Revisiting Talwar

REVISITING TALWAR

A STUDY IN THE ROYAL INDIAN NAVY UPRISING OF FEBRUARY 1946

REVISITING TALWAR

A STUDY IN THE ROYAL INDIAN NAVY .UPRISING OF FEBRUARY 1946

Dipak Kumar Das

I

AJANTA

ISBN 81-202-0349-6

Published 1993 AJANTA PUBLICATIONS P.O. Box 2192, Malka Ganj, Delhi-ll0007 A Publishing Unit of AJANTA BOOKS INTERNATIONAL 1 u.B. Jawahar Nagar, Bungalow Road, Delhi-llOOO7

(PRODUCED IN INDIA) ..

r~

Typeset and Printed at: Cambridge Press, Delhi-ll0006

on behalf of AJANTA PUBLICATIONS (INDIA)

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© No pari ofthir book may be reproduced or transmitted in any fonn or by any means, electronic ormechanical, includingphotocopying,recotdingor by any infonnation storage and retlieval system without prior written pennission from the publishers.

LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS Shore Establishments on Strike 'Storm Centres' in Bombay Karachi Harbour and Islands Route of HMIS Kathiawar Rough Plan of Positions of 37th MS Flotilla in Semaris Bay, Port Blair Appeal to All RIN Personnel by NCSC Leaflet Issued by Secretary, Bombay Committee of CPI

To Buddhadeva Bhattacharyya and Mohit Bhattacharya to whom I am most indebted

CONTENTS Acknowledgements Abbreviations

xi

Briefing on Talwar

xv 1

1

Under the White Ensign

2

'Tide' Turns

30

3

'Silence' Broken

61

4

Aggrieved Lower Deck

90

5

A Hell-Hole

130

6

A Tale of Three Ships

159

7

Rebellious Lower Deck

189

8

Faces of the Elite

234

9

The Other Responses ,

288

In Sum

341

Bibliograpliy

347

Index

354

CONTENTS Acknowledgements Abbreviations

xi

Briefing on Talwar

xv 1

1

Under the White Ensign

2

'Tide' Turns

30

3

'Silence' Broken

61

4

Aggrieved Lower Deck

90

5

A Hell-Hole

130

6

A Tale of Three Ships

159

7

Rebellious Lower Deck

189

8

Faces of the Elite

234

9

The Other ~esponses

288

In Sum

341

Bibliography

347

Index

354

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The writings of Ranajit Guha, Dipesh Chakravarty, Gyan Pandey and David Arnold among other 'subaltern' historians have been a great source of inspiration for me. I ~sh to take this opportunity to acknowledge that I have borrowed quite a number of ideas from them. Gautam Bhadra's advice on source material was useful for me. He has been kind enough to read the manuscript and offer his comments. I am grateful to Supriyo Chatterjee and Mihir Ranjan Purkayastha for their editorial assistance. A word of thanks is due to Tarun Kumar Mukhopadhyay, Sanjay Prakas Nanda, Alok Das, Tapan Kumar Chattopadhyay, Pradyumna Banerjee, Santanu Rakshit and Sunil Kumar Dhar for taking special interest in the work. To the librarians, archivists and other members of the staff of National Library, National Archives, Historical Section (Ministry of Defence, GOI) and Archives on Contemporary History (Jawaharlal Nehru University) goes my deep gratitude. Of them Dilip Kumar Mitra, Santanu Mukhopadhyay, Shankar Bhaduri, Sunil Kumar Ghosh, N.P. Sharma and Ajit Kumar Dey deserve special mention for their excellent cooperation with me. Grants from the research fund of the Department of Political Science, Calcutta University, enabled me to meet parts of my research expenses.

ABBREVIATIONS ...

AA C-in-C

Allied Air Commander-in-Chief

AB

Able (rate)

ABP

Amrita Bazar Patrika

AIR

All India Radio

AOC-in-C

Air Officer Coinmanding-in-Chief

AS

Active Service

BAFSEA

British Air Force, South-East Asia

BBC

British Broadcasting Corporation

BC

TIle Bombay Chronicle

Bl

TIle Bharat lyoti

BORs

British Other Ranks

BVO

Base Victualling Officer

BW

Bombay Witness

CCO

Central Communication Office

C-in-C

Commander-in-Chief

CMG

TI,e Civil & Military Gazette

CNA

Controller of Naval Accounts

CO

Commanding Officer

CPO

Chief Petty Officer

CSO

Chief Staff Officer

CW

Collected Works

DO

Divisional Officer

DSQ

Depot Sick Quarters

DSS

Dockyard Signal Station

DW

I'elhi Witness

EO

Executive Officer

ERA , ETE

Engine Room Artificer Emergency Tf!mporariIy Employed (Civilians)

xi

xii FOB

Flag Officer, Bombay

FOCRIN

Flag Officer Commanding RIN

FPJ

17ze Free Press Journal

GHQ (I)

General Headquarters (India)

GI

American soldier. (from gi - general issue or government issue)

GIPD/S

Government of India Press, Delhi/Shimla

GOC-in-C

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief

GOI

Government of India

GTCoy

Ground Transport Company

HM

His Majesty

HMI/S

His Majesty's Indian/Ship

HMS

His Majesty's Ship

HO

Hostilities Only

HS

Hindustan Standard

HT

17ze Hindustan Times

lA

Indian Army.

fAR

17le Indian Anllual Register

ICO

Indian Commissioned Officer

ICSD

Indian Canteen Stores Department

INA

!ndian National Army

IORs

Indian Other Ranks

LAD

Legislative Assembly Debates

LCM

Landing Craft Mechanized

LCT

Landing Craft Tank

LCW

Landing Craft Wing

Ldg. Sig.

Leading Signalman

Ldg.Tel.

Leading Telegraphist

LH

Leading Hand

LS

Leading Seaman

xiii MG

The Manchester Guardian

ML

Motor Launch

MP

Member, Parliament

MS

Mine Sweeper

MSA

Mine-Sweeping Allowance

MT

Motor/Mechanical Transport

MTE

Mechanical Training Establishment

NAAFI

Navy Army Air Force Institute

NC

Negotiation Committee

NCO

Non-Commissioned Officer

NCSC

Naval Central Strike Committee

NHQ

Naval Headquarters

NL

Naval Law

NIT OD

17le /Yew York Times Ordinary (rate)

OOD

Officer on Duty or Officer of the Day

OOW

Officer on Watch

PA PD

People's Age

PO

Petty Officer

RAF·

Royal Air Force

RAMC

Royal Army Medical Corps

RIA.F

Royal Indian Air Force

RIASC

Royal Indian Army Supply Corps

RIM

Royal Indian Marine

Parliamentary Debates

RINFR

Royal Indian Naval Fleet Reserve

RINR

Royal Indian Naval Reserve

RINVR

Royal Indian Naval Volunteer Reserve

RN

Royal Navy

RNR

Royal Naval Reserve

xiv RNVR

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve

RO

Regulating Office/Officer

RP

Rocket Projectile

RPO

Regulating Petty Officer

RT

Radio Telephony

SB

Sick Bay

SBA

Sick Berth Attendant

SCO

Staff Communication Officer

SEAC

South-East Asia Command

Sig. Bos'n

Signal Boatswain

SNCO

Senior Non-Commissioned Officer

SNLR

Service No Longer Required

SNOPG

Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf

SS

Short Service/Special Service

SW

Selected Works

TOI

The Times of India

TOP

17le Trallsfer of Power

VCO

Viceroy's Commissioned Officer

VS

Visual Signal/Signalling

WAC (I)

Women Auxiliary Corps (India)

WO

Warrant Officer

WRINS

Women Royal Indian Naval Service

WT

Wireless Telegraphy

BRIEFING ON TALWAR

Ta/war here stands for the rebellious Royal Indian Navy of February 1946 in its entirety. A colonial armed service built to protect British interest, RIN sought to impose on its men a sense of devotion and loyalty to the alien rulers and, immediately, to their representatives in the upper deck. The barriers around naval units were to distance them from civilians and prevent any influence from outside that could dilute their allegiance. Aboard ships, duty and space for Indian men were divided so as to suit the specific requirements of the service. Any violation of this arrangement invited punishment. Every aspect of lower-deck life was regulated by 'standing orders'. An occupant of the bottom tier of the naval hierarchy, the I:.ating was required to abide unquestionably by the command of his · superiors. The latter had to be saluted at all times and places. The rules of etiquette demanded that the rating must spring to attention · whenever addressed by the officers and answer submissively any of their queries. On enlistment he was allotted an 'official number'. After that he had no other identity. His privacy and individuality were the first casualties on signing up. Everything, his body, apparel or belonging, was open to scrutiny by RO or RPO. Even while off duty or on 'liberty' the rating could not cross the boundary of his unit unless permitted to. Out on the civvy street he was under the surveillance of the naval police and liable to be punished for any 'deviant' behaviour. Routine and regimentation sought to reduce him to a cog in the wheel,an automaton with neither intelligence nor a capacity · for judgeme~t, doing only what he was programmed to. Punitive djscipline, enforced with iron hand, sought to dull his mental abilit.i~s. Isolated from the people and reared on a heavy dose of training and militarization under British direction, the rating was expected to be wholly loyal to the Raj. He was to be so even under uI).bearable service conditions or in the face of blatant racial discrimination. Except for an insignificant section the entire naval elite believed that Indian lower ranks could be made to behave as it wished through coercion, deprivation and ill-treatment. But oppression and injustice generated among the lower-deck subalterns a sense of moral outrage xv

xvi

Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946

and undermined their loyalty to the service. Tension surfaced time and again in individual units. At such moments the men threw off allegiance to the upper deck. Andjn early 1946 the entire. RIN lower deck did so. Defiance of authority, in contrast to the unquestioning obedience in other circumstances, became the hallmark of their action during those tumultuous days of 18-23 February. The mutiny on Bounty, the one on Potemkin or even some of those elsewhere,' in between or later, given the corpus of historical writings and film classics, are more familiar to us than what happened aboard Talwar. We do not have an Eisenstein or a Frank Lloyd. Our historians have ignored, marginalized or distorted the phenomenon. On their part the rating-rebels hardly left any written testimony of their action and perspective. Ahmed Brohi, a leading striker at Talwar, told the RIN Commission of Enquiry: 'We did our job.... Nobody has any evidence. All records have been burnt... Nobody will speak anything.' Neither the witness nor, for that matter, any of those who deposed before investigating teams could be made to reveal anything beyond why they launched the movement. This makes our visit to Ta/war arduous. The access to it lies largely through the upper~deck discourse. Broadly, Ministry of Defence/NHQ· records under the series 'RIN Mutiny'I'Naval Law' comprise (i) COs' reports written a day or two after the ratings' surrender, (ii) proceedings and findings of the boards of investigation, held in March-April, into the 'mutiny' aboard individual ships and establishments, (iii) 'mutiny charges' 'levelled subsequently against category 'A' rebels for trial by courts martial and (iv) proceedings and reports of the Commission submitted in July. The commanding officers of quite a number of units under Bombay command tried, in their reports and evidence, to pass the buck on to the neighbouring ships or establishments which figured prominently in the strike. It was endlessly repeated in their statements that their men were 'perfectly loyal', 'quiet' and 'orderly' until 'hooligans' from the latter incited them to 'mutiny' and 'rowdyism'. The explanations by officers in command of the more turbulent units were nothing but an improvisation on the old bogies that had suited the counter-insurgents so well. The men had no grievances. No complaint was reported to them before the outbreak. Nor was any 'request' suppressed by officers under their command. No 'active mutiny' was contemplated by the bulk of the ratings. There

Briefing on Talwar

xvii

was no 'pre-meditation', 'pre-planning' or 'pre-organization' on their· part. The development was essentially external to them. To argue otherwise was difficult for the officers: it might amount to admitting their part in the aggravation of lower-deck discontent, their ignorance of the 'state of morale' among the men and lack of contact with them. More precisely the upper-deck response produced a plethora of conspiracy theories and obliterated the ratings' role as the wiIIing subjects of their own action. The departmental boards upheld this perspective and absolved the officers of any responsibility for creating the 'state of mind that led to the mutiny'. A few spoke of a 'tacit understanding' among officers as well as men as to what they should divulge. While the latter refused to leak any information that might implicate their comrades or themselves, the former were anxious to underplay the disturbance aboard their units, prove their vigilance before' the outbreak and save their reputation as 'strict disciplinarians'. The officers' evidence was attuned to a logic of selfdefence, an effort to protect their rank and position. However most of the boards understood from the directives of the higher authori-. ties the kind of 'opinion' the latter would like to hear from them. The reports they wrote whitewashed the existing regime in RIN and named the 'ring-leaders' for punishment. Excepting a honourable few the entire body of officer-witnesses, in their depositions before the RIN Commission, reiterated the external manipulation theses, as usual, with no concrete evidence to substantiate them. Quite a number of ratings who were likely to give ullpalatable evidence were threatened and' prevented from making any statement. Many more had been dismissed or discharged from the service and thus removed out of the Commission's view. Still those who were allowed to ap- . pear in its witness box made the officers' arguments look hollow. The grievances they voiced, the Commission had to admit, were not foisted on them from outside. Even then the report it submitted did not, in substance, deviate from the dominant explanation as above: it echoed in fact a subtler variant of it. The event was attributed to a small 'educated' and (therefore) 'politically conscious' nucleus in the lower deck. It was mediated through the ratings' grievances but, still, was external to the bulk of them. Enough hints of the ratings' conditions in RIN and their perception of the structure of authority that made such conditions possible are contained in the transcriptions of their depositions before ,

xviii

Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946

the investigating teams. To find out why they rose in revolt one need not rely on the upper-deck discourse (which reveals its own assumptions rather than their motivations). But when it comes to knowing how, dependence on it becomes unavoidable .. The rebels were too uncommunicative to answer the question. Given the absence of wrjtten testimony or a substantial body of oral evidence by them outlining the rebellion as they viewed it, one must tap the records thatthe naval elite produced in the exercise of its official function and, at the same time, be on guard against its bias. The 'narrative of events' in COs' reports and officers' statements to the Boards and the Commission of Enquiry provide clues of the rebellion, its flash point, spread and end, forms and methods, organization and leadership and its tensions or contradictions. The ratings' actions and the utterances that matched them, galling as they were to their officers, were detailed in the 'charges' that the latter framed to have their adversaries punished. The reconstruction of much of what the rebels did aboard ships and establishments in Karachi is bedeviled by the absence of sources other than the one of this kind. The NHQ records on the 'mutiny' can be supplemented by -the Home-Political (Internal) files, civilian officials' papers, nationalist leaders' speeches and writings, assembly proceedings an,d newspaper reports. The latter simultaneously throw light on the elite response other than that of naval officers. In the early writings on late colonial India scholars spared little attention for the affairs of the rebellious ratings. In referring to their uprising en passallt in his multi-volume History of the Freedom Movement in India R.C. Majumdar reproduced a passage from the bureaucrat-turned-historian V.P. Menon's Trallsfer of Power ill India. To him as to the latter the situation that developed out of the strike by a 'section' of Indian ratings was very 'ugly'. For ships were seized, guns mounted and preparations made to attack the military. The ratings went 'completely out of hand'. Contrary to the advice of Congress and League, strikes and hartals were organized. 'Unruly crowds' went about looting and burning, particularly in Bombay. The military had to be called in to assist the police in restoring order. While some conspired to fish in the troubled waters, Vallabhbhai Patel contributed to the efforts to bring the situation under control. The entire development was thus reduced to a problem of law and order and explained in the same terminology as that of its guardians.

xix

Briefing 011 Talwar ,

The naval ratings' action and the mass upsurge that followed were divested of their anti-colonialist content and rendered free of any political meaning. These had no significance except as a phenomenon creating lawlessness· and disorder and impeding the measures taken by British rulers to settle India's problems constitutionally. More recently Amales Tripathi and a couple of historians of Bipan Chandra's persuasion have paid a little more attention to the RIN revolt. But this hardly makes any difference for those who willed the event. While their predecessors saw the action as a problem of control for the colonial state and part of its life, these scholars view it as an event within the domain of Congress nationalism and seek to appropriate it as such into its history. For the latter the task of assimilation was not unproblematical. The spirit behind the revolt has to be lauded, in most general terms, to the exclusion of its more concrete achievements, as was done by Congress leaders. A fearless act of collective defiance in an armed force, it has a 'dramatic impact' on the minds of the people. But nothing more. Nothing more than a 'symbolic significance' should be attached to the event. The revolt was unable to rally round itself all sections of society, especially 'liberal and conservative groups' and small town - and villagefolk, as Congress-led movements had done before. The response it evoked, unlike the latter, was confined to the more militant sections of the people in a few urban centres, that is, the organized working classes. Underlying this jll;dgment is a predilection for an all-ornothing position, a movement by the whole people or none. By the same token the communal unity witnessed during the upsurge was more of organizations than of the people. It was limited in purpose and short in duration. It was forged for a specific agitation and disappeared as soon as the requirement was over. The 'unity at barricades' had. little 'realized potential' and showed hardly any prospect for the future. A battalion of Mahratta troops was enough to confine the ratings to their barracks and one m·ore battalion to subdue their civilian sympathizers. It is as if the protests would have appeared seminal had these been more extravagant and had forced the authorities to deploy more troops to tackle them. But then our scholars show stubborn reluctance to look at the evidence that is extant and relevant to their assessment. When all is said about the failures of the naval rising and the mass upsurge in its wake they are out to prove the relations~ip between Congress and these protests to

Xt"

Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946

be one of integral association rather than of opposition. In their explanation Sardar Patel exerted himself for the restoration of peace because, aware of the British mobilization of repressive forces, he wanted to save all those. in the fray from inevitable extermination. This echoes word for word the apology that Congress offered later (and conventional historiographical wisdom readily accepted). The overwhelming evidence as to its conscious subversion of the actions that the naval ratings and their civilian supporters initiated on their own is conveniently glossed over. These protests are in fact presented as an 'extension' of the Congress nationalist activity. Understandably it is difficult for scholars trapped within the paradigm of elite discourse to admit the existence of any anti-colonialist politics outside the urbit of the latter. To do so is to question the notion of Congress hegemony over all such politics as well as that of a unified nationalism. . Of the few monographs on the naval uprising one was written by B.C. Dutt who served RIN as a communication rating until his dismissal allegedly for 'subversive activities' on the night before FOCRIN's visit to Ta/war on 2 February 1946. Contrary to the general impression about it his is not a participant's account. It is a 'personal narrative', rather a narrative of events to some of which he was a witness. When the Talwar ratings struck work, he was inside the Signal School, confined to his barracks, and played no part at that time or 'later. Presented as a leading participant's work Dutt's Mutiny of the Innocents soon came to be treated as 'the most au. thoritative' of all accounts. Ironically its author who claimed to have, along with few others, led the rebellion fell back upon, after a lapse of two and half decades, the view of some of its adversaries. Behind the uprising, Dutt wrote, was a conspiracy hatched by a few Talwar ratings (including himself) who called themselves 'Azad Hindi' or 'Free Indians' and received 'some guidance' from left-wing Congress leaders. It is these conspirators whom Dult credited with whatever pre-meditation or pre-planning underlying the uprising. They roped in the 'likely candidates' for the Azad Hindi work by means of flattery, offering food, tea and other drinks. A 'comprehensive. plan' was drawn up by them to channel the discontent among lower ranks through a 'whispering campaign' and to create a sense of instability in their minds through widespread sabotage. Navy Day, 1 December 1945, was chosen as the 'curtain raiser' for the first of a series of acts

xxii

Revisiting Ta/war: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Febntary 1946

consciousness other than theirs, either that of a scheming few among them or of the nationalist elite as its motive force. The view inclined to the left moved away from the conspiracy thesis, like that of Dutt, but not very far from the perspective of nationalist historians on the event. To the radical commentators the naval uprising was the 'logical culmination' of the anti-imperialist mass movement rather than of Congress nationalist activity. E.M.S. Namboodiripad, in his 'Preface' to Subrata Banerjee's monograph 171e RIN Strike, wrote: the revolt was an 'inseparable part' of the struggles which different sections of the people, especially workers and peasants, had waged to force the British to quit the country. These struggles showed a great deal of initiative, resourcefulness and militancy. Yet the hegemony of Congress and League over them was nearly total. That was why the ratings, having pulled down Union Jack and White Ensign, the symbols of British domination over the service, hoisted in their place Clzarka and Crescent. This act of appropriation by men of Congress and League symbols for a project of their own signified here their loyalty to the 'parties of the bourgeoisie and the landlords'. It was this 'weakness which the British exploited to bring the movement to its knees. Of course these writers did not forget to add: Congress and League flags did not fly alone. Together with them flew Hammer and Sickle. This indicated the direction in which the struggle tended to move. The individuality of the rating-rebel or the specificity of his action escaped the radical writers' attention. They found in his place some other with an identity or consciousness different from his. Perhaps for this reason Subrata Banerjee heard a rating say: 'We are working people ... we must put up the Red flag as well'. To lay claim to the (revolutionary) heritage of the rising and assimilate it to the history of the 'working people' our commentators invented Hammer and Sickle on the flagmast of every naval unit in stream or . ashore. What we question here is the exclusion of ordinary ratings as the principals of their own history, the representation of ordinary rebels as innocent victims of some others' machinations or the view of their uprising as an extension of elite nationalism or the culminaaim tion of workers' and peasants' struggles for independence. is to explore and emphasize the initiative that naval subalterns took on their own and the consciousness that informed their action. In drawing out these spccificities we need to look at what constituted

Our

Briefing on Talwar

xxiii

the backdrop to the ratings' uprising. The stream of incidents that contributed to the creation of an elemental preparedness for a collective defiance on the scale it took place deserves special attention. It is necessary to examine what conditions within RIN brought about ratings' disenchantment about the moral standing of upper-deck authority which underlay their will to overthrow it. The growing willingness to resist oppression, arbitrariness or injustice is clear from the series of protests that preceded in point of time. Apart from the context and development of the rebellion in the unit where it originated, the 'narrative of events' in ships and establishments which shot into prominence for the intensity of their conflict with the authorities is interesting and instructive for us. To analyze the action in all its essentials is the only means by which to grasp the message It contained or the cognitive scheme of its subjects. The rebels' identity as revealed in the moment before an alternative structure of authority came up in place of the one they had overthrown and the crisis it faced thereafter is particularly noteworthy. The response that racings' action or that of their civilian sympathizers evoked from either the alien rulers or the nationalist leaders is not unusual. What seems to be so is the extent of complicity between their respective positions. This is understandable in terms of the tendency of such protests to go beyond their original objectives by switches.

1 UNDER THE WHITE ENSIGN The British Indian Navy had a long, chequered career. Its history spans three hundred and thirty-odd years.! It began with a group of British ships arriving in Surat in 1612. From its foundation to the middle of this century the navy 'had a history of alternate expansion' and contraction 'in the face of emergency, the successful accomplishment of its tasks and subsequent retrenchment, sometimes almost to the vanishing point. It .. had ... been built up when required.'2 It flourished and wilted depending on the needs of British. trade and interest in the region. I

Soon after the foundation of the East India Company in 1600 Hector, one of its ships commanded by Captain Hawkins, reached Surat with a letter to Emperor Iehangir seeking permission to trade with India. The permission was duly granted, and the Emperor promised trading facilities to the Company. But the Portuguese whose trading stations were already well established in India made it clear that they would resist any encroachment on their preserves. Unable to trade freely with the Indian mainland due to the presence of the Portuguese in all principal ports and especially their fleet of some twenty vessels at Surat, the Company sent out a squadron of warships comprising Dragon, Osiander (or Hoseander), lames and Solomon under the command of Captain Thomas Best. The vessels arrived in Swally, the roadstead of Surat on 5 September 1612, the date to which the British traced the foundation of the Indian Navy. It had its baptism in fire in October. Later through successive engagements in Swally off Surat the Portuguese were overpowered by the Company's ships assisted by a fleet of small Indian craft known as Ghurabs (the British called them Grabs) and galivates.3 The latter were officered by volunteers from the Company's ships, and their crew consisted mainly of HIndu fishermen from the Konkan coast. This 'Grab service', as !t was called for many years, formed the nucleus of the Indian Marine, and fought to establish British supremacy over

2

Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946

. ,-Indian waters by eliminating Portuguese and other European competitors from there. Larger ships came out from England and went back as the Company deemed fit. After the acquisition of Bombay in 1668 from King Charles 11 and the transfer of its headquarters from Surat to this island about two decades later, th.! Company's trade tended to flourish. Appointed in 1685 Admiral of the Company's land and sea forces between Cape Comorin and the Gulf of Persia, Sir John Child decided, contrary to the advice of his counsellors, to. attack the Mughals. The latter, with the support of the Sidis' fleet, captured most of Bombay island and besieged Child in Bombay Castle. Bombay was redeemed subsequently on payment of a huge sum. A year after the transfer of the Indian Navy in 1685 to Bombay (where it remained till 1941 when FOCRIN thought it necessary to shift NHQ to Delhi and direct the naval force from the banks of Ju:mna) its nomenclature 'Honourable East India Company's Marine' changed to 'Bombay Marine'. By the time the Portuguese and the Sidis had been reduced to insignificance the British faced a serious challenge from Admiral Kanhoji Angre's Mahratta fleet which extended its control throughout the west coast. The size, manoeuvrability and firepower of Angre's navy continued to grow, and consequently the British decided to build corvettes for the Bombay Marine which would convoy merchant ships and protect them from the former's wrath. In 1717 a strong English fleet under the command of Captain Barlew attacked the Mahratta garrison at Gheria but had to beat a hasty retreat with severe losses. The sucq:ssive attempts to defeat Angre failed. The Mahratta fleet had the unique record of maintaining supremacy over the waters off the Konkan coast for many years, and it could only be suppressed much later, after Kanhoji's death and with a combined operation with Peshwas (led by Admiral Watson with his ships and Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Clive with his army contingent). It would not be irrelevant to mention here that Clive's mission in Bengal was in no small way assisted by Admiral Watson and sailors of the Bombay Marine. Meanwhile in 1740 another sea power capable of challenging the British entered the Indian ocean. From their naval base in Mauritius, the French sent a strong fleet into the Bay of Bengal to inter-

Under the White Ensign

3

cept and capture British merchant ships. Co~manded by La Bourdonnais it scored a few victories over the British but these were short-lived. The French were eventually defeated, and the British gained almost undisputed control of the sea. The eighteenth century saw an increase in the strength of the Marine. The expansion of the Company's trade and interest in this region increasingly demanded its assistance. This in turn called for addition of ships and personnel to the service. Already in 1635 the Company built pinnaces and other larger vessels including Queen at the shipbuilding yard at Surat. Bombay being a safer harbour and closer to the scenes of action, the yard was shifted there in 1735. The site for shipbuilding was selected by Lowjee Nusserwanjee Wadia, ancestor of a long line of Parsi master-builders of ships, naval and commercial. In a little over 100 years no less than 115 men-of-war and 144 merchant vessels were built in this dockyard, which included gunships for the Royal Navy. The first half of the next century and the opening years of the second witnessed among other things the defeat of Joasmis4 and the capture of Rangoon and Bushire. Meanwhile in 1830 the Company's marine was constituted as a combatant service and rechristened 'Indian Navy'. In the same year Hughes Lindsay, a 411-ton ship of the Company, sailed under steam. The Indian Navy became active during the siege of Multan and, above all, during the great mutiny of 1857. Two highest decorations, the Victoria Cross, were awarded to its personnel for their role in the suppression of the mutiny. A naval brigade comprising 78 officers and 1740 Itlen were assigned shore service during the u p r i s i n g . ' , Soon the Company's rule came to an end, and in 1863 the Indian Navy was abolished, the 'naval protection' of Indian waters having been taken over by the Royal Admiralty. The service was reorganized on a non-combatant basis and renamed 'Bombay Marine'. For fourteen years it ::>erformed various non-combatant jobs, including trooping and the laying of submarine telegraph cables from Bombay to Suez and from Karachi to Basra. In 1877 the service became 'Her Majesty's Indian Marine' with two divisions at Bombay and Calcutta. The duties assigned to it were: transport of troops and government stores; maintenance of station ships at Aden, the An-

Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946 damans, Burma and the Persian Gulf for political, police, lighting and other purposes; maintenance of gunboats on the Irrawadi and the Euphrates; repair and maintenance of all government launches and vessels, and marine survey. The service underwent yet another change in nomenclature: in 1892 it was assigned the title 'Royal Indian Marine'. Until the outbreak of the world war RIM did not need to assist the British in any significant way. Its role remained one of marine survey, maintenance of light houses and transportation of troops. During the war RIM ships served as auxiliary cruisers with the Royal Navy in various theatres of operations, They carried troops and war materials to Egypt, Iraq and East Africa. The RIM ship Hardinge, while on patrol in the Suez, fought off the Turks attempting to block the canal. Its vessels also played an important role in landing troops in Mesopotamia, and smaller craft, designed for operations in inland waters, did a very useful job in the Euphrates and the Tigris. Three other ships, Northbrooke, Millto and Dufferin, were engaged in patrolling duty in the Red Sea. The total temporary enlistment was 240 officers, 60 warrant officers and 2000 men. 11

The Indian navy was organized by the British in the early seventeenth century to protect its commerce from other competitors and pirates. Later, as occasions demanded, it acted as adjunct to the 'army of occupation' at home '- it assisted in the quelling of civil disturbances like the mutiny of 1857 and the Mopilla rebellion of 1921, and fought Britain's wars in alien waters. At the termination of the first world war RIM reverted to its non-combatant role. It was reduced to a small force entrusted with minor coastal duties and its manpower drastically cut down by demobilization. The 'naval protection' of Indian waters Was once again assigned to the Royal Navy. For its service towards the 'naval defence' of the country and 'protection of her trade in alien waters' India had to pay a staggering sum of £ 100,000 annually to HM's government in addition to a. series of miscelhneous charges. Following the report of the Inchcape Committee in the early twenties the drive towards retrenchment gathered momentum. Con-

Under the White Ensign

5

.' sequently RIM reached its lowest ebb.·It was converted into a luxurious yacht for high officials, with hydrographic, buoyage and lighting duties being entrusted with and paid for by the provincial governments. The troopers were sold out, the transport work being left to private contractors, and the marine was virtually reduced to a survey department and a dockyard. Finally the service was left with Clive (sloop) for lighting and buoying duties on the Burma coast (where she also carried out political duties), Lawrence (sloop) doing similar duties in the Persian Gulf, Minto serving as the station ship for the Andaman and Nicobar islands, Comwallis (sloop) lying in the dockyard unconverted and two small ships, Pathan and Ba/lichi, for local training at Bombay. Elphinstone, an old sloop of the Royal Navy, ·was employed as a relief ship until her loss in 1926. The Royal Navy continued to 'guard' the oceanic highway and the coastline of India on payment of a huge sum annually. But as before in its long history a virtual eclipse of the naval service was followed by a revival of its strength (ill both man. and material) and activity. Time and again this happened in response, at bottom, to the needs of the empire here as elsewhere. In 1925 a departmental committee was set up ul'der the chairmanship of Lord Rawlison, Minister of Defence and Cummander-inChief, India, with the purpose of preparing a scheme for the reorganization of the service. The Rawlison Committee. recommended the conversion of RIM into a combatant force with an initial strength of four sloops or escort vessels, two patrol vessels, four minesweeping trawlers, two surveying ships and a depot ship under the command of a Rear Admiral of the Royal Navy on the active list. Accordingly the Naval Discipline Act was introduced as a bill in 1928. But it failed to pass the Central Assembly and was shelved. In February 1934 it was revived with a few minor amendments and, finally in August was passed by both the Assembly and the Council of States. On 2 October the Royal Indian Navy came into being. Meanwhile in 1928 RIM had been restored to combatant standing and like the ROYCl.I and Dominion Navies, permitted to fly the White, Ensign on board all its ships. But very little progress was made towards its reorganization, the priority being given to the army for understandable reasons. Subsequently in 1937 FOCRIN advanced a five-year plan for

6

Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Febntary 1946

the expansion of RIN. The scheme proposed, among other things, the opening of a boys' training establishment at Manora (Karachi) and increase in the strength of personnel, both officers and men. But the plan was referred back for redrafting so that the expenditure for reorganization in a year did not exceed the sum hitherto paid annually to the British government for the so-called naval defence of India. In January, next year, HM's government agreed, after protracted negotiations with its Indian counterpart, to forego the annual subvention of £100,000 and also the miscellaneous charges of £32,000. But this was agreed to on condition that India would maintain a seagoing squadron of no less than six modern escort vessels for cooperation with the Royal Navy in the 'naval defence' of the country \ and, in addition, undertake the responsibility for the protection of its ports. Accordingly the contributions ceased from 1 April 1938. Shortly afterwards FOCRIN prepared a nine-year plan to fulfil the conditions on which the annual subvention had been discontinued. The scheme provided for completing India's local naval defences, establishing training depots, acquiring motor torpedo boats and for all the measures recommended later by the Chatfield Committee. This plan was examined by the authorities in India as well as by the. Royal Admiralty. Subsequently the whole problem was studied afresh by the Chatfield Committee (February 1939) which recommended the expansion of RIN with the construction of four 'Bittern' class 19-knot escort vessels (in replacement of Comwallis, Lawrence and Clive which were to be scrapped), four 'Mastiff class trawlers, the acquisition on loan from RN of four 'Halcycon' class minesweepers, the rearming of Indus and Hindustan with modern high and low angle guns, and the provision of depots and instructional equipment and of local naval defence equipment. Naturally all these proposals were intended to suit the British government, and in anticipation of the war the Committee insisted on the implementation of the scheme in five instead of nine years. The outbreak of the war in September 1939 overtook action on these proposals, and a "mad rush' towards the expansion of the service became inevitable. Shortly before the war RIN was permitted to establish reserves. RINR consisted of serving officers of the mercantile marine. Originally RINVR had two branches, executive and accountant. A third, engineer branch, was added on the outbreak of hostilities. Its

Under the White Ensign

7

offIcers were recruited from the qualified members of the general p·ublic; they received six months' intensive training at the depot and subsequently instruction at sea. As for ratings a special procedure was set up: in addition to the regulars special service ratings were recruited, who served for five years before being transferred to RINFR, and 'Hostilities Only' ratings were drawn from the personnel of the mercantile marine, principally froni the trained crew of requisitioned merchant vessels for service during the war. At the outbreak of hostilities the strength of naval personnel was 152 officers (inclusive of reserves), 46 warrant officers (inclusive of those on loan from RN) and 1475 ratings (inclusive of special service and 'hostilities only' cadres). The Royal Indian Navy had at the time six. ships and two tenders in commission. Table 1 gives partiLtl1ars of their displacement and armament in addition to their nam(:", and types. Except for these vessels RIN was in fact confined within the

TABLE 1 Name

Class

Ciive

Date of commission

Displacement in tons

Sloop.

1921

2,021

COl71waf/is

Sloop

1917

1,383

JIindustan Indus Lawrence

Sloop Sloop Sloop

1930 1934 1919

1,190 1,190 1,225

Investigator

Survey ship Targettowing trawler Patrol vessel

1924

1,572

Madras

Path an

413

G95

Main armament

Two 4", four 3-pdr., two 2-pdr. Three 4", four 3-pdr., two 2-pdr. Two 4"; four 3-pdr. Two 4.7", four 3-pdr. Two 4", four 3-pdr., two 2-pdr. 1 OF 4" MK IV (low angle) 10F 12-pdr. 12cwt (low angle) 2QF 12-pdr. 12 cwt (low angle)

Source: RIN Mutiny Sr. No. G, p.G. Also Collins, op. cit., p. 13.

8

Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946

walls of the dockyard, Bombay. All its shore establishments (naval barracks, signal school, gunnery school, mechaniCal training establishments, naval offices and Fort WIT station) were concentrated there. Only a WiT station was situated at Mahul. Its ordnance was in the hands of the army. Its medical staff was provided by the Indian MediCal Department and administered by two part-time officers of RAMC. There were no schools for training ratings in torpedo, radar and electrical disciplines and also no facilities for training officers who had to be deputed to the Royal Navy establishments in UK for basiC and advanced training in all disciplines. When the war broke out, NHQ was situated in Bombay. Preoccupied with operatior..al and organizational work at the port FOCRIN was less in a position to visit New Delhi, the seat of decision-making at re~lar intervals. Naval matters were thrashed out in the capital between two civilian officers innocent of the 'special naval point of view' and with no experts to advise them. The bulk of exchange between Delhi and NHQ concerning important matters was carried out through correspondence or signals. Hence the delay in obtaining urgent clearance could hardly be avoided. In October 1939 a naval liaison officer was posted in the capital to ensure the early di~posal of important matters but the situation did not improve. On the other hand, FOCRIN Was unable to improve his contact with the central government. Eventually he had to do it at the expense of his contact with the naval personnel, ships and establishments in Bombay. In 1941 NHQ was shifted to Delhi. With the outbreak of the war - India being dedared a party to it and committed to joining the Allies by the ViCeroy _. the expansion of RIN needed to be carried to the utmost within the shortest possible time. Prompt steps had to be taken to get ships. Immediately a number of merchant vessels belonging to Indian shipping concerns were commandeered and converted into men-of-war. Orders for ships were placed with Australia and England. Some trawlers (of 'Bassett' class) were built in Vizagapatam. Among the vessels made in India were Travancore, Baroda, Agra, Poona, Lahore and Patna. The ships received from England included Sutiej, Jumna and Narbada and those from Australia Bellgal and Bombay. During the first few months of the war RIN had to do minesweeping, patrolling and other duties! with the merchant vessels converted (in Bombay and Calcutta) into auxiliary warships.

Under the White Ensign

9

RIN, it may be remembered, entered the war with five sloops, a survey ship, a patrol vessel and a steam trawler. With the exception of Indus and Hindustall all were old and none was capable of steaming at 16-knots. Even "these two relatively modern sloops were overdue for rearming and refitting. In the course of the war the number of ships in commission multiplied severalfold. The growth of the service in terms of the strength of each class of vessels on 31 December of each year during the war is indicated in Table 2. The expansion of the RIN fleet and the multiplication of its duties involved a rapid increase in the intake of personnel, specially technical hands. In fact by the end of 1939 the number of personnel in the service was nearly doubled and by the turn of 1942 it was increased over six times its pre-war level. With more manpower the number of naval establishments multiplied. Several new establishments came up at Jamnagar, Cochin, Mandapam, Madras, Coconada, Vizagapatam and Calcutta. To cope with training an increasing number of personnel in specialist as well as in general tasks and to equip the growing fleet the existing facilities were expanded and modernized. HMIS Bahadur was commissioned at Karachi to augment the training of boys at HMIS Dalhousie at Bombay. To train officers and men two more establishments, one, gunnery and the other, radar (namely, HMIS Himalaya and Ch amak) , were set up at Karachi. The other facilities that were established at the time were HMIS Shivaji, a mechanical establishment at Lonavla, HMIS Akbar, a ratings' training establishment at Thane, HMIS Talwar, a signal school '. at Bombay and a mechanical training establishment at Pilani. Clearly more shore establishments were set up with the greater intake of personnel during the war. By the termination of· hostilities in August 1945 the actual strength of ratings shot up to 27,651 (which fell to 21,193 by December owing to demobilization). This was nearly twenty times what it was at the start of the war. Additional officers were recruited from the merchant navy and from various trades and professions in civil , life. During the first four months of the war ratings were drawn almost entirely from the merchant ~avy but for reasons of pay and allowances the best elements did not join RIN. Later men from the civvy streets 'volunteered' in thousands to swell its ranks. Table 3 shows the increase in the strength of officers and men in various cadres of the service as the war progressed.

......

0

TABLE 2 Class

31.12.39

31.12.40

31.12.41

31.12.42

31.12.43

31.12.44

31.12.45

~

~

"7l Thereafter Iafrey left for his office. On the 22nd morning too officers were unable to enforce any order. Raher their men went about ordering them. The Victualling Officer, Sub-Lieut. Kanwar was about to leave Hamla in a truck. He was stopped by RPO Fakey and ordered to fetch rations for his men - he was addressed in disrespectful 'tum': 'ralion ka bundaboost karo, nai toh malum hai hia ke kia haja'.72 ,About the same time instructed by CO, Lieut. Belcourt and Sub-Lieut. Jamaji went to address their respective divisions to wean them away from the strike. But in vain. They were told by the leading rates: 'you cannot address your [men] .... unless you submit a written request to the [strike] committee'. In accordance with the strike committee'reguJations' none of the officers could be allowed to speak to their divisions separately and thereby disrupt the lower-deck unity. They could address the ship's company collectively and that too on permission from the local strike committee. On the way back to his office Lieut. Belcourt was ordered by RPO Razzak to take off his cap and shoulder straps.73 The slogan everywhere was 'koi kam par mat jao' and 'hartal jari· rakho'. The ratings made it clear to their officers that no one would resume work until they were. told to by the Naval Central Strike Committee?4

Rebellious Lower Deck

211

III

By the dawn of 23 February NCSC had made up its mind to surrender unconditionally. It decided to do so on the advice of the 'national leaders' whose mediation it had sought from the beginning. On the very first day of their strike the Talwar ratings demanded of FOB to invite a national leader, preferably Aruna Asaf Ali,7s to negotiate on their behalf and underwrite the official promises about redressal of their grievances. When asked by a journalist why they insisted on outside leaders' intervention, their reply was: 'our demands will have the usual official run of several months in the name of investigations, while, as we know, within ten minutes orders can be issued by the Naval Headquarters in Delhi to direct a whole fleet to bases fraught with risks and scenes of danger'.76 Unwilling for this reason among others to leave the matter to the discretion of naval authorities, the ratings wanted national leaders to take up their cause and mobilize the support· of popular masses for their struggle. In fact on the 18th February itself the Talwar leaders called upon Aruna to 'iJtteIvene on their behalf'. 'They even wanted' heno be their spokesman to FOB next morning. But reluctant to associate herself with . the 'trouble' she gave them some gratuitous advice. 'Remain clam', separate service grievances from political demands, take up the former with the naval .authorities and refer the latter to political leaders, she told them. As for 'the support of national forces' for their cause she advised 'them to see the highest Congress authority in Bambay, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel'.77 The Sardar, when contacted by Aru~a, told her that 'the ratings did not resort to ... [the strike] under his advice,' and so it was 'no business of his or hers to interfere.' Th"(fstrikers, he did not forget to add, must abide by discipline. ArUna tried to impress upon the ratings the same thing: 'discipline should be their watchwotd.'78 The Bombay Provincial Congress Committee upheld this policy of non-intervention, and its Secretary, S.K. Patil similarly asked the ratings 'to observe perfect peace and discipline in their conduct and maintain an atmosphere of non-violence in all circumstances':79 Most of the Ta/war leaders. tried their best to act in keeping with this advice. Nevertheless there was violence. The 19th morning saw violent demonstrations by the ratings from ships at anchor and establishments ashore. Some time after the news reached Ta/war 'peace bri-

212

Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of February 1946

gades' were sent out in RIN lorries (bedecked with Tri-colours and their nameplates changed to read 'Indian National Navy') to go round the city and bring the stragglers under control. The ratings who approached the Signal School with sticks in their hands were disarmed by some Talwar leaders before they were allowed to enter the establishment.so The same day NCSC issued an appeal calling upon the men to abide by the code of conduct - desist from violence and respect the sanctity of life and property 'in any circumstances or even under the gravest provocation,.sl Still again in the next morning there was a repetition, though on a smaller scale, of violent demonstrations in front of Churchgate station by the men from establishments in the suburbs. Afterwards when all gathered at Oval the central leadership in its eagerness to atone for the previous day's acts of 'indiscipline', deplored the burning of the American flag at USIS and formally recorded its apology. The lull that followed was deceptive. The naval authorities had already emerged from the state of initial bewilderment and indecision. Preparations for an offensive were afoot. The leniency still being shown towards the 'mutineers' was a ploy to gain time. Reinforcements of men, bombers, cruisers and battleships had been requisitioned. Troops from nearby cantonments were on their way to Bombay. So was FOCRIN. He arrived in the evening. The authorities had already struck by confining the ratings to their barracks and posting military pickets to guard them. Puzzled by the sudden turn of events the negotiation committee decided to take up the matter with FOCRIN, and in the meantime beat a retreat. The deployment of military guards enraged the ratings - they took it as an insult to India's ~senior service' and its personnel in general; they could not reconcile to their being interned like criminals. More crucially the war had taught them to fight back and not to bow before enemy offensive. To yield, they knew, was to perish. So the Castles ratings in particular forced the British guard commander -to withdraw his- sentries form within the barracks and their main entrance. Several times they att~mpted to break out of the establishment - everytime they did so,. I,.dg. Sig., M.S. Khan was summoned to restrain them. The centra.leader-ship:ulid~rstood .the reason why the ratings were so 'perturbed and annoye'dover.the action of the authorities in calling' in the army to guard them. It was,

Rebellious Lower Deck

213-

the men sensed, 'an attempt to isolate them and prevent them from having access to food from outside' and thereby to force them into submission. As they felt the pulse of the ratings the members of NC headed by Ldg. Sig. Khan proceeded again to FOB's bungalow to meet FOCRIN. The message was left behind for the ratings: While the committee feels that it will do everything in its power to impress upon the authorities the need to immediately withdraw the armed guards, it strongly appeals to the comrades wherever they may be ... to maintain complete calm and solidarity and refuse to be stampeded into any kind· of vioient action on their part. It appeals to all comrades to remain nonviolent and. disciplined under the gravest provocation or even upon being done violence to.82 Aware of the national leaders' attitude and NCSC's vacillation . FOCRIN could afford to turn down the latter's demand for the withdrawal of military guards. The naval authorities had already scored a victory over the strike leaders: the latter adopted a defeatist tactic in the face of their first offensive. Vice-Admiral Godfrey refused to withdraw military sentries on the plea that it was up to GHQ to do so. lie could recommend it if the ratings surrendered and resumed duty unconditionally. In spite of the strike leaders' threat that they would not be able to restrain the angry ratings unless armed guards were withdrawn, both FOCRIN and FOB refused to budge from their stand. The authorities tried out a ruse: while they turned down the demand for the withdrawal of troops, the top naval brass gave a sop to the strike leaders. Vice-Admiral Godfr~y promised to provide them the food they demanded, and give other grievances a sympathetic consideration. He suggested thereupon: now that theirprincipal demand had been met the strike should be called off. FOCRIN'S strategy was quite clear to the members of the negotiation committee: he was subtly manoeuvring for time - he was waiting for reinforcement to begin the next offensive. More importantly his offer of better food was intended, on the one hand, to bring home to the national leaders how reasonable he was about the men's grievances ., and, on the other, to drive a wedge into the lower-deck unity and break their strike thereby. / On return from Rear Admiral Rattray's bungalow the NC

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(RIN Esfab/ishmenls)

Supp(irt The Demands Of Naval Ratings! Protest Against Racial Discrimination And Barbarous Treatment Of Indian Naval Boys ! YcsltHlay 5,000 mell in the Indian Navy went on strike. Among them arc Hindus, Muslims. Christians. men from all provinccs of our great country. speaking all languages. They all stanri united behind their demands. J':VCI'Y lndian knows that thc cOlllliUom; of 01lr brothcrs in thc Navy al'C vcry ba(l. Racial discrimillation dominatcs cVC\'y bra11(:h of thc scrvice, thc pay is VCI'y Jow, 100(1 is ofl.cn uncatablc. It ;:; also a fact that although thousands of these men arc due to be demobilised in the near future. no arrangementll worth the name have been made for finding them adequate and satisfactory cmploymcnt in civil ure after demobilisation. Worst Of. all is the .maltreatment of the Indians by superior omt'ers. parl.lcularly Bntish olUcers. There are terriblc talcs of I.hill . p •• rLicularly one instance when a :;ick man was forced to do laboul' which resulted in his death. There are also storic:; of suio'ides a.nd desertions, many of which are said -to spring-Crom such 111~1:trcatmcnt. . ThiS is why they have put forward the following demancls : 1. DecenL food and' adequate ration:;. . 2. Ac.t.ion to be taken against I.he Commanding Omcer of HMIS Talwar 'for abusing Indian raLings. :1. MaiLreatment of ratings by officers to stop. . 4. The sa.me facilities that the rnLings in the Royal Navy get rc"ardll1g pay, travelling. family and Children's allowances ;;hould also be given to RIN ratings. 5. Speedy demobilisation, resettlement 'and gratuity. P.T.O.

6. Thc rule I.hat clothing kit should be ret,urhed at the. tlll1l1

of dcmobilisation should be cl1.l1cclled, 7. Indlanisation of officers in the Indian· Navy shoulcl be l:alTicd through immediately and no new British officers should be recruited into the Indian Navy. G. It. K. 81ngh (a victimised rating) should be immediaLely dischD.rr;ed from Arthur Road Jail. 9. ImmediaLe release of all political prisoncrs, lncluding the INA prisoners. . lO. lillll1cdial;e withdrawal of all Indian troops from IndoneSIa. 11. ImparLial Judicial enquiry inl:o the police shootings that nave Laken place al1 over India. . .Everyonc of our countrymen knows thcs(l. demand:; :l;r!) Jusl•. Everyolle will surely respond to our appen.ithat 'all .1.'l'!l1m lUust. ulliLcdly supporl. these demands, that diIIerences of parl.y ami poJic:y m other Helds should not be aJlowcd to comc in the way of SIlPpurt of I.hcsedemands of'our 5.000 brothers. We 11.llllcal to Icallcrs of all Ilolitical' llnl·tics in Bomhay to S1I11110I·t these Ilcmands, particularly wc ask I.he Con~rcss :LI1(I L~agll(~ lcaders to take liP thc issue in the Ccntral Assembly and sce I.bat the ilemands of these mcn are met . . ],e~ I.hc Oilvcrnment on its llart realisc that no vi1ulictivcllcss against thc :;,000 will be \.olcrat·ed by any Indian, whatevcr thc Ilarty to which he may bclong. Lcl1.lulGovcrnmellt hmJlediaLely set in motion·the machinery to satisfy the (lemands of the men 011 stril<e. 10'",' ·C.he Unity of all citizcns or Bombay al1d pcollle of Il1dia behind tbe Ilcmand or the 5,000 I

D. S. Vaidya, Secretary. Bombay Committee of the Communist Party of India' N.A.P. Domllay 4.

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(EDITED BY G, Y. Cm'l'NIS)

.Appeal To All R.l.N. Personnel FrOlll Central Naval Strille Committee 'I'he Cenh'ul '~avlll StrlI,,, CommiUee l"ls reviewed thu lnation create!l by the all-ill !ilrik" of the RI.N. llel'sOllllel all'estu~lishllleuts

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"f cOlldu,·I. ill order to 11l'Oseculc tlie sh'ille lu a suc(:ess(ui t:uucitISi()UI

1.

l:iLl'ill" dJ' WllI'II UIlIHL" 11" ylllll' Hl'Ni IUlIl "I~L l3 They were unwilling to listen to the upper deck. CO then rehoisted another ensign but that too was torn by his men. CPO Abdul Kader attempted to dissuade his juniors from doing so but was threatened that if he took any part in the suppression of the strike his life would be in danger. Similarly in HMIS Khyber and Assam the officers who tried to rehoist ensigns were cautioned by their men. The latter pushed them aside, tore the ensigns and halliards into pieces and threw them· over the side. Aboard shore establishments like Machlimar and Cheetah the ratings having pulled down the ensigns formed a circle around the flagmasts and the officers found it impossible to break through the cordon and rehoist them. After they had removed the symbols of British domination over the service the naval subalterns rechristened it 'Indian National Navy' and hoisted Tri-colour in most places, Crescent in a few and 'Jai Hind' flags in still others to the sound of bugles. These were improvised on the spot, made from the buntings of naval flagspa They seldom corresponded fully to Congress, League or any other party banner in colour combination or symbols. In HMIS Cheetah CO, when he saw the Tri-colour fluttering on the flagmast, directed Lieut. Malia to haul it down. But the ratin~ crowded the officer and warned him that they would behead him if he tried to approach their flag. 14 The men of HMIS Mchlimar, before they broke out of the establishment, told the officers: 'Don't ... pull that [Jai Hind] flag down as soon as we leave. we'll come and see it' .1S Once they replaced the symbols of upper-deck, and necessarily

232

Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RlN Uprising of Febntary 1946 authorities in their own interest wanted 'to avoid at '~ll costs'. It was felt: 'There was an irreconcilable element among the mutineers which might have gone to any length'. Though they continuously demonstrated their anned might the authorities were afraid of using it. The. policy they adopted was one of keeping 'the more responsible leaders' in good humour and making them play their game. Section 11, File No. NL 9930.

88.

Cited in Banerjee,op.cit., p. 57.

89.

Situation Report No. 3, 22 February 1946, op.cit.

89a. 90.

Colville (Bombay) to Wavell, 27 February 1946, op.cit., p. 1081. FP!, 22 February 1946.

91.

ibid.

92,

FP!, 23 February 1946.

93.

FP!,

94.

FP!, 23 February 1946.

22 February 1946.

95.

Cited in Banerjee; op.cit., p. 67.

96.

Situation Report No. 4, 22 February 1946, op.cit.

97.

cf. Second Witness: Capt. Innigo-Jones, 0ll'cit.

98.

Hans Raj, 'Echo of RIN "Mutiny" of Feb. 1946: The Ratings Demand their Immediate Reinstatement', File No. NL 0220.

99.

FP!, 23 February 1946.

100.

HMIS Narbada appeared to be among the 'moderates' and HMIS Khyber the 'more violent'. Situation Report No. 4,22 February 1946,

101.

FP!, 23 February 1946. Also Lieut(E). T.N. Kochar, 'Minutes of the Proceedings', File No. NL 9942.

102.

Report ofComdr. Karmarkar, op.cit. Also Section I and Exhibit B 13, File No. NL 9930. cf. 9th Witness: Sig. JoginderSingh, op.cit.

103.

ABP, 23 February 1946.

104.

Lieut(E). Kochhar, 'Minutes of the Proceedings', op.cit.

105.

About the time the Valsura ratings made up their mind to begin the strike. The Torpedo School was the solitary exception under Bombay command till an AIR bulletin announced the same day that Valsura 'has taken no part in this strike'. Immediately the establishment made good its 'fault'. For details see File No. NL 9901.

op.cit.

106.

Lieut(E). Kochhar, 'Minutes of the Proceedings', op.cit.

Rebellious Lower Deck

233

107.

Lieut. Comd •. Khan, Minutes of Proceedings', op.cit.

108.

'Report and Fi"i1di1\gs', pile No. NL 9948.

109.

CPO Dutt, File No. 'NL 9908.

110.

Sub-Lieut. Jone .•, 'Minutes of Proceedings', op.cit.

111.

Statement of PO Gustasob, op.cit.

112.

Lieut. Comdr . .Tamil, 'Minntesof the Proceedings', op.cit. and Report from CO to FOB, 9 March 1946, ibid.

113.

Lieut. O.H. Mantle. 'Minutes of the Proceedings', File No. NL 9942; Report from CO to FOB, 9 March 1946, File No. NL 9907; Lieut. Comdr. Khan,'Minutes of l".roceedings', op. cit.; Sub-Lieut. Jones, 'Minutes of Proceedings', op.cu; 1st Witness: Lieut. Comdr. A R~shid, File ·No. NL 9944; 'Opinion Of the Board', File No.NL 9923 and Statement of Saleem; RIN Mutiny Sr. No. 14.

114.

'Report on Findings', File No. NL 9976. Also 'Report and Findings', File No. NL 9948 and Report from CO to FOB, 9 March 1946, File No.NL 9901.

115.

Exhibit B2: Report of Comdr. S.G. Karmarkar, File No. NL 9930. Ldg. Sig. M.S. Khan later told the RIN Commission that he along with his strike committee worked hard to restore 'peace and order' and the Talwar officers 'appreciated his work'. FP!, 27 May 1946.

116.

See Note 87 above.

8· FACES OF THE ELITE

In the context of the naval mutiny at Spithead in 1797 Sir Geofrey Calender in his Sea Kings of Britain observed: 'Had the government given the mutineers credit for honesty of purpose all might ... have been well'.l But it did not so happen - seldom does it so happen. Seldom does the ruling elite give its adversaries credit for honesty of purpose. In most cases the former sets itself 'to discover by a priori reasoning' the 'real' and 'effective' cause underlying the latter's mutinous actions. Inevitably it is attributed to manipulation by evil-intentioned external agents or internally by 'vicious ringleaders', to the 'natural aptitude' of men in any armed service to grouse over imaginary grievances or to anything other than a genuine effort on their part to get the abuses they were subjected to corrected. Based on such reasoning is the standing instruction to all concerned to suppress any incidence of collective defiance, accompanied by violence or not, immediately and mercilessly. The RIN law rested on no different principles. The colonial elite here, naval or otherwise, looked at the 'mutiny' of 1946 no differently - it too refused to consider it an honest attempt on the part of lower-deck personnel to redress their grievances. The latter were seen as victims of some o~hers' conspiracy rather than subjects of their own actions, as instruments in some others' hands rather than participants in a project of their own. What is more noteworthy is the convergence of the views of the colonial rulers and the nationalist leaders on the 'mutiny'. StilLmore so is the mutuality of their interest in its suppression. I

Let us first turn to Comdr. King's perspective on the events that took place in Talwar after he had assumed its command. Behind much of what happened in the establishment he saw the hands of some 'ill-disposed' persons or 'unscrupulous' politicians.2 He was of' the opinion that such elements from outside incited the Talwar ratings to behave in the way they did. It was on Ldg. Tel. B.c. Dutt's

Faces of the Elite

235

case Comdr. King hung his conspiracy theory. The rating, in the latter's view, was an 'honest, good man' led astray by 'some revolutionary organization':] The only tangible evidence in support of this explanation was the papers found in Dutt's possession. Neither the board of enquiry into the slogan-writing incident on the night before FOCRIN's inspection nor the one held into the 'mutiny' in the Signal School was able to adduce any further evidence of Dutt's contact with subversive elements outside. From a study of the documents found in his locker the Talwar Board concluded that he had some contact with Lieut. P.N. Nair (who formerly belonged to RINVR) and a few others connected with the formation of the Ex-Services Association. 'Attempts were ... made to enrol ratings in some such organization ... sponsored by some outside source. The political origins of this source are doubtful.' It 'does NOT appear to be orthodox Congress'. Nor was it Communist. It 'appears to be' that wing of the nationalist movement which was dominated by the 'radical' Congress elements like Aruna Asaf AIi or Congress Socialists. 'Little concrete evidence has come before the Board to support this theory.'4 Ddttis activities, whatever their exact nature, bore little fruit. That as an 'Azad Hindi' he could make little headway in a space of a month or so is borne out by several entries in his diary for January 1946 and letters he exchanged with his friends. 'Things', he wrote, 'are taking a gloomy shape'. Except for one or two the ratings appeared to him hopelessly foolish and 'losing interest' in the 'Azad Hindi' work. They understood almost nothing of what went on round them - they were 'born as kids' and would end up as such. He knew from the beginning that the life of an 'Azad Hindi' was not going to be a 'bed of roses', and was determined not to lose his wits so soon. Still he found it 'impossible' to concentrate on the 'great' work he embarked on in view of the 'doubtful' future. Impatient and 'pleasure-loving' as he was, Dutt could make no sl'''tained effort to build a large following. He described himself as an idealist but Seth, one of his close friends, called him a 'sychophant' and a devoted follower of Mirjafar' (i.e. a traitor).s Just before his arrest allegedly for sloganwriting Dutt applied for a commission in the navy.· Doubtful of his advancement in the service he was already on the lookout for a job outside and put up a request for release. Those who knew him felt that his 'mind will change' after he was released. He 'appears to have some influence' over a few ratings but it is doubtful whether they

236

Revisiting Talwar: A Study in tlte RIN Uprising of Febntary 1946

trusted him fully.6 His evidence before the RIN Commission reads that when he went to reason with the strikers at the instance of Comdr. King, they unceremoniously dismissed him, and disdainfully called him a paid agent of the Commandipg Officer.? Ldg. Tel. Dutt was appreherided on 2 February, and was under close arrest and restraint until the 16th instant. During this period he 'must be presumed to have been unable to communicate with other ratings in HMIS "Talwar".' Under instructions from FOB he was tried summarily by Comdr. King on the 16th and CO's recommendations were forwarded to the higher aunlOrities. Pending orders from NHQ Dutt was released to open arrest around 1 p.m. that very day, and confined in CO's unoccupied bungalow under the watch of a sentry. Next afternoon he was sent back to his barracks and allowed no liberty. 'All the evidence goes to show that L/Tel. Dutt during this period kept very much to himself.s He deliberately avoided others' company lest the authorities should suspect him to be a 'ringleader'.s, Apart from the ratings who noticed him on the eve of the strike the Talwar Board examined several officers inclu!;1ing Lieut. Comdr. Lisle-Tay-Ior, Lieut. Nanda and Headmaster Lie~t. Bamji (none of whom can be said to be favourably disposed towards him) in an endeavour to ascertain whether Dutt during 16-18 February took any part in 'organizing', 'fomenting' or executing the 'mutiny'. It was convinced that he did nothing of the sort. It had evidence to show that the rating tried twice, though unsuccessfully, to exercise a 'moderating influence' on some of the 'more turbulent' elements among the strikers.9 On 18 February itself before acting as Comdr. King's trouble-shooter he urged a few who thronged near CO's office not to create any trouble. Two days later he tried again to pacify the ratings who turned furious on the appearance of military guards at the establishment. Captain Inigo-Jones who succeeded Comdr. King and Comdr. Karmarkar the former as CO of Ta/war chased the ghosts that were supposed to have planned the 'mutiny' and executed it through their agents inside the service but caught none. Everyone had in mind Ldg. Tel. Dutt whose role in the planning or organization of the strike was doubtful even to the official investigators, and still refused to go beyond the usual preconception of manipulation and conspiracy. These officers were joined by the top brass of Vithal

Faces of the Elite

237

House. In appearing before the RIN Commission Rear Admiral Rattray stated that from the end of 1945 'subversive elements' from outside 'got to work ... to undermine the discipline of the ratings' .10 FOB produced an undated, anonymous letter addressed to C~in-C, which, in addition to Dutt's papers, was said to lend support to the conspiracy theory. On a careful reading of the document the Commission concluded that even if it was taken at its face value, all that could be inferred from it was that there had been certain grievances in all the three services, some among their ~en 'had put their heads together' and produced the letter, demanding their redressal by 15 February· and threatening otherwise '100% indiscipline' after this deadline. The document 'does not bear any political complexion'. It proved no connection with any subversive elements outside. The fact that the strike broke out in Talwar on 18 February was, in the circumstances of the case, ' a mere coincidence'.u Still the effort to track down such elements began. Ahmed Brohi who figured prominently among the Talwar strikers stressed the futility of such an endeavour in his evidence before the Commission. Anyone who believed that the strike was organized by an 'outside party', the witness was convinced, 'will have to get disappointed. To search for any clue that it was planned by outsiders is just like a blind man who is searching for a missing needle in a dark room' .12 Unable, on their witch-hunt, to pin down the blame on any particular organization or its agents the officers of Comdr. King's variety harped, in more general terms, on their belief in some extraneous 'infection', 'instigation' or 'direction' behind the 'mutiny'P Unless it was so caused or stimulated the whole phenomenon, according to them, remained incomprehensible. Looking back a few maintained that the· political issues which cropped up soon after the surrender of Japan afforded the nationalist leaders a splendid opportunity of inciting civilians as well as service personnel to violence through their fiery speeches in public meetings and the press through its inflammatory articles. Of the lower-deck personnel stationed in Bombay in particular a few regularly attended such meetings at Shivaji Park or on' the Chowpatty sands and read 17le Free Press Journal, The Bombay Chronicle or Blitz, imbibed subversive ideas from these 'sources and disseminated them among others.14 Unless the men's loyalty was thus impaired, it was difficult to explain the defiance of upper-deck authority which had been obeyed so unquestioningly

238

Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of Febrnary 1946

before. The spread of the strike from one end of the service to the other in an amazingly short· time was the function of an infectious epidemic or some pre-arrangement from outside.1s Otherwise the simultaneity of the outbreak could not be accounted for. The argument was stretched further to say: unless there had been some direction and coordination from outside, the uprising could by no means have assumed the same fonn everywhere. 16 The ratings shouted the same anti-authority and anti-British slogans and pasted them on the walls of their units; they broke the norms of deference, verbal or otherwise; they ripped up Union Jack or White Ensign, the symbols of British dOlllination over the service and hoisted Tricolour or Crescent in their place; they attacked ROs, forced open cells and released prisoners; they destroyed the graphic instruments of upperdeck rule; they broke out of their units in a body and paraded in public thoroughfares crying nationalist slogans and waving party banners; they sought the intervention of national leaders and formulated service grievances together with some political demands; they used signal communication, both visual and wireless, for the synchronization of their actions - units on R Twatch followed correct procedures, used call signs and codes .. Underlies this argument. the assumption that the ratings' action could not be self-led. The naval subalterns were passive and powerless supplicants; they had neither the will nor the capacity to resist. The men were thought incapable of acting. on their own, planning and organizing protests independent of any elite initiative from outside. The morale (intelligence) reports, as submitted by the commanding officers of ships and establishments between May and December 1945 dwelt, among other things, on the reactions of naval personnel to political developments outside or their exposure to political influence. These never failed to add that the morale of the lower deck was goodY In the quarterly abstract for May-July the morale was reported to be high especially in ships and among their personnel. The ratings stationed in non-operational zones were keen to serve in operational and forward areas. There were no remarks under the headings such as (i) effect of subversive literature, (ii) subversive activity among personnel on leave or in shore establishments and (Ui) response to current developments. The morale reports of 44 ships and establishments for the period ending on 30 September show that the naval personnel were 'indifferent' to 'politics' or the

Faces of the Elite

239

average rating had very little interest in political matters. In the report relating to Talwar where the 'mutiny' originated there was no reference to politics or political views. And subversive influence was said to be absent. In a summary of the morale reports for the quarter closing on 31 December the paragraph devoted to politics said the ratings had shown interest especially in the iNA affair. It added, however, that 'they do not give their political feelings priority over their duties to the service'. Generally 'political views held by ratings were healthy and rationalistic and not extreme'. The summary concluded with the remark that the morale of RIN lower deck appeared 'to be satisfactory' and 'their loyalty to the service is unquestionable'. It is instructive to read together with these extracts the report of Colonel Haq Nawaz who visited various ships and establishments in Bombay and Karachi to ascertain the state of morale among the personnel who manned them. On investigation in Karachi in January 1946 he wrote: 'I do not notice any undue interest being shown in politics by any ranks ... Although the personnel are aware of the political situation in the country and follow events with keen interest, they do not give this priority over duties'. In dealing with 'RIN and Politics' the same officer on his visit to several units including Talwar and Kakauri in Bombay in December 1945 remarked that the ratings were frank and above board about their interest in political matters 'but by no means fanatic'. It was added: 'Although I do not notice any subversive tendency in them, I dare say they need careful handling at all times'. Already in the summary of morale reports for the last quarter of 1945 it was hinted tha~ the ratings were not satisfied with the service conditions in the navy.1S In other words, none of the morale reports pointed to any subversive activity, propaganda or tendency in RIN ships and establishments. None reported any deterioration of morale among the lower-deck personnel. Even in the last quarter of 1945 when the ratings evinced keen interest in current political events, their loyalty to the service was in no way impaired. Clearly what many officers later said in explanation of the 'mutiny' was not supported by the morale reports for the months immediately preceding it. The emphasis they laid on extraneous 'political causes', the ratings argued, was intended to hide their responsibility for the rising discontent among their men. The political issues in question definitely formed part of the backdrop to the ratings' action in February 1946 but

240

Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946

could hardly account for their perception of authority and will to overthrow it. A Chamak rating told the RIN Commission: the INA episode inspired the naval strikers 'a lot' but to say their action 'had its cue from the INA is ... groundless, because long before we in India had known about the INA'.19 The suddenness, extensiveness and simultaneity of the 'mutiny' took the naval elite by surprise and made it look desperately for germs of 'infection' or traces of 'pre-arrangement'. It refused to come to terms with the fact that the unifying factor lay in nO,thing other than the conditions of lower-deck life in RIN. It was their subjection everywhere _to the same regime of oppression that enabled the men to combine in protest against it. No infection or prearranagement was enough to stimulate the strike on the scale it took place. What did so was the unjust and unfair system prevailing in RIN. The solidarity that the latings expressed everywhere was a conscious act of collaboration on their part in a common project. It was political in so far as it aimed at overthrowing the authority of the upper deck, reversing the existing relations of domination-subordination as a precondition of redressal of their grievances. The naval subalterns had so much at stake that they could not embark on such a project in a fit of absentmindedness. Fairly long discussions and consultations among them, much weighiDg of pros and cons and planning by them preceded the inauguration of the strike and every step taken thereafter in all units. The consciousness that informed these actions derived from the ratings' perception and day-to-day exPerience of authority. Everyone in the lower deck knew who had SUbjected him to untold sufferings so long. For the ratings it was not at all difficult to identify the enemy and coin their slogans accordingly. It was obvious that British domination over the service was responsible for the discriminatory and humiliating treatment meted out to them in their own country. At the first opportunity they attacked the white officers verbally or physically, and replaced the symbols of their authority with their own. The flags they hoisted were improvised, made of naval buntings, and resembled, even if not exactly, the banners of Congress and League. The ratings appropriated the symbols of mainstream nationalism on their own terms for a politics that was basically their own. At one stroke they demolished the walls that sepa-

Faces of the Elite

241

rated them from civilians. In demonstrating on public thoroughfares they expressed their unity with the people in the slogans they shouted and banners carried. At a crucial stage the naval subalterns decided to use the service channels of communication, seize armouries and magazines and man action stations. The ratings were in the know of the jobs - it was not difficult for them to organize any of them. In fact NCSC was constituted to plan, direct and coordinate actions almost on the scale of the entire service, and local committees were to organize or execute them at the unit ievel. The ratings who took over ships and establishments indeed showed remarkable capacity for organization. In standing by for action aboard ships they managed everything, communication, gunfire and internal coordination. In reply to a query from a FP] representative as to why they insisted on the national leaders' intervention the strikers said: it was sought not at all for 'mternal organization'; here they were competent enough to require any external assistance. 'We have learnt the art of how to defend ... we know how to organize - life in the navy has taught us to be on the job with perfect discipline at a few minutes' notice', they said.20 The national leaders' intervention was sought for altogether different reasons. They were expected to mobilize popular support for the strike, especially its demand for the indianization of the service, an ideal so dear to the ratings. The latter wanted them to link their cry for a 'nationalized' navy with the popular demand for freedom - they wanted them to forge these into a inighty weapon for the overthrow of British rule in India. The end of foreign domination over the country, the ratings hoped, would give birth to a popular navy where everyone would. be able to serve with self-respect and dignity. It was largely for this purpose that the national leaders were called upon to intervene in otherwise entirely an affair of their own. Elite nationalism was completely irrelevant to the planning of the strike or its execution. In refuting one of his officers, Lieut. Arjan Singh's argument that the strike was assisted by outsiders, Wireman Sheikh Shahadat Ali,a Castle-strike leader, said the Indian sailors needed no assistance in the movement they launched.21 It was organized and conducted by the ratings themselves, and the credit or discredit for what was done in the course of the strike should go to them alone. To apportion this to outsiders was to take away from them the responsibility for their actions, right or wrong. While many a naval officer ascribed whatever premeditation or

242

Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising o/February 1946

organizational spadework the strike required to outsiders, a few maintained that this was done by the 'educated' ratings in the lower deck who manned commuriication, artificer, schoolmaster and writer branches of t4e service. The latter argued, in an interesting variation of the manipu:lation thesis, that the bulk of the naval subalterns were unthinking and incapable of looking after things for themselves and must have been mobilized and led by the 'enlightened' few among their colleagues. A number of officers who appeared otherwise sympathetic towards their men's grievances shared with others the upper-deck contempt for 'illiterate' seamen, stokers, cooks, stewards and topasses. One of them, Lieut. Mahendra Pal Singh, said: an 'uneducated' rating was stupid and servile. He was led by instinct or emotion rather than by reason. On the other hand, an educated rating was incomparably more rational, self-respecting and sensitive. He would resent racial discrimination, ill-treatment, abuses and wretched living conditions. He was far more advanced in ideas and beliefs.22 The degree of consciousness, in this view, was directly proportional to the standard of a rating'~ general education.23 Others bent this argument to suit their explanation: the educated ratings were less amenable to discipline and more apt to grouse over grievances, real or imaginary. They were more argumentative, and acted as 'sea lawyers'. Their knowledge of English made them more susceptible to subversive propaganda.24 Commodore Jefford, Chief of Personnel, NHQ, said that these ratings with 'a veneer of book learning overlaying their gullible nature' were 'God's gift to the unscrupulous politicians', especially 'left-wing' Congress and Communist. 25 Unable to fulfil their ambition in the navy or doubtful about their future the discontented educated men absorbed subversive ideas from nationalist propaganda and infected others by them. It was they who manipulated their uneducated colleagues, undermined their loyalty and led them astray. The bulk of the latter, in this explanation, were easily excitable, and were said to be during the strike 'in a state of mass hysteria ... beyond reason'.26 They were thus banished to a domain of fanaticism and irrationality. Whatever consciousness was attributed to the strikers went to the credit of their few educated leaders. It was this sort of elite consciousness which was seen as the motive .force of the strike. Additionally the argument was given a provincial and communal twist: the educated leaders mostly hailed from the south and belonged to the Hindu community while the uneducated led came from the north and were Muslims.27

Faces of the Elite

243

The naval unit to begin the strike was Talwar, the Signal School which accommodated communication ratings. It could have broken out anywhere. For the entire service was simmering with discontent. The dal incident occurred coincidentally in Talwar, which its inmates seized as an occasion for a collective protest. On a number of such occasions during the war the 'uneducated', non-communication ratings made similar protests at their units. Under the combat situation none developed into a service-wide 'mutiny'. Although the Talwar ratings initiated the protest in February 1946, the lowest of the lower deck, seamen, strokers, cooks, stewards and topasses elsewhere in Bombay surpassed them in militancy, organizational spirit and resourcefulness.28 The uneducated ratings in Castle Ba"acks did not wait for any· signal from Talwar to organize their armed defence against the military attack. This was also the case in Karachi. The ratings of the non-technical, seaman and stoker, branches, whose company many a 'superiority flaunting' communication rate disdained, played a leading part everywhere except at Talwar and a few units of its class.29 That these uneducated leaders numbered more than their educated counterparts aboard ships and establishments which came to the forefront of the strike is clear from the list in table 1 of category 'A' strikers against many of whom the most serious charges were framed for court martial. Almost all the Talwar leaders vacillated between violence and non-violence. At times they tried hard to restrain the ratings of other units and drum into their ears the mantra of non-violence.3D Quite a number of educated rating-leaders of units other than the Signal School acted similarly hesitantly - they used their 'influence on the side of moderation'. ERA IV Chandra Nath Ghose (? Bose) of Assam, CPO Schoolmaster P.B. Dutt of Cheetah, Telegraphist A.K. Roy of Chamak, CPO Schoolmaster Mir Niaz Abmed of Fort Barracks and Signalman S.C. Roy of Dhanush, for example, tried to peg down the strike to a non-violent form in their units.31 Just as it cannot be said that the strike leaders were mostly educated ratings of communication, artificer, schoolmaster and writer branches, so also there is no evidence to suggest that they belonged to any particular region of the country or religious community.32 Among the 'A' category 'trouble-makers' listed in table 1 more than half were Muslims. A number of enquiry boards on investigation

244

Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the RIN Uprising of February 1946 Table 1

Ship or establishment

Name

Rate

Castle BamIcks Castle Barracks Castle BamICks Castle BamIcks

Sheikh Shahdat All Meherban Shah Basant Singh S.N.Misra

Wireman Seaman PO Able Seaman Ldg. Seaman

Y.D. Sharma R. Singh MA-Khan B. Hussain M.S. Uddin

Radar Operator Able Seaman Able Seaman Able Stoker Able Stoker

Dhanus Dhanus Dhanus Dhanus Dhanus Dhanus

C.Albert C.Anthony S. Krishna 1. Raj H. Hussain H. Hamid

Signalman Stoker Stoker Stoker Able Seaman Radar

Khyber Khyber Khyber Khyber

M. Nazir Md. Iqbal Abdul Ghani Inayatuliah

PO Able Seaman Able Seaman Able Seaman

Kathiawar Kathiawar Kathiawar Kathiawar

K. Nagaratnam Kulbir Singh Yusuf Hussain Qazi. AbdulKarim

Ordinary Seaman Actg. ERA CPO Ordinary Seaman

Himalaya Himaiaya

Hiralal Akbar Ali

Ldg. Seaman Able Seaman

Narbada Narbada Narbada Narbada .. Narbada

Source: File Nos. NL 9965 and 9984. Also File No. Home-Poli(I) 21/8/46

reported: the majority of 'ringleaders' were from the Punjab and Madras presidency; they· were almost equally divided between the north and the south.33 The Muslims played as prominent a part as the Hindus, if not more, in the strike. No less active were the Sikhs. On board a few units the strike leaders were almost entirely from the Punjab and NWFP.34 Table 2 which relates to Fort Ba"acks is in-

Faces of the Elite

245

structive in the context of the communal/provincial bogey raised by the upper deck. Table 2 Name

Religion

District

Mir Niaz Ahmed H. Singh Ghaus Mohd. Khan R. Charan B. Tal KK Nair S. Din J. Singh H.S. Khosla A. David

Muslim Sikh Muslim Christian Hindu Hindu Muslim Sikh Hindu Christian

Lahore Ludhiana Punjab Bareilly Punjab (Chakwal) Travancore Amritsar Ambala Punjab Bangalore

Source: Appendix 'A', File No. NL 9956.

Any suggestion that the. strike was due to the oppressive service conditions in RIN was dismissed by most of the naval officers. For to accept it rather than to attribute the outbreak to some secret designs was to admit the system to be unjust and own their responsibility for the same. Among the few in the upper deck who considered the men's grievances genuine and worthy of serious attention were Lieuts. Ghatak and Sachdev. They admitted that 'a background conducive to a mutiny' existed for long. Discontent, in their view, was 'smouldering ... due to manifold grievances' and was fairly 'widespread'. The slightest 'trouble' like what happened in Talwar was enough to serve as an occasion for a great rising. The men shared so many grievances in common that they exploded in anger on a little initiative from the communication ratings.3S Except for these few all in the upper deck stuck to the conspiracy theory so dear to their heart. To the latter any interest in the men's conditions beyond what the needs of control demanded was suspect and those who showed such interest were indulgent to the 'sailors' moans'. To them the conditions seemed always satisfactory. The ratings, in their view, could not have any serious grievances because they made such obviously impossible demands as parity of treatment with BORs in mat-

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ters of pay and allowances. The grievances they expressed were foisted on them by self-interested, manipulative elites. The attitude of the upper deck generally was one of unconcern with the men's grievances until they posed a problem for repression. Even then these never acquired priority over the question of control. Soon after the end of the February strike the authorities said that the ratings did not formally make any complaints prior to its outbreak. The complaints, therefore, did not exist at all and were 'ex post facto'. Further the ratings everywhere advanced grievances same as those of their brethren in Talwar, and these, therefore, were not genuine.36 The upper deck thus sought to blur the fact that complaints were put up in a formal manner many times before and were the same in all units because the same conditions prevailed everywhere. The ratings had no ground for a 'mutiny'. Even if they had any, none, from the standpoint of counter-insurgents, was sufficient to cause a collective defiance of authority on the scale it did in February 1946. This was emphasized by all, COs through FOB-FOCRIN to the Viceroy of India and the Prime Minister of England. It informed their attitude towards the the rebellion and the rebels' demands. The naval top brass dished out a promise for better food, a promise attuned to the time-honoured colonial policy of 'divide and rule'. As the ratings saw through the game, the signal issued in keeping with it was withdrawn immediately afterwards. All other demands, the men were informed, had been forwarded to the authorities in Delhi. In reply to a question in Central Legislative Assembly on 22 February Philip Mason, War Member, lied when he said the demand 'for improvement in the quality of food was met as soon as it was made known, although the standard of rations in this service [RIN] is already considerably above the Army standard' .37 As for other demands, especially those relating to pay and allowances, the War Member repeated the argument that had been advanced in connection with the RIAF strike, an argument based on the principle of 'political economy'. Next day when the situation changed greatly on the ratings' unconditional surrender, Mason in a statement in the Assembly spoke his mind clearly: the men struck work 'on the most frivolous ground', 'for reasons which were very insufficient and which I do not think ought to be taken very seriously.'38 This was exactly the attitude of Claude Auchinleck and Wavell

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as, well. Both ruled out any negotiations with the 'mutineers' over their 'fancied' grievances. The Viceroy in his diary of 21 February wrote: 'According to C-in-C there was some suggestion of parley, buthe and I entirely agreed that there could be no question of parley and that nothing else than unconditional surrender would be accepted'.YJ They both believed the 'trouble' was due to 'political instigation' or 'influences'. The Secretary of State for India, Pethick-Lawrence, in his communications with Wavell, spoke of redressing genuine grievances, if any, in RIN. 'I realize that politics plays a big part, but political excitement needs suitable soil to grow in'.40 This he said out of his anxiety to plug in advance every possible source of 'trouble' in the services. In view of the recent developments in the British Indian armed forces Pethlck-Lawrence suggested the desirability of an urgent investigation into whether there were any unredressed grievances which 'might provide material for disaffected persons to work on'.41The Viceroy informed the higher authorities in England: 'I do not believe there is any really serious material ... for agitation'. The grievance over racial discrimination, for example, could not be said to be 'serious'. 'Unless Indian soldier is paid at same rates as British, which is not possible, agitators may always allege racial discrimination'. In Wavell's view it was not service grievances but 'instigation' by 'political agitators' which caused the 'mutiny'. A bunch of 'young', and 'excitable' men had been worked on by such elements 'from inside and outside' .42 This was 'undoubtedly' clear from 'the expression of any grievances there were took the form it did' .43 Besides the 'hero worship' of INA officers, 'inflammatory speeches and articles in the press' and the 'legacy of strikes inherited from the American Army and the RAF were responsible for the RIN 'mutiny'.44 By implication the 'instigation' by agitators or external 'influences' hardly needed the mediation of any 'suitable' 'material' (let alone the sciousness of men) inside the service to produce effect.

con-

In apportioning the blame for the 'mutiny' the Viceroy made it clear to Attlee and Pethick-Lawrence that the 'top leaders' of Congress and Muslim League 'had nothing to do with inciting this ... and ,did not wish it'. They 'dissociated themselves· at a fairly early stage' from what happened in RIN. Wavell pointed the needle of suspicion to 'leftwing' Congress elements and Communists: 'I think some of

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smaller Congress fry had a great deal to do with it and probably also Communist agitators'. It was they who seemed 'to have fanned the flames'.4S The authorities in England held no different views. The statement that Prime Minister Attlee made in the House of Commons is an example: 'The Congress Party officially disclaimed participation in the mutiny' but left-wing Congress and Communist elements did the contrary in their action.46

11 Soon after the termination of hostilities the Congress leaders found the prospect of coming to power brighter than ever before. Elections were announced for the winter, and the promise of 'early realization of full self-government' was reiterated by Wavell. The trial of INA prisoners, the use of Indian troops against the Indonesians and the food crisis accompanied by post-war problems of unemployment and rising prices, which seemed to have brought the rulers on to 'the edge of a volcano', afforded the Congress'leading lights an excellent opportunity of fishing in the troubled water. The former were afraid of a recrudescence of 1942 coupled with disaffection in the British Indian armed forces. Judging by Nehru's 'disquisition' on 'inevitable' revolution, his and other leaders' 'violent speeches' championing the cause of 'Quit-India' martyrs and INAheroes, a fresh trouble seemed imminent. That much of the Congress hype glorifying 1942 and INA was part of its election strategy became clear to the British soon. The Congress seemed determined to do as well as it could in the elections, andwas intent upon making the fullest use of any issue for the purpose. General Auchinleck among other officers in India understood that INA was essentially its 'election cry' .47 And the higher authorities in England felt: 'Much of what these [Nehru, Patel and other Indian] leaders had said [on the issue] could be regarded as electioneering exuberance.'48 The Congress indeed lost no time in exploiting the INA episode and popular sentiment over it for all they were worth. Before long its leaders, however, realized that the unintended consequence of this action might be to encourage popular outbursts independent of their initiative or leadership. The Calcutta explosion in the last week of November was an eye-opener to them. It 'proved

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a turning point' in the -Congress' recent tactic and brought about a fresh 'detente' with the British.49 Sardar Patel denounced the 'popular excesses' in no uncertain terms, and Gandhi who seemed to have favoured 'a much mote cooperative line' but had been 'hybernating for some time' reasserted his authority in favour of 'moderation'. Citing-some recent utterances of the top Congres~ leaders, including Nehru, Wavell wrote to Pethick-Lawrence in early December: 'There have ... been indications that the Congress... want t,o reduce the political tension by making it clear that there must be no mass movement until after the elections'.so Similarly G.D. Birla, 'the strong capitalist element behind the party' who, like British officials here, 'was alarmed at the virulence of Congress speeches',si informed Parliamentary Under-Secretary Arthur Henderson about the same time: 'There is no political leader including J awaharlal who wants to see any crisis or violence. Whatever they may be speaking - and one should .try to understand the reason for these strong speeches ... everyone is anxious for a settlement.' The need to accommodate the prevalent mood of the masses was 'responsible' for such speeches of the leaders. However 'unrestrained language will be heard less and less in the future', Birla was sure.S2 By the turn of 1945 the 'danger' from the Congress end receded. In view of the mass upsurges in the wake of INA trials the British thought it necessary to make some conciliatory gestures. Accordingly the trial of INA personnel on the sweeping charge of 'waging war against the King' was abandoned. The decision on parliamentary delegation was taken. And it was followed by a more crucial one of sending a 'cabinet mission' to negotiate with Indian leaders. This, together with the fear of popular 'excesses' which the Congress leadership was determined to curb, made it hold on all the more firmly to the path of negotiation and compromise with imperialism.53 No less firm was Muslim League in its faith in the legal means of settlement. In preaching passivity to the masses both began to prepare themselves for a fight against each other at the constitutional front, nay, the bargaining counter.

* What the top 'national' leaders were up to must have been clear to the left-wing 'smaller fry'. Especially the Communist leaders should have harboured no illusion about the Congress leadership in \

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view of its increasingly bitter attack on them. Still when the RIN -' strike broke out they could do nothing but appeal to it for interven- " tion in favour of the naval subalterns. For the armed forces never counted for anything in their project and no serious attempt was ever made 'to' build lines of communication' with them. The discontent among service personnel and its manifestation in a series of strikes that preceded the February one seemed to have little significance for the Communists leaders. In fact like Congress and League the left looked at IORs as 'mercenaries'. This attitude was inherited from the nationalist mainstream within the womb of which it was born.54 In its memorandum to the RIN Commission the Communist Party refuted the charge that it acted as 'the instigator of the mutiny'. It was too flattering for its leaders to accept. It was stated in the memorandum that there were a few men in the lower deck 'with Communist sympathies as there were Congress and League sympathizers also'. But the party cultivated no link with these personnel which it could use to instigate the 'mutiny'. Together 'with the rest of the men they took part in what was a movement' by the entire lower deck. 'These individual sympathizers received no instruction from the party; they acted on their own as did all other ratings'.ss The only proof of Communist 'involvement' was a leaflet issued on 19 FebI,'uary under the signature of D.S. Vaidya, Secretary of the Bomb~y Committee of CPI, and two statements by G. Adhikari, member of the Central Committee of the Party. But these were essentially ap'" peals to Congress and League to support the demands of the ratings, , "to raise the issue in Central Assembly and organize hartals and strikes 'as a mark of their disapproval of government repression'. Of the statements in reference the one issued on 22 February urged upon the Congress leaders in particular to take up the cause of RIN lower deck and 'call a general hartal and strike to give a peaceful expression' to popular protest against the military atrocities in Bombay.56 The party made this appeal a day after the Congress authorities had openly opposed NCSC's call and asked the people 'to go about their normal business as usual'. Again after the victimization process started on the RIN strikers' surrender it appealed to Congress and League to redeem their pledges, called upon them to join hands to stop it and to enslire the settlement of lower-deck grievances on the basis of justice anq equality.57 A firebrand leader of August 1942 Aruna Asaf Ali ranked higher

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than any other 'Socialist' Congressman in the ratings' estimation. The image they built of her compared with that of none. But it crumbled into pieces in the course of their interactions with her during the strike. In a press statement intended to end all speculations about her 'part in its origin and development' she said quite unequivocally: on the first day of the strike the ratings approached her 'to intervene on their behalf, 'address a meeting' of theirs and act as 'their spokesman' to Rear Admiral Rattray next day but all that she did was to advise them 'to remain calm' and not to mix their service grievances with politi,cal demands, which she found they had done, confine themselves strictly to the former and leave the latter to political leaders whose exclusive preserves these were. Expressly unwilling to be involved in the 'trouble', she directed them to see Sardar Patel 'the highest Congress authority' in the· city. In her explanation to the press Aruna said: the advice stemmed from her belief that 'what they sought for was the support of the national forces' for their demands. A secular leader Aruna 'did not want to give it a wholly Congress complexion' as there were some among them 'with leanings towards the Muslim League' .58 Hence her advice also to see the President of its Provincial Committee. On the 19th afternoon a large number of ratings waited outside the Signal School in the hope of hearing her but she did not come to address them. Next morning Aruna went to Poona ostensibly on an urgent piece of business there. Before leaving Bombay she did not forget to ask the ratings to conduct their strike with 'discipline' and 'dignity'. 'Care should be taken to eschew injury to person or property in the action.'59 Implicit herein was her anxiety to prevent the recurrep.ce of what had happened the morning before in the Fort area. Aruna was heard again after the gun battle at Castle Barracks on 21 February, offering her 'service as peacemaker'. 'I am prepared to address the ratings ship by ship and barracks by barracks', she said. The intention was to make it sure that their 'indiscipline' which, implicitly, caused violence that day did 'not give ground for further violence'.60 Alarmed by what happened in the city on the 22nd Aruna wired Nehru, requesting him to come down to Bombay immediately to 'control and avoid tragedy'.61 Finally, when the radical elements among NCSC members informed he:'" of their strong n*ervation about Patel's 'award' which the majority acceptetl, she advised them to 'follow suit' and 'avoid a split'. They were told that the ratings could 'think of a strike again' should 'the authorities go back on their word'.62 It is as

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if like industrial workers the ,men in armed services could resort to strike whenever necessary to bring pressure to bear on the authorities to keep their promises. Just a few days after she had so assured the militant ratings, Aruna in giving the Congress President an 'eyewitness' account of the strike said: 'In seeking redress of their grievances, by resorting to strike and wanting Congress intervention they [ratings] ... overstepped conventions and regulations governing armed services'.63

All through the strike Aruna kept a safe distance from the scene of 'trouble', and handed out her advice underlining the need for discipline and non-violence. After all was over, fiery words poured out of her mouth on certain generalities: she began a verbal duel with Gandhi on the questions of violence, Hindu-Muslim unity on barricades and so on. Similar was the part played by other Socialists. In his presidential address at the second annual conference of the Indian Students' Union in Madras Asok Mehta referred to the incidents during the strike and in its aftermath as 'stage rehearsals of impending fight against imperialism'.64 But none of the Socialists of his tribe was seen anywhere near the scene of action. Purshottamdas Tricumdas, who was in Bombay at the time, carefully avoided any association with the strikers. Approached by the latter to address a meeting of ratings he refused them with a flimsy excuse.6S The left-wing 'smaller fry' were said tu have egged on the young 'excitable' ratings to 'mutiny' or directed its course notwithstanding the facts that Communist leaders left initiative to Congress and persisted in their appeal to its good sense even at the crucial moments of the strike and mass fury in Bombay, and Aruna Asaf Ali among Socialist Congressmen in particular stayed away from the city when the. struggle was 'climaxing to a grim close' and solicited first Patel's intervention and then Nehru's out of her anxiety to control and discipline the naval subalterns and their civilian sympathizers. Aruna was for holding down the unrest to a permissible form, and her advice to the RIN lower deck, minus its populist streak, hardly differed from that of the Congress High Command in Bombay. Like the top party bosses she felt that the ratings violated the naval discipline regulations by striking· work and giving it a 'political complexion', and commended to them non-violence against British violence. While they made it clear to the authorities that Congress .was

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totally opposed to the strike, Patel and Patil's public stance was one of non-intervention. On being sounded by Aruna on 19 February whether he would intervene in the matter, the Sardar said that the ratings did not strike work on his advice and hence it was none of his business to 'interfere'. It was more so after they had indulged in gross acts of 'in discipline' that morning in the city streets. Again on the 21st evening Patel turned down a request from the ratings for support to their hartal call in protest against the military attack on Castles. Unmoved by the day's' incidents he observed: they should not have taken to arms, and were ill-advised to give such a call which would only help the 'unruly elements' on the lookout for an opportunity to create disorder and exploit it to their advantage, which might even result in communal strife and would not do them or their country any good. 66 Out of his concern for 'peace' in the city Sardar Patel sent Governor Colville a message offering 'to do anything which he could' to prevent disorder.67 Simultaneously he put out a. statement asking the people not to observe hartal, to plunge the city .~ into trouble and disturb its peace. In an effort to play down the significance of the day's battle at Castles the Sardar called it an 'unfortunate' event and essentially a clash between armed ratings and military guards, rather 'military police'. Though the official communique. stated clearly that the troops opened fire on the besieged men on their attempt to break out of the barracks which were running short of food and water, Patel was not sure about 'the immediate cause of the firing'. 'Who was responsible for the unfortunate turn of events which led to these disastrous consequences and what was the actual provocation which led to them' he did not know. Nor was this 'an opportune moment to assess the relative responsibilities or to apportion the blame between the parties concerned', he felt. 68 It would only fuel tension, he argued. Till the popular explosion took place Sardar Patel could afford a neutral stance and stick to the policy of non-intervention. But what happened on the 22nd seemed ominous to him. Alarmed he intervened at last, intervened to induce the ratings to surrender. unconditionally and thereby to take the wind out of the protesting people's sails. On behalf of his party Patel promised to see that none of the strikers was victimized and their grievances were redressed. Maulana Azad and Asaf Ali were in contact with the authorities in Delhi, and the Sardar himself with the Governor of Bombay. The ratings were assured that the Congress Legislative Party would raise the issue in Central Assembly, .and all

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would try to help them out of their difficulty. But as it was a delicate case, its solution would take time, and the ratings must meanwhile keep patience and peace. Significantly at the same time the League High Command sent them a message couched in similar terms. Hinting darkly at the machination of 'professional agitators' Jinnah, like Patel, asked the ratings 'not to play into the hands of those who want to create trouble and exploit those on strike for their own ends'. Urging them 'to call off the strike', 'create no further trouble' and 'restore normal conditions' he said: 'let us handle the situation, which will surely result in their welfare and will be in their best interests'.69 This was a unique example of Congress-League unity for 'peace' which Gandhi preferred so much to the one for 'violence' against imperialism! Even as Maulana Azad and Liaquat Ali Khan were, on C-inCs authority, assuring there would be no victimization of strikers or vindictive action against any of them,1° Philip Mason, intervening in the discussion on an adjournment motion on the 'mutiny' in Central Assembly, declared: 'I shall give no assurance that punishment would not take place'. 'Government', he reasoned, 'should reserve to themselves the right to punish' the persons who 'misled' the 'young', 'excitable' ratings. The men who took the lead in 'rowdyism' and 'violence', these 'ringleaders' must not go unpunished. Now to censure the government for it, said Mason, was to put a premium on acts of 'indiscipline' in the armed forces. It was to make those guilty of such acts feel that they were 'right -in taking the course they did'. Moreimportantly, it would encourage service personnel to resort to such a course whenever they felt they had a grievance and thereby violate regulations governing the services. Mason cautioned his Indian friends now in opposition: they would form a government shortly and need the aimed forces very much, and hence should not do anything which might undermine their discipline in the meantime.71 Far from doing anything to undermine it, the representatives of Congress in the Assembly spoke of its importance even more emphatically than did the War Member. Concerned perhaps more than Philip Mason about the ·'grave situation' that had arisen out of the naval strike Asaf Ali, Deputy Leader of Congress in the House, proposed to refer the issue to the Defence Consultative Committee (which was yet to be constituted to include the political leaders) for

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deliberations at a later date and drop the motion he himself tabled for discussions in the Assembly. In giving reason for this suggestion, which Mason described as 'excellent', Asaf Ali said: 'It is not a suitable occasion for questions, quick-firing replies and retorts; it is a matter which requires deep, deliberate and very serious consideration'.72 His desire to avoid a discussion on such a matter of public importance on the floor of the Assembly was coupled with a sense of 'restraint' born of the realization that freedom was round the corner. Emphasizing the need for restraint on the part of all in the situation he told the House: 'We are going through a travail and it is through this travail that we have got to steer our bark as carefully as possible'.73 Next day, 23 February, when the motion was taken up for discussion the naval strike was over. Mason reported: 'I am very glad to be able to say ... that the situation as regards the indiscipline in the RIN has practically come to an end'.74 But Asaf Ali remained as reluctant as before 'to say anything which may... contribute to the deterioration of the situation.' This time .he explained the reason for his restraint with a 'simile' borrowed from Sardar Patel: 'My restraint is due to the fact that I realize that today India's ship [of freedom] is nearing the shore ... the ship has to be piloted carefully out of the shoals and rocks which lie ahead. It must be piloted as tactfully ... and as cautiously as possible to the shore' .75 The nearer the shore the greater the danger. The greater the danger the more the need for self-restraint. The same perception of the danger persuaded the Socialist Congressman Masani to exercise as much restraint as did Asaf Ali. He was all praise for the 'national leaders' (of both Congress and League) for their approval of the (foreign) rulers' call for discipline in the armed forces and their cooperation in the latter's effort to bring the situation under control. Masani's anxiety to keep the armed forces intact prompted him to appeal to the British to leave the country before there was any further deterioration of discipline among their personnel. No less aware of the 'gravity' of the situation and the restraint it demanded, Liaquat Ali Khan, Deputy Leader of League urged the members of the House last (22nd) afternoon not to indulge in any propagandist speech. Conscious of the future need for armed forces he, like Asaf Ali, now endorsed 'the desire of the War Secretary that there should be maintained complete discipli.ne' in their ranks.76 The restraint which the members of both Congress and League had shown, the agreement they had expressed with his 'homily' on the subject of discipline plea-

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sed Mason so much that he thanked them unhesitatingly. 'It is quite clear', he concluded, 'that all sections of the House are at one on this question, and do wish to preserve the discipline of the armed forces'.77 The agreement of the leaders of the ruled with the rulers on the question in reference is even more evident in the observations of top ones among the former. On a talk with the Congress President Wavell wrote in his 'Journal' of 10 March: 'He fully realized the danger of undermining the morale of the armed forces.' When the Viceroy emphasized the implications of 'indiscipline' for the future Maulana Azad said that he was aware of the necessity of maintaining discipline among the service personnel. Naturally Wavell 'was very glad to hear it'.78 Vallabhbhai Patel was more uncompromising in this respect. Soon after the naval strike, in meeting the Governor of Bombay to convey a message from the Sardar, S.K. Patil told him that Patel felt 'indiscipline must be punished'.79 Around the same time the Sardar himself wrote in a letter to Venkatappayya 'we cannot object to the enforcement of discipline in the defence forces', and in another to Viswanathan, 'discipline in the army cannot be tampered with. To do so would be to court disaster'. Explaining the reason he said: 'We will want army even in free India'.80 Similarly in polemizing with Aruna Asaf Ali on a related issue Gandhi added: 'Discipline will be ... as necessary under Swaraj as it is now.'81 The leaders were equally emphatic about it in their public utterances as well. The reason why they all cried themselves hoarse over 'discipline' was not merely their concern about its future need. It was also their immediate fear that the spread of 'indiscipline' to other wings of the armed forces and 'popular excesses' in response to it might retard the process of a negotiated settlement with the British. They were afraid of losing their grip over the situation and missing the chance. of coming to power early. Already by the turn of 1945 they all came round to the view that 'swaraj' would be achieved quite soon by peaceful means, and under the circumstances to stir up trouble, to create disorder, would be suicidal. Aday after the RIN strike began Prime Minister Attlee announced in the House of Commons that a cabinet mission would visit India shortly to negotiate a peaceful transfer of power. This was coincidence no doubt but it succeeded in making the national leader oppose anything that tended to

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upset their calculations about it. They lost no time in welcoming Attlee's announcement and reaffirming all the more strongly their faith in a non-violent settlement with the British. That the leaders were eager to come to terms with the British and avoid any clash with them is explicit in their statements on the naval strike. For Maulana Azad the strike was 'unexpected': It 'led to a sequel which has assumed distressing proportions'. It took place at a time when 'a calm and peaceful atmosphere' was most needed for the 'immediate purpose', negotiations with the cabinet mission.82 Elaborating the point in a statement on 2 March the Congress President 'said: 'transfer of power from foreign to Indian hands ... is now only a matter of short time. It is, therefore, most essential that all should ... desist from creating situations which may ... prejudice the early realization of Indi'!'s aspirations'. Describing those in power now as 'temporary authority', as 'caretakers' Azad dismissed strikes, hartals or any other protest against them as being 'out of place'. There was no 'immediate' reason for joining 'issue with the foreign rulers' of the day. 'It is in abeyance until the refusal to transfer power'. He promised a struggle in future: 'the Congress will not hesitate to sound the bugle call' for it should the negotiations fail. Meanwhile the people should cooperate with the 'temporary government' despite its recent atrocities in Bombay in particular. 83 In addressing a number of public meetings, a few for election propaganda, Vallabhbhai Pate! expressed his resentment over the way the people ignored his advice against the hartal in support of the ratings. The Sardar, and for that matter the Bombay Provincial Committee of his Party, stuck firmly to a policy of non-intervention in the strike and maintained a studied silence over the ratings' demands until NCSC appealed to the people to come out on a hartal in their defence. Late on 21 February Patel issued a statement, on the one hand, promising (for the first time) Congress intervention at the 'appropriate' level for the redressal of their grievances and, on the other, opposing the call for bandh. The Sardar did not speak the whole truth when he maintained later that as Congress had been seized of the question of the men's demands from the beginning, it would have been wise on the part of the people to leave the matter to the party which could use its position and influence to secure relief for the 'unfortunate lot'. Instead of heeding his advice the

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people responded to the call of some 'misguided' persons for a hartal and thereby spoiled the chance of a 'proper settlement'. The main item on the agenda of the day, Patel said, as freedom, and hence smaller issues like, implicitly, the RIN strike, should not be allo ed to distract their attention from it. Like his other colleagues the Sardar declared India ould be free before the year as out. As the 'ship of freedom' as approaching her shores, 'it ould be rong to go out and sink it'.84 Precisely a delegation of ministers as coming to finalize the details of the transfer of po er. At such a crucial moment the slightest indiscretion ould hinder the process. Hence the Sardar's counsel for the people to ait patiently and prepare, say, by using assemblies and councils, for the final struggle if forced on the country. By the time Nehru came to Bombay the situation had cooled off considerably. Aruna's telegram gave him an idea of the job he as anted for in the city. On detraining at Byculla station to avoid the large cro d aiting at Victoria Terminus for him, Nehru drove straight to Patel's residence. Before the Sardar briefed him on the recent happenings he did not utter a single ord in public. Initially , Patel as a bit apprehensive that his ords might kick up a fresh trouble. But Nehru allayed his fear: he as quite iIIing to condemn the ' ild outburst' of violence in Bombay. ss Similarly the local authorities ere afraid of his 'unrestrained language'. The ban on public meetings as lifted to allo Patel and Nehru to address a gathering at Cho patty on 26 February only on the understanding that they ould confine themselves to 'the tragedy from hich the city had just emerged', on the indication that they ould unequivocally decry the outbreak of violence and condemn those ho caused it. A day after the meeting the Governor in his report to Wavell rote that judging by its immediate impact it ould have been un ise to refuse perm ission. 86 TIle Economist as a are of the 'pattern' of Nehru's speeches, of his 'blo iog hot' in times of quiet and blo ing 'cold' in times of trouble. 87 In bet een, in the situation like that hich prevailed in the aftermath of the RIN strike he, one may modify this observation to say, ble hot and cold simultaneously, rather ble colder than hotter. The reasons are not difficult to seek. Nehru could not afford the image of Patel's - he must protect his 'reputation' as a 'revolutionary'. He as keen on exploiting the issue of RIN unrest like that of

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1942 or INA for elections and bargaining with the British for power. .;., -The accommodative spirit of his speeches was informed by this intention. Simultaneously Nehru was aware of the overriding necessity of curbing the violent outbreaks of popular discontent at a time when his party, including himself, was anxious to settle the question of 'swaraj' by negotiations. Naturally his rhetoric about the awakening of service personnel was accompanied by a condemnation of their actions. Short of its populism Nehru's perspective was no different from that of his more 'sensible' colleagues like Azad and Patel. 'The RIN episode has opened an altogether new chapter in the history of the armed forces of India', said Nehru at the Chowpatty meeting presided over by Patel. He spared a few more words for the 'boys': they smashed the wall between the civilians and themselves and thereby 'rendered the country a very great service'. But he was quick to bridle his eloquence and came round to the 'responsible' line taken by Azad and Patel: the ratings were denounced for what they did after the demolition of the barrier. In his inimitable way Nehru performed the same jugglery wherever he dwelt on the theme. Just as Asaf Ali wanted the service personnel to be 'patriotic', 'impartially patriotic' and 'disciplined', implicitly, as per colonial service codes, he also made the same demand of them: they ought to be 'fully conscious politically' and mindful of their duties to the nation. They 'have to be citizens' and as such 'have to discharge certain responsibilities to their people'. They 'have every right to revolt against the foreign ruler' and should be approached 'to fall in line with the fighters for the freedom of India'.88 In the same breath Nehru said: 'We al~ want discipline in the army, for any army without discipline is no army'.f!B He readily agreed with C-in-C's view that there should be no 'political intrigue' in the armed forces and that 'there should be absolute discipline in the ranks of the services'. Naturally he could not approve of any of the ratings' actions that smacked of 'illdiscipline'. What they did in an effort to destroy the symbols of foreign domination and establish their own in their place was ridiculed. J...ikewise their attack on the symbols which they considered identical with British imperiaism was not spared. 'The pulling down of the Union Jack or the burning of the American flag is ... childish. You [the ratings] have no right to pull down a foreign flag from a private premises. While their success in demolishing the wall that had kept

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them away from the people appears to have drawn Nehru's praise, the ratings' attempts to prevent its re-erection and to foil the plan to starve them into submission raised his ire. The latter were considered dangerous and foolish. The 'boys' provoked the military pickets and thereby walked 'into the enemy's trap'.90 Nehru took a lot of pains to prove the impossibility of armed action against the British. He launched into an exegesis in 'superior violence' and 'inferior violence', 'big-scale violence' and 'small-scale violence'. To Nehru it seemed obvious that 'if one thinks in terms of violence, one must think in terms of superior violence. It is folly to put up inferior violence to oppose superior violence. No general of an armed force does that'. One could not match a pair of nail scissors with a gun and a gun with a machine-gun. Again Nehru maintained: 'If there is going to be violence, it should be on the biggest scale possible ... Small-scale violence comes in the way, not only of non-violence, but of big-scale violence.' In other words 'inferior violence' could not develop into 'superior violence' and 'small scale' into 'big scale'. After expending so much 'dialectics' Nehru came to say 'I have not a shadow of doubt that .,. the right policy is nonviolent policy'. To Nehru, just as to Patel, the firing at Castles had little significance: it caused 'a great deal of excitement' and 'made the people think that a pitched battle was being fought in the Bombay harbour which it was not'. It was small gunfire. Pitted against it was a superior force. Against the heavily armed British troops with adequate supplies the ratings had no provisions and little ammunition. Just as Vice-Admiral Godfrey considered it 'the height of folly' to fight against the 'overwhelming' forces at the disposal of the government;similarly Nehru thought it a grave mistake to challenge such an enemy.90a Then, nothing drew so much of Nehru's ire as the Central Strike Committee's call for a hartal in the city. This was considered an encroachment on the preserves of political leaders, and frankly he would riot 'tolerate' it . The central strike-leaders whom Nehru contemptuously referred to as 'fifteen men' 'had no business to issue such an appeal'. Ignorant as he supposed them to be of 'the situation .in Bombay, in India or the world', they should not have gone over the heads of all 'recognized leaders' and called upon the people to observe a hartal. The right course would have been to leave the

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matter to the leaders of the 'recognized parties'.91 Even if they were of League besides Congress, a fair-minded, secular politician like Nehru would not mind despite his reservations about the former. Such leaders alone had the authority to give a direct call to the people. The reason for so much irritation over NCSC's appeal was the support that the people extended to the strikers notwithstanding Congress' advice to the contrary. 'Foreign rule in India is now a thing of the past'.92 In saying so Nehru went a step further than Azad or Pate!. The country, he continued, had 'reached the door of Swaraj' and would open it sooner than one could imagine. Now that India was 'on the threshold of independence' all 'must act judiciously'.93 Any expression of the urge for freedom in violence, Nehru felt, would negate the possibility of an early agreement with the British. There was absolutely no need for violence when freedom was so 'near at hand', he argued.94 Nehru would have the people believe that should the need for violence arise he would 'be the first to give the call' for it,9S and wanted them to preserve their fiery spirit for the future and direct all energies into the channels of 'constructive work' in the meantime. The country, in his words, was 'sitting on the edge of a volcano' which might erupt any moment. The lava flowing out of it, he feared, would bury all chances of a negotiated settlement to which both the British and his party, including himself, were committed, and 'plunge the country into fiery ordeals' which both were determined to avoid.96 While almost all the Congress lea4ers in their public utterances paid lip service to the cause of RIN strikers, Gandhi was opposed to it. This, he thought, might be construed by the men in other services as their approval of what the ratings did to get their grievances redressed, might embolden them to follow in the latter's footsteps and encourage the civilians to give a hand in it. Gandhi could not forget that in the past many un-Gandhian things were done in his name. Even in cases where he had himself planned and initiated. movements it often became difficult to prevent their radicalization eventually.96a It would be more so, Gandhi realized, at a time when disaffection was more widespread than e¥er before. He felt even more strongly than Azad or Patel that nothing should be said, sti11less done, which might in any way contribute to exacerbating it. Both during the strike and after he did not utter a single word

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in sympathy for the aggrieved ratings. Significantly after the civilians came out on the streets Gandhi broke his silence. On 23 February he broke it to denounce what had happened in Bombay over the last two days. In a statement to the press at Puna he denounced it as 'thoughtless orgy of violence'. Next day Wavell gladly reported to Prime Minister Attlee: 'Gandhi put out good statement condemning violence' .97 To the 'father of the nation' just as to the alien rulers the action of the Indian ratings was a 'mutiny'. It was 'disloyalty' to the British government in whose pay they were. It was 'unlawful'. More so because it was accompanied by violence. 'In resorting to mutiny they were badly advised', said Gandhi.98 'It must be remembered', he added, 'that the RIN was founded not for the benefit of the ruled'. It was organized in the interest of the rulers. 'Discrimination' was glaring in the service. But it was bound to be so. 'It cannot be avoided'. Nor could it be corrected. The men entered the service "With their eyes open', and should accept it as such.99 The other course open to them was to leave the service, according to Gandhi. He failed to understand why the ratings continued to serve if it was too humiliating for them to do. loO Instead of 'mutinying' they should have 'manfully given up their job'. They would not have lost anything thereby. On the contrary 'they would have gained honour and dignity', taught the civilians how to defend it and saved the city from 'senseless destruction oflife and property'.lOl In short the alternative that Gandhi held out to the oppressed and humiliated ratings was simple: reconciling to the situation or resigning from the service but no protest in any form, violent or non-violent. Gandhi argued here as if he was unaware that resigning was a privilege the ratings were not entitled to. They could not leave the service on any ground whatsoever. Neither. was it a fact that all of them joined the navy voluntarily. Many were lured by false promises, and those who left their job on this ground were caught and punished as deserters. In fact cas were forbidden to use their power of discharge against the men who wanted to leave the service and made any effort to secure their release. 102 Hence the alternative actually was protest or reconciliation. 'Discriminatioft stares one in the face' in RIN, said Gandhi himself.1 03 Like -any other Indian he was aware of the humiliating treatment meted out to IORs in HMI services. The men's grievances over it or others were 'nothing new', admitted Nehru.104 Many of these grievances were discussed in Central Assembly in the context

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of the strikes that preceded the one in RIN or before in the course of debates on finance bills. The charter of demands that the naval strikers submitted to the authorities was publicized by the nationalist press. Still Gandhi was not sure whether their grievances were genuine or wherher they had struck for their redressal. He maintained that if it had been for grievances, 'fancied or real', they should have contacted 'political leaders of their choice' and waited for their 'guidance and intervention' .105 The resentment of national leaders that they were not consulted before the strike was begun is ridiculous. No one had ever shown any interest in the armed forces so that they could expect the service personnel to run to them with their griev-ances before initiating any action independently. There was no contact with the 'boys' nor was any effort made at establishing it either. The ratings were 'impartially patriotic': they approached both Congress and League leaders on the very first day of their strike for support and intervention, and next morning demanded of FOB to invite one of them for arbitration. This was reported in all major dailies including the pro-establishment The Times of India. It is difficult to believe that the news escaped Gandhi's attention. For he himself said, 'I have followed the events ... with painful interest' .106 The strikers waited till the last moment expecting that the national leaders would intervene in their favour, that they would come forward to link and coordinate their action with the popular protest and harness this to the overthrow of foreign rule. The ratings were fully aware of their capabilities and limitations. Left to themselves they could organize and synchronize actipns within the spatial limit of the service but hardly anything beyond it. Hence their repeated appeal to the national leaders to raise their struggle above localism and merge it into a nation-wide campaign for freedom. Nevertheless their patrioti m drew ridicule and admonition from Gandhi: 'If they mutinied for t e freedom of India, they were doubly wrong. They could not do so ·thout a call from a prepared revolutionary party. They were thougness and ignorant, if they believed that by their might they would deliver India from foreign domination'.107 Clearly Gandhi's contempt fcir naval subalterns, initiative was deeper than anyone else's in Congress. The ratings enlisted themselves in the service for money and served as 'mercenaries' of an occupation force. Even if their strike had been successful it would have benefited themselves and their kin

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and not the country, said Gandhi apparently in drawing out its implications for the nation. Actually this argument was based less on any concern for the country than on an awareness of the need for armed forces, the need for 'discipline' and 'order' in them. Gandhi did not wish them to be disloyal to the foreign rulers. For he felt: 'If they are disloyal to the present government today, by the same token they may be disloyal to the national government tomorrow' .108 Therefore the heritage of the naval strikers had to be renounced. They set Sa bad and unbecoming example for India' by their acts of indiscipline. 109 A pragmatic politician Gandhi would not countenance any such thing in the armed forces. Mindful of the indispensability of loyal forces for a national government in the near future, Gandhi wanted the service personnel to be perfectly loyal to the colonial government. At the same time he seemed very particular about the need for them to be patriotic. Gandhi did not think that loyalty to the British rulers conflicted in anyway with their patriotism. 'The soldiers should declare that they will do soldiering not for their bellies but to make India free and to keep her free .... it is no disloyalty for a soldier to go and tell his superiors that he will be their man only so long as they stand for his country's freedom and that he would never bear arms to crush the liberty of his own people'. Instead of resorting to 'indiscipline and violence or rowdyism', the service personnel should make such puerile declarations (to be accused again by Gandhi of mutinous utterances) and brave their consequences. None should mind 'if they were disbanded, cashiered or even court martialled'.n° Besides they should learn 'constructive activities', such as spinning wheel, paper making or any other village craft and thereby keep the love of freedom bUrning in their mind.ll1 Thus laboured Gandhi, like his trusted lieutenants, to explain how the men in armed forces could simultaneously remain true to their'Spirit of patriotism and loyal to the foreign rulers avoiding conflict, indiscipline or violence. Again like them he considered the country was passing through a 'critical period in her life'. The British had 'declared their intention to "quit" in favour of Indi;m rule'. Still the people seemed unwilling to listen to the counsel of their leaders for patience. Gandhi noted with alarm the outbursts of discontent, especially in the armed forces. The way the ratings demonstrated in the city streets and gave expres-

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si on to their hatred for the British on the morning of 19-20 February was disturbing to Gandhi. 'Inasmuch as a single person is compelled to shout "Jai Hind" or any popular slogan, a nail is driven into the coffin of swaraj in terms of the dumb millions of India'.112 In his scheme of things there was no room for it. The 'exhibition of distressful unrest which has been lying hidden in the breast', Gandhi feared, would delay the transfer of power. But the people were in DO mood to abide by his advice to trust the British and sit still with folded arms. Gandhi called their distrust 'unmanly'. 'Emphatically it betrays want of foresight to disbelieve British declarations and precipitate a quarrel in anticipation'. He did not think that the cabinet ministers were 'coming to deceive a great nation'. To think so was neither 'manly or womanly', implicitly, beastly.ll3 Gandhi himself had not 'the slight~st doubt as to the bona fides of the cabinet mission' .114 And he wanted the people to take at face value the declarations of British ministers and get ready to welcome them. To treat the 'usurper' with insult and humiliation or to inflict injury on him in remembering his past would be inhuman.11S Gandhi was convinced that the British had 'finally made up their minds to withdraw ill toto' and the question confronting them was 'how to effect the withdrawal in an orderly manner'. This was not the time 'to rake up old sores'. Rather 'gentlemanliness' demanded of the people to forget them and assist the British to quitpeacefully.t 16 Sardar Patel echoed Gandhi when he said: 'We should help them to pack up quickly'.117 'the Indian leaders were eager to give the British what they called the last chance to prove their trustworthiness. If the latter failed to act according to their professions, Gandhi assured he would give the call to turn on their fiery spirit. Till then they must keep off it and 'maint:ain dignified silence'.118 Thus tried the national leaders with fingers on their lips to quiet the people, service personnel or civilians, lest the pre~ carious balance be disturbed in the meantime. III

The promise of not victimizing the strikers was made to ensure the national leaders' assistance in getting the ratings back to their barracks and their civilian sympathizers to their 'normal business'. That it was not meant to be kept is clear from the statement which Philip Mason made on the floor of Central Assembly just a few hours after the ratings had decided to surrender. The kind of indisci-

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pline that broke out in RIN, he told the members of the House, could not be treated as a trade dispute and must be dealt with fIrmly.119 For some grievances, 'fancied or real', the ratings took the law into their hands - they seized warships, guns and ammunition. Aware of its implication for the existing relations of power the War Member said: 'A very great danger' arose not merely in terms of loss of life and property but crucially 'because in the ultimate resort power does depend upon the use of force, and those who command that force may get power into their own hands.'l20 In view of this danger it was essential to punish the ratings who had misled the bulk of their colleagues, mostly 'very young' and 'excitable'. This statement was not only not opposed but virtually endorsed by both Congress and League members. Once the ships and establishments were reoccupied and degunned· General Auchinleck felt free to offer further clarifications. In keeping with the colonial tradition of quibbling in matters of public importance C-in-C in a broadcast on 25 February said: there would be no victimization in the sense that there would be no collective .punishment, no vindictive infliction of penalty or indiscriminate retribution. The word 'victimization' afforded him an excellent opportunity of showing his verbal legerdemain. He could deny having ever made any promise that offenders would not be punished. On the contrary, they would be, he said now. Like the War Member C-in-C wa.s opposed to 'any attempt to whitewash collective di~obedience by using the civil term "strike".' 'The word "strike" is dangerous in 'that it suggests something less serious than mutiny and implies that the armed forces can be excused if they indulge in such direct action as is legally open to those in civil employment.' To General Auchinleck it did not matter what form collective disobedience took, refusal of food ot violence. All were mutinous irrespective of their natur~ and must be dealt with as such. He was convinced that 'politics' (in the sense of an intrigue by unscrupulous politicians or subversive elements from the organized sector) was behind much of what happened in the services. As C-in-C he claimed to 'have nothing whatever to do with politics' and would not tolerate 'political intrigue in the armed forces'.121 Any attempt to undermine discipline in the ranks would be resisted, and that would be done in the interests not of British empire but of India, present and future! as C-in-C went back on his words, so did the national Just . .

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leaders who had on his authority assured non-victimization. Aware of this possibility Ldg. Sig. M.S. Khan requested Vallabhbhai Patel to give his assurance in writing. The Sardar turned furious and said emphatically that his 'words' were more than what they wanted. I22 Ironically Patel was among the fIrst few leaders who readily concurred with what C-in-C said in his broadcast on 25 February. In his speech on the Chowpatty sands next day th~ Sardar said that the British military policy seeking to punish the 'ringleaders' was legally 'souncl'.IZJ Under the service rules a 'strike' or, for that matter, any act of collective disobedience, was a mutiny and a punishable offence. The authorities, he certifIed, were well within their rights to enforce discipline in the ranks of the service. About· the same time Patel informed Colville of this stand. His messenger, S.K Patil, agreed with the Governor when the latter said: 'I could not accept the view that no victimization meant no punishment' .124 In his private correspondence the Sardar was even more explicit:'We must not allow .any impression to be created in the defence forces that they can take 'collective action and break the army rules with impunity'. The ratings might 'have their grievances but they should not be allowed to be exploited by political parties' nor should these 'be mixed up with politics'. To allow this would be 'dangerous' for alJ.l2S The alien rulers as well as the national leaders here spoke in the same language and meant the same thing. Anyone who indulged in 'acts of indiscipline' in the services was their common adversary. Meanwhile the victimization machinery had been set in mo" tion, and all hell let loose on the men. Immediately after they surrendered, ships and establishments were combed for their leaders. Except for a honourable few the offIcers, both British and Indian, sought revenge and competed with one another in apprehending the 'boys' believed to have organized the strike. Even those remotely connected with them were not spared. Commander Karmarkar was said to have paraded all the ratings of Talwar, looked at the face of each one of them, picked out the ones he did not like and packed them off to Mulund. l26 In a short space of time about four hundred ratings were removed to Muland camp in the suburbs of Bombay and quite a large number to Malir camp in Karachi for detention under military guards pending 'enquiry' and 'trial'. The Naval Headquarters indeed lost no time in directing the

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officers in command of ships and establishments about how 'to deal with the persons involved in the mutiny'. Just a day after the strike ended instructions were issued to the effect: 'Apparent ringleaders' should be picked out and segregated quickly for trial by court martial or for 'summary award' of punishment. It might be difficult, the authorities anticipated, to produce evidence sufficient to secure their conviction. In such a situation, it was suggested, 'a definite order will be given in front of reliable witnesses to a picked man or picked men to perform a definite task. In the event of refusal there is an obvious case for immediate disciplinary action. If this process causes the men to resort to violence the same principle holds good, namely, segregation and punishment of ringleaders who are likely in this event to be more radically obvious'. Thus an opportunity was to be created to punish the persons against whom evidence was insufficient. The entire process could 'be continued as necessary until the bulk of the men, that is, those who have been misled see the futility of their ways,.m Clearly the intention was to punish the 'ringleaders' and at the same time to terrorize the others. Of the Congress leaders Nehru, in particular, was aware of these instructions. In a press interview on 27 February he admitted 'that there is going to be a great deal of victimization, in every sense of the word, not only victimization but a measure of terrorization'.128 But he proposed nothing concrete to prevent it. The Congress, he suggested, would organize legal defence if public trials were held. Nothing more. For him as for others in his party a few 'young men' in RIN went 'astray in a moment of excitement'. To the national leaders just as to the British the ratings seemed immature, subject to passion and incapable of rational behaviour. Technically what the naval.subalterns did, Nehru said, was mutinous, and he had no objection, implicitly, to punishment in the 'technical' sense of the term. Nehru washed his hands off, saying: 'we can make no promises and give no guarantees, for only a free India can do SO.'129 In an effort to disown any responsibility on behalf of his colleagues he added: 'Neither the Sardar nor the Maulana is in a position to give any guarantee in the present stage of our slavery. It is the government alone which can do SO.'130 In his view the ratings' plight was a function or consequence of foreign rule and, on the changeover to a free government, would vanish. Once such a government was established, their demands, Nehru pledged, would be dealt with.

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While the top leaders virtually acquiesced in the victimization of strikers,the lesser fry literally feasted on their defeat. HMS Glasgow which entered the Bombay waters the day the strike was called off threw aboard a cocktail party on the evening of 1 March. Among the Indian invitees K.M. Munshi and his wife. Mirchandani, Municipal Commissioner and Chundrigar, President of the Bombay Muslim League Committee joined. Butler Cominissioner of Police and Charles Bristow, Adviser to the Governor, to celebrate the defeat of the 'mutiny'. Glasgow was summoned from Trincomalee to suppress the strike. The guests were taken round the cruis(:r and regaled with its wartime feats, besides drinks.l3l Objectively the national leaders' attitude suited the authorities well. The latter could pursue their policy in regard to the strikers unopposed. Under the veil of secrecy the naval elite began to work out the plan to crush the rebellious spirit of the lower deck and break its unity. The detenues were sought to be cajoled or terrorized into submission. Rewards were offered, mercy was promised and threats were held out in an effort to extract information about their comrades. But nothing worked. Hardly anyone was willing to divulge anything beyond what he considered advisable. Even in defeat the sense of solidarity which had developed among the men during and since the strike remained almosf unbreakable. The ratings in detention camps were treated worse than the ordinary criminals. The authorities were determined to make their lives unbearable. The same atrocities as had stimulated the strike recently were perpetrated with vengeance. No resistance was expected from the leading rates, now isolated from the bulk of their comrades in ships and establishments and under the surveillance of military guards. But it did occur, puzzling· the camp officials, and proving that even after defeat their spirit of resistance, courage and conviction were as strong as before. On 12 March in protest against the ill-treatment of their colleagues, the ratings confined in the Mulund camp went on a hunger strike. That morning they had their breakfast as usual. Later when the representatives from different barracks went to the canteen to fetch food for lunch one from 'H' block found the quantity offered insufficient to feed 50 men in his mess. On complaining to a PO he

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was advised to see the officer-in-charge of the canteen, one Lieut. Singh. The latter caught him by the ear and dragged him out of his office. Immediately the whole block decided. not to take any food until the officer apologized for his action and it was given enough to eat. Afterwards the rest of the camp, except for few, joined in the strike. Next morning FOB accompanied by a senior army officer visited the place, and was told by the ratings that the strike would be called off only if their demands were fulfilled. After his departure the situation became tense. Two Indian lieutenants made every attempt to break the strike - they tried to take out ratings in batches and tempt them with fruits and sweets. But not a single one was taken in by the flattery. Later in the evening the officers decided to arrange a cinema show. The strikers were unwilling to cooperate in any way but when the authorities persisted in their effort, some among them rushed to the screen and tore it down. That night the few blacklegs who wanted to take food earned the contempt of their colleagues and were frightened by jeers and shouts directed at them. They pleaded with the officer-in-charge of the camp for protection, and were eventually kept in a separate block with a special armed picket round it. Early in the morning of 14 March forty ratings suspected of intimidating the blacklegs were rounded up and removed to a 'hutted building' some distance away. That evening they were taken to a jail at Kalyan. Some time in the morning the strikers attempted to rescue their comrades, and retraced their steps only under the threat of being fired by troops. Soon after this a naval officer went to the camp to persuade the men to give up their strike. The attempt failed, his shoulder straps were torn off and he had to flee. The strike continued in spite of the most militant elements among them having been removed. It continued right up to the 16th. Some fell ill and were force-fed. The men were divided into batches of eight and forbidden to communicate with one another. Eventually the strike petered out. l32 The number of military guards around the camp had already been doubled. It was out of bound for all, and its doors were bolted fast. Still the news of the strike trickled out, and reached the naval units in and around Bombay through the press. HMIS Talwar and Cheetah went on a 'sit-down' strike in sympathy. Others were ready to follow suit. But by the time the strike was over at Mulund. Such incidents occurred in Karachi too. The ratings· in deten-

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tion at the Malir camp did" not take the atrocities lying down. The" resistance they offered was as stiff as at Mulund.133 Apprehensive of further trouble the authorities $peeded up the punishment of 'offenders'. Already a number of service courtS" of enquiry had begun functioning. Supposed to investigate into the causes and circumstances of the 'mutiny' in individual ships and establishments the officers serving on them tried hard to gloss over the existing conditions in the service and pin the blame on 'ringleaders' in an effort to bring them to book. Any evidence that did not suit their purpose was rejected. Tremendous pressures were brought to bear on the 'accused. But the men resisted boldly, refusing to succumb to them and to bend so low as to implicate their comrades. The officers of the worst affected units accompanied by the loyal POs visited detention camps, asked the latter to identify the prmcipal 'ringleaders' and other 'violent' elements and took down their statements against them. The intention was to frame suitable charges for their trial by court martial. The appropriate area authorities had been instructed to divide the ratings into three classes in terms of their offences for punishment. Those who acted as principal 'ringleaders' and indulged in violence, assaulting officers, using firearms and endangering life were to be classed into category 'A' and 'remanded in custody' for trial by court martial. The ringleaders who did not figure so promip.ently but committed acts such as threatening officers, striking ensigns and damaging buildings and fittings were to come within class 'B' and shoul~ be summarily dealt with a sentence of dismissal with or without disgrace or imprisonment or remanded in custody if a punishment higher in the summary scale was considered necessary. The rest whose retention in the service was deemed undesirable but against whom the eVidence of specific offences was insufficient should be treated as belonging to category 'C' and discharged as being 'unsuitable'. The commanding officers were asked to make the fullest possible use of 'summary powers' in dealing with the ratings held in detention so long ostensibly for investigation and triaP34 Although the trial by court martial of the most 'dangerous' elements was approved in principle and necessary papers were prepared, the idea was eventually given up. It was done not out of any

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waekness for them but because of certain practical considerations. The decision was unpalatable to the officers, especially in regular cadres, at the unit level - they felt that such offenders should not escape severe punishments which courts martial were likely to inflict. But the higher authorities considered it undesirable politically and inexpedient from the service point of view. Like C-in-C and FOCRIN the Viceroy was convinced of the necessity of stern actions but at the same time determined to avoid the mistakes committed in the case of INA personnel. l35 The latter were tried 'unwisely' in the full glare of publicity despite the advice of the Home Member to the contrary. The court martial of RIN 'mutineers', it was feared, would be 'a focus of public interest' and would 'create the same unfortunate atmosphere as did the INA trials'.136 The RIN strike had already had too much 'undesirable publicity'. Hence the decision to finish the whole business without any fuss. The Congress too thOUght this the wisest course to adopt. Though it promised to provide legal aid to the men in case of their public trial the· party did not want their 'episode' to receive any more publicity, the main reason being its possible impact on other wings of the armed services and on the civilian population. It was a 'mutiny' to Gandhi as to C-in-C. It was an 'unfortunate' incident to Sadar Patel as to FOCRIN. Its repetition was unwanted. They all were for closing the chapter as quick as possible. The national leaders, including 'Socialists', favoured the summary trial for 'technical offences' 'to satisfy regulation-formalities'.137 In an interview to UNI Masani expressed his fear that the trial by court martial would involve the government in 'a long and cumbrous procedure'. 'The history of the INA trials, with all their unforeseen consequences, will be repeated'. The·people might again explode in anger. The government, argued Masani, should 'in their own interests as well as in those of keeping the atmosphere congenial for the impending ... negotiations', should desist from the 'venture' to try any man publiclyYs The rulers did so to the satisfaction of the 'leaders' of the ruled. Unwilling to give the accused any opportunity of self-defence which might attract public attention the authorities punished them summarily by warrant. As many as 523 ratings were thus dealt with by sentences such as 'dismissal with disgrace and imprisonment', 'dismissal with disgrace only', 'dismissal and imprisonment', 'dismissal

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only', 'discharge unsuitable' or 'imprisonment and discharge unsuitable'.!39 The punished were deprived oftheir legitimate dues and any certificate that might entitle them to concessions in education and employment. Those who were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment were sent off under military escorts for a distance and then under police escorts to jails in their respective districts. 14o The others, penniless, without clothes and food, were taken under armed escorts to stations and put on homc·-bound trains. The stigma of 'imprisonment', 'dismissal' or 'dis.:li;uge' was a bar to their settlement in civilian life. Apart from them, more than 16,000 ratings were involved in the 'mutiny' in an official estimate. 141 Although no 'disciplinary action' could be taken against all of them owing to their sheer number the authorities were determined to flush out from the service as many 'devils' as possibk. 1n the months immediately following the strike the number of men rek::lsed from the service far exceeded the previous monthly rate of 2000. Around 3300 ratings were discharged in March alone. 142 This was done without much ado. The men with excellent service records, 'Very Good' for conduct and 'Superior' for ability, found that those changed overnight to 'Fair' and 'Indifferent' .143 Thousands were literally thrown out of job before the RIN Commission was convened_ Consequently it had much of the evidence away from its sight.

* Complicit to the victimization thus being visited upon the naval subalterns, the national leaders on whose.promises of protection the strike was calld off had no compunctions in backsliding from them. Practically their condemnation of the acts of 'indiscipline' in the service legitimized the vindictive infliction of punishment on the men. The leading lights of both Congress and League soon got busy bargaining with the British for power and turned deaf to the ·reminders from RIN ratings. The prospect of power induced in them a desire to keep well with the coercive arms of the colonial state and a wish to preserve their strength_ Within six months of the strike an interim government dominated by Congress and headed by Nehru was installed in Delhi. But nothing changed for the men. The officers of Comdr. King's tribe carried on unhindered the same regimen of tyranny and discrimina-

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tion against which the ratings rose in revolt in February. The interim government did not protect the latter from the Blimps who still ruled the navy. Of course on assumption of office as Defence Member of the Nehru cabinet Sardar Baldev Singh, in a message to the service personnel, spoke of his government's determination to indianize the armed forces. But ironically he looked to the British officers, then engaged in purging the service of the men who showed the rare courage to raise the standard of freedom, for presiding over the process of 'nationalization'. The Defence Member had nothing to say about the victimized ratings. In fact his departJjnent issued a press note on 10 October dispelling the rumour about his government's intention to reinstate the men dismissed, discharged or punished otherwise.l44 For several months the interim government sat silent over the report of the RIN Commission perhaps in an effort to save the British brass hats from being exposed. The truncated version of it released to the press late in January 1947 disclosed almost nothing about their misdeeds. In the statement that .accompanied the brief handout, the February strike which, Nehru in its immediate aftermath said, had 'opened an altogether new chapter in the history of the armed forces of India' was referred to by his government as 'tragic' in the annals of RIN:- In declaring its intention to redress the lower-deck grievances the interim government uttered not a word