphasizes the values that he sees as necessary for bringing about revolutionary change—freedom and liberty, equity and justice, Jihad and struggle, unity and brotherhood, and martyrdom. Taleqani’s critique of conditions under the Shah and his program of action, however, are very sketchy. He presents some arguments aimed at encouraging commitment to action and self-sacrifice. He also uses some stories and symbols to simplify his message. Like Imam Khomeini, Taleqani is very careful to establish his claim to truth by reference to authoritative sources and also by logical reasoning. Ayatollah Mutahhari does not present any criticism of the Shah’s regime and makes little effort to simplify his message. His focus is first and foremost on fostering political consciousness, although he presents his arguments in religio-philosophical language. Faith and knowledge are at the top of his list of values. They are followed by self-sacrifice, “the ascent towards perfection,” responsibility, good deeds, freedom, justice, and struggle—all relevant to revolutionary action and the building of the ideal society. Mutahhari’s outline of the good society and the program of action necessary to achieve it are very sketchy. His philosophy of history, which encourages commitment to action and self-confidence, is well thought-out and comprehensive, however. Moreover, he presents several lines of argument aimed at encouraging martyrdom and self-sacrifice. In general, Mutahhari presents his views within a comprehensive, coherent, and consistent theoretical framework based on premises derived from the Holy Quran. Eng. Bazargan also focuses on fostering political consciousness and encouraging commitment to action. Unlike Mutahhari, however, he presents his views in simple and direct language. His criticism of the Shah’s regime, his notion of the good society, and his program of action are all presented in very sketchy terms, and neither does he give much

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attention to self-sacrifice. God-consciousness, charity, service, love and kindness—none of them intimately related to revolutionary action or the ideal society—head up his list of values. However, Bazargan also notes the importance of justice, freedom, struggle, and social responsibility, even if he grants them little prominence. Since he speaks in simple terms and uses many concrete examples, he has no need to simplify his message further. Bazargan refers extensively to the Quran as a source of authority. His use of scientific principles and formulas—including some drawn from his own professional discipline of thermodynamics—to support his arguments is unique among the leaders discussed. The comprehensiveness of Dr Shariati’s ideology of revolution is comparable to Imam Khomeini’s. Every sentence spoken or written by Dr Shariati seems to be directed towards the birth of political consciousness. His program of action is detailed and in many ways complementary to that outlined by Imam Khomeini. He mostly emphasizes values directly related to revolutionary activities—social responsibility, martyrdom, Jihad and struggle, justice and equity, and the ascent towards perfection. He also takes great pains to encourage commitment to action, self-confidence, self-sacrifice, and revolutionary patience. His use of symbolism and satire is both masterful and unique. Despite being surrounded by SAVAK agents, Shariati still manages to criticize the Shah’s regime—although, understandably, indirectly and subtly. He is very successful in establishing his claim to truth by reference to authoritative sources and to his own qualifications and personal sincerity. The only component of the ideology of revolution not spelled out in detail by Shariati is an outline of his ideal society, although he touches on some relevant issues. Bani-Sadr focuses on some areas “overlooked” by Shariati, presenting a detailed account of his ideal society as well as a comprehensive policy framework for the interim Islamic Republic he envisages. His critique of social, political, and economic conditions under the Shah is also very detailed. Bani-Sadr also focuses on fostering political consciousness and encouraging commitment to action. His proposed program of action, however, is very sketchy, and he only occasionally alludes to self-sacrifice. The values and qualities emphasized by Bani-Sadr include freedom and liberty, unity and oneness, justice, independence, a critical outlook, equality, struggle, and the ascent towards perfection. Bani-Sadr often uses examples drawn from everyday life and occasionally makes extensive use of stories and symbols from the Quran to elucidate his points. To

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establish his claim to truth, he sometimes relies on the Quran but elsewhere seeks to support his arguments through objective evidence and concrete examples. In some cases, however, he fails to present convincing evidence or arguments in support of his views. In addition to their concern with these central elements, each leader has made some further, particular contribution to the development of revolutionary ideology in Iran. Through his pioneering efforts, for example, Eng. Bazargan demonstrated that speaking about religious subjects was not a monopoly of the religious scholars. Ayatollah Taleqani brought the Holy Quran “from the graveyard to the heart of society,” and showed that its interpretation was not reserved for the Imams. Both Ayatollah Taleqani and Ayatollah Mutahhari, who had each studied in Madrasa (traditional religious school) and later lectured to university students, built bridges between traditional religious scholarship and intellectuals with Western-style education. Bani-Sadr, who was the son of an Ayatollah and went to France for higher education, was able to present Islam in contemporary language to the Western-educated youth of Iran. More important in this regard, however, was Dr Shariati’s contribution. If not for him, it is doubtful whether Iranian youth would have been able to overcome the cultural domination of the West by the time the revolutionary upheaval occurred and give their all in a bloody struggle with the Shah’s army. In addition, Shariati’s ideas were influential in turning Iranian youth away from Marxism and other leftist ideologies. He also seems to have influenced younger religious students and scholars. Imam Khomeini’s contribution to the development of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and its ideology is much more significant than that of any other Iranian leader or activist. He made his first political statement in the early 1940s in Kashf al-Asrar (Exposing the Secrets). According to Hamid Algar, “The book is essentially [a] detailed, systematic critique of an anti-religious tract, but it also contains numerous passages that are overtly political and critical of the Pahlavi rule.”2 Khomeini went “quiet,” however, for about 20 years until he emerged as the most formidable opponent of the Shah in the early 1960s. But was he really politically inactive during all those years? While discussing the revolutionary ideology in his work, I quoted him as saying, “Great men, with broad horizons of thought … continue making plans for the advancement of their cause.”3 Although it is uncertain whether Khomeini numbered himself among the “great men” he mentions, his role in the revolutionary process and the establishment of the Islamic Republic clearly demonstrates his planning


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skills. It seems that during his 20 years of apparent quiescence, he limited the scope of his political activities to identifying and training potential revolutionary leaders from among his students.4 In a list of 190 students of his who became prominent scholars, the following played important roles in the Islamic Revolution: Ayatollah Muntazeri, Ayatollah Khamenaie, Ayatollah Mutahhari, Ayatollah Behishti, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ali Meshkini, Mehdavi Kani, Sadiq Khalkhali, Muhammad Mufateh, Raza Saidy (martyred by the Shah in the late 1960s), and Imam Musa Sadr (the founder of the Islamic movement in Lebanon).5 The early 1960s, when Imam Khomeini launched his movement against the Shah, presented him with the moment he had been waiting for. Firstly, he had already trained a large number of students whom he could rely on to follow his instructions. Secondly, the Shah’s “White Revolution” agitated the religious community, which was for the most part apolitical, and made it receptive to Imam Khomeini’s teachings. Thirdly, the death of Ayatollah Borujerdi, who had been the sole “source of imitation” for the Shiites, provided Khomeini with the opportunity to speak out freely and become a prominent leader. Revolutionary Ideology in the Quran and the Works of the Iranian Leaders—a Brief Comparison As we have seen, many influences can be found in the works of the Iranian revolutionary leaders—from Plato and medieval Muslim philosophers to classical liberalism, Marxism, existentialism, “Third Worldism,” and Latin American dependency theory. Nonetheless, most of their ideas seem to be firmly anchored in the teachings of Islam. What the Iranian leaders seem to be doing is (1) to use contemporary terminology to express ideas taken from the Quran and the traditions of the Prophets and Imams; and (2) to give prominence to certain Islamic teachings in the light of their experience in the contemporary Iranian society—the significance of which may have been reinforced for them thanks to their familiarity with “modern” ideas. While they sometimes go beyond what is apparent in the Quran or the traditions, they remain within the general bounds of religion. Occasionally they seek to give new meanings to traditional Islamic teaching, but such cases are rare. Dr Shariati is by far the most innovative in this respect. His distinction between the terms Bashar and Insan and its application to the story of Adam; his interpretation of the concepts of Ummat, Shahadat and Ebadat; and his understanding of the story of Cain and Abel are all original and

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idiosyncratic. He successfully seeks to authenticate his innovations as genuine teachings of Islam by referring to etymology, traditional stories and verses of the Quran. Conversely, Bani-Sadr’s innovations—noted below—seem less authentic. Political consciousness Most of the Iranian revolutionary leaders go beyond the immediate political issues of the day in their efforts to foster political consciousness. They focus on broad questions relating to mankind in general, its nature and aspirations, and its duties and responsibilities. Their various arguments—which are actually not very different from Yusuf Ali’s understanding of the Quran6—can be summarized as follows. God created mankind from clay and breathed His spirit into him. Mankind is God’s Khalifa (vicegerent, representative) and has been granted responsibility and freedom of choice. Mankind is neither good nor evil by nature, and thus has the potential for both good and evil actions. It possesses instincts and selfish desires as well as the higher intellectual, moral and spiritual attributes which are mankind’s defining characteristics. Mankind’s ultimate goal is God, i.e., Perfection, and thus it is endowed not only with great potentialities but also with an infinite capability to achieve them. By actualizing its higher potentialities, mankind will acquire divine characteristics and ascend towards the perfection that is its birthright. The alternative is a descent into degradation and spiritual stagnation. Thus, mankind is the maker of itself and its destiny. It can, and should, put its selfish desires and animal instincts—attributes necessary for survival in this world—under the direction of its intellect and willpower. Otherwise, not only will it fail to achieve its full humanity, but its lower propensities will be exploited by oppressive forces to bring it under their subjugation. Religious faith—which always has sociopolitical implications—is the primary condition for achieving perfection and acquiring divine characteristics. While mankind and its journey towards perfection are discussed in detail by Khomeini in his work on Irfan (Gnosticism),7 in the lectures on Islamic Government he focuses on the obligations of his immediate audience—the Ulama. The duty to defend Islam and promote its authentic teachings; the duty to enjoin right and forbid wrong (which involves the struggle against oppression, exploitation, and injustice); and the duty to establish the ideal Islamic society are responsibilities common to Muslims in general, and to the Ulama in particular. Other revolutionary leaders also


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emphasize the duties commended by Khomeini. Shariati and Bani-Sadr go beyond those and what is apparent in the Quran when they assign some further obligations to mankind: the responsibility to cast off the shackles of nature, history, society, and self; and to struggle against censorship.8 The revolutionary leaders also emphasize that mankind is a social and political creature and that Islam is a social and political religion. Khomeini, Taleqani, and Bazargan discuss the political significance of Islamic acts of worship and religious gatherings. They argue against the separation of religion and politics as well—although they disagree on the extent to which religious scholars should be involved in politics. While Mutahhari’s notion of “human consciousness” is innovative, it is not out of line with the general teachings of Islam. And whereas Shariati’s definitions of Ummat (Islamic community) and Shahadat (martyrdom) differ somewhat from conventional understandings, his arguments, based on the root meanings of the terms, and his supporting references to the Quran are persuasive. Bani-Sadr, on the other hand, introduces novel meanings to some important concepts of Islam, and the basic tenets of Shiism, without making much effort to justify his position. Shariati’s heavy emphasis on social responsibility—to the extent of claiming that Islam without it is not Islam at all—may also raise objections among many Muslims—though it seems to be supported by the revolutionary ideology of the Quran and the views of Imam Khomeini.9 Criticism of the existing social arrangements Imam Khomeini presents the most comprehensive critique of conditions under the Shah. While some of the other leaders focus or touch upon some of the areas covered by him, some—like Mutahhari—refrain from criticism altogether. Khomeini’s criticism includes the following areas: (1) imperialism, foreign domination and relations with the Zionist state; (2) the unjust economic order and domestic and foreign exploitation; (3) misery, hunger and deprivation of the masses; (4) oppression and tyranny; (5) the ruling clique’s luxury, wastefulness, incompetence, and burgeoning bureaucracy; (6) the prevalence of corruption, immorality, and materialism; and (7) the illegitimacy of the government with its un-Islamic policies and laws. All these are characteristics of the “evil social systems” condemned by the Holy Quran. While the Quran naturally does not use the term “imperialism,” it condemns its defining characteristics— arrogance, oppression, and exploitation—as well as commanding Muslims

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to establish an independent community (2:143, 9:16), and resist aggression and wrongdoing (22:39, 42:39). Among the characteristics of “evil social systems,” the Quran also lists traditionalism and conservatism. This is an area on which Shariati focuses, labeling the traditional, conservative Shiism, which he calls “Safavid,” a deviation from the original Alavid Shiism. He also criticizes the conservative Ulama. Taleqani too finds the “Islam” preached and practiced in his time “located amidst superstitions, fantasies and distortions.” Even Khomeini—for whom the Ulama should play the leadership role in the revolutionary process and in any Islamic Government—not only criticizes those conservative “Akhunds” who are concerned only with trivial matters, but holds that “the neglect that has overtaken the religious teaching institutions has made it possible for [foreign schemers] to succeed.”10 New set of values All the revolutionary leaders studied emphasize the values of justice and equity, freedom and liberation, and Jihad and struggle. “The ascent towards perfection” is a leading value for almost all the leaders as well, in both its personal and social aspects. Other values emphasized by the majority include self-sacrifice, faith, unity, love and devotion, and activism. With the exception of the ascent towards perfection, all these values are also affirmed by the Quran. Yusuf Ali, however, accords with the Iranian leaders on the importance of perfection.11 It is not included in the list of values commended in the Quran used here, due to its omission from the index in Yusuf Ali’s commentary—on the basis of which the list used in this study was prepared. Outline of the good society This is the only component of revolutionary ideology where we find great divergence of views among the Iranian leaders. However, there are some aspects of an ideal future society on which they all agree. These include: 1

The goal of the government—or the purpose of society—is to nurture refined human beings; and to provide the conditions for all to develop their individual talents and potentials, and to move towards perfection.

2

Society will function on the basis of Islamic principles.


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3

The ideal society is a moral and just society.

4

Social relations among the members of society will be based on the principles of co-operation and Islamic brotherhood.

5

An Islamic society will conduct its affairs on the basis of mutual consultation.

6

An Islamic society will be politically, economically, culturally, and ideologically independent.

In addition to these agreed characteristics—all of which accord with the view presented by the Quran—other aspects of the ideal society are emphasized by several of the leaders: (1) Madina under the leadership of the Prophet provides a model for the desired Islamic society (Khomeini, Taleqani, Mutahhari, Shariati); (2) an Islamic society will be marked by genuine freedom of thought and expression (Taleqani, Mutahhari, Bazargan, Bani-Sadr); (3) sovereignty belongs to God (Khomeini, Taleqani, and Mutahhari); (4) in an Islamic society poverty will be eradicated; security and peace will prevail; and the government will be at the service of the people—in Khomeini’s words, it will “serve mankind in general” (Khomeini, Taleqani, Bazargan); (5) absolute ownership belongs to God alone; individual ownership of property is relative and limited (Taleqani, Shariati, Bani-Sadr); (6) in the ideal society, everyone will have the opportunity to undertake useful activities, and will own the fruits of their labor (Taleqani, Bani-Sadr); (7) knowledge and justice are the two main qualifications for leadership (Khomeini and Taleqani—each emphasize additional qualifications as well). Most of these principles are also affirmed by the Quran, and those not explicitly mentioned there are based on Islamic teachings.12 Other features, however, are not so easy to harmonize. Imam Khomeini’s advocacy of “Governance by the Jurists” (Valayat-e Faqih) and Bani-Sadr’s anarchical notion of the “Society of Tawhid” offer two opposing pictures of the ideal society that are impossible to reconcile. Both are religious innovations as well. While Bani-sadr’s attempts at finding religious justification for his concept are flimsy—and he fails to find much sympathy or support among the other leaders or the people in general—Khomeini goes to great lengths to gain backing for his idea. Although he faced strong resistance from some religious leaders—for

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example, Ayatollah Shariatmadari—he was able to institutionalize his radical notion in Iran by enshrining it in the Constitution. The other revolutionary leaders took a variety of positions on the question of governance by the jurists. Mutahhari is the only one who agrees that the top leadership belongs to qualified Fuqaha (Islamic jurists), although he assigns them the role of ideologues. Shariati is silent on this point;13 but in light of his general views, it is very unlikely that he would support it. The views of Taleqani and Bani-Sadr are somewhat ambiguous, but tend not to support Khomeini’s position. Although Taleqani notes that knowledge is a necessary qualification of the leader, he does not underscore it. He also states that Islamic government is not government by “Akhunds”—by which he may mean religious scholars in general or unqualified clergy. In Bani-Sadr’s ideal society each individual is an Imam (leader); thus, there is certainly no place for a jurist as leader. In his interim “Islamic Republic”, while religion should play a leading role, it should not become an official arm of government or the means of gaining power. It is not clear whether the “leading role” assigned to religion includes leadership by religious scholars. Eng. Bazargan, however, is unequivocally against “governance by the jurists” and clearly states that religious scholars should not interfere in the activities of government. Bazargan is also the only leader who speaks favorably about democracy—although he does not introduce it as an ideal system. Program of action The Shah, the ruling clique, imperialism and foreign domination constitute the main targets of change for most of the Iranian revolutionary leaders. For Imam Khomeini the targets include the illegitimate system of monarchy and apolitical religious scholars as well; and for Dr Shariati the religion of Shirk (polytheism, contradictions) becomes a principal target. For Bani-Sadr, however, the “cult of personality” constitutes the main target. Although the language used is different, all these targets correspond to evils identified by the Holy Quran. The only contentious issue is likely to be Khomeini’s staunch opposition to the monarchy, which has been tolerated by the majority of Muslims for centuries. Interestingly enough, Khomeini does not base his views on religion but argues, rather, “A monarchical regime is … contrary to all rational laws and precepts as well as human rights.”14


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All the revolutionary leaders agree on the importance of youth and Annas as agents of change. While others understand An-nas to mean “people in general,” Bani-Sadr defines the term as referring to the oppressed masses. For him, the leadership of a revolution also primarily belongs to the oppressed. According to Imam Khomeini, however, leadership should be provided by religious scholars. Dr Shariati assigns the greatest responsibility for revolutionary change to those he labels “intelligentsia” (Roshan-fikr). However, he disqualifies Western-educated intellectuals from the leadership role and emphasizes that leaders should emerge from among the ordinary people. He also believes that the middle class can play the most active role in initiating a revolution. The emphasis given to Annas as agents of change clearly derives from the Quran. In translating the term as “the people,”15 Quranic commentator Yusuf Ali seems to be in tacit agreement with the majority of the leaders of the Iranian revolution. While a leadership role for religious scholars also finds some theological support, Shariati’s emphasis on the role of intelligentsia and the middle class naturally goes beyond the teachings of the Quran, as does BaniSadr’s concept of the leadership of the oppressed. In regard to the forms of action envisaged, all the revolutionary leaders consider self-development as the starting point and agree that armed struggle can be used only as a last resort (Bazargan alone makes no reference to armed struggle). They also emphasize the importance of propagation and the fostering of political consciousness as well as unity and cooperation. Khomeini also notes the significance of nonviolent action, collective protest, organization, and long-term planning. Taleqani considers Mazlumyat (victimization by a brutal aggressor) as a form of revolutionary action, and Bani-Sadr advises that revolutionaries become “negative opponents”—activists who have changed their perceptions and reject action based on power relations. Shariati’s recommended forms of action are much more detailed than the others’. The “self-construction” he advocates includes not only worship but work and social struggle as well. He also emphasizes the importance of ideology and the political party, and recommends that change should be based on the existing cultural foundations of a society and that the revolutionaries should avoid alienating the people by retaining the forms of social customs and cultural traditions while transforming their content and meaning. Most of these forms of action are similar to ones commended in the Quran. Religious justification can also be found for Shariai’s emphasis on the role of ideology and the party and Taleqani’s emphasis on Mazlumyat.

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Only Bani-Sadr’s notion of the “negative opponent” is a purely innovative one. Commitment to action and self-confidence The Iranian revolutionary leaders use various methods to inculcate a sense of commitment to action and self-confidence among the people. Imam Khomeini exhorts his audience to remember their religious duties, the examples of the prophets and other outstanding individuals, their own qualifications and capabilities, and historical examples of the negative consequences of apathy. Other revolutionary leaders also employ exhortatory language, although to a lesser extent, and all use themes drawn from the Holy Quran. Except for Khomeini (at least in his works covered in this study), they seek to encourage commitment to action by placing mankind at the center of the process of social change and by arguing that mankind is the maker of itself and its destiny. Mutahhari, Shariati and Bani-Sadr present philosophies of history according to which ultimate victory belongs to those who struggle for the cause of truth, justice and human liberty. Bazargan applies a formula from the field of thermodynamics to human social life to show how Islam revives and rejuvenates its followers. While the use of such a formula is certainly innovative, Bazargan’s message, like the philosophies of history espoused by the other leaders, is in accord with the teachings of the Quran. Self-sacrifice and revolutionary patience All the Iranian revolutionary leaders emphasize the concept of martyrdom in general, and that of Imam Husain in particular, in order to instill the value of self-sacrifice in their audience. They note that the true way of commemorating Husain’s martyrdom and of being his “Shiite” (follower) is to follow his example of self-offering. Mutahhari and Shariati devote much more space to the theme of martyrdom than their contemporaries, while Khomeini refers to the lives of the prophets and other Imams as well in order to encourage self-sacrifice and revolutionary patience. Khomeini also stresses that success depends on steadfastness, and that God richly rewards self-sacrifice and perseverance endured for His sake. While these various views coincide with those expressed in the Quran, the revolutionary leaders by no means exhaust the wealth of thought and exhortation contained in the Quran both on this subject and on commitment to action and self-confidence.


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Simplification All the revolutionary leaders use stories from the Quran and the lives of the Imams and other outstanding individuals in order to illustrate their points. They also refer to the prophets, Imams, and great leaders—as well as their opponents—as models and symbols. Some use these rhetorical techniques much more than others. Mutahhari, for example, only occasionally uses stories and symbols. Shariati, on the other hand, relies heavily on symbolism and makes very effective use of narrative. His literary style, use of satire, and terseness of language form a unique combination. Claim to truth The Holy Quran provides the fundamental and most important source of authority for all the Iranian leaders. Most of them support their arguments by reference to the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, the Imams, and sometimes their companions—although Mutahhari and Bani-sadr refer only rarely to these sources. Some leaders, Bazargan and Shariati for example, also make an effort to show how these religious sources conform with human rationality, socio-historical evolution, and contemporary social reality. While all the leaders use logical reasoning to support their points of view, it plays a more significant role, however, in the works of the three Ulama, Ayatollahs Khomeini, Taleqani, and Mutahhari. Most also refer to history, but mainly in general terms. Mutahhari, Taleqani, and especially Shariati draw on the works of other scholars and thinkers—including non-Muslims—in support of their views. These three leaders also criticize rival ideologies, especially Marxism. Academic enquiry and scientific investigation are important for the three non-Ulama leaders, Bazargan, Shariati, and Bani-Sadr. Bazargan, however, is unique in using scientific principles and formulas to support his views on religion and social issues. Bani-Sadr frequently presents “objective evidence” to establish his arguments. Shariati is the only one to emphasize his life experience, educational qualifications and the sincerity of his beliefs in support of his claim to the truth. While such personal qualities seem to have played an important role in establishing the position of other leaders as well—especially that of Khomeini16—they do not mention them themselves.

10 The Ideology of the Islamic Revolution, Terrorism and “The Clash of Civilizations”

The Islamic Revolution in Iran was followed by a series of developments which has kept Islamic militancy at the centre of international attention. The start of the Islamic resistance against communist rule and Soviet domination in Afghanistan coincided with the revolutionary upheavals in Iran. It picked up momentum in the 1980s and led to Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the establishment of an Islamic state in Afghanistan in 1992. The assassination of Anwar Sadat, the Egyptian President, in October 1981 focused world attention on the emergence of extremist Islamic groups in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East. The early 1980s also witnessed the emergence of Hezbollah in Lebanon and its successful resistance against the American, French and Israeli presence there. The 1980s ended with the Palestinian intifada at its peak, and the rising influence of Hamas in Palestine. The 1990s began with the first Gulf War, followed by the growing activity of al Qaeda and the rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan. That decade also witnessed Islamic insurgencies in Kashmir, Chechnya, the Balkans and Algeria. These developments—together with the “revitalization of religion throughout much of the world” and the end of the Cold War—led the eminent American political scientist Samuel Huntington to formulate his (in)famous theory of “the Clash of Civilizations.”1 The notion of the clash of civilizations, which was first presented in an article in the journal Foreign Affairs in 1993, has been rigorously criticized both at the conceptual level and on an empirical basis.2 Nonetheless, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and President George W. Bush’s

IDEOLOGY, TERRORISM AND “THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” 189 subsequent “war on terrorism” turned the theory into “conventional wisdom”—at least in the United States.3 However, the invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies in March 2003 should have discredited the theory. The widespread opposition to the war—not only by “Western” governments such as France and Germany, but more importantly by millions of demonstrators all over Europe and the US—contradicted a fundamental principle of Huntington’s theory: “In civilizational conflicts, unlike ideological ones, kin stand by their kin.”4 The fact that the “clash of civilizations” paradigm still reigns supreme, however, is clear from some of the “recipients” of New York Times columnist David Brooks’ “Hookie Awards” for 2004.5 In language reminiscent of Huntington’s own, Robert S. Snyder has termed Osama Bin Laden, the perpetrator of the September 11 terrorist attacks, “a civilizational revolutionary,”6 and the current insurgency against the US occupation of Iraq certainly includes Islamic militants. Are these militants fighting a “civilizational” war against the “West”? Are they inspired by the ideology of revolution in the Quran discussed in chapter two? Does their use of terrorism as a tactic conform to the understanding of the teachings of their religion held by the majority of Muslims? This chapter seeks to answer these questions. A Clash with the “West” or with Arrogance, Oppression and Injustice? A basic challenge to the notion of the clash of civilizations has been the argument that neither the West nor Islam is a monolithic entity.7 Besides elaborate academic diatribes, simple facts such as widespread opposition in the West to the US-led war in Iraq and European Muslims’ attempts to integrate into European society8 clearly support this contention. Nonetheless, in this section I will argue that there is some truth in Huntington’s thesis if we take revolutionary Islam as a manifestation of religion in the contemporary world and identify what he means by “the West.” A careful study of Huntington’s book demonstrates that he uses the term “the West” in two senses, one general and the other particular. When he refers to the West’s capacity to win wars “by its superiority in applying organized violence” or defines the “distinguishing characteristics of Western society,” for example, the West “includes Europe, North America, plus other European settler countries such as Australia and New Zealand.”9 This is also evident from his map titled “The World

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Civilizations: Post-1990.”10 In most other cases, however, the term “the West” is coterminous with the United States of America—or the US government and the American ruling elite to be more specific. While the distinction is generally clear from the context, occasionally Huntington himself clarifies the point by putting an especial emphasis on the US while talking about “the West.” A few quotations will suffice to demonstrate this: “The central problem in the relations between the West and the rest is, consequently, the discordance between the West’s—particularly America’s—efforts to promote a universal Western culture and its declining ability to do so.” “[The phrase ‘World Community’] has become the euphemistic collective noun … to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers.” “The principle conflictual issues between Latin America and the West, which in practice means the United States, are immigration, drugs, …” “Before the [1990 Gulf] war, Iran, Iraq, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the United States jostled for influence over the Gulf. After the war [which ‘eventually came to be viewed by many nonWesterners as a war of East versus West’] the Persian Gulf was an American lake.” “A world in which cultural identities—ethnic, national, religious, civilizational—are central, and cultural affinities and differences shape the alliances, antagonisms, and policies of state has [some] broad implications for the West generally and for the United States in particular.”11 As is apparent from these quotations, Huntington is mainly concerned with American domination in the world and the implications of challenges to its hegemony by other groups. He seems to believe that the United States alone does not have the capability to face those challenges successfully.12 Thus he attempts to align the fate of other “Western” countries with that of the USA to ensure their cooperation in confronting

IDEOLOGY, TERRORISM AND “THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” 191 the challenges to American power. This political bias leads Huntington to adopt contradictory positions on the nature of the clash in international relations. On the one hand, he is well-aware that “[h]aving achieved political independence, non-Western societies wish to free themselves from Western economic, military, and cultural domination.”13 Moreover, the “intercivilizational issues” that Huntington names as causing conflicts between the West and Islam include political issues “such as weapons proliferation, human rights and democracy, control of oil, migration, Islamic terrorism, and Western intervention.”14 Nonetheless, he has the audacity to propose that “[t]he underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power. The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the U.S. Department of Defense. It is the West, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture …”15 Many Muslims may be “convinced of the superiority of their culture,” but do they really see “the West” as a problem or “the CIA or the US Department of Defense”? Even if they are against “the West,” do they oppose it as an entity or rather its arrogance and domination in their lands? There is a fundamental difference between the two. We would be able to speak unequivocally of “the clash of civilizations” if Muslims were intent on destroying “the West.” But can we use the same terms if they simply want to liberate themselves from foreign domination? Huntington’s confusion of the two issues can be seen in his discussion of Afghanistan’s war of liberation when he states: “The Afghan War became a civilizational war because Muslims everywhere saw it as such and rallied against the Soviet Union.”16 This is news to those who participated in that struggle—including the author of this book. It is true that Afghans rallied against the Soviet invasion—and thousands of Muslims joined them from other parts of the Muslim world—because they saw it as their religious duty to oppose foreign aggression. However, they considered their struggle a war of liberation and never blamed “Orthodox Russian civilization” as the culprit or viewed it as a target. As suggested above, Huntington is justified in seeing a clash between revolutionary Islam and American arrogance, domination and exploitation—although “the clash of civilizations” is a misnomer for this conflict. He perceives the Islamic Revolution in Iran as the beginning of the contemporary “civilizational” clash between Islam and “the West”: “Given the prevailing perceptions Muslims and Westerners have of each

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other plus the rise of Islamic extremism, it is hardly surprising that following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, an intercivilizational quasi war developed between Islam and the West.” Two paragraphs later, he makes it clear that by “the West” he means the US government: “During the fifteen years between 1980 and 1995, according to the U.S. Defense Department, the United States engaged in 17 military operations in the Middle East, all of them directed against Muslims. No comparable pattern of U.S. military operations occurred against the people of any other civilization.”17 He argues that “It is a quasi war for three reasons. First, all of Islam has not been fighting all of the West. … Second, … it has been fought with limited means. … Third, … it has not been continuous.” Nonetheless, he alleges, “Both sides have … recognized this conflict to be a war. Early on, Khomeini declared, quite accurately, that ‘Iran is effectively at war with America.’”18 As for “the underlying problem” giving rise to the “quasi war,” Huntington emphasizes cultural differences.19 What is “Islamic extremism” about? Does it advocate a cultural war or does it have other concerns? Our study of revolutionary ideology in the works of the Iranian leaders demonstrates that although they were concerned with the damaging cultural influence of “the West” on Iranian society—the prevalence of corruption, immorality, and materialism—it was only one issue among many. They were equally concerned with foreign political domination; an unjust economic order and economic exploitation; misery, hunger and poverty among the masses; oppression and tyranny; the luxury, wastefulness, incompetence, and burgeoning bureaucracy of the ruling clique; and the illegitimacy of the government with its un-Islamic policies and laws. Moreover, the values they advocated—justice and equity, liberation and freedom, unity and fraternity, charity, love and kindness, courage, and social responsibility— will all find resonance among “Westerners”—with some possible exceptions such as struggle (Jihad), self-sacrifice and “the ascent towards perfection”. The stated aims of Al Qaeda and the Iraqi insurgency do not seem to include destruction of the “West”, either. No doubt to Huntington’s delight, both groups speak in a “civilizational” language—but they make it clear that their goals are political and that their fight is with the USA and its allies. In his 1996 message to Muslims entitled “Declaration of War Against Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” Bin Laden states: “It should not be hidden from you that the people of Islam

IDEOLOGY, TERRORISM AND “THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” 193 [have] suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist-Crusaders alliance and their collaborators; to the extent that the Muslim blood became the cheapest and their wealth as loot in the hands of the enemies.”20 The title of the message clearly indicates that the target is not the “West” in general, but the US government. This is also made clear in the text: “Clearly after Belief (Imaan) there is no more important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the holy land.”21 Contrary to the claims of some commentators that al Qaeda aims at “terrorizing ‘infidels’ or ‘unbelievers’ because they do not share in an unlikely assortment of inherently unverifiable beliefs,”22 one searches Bin Laden’s statements, declarations, messages, and interviews in vain for evidence of his animosity to the West as such.23 On the contrary, in an interview with CNN correspondent Peter Arnett, Bin Laden was asked: “If the Islamic movement takes over Saudi Arabia, what would your attitude to the West be and will the price of oil be higher”? He responded: We are a nation and have a long history. … We are now in the 15th century of this great religion, the complete and comprehensive methodology, has clarified the dealing between an individual and another, the duties of the believer towards God, … and the relationship between the Muslim country and other countries in time of peace and in time of war. If we look back at our history, we will find there were many types of dealings between the Muslim nation and the other nations in time of peace and in time of war, including treaties and matters to do with commerce. So it is not a new thing that we need to come up with. ... As for oil, it is a commodity that will be subject to the price of the market according to supply and demand. We believe the current prices are not realistic due to the Saudi regime playing the role of a US agent and the pressure exercised by the US on the Saudi regime to increase production and flooding the market that caused a sharp decrease in oil prices.24 There is very little information available on the ideas and views of the current Islamic insurgency in Iraq. However, if al Qaeda with its worldwide reach does not consider the “West” as a target, it is unlikely that those fighting an occupation force in their own homeland would have such an aim. Thus, we can conclude that there is no real “clash of civilizations” between Islam—even in its revolutionary form—and the West. Nonetheless, Huntington is right in his assertion that “[t]he

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dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness”25—if by “Western arrogance” he means the arrogance of the American ruling elite and by “Islamic intolerance” Islam’s intolerance of arrogance, foreign domination and injustice. (“Sinic assertiveness” lies beyond the scope of this study.) Al Qaeda, Islamic Militancy and Islamic Revolutionary Ideology The concept of “revolutionary terrorism” predates Bin Laden’s al Qaeda by many decades.26 Bin Laden can be considered a “revolutionary” because of his political aims, and he is a “terrorist” because of the methods he uses to achieve his goals. I will discuss the issue of his terrorism in more detail in the next section. Here I seek to find out to what extent he is influenced by the ideology of revolution set out in the Holy Quran. In what follows, I focus on some of the same issues examined in the preceding chapters: political consciousness, criticism of the existing situation, a program of action, commitment to action and selfconfidence, and self-sacrifice and revolutionary patience. By implication, the discussion in this section and the next also apply, more or less, to instances of Islamic militancy in Iraq, Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya and elsewhere around the world. Political consciousness Why does Bin Laden—and other Islamic militants—want to bring about radical changes in the world? What motivates him? A survey of his statements and interviews clearly demonstrates that Bin Laden is highly motivated by the teachings of the Quran to take action. In his “Declaration of War Against Americans” cited above, after the customary Islamic supplications which begin the document, Bin Laden quotes three verses of the Quran all exhorting Muslims to “be careful of your duty to your Lord.” They are followed by another verse which states, in part, “I desire nothing but reform so far as I am able,” and the first paragraph ends with the famous Quranic verse: “You are the best of the nations raised up for the benefit of mankind; you enjoin what is right and forbid the wrong and believe in Allah.”27 Moreover, in the statement “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” Bin Laden and his associates quote several verses of the Quran including the following: “fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God;” “And why should ye not fight in the cause of God and of those who,

IDEOLOGY, TERRORISM AND “THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” 195 being weak, are ill-treated (and oppressed)?—women and children, whose cry is: ‘Our Lord, rescue us from this town, whose people are oppressors, and raise for us from thee one who will help!’”28 In an interview with an ABC reporter in May 1998, Bin Laden was asked: “You come from a background of wealth and comfort to end up fighting on the front lines. Many Americans find that unusual.” He replied: This is difficult to understand, especially for him who does not understand the religion of Islam. In our religion, we believe that Allah has created us for the purpose of worshiping him. He is the one who has created us and who has favored us with this religion. Allah has ordered us to make holy wars and to fight to see to it that His word is the highest and the uppermost and that of the unbelievers the lowermost. We believe that this is the call we have to answer regardless of our financial capabilities. … When the holy war called, thousands of young men from the Arab Peninsula and other countries answered the call and they came from wealthy backgrounds. Hundreds of them were killed in Afghanistan and in Bosnia and in Chechnya.29 Thus, Bin Laden is clearly influenced by the teachings of the Quran to take action against the oppression of other Muslims, wherever they are; he considers it an Islamic duty and part of fulfilling his purpose in life— worshiping God. His understanding of the Quran, however, seems to be much narrower than the commentator Yusuf Ali’s, whose interpretation of the Quran was used in the analysis presented in chapter 2. For Yusuf Ali, worshiping or serving God means that “God is the source and the center of all power and all goodness, and our progress depends upon our putting ourselves into accord with His Will. This is His service.”30 For Bin Laden, however, worshiping God entails first and foremost waging Jihad or “holy war.” This may reflect his Wahhabi background or simply the circumstances in which he finds himself.31 Equally important to Bin Laden is the sense of community fostered by the Quran. It indeed seems very strange for a millionaire Arab youth to give up a luxurious lifestyle and choose to live a life of austerity and dangerous exile in remote caves. The example of political revolutionaries like Che Guevara shows that religion may not be the only motivating force for such an action, but certainly religion—and especially Islam—has been one of the strongest source of social solidarity throughout human

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history.32 It is richly ironic to find so much bickering and division among Muslims at the local level and such strong fraternal bonds and sentiments of solidarity at the global level. Many Muslims credit the latter to the quality of their religion and blame the former on their own failings.33 Criticism of the existing situation In his message to the American people in October 2004, when for the first time he admitted responsibility for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Bin Laden stated: I say to you, Allah knows that it had never occurred to us to strike the towers. But after it became unbearable and we witnessed the oppression and tyranny of the American/Israeli coalition against our people in Palestine and Lebanon, it came to my mind. The events that affected my soul in a direct way started in 1982 when America permitted the Israelis to invade Lebanon and the American Sixth Fleet helped them in that. This bombardment began and many were killed and injured and others were terrorized and displaced. I could not forget those moving scenes, blood and severed limbs, women and children sprawled everywhere. Houses destroyed along with their occupants and high rises demolished over their residents, rockets raining down on our home without mercy. In those difficult moments many hard-to-describe ideas bubbled in my soul, but in the end they produced an intense feeling of rejection of tyranny, and gave birth to a strong resolve to punish the oppressors. 34 Before this statement, Bin Laden’s anti-American sentiments were usually traced back to the first Gulf War in 1990 when the Saudi government rejected his offer to organize a military force, to consist of veterans of the Afghan Jihad, to oppose Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, and instead invited the US and its allies to send forces to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait—forces which would be based in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.35 These two themes—the suffering of the Palestinians through Israeli atrocities and the presence of foreign troops in

IDEOLOGY, TERRORISM AND “THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” 197 Arabia—dominate all Bin Laden’s various pronouncements and interviews. He also emphasizes the suffering of the Iraqi people— especially children—as a result of US attacks and the UN embargo on that country.36 US arrogance is criticized as well: “After the collapse of the Soviet Union … the U.S. [became] more haughty and arrogant and it has started to look at itself as a Master of this world and established what it calls the new order. It wants to delude people that it can do whatever it wants, but it can’t do this.”37 Exploitation is another important theme: “The Arabian Peninsula has never—since God made it flat, created its desert, and encircled it with seas—been stormed by any forces like the crusader armies spreading in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping out its plantations.”38 Bin Laden is certainly concerned with the situation in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries and provides a long list of “the oppressive and illegitimate behavior and measures of the ruling regime[s]”—in particular the wrong-doing and “injustice that [has] affected every section and group of the people.”39 Nonetheless, in a response to the question to give his main criticism of the Saudi royal family, he focuses on foreign domination: “By being loyal to the US regime, the Saudi regime has committed an act against Islam. And this, based on the ruling of Shari’a (Islamic jurisprudence), casts the regime outside the religious community.”40 It is true that accepting foreign domination goes against the teachings of Islam, but to consider a government that establishes close relations with a foreign power as “cast outside the religious community” will be a contentious judgment among Muslims. Program of action As we have seen, the main targets of change for Bin Laden include the presence and domination of the US and its allies in Muslim lands; Zionism and its atrocities against the Palestinians; and then, at the second stage, the corrupt and illegitimate Arab regimes. As for agents of change, while Bin Laden usually addresses his messages to Muslims as a whole, occasionally he focuses on specific groups such as youth, the Saudi military forces and women.41 More important are the forms of action that Bin Laden advocates for changing the situation. His use of terrorism as a form of action is well-known. Less well-known is the fact that he considers armed struggle as a last resort. In the “Declaration of War Against Americans,” Bin Laden notes that after American troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia,

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[various individuals and groups] advised the government both privately and openly; … they explored every avenue and enlist[ed] every influential man in their movement of reform and correction. They wrote with style of passion, diplomacy and wisdom asking for corrective measures and repentance from the “great wrong doings and corruption” that had engulfed even the basic principles of the religion and the legitimate rights of the people. But to our deepest regret the regime refused to listen to the people accusing them of being ridiculous and imbecile. The matter got worse. … [Despite further efforts by groups of religious scholars and the preparation of a detailed report entitled “Memorandum of Advice,”] the regime closed all peaceful routes and pushed the people toward armed action which is the only choice left for them to implement righteousness and justice.42 It is interesting to note that in the same statement, Bin Laden calls for a boycott of American products and considers it “a very effective weapon of hitting and weakening the enemy. … The security and the intelligence services of the entire world cannot force a single citizen to buy the goods of his/her enemy.”43 Thus, armed struggle is not the only form of action for Bin Laden. This is the subject of the next section where a distinction will be made between terrorist acts and what can be considered guerrilla warfare—the first contradicting the teachings of Islam, while the second is a legitimate form of action for the Quran. Self-confidence, self-sacrifice and perseverance To any “reasonable” person, it is obvious that Bin Laden and his associates—and to a lesser degree the Islamic militants in Iraq, Palestine, Chechnya and elsewhere—are fighting against all odds. “A reasonable chance of success” forms an important component of the Christian doctrine of the Just War. Therefore, even if the militants were able to fulfill the other requirements of “jus ad bellum” and “jus in bello,” their actions would be condemned, by Christians at least, because of the lack of any realistic prospect of success.44 Are these people lunatics or irrational psychopaths? Are they fed up with life and just want to commit suicide? Has their religion blinded them to reality? The answers to these questions

IDEOLOGY, TERRORISM AND “THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” 199 depend on how we define “rationality” and the hierarchy of values we subscribe to. As the eminent American philosopher Donald Davidson observes, Irrationality, like rationality, is a normative concept. Someone who acts or reasons irrationally, or whose beliefs or emotions are irrational, has departed from a standard; but what standard, or whose, is to be the judge? If you deviate from my norms of rationality, and you do not share my sense of what is reasonable, then are you irrational? After all, fully rational agents can differ over values. If rationality is just one more value or complex set of values, then calling someone irrational would seem to be no more than a matter of expressing disagreement with his values or norms.45 If we agree with Davidson that “inner consistency” should be the defining characteristic of rationality,46 given the values and beliefs to which Bin Laden and other Islamic militants subscribe—beliefs and values which are mostly based on the teaching of Islam and which they consider integral components of being “religious theists”47—then their actions are coherent and consistent, and thus fully rational. Given this worldview, they have every reason to be committed to their chosen course of action (with some exceptions to be noted at the end of the chapter), to be selfconfident, ready to persevere under harsh conditions, and not to be afraid of death. The components of this worldview can be briefly described as follows: 1

Jihad as a duty and the only way to correct the situation: Bin Laden believes that by “occupying” the birthplace of Islam, by helping the Zionists in their crimes against innocent Palestinians, and by killing more than one million Iraqi children, women and men through aerial bombing and a “protracted blockade,” the United States has in fact declared “war on God, his messenger, and Muslims.”48 “Under such circumstances, to push the enemy … out of the country is a prime duty,” and it is second only to maintaining religious faith.49 For a Muslim, it is important to fulfill one’s obligations, regardless of their outcome—for which the individual is not held responsible. As the Holy Quran states: “Fight in the path of Allah, you are not charged with the responsibility except for yourself, and urge the believers.”50 For Bin Laden, this is the only course to take because “there is no

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY way to obtain faithful strength but by returning to this jihad.”51 American leaders know only the language of force52 and they can “be deterred from killing our women and children [only when] they taste some of what we tasted.”53

2

God as protector and helper: A number of prayers used by Bin Laden— mainly quotations from the Quran—indicate the importance of trust in God and His help: We ask Allah to bestow us with victory, He is our Patron and He is the Most Capable. Our Lord, You are the one who help us and You are the one who assist us, with Your Power we move and by Your Power we fight. ... Our Lord, those youths got together to make Your religion victorious and raise Your banner. Our Lord, send them Your help and strengthen their hearts. Almighty God says: “So lose no heart, nor fall into despair. For ye must gain mastery if ye are true in faith.” And Allah is our Guardian and Helper, while you [the unbelievers] have no Guardian or Helper.54

3

The value of life and death: Bin Laden’s belief in God’s predetermination of the limits of life and death is an inducement to courage. He cites a Hadith of the Prophet that “if the Whole World [sic] gathered to (bestow) profit on you they will not profit you except with what was determined for you by Allah, and if they gathered to harm you they will not harm you except with what has been determined for you by Allah.” Bin Laden also believes that, “Death is truth and ultimate destiny, and life will end any way. … [Those] who do not die by the sword will die by other reason; causes are there but one death.” Since this is the case, he argues, why should one accept “aggression, humiliation and indignation?” Those youths who sacrifice their lives for Islam “inherit dignity, pride, courage, generosity, truthfulness and sacrifice from father to father.” They also act in this way because they know what a great reward awaits them whether they survive or are martyred.55

IDEOLOGY, TERRORISM AND “THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” 201 Commenting on his expulsion from Saudi Arabia in 1991, Bin Laden told reporters: “I have rejected liv[ing a] submissive life … that is not befitting of a man let alone a believer. ... We are living in dignity and honor for whom [sic] we thank Allah. It is much better for us to live under a tree on these mountains [of Afghanistan] than to live in palaces in the most sacred land to Allah, while subjected to disgrace … where injustice is so widespread.”56 Responding to President Bush’s accusation that he “hates freedom,” Bin Laden replied: “No, we fight because we are free men who don’t sleep under oppression.”57 4

Time scale: When Bin Laden and other Islamic militants confidently speak of their eventual victory,58 they seem to be using a different time scale than people ordinarily do. Bin Laden makes this clear in his October 2004 speech to the American people where he talks of a “war of attrition” and “bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy.”59 This long-range view is inspired by the teaching of the Quran. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, it seemed even unimaginable that the Afghans, who were incomparably inferior to the Soviets in numerical, economic, and especially military terms, would be able to put up a successful resistance—and the prospect of victory was out of question. Members of the resistance movement did not foresee defeating the Red Army and expelling it from Afghanistan in a matter of years or even decades. Nonetheless, they were certain of their ultimate victory and took solace from Sura (chapter) 18 of the Quran which tells “the story of Christian youths, who, persecuted by a cruel pagan ruler, hid in a cave, and were put into a divine sleep for 300 years. When they awoke, the ruler’s reign had passed, and there was peace in the land.” At the time, the resistance fighters gained inspiration from this legend, which they applied to the Soviet occupiers.60

5

Support of the Muslim world: Bin Laden believes that the issues which concern him—the occupation of Muslim lands and the suffering of innocent Muslims in Palestine, Iraq, Kashmir, Chechnya and elsewhere around the world—concern all Muslims. In his “Declaration of War Against Americans,” he calls upon Muslims to “take part in fighting against the enemy” and shows confidence that “the Muslims of the world will assist and help [their brothers] to

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY victory.”61 He repeats the same theme in an interview with British journalist Robert Fisk: “Ultimately, all Muslims will unite in the fight against America, says bin Laden. ‘I believe that sooner or later the Americans will leave Saudi Arabia and that the war declared by America against the Saudi people means war against all Muslims everywhere. Resistance against America will spread in many, many places in Muslim countries.’”62 After the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the launch of President Bush’s “war on terrorism,” Bin Laden, echoing President Bush, asserted: “These incidents divided the entire world into two regions—one of faith where there is no hypocrisy and another of infidelity, from which we hope God will protect us.”63 Believing himself to have more than one billion Muslims on his side certainly boosts the morale of any fighter.

6

The lessons of history: If Bin Laden’s hope of general support from the Muslim world seems rather wishful thinking—although President Bush’s reckless policies could make it a reality—the lessons he draws from history are more concrete. Answering a question about “the future of the Saudi royal family and their involvement with America and the US military,” Bin Laden responded: History has the answer to your question. The fate of any government which sells the interests of its own people and betrays the nation … is known. We expect for the ruler of Riyadh the same fate as the Shah of Iran. We anticipate this to happen to him and to the influential people who stand by him.64 He seems to have drawn the greatest lessons from the Soviet failure in Afghanistan and the US debacle in Somalia. For him, in the Soviet defeat “the myth of [the invincibility of] the super power was destroyed not only in my mind but also in the minds of all Muslims. Slumber and fatigue vanished and so was the terror [of the US as a superpower].” In the same way that the Soviet Union “was thrown in the waste basket [of history, and gone] was the Soviet Union forever; [we] are certain that we shall—with the grace of Allah—prevail over the Americans and over the Jews.”65 As for Somalia, in remarks addressed to the American Secretary of Defense, Bin Laden states:

IDEOLOGY, TERRORISM AND “THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” 203 [Y]our most disgraceful case was in Somalia; wherefore [sic] vigorous propaganda about the power of the USA and its post cold war leadership of the new world order you moved tens of thousands of international forces, including twenty eight thousands American soldiers … . However, when tens of your soldiers were killed in minor battles and one American Pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu you left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your death with you.66 He also refers to the withdrawal of American troops from Beirut in 1984 after “241 mainly marine soldiers were killed.”67 However, Bin Laden fails to mention the most spectacular US military defeat in history—Vietnam. Probably he does not want to acknowledge that “atheist communists” could also successfully oppose foreign aggression. 7

Positive results of the present conflict: While President George Bush talks confidently of Osama Bin Laden being on the run and his Al Qaeda organization dismantled, Bin Laden himself believes that the results of the conflict “have been, by the grace of Allah, positive and enormous, and have, by all standards, exceeded all expectations.” He refers to reports which estimate that “al-Qaeda spent $500,000 on the [September 11, 2001] event, while America, in the incident and its aftermath, lost—according to the lowest estimate—more than $500 billion. Meaning that every dollar of al-Qaeda defeated a million dollars by the permission of Allah, besides the loss of a huge number of jobs.” He also mentions the fear mentality prevalent in the USA: “All that we have to do is to send two mujahidin to the furthest point east to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al-Qaeda, in order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic, and political losses without their achieving for it anything of note other than some benefits for their private companies.” Bin Laden partially credits the American government for these “spectacular gains.” He believes “the policy of the White House that demands the opening of war fronts to keep busy their various corporations—whether they be working in the field of arms or oil or reconstruction—has helped al-Qaeda to achieve these enormous results.” Bin Laden sees the US facing inevitable bankruptcy: “As for the size of the economic deficit, it has reached record astronomical

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REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY numbers estimated to total more than a trillion dollars.” For Bin Laden, these are all clear signs pointing to eventual victory.68

“Islamic Terrorism”: a Contradiction in Terms The operations undertaken by Bin Laden’s and other Islamic militants are almost always labeled as “Islamic terrorism” by the international news media and even most academic publications. However, many Muslim— and some non-Muslim—scholars object to the term “Islamic terrorism.” They point out that if terrorist acts committed by the followers of other faiths are not referred to as Jewish or Christian or Hindu terrorism, for example, why should outrages committed by some Muslims be labeled “Islamic terrorism”? Equally important is the objection that, quite literally, as well as in the religious sense, Islam is the antonym of terrorism. Literally, Islam means submission or surrender and peace. In a religious sense, it means submitting oneself to the Will of God and achieving true and genuine peace; that is, peace of mind, peace in society and peace with nature.69 Islam is also a religion of tolerance and moderation. While the Holy Quran encourages militancy against injustice and oppression, it also tells Muslims, “And thus We [God] willed you to be a community of the middle way, so that [with your lives] you might bear witness to the truth before all mankind, and that the Apostle might bear witness to the truth before you” (2: 143). Commenting on this verse, Muhammad Asad, an eminent scholar and commentator on the Quran, interprets this as referring to “a community that keeps an equitable balance between extremes and is realistic in its appreciation of man’s nature and possibilities.”70 The Prophet Muhammad also advises against extremism: “Beware of excesses in matters of religion. For, as a matter of fact, those before you were destroyed by religious immoderation.”71 Despite Islam’s emphasis on moderation, throughout history Muslim extremists72 have tried to justify their actions by recourse to holy texts—as Jewish and Christian extremists have done also. Such extremists have usually defined Islam so narrowly as to exclude anyone who does not believe exactly as they do. They have also taken verses of the Quran and Ahadith (Sayings) of the Prophet out of context to justify their extremism and violence. Their real motivation, however, has often been political. The Kharejites of the first century of the Islamic calendar and the contemporary Al Takfir wal Hijra (Excommunication and Migration) organization both believe that the Muslim community as a whole has deviated from the right

IDEOLOGY, TERRORISM AND “THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” 205 path and become apostates and infidels. “Jahileyyah” (ignorant or pagan) is another term used by contemporary extremists to characterize both Muslim and non-Muslim societies alike.73 Thus, in their view, the use of force is justified in returning these renegade societies to Islam. Although not all Islamic militant groups can be categorized as extremist,74 Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, Ayman Al Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad, and their associates who are mainly accused of “Islamic terrorism” today certainly fit the criteria.75 At this point we need to ask: What is terrorism? Are all the operations carried out by Islamic militants acts of terrorism? And how are those that are, justified by these groups? Since Islam is an antonym of terrorism, what are its views on the concept? What is terrorism? “Terrorism” is a concept that lacks a consensual definition. It is especially difficult to define because of its moral connotations and use as an ideological tool. Attempts to find a “neutral” definition of the term have so far failed. A sampling of proposed definitions of terrorism is given below, each emphasizing some of its various aspects: “a symbolic act designed to influence political behavior by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of violence” (Thomas P. Thornton) “[a] process of terror [having] three elements: the act or threat of violence, the emotional reaction, and the social effects” (Eugene Walter) “the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fearinducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators” (Grant Wardlaw) “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (US State Department)

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“Terrorism involves violence against innocents with the objective of coercing third parties (usually governments) to act in accordance with the terrorists’ wishes and demands.” (R. C. Smith) Despite their differences, it seems that most scholars would agree on the following characteristics of terrorism: 1.

It involves violence or the threat of violence.

2.

It is usually directed against innocent civilian targets (noncombatants).

3.

It is intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage it causes.

4.

It has political motives.

5.

Its perpetrators are members of an organized group.

6.

It is carried out in a way that produces extreme anxiety and shock and aims to achieve maximum publicity.

Guerrilla warfare versus terrorism, and Muslim extremists’ justification for their actions R. C. Smith expands his definition (quoted above), stating: “[I]t is clear that terrorism can be seen as a tactic in any kind of irregular warfare and also in conventional war. It may equally be a tactic of governments as well as insurgents. It is equally clear that it is an illicit tactic whoever engages in it.”76 It must be distinguished, however, from another tactic of insurgency, guerrilla warfare, which is mostly viewed as a “justified form of warfare”—and the defining characteristic of which is the targeting of combatants.77 Thus, it is only when innocent civilians are the target of violence—whether perpetrated by organizations or governments—in order to produce shock and achieve certain political goals, that we can label the action “terrorism.” When Muslim—and non-Muslim—militants target the military, police or other security forces of an occupation power or an oppressive regime, they are engaged in guerrilla warfare.78 Such a distinction was made by an Italian judge, Clementina Forleo, in January 2005. According to a report in the New York Times, “she dismissed terrorism charges against five north Africans accused of being Islamic

IDEOLOGY, TERRORISM AND “THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” 207 militants … [and ruled] that the evidence against three Tunisians and two Moroccans arrested on charges of recruiting suicide bombers and supplying support to Islamic terror organizations for operations in Iraq constituted wartime ‘guerrilla’ activities, not terrorism.”79 When Osama Bin Laden first advocated the use of violence in waging Jihad against the American occupiers and their Saudi allies, he called for guerrilla war: “[D]ue to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted i.e. using fast moving light forces that work under complete secrecy. In other word to initiate a guerrilla warfare, where the sons of the nation, and not the military forces, take part in it.”80 Originally his targets were limited to American troops stationed in Saudi Arabia. In his 1997 interview with CNN, he was asked to explain his declared Jihad against the USA, and whether it included civilian Americans. Bin Laden replied: We declared jihad against the US government, because the US government is unjust, criminal and tyrannical. … The mention of the US reminds us before everything else of those innocent children who were dismembered, their heads and arms cut off in the recent explosion that took place in Qana (in Lebanon [in April 1996]). … [They have also] occupied the qibla of the Muslims (Arabia). … As for what you asked whether jihad is directed against the US soldiers, the civilians in [Saudi Arabia] or against the civilians in America, we have focused our declaration on striking at the soldiers in [Saudi Arabia]. … [E]ven though American civilians are not targeted in our plan, they must leave. We do not guarantee their safety … (emphasis added).81 In an earlier interview, he calls upon the US to present evidence for the accusation that his organization targets innocent people, and goes on to say: “[Such allegations are made despite] what our history is witnessing in the Afghan phase of Jihad. This was also unstained with any blood of innocent people, despite the inhuman Russian campaign against our women, our children, and our brothers in Afghanistan.”82 It is not certain why Bin Laden changed his mind in February 1998 and began advocating the killing of “the Americans and their allies—civilians and military”— although in the CNN interview cited above he notes that the American people “are not exonerated from responsibility, because they chose this government and voted for it despite their knowledge of its crimes…”83 In

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his May 1998 interview with the ABC, Bin Laden presents a detailed justification for his “Fatwa” (religious verdict): Allah has ordered us to glorify the truth and to defend Muslim land, especially the Arab peninsula … against the unbelievers. After World War II, the Americans grew more unfair and more oppressive towards people in general and Muslims in particular. … The Americans started it and retaliation and punishment should be carried out following the principle of reciprocity, especially when women and children are involved. Through history, America has not been known to differentiate between the military and the civilians or between men and women or adults and children. Those who threw atomic bombs and used weapons of mass destruction against Nagasaki and Hiroshima were the Americans. Can the bombs differentiate between military and women and infants and children? … We believe that the worst thieves in the world and the worst terrorists are the Americans. Nothing could stop you except perhaps retaliation in kind. We do not have to differentiate between military and civilian.84 Thus, a desire for retaliation and the hope that such action would produce some positive outcome seem the only justifications for this major switch in focus. It is interesting that here Bin Laden does not present any religious rationalization for the targeting of civilians. Bin Laden appears to contradict himself as, in response to another question in the same interview, he claims that “our retaliation is directed primarily against the soldiers only and against those standing by them. Our religion forbids us from killing innocent people such as women and children.”85 And earlier in the same interview he notes that “terrorism can be commendable and it can be reprehensible. Terrifying an innocent person and terrorizing him is objectionable and unjust. … The terrorism we practice is of the commendable kind for it is directed at the tyrants and aggressors…”86 It seems that by the late 1990s Bin Laden had reached the conclusion that all Americans are guilty by association of the crimes committed by their government. Since experience had taught him that the US government would change its policies only if it suffered casualties, and since American civilians are easier targets than US military forces, Bin Laden tended increasingly to focus on civilian targets—although he had difficulty finding a religious rationalization for it.

IDEOLOGY, TERRORISM AND “THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” 209 A quotation from the Quran used to open Bin Laden’s statement “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders” has given the impression that Bin Laden—and perhaps Islam—advocates an all-out war against unbelievers. The statement—which also calls itself a “Fatwa” or religious verdict— quotes verse 5, chapter 9 of the Holy Quran: “But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find them, seize them, beleaguer them and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war).”87 Taken in isolation, this text does seem to advocate such a position. To understand the meaning and implications of this verse, however, it should be read together with the verses preceding it and other texts on the same subject elsewhere in the Holy Quran. As the commentator Muhammad Asad points out: “Read in conjunction with the two preceding verses, as well as with 2: 190–194, the above verse relates to warfare already in progress with people who have become guilty of a breach of treaty obligations and of aggression” (emphasis in the original).88 A careful reading of Bin Laden’s statements and interviews reveals that this is exactly how he understands the verse. In “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” Bin Laden and his associates repeatedly refer to instances of American aggression which amount to “a clear declaration of war.”89 Bin Laden quotes the same verse in his “Declaration of War Against Americans” after he attempts to prove that the Prophet Muhammad cancelled existing treaties with non-Muslims once they violated the terms of those treaties.90 Thus, it would be unfair to accuse Bin Laden of taking this particular verse out of context.91 Terrorism from the Islamic viewpoint Bearing in mind the main characteristics of terrorism listed above, in this section I attempt to define the position of the Holy Quran on each characteristic. Two other issues will also be discussed. Terrorism is sometimes described as a crime of hate. Hate seems to be a motivating force for Bin Laden in such statements as: “The hearts of Muslims are filled with hatred towards the United States of America and the American president.”92 Moreover, as we have seen, retaliation is the justification that Bin Laden presents for targeting civilians. In his April 2004 statement he says: “Which religion considers your killed ones innocent and our killed ones worthless? And which principle considers your blood real blood and our blood water? Reciprocal treatment is fair and the one who starts injustice bears greater blame.”93 Thus, the Quranic position on hate and vengeance will also be discussed here.

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Violence The Holy Quran clearly permits the use of violence by Muslims in certain circumstances. The first reference to the legitimacy of fighting and bearing arms relates to the situation of the first Muslims after their migration to Medina. The text reads: “Permission [to fight] is given to those against whom war is being wrongfully waged … those who have been driven from their homeland against all right for no other reason than their saying, ‘Our Sustainer is God’” (22:39-40). The Quran recognizes that violence and war is repugnant to human nature: “Fighting is ordained for you, even though it be hateful to you; but it may well be that you hate a thing the while it is good for you, and it may well be that you love a thing the while it is bad for you: and God knows, whereas you do not know” (2:216). It argues, however, that if the weak were not ready to defend themselves, “corruption would surely overwhelm the earth”, and all places of worship “would surely have been destroyed” (2:251 and 22:40). From his comprehensive study of the relevant Quranic material on the subject, Sheikh Shaltut, a former rector of Al Azhar University, concludes that in Islam, “There are only three reasons for fighting, viz. to stop aggression, to protect the mission of Islam and to defend religious freedom.”94 He also notes that Islam does not allow provocation of hostilities. The Quran says, “And fight in God’s cause against those who wage war against you, but do not commit aggression—for, verily, God does not love aggressors” (2:190). Shaltut’s study also includes the Quran’s teachings on Muslims’ relations with non-Muslims. The relevant verses include: “And for such [of the unbelievers] as do not fight against you on account of [your] faith, and neither drive you forth from your homelands, God does not forbid you to show them kindness and to behave towards them with full equity: for, verily, God loves those who act equitably” (60:80). Shaltut concludes: “Read all this and you will know the lofty spirit of righteousness, equity, co-operation and affinity that Islam cherishes with regard to its relations with non-Muslims.”95 Targeting civilians and creating effects beyond immediate physical damage As we have seen, the Holy Quran emphasizes that Muslims’ warfare should be directed towards “those who wage war against [them]” (2:190)—in other words, that it should be restricted to combatants. Islam, like all other major religions, values human life to such a degree that the

IDEOLOGY, TERRORISM AND “THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” 211 Holy Quran states: “If anyone slays a human being—unless it be [in punishment] for murder or for spreading corruption on earth—it shall be as though he had slain all mankind …” (5:32). Thus, it absolutely forbids the taking of innocent lives—Muslims and non-Muslims alike—and in fact considers it a major sin and a capital crime. It was for this reason that, as John Esposito notes, even during wartime, “[f]rom the earliest times it was forbidden to kill noncombatants as well as women and children and monks and rabbis, who were given the promise of immunity unless they had taken part in the fighting.”96 A story in the Quran which tells of Moses’ killing of an Egyptian youth indicates that Islam does not approve the notion of guilt by association. One day, in the prime of his youth, Moses, who had been brought up in the house of Pharaoh, “encountered two men fighting with one another— one of his own people, and the other of his enemies. And the one who belonged to his own people cried out to him for help against him who was of his enemies—whereupon Moses struck him down with his fist, and [thus] brought his end” (28:15). We would expect that Moses would have felt glad to eliminate a member of the group that had oppressed his people. Instead, he felt remorse and sought forgiveness from God: “[But then] he said [to himself]: ‘This is of Satan’s doing! Verily, he is an open foe, leading [man] astray!’ [And] he prayed: ‘O my Sustainer! Verily, I have sinned against myself! Grant me, then, thy forgiveness!’ And He forgive him—for, verily, He alone is truly forgiving, a dispenser of grace” (28:16). Thus, Islam considers any wrongful act—crime, oppression, injustice, and so on—as the individual responsibility of the person or group that commits it. The Holy Quran clearly states: “And whatever [wrong] any human being commits rests upon himself alone; and no bearer of burdens shall be made to bear another’s burden” (6:164). Political motivation As we saw in chapter 2, Islam strongly encourages its followers to be concerned with the affairs of their community and to foster a virtuous society free from oppression and injustice. The Prophet Muhammad is reported as saying: “All of you are like shepherds, and all of you are responsible for your flocks.”97 The duty of Muslims to be politically motivated and active, however, does not mean that they can use any means to achieve their aims. In Islam, the ends do not justify the means; noble goals must be achieved through proper means. Islam strongly enjoins righteousness and justice. In more than 25 places in the Holy

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Quran, “doing good deeds” is associated with true faith. Regarding fairness and justice, the Quran commands: “O you who have attained to faith! Be ever steadfast in upholding equity, bearing witness to the truth for the sake of God, even though it be against your own selves or your parents and kinsfolk” (4:135). Islam forbids dishonesty, hypocrisy, cheating, treachery, breaking promises, violating treaties, exploitation, oppression and tyranny. According to Muslim scholars, these prohibitions apply equally in relations with Muslims and non-Muslims.98 Organised groups Islam recognizes the importance of organization and enjoins Muslims to work together in an organized manner (The Quran, 3:104, 61:4). It warns, however, that such organizations must have noble goals, not evil ones. It commands, “O you who have attained to faith! When you do hold secret confabulations, do not conspire with one another with a view to sinful doings and aggressive conduct and disobedience to the Apostle, but [rather] hold counsel in the cause of virtue and God-consciousness: and [always] remain conscious of God, unto whom all shall be gathered” (58:9). Elsewhere the Quran enjoins: “Help one another in furthering virtue and God-consciousness and do not help one another in furthering evil and enmity; and remain conscious of God: for, behold, God is severe in retribution!” (5:2) It is interesting to note that Osama Bin Laden is well aware of such verses and quotes them in his statements and interviews. Apparently he believes that what he and his associates are doing is “cooperation for the sake of truth and righteousness.” 99 Creating terror and shock The Holy Quran encourages Muslims to be militarily prepared so that their enemies fear them and are deterred from aggression (8:60). It also encourages Muslims to be fierce in war so that terror is spread in the heart of their enemies (8:12). Apart from these two cases, there is nothing in the Holy Quran or the tradition of the Prophet to condone the use of terror and shock for achieving any aims. The Quran considers security and safety to be a basic human need, along with freedom from hunger (106:4). It enjoins establishment of a peaceful and orderly society and warns that people should “seek not to spread corruption on earth: for, verily, God does not love the spreaders of corruption” (28:77). Khalid Abou El Fadl, a prominent scholar of Islamic law, points out that, based on the moral teachings of Islam, classical Muslim jurists designated those who spread

IDEOLOGY, TERRORISM AND “THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” 213 terror in society as “Muharibs” (literally, those who fight society or God). “Many jurists classified rape, armed robbery, assassination, arson and murder by poisoning as crimes of terror and argued that such crimes must be punished vigorously regardless of the motivation of the criminals.”100 Terrorism as a crime of hate and vengeance Islam emphasizes kindness and compassion. Muslims are encouraged not to hate. The Holy Quran, following a discourse on ascribing associates to God—which is the gravest sin in Islam—admonishes Muslims: “Make due allowance for man’s nature [or ‘hold to forgiveness,’ as another commentator puts it], and enjoin the doing of what is right; and leave alone those who choose to remain ignorant” (7:199). Despite this, Islam recognizes human weakness and the fact that, no matter how much we try, hatred may enter our hearts. Thus, the Quran warns, “O you who have attained to faith! Be ever steadfast in your devotion to God, bearing witness to the truth in all equity; and never let hatred of anyone lead you into the sin of deviating from justice” (5:8, emphasis added). This should be the case even in regard to those who commit injustice and oppression: “And never let your hatred of people who would bar you from the Inviolable House of Worship lead you into the sin of aggression” (5:2, emphasis added). As for vengeance, the Holy Quran affirms the Jewish law of “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” However, it goes on to state that “… he who shall forgo it out of charity will atone thereby for some of his past sins” (5:45). Thus, the emphasis is on forgiveness. This is noted elsewhere in the Quran: “And if it should happen that a prompting from Satan stirs thee up [to blind anger], seek refuge with God: behold, He is all-hearing, all-knowing” (7:199). “[True believers are those who] hold in check their anger, and pardon their fellow-men because God loves the doers of good” (3:134). Elsewhere, the Quran goes a step further than mere forgiveness and recommends responding to evil with good: “[Since] good and evil cannot be equal, repel thou [evil] with something that is better—and lo! He between whom and thyself was enmity [may then become] as though he had [always] been close [unto thee], a true friend!” (41:34). When these texts are read in conjunction with those that emphasize personal responsibility for actions (6:164, 17:15, 35:18, 39:7 and 53:38), it is clear that the targeting of innocent civilians in the name of vengeance can never find any justification in Islam. It is significant that in none of his recorded pronouncements does Bin Laden refer to any of the texts which emphasize importance of forgiveness and the need to avoid hatred.

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In conclusion, ever since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, Islamic revolutionary movements—termed variously as fundamentalist, radical, militant, extremist, Jihadi and terrorist—have been perceived as a threat to the West. Samuel Huntington put the seal of academic approval on this sentiment with his “clash of civilizations” thesis. A closer look at his work, however, reveals that he perceives the real clash as one between US hegemony and Islamic resistance. The ideological work of the Iranian revolutionary leaders discussed in previous chapters confirms this. Bin Laden and Islamic militants are also influenced by the Islamic ideology of revolution. A distinction needs to be made, however, between their terrorist activities and legitimate guerrilla warfare. The targeting of innocent civilians is clearly terrorism, prohibited by Islam, and Bin Laden and other militants know this. When they assign guilt by association—for example, to all Americans for the actions of the US governing elite—they cross the line that separates their views from those of the majority of Muslims. The Quran’s notion of personal responsibility and its concern that hatred should never lead “to the sin of deviating from justice” are too clear to be ignored. While Bin Laden does just this in his various statements and interviews, his uneasiness and contradictions in rationalizing his terrorist activities in religious terms demonstrate that he is well aware of them.101 The question of how a devoutly religious man can justify the unjustifiable to himself is one that needs further investigation.

CONCLUSION

In Christian tradition, God is said to have created human beings in His own image. In Islam, God created humans from clay and breathed His Spirit into them; He made them His vicegerents on earth and entrusted them with free will. In both religions humans are commanded: “You shall worship the Lord your God and Him only shall you serve.”1 Christians and Muslims have understood the injunction to “serve God” in different ways, not only between the two faiths, but within each faith as well. For early Muslims, spreading the Word of God around the world was serving Him. They then undertook a variety of scientific, philosophical and theological investigations—as well as artistic and architectural endeavors—and considered it service to God. At the same time, other Muslims focused on Sufism and mystical experience as ways of serving God. Ordinary Muslims have always seen living a moral religious life as a service to God. In the contemporary Muslim world we find all these trends. Throughout history, however, there have been Muslims who have seen the elimination of injustice and oppression and the establishment of a just and virtuous society as the real service of God. Such individuals have been termed “revolutionary” in this study and their ideas, values and beliefs have been named “revolutionary ideology.” Although the notion “revolution” implies “rapid change,” since the time-scales we use are relative some revolutionaries may aim at bringing about changes in decades rather than in months or years. Revolution is also usually associated with violence, and Islam allows the use of violence under certain circumstances. Muslim revolutionaries, however, do not always advocate violence—or they may see it as a last resort. Alternatively, others may see it as the only course of action open to them for effecting change. The study of the ideology of revolution in the Quran from the Sunni viewpoint in chapter 2, and its treatment in the works of the Iranian revolutionary leaders in subsequent chapters, showed many points of similarity. There is little difference between Sunni and Shiite approaches to

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the ideology of revolution—except for the vision of the ideal society, which was also a point of controversy among the Iranian leaders. Osama Bin Laden also seems to be influenced by the same ideology. Contrary to what is claimed in the media—and even in some academic work—he does not advocate an all-out war against the West and the extermination of all “infidels”. Neither does he seem to aspire to “reestablish the caliphate (the civilizational institution)”.2 What he wants to do is to repulse American domination in the Muslim world and liberate Muslims from oppression, injustice and exploitation. In this sense, ironically, he seems to be motivated by what the neoconservative American scholar Michael Novak calls “the universal hunger for liberty.”3 The methods Bin Laden and some other militants adopt, however, are repugnant not only to nonMuslims but to many Muslims as well. They are also contrary to most Muslims’ understanding of the teachings of their religion. If it were not for their erroneous tactics, Bin Laden and his associates would have been much more popular among Muslims due to their political agenda. “The war on terrorism” proclaimed by President George Bush and the invasion of Iraq by the US and its allies have made the situation very difficult for Muslims around the world. This is so not only because they are often subjected to discrimination and the violation of their human rights, but more importantly because of the peculiar position in which Muslims find themselves. While they do not want to endorse atrocities against innocent civilians in the name of religion, on the other hand they find the arrogance, oppression and double standards practiced by the “hyper-power” of our times both frustrating and loathsome. When they hear a CIA analyst confirming that “Osama bin Laden appears to be a genuinely pious Muslim; a devoted family man; a talented, focused, and patient insurgent commander; a frank and eloquent speaker; a successful businessman; and an individual of conviction, intellectual honesty, compassion, humility, and physical bravery,”4 any doubts about his being a victim of “American bullying” evaporate. This explains why the popularity of Bin Laden and Islamic militant groups has recently been on the rise, along with growing anti-American sentiments. A task force appointed by the Defense Science Board, a Pentagon advisory panel, confirms this in its September 2004 report entitled “Strategic Communication.” It admits that “the war on terror and the invasion and occupation of Iraq have increased support for al-Qaeda, made ordinary Muslims hate the US and caused a global backlash against America because of the ‘self-serving hypocrisy’ of George W Bush’s

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administration over the Middle East.”5 The report also notes that “Muslims do not ‘hate our freedom,’ but rather, they hate our policies;” and rightly identifies some policies of great concerns to Muslims. Instead of recommending changes to those policies, however, the report “calls for the establishment of a national security advisor for strategic communication, and a massive boost in funding for the ‘information war’ to boost US government TV and radio stations broadcasting in the Middle East.”6 The recommendation reflects the report’s perception that the real problem is not US policies but rather how these policies are perceived by Muslims. In other words, it is a question of an “image problem” or “the war of ideas.” The notion of “the war of ideas” has been promoted even by journalists and commentators who are critical of President Bush’s policies and Huntington’s theory of “the clash of civilizations.” Starting in January 2004, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman published a five-part series under this very title, “War of Ideas.” The following quotation sums up his thesis: “What we can do [to combat terrorism] is partner with the forces of moderation within these [Muslim] societies to help them fight the war of ideas. Because ultimately this is a struggle within the ArabMuslim world, and we have to help our allies there, just as we did in World Wars I and II.”7 Richard Clarke, former head of counterterrorism in the US National Security Council and the author of the book Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror, holds a similar view, as do many other observers.8 The main problem with this approach, however, is that it shifts the focus away from correcting erroneous policies and results in their continuation. If that is the case, and if Zbigniew Brzezinski is right in his assertion that there are “extremists in the Bush administration who are committed to an existential struggle against Islam,”9 then the fear that “the clash of civilizations” will become a “self-fulfilling prophecy” is a very real one. Finally, there is one more important question that needs to be asked: To what extent has post-revolutionary Iranian society lived up to the ideals of the Islamic Revolution? Of course, this is really the subject of another study. Briefly, there are two problems. As Vanessa Martin convincingly demonstrates, “much reporting [in the Western media about the Islamic Revolution in Iran] was subjective, inaccurate, prejudiced and superficial.”10 The same is true of developments in the aftermath of the Revolution. Nonetheless, it is also true that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been aptly named “the Republic of contradictions.”11 Although the

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ideals of the Revolution were enshrined in the Constitution, the political structure that was created to govern the country led to the neglect of those ideals. After Khomeini’s death, “A new generation of Iranians joined by its beleaguered middle class demanded the fulfillment of the long-delayed revolutionary promises of freedom and economic equity.”12 The struggle has been going on ever since. Yet despite these ups and downs, the seeds sown during the Revolution may ultimately bear fruit. “The tragedy of Iran’s polarized politics,” however, as Ray Takeyh points out, “is that a period of social tumult may precede the arrival of the new dawn in Iran’s modern history.”13 For those who seek true freedom and justice throughout the world, the vision of the good society is remarkably homogeneous. Some of the ideals of the Islamic Revolution in Iran do not differ greatly from those set out in The Catechism of the Catholic Church: Any system in which social relations are determined entirely by economic factors is contrary to the nature of the human person and his acts. A theory that makes profit the exclusive norm and ultimate end of economic activity is morally unacceptable. The disordered desire for money cannot but produce perverse effects. … The Church has rejected the totalitarian and atheistic ideologies associated in modern times with “communism” or “socialism.” She has likewise refused to accept, in the practice of “capitalism,” individualism and the absolute primacy of the law of the marketplace over human labor. Regulating the economy solely by centralized planning perverts the basis of social bonds; regulating it solely by the law of the marketplace fails social justice, for “there are many human needs which cannot be satisfied by the market.”14 These and similar religious teachings—as well as humanist ideals—have encouraged thousands of activists around the world to protest against the domination and injustice imposed by the powerful over the weak. Unfortunately, Bin Laden and many other Islamic militants are too focused on the immediate problems of oppression and brutality against Muslims to be able to see the broader picture. If they did, they would have

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agreed—as would most of the Iranian revolutionary leaders15—with John C. Raines, professor of religion at Temple University, that (to paraphrase): The real clash everywhere in [early twenty-first] century global capitalism is over power and privilege and the growing inequalities elites everywhere extract from the common good. That reality is an offense to the prophetic heritage we [Muslims] share with [Christians] and Jews. In the global struggle for justice that is emerging, we need each other as the other by whom we can “be taught”—a perspective that gives us perspective upon our own standpoint, a way to step beyond the Looking Glass.16

Notes

1. 2.

1. 2.

3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Preface For an interesting debate on this subject at the time of this writing, see ‘Blogging the Qur’an,’ The Guardian website (accessed early February 2008): http://blogs.guardian.co.uk/quran/. Muhammad Asad (Translated and Explained) The Message of the Quran (Gibraltar, 1980), p. vii. Introduction General Service Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977. Book II (Washington, 1978), p. 2221. On 8 January a demonstration in Qum sparked by a newspaper article about the death of Imam Khomeini’s son ended in clashes with the police in which 20 people were killed; the date is generally considered as the beginning of the revolutionary confrontation in Iran. Resistance 5 (Nov. 1978), p. 2. For a survey of theories of revolution and their view of the role of culture and ideology, see John Foran, ‘Theories of Revolution Revisited: toward a Fourth Generation?’ Social Theory 1/1 (1992), pp. 1–20. Also John Foran, ‘The Iranian Revolution of 1977–79: A Challenge for Social Theory,’ in John Foran (ed.), A Century of Revolution: Social Movements in Iran (Minneapolis, 1994). Theda Skocpol, ‘Rentier State and Shi’a Islam in Iranian Revolution,’ Theory and Society 11/3 (1982), p. 268. Ibid., p. 265. Ibid., p. 267. Theda Skocpol, ‘Cultural Idioms and Political Ideologies in Revolutionary Reconstruction of State Power: A Rejoinder to Sewell,’ The Journal of Modern History 57/1 (1985), pp. 86–96. They include: Misagh Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua and the Philippines (Cambridge, 2000). Val Moghadam, ‘Islamic Populism, Class, and Gender in Post revolutionary Iran,’ in Foran, (ed.), A Century of Revolution. Said Amir Arjomand, ‘Iran’s Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective,’ World Politics 38/3. (1986), pp. 383–414. Farida Farhi, ‘State Disintegration and Urban–based Revolutionary Crisis,’ Comparative Political Studies 21/2 (1988), p. 232.

222

10.

11.

12. 13.

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY Sharough Akhavi, ‘The Ideology and Praxis of Shi’ism in the Iranian Revolution,’ Comparative Studies in Society and History 25/2 (1983), pp. 195–221. Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: the Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York, 1993). Mansoor Moaddel, Class, Politics and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution (New York, 1993). It should be noted that these authors not always agree on definition of ‘ideology’ or the degree of significance to be assigned to it. These works include: Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran (London, 2000). Hamid Algar (ed. and trans.), Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (Berkeley, 1980). Hamid Algar (ed.) (trans. R. Campbell), Society and Economics in Islam: Writings and Declarations of Ayatullah Sayyid Mahmud Taleghani (Berkeley, 1982). Hamid Algar, Roots of the Islamic Revolution in Iran: Four Lectures, Revised and expanded ed. (North Haledon, NJ, 2001). Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley, 1993). Farhang Rajaee, Islamic Values and World View: Khomeyni on Man, the State and International Politics, American Values Projected Abroad, Volume XIII (Lanham, MD, 1983). Ali Rahnema, An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali Shari’ati (London, 2000). Abdulaziz Sachedina, ‘Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution’ in John Esposito (ed.), Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York, Oxford, 1983), pp. 191–213. Homa Katouzian, ‘Shi’ism and Islamic Economics: Baqr Sadr and Bani Sadr,’ in Nikki Keddie (ed.), Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi’ism from Quietism to Revolution (New Haven, 1983), pp. 145–165. See for example: Mark Downes, Iran’s Unresolved Revolution (Hants, England, 2002). Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven, 2003). Charles Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (Cambridge, MA, 2004). Mahmood T. Davari, The Political Thought of Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari: An Iranian Theoretician of the Islamic State (London, 2005). David H. Albert (ed.), Tell the American People: Perspectives on the Iranian Revolution. (Pennsylvania, 1980), p. 4. See, for example, Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York, 1962), John Foran, ‘The Comparative–historical Sociology of Third World Social Revolutions’ in John Foran (ed.), Theorizing Revolutions (London, 1997), and John Foran, ‘Introduction to the Future of Revolution,’ in John Foran (ed.), The Future of Revolutions: Rethinking Radical Change in the Age of Globalization (London, 2003).

NOTES

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14. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York, 1996), p. 216. 1.

2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

Chapter 1 See, for example, Webster’s New International Dictionary (2nd edition, 1948), Webster’s New World Dictionary (1971), Webster Comprehensive Dictionary: Encyclopedic Edition (1984), The Reed Dictionary of New Zealand English (2001), Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles (5th edition, 2002), and Encarta Dictionary (Microsoft Office, 2003). Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford, 1996) As is mostly the case with the work of Hamid Dabashi noted above—and to some extent with that of Mansoor Moaddal. For a review of the vast literature on “ideology” and an attempt to provide a “comprehensive framework … contain[ing] all attributes regularly associated with ‘ideology’ in contemporary social science discourse”, see John Gerring, ‘Ideology: A Definitional Analysis,’ Political Research Quarterly 50/4 (1997), pp. 957–994. D.J. Manning, ‘Introduction’, in D.J. Manning (ed.) The Form of Ideology, (London, 1980), p. 2. H.M. Drucker, The Political Uses of Ideology (UK, 1974), p. 3 Manning, ‘Introduction,’ p. 2. Drucker, The Political Uses of Ideology, p. 12. Ibid, p. 101. Henry D. Aiken, The Age of Ideology: The Nineteenth Century Philosophers (New York, 1956), p. 17. Jorge Larrain, The Concept of Ideology (Georgia, 1979), pp. 48, 50. For a recent work on ideology as “false consciousness”, see David Hawkes, Ideology, 2nd ed., ‘The New Critical Idiom’ Series (London, 2003, 1st ed. 1996). Drucker,. The Political Uses of Ideology, p. 76. V.I. Lenin, What is to be done? Quoted in Drucker, The Political Uses of Ideology, p. 103. Larrain, The Concept of Ideology. p. 76. Karl Mannheim (trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shels), Ideology and Utopia (New York, 1946), p. 49. Ibid., p. 50. Ibid., pp. 238–39. Harry M. Johnson, ‘Ideology and the Social System,’ International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 1968 ed. Julius Gould, ‘Ideology’, A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, 1964 ed. Richard Cox (ed.), Ideology, Politics and Political Theory (Belmont, CA, 1969) pp. 210–11. Richard V. Burks, ‘A Conception of Ideology for Historians,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 10 (1949), p. 184. T.W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York, 1950, rpt. New York, 1969), p. 2.

224


23. Feliks Gross, ‘Introduction’, in Feliks Gross (ed.) European Ideologies (New York, 1948), p. 5. 24. Robert Wuthnow, ‘Comparative Ideology,’ International Journal of Comparative Studies 22 (1981), p. 121. 25. Clifford Geertz, ‘Ideology as a Cultural System,’ in David Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York, 1964), pp. 63–64. 26. Abbas M. Milani, ‘Ideology and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution,’ Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Hawaii, May 1975), p. 66. 27. Robert A. Haber, ‘The End of Ideology as Ideology,’ in Chaim I. Waxman (ed.), The End of Ideology Debate (New York, 1968), p. 186. 28. Dale Yonder, ‘Current Definitions of Revolution,’ The American Journal of Sociology 32 (1926), p. 433. 29. Jeffery M. Paige, ‘Finding the Revolutionary in the Revolution: Social Science Concepts and the Future of Revolution,’ in John Foran (ed.), The Future of Revolutions. 30. For a discussion of this distinction, see Mansoor Moaddel, Class, Politics and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, pp. 266–269. 31. John Foran provides more examples of “revolutionaries [taking] non–violent and/or democratic routes to power.” See John Foran, ‘Introduction to the Future of Revolutions,’ in Foran (ed.) The Future of Revolutions, p. 2. 32. A more detailed description of the construction of a model and its functions appears as Appendix A in the dissertation that forms the basis of this book, see Najibullah Lafraie, ‘Ideology of Revolution: A Normative Study of the Islamic Revolution in Iran’ (University of Hawaii, 1986), pp. 387–392. 33. C.W. Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism (New York, 1966), Quoted in David Bouchier, Idealism and Revolution (New York, 1978), p. 12. 34. Max Weber, ‘’Objectivity’ in Social Science,’ in Max Weber (trans. Edward Shils and Henry Finch), The Methodology of Social Sciences, (New York, 1949), p. 90. 35. Ibid., p. 101. 36. John McKinney, Constructive Typology and Social Theory (New York, 1966), p. 6. 37. Bouchier, Idealism and Revolution, p. 23. 38. Haber, ‘The End of Ideology as Ideology,’ p. 186. 39. Johan Galtung, A Structural Theory of Revolution (Rotherdam, Netherlands, 1974), p. 40. 40. Bouchier, Idealism and Revolution, p. 10. 41. Galtung, A Structural Theory of Revolution, pp. 49, 51. 42. Bouchier, Idealism and Revolution, p. 23. 43. Robert Bierstedt, ‘Legitimacy,’ A Dictionary of the Social Science, 1964 ed. 44. Mark N. Hagopain, The Phenomenon of Revolution (New York, 1975), p. 170. 45. Milton Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values (New York, 1973), p. 5. 46. Mostafa Rejai, The Comparative Study of Revolutionary Strategy (New York, 1988), p. 38. 47. Robert Michels (trans. Eden and Edar Paul), Political Parties (1915), Quoted in Krishan Kumar (ed.), Revolution, The Theory and Practice of a European Idea (London, 1971), p. 197. 48. Bouchier, Idealism and Revolution. p. 29. 49. Lenin, Selected Works in Three Volumes, Quoted in Kumar, Revolution, p. 161.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

225

Chapter Two Abul Ala Mawdudi, The Meaning of the Quran (Lahore, Pakistan, 1967, Seven volumes), Vol. 1, p. 26. Due to space limitations, a detailed review of the literature is not presented here. For a more detailed review see Lafraie, “Ideology of Revolution,” chapter II, pp. 37-74. Maxim Rodinson (trans. Anne Carter), Mohammad (New York, 1971), “Foreword,” p. xi. E.D. Hirsch Jr., The Aims of Interpretation (Chicago and London, 1976), p. 2. E.D. Hirsch Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven and London, 1967), pp. 136, 144 Ibid. p. 162. Ibid. p. 162. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur-an: Text, Translation and Commentary (New York, 1946), Two volumes. Unless specially marked, all the quotations from the Quran in this study are taken from this translation. Holy Quran, English trans. Marmaduke Pickthall (Pakistan, n. d.). Quotations from this translation are marked with an asterisk (*). See chapter I, section (3b). See, e.g., 2:163, 6:19, 6:22, 23:91, 38:65, 112:1-4. Here and in all subsequent references to the Quran in the text, the first figure refers to the chapter number and the second figure to the verse numbers cited. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur-an, f. n. 5032, p. 1429. Sahih Muslim (Collection of Hadith), quoted in Maulana Fazlul Karim, Al-Hadith: An English Translation of Mishkat-ul-Masabih, Book I (Dacca , 1938, 2nd ed. 1960), p. 226. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur-an, f. n. 5433, p. 1539. The Quran instructs believers: “and bow your heads with those who bow (in worship)”* (2:43). The Prophet has said, “Prayer in congregation is superior to single prayer by 27 degrees.” Sahih Muslim and Sahih Al-Bukhari (Collections of Hadith), quoted in Maulana Fazlul Karim, Al-Hadith: An English Translation of Mishkat-ul-Masabih, Book III (Calcutta, 1940), p. 341. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur-an, f. n. 2800, p. 857. See e.g., chapters 7 and 26. Beverley Milton-Edwards, Islam and Politics in the Contemporary World (Cambridge, 2004), p. 69. Maxim Rodenson (trans. Jean Malthews), Marxism and the Muslim World (New York, London, 1981), p. 137 Milton-Edwards, Islam and Politics, p. 69. The method used for preparing the list, the frequency of occurrence of each value, the references to and examples from the Quran are given in Lafraie, “Ideology of Revolution,” Chapter III, Section 3. Some of the relevant passages include the word Aflah which, according to Yusuf Ali, means “win through, prosper, succeed, achieve their aims or obtain salvation from sorrow and all evil.” Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur-an, f. n. 2865. p. 874.

226


23. Zakat literally means “purity and growth” and has been translated as “regular charity” by Yusuf Ali. 24. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur-an, f. n. 2865, p. 874. 25. Maxim Rodinson (trans. Brain Pearce), Islam and Capitalism (New York, 1973), p. 75. 26. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur-an, f. n. 1270, p. 444. 27. Sunnan Abu Dawod (A collection of Hadith) Book 37, Hadith no. 4330. Available online at MSA-USC Hadith Database: http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/abudawud/037. sat.html#037.4330 (accessed December, 2004). 28. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur-an, f. n. 2512, p. 780. 29. See Chapter I section (3) above. 30. According to Mohammad Iqbal, “The ultimate spiritual basis of all life, as conceived by Islam, is eternal and reveals itself in variety and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality must reconcile, in itself, the categories of permanence and change...” Mohammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (London, 1934), p. 140. 31. Muhammad Asad, The Principles of State and Government in Islam (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961), p. 14. 32. Al-Tumudhi and Abu Daud (Collections of Hadith), quoted in Ibid. p. 25. 33. Ibid., p. 44. 34. See, e.g., Ibid., p. 36. 35. Abu Daud, quoted in Ibid., p. 81. 36. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur-an, f. n. 5427. Although the meaning of the verse is clear, its significance has generally been ignored by Muslim scholars and laypeople alike. 37. Sahih Al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim, quoted in Muhammad Asad, The Principles of State, p. 76. 38. Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (Collection of Hadith), quoted in Ibid., p. 76. 39. Sahih Al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim, quoted in Ibid., p. 91. 40. Sahih Al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim, quoted in Ibid., p. 89. 41. Noted, e.g., by Muhammad Qutb, Islam the Misunderstood Religion (Lahore, 1972), p. 85. 42. For the rate of Zakat see, e.g., Al Ghazzali (trans. Amin Faris), The Mysteries of Almsgiving (Beirut, 1966), pp. 5-15. 43. Yusuf Ali,. The Holy Qur-an, f. n. 510-11, p. 179. 44. Hadith of the Prophet qquoted in Muhammad Asad,. The Principles of State, p. 84. 45. Dr Sadiq Al-Mahdi, “The Economic System of Islam,” in Salem Azzam (ed.), Islam and Contemporary Society (London and New York, 1982), p. 108. 46. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur-an, f. n. 324, p. 111. 47. See items 16 and 21 of section (3) in this chapter. 48. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur-an, f. n. 1908-9, p. 629. 49. Ibn Marjah (Collection of Hadith), quoted in Muhammad Asad, The Principles of State, p. 87. 50. Baihaqi (Collection of Hadith), quoted in Fazlul Karim, Al-Hadith, Book I, p. 271. 51. See Chapter I, section (3) above.

NOTES

227

52. Yusuf Ali translates this verse as follows: “Verily never will God change the condition of a people until they change it themselves (with their own souls).” The Arabic text implies both meanings. 53. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur-a,n, f. n. 4570, p. 1315. 54. Ibid., f. n. 2161, p. 689. 55. As Yusuf Ali notes in his commentary on this verse (The Holy Qur-a,n, f. n. 1468), the instruction was given after a confrontation between Moses and the Pharaoh. The Israelites would not have been allowed to hold public meetings thereafter. Thus, they were instructed to organize private, secrete assemblies. 56. See also 22:40. 57. For a discussion of structural violence, see Johan Galtung, “Violence and Peace,” in Paul Smoker, et al. (eds.), A Reader in Peace Studies (Oxford, 1990). 58. Sahih Muslim, quoted in Muhammad Asad,. The Principles of State, p. 77. 59. See, e.g., 2:21; 3:3; 4:1; 6:130; 7:158; 10:104, 108. 60. Such stories are found in numerous places in the Quran; see, e.g., Chapter 26. 61. For reference see note 49 above. 62. “Allahu Akbar,” the phrase repeated more than one hundred times a day by a Muslim during the regular prayers. 63. See, e. g., 2:250-52; 7:127-29; 26:47-52; 29:14, 24; 37:102-107; 40:25-27; 85:4-9. 64. See also 9:111 for the “bargain.” For the greater reward in general, see also 2:153, 207; 3:15-17, 157, 195, 200; 4:95; 8:74; 9:20; 11:115; 76:12. 65. For the meaning of worship from an Islamic point of view, see Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur-a,n, f. n. 1626, p. 547. 66. It is interesting to note that during the revolutionary upheaval in Iran, new formulations of this “motto” were introduced; e. g., “In the Name of God, the Lord of the Oppressed;” “In the Name of God, the Avenger of Tyrants.” 67. For an explanation of this see Muhammad Asad, “Symbols and Allegories in the Qur’an,” Appendix I to The Message of the Qur’an, translated and explained by Muhammad Asad (Gibraltar, 1980), pp. 989-993. 68. This female symbolism is highly significant for the status of women in Islam. Mary is a model through her own virtue — as a righteous woman—and in her role as Jesus’ mother. Pharaoh’s wife, however, is completely lacking in positive relationships to men; her role as a model is based on her virtue alone. The significance of this female symbolism has also been ignored by Muslim scholars. 69. It is interesting to note that the word “Makkah” — the city where Kaabah is located — has entered the English language as “mecca”, meaning “the goal of one’s aspirations,” (Funk and Wagnalls Standard College Dictionary, 1963 ed.). For an interpretation of the verses referred to in this paragraph see Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur-a,n, f. n. 154, p. 60; f. n. 2807-11, pp. 859-60; f. n. 160, p. 62; and f. n. 221-22, p. 80 respectively. 70. The word translated by Yusuf Ali as “Truth” is “Ar-rushd” in Arabic; another commentator translates it as “the right way.” See Muhammad Asad, The Message of the Qur’an, p. 58. 71. For conversions at the time of the Prophet, see Ibid., f. n. 4784. Examples of contemporary converts include Marmaduke Pickthall; Malcom X; Muhammad

228

72. 73. 74. 75.

1. 2. 3.

4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY Asad, formerly Leopold Weiss; Maurice Bucaille; Maryam Jameelah, formerly Margaret Marcus; and Yusuf Islam, formerly Cat Stevens. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur-a,n, f. n. 42, p. 21. Ibid., f. n. 3478, p. 1041. Edward Said, “Time for Intellectual Honesty: There Are Many Islams,” CounterPunch website, September 16, 2001. Accessible online(accessed 15 December 2004): http://www.counterpunch.org/saidattacks.html. See, for example, Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (New York, 2004). Chapter Three S.H.R. (Full name n.a.), Barrasi wa Tahlile az Nazate Imam Khomeini (A Survey and Analysis of Imam Khomeini’s Movement), (Tehran, date n.a.), pp. 57-61. Hamid Algar, “Introduction” in Islam and Revolution, p. 15. Hamid Algar has annotated and translated these lectures, in addition to a selection of Khomeini’s speeches and declarations, into English under the title of Islam and Revolution. For the works selected for the present study, see Ibid., pp. 27-149; 181-188; 212-227; and 233-236. This include: (1) Speech on “The Granting of Capitulation Rights to the US,” (October 7, 1964); (2) Speech “In Commemoration of the First Martyrs of the Revolution” (February 19, 1978); (3) “Declaration on the Occasion of ‘Id-i Fitr’” (September 6, 1979), and (4) “Address at Bihisht-i Zahra” (February 1, 1979). The criteria for the inclusion of these works — as well as those of other revolutionary leaders — in the present study is described in Lafraie, “The Ideology of Revolution,” p. 157. See Chapter 2, section 1. Algar, Islam and Revolution, p. 130 Ibid., p. 38. For a similar argument presented much later, in his speech in commemoration of the first martyrs of the Revolution, see Ibid., p. 219. See, for example, Ibid., pp. 27-28, 142. Ibid., p. 75. Ibid., p. 144. Ibid., pp. 74-75. Ibid., p. 29. Ibid., p. 50. For an explanation of this issue see Mangol Bayat, “The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79: Fundamentalist or Modern?” The Middle East Journal 37:1 (1983), pp. 30-42. See Algar, Islam and Revolution, Lecture II, pp. 40-54. See also Ibid., pp. 37, 61, 62, 76-77, 79, 80, 94, 96, 110, 111, 126, 128, 143, 147. Ibid., p. 54. Ibid., pp. 59-60. Ibid., pp. 61-62. Ibid., p. 62. In his speeches and declarations, Imam Khomeini directs the attention of ordinary Muslims to the same obligations placed on Ulama discussed above.

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21. Algar, Islam and Revolution, p. 186. In October 1964 the Iranian “Parliament” approved a treaty with the U.S. according to which the Iranian Government conceded the jurisdiction of its courts to prosecute American citizens for crimes committed in Iran. 22. Ibid., pp. 236, 260. 23. Ibid., pp. 181-85. 24. Ibid., p. 120. 25. Ibid., pp. 34-39. 26. Ibid., pp. 48-49. 27. Ibid., pp. 49, 50. 28. Ibid., p. 115. 29. Ibid., p. 225. 30. Ibid., p. 34. 31. See, for example, Ibid., pp. 48, 50, 54, 86, 111, 122, 127. 32. Ibid., pp. 234-35. 33. Ibid., pp. 34, 54, 58, 86, 120, 257. 34. Ibid., p. 31. 35. See Ibid., pp. 33, 48, 54, 183, 222. 36. Ibid., p. 31. 37. Ibid., pp. 32-33. 38. Ibid., pp. 218, 224. 39. See Ibid., pp. 182-83. 40. Ibid., pp. 187-88. 41. Ibid., p. 31. 42. Ibid., pp. 254-55. 43. Ibid., pp. 225-56. 44. Ibid., p. 256. 45. For references to all the values listed above and their frequencies of occurrence, see Lafraie, “Ideology of Revolution,” pp. 173-74. 46. Algar, Islam and Revolutio., pp. 55, 56-57. See also Ibid., pp. 30, 33-34, 79. 47. Ibid., p. 56. 48. See Ibid., pp. 76-77, 79, 80, 96, 111, 62, 79, 90. 49. See Ibid., pp. 54, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 78, 86, 89; 139, and 139. 50. Ibid., pp 45; 65-66. 51. Ibid., p. 88. See also p. 56. 52. Ibid., pp. 55-56. 53. Ibid., p. 138. 54. Ibid., p. 83. 55. Ibid., pp. 32, 58. 56. Ibid., pp. 33-34. 57. Ibid., p. 60. 58. Ibid., p. 44. For a list of government functions according to Khomeini see Lafraie, “Ideology of Revolution,” p. 178. 59. Algar, Islam and Revolution, p. 186. 60. See Ibid., pp. 31, 49, 58, 182, 218, 256. 61. Ibid., p. 259. 62. Ibid., p. 30.

230 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.


Ibid., pp. 135-36. Ibid., pp. 136, 144-45. Ibid., pp. 114, 116. See, for example, Ibid., pp. 29, 128, 145. See, for example, Ibid., p. 184. Ibid., p. 129. “The Struggle Against the Appetitive Soul, or the Supreme Jihad”; for an introduction to the lecture and an extract from it, see Ibid., pp. 349-362. 70. Ibid., pp. 135-36, 137. 71. Ibid., p. 112. 72. Ibid., p. 146. 73. Ibid., pp. 143, 227. 74. Ibid., p. 146. 75. Ibid., pp. 126, 127. 76. See Ibid., pp. 29, 37, 76, 131, 187, 188, 216-17, 235. 77. Ibid., p. 115. 78. Ibid., pp. 128-29, 149. 79. Ibid., pp. 131-32. 80. Ibid., p. 235. 81. Ibid., p. 118. 82. See Ibid., pp. 212, 216, 233, 234, 235. 83. Ibid., p. 234. 84. Ibid., p. 146. 85. Ibid., p. 130. 86. Ibid., p. 234. See also Ibid., p. 131. 87. Ibid., pp. 132, 133-34. 88. Ibid., pp. 114-15. 89. Ibid., p. 138. 90. Ibid., pp. 38-9, 139. See Ibid., p. 54 for his view on apathy. 91. Ibid., p. 233. 92. Ibid., p. 137. See also pp. 37, 125, 132, 234. 93. Ibid., p. 136. 94. Ibid., p. 137. 95. For a discussion of this subject see section (a) above. 96. Islam and Revolution, pp. 125, 113, 185. 97. Ibid., pp. 211-20. 98. Ibid., p. 233. 99. Ibid., p. 75. For references to other Imams and prophets see Ibid., pp. 131, 133, 134, 135, 144, 147, 219-20. 100. Ibid., pp. 137, 144. 101. Ibid., pp. 212, 221. 102. Ibid., p. 134. See also pp. 111, 121, 133. 103. Ibid., p. 254. 104. Ibid., p. 227. 105. See Ibid., pp. 48, 71, 134, 138, 219-20, 226, 227. 106. See section 7-a above.

NOTES

231

107. For references to the Prophet Muhammad see Algar, Islam and Revolution, pp. 37, 57, 75, 89; for references to Imam Ali see Ibid., pp. 57, 68, 86, 89, 129-30, 135, 225. 108. Ibid., p. 154. For Khomeini’s references to the term, see Ibid., pp. 48, 92-93, 98, 147-48. 109. See, for example, Ibid., pp. 41, 42, 43, 51, 59-60, 61, 124, 219-20. 110. Ibid., p. 42. 111. Ibid., p. 226. 112. See, for example, Ibid., pp. 68-73 and pp. 109-124, each section of which expounds a single tradition. 113. Ibid., p. 220. 114. See Ibid., pp. 43, 124 and 219-20. 1. 2. 3.

4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16.

Chapter Four Hamid Algar (ed.) (trans. R Campbell), Society and Economics in Islam: Writings and Declarations of Ayatullah Sayyid Mahmud Taleghani, Contemporary Islamic Thought, Persian Series (Berkeley, 1982), p. 11. Quoted in Ibid., p. 10. The full name of the book is Islam wa Malikyat dar Muqayesa ba Nezam-hi Gharb (Islam and Ownership in Comparison to Western Systems) (Tehran, 4th printing, 1344/1965). The first two chapters, which are historical accounts of the evolution of ownership and the emergence of the labor force, have not been included in this study. All quotations from this work in the text have been translated by the present author (as with other translations from Persian unless specified otherwise). Occasionally the texts of other translators have been slightly modified to improve their quality. They include: (1) “Jihad and Martyrdom,” a sermon delivered at the Hidayat Mosque, Tehran, in 1963, and published in Algar, Society and Economics in Islam, pp. 73-108; (2) Tabayun-e Resalat Barai Qeyam ba Qist (Clarifying [the meaning of] the Mission to Rise up for Equity), a collection of six lectures delivered at the Hidayat Mosque, Tehran, during the 1979 Revolution (Tehran, 1360/1981). Ibid., p. 45. Islam wa Malikyat, pp. 120, 122-23. Ibid., pp. 222-23. Algar, Society and Economics in Islam, p. 53. Ibid., p. 79. Ibid., pp. 83-84. Tabayun-e Resalat, p. 84. Ibid., pp. 85, 86, 87, 92. Islam wa Malikyat, pp. 297-98. Ayatollah Taleqani participated in at least three international Islamic conferences outside Iran: in Karachi, Pakistan, in 1953; in Cairo, Egypt, in 1959; and in Jerusalem, Jordan, in 1961. See Bahran Afrasiabi and Saeed Dehqan, Taleqani wa Tarikh (Taleqani and History) (Tehran, 1360/1981), pp. 145-48, 169. See, e.g., Tabayun-e Resalat, pp. 65-69. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

232 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY Ibid., pp. 55, 73, 74, 75. Islam wa Malikyat, p. 322. Algar, Society and Economics in Islam, pp. 90-91. Tabayun-e Resalat, pp. 38, 41, 54, 67. Ibid., pp. 23- 92. Ibid., pp. 250-51, 267. Tabayun-e Resalat, pp. 17, 48. Society and Economics in Islam, p. 102. Tabayun-e Resalat, pp. 19-20. Ibid., p. 48. Islam wa Malikyat, pp. 166-67, see also 197, 258. Ibid., p. 199. For references to all the values listed above and their frequencies of occurrence, see Lafraie, “Ideology of Revolution,” pp. 206-207. Tabayun-e Resalat, pp. 97-98. Islam wa Malikyat, pp. 129-30. Ibid., pp. 140-41. Ibid., p. 69. Tabayun-e Resalat, pp. 40, 50-51. Islam wa Malikyat, p. 274. See also Ibid., pp. 204-207. Tabayun-e Resalat, pp. 22, 46. See also Ibid., pp. 40, 69, and 81. Islam wa Malikyat, p. 125. Ibid., p. 294. Ibid., pp. 126-27, 292-308. See Ibid., pp. 122, 125, 143, 146-47. Ibid., pp. 149-51, 334-36, 255-57. Algar, Society and Economics in Islam, pp. 28, 30. Ibid., pp. 30-31. Islam wa Malikyat, pp. 185-89. Algar, Society and Economics in Islam, p. 43. Islam wa Malikyat, pp. 204-207, 230. Ibid., pp. 207-219, 238-39. For references, see notes (17) and (18) above. Tabayun-e Resalat, p. 35. See also Ibid., pp. 13-14, 21, 25, 45, 76, 81. Ibid., p. 52. For references to other points noted in this paragraph, see Ibid., pp. 34, 35, 40. See Ibid., pp. 18-19. See also Islam wa Malikyat, , pp. 136-37, 138-39. Tabayun-e Resalat, pp. 10, 12, 18, 25, 27, 31, 80. Algar, Society and Economics in Islam, p. 92. See also Tabayun-e Resalat, p. 72. For further references to popular uprisings, see Ibid., pp. 13, 23. Algar, Society and Economics in Islam, p. 95. For the first condition, see Ibid., p. 94. Tabayun-e Resalat, pp. 72-76. See Ibid., pp. 38, 67-68, 75, 78, 93. Islam wa Malikyat, p. 117. See section (1) above. Tabayun-e Resalat, p. 14. Ibid., p. 24.

NOTES 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

70. 71. 72. 73.

233

Ibid., p. 80. Se also Ibid., p. 36. Ibid., pp. 54-55, 39. Algar, Society and Economics in Islam, pp. 89, 101; Tabayun-e Resalat, p. 26. Algar, Society and Economics in Islam, p. 102. See also Ibid., pp. 101, 103-104; and Tabayun-e Resalat, pp. 41, 60, 78, 89-90, 93, and 95. See, for example, Islam wa Malikyat, pp. 126, 221, 274, 295-99, 301, 303-306. See also Society and Economics in Islam, pp. 97-98. Ibid., pp. 96-98, 101-104; Tabayun-e Resalat, pp. 39, 49-50. Ibid., p. 94. Ibid., p. 74; Islam wa Malikyat, p. 224. References to the Holy Quran in Taleqani’s works are so numerous that they require no documentation. For references to the traditions of the Prophet and the Imams, see Ibid., pp. 148, 153-57, 187-89, 205-207, 215-18, 272-72; Algar, Society and Economics in Islam, pp. 84 , 92-94, 96. For references to history, see Islam wa Malikyat, pp. 126-27, 161-62, 65-66, 187, 221, 262, 274, 285-313. For references to philosophers and scholars, see Ibid., pp. 133-34, 214. Ibid, pp. 149-51, 25-27, 233-36, 256-67, 266-67, 310-18. For his arguments on the shortcomings of man-made laws and on Islamic legislature, see Ibid., pp. 117-142. See, e.g., an interpretation of 4:29 in Islam wa Malikyat, pp. 200-203. Ibid., pp. 128, 149, 226, 235, 256-57, 267. Ibid., pp. 128, 235.

Chapter Five Dr Abdul Karim Soroush (ed.), Yadnama-e Ustad-e Shahid Murtaza Mutahari (In Commemoration of the Martyred Teacher Murtaza Mutahhari) Vol. I (Tehran, 1360/1981), pp. 535-552. 2. The following works by Mutahhari are included for analysis in this study: (1) The Martyr, an article written in the mid 1970s, trans. n. a. (Houston, Texas, 1981); (2) Insan dar Quran (Man in the Quran), a book probably written in 1977-78; and (3) Jame’a wa Tarikh (Society and History), a monograph also probably written in 1977-78. Both (2) and (3) were published as part of a seven-volume series under the title Muqaddamah-e bar Jahanbini Islami (An Introduction to the Worldview of Islam) (Qum, Iran, date n. a.); Insan dar Quran as vol. 4 (pp. 245-306), and Jame’a wa Tarikh as vol. 5 (pp. 307-482). Insan dar Quran has been translated into English under the title Human Beings in the Quran (trans. Hossein Vahid Dastjerdi) (Tehran, 1983). 3. Jahanbini Islami, pp. 363, 376. 4. Human Beings in the Quran, p. 88. 5. Jahanbini Islami, p. 262. 6. Ibid., pp. 263-65. 7. Ibid., p. 253. 8. For the quotations in this paragraph, see Ibid., pp. 331, 460-63, and 448. 9. Ibid., p. 284. 10. The creation of a sense of community as a component of political consciousness was defined earlier in this study (see Chapter II, section (1), the quotation is from that section too). Mutahhari has nothing to say (at least, not

1.

234

11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY in the works analyzed here) about the other component of political consciousness: “to provide a framework for the popularization of higher needs and values.” See Jahanbini Islami, pp. 288-92, 299-302. Ibid., pp. 292-93. Ibid., p. 340. Ibid., pp. 314, 317. Haftanama-e Ummat, No. 57, May 21, 1980; quoted in Sayed Hussain Shafiei Darabi, Yadnamah-e Ustad Mutahhari (In Commemoration of Professor Mutahhari) (Qum, Iran, 1360/1981), pp. 318-19. Haftanama-e Ummat was a newsweekly paper published in Persian in Tehran by the “Militant Muslims’ Movement”. Ibid., pp. 164, 193, and 219. Ibid., p. 211. Occasionally this can be deduced from his writings; see, for example, Jahanbini Islami, pp. 276-77. For references to the values listed here and their frequencies of occurrence, see Lafraie, “Ideology of Revolution,” p. 235. For the points discussed below, see Majmoa-e Yadasht-ha, Sokhanrani-ha wa Musahiba-hi Ustad-e Shahid Murtaza Mutahhari Piramun-e Inqilab-e Islami (A Collection of notes, speeches, and interviews on the Islamic Revolution by the Martyred Teacher Murtaza Mutahharis) (Tehran, date n.a.): (a) pp. 80-81; (b) pp. 91-91; (c) pp. 85-86; (d) p. 59; (e) pp. 60-62; (f) pp. 62-62, 103-104; and (g) p. 65. See Jahanbini Islaimi, pp. 433-39, 449, 467-68. Ibid., pp. 457, 461-62. This is the same “human consciousness” noted in section (1) above, looked upon from a different angle. Jahanbini Islaimi, p. 462. Ibid., pp. 263-65. “Complex” in this context means “a set of related feelings, ideas, or impulses that may be repressed but that continues to influence thoughts and behavior” (Encarta Dictionary, provided online by Microsoft Office 2003). Ibid., pp. 436, 460. Ibid., p. 460. Ibid., p. 277. The discussion is limited to the works covered in this study. Jahanbini Islaimi, pp. 319-21, 340. Ibid., p. 327. Ibid., pp. 469-70. Ibid., pp. 479-80. See Ibid., pp. 342-44. Ibid., pp. 270-72. For the previous quotation see Ibid., p. 330. See The Martyr, pp. 3-4. See Ibid., pp. 5, 15-16. Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

NOTES

235

40. See Ibid., pp. 11-14. 41. See, for example, Ibid., pp. 4, 8, 10, 11, 14-17, 21, and 26. 42. Ibid., pp. 5, 8, 9, 14. For stories, see, for example, Ibid., pp. 7-8, 11-14, 15, 22-23, 28. 43. See section (6) above. 44. Jahanbini Islami, pp. 366-421. 45. The English translation is by Mahliqa Qara’i, “Sociology of the Quran, Part II: A Critique of Historical Materialism”, Al-Tawhid 1:4 (1984), p. 132. Al-Tawhid was a quarterly journal published in English in Tehran. 46. See Jahanbini Islami, pp. 342-44, 260, 365, 259, 354, and 286. 1. 2. 3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

Chapter Six Hamid Algar, The Roots of the Islamic Revolution (Ontario, 1983), p. 72. Ibid., p. 72. The following works of Eng. Bazargan were selected for this study: (1) Musalman-e Ijtemaie wa Jahani (The Social and Universal Muslim), the text of two speeches delivered at Hedayat Mosque and at a meeting of the Students’ Islamic Society in January 1960, edited by Abdul Ali Bazargan (Houston, 1356 /1977); (2) “Man and God” (a speech delivered to a meeting of the Engineers’ Islamic Society in January 1961), published in Chahar Maqala (Four Essays) (Tehran, date n. a.), pp. 99-154; (3) “Ali and Islam,” (a speech delivered in February 1961), published in Del wa Damagh (The Heart and the Mind) (Tehran, 1344 /1965), pp. 37-50; (4) “Youthful Islam,” (a speech delivered at a gathering of the Students’ Islamic Society in early 1962), published in Chahar Maqala, , pp. 155-212; (5) Marz Meyan-e Deen wa Seyasat (The Borderline between Religion and Politics), (a speech delivered at the second Congress of the Islamic Societies of Iran in August 1962), (Publisher and date n.a.). Musalman-e Ijtemaie, pp. 27-33. Ibid., p.48. Ibid., p. 63. Musalmay-e Ijtemaie, pp. 52-53, 66. Ibid., p. 67 and Deen wa Seyasat, pp. 38-39. Deen wa Seyasat, pp. 4, 12-14, 41. Ibid., pp. 5-9. Ibid., pp. 45-53. Ibid., pp. 22-24, 31-34, 53 (See p. 33 for the quoted Hadith); Del wa Damagh, pp. 35-70; Musalman-e Ijtemaie, pp. 36, 76; and Chahar Maqala, pp. 205-6. Ibid., pp. 125, 130, 139, 142. Ibid., pp. 132, 134. Chahar Maqala, p. 206. For the passages quoted see Ibid., pp. 110, 112-13, 115. Musalman-e Ijtemaie, pp. 38-40. Ibid., p. 42. Ibid., p. 12. Chahar Maqala, pp. 185-86. Ibid., pp. 198-208. Deen wa Seyasat, p. 46.

236


23. Ibid., p. 8. 24. Chahar Maqala, p. 212. 25. Ibid., p. 114. Yet straight after making after these remarks, Bazargan criticizes American society for its treatment of the individual as “a dollar-producing machine”. 26. For references for all these values and their frequencies of occurrence, see Lafraie, “Ideology of Revolution,” p. 262. 27. Del wa Damagh, pp. 47, 51. 28. Ibid., p. 48. 29. Ibid., pp. 48-49. 30. Del wa Damagh, p. 44. 31. Ibid., p. 44. 32. Chahar Maqala, pp. 108-109. 33. Musalaman-e Ijtemaie, pp. 32, 34-35. 34. Ibid., p. 66. 35. Chahar Maqala, p. 212. 36. Ibid., pp. 120-130 (the quote is on p. 130). 37. Ibid., p. 138. 38. Musalman-e Ijtemaie, p. 64. 39. Chahar Maqala, p. 200. 40. Ibid., pp. 210-11. 41. Del wa Damagh, pp. 40-41. 42. Chahar Maqala. pp. 186-96. 43. Ibid., pp. 188-89. 44. Chahar Maqala, p. 212. 45. Ibid., pp. 205-206. 46. Del wa Damagh, pp. 40-50. 47. Chahar Maqala, pp. 205-206. 48. See, for example, “Borderline between Religion and Politics,” Deen wa Seyasat, pp. 35-39, 46-48. 49. See, eg, Chahar Maqala, pp. 122, 124, 127, 131, 162-64, 182-191, 204-208; Musalman-e Ijtemaie, pp. 21-34, 57-63. 50. For references to the Prophet and the Imams see sections (7) and (8) above, as well as Ibid., pp. 32-35; Musalman-e Ijtemaie, pp. 34, 36. 51. Chahar Maqala, p. 125. 52. Ibid., p. 209. 53. Del wa Damagh, pp. 31-32. 54. See Chahar Maqala, pp. 105-109, 115-17, 118-19, 123-24, 134-37. 55. For further references in the works covered here, see Deen wa Seyasat, pp. 28-30; Masalman-e Ijtemaie, p. 47; and Chahar Maqala, pp. 158-59 and 206-207. 56. See section (6) above. 57. Chahar Maqala, pp. 164-69. 58. Academic American Encyclopedia (Princeton, NJ, 1981), Vol. 4, p. 209. This quotation is a fair summary of Bazargan’s lengthy discussion. 59. Chahar Maqala, p. 169. 60. Deen wa Seyasat, pp. 24-25.

NOTES

237

61. For this argument, see Chahar Maqala, pp. 139-42 and, for a brief summary, see section (1c) above. 62. Chahar Maqala, pp. 147-49. 1. 2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

Chapter Seven Algar, The Roots of the Islamic Revolution, p. 71. See, e.g. Ibid., p. 71. Ali Jahanzadeh (ed.), Doktor Shariati (Doctor Shariate) (Iran, 1358 /1979), pp. 26-221. At least ten more works could easily be added to the list provided here. The selection of five works from among 200 or so is obviously extremely subjective. While I refer occasionally to Dr Shariati’s other works, the following works were selected for this study: (1) “Shiism: A Complete Party” (a lecture delivered in Husainiya-e Irshad, Tehran, in Fall 1351 /1972), “Shia yakHezb-e Tamaam,” in Shia (in Persian), Collected Works, Vol. 7 (Tehran, date n. a.), pp. 7-107. While this lecture was delivered over two nights, this study includes only the first part. (2) Madhhab Alaih-e Madhhab (Religion against Religion), a lecture delivered at an unnamed conference in the early 1970s (USA, date n. a.); (3) “Shahadat” (Martyrdom), a lecture delivered in Tehran in winter March 1972, excerpted in Kayhan-e Hawai-e (Kayhan Airmail) 6 November 1985, p. 10. (4) “Reflections of a Concerned Muslim: On the Plight of the Oppressed” (a lecture delivered in Tehran in Fall 1970), reprinted in Race and Class XXI, 1 (1979): 33-40 (translator unnamed). (5) “Modern Man and his Prisons,” a lecture reprinted in Man and Islam, Dr Fatollah Marjani trans. (Houston, 1981), pp. 46-62. Neither the date nor place of the lecture are given in the book. Man and Islam, pp. 46-47. Ibid., pp. 51-52. Ibid., pp. 48-50. Ibid., pp. 49-50. Ibid., pp. 50-51. Ibid., pp. 55-58. Ibid., p. 58. Ibid., pp. 58-60. Ibid., p. 62. Shia, p. 42. Ibid., pp. 42-49. Ibid., p. 49. Ibid., pp. 55-56. Ibid., pp. 57-58. Ibid., pp. 61-62. Ibid., pp. 59-60. Madhhab, pp. 10, 26-27. Ibid., pp. 16-22. Ibid., pp. 23-25. Ibid., p. 45. Ibid., pp. 9-11. Ibid., p. 14.

238 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61.

62.

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY Ibid., p. 23. Shia, pp. 16, 26. Ibid., pp. 98-99. Madhhab, pp. 44, 47. “Shahadat,” p. 10. Shia, pp. 33-34. Ibid., pp. 105-6. Ibid., p. 74. Ibid., pp. 74-75. Ibid., pp. 78-82. Ibid., p. 87. Ibid., pp. 23-30. Ibid., p. 28. The citations and quotations in this section are all taken from “Shahadat,” p. 10. Race and Class, p. 34. Ibid., p. 39. Ibid., pp. 34-35. Madhhab, pp. 36-38. See Race and Class, pp. 36, 37, 39. “Shahadat,” p. 10. Man and Islam, p. 48. Emphasis added. Ali Shariati, Khudsazi Inqilabi (Revolutionary Self-construction), Collected Works, Vol. 2 (Tehran, 1356 /1977), p. 153. Race and Class, p. 40. Padar, Madar, Ma Mutahamaim (Father, Mother, We are to be Blamed) (Tehran, 1350/1971), reprinted by the Muslim Students Association of USA and Canada, 1976. A reference to Islam’s basic proclamation of faith: “(There is) no god but God.” See Ali Shariati, Tashyu-e Alawi wa Tashayu-e Safawi (Alawid Shiism and Safavid Shiism). Collected Works, Vol. 9, (Tehran, 1359/1980). Ibid., p. 15. For full references to the values listed here and their frequencies of occurrence, see Lafraie, “Ideology of Revolution,” pp 298-99. Madhhab, pp. 20, 55-57. Ibid., p. 25. Shia, pp. 42, 56. Madhhab, p. 34. Shia, p. 46. Ali Shariati, Ummat wa Imamat (The Brotherly Community and Leadership) (Tehran, 1358/1980), pp. 182-83. To support his view, Shariati refers to a debate between Abudhar (a famous companion of the Prophet) and Maaweya (a ruler who adopted a luxurious lifestyle and initiated hereditary monarchy in early Islamic society). See Madhhab, pp. 31-32. Shia, p. 76.

NOTES 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

239

Madhhab, p. 19. Ibid., pp. 18-19. Ibid., p. 15. See also pp. 24, 32, 46, 47. Shia, p. 103. Madhhab p. 44. Man and Islam, , p. 110. Shia, pp. 16-17. He writes, for example: “It is ‘Imamat’ or leadership which is the factor [that provides] life and movement [to society]. Its existence and continuity makes the existence and continuity of the Ummat possible. The leader becomes the motor for the movement of the ideological society and the element which provides it with direction.” Shia, p. 47. 71. Ali Shariati (trans. Hamid Algar), On the Sociology of Islam (Berkeley, 1977), pp. 48, 50. 72. Ibid., p. 49. 73. Ibid., p. 49. 74. Khudsazi Inqilabi, pp. 158-59. 75. Madhhab, p. 34; see also pp. 44-45. 76. Shia, p. 29. 77. Khudsazi Inqilabi, p. 151. The word “Ikhlas” is emphasized in the original Persian text. 78. Ibid., p. 157-58. 79. Ibid., pp. 159-60. 80. Ibid., p. 173. 81. Ibid., pp. 176-77. 82. Ali Shariati, “The Mission of the Free-Thinkers”, in Man and Islam, pp. 102-119. The quotation is from p. 103. 83. Shia, p. 93. 84. Ibid., pp. 95-97. 85. Ibid., pp. 64, 105. 86. See Ibid., pp. 124-48. 87. Man and Islam, p. 106. 88. Ali Shariati(trans. Laleh Bakhtiar), Fatima is Fatima (Tehran, 1980), p. 65. 89. For a discussion of this subject, see Soroosh Irfani, Revolutionary Islam in Iran: Popular Liberation or Religious Dictatorship? (London, 1983), pp. 121-25. 90. Man and Islam, p. 109. 91. Shia, pp. 21-22. 92. Ibid., pp. 63-64. 93. Ibid., pp. 57-60. 94. Ibid., pp. 19-21. 95. Ibid., pp. 22-23. 96. Madhhab, p. 16. 97. Shia, p. 86. Shariati’s statement is based on the Quranic verse 13:11. 98. On the Sociology of Islam, p. 97. 99. Ibid., p. 98. 100. Ibid., p. 108; Madhhab, pp. 33-35. 101. Ibid., p. 25.

240


102. Sociology of Islam p. 10. 103. “Shahadat,” p. 10. Shariati’s choice of words is deliberate to emphasize that those martyred are alive, but those living without fulfilling their responsibilities are just “moving corpses.” 104. Shia, p. 88. 105. “Shahadat,” p. 10. 106. Ibid., p. 10. See also Shia, pp. 10-14. 107. See section (2) above. 108. Doktor Shariati, p. 44. The symbolic significance of Shariati’s speech on “Great Civilizations” is also noted in this book. 109. “Shahadat,” p. 10. 110. Shia, pp. 54-58; Madhhab, pp. 11-12; Race and Class, p. 38. 111. Madhhab, p. 34. 112. Race and Class, pp. 38-40; Shia, pp. 13-14. 113. Ibid., pp. 10, 13, 14, 72-73, 92; “Shahadat,” p. 10. 114. Ibid., p. 10. 115. Shia, pp. 11-13, 29, 33, 93-100; Madhhab, pp. 50-51. 116. Ibid., pp. 11-12, 15. 117. Ibid., p. 15. 118. Ibid., p. 15. 119. Ibid., pp. 11-12, 15, 46. 120. Ibid., pp. 67-68. See also Ibid., pp. 8-9, 23-24, 52-53, 65-66, 69-72, 75, 79-80, 8485; Man and Islam, pp. 47-48. 121. Shia, p. 102. 122. “Shahadat,” p. 10. 123. Shia, p. 106. 124. “Shahadat,” p. 10 125. Ibid., p. 10. 126. Ibid., p. 10. 127. See, for example Ali Shariati, “Shiism: A Complete Party” in Shia, pp. 16, 19-21, 30-31, 34, 41, 48, 50, 56, 58, 61, 77, 86-89, 96, 102. 128. For references to the Quran in other works included in this study see Madhhab, pp. 18-31, 45; Man and Islam, pp. 46-48; and “Shahadat,” p. 10. 129. Shia, p. 86. 130. On the Sociology of Islam, pp. 63-64. 131. See, for example, Ali Shariati, The Visage of Muhammad, trans. A.A. Sachedina (Houston: Free Islamic Literature, Inc, 1979); see also Race and Class, pp. 36-37. 132. See, for example, Shia, pp. 34, 61, 93, 101; Madhhab, p. 44; Man and Islam, pp. 52, Race and Class, pp. 37. 133. Shia, p. 38. 134. Ibid., pp. 9-14, 31, 38-39, 66-67, 69, 72-73, 93, 103; Madhhab, pp. 31-32, 50-51; Race and Class, pp. 36-38; “Shahadat,”p. 10. 135. See, for example, Madhhab, pp. 1-5, 9-13, 15-21, 26-28, 35-38, 41-50; Race and Class, pp. 34-40; Man and Islam, p.48. 136. See, for example, Madhhab, pp. 42-43.

NOTES

241

137. Shia, pp. 15-16 (There is a measure of exaggeration in this statement). For other references to academic research, see Ibid., p. 39; Madhhab, pp. 1, 4-5, 18, 19, 22, 36-38, 49; Race and Class, p. 33. 138. Shia, p. 15. 139. Ibid., pp. 8-15. 140. Ibid., pp. 83-84. For other references to factual observation, see Madhhab, p. 49; “Shahadat,” p. 10; Man and Islam, p. 60. 141. See, for example, Shia, pp. 16, 19-21, 30-31, 73, 76, 97-98, 105-6; Madhhab, pp. 16, 49. 142. See Man and Islam, pp. 49-53, 57, 59, 60, 62; Shia, pp. 10, 31, 79, 90; Madhhab, pp. 43, 49, and 50. 143. See section (2) above. 144. See, for example, Ali Shariati, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic Critique, trans. R. Campbell (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980) pp. 40-41, 49-96; Madhhab, p. 49; Man and Islam, pp. 103-7. 145. See Man and Islam, pp. 52-55. 146. Padar, Madar, Ma Mutahamaim, p. 9. 147. Ibid., p. 9. 148. Ibid., p. 9. 149. Shia, p. 14. See also Ibid., p. 33; “Shahadat,” p. 10; Race and Class, pp. 38-40. 150. Padar, Madar, Ma Mutahamaim, p. 12. See also Shia, pp. 18, 32-33, 37-38. 151. Madhhab, pp. 4-5, 25. 152. See, for example, his lecture on “Martyrdom,” “Shahadat,” p. 10. See also Race and Class, pp. 33-40. 153. Shia, pp. 92-97. 154.For other examples see Madhhab, pp. 48-49 and pp. 50-51. 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Chapter Eight Three of Bani-Sadr’s works were selected for the present study: (1) Kaysh-e Shakhseyyat (The Cult of Personality) (place of publication and publisher n. a., 1976). The analysis offered here focuses on the preface and chapters 1 to 6, pp. 1-48, 231-314. (2) Bayanya-e Jamhuri Islami (Manifesto of the Islamic Republic) (Tehran, 1979). This book consists of two parts; the first was written in 1971-72 and the second in 1978-79. (In the preface, Bani-Sadr claims that the whole book was written in 1971-72. A careful study, however, shows that the second part was written — or at least substantially revised — in the light of the revolutionary developments in Iran in 1978-79.) (3) Rabita bayn-e Madyat wa Manawyat (The Relationship between Materialism and Idealism), a speech delivered to the Union of Muslim Students’ Associations in Europe in October 1977. Published as a pamphlet (place of publication and publisher n. a., 1978). Keysh-e Shakhseyyat (preface), pp. 1-2. Ibid., p. 1. Ibid., p. 2 (emphasis in the Persian text). See Ibid., pp. 7, 51, 87. Ibid. (preface), p. 3. Ibid., p. 270. Ibid., p. 273.

242 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY Ibid., pp. 276-77. Ibid., pp. 280-81, 282 (emphasis in the Persian text). Ibid., p. 286. Madyat wa Manawyat, p. 53; see also Bani-Sadr, Mawazena-ha (The Balances) (Tehran, 1356 /1977), pp. 1-2. Ibid., pp. 42-43; Madyat wa Manawyat, p. 48. Mawazena-ha, pp. 3-4, 7, 26. Tameem-e Imamat wa Mubareza baa Sansor (The Generalization of Imamat and the Struggle against Censorship) (Place of publication and publisher n. a., 1978), pp. 96-138. See also Madyat wa Manawyat, pp. 22-23, 42. Ibid., pp. 42-43. Ibid., p. 5. As is evident in the first paragraph of section (a) below, and also when he compares the political, economic, social, and cultural goals and activities of the “political power” with those of “religion” and demonstrates how the Shah’s regime violates religious principles. See Jamhuri Islami (preface), pp. Alif to Thai. Madyat wa Manawyat, pp. 3-5,. Ibid., pp. 1-4. Ibid., pp. 5-12. The quotations are from p. 11. Ibid., pp. 18-29. Ibid., pp. 45-66. Ibid., pp. 67-77. Ibid., pp. 15-20. Keysh-e Shakhseyyat, pp. 1, 6. For full references for the values listed here and their frequencies of occurrence, see Lafraie, “Ideology of Revolution,” pp 343-44. Keysh-e Shakhseyyat, p. 288. Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York, 1984), p. 94. Keysh-e Shakhseyyat, pp. 276-77. See Ibid., pp. 279-82; Jamhuri Islami, (preface) p. Tuy; Mawazena-ha, p. 3. Jamhuri Islami, pp. 98, 115. “Islamic Economics: Ownership and Tauhid,” excerpted from Bani-Sadr’s Iqtesad-e Tawhidi (The Economy of Tawhid), (trans. and eds. A. Dabirian and David Albert) in David Albert (ed.), Tell the American People: Perspectives on the Iranian Revolution (Philadelphia, 1980), p. 194. Jamhuri Islami, pp. 194-97. Ibid., p. 119. Ibid., pp. 94, 116, 126. Ibid., p. 94. Ibid., pp. 95-96. Ibid. (preface), p. Jeem. Ibid. (preface), p. Bai; Ibid., pp. 94, 113-14. Ibid., pp. 99-122. The quotation is from p. 106 (emphasis in the original.) Here Bani-Sadr offers detailed guidelines for fundamental reform of the national economy. Ibid. (preface), p. Alif.

NOTES 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84.

243

Ibid., pp. 93, 115-16, 118. Ibid., p. 128. Ibid., pp. 97, 137-38. Keysh-e Shakhseyyat, p. 25. Ibid., p. 27. Madyat wa Manawyat, pp. 15-20, 22-26, 42-43. For Bani-Sadr’s views on capitalism and censorship see sections (2b) and (1c) above respectively. Keysh-e Shakhseyyat, p. 4. Jamhuri Islami, (preface) p. Zuy. Keysh-e Shakhseyyat, p. 20. Ibid., pp. 18-19. Madyat wa Manawyat, p. 140. Keysh-e Shakhseyyat, pp. 23-33, 291-92. Madyat wa Manawyat, pp. 51-52. Ibid., pp. 22-23. Jamhuri Islami, p. 136. Keysh-e Shakhseyyat, p. 20. Madyat wa Manawyat, p. 26. Ibid., p. 28. Keysh-e Shakhseyyat, p. 274. See also Jamhuri Islami (preface), p. Zuy and Madyat wa Manawyat, p. 29. Ibid., p. 42. See also section (1c) above. Ibid., p. 5. Keysh-e Shakhseyyat, p. 289. Ibid., p. 288. Ibid., p. 309. Ibid., p. 31. Ibid. (preface), p. One; Jamhuri Islami (preface), p. Ray. Ibid. (preface), p. Zay. Ibid., p. 123. Ibid., p. 143. Keysh-e Shakhseyyat, pp. 7, 10-11, 18-19, 25-26. Ibid., pp. 32-33. This is the case at least in the works covered in this study. Madyat wa Manawyat, p. 41-42. Ibid., pp. 38-39. Keysh-e Shakhseyyat, pp. 3, 8-25. Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., pp. 10, 21. Ibid., pp. 19, 22. See, e. g., Madyat wa Manawyat, pp. 38-41. See, e. g., Ibid., pp. 7-8, 11-12, 15-16, 17-18, 19, 20-23. The other two works included in this study each contain only a single reference to the Holy Quran. See Jamhuri Islami, p. 136; Madyat wa Manawyat, p. 35. For these occasional references see Keysh-e Shakhseyyat, p. 292, 302-303; Madyat wa Manawyat, pp. 38-40; Jamhuri Islami (preface), p. Tuy; Ibid., p. 45.

244


85. Keysh-e Shakhseyyat, pp. 295-96, 303. It is interesting to note that Bani-Sadr refers to Imam Khomeini as Mr. Khomeini — without using the title “Ayatollah”, as was usual at the time. 86. See, e. g., Jamhuri Islami (preface), pp. Alif to Zuy; Madyat wa Manawyat, pp. 3137, 50. 87. For an example of his use of logical reasoning, see section (1b) above. For further examples, see Madyat wa Manawyat, pp. 14, 15-16, 25, 27-28. 88. Keysh-e Shakhseyyat (preface), p. 5; see also Jamhuri Islami (preface), p. Tuy; Madyat wa Manawyat, p. 49. 89. For references to history, see Keysh-e Shakhseyyat, p. 31, and for Western thinkers, see Ibid., p. 35. 90. See Keysh-e Shakhseyyat, pp. 271-89. For a summary see section (1a) above. 91. See Keysh-e Shakhseyyat, pp. 285-88. Chapter Nine For works on this subject, see Chapter I, note (18). Hamid Algar, Islam and Revolution, p. 15. Martin Vanessa (Creating an Islamic State) discusses the book in much more detail. 3. See Chapter III, section (5c) for the reference. 4. This point —which was made in Lafraie, “Ideology of Revolution,” p. 368— is confirmed by Martin, Creating an Islamic State, p. 55. 5. S.H R. (Full name n. a.), Barrasi wa Tahlile as Nahzat-e Imam Khomeini, pp. 43-50. It should be noted, however, that Imam Khomeini did not openly advocate revolution. According to the anonymous author of this work, until Khomeini started his resistance movement in the 1960s, his intentions were kept secret even from his closest associates (p. 96). 6. See Yusuf Ali The Holy Qur-an, footnotes 47, 48, 3777-3782, 5032, 6199, and 6200. 7. This subject is not covered in this study, but is presented in some detail in Martin, Creating An Islamic State. For Khomeini’s concept of man, which is very similar to other leaders’ concept, see Farhang Rajaee, Islamic Values and World View, Chapter IV, pp. 35-50. 8. The first is advocated by Shariati, and the second by Bani-Sadr. The characteristics attributed by Bani-Sadr to the “cult of personality” are similar to those ascribed by the Quran to “evil social systems.” It could thus be argued that the duty to oppose it is an Islamic duty. 9. For example, Khomeini considers the social responsibility to present the authentic teachings of Islam to be “more necessary than prayer and fasting.” See Chapter III, Section (1a). 10. See Chapter II, Section (5a). 11. See Yusuf Ali The Holy Qu-ran, f. n. 5032. 12. For example, the leaders (including Shariati in works not discussed here) base the principle of freedom of though and expression on the Quranic text: “… So announce the good news to my servants, — Those who listen to the word, and follow the best of it” (39:17-18). Although some commentators take “the word” to mean the Quran itself, others take it as “any word,” interpreting the text to mean that “good men would listen to all that is said and choose the best of 1. 2.

NOTES

13. 14. 15. 16. 1. 2.

245

it” (Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur-an, f. n. 4269 — emphasis added). Frequent references to censorship in the Islamic Republic of Iran indicate the extent to which it has deviated from the ideals of the revolution. At least in the works consulted for this study. See Chapter III, Section (2h). See, e. g., The Quran (2: 8 and 2: 21). See, for example, Martin, Creating an Islamic State, p. 57. Chapter Ten Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations. The quotation is from p. 28. See, for example, the following works: John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, 3rd ed. (Oxford, New York, 1999). See especially chapter 6, “Islam and the West: A Clash of Civilizations?”, pp. 212-289. Edward Said, “The Clash of Definitions,” in Emran Qureshi and Michael Sells (eds.), The New Crusade: Constructing the Muslim Enemy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 68-87. John Trumpbour, “The Clash of Civilizations: Samuel P. Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and the Remaking of the Post-Cold War World Order,” in Ibid., pp. 88-130. Roy P. Mottahedeh, “The Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist’s Critique,” in Ibid., pp. 131-151. Walter Benn Michaels, “Political Science Fictions,” New Literary History 31:4 (2000), pp. 649-664. Christopher Vasillopulos, “Clash of Civilizations: Prophecy or Contradiction in Terms,” Arab Studies Quarterly 25:1/2 (Winter 2003), pp. 89-101. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, “Islam and the West: Testing the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ Thesis,” John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Faculty Research Working Papers Series (RWP02-015), April 2002. Available online (accessed 19 January 2005): http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP02015/$File/rwp02_015_norris_rev1.pdf. Jonathan Fox, “Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict: Islam and the West,” Journal of Peace Research 38: 4 (2001), pp. 459-472. Andrej Tusicisny, “Civilizational Conflicts: More Frequent, Longer, and Bloodier?” Journal of Peace Research 41: 4 (2004), pp. 485-498. Manus I. Midlabsky, “Democracy and Islam: Implications for Civilizational Conflict and the Democratic Peace,” International Studies Quarterly 42:3 (1998), pp. 485-511. Errol A. Henderson, “Mistaken Identity: Testing the Clash of Civilizations Thesis in Light of Democratic Peace Claim,” British Journal of Political Science 34: 3 (2004), pp. 539-555. For a brief overview of Huntington’s thesis and a good summary of its critiques, see Engin I. Erdem, “The ‘Clash of Civilizations’: Revisited after September 11,” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 1:2 (2002), pp. 81-107.

246 3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC MILITANCY See Ervand Abrahamian, “The US Media, Huntington and September 11,” Third World Quarterly 24: 3 (2003), pp. 529-544. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, p. 217. David Brooks, “The Hookie Awards,” New York Times, 25 December 2004 and “Hookie Awards, Part 2,” New York Times, 28 December 2004. In these articles, Brooks selects “some of the most important essays written in 2004.” They include “When Islam Breaks Down” by Theodore Dalrymple and “World War IV” by Norman Podhoretz. The latter argues that “the struggle against Islam is essentially like the struggle against communism. It will lead to similar domestic debate and will require the same U.S. leadership and resolve” (“Hookie Awards, Part 2”). Robert S. Snyder, “Hating America: Bin Laden as a Civilizational Revolutionary,” The Review of Politics 65: 4 (2003), pp. 325-349. See Erdem, “The ‘Clash of Civilizations’,” pp. 89-90; and also Esposito, The Islamic Threat. See Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim: A Study of Islamic Sources in the European Context (Leicester, UK, 1999, Reprinted 2002); and Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. See Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, pp. 51, 69-72 and 46. Ibid., pp. 26-27. See Ibid., pp. 183, 184, 240, 251-252, and 308. On the moral decline and the economic and demographic limitations of the “West” (i.e., the US), see Ibid., pp. 304 and 310-311. Ibid., p. 184. Ibid., p. 212. Ibid., pp. 217-218. In fairness to Huntington, it should be noted that elsewhere he argues against an insistence on “the universality of Western culture” (see, for example, Ibid., pp. 310, 318). This point is irrelevant to the discussion here, however. Ibid., p. 247. Ibid., pp. 216-217. Ibid., p. 216. Ibid., p. 217. Yonah Alexander and Michael S. Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda: Profile of a Terrorist Network (New York, 2001), Appendix 1 A, p. 1. Ibid., p. 6. The quotation is from Charles W. Collier, “The Harsh Judgment of History: The Terrorist Worldview and Intellectual Values,” Dissent 50: 1 (2003). In addition to the two statements cited in notes (20) and (22) above, see the following: “Mujahid Usamah Bin Ladin Talks Exclusively to “NIDA’UL ISLAM’ about the New Powder Keg in the Middle East,” in Alexander and Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, Appendix 2, pp. 1-7. This interview was originally published in the 15th issue of Nida’ul Islam (The Call of Islam) Magazine (Sydney, Australia), October-November 1996. Robert Fisk, “In his last recorded interview, Usama bin Ladin tells Robert Fisk why he so despises America,” available online at Robert-Fisk.Com

NOTES

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33.

247

(accessed 11 January 2005): http://www.robert-fisk.com/fisk_ interview3.htm. “CNN March 1997 interview with Osama bin Laden,” available online at FindLaw (accessed 11 January 2005): http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/ docs/binladen/binladenintvw-cnn.pdf. “Interview: Osama Bin Laden (May 1998),” available online at PBS: Frontline (accessed 11 January 2005): http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ shows/binladen/who/interview.html. “Bin Laden’s warning: full text,” BBC News Online, 7 October, 2001. Available online (accessed 11 January, 2005): http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/ world/south_asia/1585636.stm. Hamid Mir, “Osama claims he has nukes: If US uses N-arms it will get same response,” Dawn: the Internet Edition, 10 November 2001. “Full text: ‘Bin Laden tape,’” BBC News: World Edition, 15 April, 2004. Available online (accessed 11 January 2005): http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/middle_east/3628069.stm. “Full transcript of bin Laden’s speech,” ALJAZEERA.NET, 30 October, 2004. Available online (accessed 11 January 2005): http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/554FAF3A-B267-427A-B9EC-5 4881BDE0A2E.htm?printguid={79C6AF22-98FB-4A1C-B21F-2BC36E 87F61F}. “Bin Laden’s sole post-September 11 TV interview aired,” CNN.com. Available online (accessed 11 January 2005): http://cnn.allpolitics. printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&title=CNN.com+-+Bin+L aden%27s+sole+post-September+11+TV+interview+aired+-February+ 5%2C+2002&expire=1&urlID=11940001&fb=Y&url=http%3A%2F%2 Farchives.cnn.com%2F2002%2FUS%2F01%2F31%2Fgen.binladen.inter view%2F&partnerID=2001. “CNN March 1997 interview with Osama bin Laden,” pp. 1-2. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, p. 183. See Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, “The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 16:3 (1972), pp. 383-396. Alexander and Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, Appendix 1 A, p. 1. Ibid. Appendix 1 B, p. 2. “Interview: Osama Bin Laden (May 1998),” PBS: Frontline, pp. 4-5. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur-an, f. n. 5032, p. 1429. Quoted in chapter 2, section 1a. For Bin Laden’s Wahhabi background and its implications see, among others, As'ad AbuKhalil, Bin Laden and the Taliban: Consequences of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York, 2002). For a brief biography of Che Guevara, see the website CHE-LIVES.COM (accessed 26 January 2005): http://www.che-lives.com/home/modules .php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=3. For a discussion of the role of religion in fostering social solidarity, see “Religion” on the “Emile Durkheim” website (accessed 26 January 2005): http://durkheim.itgo.com/religion.html. As a Persian couplet puts it, “There is no fault in Islam as such; whatever faults and shortcomings there are, are ours alone.”

248


34. “Full transcript of bin Laden’s speech,” ALJAZEERA.NET. For the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and its accompanying atrocities, see Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians, updated ed. (Cambridge, MA, 1999), Chapter 5. 35. Jason Burke, “The making of the world’s most wanted man,” The Observer, 28 October 2001. See also Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London, 2003), pp. 124-127. 36. See, for example, Alexander and Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, Appendix 1B, p. 1, Appendix 2, p. 5; and “Full transcript of bin Laden’s speech,” ALJAZEERA.NET. 37. “CNN March 1997 interview with Osama bin Laden,” p. 4. 38. Alexander and Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, Appendix 1 A, p. 1. 39. Ibid., pp. 3-5. 40. “CNN March 1997 interview with Osama bin Laden,” p. 1. 41. See, for example, Alexander and Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, Appendix 1 A, pp. 11-21. 42. Alexander and Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, Appendix 1 A, p. 4-6. 43. Ibid., pp. 11-12. 44. For a brief description of the Just War doctrine, see “Just War Tradition,” The PEW Forum on Religion and Public Life; available online (accessed 15 January, 2005): http://pewforum.org/just-war/. 45. Donald Davidson, Problems of Rationality (Oxford, 2004), p.189. 46. Ibid. 47. For a discussion of this concept and the rationality ascribed to it, see Joshua L. Golding, Rationality and Religious Theism (Aldershot, England, 2003). 48. Alexander and Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, Appendix 1 B, p. 2. 49. Ibid. Appendix 1 A, pp. 6 and 8. 50. Ibid. Appendix 2, p. 6. 51. “CNN March 1997 interview with Osama bin Laden,” p. 3. 52. Ibid., p. 7. 53. “Full transcript of bin Laden’s speech,” ALJAZEERA.NET. 54. For the quotations see respectively Alexander and Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, Appendix 1 A, p. 2 and p. 22, Appendix 1 B, p. 3; and “Full transcript of bin Laden’s speech,” ALJAZEERA.NET. 55. Alexander and Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, Appendix 1 A, pp. 15, 16 and 18. 56. “CNN March 1997 interview with Osama bin Laden,” p. 3 and 6. 57. “Full transcript of bin Laden’s speech,” ALJAZEERA.NET. 58. See, for example, “CNN March 1997 interview with Osama bin Laden,” p. 1. 59. “Full transcript of bin Laden’s speech,” ALJAZEERA.NET. 60. See Christan Stoddart, “Profile: The Kabul Guy,” University of Otago Magazine, Issue 4 (February 2003), p. 28. 61. Alexander and Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, Appendix 1 A, pp. 15 and 21. 62. Robert Fisk, “In his last recorded interview …” 63. “Bin Laden’s warning: full text,” BBC News Online 64. “Interview: Osama Bin Laden (May 1998).”

NOTES

249

65. Ibid. For the first quotation, see “CNN March 1997 interview with Osama bin Laden,” p. 3. 66. Alexander and Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, Appendix 1 A, pp. 14. 67. Ibid. 68. All the quotations in this paragraph and the one above are taken from “Full transcript of bin Laden’s speech,” ALJAZEERA.NET. For a scholarly view about the possibility of the USA going bankrupt, see Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New York, 2004)—especially chapter 10. 69. For the significance of peace in Islam, see chapter 2, section (3) and section (8) above. 70. Muhammad Asad, The Message of the Quran, p. 30. 71. Islamic Feqh Council, “Terrorism: Islam’s View,” Muslim World League Journal, July 2002. Reprinted on the Canadian Society of Muslims’ website (accessed 30 January 2005): http://muslim-canada.org/fiqhcouncil.html. 72. The term “extremist” should not be applied to those seeking to implement the true teachings of religion in their life. Yusuf al Qaradawi lists the characteristics of extremism as follows: a. “bigotry and intolerance,” b. “perpetual commitment to excessiveness and … attempts to force others to do likewise,” c. “the out-of-time and out-of-place religious excessiveness and overburdening of others [especially non-Muslims],” and d. the use of harsh measures and violence “in calling people to Islam.” (Yusuf al Qaradawi (trans. A. S. Al Shaikh-Ali and Mohamed B. E. Wasfy), Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism, 3rd ed. (Virginia, 1995), pp. 33-39.) “Islamic revivalists” (who are sometimes called “Islamists” or “Islamic fundamentalists”) differ from extremists by virtue of the fact that they want to revive Islam in their societies without resorting to force and violence. Likewise, those Muslims who are forced to use violence in self-defense, and do not “transgress the limits” (as the Holy Quran puts it), cannot be called “extremists.” 73. See, for example, William E. Shepard, “Sayyid Qutb’s Doctrine of Jāhiliyya,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 35:4 (2003), pp. 521-545. 74. For example, a case could be made that Hamas and Hizbollah are moderates in every respect—except for their commitment to oppose an occupying enemy by force. 75. I base this judgment on their characterization of the leadership of many Muslim countries as “apostates,” their association with the Taliban regime, and their targeting of innocent civilians. However, I have not seen any evidence of their “bigotry and intolerance” towards other Muslims in general. On the contrary, Bin Laden repeatedly emphasizes the importance of Muslim unity and seems tolerant of even “non-righteous” Muslims (see, for example, Alexander and Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, Appendix 1 A, p. 7). 76. R. C. Smith, Violence Politics and Morality: Ethical and Political Issues in War and Peace (Hamilton, New Zealand, 1997), p. 212.

250


77. 78. 79. 80. 81.

Ibid., p. 216. The targeting of high-level government officials is a contentious issue here. “Terror Charges Against 5 Dropped in Italy,” New York Times, 26 January 2005. Alexander and Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, Appendix 1 A, p. 11. “CNN March 1997 interview with Osama bin Laden,” p. 2. For the “Qana Massacre” see Robert Fisk, “Qana: Massacre in Sanctuary; Eyewitness,” The Independent, 19 April 1996. 82. Alexander and Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, Appendix 2, p. 6. 83. “CNN March 1997 interview with Osama bin Laden,” p. 2. 84. “Interview Osama Bin Laden (May 1998).” 85. Ibid. 86. Ibid. 87. Alexander and Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, Appendix 1 B, p. 1. 88. Muhammad Asad, The Message of the Quran, p. 256. See also John Esposito, Unholy War: Terrorism in the Name of Islam (New York, 2002), p. 35. 89. Alexander and Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, Appendix 1 B, p. 2. 90. Ibid. Appendix 1 A, p. 19. 91. As the author did in an earlier version of this section: “Islam and Terrorism: A Contradiction in Terms,” a paper presented at a meeting hosted by the Dunedin Branch of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs (April 2003). 92. “CNN March 1997 interview with Osama bin Laden,” p. 7. 93. “Full text: ‘Bin Laden tape,’” BBC News. 94. Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader (Princeton, 1996), p. 79. 95. Ibid., p. 80. 96. Esposito, Unholy War, p. 32. 97. Sahih Muslim, “Book of Governance,” Book 20, Hadith no. 4496, Muslims Internet Directory website (accessed August 2003): http://www.2muslims.com/cgibin/hadith/hadith1/hadith.cgi. 98. Yusuf al Qaradawi (trans. [from Arabic to Persian] Abu Bakr Hasanzada), Halal wa Haram dar Islam (The Lawful and Prohibited in Islam) (Peshawar, 1377/1998), p. 52. 99. See, for example, “Interview: Osama Bin Laden (May 1998).” 100. Khalid Abou El Fadl, “Islam and the Theology of Power,” Middle East Report 221, Winter 2001; available online (accessed August 2003): http://www.merip.org/mer/mer221/221_abu_el_fadl.html. 101. The best example is his interview with the Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (Hamid Mir, “Osama claims he has nukes”). See also “Interview: Osama Bin Laden (May 1998)” and “CNN March 1997 interview with Osama bin laden.” 1. 2.

Conclusion Catechism of the Catholic Church (Vatican, 1994, 2nd Printing 1995), p. 571. For Islam’s view, see chapter 2, section (1) above, and the Quran (51:56). Snyder, “Hating America,” p. 331. Bin Laden’s approval of the Taliban regime and his view of Afghanistan under their control as “the only Islamic country” in

NOTES

3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16.

251

the world (see Hamid Mir, “Osama claims he has nukes”) contradicts the vision of the ideal society promoted by the Iranian leaders in this study as well as that of the Quran as interpreted by Yusuf Ali. Michael Novak, The Universal Hunger for Liberty: Why the Clash of Civilizations Is Not Inevitable (New York, 2004). Anonymous (Michael Scheuer), Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America (Washington DC, 2002), p. 3. Neil Mackay, “U.S. Admits the War for ‘Hearts and Minds’ in Iraq is Now Lost,” The Sunday Herald, 5 December, 2004. The original report is available online at: http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09Strategic_Communication.pdf. Ibid. Thomas L. Friedman, “War of Ideas, Part 1,” The New York Times, 8 January 2004. Richard A. Clarke, “The Wrong Debate on Terrorism,” The New York Times, 25 April 2004. See also Akeel Bilgrami, “The Clash within Civilizations,” Daedalus 132:3 (2003), pp. 88-94; and Dale F. Eickelman, “Inside the Islamic Reformation,” The Wilson Quarterly 22:1 (1998), pp. 80-90. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “How to Make New Enemies,” The New York Times, 25 October 2004. Emphasis added. Martin, Creating an Islamic State, Chapter VIII, pp. 174-187; the quotation is from p. 187. Ray Takeyh, “Iran at Crossroads,” The Middle East Journal 57:1 (2003), pp. 4256. Ibid., p. 43. Ibid., p. 56. “The Social Doctrine of the Church”, Catechism of the Catholic Church, pp. 648650. Although there are many other similarities between the Church’s doctrine and Islamic teachings, the subject is naturally beyond the scope of this study. I am grateful to Dr Paul Sorrell for bringing the similarities to my notice and for providing the reference. Unlike the Iranian revolutionary leaders who deal extensively with economic issues, Bin Laden rarely refers to the economy. John C. Raines, “The Politics of Religious Correctness: Islam and the West” (paper presented at the annual meeting (January 1996) of the Society of Christian Ethics), Cross Currents; available online (accessed 21 January 2005): www.crosscurrents.org/Raines2.htm.

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Index

Abel 149–50, 179 Abou El Fadl, Khalid 212–13 Abraham (the Prophet) 52, 53, 54, 77; wife of 53 Abudhar (Abu Zar) Ghaffari 39, 152, 155 action, revolutionary, see revolutionary action action-oriented irrational idealization 8 activism 46, 113, 122, 140, 141, 152, 166, 182, 218; see also Islamic extremism; Jihad; militancy; revolutionary action Ad tribe 26 Adalat (justice) 160–1, 165, 174 Adam 128, 149, 179 Afghanistan 3, 33, 188, 191, 195, 201, 202, 207 agents of change 45–6, 71–2, 93–4, 106, 121, 143–4, 168–9, 185, 197 Akhunds (religious scholars) 71, 88, 182, 184 Al-hakim bil-Kitab (ruling by the Book) 88 al Qaeda 188, 192–203, 205, 216 Al Takfir wal Hijra (Excommunication and Migration) organization 204 alcohol 66, 92, 137 Algar, Hamid 78, 113, 178 Algeria 3, 13, 188 Ali, Imam 77, 78, 90, 111, 115, 120, 122, 124, 140, 152, 153, 155, 157, 161 Ali, Yusuf 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 55–6, 180, 182, 185, 195 alienation 18, 46, 89, 94, 164 Allah, see God Allende, Salvador 12 Al-qaeim bil-qist (standing in equity) 89 animal sacrifice 53 An-nas (the people, the masses) 93, 106, 142, 143, 185

apathy 46, 72, 76, 77, 94, 118, 122, 186 Arendt, Hannah 9, 11 armed struggle, see militancy army 18, 95, 164, 167–68; American influence and capitulatory rights over 62, 85 Arnett, Peter 193 arrogance 25, 31, 53, 54, 123, 181, 189, 191, 194, 197, 216 asceticism 68, 72, 119, 122, 123, 124, 135 Asad, Muhammad 33, 35, 204, 209 Avineri, Shlomo 7 awareness 99, 101, 103, 108, 135, 146 Bahais 93 Bakhtiar, Shapour 67 Balkans 188, 195 Bani-Sadr, Abul Hasan: Bayanya-e Jamhuri Islam 173; claim to truth and rationality 173–4, 187; commitment to action and self-confidence 172–3, 186; criticism of existing social arrangements 163–5; Kaysh-e Shakhseyyat 173; outline of good society 166–8, 183, 184; political consciousness 159–63, 180; program of action 168–71, 184, 185; “The Relationship Between Materialism and Idealism” 174; revolutionary ideology of 177–8; sacrifice and revolutionary patience 173; simplification 173; values 165–6, 176 Bashar 128, 179 Bazargan, Mehdi: claim to truth and rationality 124–6, 186; commitment to action and self-confidence 121–3, 185; criticism of existing social arrangements

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118–19; outline of the good society 120–21, 183, 184; political consciousness 113–18, 175, 180; program of action 121, 185; revolutionary ideology of 176–7, 178; sacrifice and revolutionary patience 123-24; simplification 124; values 119, 176 beauty 101, 103, 105, 115, 119, 132, 135 beliefs, ideology as system of 9–10 Be’that (consigning, commission, delegation) 160, 161, 165, 174 Bin Laden, Osama 189, 192–204, 205, 207–9, 212, 213, 214, 216–18; “Declaration of War Against Americans” 192–3, 194, 197–8, 201–2, 209; “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders” 194, 209; Fatwa 208, 209 Bonaparte, Napoleon 6, 8 Borujerdi, Ayatollah 179 Bouchier, David, Idealism and Revolution 14–15, 16, 18 Britain 14, 63, 66 Brooks, David 189 brotherhood 24, 28, 52, 59, 68, 87, 97, 105, 176, 183, 201–2; see also community, sense of; Ummat Brzezinski, Zbigniew 217 bureaucratization 66 Bush, George W. 188–9, 201, 202, 203, 216–17 Cain 149–50, 179 Calvert, Peter 11 Camus, Albert 129, 157 capitalism 92, 98, 112, 118, 138, 139–40, 143, 164–5, 169, 218, 219 cartels and trusts 142 Carter, Jimmy 1 censorship 159, 162–3, 169, 170 change: agents of 45–6, 71–2, 93–4, 106, 143–4, 169–70, 185, 197; individual 121; method for introducing 146–8; of perception 171; and revolutions 12, 14, 16, 27, 215; targets of 44, 70–1, 93, 142–3, 169, 184, 197 charity 27, 87, 97, 104, 116, 119, 123, 140, 165, 177, 192 chastity 30

Chechnya 188, 194, 195, 198, 201 Chile 12–13 Choice, freedom of 91, 100, 104, 128–9, 141, 145 Christianity 60, 133, 215, 218; doctrine of Just War 198; see also Roman Catholic Church CIA 1, 12, 85, 191, 216 citizens, rights and responsibilities 36 civilian targets of warfare and terrorism 206, 208–9, 210-11, 216 Clarke, Richard 217 “clash of civilizations” 188–94, 214, 217 class: middle class 144, 145; Pharaonic social system 26; revolutionary and counterrevolutionary 106; Sassanid dynasty 139; stratification of 143, 160; worldview of 7 class conflict 142 class consciousness 16, 18, 101 colonialism 85, 142 communism 98, 112, 118, 203, 218 community, sense of 22, 24–5, 28, 58, 59, 84, 102, 114, 137, 166, 195–6; see also brotherhood; Ummat commutation 14 companionship 28 compassion 29 consciousness, false 6–7 consciousness, types of 101; see also class consciousness; human consciousness; primordial natural consciousness; selfconsciousness conservatism 26 consultation 35, 68, 104, 114, 119, 120, 140, 142, 165, 183 consumption: based on economic interests of dominant country 164, 165; capitalist and communist views on 98; in Islamic Republic of Bani-Sadr 168; Islamic principles and ordinances on 92; of what is forbidden 64–5 cooperation 32, 37, 59, 68, 87, 89, 95, 97, 116, 119, 141, 165, 171, 185 corruption 23, 26, 45, 46, 52, 64, 66, 67, 72, 78, 101, 107, 109, 152, 181, 192, 210 courage 29, 51, 53, 68, 77, 104, 110, 119, 146, 165, 172, 175, 192, 200

INDEX courtesy 31 Cox, Richard, Ideology, Politics and Political Theory 9 creativity 109, 119, 128, 128, 129, 141, 164, 165, criticism, and interpretation 21–2 criticism of existing social arrangements, see social arrangements, criticism of Croesus 152, 173 cult of personality 159–61, 165, 169, 174, 184 cultural resurrection 170, 171, 173 culture, and ideology 10 custodial concept of ownership 90, 98 Dabashi, Hamid, Theology of Discontent 3 David 26, 53 Davidson, Donald 199 De Tracy, Destutt, 5–6 delegitimization, see under government democracy 116–17, 120–21, 184, 191 dependability 30 deprivation 14, 16, 44, 65, 98; see also poverty destiny, mankind the maker of own 107, 108, 131, 159, 170, 172 determinism 110, 129, 146, 149, 172 Deutscher, Isaac 7 devotion 29, 52, 53, 103, 105, 182, 213 dignity 116, 117, 119, 200, 201 dis-alienation 14 discrimination 26, 90, 102, 140, 143, 216 distortion 8 distribution 91–2, 98 Drucker, H.M. 6, 7, 9 Ebadat (worship) 144, 179; see also worship economic elite 44, 52, 64, 66, 219 economy, Islamic 90–93 education 104, 119, 146, 157, 164, 178; see also Madrasas (religious schools) Egypt 25–6, 42–3, 108, 137–8, 139–40, 188, 211 Eid 25, 38, 53 entropy 125 equality 18, 23, 28, 39, 54, 87, 90, 104, 117, 119, 120, 132, 140, 141, 165, 177; and capitalism 165, 219

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equity 23, 29, 35, 68, 86, 89–90, 101, 104, 132, 140, 175, 182, 192; and custodial concept of ownership 98; duty to establish 83–4, 95, 96; of wealth distribution 39 Esposito, John 211 Europe 14, 117, 156, 159, 189 exile 43 experiences 109 experiments 109, 135 exploitation 23, 26, 39, 45, 46, 53, 60, 64, 65, 76, 89, 91, 98, 139, 140, 142, 144, 152, 153, 181, 191, 192, 197, 212, 216 faith 87, 103, 110, 119, 141, 154, 173, 176, 182; as basis of social solidarity 37, 109, 110; lack of 46; necessary for mankind’s achievement of potential 101; true and strong 47 false consciousness 6–7 Faqih, see Fuqaha family 37 fasting 123 fatalism 17, 46, 117, 149 fi’a baghiya (rebellious group) 75 firmness 31, 48 Fisk, Robert 202 followers, as agents of change 45 foreign domination, see West, imperialist domination forgiveness 31, 119, , 211, 213 Forleo, Clementina 206–7 France 2, 5–6, 159, 178, 189 fraud 39 Freeden, Michael 5 freedom 11, 23, 29, 68, 83, 86, 104, 105, 110, 116, 119, 120, 132, 140, 175, 182, 192, 218; of thought and expression 162–3, 165, 183; moral or spiritual 100; see also liberation Friedman, Thomas 217 Friedrich, Carl 11 friendship 87, 102, 166 frugality 31 Fuqaha (jurists) 60, 61–2, 69, 70, 105, 183–4 Galtung, Johan 12, 16

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al-Ghazali 27 Geertz, Clifford 10 generosity 27, 119, 200; see also sharing Germany 8, 189 globalization 117 God: Almighty 47; belief in, and consciousness of 23, 27, 50, 51, 52, 89, 109, 119, 135, 166, 212; constant movement towards 82; continuing involvement with His creation 125; focus on 123; Khalifa (God’s vicegerent and representative) 83, 100; Oneness of 23, 57, 160-1, 166; proof of existence 126; protector and helper 200; relationships based on 162; serving 23, 49, 195, 215; sovereignty of 34, 68, 90, 183; trust in 48; ultimate goal of a Muslim 115–16; Way of 83, 95, 97; Will of 23, 89, 125, 195; see also faith; worship “God is the Greatest” 51, 95, 97 gods, social 116, 117–18 good deeds 27–8, 87, 104, 115 good society 15, 17, 218; in works of BaniSadr 166–8, 183, 184; in works of Bazargan 120–21, 183, 184; in works of Khomeini 68–70, 183–4; in works of Mutahhari 104–5, 175, 183, 184; in works of Shariati 141–2, 183, 184; in works of Taleqani 87–93, 175, 183, 184; Quranic outline of 32–41, 182–3 Gould, Julius 9 government: Bani-Sadr’s writings on 163–4, 166–8, 169; Bazargan’s writings on 118– 19, 120-21; delegitimization 14–15, 26-27, 136, 139, 163, 175; divine authority over 68–9; functions of 35; head of, should be Muslim 35; Khomeini’s writings on 62–7, 79-80, 183–4; laws and policies 67–70; legitimacy of 34, 44, 62, 67, 85, 97, 138, 163, 181, 192; Mutahhari’s writings on 104; ruled by Fuqaha 61–2, 69, 183–4; in service of mankind in general 182; supervision and public finance 92–3; Taleqani’s writings on 85, 87–9; see also Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran; Parliament Gramsci, Antonio 7

Greece 117 greeting, Salamun Alaikum (Peace be with you) 32, 51-2 Gross, Feliks 9 groups, role in social reform 121 guerrilla warfare: Quranic viewpoint 43–4; versus terrorism 206–9 guidance, Quranic 54 Gulf wars 188, 190, 196 Haber, Robert 15 Hadith 21, 30, 37, 200, 204 Hai’at-e Mo’talefa 103 Hajj 25, 28, 38, 53, 54, 59, 90, 137, 148 Haman 173 Hamas 188 Hagopain, Mark N. 16 Hereafter 27, 32, 43, 49, 50, 115–16, 120, 166, 174 Hezbollah 188 Hijra (migration) 104 Hirsch, E. D. 21–2 history 40, 95, 97, 108–10, 111, 129, 149-50, 155–6, 172–3, 176, 186, 202–3; evolution in 116–18, 124 honesty 28, 68, 87, 119 Hopper, Rex 11 Hud tribe 52 human consciousness 82, 101–2, 107, 181 human nature: in works of Mutahhari 99–100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111; in the Quran 50; in works of Shariati 127–30 human rights 67, 116, 132, 184, 191, 216 humility 31, 119 Huntington, Samuel 188–92, 193–4, 214, 217 Husain, Imam 77, 88, 89, 97, 111, 115, 123, 124, 135–7, 140, 152, 153, 154, 155, 173, 186 Husainiyas (religious lecture halls) 59 Hussein, Saddam 196 Ibn Omar 39 ideas: ideology as system of 9–10; science of 5–6; war of 217 ideologues 5–6, 105, 157

INDEX ideology: as class worldview 7, 8; as false consciousness and apology 6–7; as action-oriented irrational idealization 8–9; as science of ideas 5–6; as system of ideas, beliefs, and values 9-10; as system of meaning 10; significance of 146–7; simplification of 51; and sociology of knowledge 7–8; totalitarian 8–9; see also revolutionary ideology Ijtihad (independent reasoning) 33-4, 88, 167 Ikhlas (sincerity) 144; see also sincerity Imaan (belief) 193 Imamat (leadership) 161, 165, 174 Imams 61, 77, 78, 79, 80, 87, 97, 112, 115, 124, 140, 142, 151, 153, 173, 178, 186, 187; see also Ali, Imam; Husain, Imam immorality 66, 85, 86, 181, 192 imperialism 63, 76, 84, 96, 142, 184 India 117 individualism 113, 114, 118, 153, 218 injustice 46, 53, 60, 107, 109, 189, 193, 194, 197, 201, 211, 215; economic order 6465; see also justice innovation 109, 118, 129, 170, 180 Insan 128–30, 179 institutions, new 74–5 intelligentsia (Roshan fikr ) 127, 133–5, 143, 145–6, 156, 157–8, 185 interpretation, and criticism 21–2 intolerance 194 invention 108, 166 invitation and propagation 42 Iran: Bazargans’ criticisms of society 118; Constitution 66, 184, 218; domination by Western imperialism 62–4, 70–1, 84–5, 142, 163–4, 168, 181, 192; failure to understand social dimension of Islam 114; post-revolutionary 217–18; see also government; Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran Iranian Revolution 1–2; aftermath of 217– 18; as beginning of “clash of civilizations” 191–2; importance of ideology in 2–3; Khomeini’s leadership 175-76, 178–9; students of Khomeini who played important roles in 179; Shariati’s leadership 127, 177

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Iraq 58, 71, 189, 190, 193, 194, 197, 198, 201, 207, 216 Islam: acts of worship strengthen relations with fellow human beings 82–3; Bazargan’s formula, revival and rejuvenation of followers 122–3; calendar 67; compared to Christianity 60; domination by Western imperialism 63–4; duty of intelligentsia to promote 133; establishment of a party 147; ideology of 146, 158; misunderstood and neglected 86; promotion of teachings 59–60; social religion 113–14; see also Imams; prophets; Quran; Shiites/Shiism; Sufism; Sunnah Islamic extremism 188, 192–4, 204-5, 214; see also al Qaeda; Bin Laden, Osama; Taliban; terrorism Islamic law (Sharia): as law of the land 33–4; in works of Khomeini 69–70; in works of Mutahhari 104–5; in works of Taleqani 87–8, 98 Islamic Republic (Bani-Sadr) 167–8, 184 Israel 63, 85, 188, 196; see also Judaism; Zionism; Zionist-Crusader alliance Israelites 25, 26, 29, 35, 42, 43, 49; see also Moses Italy 8 Jesus 51, 52, 54 Jihad 28, 29, 30, 46, 48, 175, 182, 192, 195, 196; Bin Laden 199–200, 207; in works of Bani-Sadr 162–3, 165, 170, 171; in works of Khomeini 59, 68, 72, 75; in works of Mutahhari 101, 104, 108, 110–11; in works of Shariati 136, 140, 148; in works of Taleqani 83, 87, 94–5, 97 Jonah (the Prophet) 53 Joseph (the Prophet) 52 Judaism 133, 219; see also Israel; Zionism judicial system 67, 69 justice 23, 29, 34, 181, 182, 191, 217, 218; Adalat 161–2, 165, 174; in works of BaniSadr 161–2, 165, 174; in works of Bazargan 116, 119, 121; in works of Khomeini 68, 69, 70, 76, 78; in works of

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Mutahhari 101, 102, 104, 105, 109; in works of Shariati 131, 132, 140, 141; in works of Taleqani 86, 89; see also injustice Kaabah 53 Karbala 97, 135, 136, 137, 154 Kashmir 3, 188, 194, 201 Khalifa (God’s vicegerent and representative) 83, 100, 180 Khomeini, Ruhollah: claim to truth and rationality 78–80, 172, 186; commitment to action and self-confidence 75–7, 186; criticism of existing social arrangements 62-67, 181; exiled to Turkey 103; Islamic Government (The Guardianship of the Jurist) 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 72, 73, 79, 180; Kashf al-Asrar 58, 178; leadership of 175, 178–9; outline of the good society 68–70, 183–4; political consciousness 58–62, 174, 180, 181; program of action 70–5, 184, 185; revolutionary ideology of 175–6, 178–9; self-sacrifice and revolutionary patience 77-78; simplification 78; and United States 192; values 68 kindness 29, 87, 116, 119, 123, 177, 192 knowledge 87, 102, 103, 119, 166, 183; mobility in search for 31; perfection of 116; seeking, as a duty 40–1; sociology of 7–8, 14–15, 110; transformation of 101 Kumar, Krishan 12 Khutba 25 Kuwait 196 Larrain, Jorge 6, 7 law, 1907 constitution 66 law, Islamic; see Islamic law leaders: criteria for 35–6, 88–9, 183; Fuqaha (jurists) 69; Imamat 161, 165, 174; intelligentsia 143; of religio-ideological movements 45; of Ummat 142; oppressed 169–70; Prophet Muhammad 78; succession 142 learning, through speech and writing 109 Lebanon 179, 188, 196, 203, 207 legitimacy, see under government Lenin, Vladimir Il’ich 7, 8, 18

liberalism 118, 179 liberation 29, 42, 52, 68, 140, 141, 152, 163, 168, 175, 182, 192, 216; see also freedom Liberation Movement of Iran 113 life and death, value of 200–201 living standards 119 love 37, 68, 101, 102, 103, 116, 119, 122, 123, 130, 132, 141, 165, 177, 182, 192 Lukacs, Georg 7 Lut (Lot) 52; wife of 53 luxury and waste 26, 66, 118, 144, 152, 192 Maad (resurrection) 151, 160, 162, 174 Maaweya 149 Madian tribe 26 Madina 97, 141, 150, 152, 183 Madrasas (religious schools) 59, 167, 178; Fayzia Madrasa 67 Makkah 25, 38, 53; see also Hajj Mannheim, Karl 7–8, 14–15 Mao, Zedong 11 Marcuse, Herbert 7 Maroof, duty to enjoin 24, 32, 36, 45, 84, 108, 113, 134–5, 180 Martin, Vanessa 217 martyrdom 18, 186; Bin Laden 200; in works of Bani-Sadr 173; in works of Bazargan 119, 123–4; in works of Khomeini 77, 185; in works of Mutahhari 103, 110–11, 176, 186; in works of Shariati 127, 135–7, 140, 150–51, 152, 154, 181, 186; in works of Taleqani 96–7; Quranic viewpoint on 49 Marwa 53 Marx, Karl 6–7, 8, 16 Marxists/Marxism 6, 7, 8, 16, 112, 146, 157, 178, 179, 187 Mary 52, 53 materialism 50, 66, 85, 86, 157, 192 Mawdudi, Maulana Abul Ala 20 maxims, Islamic 51–2 Mazloumyat 95, 185 McKinney, John 13 meaning: distinction between significance and 21–2; ideology as system of 10 media 165, 168, 204, 216, 217 Michels, Robert 17

INDEX middle class 144, 145, 185, 218 Middle East 84, 96, 188, 192, 217; see also specific countries Milani, Abbas M. 10, 15 militancy: as last resort 75, 185, 197–8, 215; Imams as symbols of 77; in cause of God and oppressed 28–9; in works of Khomeini 74, 75; in works of Mutahhari 108; in works of Taleqani 94–5; Quranic viewpoint on 42–4; time scale of 201, 215; see also al Qaeda; guerilla warfare; Islamic extremism; Jihad; Taliban; terrorism Mills, Wright 13 Milton-Edwards, Beverley 26–7 Mobedans 139 models, functions of 13–14 moderation 31, 119, 204, 217 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran 1–2; Bani-Sadr’s criticisms of 159, 163–4, 169; Bazargan’s criticisms of 118–19; Khomeini’s criticisms of 63, 64, 65, 66–7, 70–1, 74, 78, 79, 175, 178-9, 181; Mutahhari’s lack of criticism 103; Shariati’s indictment of 138–9, 151–2, 177; Taleqani’s criticisms of 85, 93, 176; “White Revolution” 179 monarchy, system of 67, 70, 118, 138–9, 149, 175, 184 monasticism 51 monotheistic religion 23, 127, 131–3; see also Tawhid morale 46, 172, 202 Moses 25, 26, 29, 42–3, 52, 54, 77, 78, 108, 152, 173, 211 mosques 25, 37–8, 59, 60, 64, 84, 167 Muadh ibn Jabal 34 Muhammad, Prophet: “a beautiful pattern of conduct” 53; evidence of Quran’s truth 55–6, 78; and extremism 204; and faith 37; and family 37; God’s Messenger 23, 45, 51, 54, 69, 78, 121; and invitation/propagation 42; involvement in political and social affairs 115; and knowledge 40-1; and obedience 36; and prayer 24; and property 39; relevance of life and traditions 155; self-sacrifice 77,

267

78; society established by 90, 97, 141, 147–8, 150, 152, 183; successful struggles waged by 77, 131; symbol and model of Islamic justice and leadership 78, 152; and Zakat 38; see also Hadith Muharibs 213 Mujahid (fighter in holy war) 74, 110, 203 Mujtahid (Islamic scholars) 87 Munkar, duty to forbid 24, 32, 36, 45, 60, 84, 95 101,, 109, 114, 133, 134–5, 180 Musa ibn Jafar 77 Mustadhaf class 6 Mustakher class 106 Mutahhari, Murtazah: claim to truth and rationality 111–12, 187; commitment to action and self-confidence 108–10, 186; criticism of existing social arrangements 103; Jahanbini Islami 111; outline of good society 104–5, 183, 184; political consciousness 99–102, 176, 181; program of action 106–8; revolutionary ideology of 176, 178, 179; sacrifice and revolutionary patience 110–11, 186; simplification 111; values 103–4, 176 nationalism 118 nature 128; controlling forces of 40 needs, and political consciousness 22 Newman, Sigmund 11 Noah 26, 45, 52; wife of 53 North America 189; see also United States Novak, Michael 216 obedience: of citizens 36; to divine authority and righteous leaders 29–30; of women 36-7 observation 30, 156 oil 1, 63, 64–5, 163, 164, 191, 193 oppressed: leadership of revolution 169–70, 185; solidarity with 137–8 oppression 25, 41, 46, 60, 65–6, 76, 90, 101, 139, 171, 172–3, 215, 216; and economic order 64, 65; flight or withdrawal from 43; militancy in cause of 28–9, 42–4, 76, 101, 114, 192, 195; peaceful resistance against 42, 73, 171, 185; and private property ownership 98; see also tyranny

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orphans 38, 39 ownership 38, 90–91, 98, 142, 143, 149, 166, 183 Paige, Jeffery 12, 15 Palestine 188, 194, 196, 198, 201 parables, in Quran 52–3 Parliament 67, see also government passive resistance 42, 73, 171, 185 patience 18, 28, 48, 77, 96–7, 110–11, 123–4, 150–51, 173, 186 patriotism 118 peace 31–2 perception, change of 171 perfection 68, 119; Absolute 131; attainment of 108; perfectibility of human nature 101, 126; seeking for/moving towards 82, 85, 87, 102, 128, 131, 141, 162, 166, 167, 177, 180, 182, 192; wealth spent in pursuit of 82, 85 perseverance 28, 48, 49, 52, 53, 77, 123, 135, 141, 186, 198–204 personal responsibility 41, 101, 103, 106, 213, 214 personal values 68, 87, 103–4, 119, 141, 165–6 personality, cult of 159–61, 165, 169, 174, 184 Pharaoh 25–6, 42–3, 52, 53, 78, 108, 152, 173; wife of 53 Pickthall, Marmaduke 22 piety 28, 35, 53, 68, 87, 90, 101, 104, 109, 119, 122, 123, 141, 166; see also Taqwa pilgrimage to Makkah, see Hajj planning, long-term 75 political consciousness 15–16; Bin Laden 194–6; in the Quran 22–5, 180–81; in works of Bani-Sadr 159–63, 181; in works of Bazargan 113–18, 176, 181; in works of Khomeini 58–62, 175, 180; in works of Mutahhari 99–102, 176, 181; in works of Shariati 127–38, 177, 181; in works of Taleqani 81–4, 176, 181 politics: common boundary between religion and 114–15; purpose of 120; separation of religion and 59, 120; taking advantage of religious assemblies to develop 74–5 polytheism, see Shirk

potential, realizing 82, 89, 95, 99, 101, 105, 108, 109, 116, 121–2 poverty 65, 102, 118, 165, 183, 192; see also deprivation power elite 44, 52, 143, 160, 172, 219 power relationships 159–160, 166, 171 powerlessness 46, 77, 122 prayer 53, 124, 131, 137; congregational 24–5, 28, 59, 74, 90, 125; Friday 24, 25, 38, 59, 90; insufficient to counter imperialist plots 76 primordial natural consciousness 101, 102, 107 production 89, 91, 98, 145, 164 program of action 17; Bin Laden 197–8; in works of Bani-Sadr 168–71, 184, 185, 186; in works of Bazargan 121, 185; in works of Khomeini 70–5, 184, 185; in works of Mutahhari 106–8; in works of Shariati 142–8, 177, 184, 185; in works of Taleqani 93–5, 185; Quranic viewpoint on 41–6, 184–5 propaganda and instruction 73–4 property ownership, see ownership prophets 33, 42, 48, 77, 78, 79, 83, 94, 126, 133, 151, 179, 186, 187; see also names of specific prophets protest 73, 77; collective 74 public opinion, international 74 punishment 49 Qist 83–4, 89; see also equity Qital 29 Quran: action in 148–9, 194–6, 199, 204, 209–14; and balance between extremes 204; and commitment to action/selfconfidence 46–7, 186; consistency of 55; criticism of social arrangements in 25–7, 181–2; fairness and justice in 212; form and content of 55; good society in 32–41, 181–3; and hatred 213, 214; in “heart of society” 178; maxims in 51–2; meaning of 21–2; message addressed to An-nas (people as a whole) 106, 142; political consciousness in 22–5, 180–81; and program of action 41–6, 184–5; rationality, claim to 56–7; research tool

INDEX 20; and responsibility 100, 106–7; revelations, confirmation of 54; revolutionary ideology, compared to works of Iranian leaders 179–87; and rise or fall of civilizations 109; and selfsacrifice/revolutionary patience 48–51, 186; and sense of community 24–5; significance of 21–2; and social responsibility 134–5; stories and parables in 52–3, 172, 187; symbols in 53; truth, claim to 54–7, 78, 79, 97–9, 124, 154–5, 187; values promoted in 27–32, 181; and vengeance 213; see also good society racism 142 Raines, John C. 219 rationality, claim to: in works of Bani-Sadr 173–4; in works of Bazargan 124–6; in works of Khomeini 79; in works of Mutahhari 111–12; in works of Shariati 154–8; in works of Taleqani 97–8; Quran 56–7 rationality, concepts of 199 reasoning 30, 33–4, 56, 78, 79, 88, 97, 107, 111–12, 124, 125–6, 154, 158, 174, 176, 187; see also Ijtihad (independent reasoning) reflection 30, 94, 104 Rejai, Mostafa 17, 32 rejuvenation 122–3, 151 religion: common boundary between politics and 114–15; distortion by cult of personality 169; ideology and politics in 76; method for comparative study of 155; revitalization of 188; separation of politics and 59, 120; see also Christianity; Islam; Judaism; monotheistic religion; Shirk; worship research, academic 156, 187 resistance, peaceful 42, 74, 171, 184 responsibility, see personal responsibility; social responsibility revolution, definitions of 11–13 revolutionary action: commitment to 17–18, 46–7, 75–7, 95–6, 108–10, 121–3, 148– 50, 172–3, 186; forms of 41–4, 72–5, 94–5, 106–8, 144–8, 170–71, 185–6,

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197–8; time scale of 201, 215; see also activism; change; Islamic extremism; militancy; program of action revolutionary ideology 3; al Qaeda and Islamic militancy 194–204; as service of God 215; ambiguity in 17, 32; comparison of Quran and works of Iranian leaders 179–87; contribution of Iranian leaders 175–9; definition of 15; flexibility in 17; model of 14–19; simplification of 51–3 rewards 42, 43, 49, 56 right, duty to enjoin 24, 32, 36, 45, 60, 84, 109, 114, 133, 134–5, 180, 194 righteousness 26, 28, 35, 37, 109 Rodinson, Maxim 27 Rokeach, Milton 17 Roman Catholic Church 6, 218 Rome 117 Roshan fikr (intelligentsia) 127, 133–5, 143, 145–6, 156, 185 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 97 Rudé, George, Ideology and Popular Protest 14 Russia 8; see also Soviet Union Sadat, Anwar 188 Sadr, Musa 179 Safa 53 Safavid dynasty 140 Salamun Alaikum (Peace be with you) 32, 51-52 Salih (the Prophet) 46, 52 salvation 27, 50, 51, 68, 118, 129, 131, 141, 153 Sassanid dynasty 131, 139 satire 152–3 Saudi Arabia 193, 196, 197–8, 201, 202, 207 Saul (Talut) 35 SAVAK 1, 138, 151, 177 science 92, 102, 110, 116, 129; importance of 41; transformation of 101 self, overcoming shackles of 129–30 self-centeredness 81–2 self-confidence 29, 46–7, 72, 75–7, 95–6, 108–10, 121–3, 148–50, 172–3, 186, 198–204 self-consciousness 101–102, 128, 135

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self-defense 31, 46 self-development 72, 185 self-restraint 28, 52 self-sacrifice 18, 29, 175, 176, 182, 186, 192; Bin Laden 198–204; in works of BaniSadr 161, 166, 173; in works of Bazargan 119, 123–4; in works of Khomeini 68, 78; in works of Mutahhari 103, 110–11; in works of Shariati 130, 141, 146, 150; in works of Taleqani 82, 87, 96–7; of community 160; Quranic viewpoint on 48–51, 53; see also martyrdom September 11 terrorist attacks 188–9, 196, 203 Shah of Iran, see Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran Shahadat, see martyrdom Shaheed (martyr, model) 136, 137 Shahnama 139 Shaltut, Sheikh 210 Sharia; see Islamic law Shariati, Ali: autobiographical data 157–8; claim to truth and rationality 154–8, 187; commitment to action and selfconfidence 148–50, 186; criticism of existing social arrangements 138–40, 182; leadership in Iranian Revolution 127; new meanings to traditional Islamic teaching 179–80; “On the Plight of the Oppressed” 137–8, 152–3; outline of good society 141–2, 183, 184; political consciousness 127–38, 177, 180; program of action 142–8, 185; revolutionary ideology of 177; sacrifice and revolutionary patience 149–50; “Shiism is a complete party” 156; simplification 151–4; values 140–41, 177 Shariatmadari, Ayatollah 184 sharing 27, 32, 87; see also generosity Shiites/Shiism 59, 61, 78, 84, 111, 123, 125, 133, 135, 136, 140, 142, 151, 156, 161, 174, 179, 186, 215–16; Alavid Shiism 140, 182; Safavid Shiism 140, 182 Shirk (contradictions, polytheism) 132, 142–3, 149, 150, 152, 158, 173, 184 significance, distinction between meaning and 21–2

simplification 18, 51, 78, 97, 111, 124, 151– 4, 173; see also parables; slogans; stories; symbolism sincerity 28, 53, 56, 104, 141, 144, 146, 166 Skocpol , Theda 2, 11 slogans 15, 18, 21, 51, 94, 111, 153–4 Snyder, Robert S. 189 social arrangements, criticism of 16; Bin Laden 196–7; in the Quran 25–7, 181–2; in works of Bani-Sadr 163–5; in works of Bazargan 118–19; in works of Khomeini 62–7, 181; in works of Mutahhari 103, 181; in works of Shariati 138–40, 182; in works of Taleqani 84–6, 182 social gods 117–18 social justice 121 social nature and needs of humans 102, 108 social responsibility 23, 32, 68, 107, 119, 133, 134–5, 140, 141, 165, 177, 181, 192; see also personal responsibility social struggle 145–6, 185 social systems: evil 25–7; moral and just 26 social values 27, 68, 86–7, 104, 119, 140, 165 socialism 118, 218 society: desired, outline of in model of revolutionary ideology 17; goal of 141, 162, 182; Iranian, Bazargan’s criticisms of 118; Iranian, failure to understand social dimension of Islam 114; “shackles” of 129; see also good society Solomon (the Prophet) 26, 52 Somalia 202–3 spiritual values 68, 87, 103, 119, 141, 166 steadfastness 31, 48, 49, 68, 77, 123, 149, 186 stories 23, 42, 45, 48, 51, 52–3, 78, 111, 152, 173 Soviet Union 63, 188, 191, 197, 201, 202, 207 submission 27, 144, 204 success 16, 22, 27, 51, 54, 68, 141 Sufism 215 Sunnah 33, 34, 69, Sunni 4, 33, 35, 142, 215–16 symbolism: in Quran 53; in works of Shariati 151–2, 177, 187

INDEX Taghut 78, 83, 93 Takeyh, Ray 218 Taleqani, Mahmoud: claim to truth and rationality 97–8, 187; co-founder of Liberation Movement of Iran 113; commitment to action and selfconfidence 95–6; criticism of existing social arrangements 84–6, 182; Islam wa Malikyat (Islam and Ownership) 81, 90; outline of good society 87–93, 176, 183, 184; political consciousness 81–4, 175, 180; program of action 93–5, 186; revolutionary ideology of 175, 177; sacrifice and revolutionary patience 96–7; simplification 97; values 86–7, 176 Taliban 33, 188 Talut (Saul) 35 Taqya (dissimulation) 59, 60, 123 Taqwa (piety, God-consciousness) 28, 90, 101, 119, 166 targets of change 44, 70–1, 93, 142–3, 169, 184 Tawhid (oneness, unity, monotheism) 23; in works of Bani-Sadr 160–1, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 173, 183; in works of Mutahhari 106; in works of Shariati 132–3, 143, 150, 158; in works of Taleqani 82 taxation 92–3 technology 129 Tehran University, Students’ Islamic Society 113 terrorism: as crime of hate and vengeance 209, 213; civilian targets 206, 208–9, 210– 11, 213, 214, 216; definitions and characteristics of 205–6; guerilla warfare versus 206–9; Islamic viewpoint 43–4, 204–5, 209–14; war on 189, 201, 202–3, 216; see also September 11 terrorist attacks Thamud tribe 26 totalitarian ideologies 8–9, 218 traditionalism 26, 182 traditions and sayings 36, 37, 69, 78, 79, 97, 111, 124, 155 tranquility 32, 68, 149 travel 46 trusteeship from God, as basis of ownership 38-9

271

truth, claim to: in works of Bani-Sadr 173–4; in works of Bazargan 124–6; in works of Khomeini 78–80; in works of Mutahhari 111–12; in works of Shariati 154–8; in works of Taleqani 97–8; Quran 54–6; revolutionary ideology 19 truthfulness 28, 68, 87, 118 tulab (students of religion) 67 tyranny 25, 65, 73, 74, 76, 78, 94, 101, 107, 140, 163, 192; see also oppressed; oppression Ulama (religious scholars) 35, 58, 175, 180, 182; apathy of 75–6, 77; as agents of change 71–2, 93–4; “evil” 73; need for self-confidence 76–7; obligations of 59– 62 Ummat (fraternal community) 127, 130–31, 134–5, 141, 142, 154, 179, 181 United States: arrogance, domination and exploitation 191–2, 197, 216; Bazargan’s views on 117, 119; boycott of products 198; capitulatory rights of 62, 67, 85; CIA 1, 12, 85, 191, 216; Defense Science Board report 216–17; in Iran 62, 70, 85, 163–4; invasion of Iraq 189, 199, 202, 203–4, 216; Islamic extremist fight with 192–3; liberation ideologies 14; living standards 119; military operations in Middle East 188, 192, 196–7, 201, 202, 207, 217; pressure on oil prices 193; in Saudi Arabia 193, 196, 197–8, 202, 207; in Somalia 202–3; in Vietnam 203; term “West” coterminous with 189–91; “war of ideas” approach 217; see also Bin Laden, Osama; clash of civilizations; Gulf wars; September 11 terrorist attacks; Zionist-Crusaders alliance unity 28, 87, 95, 106, 109, 140, 171, 182, 185, 192; see also Tawhid “Unseen”, belief in 57 usury 39–40, 66, 91 values: definition of “value” 17; and God 115; in works of Bani-Sadr 165–6, 177; in works of Bazargan 119, 177; in works of Khomeini 68–9, 175; in works of

272


Mutahhari 103–4, 176; in works of Shariati 140–41, 176; in works of Taleqani 86–7, 176; personal, changing 41; Quranic 27–32, 50, 182; and revolutionary ideology 9–10, 16–17, 191 victory 49, 77, 87 Vietnam 203 violence 18, 210, 215; see also militancy warfare, see militancy wealth: attempts by oppressors to establish monopoly over sources of 60; accumulation and hoarding of 39, 50, 71, 98, 118, 122, 165, 166; and disfigurement of human nature 106; Islamic principles and ordinances on 91, 92; love of 85–6, 218; sacrifice of 123, 124; spent in pursuit of perfection 82, 85; see also economic elite; materialism wealth distribution, equitable 38–9 Weber, Max 13 West: imperialist domination 62–4, 70–1, 84–5, 142, 163–4, 168, 191, 192, 194, 197, 216; lifestyle 140; meaning of, in

Huntington’s book 189–90; scholars, references to 112, 125, 129, 157, 174; see also United States women: as agents of change 197; political rights of 36; uncovering of 66 work 145, 164, 165 worship (Ebadat) 51, 59, 75, 76, 82, 103, 114, 115, 118, 132, 144, 179, 195 wrong, duty to forbid 24, 32, 36, 45, 60, 84, 95, 101, 109, 114, 134–5, 180 Wuthnow, Robert 10 Yemen 34 Yoder, Dale 11 youth 77, 96, 103, 106, 124, 127, 133, 140, 143, 157, 169, 170, 172, 178, 185, 197 Zainab 137, 152 Zakat 27, 38, 39 Zionism 85, 142, 197, 199; see also Israel; Judaism Zionist-Crusaders alliance 193, 194, 209 Zoroaster 139 “Zul-Qarnain” 26, 53

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