Religious Pluralism in the Diaspora
International Studies in Religion and Society
Edited by
Paul Gifford School of Oriental and African Studies, London Deputy Editor
Ingrid Lawrie The Mirfield Centre, West Yorkshire
VOLUME 4
Religious Pluralism in the Diaspora Edited by
P. Pratap Kumar
LEIDEN • BOSTON 2006
This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data Religious pluralism in the diaspora / edited by P. Pratap Kumar. p. cm — (International studies in religion and society ; v. 4) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15250-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 90-04-15250-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Religious pluralism. 2. Emigration and immigration—Religious aspects. 3. Asian diaspora. I. Kumar, P. Pratap, 1952BL85.R3895 2006 201'.508691—dc22 2006049080
ISSN 1573-4293 ISBN-13 978 90 04 15250 2 ISBN-10 90 04 15250 4 © Copyright 2006 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.
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CONTENTS Introduction P. Pratap Kumar ......................................................................
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PART ONE
CHINESE EXPERIENCE Chinese Catholic Center in Tokyo: Institutional Characteristics in Contexts .................................................... Gracia Liu Farrer
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Chinese Christian Community in Bucharest (Romania): A Missiological Approach to the Ecclesiogenesis ................ Dorottya Nagy
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Searching for a Niche, Creolizing Religious Tradition: Negotiation and Reconstruction of Ethnicity among Chinese in Jamaica ................................................................ Yoshiko Shibata
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Missiological Implications of Chinese Christianity in a Globalized Context ............................................................ Kim-kwong Chan
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Ethnic Identity in Overseas Chinese Protestant Churches in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area .............................................. Barbara Ambros
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PART TWO
JAPANESE-BRAZILIANS AND BRAZILIANS EXPERIENCE Religious Activities among the Japanese-Brazilians: “Dual Diaspora” in Japan .................................................... 121 Regina Yoshie Matsue
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Two Faces of God: Religion and Social Class in the Brazilian Diaspora in Sydney ................................................ 147 Cristina Rocha PART THREE
SOUTH ASIAN EXPERIENCE Hindu Processions, Diaspora and Religious Pluralism ............ 163 Knut A. Jacobsen Religious Pluralism in London: Ethnicity, Religion and Caste Among Indians in Southall (Middx, UK) ............................ 175 Igor Kotin The State of Philanthropy amongst the Muslim Diaspora in South Africa ............................................................................ 189 Sultan Khan and A.F.M. Ebrahim Managing Religious Diversity through the Discourses of Ordinary Members of Inner-Urban Neighbourhoods in Birmingham, UK .................................................................... 221 Martin D. Stringer Tamil Hindu Temple Life in Germany: Competing and Complementary Modes in Reproducing Cultural Identity, Globalized Ethnicity and Expansion of Religious Markets Annette Wilke
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Diversity among the Diaspora Hindus and the Issue of Ethnicity: Examples from South Africa and Britain .......... 269 P. Pratap Kumar PART FOUR
IMPACT OF 9/11 ON MUSLIMS Beyond Herberg: An Islamic Perspective on Religious Pluralism in the USA after 9/11 ........................................ 287 Hajer Ben Hadj Salem
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American Muslims and US Political System: Towards A New Role ................................................................................ 305 Pakinam Rachad El Sharkawy PART FIVE
ISSUES OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN THE DIASPORA Immigrant Settlement and Religious Organisation: The Case of Finland .............................................................. 335 Tuomas Martikainen New Religious Plurality in Switzerland: Studying Lucerne’s Religious Diversity .................................................................. 353 Martin Baumann A Brief Word .............................................................................. 363 P. Pratap Kumar List of Contributors .................................................................... 367 Index .......................................................................................... 375
INTRODUCTION P. Pratap Kumar University of KwaZulu Natal, South Africa Studying religious pluralism in the context of diaspora communities has begun to acquire new significance in the face of globalisation and especially in the context of global conflicts. The nature of diaspora has also significantly changed in the last couple of decades in that on the one hand many developed countries are facing shortages in skilled labour and professionals, and on the other hand many developing nations are experiencing economic challenges coupled with an over supply of skilled labour and professionals. The presence of immigrants in host societies has generally led to many socio-political challenges. One such challenge is in the area of cultural and religious expressions among the immigrants. The host society generally places certain restrictions on immigrants with regard to their religious expressions. The general thrust of the host society is to expect the immigrants to gradually integrate into the mainstream society and assimilate the values and belief systems of the host society. However, the immigrants invariably show signs of dissent and manifest their desire to pursue their own cultural and religious worldviews even when such beliefs and practices are seen to be unwelcome within the host society. It is in this context, a careful study of religious pluralism will help us understand the various dynamics of how religious worldviews are perpetuated in the modern world. This volume is therefore dedicated to the various examples drawn from a variety of diaspora contexts. In order to make the examples more widely spread out, we have included examples from Chinese, Japanese and South Asians and one from the Brazilian context. These are some of the most conspicuously seen immigrant communities in different parts of the world today. Before I introduce these examples of religious pluralism some comments on the diaspora notion itself might be of some use. To begin with, it would be useful to get some conceptual clarity on diaspora and its related concepts. Various scholars have offered useful ideas in defining the term ‘diaspora’ in the modern context. Referring to William Safran’s work, Tambiah points up four important
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aspects in conceptualising the diaspora. The diaspora, Tambiah suggests, refers to four important features— 1. expatriate minority communities dispersed from an original ‘centre’ to at least two ‘peripheral’ places. 2. they maintain a memory/myth of the original homeland. 3. they believe that they cannot be fully accepted by their host country. 4. they see their homeland as eventual place of return. (Tambiah 2002: 328) Ben-Rafael borrows the definition from Van Hear and suggests that “[D]iaspora means the dispersion in countries of groups of a same origin that remain in contact with each other and with their homeland”. (Ben-Rafael 2002: 327).1 Robin Cohen points out that “[T]he assumption that minorities and migrants will demonstrate an exclusive loyalty to the nationstate is now questionable.” (see Vertovec 2000: inside cover page). Furthermore, in discussing the diaspora in general, Tambiah identifies four possible processes of social transformation. 1. Assimilation (melting pot—e.g. US), 2. Exclusion—only into selected/marked off sectors (e.g., the old apartheid state in South Africa), 3. Integration (mutual accommodation), 4. Multiculturalism (constituting themselves as ethnic communities (e.g., in the new South African context). (Tambiah 2002: 328. Examples are mine). Other possibilities in conceptualising the diaspora are the following: 1. Hybridization (first used by Salman Rushdie)—refers to new and unexpected combination of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs, etc. Hotchpotch— a bit of this and bit of that. 2. Eclecticism—a postmodern condition in which there is a multiplicity of choice and variety of diverse experiences run together simultaneously. (e.g., listening to ruggae, watching a western, eating at McDonald for lunch and local cuisine for dinner, wearing Paris perfume in Tokyo and retro clothes in Hong Kong). 3. Creolization—(e.g. Mauritius). Tambiah does not think that all of these processes explain what the dominant strands that give local flavour are. So, he calls for more case studies. (Tambiah 2002: 333). Other concepts that are important in understanding are the following— 1 See Van Hear, N. New Diasporas: The Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant Communities. (London: University College of London Press, 1998).
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1. Deterritorialization: refers to immigrants being cut off from their homeland. (Tambiah prefers dual/triple/multiple—territorialization or multiple pools of memories and subjectivities, both context bound and interpenetrating). 2. Minorities: at some point the immigrants or diasporas might be considered ‘minorities’ to enable them to enter main stream politics. 3. Transnational Diasporas: migrants and immigrants dispersed in different diasporic locations and connected by technology, business relations, exchange of marriage, etc. Such translational connections are just as important as the desire to return to homeland. (Tambiah 2002: 330–333). Finally, Tambiah suggests that in conceptualising the diasporas, we need to be thinking of multiple modernities rather than a single modernity. He argues that industrialiazation, urbanization, advanced communication media, capitalist market economy, formation of modern nation-states, national collectivities and accompanying cultural programme and pattern—are considered the essential ingredients of modernization. The convergence of these above is expected to create a uniform world. But, he argues, this did not happen [as yet]. Instead, there is growing evidence to show that by combining these in select ways, different societies create multiple civilizational patterns, while sharing some common modernizing goals. Therefore, multiple modernities is a possible concept to explore. (Tambiah 2002: 334). He gives three examples— 1. Massachusetts South Asian Community: very modern, connected by technology, media and yet built a Hindu temple to live their own cultural traditions 2. Chinese Community in Hong Kong: dispersed all over the world; linked by Cantonese language and regularly return to homeland to perform ancestor worship based on filial piety. 3. Daudi Bohras, a denomination of Ismaeli Shias, successful business community, transmits homilies and rituals by radio, videocassettes, satellite TV. All the above are examples of how different diaspora communities generate alternative modernities suited to a self-conscious minority located in an area of diversity and recognized difference. (Tambiah 2002: 334–336).
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Ben-Rafael suggests that studies in socio-linguistics can give us some understanding of how to conceptualise the diaspora processes. He, in line with the ideas from socio-linguistics, suggest that ideas such as, substrative multiculturalism and additive multiculturalism would explain the diaspora condition more effectively. Substrative multiculturalism “refers to individuals who tend to leave their original culture while acquiring the culture that is dominant in the society and assumedly represents the collective personality of the society”. (Ben-Rafael 2002: 340). Additive multiculturalism means that “the acquisition of the dominant culture does not prevent the retention of some faithfulness to one’s particular heritage. Even then, though, as a result of the very exposure to the dominant culture, the cultures of specific groups may evolve into intercultures articulated by interlanguages”. (Ben-Rafael 2002: 340). Based on these two key ideas he suggests that there could be three kinds of diaspora— 1. Enclave—strong retention of ethnic language, culture and heritage; the main stream language and culture is appropriated with a certain reservation. (e.g., Polish Jews or Gujarati Indians) Emphasis on being Jewish rather than being Polish. 2. Symbolic Ethnic Group—identification with one’s own language, culture, and heritage is symbolic. Emphasis is on host society’s culture rather than one’s own. (e.g. French Briton) 3. Transnational Groups—dilemma between two identities. (e.g. South African Indians, Turkish Germans, Moroccan Belgians). (BenRafael 2002: 349). Michael Bodemann, however, argues for a case of localization as opposed to Appadurai’s Transnationalization of diasporas. (See Bodemann in Ben-Rafael 2002: 352–370). Many of these above issues need to be studied with more examples from the wider diaspora communities around the world. As indicated earlier and since the volume is about religious pluralism in the context of the diaspora communities, let me make some general comments on religious pluralism to help us move into the context of the diaspora. In the last few years, several scholarly works have contributed to various aspects of religious pluralism. There is general consensus that religious pluralism is of critical importance in the context of increasing globalisation of modern society. Nevertheless, it is also recognised that religious pluralism is not new and is as old as religion is.
introduction
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(Coward 2000, van der Toorn 1995). One does not need to visit the many native lands to experience religious pluralism. As Harold Coward says, one can experience virtually all religions in Calgary (Canada). (Coward 2000: vii). This is due to the increasing movement of people from one end of the earth to the other, thereby breaking down the old geographical boundaries as limits of religious and cultural traditions. Platvoet and van der Toorn make distincition between internal and external religious plurality. The external plurality refers to co-existence of different religions side by side either in some tension or in relative harmony. The internal plurality refers to diversity of beliefs and practices within a religion or “in the society or societies, in which that religion happens to hold a dominant position”. (Platvoet & van der Toorn 1995: 14). Both the internal and the external pluralism present problems in their respective ways. Coward in his book on Pluralism in the World Religions (2000) demonstrates the fact that all religions arose out of religiously plural context. He draws from it the following principles— 1. that “One” is experienced in many manifestations; 2. different religions are the instrumental forms of the “One”; 3. there is a tendency to superimpose one’s criterion on the others. The most important conclusion that he draws from religious pluralism is that religious experience is universal. (Coward 2000: 140–48). Although Coward emphasises in his study the plural theologies, as he calls them, he does not take his main observation, viz., that all religons arose out of religiously plural context to its logical end, that is, sycretism on the one hand and the fact of social, cultural and historical construction of religions through human intellect on the other. There is a growing sense among both religionist scholars as well as historians and social scientists that religion will not disappear in the modern world as was speculated by some (e.g., August Compte and Karl Marx) in the wake of industrialisation and technological advancement. Science is thought to become the dominant force. This does not necessarily mean that in the modern society there will not be any place for religion. In other words, people becoming secular does not automatically follow that they are also atheists. Steve Bruce has rightly argued that The clash of ideas between science and religion is far less significant than the more subtle impact of naturalistic ways of thinking about the world. Science and technology have not made us atheists. Rather, the fundamental assumptions underlying them which we can summarily
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p. pratap kumar describe as ‘rationality’—the material world as an amoral series of invariant relationships of cause and effect, the componentiality of objects, the reproducibility of actions, the expectation of constant change in our exploitation of the material world, the insistence on innovation— make it unlikely that we will often entertain the notion of the divine. (Bruce 1996: 51)
And yet, as several scholars have argued, wars are still being fought that have religion as the basis for many of the global conflicts. Scholars are beginning to link different religions with ethnic and cultural expressions. Using Meland’s work on Secularisation of Modern Cultures (1966), James Wiggins points up the “cultrual and creatural dimensions of its utterances.” (Wiggins 1996: 3). In other words, religions provide meaning and identity and hence the need to hang on to those social conventions. This is largely the approach of what is known in sociology of religion “structural-functionalism” of scholars like Talcott Parsons. Christian Smith (1996) argues that the role of religion in modern society has not been adequately explored in current scholarship in social sciences because firstly, secularist theorists, such as Compte and Marx have argued against the social importance of religion in the modern world and it was taken forgranted in the social sciences. Secondly, structural-functionalism became out of fashion in social sciences since the early 1970s and since religion was only used to explain social integration was not seen relevant in explaining social conflicts. He argues that the role of religion in social movements, especially in, what he calls, “disruptive politics” has been underestimated and under studied. Therefore, he calls for a serious scrutiny of the role that religion plays in modern society, in particular in protest and disruptive politics. (Smith 1996). In a similar vein, Steve Bruce (1996) argues that it is easy to use Marxist analysis, for instance in the case of Ireland, and suggest that religious differences are merely “window-dressing, a polite rhetoric put up to disguise the baser but real source of motivation.” (Bruce 1996: 101). He argues that such an analysis is problematic. He says, Social scientists may well divide the material from the cultural but lay people do not. In so far as they sometimes see themselves as being privileged, Protestants understand this as the consequence of having the right attitudes to the state, to law and order, to industry, and to personal discipline, and in turn they see these civic virtues as being the result of having the correct religion. (Bruce 1996: 102).
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Thus, Bruce sees the role of religion integral to ethnicity as in the case of Irish Protestants, and cultural defence as in the case of revivalism in America. (Bruce 1996: 105–106). In explaining the role of religion in ethnicity and social transformation, Bruce makes two important points. First, he says that before the rise of nationalism and the secular state as a social institution, religion was the only thing that people had in common. Second, he says that “[S]ecular nationalist philosophies can perform a similar function, but religion does it better because there is no more comforting and reassuring thought than that one has God on one’s side.” (Bruce 1996: 107). In other words, he makes a case for the seriousness with which we, as scholars explaining religion and its role in society, should consider religion as an important aspect in modern society. If religion is going to continue to be an important aspect in modern society, how must we deal with society that is increasingly becoming pluralistic culturally, religiously and ethnically? How should we understand the secular nature of modern society? And in the context of this volume, the question is—how does diaspora phenomenon contribute to religious pluralism in the modern world? As indicated earlier, this volume covers a range of religious experiences from a variety of diaspora communities that range from Chinese, Japanes and South Asians to Brazilians. As hinted by scholars such as Stanley Tambiah, more examples of diaspora are necessary in order for us in social sciences and religionist studies to examine the nature of not only the diaspora communities, but specifically the nature of religious pluralism in our modern world. To this extent this volume is a small contribution. Overview of the Volume The volume is organised to reflect not only the wide range of diasporic experiences in the context of religious pluralism, but also to reflect some of the nuances in conceptualising religious pluralism in the diaspora. The opening essay of Farrer on Chinese Catholics in Tokyo deals with immigrant religious institutional structure in Japan. He highlights the point that it is important to understand the kinship based transnational migration networks to make sense of the religious institutional structures of the immigrants. He says that the
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Chinese religious affiliations in Japan are “constrained by political and social environments in both host and sending countries as much as by the immigrant community’s social and cultural character.” (p. 15). Another example of Chinese diasporic experience is brought to bear by Nagy’s study on Chinese Christians in Romania. Her essay highlights the point that as the religious others, the Chinese immigrants struggle to manifest themselves as “exemplary community” among the immigrants in Romania. By focusing on the missionary work among the migrants, she makes an interesting observation in that the local churches in China developed an effective mechanism for their missionary work in Romania by using the immigrant Chinese Christians as missionaries. In other words, the immigrant Chinese Christians in Romania are not only there as migrant workers, but also as missionaries for their home-based churches. Shibata’s essay focuses on Chinese ethnicity in Jamaica. She argues that Chinese ethnicity in Jamaica has been transformed in relation to other ethnic groups as well as the diversity that exists within itself. It is this internal diversity that is often ignored when dealing with the diaspora in some studies. The tendency to view diaspora group/s in a homogenous manner needs to be problematised. Shibata’s study rightly alerts us to this point. She also demonstrates how the Chinese identity in Jamaica is negotiated between their ethnicity and their adopted religion, viz., Christianity. Kim-kwong Chan, in his essay on Chinese Christianity (Chapter 4) in the global context, points out that there is a high level of conversion to Christianity among the Chinese diaspora in the west. This has resulted in the establishment of seminaries and bible colleges to meet the growing demand from the emerging Chinese Christian communities overseas. He points out that many Christian churches target the Chinese immigrant for conversion in the hope of not only to spread Christianity in the host country across cultural boundaries, but also in the hope of establishing Christian churches in the main land China. He suggests that this new trend is facilitated by the growing Chinese economic influence in the west and the increasing liberalisation of Chinese government policy on religion. Ambrose, in her essay (Chapter 5) deals with Chinese immigrants in Japan. She mainly focuses on the Chinese Christians from Evangelical Protestant and Pentecostal churches. In her study, she finds a closer link between ethnicity and religious denomination, e.g., the Presbyterian church and Chinese of Taiwanese background. Although
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the general tendency among the Japanese is to associate the traditional Chinese festivals, temples etc., with the Chinese community, Ambrose argues that the newer Chinese immigrant population is mainly involved in Christian denominations from Protestant and Pentecostal background and therefore it would be misleading to view Chinese immigrants from the standpoint of their traditional belief systems. In her essay, Matsue focusing on the Japanese Brazilians, demonstrates the relationship between displacement and religious practices. She highlights the notion of dual diaspora, viz., the ambiguous state of mind that the Japanese immigrants experience in terms of their natal homeland and their ancestral homeland. The significance of the contribution of this essay lies in the fact that it explores the changes in ethnic identity when a group re-emigrates to its ancestral land where they are again classed as immigrants. This double immigrant consciousness coupled with their choice of religious affiliation has significant impact on their relationship to the society in Japan. That is, the Japanese Brazilians, as the immigrants are called, and the local Japanese people in Japan seem to circumscribe their boundaries in relation to the double immigrant consciousness of Japanese Brazilians. Rocha’s essay deals with Brazilian immigrants in Australia. She examines the role that social class, as opposed to ethnicity, plays among the Brazilian immigrants to Australia. She argues that there is a relationship between their social status and their choice of religion. She points out that “adhering to a religious institution from homeland and spending time with their peers immigrants reconstruct the past through the standpoint of the present in order to feel at home.” (p. 158). Moving on to the South Asian case, Jacobsen explores in his essay the relationship between religious processions among Tamils in Norway and the public recognition that they receive. The successful processions are seen as a sign of their ability to be integrated into the host society. Kotin’s essay takes us to the British context. He deals with the Indian diaspora in Southall. His research shows that in addition to religious affiliation, caste affiliation remained significant among the Indian diaspora in Southall. In his essay, Kotin explores the relationship between “ritual and social status, migration and social status, spatial and social distance between South Asian groups.” He, however, points out that the immigrants generally lose their social status (if they were classed as higher in their homeland) or remain low if their earlier caste status was already lower in their homeland. The essay of Khan and Ebrahim explores the relationship between
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social organizations among Muslims in South Africa and their institutions of charity based on denominational affiliations. They also suggest that there is an integral relationship between leaders who control major charities and their positions of power within the broader Muslim society. In their study, they have identified three classes of Muslims who came to settle in South Africa—the Malay Muslims, Arab Mulsims and the African/Zanzibari Muslims. Their study shows that there is an intrinsic connection between their denominational affiliation and their ability to receive charitable support. For instance, Khan and Ebrahim argue that the Sunni Muslims of indentured Indian background are “less likely to receive charitable support from their merchant class counterparts belonging predominantly to the Tablighi school of thought.” (p. 203). Staying with the South Asians, Martin Stringer examines religious diversity in Birmingham, UK. He analyses the role that visual markers such as dress and buildings play in shaping the discourse on religious diversity. His analysis takes account of how ordinary people view dress and conflate ethnicity and religious affiliation. In this regard his comment that “race or ethnicity and religion are clearly related within many people’s minds” is worth noting. Annette Wilke examines the role of Hindu temples in the retention and transformation of tradition, maintenance of identity and creating social and cultural ties. In this essay, she looks at closely three priestly models, viz., Brahmin, non-Brahmin and non-Brahmin enthusiast based on her focus on three Sri Lankan temples in Germany. She examines how these models reveal “rival systems in reproducing cultural identity.” (p. 239). Through these forms of religious manifestation, she deals with patterns of re-adjustment and patterns of cultural exchange. Kumar’s essay explores the issue of identity among South Asian diaspora using examples from South Africa and Britain. Examining the data based on caste, rituals and temples, Kumar examines their self representation in public sphere. While caste based social formation was strong in the UK, in South Africa Indian diaspora moved away from caste, with some exception of Gujarati Hindus. Since the aftermath of the 9/11 events a great deal of international focus fell on the Muslims around the world. In particular, Muslims in the US have come under intense pressure from the US public as well as the government. In his essay, Hajer Salem examines religious pluralism in the US, especially in the context of American openness to immigration and the American society’s quest for diver-
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sity and oneness. His essay, though written from an Islamic point of view, lends itself to a multiple cases of religious communities that have emigrated to the US (e.g., Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists). He examines the various models of religious pluralism and suggests that “America’s diversity is much more radical (p. 302) and calls upon Islamic scholars to explore “the moral and legal principles of pluralism available in their religious sources and heritages . . . to “be a constructive and effective contributors to religious pluralism in America.” (p. 302). El Sharkawy examines the political participation of Muslims in America. One of the thorny issues in this context is whether Muslims in the US consider themselves as US citizens or Mulsims living in the US. In this regard it is noteworthy that various Muslim ethnic groups: African Americans, Arab Americans, and Pakistani Americans started to form closer ties and creating a common vision. (p. 320). However, she points out that inspite of their concern for internal divisions, the most important concern of the American Muslims s to deal with the growing anti-Islamic feelings after 9/11. Even though the American government began to include American Muslims in the political process, the general anti-Muslim sentiment in the US seems to continue. In the context of the studies in religious pluralism, some general issues have become critically important. One such issue is raised by the study of Martikainen in Finland. He critiques the tendency of most studies to focus on the “religious others” and ignoring the religious diversity that exists in the mainstream religion and in this case, Christianity. His essay in this regard discusses various strategies and patterns of religious organisation in Finland. He argues that religious affiliation is a primary element in structuring the immigrant communities in Finland. His study, however, highlights the need to study more closely the invisible changes that are taking place within the host society of Christian background. In his essay, Baumann deals with religious ‘plurality’ in Lucerne (Switzerland). One of the significant points of his research is that the different immigrant religious communities are mostly self-centred and do not have any interest in inter-religious activities. The only religious group that has an interest in inter-religious activities is the Roman Catholic Church, which enjoys the numerical majority in Lucerne. It is precisely because of a lack of interest in other religions among the immigrant religious communities, Baumann contends that a more apt way to describe
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the situation in Lucerne is by using the category ‘plurality’ rather than ‘pluralism’ as the latter, according to him, would imply some inter-religious relationships among different religious groups. As the overview indicates, the volume includes groups of diaspora from Chinese, Japanese, Brazilians to South Asians. It also touches on some crucial issues pertaining to the diaspora as reflected in each of the essays. In particular one issue that could be of some significance to scholars is the issue of dual homeland and the resulting identity crisis as discussed in the essay of Matsue on Japanese Brazilians. I, together with my collaborators in this project believe that the volume will be of significance to both social scientists and religionists in dealing with religion in the diaspora context and especially the issues of pluralism. We do hope that both senior scholars as well as students in the study of diaspora will find this volume useful. References Bruce, Steve (1996). Religion in the Modern World: from cathedrals to cults. New York: Oxford University Press. Coward, Harold (2000). Pluralism in the World Religions. Oxford: One world Publications. Gellman, Jerome. “In defence of a contented religious exclusivism”, in Religious Studies, Vol. 36, pp. 401–417. Heim, S. Mark. “Saving the particulars: religious experience and religious ends”, in Religious Studies, Vol. 36, pp. 435–453. Meland, Bernard (1966). The Secularisation of Modern Cultures. New York: Oxford University Press. Platvoet, Jan & Karel van der Toorn (eds.) (1995).Pluralism and Identity: Studies in Ritual Behaviour. Leiden: E.J. Brill. Smith, Christian (1996). Disruptive Religion: the force of faith in social-movement activism. New York: Routledge. van der Toorn, Karel (1995). “Ritual resistance and self-assertion: the Rechabites in the early Israelite religion.” in Pluralism and Identity: Studies in Ritual Behaviour, edited by Jan Platvoet & Karel van der Toorn. Leiden: E.J. Brill, pp. 229–260. Wiggins, James B. (1996). In Praise of Religious Diversity. New York: Routledge.
PART ONE
CHINESE EXPERIENCE
CHINESE CATHOLIC CENTER IN TOKYO: INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS IN CONTEXTS Gracia Liu Farrer University of Chicago In China, we are free but we can not practice it freely; In Japan, we can practice it freely but we are not free.— An interviewee
Many social scientists who studied immigrant religion in U.S.A. have observed that, regardless of their denominations, immigrants tend to assume an early U.S. ‘Protestant congregations’ organizational model. Warner (1994) describes this tendency as de facto congregationalism. It is characterized by voluntary membership, a high degree of lay involvement in decision making, a professional clergy, the declining significance of denominationalism, financial support from members, the development of community centers, and the provision of social services. Ebaugh and Chafetz (2000) grouped these characteristics into two dimensions: the structural dimension, including elements such as lay leadership, voluntary membership, and member financing; and the functional dimension, indicated by the development of community centers for the provision of non-religious social services to members. They found out through researching among thirteen immigrant religious institutions in Houston that immigrant religious organizations assumed many elements of these two dimensions of religious congregation, although they varied in the extent to which they adopted one or both of these features. No apparent reason—religion, ethnicity, membership size, or social economic status—could explain such a variation. In this paper, I attempt to look for the mechanisms that shape an immigrant religious institution’s congregational structure and community center functions in its political, social, and institutional contexts. I describe a Chinese immigrant Catholic congregation in Japan that consisted of mostly undocumented immigrants from Fujian Province. Although a single case could not possibly explain variations, by explaining how, over the time, the only Chinese immigrant Catholic congregation in Japan transformed into a largely regional one and
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became embedded in kinship based transnational migration networks, and how this consequently affected the balance of different dimensions of its congregational characteristics and its transnational practices, I argue that congregationalism is constrained by political and social environments in both host and sending countries as much as by the immigrant community’s social and cultural characteristics. Data This study is part of my on going project about Chinese immigrants in Japan. My larger project studies recent Chinese immigrants’ diverse incorporation patterns in Japan and their transnational practices. I started my fieldwork in Tokyo in January 2002, and spent a summer in 2003 interviewing returned immigrants in Shanghai and Fujian. The fieldwork yielded lengthy field notes from participant observation in various Chinese leisure and religious institutions in Tokyo Metropolitan area, 123 interviews I personally conducted from 2002 to December 2004, and a sample survey of 230 respondents. The fieldwork in general helped me understand the meaning of the practices within this Chinese Catholic congregation. I used in this paper mainly field notes from my participation in the congregation since February, 2003, and interviews with the director of the congregation and two sisters that managed the center’s affairs as well as with 20 individuals who were or had been frequent participants of the congregation. Five of the 20 interviewees had returned to China. I interviewed them at their homes in Fujian. I supplemented the data with a survey of 80 members conducted by the Promotion Committee of the congregation in October of 2003. I did not participate in designing the survey questionnaire, but some results were helpful for me to have a statistical understanding of the member’s demographic composition and their social, economic and religious backgrounds. A History of the Chinese Catholic Center1 In 1984, a Japanese sister and a student from Taiwan approached a Jesuit priest who was then teaching at a university and asked him
1
Pseudonym.
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to hold a mass for Chinese speaking Catholics in Tokyo. A monthly mass thereafter began in the University Chapel. Since he did not speak Chinese, the priest gave the sermon in Japanese and a student translated it into Chinese. About 50 students and Chinese-speaking Catholics from China, Hong Kong and Taiwan attended the mass. In 1990, through the Provincial Superior of the Society of Jesus in China, a French priest who spoke fluent Chinese and had taught and lived in China was assigned to lead the congregation. The congregation was given an unoccupied Jesuit dormitory by the Society of Jesus in Japan. The new pastor and congregation members renovated the seventy-year old house and started a weekly Chinese mass in the fall of 1990. The Chinese Catholic Center was officially established. It was supported by the Society of Jesus Japan Province initially. The Jesuit house had a chapel, office space, a common room, and a kitchen. It soon became a community center for Chinese immigrants. Members brought in friends and relatives. On Sundays, over 100 Chinese immigrants filled the house. After the worship, they lingered and confabulated. Volunteers cooked lunch. Everybody ate together. However, after the Kobe earthquake in 1995 the house was inspected to be unsafe. The Center was told to evacuate the house before 2001. In the meanwhile, the French pastor also left Japan to take up a new post. The incoming leaders made a lot of efforts in locating a new place for the congregation. With the support of the pastor of a Japanese parish and the Archdiocese of Tokyo, Chinese Catholic Center moved into a Japanese parish church in 2001. On Sundays, a Japanese mass was held in the morning, and a Chinese one in the afternoon. About 40 to 50 Chinese congregation members would stay on for tea and snacks after the worship. Children and youngsters set up the ping pong table to play ping pong. Several people watched TV, although most gathered around several round tables chatting, munching on snacks, or playing cards and Chinese chess. Since moving into the Japanese parish, the congregation had more interaction with Japanese Catholics. It started issuing the Japanese version of a quarterly newsletter that used to be Chinese only. Japanese people from the parish were also invited to participate in many Center events, such as Chinese New Year Celebrations and Center’s anniversary celebrations. The Chinese congregation also took part in activities organized by Catholic parishes in that area. Although a few members from the Jesuit house era were nostalgic about the old exclusive environment and described the old place as more resembling
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home, most others liked the new place because it was spacious and they had more social interactions with Catholic Japanese. In any event, more and more members in the congregation came after it was relocated, and the Jesuit house became a Center legend. Becoming a Fujian Immigrant Church Started with members from various regions in China and some core members from Taiwan and Hong Kong, Chinese Catholic Center gradually became a predominantly Fujian immigrant congregation. By the end of 2003 when the church survey was administered, Fujian immigrants composed 90 percent of the congregation2 (Table). With the increase of Fujian immigrants, it also became an important node in their transnational migration networks which brought more and more immigrants from that region into the congregation. Table: Region and sex compositions of Chinese Catholic Center (2003)
Men Woman Total
Fujian
Non-Fujian
Missing2
Total
17 24 41
1 5 6
9 22 31
27 51 78
Demographic Base and Network Overlapping The presence of a large number of Catholic Fujian immigrants in Japan provided the demographic base for the Chinese Catholic congregation in Tokyo to consist of members mostly from Fujian Province. Fujian, particularly rural areas around the capital city Fuzhou, not only had one of the largest Catholic populations in China but also sent one of the largest migrant populations to Japan. Although around 2 80 people (including myself ) responded to the church survey conducted in October 2003. 33 people answered “China” to the question “birthplace.” 47 people wrote down cities or provinces. Among the 47, 41 marked “Fujian.” When asked about how they filled out the answers later, several Fujian members said they wrote down “China.” Given my observation that Fujian immigrants were sometimes reluctant to report their regional origin in social occasions and quite a few changed their birthplaces to other provinces in their fake passports and alien registration cards, I suspect most of these “Chinese people” were in fact from Fujian. I therefore could safely say the percentage was close to 90 by imputing the numbers.
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210,000 Roman Catholics worshiped in registered churches in Fujian,3 there were numerous underground churches in the province. 4 Journalistic and academic reports often estimated China’s Catholics to be three to four times of the official number (Madsen 2003). According to such a calculation, Catholics in Fujian were likely to approach a million. Some informants told me that in their home villages every Sunday at least several hundred people attended the mass. In 2005, the Ash Wednesday coincided with Chinese New Year. One Center member learnt from his wife at home that over three thousand people congregated in their local parish. Since the late 1980s, immigrants from areas surrounding Fuzhou started migrating into Japan. In 2003, the number of legal Fujian immigrants in Japan was 35,703, ranked number five after three Northeast provinces and Shanghai ( Japanese Immigration Association 2004). However, the number of undocumented Fujian immigrants was likely to be as high or higher. Japan Coast Guard discovered organized human smuggling from China in 1990 for the first time. Since then, 80 percent of apprehended illegal entrants into Japan were Chinese, and almost all were from Fujian.5 Since mid-1990s, the number of apprehended clandestine entrants from China was over one thousand every year. In my own survey among the Chinese immigrants in Japan, more than half of the Fujian immigrants who answered the question on legal statuses reported to be undocumented (Appendix 1). Many Fujian immigrants, including one sister from the Center, believed there were likely over 100,000 Fujian immigrants in Japan, with or without legal statuses. As important as the numbers of Catholics in Fujian and immigrants from that area was the conjunction of the kinship-based networks that were used for both international migration and religious activities. Fujian immigrants mostly came from rural areas around the capital city Fuzhou (Liang and Ye 1999; Liang and Morooka 2004). The 3 The number comes from Overseas Missionary Fellowship. “China Church Survey,” by Tony Lambert. Global Chinese Ministries Newsletter—March 2003. http://www. us.omf.org/content.asp?id-17570 4 Because of Communist Party’s efforts to bar foreign influences over Chinese Christians, in contemporary China, Chinese Catholics were channeled into two competing organizations—the open church that belonged to the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association independent from the ecclesiastical authority of Holy See and the underground church clustered around priests ordained by and loyal to Vatican (Liu and Leung 2002; Madsen 2003). 5 http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/kouhoushi/kouhoushi3.htm
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villages in these areas were naturally formed by and named after one or two extended families. For example, most people living in Chen-Li Village belong to either Chen Family or Li Family. Similar to rural migrants out of Mexico to US (Massey et al., 1987), Fujian immigrants mostly migrated through kinship-based networks. As a result, neighboring villages often varied greatly in the number of emigrants and the destinations of migration. This was not only true to clandestine migrants whose illicitness required a high degree of mutual trust only attainable through closed social networks (Coleman 1990), but also applied to legal migrants who came to Japan on student visas. Because of the general ignorance of application procedures, the legally entered Fujian informants I interviewed mostly arranged their migration into Japan through “snakeheads”6 by paying a substantial fee. Very often these “snakeheads” were in their extended families or connected to their extended families. On the other hand, the Chinese Catholic community in general mostly developed through kinship networks (Madsen 1998, 2003). Members of the Chinese Catholic Center were either from families with generations of Catholics or were initiated into Catholicism through kin. According to my informants, during 1980 and 1990s, in the villages in coastal Fujian, Catholics increased rapidly because of evangelizing efforts of neighbors and villagers. Since the majority belonged to non-official churches, they also relied on these networks to inform members of schedule changes and other church events. Through frequent communications between immigrants in Japan and their families at home and the growing former Center members in their local parishes (a point I will elaborate later), the Chinese Catholic Center became known among Fujian Catholics in China. Many congregation members were aware of the existence of such a Catholic organization before they came to Japan. Even if some did not know about the Center initially, after arriving in Japan and getting connected to the kin and friends here they would gradually learn where to find it. As a consequence of the size of Catholic population among Fujian immigrants and their kinship-based transnational migration networks and religious connections, Chinese Catholic Center soon became a congregation consisting of an increasing number of Fujian immigrants. 6 “Snakeheads” is a name they used for all brokers and middle agencies in the migration industry.
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Socially and Culturally Reinforced Ethnic Concentration As Ebaugh and Chafez (2000) pointed out, “immigrants are attracted to specifically immigrant religious institutions in large measure because they seek to develop social networks with others who share their native language, customs, experiences, and problems.” In the case of the Chinese Catholic Congregation in Japan, unfortunately, the concentration of Fujian immigrants created social, cultural and linguistic barriers for incorporating Chinese Catholics from elsewhere. Due largely to sensational media coverage of organized human smuggling from Fujian to Japan, Fujian Province was frequently associated with organized crimes, and Fujian people with illegal immigrants. In addition, Fujian immigrants, compared to immigrants from other regions in China, were less educated and predominantly from rural areas (Liang and Morooka 2004). These social and economic characteristics created their underclass image. Fujian immigrants thus became isolated in the Chinese immigrant community in Japan. In my fieldwork at the Chinese social dance in Tokyo, a rare occasion where people from different regional and socioeconomic backgrounds intersected, I constantly heard discriminatory remarks toward the Fujian immigrants, and an avoidance of their company. There was a clear separation of Fujian people from the others (Farrer 2004). The Catholic Center was a rare public space where the Fujian immigrants did not feel discriminated against inside. Since it occupied an independent building during the first 12 years, its physical detachment impressed on the congregation members a sense of social detachment from Japanese society. It helped the Fujian immigrants feel secure inside. As some put it, “when you closed the door, it became our own world. We always spent the whole day in the Center. The atmosphere was good. People greeted you when you walked in. We really felt at home there.” While Fujian immigrants cherished the fellowship in the center because they shared the same language, customs, and problems from being migrant labor and victims of social prejudice, the Chinese immigrants from elsewhere sometimes felt marginalized in the environment. Fujian dialects were incomprehensible to other Chinese immigrants. Their relative lack of socioeconomic diversity also made the congregation unable to match the interests of Chinese from other regions who were mostly legal and more socially mobile. Other
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Chinese also depended less on the resources provided by the Center because they were more likely to be affiliated with formal organizations and had alternative institutional resources. As a consequence, Chinese Catholic Center saw fewer and fewer Chinese from elsewhere. I had met non-Fujian immigrants in the Center who found the place through its webpage, but they left after several weeks. Those remained were either connected to the congregation through immediate family such as spouses or kin, or because they had no alternative. The Center had been the only place in Japan that Chinese mass was given.7 Non-Fujian Chinese who could not speak Japanese continued to participate in the congregation, although they rarely stayed to socialize after the worship. The Institutional Consequences of Demographic Concentration The concentration of Fujian immigrants in the only Chinese speaking Catholic congregation in Japan affected its institutional characteristics in important ways. Measured by Ebaugh and Chafetz’s two dimensions typical of congregational organization, the Chinese Catholic Center had a weak congregational structure and a strong community center feature. Weak Congregational Structure Ebaugh and Chafetz (2000) judge whether a religious organization has a congregational structure according to whether it: 1) has a formal member list; 2) a local governing body (board or council), elected by the members and composed of lay members that makes policy for, and administers, the affairs of the institution; 3) has committees/ministries composed of lay members who conduct the work of the institution; 4) has clergy who are selected by the local organization; and 5) raises most of its operating funds from its own local members. As an institution belonging to a global organization, Chinese Catholic Center could not recruit its own clergy. The priests were appointed by the Catholic hierarchy. But the Center’s lacking in
7
In January 2005, another Chinese mass began in Saitama Prefecture.
chinese catholic center in tokyo
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other aspects of congregational structure had much to do with its consisting mostly of Fujian immigrants and their political and social disadvantages under an unfavorable immigration policy in Japan and control over religious activities in China. First, the Center could not have an effective list of members because many Fujian immigrants in the Center were undocumented and therefore the length of their stay in Japan was unpredictable. Japan did not have precedence of amnesty. Due to the common association of illegal stay with criminal activities, especially after human smuggling became rampant since early 1990s, its police forces had been particularly adamant in clearing its streets of undocumented immigrants. In December 2003, in order to make Japan into “a strong society against crimes,” Japanese government, considering “illegal immigrants being the hotbed of foreigner’s criminal activities,” started a campaign to reduce the number of illegal foreign residents by half in five years ( Japan National Police Agency 2004).8 Police regularly raided entertainment districts, construction sites, and some residential areas. Plainclothes roam in train stations and neighborhoods trying to identity suspects by mere appearances. As a consequence, the member turnovers were high. The church survey of 2003 indicated that half of the congregation had been coming to the Center for less than two years. 43 percent had only been in the Center for less than a year. The Center had once composed a roster, but it soon became an alumni list. One sister who managed the Center’s administrative affairs told me that over ten years, the congregation might have had over a thousand alumni. Second, lay persons’ involvement in the Center’s policy decisions and administrative affairs was limited by congregation members’ lack of religious and social resources and high turnovers. Initially, there had been more active lay participation in building a Chinese Catholic congregation. The Chinese Catholic Center was established upon the request of immigrants. Immigrants also helped renovate their first church. Before the Center was formally established, there was a couple from Hong Kong using their connections to bring in Chinese speaking priests to lead religious retreats and give courses on doctrine. They also invited congregants home for holiday celebrations. In the current congregation composed mostly of Fujian immigrants,
8
http://npa.go.jp/kouhousi/biki2/sec03/sec03_07.htm
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there were no people with such resources. Catholics in Fujian were more commonly affiliated with underground churches. At home, because of illegitimacy and the scarcity of priests, their religious practices were clandestine and irregular. In addition, Fujian Center members were young. Over half were younger than 30. Before coming to Japan, many were preoccupied with school, starting business, and setting up a family. Quite a few of my informants reported to have stopped practicing completely. Therefore, they had limited knowledge of their faith, let alone religious resources and social connections. Although there was a committee that convened once a month to discuss the Center’s matters, the committee members were mostly young migrant workers, and the majority undocumented. In Japan’s recent campaign effort to reduce illegal immigrants, the Committee lost two members. The committee was led by a sister, and its members were recruited by the sisters and other committee members. It conducted the work within the Center such as assigning liturgical tasks and organizing celebrative events under the supervision of the sisters. All other administrative work such as inviting priests from overseas Chinese congregations, issuing the newsletter and maintaining a webpage, was managed by the priests and four sisters with organizational resources. Finally, the Center was not yet self-sufficient financially because, despite their generosity and good will, members were relatively resource poor and each under heavy financial burdens. The operating funds partly came from the Society of Jesus in Japan Province although in recent years, according to the director of the Center, member donations contributed to 70 percent of the operating costs. Congregation as a Community Center Ebaugh and Chafetz (2000) define the community center as a place that includes the communal celebration of secular holidays, secular classes, mundane services for members, recreational facilities and a community hall in which social activities occur. Although the Chinese Catholic Center in Tokyo was foremost a religious institution that provided guidance to immigrants’ faith life and administered Sacraments, it adopted many community center functions. The Center celebrated secular holidays such as the Chinese New Year. It had a common room where members could gather and social-
chinese catholic center in tokyo
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ize. Sometimes wedding receptions were held there. In late 2004, two newcomers from Hong Kong started offering English classes to the members. The Center also provided limited recreational facilities such as a ping pong table, a small library, cards and chess, and organized retreats during New Year holidays. Most importantly, the congregation provided social networks that were essential resource for Fujian immigrants. The biggest practical problems Fujian immigrants faced were housing and jobs. Undocumented immigrants had difficulties in finding housing because in Japan a guarantor was usually needed for leasing apartments. Fujian immigrants relied on social networks to solve housing problem. Most of them lived with kin or friends. However, their kin and friends were also frequently undocumented immigrants, and sometimes repatriated unexpectedly. The initial connection between the owner and the tenant could suddenly disappear. The roommates therefore had to find new housing. Occasionally, the roommates feared the police would raid their apartment after one person being arrested for illegal stay and opted to leave. The Chinese Catholic Center extended Fujian immigrants’ social networks. Not only did many members end up sharing apartments, when emergencies occurred, they had more alternative places to go. Because most Fujian immigrants came to Japan with a sole purpose to make money, and often came with heavy initial financial burdens, they not only needed jobs immediately upon arrival, but also changed jobs often in order to get better pay. Lacking language proficiency and often proper documents, the majority of Fujian immigrants relied on relatives and friends’ introduction and references for jobs. In the stagnating Japanese economy, good jobs were difficult to find. Because of the mass media’s portraits of crimes committed by foreigners, not only did the undocumented immigrants but the legal ones also have trouble finding jobs. Networks therefore were essential for Fujian immigrants. According to my independent survey, over four fifths of employed Fujian immigrants found their current jobs through kin and friends. The Chinese congregation, with a majority working on part time jobs in restaurants, food markets, and construction, was a good source for job information. Moreover, outside of the church, job introduction cost money even among friends and relatives. Within the church, however, my informants claimed that members gave information about jobs for free. Several interviewees reported to have found jobs through people at the Congregation.
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These types of social resources available through the Center were especially important for immigrants who had limited kinship networks in Japan or could not rely on them for assistances. Yimin, a young man I interviewed, was the first in his village to come to Japan. Typical of Fujian immigrants, he came with a debt of three million yen (about USD 26,000). After two years in a language school in Okinawa, he enrolled in a post-secondary vocational school in Tokyo. Without kin in Tokyo and knew few people, he was out of job for four months. He quit school and gave up the student dorm because he could not afford the tuition or the rent. His mother, through a church member in the local village, obtained the address of the congregation in Tokyo. When he finally knocked on the door of the Center, he was homeless, living off a slice of bread everyday. He moved in with a Center member, and was introduced to jobs. Initially intending to pursue college education in Japan, Yimin regretted that he gave up the opportunity because he found the congregation too late. “If he had found the church earlier, we would all have helped him.” One Center member told me, “We could at least loan him money to pay for the tuition.” In addition to network resources, because of the vulnerable political and social situations they found themselves in, the undocumented Fujian Catholic immigrants or their families turned to the Center for social support and practical services they had trouble obtaining from other channels. Catholicism had a history of benevolence and assistance to people in disadvantaged situations (Degeneffe 2003). In practice, the Chinese Catholic Center was in close cooperation with Catholic Tokyo International Center, which was founded and administered by the Archdiocese of Tokyo for the migrant workers and foreigners staying in Japan. Since its establishment, the sisters of the Chinese congregation took upon themselves the task of visiting the detained undocumented immigrants and helped communicate their needs to their families and friends and deliver goods. Several times they had to negotiate with the police in order to expedite the repatriating process for some congregation members in order to unite them with their families in difficulty. Furthermore, for undocumented immigrants, the Center was the only place that gave official recognition to their marriage. Several informants of mine received the Sacrament of Matrimony and had a wedding ceremony in the Center. Over the years, the Chinese Catholic Center gained publicity by sheltering an immigrant with lethal injury; and raising funds to send
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another undocumented immigrant who was seriously ill back home. Both immigrants were from Fujian. Transnational Religious Practices In recent years, scholars have paid increasing attention to immigrants’ transnational religious practices. Transnationality was considered an important institutional characteristic of immigrant congregations. For example, Yang (2002) describes three-layered trans-Pacific networks formed by contacts between individuals, single churches, and paraChinese Christian Churches that connected migrants in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mainland China to their counterparts in the U.S. and Canada. Chinese Catholic Center’s transnational practices also took on distinct characteristics because of the political and social situations of its members. Chinese Catholic Center, in comparison with the immigrant religious institutions being studied in US, had limited transnational practices. This was first because of Chinese government’s ban on foreign missionary work in China and the political sensitiveness of the underground church where most Chinese congregants belonged. The Center refrained from direct contacts with immigrants’ home organizations for fear it would potentially endanger the Catholics and their religious institutions in immigrants’ hometown. Secondly, the majority of its members were undocumented and therefore not free to travel transnationally. This limited the resource exchanges between the Center and the churches in immigrants’ home villages. Despite the difficulties, the Center affected the religious institution in immigrants’ home society through an expanding network of alumni reeducated in Catholic doctrine and practices, and impressed with a vision of world church and a sense of connection with a global Chinese Catholic organization. Due to social isolation, the immigrants from rural Fujian had very limited knowledge of Catholic faith. In the Catholic Center in Japan the members participated in courses of Catholic doctrine and practices. I heard many immigrants comment that they had never truly understood their faith until joining the Center. The Center also tried to develop among its members a reconciliatory attitude toward the official churches in mainland China. Though some researchers pointed out that the membership of the open and the underground churches
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overlapped and the boundary blurred in some areas (Lozada 2001; Liu and Leung 2002), in rural Fujian, the tension between the underground church and the official church seemed to be more heightened. Almost all Fujian immigrants in the Catholic congregation in Japan were affiliated with underground churches at home. After joining Chinese Catholic Center, however, immigrants learnt to neglect the distinction between the open and the underground because several members from other regions in China were affiliated with official churches. The center also tried to give its members perspectives about the conflict. Priests from other overseas Chinese churches were invited to give lectures on Chinese church affairs. The high member turnovers at the Center meant an increasing alumni population in China. Many former members were active in their local congregations after they went back home. Some organized Youth Leagues in their communities. Two of the five people I interviewed in Fujian assumed administrative roles in their local congregations. One middle aged woman said she didn’t have to work for a living after returning from Japan. Coordinating with other members and organizing masses became her job. Although the Catholic Church was organized around the clergy and therefore the priests and sisters had more authority about religious matters, the former members tried to communicate in their religious communities what they learnt about the Catholic doctrine and practices in Japan. It would be difficult to assess the influence of their education in Japan on their home community, but the former members were expected to bring fresh air to the relatively isolated and conservative Catholic Church in rural China. The center’s nodal position in immigrants’ transnational kin networks and its expanding alumnus network also allowed the Center to channel some educational resources into the congregations in immigrants’ home villages. 300 former members left their contact information with the center, and received a quarterly newsletter. The members also sent home newsletters and other religious materials. The priests and the sisters visited members’ families or former members in China every year. They took with them videos of Chinese Center’s activities which included their family members in Japan, and other materials to distribute among them. When I visited Fujian in August 2003, the former pastor of the Center had just left Fuzhou area. About 40 Fujian alumni came to meet the priest, some flying back from other parts of China just for the occasion. Upon their requests, the
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clergy also offered lectures on doctrine to the local catholic communities, and occasionally led worship services. However, because of their political sensitivity, these kinds of religious practices were infrequent. Conclusion This paper is an attempt to contextualize an immigrant religious congregation and to explain its institutional characteristics by looking at the social organization of the congregation and the political and social environment it was in. Using the case of a Chinese Catholic congregation in Japan, I first looked for social and cultural reasons for the demographic transformation of an immigrant religious institution. I pointed out that the only Chinese immigrant Catholic congregation in Japan turned into a largely Fujian immigrant congregation because Fujian was a region with both a large Catholic population and a large migrant population. Furthermore, the international migration and religious community expansion made use of the kinshipbased networks which were characteristic of the social organization in rural Fujian. On the other hand, because Fujian immigrants had relatively low social economic statuses and a stigmatized image as clandestine migrants, with the increase of Fujian members, the center became less attractive to other Chinese immigrants who did not share the same dialect, customs, and problems. This demographic transformation of the Center had important institutional consequences. One informant’s remark summarizes the political and social situations facing Catholic Fujian immigrants that “in China, we are free but we can not practice it freely; in Japan, we can practice it freely but we are not free.” In other words, their religious activities were constrained by Chinese government’s control over non-official religious activities at home, and their physical mobility was constrained by Japanese government’s control over undocumented immigrants. The former prevented them from obtaining religious resources and taking up transnational religious activities; the latter caused the instability of the congregation and limited transnational connections. Being undocumented also limited their channels of social and practical resources. Under these conditions, the Chinese Catholic Center assumed a weak congregational structure and strong community center functioning. Its transnational religious practices were constrained and largely indirect, relying mostly on both immigrants’ kin networks and its own alumni network.
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Appendix Table: Cross-tabulation of entry visa categories1 and current statuses of Chinese immigrants entering before 20022 Entry Status
Illegal Entry Pre-University student Universitybound student Trainee Employment Japanese spouse Dependent Settler Others Total
Fujian Current status Undocu- Documented mented
Others Current Status Total Undocu- Documented Total mented
14 12
1 8
15 20
0 7
0 39
0 46
5
4
9
1
20
21
0 1
0 3
0 4
1 0
1 14
2 14
1 0 0 0 33
4 1 3 3 27
5 1 3 3 60
0 0 0 0 9
11 9 9 6 109
11 9 9 6 118
Notes 1. Japanese Ministry of Justice processes 27 visa categories. Listed in the table are types of statuses that Chinese immigrants usually obtain. I have also combined 9 employment related visa categories into one, and named it “Employment”. 2. The longest a pre-university language student is permitted to stay is two years. Because I conducted my survey in second half of 2003, I include in the table only those who entered before 2002.
References Coleman, James. 1990. Foundation of Social Theory. Harvard University Press. Degeneffe, Charles Edmund. 2003. “What Is Catholic about Catholic Charities?” Social Work, 48(3), 374–383. Ebaugh, Helen Rose and Janet Saltzman Chafetz. 2000. “Structural Adaptations in Immigrant Congregations.” Sociology of Religion, 61(2) 135–154 Farrer, Gracia. 2004. “The Chinese Social Dance Party in Tokyo: Identity and Status in an Immigrant Leisure Subculture.” Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 33(6): 651–673. Japanese Immigration Association. 2004. Statistics on the Foreigners Registered in Japan. Liang, Zai and Hideki Morooka. 2004. “Recent Trends of Emigration from China: 1982–2000.” International Migration 43(3): 145–164. Liang, Zai and Wenzhen Ye. 2001. “From Fujian to New York: understanding the new Chinese immigration,” in D. Kyle and R. Koslowski (eds), Global Human
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Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives, Hohns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore: 187–215. Liu, William T., Leung, Beatrice. 2002. “Organizational Revivalism: Explaining Metamorphosis of China’s Catholic Church.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 41(1). Lozada, Eriberto P. 2001. God Aboveground: Catholic Church, Postsocialist State, and Transnational Processes in a Chinese Village. Stanford University Press. Madsen, Richard. 1998. China’s Catholics: Tragedy and Hope in an Emerging Civil Society. University of California Press. ——. 2003. “Catholic Revival During the Reform Era.” China Quarterly (174), 468–487. Massey, Douglas, Rafael Alarcon, Jorge Durand, and Humberto Gonzalez. 1987. Return to Aztlan: The Social Process of International Migration from Western Mexico. University of California Press. Warner, R.S. 1994. “The Place of the Congregation in the American Religious Configuration.” In American Congregations, Vol 2, edited by J.P. Wind and J.W. Lewis, 54–99. University of Chicago Press. Yang, Fenggang. 2002. “Chinese Christian Transnationalism: Diverse Networks of a Houston Church.” In Religions Across Borders: Transnational Religious Networks. Edited by Helen Rose Ebaugh and Janet Chafetz, 175–204. Maryland: Altamira Press.
CHINESE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY IN BUCHAREST (ROMANIA): A MISSIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE ECCLESIOGENESIS Dorottya Nagy University of Utrecht, the Netherlands The phenomenon of the new international migration brings new issues in the discipline of the missiology1 as well. Missiologists are not only challenged to find their way at the intersection of sociology, anthropology and many theological sub-disciplines, but first of all they must struggle with building up a relevant missiological vocabulary for the contemporary missiological issues. Due to the modern international migration in many places of the world, we can witness the birth of new Christian communities with “on-citizenship-based” homogeneous membership.2 Such migrant communities are “the exemplary communities of the transnational moment”.3 The article contributes to the missiological study of migrant churches by detecting the ecclesiological elements which have a role in the ecclesiogenesis4 of one concrete ‘exemplary community’, the Chinese Christian Church in Bucharest5 (CCCB). 1 For a detailed description of Missiology as an academic discipline see J.A.B. Jongeneel, Philosophy, Science, and Theology of Mission in the 19th and 20th Centuries, A Missiological Encyclopedia, part I–II, (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1995–1997). 2 Most of the literature discusses these communities under the name “migrant churches” or “immigrant churches” (among others Jan Jongeneel, Lois Ann Lorentzen, Kahl Werner et al.). However, further distinction is made when using the terms “historical (im)migrant churches” and “new migrant churches.” 3 Kachig Tololyan, ‘The nation-state and its others: in lieu of a preface’ Diaspora, Vol. 5 (1996), pp. 3–7. 4 We use the term “ecclesiogenesis” in the tradition of Leonardo Boff and Lewis S. Mudge. In this tradition ecclesiogenesis is a process by which church takes form in a “highly situated and predominantly preinstitutional sense” (Mudge, Lewis Seymour, Rethinking the beloved community: ecclesiology, hermeneutics, social theory, (Geneva: WCC Publications, 2001), p. 19. We are aware of the fact that the term “ecclesiogenesis” is very much loaded in the context of liberation theologies. Yet we should not stop using terms which might be relevant also in different contexts than their original one. 5 The official Chinese name of the church is: Lomania Huaren Jitu jiao hui, but they translated officially into Romanian as: Biserica Crestina a Chinezilor din Bucuresti, Romania, which translated into English is: Chinese Christian Church in Bucharest, Romania. Our abbreviation comes from this English translation.
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After defining the context in which the research had been done, we present a brief history of the formation of the CCCB. The article continues with an inductive approach of nine key-elements of the ecclesiogenesis of the CCCB. We discuss those nine elements in three groups of three elements moving each time to a deeper analytical framework. It is necessary to opt for such an inductive/descriptive approach in order to be able to introduce the whole issue of the “on-citizenshipbased” communities for the study of missiology in Central and Eastern Europe. Both in presenting the history and the detected ecclesiological elements the role of a missionary organisation, as the outsider, proves to be dominant in the process of the ecclesiogenesis. The study is based on field work done in April 2002 and July and August 2004 as well as literature study on the concepts ‘transnational communities’, ‘contextual theology’ and ‘immigrant and migrant churches’. The majority of the collected data is gathered through interviews and participant observation. The church has one church newspaper, with the title Kuang Ye Lu. The newspaper is irregularly issued. Nor the congregation, nor other organizations hold any other documents or archives about the history of the CCCB. The article provides only a little window in the first years of struggle in becoming a church for migrants. Yet this window is of huge importance to introduce the issue of the new ethnic and (im)migrant churches in Central and Eastern Europe. Context The migration of Chinese from mainland China is a new demographic phenomenon in the Romanian social context. The first Chinese migrants entered the country legally and illegally in 19906 after the fall of the communist government. Romania as a nation-state had many problems with the already existing so called “historical” ethnic groups (e.g. Hungarians, Swabians, Transylvanian Saxons, etc.) and tried to assimilate them as good as possible. The idea that one
6 http://www.iom.ch/IOM/Publications/books . . . surveys/MIP_easterneurope_ chinese_eng.htm, Chinese Migrants in Central and Eastern Europe: The Cases of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania, (International Organization for Migration, 1995). This was the first study issued on Chinese in Romania. The article states that by that time 80% of the Chinese in Romania were illegal. At present the article is only available in printed form, from the IOM archives.
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could be different but a Romanian, was not relevant for the official Romanian assimilation policy. In this context and remaining political atmosphere the first new migrants arrived. This migration wave called into existence a Chinese Christian Church as well. During the last decade Romania was declared to be a country in transition, recovering from the painful consequences of a dictatorial regime. After fifteen years of democracy, Romania still does not have a welldeveloped migrant policy which makes the lives of the migrants unstable and unpredictable. The thinking of the Chinese small traders, however, seems to match this kind of mentality: they do not have a long term planning.7 They count in few years not knowing what they want to do next. Thus the presence of the Chinese migrants in the first few years after 1989 was not “disturbing”; firstly because the Chinese were considered a group which uses Romania as a stepping stone towards the West, secondly they could even contribute to the development of the Romanian economy. In the present, strict visa regulations are introduced. In the coming years, as Romania is trying her best to enter the European Union, one might expect the emergence of an economic filter which might hunt away the Chinese small traders from the Romanian market and which might welcome on the other hand Chinese traders with higher economic potentials.8 Meanwhile, the local churches being so much focusing on rebuilding of their own communities, with the actions for recovery of their properties, etc. did not even have time to realise that the presence of the huge Chinese migrant group might be a missiological challenge for them. Yet the first Chinese Christian Church was born and continues to live in these conditions, making many missiological issues becoming relevant and research worthy.
7 This statement we conclude from the many interviews conducted between 2002 and 2004 among the Chinese in Bucharest. 8 There are more plans about such investments between the Chinese and the Romanian government. E.g. Bogdan, Adriana, ‘China va investi masiv in infrastructura romaneasca’, Gardianul, (17 Feb. 2004). There are no academic writings on this topic in Romanian. Local newspapers can be used as primary literature in some cases.
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dorottya nagy A Short History of the Chinese Christian Church in Bucharest
The ecclesiogenesis of CCCB is a typical instance of the gradual integration of Chinese migrant networks into modern Protestant missionary enterprises. We are witnesses of how certain missionary organizations skilfully use Chinese migrant networks for the purposes of evangelisation and church implantation. The ecclesiogenesis of the CCCB started at the moment when a missionary organization, in our case the Chinese Overseas Christian Mission (COCM) realised the evangelising opportunities the Chinese living in Romania offered. It is not the aim of this paper to analyse the COCM in detail, yet we have to introduce it since it is through the work of the COCM that the CCCB came into existence. The COCM is an international missionary organisation, having offices in the UK, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, Canada and the USA. Its European centre is in the UK. Its director is Mary Wang, and its vision is “Reaching the Chinese to Reach Europe.” 9 Their mission statement is formulated in five points: 1. To preach the Gospel of Jesus Christ primarily to people of Chinese ethnic origin in Europe. 2. To establish and foster self-supporting groups of Chinese Christians in Europe. 3. To encourage mutual fellowship and cooperation amongst the Chinese Christians in Europe. 4. To encourage mutual fellowship and cooperation with local evangelical Churches, societies and agencies in ministering the needs of the Chinese people and also in the task of world evangelisation and building up the Universal Church. 5. To prepare and equip Chinese Christians to serve God in their countries of residence.10 This is the framework in which the COCM operates also in Bucharest; however, we will see that few of these statements are being fulfilled in the case of the CCCB. The work of the COCM in Bucharest started in the summer of 1995. They sent a so called short-term mission group which included a certain Mr Wang.11 He had just graduated from the Moody Bible Institute (USA), and was invited by the 9 COCM Link, March and April, 2004. The COCM Link is a bi-monthly publication “reporting on the work among Chinese in the UK and Europe”. 10 http://www.cocm.org.uk/ourmission/statement.html 11 For privacy reasons all personal names related to CCCB are fictive.
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COCM to join the short term mission in Romania. What Mr Wang saw by that time were the Chinese “suffering by the local people, absolutely lacking the knowledge of the gospel.” Mr Wang knew with certainty that “it was only Jesus Christ who could give them the peace they longed for so much.”12 After this experience Mr Wang went to England where he completed a one year training course of the COCM.13 In 1998 when he visited the Romanian Chinese they confronted him with a sentence: “we have nobody to help us”. From this point on Mr Wang knew that he had a call for Romania. After some more short-term missions and already conducted baptisms, the establishing ceremony of the church was on the 9th of April 2000, on which day those present in the church still prayed that the official papers would be approved by the Romanian government, so that they may be registered as a daughter-church of the Biserica Baptista “Betania.”14 The church started with about one hundred members. Most of the members were converted during the many short term missions of the previous years. The short term mission strategy continued also from 2000 on. There were yearly four to six teams doing evangelisation work in Bucharest. In 2002 there have been already some misunderstandings between Mr Wang and the missionary organisation. Finally, because of “committing a sin”, he was excommunicated by the COCM. With this event the possibility of forming a second Chinese Christian Community arose. He was the first and the last church leader who used to live in Bucharest. Since his departure the COCM appointed two, so called itinerary missionaries, who on regular basis visit the congregation and do ministry among the people. One of them is responsible for the congregation, being called the minister of the congregation.15 The actual minister of the community spends each month ten days (two Sundays) in the midst of the people, being the minister of a Chinese church in England as well. However the COCM propagates self-supporting groups in its Mission Statement, we can conclude that the actual power-structure of the CCCB is determined by the COCM. This dependency of the CCCB on the COCM manifests itself also in the identity formation of the community.
12
1st interview with Mr Wang in August 2004. This was the “Europe Pastoral Work Diploma Course”. 14 Kuang Ye Lu, 03–07–2000. 15 It is remarkable that the actual minister is called Mushi (minister) while the previous one used the title: Laoshi (teacher). 13
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dorottya nagy Circumstantial Elements: Membership in the CCCB
One of the significances of the short-term missions was to discover those who were already Christians among the Chinese in Bucharest. They were not many in number but enough to start a fellowship for them.16 There were quite many people from Zhejiang province who have heard about Christianity. In Zhejiang province Christianity is flourishing.17 There is a smaller group form Fujian province as well and there are several coming from other parts of China. In the Romanian context the church members are socio-economically homogeneous. 95% of the congregation is made up by so-called smalltraders. They opened small shops on a big open market where they sell their goods imported from China. Most of them had already tried their luck as small-traders in China. The majority of the group does not have higher education. Yet the role of the high educated in the CCCB can be observed as distinguished, but in fact they are all sharing the same life-experience. They must work hard. Most of them have an upside down bio-rhythm. They usually get up at 4 a.m. in order to go to the Piata Europa, which opens at 5 a.m. They close their small boutiques about 3 or 4 p.m. After that they still have to take their goods to a safer place. Some of them have a second shop, somewhere in the city which they keep open till late in the evening. “They just fell in their beds and wake up the next day, and go on again in their work”, the minister said. There are quite many young people, in their twenties, who went to Romania to try their luck there. The presence of couples is characteristic for the community. Yet it is remarkable that many of them have their child(ren) back home in China. Those young couples who decide to get a baby while working in Romania, after few months send their child back to China. This attitude underlines once again the short-time planning of the migrants. In most cases they do not know whether they will settle in Romania or not, but “for the time being it is better for our child to be in China”— said a lady. Women and men are almost equally present in the CCCB. 16
Mr. Wang mentioned about ten persons, the minister talked about more. Both Protestant and Roman Catholic communities are growing in this province. None of the interviewed CCCB migrants affirmed any former belonging to a Roman Catholic community in China. 17
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Yearly there are two to three baptism services. The number of those who were in the last five years baptised varies from five to ten. After the baptism, one becomes a full member of the church. Language in the CCCB The church service and the activities use Mandarin as lingua franca. We met only one person who had big difficulties with speaking Mandarin. He was a Hakka and became Christian in China. The members of the church do use their native language as well. It happened that when there were only Wenzhou people present on an activity, they sang their songs in Wenzhounese. For the missionaries who are mainly coming from Cantonese speaking communities, using Mandarin is not always the easiest. Some of the members complained about that. This is firstly the case with those doing shortterm mission. Locus of the Church In the beginning the gatherings of the Chinese Christians in Bucharest were comparable with house-church gatherings. From the church newspaper we learn that the different activities were held in the home of some of the members. From 2002 the activities are no longer held in homes, but they are either organised in the Baptist church which they hire or in the Church Centre ( Jiao Hui Zhong Xin). The actual minister tried to give an explanation for this change. They try to keep the activities open. The criminality among the Chinese in Bucharest rose in the last years. They don’t trust everyone. Their addresses are known only among few. It happened that while some of them were working in the market somebody robbed their home. In the last years they became very cautious. The church centre is located in the district where most Chinese live. It is convenient for them to go in. Some of them go there daily. They rented an ordinary apartment. One of the co-workers lives there and takes care of the centre. It is comparable with an open house. The Sunday services are held in a Baptist Church located quite much in the centre of Bucharest. Probably this is the only occasion when most of these Chinese are seen in the centre.
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dorottya nagy Organisational Facets: Structure of the CCCB
One might expect that in such a non-denominational community we might discover the so called congregationalism, which stresses the independency of the local community, as a congregation and which motivates its members for voluntary participation thereby giving birth to a so called lay-centred community.18 In our case next to the minister (mushi) there are the so called, co-workers (tong kong). Each of them has an appointed task, e.g. responsible for the church music, responsibility for the finances, responsibility for the Bible study groups, etc. Among the tong kong there is no sexual discrimination. Till this point the structure might match the above mentioned congregational model. Inside the CCCB, however, the co-workers never take decisions on their own. They do fulfil the task they are in charge of and they might even take initiatives,19 but this must be discussed in the presence of the mushi. From the ministers’ point of view, the problem is that the co-workers are not mature Christians and in many cases one might talk about “co-fighters” rather than co-workers.20 That is the reason they decided to introduce the term and the status of the co-worker in contrast to the more common term: ‘elders’. The minister explained this decision by giving some examples. During a Sunday service he asked whether there are persons in the church who read their Bibles every day in the previous week. There were no such persons. After some more questions it turned out that there were three persons in the church who read their Bibles in the previous two days. According to the minister one can talk about a permanent decadency of their spiritual life. He mentioned that on Sundays when the co-workers preach, the number of the churchgoers diminishes.21
18 More about the idea of congregationalism and de facto congregationalism in R. Stephen Werner, ‘The Place of the Congregation in the American Religious Configuration’ in James P. Wind and James W. Lewis (eds), American Congreagtions, (Chicago: University Press of Chicago, 1994), pp. 54–99. Fenggang Yang, Helen Rose Ebaugh, ‘Transformations in New Immigrant Religions and Their Global Implications’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Apr. 2001), pp. 269–288. 19 E.g. some of them would like to have their own Chinese church building in Bucharest. 20 2nd interview with the actual minister of the CCCB. 21 In spite of the argumentation similar hierarchical terminology can be observed in other Chinese migrant communities as well.
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We might conclude that the CCCB has a quasi-congregationalist structure, but in reality it might be more identifiable with the structures of the local so-called historical Protestant churches,22 where the role of the elders manifests itself more at the organisational level than at the spiritual level. Why a Church? The fact that the Chinese Christians identify themselves as the ‘Lomania hua ren Jitu jiao hui’ was not an issue on which they had to debate. The terms were already in use all over the world by other overseas Chinese Christian communities. The CCCB followed this practice and did not question the relevance of her name. We should not search for deep ecclesiological factors behind the scene. Yet her name seems to confirm the 4th point of the Mission Statement of the COCM. By following the tradition of adopting the name ‘Jitu jiao hui’ the CCCB entered the network of what social scientists call transnational religion. At this point we do not enter the debate in clarifying what transnationalism really means. Instead, we use the term “INTER-national” where social scientists apply the term “transnational”. The inter-nationality of Christianity is not a modern phenomenon. It already exists for almost two millennia. Specifying this INTER-nationality, the Chinese Christians in Bucharest identify themselves with the ‘Hua ren jitu jiao hui’, gaining access in this way to a specific network of the same international religion and becoming a member, an element of the “Universal Church”. The name CCCB itself points to the fact that this immigrant community does not overemphasize the ethnic identity. The church with her organized character once again becomes an important element of an existing INTER-national network. However the question still remains: will the church as such operate INTER-nationally or will the INTER-national character of the church be sustained only by the migrants, the actual members of the church?
22 In Romania the Reformed, Lutheran and Unitarian churches are known under the name historical Protestant churches to distinguish them form other, new Protestant churches, such as Baptists, Pentecostals, Adventists, etc. The parallel might be made only on the level of the structure and not on liturgical, etc. levels.
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dorottya nagy Ecclesiology in the CCCB
At the official opening ceremony of the church the public was faced with an already well-developed church structure which points to a conscious church building program. This systematic planning can be seen in the church newspapers announcing the different weekly activities. Observing the genre of the activities we can conclude that the basic elements23 of church building were present: pastoral counselling, spiritual activities, liturgy, preaching, and social service.24 This leads us to ask the question: given these details can we already talk about the ecclesiology of the CCCB? Can we claim that by adopting a quasi-congregational form the CCCB has a clear theology of the ecclesia as well? The only written document of the CCCB is the above mentioned, irregularly issued church newspaper. In those texts we could not find any trace of officially accepted theological assumptions, thus also not about the church. We can only construct ‘our’ theology of their ecclesia, church. This is why we prefer to talk about ecclesiology in the CCCB. From the many interviews it became obvious that the CCCB follows the ideas of the COCM about being a church. This might be seen as a paradox. Officially the name of the church is: ‘Lomania hua ren jitu jiao hui’. There is nothing which points to a direct link between the CCCB and the COCM. Moreover, the community which calls herself vague enough “Christian” is affiliated with a denominational church. The Baptist church already represents a religious minority in contrast with the Romanian Orthodox church. But also within the Protestant circles in Romania the Baptists are considered newcomers. Is this coincidence or was this a conscious decision made by the two partners? The COCM, and respectively the CCCB have minimal knowledge about the Romanian Orthodox church. This lack of knowledge makes many CCCB members condemn the Romanian Orthodox church as being heretic. The COCM has links with Baptists all around the world. It was the most convenient step to
23 When defining the basic elements of a church one might make different lists. In our division we follow J.A. van der Ven, but where he talks about catechism we extend this to spiritual activities. For more details see: J.A. van der Ven, Ecclesiologie in context (Kampen: Kok, 1993) (in English translation: J.A. van der Ven, Ecclesiology in context, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996). 24 All issues of Kuang Ye Lu contain such an activity list.
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start negotiations with them.25 We might conclude that already from the very beginning the CCCB was made to be INTER-national in several levels. At this point they are becoming attached to a so called evangelical circuit.26 In the following we will introduce the five basic ecclesiological elements of the CCCB. Pastoral Counselling Inside the CCCB the pastoral counselling is carried out by the minister and by those who are becoming “mature in faith”. The basis of pastoral counselling is trust. In traditional quasi-congregational settings it is the minister who goes and visits the members of the ecclesia. Most of the counselling happens in the homes of the members. In the case of the CCCB this might not work. In many cases the minister does not know the exact address of their homes; they are registered in the church with the numbers of their boutique at the Piata Europa. Yet in order to fulfil this basic need, the actual minister decided to invite the members to his home.27 In this way he tries to build up a sort of trust-relationship which is so necessary in a church. Spiritual Activities Under the spiritual activities we may talk about the Bible studies organized for women, for men and women together, prayer groups, meetings for the youth, catechism and prayer meetings. Comparing the activities of the first years with the present situation we can see that the number of activities diminished. In the beginning every day there was something organised. At the moment there are three activities during the week. According to the interviewees this can be explained with the fact that they do not have a full-time minister. However, for each activity we can find a responsible co-worker. 25 Mr. Wang informed me that first they tried to affiliate with the British Church, Resurrection (Anglican) Church in Bucharest, but there they didn’t achieve the results they wanted. The search for a local evangelical community is in direct line with the Mission Statement of the COCM. 26 The limitations of this paper do not allow us to give detailed comments on our use of the terminology. 27 The COCM provided an apartment for the COCM staff members, so that they might stay there when being in Bucharest.
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During these activities we could observe the theologising activities of the members. It is during these meetings they translate the Christian message into their own context. It is during these meetings we can detect the INTER-national links with other Christians around the world. One of the members for example propagated a method to improve Bible knowledge he experienced in an evangelical church in Chile. He expressed his pity that in the CCCB the knowledge of the Bible is so low that the one who quotes something, has to mention the page on which one can find the text. Liturgy The CCCB does not follow a high liturgy during the services. This is an element which underlines the non-denominational aspect of the church. Instead, the liturgy is a type that is common in free- and neo-Protestant churches. Two elements can be distinguished during the service: a praise section and the preaching, followed by prayer, some songs and blessing. This pattern makes the new comers feel at ease. Those who join the CCCB as Christians most probably had a similar liturgical experience in one of the Chinese Christian Churches in Europe or in China as well. The CCCB has a choir. They practice every Saturday. The members of the choir consider their singing a precious and important service. It is remarkable that they use a high percentage of Chinese Christian hymns. However, the translated Western hymns are sung as well. The hymns originally written in Chinese constitute a part of the primary source in detecting the theology of the community.28 Theologically there is much to say about such a liturgy. The role of the sacraments, the person of the minister, etc constitute a debatable theological issue, yet the aim of this paper does not allow us to explore such theological debates. Preaching The sermons focus on the practical life of the Christians. In many cases they tend to be moralising. During the sermons we can observe the theology of the one who preaches but also that this theology does not always coincide with the theology/theologies of the members. 28
See also footnote 29.
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Social Service During the time Mr. Wang was in the congregation, there was much accent put on social service. The CCCB organised language courses for the members to learn Romanian and English. They also provided help in regulating their official papers, etc. The actual minister thinks that the congregation should offer social service for the locals as well. At the moment we cannot see a structured social service in the CCCB. Missiological Aspects Doctrines During the very first interview with the actual minister of the community I was told that the believers are immature. They do not have deep knowledge of the Bible and they do not work hard to grow in their faith either. But what does the COCM do in order to teach Christianity to the members of the CCCB? Before the members might receive baptism they must follow the classes of catechism. For the catechism the COCM workers use a workbook translated from English to Chinese: ‘You and Your God’. This is a booklet which tries to explore the basic teachings of Christianity in six lessons. Most of the written text is Bible quotation. We could follow one such course conducted by one of the COCM missionaries. Because of a lack of time she decided to reduce the number of the sessions from six to three. After the course the candidates had a sort of exam with the minister of the congregation, who has the right to say no, when he thinks that the candidate is not yet prepared for baptism. Before they are baptised the candidates give their own testimonies. Some such testimonies are published in the Kuang Ye Lu. In most cases those who are baptised emphasize the peace they received and the happiness they experienced because of knowing God. From the testimonies we can conclude that Christianity for most of the Chinese in Bucharest is first of all a practical paradigm which helps them in conducting their lives in Romania. The INTER-national connections with their relatives and friends in China and elsewhere in the world, have also an influence on their belief. They receive regularly news from home about fashionable Christian trends. During the summer of 2004 we could observe for example, the strong
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influence of Xiao Min.29 The community uses many of her songs. The short term mission team used a DVD made about her life to encourage the sisters and brothers in Bucharest. One could observe how much those pictures influenced the behaviour of some of the members for the next couple of weeks. For example, we could see how sisters and brothers tried to imitate the way of prayer they have seen in the congregations Xiao Min visited. The members of the CCCB are not fixed to deep Christian doctrines; their spirituality can be influenced easily. Many different kinds of theologies might grow out from the CCCB but the COCM attempts to control these theologies. We might conclude that the CCCB contextualizes theologies, but we cannot talk about a theology of the CCCB. Missionary Outreach We can state that in evangelical understanding personal conversion is the essence of the missionary activities.30 “Saving souls for Christ”, might echo some of the mottos of the 19th century mission movements. Accentuating the personal conversion the missionaries draw the attention absolutely to the individual. It is a matter of life and death for the person they speak to, but it has nothing to do with the rest. When Christian identity is fundamentally a matter of an individual’s relationship with God, through Jesus Christ as his/her Saviour, it is difficult to understand the church in communal terms. Yet this was the aim of the many short-term mission groups. We could see in their way of doing evangelism. They visited the Chinese in the Piata Europa, they addressed them personally. They applied evangelisation methods developed by westerners and they did not realise that in most cases such methods have no relevance for Chinese.
29 Xiao Min became a leading personality in the Chinese Christianity in the last few years. She grew up in a little village in Henan. After she had converted to Christianity, she received the gift of singing songs for God. Because she had never studied music, there are musicians who, after recording her songs, put down the notes and the texts of each song. Her songs are known as the Canaan Hymns. The purpose of the article does not allow us to spend more time with Xiao Min’s influence on the community in Bucharest. 30 We use the term evangelical connected with the Mission Statement of the COCM.
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It took some time before the Chinese Christian Community could become a sort of “unit” (dan wei), which might have the potential of replacing the traditional extended family.31 Through this unit the individual can define her/his identity. The principle, adopted by the COCM as well, that Chinese Christians should evangelise other Chinese is not a new discovery. Already in 1844 Karl Gützlaff applied this idea when setting up the Chinese Union,32 an evangelistic organisation. His original principle was that the evangelising work of the Chinese Christians should be supervised by foreign missionaries. At a conceptual level, the emphasis on Chinese evangelistic agency has shown that the spread of Christianity is largely a Chinese matter. The COCM practices this principle by appointing its own missionaries as supervisors for the locals. But is there anything to be supervised? Are the local Christians eager to evangelise? In July 2004 there was a short-term mission group from Hong Kong. They were trying to teach evangelising techniques to the locals. They brought all kind of tools, which might ease the difficulties in talking about Christ for a non-Christian. These tools had absolutely no relevance in the context of the Chinese in Bucharest. The magic cube, the five colours, the magic rope were considered childish, not serious enough to approach a person. While the short term mission was operating in the Piata Europa, each day a local Christian was in charge to go with them, to participate in their work. We could observe that those people in charge took care of the team, but when it came to evangelise, they disappeared. From interviews we could learn about the reason why the local Christians are not eager to witness. By pushing them to be converted, they are expected to change their lives. In some cases this might directly mean to go home to China (e.g. if they are illegally in Romania). There is a huge conflict between what they believe and confess and the way they continue to conduct their lives. If they want to go on with their business, they also must go on with being the element of a corrupt bureaucratic system. The Christian sisters and brothers have not too much respect for each other in matters 31 About the concept of the “unit” read more in Kim Kwong Chan and Tetsunao Yamamori, Holistic Entrepreneurs in China, (Pasadena: William Carey International University Press, 2002). 32 Jessie G. Lutz and Rolland Ray Lutz, ‘Karl Gützlaff ’s Approach to Indigenization: The Chinese Union’ in Daniel, H. Bays (ed.), Christianity in China: from the Eighteenth Century to the Present, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 269–91.
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of belief. This element paralyses the evangelisation élan known from other new congregations. We cannot see a spectacular church growth. Yet those who become Christians in most cases become stabile members of the church. The sermons and all the weekly activities challenge the believers to respond to God by sharing their faith with others. By “others” the preachers first of all understand other Chinese living and working in Bucharest. The Role of The CCCB in the Local Context Beside the Baptist Church she is affiliated with, the CCCB has no official contacts with other local churches. There have been several attempts to bring her in touch with local churches and organisations. But these attempts, after having an initial meeting were not developed further. The Lutheran Church in Bucharest as well as the Asociatia Ecumenica a Bisericilor din Romania (Ecumenical Association of Churches in Romania) were open to begin a partnership with the CCCB. Local churches do not know about the existence of the CCCB. The above mentioned two instances about the CCCB. We are made known through persons who were conducting research in the CCCB. Neither does the CCCB propagate herself in the Chinese local newspaper: Ziarul Chinezilor din Romania, Lomania huren bao zhi. It is inappropriate to mention the activities of the short-term missions as they are sent by the COCM and not organised by the CCCB. Yet through these teams the local Chinese can learn about the existence of the CCCB. During the summer of 2004 we could observe that the shortterm mission group next to the fact that it did not attract too many non-Christians to the CCCB, (due to their evangelising methods), it did not present an attractive image inside the CCCB either.33 The role of the CCCB in the local context can be measured through the activities of the church members but we can rarely speak about the role of the CCCB as such in the local context. This might underline once again the result of some misused evangelising methods. On a more discreet way, the church members do call for prayer for the Romanian government, for the spiritual wellbeing of the locals, etc. This can be seen as a manifestation of being aware of one’s own 33 There were conflicts within the team, and also between the team and the CCCB.
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context. Yet their concrete knowledge about Romania remains limited. The local Chinese newspaper is their only access to news, also to actual news on the Romanian social, economic or political situation. All in all these examples show that the mission statement of the COCM, which should be translated into the context of the CCCB remains a goal and it could not become true in the first years of the Chinese ecclesiogenesis in Bucharest. Conclusion After opening a window on the ecclesiogenesis of a new migrant church we could see how much a global religious organisation, the COCM, shaped and continues to shape the religious experience and the theologising of the Chinese migrants in Bucharest. On their turn, the members of the CCCB show a high potential and ability of recreating the global Christianity by making it local. Once having a localised Christianity, the phenomenon of moving beyond the context pops up again, leading us to the conclusion that inside the CCCB we can discover a theologising simultaneity. Listening to the members we can see that a strong attempt to contextualise theology is still present. The danger of outside missionary organisations prescribing to the local migrant communities how to believe and what to believe is present as well. Here one should not think that it would be preferable to alter basic Christian doctrines just to place the respective community better in her context. The danger of the issue lays in the fact that migrant communities, because of the tutoring missionary agencies, will not feel the need and necessity to compose their own, local and beyond-local theology. The very low language competence of the CCCB members in Romanian, English or any other European language limits the attempts to contextualise theology in an empirical way. In this article we argued that the CCCB in the process of institutionalising borrows several elements of a congregational structure. Yet the available data makes us conclude that the CCCB does not have a congregationalist structure. Non-contextual missionary organisations propagate a certain ecclesiological model. The belief that such a model should be adoptable each and every time they start a new community endangers the ability of the locals (migrants) to contextualise theology. Consequently both the models of the missionary outreach and the formation of
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the new communities will become handicapped. This results in fatal mistakes in trying to propagate church-growth. Migrant communities and migrant churches are very much influenced by some globally active missionary organisations. Yet the outreach methods of these are not effective. In many cases the methods such missionary organisations work with are developed for migrant churches situated, in what we call, Western countries. The situation of the migrant churches in Central and Eastern Europe differs from their Western parallels. In the missiological debate on Chinese Christian migrants, two missiological trends had been described:34 local Christian communities/churches might see the mission opportunities among the migrants and on their turn the migrants might become missionaries for the locals. Such a statement has no relevance for the CCCB and as demonstrated above it can not have relevance for any first-generation (im)migrant community. In contrast with such local focused links the case of the CCCB points to the fact that international networks are preferred to local cooperation. In such circumstances it is not relevant to talk about a common missionary vocation of the Romanian mainline churches and the CCCB. In the issue of the ‘local churches’, the Mission Statement of the COCM and the achieved reality contradicts itself. Missiologically, the non-contextualised character of the CCCB hinders the contacts between the CCCB and the local churches.
34 Enoch Wan, ‘Mission among the Chinese Diaspora: A Case Study of migration and Mission’, Missiology: An International Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 ( Jan., 2003), pp. 35–43.
SEARCHING FOR A NICHE, CREOLIZING RELIGIOUS TRADITION: NEGOTIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF ETHNICITY AMONG CHINESE IN JAMAICA1 Yoshiko Shibata Kobe University, Japan Changing Chinese: Research Scope2 In 2004 Chinese in Jamaica celebrated the 150th anniversary of their arrival.3 They held more events and performances than usual to remember and commemorate their ancestral heritage, toils and great contributions to local society, not only economically but also culturally. Their self-confidence as Chinese seems to have been variously witnessed. They also gave special lectures to general public including school children, a seminar on religion and established a small museum of their own for the first time in their 150 year local history. All annual events and celebrations such as Chinese New Year, Gah San (Hakkabased ancestral ritual, also called Ching Ming in Cantonese) just after Easter, Chinese picnic in summer and China Day Garden Party in autumn, also exhibited extra elaboration for this anniversary. These
1 This research on Chinese in Jamaica, largely funded by the Japanese government, is based primarily on my fieldwork, in 1991, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 (the last visit was February), although my initial research started in 1978. For the research starting from 2004 (till March 2008), I owe the Japan Society for the promotion of science for the funding with The Grant-in-Aid No. 16310162. My research on the reconstruction of ethnicity of Asians in the Caribbean, mainly Chinese and (East) Indians, is related to creolization and globalization, or ‘glocalization.’ I must thank all those Chinese I met and interviewed for their valuable information. 2 I dealt with the new situation where local Chinese have encountered, become very aware of the increasing influx of Chinese from China, who have become visible, with an emphasis on their differences. They began to have some relationships and interactions with New Chinese, but not without difficulty (Shibata 2003). 3 Apart from their year-long celebration, they made sure the media would have articles and special features, at least on their annual and special events related to this anniversary. They could manage to push the government to issue special postal stamps as an official recognition and appreciation.
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reflected in fact their renewed awareness of both being Chinese diaspora and having become proud citizens of a settled country with supposedly rich ethnic culture. Over the years, through many difficulties and prejudices, they have gone through considerable changes and even loss of some ancestral heritage. Traditional religious beliefs and practices, among other things, have largely died away. The majority are now proud Christians, absorbing the mainstream principles and criteria of local society. Those Chinese who settled and adopted Jamaican life-styles have become Creole Chinese or Chinese Creoles. In this sense, a popular image that Chinese are well integrated into society is appropriate. At least so it appears. This, however, does not mean religious pluralism has disappeared from the Chinese community, or in the wider Jamaican society. Since their first encounter and due to unequal power relations, Chinese were obliged to be subjected to the norms of the dominant establishment, but they could be left alone as long as they did not cross lawful boundaries. They thus found their own space and time not only for expressing ethnic traditions but also altering them according to new situations and even creating something new. There are some Chinese, including outstanding Christians, who have not abandoned their special closeness for ancestors, for instance, if not worshipping them. This remnant of beloved ancestors might have influenced their identity and spirituality albeit not professed outwardly. Some have retained traditional religious ideas and ways they may be unconscious of and may not even articulate. Some others on the other hand have become very aware of their Chinese-ness and try to seek for its appropriate space while nurturing their Christian commitment. Their realization of rapid disappearance of memories of past generations has recently been sensitized again with this anniversary. This has even energized incentives of local leadership to re-configure their desirable self-images as Chinese in Jamaica. The anniversary was only the last among big momentums to direct their orientation as an ethnic community. With considerable achievements in society, especially economically, their contemporary focus has shifted more to cultural revitalization, if not restoration, which was previously forborne for the sake of integration and assimilation as a visible ethnic minority. Chinese ethnicity in Jamaica has been formed and transformed in relation not only to other ethnic groups but also within itself, including
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overseas diaspora communities. Contemporary Chinese community is far from its seemingly monolithic stereotypes. Changes have been indispensable for the survival of the community and each individual. Length of settlement, generation, class, occupation, education, language, gender, marriage (especially intermarriage) and mixed race offspring, and religion are most crucial factors that contribute to their changing ethnicity. All such are inter-related and often inseparable, and focussing religion will show this aspect well. Chinese recent initiatives in accommodating ancestral traditions to adopted religious faith, or vice versa, are good examples to illustrate how they negotiate with their ethnic identity and Christian traditions of the settled society. This has become even more important to consider since the new introduction of Chinese from China has become conspicuous. Some have recently tried to revive certain aspects of ‘Chinese spirituality.’4 They have re-examined the deteriorated situation of the Chinese Cemetery and began to refurbish each identified tombs. They thereby aim to restore the whole place to a respectable sacred ground it used to enjoy. This project is very important because the Cemetery is the very place to perform Gah San, to relate directly with their ancestors. They have even re-set its stage as a collective ceremony, showing respectability. I will examine some of the key changes related to the Chinese Cemetery and Gah San, which illustrates how Chinese ethnicity and religion is still interlocked. It also presents how religious pluralism is at work both in the wider society and within the Chinese community, negotiated through ethnic dynamics. Academic research on Chinese West Indians has been limited both in volume and in breadth including those in Jamaica. Since Christianity
4 A seminar was held on this theme in connection with the 150th anniversary of the arrival of Chinese in Jamaica presented by the Centre for Caribbean Spirituality and Interfaith Dialogue, St. Michael’s Theological College in Kingston on April 3rd, 2004, titled “Caribbean Spirituality: The Contribution of Chinese ReligioCultural & Spiritual Experience.” The principal organizer was Franciscan Sister Grace Yap, herself local born Chinese, who also became very conscious and evoked by the coming celebration of the 150 years presence and contribution of Chinese. The seminar consisted of three sessions. The first was ‘The Coming of the Chinese to the West Indies: Living the Heritage in a New Homeland.’ The second was ‘Chinese Religio-Cultural and Spiritual Experience: Possible Linkages with Christianity.’ The last was ‘Chinese Contribution Towards the development of a [sic] Caribbean Spirituality: Faith in Action.’
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was embraced without many problems, their religious aspects have little been problematized, bracketed within unanimous ‘Christian.’ Aspects of their religious life, especially traditional ones and their changes, are little known. The present essay is a small contribution to this lacking area. Changing Religious Traditions among Chinese and Their Plurality Jamaica is a multi-racial/ethnic country, but over 90% are Black (African). The next largest group is Mixed Race or Coloured (the majority of whom stem from Black and White unions, with infinite shades of colour and features), occupying more than 7% of the population. The rest are branded as ‘minorities’: (East) Indians 1.3%, Chinese only 0.2%, Europeans 0.2%, Syrian-Lebanese 0.1%, and others 0.1% (according to the 1991 census). Chinese therefore have remained a very small minority in a predominantly ‘Black’ society.5 Jamaica is also a multi-religious country, but again over 90% are Christian. However, we must remember how plural its Christianity has been with almost every denomination and sect. Spain was the first to colonize Jamaica since 1494, hence Catholicism came first, but Protestant churches proliferated since Britain took over in 1655. Many of them however developed their own styles and expressions, distinguished from Euro-American originals. In addition, numerous native churches and syncretism of various types sprang since creolization of African slaves. Rastafari movement is the last nativistic movement which uses the Bible as canon but incorporates any other possible elements for their convenience. Such diversity became even more colourful with continual introduction of other ethnic minorities, especially Indians and Chinese. A great majority of Indians were Hindus but a small number were Muslims and Christians. ‘Hosay’ or ‘Hussay’ is the most known religiocultural ‘festival’ whose original styles and meanings have changed considerably to the extent it has lost much of Muslim elements but been transformed into more Creole Indian style. Chinese came first as indentured labourers for sugar plantations in 1854, predominantly Hakka speakers from Guangdong province 5
Needless to say, the ‘number game’ has remained controversial in various ways.
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(Cuangtong in Cantonese) in southeast China. Their traditional religion was basically categorized as ancestor worship: therefore Gah San was the core of their traditional ritual. Because the majority were single men, some of those who stayed on after the expiration of the contract started to take local women, i.e. Blacks or Coloured, hence Christian influence came in. Those mixed race children would be called ‘Half Chinese,’ ‘Chiney Dougla,’6 and ‘Eleven O’clock.’7 Chinese used to call them ‘Ship Yit Diam’8 (literally ‘ten-one-point/clock, or ‘native’, hence ‘local’), and ‘Ban Rao Shee’ (meaning ‘half brain’).9 All suggest their inferior and degraded positions in both communities. With maternal influences and those of the establishment, nevertheless, they usually became Christianized and functioned as the initiators for integration to the mainstream culture. Those who could find Chinese wives either within a local society or from ‘home’ in China would continue their traditions but with inevitable changes. It was a long custom for children born overseas to be sent back to China to be educated in language and culture and possibly find a spouse.10 Early Chinese also brought a popular hero worship in Kuangung, a deified brave person of a Chinese legend. They built his ‘temple’ on the top floor of the high-storied original building of the Chinese Benevolent Association (CBA), the umbrella organization for the entire Chinese community, in the heart of Chinatown in downtown Kingston, the capital. The temple is still there with a very colourful altar and the very statue with many other ritual paraphernalia including incense, charms, and pots and bamboo sticks for divination and fortune-telling, etc.
6 ‘Dougla’ is a derogatory term used by East Indians meaning ‘outcaste’ and ‘bastard out of miscegenation.’ East Indians detested inter-racial/inter-ethnic sexual relationships and marriage and referred to mixed races, especially with Blacks (Africans) with scorn. 7 For a clock, twelve is full; therefore eleven is ‘not quite full.’ The expression must have come from the Chinese ‘ship yit diam,’ meaning ‘ten, one, point.’ Ten plus one equals eleven, hence eleven point. The last word ‘diam’ in Chinese pictograph means a bell to tell time, hence a clock. 8 In Chinese writing, ‘ship-yit,’ together makes a character literally meaning ‘ground’ or ‘earth,’ hence deriving the meaning ‘native’ and ‘local.’ This is naturally close to a Caribbean concept ‘Creole.’ It is important to remember that the explanation using writings is possible only by those Chinese who have enough knowledge of Chinese script. 9 This literally means ‘half, old, death,’ and from ‘half brain,’ ‘half educated.’ 10 Sons were preferred but daughters, too, were sent back. Upon returning to Jamaica, they once again would experience some difficulties in English.
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Some older generation Chinese, both men and women, still remember how they witnessed the then lively activities inside the temple, especially before Chinese New Year, when people swarmed into the bustling streets for shopping even from the countryside. Usually people tried this divination after bowing to the statue. They shook the bottle to let one of the bamboo sticks to pop out to be read usually by a CBA Secretary, based on the Chinese characters written on each stick. They might not completely believe in what was said, but consider it just as luck or omen. The hero worship was also a moderate kind of folk belief to remember the ancestral land and keep its memories alive. The temple was one of the epicentres of dispersed Chinese to recollect their roots, providing a sense of security with a direct connection with the original. However, now the entire building has been in ruin, and the whole floor for the temple is in dust and rust, hence no longer in use. As downtown became notoriously dangerous since the late 1960s, when a racist riot against Chinese spread, and especially towards the late 1970s, when Jamaica went through traumatic socio-economic crises under Michael Manley’s social democratic government, coupled with increasing violence by gangs, political or otherwise, many Chinese fled into somewhere safe, mainly joining in North American diaspora communities. With their massive flight from downtown, all such religious activities are gone. Their beliefs too seem to have disappeared, evaporated or submerged into individual imaginations or inner world. Their invisibility however may elude our easy judgement. Now the CBA headquarters is moved to uptown with more grandiose Chinese style architecture, but without the temple. The temple therefore has long been under nobody’s care. Recently the CBA leadership suggested that it had better be housed in the present decent location. They believe however it requires a special ritual to (re)move the sacred statue, hence calling a Buddhist priest from Hong Kong is necessary to get special permission from the spiritual world. Here it is important not to forget that those leaders are now respectable Christians even though they might not be ardent church-goers. Though it was not a religious organization, Chinese Freemason Society called Chee Kung Tong used to offer special ethnic religious experiences for its members since 1887. The grandmaster officiates a secret ritual in front of the altar, where the spirit is called in. Different
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from the Kuangung altar, the curtain will be open only when it is allowed, hence very exclusive. They celebrated its 110th anniversary in 1997, but its members have been rapidly declining. Those who have been active are above middle age. The office may often turn into a space for gambling11 on top of chatting and relaxing. They have ceased to function as an original fraternal society. The primary role it used to play for the Chinese community at large has become very limited and has mostly been replaced by that of the Chinese Benevolent Association and its controversial offshoot, Chinese Cultural Association. While Jamaican Chee Kung Tong has lost its past vigour, they still boast international connections with other overseas branches. It is important here again to remember a great majority of its members are Christians, or more precisely, Catholics. Some have multiple memberships of other ethnic organizations. Since Christianity has become the main religion among Chinese, one can no longer find a strict believer-cum-practitioner of the traditional ancestor worship. Nevertheless, even if they belong to Christian orthodoxies, their beliefs and practices may be different from those regular members of such churches. Their conversion to Christianity did not erase their traditions altogether, though some may be a little concerned and even be upset or afraid of such ethnic traditional beliefs and practices being stigmatized as ‘idol worship.’ Some others may not bother at all, being proud to keep Chinese-ness. It is noteworthy that a large majority are not Protestant but Catholic though the establishment is primarily Protestant. The second largest denomination in which Chinese have membership is Anglican, and small numbers can also be found among others, e.g., Moravians. However, Chinese are hardly seen among certain denominations, especially Baptists, a group which has retained a very strong connection with the Blacks and used to be called ‘the friend of Blacks’ since the beginning of their mission work. Chinese seem to be away from Pentecostal churches, too, which again have a name for lower-class Blacks. Since the majority of Chinese have risen to be well-to-do from almost a bottom and a few have gained their names among the wealthiest in the country, the class factor has become very impor-
11
Players may be anyone including New Chinese and even Blacks/Afro-Jamaicans.
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tant for them. This has also been reflected in the choice of religious affiliations. How and why Chinese turned to Christianity seemed to be basically for convenience. After they settled down, especially with marriage and births of children, they needed to have legal proofs, which could be easily issued from the Churches. Lawful recognition in civic matters had better be sought for not only for their own sake to testify their decency but also for their entire family and descendants. As Chinese were long prejudiced and looked down in the wider society, exclusivist and separatist attitudes had better be avoided if they desired to secure a proper place and position in society. If they married a local woman, she might become an introduction to Christian world. Though some Chinese did not find any need for church attendance, children became mediators. First for christening, godparents were necessary to be chosen, who would be any kind Christian neighbours. When babies grew up, they became targets for evangelization. They were invited to Sunday school, for example, which Chinese parents hardly resisted. For English language training, a connection with churches was also beneficial. Parents were too busy with work to learn official English but just got by with colloquial Creole language patois, which is far from standard English. Children went to local school where they learned English but acquired patois from friends. Through church, they could speed up mastering more standard English. Christian influences through education have been undoubtedly significant in general. Even when Chinese Public School was running up to mid 1960s, Catholic teachers were called in to teach English. After its closure, Chinese have sent children to famous Catholic schools, where they have established trustful relationships. Out of these came highly respected Chinese Fathers, priests and nuns. After new sets of Chinese came to Jamaica either from Hong Kong or Mainland China apart from Guangdong province, especially since 1980s, diversity among Chinese community has multiplied.12 This is also true with religion. Those non-Christian Chinese have not practiced any visible non-Christian religious activities which might be branded as ‘heathen.’ Therefore, they have remained invisible religiously. Many young generation newcomers who went into Free Zone
12
Shibata (2003).
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factories and rough downtown business areas may not have any particular ‘religion’ to be called but fairly secularized, if not total atheists. Belief-wise, at least, their non-Christian worldviews have hardly been noticed but remained submerged. They may keep small religious images like a miniature Buddha13 or small ritual gadgets or protections of various kinds, but these have not been exposed to the general public. On the other hand, Christianity has witnessed more changes among Chinese and found new avenues to grow, albeit with some problems. A few of Chinese nationals were already committed Protestant Christians before entering Jamaica, and they began their own gathering of prayers and praises, which has been formed into a church exclusively for Chinese. This is growing steadily but without a pastor or minister of its own.14 They have had little connection with the majority of Jamaican Christians, including Chinese, due to language barrier, they say. It is interesting to recognize that Jamaican Chinese Christians did not approach such newcomer Chinese and seem to have kept some distance from them. This remains so even after they found out about the little Christian gathering. From Jamaicanized Old Chinese, who largely embraced Catholicism, New Chinese, including the small but committed Protestant group, appear simply ‘the others,’ lacking communication tools, hence accumulating a sense of being unapproachable. The differences between these Old Chinese and New Chinese have been so widely recognized that such felt differences have often been interpreted as incongruities and credibility gaps from both sides. Therefore, building cordial relationships based on the same Christian faith on top of being same ‘Chinese’ in diaspora has not been facilitated yet. Though they look alike,15 they have not shared the same ‘Chinese-ness.’ Or
13 It is very interesting to see a beautiful golden little Buddha collected at the newly opened Chinese museum. This was either donated or temporarily hired for exhibition. Whether the original owner is an Old Chinese or New Chinese was hardly identified, but possibly from the Old Chinese community. Chinese immigration into Jamaica continued with small numbers through personal and familial connections, which have made multi-centred communication and contacts possible. 14 I have a separate article for this new Chinese church. 15 Actually even from appearance, they claim they can distinguish between Old and New Chinese. Even without speaking, which normally is the clearest marker for difference, they say they can tell the differences based on the clothes, total looks, behaviours and mannerisms, etc.
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because they look alike, the sense of Chinese-ness is felt more different, and seems to have hindered positive approaches to share ‘brotherhood’/‘sisterhood’ and cooperate for mutual upliftment. Drastic changes of Chinatown seem to tell such contradictions and disjunction in dealing with their ethnicity and religion. In addition, new initiatives have developed in recent years. Changing Chinese Cemetery: From Epicenter to Ruin, and on the Way to Magnet Field? The Chinese Cemetery used to be one of the most important epicentres for dispersed Chinese over the island. It was well known for its scale and outlook in downtown Kingston. It has remained a very conspicuous ethnic space not only because it is exclusively for Chinese but also it is located very close to another landmark Catholic Cemetery. Taking into account the fact that the majority of Chinese turned to Catholicism, the Chinese Cemetery shows very interesting aspects of Chinese ethnicity. With considerable changes within the Chinese community itself and the wider society, especially downtown surroundings, the Cemetery has changed accordingly. According to the CBA, which has been responsible for its management, the property of the Chinese Cemetery was obtained by a Chinese to be used for a Chinese burial ground. Already Chinese had settled and formed a unique growing ethnic community with accumulating wealth and increasing reputation especially as business entrepreneurs. Due to lack of funds, however, the Cemetery was not developed until 1907, left alone and became a desolate place. . . .” (CBA NEWS March 2004, p. 5) Repair was done with a fence in 1927, and within two years, a monument and a pavilion were consecrated (Ibid.).16 These are the two most important landmarks inside the Cemetery.17 16 An article in the same issue (p. 3) titled “What of the Legacy of our Forefathers to carry on? (with the Chinese title), written by ex-president of the CBA, Mr. David Wai Yan Chang, explains the controversy over the legal ownership and the right for usage, etc. It seems only a handful of leadership within the CBA know about the issue. 17 According to a Hong Kong born Chinese who has established himself in Jamaica, the pavilion is supposed to face the sea, but he is not so sure if it really does in Kingston.
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The old black and white pictures of the pavilion show how the place attracted so many Chinese. The conical concrete monument has survived without much damage, but the very tall concrete grandiose pavilion has lost its roof, perhaps by hurricanes and other natural disasters. Three Chinese characters denoted this building as a sacred pavilion ‘Yee San Teng’. Yee literally means ‘just,’ and San is mountain, the same as the one for Gah San. ‘Yee San’ together means a cemetery and ‘Teng’ is a resting place. Out of the three, however, only one in the middle, ‘San’ (mountain) has remained. These exhibit how the architecture has not been taken care of. Though the entire outlook exposes its misery, the cross on top of it has stood out, even more conspicuous without the roof. Even with this Chinese character ‘San’, the cartographical symbolism attached to the cross shows their Christian commitment at the most outstanding ethnicized space. However, understanding completely its nature of co-existence and syncretization of both ethnic non-Christian and Christian elements may not be easy. They could be taken as a camouflage for the sake of their intended integration to avoid unnecessary suspicion from the establishment. Nevertheless, the fact both Christian and non-Christian Chinese symbols occupy the equal standings, it may be appropriate to interpret their inseparable commitment. The Cemetery has exhibited visible syncretistic nature of the Jamaican Chinese since the late 1920s. Newer graves with Chinese pictographs have shown more and more Christian, or more precisely, Catholic emblems represented in the cross and images of Virgin Mary, with or without Baby Jesus. More recent epitaphs have Christian mourning expressions only in English. Despite its dominant Christian influences, however, Chinese have not deserted this memorial place as a sacred ground to communicate with their departed families and ancestors from the community. They hardly believed it as a heathen enclave where stigmatized non-Christian rituals were performed exclusively, even though they had a strong Catholic faith. Many think that very few Catholic Chinese (or Chinese Catholics) were buried in the Catholic Cemetery nearby. In a way the Chinese Cemetery has continued to function as a centripetal but multi-focal space in which to consolidate their imagined Chinese-ness. It is true that many graves have been left alone for years because of the violence and stark poverty around the Cemetery, massive outmigration, and even vandalism within the Cemetery. Quite a few
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inscribed epitaphs and numbers on the plates have already become intelligible. Some parts of the Cemetery have turned into haunts of gangsters and criminals as well as a semi-permanent den of the homeless. The disgusting smell of excretion and rotten foods and litter has been beyond description. Valuable marble-like stone was ripped from the gravestones to sell, and precious metals were dug out to transform allegedly into bullets and other dubious weapons. Many roofs from the mausoleums were stolen away. The Chinese have felt humiliated and disgusted with the disgrace not only to their ancestors but also to themselves.18 Since the CBA re-formed an orchestrated Gah San, as I will show in the next section, more and more overseas Jamaican Chinese have begun to re-visit the graves. However, identifying a particular grave in the widespread open space is undoubtedly difficult. Fortunately the CBA has kept the original record book of the Cemetery, which has played a vital role in identifying the graves, hence embodying a local Chinese history. This voluminous book also provides a channel for private recollection. Most pages were written in Chinese, and gradually English has been added. Many entries list both Chinese and English names, dates of birth and death, and original place names. Some had only English names, suggesting their origins being either non-Chinese or Half Chinese as local born Chinese gradually dropped their Chinese names.19 The book does not necessarily maintain its consistency in terms of what should be written as a public record. At times, this has made the interpretation of the writings and identification of each grave problematic. This work of identification can only be possible by genuinely dedicated persons who not only understand the language but also can spend enormous time and resource in a totally voluntary capacity. Currently only one prominent man has devoted to it, one of the expresidents of the CBA, an owner of a large pastry company.20 Those
18 However, it is unfair and misleading to condemn them for the lack of maintenance. During the ‘bad time’ of inaccessibility to the Cemetery, some families in fact gave extra money to the caretaker at the Cemetery to keep their graves clean. 19 Even though some local born Chinese remember their parents calling them by Chinese names, these Chinese names were hardly remembered with accuracy in pronunciation and writing. 20 He could continue only with the support of his family, together with the encouragement and praise from the entire community including overseas Jamaican Chinese. Jamaica’s baking industry has been much developed by Chinese.
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with vague memories of the locations of their graves, including overseas diasporas, have continuously requested his help. He has also supported the restoration of headstones with inscriptions in order to make them look respectable.21 He has digitalized all the gravesites he had already checked, and many photographs have been computerized for easier reference.22 This demanding project has made a steady progress. They want to stop the deterioration soon because to them the visible ethnic landmarks reflect the respectability of the entire Chinese community. However, the current discussions at the CBA on the renovation to build a high solid wall to ward off trespassers have found the finance too costly at the moment. The CBA nevertheless wants to gain a wider support for this big plan, providing a brief history with its symbolic significance. Without their sincere concern and interest and commitment, the project to dignify it by refurbishing would be impossible, not to mention financial support. So far, unfortunately, they have failed to obtain the unanimous acceptance that they expected. More and more bodies have recently been buried not in the Chinese Cemetery but in Dovecot, another popular burial ground for the middle class Jamaicans regardless of race, a little away from Kingston.23 If one has no family buried in the Chinese Cemetery, then the feeling towards it is naturally different from those who have connections there. It is therefore no wonder if some raised a voice to start another Gah San in Dovecot instead. For them, the Chinese Cemetery has become more of a racialized historic relic that belongs to the past. With comments from various sections of the Chinese community, the Cemetery may enhance its charm as an ethnic magnetic field if the place is refurbished.
21
Some writings have already faded away and demand very careful attention. He has spent hours even on the Gah San day to escort those with requests to their respective ancestors’ graves, to the extent that he had no time to observe the ritual! 22 Obviously, those who live far from Kingston, especially diaspora Chinese, find it very useful. They can gain access through the Internet to exact pictures, both of the previous state and the finished stage. 23 It is located near Spanish Town, the first capital of Jamaica before Britain took over in 1655.
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Changing Gah San: From Familial Ancestor Worship to Community Celebration Contemporary Gah San practiced in Jamaica is a Hakka ritual and used to be a form of ancestral worship (and importantly a few still call it so). Gah San, literally meaning ‘bride, mountain’24 in Hakka is also called Ching Ming, literally meaning ‘clean/just, bright/clear’ by Cantonese, also seasonal cleaning-up of graves.25 The difference of the expression together with the Chinese characters shows their ethnic difference, which is important to remember. Moreover, it is significant to emphasize the change of the nature of Gah San, disclosing its ambiguous definition. The ritual used to be a family-based worship at each familial grave. It is now generally performed as a collective homage to the ancestors, paying respect to those buried in the Cemetery, and for some, the entire Chinese who came to Jamaica and died there. Nevertheless, the ritual space remains an ethnic enclave. The biggest expressed ambiguity is derived obviously from Chinese conversion to Christianity. While some Chinese, both local and China born, young and old, have still used the term ‘ancestor worship,’ others will deny this aspect. The manner of explanations in fact varies according to individual religious orientation and socio-cultural positions. It is certainly a multi-semantic and multi-functional ritual, which even allows freedom of definition. Though Gah San has still remained primarily as a familial ritual, it is no longer practiced as it used to be. Due to massive emigration called ‘exodus’, particularly to North America, it ceased to be carried out for more than a decade. With many graves apparently deteriorated and abandoned, the CBA leadership felt it necessary to intervene in the situation that was becoming worse, and avoid possible virtual termination. Hence came out a decision to re-organize Gah San as a collective ceremony. This change was inevitable also because the area became so notoriously dangerous, and the Cemetery became a target for looting and a hide-away for criminals as mentioned before, exposing Chinese fear and abandonment. It is, therefore, not surprising to find so few remember how to write Gah San in Chinese and understand the meaning. Only a small 24 This expression seems to be known only among Hakka-speakers. Mandarin speakers seldom understand it. 25 It is also written to mean sweeping a grave clean.
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number of China-born elders and local Chinese who were sent back to China could remember the correct spelling and their meanings, but again with some difficulty, especially for the first word Gah. The Chinese word for Gah San consists of two pictographs. ‘Gah,’ literally meaning bride, signifies marriage, hence a permanent bond. ‘San,’ meaning mountain is associated with the geo-historical fact that their home villages in Guangdong were surrounded by hills where dead bodies were buried. The CBA made efforts to ensure that all the members share the ‘authentic’ knowledge about the ritual and its richness in symbolic meaning. They emphasize the need for collective recognition of the historical importance of the Cemetery and continuation of the tradition. They tried to raise members’ awareness, restore their ancestral memory and rekindle their ethnicity. The newsletter CBA NEWS in March 200426 put the notice of the coming Gah San in the front page as follows: Gah San The Chinese Memorial Service will take place at the Chinese Cemetery on Sunday, April 11, 2004 from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. Ceremony starts at 12:00 noon Security will be provided
It is interesting to pay attention to the shape of the notice in words, which resembles that of a monument at the Cemetery. Also it is noteworthy to recognize the expression ‘Memorial Service’ which inevitably shows a Christian influence. The CBA’s confidence in the ritual performance is given by the guaranteed security for participants. In fact, they spend a considerable amount of their budget for the police force in addition to the cleaners for the basic clearing of bushes in the 12 acre compound.27 Also important to remember is
26
It spent more than 3 pages on the Cemetery and Gah San out of the total of 8 pages. 27 In 2004, the CBA spent J$ 105,000 for clearing of bushes and J$ 33,000 for the police as the security, according to the ex-president of CBA, is still one of the most significant figures in CBA. (1$ US is around J$ 60.) But we must take into account that the annual membership fee for the CBA has remained just J$ 1,000, which is very modest for the large majority of Jamaican Chinese who belong to the middle or upper-middle class with businesses and wealth.
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the unwritten agreement and promise that cleaners are recruited from nearby lower-class communities for their cash-earning opportunities. This has been a traditional strategy to continually demonstrate their open-minded, cordial attitudes to the local communities. The date of Gah San in Jamaica is decided every year, according to the Chinese lunar calendar, which shows the exact day of the month, as it is a national holiday in China.28 However, Jamaican Gah San is not the same as the Chinese one. Since the Chinese have remained a very small minority in Jamaica, only Blacks (‘Africans’) have their commemoration such as the ‘Emancipation Day’ as a racialized public holiday. Jamaican Gah San falls around Easter, usually the first Sunday after the original Gah San. The date and other details therefore are scheduled and announced by the CBA. They used to do it twice a year, one in ‘spring’ and the other ‘autumn,’ although for a long time the ‘autumnal’ one did not take place. One of the reasons why they perform it just once around Easter may be convenience. Being a Christian country, Easter in Jamaica is a big event, though some Christians, including Chinese, no longer participate in a ‘church’ ceremony but take advantage of the long vacation. It is like Christmas in terms of family reunions and travelling in and out of the country and within.29 Therefore, it is no wonder if the attendance at Gah San may be lower than expected. In 2004, Gah San took place on East Sunday itself. The then president of the CBA confessed his negligence in not re-checking the schedule.30 The ritual was supposed to be scheduled on a date other than Easter Sunday, when many Catholic Chinese are expected to go to Mass. It turned out to be an interesting expression of their identity.31 I don’t know if there was a voice to avoid this overlap, but the date was not re-scheduled. It should not be judged as a simple ‘either/or’ choice, but if they needed to choose which of their ‘religious’ traditions to prioritize, they may have been left in a dilemma. 28 Those who have direct and strong connections with China and Chinese nationals generally keep a Chinese calendar at home and/or business place, but other local Chinese may not. 29 Some go for a special retreat reflecting their religiosity, but some other Christians may just enjoy their private time with kinsfolk and/or close friends. 30 He admits by saying, ‘It was a mistake!’ He himself is Catholic, but not so much an ardent church-goer, he said. 31 I don’t know if there was a voice to avoid this overlap, but the date was not re-scheduled.
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While it is an annual ritual, the way to do it was not standardized strictly as such. Without necessarily visiting the Cemetery, some older generations used to prepare a special table in the corner of a room,32 where they lay chopsticks, little cups for drink (usually wine) and plates of cooked food to offer for their ancestors. Others remember their parents putting incense on the table as well. Elder Chinese bowed to the table and murmur in incomprehensible language. Offering food is a highly valued Chinese tradition to pay respect. Their usual courtesy to show politeness to a guest or visitor is an invitation to their communal eating or offering food, with a greeting such as, ‘Have you eaten?’ or ‘Please join us.’33 A sense of togetherness and sharing is the key virtue to display. Setting a special table for the departed is understood to be a continuum both in space and time from the present life. They visited the Cemetery as a family event. They cleaned the graves, particularly the headstone, and graveyard, replaced withered flowers with fresh ones. They lit incense and burned imitation paper money, with or without deep bowing and prayers, and laid out cooked food and fruits in front of the headstone to be shared. Chopsticks and cups were also placed neatly. Older folks explained its purpose to invoke the ancestral spirits so that the living could feel their presence. Each family used to eat at their graves like a picnic.34 Contemporary Gah San organized by the CBA is held near the monument, beside the pavilion in the Chinese Cemetery. Some families may finalize the cleaning of their respective graves,35 place fresh flowers, light incense and burn paper money,36 besides the collective ritual. However, they no longer offer cooked food at each grave because they believe the food will be carried away or eaten at the spot with extra litter by intruders as usual. Taking the matter seriously,
32 It can be a living room, where family members usually see the table while they eat at a dining table. Togetherness seems to have been emphasized. 33 Some interviewees remember that even a stranger used to be called in to receive some food at a very humble family, to the extent their supper was fallen short of. 34 In China, the CBA explains, eating the offered food together at the grave is said to ‘bring good luck.’ 35 The size, shape and materials of tombstones, inscriptions, fences and a roof or house, etc. all differ. Usually each deceased one has one tomb, but gradually due to the decreasing space, one plot began to receive two bodies, but not more than two. 36 The CBA arranges packets of incense and paper money to sell.
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the CBA has arranged the big feast to be taken to the Chinese Home for the Aged to be shared after the ceremony. According to the CBA, the table normally includes the following; a steamed whole chicken (including the head, which is later twisted off ), hard boiled eggs cut in half lengthwise with shell attached, sliced barbecued pork (chashiu), cut roast pork with crunchy skin attached, and dim sum pastries and some fruits.37 Three sets of chopsticks and three Chinese wine cups are arranged above the food. However, local born leaders of the CBA don’t know much about the symbolic significance of each dish.38 They say they are still learning. They start by reciting a short liturgical address in Chinese. A respected person who understands the language reads it out, but there are only a few who can take this responsibility. Then the English translation follows, albeit a summary. It includes the greeting to the deceased, the reason and purpose of the ritual, and the petition for the ancestors for protection.39 The CBA representatives (usually two, the one who reads Chinese and the other who summarizes in English),40 as embodied household heads, begin by ‘bowing three times with the wine cup in hand, then pouring the wine on the ground just in front of the headstone. This procedure is usually repeated three times. . . .’ Then some members instead of each member of the family come in front of the monument instead of the headstone of a family grave and ‘bows three times with the right fist held cupped in the left hand.’ (CBA NEWS, March 2004, p. 3) Why the number three is important was not so clear. Some of the CBA members could not explain. A few believe it is a number related to mourning and death, ‘unlucky,’ or something to bring ill omen. In Christianity, on the other hand, it symbolizes the Holy Trinity, hence sacred in a way. It could be either based purely on the Chinese tradition or may have a possible association with Christian belief (or anything else). They used to set off firecrackers (‘fire-clappers’) to drive away evil spirits and announce their presence to pay homage Some leading CBA members claim roast fish may be prepared, too. The steamed chicken with soy sauce and ginger is said to be a typical Chinese dish, which is easy and quick to cook. This exemplifies a busy Chinese ingenuity. 39 It goes something like, ‘Dear our beloved ancestors, we are here to pay respect to you, showing our love. We offer you food and money to be enjoyed in the spirit world, so please protect us.’ 40 If a CBA president can read Chinese, then he summarizes it, too. 37 38
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to the departed, but many have forgotten the reason and the purpose of this custom. Fire-crackers were also used with the same reason and purpose, in the beginning of the Chinese New Year.41 It however became illegal due to the loud noise and confusion.42 Very importantly, the concluding part of the ritual is a blessing, though simple, by a Chinese Roman Catholic priest. This new introduction guarantees the possible co-existence of the two different religious practices without much contradiction. It may not lead to syncretism as such, but being Catholics, they sought out ways and means to avoid the underestimate of their Christian commitment, judged by non-Chinese Christians. One of the best possibilities could be to dilute and reduce its controversial aspect of a worship of the dead spirits to a non-religious cultural activity. Their denial of the so-called ‘idol worship’ must have pacified the commotion within non-Chinese Catholic communities. For fundamental Christians, including Chinese, however, Gah San has remained problematic. Some still mind the reminiscence of ‘paganism’, represented in the offerings of food, incense, and paper money, the Chinese formula and ritualistic bowing, etc. If those Chinese believe they can invoke the ancestral spirits, who are supposed to communicate with the living, then it should require its re-arrangement or abandonment, according to a Chinese Catholic priest who enhances and enriches his own spirituality by means of accepted ‘charismatic’ ways such as meditation, chanting, and speaking in tongue. For the majority of the Chinese Catholic laymen, nevertheless, religious pluralism or syncretism does not seem to be a big issue. They have not felt difficulties being Catholic and dealing with ethnic rituals. One layman’s comment was impressive: ‘It is those missionaries who had bias against anything which was non-European and non-Christian. But we did not have a problem. Their views needed correction.’ Can Ancestors Hear Their Prayer?: Epilogue The CBA admits that ancestor worship is the only native religion to China, hence worth remembering and keeping, if not sticking fast 41 It was either around midnight of the New Year’s Eve or very early on New Year’s Day. 42 It was one of the ways for the establishment to control and confine ethnic minorities.
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to its original form. They explain clearly in the newsletter that ‘all, including Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, were imported from outside of China.’ (CBA NEWS, March 2004, p. 3). Confucianism and Taoism, originated in China, are regarded more as philosophies than religions, and in Confucianism, ‘a form of ancestor worship is incorporated with the virtue of filial piety.’ (Ibid.) At least the CBA leadership was aware of the origin of Gah San as ancestor worship. Not a few of my informants explained using the similar expression. The dilution, syncretism, incorporating many of Christian elements, and reinterpretation, if not total erasure or even eradication, of what was internally regarded ‘original tradition’ and labelled ‘pagan’ from the Others, was crucial to their integration into the wider society. It may well be said that stressing the simplified and yet clarified moral and ethical values as respect and honour for ancestors has been colluded by their own strategy not to be excluded from the main stream Creole society. How they inform what in the newsletter as an ethnicized semipublic media suggests various important points. Their strategy to include their imagined religious traditions in the dominant Christian ethics is discrete but collusive, without confronting the establishment overtly. Belonging to Catholicism has assured their respectability in society. And yet nurturing and invigorating their religious ethnicity simultaneously while keeping orthodox Christianity has caused slight ambiguities and reservation about their complex appropriation of identities, both within the Chinese community and without. Some Jamaican Chinese Catholics have individually discovered similarities in beliefs and rituals between Catholicism and Gah San in terms of remembering, honouring and approaching the spirits of the beloved especially through prayers, meditation and ritualized behaviour as bowing down and putting the hands together. Doing these and thinking in such a way suggests their way of compartmentalization and re-definitions of elements and aspects of what they found important and yet feel uncomfortable with. They have thus created time and space, however temporal, for no outright contradictions in their spiritual quest. Although this has not been shared collectively among local Chinese, their way of avoiding simplified dichotomy and binary oppositions illustrates their firm awareness of being different but not exclusively so within the Christian world at large. Such re-marking of their boundaries within the Creole framework has stimulated kaleidoscopic
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identification among Chinese, refuelled also by multifarious encounters with different kinds of Chinese both within the national boundary and in the diaspora. Jamaican Chinese have never forgotten their marginalized position in their cultural representation. The Chinese Cemetery and Gah San seem to have questioned their ethnicity and national identity simultaneously, offering opportunities to work out their original ways of presence and representation. By re-centring the Chinese Cemetery and Gah San as their ethnic focal points, Jamaican Chinese have well illustrated an undoubted wish to obtain a more respected location in society and desire more appreciation for their uniqueness and difference among the other races. While the Chinese massive flight with wealth since the late 1960s testified their readiness to be ‘in transit,’ as Hakka, literally meaning ‘guest people,’ it is also important to acknowledge that many diaspora Chinese Jamaicans have recently returned to Jamaica as their own home, otherwise they maintain frequent communications between ‘here and there’. Their ethnicity has continually been transformed and re-structured with enforced Jamaican identity through encounters with different kinds of Chinese diasporas both within and without Jamaica. In Jamaica, the new immigrants, who come directly from China, have challenged their (Chinese Jamaicans) ethnicity which had been taken for granted. The newcomers are furthering to seek a different niche in the society they already regarded home, but not quite. Their occasional visible presence is not only striking in that they feel different from other diasporic Jamaicans, more specifically, Afro-Jamaicans, but also recognizes how Jamaican they were and had become. Questioning Chinese-ness in various ways has thus re-triggered a passionate momentum to rethink their roots and routes and ‘here and now.’ This exercise is well exemplified in the two controversial living ‘traditions,’ Chinese Cemetery and Gah San while adhering to undoubted Christian faith. References Alleyne, Mervyn (2002). The Construction and Representation of Race and Ethnicity in the Caribbean and the World. Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago: The University of the West Indies Press. Bryan, Patrick (1991). The Jamaican People, 1880–1902: Race, Class and Social Control. London & Basingstoke: Macmillan.
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—— (1996). “The Creolization of the Chinese Community in Jamaica.” In Rhoda E. Reddock (ed.), Ethnic Minorities in Caribbean Society. St. Augustine, Trinidad: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Univ. of the West Indies. pp. 173–271. Chang, Victor (ed.) (2004). The Chinese in the Caribbean. Caribbean Quarterly 50:2. Clifford, James (1994). “Diasporas,” Cultural Anthropology 9:3, pp. 302–338. Gilroy, Paul (1993). The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Horton, V.P. Oswald (1941). Chinese in the Caribbean. (30th Anniversary Publication for the Republic of China) Kingston: Published by the Author. Johnson, Howard (1979). “The Anti-Chinese Riots of 1918.” Mimeographed. Kuper, Adam (1976). Changing Jamaica. Kingston: Kingston Publishers. Lee, Easton (n.d.). “The Chinese in Jamaica: A Personal Account.” (mimeographed) Kingston. Lind, Andrew W. (1958). “Adjustment Patterns Among the Jamaican Chinese.” Social and Economic Studies 7:2 (Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica), pp. 144–164. Look Lai, Walton (1998). The Chinese in the West Indies 1806–1995, a Documentary History. Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago: The Press University of the West Indies. Shibata, Yoshiko (2003). Revisiting Chinese Hybridity: Negotiating Categories and Reconstructing Ethnicity in Contemporary Jamaica, a Preliminary Report. CDRom, Proceedings for the XI Congreso del FIEALC, Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology. Smith, M.G. (1960). Plural Societies in the British West Indies. Berkeley: University of California Press. Tortello, Rebecca (2002). “The Arrival of the Chinese.” The Gleanrer (Kingston), Sept. 1, p. A2. Local Newspaper for Chinese Chinese Cultural Association, Blue Mountain Journal (sporadically from September 2001 to August 2003). Taped Lecture Chang, Victor (1999). “Coming of Age as a ‘Chiney Man’.” Lecture series on ‘Races in the West Indies’ organized by the Institute of Caribbean Studies in the Faculty of Humanities and Education. Kingston/Mona: Radio Education Unit, the Univ. of the West Indies.
MISSIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE CHRISTIANITY IN A GLOBALIZED CONTEXT1 Kim-kwong Chan Chinese University of Hong Kong During the past two decades, China has emerged from economic obscurity with virtually no significant economic impact into the world’s third largest import and export economy entity in the year 2004.2 Globalization seems to be in flavor of China as Chinese goods are flooding the world market and China’s economic tentacles are reaching virtually every region and country in the world. In the religious areas, all religious groups in China are growing with the Christian (Protestant) community3 being the fastest. Christian community in China emerged as a tiny group in 1980 (estimated 3 million), and two decades later, mushroomed into a powerful community numbering into tens of millions.4 Concurrently, the centrality of world Christianity is shifting from the traditional Northern countries such as countries in Europe and North America to the current emerging South countries like Korea, Nigeria, and Brazil where the fastest growing Christian
1 This Chapter is a revised and updated version of the paper, same title, presented at the International Association of History of Religion (IAHR) 2005 Tokyo Conference held in March 2005. 2 Total export in 2004 is USD 1,154 billion, see “Our Country’s Foreign Trade tops USD 1,150 Billion in year 2004,” in http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2005–01–12/ 07554800658s.shtml, and import is more than USD 500 billion, see Gong Wen’s “Our Country’s Exports has, the first time, exceeded USD 1,000 billion,” in Remin Ribao [People’s Daily] (15 November 2004), in http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004–11–15/ 04444237319s.shtml. 3 This Chapter deals only with the Protestant (hereafter referred to as Christian) Community in China and the discussion on Catholic community is not included for the Catholics in China are involved with the complicated issue of Sino-Vatican diplomatic tension. 4 The current number ranges from 18 million, from Amity Foundation in Amity News Service, 2004.11/12.4 “How Many Sheep Are There in The Chinese Flock,” December 2004, www.amityfoundation.org, to 80 million by David B. Barrett, in entry of “China,” in J. Gordon Melton and Martin Baumann edited, Religions of the World: A Comprehensive Encyclopedia of Beliefs and Practices, Vol. 1: A-C (Oxford: ABCCLIO, 2002), p. 237.
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communities are found.5 The Chinese Christian community may well become one of the major centers of Christendom in this Century, as it is one of the main contributors to this global religious trend.6 If one places China’s economic-political and Christian development trends together, one can hardly ignore the possible missiological ramifications of Chinese Christians to the future development of world Christianity. Some, such as David Aikman, venture to suggest that perhaps the Christian community in China—one of the fastest growing Christian churches situated within the most significant economic entity with global ambition—may become the largest exporter of missionaries to conquer the last frontier of Christendom (popularly known as the 10/40 window7 among mission circles), namely the predominantly Islamic region stretching from Central Asia to the Middle East,8 just like its commercial counterpart has been doing with commodity goods such as shoes, refrigerators and TVs. This Chapter will first look into the growing Chinese influence in the world, followed by an assessment of the Chinese Christian community and its development. It will then speculate of possible missiological endeavor by the Chinese Christians vis-à-vis religious policy of China and other socio-political factors in a globalized context. Globalization and Chinese Influence We have witnessed the emergence of China as a major political-economic entity, the focus of today’s global attention, which has almost doubled its GDP since 1997 with a sustained growth of more than 7.5% per year continuously for more than 20 years whereas the rest of the world grew by less than half of this rate. China’s trade surplus with US increased about three times since 1997 to almost USD 150 Billion by the end of 2004. During the same period, China’s posi-
5 The largest Congregation is the Full Gospel Church in Seoul with membership of more than 750,000 as of December 2003, personal visit, December 2003. 6 Cf. Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 7 The 10/40 Window is an area of the world that contains the largest population of non-Christians in the world. The area extends from 10 degrees to 40 degrees North of the equator, and stretches from North Africa across to China, see http:// 1040window.org/main/whatis.htm. 8 See David Aikman’s Jesus in Beijing: How Christianity is Transforming China and Changing the Global Balance of Power (Washington, D.C.: Regency Publishing Inc, 2003).
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tive trade balance with EU increased from almost zero to USD 62 Billion.9 China received the largest amount of Foreign Direct Investment (USD 53.5 Billion) in the year 2004 and holds the second largest foreign reserve in the world, after Japan, with USD 483 Billion in July 2004,10 with USD 230 billion in US Treasury bond.11 Such aggregation of wealth has translated into rapid development as can easily be felt from the increased price of raw materials such as steel and aluminum in the international market as China imports in huge quantity to feed its development boom. The high oil price since the last quarter of 2004 continue till mid 2005 is also partly caused by the rapid increase of oil import by China due do the unexpected high consumption to feed the rapid economic growth;12 China has already surpassed Japan to become the second largest oil and gas consumer.13 Today China has become one of the most important economic players in the world acquiring major international firms and making headlines in international business communities.14 The presence of the China’s economic influence can easily be noticed on shelves of supermarkets and retail stores in US and other nations as increasing amount of “Made in China” goods are available, from clothing to house wares, and from electric appliances to electronic goods. Now China outpaces Japan as the second largest producer of electronic goods in the world, after USA. China is also the world’s largest producer of clothing, luggage, shoes, television sets, watches, mobile phones, and disposable lighters. The coastal provinces in China have become literally the Factory of the World manufacturing commodities for a global market. “Made in China” has already evolved from cheap household goods to quality hi-tech products. Not only Chinese goods, but also Chinese populations, are increasingly making their presence felt as the total number of Chinese in
9 Peter Gumbel, “Pack Your Bags For The Orient Express,” Time (Asia Edition) October 18 2004, pp. 46–52. 10 See “China Brief ” in FEER (21st October, 2004): 28. See also IMF national statistics, quoted in The Economist October 16, 2004, p. 93. 11 “China and Unocal,” Economist 30 June 2005, http://www.economist.com/ displayStory.cfm?story_id=4129012&tranMode=none. 12 See Mathew Forney’s “China Quest for Oil,” in Time (Asia Edition) October 25 2004, pp. 30–35. 13 Mehdi P. Amineh, “Power and Energy Supply Security,” in IIAS Newsletter # 37 ( June 2005): 6. 14 “Chinese Companies Aboard,” Economist 30 June 2005, http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_id=4127399.
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Diaspora increased from 22 million in 1985 to 33 million by the end of the last century, there is no current reliable statistic yet all agree that the number is rapidly on the rise. The majority of these new overseas Chinese are from Mainland China as China opened its door for Chinese citizens to emigrate since the early 1980s. These new Chinese migrants now live virtually in every country in the world from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, (even in People’s Democratic Republic of Korea as Chinese have substantial commercial activities in that country often off-limits to other nationalities). Many work as merchants or operate restaurants while some open factories, shops or run farms. Others are taking up infrastructure projects or industrial complexes.15 Chinese students are becoming a significant block of foreign students in major international universities, as they constitute half of all foreign students in Japanese universities and the largest single block of foreign students in universities in UK, Australia and Canada. They make up of the second largest group of foreign students in US campuses numbering 64,757 in year 2002–2003 with most of them pursuing graduate degrees.16 As an increasing number of Chinese become middle class, Chinese tourists are taking holidays in tourist hot spots such as Thailand, Singapore or Hong Kong replacing Japanese or Western tourists as the largest group of tourists to these countries or regions. In 2004 more than 23 million Chinese took trips outside of China for personal reasons.17 Since September 2004, 24 EU nations are opened up for Chinese tourists; it is anticipated there will be a flood of Chinese tourists into Europe. Finally, there are those shadowy irregular migrants from China to Europe, Japan Korea and USA about which there is no reliable data on their size; it is estimated that in Korea alone there is about 1 million irregular Chinese migrants.18 However, this group of Chinese has already made international headlines from the Golden Venture inci-
15 Limdsey Hilsum, “The Chinese in Africa,” 4 July 2005, in www.channel14.com/ news/special-reports/special-report-storypage.jsp?id=310¶StarAt=1. 16 Ronald Skeldon, “China: From Exceptional Case to Global Participant,” in Migration Information Source, (April 2004): 3. http://www.migrationinformationsource.org/Feature/print.cfm?ID=219. 17 “More than 20 million Chinese took private trips outside of China,” Epoch Times (Hong Kong Edition January 14, 2005). 18 “Short Term Mission To Korea,” 5 July 2005, www.gospelpost.com.hk/template/news_view.htm?code=mis&id=196
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dent off the coast of New York in 1993, to the tragedy of Morecambe Bay in Scotland at the beginning of 2004.19 The continuous growth in number of these irregular Chinese migrants will surely draw more attention in the international community in the days to come. Since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the international political scene changed from bi-polarity to multi-polarity with China being the emerging power challenging the leadership of the former Super-powers. Now China practically sets the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) agenda by being the largest trading partner with ASEAN nations. China initiated the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO or better known as the Shanghai Summit) in June 200120 which gradually created a special trading zone headed by China with Russia and four other Central Asian Republics bordering China. In 2004 China was invited to join the G-8 nations as a full member, which signifies her economic coming of age. China, being a permanent member of the Security Council in the UN, has effectively influenced the UN decision of using more political rather than military means in international affairs. China has also sent peacekeeping forces to many countries with the latest stationing in Haiti under the flag of the UN.21 Currently China is re-asserting itself as a significant member of the international community, be it a new ambitious empire of domination as feared by some observers22 or a peaceful stabilizing force as suggested by others.23 Either way, China is an emerging power not to be ignored. The increase of Chinese language students from other countries reflects the growing importance of Chinese language— hence China—in global political-economic activities, as many countries are sending their students to China preparing people to engage with China; the figure in 2003 suggests that the largest group is Korean (with 35,353 students in China followed by Japan with 12,765 students). Even small countries send significant number of students to China: Vietnam (3,487), Thailand (1,554), Nepal (1,199), and
19
“Tide kills 18 cockle pickers,” in BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/lancashire/3464203.stm 20 “Shanghai Summit FMs Meet in Beijing to Tackle Terrorism,” China Daily, January 7 2002. 21 “Chinese Police on Haiti UN Duty,” BBC News October 18 2004, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3751814.stm 22 See Ross Terrill’s The New Chinese Empire (New York, Basic Books, 2003). 23 Jiang Xiyuan and Xia Liping, Peaceful Rise of China (Beijing: CASS., 2004).
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Mongolia (1,060). Indonesia—which until recently banned the Chinese language—sent 2,563 students. Even Yemen sent 284 students and Kazakhstan, 215.24 As one reflects on contemporary world history, one notices the British dominated the world events in the 18th and 19th century, followed by USA in the 20th century. It is not unreasonable to speculate China may follow in the footsteps of Britain and USA in this new century—a Chinese Century. Chinese Christianity—Phenomenal Expansion The Christian community in contemporary China has a humble origin of less than a million in 1949 among 450 million Chinese, a mere 0.2% of the population, certainly a minority in a country with rich religious traditions such as Daoism and Buddhism. Many of the Christian enterprises were staffed by thousands of foreign missionaries backed by literally hundreds of mission boards representing almost the entire spectrum of Protestantism. With the formation of the People’s Republic of China which adopted a nationalistic, Communist and an anti-western policy, foreign missionaries were expelled and mission support was severed. Without these supports, almost all Church operated institutions, such as schools or hospitals, soon collapsed and was nationalized. China’s adoption of a Marxist worldview as State orthodoxy further discouraged people to embrace religion, including Christianity. Soon, the Christian populations shrank to a few elderly. By 1966, there were only a handful of Christian churches that were still functioning. During the period affected by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976), there was no public presence of Christian activity other than a Church in Beijing serving the diplomatic corps. In short, Christianity publicly ceased to exist in China and people generally thought that it had ceased to exist in China for good. China caught the world by surprise as she adopted the Reform and Open Policy since the late 1970s. The consequence of this Policy literally transformed the face of China, if not the soul. This Policy
24 Figures, see http://www.moe.gov.cn/edoas/website18/level3.jsp?tablename=1469& infoid=13754. The figure on 2004 is not available but would be at least 10% higher than the 2003 figure because foreign student enrollment in China during 2003 was affected by SARS.
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allowed Christians to be active again, though within a rigid set of constraints enforced by the Government. As Christians came out of hiding, in the early 1980s they numbered about 3 million, three times more than the Christian population in 1949 and certainly outpacing the growth rate of the general population which had just doubled since 1949. One might ask as to where all these Christians came from if there was not any public Christian activity for at least a decade. How could the Chinese Christians have preserved, and more importantly transmitted, such faith under an oppressed and unfavorable condition with virtually no socio-political resource to rely on within a multi-religious context in which Christianity is a late comer as compare to the traditional religious such as Buddhism or Daoism? This ecclesial puzzle continues to elude scholars of religious studies as the Chinese Christian community grew at a phenomenal rate during the past two decades. In the early 1990s, the official figure was from 6 to 10 million and currently the official figures are between 15 to 25 million. However, the unofficial figures range from 35 million to 80 million. Some even venture to support a high figure of more than 100 million. Even the conservative unofficial estimate of 35 to 40 million25 suggests a ten-fold increase in two decades with virtually no public proselyte campaign as such campaign would be against the law in a socialist state such as China. In public, all religious activities are restricted within designated religious venues. Therefore, one can hardly observe public manifestations of Christianity other than the usual religious symbol such as a cross at the top of a church building marking the presence of a functioning Christian community. There may perhaps be a few church run clinics, old age homes, orphanages, or social centers, etc. These Christian institutions are too few to have significant impact in the society. However, the Christian community has expanded and penetrated in all sectors of the society with adherents including prominent business people, artists, entertainers, intellectuals and even senior government officials who are not supposed to embrace religion in their status as a Communist Party member. Many receive the Christian
25 During the past 20 years, the China Christian Council printed 30 million copies of the Bible and overseas Christian groups have brought in at least 10 million copies of the Bible. There are also unknown numbers of Bibles privately printed in China. Therefore, it is suggested that the figure of 35 million errs perhaps on the conservative side.
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Faith in secret without public acknowledgement especially those who are in Government or military posts.26 Further, there is a huge section of the Christian community which has not registered with the authority, hence operating independently from the Government’s monitoring system and without public religious appearance. They may conduct meetings at private homes, factories, or some hidden places. Therefore the influence of Christianity extends far beyond the visible religious activities and memberships within the official sanctioned churches. The Christian community in China is like a mustard seed, small and almost invisible, yet its potential is far beyond the visible manifestation. The Christian communities of Chinese in Diaspora outside the Greater China Circle (such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao) are also on the increase, paralleling the growth of counterparts in Mainland China. Traditionally there are Chinese Christian communities in areas where there are large populations of Chinese such as the US, Australia, Canada, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. As more Mainland Chinese settle overseas, they are often targets of various mission agencies. The conversion rate among overseas Mainland Chinese is very high as increasing numbers of Chinese congregations, mainly for Mainland Chinese, are established in those abovementioned nations. Recently, there are records of sustainable Chinese Christian communities in countries, many with hitherto no record of a Chinese church, such as Mongolia, most nations of the former Soviet Republic, most Eastern European countries, many Polynesian nations, all EU nations, many Middle East countries, most of all South American countries, and a dozen African countries. In countries such as Italy, the Chinese Christian churches number in the dozens and they formed their own national association of Chinese churches. Chinese language seminaries/Bible schools have been established in UK, USA, Australia, Canada, Korea, Myanmar, Panama, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and South Africa to serve the growing demand of these Chinese churches in the Diaspora. With the rapid expansion of Christian community in China, the Chinese diasporic community, and Chinese diasporic Christian communities, the Chinese Christianity may have significant impact to shape the landscape of world Christendom. 26 The right of freedom of religious belief does not extend to Party members (of whom Government officials are always a part of ), military personnel, and those in law enforcement agencies.
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Chinese Church: A New Missionary Exporter? On the policy level, the Chinese Government’s policy on religion is to keep Government’s control over religious affairs in the territory of China, and to keep foreign influence out of China.27 There is no discussion, or policy, regarding the possible exportation of religion from China to other countries. Therefore, there is no Government policy regarding whether the Chinese Christian can or should proselytize in other countries for all the current policies and regulations are effective only within the boarders of China. So long as the mission activity is beyond the boarders of China, the Chinese authority has no jurisdiction, hence authority, over it. The only repercussion is the linkage between Chinese Christians while in China with foreignbased Christian groups. Regarding Chinese residing overseas, the basic policy of China on the behavior of Overseas Chinese is to urge them to be obedient to local authority and, if possible, to renounce their Chinese Citizenship and to assimilate into the host country. Even at times when the Overseas Chinese faced political persecution by local authorities, such as the recent Anti-Chinese Riot in Indonesia in 1998, where thousands of Chinese homes were burnt, hundreds of Chinese women were gang raped, and hundreds were killed with many burnt alive,28 the Chinese Government would not do anything —other than verbal protest—for they regarded any action to protect those IndonesianChinese would be an interference in internal affairs of a sovereign state such as Indonesia, a political stance which the Chinese authority has taken. Consistent with this policy, the Chinese authority would reject any foreign interference or criticism of its own treatment over its citizens. Therefore, there is no current Government policy on the China side restricting Chinese to be trans-national missionaries. China feels that host country should be responsible to regulate proselytizing within its jurisdiction; somewhat similar to what China has done
27
See the latest “Regulations on Religious Affairs,” State Council Decree 426, of 30th November 2004, made public on 18th December, 2004. Http://China.org.cn/ chinese/2004/Dec/732346.htm., also Chan Kim-kwong and Eric Carlson, Religious Freedom in China: Policy, Administration, and Regulation—A Research handbook (Santa Barbara, California: Institute for the Study of American Religion, 2005). 28 Such atrocity has largely been ignored by the international community, perhaps due to the silence of the Chinese Government, see http://www.5819375. idv. tw/phpbb2/images/avatars/gallery/ynfh/index.htm.
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on issuing regulations governing foreigners’ religious activities in China. With the enthusiasm of China’s global ambition and the rapid growth of the Chinese Christian community, one may easily speculate on a merging of these two elements into a new global Christian mission movement. This phenomenon is somewhat similar to the religious (Christian) Awakening movements in USA and England during the 19th century which coupled with the global market expansion of the Western nations, resulted in the largest Christian mission movement in history during the period of mid 19th to mid 20th centuries undertaken by Christians in western countries; and also resemble the contemporary strong impact by the Korean Christianity on world Christendom during the past three decades as Korean’s global economic activities have been increasing and Korean Christian growth has achieved at a phenomenal scale. With these two historical paradigms on Christian mission, there are currently two popular speculations on such missiological potential from the Chinese Christians: Chinese Christian merchant-cum-missionaries especially the Wenzhou Christians, and the Back to Jerusalem Movement (BTJ).29 If both speculations are to be realized, Christians in China may shape the Christendom in the future, not unlike what the Korean Christians have done in recent years but on a much larger scale for the sheer quantity of Chinese Christians. Let us examine these two hypotheses in detail. 1) Chinese Global Commercial Activities and Mission: Case of Wenzhou Christians Wenzhou is a municipality with a population of about 7 million within the Zhejiang Province on Eastern Coast of China. Wenzhoueses speak a unique dialect that few outside of this region can comprehend. They are entrepreneurs by tradition and led the economic reform policy of China by establishing the first batch of private enterprises in China in the late 1970s. They have the highest per capita income in China, they have the highest percentage of merchants among their population, and more than 98% of GDP of Wenzhou is from the private sector whereas the national average is merely around 50–60%. Further, Wenzhouese carries their age-old tradition as itinerant merchants wherever there is business opportunity; Wenzhou mer-
29
See www.backtojerusalem.com, see also Aikman’s Jesus in Beijing.
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chants had been doing business in Europe since the 1800s! They are currently setting up business in at least 150 countries. They form the largest regional group of Chinese migrants in Europe. They are called the Chinese Jews. Above all, they have the highest percentage of Christians among all municipalities in China with official estimates ranging from 700,000 to 1 million (10% to 15% of population) and unofficial claims at least 1.5 million (20%). Any visitors to this region can find church building literally in every village. At any given time, there are at least 1 million, possibly as many as 2 million Wenzhounese who are living as either internal migrants in China or migrants overseas doing business. They can be found in major cities or remote towns, from the rich Chinese coastal provinces such as Jiangsu to harsh plateaus like Tibet. They set up shops from Morocco30 to Montenegro.31 As many of them are Christians they often establish Christian gatherings among themselves in new places for worship where hitherto there wasn’t any Christian presence. For example, Wenzhou Christians formed perhaps the first Governmentsanctioned Christian meeting point at Lhasa, Tibet, now with about a thousand gathering each Sunday. They often share the Christian faith with the local inhabitants where no Christian missionary had ever been there before. Many Wenzhounese merge their business with religious zeal, to share the Christian faith in places where they have business ventures especially to newly developed markets in remote places.32 There are at least 755,000 Wenzhou Christians merchants outside of China operating as merchants in more than 150 countries. They are also the founders of many new Chinese congregations in Europe, such as the one in Bucharest, Romania. Will they, through their global commercial activities and their strong evangelical zeal, be a natural army of missionaries to proselytize in places hard to access by conventional mission channels, especially those countries which forbid any missionary activity or missionaries to enter, or are inconvenient for missionaries from the West to operate? Can they,
30 See “Attention, les Chinois debarquent!” in Aujourd’hui Le Maroc, 15 September 2004. 31 This writer traveled to Kotor, a medieval town in Montenegro in August, 2004, and saw a Wenzhounese who operated a shop in the local market. 32 See Kim-kwong Chan, Tetsunio Yamamori: Holistic Entrepreneurship in China (Pasadena, California: William Carey International University Press, 2002), the Chapter on Wenzhou Christians in Qinghai Province.
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like the Moravian Brethrens in the 18th Century, establish similar Christian colonies in places where no Christian presence was found? As one critically reflects on the history of contemporary mission movements, when Christian mission was associated with Western political and economic forces especially during the 19th century, mission activities benefited and were protected by colonial powers as missionaries preached along the trade routes established by their political and commercial counterparts in the developing world. As the developing world gained their national independence from Western colonial powers after the Second World War, one of the major victims was the Western-backed Christian activity which was often rejected by the xenophobic and nationalistic new regimes. The tragic experience of the Chinese Christian community in China in the 1950s is a good reminder of the negative consequence from the close alliance between Christian mission and secular political/economic powers. Will China take up the historical role of those former colonial powers perceived as economic aggressor, leading to emergence of sinophobic sentiments effecting all the Chinese—including the missionaries—in those host countries as China expands its global economic influences? The current large volume of cheap Chinese goods in international markets has already become a threat to many countries as such goods seem to undercut the local industry which is often obsolete or inefficient without a competitive edge against Chinese imports. A global sinophobic sentiment is in the making in recent years and China bashing has become a common political gesture often to distract the public attention from internal economic problems. The following are just some examples of anti-Chinese sentiment related with Chinese global commercial activities since 2004. During the first two quarters of 2004, many US politicians repeatedly blamed China for causing large number of unemployed US workers whose high wages have effectively priced them out of the international market. The US Government’s decision on 30th June 2005 to block the sale of the US oil company UNOCAL by the Chinese CNOOC was out of fear of China’s growing economic power against American national interest; it seems that American Government simply does not want to see a strong China. In February 2004, Moscow police “confiscated” more than USD 30 million worth of goods from Chinese merchants in Amila Market
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outside of Moscow.33 In March 2005, Russian Police in Moscow, again, “confiscated” more than USD 10 million worth of goods from the warehouses of Chinese merchants without warrant or receipt of confiscated goods.34 Also the presence of about half a million Chinese in Siberia has already stirred strong sinophobia in Russian society resulting in numerous abuses against Chinese in that region, such as blocking roads to the markets of Chinese vendors;35 Chinese merchants in Russia find it increasingly difficult to engage in business activity.36 Chinese citizens have been regularly harassed and attacked in other parts of Russia, probably due to the increasing anti-China racist sentiment by the local populations especially among the unemployed youths who easily cast the blame not to foreign vendors like the Chinese merchants.37 Similar scenes are taking place in other countries. In May 2004, district polices in Bucharest cordoned off a section of the huge European market (currently the largest commodity market in Europe with 95% shop owners being Chinese) and literally robbed every Chinese merchant within the cordoned areas.38 In September 2004, the Moroccans were urging the Government to take active measures to curb importation of Chinese goods to protect their own industry.39 At the end of September 2004, several hundred Spaniards in Elche
33 See the Chinese report “Reflection on the Elche Incident,” in http://news.sina. com.cn/c/2004–10–07/11433847992s.shtml 34 See http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005–03–17/06146106981.shtml. 35 For example, see Vilya Gelbras’s interview in Vladivostok News, October 25 2001, in http://vn.vladnews.ru/arch/2001/iss280/News/upd25.HTM, or “Chinese Consul Investigates Protest,” in Vladivostok News, April 23 2002, in http://vn.vladnews.ru/arch/2002/iss306/News/upd23_3.HTM. 36 Yu Chen, “Reports on the Situation of Chinese Merchants in Far East Siberia,” 11 November 2004, found in http://peacehall.com/news/gb/chinese/2004/11/ 200411111357.shtml. 37 For example, see the attacks on Chinese in St Petersburg on http://appledaily. atnext.com/template/apple/art_main.cfm?sec_id=15335&showdate=20050321.html. 38 This writer personally interviewed many victims of this incident in August, 2004. The Chinese embassy stepped in to stop the abuse of the local police against the Chinese merchants. See the statement issued by the Chinese Embassy in Romania in Ziarul “Chinezi Europeni” (Chinese In Europe), 20 July 2004, p. 1. 39 The recent arrival of more than 1,000 Chinese merchants triggered a whole series of anti-China articles appearing in local newspapers, for example, see Adam Wade, “Les chinois coulent la plasturgie marocaine,” in Aujourd’hui Le Maroc, 17 September 2004, or Bensalem Fennassi, “Menace sur l’industrie locale,” in Aujourd’hui Le Maroc 17 September 2004.
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took to the street to protest against the Chinese merchants, attacked the Chinese-run stores and burnt Chinese-made shoes worth USD 1 million, while the local police took no action.40 Many shouted insulting or xenophobic racist remarks such as “chinos fuera” or “chinos de mierda.”41 Soon Mexican media are echoing similar anti-Chinese sentiments.42 Other anti-Chinese incidents were recorded in Rome in 2003 were local thugs burnt Chinese shoes taken from the Chinese stores. It is also note that majority of the Chinese merchants affected in these above mentioned incidents are from Wenzhou. These increasing anti-Chinese sentiments have caused bankruptcies among many Wenzhou enterprises and factories engaging in this volatile field of export-oriented manufacturing,43 and may dampen the flow of Chinese (especially Wenzhounese) migrants for their presence in the host country poses a conflict of interest for the local merchants and manufacturers. The escalating trade conflicts between China and USA/EU especially since the lifting of import quota on clothing beginning 2005 have already caused severe political tensions which translate into a very uncertain, if not volatile, market environment for Chinese merchants engaging in international trades. Unlike the 19th century where the Christian missionaries enjoyed long-term stable mission environment provided by strong colonial commercial establishment, such as East India Company, as well as strong colonial powers over the colonized inhabitants, the contemporary complex and dynamic commercial reality in the globalized market coupling with the emergence of Sinophobic sentiment does not seem to provide a stable environment for Chinese merchants to sustain any long term development of market penetration which translates into instability for any potential Chinese merchants-cum-missionary to gain foothold in the targeted mission field.44
40 Katya Adler, “Spanish fury over Chinese shoes,” in BBC News, 24 September 2004, in http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/europ/3687602.stm 41 “Protesta xenofoba en Elche,” in www.carteleralibertaria.org/articulo.php?= 1005&more=1&c=1 42 Jose Gonzalez Mendez, “La pesadilla China,” in La Jornada, 11 October 2004. 43 Wang Jin and Xian Yuanhong, “Bitter Winters for three major Shoe Manufacture Capitals,” January 16, 2005, in http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20050116/ 11501297523.shtml. 44 One recent case is the leadership crisis of several Chinese churches in Eastern Europe caused by change of local commercial policy resulting in departure of many Chinese merchants of which some are Church leaders. Personal field research/interview, August, 2004, Romania.
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Further examination on the characteristics of the many newly developed Chinese Christian communities in emerging markets reveals the following features: 1) more ethno-centric than ecumenical in spirit as Wenzhounese would gather together while even speakers of other Chinese dialects would have separate groups, 2) social function along with spiritual care as these communities serve often as the only means of social supporting network to those merchants who are far from home, 3) diasporic growth rather than cross-cultural growth as almost all the new converts are of similar ethnic, if not dialect, origin, 4) most of these Christian merchants are in survival mode—both business wise and spiritual wise, 5) unstable community as there is high degree of turn over rate among members due to instability of residency and inability to devise of long-term plans, and 6) ambivalent to antagonistic to local community with similar reciprocity. In light of these characteristics, these religious communities are in the early stage of development to consolidate their presence, rather than in a position to bring the Christian faith in a cross-culture manner.45 Also many of these newly established churches are more from a natural development of the socio-religious needs of the Chinese Christians who founded themselves in a transient and diasporic context for mostly commercial or economic reasons, than from an intentional establishment of a religious community at a targeted location for strategic transmission of Christian faith. Although many of these churches owed their existences to mission groups who target overseas Chinese as object of proselytization, the main objectives of these groups have been the conversion of Chinese in Diaspora with eventual establishment of Christian group in Mainland China as these converted Chinese return to China. They train these converted Chinese to expand Christian influence in a cross-cultural manner targeting the population of the hosting countries. The ability to send cross-culture missionaries to foreign places requires a huge pool of resources, money, personnel, training, and supporting structure—executed not without controversies, by Churches in the West since the 19th century till now, and by the younger churches since the latter part of the 20th century. Such noble vision 45 Dorottya Nagy, a Romanian-Hungarian, is finishing her doctoral studies at University of Utrecht on Chinese Christian communities in Eastern Europe. The above findings are result of her fieldwork which Ms Nagy had shared with her doctoral co-supervisor, this writer, in Summer 2004.
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requires a certain level of organizational experience and co-ordination efforts, often way beyond the resources of current Chinese Christian merchants who are in different countries living at the mercy of the local Governments’ increasing xenophobic sentiment. Perhaps groups like Sinum Fellowship46 of Wenzhou can be in such a position to initiate pilot projects in the field. However, there is also the challenging issue of cross-cultural adaptation, future ecclesial identity of targeted people, responses from other religions in locality, conflicts and tensions in dual-role (merchant-missionary), and long-term sustainable status (both legal and financial) of these workers—harsh realities that confront not just potential Chinese merchant-cum-missionaries, but all contemporary missionaries engaging cross-culture work. While it is certainly tempting to speculate the possible Christian impacts of Chinese Christian merchants in the shaping of world Christendom based on seemingly similar historical paradigms, the current context has far more variables than in those historical cases had to render a clear reading on such possibility. 2) Back to Jerusalem Movement In the late 1940s, there was a movement among Chinese Christians to initiate evangelistic campaigns in remote regions of China, mainly northwest and southwest regions. A few of them attempted to spread Christian faith from the northwestern part of China (Xinjiang) through Central Asia to Jerusalem. One of these small bands was called “Spreading the Gospel all Over The Place—Pinzhuan Fuyin Tuan” and was translated into English as the “The Back To Jerusalem Band” by an English missionary who intended to write prayer letters on behalf of this band to Christians in England.47 The farthest they traveled was Kasghar, and none was able to travel beyond the border of China.48 Many of the descendants of these missionaries settled in the border region and later founded Christian communities.
46
A well-established group of non-registered churches based in Wenzhou with nation-wide network and relatively high level of financial and personnel resources. 47 Phyllis Thompson, The Chinese Back-To-Jerusalem Evangelistic Band, circa 1946, n.p. 48 Personal interview with Grace Ho (He Enzhen) in Kashgar, August 2002. Ms Grace Ho and her husband Mecca Zhao felt the call to travel westward with a vague notion in mind, while Zhao wanted to be in Mecca, Ho desired to be in Jerusalem “to welcome our Lord Jesus when He comes again.” (Thompson, p. 14). During that interview, Ms Ho suggested that in 1949–1950, they planned to travel
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Such legend, or serendipity, gave rise to the name ‘Back To Jerusalem” (BTJ) Movement later claimed by some Chinese Church leaders who felt the calling to continue this venture popularized by hymns, books, websites, and enthusiastic discussions in mission conferences.49 The current BTJ movement calls for the mobilization of 100,000 (originally calls for 200,000) Chinese missionaries from China to launch into the Islamic-dominated Central Asia region and eventually spread the Christian faith to Jerusalem ready for the Second Coming of Christ. This movement regards such endeavor by the Chinese Christians as the last baton of global Christian mission movements when the Christian faith traveled from the West to East through Western missionaries and now carried back by Chinese missionaries to where it had originated to complete the mandate of proclaiming the Christian Gospel message to the world—an ethno-centric missiological theme promoted by some Chinese church leaders since the 1970s.50 This movement has several arguments favoring the Chinese missionaries to carry perhaps the supposed last baton of global Christian mission mandate. 1) China has no major political enemy and is accepted virtually by every nation. China can do business both with Cuba and USA, Iraq and Iran, Palestinian Authority and Israel, Libya and UK, North Korea and South Korea. Being from a politically non-threatening country, Chinese can enter to places where Westerners have difficulty to gain access, especially Islamic dominated countries where there is an escalating anti-Western sentiment. 2) Christians in to Afghanistan. At that time, they had no particular destination or city, in mind. In 2002, they had no clear idea that their mission Band had an English name such as BTJ—they had, hitherto, not known that their Chinese prayer letters written in the late 1940s had been translated into English with the name BTJ instead of the original Chinese name of the Band. Another Band member, Revd Huang Ziqing, whom this author had interviewed several times in August 2002, August 2003, and April 2004, also claimed that he had no idea the name of their Band was translated as BTJ in English. Revd Huang said that, may be individual members had, but this Band as a whole had no particular destination in mind to begin with. They just moved in a general Westward direction as they felt the call. Further, none had prepared to study the local language for none of them had any particular burden for any ethnic people-group in mind as target for proselytizing. Mecca Zhao later learned Ugyur not for proselytizing but for practical purposes; he later re-tooled himself as a seal maker carving official seals that required both Chinese and Ugyur languages. 49 www.backtojerusalem.com, or Paul Hatteway’s Back To Jerusalem: Called to Complete the Great Commission (Carlisle: Piquant, 2003). For some opposite voices on this movement, see www.jesusreturn.net. 50 See the Theme Song of CCOWE (Chinese Co-ordination Center for World Evangelism-1976); www.cccowe.org.
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China, especially those who are from the unregistered sector constantly under the threat from the authority, have experience in clandestine forms of religious activities suitable to proselytizing work in countries where Christian mission activity is restricted or prohibited. 3) Christians in China practice a form of simple Christianity—house church—devoid of elaborate liturgies, activities and institutional structures; such ecclesial form is simple to operate, flexible, and cost effective. 4) The Chinese Christian community has ample experienced church planters as witnessed by the rapid development of the Christian community in China. 5) There is virtually an endless supply of missionaries drawing from the vast pool of several tens of millions of Chinese believers. 6) The cost of living of Chinese missionaries, mainly due to the frugal living style of Chinese as compared to western missionaries living as expatriates, is far lower than western missionaries. 7) Chinese Christians know and accept suffering as part of Christian reality and they are ready to be martyred for Christ without hesitation. In fact one of these advocators, Brother Yun, even suggested that he is prepared to accept 10,000 Chinese martyrs in the first decades of BTJ51 in order to crack open the Gospel door to the Muslims. 8) There is an eschatological assumption that the Second Coming of Jesus would take place as the Christian Gospel has been preached around the globe, therefore such mission movement would facilitate the coming of the End Time—a proactive millenarianism. The BTJ call for recruiting 100,000 Chinese missionaries roaming around the Middle East proselytizing in secret is a tempting idea after many decades of efforts by Christian missionaries, mainly Western, trying to convert the Muslims but yielding only few visible results. As one long-term veteran Christian missionary in a Middle East country told this writer, “We have been so lonely laboring for many years with little result. We are frustrated to a point that we are tempted to jump on any idea however berserk that it may seem.”52 Knowledgeable sources suggest that there are perhaps a dozen mission-training centers established in China specifically for this purpose, and several outside of China.53 Many vanguard teams are already
51
“Interview With Paul Hattaway—A Captive Vision,” in Christianity Today, April 2004, p. 84. 52 Personal interviews, April 2004, name and place withheld for security reasons. 53 This writer had interviewed several trainers who had done trainings in these centers, both inside and outside of China. One such center located in a Southeast Asian
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in Middle East countries establishing links and supporting bases.54 Some BTJ Chinese missionaries are already operating in a few countries and BTJ is gaining increasing amount of international attention as well as support. With the projected increase of BTJ missionaries from China, perhaps soon to be the largest bloc of professional missionaries in Christendom targeting the Muslim world—China may become an important nation which the US wants to be allied with in order to confront the growing influence of Islamic civilization.55 Should that be the case, there may well be a major shift of geo-religiouspolitical axis as China joins the camp of the Western (Christianized) bloc confronting the Islamic world, a revised version of Huntington’s clash of civilization with a new Crusader’s alliance definitely reshape the contour of Christendom, along with the global religious landscape. A closer examination on the merit raised by the BTJ movement may suggest a different scene. If there are suddenly thousands of Chinese, perhaps posing as vendors, flooding the bazaars of major Middle East countries selling Chinese goods, giving Christian testimonies, and holding home-based worship meetings, would the local authorities turn a blind eye on these activities? The answer is quite possibly that such influx of Chinese Christian missionaries may prompt the local authorities to tighten restrictions on foreigner’s activities especially those that might have bearing on proselytizing activities. Such reaction from local authorities may lead to undesirable consequences for those missionaries already working in those areas, hence damping the overall missiological impact. It may also bear diplomatic implications, as these nations would surely put pressure on the Chinese Government. The Chinese authority does not like to lose the lucrative market in the Islamic countries by offending these countries on the sensitive issue of religion, especially the precious oil from this region which China depended on to sustain her development. The Chinese government will probably use administrative measures to tighten the activities of the Christian groups in China who are the bases of the BTJ movement. country has more than 50 full-time students (all came from China) undergone one to two years of full-time trainings. Name and location withhold for security reason. 54 A recent report noted that there are 34 of these Chinese missionaries trying to enter Pakistan but was stopped at the China-Pakistan border near Kasghar (Kashi). Mostly likely they are BTJ missionaries. see www.chinaaid.org/english/press_ release/6–29–05–crackdown.htm. 55 This thesis is advanced by David Aikman in his aforementioned book.
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The martyrdom-mission spirit highlighted by BTJ seems to be a hallmark for these BTJ advocates who are accustomed to suffering and persecutions in China. However, in the context of the Islamic society, especially when we question the extreme fundamentalist teaching of Islam which promotes the martyrdom spirit such as the action of those suicide bombers, such martyrdom-mission spirituality may easily lead to a confrontational stance between fanatics of these two faiths to compete for greater martyrdom behavior under different names of the Divine. Such competition will surely add pressure to the already tensed inter-religious relations in Muslim dominated areas. Further, such martyrdom mentality would probably challenge the credibility of Christian faith especially on Christian teachings such as reconciliation, peace, forgiveness, meekness and charity. The argument on the cost-effectiveness by employing Chinese missionaries to the Islamic countries seems to be in line with the global economic trend—out-sourcing services or job to the lowest bidder. It is a fact that the Chinese Church has a vast pool of Christians, a seemingly endless supply of potential—and cheap—mission field laborers. As one takes a closer examination of this pool of Christians, most of them are in rural areas with minimum education as well as limited amount of Christian formation. The urgent needs of the Christian Churches in China seem to be religious formation, and leadership consolidation. Currently the Christian community in China is facing challenges from various Cults, extremist teachings, and leadership in-house fighting. In the context of the current ecclesial reality, the Churches in China need all its pastoral resources merely to maintain a stable development of the Churches in China. Exporting needed skill pastoral labor on the expenses of lower quality of local religious community is a cost that the Chinese Christian Church can hardly afford. Whatever profit—at least the tangible one—gains by these exported labors do not seem to be able to channel back into the home community. Also, the increasing numbers of Chinese surplus farming-workers, perhaps the largest single bloc of unemployed or under-employed laborers in the world numbering more than 150 million and increasing, may lead to easy recruitment of BTJ missionaries especially among rural Christian populations. Christian Church leaders in the Middle East have stressed that future missionaries to their place should acquire some sort of professional status and have in-depth
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understanding of Islamic culture.56 Granted there are some Chinese Christians in China of high quality ready for mission work (this writer has met many), the numbers are few and quality training in crosscultural issues rather lacking. Although large numbers of Chinese Christians may like to venture for BTJ, qualified candidates are few.57 The experience of cross-culture mission work outside of China can serve as a reminder that candidate selection is crucial to success of such mission endeavor. Quality, not quantity, counts in the success of cross-cultural proselytizing endeavor. The underlining motive of the BTJ Movement seems to be based on a popular eschatological view which suggests the Second Coming of Jesus will not take place until the Christian Gospel has been preached to all nations—an effort that all Christian believers have a responsibility to accomplish. Within the context of this proactive millenarianism, there is a missiological assumption that the Christian Gospel has to be proclaimed back to Jerusalem, a full circle around the world started from the Middle-East two thousand years ago then to the West, to the East, and back to the Middle-East as the main missiological vector of the Great Commission of the Christendom. There is neither strong Biblical basis for such round-the-world encircling of mission activities, nor any historical evidence to justify such pattern of global Christian expansion. In fact, the Christian faith had spread to the Eastern direction (hence the establishing of many Eastern Churches) prior to the West, in the early centuries. There is also the North-South expansion direction of Christian faith rather than merely a simplistic view of lateral development. The BTJs also raise the subtle ethnocentric competition to determine which ethnic group will have such honor to carry the last baton of this round the world Christian evangelistic marathon to finish off this race of Global Evangelism. Some Korean Christians have claimed that they will be the last runner as demonstrated by their extremely
56 See “Interview From The land of Pharaohs,” Back To Jerusalem Bulletin No. 2 (December, 2004), pp. 7–8. 57 A missionary has recently communicated with this writer that in Iraq he had encountered a group of Chinese BTJ missionaries from rural China. To his surprise, these Chinese BTJ missionaries have no knowledge about Iraq, certainly no language skill. Furthermore, these Chinese BTJ missionaries are pig farmers, not the most welcoming profession in Muslim world. Personal communication, 31st January 2005, identity withhold for security reason.
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high number of Christians and missionaries, perhaps the highest percentage of missionaries per population in current status of Christendom. Now the Chinese are making similar missiological claims through the BTJ movement. Such ethnocentric claim lacks serious Biblical and theological support. By interpreting a Sino-centric calling as a divinely chosen privilege, there is a danger of repeating the racial superiority mentality of the White Man’s Burden popular during the late 19th century influencing many Christian overseas missions; only this time it is a Yellow Race Burden claim begun with the Koreans now followed by the Chinese. This popular BTJ Movement becomes popular especially after the 911 events as people in the West generally fear the growing influence of Islam. At the same time, the emergence of China as a strong market force with virtually unlimited cheap labor and manufacture capacity changes the world’s manufacture and supply chain. Such production restructure also contributes to the popularity of BTJ as a cost-effective means to undertake religious proselytizing. Economic and geo-political variances, proactive millenarianism, and Chinese ethno-centric complex contribute to the development of this movement. However, a critical examination of this Movement suggests that such Movement is more a wishful desire than a practical scheme and more foundation works need to be done before it can deliver credible result. Conclusion China is undoubtedly emerging as a major economic and political power in the international community. The Christians in China together with other non-western Christians may write the next Chapter of world Christendom. However, the Christian community in China is but a minority group among 1.3 Billion of the diverse Chinese population, and still has a long way to go before becoming an influential social group even within the Chinese social milieu. Granted there are Chinese Christians who are establishing overseas footholds taking advantage of China’s global economic expansion, such as the Wenzhou Christian entrepreneurs. These Christians face the difficult task of establishing their roots in the host country in order to have religious influence among the Chinese diasporic population, before they can reach the local population. Even with extreme stable international business environment favoring Chinese merchants, it will be
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a long ecclesial development process before the Chinese diasporic Christian community to bear significant influence in World Christendom via cross-cultural proselytizing to hosting population. Furthermore, the BTJ Movement as it currently stands seems to be based more on Sino-centric wishes, current global marketing trend, and proactive millenarianism, fueled by enthusiasm promotions, rather than on serious theological reflections and critical missiological considerations. This BTJ is in the early stage of development and requires a lot more missiological groundwork before it can become a credible mission movement.
ETHNIC IDENTITY IN OVERSEAS CHINESE PROTESTANT CHURCHES IN THE TOKYO METROPOLITAN AREA Barbara Ambros Columbia University, USA In his Foreign Migrants in Contemporary Japan (2001), Komai Hiroshi notes: “Incidentally, the Chinese, who are the largest ethnic group [among newcomers] in Japan, hardly participate in religious activities at all. In Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo, . . . there is only one small Taoist shrine.”1 Komai’s statement is based on the assumption that the representative religion of the overseas Chinese in Japan2 is Daoism and hence that the lack of Daoist shrines indicates the absence of participation in religious activities. Komai is not alone in making the assumption that the Chinese Diaspora engages in few religious activities. As of now, little research has been conducted on the religious practices of the contemporary overseas Chinese community in Japan except for recent studies by Wang Wei and Zhang Yuling on the festivals and traditional performing arts in Japan’s Chinatowns. As
1
Komai (2001) p. 81. Whereas Japanese immigration statistics refer to the overseas Chinese collectively as chûgokujin (Chinese nationals), the overseas Chinese in Japan tend to prefer the term huaqiao ( Japanese: kakyô; overseas Chinese, Chinese sojourners). The distinction would be that huaqiao implies a person of Chinese descent who lives abroad whereas chûgokujin could also include short-term visitors. In addition, huaqiao is regarded as a generic term that applies to persons of Chinese descent regardless of the regional or national origin whereas chûgokujin is linked to mainland China. During the author’s fieldwork, the Taiwanese were particularly keen on emphasizing their distinct identity by insisting strongly on the use of “zainichi taiwanjin (Taiwanese in Japan)” rather than “zainichi chûgokujin (Chinese national in Japan).” The generic soubriquet huaqiao or kakyô, however, was considered acceptable because it bridged national, political, and regional boundaries. Thus the ethnic Chinese church in Yokohama is called Yokohama Kakyô Kirisuto Kyôkai (Yokohama Overseas Chinese Christian Church). The term zhonghua ( Japanese: chûka; “Chinese”) is used as an adjective with a similar connotation—sometimes translated into English as “overseas Chinese” as in Tôkyô Chûka Kirisuto Kyôkai (Tokyo Overseas Christian Church). The term huaren ( Japanese: kajin; “ethnic Chinese person”), meaning somebody of Chinese origin with citizenship in another country, is also used. The term huayi ( Japanese: kakei; “of Chinese descent”), which indicates an even greater symbolic distance from China as the cultural homeland, is used less frequently. Cf. Guo p. 7. 2
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Wang and Zhang have shown, even these seemingly archetypal traditions have undergone considerable change and reinvention in recent decades that has paralleled changes in the ethnic identities and composition of the overseas Chinese community in Japan.3 In actuality, the religious landscape of the Chinese Diaspora in the Kantô region, which has the largest overseas Chinese population in Japan, has become highly diverse. In addition to a large Daoist temple in Yokohama, there are some twenty Buddhist centers belonging to the Buddha Light Association (a modern Taiwanese order) and Tsu Chi (a modern Taiwanese movement), nearly twenty qigong groups belonging to Falungong, and about twenty Christian churches (some pan-Chinese others ethnic Taiwanese or predominantly Fujianese). It may come as a surprise that modern Taiwanese Buddhist movements and Chinese Christian churches are the most active religious communities, but similar developments have occurred among overseas Chinese in other parts of the world.4 “Traditional” Chinese Daoist shrines and Buddhist temples were founded in the Tokugawa and Meiji periods and serve mostly as tourist attractions that cultivate their exotic appeal. In contemporary Japan, the liveliest religious activities occur at Christian churches and Buddha Light Association centers that blend into their Japanese environment and are therefore less visible. Yet to understand the religious activities of the Chinese Diaspora in Japan, it is necessary to study these seemingly invisible communities. Based on fieldwork conducted at seven different ethnic Chinese churches, this article discusses evangelical Protestant and Pentecostal congregations, which reflect immigration patterns to varying degrees. Distinct Chinese churches first appeared in the postwar period as many Chinese migrated to Japan in the wake of the political changes in mainland China and Taiwan. Since the mid-1990s, the number of such churches has expanded due to the recent wave of migration from the Chinese mainland. Some congregations were founded in the
3 Wang (2001b); Zhang (2003). I have only listed Wang’s comprehensive booklength study here, but he has also published numerous articles on the subject. 4 Christians make up less than 1% of the Japanese population. According to Yang (2002), estimates of Christians in mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan range between 1% to 5%. In mainland China, Christianity is the fastest growing religion. In North America, religious activities are no longer limited to private ancestor worship and worship at make-shift temples in Chinatowns (Lin p. 136). Christianity and Buddhism are the strongest religious affiliations (Yang (2002) p. 71). These findings are supported by the research of Liu and Tseng (2003).
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immediate postwar period; others were founded more recently. Some have attracted large numbers of recent Chinese arrivals in Japan; others have focused on long-standing overseas Chinese residents instead. Some congregations are pan-Chinese while others have a specific, regionally-based identity such as Taiwanese or, less strongly so, Fujianese. Some of these congregations have served as the locus for reconciliation for the ethnically and politically divided overseas Chinese community while others have served to underscore these divisions. After a short survey of recent immigration statistics, this article discusses three case studies representing different types of ethnic Chinese Protestant and Pentecostal churches: Taiwanese Protestant churches, pan-Chinese Protestant churches, True Jesus Church congregations dominated by Taiwanese and Fujianese members.5 These Christian congregations are emblematic of the challenges, tensions and struggles of the Chinese Diaspora in Japan, which is also largely invisible despite its growing size. The Cultural Diversity of the Chinese Diaspora in Japan When studying overseas Chinese in Japan as elsewhere, one quickly realizes that it is difficult to generalize the religious practices of such a diverse ethnic group. Overseas Chinese in Japan fall into several distinct groups not just based on their place of origin (Mainland China, Taiwan, Southeast Asia) and dialect (Mandarin, Minnan) but also in terms of the period of their migration. Like Korean nationals in Japan, Chinese (Mainland and Taiwanese) can be divided into prewar-period arrivals—those who came to Japan before and during World War II, especially when Japan controlled Taiwan as a colonial power—and postwar-period arrivals, those who arrived in Japan
5 In addition to recent studies on the Chinese Diaspora in Japan and recent immigration statistics by the Japanese Ministry of Justice, this article is based on ethnographic material collected during fieldwork at eight ethnic Chinese churches in the Tokyo area as well as documents distributed by the various churches such as their own histories and a biography of a church elder. My fieldwork at the eight churches included formal and informal interviews and participation in church activities from June to December 2003. I am very grateful for the tremendous hospitality, openness, and cooperation that I encountered at these churches. I am particularly indebted to the Tokyo International Church in Ebisu, which I visited most frequently and where I was kindly permitted to attend not only the worship services but also the youth group and weekly testimonial meetings.
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after World War II. Sometimes this distinction is expressed in Japanese by referring to prewar arrivals as zainichi kakyô, “overseas Chinese in Japan”) and to postwar arrivals as zainichi chûgokujin (“Chinese nationals in Japan”).6 In addition, Chinese nationals in Japan are divided into “old overseas Chinese” (lao huaqiao), those who arrived before 1972 (the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations), and “new overseas Chinese” (xin huaqiao), those who arrived after 1972.7 Moreover, there are class distinctions between those who belong to small elite of business people and professionals (doctors, educators) and many new arrivals who are struggling to make a living. These groups often have different interests and do not always mingle. Including those who were naturalized, the number of those with Chinese ancestry is actually well over half a million among whom old ethnic Chinese are a small but a well-organized minority. The Tokyo metropolitan area is home to the largest number of Chinese nationals in Japan.8 The overseas Chinese community in this area of Japan contains both prewar arrivals and newcomers not only within the city limits but also in neighboring Yokohama, where one of the oldest Chinatowns in Japan is found—the others being in Nagasaki and Kôbe. This region of Japan, therefore, contains a representative and diverse spectrum of Chinese nationals in Japan. What is the ethnic and social make-up of the overseas Chinese community today? The Chinese in Japan once came predominantly from southern China, but in the postwar period the majority were Taiwanese until the early 1990s. However, by early 2003 most Chinese nationals were from northern China. In addition, a significant number of Southeast Asians in Japan tend to be of Chinese ancestry. Since the early nineties, the social make-up of the Chinese community has taken a very distinctive form. In January 2003 the Chinese Diaspora comprised a small elite of professionals and business people (1.2%) but consisted mainly of students/trainees (29.4%), permanent residents (23.7%), spouses/dependents (19.8%) and special residents such as refugees (6.4%). Illegal overstayers comprised 8.4%— down from a peak of about 18% in the 1994.9
6
Guo pp. 8–9. Guo p. 9. 8 Douglass and Roberts pp. 14–16; Nyûkan kyôkai p. 49. 9 Komai pp. 21–23; http://www.moj.go.jp/index.html; Guo p. 50; Nyûkan kyôkai pp. 72–75. 7
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Overseas Chinese Christian Churches The churches of the overseas Chinese in Tokyo reflect these demographics. Most members live scattered throughout the larger Tokyo metropolitan area rather than in a particular area. Many cope with a significant commute in order to attend the church of their choice. There is a relative gender balance with women slightly outnumbering men. Many churches have a significant number of mixed ChineseJapanese families, reflective of the high rate of intermarriage between Chinese and Japanese. Churches that are able to attract students from mainland China have experienced significant growth since the mid-1990s. These churches have a relatively young constituency, but they also have to cope with an extensive membership flux in their congregations. Since a significant percentage of Chinese nationals are illegal or engage in illegal employment, religious institutions able to attract recent migrants have to grapple with these issues. Mandarin is the predominant language spoken at most churches because it is the official language of the People’s Republic of China and of the Republic of China and therefore provides a means of communication for Chinese from different regions. There are no distinct Cantonese-speaking religious communities because the number of Chinese nationals from Guangdong or Hong Kong is not large enough to support an independent community. The only ethnic groups that maintains a clearly distinct identity are the Taiwanese, whose churches do not reflect the recent influx of new mainland Chinese nationals, and the Fujianese, whose numbers have increased markedly in the last decade. Recently, however, some of the congregations, whose membership was predominantly Fujianese until a few years ago, have also seen a greater influx of mainland Chinese from northern China, who now comprises the majority of new arrivals. Overseas Chinese Christians are perhaps the most organized and consistently active religious subgroup with regular, weekly worship practices and over twenty ethnic churches and congregations in the Kantô region. Of course, not all Chinese Christians in Japan attend ethnic churches. Some opt to attend Japanese or even Korean churches. In areas of Japan where there are no ethnic churches, they do not have a choice, but in areas where they have access to an ethnic church, this may be a deliberate choice open to those with sufficient Japanese skills. One parishioner at the Catholic Jesuit China Center noted: “I used to prefer going to a Japanese church because
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it was easier to find spiritual peace there. It took me a while to get used to this place always being so noisy.” However, members of ethnic churches generally remarked that they found ethnic churches to be more welcoming and friendly than Japanese churches, which they considered too stiff and formal. Japanese members of ethnic Chinese congregations frequently shared this assessment. For other overseas Chinese, these ethnic churches are attractive because they provided an opportunity to speak Chinese, eat Chinese food and spend time with other Chinese. One young Chinese woman, for example, mentioned that she used to attend a charismatic Korean church in Tokyo but recently started attending an ethnic Chinese church. She explained: “The Korean church was livelier, but things are more familiar here. We have Chinese food here, and everyone is Chinese.” Ethnic Chinese Christian congregations in Tokyo are theologically and institutionally diverse ranging from Protestant to Catholic, and relatively liberal Presbyterian to conservative evangelical and even Pentecostal churches. On the most basic level, they can be divided into three groups: (1) Some Chinese Protestant churches can be traced back to the prewar Taiwanese community and maintain a distinct ethnic Taiwanese identity. (2) Other Chinese Protestant evangelical churches and congregations can be traced back to the immediate postwar period and have a more pan-Chinese outlook than the explicitly Taiwanese churches. (3) There are also Japanese Protestant and Roman-Catholic church initiatives that try to accommodate the growing number overseas Chinese by offering services in Chinese. Initiatives such as these are partially motivated by a sense of mission and an interest in Chinese culture or by an effort to revitalize a shrinking congregation, sometimes by a mixture of both. Taiwanese Churches in Ikebukuro and Ogikubo The Ikebukuro Taiwan Kyôkai (Ikebukuro Taiwanese Church) is an example of a Presbyterian church with a strong ethnic Taiwanese identity. The church is located in a small but handsome building with a colorful stained-glass window behind the altar and a concertlevel pipe organ imported from Germany. The congregation traces its history back to a Taiwanese church now located in Ogikubo in western Tokyo. The Ogikubo Taiwanese church claims a long his-
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tory dating back to 1925, which makes it the oldest Chinese Christian community in Japan. Once a modest bible-study group, the Ogikubo Taiwanese Church was built in 1981 after the several decades of renting space in Japanese churches or operating as a house church in a condominium. As the congregation expanded, several branches developed including the Ikebukuro branch. Like its mother church in Ogikubo, the congregation at Ikebukuro first met in rented spaces from 1981 to 1984 and then bought a condominium in Yoyogi. After selling the condominium during the economic bubble years in 1988, the congregation used the money to buy land near Ikebukuro Station and build the current church during 1988–1991, while renting space in a Japanese church in nearby Mejiro until the construction was complete.10 The Ikebukuro Taiwanese Church emphasizes its Taiwanese identity. Most members of the congregation are affluent long-term residents of Japan, who are fluent in both Taiwanese and Japanese. Weekly worship services are held in Taiwanese by the Taiwanese pastor, although simultaneous interpretation into Mandarin and Japanese are available via headphone. Hymns are sung in Taiwanese, not Mandarin. To accommodate the spiritual needs of Japanese-speaking Japanraised/born Taiwanese members, bilingual hymnals with Japanese and Romanized Taiwanese hymns are available in addition to the Taiwanese hymnals, which contain the hymns in Chinese characters and Romanized Taiwanese. In addition, a Japanese worship service is held once a month. Since the church has not seen a substantial influx of recent new arrivals from the Chinese mainland or Taiwan, the youth and youngadult programs of the church are small comprising less than ten members each. According to Ms. Chen, a Japanese-raised member and Sunday-school teacher, Sunday school is taught in Japanese since most children have grown up in Japan; however, a few children prefer English to Japanese because they attend English-speaking international schools rather than public Japanese schools. To promote Taiwanese language skills, the church offers Taiwanese language courses attended by about twenty Japanese-born or Japanese-raised Taiwanese members as well as Japanese with an interest in Taiwanese culture.
10
Enatsu and Chen pp. 9, 22–36, 71.
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It is this strong Taiwanese identity that draws members to the church. Ms. Chen noted that the church was frequented by Taiwanese Christians many of whom had a strong separatist consciousness. She herself became Christian in an English-speaking Baptist congregation as a teenager in Tokyo. After the Baptist church closed during the early nineties, she attended a Japanese church for a while but found it too socially conservative. Raised in Japan and hence a nativeJapanese speaker, she had also developed a desire to improve her Taiwanese as an adult. She therefore joined the Taiwanese church in the mid-nineties upon the recommendation of her cousin who had been attending the same church. She found the Presbyterian Taiwanese congregation less formal in its social relations and the language used in prayer even though she admits reading the bible primarily in Japanese and still struggles with church Taiwanese. At the mother church in Ogikubo, the strong Taiwanese identity is even more palpable. Church services are held in Taiwanese with consecutive interpretation into Japanese. Once a month, the languages are reversed, and the worship service is conducted in Japanese and the sermon interpreted consecutively into Taiwanese. Noticeably, the church does not provide interpretation into Mandarin. According to one church elder, a trilingual worship service would be too complicated. Moreover, asked if the church had any mainland Chinese members, he explained that occasionally mainland Chinese made their way to the church, but instead of absorbing them into the congregation, the pastor tended to send them on to a Mandarin-speaking church due to the language barrier. In addition, the church elder mentioned that it would be awkward for mainland Chinese when church members voiced their strong separatist feelings for Taiwan. In contrast to the critical attitude toward mainlanders in Taiwan, the Ogikubo Taiwanese congregation, which consists of many longterm residents and a number of Taiwanese-Japanese couples, emphasizes its positive role in Japanese society. During a worship service on the 2003 election day for the Japanese Lower House, the Taiwanese service leader prayed for the national prosperity and well-being of Japan as well as for a positive outcome of the elections. Several weeks later, prayers were held for elections in Taiwan scheduled for 2004. Because of their strong Taiwanese identity, the 50–60-member congregation of the Ikebukuro Taiwanese Church and the 100-member congregation of Ogikubo Taiwanese Church do not reflect the recent influx of new Chinese migrants. The use of Taiwanese rather
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than Mandarin as well as the distinct Taiwanese consciousness makes these churches less attractive to mainland Chinese. The Ikebukuro church reaches out to Taiwanese students by offering a small stipend to help cover their living expenses. However, even though Taiwanese predominated among the overseas Chinese in Japan until the late 1980s, the recent increase of Chinese nationals has consisted mostly of mainland Chinese rather than Taiwanese. In fact, the Taiwanese population has declined by several thousand since its peak level in 1988.11 As a result, the average age at the Taiwanese churches is considerably higher than that at churches that attract mainlanders. A Pan-Chinese Church in Ebisu The Tokyo International Church (Tokyo Kokusai Kyôkai) in Ebisu has flourished in recent years due to the immense increase of mainland Chinese. It has one branch church in Tsukuba to serve the Chinese students at Tsukuba University, founded in 1980, which speaks to its dedication to the ministry among overseas Chinese students.12 The Tokyo International Church, formerly known as the Tokyo Overseas Chinese Church, developed this ministerial focus early on. One of its early pastors, Reverend Zhou (served 1958–1962), returned to the United States in 1962 where he first founded a Chinese church in the Washington D.C. area and then dedicated himself to the campus ministry for Chinese students by co-founding the Ambassadors for Christ. Even before he had gone to Japan, he had actively ministered to students while studying theology at a seminary in the United States.13 Like at most overseas Chinese churches in the Tokyo area, the current pastor, Pastor Xie, is Taiwanese, but in the past it has had several pastors from mainland China and also two non-Chinese pastors—one from Canada, the other from Australia—who had served as missionaries in mainland China before the Communist revolution.14 11
Guo p. 61, Nyûkan kyôkai pp. 100–101. Dongjing guoji jidu huijiao (1987) p. 36; Dongjing guoji jidu huijiao (1996) p. 16. During the late 1990s, it also had another branch in Higashiginza in centraleastern Tokyo, originally founded in Akihabara in 1994. When the pastor of this branch left, the congregation became independent from the mother church in Ebisu and has been sustained by temporary visiting pastors. 13 Yang (1999) p. 64. 14 Dongjing Guoji Jidu Huijiao (1987) pp. 3, 5, 7, 11, 15. 12
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Unlike the Ikebukuro Taiwan Kyôkai, the Tokyo International Church emphasizes a pan-Chinese identity claiming about 400 members— 50% mainland Chinese (especially from Fujian Province), 25% Taiwanese, 15% overseas Chinese from other countries in North America or Southeast Asia, and 10% Japanese most of whom are married to Chinese nationals. Two Sunday worship services, one in the morning and one in the afternoon, are held in Mandarin and Japanese through consecutive translation. The morning service, which is consistently better attended, is also interpreted into English via headphones, but no translation into Taiwanese is available. The hymnals are tri-lingual: Chinese, Japanese, and English. Bilingual bibles in Chinese-Japanese and Chinese-English are available for sale in the lobby. The church sees its purpose in reaching out to a pan-Chinese community and must navigate a sea of linguistic, political, and other cultural factors. According to Mrs. Ding, one of the founding members and an elder of the church, this is only possible through the use of Mandarin.15 This strategy is largely successful even though some overseas Chinese are not completely comfortable using Mandarin. For example, one Hong-Kong Chinese member at the Tokyo Overseas Chinese Church—the sister church of the Tokyo International Church—mentioned that when she first joined the church after her arrival in Japan, she had to listen to both the Mandarin and the Japanese translation because her proficiency in neither were good enough to fully grasp the meaning. Another current member of a Taiwanese church switched her affiliation from a pan-Chinese church because she preferred speaking Taiwanese. Apart from individual cases such as these, however, Mandarin serves as a successful common denominator to surmount regional differences. An independent evangelical church, the Tokyo International Church has a long history that dates back to the 1950s when many mainland Chinese migrated from China to Japan to escape the new Communist regime. Supported by American missionaries who had likewise fled from China in the wake of the revolution and were fluent in Mandarin, Chinese Christians founded a bible study group in Ochanomizu. Once the group grew in membership, it split into two. According to Mrs. Ding, a founding member, this split was motivated by a dis-
15
Author’s interview with Mrs. Ding on November 6, 2003.
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agreement over the need for a separate church building and the more charismatic approach of some church members in decision making.16 One group eventually developed into the Tokyo Overseas Chinese Christian Church (Tokyo Chûka Kirisuto Kyôkai) now located in Kôenji and the Tokyo International Church. The latter initially rented space for gatherings in the Azabu area but then built its own church in Ebisu in 1978 under its second pastor, Pastor Li (served 1970–1978). By avoiding politics, such as China-Taiwan relations, the Tokyo International Church is able to attract a wide variety of members. Yet despite its openness to newcomers from mainland China, some activities at the church have an implicit political meaning. On November 3, 2003, the church hosted to service dedicated to Song Mei-ling (the wife of Jiang Jieshi) who had recently passed away at the age of 106. Even though this was not an activity officially organized by the church but an overseas Chinese association, many church members attended the service and the church choir preformed as well. The willingness of the church to host such an event could be interpreted as an expression of sympathy for the former nationalist regime.17 An event such as this memorial service would have been highly unlikely at one of the ethnic Taiwanese churches, which display little sympathy for the Chiang Kaishek and his Nationalist Party (Guomindang), whose harsh rule of Taiwan they condemn. However, the atmosphere at Tokyo International Church is generally apolitical. As a result, the church has seen a tremendous growth over the past ten years that reflects both the increase in mainland Chinese nationals in Japan as well as the growth of Christianity, especially evangelical churches, in China. According to Pastor Xie, the church has grown from about 170 members to about 400 members since his arrival in 1996 and has had an equal number of baptisms in the same period of time. Like many non-Japanese churches, the 16
The author’s interview with Mrs. Ding on November 6, 2003. As Timothy Tseng notes, many Chinese Protestants in North America and China were sympathetic toward the nationalist government during the republican period. This pro-nationalist sentiment also manifested itself in overseas Chinese congregations after the Communists took power in 1949 (Tseng (1999) and Tseng (2003) pp. 246–147). Similarly, this sympathy appears to have carried over to the mainland Chinese nationals who arrived in Japan in the immediate postwar period. A biography of one prominent church elder at the Ebisu church, Mrs. Ding, was recently published in Taiwan, in which the biographer highlighted Mrs. Ding’s personal acquaintance with the Song family ( Jin pp. 94–101). 17
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Tokyo International Church faces a high degree of flux with new members coming and going; otherwise its growth would have been even more dramatic. About 10–15% of the membership consists of students, who tend to stay in Japan for only a limited amount of time. Yet the church sees these student members as an important part of its ministry. Adult Sunday school as well as student fellowship meetings are held weekly and attended by about 50–55 members. These meetings focus on testimonials, bible study, singing songs, prayer, as well as fellowship. The congregation has also found ways to accommodate those residing in Japan illegally. While only legal residents are allowed to become officers of the church (elders, deacons), anyone is welcome in the church and allowed to take leadership roles in church activities regardless of their legal status. Personal relationships play an important role. Newcomers, including this researcher, are usually greeted with the question “Whose friend are you?” or “Who introduced you?” New student members are often introduced to the church by their classmates from Japanese language schools where entire classes tend to consist of Chinese speakers. While ethnically homogenous classes allow the students to network amongst themselves, it also isolates them from interacting with others outside their ethnic group. The sense of social isolation is particularly strong for those who have not yet developed sufficient Japanese language skills. Even those who make the transition from language school to colleges and universities can experience difficulties as they suddenly have to adjust to a predominantly Japanese environment. One of the attractions of the church is that it provides, in the words of Pastor Li, “a home away from home.”18 During a sermon on November 1, 2003, Pastor Li, who was visiting from the United States, recounted proudly how a Japanese person noted with envy that the pastor seemed to have a lot of family in Japan when the pastor received frequent visits from congregation members while hospitalized. In the absence of family, the church provides a substitute home for many newcomer members. The church fellowship is understood in terms of figurative familial relationships as members refer to each other as brothers (xiongdi) and sisters ( jiemei). The elders of the church are referred to affectionately as “mother” (mama) and “uncle” (bobo). For example, a recently pub-
18
Sermon at the Tokyo International Church on November 1, 2003.
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lished biography of Mrs. Ding is entitled Feiying: Riben liuxuesheng zhi mu Ding Weirou [The Soaring Eagle: Ding Weirou, the Mother of Foreign Students in Japan].19 Every Sunday evening, a group consisting primarily of young church members gathers at “Ding Mama’s” apartment to listen to a testimonial by a church member. Despite the distinctive ethnic identity that marks the Taiwanese churches in Ikebukuro and Ogikubo and is expressed in a broader sense at the pan-Chinese church in Ebisu, there are clear similarities and connections in the histories of these Protestant churches. These churches began as bible-study groups that grew into full congregations, which initially rented meeting space, then bought condominiums, and finally constructed their own churches. All this was accomplished through the efforts of church members, who financed the project independently without external support. Because of continued growth, the congregations eventually split into mother and branch churches or sister congregations.20 There are even cross connections among the Taiwanese and the pan-Chinese congregations. In the past, the present Ikebukuro Taiwanese Church rented space in the basement of the apartment building in Harajuku belonging to Mrs. Ding, an elder at the Ebisu church. Members of the Ogikubo Taiwanese Church were also immediately familiar with the name of the Tokyo International Church in Ebisu and members admitted being on close terms with the pastor of the Chinese church in Yokohama. Furthermore, on November 16, 2003, Pastor Li, the former pastor of the Ebisu church, gave a 19
See Jin. The Tokyo International Church in Ebisu has sponsored branch churches in Tsukuba and Higashiginza and shares common roots with the Tokyo Overseas Chinese Church in Kôenji. The Tokyo Overseas Chinese Church in Kôenji is currently without a pastor because the previous pastor recently retired. The church therefore relies on help from the other Chinese churches in the Tokyo area, such as the pastors at the Ebisu church and the Yokohama Chinese Church. Similarly, the Ogikubo Taiwanese Church is the mother church of congregations in Ikebukuro, Kawagoe City (Saitama Prefecture), and Chiba City (Chiba Prefecture), all of which are Presbyterian. One church elder characterized the Ogikubo church’s relationship with an independent charismatic Taiwanese church in Takadanobaba as a sibling relationship despite their denominational differences. Even though other pan-Chinese Protestant churches that were more ethnically diverse rejected charismatic and Pentecostal approaches to Christianity, the Taiwanese Presbyterian churches were more open as long as the congregations were also Taiwanese. Whereas doctrinal differences were more important than ethnicity for pan-Chinese churches, in Taiwanese churches ethnic identity trumped doctrinal difference. Many even took an interest in non-Christian Taiwanese religions. 20
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sermon at the Ikebukuro Taiwanese Church, which is attended by his sister, and spoke at the Women’s Group of the same church on November 13, 2003 during his extended visit to Japan. According to Reverend Xie, the current pastor at the Ebisu church, these connections are based on personal relationships rather than institutional ties.21 The Pentecostal True Jesus Church: Merging Fujianese and Taiwanese Identities The network of Chinese evangelical Protestant churches does not always extend to charismatic and Pentecostal churches, which have also remained independent and often ostracized by mainline Protestant churches in mainland China and Taiwan.22 The situation is exemplified by two True Jesus Church congregations in the Tokyo area, whose case is particularly complex. The two churches belong to a Pentecostal, millenarian movement founded in Beijing in 1917. The True Jesus Church ranks with the Jesus Family and Little Flock as one of the three most important indigenous Chinese churches that originated in the early twentieth century and comprised about 25 percent of Chinese Protestants by 1949.23 In the late 1920s, True Jesus Church spread to Nanjing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and to Chinese Diaspora communities in Singapore and Malaysia. Likewise, it was introduced to Taiwan in 1926 while the island was under Japanese rule. The movement later established its headquarters in Taiwan once the movement was suppressed in mainland China in the early 1950s. In Taiwan, the True Jesus Church focused its proselytization on Taiwanese and
21 Author’s interview of Pastor Xie October 7, 2003. These cross-connections even extend across the Pacific Ocean. For example, former Tokyo International Church pastors Zhou (served 1959–1962), Li (served 1970–1978), and Wang (served 1979–1985) later relocated to the United States where they founded or became pastors of congregations in the Washington D.C., New York, and California respectively. They had been preceded by two Caucasian pastors, Reverend Pape from Canada and Reverend Kennedy from Australia, both whom had previously served as missionaries in mainland China (Dongjing Guoji Jidu Huijiao (1987) pp. 3, 5, 7, 11, 15). The church founded by Reverend Zhou has been the subject of a booklength study by Fenggang Yang. (See Yang (1999) pp. 64–65, 77–78, 157; Tseng (2003) p. 260) Similarly, Reverend Tan served at the Chinese church in Yokohama before moving to Boston in 1958 and founding his own church in 1961 (Tseng (2003) pp. 241–243). 22 Bays (1995) p. 131. 23 Lutz p. 189; Guest p. 92.
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aborigines but remained apolitical in contrast to the Taiwanese Presbyterian Church.24 It was in Taiwan that several Japanese Protestants such as Suda Kiyomoto, who had originally been a member of the Holiness Church and introduced the True Jesus Church to Japan after WWII, and Murai Jun, who later founded the indigenous Japanese Spirit of Jesus Church (Iesu no Mitama Kyôkai ), encountered the movement. In fact, as was the case with many churches under Japanese rule, the movement was Japanized by placing Japanese in leadership positions.25 Like Murai Jun’s Spirit of Jesus Church, the True Jesus Church displays a strong emphasis on Jesus, who is considered the actual founder of the movement and is understood from a Unitarian perspective, on the Holy Spirit and speaking in tongues, and on observing Saturday as the Sabbath (rather than Sunday).26 After its introduction to Japan, branches developed in Osaka (in 1955) and Tokyo (in 1951 and 1990). Presently, only the Tokyo churches in Tokorozawa (Saitama Prefecture) and Sumida Ward offer bilingual worship in Chinese and Japanese as do two house-church branches in Yokohama and Chiba.27 While the True Jesus Church in Osaka has a strong Japanese membership, the churches in Tokyo with about ninety members each have only a handful of Japanese members. Membership at the Sumida church consists largely of Fujianese, the third largest ethnic group among mainland Chinese in Tokyo,28 whereas the mother church in Tokorozawa is predominantly Taiwanese and also includes several overseas Chinese from Malaysia. At both churches, some of the younger members who are Japan born or raised prefer Japanese as their language of worship. Therefore, worship services are interpreted consecutively from Mandarin into Japanese. Hymnals and bibles are also available in Chinese, Japanese, and even English (perhaps to accommodate Southeast Asian members) so that members can choose according to their preference. Even though the two churches cooperate in joint events and some members attend both churches, some members rather travel a 24 http://www.tjctokyo.com/japan/t6.htm; Bays (1996) p. 311. 1996; Rubinstein (1996) pp. 358–359. For a detailed history of the True Jesus Church in Taiwan see Rubinstein (1991) pp. 117–140. 25 Rubinstein (1991) p. 126. 26 Mullins pp. 97, 99, 238–239. 27 http://www.tjc-osaka.com/tjc-osaka.htm; http://www.tjctokyo.com/japan/t6.htm 28 Nyûkan kyôkai pp. 100–101.
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significant distance to attend one church even though other would have been closer to their home. One Taiwanese member, at whose home the Chiba house church meets once a month, traveled two and a half hours from Chiba to Tokorozawa northwest of Tokyo than to attend the Sumida church on the eastside of Tokyo. From December 2003 to April 2004, the two churches merged temporarily under the auspices of the Sumida church while the Tokorozawa church rebuilt its facilities. Its membership had outgrown the church’s capacity due to the recent influx of students from mainland China. As typical of the True Jesus Church, prayer services are held on Saturdays rather than on Sundays; however, at the house-church branches in Yokohama and Chiba, believers meet on Sundays every week and once a month respectively. Worship services are completely non-liturgical and are structured around a sermon or a testimonial, which is framed by hymn-singing and prayer. The latter is largely performed by speaking in tongues, the distinctive mark of the True Jesus Church.29 Sermons and testimonials often emphasize the power of the Holy Spirit, especially in times of spiritual and physical weakness. In line with the exclusive message of the True Jesus Church, another important theme is the topic of salvation from damnation and eternal life for the righteous. Murray Rubinstein explains the connection between these two theological points in his study of the True Jesus Church: In the view of True Jesus theologians, as well as Pentecostal Theologians in the West, the process of endowment—in-dwelling of the Holy Spirit— is the key to Christian life. The Holy Spirit gives spiritual gifts, leads individuals to an understanding of truth, and brings forth with True Jesus believers call “the nine spiritual fruits.” If one shows one has been given the gift of the Holy Spirit, it is a demonstration that one possesses eternal life and is among the sons of God. When an individual receives this gift, he will be permitted to enter the Kingdom of God.30
As mentioned above, the focus on speaking in tongues and the Holy Spirit makes the True Jesus Church suspect to other Chinese Christians in mainland China, Taiwan, and even Japan but so far has not caused any problems with their non-Christian Japanese neighbors. The Sumida
29 Members pray in tongues twice during a session. After the leader invites them to begin, the congregation prays jointly as individuals and ceases abruptly as soon as the leader rings a bell to signal the end of the prayer. 30 Rubinstein (1996) p. 122.
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church, which is located in a modern three-story concrete building, benefits from the general anonymity that prevails in central Tokyo. However, the Tokorozawa church is found in a quiet residential, semi-rural neighborhood where parking issues and noise emanating from the church could easily become a source of conflict. The church has been able to avoid tension over parking space since most members commute by train. Members were also careful to close the windows of the church hall during segments of the worship service that were noisy, such as singing hymns and speaking in tongues. Despite these efforts, the neighbors could not but be exposed to a certain level of noise because the old hall consisted of a temporary, prefabricated structure with thin walls. In order to forestall complaints, church members ensured the continued good will of the neighborhood by paying biannual visits to adjacent houses and distributing seasonal gifts while assuring the inhabitants that church members would also offer prayers for their continued health and prosperity. While the True Jesus Church reaches out to its immediate Japanese neighbors to avoid conflict, there are no attempts to establish contact with other overseas Chinese congregations due to theological differences. To attain salvation, the True Jesus Church not only considers baptism by the Holy Spirit essential but also insists on physical full-submersion baptisms in running water. The True Jesus Church in Sumida, for example, performs its baptism in the sea in a park near Tokyo Disneyland, even in the winter cold. This is a stark contrast to the evangelical Protestant churches, which also perform full submersion baptisms but use baptismal pools inside the church. Baptisms are also a crucial aspect at these evangelical churches, which is symbolized by the central position of the baptismal pool in the front of the church behind the pulpit and the altar, but the evangelical churches display more flexibility in regard to the performance of the rite. For example, the Tokyo International Church, which has had about 400 baptisms since the mid 1990s, does not insist on rebaptism if new members were baptized elsewhere previously and allows those who are ill or infirm to be baptized by pouring water over the candidate’s head rather than insisting on full submersion. The True Jesus Church, however, demands that baptisms must follow its distinctive baptismal style and requires rebaptism for those who were previously baptized according to different rites in another church. Another distinctive characteristic of the True Jesus Church is that despite occasional baptism the majority of the members were church
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members before they came to Japan. Many learned about the True Jesus churches in the Tokyo area while still in China. Others found the churches once they arrived in Japan. Despite the institutional independence of each congregation, the awareness of other True Jesus churches in other parts of the world was high among members. In contrast, members displayed little interest in cooperation with other Protestant churches, which they consider heretical according to the theologically exclusive message of the True Jesus Church. Conclusion In conclusion, many Japanese might immediately associate the traditional festivals, temples, and shrines in Japan’s Chinatowns with the religions of the Chinese. While these may reflect issues of ethnicity and identity of the old ethnic Chinese communities, the contemporary religious activities of the newcomer Chinese are concentrated elsewhere, such as Christian churches. These churches are quite diverse theologically and institutionally comprising Catholic and Protestant churches; independent and denominationally affiliated churches; mainline, evangelical and charismatic churches; churches that cooperate with Western missionaries and those that are completely Chinese organized and led. The churches were founded in two waves. Some were founded in the 1950s when many Chinese Christians moved overseas to escape the communist revolution in mainland China and the nationalist takeover of Taiwan. Only one Taiwanese church, the Taiwanese church in Ogikubo, traces its history to the prewar period; however, even this church was formally established in the postwar period. The second wave occurred in the 1980s and 1990s as new churches, some of them branch churches of older congregations, were founded to serve the growing needs of new arrivals. These ethnic congregations provide their members opportunities to engage in social activities with other Chinese, to share language, food and culture, and find help overcoming adjustment problems in Japan. Among the contemporary Chinese Diaspora in Japan, the Taiwanese maintain the strongest ethnic identity in distinct Taiwanese churches, which often reflect little of the recent demographic changes. In Christian congregations with a majority of mainlanders, first generation Chinese tend to predominate. Congregations that consist largely
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of Taiwanese have a stronger presence of Japan-raised/born members. North America, which has a much larger number of ethnic Chinese and Chinese churches, can easily sustain churches with regional identities such as Fujianese or Cantonese, but in Japan, while some congregations are predominantly Fujianese, only the Taiwanese maintain ethnically distinct congregations. Other congregations usually also include members from other parts of China and hence use Mandarin rather than local dialects.31 Regardless of the demographics of the membership, a characteristic shared by all churches is the strong Taiwanese presence among the leadership. In some congregations, this is a fairly recent development. Others also had Taiwanese pastors several decades ago. These earlier Taiwanese leaders such as Pastor Li, who grew up in Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule, were fluent in Japanese and could help bridge the linguistic gap between Chinese-speaking and Japanese-speaking members. However, more recent Taiwanese leaders often have much weaker Japanese skills than their predecessors or even many members of their congregation. They usually completed their education and training in Taiwan and only moved to Japan to serve an overseas Chinese congregation. To accommodate the growing needs of Japanese members and Japan-raised or Japan-born Chinese, whose first language is often Japanese, some communities have begun to consider hiring Japanese assistant leaders. The future presence and growing number of Japan-raised/born Chinese will inevitably impact the ethnic character of the congregations and lead to greater Japanization. The True Jesus Church is completely different from all the other churches because the congregations have no designated pastor but only elders and deacons. The ethnic churches all experience varying degrees of Japanization through the presence of Chinese-Japanese couples and Japanborn/Japan-raised overseas Chinese members. As mentioned above, Chinese congregations are beginning to address this situation by hiring Japanese assistant pastors or occasionally inviting Japanese pastors as guest speakers. The Yokohama Overseas Chinese Christian 31 Kenneth Guest’s book is a detailed study of a Fujianese church in New York’s Chinatown. Yang (1999) mentions the predominance of Cantonese in churches founded before WWII and the use of Cantonese alongside Mandarin and English in tri-lingual churches. He also notes the link between the use of Taiwanese and the independence movement since the 1970s (pp. 100–101, 133–137).
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Church also organizes joint events with nearby Japanese and Korean churches. Despite a generally positive attitude toward Japan as a whole and a welcoming atmosphere that attracts occasional Japanese members, a sense that the priority of the overseas Chinese churches is to serve the overseas Chinese community prevails. Unlike many English-speaking and Korean churches in Japan, overseas Chinese churches tend not to engage in active proselytization among Japanese. According to Pastor Xie at the Tokyo International Church, the reasons for this lack of outreach are twofold: the lack of sufficient Japanese language skills among the ministers and racial prejudice among many Japanese, who would be less likely to accept Christianity from Chinese missionaries than from Western missionaries. This lack of outreach is also one of the factors that has made the overseas Chinese churches largely invisible to the majority of the Japanese. References Bays, Daniel H. 1995. “Indigenous Protestant Churches in China, 1900–1937: A Pentecostal Case Study.” Indigenous Responses to Western Christianity. Ed. Steven Kaplan. New York: New York University Press: 124–141. ——. 1996. “The Growth of Independent Christianity in China, 1900–1937.” Christianity in China: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present. Ed. Daniel H. Bays. Stanford: Stanford University Press: 307–316. Dongjing guoji jidu huijiao, eds. 1987. Gan’en tekan: Dongjing Guoji Jidu Jiaohui: Jiantang sanshi zhounian jinian (1957–1987). n.p.: Zhongguo Xindu Budaohui Taiwan Fenhui. ——, eds. 1996. Gan’en tekan: Dongjing Guoji Jidu Jiaohui chengli sishi zhounian. Tokyo: Dongjing guoji jidu huijiao. Douglass, Mike. 2003. “The Singularities of International Migration of Women in Japan.” Japan and Global Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society. Eds. Mike Douglass and Glenda Roberts. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press: 91–119. Douglass, Mike and Glenda Roberts. 2003. “Japan in the Global Age of Migration.” Japan and Global Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society. Eds. Mike Douglass and Glenda Roberts. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press: 3–37. Guest, Kenneth. 2003. God in Chinatown: Religion and Survival in New York’s Evolving Immigrant Community. New York: New York University Press. Guo Fang. 1999. Zainichi kakyô aidenteitei no henyô: kakyô no tagenteki kyôsei. Tokyo: Tôshindô. Jin Mingwei. 2003. Feiying: Riben liuxuesheng zhi mu Ding Weirou. Taibei: Yuzhouguang Quanren Guanhuai. Enatsu Kuniyoshi, Chen Huiling, et al., eds. 2002. Nihon Kirisuto kyôdan Ikebukuro Taiwan kyôkai: Setsuritsu nijû shûnen kinenshi. Tokyo: Nihon Kirisuto Kyôdan Ikebururo Kyôkai. Komai, Hiroshi. 2001. Foreign Migrants in Contemporary Japan. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press. Lin, Irene. 1999. “Journey to the Far West: Chinese Buddhism in America.” New Spiritual Homes: Religion and Asian Americans. Ed. David K. Yoo. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Liu, Chao-Ying. 1991. “The Structure of Chinese Church in Los Angeles Area.” M.A. thesis. Fuller Theological Seminary, School of World Mission.
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Mori, Hiromi. 1997. Immigration Policy and Foreign Workers in Japan. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Nyûkan kyôkai, ed. 2003. Zainichi gakokujin tôkei. Tokyo: Nyûkan kyôkai. Rubinstein, Murray A. 1996. “Holy Spirit Taiwan: Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity in the Republic of China.” Christianity in China: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present. Ed. Daniel H. Bays. Stanford: Stanford University Press: 353–366. Tseng, Timothy. 1999. Chinese Protestant Nationalism in the United States, 1880– 1927.” New Spiritual Homes: Religion and Asian Americans. Ed. David Yoo. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press: 19–51. Tseng, Timothy. 2003. “Trans-Pacific Transpositions: Continuities in Chinese North American Protestantism since 1965.” Revealing the Sacred in Asian and Pacific America. Eds. Jane Naomi Iwamura and Paul Spickard. New York and London: Routledge: 241–271. Wang, Wei. 2001b. Nihon Kakyô ni okeru dentô no saihen to esunishitei: saiki to geinô o chûshin ni. Tokyo: Fûkyôsha. Yang, Fenggang. 1999. Chinese Christians in America: Conversion, Assimilation, and Adhesive Identities. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. ——. 2002. “Religious Diversity among the Chinese in America.” Religious in America: Building Faith Communities. Eds. Pyong Gap Min and Jung Ha Kim. Lanham, M.D.: Altamira Press: 71–98. Zhang Yuling. 2003. “Zainichi kakyô no ‘Chûgoku bunka’ kan to kakyô bunka no sôshutsu—Yokohama kakyô ni yoru shishimai no denshô keitai kara.” Kokusai kaihatsu kenkyû foram. 23: 223–242. URLs http://www.moj.go.jp/index.html [website of the Japanese Ministry of Justice] http://www.sjchina-japan.org/Japanese/j-newyear3.htm [website of the Jesuit China Center] http://www.tjctokyo.com/japan/t6.htm [website of the True Jesus Church in Tokyo] http://www.tjc-osaka.com/tjc-osaka.htm [website of the True Jesus Church in Osaka]
PART TWO
JAPANESE-BRAZILIANS AND BRAZILIANS EXPERIENCE
RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES AMONG THE JAPANESE-BRAZILIANS: “DUAL DIASPORA” IN JAPAN Regina Yoshie Matsue University of Tsukuba, Japan This essay deals with the relationship between displacement and religious practices among Japanese-Brazilians in Japan. They have been pointed out as a new minority group within the Japanese society (Watanabe 1995; Tsuda 1999; Komai 2001; Roth 2001; Carvalho 2003). With the conjunction of a severe Brazilian economic crisis and a shortage of unskilled labor in Japan, the Nikkeijin1 (mainly second and third generation of Japanese descendents) started to come or “return”2 to Japan in the early 1990’s as temporary migrant laborers to work in factories and companies. Many members of this group are characterized as “double alienated minority” (Tsuda 1999), or, in a certain extent, it can be called as “dual diaspora”3 (Linger 2003: 211) “suspended between two possible homelands”. “The Nikkeijin; nisei and sansei frequently consider their country of birth and residence as ‘home’—the natal homeland of Brazil, while also speaking of their affiliation with a distant ancestral land—the ethnic homeland of Japan. However, since the ethnic homeland has only been imagined from afar, ‘return’ migration can challenge and disrupt their previous feelings of nostalgic affiliation toward it. In fact, when the Japanese descendants ‘return migrate’, they are socially alienated from their ethnic homeland because they are marginalized (and marginalize themselves inside the ethnic communities) as foreigners in Japan” (Tsuda 2000: 5). 1 This term normally refers to those who are “overseas Japanese”, or members of Japanese diaspora, and did not refer to those who live in Japan. The term Nikkei, which mean “sun line” ( Japanese ideogram), is also widely used to designate people who have this Japanese ancestry, and normally is associated to the generation. For example, issei (first generation of Japanese), nisei (second generation), sansei (third generation), yonsei (forth generation), and so on (see Roth 2002: 23). 2 Some recent scholarly literature (Yamanaka 2000; Tsuda 1999; Linger 2003) has described Japanese Brazilian migration to Japan as a return. 3 Despite Linger employs the term “dual diaspora” to characterize the Brazilians in Japan, he points out few objections related to the use of the term. (Linger 2003: 210).
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The majority of the recent studies related to the Japanese Brazilians in Japan focused on the analysis of the historical-structural and economic forces that have driven these people to migrate (Yamanaka 2000). Other different studies deal with the issue of being homelandless and ethnic identity (Tsuda 1999; Yamanaka 2000; Roth 2002; Carvalho 2003; Lesser 2003). The later shed light on crucial aspects of the phenomenon of Japanese Brazilian migration to Japan. Nevertheless, they do not consider the role of religious activities; the meaning and support that religion can offer to the migrants to cope with their condition of displacement. Scope of this Study According to Tsuda (1999: 713), 18 percent of the entire JapaneseBrazilian population currently resides in Japan (around 260,000 people). The Japanese background of these migrants presents us with a very peculiar religious configuration—the Nikkei community in Brazil was the door through which Japanese religions entered into that country. In the beginning of the Japanese migration settlement in Brazil, the Japanese religious groups attended exclusively to the needs of the Japanese community; they were considered ethnic religious groups. In Brazil, however, the groups currently have been spreading outside of the Japanese community, and 90% of the Japanese new religions members are non-Japanese. In addition, many Nikkei had been converted to Catholicism (53%) and other still belong to Japanese new religions (31%).4 Taking into account that the Japanese Brazilians are the third largest group among foreigners in Japan, the largest group among new comers,5 and that the religious phenomenon among them have not been deeply explored,6 this article reflects and analyzes the religious activities among these migrants in Japan. Considering that the two largest groups among the Nikkei are the Catholics and the Japanese
4
Centro de Estudos Nippo-Brasileiros (Research Center of Japanese-Brazilians) 1991. The settlement of Korean and Chinese communities retrace go back over more than fifty years. The new comers are these migrants who started to come to Japan in end of 1980’s. For additional information see Komai 2001. 6 There are two researches that bring information about religious activities among Brazilians in Japan—Higuchi (1998) and Ishi (1995), but none of them related to the Catholics activities. 5
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new religions, the present study focuses on the particular case of Catholics (the Brazilian main religious group), and two representative groups of Japanese new religious—Soka Gakkai and Sekai Kyuseikyo. Before analyzing the religious activities of Japanese Brazilian new comers in Japan, this article first provides some insights on the concept of diaspora as a useful instrument to analyze the group religious affiliations. Subsequently, it brings a historical analysis of the Japanese diaspora in Brazil and its religious aspects—the importance of religion in the definition of ethnic identity of the Japanese Brazilians in that country. And then, it considers the religious engagement of the Japanese Brazilians’ “dual diaspora” in Japan, based on the analysis of three different religious groups mentioned above. In addition, the article attempts to shed light on the process of adaptations that these groups have been implementing in order to deal with the presence of Japanese Brazilian in their local Japanese gathering places. This essay is based on the data collected from March 2003 until December 2004. During this period, a fieldwork—observation of gatherings places, festivals, and interviews with the staffs and members of the three groups was carried out around Kanto7 region. In the case of the Catholic Church, the scope of this work is focused on the Diocese of Saitama, which includes the Bishop that is in charge for the catholic activities in Saitama, Ibaraki, Gunma and Tochigi prefectures. This Diocese provides services in Portuguese for around 12 churches and attends around 35,742 Brazilians.8 Soka Gakkai group will be analyzed from the scope of the “Esperança” (Hope) group composed exclusively by Brazilians, which meets once a month in Tokyo, and has other secondary monthly gatherings scattered around Kanto region (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Gunma, and Ibaraki prefectures). Soka Gakkai claims to have around 1,500 Brazilians members, and around 4,500–5,000 members in the whole country. In the case of Sekai Kyuseikyo, since 20009 frequent visits have been made to its “Sacred Grounds” in Atami, Hakone and Kyoto cities. Since March 2003, observations have been conducting in the north of 7 The Kanto region consists of 7 prefectures; Chiba, Gunma, Ibaraki, Saitama, Tochigi, Kanagawa, and Tokyo. 8 In “Statistics of the Catholic Church in Japan” (2000), http://www.cbcj.catholic.jp/ jpn/data/00data.htm 9 See Matsue (2003) “Overseas Japanese New Religion: The Expansion of Sekai Kyuseikyo in Brazil and Australia” Yakara—Studies in Ethnology: Tsukuba Anthropology Study Group, number 33, pp. 20–35.
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Saitama Kumagaya city; this place also receives Brazilians members from Gunma (Ota and Oizumi towns with large concentration of Brazilians). This group alleges the existence of about four thousand Brazilian members around Japan, and approximately one thousand in the Kanto region. Diaspora and Religion In an attempt to bring new perspectives, and conceptualize about the new persistent national, cultural or religious enclaves in the context of displacement, many researchers are progressively employing the concept of diaspora.10 “For scholars of various disciplines of humanities, the term seemed to sociologically capture the group-related institutionalization and the evolving society. In addition, the term’s emotion-laden connotations of uprootedness, precariousness and homesickness provided explanations for the group’s enduring and nostalgic loyalty to the cultural and religious traditions of the country of origin” (Baumann 2000: 314). According to Safran (1991), the sentiments and diaspora consciousness are strongly associated to the myth of return to the imagined homeland to which diaspora people will be always attached. According to the author, diasporic experience implies a perpetual recollecting identification with a fictitious or far away existent geographic territory and its cultural-religious traditions are taken as diaspora constitutive. This emotion laden and identification with the homeland’s cultural tradition is the primordial characteristic of diaspora people, and in most cases it is closely related to religious allegiance. In the modern sense, diaspora definition, according to Baumann (2000), places emphasis on the enduring identification of a group of people with a cultural-religious point of reference outside the current country of living. This situation in a migration process can happen but not in all cases. This cultural-religious identification bound to a region and a culture outside the current country of residence, con-
10 The history of the semantics of diaspora points to several changes of the term’s meaning. As is fairly well known, diaspora is a Greek term, which means to scatter, to spread or disperse. However, the term has strong entailment with the Jewish historical experience, and hence being associated with being a dispersed people sharing a common religious and cultural heritage (see Baumann 2000, and Vertovec 2000).
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stitutes an important aspect of the fundamental tripolar interrelatedness of diaspora group, country of origin and country of residence. This approach redirects the attention and awareness to the role of religious identity in situations of settlement after migration, and the demarcation and strengthening of collective identity in a culturally foreign environment. In this sense, religion provides additional cement to bind diasporic consciousness among the group (Cohen 1995). This consciousness, however, is marked by a “dual nature” (Vertovec 1999: 8). “It is constituted negatively by experiences of discrimination and exclusion, and positively by identification with an historical or religious heritage”, which means that a diasporic individual is aware about their “decentred attachments”, of being simultaneously “home away from home”. According to Vertovec (2000) this “multi-locality” also stimulates the need to conceptually connect oneself with others. This essay considers that the notion of “tripolar interrelatedness” viz., between the migrant groups that is to say, the place of origin, the host society, and the diasporic consciousness of being “home away from home” is useful in order to consider the Japanese Brazilians in Japan and their religious allegiance. These migrants are finding alternative ways of allegiance and socialization through religious practices (as did they ancestors in Brazil). Religion can represent the bridge that connects the old world with the new. Faced with changes and challenges in every aspect of their lives, migrants sought to recreate the religious practices and faith of their homeland in their place of settlement (Handlin in Hirschman, 2003). In migrating to other countries people bring their religion with them, and their religious identities often mean more to them, when they are away from home, in their diaspora (Warner and Wittner 1998; Ebaugh and Chafetz 2000). In addition, as pointed out by Ninian Smart (1987), the connections between religion, diaspora, and their modes of adaptation can give us insights into general patterns of religious transformation occurred in the host countries. In this sense, one can say that Japanese migration to Brazil brought some elements that influenced and changed the Brazilian religious scenery, and currently the Brazilians are bringing influence to the religious scenery in Japan. Before analyzing the Japanese Brazilians’ religious activities in Japan, it is necessary to give a brief background about the group’s religious activities in Brazil.
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regina yoshie matsue The Japanese Diaspora in Brazil and their Religious Activities
The historical experience of Japanese migration to Brazil brings some elements that allow us to refer to the group as a diaspora, as it was pointed out above. Japanese migration to Brazil started officially in 1908. From this year, Brazil, whose coffee industry was in expansion and in need of workers, began to attract increasing numbers of Japanese migrants. The flow of migrants to Brazil reached its highest levels between 1924–34, falling down during the war period, and having a little increment in the 1950’s. Currently, there are approximately 1.5 million citizens of Japanese descendent in Brazil (Clarke, 2000: 273). In the early years, Japanese migrants lived on the fazendas (farms) together with other migrants while fostered the dream of returning home after accumulating a considerable amount of capital. “It has been widely emphasized that when the Issei (first generation) left Japan they expected to remain in Brazil only temporarily” (Carvalho 2003: 36). As they became independent farmers they settled together and formed colonies (communities of Japanese). In spite of living in Brazil, the social structure and orientation within these colonies reproduced the traditional rural Japanese community, the Mura. The migrants had a strong attachment to Japan and Japanese cultural and religious traditions, customs, and language were also reproduced inside the communities. In this way, the communal life was based on traditional ties; marriage was largely intra-ethnic, and they built up their own Japanese schools and facilities. In addition, a network of family ties, associations, and newspapers interconnected the colonies. These migrants brought with them ideals, expectations, and their religiosity based on the cultural religious setting of Japan. In the traditional Japan there was a narrow relationship between religion and kinship organization—Ie11 (household) inside the villages, which provided the element of alliance among the households, and with the main household of the same village. In general, “every village had a Shinto shrine and virtually had a Buddhist temple, and the Ie held a Shinto altar and a Buddhist one (butsu-dan)”. In this traditional system, the primogenitor inherits the family properties as well as the
11
The term Ie, it refers to the “household” in Japanese.
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responsibility for taking care of the Ie and worship the ancestors. Those who migrated to Brazil, however, were the second born sons (individually or only with a nuclear family). Consequently the Japanese migrant communities in Brazil, at least in the early years, were characterized almost by the total absence of kin groupings and a lack of consciousness of Ie rooted in the Brazilian soil. Besides, both countries, fearing the non-assimilation of Japanese into Catholic Brazilians did not allow the official coming of Japanese Buddhist monks or Shinto clerics (Maeyama 1983). Despite this restriction and the relatively non-interest related to religious matters presented by the migrants, some authors (Alves Pereira 2001; Nakamaki 1989; Maeyama 1983) pointed out the presence of a Buddhist monk (belonging to Honmon Butsuryo-shu and Jodo Shinshu sects), and few Japanese new religious groups, such as Tenrikyo Seicho-no-Ie, and Omotokyo, among the migrants. Even though they came as common workers, they also had the intention to work for the propagation of their faith in Brazil. However, these groups’ activities and rituals suffered anti-Japanese manifestations, particularly during the Word War II (Watanabe 2001). In the 1930’s the Brazilian military regime encouraged strong nationalistic feeling and migrant communities were taken under suspicion. Japanese migrants suffered strong attacks, while European migrants were accepted. Due to the fact that the Brazilian government, at that time, was encouraging eugenic ideals among the Brazilian population (Carvalho 2003), the Japanese were not accepted as part of national identity,12 because their physical and cultural aspects were represented as “yellow element” (Lesser 2003), i.e., not desirable in the Brazilian national formation. In 1934, with the revision of migration laws, a compulsory assimilation program, designed to foment patriotism was established, and teaching in foreigner languages was strictly forbidden in 1937 (Carvalho 2003: 19). Public gatherings, language publications and newspapers by foreigners were prohibited. From the 1940’s, particularly after the Pearl Harbor attack, the relations between Brazil and Japan were restricted, and consequently, in 1942, Brazil broke off the diplomatic
12 Generally speaking, the Brazilian nation and identity is formed by the belief of a country constituted by three original races: the Portuguese white settler, the native Indian, and the Black slave (the myth of three races).
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relations with Japan. These measures by the Brazilian government encouraged patriotic movements among the migrants of ultranationalistic secret societies.13 The Japanese migrants in Brazil tended to form ethnic enclaves, which were very heterogeneous in terms of previous affiliation with prefecture,14 village and Ie in Japan. In this way, according to Maeyama (1983), the only binding force among the members was the sharing of ethnicity, and the only transcendental figure of worship was the Emperor. “The Emperor of Japan became a tutelary deity (for the group) for the Japanese in Brazil, and represented the symbol, which gave integration and expressed the ethnic identity solidarity among the pre-war migrants” (1983: 185). The context and relationship between the Japanese migrants and their religious practices changed drastically after the Japanese defeat in WWII. When many migrants, facing the reality that Japan was destroyed by the war, opted to stay permanently in Brazil. Simultaneously, there were a changes in social status and urbanization of the migrants. In 1958, according to Maeyama (1983), 45% of ethnic Japanese already lived in urban areas. With the urbanization Japanese religions tended to center their activities and establish their base in the urban centers with high concentration of Japanese migrants, such as São Paulo, thereby creating better conditions for the propagation of their religions. In the 1950’s, after the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Brazil and Japan, and the attenuation of the anti-Japanese feeling among Brazilians, many Japanese Buddhist groups went to Brazil, such as Jodo Shinshu, Otani-ha, Jodo-shu, Shingon-shu, and Nichirenshu to work among the migrants. In the same period many other Japanese New Religious groups such as Sekai Kyuseikyo Perfect Liberty, Soka Gakkai, and Konkokyo, among others started their activities among the Japanese communities in Brazil. According to Maeyama (1983:
13 “The largest and the most famous of all the organizations was Shindo Renmei (The Federation of Loyal Subjects). The major objective of Shindo Renmei was to unite all people of Japanese descent within an ultranationalistic system under the paternal control of the Emperor. It was deemed to be essential to turn the Japanese in Brazil back into “real Japanese” through worship of the Emperor and the preservation of Shintoism (Carvalho 2003: 23). See also Moraes, Fernando (1998) “Corações Sujos: A História da Shindo Renmei, São Paulo: Companhia das Letras”. 14 In Japan, people who share home prefecture are closely united, and tend to form associations with their compatriots. See Matsuoka 2000: 4.
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61), the ethnic Japanese discovered another “Japan”, within the Brazilian domain, through the practice of Japanese religion. In the first moment, the Japanese religious groups represented a substitute for the emperor cult, and the groups’ strategies to proselytize among the migrants still tended towards a strong nationalism (Alves Pereira 2001). The groups stressed the necessity to maintain and preserve the Japanese ethnicity through cultural values, traditional religious ritual and language. In this way, according to Maeyama (1983: 236), for many migrants and their offspring, Japanese religions offered, a framework in which Japanese ethnic identity was effectively expressed. Their practices and doctrines offered a kind of channel for them to re-interpret and redress their ethnic identity, which had to be, in some way, incorporated into Brazilian national society. In doing so, however, “Japanese values and symbols have characteristically persisted and were conspicuous in these groups”. (Ibid.) Nevertheless, it doesn’t mean that the Japanese Brazilians form a consistent, coherent, and integrated group in which diverse values, culture, and identity are interplaying with each other. “Japanese and Brazilian values, Buddhism, Shintoism, Catholicism and other religious concepts and symbols are interpreted and manipulated differently by individuals depending upon the situation they find, identity they forge, and social strategy they create”. (Ibid.) Japanese New Religions among Japanese Brazilians Engagement with Buddhism and its practices among the migrants was related to the funerals and ancestor worship. Nevertheless, the traditional Japanese religions started to lose their formal adherents, as was observed by Maeyama (1983: 64), quickly in the course of generational change. A good number of Japanese also started to be involved, at least formally, with Catholicism, as they became urban middle-class. As a strategy “to prevent any possible difficulty for their children in the Brazilian context and also to respond to social pressures, many of the Japanese parents have decided to baptize their Brazilborn children”. (Ibid.) This strategy was characterized as a superficial conversion, but not necessarily accompanied by internalization of faith. Many others opted to become affiliated to Japanese new religious groups. Many ethnic Japanese, from second and later generations, have found in the Japanese new religious groups in Brazil a way of returning
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to the Buddhist or Shinto tradition of their parents. The worldview offered by Japanese new religions, according to Hardacre (1986), is continuous with Japanese culture as a whole, adopting Japanese cultural and religious patterns. In this way, new religion teachings and doctrines incorporate themes that are important features of the culture, such as ancestor worship, and filial devotion and reinterpreted them. Unlike from the traditional religions, the new religious groups offer response to people’s problems, they set in motion predictable chains of thought, emotion, and activity that led people to act in roughly predictable way. In the counseling sessions, leaders redefine and reinterpret the follower problems, sickness, familial strife, and economic misfortune. These are clearly not raw situations but can represent an opportunity to develop and improve someone’s life conditions. In Brazil, the leaders of Japanese new religions, such as Seicho-noIe, Soka Gakkai, Sekai Kyuseikyo, usually re-interpreted the migrants’ history and their sufferings—giving a sense of mission to them (this also happens in Japan). The migrants started to believe that their life conditions could change if they work for the group’s religious proselytization among their compatriots. Nevertheless, from the early 1960s, a second phase of the new religious groups began, with a large-scale penetration into non-Japanese society, and many groups started to achieve relative success among Brazilians. Overall, one can say that diversification and expansion of Japanese New Religions has continued until now (Nakamaki 1989; Watanabe 2001). Currently, according to Matsuoka (2005),15 Japanese religious groups together have more than one million followers in Brazil.16 On the other hand, the activities of traditional Buddhist groups tended to stay restricted to the limits of Japanese ethnic groups.17
15 Paper presented at the “XIX World Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions”, Tokyo March of 2005. 16 In the last two decades, researchers have been dealing with the production of complex and dynamic process of local interaction, adaptations and changes suffered by Japanese new religions in the Brazilian religious scenery (Maeyama 1983; Nakamaki 1989; Matsuoka 2000; Alves Pereira 2001). 17 The exception is Zen Buddhism, which successfully overcame the limits Japanese communities and gained majority of Brazilian adepts. See Rocha, Cristina (2000), in Journal of Global Buddhism http//www.globalbuddhism.org “Zen Buddhism in Brazil: Japanese or Brazilian?” vol. 1, 31–55.
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The Japanese Brazilian Diaspora in Japan Brazil became the definitive country for the migrants and their offspring. Despite the “assimilation” and the “integration” of the subsequent generations in the Brazilian society, they are still associated and called as Japanese, they are always taken as “Japanese”, who live in Brazil, but never as only Brazilians (Lesser 2003, Carvalho 2003 and Linger 2003). In this way, many of the Japanese offspring identify themselves as part of the Japanese diaspora in Brazil. . . . Diaspora membership is thus kinship writ large. “Nikkei are relatives of Japanese” because they are tied by blood to common ancestors. Second, the group history is reckoned from a particular moment, a primordial era in which ancestors inhabited homeland. Nikkei “originated” in Japan . . . Third, a key element in the historical narrative is an exodus from the native land . . . Finally, the descendants, now scattered among alien populations are thought to long for and have the right to return to their primordial territory (Linger 2003: 209–10).
However, Linger also calls attention to the ideological and political load present in the concept of diaspora. “To characterize a set of persons as a diaspora is therefore to constitute an ethnic group and impute it a historical trajectory, moral entitlements, and a collective mental state” (2003: 210). And, it can include a commitment and acceptance of Japanese government’s view, especially some politicians,18 and also Japanese Brazilians themselves. The Nikkei in general shares the myth of homeland, and feels, to a certain extent, alienated in Brazil, and self-identify themselves as Nikkei. The Nikkei label and their feelings toward being part of a diaspora can vary through generations19 (nisei, sansei, and mestizos)20 from person to person (Linger 2003). The Japanese who migrated to Brazil did relatively well, many managed to acquire farmers and to establish small businesses. Those from the second and third generations graduated from Brazilian high schools, and often attended prestigious universities, entered the professions and married Brazilians, raising mestizo children. Brazil, however, better off than it was during the great wave of Japanese
18 Usually Japanese politicians consider overseas Japanese community as a diaspora. See Roth 2001 and Linger 2003. 19 See Lesser 2003 and Carvalho 2003. 20 Term utilized to nominate the children of nikkeis with non-nikkeis Brazilian.
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On the other hand, Japan was suffering from a deficit of unskilled industrial labor. The Japanese government was uncomfortable with the presence of illegal workers from Asian countries and found in the Japanese Brazilians an alternative labor force. Many nikkeis started to try their luck in Japan, and the Brazilians nikkei organizations began to lobby the Japanese government to offer overseas Japanese special entry considerations (Linger 2001: 22).
In 1990, the Japanese immigration bureau expedited the processing visa applications from second and third-generation of nikkei. These descendants acquired the right to work in Japan. According to each generation, a specific time is allowed, three years for the niseis and one year for the sanseis. An increasing number of nikkeis from different generations, mestizos (offspring of Japanese with other several groups), and also spouses without Japanese ancestry (non-nikkei) migrated from Brazil to Japan in order to work (Roth 2002). With the arrival in Japan it was evident that “they were not Japanese”. This situation triggered a mental distancing from Japan and an intensified attachment to Brazil (Tsuda 1999; Yamanaka 2000). “Even if such nikkeis felt themselves to be Japanese in Brazil, they become Brazilians in Japan. In a manner of speaking many diasporic Japanese turn into diasporic Brazilians” (Linger 2003: 211), longing for return. Diaspora identities are those, which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference (Stuart Hall 1990: 312) in a dynamic process. Many Japanese Brazilians when they come to Japan tend to construct their identities as Brazilians contrasting to the native Japanese. The bulk of the Brazilians came as temporary workers. However, many of them are caught in the process of circular migration, shuttling back and forth between Brazil and Japan (Roth 2002; Yamanaka 2000). These migrants cannot remain in Brazil because many of them lost their jobs or occupations when decided to migrate to Japan. Nevertheless, being economically and socially displaced, they do not wish to remain in Japan where they are ethnically and socially marginalized as foreigners. The hegemonic discourse of cultural homo-
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geneity still has a strong influence on the Japanese society worldview.21 For this reason, the Japanese Brazilians undergo the fate common to many migrants in the world. They are accepted as second-class citizens, following the same pattern of other minority populations in Japan, such as the Chinese, and the Koreans. (Komai 2001; Carvalho 2003). Many of these migrants have been living in Japan for more than 10 years and, in a more recent trend, few of them are starting to settle permanently into the Japanese society. The Brazilian community in Japan22 offers many services and facilities, which makes life in Japan comfortable. The Japanese Brazilians are conscious of differences between themselves and the Japanese, and tend to withdraw themselves from situations that might demand interaction with the locals (Carvalho 2003). In their search for value and meaning in their lives in Japan, many migrants found alternative sources in the religious practices. A number of Japanese-Brazilians in Japan opted for the Catholicism,23 which also implies the option for the celebration of the Brazilian identity. Others are finding in the Japanese new religions a meaningful instrument to deal with their Japanese background. The following section provides an analysis of the Catholic activities among Japanese Brazilians in Japan. The Catholic Brazilians in Japan The sudden coming of many Latin American workers, particularly the Brazilians, to Japan originated a demand for services and support from the Japanese Catholic Church. The apparent “acquired religious” behavior is mainly motivated by feelings of despair due to the stress of living in a foreign country, separation and isolation from relatives and friends. It also offers an opportunity to the migrants to socialize (Carvalho 2003:115). 21
Nihonjiron: an ideology based on the belief of the uniqueness of Japanese culture and society. Japanese culture and “blood” are the basic components of this ideology. (See Befu 1993). 22 The Brazilian communities are concentrated in a short string of highly industrialized prefectures, such as Aichi, Shizuoka, Gunma, Nagano, and Kanagawa. See Roth 2001. 23 Besides the Catholics and Japanese New religions, there is a list of few groups that are doing advertisement on “The International Press”, the main newspaper for Brazilians in Japan—in their majority Protestant and Pentecostal groups (April, 2003).
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In this way, the churches provide spiritual and emotional support, and, at the same time, a range of material aid and information, congregationally based social networks constitute a major mechanism through which migrants begin to adapt to their new community (Hirschman 2003; Ebaugh and Chafetz 2000). The Catholic Church offers Catholic Mass and services in Portuguese at least once a month, and also pastoral services, such as Baptism, education of children in the faith. In addition to religious services, Catholic missionaries, priests and nuns have established a network to assist Latin Americans in Japan, of whom Brazilians are a group. In the Kanto area, the Diocese of Saitama created a volunteer group called Open House, which offers pastoral and social assistances—about work laws, social benefits, and health. Furthermore, the group helps people with personal and labor problems, offers services such as raising money to pay for a return ticket for those who cannot afford it. Besides, it also provides visits, spiritual support, clothes and other items to the ones who are in the prison or are unemployed. In the very beginning of the massive coming of these workers, the church represented the first place of socialization and encounter for them. A place where they could gather and speak their language, express their faith and enjoyment among the compatriots. The churches also offered their space to migrants to congregate and cook typical foods, such as Brazilian barbecue (churrasco), beans and pork meal ( feijoada). Fifteen years ago, the availability of Brazilian products was scarce, articles such as Brazilian beans and meat was really expensive. At that time, the act of eating, amusing themselves and speaking in their native language had a deep religious meaning for those migrants. On the other hand, the coming to Japan for many migrants represented a “rediscovery” of God and the Catholicism (Mira, 2003: 149).
However, the position of the Catholic Church as the space par excellence of migrant’s socialization was put back by the creation and availability of a community’s network services. Currently, the migrants have a specialized system of services in Portuguese shops, restaurants, and media. The Catholic Church in Japan, following the orientation of the regional bishops, has been trying to work toward the integration of the migrants to the Japanese congregations, seeking to promote a better understanding and communication among Japanese and Brazilians members.
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The Challenge for Innovation The presence of Latin American migrants in the Japanese congregations represents, at the same time, an opportunity to expand the membership and a challenge for innovation. The Catholic Church is trying to provide services in Portuguese, such as rituals and dailylife orientations as a way to bring people to the church, giving support and a link to the way of life in their homeland. The Japanese congregations, however, were not prepared to receive the migrants. At the first moment the presence of the Brazilians, and other Latin American migrants at the churches represented an invasion for many Japanese. Because of the history of persecution24 and the group oriented mentality the Japanese Catholic congregations tend to be closed in their communities, which represented a barrier to the migrants (Mira, 2003). In this way, according to Mira (2003), the integration of Brazilians into Japanese congregations is still an ideal. Besides the language and cultural barriers, differences between Catholic tradition in Brazil and Japan did not allow a good interaction. Brazil has a majority of Catholic population; the Catholic values are disseminated through the society, where the social engagement, to a certain extent, is emphasized. But in Japan the Catholic population is reduced to a minority of 0.5%, and because of its history the Japanese Catholicism became formal and stagnated. In this system, despite representing around 50% of the entire Catholic population in Japan, occupying empty seats in the Japanese congregation, the migrants are treated as “guests” by the locals (Mira, 2003: 149).
Taking the above-mentioned into consideration, many congregations are adding the migrants’ popular festivities to their annual calendar in order to promote some interaction. Brazilians are taking part in the annual bazaar, selling typical foods. In addition, Brazilians started to promote typical feasts, part of a popular form of Catholicism in Brazil, which brings a new tone to the Japanese congregations.25 Few Brazilian Catholic communities around Kanto region, with large
24 See Nelson (2002) “The mistrusts and fate of Christianity in 16th and 17th century” in History and Anthropology vol. 13 (2), pp. 93–111. 25 See Nogami Y. and Takahashi R. (2003) “Situacion de los Sudamericanos”, in La Inmigracion Latino-Americana el Japon, Graduate School of Languages and Cultures: Nagoya University.
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concentration of Brazilians, such as in Saitama, Tochige and Gunma prefectures, have been engaging in the promotion of festivities with the local population. The most emblematic of this feast is the one celebrated in June ( festa Junina),26 which has originated in the Brazilian popular Catholicism. As a Brazilian sister who works among the Brazilians in Saitama Diocese pointed it out, the negotiation between the two communities still is a difficult task. In spite of using the same church, Brazilians and Japanese parishes have still many obstacles to overcome. They assert that language barrier frustrates their attempts to gather and do activities together. Sometimes, the exchange between the two communities is almost nonexistent. The Japanese annual calendar is not distributed among the Brazilians, and they do their ceremonies and celebrations separately. Therefore, the existence of the two communities inside the same congregation makes necessary the effort of some priests and sisters acting as mediators—usually people who can speak Japanese and Portuguese. Additionally, the scarce number of these team of people makes difficult for the church to get organized through migrant communities. Attending to the Saitama Diocese area, there are officially two Japanese-Brazilian sisters, and around four priests—two Brazilians, a Swiss, and a Japanese priest (both of them can speak Portuguese fluently). According to the sisters, the bishop is worried about the Brazilian community’s demand for clerics, a fact, which made him send to Brazil a Japanese young priest in order to learn the language, and be familiarized with the Brazilian Catholic customs and tradition. The sister, however, still complains that these priests do not have enough time and cannot attend to the necessities of all Brazilian communities in this Diocese. Besides, since April 2005 a Brazilian senior priest, who came to work in the Tokyo Diocese, has been carrying out Portuguese services and mass in two churches in Ibaraki (at Tsuchiura and Ishige cities), and one church in Tochigi (Moka city). The demand for clerics is a problem yet to be solved. However, this situation forced the creation of communication and interchange between the two churches. A sister who works among the Brazilians says,
26 Festa Junina is a typical Brazilian feast celebrated by the Catholic Church since the colonial period. See Amaral Rita (2001) “Festa à Brasileira: Sentidos do Festejar no País que não é Sério”. E-Books Brasil.
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Many Japanese bishops from the areas with high concentration of Brazilians, such as Nagano, Aichi and Kanto region are visiting Brazil and sending young priests to study in Brazil. And also the bishop of our Diocese visited Brazil a couple of times as an attempt to create a dialogue and call the attention for the need of clerics for the Brazilian communities in Japan. I believe that the exchange tends to increase in the next few years, but it is still in its inception. The Encounter of Two Gaps According to this sister referred to above, “in Japan there is an encounter of two gaps”. In addition to the difficulty of dealing with the “foreigner” in the Japanese congregations, there is a gap of evangelization among the Nikkeis in Brazil. Because of their Japanese background, the Nikkei did not receive a solid catholic education. Many of them did not take part in the Catholic communities in Brazil. Despite this situation, the Brazilians represent a huge improvement to the Japanese small local congregations. Based on the observations and interviews among the Brazilians one can affirm that those who have a strong attachment to the Catholic faith are the non-nikkei Brazilians. As was pointed out earlier, Catholicism is not a matter of faith for the nikkei, around 80% of the migrants’ Catholic couples have a non-nikkei as a partner; who usually is the most active one at church, and expresses a strong attachment to their Brazilian roots. There is a search and a preference to the services in the native language among the Brazilians. A Brazilian Catholic member pointed out that she admires the disciplined atmosphere of the Japanese mass, but she prefers the Brazilian way, a very informal and relaxed way that allows her “feel at home”. As such, the Brazilians are not considering important the interaction with the Japanese in their monthly mass. The only contact they have is during the annual feast or celebrations that are carried out by the community as a whole. As for the Catholicism, the migrants are finding meaning and reaffirming their Brazilian identity in Japan through religious practices and festivities. Religious values also provide support for traditional beliefs and practices, such as intergenerational obligations and customary familial practices that are threatened with the adaptation of the second generation to the culture of the host country. Catholicism is the instrument that they can use to reproduce and negotiate their
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ethnic identity among their offspring. All interviewees emphasized not only the relevance of bringing up their children in the Catholic faith, but also the awareness of being a Brazilian in Japan. Japanese New Religions Activities among Brazilians in Japan Japanese new religions first appeared in Japan in the late Tokugawa time, gained strength after Meiji restoration, and became prominent after WWII. Differences in opinion also exist in terms of what kind of movements should be included in the category of new religions.27 No clear standard has been established, but most scholars consider a religion to be “new” if it created by a new leader and called by a new name. “Generally speaking the Japanese new religious groups promise followers with ‘this-world-benefits’ in the forms of healing, solution of family problems, and material prosperity. In ethics they emphasize family solidarity and quality of sincerity, frugality, harmony, diligence, and filial piety. Between laity and leaders there is only a vague dividing line, and for the most part, anyone may acquire leadership credentials”, differently from the traditional groups (Hardacre 1986: 5).
In Brazil, the Japanese new religious activities started with the coming of Japanese, in the beginning of the twenty-century. As mentioned earlier, the Japanese new religious movements developed, firstly, among the migrants. Currently, despite the majority being non-nikkeis Brazilians, many groups still maintain the leadership tradition among the nikkeis.28 Consequently, as Ishi (1995) and Watanabe (2001) pointed out, the coming of many nikkei to Japan caused a loss of leaders and membership for these groups in Brazil. In order to deal with this problem and attend the needs of the Brazilians members in Japan, many groups started to provide services in Portuguese for the migrants, and at the same time they saw in it an opportunity to gain newcomers among the migrants. 27 For more details see Hardacre 1986; Shimazono 1991; Alves Pereira 2001, among others. 28 According to Alves Pereira (2001), currently many groups of the Japanese new religious groups present a diversity of membership, with 90% of non-nikkei members; however, this is not reflecting the internal organization, where the position in the hierarchical system and leadership are still occupied by nikkeis.
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From the 1990’s, many new religious groups started to make known their religious activities through newsletters and community networks. Problems related to personal relationship, dissatisfaction, and homesickness is common. When the migrants look for professional help many troubles related to miscommunication occurred: not being able to speak Japanese properly, the migrants find themselves unable to fully express their feelings. The Japanese new religious groups perceiving these problems among the migrants started to cater for these communities, taking people to work as intermediate between the migrants and locals. Sekai Kyuseikyo and Soka Gakkai, two groups of Japanese new religions that reached relatively success in Brazil, are currently providing support, services and a sense of belonging to the Brazilians migrants in Japan. For many Nikkei, being a member of Japanese new religious group can be a familiar legacy; through generations the religious affiliation is maintained, for others is an individual option. In the interviews with the Nikkei members, it was observed that the membership and religious practice in Japan allowed them to develop into strong attachment to the group after some hardships and emotional problems. Sekai Kyuseikyo’s Activities among the Brazilians in Japan Sekai Kyuseikyo29 was founded in 1935 by Mokichi Okada, and it’s headquarter is located in Atami city, Shizuoka prefecture. In Japan there are 840.000 believers, their faith is based on the pillars of the healing-power of Johrei,30 natural Agriculture, and Japanese traditional arts. In the middle 1950’s, SKK started its activities in Brazil, where they are called Messianity Church of Brazil (Matsuoka 2000). In the 1960s, SKK started to do missionary work outside the Japanese community in Brazil. In 1998, they registered around 300.000 members, 97% are Brazilians with no Japanese background. In Brazil,
29
From now on Sekai Kyuseikyo will be referred to as SKK. For SKK members johrei means purification of the spirit, they believe that it can cure and help people by channeling johrei through the palm. Its effect would be the purification of the spiritual body by dispelling spiritual clouds. The members believe that such magical practice can clean the spirit and body producing miraculous healing. 30
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the healing ritual of the johrei is considered the “spinal cord” and the “main pillar” of the movement (Clarke 2000). Currently, SKK is a group strongly seized in Brazil; Reverend Watanabe Tetsuo (SKK’s president in Brazil and Japan) is the person who has been working toward this goal since the 1960’s.31 In November 1995, SKK founded in Brazil the sanctuary of the Sacred Ground in Guarapiranga, São Paulo. SKK’s leaders believe that Brazil plays an extremely relevant role in the groups’ diffusion through the world.32 Since the beginning of the migration process the members who came to work in Japan, started to visit SKK’s pilgrimage sites (Sacred grounds in Atami, Hakone and Kyoto and to the Nokogiri Mountain in Chiba prefecture). The international department in Atami city is responsible for giving the general orientations, accommodations to the pilgrims, and to place migrants in contact with the regional Johrei Centers. Nowadays, there is a Brazilian Reverend, and a minister assistant who are in charge for these activities at Atami city. The Brazilian members gather with the Japanese in the Johrei Centers, however, problems with language and cultural adaptation have compelled the group to send some Brazilians missionaries to the local gathering places. Many regional Johrei Centers have a Brazilian Minister attending the migrants, particularly in places with high concentration of Brazilians, such as Aichi, Shizuoka, Kanagawa, Saitama, Gifu prefectures, and others. These missionaries are also doing the role of mediator between Brazilians and Japanese members. There are around 21 Johrei Centers that offer orientations in Portuguese to the Brazilians in the whole Japan. Unlike the Catholics the sessions are not occurring in a totally separated form. SKK has been doing a bilingual session once a month in order to attend the needs of the Brazilian members. The Johrei Center is reserved for the Brazilians gatherings, and the Japanese staff and some Japanese members also come in order to give help and support. The members are also oriented to visit the monthly gatherings at the main temple in Atami, Shizuoka prefecture. 31 SKK is the group that appears in the Brazilian census as oriental religions in 2003. 32 SKK activities are present in about 60 countries, and the young Brazilians, who had received the training course in Japan, have been doing missionary work around the world. They are working in South America (Peru, Bolivia, and Paraguay), North America (United States), Europe (Italy, Greece, Portugal, France, and Germany), Africa (Angola), Asia ( Japan and Sri-Lanka), and Oceania (Australia).
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There are around six ministers who work full-time and other four who are dedicating ministers33 in the Kanto area, all of them act as a mediator between Japanese and Brazilian community. The staff and leaders of SKK are reinforcing the necessity of Brazilians to learn Japanese language and gather together with the Japanese members. In order to create an environment of interaction, SKK’s leaders are promoting ikebana and culinary class for the Brazilians members in the Johrei Centers. Despite SKK orientations toward integration between the two communities, the Brazilians members are still complaining about the difficulties in doing activities with the Japanese and communication problems.34 Additionally, Rev. Watanabe makes an appeal to the Nikkei’s “Mission” in Japan. Based on the group’s teachings, he emphasizes in his discourses that the nikkeis should learn about the country of their ancestors. In September 2003, Rev. Watanabe published an editorial on the newspaper35 directed to the Brazilian community in Japan entitled—“The nikkei truly mission: the nikkei should not be frustrated of neither being Japanese nor Brazilian, but proud of they double spiritual nationality”. This strategy put emphasis on the Japanese background and ancestry; Rev. Watanabe advocates that the Nikkeis came to Japan not only to work and make money but also to rescue their familiar lineage. According to SKK’s leaders, the Nikkei is suffering now because they bring with them not only their ancestors’ blemish and fates in their souls, but also because they have not realized about their true “mission”. The blemishes can manifest as diseases, depression, sentimental disturbs, and misery, which can only be healed through johrei’s light and sincere devotion to the ancestral rituals. As the only way to release their ancestor spirits from the abandon and sufferings, SKK’s leaders encourage the nikkeis to make contact with their relatives in Japan, do visits to the ancestor’s graveyard, and worship their ancestors. As such, SKK’s teachings provide a quite convincing interpretation The difference between full time and dedicating ministers is that the first receive a salary to work full time and had a special formation for it, they are employees of the organization. While the dedicating minister are local leaders who came to Japan to work in the factories and are not receiving a salary for its religious activities. 34 In Kariya city, Aichi prefecture, place with high concentration of Brazilians, a Johrei Center composed exclusively by Brazilians was created. 35 “International Press”, 2003, September 13th. 33
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for the Nikkei problems, and a motivation for them to make contact with Japanese culture and people, and also rescue their Japanese roots. Soka Gakkai’s Activities among Brazilians in Japan Soka Gakkai 36 is the largest Japanese new religious group in Japan with approximately 10 thousands of members. Due to the SGI ’s polemic involvement with Japanese politics (represented by the political party Komeito), and a strong proselytism in the past, the group has received many criticisms from the media and the attention of many scholars. Nevertheless, SGI have been changing its approach—from an aggressive proselytism to the globalization of its activities. Since 1981, the movement has been affiliated to and has been recognized as an NGO for the promotion of education, science and culture by the United Nations (Alves Pereira 2001). The group’s activities are present in approximately 128 countries. In Brazil, the group started its activities in the 1960’s inside the Japanese communities. Currently the movement has around 150,000 members, in which 90% are nonnikkeis Brazilians (Alves Pereira 2001). Since the beginning of its diffusion in Brazil, the group settled its root in the ethnic Japanese communities. In the 1960’s, the president Ikeda, in his first visit to the country, emphasized the role of the migrants as the Bodhisattvas (compassion Buddha) responsible for the Kosen Rufu (the diffusion of the “true Buddhism” around the world) among the Brazilians. In messianic terms, Ikeda reinterpreted the migrants’ history, giving a sense of mission to those who were in a difficult situation (Alves Pereira 2001). Currently, in order to reorient, maintain and recruit Brazilian members in Japan, support groups were created in many regions around the country. Groups like Progresso (Progress) in Kansai region, the group Brasil in Nagoya—Chubu region, Pioneiro (Pioneer) in Nagano, and Esperança (Hope) in Kanto region are a good example. A brief description of the Esperança’s group activities will be given in the following. The first nucleus of the group was created in Tokyo by few SGI’s Japanese staffs who returned to Japan after working on diffusion activ-
36
From now on Soka Gakkai will be referred as SGI (Soka Gakkai International ).
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ities in Brazil for a long period. With the coming of many Brazilians workers, the group activities started to spread out to every prefecture of Kanto region, where they have now around one thousand and five hundred members. The group provides orientations and support in Portuguese, seeks inform about the campaigns and activities from the Brazilian branch, and foster them to bring new members to their flocks. At the same time, the group motivates people to take part in Japanese local gatherings and in the locals’ electoral campaigns of Komeito. The Brazilian members generally gather in the neighborhood with the Japanese, in their local subdivisions. The meeting on the SGI’s local organizations represents to the Brazilians a place where they can get in touch and exchange with the Japanese members, and at least promote some “interaction” with the local Japanese community. In addition, based on activities of Esperança group, they a have special monthly gathering with other Brazilians. SGI’s activities demand a very assiduous participation, absorbing the member’s free time. Every weekend they have activities in their divisions, influencing and encompassing all spheres of their life. “Gakkai is a big family for us, giving us support in everything we need”, said a member. In this way, in order to deal with Brazilians migrants in Japan, SGI has a twofold orientation; on the one hand the group give to migrants a sense of identity and a place in the world that blurs ethnic and national boundaries, emphasizing their role as a “global citizens” in world’s Kosen Rufu crusade. On the other hand, the group also promotes a sense of local belonging, communal compromise, and involvement for the migrants to the local’s activities, fostering among them a sense of mission. Conclusion As Ebaugh and Chafetz (2000) pointed out, migration can be a “theologizing experience”; migrants often react to the alienation and confusion that result from their uprooting in religious terms. Migrant congregations offer spiritual support and also play a central role in providing a social space where fellow ethnics can meet one another and form networks for mutual support and assistance. In Japan the coming of migrant workers from diverse countries in the last decade, caused an increasing in the religious facilities and diversity among
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the groups (Komai 2001). The Catholic Church and the Japanese new religious groups perceiving that the migrants were in need for support, started to propagate, increment the facilities, and offer services and orientations in Portuguese. The motivation to be a member of these three different groups is diverse, despite the different orientations; each group is providing alternative allegiance, support, and a place of belonging to the diasporic Brazilians. The catholic members are motivated to maintain and reproduce the Brazilian Catholicism among their offspring, and prefer to do the activities in the Brazilian style. In other hand, SKK and SGI’s activities, provide a path to participate in community life and make contact with the Japanese members and culture. Both groups encourage their members to gather and do activities with the Japanese locals; and foster among the migrants a notion of “spiritual mission in Japan”. Being in Japan to SKK and SGI’s members represent a unique opportunity. For instance, SKK’s members who worship the ancestors, Japan represents the land of the nikkei member’ ancestors, periodically they visit their sacred lands and temples. In addition, the contact with Japanese culture and art is considering a kind of spiritual improvement. SGI, after the break up with Nichiren Soshu clergy’s, does not have a main temple to visit. Moreover, the members of both groups seek for an opportunity to meet and receive orientation from a famous leader, and also they declare that they want to contribute for the diffusion of their beliefs in Japan. In contrast, the Catholics state that they help people who lost their way and are distant from God, emphasizing the role of the Bible without mentioning elements of the Japanese culture. References Alves Pereira, Ronan (2001). O Budismo leigo da Sòka Gakkai no Brasil: da revo-lução humana à utopia mundial, University of Campinas: (doctoral thesis). Baumann, Martin (2000). “Diaspora: Genealogies of Semantics and Transcultural Comparison”, in Numen, 47:313–37. Befu, Harumi (ed.) (1993). “Nationalism and Nihonjiron” in Cultural nationalism in East Asia: Representation and identity, Berkeley: University of California. Carvalho, Daniela (2003). Migrants and Identity in Japan and Brazil: The Nikkeijin, London: Rutledge/Curzon Press. Clarke, Peter (ed.) (2000). Japanese New Religion: In a Global Perspective. Surrey: Curzon Press Richmond. Cohen, Robin (1995). “Rethinking ‘Babylon’: Iconoclastic Conceptions of Diasporic Experience”, in New Community, 21 (1), January 5–18.
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Ebaugh, H.R. and Chafetz, J.S. (eds.) (2000). “Religions and Migrants: continuities and Adaptations in Immigrant Congregations, Boston: Altamira Press. Hall, Stuart (1990). “Cultural Identity and Diaspora”, in J. Rutherford (ed.), Identity: Community, Culture and Difference. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 222–37. Hardacre, Helen (1986). Kurozumikyo and the New Religions of Japan, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Higuchi, Naoto (1998). “Zainichi Burajirujin to Nikkei Shinshukyo” [Brazilians in Japan and Nikkei New Religions], in Hitotsubashi Kenkyu [Hitotsubashi University Research] 23, no. 1: 161–73. Hirschman, Charles (2003). “The Role of Religion in the Origins and Adaptations of Immigrant Group”, Paper presented at a Conference on “Conceptual and Methodological Developments in the Study of International Migration” at Princeton University. Ishi, Angelo (1995). “Nikkei Burajirujin Dekasegi Rodosha to Shukyo” [Nikkei Brazilian Workers and Religion], in Watanabe Masako (ed.) Dekasegi Nikkei Burajiru-jin vol. 1, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. Komai, Hiroshi (2001). Foreign Migrants in Contemporary Japan, Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press. Lesser, Jeffrey (ed.) (2003). Searching for Home Abroad: Japanese Brazilians and Transnationalism, Durham and London: Duke University Press. Linger, Daniel (2001). No One Home, Stanford: Stanford University Press. —— (2003) “Do Japanese Brazilians Exists?” In J. Lesser (ed.) Searching for Home Abroad: Japanese Brazilians and Transnationalism, Durham and London: Duke University Press. Maeyama Takashi (1983). “Japanese Religions in Southern Brazil: Change and Syncretism”, in Latin American Studies No. 6, pp. 181–238. Matsuoka, Hideaki (2000). “Blemish on Our Spirits: How Brazilians Believe in a Japanese New Religion Called The Church of World Messianity”, Berkeley: University of California, Doctoral Thesis. Mira, João M. S.J. (2003). “Trabalhadores Latino-Americanos no Japão” in A Imigração Latino-Americana no Japão, Graduate School of Languages and Cultures, Nagoya University. Nakamaki, Hirochika (1989). Nihon Shùkyò to Nikkei Shùkyò no Kenkyù: Nihon, Amerika, Burajiru [A Research of Japanese Religions and Nikkei Religions: Japan, America and Brazil], Tokyo: Tosui Syobo. Roth, Joshua Hotaka (2002). Brokered Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Migrants in Japan, The Anthropological Contemporary Issues Series. New York: Cornell University Press. Safran, William (1991). “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return”, in Diaspora, 1 (1) spring, 83–99. Shimazono, Susumu (1991). “The Expansion of Japan’s New Religions into Foreign Cultures” in Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 18/2–3, pp. 105–132. Smart, Ninian (1987) “The Importance of Diasporas”, in S. Shaked, D. Shulman and G.G. Stroumsa (eds.), Gilgul, Essays on Transformation, Revolution and Permanence in the History of Religions, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 288–97. Tsuda, Takeyuki (1999). “The Permanence of ‘Temporary’ Migration: The ‘Structural Embeddedness’ of Japanese-Brazilian Immigrant Workers in Japan”, in The Journal of Asian Studies 58, no. 3 (August 1999): 687–722. —— (2000). “Migration and Alienation: Japanese-Brazilian return Migrants and the Search for Homeland Abroad” in The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, Working paper n. 24, California: University of San-Diego. Vertovec, Steven (1999). “Three meanings of diaspora, exemplifying among South Asian religions”, in Diaspora 7(2) 1999, 1–37. —— (2000). “Religion and Diaspora” paper presented at the Conference on ‘New Landscapes of Religion in the West’, School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford 27–29 September 2000.
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Warner, S. and Wittner J. (eds.) (1998). Gatherings in Diaspora: Religions Communities and the New Immigration, Chicago: Temple University Press. Watanabe, Masako (2001). Burajiru Nikkei Shinshyukyo no Tenkai: Ibunka Fukyo no Mondai Jissen. (Developmental Processes of Japanese New Religions in Brazil: Tasks and Achievements Work in Brazilian Culture). Tokyo: Toshindo. Yamanaka, Keiko (2000). “I will go home, but when? Labor migration and circular diaspora formation by Japanese Brazilians in Japan”, in M. Douglas and G.S. Roberts (eds.) Japan and Global migration: Foreign Workers and Advent of a Multicultural Society, Honolulu (Hawaii): University of Hawaii Press.
TWO FACES OF GOD: RELIGION AND SOCIAL CLASS IN THE BRAZILIAN DIASPORA IN SYDNEY Cristina Rocha Centre for Cultural Research University of Western Sydney Brazilian immigration to Australia has two defining moments. The first migrants arrived in the early 1970s, attracted by an Australian Government assistance scheme. These were poor migrants and today still belong to the working class. The second group started arriving in the late 1990s. By contrast with the first group, these are young professionals who are highly educated and belong to the upper-middle class. They usually migrate as students (and end up staying) or in search of a better lifestyle. Indeed, most of the new migrants I interviewed told me they thought of migrating to either Canada or Australia, but decided for Australia because of the warm weather and the beach culture. They usually take up professional jobs in Australia (they work as doctors, dentists, teachers, lawyers and so on). More often than not, they migrate individually, speak English and socialise with and marry Australians. Following the immense gap between the educated and uneducated/wealthy and poor in Brazilian society, the community in Australia is internally fractured between these two groups. Brazil was traditionally a country that received inflows of migrants. However, in the last two decades the flow has been reversed. Since the early 1980s, many Brazilians have emigrated due socio-economic crisis of the period, which has led to massive social inequalities, rampant crime and violence. The best translation of this fact into numbers is that while the top 10 percent of the Brazilian population accounts for nearly 50 percent of all individual income, the bottom 70 percent earns about 25 percent (Eakin 1998: 182). In fact, according to a 1995 World Bank study, ‘Brazil has the most unequal distribution of wealth of any country in the world; the richest 20 percent of the population earn twenty-six times as much as the poorest 20 percent of the nation (the comparative figure for India is 5 to 1, and 11 to 1 in the United States)’ (Eakin 1998: 188). According to a 2000 census of Foreign Consulates undertaken by the Brazilian Ministry
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of External Affairs, 1.5 million Brazilians had left the country. Of these, 800,000 were residing in the US (Margolis 2003: 45) and 254,000 in Japan (Sasaki 2002).1 An earlier assessment (1996) by the same Ministry also mentioned 460,846 Brazilians living in Paraguay, and 174,544 in Europe (Sasaki 1999: 244). Given that the number of Brazilians residing overseas has increased by 20 percent annually since the 1980s, North American anthropologist Maxine Margolis argues that ‘to leave Brazil is no longer the isolated decision of individuals [. . .] to try to better their lives in another country; it is a national trend’ (Margolis 2003: 45). There has been extensive scholarly study of the Brazilian diasporic communities in the US (Margolis 1994, 1998, 2003; Martes 1999; Rocha Reis and Sales 1999; Sales 1999a, 1999b, 2004) and Japan (Lesser 2003; Linger 2001; Roth 2002; Tsuda 2003; Yamanaka 2000), but nothing has been written on Brazilians in Australia. One such reason is that although there was some migration in the early 1970s, Australia has just recently become a major choice of destination. Here I examine the religious practices of the two distinct groups of Brazilian migrants in Sydney by looking at the World Revival Church—Assembly of God (Avivamento Mundial), a Brazilian Pentecostal Church, and a Spiritist centre called Seed of Light. I argue that migrants’ religious choice in the host country reflects their location in the Brazilian social hierarchy. In Brazil, as in Australia, Evangelicalism is the religion of choice of disenfranchised classes, whereas French Spiritism is a middle-class phenomenon. Significantly, the class divisions among Brazilian immigrants are also spatialised and this is evident in the location of their respective churches and congregations in Sydney. The Pentecostals congregate in the lower middle-class suburb of Earlwood, while the Spiritists meet in the more gentrified and cosmopolitan suburb of Bondi. The language ability and differences of income are the main reasons for choice of dwelling. The first wave of immigrants settled mainly in or around Petersham (a suburb close to Earlwood), where there is an extensive Portuguese migrant community. That is so because the 1970s migrants, who could not speak English, were able to communicate and have basic services (doctors, grocery shops, etc.) that catered for them in
1 In Japan, Brazilians comprise the third largest foreign community after the Koreans (635,269), and Chinese (335,575) (Sasaki 2002).
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Petersham. Their lack of language skills has also restricted their socialising beyond the community. By contrast, the new wave of migrants is able to afford English language courses once they arrive in the country, or already are familiar with the language. This difference of insertion in Australian society is also visible in the heads of both the Spiritist centre and the World Revival Church. While the people of the board of the Spiritist centre speak English fluently, are professionals, and are mostly married to Australians, the minister of the World Revival Church does not speak English, comes from the lower echelons of Brazilian society, and migrated with his family. In this context, I contend that social class plays a more meaningful role than ethnicity in this diasporic community. Spiritism in Brazil Although Brazil is known as ‘the world’s largest Catholic nation’, this description ignores the presence of many other religions and religious practices that have been introduced and creolised in Brazil since the Portuguese arrived in 1500 bringing with them Roman Catholicism. French Spiritism was first introduced into Brazil by the Brazilian elite in the late nineteenth century. Following an aspiration towards modernity, Brazilian elites were quick to embrace the then latest French fashion. This is not surprising since France was a metropolitan centre in the nineteenth century no less than the United States has been in the second half of the twentieth century.2 Spiritism or Kardecism, as it is known in Brazil due to its founder Hyppolyte Rivail’s pen name Allan Kardec (1804–69), was itself a synthesis of many religious practices such as Catholicism, Protestantism, and occult philosophies that flourished in the eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe such as Swedenborgianism, Mesmerism, Rosicrucianism, Freemasonry and Theosophy. At the core of the Spiritist doctrine is the idea of spiritual evolution through reincarnation, as Kardec was very much influenced by the positivist ideas of the nineteenth century. According to Kardec, the spirit, created by God, would go through several reincarnations until 2 For more on this, see Jeffrey Needell (1987). A Tropical Belle Epoque: Elite, Culture and Society in Turn-of-the-Century Rio de Janeiro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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it achieved perfection. Karma, and its corollary, the law of cause and effect, would determine reincarnation: if one’s actions in a past life were negative, one would reincarnate into a life of suffering (through poverty, disease, unhappiness). By contrast, if one practiced charity in a past life (a concept Kardec drew from Christianity), one would reincarnate into a life of happiness. In this context, free will plays a key role, as human beings may choose what path to take in their lives. As a result, the evolution of the spirit would depend solely on its own choice and effort (Cavalcanti 1990: 147–155; Hess 1991; 1994). By deploying a scientific discourse affirming its tenets, Spiritism has drawn followers from white, educated elites. Indeed, Brazilian sociologist Lísias Nogueira Negrão noted: “Spiritism is a literate religion. More than a religion, Spiritism claims to be science, philosophy. Because of its high powers of persuasion in deploying logic, it is adopted by higher educated social classes” (cited in Varella 2000). Currently, Spiritism is so widespread in the country that according to anthropologist José Jorge de Carvalho, “In many aspects, the Spiritist world-view became part of the national ethos, as much as Catholicism, and more recently Protestantism” (Carvalho 1994: 74). The latest census data showed that Spiritism is still expanding: while in 1991 it had 1.6 million followers, by 2000 the number increased to 2.3 million. Pentecostalism in Brazil In the second half of the twentieth century, the Brazilian religious universe has changed in degree, extension and speed never before seen in our history [. . .] particularly in the areas where the country is modernised and has established rational and secular patterns. This process of expansion of Pentecostalism, Spiritism, and Umbanda3 is the counterpart of the decline and erosion of the traditionally dominating religion—Catholicism (Pierucci and Prandi 1996: 10).
Despite the predominance of Catholicism in Brazil, the proportion of persons who declared being Catholics fell from 83.8% in the 1991 census to 73.8% in the 2000 census. Evangelicalism (including tradi-
3 Umbanda emerged in the early twentieth century as a quintessential Brazilian religious creation. It deployed elements of the main religious traditions of the country: Catholicism, Spiritism, and indigenous and African traditions. For more on Umbanda, see Diane Brown (1994). Umbanda Religion and Politics in Urban Brazil. New York: Columbia University Press.
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tional Protestant, Pentecostals and neo-Pentecostals) is the main denomination in expansion. This group has the second largest percentage in the 2000 census, and has raised its membership from 9% of the population in 1991, to 15.4% in 2000. Brazil is presently the second largest Protestant country in the world and the largest Pentecostal one (Freston 2001: 198). Indeed, research conducted by ISER4 in the city of Rio de Janeiro found that from 1990 to 1992, 673 new Protestant churches were established of which 90% were Pentecostal. In the same period, only one Catholic church was established (Pereira 2000: 16).5 Furthermore, a survey conducted in São Paulo city in 1995 depicts a revealing picture of the class divisions according to religious affiliation in Brazil (Prandi 1996b: 262–266). The survey showed that 30% of those who converted to Pentecostalism came from the lowest echelons of society. It also showed that the proportion of blacks and mulattos (‘pardos’), which comprise the poorest sectors of the Brazilian population, is larger among the Pentecostal stratum of Evangelicalism. In addition, 60% of the Catholics are white,6 40% are Afro-Brazilians and 13% have tertiary education; 73% of Spiritists are white, 5% are Afro-Brazilians, and 34% have tertiary education; 52% of the Evangelicals are white, 16% are Afro-Brazilians and 5% have tertiary education; finally, 50% of the Pentecostal are white, 14% AfroBrazilians and only 2% have tertiary education. From this picture, it is clear that while Spiritists and Catholics belong to the upper echelons of society, Evangelicals and Pentecostals are among the lower sectors. Many scholars have argued that the expansion of Evangelical, Pentecostal and mediumship religions is a consequence of the modernising and secularising trends of the Church following the Vatican II Council (1962–1965). The shift to a more tolerant attitude to other religions after Vatican II facilitated the expansion of religious pluralism (Carpenter 1999: 246; Roof 1999: 65). Brazilian sociologists Pierucci and Prandi add another significant reason for ‘migration’ away from the Catholic Church. According to them, while the 4
ISER is the Portuguese acronym for Institute for Religious Studies. For accounts of the expansion of Protestantism in Latin America, see David Martin (1991). Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America. Oxford and Cambridge: Basil Blackwell; David Stoll (1990). Is Latin America Turning Protestant? The Politics of Evangelical Growth. Berkeley: University of California Press. 6 Those who descend from European migrants are considered ‘white’ in Brazil. 5
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Catholic Church ironically made its ‘preferential option for the poor’— which in Brazil took the form of Liberation Theology and the Comunidades Eclesiais de Base (Base Communities)—this very action made it less attractive to that sector of society (Pierucci and Prandi 1996: 16–18).7 By emphasising politics, social issues and collective interests, while stripping itself of the sacred, miracles, and healing practices, the Church lost territory to religious traditions that emphasise the latter (Prandi 1996a: 24, 29). A more recent development is the globalisation of Brazilian Pentecostal churches. The Pentecostal expansion follows the diaspora by sending missionaries to the host countries. In 1997, the weekly magazine Veja mentioned 1700 Pentecostal missionaries overseas (April 23, 1997). Of the Pentecostal churches, the Assembly of God, Deus é Amor (God is Love), and Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus (The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God) have the most significant international presence, while the latter is the largest Brazilian Pentecostal church overseas (Freston 1999: 385). The World Revival Church-Assembly of God (Avivamento Mundial) Paul Freston has observed that ‘global Pentecostalism is culturally polycentric’ (2001: 196), that is, there is no single centre from which its flows originate. Although it is markedly a church of Brazilians and for Brazilians in Australia, the Sydney World Revival ChurchAssembly of God has its centre in the USA. This branch of the Assembly of God was established by the Brazilian Pastor Ouriel de Jesus in 1985 in Boston to cater to the fast-growing Brazilian migrant population there. Since then, his World Revival Church-Assembly of God has expanded its membership to 15,000 and has over 70 congregations throughout the United States and in 17 other countries around the world including Canada, Mexico, Brazil, England, France, Portugal, Russia, the Ukraine, Japan, and Australia. In fact, the Sydney minister was appointed to his position by Pastor De Jesus. Minister Juarez told me that he was working in a little town in
7 For a very good account in English on the decline of Liberation Theology in Brazil, see Manuel Vásquez (1998). The Brazilian Popular Church and the Crisis of Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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southern Brazil when, after a mystic vision, he received a phone call inviting him to become a missionary in Australia. His connections with the church headquarters are strong. He goes to Boston frequently for the annual biblical teaching, where he meets Brazilian missionaries who, like himself, are working overseas. The Sydney branch of the World Revival Church-Assembly of God was first established by another Brazilian minister sent by De Jesus in 1994. According to Pastor Juarez, the church had only 12 adherents for the first two years. After his arrival in 1996, it has now expanded to 120 members. Besides its headquarters in Earlwood, it has also much smaller missions in Wollongong and Gosford (in New South Wales) and Canberra (the capital city). The priest himself told me that members belong to disenfranchised classes. However, following a Protestant ethic which values social mobility and hard work,8 Minister Juarez told me proudly: Members here are from lower classes. But things are changing. When I arrived, only two of the twelve members had jobs. The rest were unemployed in a country full of jobs. Today, they are all employed, own their homes, and have two cars! We have about four or five small businessmen who are doing very well for the glory of God. They were all addicted to drugs, alcoholics, and prostitutes. Today they have been transformed by God into family men and businessmen (Personal communication, February 1, 2004).
This praising of material success by the priest dovetails with migrant desires of upward mobility. Upon finding that there are proportionally more evangelicals in the Brazilian diaspora in the US than in Brazil itself, anthropologist Ana Cristina Braga Martes argued that the reason for this is the overlapping of the Evangelical discourse of success and migrants’ aspirations (Martes 1999: 91). Comparing the Catholic and Evangelical churches of the Brazilian diasporic community in the US, Martes has shown that the Brazilian Evangelical churches are much more visible since their meetings and proselytisation are transmitted on cable channels in the Boston area (Martes 1999: 89). Unlike the Brazilian community in the US, here the existing fracture in the community means that such access to the media is not easy. Minister Juarez was not happy when he told me in an interview
8 This ‘theology of prosperity’, which praises hard working and saving, is a common feature of the Pentecostal churches in Brazil.
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that he has constantly been denied access to both the SBS9 radio program in Portuguese as well as to the Brazilian community newsletter.10 According to him, while the Spiritist centre’ activities are extensively advertised in both, he cannot get any media space even if he offers to pay for it. As an explanation for this he said, I am sure there is prejudice there. If people invite you for a soccer game, you go; if they invite you to a Spiritist meeting, you go. But if they invite you to go to the [Evangelical] church and you go, there is always someone else who says: ‘Don’t go there! Be careful, or you’ll convert!’ I mean, the person can become Spiritist, can become a thief, can become anything, but not Evangelical. So it is very difficult! (Personal communication, February 1, 2004).
I suggest that this situation is due to both media being controlled by educated Brazilians who belong to the later wave of immigration. For instance, the manager of SBS Portuguese language radio program was a lecturer at a university in Brazil and had been a journalist for more than a decade before migrating in 1998. In Brazil, most upper middle-class people would have reservations against the Evangelical and Pentecostal churches because of their voracity in proselytising and their animosity towards any other religious affiliation. For instance, Freston notes that an opinion poll conducted in 1996 found that the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God had the lowest approval rating of the main Brazilian institutions, only 17% (Freston 2001: 199). Martes corroborates this negative image. She has observed that “the ‘non-Evangelicals’ tend to regard evangelicals as fanatics (because “they are at the church all the time” and “cannot drink or dance”), credulous and ignorant (because they believe in miracles) and silly (because they give money to the priest)” (Martes 1999: 115). Seed of Light—The Spiritist Centre Seed of Light was established in 1994 in Summer Hill, Sydney. It moved to a rented and renovated garage in Bondi in 2000. According 9 SBS (Special Broadcast Service) is Australia’s multicultural and multilingual public broadcaster. 10 Since then the board of the Brazilian Community Council of Australia (BraCCA) has changed its mind. When I interviewed its board members, I was told that in an effort to patch up internal divisions between the two groups and therefore to represent the entire community, they have given this Pentecostal church room to advertise in its newsletter.
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to members of the board, it has around 100 registered members. Most followers told me that they found the centre through the internet. Some, who were Spiritists in Brazil, did their google search and contacted the centre even before leaving the homeland. By contrast, the World Revival Church of Earlwood does not have a website and the priest told me that he does not use email or the computer to contact his congregation. The ability to navigate the internet and computer literacy evinces the social class of its membership. Furthermore, not only does Seed of Light have a website, but it constantly works with email. Spiritist centres usually have a group of mediums (colegiado) whom one can consult for one’s personal problems. Since the centre in Sydney is fairly small and does not have a large body of mediums, members and visitors can have their queries sent by email to a larger centre in Brazil. There, once in trance, the colegiado will ask the spirits about the migrant’s problems. The responses will then be sent via email to the Sydney centre. Moreover, two more recent and smaller centres established in Melbourne and in Canberra also email their members’ queries to the Sydney centre, so that it can forward them to Brazil. The Sydney centre also gives support to these smaller centres in the way of books, proselytising material, and managerial ideas. Importantly, the internet also connects Seed of Light with the Spiritist Group of New York (SGNY), a Spiritist centre established by the Brazilian community in that city.11 Having been established a decade earlier, the NY centre assists the Sydney centre with managerial ideas as well as proselytising material. Seed of Light buys books translated into English for its non-Portuguese speaking membership from the SGNY. As a recent development, the NY centre has asked its Sydney counterpart to join efforts and translate books into English. To be sure, although the World Revival Church does not use the internet, it is closely connected with the World Revival Church in Boston. Not only are the priests in contact through travel between the two locations, but the Sydney congregation is connected to the Boston one through video tapes of festivities and proselytisation in the Boston church.
11
This Spiritist centre can be viewed at www.sgny.org
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Both the World Revival Church and Seed of Light Spiritist centre work as a support network to help Brazilians cope with the pressures and anxieties of migration. For instance, in one of my visits to the World Revival Church, the minister asked the congregation to donate money to help pay the hospital bill of one of its members. The AfroBrazilian woman had arrived in Australia recently and had to undergo an emergency heart surgery. She, however, was not eligible for Medicare (the national medical scheme) and did not have much money, as she was working as a nanny. Moreover, minister Juarez also told me in an interview that he gives counselling to people who have drinking and gambling problems, as well as to couples in difficulties. He added, People feel lonely; they don’t see any value in themselves or in their lives. They live from home to work, to shopping, to home, to work, and so forth. They have no perspective in life. When they meet Jesus, they see how important they are, they realise they can help others, and do lots of things in life (Personal communication, February 1, 2004).
The members of Seed of Light also help migrants through their problems of adaptation to the host country and loneliness. However, they see these difficulties not as a lack of Jesus in their lives, but as psychological and emotional issues. Such explanation evinces the upper middle or middle class to which the Spiritist congregation belongs. A member, who is an optical engineer and works for a transnational corporation, told me, Sometimes this anxiety of being away from home can become serious, even become a panic disorder. This anxiety has to do with psychology. There are some cases that the person is so unhappy with life that s/he tries suicide. [. . .] The more tools you give people to realise they are not in the best path, the better. Be it spiritually (if the person believes) or only psychologically, [the important thing is that] people need to talk and assuage their pain. We are here to advise, to show that there are other people who are on the same path, or that have been there but were able to change the situation. We need to show that s/he is not alone in the world. The help comes from the colegiado in Brazil and us here (Personal communication, April 13, 2004).
Although the problems are similar to the migrants who belong to the Pentecostal Church, solutions are distinct. While at the church learning about Jesus seems to relieve the pain, at the Spiritist centre
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there are two members of the congregation—a Brazilian psychologist and a Brazilian naturopath, who volunteer to help people who come to the centre in need. As mentioned before, their queries are also sent to the mediums in Brazil. When asked what kind of prescriptions are usually given, the same member told me that the usual advice is reading the doctrine at home, have particular laying of hands ( passe) and prayers. To be sure, both religious institutions function as a place where migrants can speak their language, meet others in the same situation, make friends and feel at home. Indeed, many people I interviewed told me they were not religious in Brazil, but because of the difficulties in adapting to the new environment, they had looked for a religious institution. Martes observed the same phenomenon among migrants in the US (Martes 1999: 113). People become members to have a sense of belonging in the host country. Conclusion By looking at Brazilian migrants’ religious practices in Australia, I showed that social class is more significant than ethnicity in their manifestation in the host country. Due to the enormous gap between the wealthy and poor in Brazil, migrants’ position in the social hierarchy in the homeland, and the correlate religion of choice, were carried to the host country. I showed that social class influenced their place of residence, language skills, jobs and relation with Australian society. Furthermore, both the World Revival Church and the Spiritist centre have strong global connections. While the former is actively expanding globally by sending missionaries overseas, the latter was established by migrants themselves and does not have a missionary vision. Such connections among the Brazilian diasporic communities in the US, Australia and the homeland reveal the complexities at play in interpreting processes of globalisation of cultural flows. The existence of inflows and counterflows of ideas among these three countries attest to the rhizomatic nature of the globalisation process (Deleuze and Guattari 1987), where the West is only one of the nodes from where global cultural flows emanate. In a rhizome, ‘centres’ and ‘peripheries’ have relational locations; centres can become peripheries and vice-versa. Although Protestantism arrived in Brazil
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from the US, it has now taken its own Brazilian distinctive shape, which in turn, has been carried back to the US and other countries where Brazilians arrived. By the same token, Spiritism, which originated in France, was appropriated in Brazil and has produced shoots in other countries. Finally, both religious sites work as support networks by offering a vicarious home away from home. As Ghassan Hage has argued, ‘intimations of lost homelands . . . should be seen as “affective building blocks” used by migrants to make themselves feel at home where they actually are’ (Hage 1998: 104). In this context, by adhering to a religious institution from the homeland and spending time with their peers, migrants reconstruct the past through the standpoint of the present in order to feel at home. These religious sites would be a safe base from which to confront life in the new country. Indeed, Hage noted that ‘positively experienced nostalgia does not necessarily involve a desire to “go back”; more often than not, . . . it is a desire of being there here’ (Hage 1998: 108). Although each religion supports migrants in different ways according to their diverse social insertions, they help them to make sense of their diasporic condition by offering a safe space for exchange of migrant experiences and spiritual counsel. References Brown, Diane (1994). Umbanda Religion and Politics in Urban Brazil. New York: Columbia University Press. Carpenter, Robert (1999). Esoteric Literature as a Microcosmic Mirror of Brazil’s Religious Marketplace. In Latin American Religion in Motion, edited by C. Smith and J. Prokopy. NY: Routledge. Carvalho, José Jorge (1994). O Encontro de Velhas e Novas Religiões: esboço de uma teoria dos estilos de espiritualidade. In Misticismo e Novas Religiões, edited by A. Moreira and R. Zicman. Petrópolis: Vozes/UFS/IFAN. Cavalcanti, Maria Laura Viveiros de Castro (1990). O Espiritismo. In Sinais dos Tempos: Diversidade Religiosa no Brasil, edited by L. Landim. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Estudos da Religião. Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari (1987). A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Eakin, Marshall (1998). Brazil: The Once and Future Country. NY: St Martin’s Griffin. Freston, Paul (1999). A Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus. Lusotopie: Dynamiques Religieuses en Lusophonie Contemporaine: 383–403. —— (2001). The Transnationalisation of Brazilian Pentecostalism: The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God. In Between Babel and Pentecost: Transnational Pentecostalism in Africa and Latin America, edited by A. Corten and R. MarshalFratani. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Hage, Ghassan (1997). At Home in the Entrails of the West: multiculturalism, ‘eth-
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nic food’ and migrant home-building. In Home/World: space, community and marginality in Sydney’s west, edited by G. Hage et al. Sydney: Pluto Press. Hess, David (1991). Spiritists and Scientists: Ideology, Spiritism and Brazilian Culture. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. —— (1994). Samba in the Night: Spiritism in Brazil. New York: Columbia University Press. Lesser, Jeffrey, ed. (2003). Searching for Home Abroad: Japanese Brazilians and Transnationalism. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Linger, Daniel (2001). No One Home: Brazilian Selves Remade in Japan. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Margolis, Maxine (1994). Little Brazil: an ethnography of Brazilian immigrants in New York City. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. —— (1998). An Invisible Minority: Brazilian Immigrants in New York City. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. —— (2003). After Little Brazil: Brazilian Immigrants in the Contemporary United States. In Emigración Latinoamericana: Comparación Interregional entre América del Norte, Europa y Japón, edited by M. Yamada. National Museum of Ethnology of Osaka, Japan: Japan Centre for Area Studies. Martes, Ana Cristina Braga (1999). Os Imigrantes Brasileiros e as Igrejas em Massachusetts. In Cenas do Brasil Migrante, edited by R.R. Reis and T. Sales. São Paulo: Boitempo. Martin, David (1991). Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America. Oxford and Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. Needell, Jeffrey D. (1987). A Tropical Belle Epoque: Elite, Culture and Society in Turn-ofthe-Century Rio de Janeiro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pereira, Sergio (2000). Society-Individual and Postmodern Condition: Understanding the Explosion of Pentecostalism in Brazil. PhD (unpublished), Department of Sociology, University of Notre Dame, Indiana. Pierucci, Antônio, and Reginaldo Prandi (1996). Assim Como Não Era no Princípio: Religião e Ruptura. In A Realidade Social das Religiões no Brasil, edited by A. Pierucci and R. Prandi. São Paulo: Hucitec. Prandi, Reginaldo (1996a). As Religiões, a Cidade e o Mundo. In A Realidade Social das Religiões no Brasil: Religião Sociedade e Política, edited by A. Pierucci and R. Prandi. São Paulo: USP/Hucitec. —— (1996b). Religião Paga, Conversão e Serviço. In A Realidade Social das Religiões no Brasil: Religião Sociedade e Política, edited by Antonio Pierucci and Reginaldo Prandi. São Paulo: Hucitec. Rocha Reis, Rossana, and Teresa Sales (1999). Cenas do Brasil Migrante. São Paulo: Boitempo Editorial. Roof, Wade Clark (1999). Spiritual Supermarket: Baby Boomers and the Remaking of American Religion. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. Roth, Joshua Hotaka (2002). Brokered Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Migrants in Japan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Sales, Teresa (1999a). Identidade Étnica entre Imigrantes Brasileiros na Região de Boston, EUA. In Cenas do Brasil Migrante, edited by R. Rocha Reis and T. Sales. São Paulo: Boitempo. —— (1999b). “Constructing an Ethnic Identity: Brazilian immigrants in Boston, Mass”. Migration World Magazine 27:15–17. —— (2004). Brazilians Away from Home. New York: Center for Migration Studies. Sasaki, Elisa M. (1999). “Movimento Dekassegui: A Experiência Migratória e Identitaria dos Brasileiros Descendentes de Japoneses no Japão”. In Cenas do Brasil Migrante, edited by R. Rocha Reis and T. Sales. São Paulo: Boitempo. —— (2002). Dekasssegui: Um Jogo Identitário. In Anais do Simpósio 15 Anos do Movimento Dekassegui: Desafios e Perspectivas, edited by C. Oi. São Paulo: Museu Histórico da Imigração Japonesa and Ciate.
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Stoll, David (1990). Is Latin America Turning Protestant? The Politics of Evangelical Growth. Berkeley: University of California Press. Tsuda, Takeyuki (2003). Strangers in the Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Return Migration in Transnational Perspective. New York: Columbia University Press. Varella, Flávia (2000). À nossa moda: criado na França, o espiritismo deu certo apenas no Brasil, onde a doutrina mística com pretensões científicas é culto da classe média. Veja, July 26th. Vásquez, Manuel (1998). The Brazilian Popular Church and the Crisis of Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Yamanaka, Keiko (2000). ‘I will Go Home, But When?’ Labor Migration and Circular Diaspora formation by Japanese Brazilians in Japan. In Japan and Global Migration—Foreign workers and the advent of a multicultural society, edited by M. Douglass and G. Roberts. London and New York: Routledge.
PART THREE
SOUTH ASIAN EXPERIENCE
HINDU PROCESSIONS, DIASPORA AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM Knut A. Jacobsen University of Bergen, Norway The main festival of the Hindus in Norway, mainly Tamil Hindus from Sri Lanka, is the twelve days annual temple festival, the mahotsava. A great amount of ritual work is invested. The temple committee wants the festival to attract public attention beyond the Hindu community of Norway. Public attention is perceived as an acknowledgement of the effort of the temple committee and the other volunteers and as a sign of success. Television stations and newspapers are invited to cover especially the chariot festival, the rathotsava. However, the mass media show little interest in the event. One of the purposes of the festival is to exhibit Tamil culture to the Norwegian public, but the religious minorities compete for the attention of the media for their ritual events. Different strategies are worked out to attract the public attention. Among the Hindus living outside of South Asia, the diaspora situation often has lead to an increased focus on the temple as a cultural centre and as a place to confirm identity in a minority situation. The temple has often become the single most important cultural institution of the diaspora group. Nevertheless, what distinguishes a temple from a cultural centre is the ritual dimension. The performance of rituals is the main function of the temple. The increased importance of the temple as a cultural centre in the diaspora, however, has often motivated the diaspora group to invest much time and effort in the ritual activity of the temple. Hinduism is a religion concerned with place and much work is traditionally invested in sacred places. Sacred time and sacred space do not create themselves; they are produced by the hard work of the community. Many elements are needed: buildings, ritual experts, a calendar, performance of rituals, devotees, ornaments, music, etc. These things were absent for the first Hindus in Norway. They did not even know the dates of the most important festivals. Some of them attended Christian churches just to experience religion. Sacred time was instituted among the
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Hindus in Norway in the 1980ies with the arrival of wives and children, and during the 1990ies money, know-how and work were invested to institutionalise sacred space. The memories of sacred time and space in India and Sri Lanka put a demand on the organisers of the new place to recreate to a certain extent the atmosphere of the old place. The devotees expect ritual events to remind them of the past. The past represents authenticity. The main temple of the eight to nine thousand Tamil Hindus from Sri Lanka in Norway is the Sivasubramanyar Alayam in Oslo. This temple was established in 1998 and since then an elaborate and intense ritual activity has taken place. A great amount of ritual work has been invested in the temple. Before the opening of the temple, ritual activity took place in school buildings rented specifically for each occasion. The establishment of the temple represented an opportunity for growth in the number of days and festivals celebrated and in the number of ritual elements included in each event. The growth in ritual activity was a function both of the ambitions of the leadership of the temple and the expectations and desires of the devotees.1 The cycle of rituals of the Sivasubramanyar Alayam in Oslo includes daily arti- and puja-rituals, a weekly program of abhishekha on Fridays, a monthly program of bhajan singing on the last Friday of each month, and an annual cycle of festivals, many of which last several days. The most important ritual of the Sivasubramanyar Alayam in Oslo in terms of work and money invested, number of priests involved and persons participating, is the annual temple festival, mahotsava, a procession festival lasting twelve days. Each day of the festival statues of the gods are taken outside of the temple. For the annual procession festival, the priests, the temple committee and the active members of the temple do their utmost to create and establish sacred space and sacred time that remind the participants of the sacred time and space of Sri Lanka. Chariots (ratha, ter) and utsava-murtis (festival images) have been brought from Sri Lanka, and musicians are hired from Sri Lanka in co-operation with other temples in Northern Europe for the days of the festival as well, to make it an authentic Sri Lankan Tamil Hindu festival. 1 Also the wealth of a given temple will be an important factor in determining the number, the length and the elaborateness of festivals. See Guy R. Welbon and Glenn E. Yocum, Religious Festivals in South India and Sri Lanka (Delhi: Manohar, 1982), p. 52.
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But the ritual is not only meant as an act internal to the group that celebrates itself through the ritual, as has been argued since Durkheim.2 Public rituals in plural societies most often involve or implicate ‘the Other.’ They are involved as much with ‘us’ as with ‘them’. The daily, weekly and annual rituals of the temple are intended mainly for the Tamils. However, with the procession ritual it is different. In this ritual the gods are taken out of the temple and made visible to the outside. The focus now is not only the group, but also the Norwegian public as spectators. The procession is a public presentation of the Tamil religion to the ‘Other’. In fact, the temple committee wants their festival to attract public attention beyond the Sri Lankan Tamil Hindu community. One of the common explanations of the function of Hindu processions in India is that they are statements of devotion that make a claim on territory, the gods circle their realm, which also means that the site of the procession is the borderline of their area and is public space that no single deity can claim.3 In the diaspora, certainly the processions do make sacred the larger surroundings of the temple. But they also raise interesting questions about territorial claims and public space in pluralistic societies. In the diaspora in Norway, processions make Norwegian space Hindu and Hinduism a Norwegian religion in particular ways. In Tamil Nadu these days there is a revival of processions, and it is claimed that this revival is about the willingness of religious people to negotiate a renewed civil religious idiom.4 This might be correct, but in the diaspora, most often processions do not represent a shared religious idiom, it is rather an expression of religious and cultural difference. Processions take on specific meanings in plural societies. Gerd Baumann writes: There are numerous cases of public ritual, religious, secular, or indeterminate, aimed as much at a symbolic statement to outsiders as the consolidation of internal values and meanings. Public ritual in plural
2
See Gerd Baumann, ‘Ritual implicates “others”: reading Durkheim in a plural society,’ in Understanding Rituals, ed. Daniel de Coppet (London: Routledge, 1992). pp. 97–116. 3 Joanne Punzo Waghorne, ‘Chariots of the God/s: Riding the Line Between Hindu and Christian,’ in Popular Christianity in India: Reading between the Lines, edited by Selva J. Raj and Corinne C. Dempsey. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 11–37. 4 Ibid., p. 11.
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One of the purposes of the Tamil processions in Norway is to exhibit Tamil culture to the Norwegian public, and to get public recognition and acknowledgement. In plural societies people are aware of each others rituals and there is a competition for the attention of the public. Public attention is perceived as an acknowledgement of the effort of the temple committee and the other volunteers and as a sign of its success, but also an acknowledgement of the contribution of the group to society at large. The festivals of the different communities compete with each others for the acknowledgement of their contribution. Few people live in the area that the Tamil Hindu processions cover, and very few non-Tamils actually witness the festival. However, even when physically absent, Others are present as cultural referents. The way to reach the public and get public attention for the processions is through the mass media. Television stations and newspapers are invited to cover the festival, especially the day of the chariot festival, the rathotsava. However, the mass media show no or little interest in the event. The religious minorities compete for the attention of the media for their ritual events and the Sri Lanka Tamils have not been able to attract much of the public attention. Murugan The Sivasubramanyar Alayam in Oslo is a Murugan (Subramanya Skanda, Karttikeya) temple. Murugan is popular today primarily in South India and Sri Lanka. He is especially a god of the Tamils. He is the son of Amman and Shiva, and belongs, therefore, to the Shaivas. The Tamils of Sri Lanka are Shaivas and the dominant theological system is the Shaiva Siddhanta. Murugan is one of the most popular gods among the Tamils of Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, [t]he shrines dedicated to the worship of Murukan are numerous and one could hardly come across a village or town inhabited by Saivite Tamils where temples dedicated for his worship are not to be found.6
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Baumann, ‘Ritual implicates “others”, 100. Italics added. S. Pathamanathan, ‘Murukan the Divine Child: The Kantacuvami Temple at Nallur,’ Lanka: tidsskrift om lankesisk kultur, 1990, pp. 80–102, p. 89. 6
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But there might be several other reasons, besides his popularity, why Murugan was chosen as the main deity of the temple in Norway. Murugan is a heroic God, he is the eternal youth and a warrior. One reason Murugan was chosen is probably because many of the Tamils who came to Norway were involved in and shaped by the experience of the civil war in Sri Lanka. Dignified lives have been destroyed by the civil war. Many families have lost at least one member in the war. Their experience of loss is an important part of what it means to be Sri Lankan Tamil Hindu in diaspora in Norway. The god Murugan as a warrior and a personification of the heroic principle is able to express symbolically the feelings of many of the devotees. This is not only the heroism of escaping from Sri Lanka and building a new life in Norway but also the heroism of war and the fight for a separate home land of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Murugan is a god that assures victory. Nevertheless, a remarkable feature of the festivals of the Sivasubramnayar Alayam, and of most Hindu festivals as well, is the absence of martyrdom. There is no element of sorrow. The festivals are about enjoyment of life. The god is entertained and it is about him having a good time, a tour around the temple, a hunting trip to the forest, and a bath at a tirtha. Given the situation of the civil war in Sri Lanka and the fact that most of the Hindus are refugees from this war, and the emphasis on violence in the Shaivite festivals among the Tamils at other places such as Kataragama and Singapore, this is noticeable.7 Murugan is also ‘the principal god of the mountainous region’.8 Since Norway is a very mountainous country it makes sense to establish a Murugan temple here. To enter the Sivasubramanyar Alayam in Oslo one has to walk (or drive) upwards a steep hillside, suitable for a Murugan temple. 7 The three features Paul Younger, Playing Host to Deity (Oxford University Press, 2002) has identified as typical of South Indian festival tradition are ecstatic religious behaviour, ritual enactment of story fragments and a dynamic sense of community formation. The first feature is absent in the Sri Lankan Tamil Hindu festival in Norway. If Younger is correct in that it is a general feature of South Indian festivals, why is it absent in Norway? Is it a sign of failure? Well I think ecstatic religious behaviour here, perhaps should be changed to joyous religious behaviour. There are many examples of this kind of behaviour in the festivals. The crushing of coconuts, the bathing at the tirtha, the proud and happy smiles that expresses pleasure over the beauty of the chariots in the festivals and of being part of a large crowd of Sri Lankan Tamils in country in which they are a small minority. 8 S. Pathamanathan, ‘Murukan the Divine Child: The Kantacuvami Temple at Nallur,’ Lanka: tidsskrift om lankesisk kultur 1990, pp. 80–102.
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One reason to establish the temple was to take care of the generational transfer of religion. That Murugan is a young boy therefore is also meaningful. In addition, Murugan favoured married life and, according to his theologians, the view that performance of social duties leads to God, no less than does the life of a renunciant.9 He is therefore a proper god for the Tamils of Norway who are mainly family persons. The Main Annual Festival The ritual event of highest importance is the annual temple festival (mahotsava) in which Mururgan is celebrated for twelve days. No other ritual can compare in terms of amount of work invested, ritual expertise employed, and number of people participating. This yearly ritual is distinguished by a flag being hoisted, in this temple the flag with the cock, the symbol of Murugan. This marks the beginning of the main festival.10 The twelve day temple festival at the Sivasubramanyar Alayam is held in late July and beginning August.11 Usually the big annual festival is celebrated to mark the star-day of the temple-image, or to commemorate when the temple was consecrated.12 But this is not the case here. The reason the festival is held at this 9 Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam, ‘The Worship of Muruka’. Journal of R.A.S. (Ceylon), 29, no. 77, 1924. 10 Such festivals are often called Brahmotsava. James L. Martin, ‘The Cycle of festivals at Parthasarathi,’ in Welbon and Yocum, Religious Festivals in South India and Sri Lanka (Delhi: Manohar, 1982), p. 56. James Cartman, Hinduism in Ceylon (Colombo: M.D. Gunasena, 1957), p. 100, writes that in Sri Lanka ‘all temples have a festival period which may last from two to three weeks.’ ‘The date of the festival varies from temple to temple, but each temple holds its own festival annually at a fixed time.’ Cartman in his Hinduism in Ceylon, notes that ‘On the day before the festival ends, there is the very special car procession when the images of the gods are placed upon huge jaggernaught cars. These huge vehicles are rope drawn round the temple by the devotees. Some of these festivals are more famous than others.’ 11 The consecration day of this temple, the kumbhabhisheka, is 26 of April. That the festival is in July/August is an adaptation to the Norwegian climate. These are the days most likely not to have cold weather. The time schedule is only to a small degree adapted to the Norwegian calendar of holidays and sacred periods. Paul Younger, Playing Host to Deity (Oxford University Press, 2002), writes about the Hindus in Canada that: «Most services are congregational, involve long sermons, and are held at 10AM on Sunday morning» (p. 157). In the Norwegian temple the pattern of Sri Lanka is followed as much as possible. 12 H. Daniel Smith, ‘Festivals in the Pancaratra Literature,’ in Religious Festivals in South India and Sri Lanka, ed. Guy R. Welbon and Glenn E. Yocum (Delhi: Manohar, 1982), 27–49.
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time is due to weather and climate. The weather can be cold all year round but late July and early August are most likely to be warm. It is in the middle of the school holiday and many people will be away to Sri Lanka on vacation. Originally they first celebrated the rathotsava in the middle of June just before the school vacation started in order to attract the most people. But the weather was awfully cold and rainy and the festival dates were moved. In the procession, movable murtis of the gods are taken out of the temple to the streets, often using a different vahana or vehicle for each festival day, usually only to go around the neighbourhood, but the gods might also move further from the temple for a special festival bath. Another occasion for the god going farther away is to go on hunting trips. Chariots, bathing festival and hunting trip are part of the mahotsav of the Sivasubramanyar temple in Oslo. On the rathotsava (car festival), the utsava murtis of the three most important gods of the temple, Murugan, Ganesha ands Durga (Amman) are transported on the festival carts around the streets. In the temple festival in Oslo, most devotees visit at the day of the rathotsava. On the rathotsava day the summer 2004, around 3 to 4 thousand persons took part. Chariots matching the size and beauty of the best chariots in Sri Lanka were brought from abroad in 2002 and 2003. These chariots were built in Sri Lanka and shipped in parts in a container to Norway. The builder of the chariot came to Norway to put the parts together for the festival and was, together with the donor, celebrated for his efforts. The chariots were drawn around the area of the temple with Murugan, Ganesha and Durga seated in each chariot. There is a competition in Sri Lanka between the temples to have the best temple festival. This is the case also in the diaspora temples. This competition is about the length of the festival and the size and beauty of the vehicles and even the quality of the tirthas. The ambition of the temple committee of the Sivasubramanyar Alayam is to have the greatest and best temple festival outside of Sri Lanka. The competition between temples is now global in scale. The processions are covered by International Tamil newspapers, TV stations and web pages. The belief of the temple committee is that the vehicles which have been specially made in Sri Lanka for the temple and shipped to Norway are the most beautiful temple cars outside of South Asia. This view is an expression of the competitive spirit of the temple committee.
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In Sri Lanka some mahotsavas last twenty days or even twenty-five days, and the committee wants to expand the festival first to fifteen days and then to twenty days or more. This is the ambition of the temple committee; the wish to expand the festival is not caused by complaints from the devotees. The opposite is the case. The temple committee wishes to expand in order to compete with other temples, but they doubt the devotees will manage to participate that many days. The temple has also run into problems with some of the neighbours. Some neighbours have complained about the music. The gods are taken outdoors every day and the bringing of the gods out of the temple and their movement around is accompanied by loud music. That is part of how sacredness is created. Twelve days of festival noise are already too much, some believe, and the police has received some complaints. A conflict might be mounting. Every year before the festival the temple committee prepares a flyer that they deliver to all the houses in the vicinity of the temple to explain the ritual and to apologise for the noise. Last year the police requested the temple committee to perform the rituals without music. That would of course be impossible, and the request reveals a lack of understanding of the meaning of the rituals. The day after the rathotsava is the day of the tirthotsava, the festival of a sacred bathing place, tirtha, in which the gods were taken to a tirtha to be given sacred bath. For temples with tanks, this means bathing the image and the devotees in the tank. This temple does not have a tank, few diaspora temples do. Instead the murtis are taken to a lake some distance from the temple. The Tamil Hindus of the Sivasubramanyar Alayam in Oslo have established this lake in the vicinity of the temple as a tirtha, ‘sacred bathing place’, the festival statue (utsavamurti ) of the god Murugan is given an annual sacred bath and the devotees take holy dips in the lake. Not only temples, but new tirthas are created in the diaspora. In some texts it is written that the faithful who bathe at the same time as the image is immersed in the sacred water will have their moral impurity washed away.13 Also rituals to the dead are performed on this occasion. The bathing ritual attracts many people, is colourful and festive.14 13
H. Daniel Smith, ‘Festivals in the Pancaratra Literature.’ For details of this festival see Knut A. Jacobsen, ‘Establishing Ritual Space in the Hindu Diaspora in Norway,’ in Knut A. Jacobsen and P. Pratap Kumar (eds.), South Asians in the Diaspora: Histories and Religious Traditions. Leiden: Brill, 2004, pp. 134–148. 14
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Rituals, Honour and Prestige The temple processions in South India have various functions: they make the deity accessible to all the inhabitants of the city, they bestow honours upon eminent citizens or special devotees, they mark out the territory over which the deity rules and they display his dominance over, or relationship with, other deities of the locality, they mark out border areas.15 The highly political character of South Indian processions in colonial and modern times has meant that they have provided the context for conflict and also violence. Processions in the diaspora have different functions. Important in the diaspora is for the rituals to provide a setting for gathering of the Tamils living in different areas of the new country. However, clearly some of the functions noted above regarding processions in South India are relevant also for diaspora temples, such as the making sacred of the larger surroundings of the temple and the bestowing of honour on eminent citizens. Also in the diaspora, the ritual functions to make sacred the surroundings and give honour and prestige to the organisers. The different Tamil temples in the diaspora compete with each other to put on the greatest processions. One function of the festival therefore is to exhibit the achievement of the Tamil community in Norway to the global Sri Lankan Tamil community. An episode from the festival of the Sivasubramanyar Alayam in Oslo will illustrate this point. In the middle of the tirthotsava (august 2004), when the weapon of Murugan was about to be given the sacred bath with 1500 devotees struggling to get a glimpse of it, the mobile phone of the main priest rang. He answered the phone, and everyone was told to be quiet. The ritual stopped and there was complete silence. It was the Tamil radio that wanted an interview with the priest about the ritual going on directly from the scene so to speak. He talked for ten minutes on the phone, after which the ritual continued. This phone call had been arranged beforehand. 1500 devotees waited in silence while the priest was interviewed. Clearly, communicating with the global Sri Lankan Tamil community is one of the main goals of the ritual. 15 Leslie C. Orr, ‘Processions in the medieval South Indian temple: Sociology, sovereignty and soteriology,’ in South Indian Horizons: Felicitation Volume for Francois Gros, ed. Jean-Luc Chevillard (Pondicherry: Institut Francais de Pondichery, 2004), 428–470, see p. 440.
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Furthermore, displaying Tamil culture to non-Tamils is an important function of the procession and attracting the attention of the ‘Other’ is an important goal. In the diaspora, the religious minorities compete for the attention of the public and mass media for their festivals. This is because attention of the mass media is considered a source of prestige and an acknowledgement and recognition of the quality of the ritual work of the community. Competition between religions for public recognition seems to be a feature of religious pluralism. Competition for attention from the public and mass media is a competition for status. With the transnational character of the diaspora communities, the competition is global, with other communities locally, and with communities belonging to the same diaspora globally. In this competition for public recognition, some religions have become more visible than others. The mass media favour some religions, others receive hardly any attention. The temple management of the Siva Subramanyar Alayam attempts every year to attract TV stations and newspapers to cover their most important festivals, especially the rathotsava, the chariot festival, but they are not able to attract their attention. Beautiful chariots are not enough. The temple committee invite politicians of national fame in order to get public attention. Politicians are public figures and their presence will in itself show public approval of the festival. It is also thought that if politicians come, then the mass media will cover the events, since politicians are favourites of the mass media. However, the lack of attention is a source of disappointment and frustration and it is perceived by the temple committee as a lack of recognition by the majority society. A lot of ritual work is invested, and public recognition would be seen as a reward and a sign of the success of the ritual. Lack of recognition can even be perceived as religious discrimination: the rituals are performed also for the larger society, for ‘the Other’ to exhibit and gain recognition of Tamil culture. The great annual festival is a sign of the successful integration of the Tamils in the Norwegian society, and public recognition of the festival would be recognition also of this accomplishment, that the Tamils have become prosperous citizens of Norway. Successful integration generates little interest from the mass media which usually focus on conflicts and problems associated with immigration and religious pluralism.
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References Baumann, Gerd (1992). ‘Ritual implicates “others”: reading Durkheim in a plural society.’ in Understanding Rituals, edited by Daniel de Coppet. London: Routledge, 97–116. Cartman, James (1957). Hinduism in Ceylon. Colombo: M.D. Gunasena. Jacobsen, Knut A. (2004). ‘Establishing Ritual Space in the Hindu Diaspora in Norway.’ In South Asians in the Diaspora: Histories and Religious Traditions, edited by Knut A. Jacobsen and P. Pratap Kumar. Leiden: Brill, 134–148. Martin, James L. (1982). ‘The Cycle of festivals at Parthasarathi.’ In Guy R. Welbon and Glenn E. Yocum, Religious Festivals in South India and Sri Lanka. Delhi: Manohar, 51–76. Orr, Leslie C. (2004). ‘Processions in the medieval South Indian temple: Sociology, sovereignty and soteriology,’ in South Indian Horizons: Felicitation Volume for Francois Gros, ed. Jean-Luc Chevillard. Pondicherry: Institut Francais de Pondichery, 428–470, Pathamanathan, S. (1990). ‘Murukan the Divine Child: The Kantacuvami Temple at Nallur,’ Lanka: tidsskrift om lankesisk kultur, 80–102. Smith, H. Daniel (1982). ‘Festivals in the Pancaratra Literature,’ in Religious Festivals in South India and Sri Lanka, edited by Guy R. Welbon and Glenn E. Yocum. Delhi: Manohar, 27–49. Waghorne, Joanne Punzo (2002). ‘Chariots of the God/s: Riding the Line Between Hindu and Christian.’ In Popular Christianity in India: Reading between the Lines, edited by Selva J. Raj and Corinne C. Dempsey. Albany: State University of New York Press, 11–37. Welbon, Guy R. and Glenn E. Yocum (1982). Religious Festivals in South India and Sri Lanka. Delhi: Manohar. Younger, Paul (2002). Playing Host to Deity: Festival Relgion in the South Indian Tradition. Oxford University Press.
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN LONDON: ETHNICITY, RELIGION AND CASTE AMONG INDIANS IN SOUTHALL (MIDDX, UK) Igor Kotin Russian Academy of Sciences St. Petersburg State University Ethnic minority settlement in Britain became the subject of investigation of several established academic disciplines including history of religion and social geography. Of interest for a scholar of a pluralist society can be the analysis of rituals of various immigrant groups in relation to their traditional rituals in the countries of origin. It seems also important to study locations of religious sites vis-à-vis each other and correlation of rituals conducted there. These sites mark areas of immigrant concentration and the symbolic importance of ethnic communities in pluralist societies. They also can speak much about ethnic, religious and caste affiliation of immigrants, e.g., in the case of South Asians in Britain. In many cases social distance between subgroups of South Asian population expressed in their rituals correlate with spatial distance between their religious sites. This relation between ritual and social status, migration and social status, spatial and social distances between South Asian groups is discussed in connection with religious sites of South Asians in Southall (Mddx) well known for its thriving Indian community. In the case of Indian diaspora, not only religion but caste matters when ritual in Indian diaspora is discussed. Of particular importance is a division between so-called pure castes and former untouchables. The latter are considered inferior by the former and access of untouchables to religious sites of higher castes is often denied. The clear example of social closeness of former untouchable groups despite their religious differences can be exemplified by three-in-one building on Featherstone Rd. in Southall. It is not coincidence that religious centres of low-caste Hindus (Sri Valmik Mandir), Neo-Buddhist centre and Sikh Missionary Society neighbour each other in Southall. Another interesting observation suggests that caste groups of disputed social status in Indian society can claim
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higher position by stressing their religiosity, performing rituals of high castes and richly decorating their places of worship. Successful attempts of social geographers to deal with religion as the marker for segregated groups are well known (Phillips, 1981). Papers on religious sites mostly deal with ethnic origins of South Asians in Britain. Religion, of course, is a key factor for foundation of religious sites both as ethnic community centres and places of prayer and religious ritual. I would argue, however, that caste also plays an important role in the foundation and choice of location of religious sites and concentration and segregation of South Asian minority groups in Britain and even in choosing of rituals for reproduction. Sometimes caste and sectarian religious affiliation also correlate (Barot, 1987, Dwyer, 1996). Rightfully many caste centres of South Asians have been included in the national directory of religious sites (Weller 1993). In this paper an attempt is made to discuss relations between religion, ethnicity and caste and their geographical representation in British urban landscape. An attempt is also made to connect observation of particular rituals with the strategy of upward social mobility. By ritual we mean here religious worship and other individual or collective events with worship elements (Delvaux, 1994: 2). Having accepted many roles and faces of rituals I follow Mitchell’s observation that ‘rituals can be seen as significant sites of political contest between different social groups.’ (Ibid.) As Kelly and Kaplan put it, ‘rituals could be basic to the effort to imagine the possibilities for real political change’ (Kelly and Kaplan 1990: 141). A ritual in South Asian context is a manifestation of a religious, caste and ethnic identity as well as means of both of preserving present social order and changing place of particular group in this order. Although the term Sanskritization suggested by M.N. Srinivas relates to Hindu rituals and social mobility among Hindus, we may argue that the Sikhs are also experiencing similar trends as well as the Neo-Buddhists. Though they claim different religious affiliation, they fail to depart from the Hindu society in terms of social mobility. Thus, both Sikhs and Neo-Buddhists have been included in this research. The area of Southall (Mddx.) in Greater London has been chosen because of its popular image as ‘little India’, high concentration of South Asian population, significant numbers and diversity of Sikh, Hindu, Muslim, Neo-Buddhist religious sites there and its proximity to Oxford, from where commuter trips were undertaken by the author in 1996–97. The paper is based on the author’s study of religious
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sites in Southall, his interviews with members of South Asian religious communities, reports and comments in local (the Southall Gazette) and ‘Asian’ media (The Asian Times, The East, Eastern Eye). Religion is the key factor of identification in South Asia. The division along religious lines that led to the partition of India and the foundation of Pakistan in 1947 is much alive in Southall. It is the religious identity of the Sikhs that lies at the centre of Khalistan secessionist movement. Thus, religious sites are community centres and prayer halls which also bear signs of ethnic links and political affiliation. Names like Ramgarhia Hall or Sri Prajapati Mandal remind one of remaining importance of caste affiliation. There are at least six Sikh gurdwaras, three Hindu temples, three mosques and one NeoBuddhist prayer hall, and three caste and missionary centres of South Asians in Southall not to mention offices of Punjabi newspapers and magazines, Asian radio stations and social services (For addresses of the latter see: BT Phonebook, 1996–97). All have strong communities based on ethnicity or caste. Southall, widely known for its thriving Indian community is the administrative part of London metropolitan Borough of Ealing. With its past as a small county town Southall retains much of its suburban tranquility, disturbed, however by the noise of airplanes from the Heathrow airport which employs many Asians and is partly responsible for the formation of the area of South Asian concentration here. According to Baumann (1996) first Indians arrived here in mid-1950s as workers for local rubber manufacturer, their former commander of a unit of Punjabi Sikhs in the previous war (Baumann, 1996: 54). The need for unskilled labour in Southall as well as in neighbouring Heathrow in general led to a chain migration here of Sikhs mostly of landowner Jat caste and occasional arrival of their Punjabi Hindu, Muslim or Neo-Buddhist co-villagers. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1962) had enforced chain migration by the introduction of entry vouchers. Further restrictions provoked immigration of dependents from same areas of Punjab again. The policy of Africanization in former British colonies in East Africa produced a flow of East African Asian refugees of whom the majority was again of Punjabi origin, but mostly belonging to artisan castes generally known under the umbrella name of Ramgarhias.1 Gujarati
1
Ramgarhia is an internally preferred title of Tarkhans, and Lohars sometimes also
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Hindus and Muslims from South Asia or East Africa also had joined Asian community in Southall. Small groups of Tamil Hindus are also present in the area and can be spotted in Hindu temples. Certain areas of Southall can be recognised as the most thickly populated cluster of Punjabis with small Gujarati Hindu residential pockets and residential presence of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Many blocks of houses are 90 per cent Asian. These areas, however, are incorporated into a series of bigger administrative units (wards) with English, Irish and Afro-Caribbean population, which makes Southall multicultural area rather than ‘Asian’ ‘ghetto’. Southall’s geography is rather typical. It is a maze of Victorian terraced houses with few big transport arteries and interesting landmarks. Baumann (1996:38) suggests a railway line which runs south of the Broadway as dividing the area into southern Old Southall with inexpensive Victorian housing and New Southall to the north with better terraced and semi-detached houses, the price of which could be higher but for the proximity of the airport. Another division can be made along two main arteries, one being former Oxford Rd., now consisting of the Broadway, High St. and Uxbridge Rd. running east to west, and another is a series of streets, namely King Street, The Green, the South Rd, Lady Margaret Rd. Important landmarks in the area are railway station on the crossing of the South Rd. and the railway line and the town Hall on the crossing, where South Rd., The Broadway, Lady Margaret Rd. and High St., meet. The area is full of Asian sari shops, sweetshops, which make Southall quite picturesque especially in days of Diwali, celebrated by Sikhs as well as Hindus. Many Asian establishments are decorated in pseudo-Moghul style adding Asian flavour to the area. Many Hindu and Sikh places of worship are private houses. However, these places are redesigned or redecorated as places of worship. The first place in our account of South Asian religious sites is the three-in-one building on the Featherstone Rd., nearby the Green in Old Southall. Formally these were three addresses: 8 Featherstone,
used for naming Raj, Nai and other artisan castes of Sikhs chosen after one of leading Sikh warriors, Jassa Singh Ramgarhia, head of one of Sikh principalities (misal ) and commander of Ramgarh fortress in 18th century Punjab. In this paper by Ramgarhias we also generally mean Tarkhans and Lohars, but if members of other artisan castes are not numerous as is the case of Southall they may want to associate themselves with Ramgarhias.
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Valmik Temple, 10 Featherstone Rd., The Sikh Missionary Society U.K. and 12 Featherstone Rd, Dr. Ambedkar Buddhist Association. In reality this is one building united by inter-religious caste affiliation. On the opposite side of the road we can find the Islamic Information Centre and the Prajapati caste organisation is located within a minute’s walk on the same road. The main feature of these centres, except Islamic Mission is caste.2 The importance of caste for South Asian migration patterns is acknowledged by Peach (1994). Caste solidarity as an important factor of their economic success is shown on the pattern of Patels in London by Lyon and West (1995). The closeness of location of the three-in-one religious centres also speaks of the importance of caste even for British Indians. The three-in-one Hindu-Buddhist-Sikh religious centre is united by ethnicity and caste affiliation with former Punjabi Chamars, Mochis and Chuhras. These are endogamous Punjabi professional groups which had been for centuries oppressed and restricted to unpleasant menial work like cleaning, sweeping streets etc, but they were also used as landless field labourers. For centuries having been formally Hindus they were denied access to Hindu temples or to participate in Hindu celebrations. Many of them had been converted to Islam and Sikhism but failed to get equality even with their new co-believers. In early twentieth century India they became target of missionary work by Christians. Worried by Christian Missionary success Hindu religious reformers (Arya Samaj), Muslim Missionaries and reformers (Tabligh-i-Jamaat, Ahmadiya movement), Sikh organisations and sects (Akalis, Sikh Missionary Society) began active conversion of numerous Punjabi low-caste members. Very often members of the same family had chosen a different religion for their offspring in the hope of better life for at least the luckiest of them. Marriage patterns of endogamy remained involving
2 Caste is a well known South Asian phenomenon generally connected with Hinduism, but evident also among South Asian Sikhs, Muslims, Christians and Jains. Traditional Hindu society had been divided into endogamous hereditary professional-cum-status groups. Members of these groups knew of their belonging to one of the four main status categories called ‘varnas’ or their being out of the Varna system and literally being out of society, being ‘untouchable’. Both caste system and the untouchability are constitutionally banned in India and formally they are not taken seriously in other countries of South Asia. The perception of caste and untouchability, however, still finds place in the minds of many South Asians in the subcontinent and abroad.
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intra-caste but not inter-religious marriages, especially among Sikhs and Hindus (Nesbitt 1991). In India both external sense of their inferiority and internal sense of their unity led to continuation of long contacts between low-caste Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims and Christians. Significant numbers of Punjabi low caste Hindus, however, remained in Hinduism, because successful campaign of Mahatma Gandhi against untouchability in 1930 had opened temples for them and made Hindus in general more tolerant towards their brethren of lower status in traditional hierarchy. Gandhi had introduced the euphemism Harijan or Children of God for former ‘untouchables’ or Scheduled Castes of British colonial terminology. Part of Punjabi Harijans—mostly Chuhras and Mochis by caste—followed the pattern of the reformist Arya Samaj movement and proclaimed themselves Valmikis (or Valmiks or Balmik (i) s) or followers of Valmik panth (sect) in Hinduism. In a conventional Hindu way they had chosen a new name and claimed origin from a popular ‘cultural hero’, slightly modified their rituals according to patterns of higher castes. Valmiki is their currently internally preferred title (euphemism) taken after the famous poet Valmiki, author of the Hindu Sanskrit epic Ramayana, of lowcaste origin. Thanks to their religious activity and due to social changes in India Valmikis witnessed significant rise in their position in society which is evident even from Nesbitt’s reference to them not as Achhut or untouchables, people out of the Varna system, but as Shudras, the lowest but ‘pure’ strata of the Varna system (Nesbitt 1990: 261). The Valmik temple in Southall stands solid brown three-storey cube with a religious red flag ( yupa, jhanda, dhvaj ) with a silver bow and arrow, the emblem of Maharishi Valmiki, and a board indicating that this building is used for religious purposes of local Hindus. Higher caste Hindus, however, do not pray here. There is a big prayer hall inside with the statue of Sri Valmik, clad in a red robe. On the walls and sloping roof are pictures illustrating the life of Valmik. People in general visit individually during the day for private darshan (worship by observation) and on Sundays for corporate prayer. In general, Vishnu is worshipped as the central god of the universe (Bhagavan). Worship either at private homes or at community centres is typical for Hindus. Not surprisingly one might mention a Shree Prajapati Mandal with its own small premises in the neighbourhood as a centre with limited religious function. It is a community centre of
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Prajapatis, who are not untouchables, but of low artisan professional groups. Prajapati centre is situated few meters from the Valmik Centre and on the opposite side of the road. Thus spatial proximity of community centres could speak of social similarity, while small but visible spatial distance between them can reflect social distance or even distancing of Prajapatis from Valmiks. There is no evidence of the attendance of caste centres of each other, while references to attendance of Ravidasi Sikh gurdwara by members of Valmik Centre are not rare. Adjoining the Shri Valmik temple is part of the multi-religious building painted in another colour and bearing board with words ‘Buddha Vihara’ (Buddhist Monastery) has images of one of the most recent ‘cultural heroes’, those of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (1890–1956). B.R. Ambedkar belonged to the ‘untouchable’ Maharashtrian caste of Mahars and not only did he become recognised as the leader of this caste but he gained a reputation as a prominent champion of all oppressed groups in the Indian society and a leading politician, Minister and the author of the Indian Constitution, as well as ‘the architect of Indian Republic’. In 1916, this popular leader seriously considered a conversion of India’s 100 million ‘untouchable’ minority to Sikhism, but the failure of first non-Punjabi (Maharashtrian Mahars) converts to improve their economic position or raise their social status after conversion caused his disillusion with Sikh religion, and led him in 1956 to become converted to Buddhism. Many low-caste Hindus followed after him to join Buddhism in the form of NavaYana or Neo-Buddhism (See Ambedkar 1957, 1980). Portrait of Ambedkar together with Buddhist chakra (wheel) decorates the entrance to the building. It has a library and a meeting room inside. Here images of Buddha Shakyamuni stay close to images of Ambedkar, decorated by flower garlands (mala) in a way similar to Hindu decoration of images of their deities. The day of Buddha’s nirvana and Dr. Ambedkar’s birthday are celebrated here and in the neighbouring Dominion Centre, which serves the purposes of many communities of Southall. The third part of the multi-religious building is an office of the Sikh Missionary Society U.K., an organisation that moved to Southall from another Sikh stronghold in Britain, Gravesend. Formally this is a Mission headquarters rather than the temple, although the inside is decorated with images of Hindu Gurus worshipped by Sikhs. The Mission publishes books on Sikhism and organises various activities
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in memory of the ten Gurus and chosen Sikh Martyrs. The fact that in both Punjab and Britain former low-caste Hindus are the main subject of Sikh Missionary activity suggests that the neighbourhood of Valmik temple and Ambedkarite centre is not mere coincidence. Low caste Sikhs, however, have their own temple at a distance from this building, at the end of Old Southall, two miles from the Southern Hump Bridge. In the case of purpose-built constructions like these, the location of the temple or mosque or gurdwara depends on municipal authorities rather than on adepts of particular religion. Peach gives the best possible example of Swaminarayan Temple, which was assembled not in upper class Harrow, as originally intended, but in working class suburb of Neasden’ (Peach 2000: 13). Ravidasi gurdwara is the most impressive domed temple with imposing entrance arch, Sikh saffron flag (nishan sahib) and decorative railing. This building situated on Regina Rd. has been constructed in the 1980s by members of local Ravidasi community, Sikhs of lowcaste origin who are often denied access to other gurdwaras by higher caste Sikhs. The patron of the community, Sant (Saint) Ravidas is not one of the Ten Gurus recognized by orthodox Sikhs. In India, low-caste Sikhs respect the fourth Sikh Guru Ram Das (1534–1581) as their saint patron, because he was known as a friend of Ravidas and a founder of Amritsar, a sacred city of Sikhs. According to Ravidasi myths their ancestors were commissioned to dig a sacred pond for the city of Amritsar. In Britain Ravidas became a ‘cultural hero’ and is worshiped as Guru. The Gurdwara of Ravidasis is situated on the outskirts of this Sikh dominated area, where main competing forces are Jats and Ramgarhias. The landowning Punjabis are known as Jats. They occupied most of the vacancies in the British Indian Army. It was the retired Jat soldiers who had first settled in Southall. In India Jats are known for their indifference to religious dogmas. In the early years of settlement they even had cut their hair, shaved their beards and did not wear turbans in public to avoid racist remarks and difficulties with employment. Old Jat gurdwara on Havelock street shows that this parish church turned temple has only a board depicting Sikh sword (tegh) and daggers (kirtan) and the pole with a flag (nishan sahib) outside. Nothing in the architecture speaks either of religiosity or of prosperity of the community. Jats are the majority, but not the rich. They are the majority and do not need to claim their rites being correct or pure. Other predominantly Jat Sikh Gurdwaras are also
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quite modest. The Gurdwara on Park Rd. near railway station is a converted warehouse with flag pole as the only distinct Sikh symbol outside. It contrasts with the neighbouring richly decorated Glassy Junction pub frequented by Jats. The gurdwara on Villier Road is a brick converted parish church. Most recent change in the architecture of the area is the construction of a new grand Gurudwara on Havelock Street. This huge Sikh place of congregation is the largest outside India and its importance as the grandest Sikh center in England makes it an all-Sikh building. Despite anti-caste rhetoric of many leaders of the Sikhs, this religious community had always been divided into caste groups (See Ballard 1996, Kalsi 1992). The number and influence of castes differ in Punjab proper, East Africa and Britain. In Southall Ramgarhias are the second largest group of Sikh castes. Ramgarhias have their Ramgarhia Hall, the Gurdwara and the social club on the Broadway on the corner with South Rd. The place geographically dominates the area. The building is decorated with a dome and other Sikh elements of architecture. This is a purpose-built religious and caste centre of the rich and thriving community, but also the community, whose claim for higher social status can and often is doubted by Jats. Ramgarhia community is composed mostly of East-African refugees and their offspring. Many of them had been quite prosperous in East Africa. Others, especially, the Raj, members of the caste of bricklayers closely associated with Ramgarhias, have been successful in construction business in Southall. Thus, Ramgarhias can claim a place among more prosperous groups than Jats, but in caste hierarchy they are lower than Jats. Sense of inferiority of Ramgarhias vis-à-vis Jats is much stronger here in Southall where the latter form the majority among Sikhs. But claims of equality of these groups can be supported by appealing to the authority of Gurus. Sikh Gurus are widely believed to have advocated the overcoming of caste boundaries. Therefore, by stressing their religiosity with means of traditional Indian architecture Ramgarhias ‘beat’ Jat claims of superiority over them. Same means are used in the Ravidasi gurdwara described above to support claims of their equality with or distinction but not inferiority from other Sikhs. The founder of the Sikh religion, Guru Nanak (1469–1539), is widely believed to have advocated the overcoming of all caste boundaries. The third Guru Arjun Dev Ji (1479–1574) called Sikhs to organise common meals for all regardless of caste or religion. All
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Sikh Gurdwaras have as their integral part for common meals—langar. In Indian society meal consumption requires equality of participants, and common meals are supposed to unite people. Those who are aware of symbolic inferiority of others will avoid common meals with them. Thus, the presence of langars designed to impose equality contributes to the integration of Sikh caste communities, while liberal British laws and municipal policies allowed various caste groups of Sikhs to develop into separate communities. Hindu community in Southall is also not homogenous either ethnically or by caste. I have already mentioned the Valmikis and Prajapatis. There are also other members of artisan castes, both Punjabis and Gujaratis, originated from India and East Africa. They are mostly Vaishnavs, but some are from the Arya Samaj. (Baumann 1996: 117). There are two recognised Hindu temples in Southall. The older one, founded and run by the Hindu Temple Trust, is located in Old Southall and dedicated to Shri Ram. The other, founded as the Vishva Hindu Kendra in 1979 and dedicated to Vishnu is located in New Southall. Both foundations can be traced to the same ‘Hindu Cultural Society’ which was formed in 1965, but in 1972 became divided due to personality clashes. Baumann observes that the management committee of one contains more East African Hindus than the other, though numerous families attend them indiscriminately and there is much cross-attendance whenever one of the two is visited by a pundit or guru from elsewhere in Britain or from India (Baumann, 1996:80). Both temples belong to those Hindus who consider Vishnu as the main god or sometimes the only God (Bhagavan). Vaishnav sect in Hinduism allows different forms of devotion, each of which can claim to be the most pure. Thus, members of middle artisan castes can claim higher status by fighting ‘impurity’. Not surprisingly members of the Vishva Hindu Kendra began active campaign against India-based cable Zee TV network for ‘the ‘obscene’ portrayal of Lord Krishna (The Southall Gazette, Jan. 10, and Jan. 17, 1997). Few words about Muslims, who are not the main object of our consideration, may be mentioned here. The majority of Southall’s Muslims are Punjabis. Others are from India, Bangladesh and even from Mauritius, the Seychelles, Fiji and Trinidad. But the overwhelming majority of them are of South Asian origin. There were two mosques in Southall by 1997 (Now there are three of them). Southall’s central mosque is located in Old Southall and its affairs are run primarily by believers from the Pakistani Punjab. It follows
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a strict interpretation of Muslim doctrine which leads it. The smaller second mosque is Barelvi one in new Southall. Muslims are conventionally considered to be more equality minded, but still it is important to note that Deobandhi mosque is more ‘oriental-like’ than the Barelvi one. This speaks of external decorations and visual marks (cupola, minarets etc.) as significant ways of stressing one’s ‘purity’ and ‘rightness’. The mosque, the temple or the Gurudvara can be very simple from outside. But for the insiders, they represent symbols of their status in society. As we can see from the brief and partial account of South Asian religious sites in Southall, each has either ethnic or caste or both dimensions. There are also signs that the location of religious sites reflects residential location of particular religious and caste groups. We can observe also that location and appearance of South Asian religious sites may reflect inter-caste relations, and similarities in location patterns can speak of similar social or even caste status of their members. Despite significant success of several professionals, particularly, Mr. Pyara Khabra, a long time representative of the borough in the House of Commons, Indians of Southall are mostly workers. As S. Shukla observes in her research on diasporic cultures of postwar America and England, ‘most of these Indians, especially prior to the middle 1960s, exhibited a distinct downward mobility. A variety of factories engaged in heavy industrial production recruited or served as magnets for Indians in both developing cities in northern England as well as in what was beginning to be known as greater London. Performing a wide variety of types of unskilled and then skilled labor, these workers established themselves as visible and significant parts of the British working class. India’s place in the world had changed, from a British colony to a ‘third world’ country, and so too had the nature of the British Indian immigrant population in shape and form. The image of the ‘immigrant’ was no longer an ayah, lascar, or prince, to borrow the title of Visram’s book on the pre-1947 period, but now a factory worker’ (Shukla, 2005: 49). Shukla’s observation supports the suggestion of Robinson that immigrants use their societies of origin as reference societies (Robinson, 1986). The society in India is still dominated by caste status, though both the rise of capitalist relations and anti-caste rhetoric had shaken the omnipotence of the caste hierarchy and caste system. Despite significant blows to the caste system it is easier to struggle for emancipation within the system rather than for removing it. The main form of social upward movement is to claim higher caste
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status, and by supporting this claim by wealth and performing higher caste rituals. This is the way chosen by many Indians in the diaspora, particularly in Southall. The first step to show one’s religiosity for Hindus of a low status artisan caste is to display it through rituals. Thus, we see public observances of darshana to Hindu gods in a somewhat eclectic form in the Shree Krishna temple and the Hindu Trust Temple are ways to overcome low caste status. The rituals there include Darshana (ritual observation of the Murti) and Arati. Main rites of passage of Hindu tradition are observed, and the Upanayana is given special attention. Thus, the Shudra group members claim the status of the Dvija. Though the members of groups known in India as Untouchables have sacred places spatially separated from the rest of the Hindu community, in Southall they reproduce their rituals and center their cult on Valmik, their cultural hero. The same is true for the Neo-Buddhists and the Ravidasi Sikhs. Conclusion Migration of Indians abroad gives them a chance to improve their living conditions and make capital significant either to return home rich or to ensure better living for the second generation. The immigrants, however, often lose their social status in the host society or remain the same (low) as they did in India. At the same time the country of origin remains the reference society for migrants. Thus for many Indians getting rich or richer is not enough. It is important for them to claim better status than before. The main way to do so is public adherence to their religion, by public observation in specially chosen and decorated sites of particular rituals that are generally attributed to the middle and higher status castes. References Ambedkar, B.R. (1957). Buddha and His Dhamma, Bombay. —— (1980). Buddha and the Future of His Religion, Jallandhar. Ballard, R. (1996). “The Emergence of Desh Pardesh”, in: R. Ballard (Ed.), Desh Pardesh. The South Asian Presence in Britain, London: Hurst and Company. Ballard, R. (1996). “Differentiation and disjunction among the Sikhs”, in: R. Ballard (Ed.), Desh Pardesh. The South Asian Presence in Britain, London: Hurst and Company, pp. 88–116. Barot, R. (1987). “Caste and sect in the Swaminarayan movement”, pp. 67–, in:
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Burghart R. Hinduism in Great Britain: the perpetuation of religion in an alien cultural milieu, London: Tavistock Publications. Baumann, G. (1996). Contesting culture: discourses of identity in multi-ethnic London, Cambridge: CUP BT Phonebook (1998). Yellow Pages: London South West 1996–97. London. Delvaux, A. (1994). Ritual in a migrant situation: intentional and unintentional use of culture. Paper presented at the EASA conference ‘Perspectives on Moralities, Knowledge and Power’. Oslo, 24–27 June, 1994. Dwyer, R. (1996). “Caste, Religion and Sect in Gujarat. Followers of Vallabhacharya and Swaminarayan”, pp. 165–173, in: R. Ballard (Ed.), Desh Pardesh. The South Asian Presence in Britain, London: Hurst and Company. Kalsi, S.S. (1992). The Evolution of a Sikh community in Britain, Leeds: University of Leeds. Kelly, J.D. and M. Kaplan (1990). “History, Structure and Ritual”, Annual Review of Anthropology, 19: 119–150. Lyon, M.H. and West, B.J.M. (1995). “London Patels: caste and commerce”, New Community, 21 (3), 399–419. Mitchell, J.P. (2001). “Ritual”. In Barnard A. and Spenser J. (Eds.) 2001: Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology. London, New York: Routledge. pp. 490–493. Nesbitt, E. 1990: “Religion and identity: The Valmiki community in Coventry”, New Community, N 16 (2), pp. 261–274. —— (1991). “My Dad’s Hindu, My Mum’s Side are Sikhs”. Studies in Religious Identity, Culture and Education. Research Papers, National for Arts Education, Coventry: University of Warwick. Nesbitt, E. (1996). “Valmikis in Coventry: the Ritual and Reconstruction of a Community”, in: R. Ballard (Ed.) Desh Pardesh. The South Asian Presence in Britain, London: Hurst & Company. Peach, C. (1994). “Three phases of South Asian Emigration”, in: J.M. Brown and R. Foot (Eds.) Migration: the Asian Experience, London. —— (2000). “The Cultural Landscape of South Asian Religion in English Cities”, A Paper presented to the conference on New Landscapes of Religion in the West, Oxford, School of Geography, 20–23 September, 2000. —— (2004). “Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs in the New Religious Landscape of England”. Paper presented at the Second International Conference on Geography of Religion. Amsterdam, April 1–4, 2004. Phillips, D. (1981). “The social and spatial segregation of Asians in Leicester”, in P. Jackson and S. Smith (Eds.), Social interaction and ethnic segregation // IBG Special Publication, N 12, London, pp. 101–121. Robinson, V. (1986). Transients, Settlers, and Refugees. Asians in Britain, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Shukla, S. (2005). India Abroad. Diasporic Cultures of Postwar America and England. New Delhi: Orient Longman. Vertovec S. (1992). “Community and congregation in London Hindu temples: divergent trends”, New Community, 18 (2), January, pp. 251–264. Weller P. (1993). Religions in the UK. A Multi-faith Directory. Derby: University of Derby.
THE STATE OF PHILANTHROPY AMONGST THE MUSLIM DIASPORA IN SOUTH AFRICA Sultan Khan1 and A.F.M. Ebrahim2 University of KwaZulu Natal, South Africa Introduction Muslims in South Africa constitute a minority group comprising different ethnic and race groups. As a community it reflects the same diversity that characterizes the rest of the South African population. Each of these groups has different historical contexts that draw on their normative and value systems from the universal principles of Islam. The institution of charity amongst Muslims is one of the five basic tenets, which adherents strictly conform to. In Muslim countries the institution of charity is regulated by the state and special institutions called the Bayt al-Mal are tasked with the responsibility of collecting and distributing this compulsory charity. In light of the fact that the Muslim diaspora is spread throughout the world, the collection and distribution of compulsory charity are voluntary. It differs from the strict notion of a Bayt al-Mal 3 system as practiced in different parts of the Muslim world. In the case of South African Muslims, sophisticated networks (both formal and informal) have developed over the years for the purposes of collection and distribution of different forms of charity. The purpose behind such a level of organisation is to prevent abuse and to ensure that the appropriate beneficiaries get their due. However, despite this, not all organisations adhere or conform to a united, coherent and systematic method in the collection and distribution of charities resulting in fragmentation, duplication, and insufficient regulation and
1
Is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Sociology University of KwaZulu-Natal. Is a Professor of Islamic Studies in the School of Religion University of KwaZuluNatal. 3 The concept of Bayt al-Mal as a centralised charitable institution is a practice in Muslim countries only. Since the institution of charity is a divine act, such an institution needs to be regulated by an Islamic State. 2
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aggressive competition. Approximately 1328 Muslim organisations4 serving different causes both within and outside the community are known to collect and distribute charities. These organisations include social welfare and relief agencies within and outside the community and theological and humanitarian aid organisations with either a strong local or international focus. Philanthropy takes different forms amongst Muslims and is strongly regulated by religious prescriptions. Separate charities focussing on different purposes such as funding places of worship, religious education and community projects5 exists. Many of these are awarded to causes other than Muslim. The largest category of charity is made up of Zakat. This charity is identified for the promotion of the social welfare needs of Muslims afflicted by socio-economic problems. Other minor forms of charity also become widely available depending on the religious observance and particular circumstances6 in which they find themselves. Although South African Muslims attempt to strongly conform to the norms and values that govern the different forms of giving, receiving and administering charity, certain fundamental contradictions become evident within this institution. Overt and latent inequalities based on religious and ethnic differences, monopolisation of the insti-
4 This is estimated from the directory of Muslim organisations compiled by Murshid Davids in 1996. It must be noted that some organisations may have seized to operate while new ones may have formed since this period. Currently, this is the only directory of Muslim organisations available. 5 Muslims are entitled to give voluntary charity called Lillah. It is not an obligatory charity and is considered the second largest category of charity after Zakat. The underlying principle in this category is that the giver derives additional spiritual benefits by such a charitable act. In this category, Muslims are permitted to give charity to needy persons both within and outside its community. 6 For example on the occasion of 'Id al-Fitr, a festivity after the observance of Ramadan, the head of the household who has the financial means gives a charity called Fitrah on behalf of all members of his immediate family before the sermon which brings the month long fasting to an end. On the occasion of 'Id al-Adha, a religious observance in memory of the Prophet Abraham, every Muslim who has the financial means is required to sacrifice an animal and distribute the meat to the needy within and outside the community and to friends and relatives. In the event of a Muslim encountering any misfortune or unforeseen calamity he or she may make a charity in the form of Sadaqah. Should a person not be able to fast in the month of Ramadan due to illness or other unforeseen circumstance then that individual can give a charity called Fidyah—an equivalent monetary value of two daily meals for the entire month of Ramadan to any indigent person in order to gain the benefit of the missed fast.
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tution by powerful theological and ethnic groups, the dominance of power and influence in important decision making on behalf of the community by powerful stakeholders, marginality of those historically disadvantaged and new entrants to the fold of Islam are some of the social dynamics masked within this noble institution. Nonetheless, to the unsuspecting observer the institution of charity as practiced by the diaspora would appear sacred, deserving manifold admiration and compliment. This paper commences by examining the historical and social organisation of diaspora, which sets the backdrop for later analysis and interpretation. It is followed by an analysis of patterns of giving, shape, size, extent and motivation for giving so that the interaction of a multiplicity of complex set of factors influencing the institution of charity is highlighted. In this way certain social processes and dynamics within the diaspora is unmasked. Thereafter, the paper examines the beneficiaries of charity both within and outside of the diaspora and the institutional mechanisms in place to regulate such an institution. Social Organisation of the Muslim Diaspora in South Africa The first arrival of Muslims in South Africa may be traced to Muslim soldiers in 1652 in the army of the Dutch East India Company known as Mardyckers (Nadvi, 1988: 145; Naude 1992: 17; Randeree, 1997:69). However, these Muslims were prevented from overtly practising Islam and never had a long-term presence in the country. A more permanent presence of Muslims in South Africa arose in 1667 in the Cape on the arrival of slaves mainly from Malaysia and the East Indies at the behest of the Eastern Batavian Dutch Empire (Randeree, 1997: 69; Nadvi, 1988: 145; Islamic Council of South Africa, 1984: 14). After the abolishment of slavery in 1833, Islam became a flourishing religion and by 1840 it had gained approximately 6 435 adherents, equivalent to a third of the total population of the colony (Nadvi, 1988: 147). Institutionalisation and an emphasis on education and literacy played an important role in the spread of Islam. Other factors such as conversion, adoption, the purchase of slaves by free Muslims and inter-religious marriage served as an important catalyst in promoting the spread of Islam (Dadoo, S: http://www.islamonline.net). These Muslims from the Cape Province
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are referred to as “Malays”,7 an apartheid racial definition to isolate coloured Muslims from the broader coloured community. A separate stream of Muslims, from the sub-continent of India arrived in South Africa from 1860 onwards to work on the sugar plantations of the Natal colony as indentured labourers (Ramphal, 1985: 109; Meer, 1980: 1). These Muslims came from Malabar, on the west coast of South India and Hyderabad in the south. Around this time, a third group of passenger Muslims followed their indentured counterparts. They were mainly Sunni Vhoras from Surat and Memons from Kathiawad and Kutch. Their history and origins vary from that of the indentured Muslims. The passenger Muslims were made up of the merchant class and referred to by the colonialists as “Arabs”8 because of their distinct code of dress. They enjoyed certain privileges from the colonialist masters, since they were free citizens of the British Empire, and excluded from the provision of the repressive Indian Immigration Law by virtue of their trading status (Sulliman, 1997: 108). The “Arab” merchants of Durban supplied merchandise to many of the small stores owned by their relatives or village contacts in the smaller towns of the Colony. They penetrated many of the remote areas of the country and rendered commercial services to communities around them (Sulliman, 1997: 109). The efficient transport system, the railway, and the fast developing mining industry attracted these Muslims to the Transvaal. Small businesses were then set up in the city of Johannesburg and outlying towns such as Pietersburg, Nelspruit, Potgietersrus and Volksrust (Nadvi, 1988: 149). Muslims of African origin referred to as Zanzibaris9 also supplemented the Muslims of Indian origin in Natal in 1873. They were descendents of Muslim slaves and were brought to Natal between 1873 and 1880 to alleviate the labour problem in the colony. They originated largely from northern Mozambique, Portuguese East Africa, Malawi and Zanzibar. They settled mainly in Kingsrest on the Bluff, in Durban (Randeree, 1997: 70–71). 7 The term “Malay” is an apartheid racial definition to isolate coloured Muslims from the broader Coloured community. 8 It must be noted that Muslims in South Africa are stratified by language, race, ethnic origin and historical evolution. Amongst the more wealthy classes of Muslims, the Memon and Surtee community whose evolution can be traced to the early days of passenger Muslims are considered by far the richest. 9 Muslims of African origin were referred to as Zanzibaris, another racial definition to isolate African Muslims from the broader Muslim community.
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Despite differences in the historical evolution of the Muslim community in South Africa, the colonialist and subsequent apartheid practices impacted negatively on their social well being, but more severely on Muslims with a history of indentured labour and slavery. Poverty and related social problems of the time necessitated a philanthropic response from the more economically privileged sectors of the community resulting in the provision of community infrastructure in the form of places of worship, orphanages, old age homes, schools, social welfare services, cemeteries and religious institutions. Distinguished amongst those who championed the social, spiritual and welfare needs of early indentured Indian Muslims in Natal was Sheik Ahmad who arrived in 1860 with the first batch of labourers. Soofie Saheb is still revered as the second founding father of Islam in Natal who arrived in 1895 and established Islamic folk festivals, madaris (pl. madrasah), orphanages and places of worship amongst the impoverished Indian Muslims who were at risk of being lured into other religious faiths. Keeping in the tradition and legacy of this highly acclaimed spiritual master; his subsequent and current descendents continue to promote the religious upliftment of the community in KwaZulu-Natal and to a certain extent in the Western Cape. Notwithstanding the diverse historical backgrounds of Muslims in South Africa and their ideological, cultural and linguistics differences, the community has continued to thrive, making a distinct impact in the country. Although the actual population of Muslims cannot be ascertained with accuracy, crude estimates suggest that the population could range from half a million adherents to in excess of more than a million during the 1990s (Naude, 1992: 17; Randeree, 1997: 68; Tayob, 1998: 43). The lack of accurate data on Muslims in the country during the apartheid era resulted from a complicated and cumbersome race classification system, which inaccurately identified people’s religious beliefs. This has in recent years been partly addressed. The 1996 and 2001 census data, which put the population at 553717 and 654063 respectively, serves as important baseline for analytical investigations. Graph 1 illustrates that Muslims are present in every province in the country with the largest population located in KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Western Cape. In addition, the population in each of these provinces has increased significantly with a national growth rate of 18.1% between the two census years. Table 1 provides a breakdown of population growth for the different provinces based on the 1996 and 2001 census data.
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Graph 1 Muslim Population by Province for Census Year 1996 and 2001 10279 6655
Northern Province
16917 14260
M pumalanga
150088 107827
Province
Gauteng
2001 1996
13067 10690
Limpopo
142498 126749
KwaZulu-Natal 4048 2301 4580 4185 19656 17137
Free State Northern Cape Eastern Cape
292931 263913
Western Cape 0
100000
200000
300000
400000
Population
Table 1 Breakdown of population growth in percent by province for the 1996 and 2001 Census Year Province
1996 2001 Census Census
Variance in Population
% Population Growth
Western Cape Eastern Cape Northern Cape Free State KwaZulu-Natal Limpopo Gauteng Mpumalanga Northern Province
263913 17137 4185 2301 126749 10690 107827 14260 6655
292931 19656 4580 4048 142498 13067 150088 16917 10279
29018 2519 395 1747 15749 2377 42261 2657 3624
11.0 14.7 9.4 75.9 12.4 22.2 39.2 18.6 54.5
Total
553717
654063
100346
18.1
(Source: Statistics South Africa 1996 and 2001)
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Table 1 indicates that there has been a significant increase in the Muslim population for all provinces since 1996. The Free State, Limpopo, Gauteng and the Northern provinces have experienced population growth beyond the national average of 18.1%. As a community it reflects the same diversity that characterizes the rest of the South African population with African adherents constituting the fastest growing segment, having increased by 52.3% since 1991 (Vahed and Jeppe, 2005: 253). Graph 2 provides the national breakdown of Muslims by race as extracted from the census 2001 database. Apart from racial differences, the community is differentiated along distinct class lines within each of the racial groups. Class differences emanate from discrepancies in education levels, unemployment and income levels of the employed. The average per capita income for Indian Muslims was R2 163 per month, Malays, R1 262 and Africans, R935 in 2001. Marked difference in per capita monthly income is noted at a regional level with R2 794 for Gauteng, R2 396 for the Western Cape and R1 656 for KZN. This trend reflects the economic well being of the merchant class Indian Muslims in Gauteng and the Western Cape, with most Indian Muslims in KZN having indentured roots and still struggling to climb the economic ladder (Vahed and Jeppe, 2005: 253). Census data analysed by Vahed and Jeppe (2005:253) suggest that 55.76% of Muslim males in the Western Cape were not working while unemployment for this category stood at 37.75% and 40.25%
Graph 2 National population breakdown of Muslims by race as at 2001 Coloured
296023
Race
Indian
274931
White
8409 74701
African 0
100000
200000 Population
300000
400000
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in Gauteng and KZN respectively. In terms of education African Muslims were most disadvantaged with 13.9% having no schooling compared to 5.23% for Indians and 2.29% for Malays. These deep class differences among Muslims in South Africa have given rise to a large social welfare sector directed at addressing the poverty and other problems of the community. Patterns of Giving A dichotomy exists in the nature of giving within the diaspora. Muslims tend to give both to organised charities and directly to persons in need. Over the years a number of charitable organisations have mushroomed in promoting different facets of community life with virtual dependence on compulsory and optional forms of charity. This organised nature of charity has resulted in the establishment of many formal offices reducing the number of active volunteer participation within these organisations. The roles of volunteers are confined to that of management functions whilst full time personnel are employed to accomplish the organisations goals and objectives. This trend is most prevalent amongst older and more established organisations. Smaller organisations with little or no formal infrastructure largely depend on volunteer support to meet their organisational goals. Membership within Muslim organisations varies. This is dependent on the nature and scope of activities, historical evolution and the special constitutional provisions by which the organisation is governed. In keeping with the Non-Profit Organisation Bill (NPO) many organisations have taken the opportunity to register either as a trust or foundation in the form of Waqf,10 which limits the participation of the general Muslim community in the affairs of these organisations. Very often trustees are appointed to serve as life members and vacant positions are filled through nominations. In several organisations the leadership structure has been entrenched for almost four decades by the same individuals. This is based on the recognition of exemplary services provided to the organisation by the incumbent over the years.11 10 This is an Islamic equivalent of an organisation established as a public entity, the proceeds from which are to be utilised for the social welfare development of the community. 11 The General Secretary of the Muslim Darul Yatama Wal Masakeen (Muslim Home for Orphans and Destitutes) a leading social welfare organisation in Durban has
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Class, ethnic, ideological and theological differentiation tends to characterise the organisational composition of Muslim charitable institutions. There is a tendency for business entrepreneurs, professionals and politically influential persons to take up important positions. Ethnic and racial exclusivity in the organisations membership exists at varying levels. Newer and progressive organisations are moving away from this tradition in the spirit of the new democracy unfolding in the country. Organisations with a strong history of supporting a particular theological or ideological thought are less open to membership from an opposing group.12 Broadly, Muslims of African extraction feature less prominently in the membership profile of these organisations. The presence of women, in these organisations is hardly felt, although more progressive organisations are only contemplating constitutional changes well beyond democracy. Even those organisations that have female representation are nominated and the gender balance by majority favour males. Nonetheless, many charitable organisations operate on the notion of a quasi Bayt al-Mal system, appealing to the community’s religious obligation to advance its social welfare needs as a collective. Despite this practice, there appears to be a strong tendency within the diaspora to fulfil the welfare needs of ones immediate family members at a personal level. The different patterns of giving within the community are highlighted in Table 2. Table 2 Patterns of giving within the community Patterns of giving Give to needy family members Give directly to needy persons in the community other than family Give directly to Muslim organisations Give to organisations other than Muslim with broader humanitarian objectives All of the above
% 98.7% 38.0% 23.3% 4.0% 0
(Source: Khan, 2005)
maintained this portfolio for more than four decades since the inception of the organisation. Although he is 82 years old and retired he continues to maintain this organisational status and involved actively in the day-to-day administration of the organisation on a voluntary basis. 12 Muslims in South Africa are theologically, spiritually and ideologically divided comprising of different groupings such as Sunnis, Soofies, Tablighi, Shafi, Hanafi, Shite
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It becomes apparent that a significantly large number of Muslims tend to give to causes first within their immediate family, followed by needy persons in the community. Muslim charitable and social welfare organisations in fact are ranked third on the priority list of giving by Muslims13 whilst giving to organisations other than Muslims with broader humanitarian objectives is less of a priority.14 Interestingly, Everatt (2004) in his study confirms similar trends. On the whole, it may be asserted that less than 30% of the charities within the Muslim community are directed to organisations. This finding suggests that a significant proportion of charity is given on an individual basis. Broadly, social welfare causes involving children, the homeless, widows, the aged, disabled and those afflicted by poverty are widely supported within the diaspora. In addition, support for places of worship, propagation of the religion and causes that contribute to social advancement of the community enjoy a fair level of support. Shape, Size and Extent of Philanthropy Cash and material forms of giving are most prevalent within the diaspora, although voluntarism is limited. The quantitative dimension of giving amongst Muslims is difficult to estimate in view of the different forms of mandatory and non-mandatory forms of giving and the number of organisations that do not register with regulating authorities. Nonetheless, according to reliable sources the projected cash value of compulsory charity (Zakat) is conservatively estimated at R300 million per annum (SANZAF, Biennial National Conference, 2004). To illustrate the operating budgets of organisations, one nationally based organisation collects and distributes cash forms of charity to the amount of R20m per annum. On the other hand there are organisations that predominantly collect and distribute material resources. The Mustadafin Foundation, an initiative of Muslim women etc. In addition within these groupings one would find those that rigidly adhere to the traditional teachings of Islam, the modernists and post-modernists. 13 It is a commonly held belief amongst Muslims that when giving religiously mandatory charity, one needs to personally identify a person in need. In addition, meeting the financial needs of immediate family members within the norms of religious prescriptions enjoys preference. 14 This trend is not surprising as most religiously mandatory charity is prescribed for Muslims only.
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in the Western Cape in the 2004 and 2003 financial year mobilised material resources to the value of R6.5m and R6.1m respectively. Capital investments in community infrastructure such as welfare institutions, places of worship, educational institutions and maintenance utilises a significant proportion of charity. In one province, charities for capital development programmes and projects amounted to R6.3m and R7.5m for the 2004 and 2005 financial years, respectively. These amounts constitute 33% and 43% respectively in capital expenditure compared to operating costs of R18.6m and R17.4m for the same period.15 In addition, optional charities (Lillah, Sadaqah, Fitrah, and Qurbani ) constitute a relatively large share of contributions made by Muslims. It is within these that much latitude exists for charitable acts to communities other than Muslims. To illustrate the extent to which these optional charities are utilized to support causes outside the folds of Islam, in the past ten years the “Gift of the Givers” made charitable contribution to the amount of R60m16 to various humanitarian causes both locally and internationally. Given the prevalence of a large number of organisations within the Muslim community, competition for resources, duplication of services, over servicing and increasing costs in the administration of these organisations cannot be ignored. These take up large amount of resources, which otherwise could be creatively used both within and outside of the community. The community is serviced by approximately 1328 organisations nationally as illustrated in Table 3. When one compares the total number of organisations serving the Muslim community at different levels as against the population, the ratio is 1:489. Various attempts over the years have failed to bring the different categories of organisations under a unified national body. Maintenance of organisational territoriality, gate keeping by older well established organisations, monopolisation of resources by powerful stakeholders in the community, religious differences and fear of competition from
15 The source of information is through a key informer who had made the minutes and annual reports available for this study on condition of anonymity. 16 A key informer Mr Abid Dawray of Gauteng made known that the “Gift of Givers” in the past ten years made charitable contribution to humanitarian causes to the value of R120m of which R60m was from the state for poverty relief programmes in the country.
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Table 3 Distribution of Muslim organisation by places of worship, social and educational institutions by Province Number Province 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Places of worship
Social17 Community Total institutions organisations
Free State 10 Gauteng 122 Mpumalanga 35 North West 25 Northern 4 Cape Western Cape 111 Eastern Cape 21 Northern 11 Province KwaZulu116 Natal
6 128 8 6 2
8 108 22 19 3
24 358 65 50 9
172 12 6
108 20 11
391 53 28
125
109
350
TOTAL
465
408
1328
455
(Source: Extracted from Murshid David’s (1997) Directory of Muslim Institutions and Mosques in South Africa)
newer, politically progressive organisations closer to the government’s transformation agenda are factors that have worked against this initiative (Anonymous Interview 5). Although one would expect the mobilisation of resources to be in line with organisational goals, strict discipline in adhering to this is seldom exercised. For example, places of worship do not conform strictly to soliciting funds (religiously prescribed forms of Lillah) for such purposes, but also collect and distribute religiously prescribed charities (Zakat) aimed at poverty alleviation programmes amongst its congregation. Similarly, organisations having a clear welfare focus also collect funds that are most needed to maintain places of worship. Such competition for funds beyond the primary objective of organisations has reduced the effective use of religiously prescribed charities for which it is intended. It inevitably results in an unequal spread between and amongst different religious programmes.
17 A social institution is defined as organisations comprising madaris, theological training centres, islamically oriented preschools, crèches, schools and community centres.
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Desperation for funding especially amongst those organisations that work on a cash strapped budget forces them into using other creative ways to solicit funding. One mosque in the Durban Metropolis, which has been in existence for more than 70 years, resorts to selling sheep during 'Id al-Adha, the festival of sacrifice, to meet its maintenance budget. Given the number and diversity of organisations makes competition for religiously prescribed charities a well sought after resource in the community. Table 4 provides a breakdown of the different sectors serviced by community-based organisations.
Burial societies
Theological
35
31
29
%
16.0 11.2 9.6
8.9
7.9
7.3
Culture and arts
Propagation
38
Radio and electronic media
Bursaries
44
Socio-political
Charitable and relief
64
Women’s groups
Social welfare
NO.
Youth and Student movements
ORGANISATIONS
Table 4 Breakdown of the different sectors supported nationally by Muslim community based organisations
45
22
18
10
7
10.4 5.6
4.5
2.5
1.7
(Source: Extracted from Murshid Davids 1997—Directory of Muslim Institutions and Mosques in South Africa)
Table 4 demonstrates that social welfare and charitable/relief organisations constitute 16% and 11.2% respectively of the total number of organisations serving philanthropic causes both within and outside the community. When combined, they constitute more than a quarter (27.2%) of the total number of organisations serving philanthropic objectives on different scales. Within the category of social welfare, one may find older, well established organisations whose aims and objectives have remained the same throughout its history. These organisations tend to have a strong hold over programmes such as caring for the aged, orphaned and destitute children, providing material aid and professional services to persons with a history of social problems. Within the ranks of social welfare organisations are those who have collaborated with the apartheid regimes separatist social development
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programmes by receiving subsidies, grants and other developmental aid to deal with social problems within the community. In addition to the financial aid received from the apartheid regime, these organisations also maximised their material and cash resource base by capitalising on the dual patronage made by the community. Given the administrative, professional and financial capacity of some of these organisations, their potential to make a significant in-put or compliment the present government’s social development initiatives presents many promising opportunities. It must be noted that there are many such resources that are under utilised, as organisations have not fully embraced the transformation agenda. Many institutions are restricted by certain legacies; trust deeds and legal complexities preventing them from reformulating objectives in meeting new challenges presented by the national social welfare sector. Assessing the asset value of organisations (land, building, investments, equipment and the like) is a study on its own. It must be noted that social welfare organisations that have emerged lately (1980s onwards) tend to have a far progressive approach to service provision compared to those established much earlier. Many of these newer organisations have established good working relationships with diverse community structures both within and outside of the community. They tend to be more flexible in adapting to changing demands and needs within communities and are supportive of programmes initiated within the national development context. Motivation for Supporting Philanthropic Causes Broadly, charitable causes that aim to alleviate the plight of orphan and destitute individuals and families and promote programmes for the betterment of community life are most favoured. However, as organisations mature and make their philanthropic accomplishments known to the Muslim public with regularity, the likelihood of them securing a stable set of patrons over a period of time is enhanced. To illustrate this principle, the case of SANZAF is considered. Originating in KwaZulu-Natal thirty years ago with a little less than R20 000 in their first year of operation, SANZAF has grown from strength to strength.18 Today, the organisation has 19 offices nationally and in 18 According to the Audited Financial Statement as at February 1977 the total income for this period was R19 049.25
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the 2004 financial year its annual income was R20m. This organisation is co-ordinated nationally, served by full time national and regional directorates employing national and provincial fundraisers. It has a well-developed marketing and publicity network and draws on a wide range of volunteer expertise to mobilise resources on its behalf. Newer and smaller organisations with little or no administrative infrastructure are disadvantaged from soliciting charitable resources compared to their older and well-established counterparts. They often rely on volunteers to solicit donations to support their aims and objectives compared to well-established organisations who use sophisticated fundraising methods. Many established organisations use mailing lists to reach potential donors. One organisation that has been in existence for over sixty years annually reaches out to 14 000 households through the mail using cash deposit and debit order systems to solicit funds. The average income derived from this method amounts to a million Rands per annum based on a response rate of approximately 800 donors. During the month of Ramadaan when most of the Islamic charity becomes due, it is not uncommon to find ones mail box flooded with letters of appeal for donations. These mailing lists are guarded fundraising secrets and seldom shared with other organisations pursuing similar aims and objectives. To a lesser extent, ethnic factors do play a role in motivating certain individuals to support a particular cause or organisation. This is particularly prominent amongst the trading classes. Some trusts and foundations have established strong ethnic links in certain villages in India from which they originate. It is common practice to make charitable contributions through trusts and foundations or directly towards development related projects. These include, amongst other things, construction of water boreholes, funding of madaris and schools, building and maintenance of places of worship and other social welfare and relief related activities. However, in the main, religious differentiation is a major motivating factor in determining the extent to which an individual will support a particular cause. Community programmes and projects initiated by Sunni Muslims of indentured Indian origin are less likely to receive charitable support from their merchant class counterparts belonging predominantly to the Tablighi19 school of thought. On the 19
Vahed (2000:46) asserts that the Tablighi/Deobandi theologians are predominantly
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other hand programmes and projects initiated under the auspices of the Tablighi orientated religious group tend to attract a larger share of charitable resources and at a faster pace compared to those of Sunni orientation. For example, in certain parts of the country mosque projects initiated by Sunni Muslims are still in a conceptualisation stage for the past decade whereas similar projects under the tutelage of the Tablighi congregation have been accomplished within a fraction of time.20 In certain instances, projects initiated by the Sunni congregation and funded by their Tablighi counterparts are subjected to certain prescriptions. These include amongst other religious preconditions, an undertaking that the Tablighi congregation would be allowed to promote regular programmes within the project, allowing its members to serve on the trust board of the project or comply with certain religious, constitutional or organisational requirements. Consequently, this religious differentiation within the community has left many Sunni orientated projects and programmes underdeveloped, under resourced and dependent on the financially affluent Tablighi allied to the Gujarati trading classes. Historically both passenger and indentured Indian Muslims followed the Sunni school of thought. However, in the 1970s the Deobandi school of thought began taking roots in the country resulting in tensions with Sunni Muslims. These tensions largely pertained to certain religiously defined practices amongst Sunni indentured Muslims considered by the Deobandi’s as nonpermissible as this was an expression of religious innovation based on cultural elements. Tensions continue to prevail between these two schools of thought and until now theologians have not ironed out some of these differences, with the most contentious being the rendition of salutations (Salam) to the Prophet (PBUH) which the Sunnis strongly perceive it to be a divine duty incumbent on every Muslim to express devotion to the messenger of God. Institutionally this theological grouping is represented by the Jamiatul Ulema. Its support base is mainly amongst trading and professional class Muslims of Indian origin, although a few Memons and Urdu speaking persons have joined this movement, including some Malays and Muslims of African origin. It must be noted that sociological factors have also influenced this theological split in the community. The very fact that passenger Indian Muslims were privileged by colonial and apartheid practices, deep class factors has predisposed the evolution of this section of the diaspora to the Deobandi school of thought. Sunni Muslims by virtue of their indentured backgrounds hardly enjoyed full integration amongst their passenger counterparts largely based on ethnic, linguistic and class differences. Hence, the emergence of a strong Deoband school of thought may be perceived as another attempt as perpetrating class differentiation within the diaspora. 20 In the small town of Verulam, north of Durban a new community in Trenance Park for the past ten years acquired a mosque site but unable to secure funding to build a place of worship. The community continues to pray in a tent every Ramadan whereas in the affluent suburb of Lotusville a mosque project was accomplished in a relatively short space of time. Similarly, in the CBD of Verulam due to theological differences between Sunni Muslims and the Tablighi congregation, the latter built a mosque some 500 metres away in relatively short period of time.
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congregation. In the sprawling township of Chatsworth, South of Durban a member of a Sunni based community project expressed disappointment on the effects of religious difference on its organisations capacity to raise funds. I am a factory worker and involved in this organisation for the past eighteen years. Every Ramadan I take my annual leave to volunteer as a fundraiser to raise funds in Johannesburg. Although my organisation complies with all the rules of the regulating bodies to raise funds for projects and has all the documents of fundraising authority on hand for the past eighteen years I am made to feel like a lesser being by the donors. I am a practising Muslim and don’t care about these differences but because my organisation supports the Sunni school of thought, I have been constantly interrogated by donors belonging to the Tablighi congregation on certain traditions practiced by the Sunnis. I find this humiliating but accept the meagre contribution made by my brothers in the name of Allah and the Prophet of Islam (Anonymous Respondent 1).
It is not uncommon for donors making substantial charitable contributions to occupy important decision-making statuses in organisations, with enormous influence in the community. They are often co-opted onto positions to serve as a trustee or given perpetual recognition for their philanthropic gesture. Historically, various projects within and outside of the community have been named after individuals or specific trusts and foundations. The former ML Sultan Technikon and certain buildings in the former University of Durban-Westville bear testimony to the recognition derived by individual donors and trusts for their charitable contribution. Representatives of these trusts served on the council of these institutions which is known to be the most powerful decision making body in the tertiary education sector. In addition, members with strong influence in the community and those known for their distinguished commitment to the aims and objectives of an organisation are often identified as candidates. To illustrate the composition of the trust board of one organisation, which has been in existence for over six decade, is made up of life trustees who were either former founding members or served as office bearers for more than twenty years. Within the same organisation one member is known to serve as both founding life member of the organisation and honorary secretary for over four decade. On the other hand it is not unusual to find individuals serving in prominent organisations in order to gain access to certain privileges or use it as a base to foist personal goals in the community. This was most prevalent during the apartheid era where individuals pursued
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positions within the politically controversial South African Indian Council through their positions within the organisation. To a certain extent such participation not only benefited the individual but also helped to promote the organisations objectives by influencing the different political organs of the apartheid state in return for certain privileges. In the post apartheid era the interplay of power dynamics, based on individual charitable acts and access to the levers of political power, is difficult to assess considering the fact that many Muslim politicians who have worked themselves up to the echelons of democratic governance have done so through active participation and opposition to the apartheid regime and not through patronised involvement in any philanthropic causes or support gained from any particular philanthropic constituency. Apart from the potential political power derived by individuals through recognisable philanthropic gestures in the community, a tendency exists amongst individuals, trusts and business entrepreneurs to derive power based on economic, theological and social motivations. Donors within the business community are more likely to make a charitable contribution to a cause that will market their financial interests further. Such a practice is more prevalent amongst new and emerging business entrepreneurs intending to gain access to financial markets in the community through visible philanthropic gestures. Contrary to this, business enterprises with a distinguished reputation of making substantial contributions to community advancement in the days of colonialism and apartheid continue to support credible and distinguished philanthropic causes that maintain visibility in the community in order to uphold the legacy established by their forebears. It is a well-recorded fact that certain family owned businesses have made unstinting philanthropic contributions both within and outside the Muslim community over the years. Many of these philanthropic legacies have left a lasting impression both within the philanthropic and general community. This tradition is continued amongst the new generation of family business givers. In spite of this, the quantitative dimension of charitable contributions is known to be not as substantial to that made by the previous generation of family businesses. This is largely attributed to many family businesses having changed hands to a younger generation of entrepreneurs, family businesses being down sized in order to fulfil inheritance requirements, the curtailment of business operations to adapt to changing demands made by the emergence of new markets and as a result of the newer
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generation pursuing professionally oriented careers compared to the traditional practice of managing family business establishments. One respondent commented: “presence of traditionally powerful families with a legacy of making magnanimously large philanthropic contributions is gradually diminishing and they no longer maintain their social prestige within organisations and in the community at large. Further, the newer generation of business entrepreneurs, not like their forefathers, are responding to corporate type of business in different markets and are more inclined to give to causes that will maximise their business interest compared to social status ” (Anonymous Interview, 2). Recipients of Charity Within the DIASPORA Since a significant number of organisations aim to alleviate poverty and promote advancement within the community, it is not surprising that almost all of the beneficiaries will originate from within. The extent to which disadvantaged members within the community benefit from the charities may be illustrated through the work of SANZAF. In the year 2003, this organisation assisted approximately 60 000 Muslim families to the value of just more than R19m (SANZAF Souvenir Brochure, April 2004). Similar to other communities, the case profile of many of these social welfare organisations comprises largely women and children. Unemployment, marital problems arising from desertion and divorce are the primary reasons for seeking assistance. Over the years the beneficiary profile of recipients has drastically changed from an all Indian and Malay grouping to include reverts, refugees and migrants. Given the rate of proselytisation amongst largely poor African communities, much pressure is exerted on welfare resources, which historically privileged poor Sunni and Malay Muslims. In the State of the Nation Report (2005: 263) one African Muslim respondent aptly captures the dependency perpetrated within the welfare system in the diaspora: We are the have nots. They are the haves, they support us with food yearly, pay our electricity and all that . . . On Tuesdays you have to be a Tablighi and wear a long kurta and speak about the Hadith. Why? Because you need something from that guy. Then the following day you have to change from Tablighism to Sunnism because they are giving something. On Sunday, then you have to go to Soofie Sahib to ask for dholl and other things. If you are not a Soofie, he won’t give you. . . . It’s a push
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Notwithstanding the philanthropic contradictions inherent within the diaspora a few welfare agencies operate professionally offering a holistic service to their clients. Contained in these programmes is an Islamic ethos, which seeks to find remedies for a particular problem. Hence, beneficiaries are expected to conform to a treatment plan comprising both western and Islamic approaches. However, the rigidity with which these programmes are implemented varies amongst service providers. The greater the theological influence exerted on service providing agencies, the greater the pressure for conformity. For example, from a strict theological perspective, for a client to have a television set at home is considered a luxury and perceived to be a source of social problems such as the prevalence of sexual promiscuity, use of alcohol, drugs, exposure to nudity and the like, which are contrary to the Islamic value system. Hence a programme aiming to remedy a client’s financial and material problem would in addition require the fortification of fundamental Islamic value systems, perceived to result in personal change and promote prosperity through the mercy and blessings of God. These requirements may include the performance of regular prayers, conforming to strict religious dress codes especially in the case of women, participation in programmes that offer spiritual enrichment and progress towards a way of life that is consonant with the Islamic value system. The extent to which beneficiaries are expected to make changes to their perceptions, attitudes and behaviour in order to qualify for assistance from the helping organisation is demonstrated in Graph 3. Graph 3 Personal change as qualifying criteria for charitable aid
Change
Not required to make change
74%
Required to make changes
26%
0%
10%
20% 30%
40% Percent
(Source: Khan. 2005)
50%
60%
70% 80%
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Just more than a quarter (26%) of the study population confirmed that they had to make certain behavioural changes in order to qualify for assistance from the service-providing agency. To illustrate the extent and costs attached to social welfare services, the case of SANZAFs sub-offices in KwaZulu-Natal best highlights this. Table 5 Number of cases attended to by category in financial terms by the Pietermaritzburg Branch of SANZAF for the period October 2002 to July 2004 Casework Category
Total no of cases
Total Amount
Rent Water Food Hamper Clothing Debt Travel Education Other
441 297 2667 210 5 89 196 157
R153 598.76 R66 125.22 R463 313.22 R11 050.00 R8281.60 R31 122.60 R536 390.37 R17 035.20
Total
4062
R1 286 916.97
(Source: KwaZulu-Natal Biennial General Meeting Report September 2004)
Given the increasing cost of social services, social welfare organisations are striving towards cost effective alternatives in the form of preventative programmes. Emphasis on outreach programmes, in the form of awareness campaigns and providing alternative programmes for sections of the community that are at potential risk in coming into contact with social problems is becoming increasingly popular. On the eve of 2005 in Cape Town, suburbs with a strong presence of Muslims held youth and family programmes at various mosques and community centres as an alternative to celebrating the coming of the New Year. The rationale behind this programme was to urge Muslims to stay away from events involving partying on the streets, coming into contact with alcohol, drug abuse and other un-Islamic practices. Families were encouraged to bring and share meals and the youth were provided with enrichment programmes comprising games and indoor sports, funded primarily by the business community within each locality. The programme commenced after the evening prayers and lasted well into the night until the next prayer, which was before dawn the next day. Cape Muslims were also advised
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by theological groupings to stay away from the 2005 Coon Carnival celebrations as it symbolised slave practices21 (Anonymous Interview No. 3). DIASPORA’S Response to Non-Muslim Philanthropic Causes Although a large proportion of Muslim charity is intra-diaspora directed, communities other than Muslims have either directly or indirectly reaped manifold benefits from charitable acts over the years. In the days of apartheid, Muslim philanthropists in the likes of the Lockhats Charities, ML Sultan Charitable Trust, MH Joosubs Trust and the AI Kajee Trust to mention a few, made magnanimous contributions to the educational and social welfare advancement of all communities. Muslim anti-apartheid movements such as the Call of Islam, Qibla Movement and the Muslim Youth Movement channelled substantial amounts of community resources in the fight against apartheid. In the 1980s, Muslim businesses and individuals generously funded the United Democratic Front (UDF). In the wake of political conflict in the UDF era resulting in the displacement of large sections of Africans fleeing the purge of ethnic related violence in the rural hinterlands to informal settlements in the city and against the tide of forced removal and demolition of informal settlements in the apartheid cities, Muslim welfare and charitable organisations maintained a consistent humanitarian presence in these troubled and devastated communities. A founding member of the Islamic Relief Agency (ISRA) established in response to the catastrophic September 1987 floods in KwaZuluNatal, against a tide of volatile and turbulent political conflict in the province recalls the processes, dynamics and challenges faced by the organisation in offering humanitarian aid in the various areas besieged by this catastrophe: The greatest challenge was to convince Muslim donors to channel their charitable resources to these afflicted areas without any political, religious and ideological interest. The setting up of ISRA within a few days to coordinate an impartial humanitarian response to this disaster was an organisational nightmare. Powerful social welfare stakeholders 21 In the early days of Cape history, slaves could only celebrate the coming of the New Year a day after their colonial masters have celebrated.
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expressed in the midst of this major human catastrophe their narrow organisational interest. A series of marathon consultative meetings were held to gain consensus on a well-coordinated Muslim response to this tragedy. In the end we succeeded in being in the forefront of this disaster as a united community purely on humanitarian grounds. This human tragedy was a turning point in the history of the Muslim community especially in KwaZulu-Natal torn by different religious, ideological and political interests to formulate a strongly coordinated Muslim response to human disasters such as this with speed, efficiency and above all compassion. The organisation over the years has established meaningful and lasting working relationships with both Muslim and non-Muslim philanthropic organisations in championing the cause of human misery of all sorts (Anonymous, Interview No 4).
The sterling humanitarian work of this organisation continued well into the dawn of democracy in the early 1990s. Its role in providing material comfort to politically torn communities in the predominantly African populated Malagasy/Folweni areas South of Durban, Cato Manor and the rural hinterlands of northern KwaZulu-Natal is yet to be recognised. The exemplary work of this organisation had inspired the birth of other specialist welfare organisations towards the tail end and after the apartheid era for a co-ordinated Muslim response to humanitarian causes outside the community. It is not uncommon to find organisations involved early in social welfare programmes continuing to make their presence actively felt in development related projects in communities other than Muslims with humanitarian objectives. Amongst the ranks of these organisations, conflicting and complimentary religious, ideological and developmental goals are pursued. Attempts at unpacking the effects of the interplay of these conflicting and complimentary set of goals in changing the social condition of communities served by these organisation, is in itself a study in need of independent dedication. For purposes of this study, an identification of goals that these organisations aim to accomplish within such communities will help highlight some of the overt or/and latent motivations underling the need to maintain a particular presence. The following typology emerges from the analysis: • Those humanitarian organisations that have gained entry into communities with a long history of resisting apartheid and have continued with their developmental roles in the post-democratic era. • Those organisations that have gained entry into communities with the purpose of fulfilling humanitarian goals and at the same time
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inviting adherents to the faith. These organisations have an overt presence in disadvantaged communities primarily serving the spiritual and social welfare needs amongst reverts who have established themselves as a community. The establishment of places of worships or other community centres serving a dual purpose of spreading the message of Islam through community work are the primary objective. • Those organisations that do not have a permanent presence in communities but regularly network with other service delivery organisations to direct their charitable resources. These comprise mainly of organisations that mobilise resources based on special needs within communities and make an appearance when a need arises. • Finally, are those organisations that provide philanthropic service to communities on certain important occasions or towards the accomplishment of a particular need. During the occasion of 'Id-ul-Fitr, various charitable gestures are made to impoverished communities. The analysis of the typology of motivations for organisations to make their presence felt in communities, other than Muslims, and the extent to which beneficiaries are required to participate in any particular programme of the aiding organisation varies. It would appear on the surface, that in impoverished communities, where a cluster of reverts exists, they are more likely to benefit to a greater extent compared to those who have not embraced the religion. This is most likely due to the fact that by embracing the religion, there is greater theological justification to allocate resources to them, since as Muslims it is permissible for them to receive charitable contributions if they are found to be in circumstance of need. In return, beneficiaries are expected to emulate the principles and teachings of Islam and to participate in the different programmes offered by these organisations. Apart from the diaspora’s involvement in different poverty alleviation programmes in the country, at an international scale, it has succeeded in making a significant philanthropic mark in identifying with causes affecting Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Although local causes are considered more important than international, a significant amount of charitable resources are made available whenever an international humanitarian crisis emerges. Despite this difference in perception, organisations such as Gift of the Givers, Africa Muslims Agency and
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the Crescent of Hope amongst others, have gained prominence in championing philanthropic causes outside the borders of South Africa. Their presence is most felt during times of conflict, natural disasters and political upheaval. To illustrate the extent of giving within the diaspora to international causes it is worth highlighting the efforts of the Gift of the Givers. Over the years it has been widely recognised both nationally and internationally for its philanthropic accomplishments and was the recipient of several prestigious humanitarian aid awards. Some of the most deserving humanitarian causes supported by this organisation are: • Mozambique floods, 2000—food, clothing, medicine and shelter to the value of R1.5m were air lifted to victims. • India earthquake, 2001—R1.1m was spent on the reconstruction of schools, houses, clinics, hospitals and R100 000 in cash was made available. • Goma volcanic eruptions, 2002—R1m was spent on food, medicine, blankets and water purification tablets in just three days for this disaster. • Somalia, 2004—R3 million of aid supplies containing food, medicine, water purification tablets and tents was provided. • Tsunami Disaster, 2004—R12 million of aid was provided to the different areas afflicted by this disaster. In Sri Lanka a Gift of the Givers housing village comprising 500 homes at a cost of R6 000 per unit was established (http://www.giftofthegivers.co.za). The organisations strong network structure within the community and organs of the state enhances its capacity to mobilise resources within hours of occurrence of a disaster. Its organisational credibility also transcends beyond the immediate community and partners other philanthropic organisations in championing humanitarian causes. In its twelve years of existence, it has already provided R110 million of aid to twenty countries, including South Africa. Mechanisms Regulating Philanthropy Within the DIASPORA Since Islamic charity is a divine act, theological institutions play an important role in regulating and setting standards for the collection and allocation of resources. In the South African case, the Muslim
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Judicial Council (Cape);22 Jamiatul Ulema (KZN23 and Gauteng) and the Muslim Charitable Foundation (KZN)24 are the most respected organisations that have official regulatory authority. The first three organisations comprise theologians primarily, whilst the latter, is a non-theologically aligned institution comprising merchant representatives and other stakeholders from community based organisations. These regulating bodies prescribe stringent conditions for the collection and distribution of Islamic forms of charity. Failure to conform to these rules results in the implementation of strong sanctions against organisations found to be in default. It is a requirement for organisations intending to solicit funds to subject them to an annual screening process. The basic qualification criteria in order to be sanctioned to fundraise are the provision of proof of the organisations legitimacy (constitution, audited financial statements, membership, achievement of their goals and objectives for the fundraising year, satisfactory proof of projects in need of funding, etc). The process is a formal one and upon meeting the qualifying criteria a certificate to fundraise in a particular province or a project for a specific duration of time is awarded. Applications for a fundraising certificate are often followed by a formal evaluation of the organisations programme. Some of the major difficulties encountered by regulating bodies from organisations are: – inability to produce an audited financial statement; – inadequate record keeping of different forms of charity; – non-conformity of the organisations constitution with the principles of Islam; and – Investment of surplus funds in interest bearing accounts which is contrary to Islamic practice. Notwithstanding attempts by regulating bodies to ensure that organisations subject their finances to public audit, doubt exists on the accuracy of receipts maintained for material and cash donations.
22
This organisation participated partially in the research but failed to confirm the necessary information in writing despite repeated requests. 23 This organisation refused to participate in the research and was of the opinion that the study will be detrimental to the cause of Islam, considering the international onslaught against Muslims since the September 11th bombings. Its counterpart in Gauteng was not approached in view of such a response from its sister organisation. 24 This organisation failed to acknowledge formal requests to participate in the research.
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This problem largely emanates from the diverse fundraising methods. It is a daunting task for auditors to verify the exact amounts receipted from sources such as tin collections, “bed sheet collections”, street collections and donations received in kind. Although regulating bodies insist on organisations to submit audited financial statements as proof of their financial transactions, the extent to which the general public may have access to these, vary. When approached, several organisations (including amongst them very popular and well established ones) indicated that their financial statements are restricted to members only. Since Annual General Meetings of many organisations receive low profile advertisement, access to these financial documents seldom falls under public scrutiny. AGM invitations are often limited to the desired quorum for purposes of constitutional legitimacy. Interestingly, with the new dispensation on the registration of Section 21 companies not for gain, such companies are not legally bound to make their operating budgets known to the public. Neither are they under any legal obligation to make their financial operations known beyond their immediate membership. Regulating bodies are not free of influence from a particular theological and ethnic grouping; hence their impartiality is questionable. An organisation supporting the theological orientation of a particular regulating body may enjoy approval with greater ease compared to an organisation that holds contrary or an opposing theological view. To illustrate, the Jamiatul Ulema ( JU) has a strong following (both in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal) from the Tablighi school of thought. Donors following the spiritual guidance of this theological body are more inclined to contribute to causes that have been sanctioned by it. The strong presence and influence that this theological body exerts on the communities of KZN and Gauteng Provinces is illustrated in Table 6. They are formally represented in every town and suburb that has a significant number of Muslims. In addition to fulfilling a regulatory role, regulating bodies also engage in the collection and distribution of charities. They are known to manage programmes and projects similar to the ones that they seek to regulate. Hence, it is not uncommon for these bodies to enter the charitable terrain as a referee and player at the same time. Since regulating bodies with a theological orientation regulate places of worship under their jurisdiction, they are better disposed to direct resources to causes initiated by them. The strong influence that these bodies exert on places of worship favours their capacity to solicit a
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Table 6 Distribution of Muslim theological organisations by province and Major towns Cape Town Muslim Judicial Council Sunni Ulama Council United Ulama Council Darul Waqaf Islamic Trust (E/Cape)
Gauteng
KwaZulu-Natal
Head Office—JU Transvaal Azaadville—JU Benoni—JU Klerksdorp—JU
Durban—JU Head Office Newcastle—JU Pietermaritzburg—JU Port Shepstone—JU
Laudium—JU Umzinto—JU Lenasia—JU Stanger—JU Mpumulanga—JU Sunni Jamiatul Ulama Waterval—JU Sunni Ulama Council Middleburg—JU Raza Islamic Council Roshnee—JU Rustenburg—JU Springs—JU Warmbaths—JU Waterval Islamic Council Sunni Ulama Council ( JU refers to Jamiatul Ulema) (Source: Calculated from Murshid Davids (1997) Directory of Muslim Institutions and Mosques in South Africa).
larger share of the community’s charitable resources. For example in the Western Cape and surrounding areas, the Muslim Judicial Council, represents 150 mosques and is the official regulator of charity within this province. Although regulating bodies have strong jurisdiction within their respective provincial boundaries, they have also formed themselves into a national network to screen out fraudulent and non-credible charitable organisations and projects originating outside the country. For example, in the 2004 screening of applications for fundraising authority by the Muslim Judicial Council, 195 organisations have been identified to lack credibility and not conforming to the necessary institutional requirement to fundraise.25 It is alleged that a large number of these organisations originate outside of the country especially from Africa. Networks have been formed in some of these countries to assess and inform on their legitimacy. The community is alerted about fraud-
25
Interview with the MJC Secretary General.
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ulent organisations through powerful mediums such as the pulpit, written and electronic media. Notwithstanding the efforts of the community to regulate charity, there is limited assurance that these control measures will deter Muslims not to support a particular cause of their choice. A tendency exists to make charitable contributions without seeking an official acknowledgement and certain causes are supported unconditionally. In addition, certain established organisations with or without the sanction of the regulating body are able to attract the required charitable resource based on their standing in the community. For example, the organisation Gift of the Givers is in no need of official authorisation from any of the regulating bodies to solicit funds. It has a well-established network of regular donors and voluntary workers, which can mobilise large amounts of resources independently. Conclusion This paper highlights that the social organisation of the Muslim diaspora is complex and sociologically diverse. It has the same diversity, which characterises the nation as a whole. This multiplicity in social composition is seen to interact and strongly influence the nature, structure and scope of the institution of charity. Consequently, the state of giving, distribution and regulation of charity within the South African Muslim diaspora is influenced by a multiplicity of factors. These involve the interplay of religious, historical, ideological, class, racial, political and ethnic factors. Despite these differences, the institution of charity forms a central feature of the community’s social organisation. A large quantum of charity is intra-community directed through a variety of organisations for the betterment and social upliftment of the community, which is unequally distributed, marginalising certain sectors. Charitable organisations on account of being custodians of charities have emerged as powerful and influential stakeholders and decision-making on the different facets of community life. Considering the fact that there are a number of organisations representing different aspects of community life, competition for resources, fragmentation, duplication and waste is prevalent. Although it has been established that a large amount of giving takes place through organisations, the study highlights a tendency amongst Muslims to support causes within their immediate family.
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The legacy of wealthy family businesses making enormous charitable contributions is gradually fading, with the newer generation pursuing professional careers and managing businesses independent of their extended family system. Amongst the most prominent causes supported within the community are social welfare and relief giving institutions, establishment and maintenance of places of worships and religious education. Causes that receive generous support outside of the community are child and social welfare societies, natural disasters and humanitarian crisis. The nature of giving in both instances takes the form of cash contributions followed by donations in kind. Active volunteer participation within community-based organisations largely takes the form of formal membership A tendency exists amongst older welfare stalwarts, who are predominantly males, belonging to a particular theological and/or ethnic group, to dominate official positions in organisations to the exclusion of females and less stronger groupings. Transformation representing the diversity that characterise the countries Muslim population within organisations is hardly reflected. While newer organisations are attempting to create a new sense of identity embracing the transformation process in the country, older organisations have made little or no advancement in taking on this challenge. The ‘old guard’ syndrome continues to dominate the social welfare sector and prescribe development initiatives with the community. Religious and ethnic differences play an important role in determining as to who gives to whom. Causes, which are contrary to the theological orientation of a donor, are less likely to draw support. Female and children stand out to be the major beneficiaries of charity. Social welfare agencies using a combination of professional and theological approaches appear to achieve greater positive behaviour change in their client system compared to those using predominantly a theological approach. These changes are based on the receiver’s level of religiosity as a qualifying determinant. Although a significant proportion of charity are intra community directed, there is overwhelming support for non-Islamic local and international causes through specialised humanitarian aid organisations. At a local level, enormous contributions have been made by these organisations both historically and in support of the present government’s national transformation agenda in the different sectors. At an international scale, much prominence has been gained in champi-
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oning philanthropic causes in times of conflict, natural disasters and political upheaval. Special organisations have established themselves in regulating Islamic forms of charity throughout the country. Theologians tend to make a strong presence felt in many of these regulating bodies. The opportunity to promote narrow interests (organisational and that of a particular congregation) is widely prevalent. These bodies are not free of ethnic prejudices, discrimination on religious grounds and favouring projects that are in keeping with a particular theological interest. Nonetheless, they have succeeded to a certain extent in regulating the institution of charity but are in need of greater openness and transparency on their activities as they are not altogether free of conflicting and vested interest. Reference List Biennial Report Western Cape Region, 2004. Dadoo S. 2003. “South Africa: Many Muslims, One Islam” http://www.islamonline.net Davids, M. 1997. Directory of Muslim Institutions and Mosques in South Africa. South Africa: Islamic Publications. Gift of the Givers Projects http://www.giftofthegivers.co.za. Khan S. 2005. “State of Giving amongst Muslims in South Africa”. Report of Findings for the Philanthropy Research Project. Centre for Civil Society University of KwaZulu-Natal. KwaZulu-Natal Biennial General Meeting Report September 2004, Constantia, Cape Town. Meer, Y.S. 1980. Documents of Indenture Labour—Natal: 1851–1917. Durban: Institute of Black Research. Meet the Muslims in South Africa. Durban: Islamic Council of South Africa. 1984. Mustadafin Foundation Annual Financial Statements for the year 29 February 2004. Nadvi, S.H.H. 1988. “Muslim Minorities in South Africa”. Annual Journal of Arabic Studies, X11:144–149. Naude, J.A. 1992. “South Africa: The role of a Muslim minority in a situation of Change”. Journal of Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, XIII(1): pp. 17–32. Ramphal. R. 1985. Marital Conflict among Hindus in the Metropolitan Area of Durban (D.Phil. thesis). Durban: University of Durban-Westville. Randeree, Z.B. 1997. “Muslim Minorities with special reference to South Africa”. Journal of the Centre for Research in Islamic Studies, 17 pp. 63–82. SANZAF 30th Anniversary Souvenir Brochure, April 2004. Statistics South Africa—Census Data Base 1996. Statistics South Africa—Census Data Base 2001. Sulliman, E. 1997. “A Historical Study of the largest Masjid in the Southern Africa and its Founder”. Journal of the Centre for research in Islamic Studies, 17 pp. 11–28. Tayob, A.K. 1998. “Muslim Political Space in South Africa: Imagining a Local Ummah”. Annual Review of Islam in South Africa. Centre for Contemporary Islam. University of Cape Town, No. 1: pp. 6–9. Vahed, G 2000 “Changing Islamic Traditions and Emerging Identities in South Africa”. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs Vol. 20. No. 1. Vahed, G and Jeppe, S. 2005 “Multiple Communities: Muslims in post apartheid South Africa”, in State of the Nation: South Africa 2004–2005 HSRC Pretoria.
MANAGING RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY THROUGH THE DISCOURSES OF ORDINARY MEMBERS OF INNERURBAN NEIGHBOURHOODS IN BIRMINGHAM, UK Martin D. Stringer University of Birmingham A couple of weeks ago I had some work done by a local plumber. He did his job and then, as he was leaving, we got to chatting. He asked what I did for a living and I told him that I taught at the local University. ‘What do you teach?’ he asked. I replied ‘Religion’, one of many alternatives I can use, but probably the most general and the most widely understood. ‘Oh’, he said, ‘I was at the house of a Muslim the other day, nice chap, had a large picture of a man with a turban on just inside his front door.’ Obviously I get all kinds of responses when I tell people what I do. Religion is one of those subjects that people feel that they ought to have some kind of opinion about. This response, however, was unusual and relates directly to the topic of my paper. What I am increasingly interested in is the way in which ordinary people of the city, particularly of Birmingham, understand, react to, and talk about the religious diversity around them. This plumber personalised his sense of religious diversity through his account of an encounter with a Sikh client (the merging of Sikhs and Muslims in the popular imagination became very clear following 9/11 when turban wearing Sikhs suffered more persecution because of their visibility than most of the Muslim population). Others respond within different kinds of context, different images and stereotypes that are held within society and different models of diversity. What follows, however, and what is essential to this paper, is an analysis of the way in which ordinary individuals begin to manage their responses to religious diversity, and in some sense actually begin to manage that diversity, through their different responses.
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There are two bodies of literature that are of particular relevance to this discussion and a brief look at both will indicate where my own approach differs. There is now a whole library of work dealing with the popular understandings of forms of classification within society, most notably and most relevant for this study, the literature on popular understandings of ‘race’.1 Race, or ethnicity, and religion are clearly related within many people’s minds, but the recent move away from ethnicity as the primary focus of the classification of immigrants within a country such as Britain, to the use of religious labels for such classification has shown that race or ethnicity may be too limited for our present purposes.2 Having said that, many of the texts about the nature of racial and racist discourses and about ethnic identities etc., can be a very useful starting point for a discussion about the popular understandings of religious diversity. I will come back to this below. The second body of work relates more to questions of ‘identity’ than of classification. This is the very wide range of ethnographic material that has been undertaken within British cities, and elsewhere, in an attempt to understand the way in which specific religious communities express their own identities to the wider world. Most of this material tends, following traditional ethnographic principles, to concentrate on the specific context of a particular community and to look at the question of identity from the perspective of that community. Very little of it is interested in the way in which the community constructs the identity of other religious communities within the wider society, or with the way in which religious diversity per se is understood. What is more, it is those with a strong religious identity of their own who tend to be studied in this way, rather than those, who arguably make up the majority in British cities, who have little or no personal religious identity but maintain more or less clear views about other religions within society. Two works that bring these two bodies of literature together within the context of Birmingham are classic studies of race and racism in Handsworth and Sparkbrook, neighbourhoods to the north and south 1 For a recent discussion of this literature see D. Mason Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 2 See Mason, Race and Ethnicity (2000).
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of the city centre respectively. John Rex and Robert More wrote their study of Sparkbrook, ‘Race Community and Conflict’ in 1967 and Peter Ratcliffe wrote ‘Racism and Reaction’, a profile of Handworth, in 1981.3 Both of these are classic British ‘Community Studies’, undertaken through a combination of survey work and participant observation. The authors were interested in the social structure of the neighbourhoods, local politics and the role of racism in the functioning of the different communities. Ratcliffe has a chapter on ‘Images of Contemporary Handsworth’ that deals with questions of racial harmony, racial prejudice and racial disharmony, and draws to some extent on popular discourses of race within the community. In Rex and Moore’s book the question of discourses and identity tends to be implicit rather than explicit, although they do have a chapter on ‘Religion in Sparkbrook’ an issue that is all but ignored in Ratcliffe’s text. Both of these books, however, in the classic British sociological tradition are not really interested in questions of identity and discourse that began to interest scholars in the later eighties and nineties. One book that does pick this up, and which is central to my own understandings of this issue, is Gerd Baumann’s study of the London suburb of Southall in ‘Contesting Culture’.4 Baumann is explicitly interested in discourse (and it is his definitions of discourse that I will be following in this text). He was also interested in the whole neighbourhood and not just one particular religious or ethnic group within that neighbourhood. Contesting Culture deals primarily with the way in which the different discourses in Southall deal with the concepts of ‘community’ and ‘culture’. Baumann distinguishes between a ‘dominant discourse’, that tends to equate community, culture and ethnicity as relating to specific social groups, and various ‘demotic discourses’, which are used by the people themselves and in which these terms were used much more loosely and with far greater local nuances. Baumann is explicit about the fact that ‘religion’ as a category of classification actually complicates his overall picture, especially of the dominant discourse, as Muslims, for example, cannot
3 J. Rex & R. Moore, Race Community and Conflict, a Study of Sparkbrook. London: Oxford University Press, 1967, and P. Ratcliffe, Racism and Reaction, a Profile of Handsworth. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. 4 G. Baumann, Contesting Culture: Discourses of Identity in Multi-Ethnic London. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
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be classified as an ethnicity or a culture, and the Irish or the West Indians did not share a common religion, even if it was possible to talk about an Irish culture or a West Indian community. While Baumann’s work raises all kinds of very interesting questions, it does not, ultimately begin to address the kind of questions that I wish to raise in this paper. Baumann was concerned with the way in which different social groupings used the concepts of ‘culture’, ‘community’, and to a lesser extent, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘religion’, of themselves, rather than how they used these terms of the other social groupings within the neighbourhood. It is only the dominant discourse, as used by the local authority, which appears to provide a means to discuss the neighbourhood as a whole. Baumann makes it clear, therefore, that any social group that wishes to engage with the whole has to use the dominant discourse of the authorities (this is what makes it a ‘dominant’ discourse) and abandon their own demotic discourses. This, however, does not ring true for my own research. There must, I would suggest, be another kind of discourse, or even a series of discourses that sit between Baumann’s dominant discourse of the authorities and the different group’s own demotic discourses about their own identities as ‘cultures’, ‘communities’, ‘ethnicities’ or ‘religions’. It is some of these other discourses that I want to begin to uncover in this paper. Methodological Starting Point As an anthropologist my primary research methodology is ethnographic, that is living and working within a community over a long period of time. There are two neighbourhoods within Birmingham that I have close associations with and have been studying for three to six years. The first is Highgate, just south of the city centre. This is a clearly defined area bordering on to Sparkbrook, which was the site of Rex and Moore’s study. However, while Sparkbrook is predominantly Muslim, Highgate, despite having the Birmingham Central Mosque within its boundaries, is very mixed with large Afro-Caribbean and local white populations. The second neighbourhood I have worked is in Perry Hall and Perry Beeches, another self-contained area nestling under the M6 in the north of the city. This area borders onto the Handsworth of Ratcliffe’s study but could not be more different. While Handsworth is ethnically diverse, Perry Beeches and
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Perry Hall is a predominantly white neighbourhood with a very stable and gradually aging population. The major problem with both these long-term studies from the perspective of this paper is that my primary interest has always been with the Christian churches in these areas and it is from this angle that I have tended to view the neighbourhoods as a whole. I will, however, be making some reference to the Highgate study within this paper. As well as my own studies I have postgraduate students who have worked in different neighbourhoods of Birmingham, also involved in ethnographic work, and also with their own particular agendas. These have focussed on Small Heath, Newtown, Bearwood and Handsworth, among others, all of which are inner urban neighbourhoods with more or less multi-faith communities. Ethnography has enabled us to listen carefully to the language and stories people tell on the streets and within the different religious communities—stories about each other and about their neighbourhoods in general. While none of this work has, as yet, focussed specifically on the question of religious diversity (our interests are far wider than this) it is clear that this has to be a central theme in any study within the neighbourhoods that make up a city such as Birmingham. We are able to listen to people at many different levels and in a wide range of differing contexts and, as with much ethnographic work, it is often the surprising and the unexpected that has generated the most interest, rather than the set piece interviews or discussion groups. What people say in off guarded moments reveals far more about their real thoughts and understandings than what they say when confronted with an interviewer and a tape recorder. This has also enabled us, over time, to go back and to test, again and again in some cases, the kind of material that we are generating. We cannot claim to have come to any clear conclusions as yet, this is still very much work in progress. However there are some thoughts and ideas that I do want to develop from our work that might form the basis for further discussion. There are for example four areas of discourse, or topics, within which the multi-faith nature of the city as a whole, and the neighbourhoods in particular, have been discussed. The first is in relation to dress, the second to buildings and the built environment, the third relates to street festivals and the fourth to a recent play staged in Birmingham which caused considerable offence to the Sikh community and led to visible protests
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and the eventual withdrawing of the play before the end of its run. I will look at each of these in turn. There are also three levels of analysis in relation to these discourses that I have identified so far and I want to draw specific attention to within this discussion. The first relates simply to the content and language of the discourses themselves, the second to the way in which different kinds of discourses interact, and the third to the way in which the use of these discourses lead to what I have referred to as the ‘management’ of religious diversity. I will begin, therefore, with the language itself. Listening to Religious Diversity There are perhaps two visual markers that lead ordinary people to begin a conversation about religious diversity in Birmingham. The first is dress and the second is buildings. The question of dress is extremely complex and inevitably leads the speakers into a range of related discourses, not all of which are specifically religious. Dress, as we have seen with my example of the plumber at the start of this paper, is probably the most confusing area of discourse and, without question, the one where ethnicity and religious affiliation become most clearly confused. It is also that area of discourse that leads to the most clearly negative comments on religious diversity, often tinged with overtly racist remarks. This has been true in the past of the Sikh turban and is currently the case for the Islamic hijab or veil.5 There would have been a time when the question of dress was treated as a specifically ethnic or cultural discourse. This, however, has changed and the question of the hijab has been very influential in doing this. The hijab also introduces a discourse about gender and the way in which Muslims are supposed to ‘treat their women’ that add another layer of complexity, and ignorance, to the whole debate. What is also interesting in this context is that these discussions are not related to specific people who wear this kind of dress. They are
5 We could also add the traditional dress of some male Pakistani Muslims in Britain, which has become associated in many people’s minds with the idea of radical Islam and terrorism. Discourses on Islam and terror are clearly a part of the overall conversation about religion in contemporary Britain. They do not, however, tend to impinge upon, or interact with, the kind of discourses on ‘religious diversity’ as such that I am highlighting in this paper.
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not triggered by the visual images in themselves. It is usually when white or other none Muslim people are gathered in a ‘safe’ environment, away from anybody wearing the hijab that a conversation will begin. This again, associates the discourse with specifically negative overtones and is treated as a discourse that defines and condemns the other. Finally this discourse suggests that if people insist on wearing a specific dress then religious diversity is, in and of itself, a bad thing. Religious and human freedoms to do and wear what the individual chooses is seen as a more significant goal, and divisions are seen to be overcome only through the downplaying of religious difference. The most interesting popular discourse on the religious diversity of Birmingham as a city, however, comes in relation to the buildings that are increasingly being put up in many inner-urban areas. Most of these structures are obviously and self-referentially Islamic, Sikh, Hindu, Buddhist or whatever. It is ironic that it is actually only the new Christian buildings that are not instantly recognisable as ‘religious’ let alone ‘Christian’. The new religious buildings are often on prime sites within the neighbourhood in question and are often visible from many of the main roads in or out of the city. Buddhist and Hindu temples are generally less obvious to the general public but are present in a very visible fashion within the neighbourhoods in which they are situated. What interests me about the discourses relating to the buildings, however, is the clearly ambiguous stance to these buildings by the general public. As with the discourses on dress, those on buildings have been changing over the years. When the Central Mosque was built in Highgate, on a prime site next to the inner ring road, it was the first purpose built Islamic building in the city and caused considerable opposition and controversy within the area itself.6 Most of the people of Highgate have now learnt to live with it and for most non-Muslims it is, in fact, a non building, they turn their backs on it and hardly appear to notice that it is present. Newer buildings, however, elicit a very different reaction. At one level they represent regeneration, the sense that an area is improving. The big Mosques and Gurdwaras in areas like Small Heath and Handsworth, with all 6 R. Gale ‘The Multicultural City and the Politics of Religious Architecture: Urban Planning, Mosques and Meaning-making in Birmingham, UK’ Built Environment, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2004, 18–30.
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their associated educational facilities, sheltered housing and other community buildings represent a significant investment within many of the run down inner-urban area communities in which they are situated. In the case of the Gurdwaras they are also flamboyant and ostentatious in their use of marble, elaborate gilding and bright garish colour. None of these buildings fit the traditional Birmingham vernacular, but all of them, in their own way, work well within the range of new ‘post-modern’ structures that are being built in areas such as Brindley Place (an area of canal-side redevelopment aimed at the entertainment industry where a variety of styles have been drawn together to form a new and exciting urban space). Having said all this, it is very clear both for local residents, and for those who pass by in cars, that these buildings are there for religious purposes and are not primarily economic or entertainment focused structures. The nature of a recent discourse about buildings can be seen through one specific comment made in relation to the development of the Gurdwara in Handsworth. An older lady, a member of a local Afro-Caribbean church, commented to one of my students that as the Gurdwara and its associated buildings took over adjoining sites, one relatively recent building housing a video shop or games arcade was demolished. This woman remembered, long ago, that there had once been a chapel on that site and she commented to my student that ‘God always claims his own’. What is important in this throw away remark is first of all that the new building was thought of as ‘religious’, although this particular part of the development was designed for education or community work and was not in itself a worship space. Secondly, the comment also implied that somehow the specific nature of the religion did not seem to matter. The site was going back to God despite the fact that it was now part of a Sikh complex and not a Christian chapel. Other comments from other parts of the city have reflected the same kind of sentiment, that the growth in buildings represents a development for ‘God’, or perhaps even from God, a reclaiming of land for God, irrespective of the particular religion that is doing the building. Of course there are those who still object to the building of Mosques or Gurdwaras but these now appear to be the minority within the neighbourhoods themselves. More important than the positive charge of these discourses, however, is the underlying universalism that is implicit in them, even from those who would claim
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no religious allegiance of their own. These structures are understood as being God’s building and that is constructed as being a generally good thing within the wider materialism of the city. This, however, represents only one further element of the discourses on religious diversity to add to that on dress. A different, but in many ways similar view to the discourse on buildings is seen in relation to street festivals and processions. The main difference here, however, is that the specifically religious element is played down or even ignored entirely. If the Irish community celebrate St Patrick’s Day in Digbeth, or the Sikhs celebrate the birthday of the Guru in Handsworth, or the Chinese celebrate their New Year in the city centre then they each come out onto the streets to take part in parades and festivals that are proclaimed by the City authorities as the biggest and best, outside of New York, Amritsar, Beijing or wherever. Each of these is a religious festival, and like the modern discourses on the buildings the overwhelming response of the people to these events is positive. As studies of festivals in other parts of the world have clearly shown, the exact nature of the sponsors or the defined purpose of the festival is largely irrelevant, everybody within the neighbourhood comes out to celebrate and the whole city is ‘Irish’ or ‘Chinese’ for the day.7 These festivals sit alongside the Afro-Caribbean Carnival and the Gay Pride marches, which also fill the streets and gather up all the passing crowds into their celebration, but neither of which is specifically ‘religious’. Unlike the discourses on buildings, these discourses are generally not about religion, although they are, very clearly, about the celebration of diversity. The discourses that followed the protests against the play set in a Sikh Gurdwara also raised serious questions about diversity, but these were far more complex and I want to look at these in more detail in the section on the management of diversity below. Levels of Discourse If we look at the different contexts in which discourses on religious diversity come into play we can see something that is far more than the simple distinction between demotic and dominant discourses as 7 See reports on the Birmingham City Council web pages at www.birmingham.gov.uk.
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outlined by Baumann. We can also see much more involved than the confusion between religion and ethnicity or culture. In the three forms of discourse that we have looked at I would suggest that there are two features that are particularly important. These features can best be understood as being two axis of a graph. On one axis there is the question of whether the discourse is essentially positive or essentially negative. It is not always easy to be clear-cut on this issue, hence the idea of a continuum set out on an axis. Taken as an overall attitude, however, we can draw some kind of distinction as we have seen in some of the examples I have already given. On the other axis we can look at the level of ‘otherness’ that is associated with the discourse, the way in which the discourse constructs those with other religions as ‘others’ in a wider sense. If we take this pair of axes as a starting point then we could suggest that the discourse on dress represents those of other religions as being entirely ‘other’ that are different from the speaker, while at the same time giving that otherness a negative value. Those who wear the hijab, or those who in the popular mind force others to wear the hijab, are identified as ‘negatively other’. They are different from the speaker and are generally to be opposed. On the other hand the discourses associated with festivities and street processions still maintain a strong element of otherness; that is the whole point of the festival, to celebrate the specificities of a different, other, culture. The value associated with that otherness, however, especially from those who are drawn into the festivities themselves, is entirely positive. Nobody is out there saying that these kinds of events should not be happening, they are seen as a positive thing for the city as a whole. The discourses on buildings fall somewhere in between these two extremes. These discourses are sometimes negative (and have generally been so in the past), but are often positive, especially when economic regeneration is brought into the equation. What is particularly interesting about these discourses, however, is the way in which the ‘otherness’ of these buildings, or the religions that they represent, is played down. The buildings belong to ‘God’, they are religious symbols within the community, an entirely positive element within the landscape that can be equated with churches and other religious buildings and are not seen as entirely other to the speaker. The ability to maintain a shared value about a building, and the fact that many of these buildings house educational and community based projects mean that they are often seen as belonging to the
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wider community as a whole and not to one or other specific religious group. This is a very odd position to arrive at. What this range of discourses also shows, of course, is the central element that Baumann was keen to highlight in his own study of Southall. The important point for Baumann was that individuals can in fact move seamlessly between the different discourses he discussed without ever realising that in doing so. This is what Baumann refers to as ‘dual discursive competence’. The same, I would argue, is true of the various discourses that I have been discussing. As people move from discourse to discourse they are subtly and yet significantly changing both their understanding of the other, and the positive or negative value that they are placing on that otherness. They are fundamentally shifting their stance towards religious diversity. This is not a new phenomenon. We are all aware, from the literature on racism and other forms of stereotyping within society, of what can be called the ‘my best friend’ phenomenon. In this situation it is perfectly possible for an individual to be a racist, a misogynist or a homophobe whilst at the same time claiming a close and positive relationship with one member of the group being despised. The ‘best friend’ is always seen as the exception that in some way proves the rule. What I am suggesting here, however, is not entirely analogous to this, unless we wish to rethink the ‘my best friend’ analysis. It is not the case in relation to religious diversity, that most people have a standard background fear, mistrust or hatred for a particular religion, or religions in general (although there will be people out there for whom this is, of course, true). There is no one discourse that is pre-eminent for the individuals concerned. It is more the case that in different contexts, and in relation to different discourses, then different values of otherness and different conceptions of what is seen as other come into play. People can, and do, shift between these different discourses with ease, primarily, I would suggest, because none of them impinge too fully on any one individual’s perceptions. It is here, I would suggest, that we can turn our attention to the question of the management of religious diversity. Managing Discourses of Religious Diversity What strikes me most forcefully from the research that I have undertaken is the way in which many ordinary members of all religions,
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thinking themselves to be a minority within society at large, actually sustain a clear universalist discourse in which all religions are seen as being essentially the same. What matters is not the differences between the religions for those who are religious, but the difference between the religious and those without religion, or those with hypocritical attitudes towards religion. There is no doubt from our research that this is a common and widespread position for those who actually practice their religion on a regular and committed basis (I have to exclude those of a strict conservative or fundamentalist attitude from this analysis, but these are not all that common within Birmingham as a whole). What is more interesting, however, is the way in which those without a clear religious identity of their own either do, or do not, take up a similar discourse. What we have seen from the evidence that I have provided is that the way in which such discourses are used will depend on the context. It is at this point, therefore, that I wish to bring in the case of the play within a Birmingham theatre just before Christmas 2004. In this case a play, Behtzi (a Punjabi word meaning dishonour), written by a young Sikh woman was performed at a major Birmingham theatre. Before the play opened the wider Sikh community objected to the play because it showed rape and murder taking place within a Gurdwara in the sight of the holy book. It was the setting of the play in the Gurdwara that offended the Sikh community, not the acts that were taking place. In much of the literature surrounding the play, however, it was suggested that Sikhs objected to the fact that abuse within the community was made public, even in a fictional situation. This was not the case. For a Sikh any space that contains the Holy Scripture is a Gurdwara, and for the sake of this play that also included the theatre, despite the fact that this was fiction. It is therefore the case that respect should have been shown to the text even within the context of the play. If the same actions were shown taking place in another space then there would have been no problems. The Sikh community tried to engage in dialogue with the theatre and gained some compromises, but not enough for some members of the community. These people mounted a peaceful protest outside the theatre during its early performances. Unfortunately the protest got out of hand on one night and a couple of windows were smashed. The theatre then chose to cancel the final performances and the author was forced to go into hiding. The whole episode caused considerable tension within the city and within a number of different
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religious communities. It has also continued to rumble on in the media and in wider discussion for much of the following three months. It does not look like going away. Obviously an event such as this immediately initiates a whole series of discourses within society at large about the nature of a multi-faith community and the ‘rights’ or ‘responsibilities’ of different religious communities or individual members of those communities. This has been linked in Britain to wider discourses about the possibility of a law to ban religious hatred and to other contexts in which religious groups have protested against plays, operas and other art forms that they have considered to be offensive. At its heart, however, and particularly in Birmingham, the question has been one of the nature of religious diversity within the city. What is seen in this context is a particular group stepping outside of the commonly accepted discourse on religious diversity, which suggest that ultimately all religions are the same and the otherness is minimal, and appearing to stress the ‘otherness’ of their particular faith position. The discourses involved a move towards the kind of discourses that we have seen in relation to the question of clothing, a discourse that the Sikh community in particular remembers all to well in relation to the turban in the 1970s and 80s. This is a discourse that presents the religious group as being entirely ‘other’, even to other religious communities, and gives that otherness a negative value. The language used is one of ‘extremism’ or even ‘fundamentalism’, a language well known to Muslims but not heard very often of contemporary Sikhs. What then, has this to do with the management of religious diversity? Is the conclusion that we have to reach simply one that says we must do all we can to dilute differences? Should we highlight only those discourses that play down ‘otherness’ or at best give that otherness a positive value? Should we encourage more festivals, more open, welcoming and community minded buildings and such like? One reading of this research could suggest that position, and if there is a dominant discourse on religious diversity in a city such as Birmingham at the present time then this is probably it. Let us celebrate the diversity and see the differences as little more than surface decoration, the costumes we wear at the festivals, the architecture we choose (in good post modern fashion) to clad our buildings. Underneath we are all the same really. This is certainly one reading of the evidence. I would want to suggest, however, that the situation surrounding the play shows up the shallowness and inadequacy of such a reading.
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Taking this line simply recognises and reinforces those discourses within the popular debate that happen to suit the manager’s purpose. They fail to hear the full story and to recognise that these are simply a small selection of the wide range of discourses that are actually present within the wider society. When the situation changes, when events bring otherness and the negative values of religion to the fore then the other discourses can just as easily be brought into play and used for more malign purposes. Those who simply stress the positive often do nothing specifically to counteract the negative; they tend to just ignore it. This does not help. We need to spend more time, I would suggest, out there among the ordinary people of the city, listening more carefully to the range of different discourses people use, observing those discourses at play in different situations, recording and analysing the differing underlying messages of the different discourses, and then, and only then, based on this more sophisticated analysis should any kind of policy for the management of religious diversity be devised. At that level, I would suggest, this is in fact, still very much a work in progress. References Baumann, G. (1996). Contexting Culture: Discourses of Identity in Multi-Ethnic London. Cambridge: Cambridge University press. Gale, R. (2004). ‘The Multicultural City and the Politics of Religious Architecture: Urban Planning, Mosques and Meaning Making in Birmingham, UK’ in Built Environment, Vol. 30, No. 1, 18–30. Mason, D. (2000). Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ratcliffe, P. (1981). Racism and Reaction, a Profile of Handsworth. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Rex, J. & Moore, R. (1967). Race, Community and Conflict, a Study of Sparkbrook. London: Oxford University Press.
TAMIL HINDU TEMPLE LIFE IN GERMANY: COMPETING AND COMPLEMENTARY MODES IN REPRODUCING CULTURAL IDENTITY, GLOBALIZED ETHNICITY AND EXPANSION OF RELIGIOUS MARKETS Annette Wilke Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster Since the devastating civil war in Sri Lanka in the 1980s, a growing number of Tamil refugees settled in European countries, particularly in Germany, Switzerland, Scandinavian countries, Great Britain and France, as well as in Canada. Although the immigrants’ legal status and opportunities of social participation diverge in these countries considerably, we notice as a common element a striking temple building activity among Tamil refugees in the 1990s.1 Among the Hindu population in Germany, the total number of whom is reckoned about 100.000, the 45.000 Hindus from Sri Lanka form the strongest group in terms of number2 as well as in terms of religious institution-building. Within the short span of two decades (1985–2005) twentyfive places of worship have been erected.3 Basements were converted into prayer halls and industrial sites into temples. All
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Baumann, Luchesi, and Wilke 2003, 8–10. Besides the Sri Lankan migrants there are approx. 36.000 Hindus from India (mainly northern India) and 5.000 Hindus from Afghanistan in Germany, whereas Germans who converted to Neo-Hindu groupings (like Osho or ISKCON) are estimated to be between of 7.000–10.000 (Baumann, Introduction to Immigrant Hinduism in Germany, 2005). 3 Hindus from India—mostly professionals, academics and businessmen who settled in Germany already between the 1950s and 1970s—have felt much less necessity to establish their own religious edifices. The only Indian Hindu temple was set up in Frankfurt as late as 1989, but short lived. It was established by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad who has been quite successful in UK, US and Canada to draw Hindus together and give them a common organizational basis (Coward, Hinnells, and Brady Williams 2000). In Germany, besides the Tamil Hindus, the refugees from Afghanistan are much more active than the Indian Hindus. Both groups share a migration background of cultural discrimination. To escape the Taliban regime Hindus from Afghanistan settled in Germany since the 1980s and established a beautiful temple in Hamburg, in Frankfurt (in 2002) and two in Köln. Also the ISKCON added to Hindu temple life in Germany with their sacred site in Berlin. 2
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temples depend on private sponsorship and volunteer work. Most Sri Lankan migrants earn their living in ill-paid sectors like cleaning or food industry. Despite poor financial resources and a chronic lack of professional Brahmin priests, the first generation has invested much time and effort not only to construct, but also to enlarge and improve their own places of worship and rituals in the midst of a foreign culture. Some would go as far as incurring financial hardships and debts, as I will show. Several authors have dealt with the socio-religious functions which Hindu temples in the diaspora fulfil regarding retention and transmission of tradition, identity maintenance, strengthening social relationships and cultural ties.4 This is true for Hindu groups belonging to the Tamil Sri Lankan communities. But I would add that the latter’s disproportional engagement in religious institution-building is an indicator of an increased symbolic value the temples attain in the case of forced migration. Hindus from India have generally been voluntary migrants and motivated to improve their economic status, social welfare and education. Sri Lankan Hindus are mainly refugees from rural Jaffna who involuntarily left their religiously active village life. A mainly •aiva background as well as Sinhalese-Tamil conflict and ethnic discrimination belong to their shared cultural background. By migrating to a western country they exchanged one minority status for another. Religion, and temple worship in particular, seems to be one of their symbolic resources to strengthen dignity and self-assurance both in Sri Lanka and the new country. In the last decade a great number of temples in Jaffna were restored. While spirituality can be practised at the shrines at home too, the temples are markers of collective identity both representing Tamil Hindus outwardly and in terms of uniting the group. For the Sri Lankan immigrants their being Tamil is very vital and there seems a specific necessity attached to temples as symbols of collective belonging and self-representation. Of course, not all Tamil people are religious, nor do I want to say that integration has failed or essentialize culture. In fact, the rate of citizenships has increased rapidly in the
There have been a number of fine studies on different Hindu diaspora groups in Great Britain, the United States, Canada and the Caribbean countries. More recently also Tamil temple life has been focussed: Baumann 2000; Baumann, Luchesi, and Wilke 2003; Fuglerund 1999; Lüthi 2005; McDowell 1996; Salentin 2002; Schalk 2004; K. Jacobsen and M. Qvortrup Fibiger (forthcoming). 4
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last years. More than 40% Sri Lankans are nowadays German citizens and the second generation in particular is developing a TamilGerman identity. My observations concentrate on the first generation and their reproduction of Tamil Hindu temple life in a foreign culture. Today we must speak of a globalized ethnicity and a transnational Tamil community and certainly of a global Tamil Hindu diaspora. The very same political situation which enforced religious and ethnic identity removed Tamil religiosity and ethnicity from its territorial roots, ensuing new transnational networks. Most migrants— including the priests—have a great many of their relatives no more in Sri Lanka, but spread in all parts of the world. Temple life is one of the networks holding the dispersed Tamil communities together. Religions help to supersede territorial (and even cultural) boundaries. By extending the native space temple life provides both a feeling of being at home in the new cultural environment as well as a powerful non-political means of Tamil identity maintenance. Compared with other Hindu diaspora groups Sri Lankans generally continue more traditional ritual forms and the Tamil element is very explicit in terms of rituals, liturgical language and deities. One of my major arguments, however, will be that religious Tamil identity maintenance is achieved in multiple ways. Each diaspora temple has its very distinct individual profile and calls into question a general characterization of Tamil Hindus from Sri Lanka as a unified religious group with a strong ethnic and sectarian identity. Among some twentyfive Tamil Hindu places of worship in Germany, I have selected three Goddess temples5 which illustrate well the broad range to reproduce cultural identity and the divergent patterns of re-adjustment. My focus is on intra-religious pluralism which attains new features by being rooted abroad. Naturally, I also tackle the manifold and intriguing exchange processes with the majority population. Until recently, the new life, which the Hindu places of worship add to the German public arena of religious plurality, has gone largely unnoticed by the locals with the exception of neighbourhoods sometimes complaining about too much noise and traffic during fes5 Since 2000 I have been regularly visiting the Kamadchi temple of HammUentrop since January 2002 the Navacakti Nayaki temple of Muenster, whereas since May 2002 only occasionally the Naagapooshani temple of Frankfurt. I warmly thank all the priests for their exceptional friendliness, willingness to give interviews and openness to communicate their personal opinion.
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tival times. Similar to Muslim mosques, the Hindu temples are generally located in former factories in industrial quarters, rear buildings in backyards, converted ground floors in German tenement houses. There has been, however, a growing attempt to be more visible6 by means of a symbol above the entrance, red and white stripes etc. My first example, the “Hindu Shankarar Sri Kamadchi Ampal Alayam (Airoppa)” of Hamm-Uentrop, Westphalia, has meanwhile grown to be the largest, most visible and best known temple in Continental Europe, attracting Hindu migrants as well as German locals. It is the only temple built in traditional South Indian architectural style, representing most Hinduism outwardly and being increasingly a platform for contacts with the majority population. In contrast, my second example, the close-by “Ohm Navacakti Nayaki Ampal Alayam” of Muenster, has probably been the smallest temple in Germany until recently. There was no external sign and only a Tamil insider would know that in the basement of a typical Westfalian brickhouse there was a sacred shrine. During the years I met only one more non-Hindu visiting the temple. He was an anthropologist doing field research like myself. The situation did hardly change after the long dream became true to move to a larger location in June 2005. The former nursery near Altenberge, nowadays decorated with a large colourful painting of the goddess, is a lonesome building far off in the country-side in the midst of Indian corn fields. Sri Lankan visitors may be reminded of rural Jaffna, but it is rather unlikely that a German native would find the place. These temples mirror some recent developments in the Sri Lankan religious landscape such as a strong Sanskritization of goddess worship, and add new blends. Compared with other Tamil places of worship in Germany, they are somewhat exceptional regarding their nonBrahmin chief priests who realized a personal religious vision by founding the temple and who also manage it. My third example, the Naagapooshani temple of Frankfurt, represents better the dominant German model of a Board of Directors founding and managing the temple and hiring a Brahmin priest. This temple is located in a transformed workshop in a backyard, but in a central residential quarter and has plans to erect a traditional style edifice.
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Luchesi 2003, 104–113.
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My comparison will reveal three priestly models: the priest being a Brahmin—generally, but not necessarily, stemming from a family of •aiva priests; the priest being a non-Brahmin, but stemming from a family of priests; and finally the pious non-Brahmin enthusiast without priestly family background. The three temples are ideal types in a Weberian sense regarding their different institutional patterns, different priestly models, different forms of authority, and different symbolic resources. They disclose rival systems in reproducing cultural identity and the intertwining of new possibilities and old constraints. The present Nagapooshani priest recalls that the chief Kamadchi priest having been a mere “assistant” in the Vinayakar temple of Hamm, before erecting his own place of worship because performing pùjà was denied to him. Even though Brahmin priests like him may be full of admiration for the Kamadchi temple, some claim that its priest Sri Paskaran Kurukkal, being a non-Brahmin Vìra •aiva, would not have achieved such a splendid temple in Sri Lanka and that the temple would be even more powerful having a Brahmin priest. This Brahmin perspective illustrates that religious hierarchies are at stake far away from home, and even the tiny Navacakti temple discloses a negotiation of hierarchies. Different spiritual “aristocracies” are colliding: one by birth and ancient sacred tradition, one by ritual power and success, and one by devotional immediacy and divine empowerment. All of this is known in Sri Lanka as well, but the rupture with territorially bound religion and ethnicity, the new transnational character of Sri Lankan Tamil Hindu groups and priests, and not least the new environment Germany offers expanded and fastened opportunities to negotiate social status and spiritual authority. Interactions with members of the “host” society are an essential part of the competing discourses. In this essay I want to deal with both patterns of re-adjustment and patterns of intercultural exchange: my case studies reveal various forms of specifically Tamil identity maintenance as well as a striking variety of religious plurality management by the German natives, some of them impeding, some of them favouring the expansion of the religious market. Implanting religion in a new cultural milieu naturally involves changes of tradition, some of them subtle, others very obvious, including the traditions of the new country. The Kamadchi temple in particular discloses that the transnational transfer of Tamil “ethnic” space is not a one way street.
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The “Hindu Shankarar Sri Kamadchi Ampal Alayam (Airoppa)” (Hamm-Uentrop) The history of this temple dates back to 1989: like many others it started in a basement and was constantly improved. The present edifice is already the fourth version and at least since its consecration in July 2002, the proud “Europe” (Airoppa) added to the temple name by Sri Paskaran has proven true: the first South Indian style temple in Europe had emerged and outgrown all other Hindu temples in Continental Europe by its size and prestige as well as by its media attention and public recognition. The construction of a new building is still an exception, and a Hindu temple to be discerned already from far away by its exterior is a novelty altogether. The Kamadchi Alayam is also the only temple in Germany having several full-time priests and three times pùjà daily. It was the first Tamil site starting public cart processions at its yearly temple festival and it became a new Hindu pilgrimage place. But only by the media attention around the erection and consecration of the present building the active presence of Hinduism became for the first time known to a wider native German public. Nowadays the Kamadchi temple attracts not only loads of German tourists and school classes, but also an increasing number of “proselytes”. Qualitative interviews7 have shown that besides the exotism of the foreign religion, its obvious vitality is reckoned attractive. Many are impressed by the overwhelming masses, the richness of colours, the sensory perceptibility of Hindu devotion, and they kept returning to the temple. Some do not feel at all as “outsiders” or mere spectators, but are attracted to Hinduism since many years and happy to find it nowadays next door. One female participant describes the procession as a deeply moving experience which brings tears to her eyes. Several men and women started to visit regularly the processions and temple pùjàs. Three decisive events in the history of this temple contributed to its present status: a) the start of public cart processions in 1993 in Hamm city by which the temple gained popularity across regions and attracted an increasing number of Tamil pilgrims and vow-
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Structured and unstructured interviews conducted with a group of students of Muenster University in 2004 confirmed my participant observation during the yearly festivals 2000–04 and during rituals and festivals throughout these years.
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fulfillers every year,8 b) the move to an industrial area in 19979 due to complaints of German citizens about the litter and traffic jam produced by the growing number of procession participants,10 and c) the support of municipal authorities who have been co-operative in many ways such as finding the present location. Their good-will towards temple and priest is illustrated by the following remarkable words of a policeman supervising the procession in 2004: “We policemen have always welcomed all of this, since we are very open towards other cultures. This Hindu community is a very peaceful religion and very tolerant. There are good contacts between police and priest. It’s a very agreeable religion to us.” We may add that the new Kamadchi temple has a high publicity value for the city of Hamm. Regarding the temple, it was a good move to settle in the industrial area of Hamm-Uentrop. Extensive processions can be carried out now without disturbing the German neighbourhood and traffic. Adjunct to the temple there is a large meadow on which the festival market with garments and goods from Sri Lanka can be held. The temple is close to the highway, so that visitors from all parts of Germany and abroad have easy access, at least those who have a car. On the major procession day which attracts 20.000 people, there is an extra bus service from Hamm railway station. A good part of this temple’s revenue comes from its imposing yearly processions.11 As there are no public funds like church-rates, 8 Such processions are an important element of Sri Lankan temple cult. In 1996 already 4000 Tamil participants from Germany and abroad attended the procession, in the years 2002 and 2003 around 12.000 including many Germans, in 2004 already 15.000 and in 2005 even 20.000. Meanwhile a number of other Tamil Hindu temples in Germany carry out yearly processions, but none attracts as many participants and vow-fulfillers. Even those Sri Lankans having an own temple in their city will come to the spectacular event. 9 In 1997 a two-storied house was set up to serve as (third) Kamadchi temple until the financial situation would allow the construction of the present “real” temple. 10 The second Kamadchi temple in a former laundry in Hamm city had to be closed down due to these complaints, but officially because of not fulfilling the fire safety requirements. 11 Even though a heavy financial burden for a temple, processions are good means of propaganda and may bring extra funds because actively participating, sponsoring and volunteering is highly valued in the peer-group: it brings social prestige as well as religious merit. The ritual paraphernalia like coconuts and fruit and flower baskets are sold by the temple, whereas the vow paraphernalia like clay pots (with camphor), copper vessels (with milk), and kàva∂i-s are leased. In 2004 the Kamadchi temple charged 15 Euros for a pùjà-tray (offering to the goddess gener-
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the temples must rely on private sponsoring, membership-rates, loans free of interest, credits and respites. Much depends on the management abilities of temple boards and priests, their talents to raise funds, and the organisational and social structure of the board of directors. In case of the Kamadchi temple, its founder and chief priest Sri Paskaran is heading a board of directors consisting of seven Sri Lankan compatriots who live in different German cities (Aachen, Oberhausen, Dortmund) and meet every three or four months. Most of them come from the same Jaffna region like the priest or belong to the Vìra •aiva caste like him. They belong to the main sponsors,12 some having donated a whole shrine,13 and paying regularly one of the costly festival days. Also transnational connections play an important role. The temple patrons include thirty families from London and three or four families from US, Canada and Sri Lanka. As far as administrative affairs are concerned, it is crucial that besides the Sri Lankan temple board, there is a German advisory board of eight or nine persons, some of them influential citizens of Hamm. This advisory board mediates in bank affairs and helps to deal with the municipal authorities. Finally, there is a temple association with a membership fee of 150 Euro. According to priest Sri Paskaran
ally some 50 Euro more are added), for a milk-pot with coconut 51 Euro, and for a kàva∂i 50–150 Euro depending on its size, whereas a bird-kàva∂i cost 500 Euro. 12 Erecting the edifice did cost 3 Mio DM, most of which have been paid back. Some of the donors contributed a whole shrine (25.000–30.000 DM), while others donated at least 100 DM for a square metre of land. On financing the erection of the temple: Luchesi 2003, 227–229; Wilke 2003, 142f. 13 All major festival days (which are very frequent) include beautiful decoration of the temple deities with heavy flower garlands etc., copious ablutions with milk, fruits etc., live music, and free food for all temple visitors. Even normal days are costly: the several priests have to be cared for as well as the daily rites, the floor heating and the high insurance costs. The maintenance is achieved in many different ways and involves many participants, some of whom are regular donors, while others donate occasionally or only once. Some families may regularly sponsor one of the many festival days, or pay the musicians, or the food distributed on each Sunday. Some have the habit to donate on their birthday 350 or 500 Euro. There is a donation account which can be used for monthly money transfers. Lately, Sri Paskaran seeks to enrol patrons for each day of the year. It may happen that a visitor from abroad signs a lavish cheque of 900 Euro, or there is respite of a larger sum and open bill, but the normal “income” derives from festival sponsoring, marriage ceremonies and priestly services like private worship (arcanai ) on behalf of lay devotees. The increasing number of German natives do generally not add substantially. Temple sponsoring is a high value for Tamil Hindus, but not for the German locals. The bus loads leave little money and hardly buy the temple booklet.
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(interview 19.1.2004) the total number of members amounts to 900 persons, whereas the entire “parish” includes 2000–3000 persons, mostly from Nordrhein-Westphalia. Besides the sponsors, the many volunteers—Tamil as well as German, youngsters as well as aged people—deserve special attention. They do free service for the temple, assist in festivals, remove the litter of processions, act as translators, mediators with journalists etc. Three or four Tamil (male) youngsters regularly assist in the many festivals. Some German board members offer guided temple tours, such as the architect, who built the raw brickwork and refused to be reimbursed immediately. Besides the financial capital, as well as the human capital of volunteers and transnational networks as well as local networks thus play a decisive role in the temple’s success. Many another priest envies Sri Paskaran for his German sympathisers, influential helpers and the well-disposed municipality of Hamm. Equally important is the symbolic capital: the luxury and beauty of the temple, the ritual faculty and reputation of the priest, and the power of the temple deity. It is not only Sri Paskaran’s ambition, but also the pride of his compatriots to have a splendid sacred place. After consecration, the rituals and festive occasions have steadily increased, and there have been constant additions, improvements and beautifications of the site. Two adjunct rooms—one for the shoes and one for special esoteric rites—were built. Valuable objects such as a pure silver flag post and a fine golden plated cart for the Friday evening worship have been acquired. After completion of the “essentials” which a “real” temple should have (such as a flag post), the walls were decorated with colourful paintings. Having beautified the interior, the exterior was decorated with paintings above the entrance, a paved car-park was built with bricks donated by a member of the local Lion’s Club, and trees and roses were planted. The expansion of the Kamadchi temple is definitely singular, but not exceptional. Almost each German temple has plans and visions to expand. The present problem is that many of those who were willing to donate lavishly, or give on trust have reached their limits. After a great initial enthusiasm in erecting the temples there is currently a certain tiredness to maintain them. Sri Paskaran complains that after gaining the German citizenship, families rather choose to invest in their new life in Germany. His fund raising abilities are great and regular or occasional sponsors are many, but the debts and ongoing costs are equally high. The monthly expenditure exceeds
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the monthly income.14 The on-going bill of the Indian artisans and interest on debts make altogether an amount of 305.000 Euro.15 Most temple visitors come only occasionally when in need of a special ritual. Even in the newly erected Kamadchi temple visitors have hardly increased. On weekends often more native German are present than Tamil families who prefer to come on Fridays and festivals. Only during traditional Tamil festivals there are generally (more or less) big crowds. It is remarkable that hardly any one seems to complain about the ambitious on-going expansion programs of Sri Paskaran. In the past years he managed to build up an aura of name and fame. Most of my informants see him as “someone very special” and the goddess Kamadchi (Tam. Kàmà†ci, Skt. Kàmàkßì) as particularly “powerful”. Within a few years legends around the priest and goddess. Some attribute super-human powers to Sri Paskaran. I have met people prostrating with all limbs in front of him as in front of a deity or a holy man. For them he will pull out his beautiful brocade pouch containing sacred ashes and give them a mark of ashes as special blessing. The same gesture repeats at the temple festival when Sri Paskaran is blessing the vow-fulfillers. He is a wonderworking charismatic for those who want to feel the deity’s blessings physically, but he acts also as a spiritual teacher by giving speeches at the end of every Friday and festival pùjà. Such “sermons” are a new element in the Hindu temple cult and give Sri Paskaran the opportunity to transmit Hindu tradition and stress a more spiritual and universalist kind of religiosity than most of his temple visitors are generally accustomed to. He is furthermore a good singer who can move the hearts of the devotees. Finally and most of all, he is a ritual specialist conversant with Vedic, àgamic and tantric rites and mantras, and full of aesthetic refinement in performing ritual acts. Sri Paskaran’s family background is non-Brahmin, yet highly respected as well. He comes from a learned Vìra •aiva clan of Jaffna 14 According to Sri Paskaran the monthly expenditures amount to 11.000 Euros, but the monthly donations only to 3000 or 4000 Euros (interview December 2004). 15 This sum has been published in November 2004 on a Tamil leaflet asking for donations (e-mail M. Baumann 13.1.2004). Around the same time Sri Paskaran started travelling to France, India, Canada and England for further fund raising. He visits Hindu temples to get donations by “talking and singing” (interview 19.1.2005). According to a member of the advisory board the priest tries to get new loans from his patrons in England and other countries, hoping that the loan may eventually turn into a gift.
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temple priests who form an own caste.16 He received his higher kurukkal ordination, in Tamil Nadu where he exiled first before coming to Germany. Even though the South Indian training made him diverge from his family tradition, the family bonds remained strong. The ritual expertise and co-operation of his numerous priestly relatives helped him a great deal to establish the present temple and perform aesthetically most beautiful, copious festival rites.17 At least three priests have been constant since 2001: Sri Paskaran, his brotherin-law Arikaraputhira Mathivan Iyer, and the “assistant (priest)” Siva Ambu Sarma. It is noteworthy how the dominant Brahmin priest model is inverted. Siva Ambu Sarma is a South Indian Diksitar Brahmin whose family has hereditary priestly rights in the famous •iva temple of Cidambaram. In the Kamadchi temple of HammUentrop, however, he does only assistant services such as preparing the rituals or cooking the deities’ meals. The priests who perform the proper acts of worship are non-Brahmin Vìra •aivas and without exception relatives of Sri Paskaran or his wife (who is—as per the Sri Lankan tradition—his cousin). Sri Paskaran makes it a point that he allows only priests from his family doing worship. In case no family member should be available, he would ask for a special exam. Only Sri Paskaran, however, performs the esoteric ≤rìcakra worship along with fire sacrifice. It takes place at certain auspicious days in a small adjunct room and the priest considers it as a major force of his success. The ≤rìcakra is the most famous ritual diagram of the Great Goddess and tremendous powers are indeed traditionally ascribed to it. Its complex and highly symbolic non-dual worship needs tantric initiation. Sri Paskaran got acquainted with it while 16 His grandfather was a renowned Vìra •aiva scholar, his parents live nowadays in South India. His extended family is a large clan of priests who owe the hereditary right to serve in four temples in central Jaffna, and lead a school for training priests. The minority of Vìra •aivas form an own caste and have been traditionally anti-iconoclastic and anti-caste in contrast to the •aiva Siddhànta majority. 17 His learned “uncle” Sri Prabhudevan would regularly come from Sri Lanka for conducting the festivals with great care, sophistication and ritual know-how. Eleven priestly relatives from Sri Lanka conducted the traditional (àgamic) consecration ceremony in 2002 which included a number of imposing grand style rituals and lasted altogether a whole month. One or three have been regularly coming back. In 2004 at least four priests and one assistant have been working in the Kamadchi temple. The number has been increasing or decreasing depending on festival times and visa problems.
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being in South India.18 It was decisive that his first exile was Tamil Nadu: there he encountered Sri Kamadchi (Kàmàkßì), the famous goddess of Kanchipuram and patron deity of the •a«karàcaryas. Since that time the Advaita Vedànta philosophy of •a«kara and •rìvidyà esoteric rites associated with •a«kara determine his spiritual orientation. This is visualized on a number of programmatic wall-paintings, on the flags alongside the road of the temple premises, on the home-page, and in the consecration memorial volume showing •a«kara and Sri Paskaran, or priest and contemporary •a«karàcàryas. Sri Paskaran calls the present •a«karàcarya his “Guru”. If he has questions on ritual or spiritual issues he will ask his “Master” in India, or learn from books, but not turn to Sri Lankan authorities. When starting to do research in the German Kamadchi temple, it was a puzzle to me how a South Indian goddess, unknown in Sri Lanka, and how the •a«kara tradition despised by traditional Sri Lankan •aivas, could become the most important temple paradigm in Germany. During a field trip in Jaffna and Colombo (May 2003) it became evident that Sri Paskaran’s love for the •a«kara tradition of Kanchi and his •rìvidyà Goddess worship correspond with recent religious changes in Sri Lanka. Since a few decades the Kanchi model is popular among Sri Lankan Brahmins, and equally important: almost all goddess temples include ≤rìcakra-pùjà in their customary temple service.19 None, however, claims an equally strong and deliberate connection with the •a«kara tradition. I gather from the public display in Hamm-Uentrop that the highly philosophical theology of the •a«kara tradition is not the only reason which inspires Sri Paskaran. By his Great Goddess worship and his self-portraits he also expresses ritually and visually the desire to belong to a prestigious brahmanical elite and to favour reformed and ritually “purified” goddess worship which coincides with late practices of a Sri Lankan priestly “avant-garde”. Although Sri Kamadchi is not a traditional Sri Lankan goddess, she is a Tamil goddess who attained her Great In his “sermons” he often teaches basic ≤rìcakra symbolism. To one couple who regularly visits the temple, he offers more advanced ≤rìcakra explanations and preliminary initiation into its ritual. 19 The implantation of •rìvidyà rites into the Sri Lankan temple cult seems to be a fairly recent phenomenon of religious change which escaped Western scholarship, maybe because Jaffna could not be visited due to civil war. I became aware of it while visiting a great number of goddess temples in Jaffna and Colombo and interviewing the priests and managers. 18
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Goddess features by inclusion into the Sanskrit (•rìvidyà) lore. The very brahmanic •a«kara tradition and its recent popularity among Sri Lankan Brahmins is certainly a powerful legitimation for a nonBrahmin priest. It is noteworthy that alongside this programmatic ascription to orthodox authority, there is inclusion of non-brahmanic popular rites during the great procession. The processions of HammUentrop differ substantially from the yearly cart processions at Kanchi. The latter do not include violent vow-fulfilling performances typical of rural South India and Jaffna. Elsewhere I have called this integrative blend a “thickening of traditions”.20 Considering the new developments I would venture a step further and recall the ambitious “Europe” in the temple’s name. The wall paintings portraying Sri Paskaran similar to the hagiographic •a«kara worshipping the goddess visually convey the message of the priest being a new •a«kara. This famous philosopher and ascetic renunciate of the 8th century is ascribed a legendary “tour of victory” (digvijaya) reforming the local cults and folk religions of the Indian subcontinent. Likewise Sri Paskaran started a “tour of victory” in Europe among Sri Lankan compatriots as well as among German spiritual Indian seekers. A woman from Detmold moved to HammUentrop to live close to the priest and Kamadchi temple. She is not the only German native who sees in Sri Paskaran an embodiment of sacred knowledge. We have arrived at a number of reasons which may explain Sri Paskaran’s success: starting with his organisational talents up to his proficiency to tap many symbolic levels and to fulfil many different religious and cultural needs, Tamil as well as cross-cultural ones. The Kamadchi temple and its chief priest have become significant factors for all kinds of intercultural encounters. After the devastating tidal wave (December 2004) which destroyed the eastern coast of the Sri Lankan island, a Christian choir gave a benefit concert in the Kamadchi temple and Sri Paskaran allied with the “Hamm Forum”, an association of medical doctors volunteering in nature catastrophes, for a joint venture in Jaffna to help the surviving victims with the money collected. Due to the benefit concert many citizens of Hamm came for the first time into a Hindu temple, and
20 Wilke 2003, 125–168. The book also contains an article on ≤rìcakra performances in the former temple (Wilke 2003, 189–222).
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the continued memorial worships21 and charity concerts22 will make them return. Sri Paskaran on the other hand is planning with his German architect to build a village for orphans who lost their parents in the tidal wave. In many ways the Kamadchi temple is exceptional and beyond competition. Previously some Brahmins called it a low caste temple (supposedly due to its non-Brahmin chief priest); now everybody acknowledges Sri Paskaran’s great achievement. However, his endeavours for a union of all German temples have not fructified, critical voices have not disappeared, difficult past entanglements extend into the present and patterns of denied exchange repeat. Sri Paskaran cooperates with German organisations but not with the other two Tamil Hindu temples of Hamm with whom he has ongoing tensions. A decade ago the rejection by the Vinayakar temple incited Sri Paskaran to erect an own place of worship, but likewise he hurt some years later his (low caste) patron Mr. Yoganathan, who thereupon built the Murukan temple of Hamm. Some devotees prefer to go there, including a native German who contrasts the “real piety” of the Murukan temple festivals with the “religious show” in HammUentrop. Note how much also German cultural actors (including researchers) are part of the temples’ competition and rivalry—and sometimes even add to it. The hegemony of the Kamadchi temple is vulnerable, also if compared with the small shrine in Muenster, whose priest contrasts the “peace” in his temple with the “noisiness” and “busyness” in nearby Hamm-Uentrop. The “Ohm Navacakti Nayaki Ampal Alayam” (Muenster) The basement shrine of Muenster was established in the early 1990s23 by its priest Tirucelvam Rama Nathan. Like other temples in Germany, it is legally organized as registered non-profit association, but there
21
Memorial worships are taking place on each 26th of a month. There was at least one more concert in May 2005 to honour the Hamm Forum and Sri Paskaran. The priest’s charitable engagement has drawn much attention in the regional newspapers which published several articles on the special events in his temple and on his Jaffna tour. 23 The date was not easy to ascertain, since the priest and the owner of the house wherein the shrine was installed offered different versions on different occasions. The versions range from 1991–92 to 1994–95. 22
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is no official board of directors. Like many other priests, Tirucelvam was, over the years, not a full time priest (although he wished to), but earned his living in a poorly paid job. Unlike in other temples, the main patron has been the priest himself who spent his wages at McDonalds for the extra rent of the basement and had the metal images made one by one. The German landlord considered him a “good chap” (“feiner Kerl”). That is why he allowed his cellar to be transformed into a Hindu shrine despite suspicious and hostile neighbours. There has been a small crowd of 4 up to 15 persons on each Tuesday and Friday pùjà. Giving room to hardly 20 persons and having no well-off donors, the Navacakti Nayaki temple was too small and too poor to afford yearly processions. It celebrated, however, all important festival days and late-comers would have to stand in the corridor. Since 2003 there has been serious search for a larger location which is payable. In October 2004 a former disco was found, but the landlord withdrew his offer and the municipal government did not support the priest’s expansion plan. Tirucelvam claims Muslim terrorism to be responsible for these impediments. The old nursery in a rural area, to which the temple finally moved in June 2005, is much further away from Muenster city. Its monthly rent of 1000 Euro actually exceeds the budget of the priest and devotees. While looking for a flat for his family, Tirucelvam was confronted with the resistance of locals towards foreigners. The new “temple” in the nursery is not yet entirely fixed while writing this article. The Navacakti Nayaki Alayam may be called an ethnic extended family temple as well as a regional temple. Almost all its visitors live in Muenster and its vicinity. Mostly due to not owning a car, they are happy to have a temple which can be reached by public transport. They appreciate its pious, unpretentious and home-like atmosphere. Some of the most regular devotees would not even go to Hamm-Uentrop for the great cart procession, but prefer the Murukan temple of Hamm, if they like to attend a temple festival. Their social and financial background is far from upper class. For a priestly mediated personal worship they offer 5 Euro,24 whereas devotees of the Kamadchi temple (which deliberately styles itself upper class) volunteer
24 A donation account was not established until recently (2004). The leaflet to register suggests monthly rates of 10, 20, 30, or 50 Euro.
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50 Euro or more. Most of them are families with small kids or young couples who recently married and start to build up their life. All know each other and many are relatives to each other. There are two elderly women and one elderly man, who are very regular in the Tuesday and Friday worships. They help preparing such as putting oil, ghee or camphor in the many candelabra and cooking food for the deities. One of the lady’s sons speaks German fairly well in contrast to the other temple visitors. He helps to deal with the municipal authorities and acts as translator.25 Over the years, even the small basement shrine has been beautified and improved. The original goddess image worshipped as Navacakti Nàyaki (Skt. Nava≤akti Nàyakì) was a Lakßmì made of papermaché and bought in Dortmund. It was replaced by the present metal Màriyamman image made in South India. The next metal images acquired were Vinayakar (Ga»e≤a) and Murukan, while the rest of the temple deities remained represented by colour prints for several years. In early 2003 a set of new metal images was acquired to replace the posters of •iva and Viß»u and establish a new Durgà altar. Since 2004 the opening and pùjà hours augmented due to the fact that Tirucelvam was unable to carry out his regular job because of health problems which gave him the chance to act as a full-time priest.26 In anticipation of a larger location a set of black stone Navagraha, further goddess bronzes and other items were ordered and stored in the basement temple kitchen. Wondering about the sudden wealth of so many new images and copious rites during Navaràtri festival (October 2004), I learnt that sponsors from France had offered lavish donations. They are relatives to a young couple who remained many years without child. Due to the priest’s special worships and the grace of the goddess, I was told, a child was born to them. By the donation the family expressed their gratitude. However, the priest informed me, that he also got a loan, and does not know yet how to liquidate his debts. They amount to 40.000 Euro.
25
Due to a German patron he came at a very young age to Muenster and is better acquainted with the German culture than most of his Sri Lankan compatriots. Since he learned a profession in Germany he has also easier access to the local labour market. 26 In previous years regular public pùjàs took place on Tuesdays and Fridays at 6 p.m. only, but in 2004 they were extended to the weekends. Since September 2004 they have taken place three times a day. In 2005 Tirucelvam returned to the former schedule for want of visitors.
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The contrast between the Navacakti and Kamadchi temple in terms of size, visibility, customer base and exchange with the majority population is obvious, but the Navacakti Nayaki temple can all the same compete in several ways and fulfil a number of complementary functions. There have been past entanglements and the two sites share common features apart from financial problems (which most temples have): Great Goddess theology, unusual organisational model, non-Brahmin priest being founder and manager. Whereas Brahmin temple priests are religious authorities by birth and profession, Tirucelvam Rama Nathan is—like Sri Paskaran—a religious authority by inner vocation and charisma. Both are considered as “Gurus” or spiritual leaders by many devotees. They are “charismatics” (Charismatiker) in a Weberian sense, but of a different kind. While Sri Paskaran is first of all a ritualist, Tirucelvam Rama Nathan may be called an enthusiast. He has no priestly family background, but he is a priest by passionate inclination and has his own powerful symbolic resources. Being neither a Brahmin nor a kurukkal, he is still an accepted authority whose legitimation is not birth or ritual or tradition but divine empowerment and devotion. There is a small, but faithful circle of regular devotees who call him respectfully “Cami”, “Master”. The Tamil term càmi/cuvàmi (“Swamy”, Skt. svàmi ) is reserved for gods and great spiritual masters or holy men regarded as physical embodiment of god. Tirucelvam was born in Kokovill, a suburb of Jaffna, and worked in Colombo selling garments. Due to civil war he exiled first to Tamil Nadu and married a girl from Trichy. In 1989 he settled in Germany, later his wife followed and they had a child. Tirucelvam’s narrative about the driving force which lead him establish an own place of worship uses a popular Sri Lankan paradigm: he expresses his piety and devotional immediacy within the system of trance, divine medium and god-possession common in the villages of Jaffna and South India. He recalls that already in Sri Lanka the goddess would, once in a while, “come to him”, but in Germany her presence started to increase in terms of frequency and intensity. In the early 1990s while regularly visiting the newly established Kamadchi temple in Hamm, the goddess would come to him many times “very strongly”, “very wildly”, and as if it is almost “too much to bear”. In a dream, the goddess instructed him to install a place of worship so that many people would have the opportunity to pray to her. After establishing her “temple”, first in a small prayer room on the
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loft, thereafter in his flat, and finally in the basement, the goddess became “quiet” and peaceful.27 It is the peaceful and contemplative atmosphere which Tirucelvam regards most valuable about his shrine. He generally speaks highly and admiringly of the large temple of Hamm-Uentrop and its chief priest. He, nonetheless, criticises the Kamadchi temple as being too noisy, busy, and not so conducive for contemplation. Both admiration and emulation are repeated patterns in his discourse. The devotional immediacy that he seems to have with the goddess is an important part of his discourse as well. These factors put him at an advantage against Sri Paskaran. Being neither a Brahmin nor a priest by family tradition,28 Tirucelvam seems to need a strong legitimation pattern. His “goddess possession” was obviously some primer experience while visiting Sri Paskaran’s earlier temple which incited his brave decision to become a priest himself. Thereafter his emotions and goddess worship indeed became “quiet”: there is nothing spectacular, or particularly dramatic and ecstatic in the Navacakti temple cult, we rather find the common ritual acts and indeed a pious and devotional atmosphere. Tirucelvam has a good deal of proficiency in ritual worship and a much greater knowledge about religious contents than the devotees coming to his temple. His pùjàs contain some elements which a trained priest would hardly do,29 but they are always beautiful, performed with love and care, and including Sanskrit litanies,30 tantric mantras as well as Tèvàram recitation and Tamil devotional songs. According to the Naagapooshani priest, Tirucelvam learned his ritual know-how in South India. Tirucelvam himself has another version by claiming again a very direct interaction with the divine. He argues that he was always praying a lot and thereby got a lot of “energy” (Tam. cakti; Skt. ≤akti ); the goddess herself taught him
27 It is a general pattern in god and spirit possession that an uncontrolled state can be changed into a controlled state by establishing a shrine and due worship. 28 I was so far not able to discern his caste. His translator (who is a Vellallar) made a point that the LTTE has forbidden to speak about caste. 29 He uses, for instance, a Sanskrit litany (in Tamil transcription) ending with the name “Kàmàkßì” which a Brahmin would consider unorthodox for the worship of another goddess, and reads his tantric mantras from a book which is equally unorthodox according to traditional standards. His light waving ceremonies, too, contain unorthodox elements. 30 One of his major prayer books has been issued by the Sringeri •a«karàcarya.
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Sanskrit recitals and ritual worship; she is his guru, not the •a«karàcarya like in the case of Sri Paskaran. Note the implicit critique: Sri Paskaran needs a human mediator and an orthodox legitimation, but the ardent devotee can do without. This is very much in line with the bhakti tradition and its (brahmanically sanctioned) conviction that the faithful devotee is the true Brahmin. Devotional bhakti instead of esoteric rites and Brahmin scholarship, immediacy and inspiration instead of traditional codes, living tradition instead of textual tradition—these are the major ingredients in the Navacakti Nayaki temple worship. The name of the goddess was divined. From a set of goddess names which Tirucelvam wrote on ten pieces of paper a child chose the paper with the name “Navacakti Nàyaki”, “Ruler of the Nine •aktis (Female Powers)”. The name recalls the “Great Tradition”, i.e. the pan-Hindu Brahmanical and Sanskrit tradition, but the metal image is taken from popular or folk religion. Whereas Sri Paskaran’s Kamadchi image bears iconographic features traditionally associated with the Sanskrit Great Goddess theology, the Navacakti Nàyaki image has the iconographic features of the Tamil goddess Màriyamman. Màriyamman is known in rural South India and Sri Lanka as ambivalent goddess of smallpox, but she also entered the brahmanic Sanskrit lore and lost much of her wild character in pilgrimage places like Samayapuram (near Trichy, the native place of the priest’s wife). Tirucelvam has gone twice to this (recent) South Indian pilgrimage place31 and had the icon made based on a poster of the Màriyamman of Samayapuram.32 It is remarkable, however, that Tirucelvam and regular devotees emphatically deny the image being Màriyamman. They emphasise it is Navacakti Nàyaki “who has everything inside her”. The priest argues that the Samayapuram icon does not look at all like the goddess on the colour poster, whereas his image is the only one in the world matching her, and his temple the only one dedicated to Navacakti Nàyaki. He revels about the images’ beauty and sweetness which attracts visitors from all over the world: Australia, Canada, and India. I have never met such foreign guests, but rather a dedicated small crowd of regular worshippers, whereas the nearby Kamadchi temple indeed draws visitors from abroad.
31 32
On Samayapuram see Younger 1980. The poster can be seen on the rear wall facing the main altar of the temple.
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Evidently, Tirucelvam wants to communicate that his temple is something very unique (and even more special than the Kamadchi temple). He associates with the brahmanic Sanskrit tradition by emphasizing the worship of not some local goddess, but rather the one and only supreme Goddess. In fact, he takes the well-known concept of the Sanskrit “Great Tradition”, that all gods (and particularly all goddesses) are one, more literally than many a Brahmin. As well as in his rituals, he discloses a rather unconventional freedom in iconographic representations. Lakßmì as well as Màriyamman is Navacakti Nàyaki.33 It is typical for the Great Goddess theology that we find at the feet of the icon a two-dimensional copper ≤rìcakra as well as a three-dimensional ≤rìyantra.34 In contrast to Sri Paskaran, Tirucelvam does not perform ≤rìcakra-pùjà (àvara»a-pùjà), but simply offers red vermillion to the three-dimensional diagram while repeating a devotional litany of thousand names,35 ending with a Tamil hymn. The Tamil element is much stronger in the Navacakti Nayaki temple than in the Kamadchi temple, and at the same time there is an evident attempt to style it Sanskritic, starting with the “Oμ” in the temple’s full name “Ohm Navacakti Nayaki Ampal Alayam”. The Navacakti Nayaki temple can definitely compete with the Kamadchi temple because it complements it by being closer to the Tamil clients, and to lower social strata in particular: spatially (being easier to reach by public transport), ritually (by regularly including Tamil hymns etc.), economically (matching better their small income), and socially (being not a Brahmanical, upper-class, high-caste or high-standard reform36 temple). Notwithstanding the different religious styles, Tirucelvam has a very similar Great Goddess theology and like the Kamadchi temple is the Navacakti Nayaki temple dedicated to all great deities (Ga»e≤a, •iva, Viß»u, Devì, and the Tamil god Murukan) who form a semi-circle around the central Navacakti Nayaki shrine. There is an ideological competition, too, an urge to emulate as well as to outdo the big brother Sri Paskaran just like 33 Likewise was Sri Paskaran’s previous Kamadchi image not a Kamadchi by iconography (Wilke 2003, 217f.). 34 Tirucelvam calls this three-dimensional diagram “yantraketu” or “Mahà≤aktiyantra”. The ≤rìcakra represents, according to him, purely the female aspect, whereas the yantraketu both male and female, •iva and •akti. 35 Previously the rite was performed only during New Years Day ( January 1) and Navaràtri, since 2004 it is done during each Tuesday and Friday pùjà, too. 36 The most important and evident example of this type in Europe is the Swaminarayan temple of London.
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the latter seeks to outdo the orthodox (•aiva Siddhànta) Brahmin priests by claiming to belong to the equally prestigious tradition of the •a«kàràcàryas (who favour the universal approach of modern reform Hinduism). Tirucelvam supposedly was well aware about Sri Paskaran’s emancipation from the Vinayakar temple, and likewise he emancipated himself by starting his basement shrine. Enthusiast religion has been observed to be a means of emancipation and selfassurance for discriminated and minority groups. It is often a protest against the religious establishment, whereby traditions are negotiated and stigmata transformed into glories. Tirucelvam’s discourse discloses as well a pattern of protest (against the new religious establishment of Hamm-Uentrop) and a negotiation of tradition: claiming alternative powerful symbolic resources and devotional immediacy, the claim is no less than spiritual superiority: his guru being the goddess, not the •a«karàcarya etc. Like Sri Paskaran, however, Tirucelvam makes use of well-known Hindu devices for social upward movement such as “Sanskritization”, strict vegetarian diet,37 and other orthodox regulations to maintain the sacred power of the temple deities.38 If already the Kamadchi temple discloses the possibility of an easier social upward movement in the foreign culture, the Navacakti does so even more. The new cultural environment, the article of religious freedom, the democratic system, the religious plurality, the strong individualism of the Western way of life including religious life, reinforce transformations of tradition and individual trends. Old constraints (such as caste affiliations), however, linger on, and new impediments (such as unfamiliarity with the local political culture, institutional settings and the new culture at large, unfriendly neighbourhoods and municipal authorities, lack of language skills etc.) are equally there. Both explain why the Navacakti Nayaki temple has by far not been as equally successful as the Kamadchi temple: there is no hereditary ritual know-how and priestly clan like in Sri Paskaran’s case and there are no influential German sympathisers to render the
37 Not only Tirucelvam restricts to food regulations, but so do the devotees on the day they visit the shrine. I have met men waiting outside because of having enjoyed meat, while their wives (who had been fasting) attended the worship. 38 “Impurities” acquired by consumption of meat and alcohol, the menses or a recently deceased relative are believed by all three priests discussed to give “bad vibrations”, decrease the deity’s power and “energy”, and disrespectfully profane the holy place.
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negotiations with municipal authorities more effective. Tirucelvam attributes Sri Paskaran’s success in erecting such a great edifice to the active help of his German sympathisers.39 He is sure that a larger location will attract a larger crowd. He is partly right. The religious market, too, functions according to the laws of supply and demand, and the Kamadchi temple with its increasing attractiveness to German natives and visitors from abroad is a good example for this dynamism. However, caste constraints are still strong and the supply of temples overrates already the demand. The larger crowd in the Kamadchi temple on normal days is primarily due to a new base of customers and not so much due to a substantial increase of Tamil devotees. My next example will underline these observations. The “Sri Naagapooshani Amman Thevastaanam Hinduistischer Kulturverein Inthumantram” (Frankfurt a. Main) The Naagapooshani temple of Frankfurt was installed in 1998. Due to its central location it is most easy to reach by public transport, but only some thin red and white stripes mark the former workshop in the backyard of a block of multi-storied tenant houses as religious edifice. The interior is quite spacious with its 500 square metres. The temple board pays a monthly rent of 2.500 Euro, reimburses the Brahmin priest and organizes the festivals. The total monthly expenditure amounts to 4000 Euro. The Naagapooshani temple is maintained by donations, memberships (there are presently 30 committed members and 135 donors), as well as sponsored Friday worships, costly special pùjàs and àratis performed on request. A Friday pùjà costs between 175 and 250 Euros, a “special pùjà”40 350 Euros, and a ≤a«kha-pùjà41 600 Euros.42 39 He wrongly reckons them as major donors. On the one hand he is critical about an influence of “foreigners”, on the other hand he has been praying to the Goddess to send him Germans for helping to get a larger location wherein he can work as full time priest. 40 It involves Lalitàsahasranàma recitation, an extended pùja with abhißeka, cooked food offerings, prasàda, and takes place on each last Friday of a month. There are also other special pùjàs on request. Once a month there is dìpa-pùjà performed by a group of twenty married women and unmarried girls. 41 This copious worship with shells is performed only four times a year if sponsors are available. 42 The information about all costs and rates I owe to the present Naagaposhani priest, Rama Muralithara Sarma (interview 17.7.2004).
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The Naagapooshani temple is one of the rare places of Hindu worship in Germany having a well trained full-time Brahmin priest, daily pùjà and a beautiful flag-post (essential for festivals) since its very beginning. The first priest was Sivasri Soma Thulasikurukkal whose “aristocracy of birth” was undisputable: he was a Vaiß»ava Brahmin, coming from one of the most reputed priestly families of Jaffna, and the son-in-law of a major •aiva priest serving in the original Naagapooshani temple (Nàkapùcani Koyil) on the Nagadipa island of Jaffna. This original site and its ancient Tamil goddess belongs to the largest, most beautiful and popular Hindu pilgrimage places of Sri Lanka and attracts large crowds not only during the festivals, but also on each Friday. Similar to Hamm-Uentrop we find in the Jaffna temple ≤rìcakra worship along with self-afflictive vowfulfilling at the yearly cart processions. The chief priest is most active spreading ≤rìcakra worship in the Sri Lankan •aiva temple cult. In a big city like Frankfurt and a temple with such powerful symbolic resources one would expect many visitors. This is, however, not the case. When I met Thulasikurukkal for the first time on a Saturday noon in 2002, he taught his little sons to perform temple pùjà and recite Vedic mantras, but there was no one else present. He deplored the little interest of the numerous Sri Lankans living in Frankfurt, and recalled a constant decline of devotees since the first temple festival. Initially performing ≤rìcakra-pùjà he stopped doing it, because of the disinterest of the few temple visitors.43 When the temple board asked him in late 2003 to augment the daily pùjàs, he resigned.44 The small rate of temple visitors in a busy city like Frankfurt maybe less amazing than the zeal of the temple committee to extend the pùjà hours. The board is currently even making plans to acquire land and build a South Indian style temple with a temple tower similar to Hamm-Uentrop. Considering that even the fairly large crowds on festival days like •ivaràtri are not big enough to exceed the present temple space, such plans appear pragmatically and financially 43
The present priest would not even know how to do it. According to the present priest, Muralithara Sarma, Thulasikurukkal is no more engaged in temple worship, but still performs life cycle rites. Muralithara Sarma himself is proud of having performed 700 marriage ceremonies in England, Denmark and Germany which made his major income. After his engagement in Frankfurt, he goes on performing life cycle rites like birth functions etc. in different German cities. 44
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rather irrational to an outsider. I can see no other reason than the high prestige and symbolic value such a “real” temple has regarding identity maintenance and public representation. Possibly it is yet another sign of contest: a South Indian style (•aiva Àgama) temple should after all have a high class Brahmin chief priest to fulfil the Sri Lankan norm. The new (current) Naagapooshani priest, Rama Muralithara Sarma, was willing to perform pùjà twice a day, although only Tuesday and Friday evening worships attract lay devotees. He deplores that many visitors would hardly stay for the whole ceremony. All the same he is happy to be full-time priest having been without work for more than a year. After eight years (1993–2001) service in the Vinayakar temple of Hamm, he officiated three months in the Murukan temple of Hamm who could, however, not afford a full-time priest the whole year through. He gives praise to the Kamadchi temple and Tirucelvam’s spiritual power, but is critical of non-Brahmin priests and Sri Paskaran in particular, because he erected a shrine “against” the Vinayakar temple. Muralithara Sarma attended the 2004 procession in Hamm-Uentrop during which an accident occurred, and claims this would not have happened with a Brahmin chief priest.45 He praises Hamm for being more liberal than other places regarding Hindu temples and for securing residence permits for priests. During the Naagapooshani temple festival 2004 about which he informed the neighbourhood, the loud temple music arose all the same complaints of one neighbour and the police came even twice. A similar incident caused the temple of Dortmund to be closed down.46 Muralithara Sarma was afraid that the Naagapooshani temple would suffer the same lot, but characterized the neighbourhood otherwise as very friendly (interview 17.7.2004). The central location has its price: due to traffic problems no out-door processions can take place which is compensated by indoor cart processions thrice a day on each of the fifteen festival days. Muralithara Sarma is proud of having performed the longest temple festival in Germany attracting a number of vow fulfillers on the main day.
45 It is noteworthy that he considers only the non-Brahmin priest objectionable, not the self-torturing hook-swinging (“bird-kava∂ì”) which took place. The accident was due to a badly constructed “bird-kava∂ì ”. 46 Like in the case of the previous Kamadchi temple of Hamm, the more official version was lacking fire safety requirements.
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Like the former priest, Muralithara Sarma is a Vaiß»ava Brahmin and comes from a family of temple priests. Since his engagement in the Naagapusani temple, the goddess site has turned more Vaiß»ava. Instead of playing recordings of devotional goddess songs or tantric and Vedic mantras like before, there is currently the constant sound of the famous Vaiß»ava mantra “Om namo Naràya»àya”. Muralithara Sarma plans to erect a new altar for his family deity Lord Perumଠ(Tamil name of Viß»u/K‰ß»a) in the form of Ve«kate≤vara who is also printed on his visiting cards. The priest wears, however, three streaks of ashes on his forehead like a •aiva (as it is due for a •aiva temple priest) and comments: “We have no difference like that. We pray to all gods.” He received his priestly training from a Sastrigal Brahmin in a kurukkulam of Kerala who taught him that priests should know all gods. The Naagapooshani temple represents an interesting contrast to the Kamadchi and Navacakti temples, and yet another facet of Tamil identity maintenance inscribing itself into the lineage of a famous Jaffna pilgrimage site and offering a number of “high-class” rites. It also reveals a number of continuities: ambitious plans to expand are obviously not restricted to private visions of some “charismatics” and may be there despite low customer base except for Tuesdays and Fridays. Note that the free weekend still ranges lower than the two traditional sacred days which are simple working days in the new culture. The case of the priest Muralithara Sarma illustrates that there seems to be a competition and negotiation of hierarchies among the religious personnel which centres particularly around priest Sri Paskaran. At the same time he illustrates that also the “common” model of a managing temple board and a hired Brahmin priest may involve uncommon elements and leaves space for the priest to bring in his very personal spirituality and way of worship. Further on is shown that neither Brahmin priest, nor favourable location being sufficient for attracting a substantial crowd. The Brahmin priest model and the variously disrupted Sri Lankan priestly tradition deserve a closer look. The dominant model in Germany is certainly Brahmin, and seeks to re-produce as much as possible the normative standards of •aiva Siddhànta. But if the following information by a Jaffna •aiva Siddhànta temple priest is correct, than there are few diaspora temples which really fulfil this norm. According to this priest the norm being only Aiyyar Brahmins to be chief priests in traditional •aiva (Àgama) temples, whereas other
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Brahmin castes (including •armas) and certainly non-Brahmin priests in particular being merely priestly “assistants” or “helpers”. This ideal norm is hard to fulfil in the foreign culture due to several reasons: the lack of high caste Brahmins and the lack of priestly knowhow altogether, the different priestly lines to whom Brahmin refugees belong, the lack of funds to have a full-time priest (not to speak of several priests), and finally visa problems and time restricted resident permits. There is frequent change of priests in the temples due to these problems.47 We should keep in mind, that already in Sri Lanka Brahmins form a very small segment of the population in contrast to southern India.48 I am not aware of an Aiyyar Brahmin serving in a diaspora temple, but of several •arma Brahmins, some of whom are not •aiva, but Vaiß»ava and come from a family of temple priests (such as the Naagapooshani priest), while others may not come from a priestly family but start to be priests due to the crucial lack of Brahmin personnel (such as the •arma Brahmin priest in Adliswil, Switzerland, on request of his compatriots). Both would hardly happen in the old country where the Vaiß»avas have their own temples and where the priestly office is generally hereditary. All of this explains better why the competition centres particularly around Sri Paskaran and why it is him who is most successful. The Vinayakar temple, allowing him only “assistant” services (like winding flower garlands), reproduced the standard Sri Lankan model. However, there was a •arma Brahmin doing proper pùjà which is not quite in line with the “ideal norm” mentioned. On the other hand Sri Paskaran, without being an Aiyyar Brahmin, does reproduce perfectly the high standard ideal norm according which a •arma Brahmin acts as mere assistant. Sri Paskaran’s further advantage is his having higher kurukkal (•aiva priest) ordination and to come from a large clan of hereditary •aiva priests. These relatives form an important human capital—all the more so considering the chronic lack of priests. Finally, Sri Paskaran being his own master and head of the temple board, has much more freedom than any hired priest to shape his temple according to his wishes. Being much more independent of the board than the Naagaposhani priest, he can decide
47
See also Baumann 2000, 145, on the temple of Hannover. Sri Lankan Tamil Hindus who mainly live in Jaffna constitute approx. 15,5% and the Brahmins merely 1% of the Sri Lankan population. 48
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quickly and act effectively. Note, that I am mentioning only structural reasons, and not even personal qualities which he has as well. What I call the “human capital” of an own priestly clan is an enormous resource in terms of ritual assistance, man power and financial capital. A most serious challenge the pious lay owner of the Murukan temple of Hamm had to deal with was the constant change and high costs—sometimes overrated charges—of Brahmin priests. For the temple festival 2003, for instance, a Brahmin specialist would ask 3000 Euro for a single day and a full-time priest for daily pùjà was hardly affordable. The lay patron (another “enthusiast” and shop-keeper of Indian goods) was forced to do temple pùjà himself, sometimes assisted by a native German who offered to take over the priestly office. This German man (an academic with PhD) is not totally disinclined, for he “lost his heart” in the Murukan temple, as he puts it, and started to learn Sanskrit. For years he travelled several hours to attend each festival occasion and do service like sweeping the temple. A native German priest in a •aiva temple would be quite an innovation and a complete disrupture from the Hindu tradition. As far as I know there are so far native Western priests only in ISKCON temples—at least in Europe. Disruptions (of a lesser extent) happened, however, in Sri Lanka as well. Because the priestly knowledge deteriorated, there has been a strong tendency among Sri Lankan priests to learn in south India. All priests of my case study, too, had their priestly training in South India except for Thulasikurukkal. An even deeper disrupture was caused by the civil war and ensuing flight of many. As a consequence members of the priesthood have “globalised”. Thulasikurukkal’s father trains Hindu priests nowadays in Australia, his brother is doing service in the Durga temple of Wuppertal. Generally, the priests in Germany are not recruited from Sri Lanka, but rather from another German city, or other European country. In this respect, too, the Kamadchi temple is quite special for having priests from back home, and yet participating in terms of donors in the transnational, “global” Tamil community. I have suggested three priestly models. There may be more and possibly very new ones in near future if the unorthodox solution of the Murukan temple should become true. Maybe I have given the charismatic and enthusiast type too much attention and the Brahmin too little, but my stress was also due to theoretical reasons. I propose the new cultural environment to be a good ground for individual
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ways to live out religion, and to offer new opportunities for negotiating social status and spiritual authority. From my case studies I conclude that charismatics and religious enthusiasts receive greater response than the Brahmin and may become even gurus in the new cultural environment. Sri Paskaran’s success is also due to his role as spiritual master and likewise was Tirucelvam Rama Nathan able to draw a dedicated crowd of Tamil devotees who call him “Master”. I should add that my suggested three modes of “aristocracy”— one by birth, one by ritual power and one by devotional immediacy—are not exclusive. I do not mean to say that the Brahmin priest is not a spiritual authority or pious person, but rather that he does not need a social legitimation of special personal aptness like the other two priests because his culturally defined role as pure Brahmin is enough to ensure his authority. The cultural pattern dictates a social hierarchy which is not easily shaken, but the very same cultural pattern allows for an extension of spiritual authority in case of charisma and piety. It is noteworthy that all three forms of aristocracy include in our case the ideal of a morally clean and ritually pure life-style, and a strict self-discipline: “noblesse oblige”!49 Summary and Ensuing Trajectories for Future Research My point of departure was the striking fact that a great number of Tamil Hindu temples have been established in Germany and other countries within the last two decades. When emphasizing the Tamil element my aim is far from essentializing culture, but rather take into account the emic stance and the fact of forced migration. It is crucial that speaking of Tamil religious life abroad we do not deal with Hindus of Indian origin, who migrated to western countries to bring in their skills or have a better share in the labour market. Even less do we deal with a highly professional and wealthy Hindu
49 The Naagapooshani priest keeps his ritual purity by not going out: even his food is brought to him. He accuses certain priests to have led an unclean life of drinking, smoking and eating meat before becoming priest of a German temple. Sri Paskaran initially did not like Germany because its social life style of “smoking, drinking, and eating meat” which he considered not conducive to a spiritual seeker. In spite of his exerting manager life, a house ever full of guests and four little children to whom he gives much attention, he never looses self-control and devotees make a point of his morality without blame. A similarly positive portrait in terms of ethical and social standards enjoys Tirucelvam Rama Nathan.
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population like in the US who started to develop distinct forms of a new American Hindu identity, nor with strong recent religious movements like the Swaminarayan and ISKCON who largely represent Hinduism in Britain. The Tamil immigrants are mostly villagers from Jaffna who continue a more traditional and ritualistic form of Hinduism than most other diaspora Hindu groups, and the first generation has been willing to invest much to do so. The Kamadchi temple (priest Sri Paskaran) may be favouring a more “universal”, spiritualized Hinduism due to the attachment to the •a«karàcàryas, but the processions are very Tamil. The Navacakti temple (priest Tirucelvam) may attach the Tamil goddess worship to the Sanskritic tradition, but so does contemporary Jaffna, e.g., the Naagapooshani island temple. The ruptures in the old country augment in the diaspora: a Vaiß»ava •arma Brahmin is chief priest in the German •aiva-•àkta Naagapooshani temple etc. The factors contributing to the success of a diaspora temple are manifold: the first generation’s enthusiasm, initiative of founders, form of institutionalisation and combination of temple board members, social and financial situation of donors, their number, clever management, transnational connections, language abilities, help by municipal authorities and other German sympathisers, as well as splendid processions, decentralized location, decent neighbourhood or no neighbourhood at all, and decisively also family background and spiritual authority of the priests and acknowledged “power” of the image/deity worshipped. In addition to the financial, social and human capital the symbolic capital plays an important role. I am proposing that religion, and temple life in particular, seems to be a major symbolic resource to strengthen dignity and self-assurance and cope with a minority crisis in addition to the more general function of religion as a major root of individuals’ identity, morality and collective belonging. For most Sri Lankan migrants it is extremely vital to be Tamil. My essay is intended to show the multiple patterns to be Tamil in a religious way, the very individual profiles of the diaspora temples, their variant financial, symbolic and human resources, the competition and negotiation of hierarchies among the religious personnel, the transnational character of Tamil ethnic space. By extending the native ethnic space into the new cultural environment, diaspora temples add to the arena of religious plurality. The exchanges with the German majority culture do not only occasion tensions, but also increase intercultural transfers and enthusiastic welcome to the expanded religious market.
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My presentation of varieties of Tamil identity maintenance and new religious developments in a culture far away from home is but a “snapshot”. The history of Tamil temple Hinduism in Germany is much too short, to draw a general conclusion. There have been— and there still are—breathtakingly quick and sudden changes. After an initial phase of great enthusiasm there seems to be a certain tiredness to invest in temples and maybe even a decline in visiting them. However, an urge to expand is still there, not only by religious enthusiasts (who may realize thereby a social up-ward movement), but also by temple boards. I interpret this fact with the temple being a major force of Tamil identity maintenance, self-assurance and public recognition—within the peer-group as well as within the majority society, particularly if succeeding to become “visible”. To have a temple— or rather so many of them, possibly even in the same city—may not be as necessary any more for later generations. The major future trajectory is to keep watching. Long term studies are needed. Along the findings of my paper I suggest three fields worthy to explore: 1. Developments of the Tamil diaspora Temple Hinduism and comparison of individual temples both local (within Germany) and global (within Europe, within Sri Lanka, and worldwide) I am positive that in terms of individuality all diaspora temples will substantiate that empirically there is no such thing as a homogeneous Tamil Hindu diaspora temple. Each should be explored separately to avoid simplified conclusions. Each seems to have a very distinct profile and possibly its very own unique ways to reconstruct cultural identity, dependent on and shaped by priests, visitors, board members, international and local networks, public recognition. Public recognition is a very complex phenomenon and consists of more poles than immigrants and host society: also local intra-ethnic, international intra-ethnic as well as interethnic/-religious relations and references (concerning different Hindu groupings, Hindu and nonHindu migrants etc.) should be taken into account besides the interactions with the new society and the emergence of transcultural identities. Relevant issues are political and structural integration in the new land, such as migration politics, distribution of public funds, religious education, but also developments in the old country and in the global Tamil diaspora. 2. Recruitment, training and spirituality of priests, their possibly new roles (e.g. as gurus, or attaining a bridging function between members of the Tamil community and a wider society), traditional and new priestly models
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My paper has revealed competing and complementary discourses and a new negotiation of hierarchies. This is an interesting and touchy, specifically Tamil religious and ethnic issue. However, by singling out the elements of rivalry and contest there is a danger of overstatement. I am not sure whether a broader comparison would result in an equally strong rival situation. By chance there exist personal past entanglements between the priests I have been discussing, with the exception of the first priest of the Naagapooshani temple and precisely in his case the competition argument fails. All the same I consider it important because: a) there would be less temples if such competitions were not there, b) the new cultural environment allows more easily new negotiations of hierarchies and individual religious expressions, c) the diaspora situation is characterized by the intertwining of new possibilities and old constraints in reproducing cultural identity. Both my argument of individuality and my argument of competition explain a heightened chance for religious “charismatics” and priests taking the new role of a “guru” or religious leader; be it for the Tamil peer-group (Sri Paskaran, Tirucelvam) or for Western spiritual seekers as well (Sri Paskaran). Attention deserves the fact that the temples of charismatics and religious enthusiasts are the best-known in Continental Europe: besides Sri Paskaran a lady priest in Denmark who is a goddess medium attracts the largest crowds, including Westerners, and both their temples have become new pilgrimage sites. 3. Public management of religious diversity, new religious forms, “proselytes” and cultural osmosis’s Contemporary Sri Lankan Tamil Hinduism is not a discrete nationally confined entity, but a transnational phenomenon. Sri Lankan cultural actors are spread across the whole world which has impacts on the religious life of the ethnic community as well as on the religious life in the “host” countries. Hindu Tamil life in Germany has largely gone unnoticed until 2002, when the media started to report about the newly built South Indian style temple of Hamm-Uentrop. The media’s perception of the Hindus is in striking contrast to the perception of the Muslims, whereby the media express and shape the dominant discourse of the majority society. Regarding the Hindus there is no fear of a “parallel society”, but rather a very positive image and well-disposed echo (the policeman I quoted is typical) as well as a great fascination and attraction (to the colours, to the vitality of this religion, to the sensuous and spiritual aspects of Hinduism).
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The difference in the discourses of “othering” (e.g., Muslim terrorism and Hindu exotism) and their possible reasons (different common history, mission, sheer number etc.) are worthwhile to explore in more detail. I suppose that the image of the Tamil Hindus would get worse if their number would increase. What will happen if all temples realize their expansion plans? From the neighbourhood problems of some temples one may gather: the closer the foreign culture the more problematic and disturbing or even threatening, the farther away (i.e. once a year going to watch the procession of HammUentrop, or watching it in TV, or having a guided tour in the temple by a German native) the less problematic and the more beautiful and exotic. Hindu temples like Muslim mosques are generally kept outside the city centres. Well audible places of worship may disturb urban settings and local order. Problems increase when carrying out processions and festivals (involving many visitors and loud music) in residential areas. There is a striking variety of exchanges—from hostile neighbours to native Germans who start learning Sanskrit and ponder about becoming a temple priest. In fact, hostile neighbours are much less a problem than lacking temple funds. Complaints restrict to singular events. Globally the reception of Tamil Hindus and their places of worship is very positive and the interest to know more about the “interiors” of a Hindu temple is great as the many requests for guided tours in Hamm-Uentrop demonstrate. Temples profit greatly if they have influential and co-operative native German sympathisers (and suffer if they don’t). The temples’ rivalries are partly rivalries for public recognition, jealousies of having no German sympathisers. The Tamil Hindu and the German culture are not two blocks. There are fluid boundaries. There are mutual interactions and impacts on both sides. Many of the Sri Lankan immigrants are by no means “foreigners” or aliens in a “host” society, but meanwhile German citizens. Their children often talk to each other in German and not in Tamil. Whether the young generation will continue the temple life of their parents is far from clear. Currently it rather looks like native Germans would continue it. It is striking how the number of German visitors increased since the Kamadchi temple has been in the media. Before, hardly any native German would visit it, simply because it was not known to exist, but also because it had less publicity value. The present “real” temple has “brought India to us” as an interview-partner puts it. He has never been in India, but started
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to come regularly to the temple. Particularly on weekends there are often more native Germans in the temple than native Sri Lankans. Besides curious tourists I observed an increasing number of German locals whose interest exceeds by far curiosity, who have the priest perform the same rituals for them as for his Tamil customers and so on. Some even follow the purity rules like vegetarian diet and menses’ taboo. Scholars of religion have an exiting new field to explore and have to think about terms and classifications to describe such new religious developments: hybrid forms, osmosis, proselytes, converts and so on. It is remarkable that after the so called new religious Hindu movements like TM etc., currently traditional Tamil Hinduism has become popular among a growing number of native Germans within the very short span of two and a half years. References Baumann, Martin (2000). Migration—Religion—Integration. Buddhistische Vietnamesen und hinduistische Tamilen in Deutschland, Marburg: Diagonal. ——, Brigitte Luchesi and Annette Wilke (eds.) (2003). Tempel und Tamilen in zweiter Heimat. Hindus aus Sri Lanka im deutschsprachigen und skandinavischen Raum, Würzburg: Ergon. —— (2005). Immigrant Hinduism in Germany, www.pluralism.org/resources/slideshow/ baumann/hindgermany. Coward, Harold, John R. Hinnells and Raymond Brady Williams (eds.) (2000). The South Asian Religious Diaspora in Britain, Canada, and the United States, Albany: SUNY. Fuglerund, Oivind (1999). Life on the Outside: The Tamil Diaspora and Long-Distance Nationalism, London: Pluto. Luchesi, Brigitte (2003). Wege aus der Unsichtbarkeit. Zur Etablierung hindu-tamilischer Religiosität im öffentlichen Raum der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: M. Baumann, B. Luchesi and A. Wilke (eds.), Tempel und Tamilen in zweiter Heimat, Würzburg: Ergon 2003, 104–113. —— (2003). Hinduistische Sakralarchitektur und Tempelgestaltung in HammUentrop, in: M. Baumann, B. Luchesi and A. Wilke (eds.), Tempel und Tamilen in zweiter Heimat, Würzburg: Ergon, 223–274. Lüthi, Damaris (2005). Soziale Beziehungen und Werte im Exil bewahren. Tamilische Flüchtlinge aus Sri Lanka im Raum Bern, Arbeitsblatt Nr. 30, Bern: Institut für Ethnologie, Universität Bern, www.ethno.unibe.ch/arbeitsblaetter/AB30_Lue.pdf. McDowell, Christopher (1996). A Tamil Asylum Diaspora. Sri Lankan Migration, Settlement and Politics in Switzerland, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996. Salentin, Kurt (2002). Tamilische Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik. Eines Bestandesausnahme sozialer, ökonomischer und rechtlicher Aspekte der Integration, Frankfurt, London: IKO— Verlag für Interkulturelle Kommunikation. Schalk, Peter (2004). God as a Remover of Obstacles. A Study of Caiva Soteriology among Ilam Tamil Refugees in Stockholm, Sweden, Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet. Wilke, Annette (2003). “Traditionenverdichtung” in der Diaspora: Hamm als Bühne der Neuaushandlung von Hindu-Traditionen, in: M. Baumann, B. Luchesi and A. Wilke (eds.), Tempel und Tamilen in zweiter Heimat, Würzburg: Ergon, 125–168.
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—— (2003). Die Göttin Kàmàkßì und ihr jährlicher ≤rìcakra-Ritus: Zur neuen Öffentlichkeit einer esoterischen Tradition in Hamm-Uentrop, in: M. Baumann, B. Luchesi and A. Wilke (eds.), Tempel und Tamilen in zweiter Heimat, Würzburg: Ergon, 189–222. Younger, Paul (1980). A Temple Festival of Màriyamman, in: Journal of the Academy of Religion 48, 4, 493–517.
DIVERSITY AMONG THE DIASPORA HINDUS AND THE ISSUE OF ETHNICITY: EXAMPLES FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND BRITAIN P. Pratap Kumar University of KwaZulu Natal, South Africa In dealing with the diasporas, scholars have described them in at least three variables: 1) enclaves (pre-modern), 2) symbolic ethnics (modern) and 3) transnationals (post-modern) (Ben-Rafael 2004). Another aspect in this connection is the idea of multiple modernities and not a singular modernity in conceptualising the diasporas. (Tambiah 2004). All of these notions need clarity based on case studies from different parts of the world. Here I am attempting a case study primarily from UK and South Africa and describe their identity to see if they fit some of these conceptualisations. In doing so, I will utilise data from two important areas: caste and social formations and secondly rituals and temples. Based on these two types of data I will look at their various self-representations in public sphere. In the last hundred and forty odd years, South African Hindus have maintained their identity through the many changes and transformations that they had gone through both in their socio-political life as well as in their cultural and religious life. Likewise, the Hindu community in Britain have in the last one generation become a conspicuous community. In the light of these two specific cases, how do we conceptualise them and what categories do we use to circumscribe how they maintain their identity? Unpacking this would be the thrust of the paper. Some General Patterns of Hindu Diaspora Steven Vertovec very effectively brings together some of the broad features of the diaspora Hindus in his work on The Hindu Diaspora (2000). Here, I would simply highlight some of those features that he outlines in his book. He identifies two major periods during which the settlement of the South Asian diaspora took place. First, the
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migration “under the imperial auspices”. Much of this happened under the system of indenture by which labour was transferred to different colonies—Mauritius, Guyana, Surinam, Trinidad, Jamaica and other British and French West Indian Islands, South Africa, East Africa and Fiji. Burma and Malaysia received South Asian labour under other schemes. Vertovec notes that during this period the Gujarati merchants expanded their trade significantly. (Vertovec 2000: 15). The second period was during the post World War II and postIndian independence era. During this period, large numbers of both skilled and semi-skilled workers emigrated to many industrialised countries in the west, mainly UK, USA, Canada and Australia and also to some Gulf States. Added to this was the number of refugees from mainly Sri Lanka which has a significant number of Hindus among them. Vertovec 2002: 15). Vertovec (2002: 16–18) identifies the following patterns of Hindu socio-religious organisation and practice— 1. In Mauritius, East Africa, Malaysia and Britain caste, regional and sectarian practices have been maintained. 2. Generalised Hindu temples that display uniformity of rituals and doctrines (e.g., Guyana), Specialised Centres (Fiji), temples that provide a sense of common community and at the same time reproduce social hierarchies (Malaysia). In some places one could identify four distinct groups of temples—Hare Krishna temples, sectarian temples (Swaminarayan temples, Sai Baba temples, etc.), North Indian and South Indian temples (e.g., USA). In other places temples reflect regional differences, settlement patterns, institutional strategies of their founders and users. (UK). 3. Ritual performance differs in various places of the diaspora—in some places ritual procedures are truncated/refashioned/eclectically performed. In other places new rituals are invented in line with changes in society. In some other places ritual procedures are negotiated. Embellishment or rituals also takes place in some places such as UK (e.g., including Indian disco music). 4. Differential treatment of Brahmin Priests—in some places the Brahmin priests totally dominate. In other places they are at the mercy of market forces and local Hindu associations. In yet other places they are rejected by the progressive and educated youth (Surinamese Hindu Youth in the Netherlands. [In South Africa, the Hindu priesthood is no longer in the hands of the Brahmins.
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Anyone who knows how to perform rituals can become a local priest. Hence, the idea of Brahman in South Africa has no caste reference, but simply refers to anyone who performs rituals. (Kumar 2000: 35).] Changing status of women is noticed in many places (e.g., South Africa, Malaysia, Sweden, USA and UK). In many of the places there is no system of dowry as well as caste consciousness or identity (e.g., South Africa). In many of these places, caste simply is a memory retained in the last name. In places like South Africa, caste mobility had occurred in the first two generations. (Kumar 2000: 9ff.). Persistence of what came to be known as folk/village Hinduism in many diaspora locations is strongly noticeable. (e.g., South Africa, Singapore, the Caribbean. Fusion of caste, regional and linguistic backgrounds varies from location to location. In South Africa generally marriages take place along the lines of South Indian groups, North Indian groups. Thus, social cohesion exists along these lines. In other places, marriages take place within a linguistic group. Gujaratis are generally strong in maintaining caste markers through marriage and religious or ritual denominations. Despite the various differences in patterns, Hinduism seems to be the core feature of “ethnic consciousness and community mobilisation”. (Vertovec 2002: 18). Caste in the Diaspora
One of the most interesting changes that occurred in the Hindu diaspora is in the area of how they have constructed their society outside India. Many variables have impacted on how that actually happened. These have to do with the following—1. type of migration, 2. the extent to which they have maintained ties with India, 3. the economic activities in the new context, 4. geographic features of settlement, 5. religion and caste, 6. language, 7. region of origin, 8. degree of cultural homogenisation, 9. extent and nature of racial and ethnic pluralism, 10. class composition, 11. organisations, and 12. leadership. These are some of the aspects, among others, that Vertovec points up. (Vertovec 2000: 21–23). In the light of the above aspects, if we look at the different diaspora contexts with a view to understand how caste and its related structures have panned out,
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caste and society in the diaspora Hindu community needs a different way of conceptualising. Hinduism and Caste in Britain First some clarification of term “Asian”—in Britain it generally meant Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi and some Sri Lankan; in South Africa a more distinct term was used, viz., “Indian” to refer to Indians from India, that includes the pre-partition India. Two sets of groups came to Britain, one from India from traditional locations such as Gujarat and the other from East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi). The first group came to Britain for economic opportunities in the post colonial Britain and the later group arrived due to various policies of Africanisation in the East African countries. According to Vertovec 1991 census revealed the following statistics— – 1.48 million Asians, of which 840 000 are Indians (total population in Britain in that year 55 million) – 48% of the Indians were Hindu (403,200), 70% of which Gujarati speaking, of which 63% East African Gujarati and 37% are Indian Gujaratis; – 15% of Hindus were Punjabi speaking, of which 20% were East African and 80% from India – 15% all other Hindus from India. Agehananda Bharati is quoted by Vertovec as saying that among East African Hindus, though the Gujaratis and Punjabis were classed as ‘Hindu’, there is hardly anything common between them and they never interacted. This strong spatial separation between Punjabi Hindus and Gujarati Hindus is indicated by their stereotypes— Punjabis are generally prone to drinking in pubs and meat eating and the Gujarati Hindus being the opposite of that. (Vertovec 2000: 89). Among the Punjabi Hindus caste distinctions in Britain are less important than regional distinctions such as the places where they originated ( Jullunder and Ludhiana) even though they included such diverse caste groups as Jats, Khatris, Brahmins, Chuhras, and Chamars). Caste distinctions are better maintained among British Gujaratis— nearly 30 distinct caste groups are identified among British Gujaratis; status, marriage and social networks are generally based on caste
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affiliations. Within the same caste among the Gujaratis, often social differentiation persisted based on geographical and other considerations (e.g., different kinds of Patels and Patidars based on levels of education, and urbanisation). The distinction between East African Gujarati Hindus and Indian Gujarati Hindus is strongly maintained even though the East African Gujarati migration was also a post world war 2 phenomenon. In general among all Hindus, their caste or sub-caste practices, regional and sectarian variants in traditions, contact with revivalist movements and Islam have all been reproduced in Britain in various ways. Nevertheless, there is a certain homogenization of the Hindu calendar—“the All Hindu Calendar”. Many so called neoHindu branches that originated predominantly in India and some in the diaspora have all been reproduced in Britain—Ramakrishna Mission, Brahma Kumaris, Brahmo Samaj, yoga and meditation associations and the ISKCON. The other minority communities among the Hindus in Britain are—Bengalis, Telugus, Tamils, Indo-Caribbeans, Indo-Mauritians and Indo-Fijians—all of whom have their own ways of worship and practices. However, in spite of the preservance of caste distinctions, caste as such is not able to control socio-economic and ritual relations in the diaspora context. (Interestingly this seems to be the case in the Indian urban space, like Delhi and so on). Vertovec points out two important ways in which the diaspora in Britain have reproduced their traditions—one is cultural transmission through generations and the other is institutionalisation. It is the first one that happens on the domestic front and, therefore, it is also here that “[t]he traditions associated with provenance, sect, and social group or caste are those which largely condition these popular, domestic forms of practice.” (Vertovec 2000: 95). He also points up that even in the public sphere, the caste based associations have occurred since 1960. He suggests that in the first phase between 1950 and the early 1960s, the associations were loosely organised around broader concerns. In the second phase i.e., in the mid 60s the caste based associations flourished; and the third phase was marked by ‘Umbrella’ organisations. (Ibid., 95–99). Thus, in the context of Britain, the private representations of Hinduism consisted of various caste formations whereas the public representations were mainly umbrella type bodies.
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In the initial stages the ship lists provide us with scant details of caste and other social background of the indentured immigrants. Only from 1870s we have some details of caste and other social information on them. In contrast, the Passenger immigrants carried strong caste affiliations—the dominant caste groups are from a variety of Bania caste with different regions mainly from Surat and Kathiawad. (Kumar 2000: 9; 98–101). There is enough evidence to suggest that most indentured immigrants came from lower strata of society who are generally classed as ‘Sudra’ castes and some from the 5th caste or the so called scheduled castes in modern Indian context (this group is again highly differentiated). By the second generation, there seems to have been attempts to change caste status among some, and most moving into the broader non-Brahmanical caste types (e.g., Naidu/Naidoo, Reddy, Padyachi, Govender etc., among south Indians; Singhs in the case of north Indians). While most south Indian names included the caste names, the north Indian names did not, with the exception of Singhs. That is to suggest the caste is merely expressed in name and no real caste bars existed after the second generation among indentured immigrants. This could be largely because no single caste had the numbers to constitute a homogenous whole and preserve their caste rules and relations. Therefore, integration and homogenization among castes both in the case of north and south Indian indentured immigrants occurred very quickly. In contrast, the Passenger immigrants, who were mainly Gujaratis included both Muslims and Hindus and caste distinctions among both groups survived in spite of their religious differences. The early associations (1908–1934) among Gujarati Hindus were mainly along the lines of their respective castes—Pattini Sonis, Girana Sonis, Patels, Vainiks, Mochis; (Sonis were Jewellers and Vainiks were traders)— Pattini Soni Association, Saurashtra Hindu Association, Kathiyawad Arya Mandal, Kathiyawad Hindu Maha Sabha, and so on appeared between 1908–1934. Since 1943—umbrella associations such as Kathiyawad Gujaratis Kathiyawad Hindu Seva Samaj were established. This phase was followed by the more current trend of associations using the local regional names in South Africa—Transvaal Gujarati Parishad, Natal Gujarati Parishad, Gujarati Mahila Mandal (Durban) and so on. (Kumar 2000: 99–101).
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In the case of the indentured immigrants it took on generally the distinctions along linguistic lines—Hindi Siksha Sangh of South Africa, Veda Dharma Sabha (Pietermaritzburg); by the turn of the 20th century the Hindi-speaking community had already been divided along two groups on the basis of religious affiliation—Arya Samaj represented by the local organisation called Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and the Sanatanists represented by organisations such as Veda Dharma Sabha or Sanatana Dharma Sabha. The south Indian groups mainly became homogenized largely as Tamil, with the Telugus mainly integrating themselves into the Tamil community. In the early days, however, they did have their respective language based organisations. (Kumar 2000: 101–104). Reconceiving Rituals in the Diaspora, Inventions of Rituals In recent years, the Tirupati temple in India started a new form of performing rituals in absentia for those who live abroad. The Hindus who live overseas can, by internet or federal express mail, can contact the temple authorities for any particular rituals to be performed for them at the temple without their presence being needed and they would be sent the Prasadam in the Federal Express mail. This indicates the radical and new ways in which Hinduism is attempting to become attuned to the changing society. Such radically innovative and new approaches invariably call into question the essentialist notions of ritual, dharma and social/religious practice in Hinduism in the context of Hinduism outside India. Such innovations and inventions are not merely a recent trend but have gone on for centuries even prior to the medieval period. A case in point is Hinduism in Bali. C. Hooykaas (1973) makes rather interesting comment— Moreover, a rapidly growing population, confined to the same geographical boundaries, and for lack of industry restricted to the same occupations, creative and artistic, seems to have found an outlet in the manu-facturing (in the forgotten literal sense of the word) of gradually more and more complicated offerings, so that at the outset one is far from sure whether it will be possible to find, let alone easy to find, the original religious substratum which has become inextricably mixed with a lush development of aesthetic, even at times light-hearted, elements. (p. 169).
Even within the Indian context, such inventions were common during the Mughal period. Sumit Guha points out that in the Mughal
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time, the classical notion of dharma was in fact what was known as Maharashtra dharma. He argues that scriptural law did not influence very much in the Mughal administration of justice, but rather depended on “a repertory of punitive techniques that had grown up over centuries. . . .” (Guha 1995: 103). He further notes that Peshwas, though Brahmans, were less influenced by Sanskrit scriptures on matters of criminal jurisprudence. (Guha 1995: 104). This invention of rituals is perhaps the hallmark of Hinduism outside India. These inventions in rituals are in consonant with changes in priesthood. Shirley Firth points out that, in the context of the British Hindus, the distinction between “pure Brahmins” and the “Brahmins” who perform funerary rituals has disappeared. She says, While in theory the pandit who has to take funerals, and thus acts as the ritual scapegoat for the sins of the deceased person, has diminished status in comparison with ‘pure Brahmins’, in Britain such distinctions may become less clear, since the same pandit normally also has to conduct auspicious ceremonies such as marriages. (Firth 1997: 195).
Firth also notes that these local inventions in the diaspora have a basis in the classical Hindu law. Referring to the work of Menski, she argues that [D]espite the claims of some pandits that there is only one way to perform a particular ritual, the content of the rituals is constantly being renegotiated and developed according to need. Menski shows “that classical Hindu law favoured continuous ritual innovation and flexibility”, in which there is “a complex conglomerate of sanskritic and local/caste customary practices that show quite considerable flexibility. (Firth 1997: 195).
This invention of ritual procedures has also implications for how one understands auspicious and inauspicious times, spaces and so on. These new inventions and adjustments are often and invariably followed by the attempts on the part of the priest to explain the procedures and the meanings of the various elements. This phenomenon is noticeable in both the British and the South African context as younger people want to know what is happening in the rituals. The inventions would also take into account different client needs, caste status and area of origin (where such details are important). In Britain such details are still important, whereas in South Africa such details are becoming less important. Kim Knott’s work on Leeds Hindu
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community demonstrates the interesting inventions that Hindus in Leeds had to make. She says [I]n Leeds at the present time, where the mandir is situated in an old stable building where the practitioner has only assumed a priestly role in recent years and where the Hindu calendar is removed from such well-known dangers as monsoon and uncontrollable disease, such an ideal is far from possible. (Knott 1986: 89).
The following features can be noticed among Leeds Hindus— 1. Sacred space is in a stable with a portable mandir having temporary purpose; on festival days special mandirs are prepared with appropriate symbols 2. Although they use some traditional calculations, in the end the calendar has to accommodate itself to the British situation—instead of the monsoon periods, and hot summers, features such as long cold winter, Christian and commercial calendar and the working week are the determining factors. [Knott calls attention to a lack of uniformity of calendar in India itself ]. 3. the lack of hereditary order of appointment to the priesthood and the multiple roles they play (e.g., rituals, consulting in astrology and so on) mark the priesthood in the British diaspora context 4. unlike in the Indian context, temples tend to have more group worship rather than individual worship 5. there is a need for consensus of opinion on the meaning and purpose of ritual in the diaspora 6. temple practice, Knott argues, is crucial for Hinduism in Leeds (Knott 1986: 87–115). One of the most interesting developments in the diaspora Hinduism is that unlike patriarchal transmission method in the traditional Brahmanical order of Hinduism, in the diaspora mothers and daughters are the key transmitters of tradition. (Pearson 1999: 397). Bilimoria suggests that multiculturalism is an important feature of the Hindu diaspora in Australia. He argues that the migrants might have come from a variety of backgrounds from India (Vaishnavites, Shaivites, Lingayatas, Rama bhaktas, Vedantins and so on) but chose to be called Hindus in the context of multiculturalism. (Bilimoria 1999: 20). Thus, continuous adaptations and adjustments is a regular feature of diaspora Hinduism. Hanson in his work on the Ganapathi temple in Flushing, New York, suggests that
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Finally, Eleanor Nesbitt’s study on food among British Hindus is revealing. She suggests that a general association of vegetarianism with Hinduism is not common; changes from non-vegetarianism to vegetarianism was not always based on religious grounds, but rather on the grounds of ‘animal rights’ and so on. Similarly changes from vegetarianism to non-vegetarianism sometimes have to do with avoiding ‘malnutrition’ and to have ‘protein’ in the food for health reasons. (Nesbitt 1999: 397–426). Thus far my analysis has revealed two important developments in the context of the diaspora—1. substantial changes in the social organisations of the diaspora Hindus. That is, the conventional caste structures have lost much of their core meanings and relevance other than mainly signifying something of their past statuses; 2. substantial inventions and innovations have occurred in the areas of rituals. These two important changes in the Hindu diaspora society have implications for how they construct their broader life in relation to the others in the host society and how they are globally conceptualised. What sociological categories will assist us in understanding the diasporas is a moot point. In the following, I shall explore such conceptualisations. Ethnicity, Nation and Race Sebastian Poulter identifies three meanings of the term ‘ethnic’— 1. [dating back to 1490—‘pertaining to nations not Christian or Jewish; Gentile, heathen, pagan’. [no longer considered acceptable in legal terms] 2. ‘pertaining to race; peculiar to race or nation; ethnological’. [superfluous as it does not add much to words like ‘colour, race, nationality’. 3. ‘pertaining to or having common racial, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics, [especially designating a racial or other
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group within a larger system’. [in legal terms considered too broad]. (Poulter 1998: 4–5) Poulter suggests that “[e]thnic identity is a malleable phenomenon and cultures can obviously be employed, mobilized, manipulated, or modified to suit strategic purposes”. (Poulter 1998: 7). A case in point is that in the 1991 census in Britain, when the term ‘ethnic’ was introduced, people of Arab origin indicated ‘White’ contrary to the expectation of the government. What is considered ‘ethnic’ changes depending on circumstances and situations—one may be Welsh in England, British in Germany, European in Thailand, East African Indian, Indian, Sikh and so on. For this reason, scholars such T.K. Oommen (1994) have suggested that the notion of ethnicity must be separated from notions of ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’. Da Silva suggests that these two terms, viz., nation and race, have emerged as privileged categories of ‘collective being’ in the 19th century. Da Silva says that the nation is a collectivity of cultures which are in effect the “embodiment of modernity’s cultural principles”. “What it constructs is a culture of a people, which in Hegel’s formulation, is nothing other than the concrete activities of the transcendental subject. . . .” The notion of ‘race’ is based on an understanding of natural laws about cultural diversity. (Da Silva 2002: 429). Craig Calhoun argues that national identities are not necessarily inherited from the past. These are constructed in the context of the competing modernisms of the present. The idea that CNN and MacWorld would create a single world and single modern culture did not happen but instead what we have is competing cultures of Jihad vs. MacWorld. Calhoun says that [I]t is as though analysts imagine that there was great cultural creativity in tribal and agrarian societies, but that moderns wield only the capacity to homogenize, or manipulate, but not to create—and create differences. This view, I think, is one that early moderns helped to produce by the way they revered the classics and the way they understood historical time, reason, and the struggle against prejudice. But it is false. (Calhoun 2002: 447–48).
Calhoun’s following points on ‘ethnicity’ are informative in this regard—
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1. differences among groups are not simply inherited from premodern cultural forms 2. it is a product of confrontation among people of different group identities 3. it may have existed in the premodern world, with religion as its main ascriptive construction, but it has flourished and constructed anew in the modern rise of cities [I might add the rise of globalisation and migration] (Calhoun 2002: 450–52). What distinguishes the modern identity formed around ethnicity is that it is not based on “individual placements in society, but the places to which the individuals may gain access and in which they may wish to settle are melting fast and can hardly serve as targets for ‘life projects’”. (Baumann 2002: 476). Baumann argues that people construct more than one identity and they are constantly exploring new identities. Therefore, he says, [P]erhaps instead of talking about identities, inherited or acquired, it would be more in keeping with the realities of the globalising world to speak of identification, a never-ending, always incomplete, unfinished and open-ended activity which we all, by necessity or by choice, are engaged. (Baumann 2002: 482).
Today the notions of ‘ethnicity’, ‘citizenship’ and ‘transnationalism’ are understood mainly in the context of ‘globalisation’. Therefore, scholars such as Michael Bodemann speak of ‘ethnicity being cosmopolitanized’ (Bodemann 2002: 355ff.). The role that electronic media has played in transforming these identities is enormous. Bodemann says, “[W]hat the new media have indeed accomplished is a continuous infusion of new ethno-national cultural influences from abroad.” (Bodemann 2002: 369). Indo-Trinidadian context is a case in point as to how the Bombay based films have transformed their identity into re-Indianization and re-Hinduization. However, all of this happens in the context of ‘Creole-African’ environment. (Bodemann 2002: 369). One key word in globalisation is ‘flow’—of capital, people, material goods, information. It indicates a paradigm shift in cultural studies—a move away from study of fixed objects to processes often blurring all boundaries. Featherstone says that [T]he concept of flow points to movement, mobility, to speed, volume and intensity of interchanges in a globalising world. The impli-
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cation for social and cultural life is that the intensity of global flows helps to establish new connections and patterns of association and social relationships, along with new modes of identification. (Featherstone 2002: 501).
One of the results, as shown in Appadurai’s work, is that this ‘flow’ of information, migration, etc., results in the construction of what is known as ‘imagined communities’ who are characterised by their deterritorial nature. Featherstone points out that the “[D]iasporic public sphere form the basis for post national imagined communities”. (Featherstone 2002: 503). Often the ethnic conflicts are fuelled by these ‘imagined communities’ in the diaspora (e.g., Hindu-Muslim conflict in Ayodhya). This potential to sustain imagined communities means that localities are influenced by events distant in space and time. Distant people see themselves as having a stake in each other’s lives, as we find in the case of Bosnian Muslims who were under pressure from Islamic forces in Saudi, Sudan and Egypt who felt they had a legitimate stake to reconstitute Bosnian Islamic identity more in line with their own perspectives. (Featherstone 2002: 503).
The issue whether in the context of globalisation there is an independent role for culture is a moot question that divides the works of both Appadurai and Jonathan Friedman. While Appadurai sees a central role of culture in the globalisation and identity constructions, Friedman sees this as a continuous world system. According to Friedman, the world systems go through two phases—hegemonization and dehegemonization. The first phase is characterized by strong “hierarchical relationships between centres and peripheries” and the second is marked by decentralisation and emergence of multiple centres. It is in this second phase that “culture emerges as a central visible feature of social life and a central topic for intellectuals.” (Featherstone 2002: 507). It is here, according to Featherstone, that Friedman raises the question whether there could be “transnational or transcultural identities or cultures”. This, in the argument of Friedman, occurs only when “the identification process is transcultural, that is, mixed, or occurs on a level above the nation-state and not between them.” (Featherstone 2002: 509). This would mean that, for example, for Hindus to be transnational the identification process must be not just between British Hindus and Indian Hindus, but rather identification between global Hindus across nation-state boundaries.
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Whether this phenomenon of transnationalism has occurred in the case of Indians in general and Hindus in particular is an important question. Stanely Tambiah seems to think that it has. Like Friedman’s idea, Tambiah’s idea of transnationalism also works along the lines of connections beyond the homeland or origin. He says, “[t]ransnational connections linking diasporas need not be articulated primarily through a real or symbolic homeland. Decentred, lateral connections may be as important as those formed around a teleology of return.” (Tambiah 2002: 332). Instead of a teleological desire to return to homeland of origin, the transnational diasporas “reproduce and maintain themselves over time through marriages between persons located elsewhere in other diaspora communities or in their societies or origin, through sharing cultural knowledge and receiving visiting priests, artists, and public figures, and also sharing and fusing assets to extend their businesses, and professional interests.” (Tambiah 2002: 332). Issues of gender, race and religious discrimination can engender transnational responses from Hindus in other parts of the world in an effort to assist their fellow Hindus elsewhere. Therefore, issues of “whose interpretation of Hinduism is most persuasive among British Hindus” (Knott 2000: 101) may be a local British Hindu concern, but it can ring a bell for some other Hindus elsewhere. Similarly public policy issues around racism in Canadian society vis-à-vis Hindus there can also engender a response from other Hindus elsewhere. (Coward 2000: 166–167). The issue of transnationalism among Hindus or for that matter Indians in general has to take into account a multidimensional concern—on the one hand, Hindus living in South Africa or Britain may wish to think of themselves as citizens of those countries in the first place and their ethnic origins in that context take secondary place; in the context of reproduction of their various traditions and customs and inventions of rituals in the host country, they may thrive on their affinity and proclivity for their places of origin; and in the context of broader issues of public policy, trade, flow of capital and so on that characterise the globalisation phenomenon, there is an attempt to forge links with global Hindus elsewhere. It is perhaps in this sense Hindus in the diaspora are citizens, ethnics and transnationals depending on the situation.
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References Bacon, Jean. Life Lines: Community, Family and Assimilation among Asian Indian Immigrants. Oxford: No details of Publisher and date. Ballard, Roger (1994). Desh Pradesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain. London: Hurst & Company. Baumann, Zygmut (2002). “Identity in the Globalising World” in Identity, Culture and Globalisation, edited by Eliezer Ben-Rafael with Yitzhak Sternberg. Leiden: E.J. Brill, pp. 471–482. Ben-Rafael, Eliezer (2002). “The Transformation of Diasporas: The Linguistic Dimension”, in Identity, Culture and Globalisation, edited by Eliezer Ben-Rafael with Yitzhak Sternberg. Leiden: E.J. Brill, pp. 327–351. Bilimoria, Purushottama (1999). “The making of Hindus in Australia: A diasporic narrative”, in Hindu Diaspora: Global Perspectives, edited by T.S. Rukmani. Montreal: Department of Religion, Concordia University, pp. 3–33. Bowen, David (1988). The Sathya Sai Baba Community in Bradford. (Monograph Series: Community Religions Project). Leeds: University of Leeds. Calhoun, Craig (2002). “Nationalism, Modernism, & and Their Multiplicities” in Identity, Culture and Globalisation, edited by Eliezer Ben-Rafael with Yitzhak Sternberg. Leiden: E.J. Brill, pp. 445–470. Carter, Marina (1996). Voices from Indenture: Experiences of Indian Migrants in the British Empire. London: Leicester University Press. Coward, Harold, John R. Hinnels & Raymond Brady Williams (eds.) (2000). The South Asian Religious Diaspora in Britain, Canada, and the United States. Albany: State University of New York Press. Da Silva, Denise Ferreira (2002). “Race & Nation in the Global Space”, in Identity, Culture and Globalisation, edited by Eliezer Ben-Rafael with Yitzhak Sternberg. Leiden: E.J. Brill, pp. 427–440. Featherstone, Mike (2002). “Postnational Flows, Identity Formation and Culture Space”, in Identity, Culture and Globalisation, edited by Eliezer Ben-Rafael with Yitzhak Sternberg. Leiden: E.J. Brill, pp. 481–526. Nesbitt, Eleanor (1999). “ ‘Being Religious shows in your food’: Young British Hindus and Vegetarianism”, in Hindu Diaspora: Global Perspectives, edited by T.S. Rukmani. Montreal: Department of Religion, Concordia University, pp. 397–426. Firth, Shirley (1997). Dying, Death and Bereavement in a British Hindu Community. Leuven: Peeters. Gifford, Zerbanoo (1990). The Golden Thread: Asian Experiences of Post-Raj Britain. London: Grafton Books. Guha, Sumit (1995). “An Indian Penal Regime: Maharashtra in the Eighteenth century” in Past and Present, No. 147, May, pp. 101–126. Hanson, Richard Scott (1999). “Sri Maha Vallabha Ganapati Devasthanam of Flushing, New York”, in Hindu Diaspora, Global Perspectives, edited by T.S. Rukmani. Montreal: Concordia University, pp. 349–365. Hooykass, C. (1973). Balinese Bauddha Brahmans. Amsterdam, London: North-Holland Publishing Company. Jacobsen, Knut A. and P. Pratap Kumar (2004). South Asians in the Diaspora: Histories and Traditions. Leiden: E.J. Brill. Knott, Kim (1986). Hinduism in Leeds: A Study of Religious Practice in the Indian Hindu Community and in Hindu-Related Groups. (Monograph Series: Community Religions Project). Leeds: University of Leeds. Knott, Kim (2000). “Hinduism in Britain” in The South Asian Religious Diaspora in Britain, Canada, and the United States. Edited by Harold Coward, John R. Hinnells, and Raymond Brady Williams. New York: State University of New York Press, pp. 89–108.
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Kumar, Pratap P. (2000). Hindus in South Africa: Their Traditions and Beliefs. Durban: University of Durban-Westville. Menski, Werner (1991). ‘Change and continuity in Hindu marriage rituals’ in Hindu Ritual and Society, by Killingley, Dermot, Werner Menski and Shirley Firth. New Castle upon Tyne: S.Y. Killingley. Meyers, Helen (1998). Music of Hindu Trinidad: Songs from the India Diaspora. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Oommen, T.K. (1994). “The Changing Trajectory of Constructing the Other: West Europe and South Asia”, in Sociological Bulletin, 43 (2), September, pp. 161–174. Pearson, Anne M. (1999). “Mothers and Daughters: The Transmission of Religious Practice and the Formation of Hindu Identity among Hindu Women in Ontario”, in Hindu Diaspora, Global Perspectives, edited by T.S. Rukmani. Montreal: Concordia University. Poulter, Sebastian (1998). Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights: The English Experience. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rukmani, T.S. (ed.) (1999). Hindu Diaspora: Global Perspectives. Montreal: Department of Religion, Concordia University. Tambiah, Stanley J. (2002). “Vignets of Present Day Diaspora”, in Identity, Culture and Globalisation, edited by Eliezer Ben-Rafael with Yitzhak Sternberg. Leiden: E.J. Brill, pp. 327–336. Tweed, Thomas A. and Stephen Prothero (1999). Asian Religions in America: A Documentary History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vertovec, Steven (2000). The Hindu Diaspora: Comparative Patterns. London: Routledge. Visram, Rozina (2002). Asians in Britain: 400 Years of History. London: Pluto Press. Wolffe, John (ed.) (1993). The Growth of Religious Diversity: Britain From 1945. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
PART FOUR
IMPACT OF 9/11 ON MUSLIMS
BEYOND HERBERG: AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE ON RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN THE USA AFTER 9/11 Hajer Ben Hadj Salem Institut Supérieur des Etudes Appliqués aux Humanités, Mahdia, Tunisia On balance, it may well be that the greatest contribution made by the United States to global religious life is its demonstrating that, however vast the pluralism, a vital religious culture can flourish. Pluralism does not undermine common life but seems to enrich it. The seeds planted by diverse tribal cultures and by European colonists centuries ago came to full growth in the twentieth century, for it was the century when pluralism—religious pluralism—came of age.1
Charles Lippy’s celebration of a pluralism that came of age in the twentieth century is a celebration of a contextual realization of an ideal that the US has been struggling to affirm since its inception. The US has a culture of pluralism because it has been the setting for a multitude of responses to religious diversity. These responses have been shaped by a tension between two seemingly antithetical poles: a gradual, at times grudging, acceptance of the reality of religious diversity (many-ness) and a staunch desire for unity (one-ness). Although the meanings of the two terms “diversity” and “pluralism” overlap, the difference between both is essential to understand the dilemmas and tensions that underscore the process of transformation. In the Culture of Religious Pluralism, Richard E. Wentz defines “diversity” and “pluralism” as follows: Diversity is the awareness of many-ness, the discovery that there are “others besides us and our own communities (. . .) individuals and groups often tend to think of themselves as isolated entities. Diversity represents a threat to that isolation (. . .) [T]he human condition is such that pluralism continues to be resisted by programs of conquest
1 Charles H. Lippy, Pluralism Comes of Age, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000, p. 162.
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hajer ben hadj salem and conversion. The culture of religious pluralism has evolved in tension with the impulse to conquer or convert the “other” instead of to contemplate the manner in which the ideas, practices, and sociality of others are aspects of our own incompleteness, indeed, of human incompleteness. (Wentz: 15)
This paper is an attempt to show how the history of America’s openness to immigration from diverse sources,2 has advanced the course of religious pluralism. Many religious groups existed in America, yet only a few were publicly significant in advancing the course of pluralism from tolerance of differences to inclusion and participation. Their public significance was contingent upon their ability to provide a viable and coherent interpretation of American reality of which they are a part. In a telling manner, groups who revered different cultural and religious symbols were able to project different perspectives on shared cultural and religious symbols. In finding a common ground, these groups were able to help develop models of religious pluralism. Such models reflect structures, which evolved as a result of attempts to formulate responses to diversity and assert that there is a religious unity to America. These responses were meant to give meaning to “E Pluribus Unum.” At first, the unity meant Christian (ideally including all Christian, then Protestant, denominations), at some point in US history it evolved into JudeoChristian (including Protestants, Catholics and Jews), then it came to mean “potentially” multi-religious with an Abrahamic overtone (including Christians, Jews and Muslims, with Hindus and Buddhist on the periphery). Since 9/11 some scholars of Islam have become more articulate in advancing the pluralist state of mind further to become global in perspective. The religious traditions which are covered by these models are known as world religions. They immigrated to the US at relatively different stages of its history and made varying headways on the road to pluralism. What unites them most is that their experiences on the path of pluralism reflect recurring patterns and contest strategies. My study of the dynamics of the culture of religious pluralism is based on the following definition of culture “an identifiable and regularized behavior that is attributable to a particular people and that
2 It was also punctuated by Acts of exclusion and quotas at the end of the 19th and during the first half of the 20th century.
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is expressed through certain images, symbols, rituals, myths, and other kinds of stories.” (Wentz p. 1) As cultures undergo endless transformations, the culture of religious pluralism, as it now stands, is the outcome of interactions of symbols and myths of the “many” and the “one”. These interactions have generated transformations in both. Let’s go through the models of religious pluralism. The First Model: A Protestant “Establishment” that Nurtured Diversity At the time of the Revolution the people of America were predominantly foreign born: Europeans and their descendants. The religious mosaic that they spread throughout the American landscape reflected the spectrum of Protestant Europe’s sectarianism. The colonial period was marked by the centrality of Calvinism and Puritanism in shaping the world view of the settlers, the centrality of religion in shaping the civil order. It was also marked by an underlying current of tolerance of dissent which set the groundwork for religious liberty in the new nation. When the Constitution was adopted and the “novus ordo Seclorum” was established, Denominationalism was the unique response of these diverse groups to give meaning to their diversity; and an unofficial “Protestant establishment” was their answer to their plural claims to religious truth. While levelling many of the traditional notions of religion and politics that were left behind in Europe, and to a lesser extent in some of the colonies, religious disestablishment and the concomitant unique American principle of voluntary Churches enshrined in the First Amendment3 to the constitution,4 did not act as a sluice obstructing the normal flow of the Christian
3 Under the terms of the First Amendment, Congress could make no law either establishing or prohibiting the free exercise of religion. 4 The American separation of church and state was a unique and revolutionary settlement to the question of religious diversity in the Christian world. As Catherine Albanese put it in America Religions and Religion “Until the Reformation of the sixteenth century, Europe has understood itself as Christendom—one theoretically unified kingdom of Christ in which spiritual and worldly power were separate aspects of the whole. Even after the reformation, leading reformers such as Martin Luther and John Calvin, as well as Roman Catholics had agreed that spiritual and worldly government went hand in hand . . . both mainstream Reformers and Roman Catholics persecuted the Radical Reformers, who with their sectarian principle were viewed as dangerous to the Church-state unity of Christendom. Official state churches,
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spirit in the infant republic. On the contrary, as de Tocquville observed in Democracy in America and historical facts have confirmed, it fostered constant diversification and perpetual modifications within Christian denominations, and made Christianity the indiscriminately “well-established religion of the nation.” The pervasiveness of the institutional presence of the “informal Protestant establishment” in the early days of the republic was captured by Hutchinson who argues that The religious establishment involved, first and most obviously, the more powerful Protestant denominations, especially those of the Baptists, Congregationalists, Episcopalians, Methodists, and Presbyterians. Second, it included the multitude of voluntary associations, both interdenominational and nondenominational, that promoted missions, peace, temperance, and numerous other kinds of moral and social reform. Third, it derived authority from a large and dominating world of Englishlanguage cultural, literary, educational, and journalistic entities that were Protestant in personnel and outlook. Finally, the establishment must be understood as a personal network of Protestant leadership that extended across the churches, controlled most of the nation’s political life, and managed virtually all of the major secular institutions and entities in American society.5
The denominations that are referred to in the foregoing quotation used to denounce each other’s teachings during the colonial period. Yet within the republic where religious liberty was protected by law, they came to see themselves as part of a larger spiritual community of the Christian Church. This spirit of unity was not provided by any of these denominations. The real ground for unity was the religion of the civil order: the civil religion6 of the American Revolution.
whether Protestant or Catholic, were the rule in Europe. Holland, the most liberal nation in its tolerance for dissent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, still had a state reformed Church until 1795. England during the same period continued to maintain a religious establishment. Hence, when Americans separated church and state through the new federal Constitution, even though they understood themselves still as Christian and predominantly Protestant, they had created a radically innovative condition for religion.” (p. 403). 5 William R. Hutchinson, Religious Pluralism in America: The Contentious History of a Founding Ideal. New haven and London: Yale University press, 2003, p. 61. 6 Historically, the term “civil religion” was used by the French Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). The word came to repeated use in the US to refer to a phenomenon that coincided with the birth of the nation. In the American context the resurgence of the term tends to be associated with Robert Bellah who published an essay titled “Civil Religion” in 1967.
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In The Broken Covenant: Civil Religion in Time of Trial, Robert Bellah defines civil religion as follows: By civil religion I refer to that religious dimension, found I think in the life of every people, through which it interprets its historical experience in the light of transcendent reality (p. 3).
Civil religion provided some basis for public unity that broke down boundaries separating diverse religions that were on American soil at the inception of the republic. It did so by initiating a whole process of myth-building which revolved around the memorable deeds that Americans performed to initiate an age unknown before in the history of humanity. The way some of these myths were interpreted during the early years of the republic helped maintain an unofficial “Protestant Establishment” in the US. The latter helped weaken the boundaries between “the many” and the “one.” By binding the “many” into the “one” in Protestant terms, the Protestant majority gave a possible meaning to diversity that opened the way for further possibilities. The Second Model: Protestant, Catholic and Jew With the advent of the 19th century, signs of cultural complexity and heterogeneity were very well reflected in the unprecedented demographic change that marked the American landscape. A severe reduction in Protestant Christianity’s numerical dominance in the American population was occasioned by the sweeping flow of Catholic and Jewish immigrants who started settling in America in significant numbers. Along with the new “divergent” movements such as Adventism, Pre-millennialism, the Mormons, and the Holiness Movement that started gaining ground after the Civil War, Catholic and Jewish public presence became highly visible in America. According to Hutchinson between 1850 and 1920, the Roman Catholic population “expanded at nearly three times the rate of overall population growth, while the number of Jews rose spectacularly-from fifty thousand to more than three million.” (Hutchinson: 114) What this religious mosaic generated was a visible change in the public discourse about religious diversity and pluralism. Toleration of non-radical beliefs, and to a less extent behaviour, seemed to have given way to the rhetoric of inclusion that was articulated by Jewish and Catholic leaders in an era of melting pot enthusiasm. Such headway
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could not have been made without changes that took place within the informal “Protestant establishment” to keep pace with the social, economic and cultural changes that cut right across the society and affected religion as well as politics. These included the rise of the social gospel with its leanings towards minorities, the wide appeal the liberal theological surge had among great numbers of people in the US and the convening of the World Parliament of Religions in September 1893 in Chicago. The latter was an outright manifestation of a much wider campaign for inclusion orchestrated by liberal sections within Judaism, Catholicism and Protestantism. For the first time ever Jews and Catholics were included by American Protestants in a conference on religion. By doing so the latter infused Protestantism with a new life and contributed more than their native counterparts to maintain the “establishment’s” authority within American culture. Despite opposition to inclusive pluralism within the right ends of the Protestant, Catholic and Jewish spectrums, the liberals within these traditions displayed in their campaign for inclusion a plethora of themes and provided a repertoire of contest strategies. It was by capitalizing on the liberal belief that all religions are infused with divinity that the liberal wings within Judaism, Protestantism and Catholicism won their battles for inclusion within their faith groups and the large faith community. They advanced a discourse that rested upon two pillars. First, it is based on a rejection of the non-essential doctrines and practices of their faith, and a preservation of its timeless essentials. Second basis is a belief in the promise of universal religious freedom guaranteed by the first Amendment to the Constitution. Their arguments reflect a subtle blend of civil and religious themes even in their theological aspect. Theologically, their discourse was premised on a repudiation of religious essentialism by acknowledging that one’s religion presents a conception of the God-Idea, (almost the same as that referred to in the Declaration of Independence). What ensued from this was an outright rejection of rigid traditionalism as a crippling force. Americanists among Catholic and Jewish religious leaders expanded this rhetoric so far as to enthusiastically assert their claim that traditionalism was out of tune with the times, and that the future and welfare of their religions depended upon the willingness of the traditional establishments, (Roman authorities in the Catholic case and Orthodox Rabbis in Europe and the US in the Jewish case) to undertake reforms based on American Catholic and Jewish experiences.
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Moreover, they would consider themselves, as Americans with a special mission to reconcile their religious traditions with modernity by providing a model that derived its superiority from that of the American example with its separation of Church and State. This argument dealt an outright attack on the Roman establishment, and certainly more on the then nascent Zionist spirit within the Jewish communities than its Orthodox wing. No where was it more strikingly expressed than it was in the Americanist Jewish attempt to adopt the American myth of origin to that of the children of Israel as presented in the Old Testament. They portrayed America as their promised Zion. This was best reflected in the Central Conference of American rabbis that convened in 1897. In this gathering American rabbis asserted that “We are unalterably opposed to political Zionism. The Jews are not a nation, but a religious community . . . America is our Zion. Here in the home of religious liberty we have helped in founding this new Zion”. (Hutchinson: 126) The sense of separation from a group that allegedly held them loyal to an outside authority, which seems latent in the Jewish statement was a pivotal theme in the Catholic discourse. From John London to John F. Kennedy, American Catholics had the most daunting task of asserting their loyalty to America and the American political system. They had to deflate a staunch anti-Catholic propaganda. Entangled in emotional and ideological considerations, it thrived on breeding in the public an irrational fear that Catholics in America were conspiring with Rome to threaten the stability of the American system. In spite of the religious polyphony that characterized public discourse on religion and in spite of the fact that religious and ethnic diversity became a daily reality by the end of the 19th century and the first half of the twentieth, American church history continued to emphasize themes of Protestant unity rather than themes of diversity and unsettled pluralism. It was Will Herberg’s Protestant, Catholic, Jew, published in 1955, that shifted the emphasis of American religious history. The Judeo-Christian model he praised was premised on a claim he made that Americans identified themselves, as Americans, as belonging to one of three traditions. The American way could be Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish. Even though Herberg’s book was a consensus book, it was an attempt at broadening the scope of religious pluralism by assigning a new meaning to “Christianity” whereby a Christian came to mean a monotheist: one who believes in the
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God of the Bible and of Abraham. This meant in effect that “Christian” was in some way inclusive of “Jew”. Herberg’s model which stresses that Americans define themselves religiously as Protestants, Catholics, or Jews found a great appeal in a post-war spirit of revival that cut right across churches and the realm of civil religion. Herberg’s trinity came to light when the legendary status that the story of the four chaplains, two Protestants, a Catholic and a Jew, who sank in the troop ship Dorchester in 1944, was still tickling the American sense of divine providence. It was also a possible answer to President Eisenhower’s pronouncement in 1952 that “our government makes no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith and I don’t care what it is.” Certainly what Eisenhower meant by deeply felt religious faith was something antithetical to the atheism of the then communist enemy. It was so large in scope that it might include the myriad of long-ignored religious traditions in the US. In this respect, Herberg’s trinity fell short of reflecting the richness of the religious landscape of America in the mid-twentieth century. It was left to Martin Marty, Edwin Gaustad, Sydney Ahlstrom and their followers to fill in the gaps. The Third Model: A Multi-Religious America with an Abrahamic Overtone Since the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965, the definition of religious diversity expanded well beyond its sectarian Christian rivalries and Biblical toleration to include Buddhists, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and others from many parts of the Globe. These traditions, upon observation, reflect a wide range of sectarian postures, adding to the plurality of the American landscape. From a civil religious perspective, the Act marked another stage in broadening the meaning of such long-cherished concepts as religious freedom, mutual respect and voluntary “churches” or churches without government financial support guaranteed by the First Amendment. Among the recently published studies of the post-1960s religious pluralism is Diana Eck’s A New Religious America. The book gave a sympathetic attention to the presence of three major world religions on American soil: Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam. The pluralism, about which Eck wrote, far away from being the trinity presented by Herberg, is associated with the democratic idea which holds that
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difference must not be equated with inferiority. It is neither inclusive nor participatory; it is more likely to be still grappling between the stages of tolerance and inclusion. With an assurance made by a participant observer to her fellow Americans that neither the religious behaviour of these groups nor their beliefs are radical, the book includes an open invitation for average Americans to build bridges of dialogue and mutual understanding with them. Diana Eck’s call for “positive pluralism” betrays a latent warning about the consequences of isolation from and ignorance of these faith traditions and communities. The September 11 events proved Eck’s fears true. Before September 11 there were already more Muslims in the United States than Episcopalians. It is only a matter of time before adherents of Islam replace Jews as the largest non-Christian religious group in the US. To cover this new reality, scholars were engaged in an effort to develop a model that would replace the “Judeo-Christian” one. The “Abrahamic” model emerged as the leading candidate. The advocates of this model tried to trace Islam, Judaism and Christianity back to their origin: Abraham. The model seemed to have had official sanction by the US government during the 90s. On the occasion of the first Eid after the Gulf War, president Bush Senior started the tradition of sending Eid greetings to American Muslims. Under the Clinton administration, the first Eid celebration was conducted in the White House. The same year (1996), the first break-of-thefast event was held on Capitol Hill. In 1999 the first Muslim was appointed ambassador by the Clinton administration; and in 2000 both chambers of congress passed resolutions H.R. 174 and S. Res. 133 whereby Islam was recognized as an Abrahamic faith along with Judaism and Christianity and the contribution of Muslims to American society. These gains were the outcome of dialogue between the elite of the Muslim communities and the US government that was attempting to build bridges with the Muslim world. Ordinary American citizens, whose knowledge of Islam and Muslims was at best shaped by Hollywood and at worst by ignorance, like ordinary Muslims and Imams, who were ignorant of the system of their country, did not have a place at the table. The Abrahamic model was a structure with bolsters of clay. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks a surge of hate crimes was directed at American Muslims, Sikhs and other Americans
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of foreign origin who were likely to fit in the stereotype of the terrorist as portrayed in the media. The well-established network of American Muslim organizations, including the ministry of W.D. Muhammed issued in an unprecedented way jointly as well as individually public statements condemning the terrorist attacks and distancing themselves, at least in terms of religious behaviour, from the perpetrators of the attacks. Their voices did not reach most of their fellow Americans because they lacked the adequate networks. The aftermath of September 11 was marked by a public relations crisis. Even though many Muslim voices were invited for the first time to speak through major American media networks, they did not manage to dispel the revived centuries-old prejudices of “Islam” as a force to be feared and of Muslims as inherently irrational and violent people. Nor did President Bush’s declaration of Islam “a religion of peace” restore the image of Islam. President Bush, like the speakers on TV channels, mostly engineers, medical doctors, and physical scientists, who were primarily self-taught and whose knowledge of Islamic text and history was quite superficial, were able to position themselves as authorities on Islamic law and theology. Their discourse was apologetic. Even though they negated the association between Islam and terrorism, they created another static, idealized portrait of Islam, failing to address the concrete social, economic and political causes at the root of such profound wrong doing. The discriminatory aspect of the measures taken by the government against Arab and Muslim nationals under the PATRIOT Act,7 the double-standard that the government did not shun during the
7
According to The Status of Muslim Civil Rights in the United States 2002: Stereotypes and Civil Liberties, during the first few months following the attacks between 1,200 and 1,700 nationals of Arab and Muslim countries “were taken into custody in the initial stage of the crackdown. There have been charges that detainees have not been informed of the reasons of their detention. Many have not had prompt access to a lawyer and detainees have been treated as if they were guilty until proven innocent.” (p. 5) They are in violation of the 6th amendment that guarantees a speedy and public trial. Most of them were freed and none had any links to terrorism. On November 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced that the government would conduct “voluntary” interviews with 5,000 legal Muslim Foreign nationals, 3,000 more were interviewed in 2002. Though the attorney general said the government learned a great deal from the initial interviews, but little was known as to how that information related to the investigation of the September 11 attacks or any suspected terrorists. The use of secret evidence was also the basis upon which three Muslim charities, designated by the government as terrorist organizations were closed.
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April 2002 Palestinian-Israeli crisis, President Bush’s failure to denounce publicly anti-Muslim comments by conservative Christian leaders and the Iraqi war campaign with its glaring anti-Arab stereotypes awakened many Muslim activists and scholars in America to their own obligation of restoring the image of their faith and traditions by assertively speaking out against and eschewing all forms of extremism, violence, and hatred in their midst. What is interesting is that out of their reconstitution of Islam one can trace a budding conception of a new pluralism. Even though the tenets of this new pluralism can be found in many aspects of American Muslim life, it can best be sketched out, I believe, in the discourses of the so-called “progressive Muslim”8 scholars who come from highly varied ethnic, geographical, linguistic, and intellectual backgrounds and who can be upheld as voices of legitimacy and authenticity. The new pluralism, “Global Pluralism,” has the following tenets. Beyond Abrahamic America On May 21, 2003, the Newhouse News Service interviewed religious leaders from the three ‘Abrahamic’ faiths about whether Americans should stop using the phrase “Judeo-Christian”9 and use “JudeoChristian-Islamic” or “Abrahamic” when describing the values and
8
Omid Safi defines “Progressive Muslims” as follows: Many people today who come from a whole host of religious, political, and ethnic backgrounds describe themselves as “progressives.” There is, furthermore, a nascent community of Muslim activists and intellectuals who readily identify with the term “progressive Muslims” and publicly embrace it. “Progressive,” in this usage, refers to a relentless striving towards a universal notion of justice in which no single community’s prosperity, righteousness, and dignity comes at the expense of another. Central to this notion of a progressive Muslim identity are fundamental values that we hold to be essential to a vital, fresh, and urgently needed interpretation of Islam for the twenty-first century. These themes include social justice, gender justice, and pluralism. Of course, the kind of Islamic interpretation one comes up with is largely determined by who undertakes the interpretation. (Progressive Muslims, p. 3). 9 From its founding to the late 1940s, the United States was commonly described as Christian, a trend epitomized by an 1892 Supreme Court ruling in which Justice David Brewer wrote, “This is a Christian nation.” In a 2002 survey by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life and the Pew Research Center for People and the Press, two-thirds of respondents said they consider the United States a “Christian nation” and 58 percent said the strength of American society is based on the religious faith of its people. But only 14 percent said it is essential that a person believe in “basic Judeo-Christian values” in order to be a good American.
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character that define the United States. National Muslim groups supporting a change included the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the Muslim American Society, the American Muslim Council, and the American-Muslim Alliance. These attempts at changing the language can be justified by the fact that the term “Judeo-Christian” is no longer inclusive. Yet it is difficult to think that the public will accept “Judeo-Christian-Islamic” when people who attacked the US on 9/11 did so in the name of Islam. To avoid falling in to the trap of exclusivism, broader conceptions of pluralism were put forward. One way of doing so was through stressing the American-ness of the new religious outsiders, including Muslims and non-Muslims. This stance is best articulated by Osama Siblani, an influential voice among American Muslims and publisher of the Arab-American News in Dearborn, Michigan. “I believe we should call this the United States of America, made up of Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Muslims, Christians, Jews and others,” said Siblani. “This stuff about language has to stop. We are all just Americans.”10 Beyond Tolerance In Progressive Muslims, Omid Safi underlines the shaky foundations of any conception of pluralism that rests only upon toleration and does not evolve into inclusion and participation. As he puts it [ T ]he connotations of “tolerance” are deeply problematic (. . .) the root of the term “tolerance” comes from medieval toxicology and pharmacology, marking how much poison a body could “tolerate” before it would succumb to death. Is this the best that we can do? Is our task to figure out how many “others” (be they Muslims, Jews, blacks, Hindus, homosexuals, non-English speakers, Asians . . .) we can tolerate before it really kills us (?) In short, progressive Muslims do not wish for a “tolerant” Islam, any more than we long for a “tolerant” American or European society. Rather we seek to bring about a pluralistic society in which we honour and engage each other through our differences and our commonalities.11
10 “Has the United States Become Judeo-Christian-Islamic?” See www.mpac.org (2003). 11 Omid Safi, ed. Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003. pp. 23–24.
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Building Bridges of Understanding A study of the reactions to Muslims in various communities in the US after 9/11 reflects a curious mix of responses. They vary between tales of sympathy, cooperation and compassion and others of intolerance expressed through hate crimes directed at individuals and institutions. Out of the welter of reasons that can express this polarity is a fairly clear pattern that emerges from many an American Muslim citizen and leader of organizations I interviewed in geographically different parts of the US. It rests on the distinction between exclusivist and pluralist communities. The pattern, it seems, applies as much to the Muslim communities as it does to other faith communities. Dr. Koshampour, the director of the Islamic Council of Greater Chicago argued that his community mosque was not attacked because they had been very active in interfaith dialogue years before 9/11. He added that his community and other faith communities formed human shields to protect the mosques of the isolationists among Muslims. Isolationism within the Muslim communities is anchored in religious orientations that are distinctively puritan and supremacist. Reconstituting Islam To promote a pluralism based on mutual understanding and respect between religions, progressive scholars of Islam have recommended a reconstitution12 rather than a reformation of Islam. Their objection is due to the fact that in the very language of “Reformation” is the notion of a significant break with the past and split within the Muslim communities. It also implies that Islam adapts the historical and cultural course of action laid out by the Christian tradition. Unlike their Christian predecessors who associated religious progress with a rupture with the past, Europe and traditionalism, the progressive Muslim project, argues Omid Safi, “is not so much an epistemological rupture from what has come before as a fine-tuning, a polishing, a grooming, an editing, a re-emphasizing of this and a correction of that. In short, it is a critical engagement with the
12
The term was used by Aziz Al-Azmeh in 1996.
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heritage of Islamic thought, rather than a casual bypassing of its accomplishments . . . It might be an easier task to start with a tabula rasa, but that would not be an Islamic project. Being a progressive Muslim, at least in the view of this group, mandates a difficult, onerous, critical, uneasy engagement with the tradition.”13 Engagement with tradition concerns not only Muslim scholars of varied ethnic, geographical, linguistic, and intellectual backgrounds, but also non-Muslim scholars who are involved in producing knowledge about Islam for ordinary Muslims and non-Muslims. Such production of knowledge, which is a process of image-building, should, according to progressive Muslims, be rebuilt on sound assets. These include the following: 1) Engaging the Islamic tradition as a dynamic and viable living tradition by transcending pietistic fictions about Islam developed by both apologetic Muslim scholars and the so-called orientalists. According to Khaled Abou El Fadl “the apologetic orientation consisted of an effort by a large number of commentators to defend and salvage the Islamic system of belief and tradition from the onslaught of Orientalism, Westernization, and modernity by simultaneously emphasizing both the compatibility and also the supremacy of Islam.” He carries this logic further as to argue that “A common heuristic device of apologetics was to argue that any meritorious or worthwhile modern institutions were first invented and realized by Muslims. Therefore, according to the apologists Islam liberated women, created a democracy, endorsed pluralism, protected human rights, and guaranteed social security long before these institutions ever existed in the West.” (p. 55) The main effects of apologetics, was to turn Islam into an untouchable symbol and to marginalize the complexity of Islamic intellectual heritage by reducing the history of Muslims into immutable origins. This essentialist reading of the past is not less obscurantist than that of Orientalist writers whose essentialist approach to the history of Muslims is constituted primarily by a static notion of religion. 2) Appreciating differences of orientations: The attempt to reflect critically on the heritage of Islamic thought and to adapt it to the modern world requires an honest intellectual study of the perspectives of
13
Omid Safi, ed. Progressive Muslims, p. 11.
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various schools of thought. Such a study is essential to legitimize a range of opinions and to acknowledge a spectrum of interpretations. In doing so learned scholars would situate themselves in that wider spectrum. Undertaking self-positioning, would expose the exclusivism of many contemporary Muslim pundits who hijack an entire tradition, claiming to be a one-man spokesperson for all Muslims. This supremacist posture excludes debate and discussion within the tradition and stymies the richness that racial, gender and other forms of diversity may bestow upon the tradition. 3) Commitment to social justice: Even though justice lies at the heart of Islam, involvement in social justice issues may be new to many contemporary Muslims in the US. After September 11th, many Muslims have joined Christians, Jews, Buddhists, Hindus and others who have long been involved in social justice issues. By feeling responsible for the well-being and dignity of the marginalized members of the society, the Muslim communities realized the need to make positive contributions to culture and society so as to win their battle for inclusion. Yet such battle is hard to be won as long as justice is not guaranteed to women and African American Muslims. In short, there can be no real participatory pluralism without getting women involved and incorporating the African American Muslim experience. 4) A commitment to the universality of Islam: Because Muslims have the moral and legal principles of pluralism available in their religious sources and heritages, and have had a long history of practicing pluralism; they can, according to “progressive Muslims”, be a constructive and effective contributor to contemporary global pluralism. “To be committed to the universality of Islam and to cope with our era of global pluralism,” argues Fathi Osman, “Muslims have to go beyond their bitter memories of history, including the Crusades, colonization, and exploitation, Jewish hostility and Hindu fanaticism. They have to approach Baha"is and Ahmadiyyas (. . .) Muslims cannot ignore each other in this rapprochement they should also bridge the gaps between the Sunni, Shi"iah (Zaydis, Ja"faris, Isma"ilis and Ibadis), and all other sects and subdivisions (. . .) Muslims ought to display the Quranic attitude towards human kind by extending the range of their dialogue to reach Hindus, Buddhists, Taoists, and other faiths. The Quran (7:172–173) teaches that every human being has his or her spirituality, morality, and dignity, all human beings can develop universal relations and maintain global pluralism. It is significant that the Quran calls the good “what is recognized by
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common sense” (ma"ruf ) and evil “what is rejected by common sense” (munkar).14 In spite of the glaring absence of African American Islam in the list, Osman’s view reflects a wider conception of pluralism that is based on global interfaith and intrafaith dialogues. Conclusion The radicalism of religious diversity that has become a fact since the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965 has made it evident that America’s diversity is much more radical than any of the foregoing formulas. Living in an epitome of the global village, some scholars of Islam in the US have advanced the pluralist state of mind further to become global in scope. The moral and legal principles of pluralism available in their religious sources and heritages, and the long history of practicing pluralism they have had can help them be a constructive and effective contributor to religious pluralism in America as well as to contemporary global pluralism. Whether this project will be implemented will depend on how to develop practical strategies and independent institutions to channel their ideas. References Ahlstrom, Sydney E. (1972). A Religious History of the American People. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Albanese, Catherine L. 1992. America Religions and Religion. 2nd ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Basinger, David (2002). Religious Diversity: A philosophical Assessment. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Bellah, Robert N. (1975). The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial. 2nd ed. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Brimelow, Peter (1995). Alien Nation: Common Sense about America’s Immigration Disaster. New York: Random House. Eck, Diana (1993). Encountering God. Boston: Beacon Press. —— (2001). A New Religious America: How a “Christian Country” has become the World’s Most Religiously Diverse Nation. New York: Harper Collins. Elias, Norbert (1994). The Established and the Outsiders: A Sociological Enquiry into Community Problems. London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.
14 Mohammed Fathi Osman, The Children of Adam: an Islamic Perspective on Pluralism, Washington, D.C.: Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding: History and International Affairs, 1996, p. 65.
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Fuchs, Lawrence H. (1990). The American Kaleidoscope: Race, Ethnicity, and Civic Culture. Hanover and London: University Press of New England. Gaustad, E.S. (1966). A Religious History of America. New York: Harper and Row. Glazer, Nathan (1997). We are all Multiculturalists Now. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Gutmann, Amy (ed.) (1999). Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Herberg, Will (1955). Protestant, Catholic, Jew: an essay in American religious sociology. Garden City: Doubleday. Hutchinson, William R. (2003). Religious Pluralism in America: The Contentious History of a Founding Ideal. New Haven: Yale University Press. Kallen, Horace M. (1924). Culture and Democracy in the United States: Studies in the Group Psychology of the American Peoples. New York: Boni and Liveright. Lippy, Charles H. (2000). Pluralism Comes of Age: American Religious Culture in the Twentieth Century. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharp. Lubarsky, Sandra B. (1994). Tolerance and Transformation: Jewish Approaches to Religious Pluralism. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press. Marty, Martin E. (1997). The One and the Many: America’s Struggle for the Common God. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Miller, John W. (1986). Interfaith Dialogue: Four Approaches. Waterloo, Ontario: University of Waterloo Press. Moore, R. Lawrence (1986). Religious Outsiders and the Making of Americans. New York/ Oxford: Oxford University Press. Muck, Terry C. (1990). Alien Gods on American Turf. Wheaton, Ill.: Victor Books. Myrdal, G. (1944). An American Dilemma. New York: Harper and Brothers. Osman, M. Fethi (1996). The Children of Adam: An Islamic Perspective on Pluralism. Washington, DC: Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding: History and International Affairs, Georgetown University. Richardson, E. Allen (1988). Strangers in this Land: Pluralism and the Response to Diversity in the United States. New York: Pilgrim Press. Robbins, Thomas, and Anthony, Dick (Eds.) (1981). In Gods We Trust: New Patterns of Religious Pluralism in America. New Brunswick, N.J. Transaction Books. Wentz, Richard, E. (1998). The Culture of Religious Pluralism. Colorado: Westview Press.
Work on Islam in America Al-Azmeh, Aziz (1996). Reconstituting Islam. Washington, D.C.: Center for MuslimChristian Understanding. Denffer, Ahmad Von (1980). Dialogue between Christians and Muslims. Leicester: Islamic Foundation. Dyrness, G.R., and Dyrness, A.E. (2002). Faith Works: Religious Communities Building Neighborhoods. CA: Center for Religion and civic Culture, University of Southern California. Findley, Paul (2001). Silent no more: confronting America’s false images of Islam. Beltsville, Maryland: Amana Publications. Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck (ed.) (2002). Muslims in the West: from Sojourners to Citizens. New York: Oxford University Press. —— (2002). Muslims in the West: from Sojourners to Citizens. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. —— (1991). The Muslims of America. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, and Smith, Jane Idleman (1993). Mission to America: Five Islamic Sectarian Communities in North America. Gainesville: University of Florida.
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Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, and Lummis Adair T. (1987). Islamic Values in the United States: A Comparative Study. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck and Esposito, John L. (eds.) (1998). Muslims on the Americanization Path? Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press. Hassan, Asma Gull (2002). American Muslims: the New Generation. New York: Continuum. Hathout, Maher (2002). Jihad vs. Terrorism. Los Angeles, CA: Multimedia Vera International. Hunter, Shireen (1998). The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence? Westport, Conn.: Praeger. Ibrahim, Anwar (1995). The Need for Civilizational Dialogue. Washington, D.C.: Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University. Khan, M.A. Muqtedar (2002). American Muslims: Bridging Faith and Freedom. Maryland: Amana publications. Lawrence, Bruce B. (2002). New Faiths Old Fears: Muslims and Other Asian Immigrants in American Religious Life. New York: Columbia University Press. Naff, Alixa (1985). Becoming American: The Early Arab Immigrant Experience. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein (1998). Islamic-Christian Dialogue: Problem and Obstacles to be Pondered and Overcome. Washington, D.C.: Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University. Nimer, Mohamed (2002). The North American Muslim Resource Guide: Muslim Community Guide in the United States and Canada. New York: Routledge. Smith, Jane I. (1999). Islam in America. New York: Columbia University Press. Safi, Omid, (Ed.) (2004). Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism. Oxford: One world Publications.
AMERICAN MUSLIMS AND US POLITICAL SYSTEM: TOWARDS A NEW ROLE Pakinam Rachad El Sharkawy University of Cairo ˆ| ‰La ˜μ| ‰La ∫a ÂßB Seeing American Muslims as a political power is still a hope more than a reality for Muslims. But this potentiality is becoming more and more feasible in the future not only in the eye of the American Muslims but other non-Muslim actors as well. The Muslim community is passing now through a very critical stage of its history; it is an era of transition and of developing. American Muslims are witnessing a reshaping process of their aims and ambitions. It is not a community searching for tolerance and acceptance anymore but for admission, influence and active role on a global scale. The American constitution’s protection of the free expression of religion is not the convenient approach to study the relation between American Muslims and the political system now a days and especially after 9/11. The political factors and security considerations play a major role in setting policies and shaping attitudes. September 11 was a turning point for Muslims in the US. Intensive rethinking and huge efforts emerged to enable them to follow up the events. The essay will focus on the evolution of Muslim community: its major characteristics, its political vision, its adopted tools, its organizations, its agenda and the political surrounding in which it has to act and move. Major Characteristics of the Muslim Community Muslims in the US are visible and vocal within the fabric of the American society. Muslims pray five times a day, fast one month a year and women wear veils, all of these are signs that make Muslim visible and noticed by the rest of society. Islam is one of the fastest growing religions in the United States. Some estimate that if the
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Muslim community’s growth continues at the current rate, Islam will be the second largest religion in terms of number of believers by 2015.1 Numerous indicators show the high potential of the Muslim community in the US: it was the same size as Hispanics 25 years ago, currently there are around seven million in the US, their annual population growth rate is 6% versus 0.9% for total US.2 Besides, American Muslims are younger, well educated and well-off financially than the American general public: while 67% of adult American Muslims are under 40 years old, 67% of the adult American population is over 40 years old. At the same time as 67% of American Muslims have Bachelor degree or higher, 44% of Americans have the same level of education.3 In addition, 66% of American Muslims earn over 50,000$ per year and 26% over 100,000$ per year in time that US average income is 42,158$ per year.4 On the other hand in regards to the occupations under-represented for Muslims, we found journalists, attorneys, actors and so on, while engineers and doctors are over represented. American Muslims are underrepresented in occupations that participate in making public policy and influence public opinion. Few American Muslims pursue Print/ TV/Film media. In the short term, American Muslims are unlikely to be in state legislatures and courts where laws are made and practiced.5 But the pattern had already begun to change by the increasing numbers of social studies students among American Muslims. Diversity is a major characteristic of Muslim community; it is comprised of a wide range of ethnic and professional mix. Mainly two sub-groups: immigrants and indigenous Americans or converts exist with different levels of conflict. Regarding the dilemma of American Muslim identity, we can distinguish two levels of analysis: the first concerning the whole community in its relation to the American
1 (In Arabic), Esam Abdel Shafi, The role of Muslim Minorities in the American Society, Master thesis, Faculty of Economic and Political Sciences, Cairo University, 2002, p. 50. 2 U.S. Census Data 2000, http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http:// www.allied-media.com/AM/Images/usmosmap.jpg&imgrefurl 3 Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 2001, http://images.google.com/imgres? imgurl=http://www.allied-media.com/AM/Images/usmosmap.jpg&imgrefurl 4 Cornell University April 2002, http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl= http://www.allied-media.com/AM/Images/usmosmap.jpg&imgrefurl 5 Cornell University April 2002, http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl= http://www.allied-media.com/AM/Images/usmosmap.jpg&imgrefurl
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society, and the second within the community itself in relation to immigrants and African Americans and between different ethnicities. One major question that is always asked in many circles and in varied circumstances is the following—do American Muslim majority perceive themselves as Americans or Muslims living in the US? To what extent the “Ommah” concept played a major role in the Muslim identification of themselves? Additionally, the wide distance between Muslim immigrants and their countries of origins did not determine the American identity of Muslims in the eyes of most Americans, but rather it has added complexity to the dilemma of “Muslim identity in America”. This problem is strongly related to national security and the formal perceptions towards the threats imposed by Muslim presence in the US, especially after 9/11. Three circles of identity” interacted within Muslims community: ethnic identity, religious identity and American identity. Ethnic identity is based on the principle of authenticity, the religious one is based on the principle of moral purpose and the American identity is based on the principle of citizenship. The interactions between these different circles have influenced the identity of Muslim community and created its distinctiveness. For some writers all these principles are frequently in conflict.6 But isn’t it the same situation for all other Americans? If we take a close look at every American citizen we will find the additional two circles of identities that coexist and affect the American circle of belonging (religiously and ethnically). Therefore, why is the doubt about Muslim loyalty only. The answer is more related to the new context in America which turn out to be more aggressive towards what is Islamic. A Growing Political Role Between Vision And Tool While many Muslims had faced major difficulties, a growing favor towards involvement into American political life emerges among American Muslims especially after September events. Until recently, most Muslims stayed clear of political involvement for many rea-
6
Agha Saeed, “Muslim-American politics: developments, debates and direction”, Phillipa Strum and Danielle Tarantolo (ed.), Muslims in the United States, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, 2003, p. 39.
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pakinam rachad el sharkawy Ethnicity of American Muslims
AfricanAmerican 30%
European 2%
Other 5%
Arab 25%
African 3% Southeast Asian 2%
South-Central Asian 33%
(Source: AZIZAH magazine)7
sons: many Muslim families are in the process of immigration whom they need some time to become eligible for naturalization, immigrants had no experience with effective participation in their countries of origin, others believe that their vote cannot make any difference, and some others believe that American policies will never benefit Muslims. Besides, a small minority feels that involvement in politics is religiously forbidden (Haram),8 they believe that American society is largely seeking-pleasure and morally corrupted, they are proud that Muslims suffer less from contemporary life problems. While some prefer avoiding the organized society, they propose instead to focus only on da waa (missionary call to Islam).9 However, this situation had dramatically changed, Muslim began to believe in the benefits of organizing the community which could wield significant influence in American politics. Many arguments 7 Muslim, http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://health.csuohio.edu/ healthculture/images/photos/chart1.gif&imgrefurl=http://health.csuohio.edu/healthculture/culture/muslim/muslim.htm 8 Jane I. Smith, Islam in America, Columbia University Press, New York, 1999, pp. 184–185. 9 Mohamed Amir, “Social and political institutions of American Muslim: liberty and civic responsibility”, Phillipa Strum and Danielle Tarantolo (ed), op. cit., p. 45.
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taken from the Sharia appear on the surface and have been widely noted like the Qur’anic verse 13:11 “God does not change the condition of a people until (first) change what is in their hearts”, a climate of initiative feasibility had risen. Some have cited that Muslim passivity is responsible for many of the current Muslims problems.10 Furthermore, mainstream Muslims consider a number of American values to be consistent with Islamic moral teachings such as liberty, hard work and clear institutionalization of political power which is present in the West more than in Muslim countries.11 Under Clinton leadership, many changes had occurred: new Muslim leaders appeared; and the seeds of enhancing Muslim political action to integrate the political system emerged. Shift towards social studies came out after a long period of focusing on hard sciences studies. The numbers employed in state department or in governmental agencies or as congressmen assistants had increased. Still, the public presence in politics and media is a completely new phenomena for Muslims (may be since 5 or 6 years).12 The American Muslims launch a new era of sharpening their public presence and augmenting their political participation. This new trend is showed in the figure on the following page reflecting a survey conducted among Muslim Americans. On the other hand, shifts appear on the tools levels as well in order to serve this new vision about the necessity of enhancing American Muslims public presence and influence. So, more diversification in tools used by Muslims was another aspect of Muslim community to express itself recently. In the 1992 election, Muslim indifference was obvious; latter the situation had changed slightly in 1996, especially after the event of World Trade Center in 1993, Oklahoma explosion later on and the widespread of bad images about Muslims. So, American Muslims began to perceive the necessity of action and exercising influence by social involvement in general and political one in particular. While the normal turnout of Americans in elections is low (60% of American do not turn out at polls), minorities like Jews and now 10
Jane I. Smith, op. cit., pp. 184–185. Mohamed Amir, op. cit., p. 45. 12 (In Arabic), Yehya Hendi, “The status of Islam and Muslim in The United State of America”, Nadia Mostafa (ed), The American policy towards Islam and Muslims: between cultural and civilizational aspects and strategical aspects, Dialogue among civilizations program, Cairo University, 2002, p. 117. 11
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Muslim Participation in American Society 80% Yes
70%
Yes
60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%
No No
0% Muslims Should Be Involved in American Institutions
Muslims Should Participate Politicaly
(Chart based on information from the Hartford Institute for Religious Research)13
Muslim enjoy higher level of turnout. So, the participation of these minorities can make a difference in election results.14 A more nuanced understanding of the American political system emerged.15 But still Muslims focus more on presidential election and Congressional one does not gain the same attention because Muslim political immaturity or of the difficulty of reunifying Muslim stance in the latter. 2000 Election was a turning point in regards to Muslim political participation. At this election, some Muslim immigrants debated whether their religion even allowed them to participate in democratic elections. But American Muslim leaders faced decisively this opinion saying that those questions are no longer valid, and began to work for high voter turnout in their communities. Specially that Muslims have sizable populations in swing states such as Ohio,
13 http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.allied-media.com/ AM/m 14 (In Arabic), “Arabs and Muslims in America; are they will play an essential role in the coming phase?”, www.Usinfo.Gov/Arabic. 15 Agha Saeed, op. cit., p. 43.
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Michigan and Florida and hope this will help them gain visibility in the usually tight presidential race. Already, they have been pleased with their representation at the Republican and Democratic conventions, according to Sayyid Syeed, secretary general of the Islamic Society. In 2000, major Muslim organizations made their first collective endorsement of a presidential candidate, backing George W. Bush. However, many Muslim leaders said they came to regret that decision after Sept. 11. Disappointment with the performance and the policies of Bush administration led to Muslims reconsider their bloc vote in 2004 presidential election. A major concern was seen because of the USA Patriot Act which has made all Muslims suspects. The Bush administration has defended the law as critical for national security. Polls indicated that most U.S. Muslims had planned to vote for Democrat John Kerry.16 Statistics show that American Muslim majority had voted against Bush in presidential election in 2004, but their votes did not lead to its fall as it had lead to its victory in 2000. Two important targets emerge to increase the political weight of Muslim community to encourage political participation: helping register voters and cheering Muslim candidates to run for public office. As a consequence of increasing awareness among American Muslims, the number of eligible and registered voters will grow rapidly in the near future. There is definitely great potential that the Muslim vote may become a swing vote and could certainly affect the outcome of the elections. American Muslims like any other ethno-religious group living in US is affected by important factors in determining the level of political participation in elections and the political choice between candidates. Three sets of issues are significant in determining the political affiliation of Muslims in America: 1) race, rights, and welfare; 2) values and religious issues; and 3) American policy on foreign and international conflicts, especially where Muslims are involved. Two more factors, namely, the image of the party and personality of a candidate, are also important.17
16 Rachel Zoll, American Muslims focus on election, civil rights at annual meeting, September 4, 2004 http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.detnews.com/pix/2004/09/04/american_muslims.jpg&imgrefurl= 17 Interview With Zahid Bukhari, Muslims in American Politics, October 2004, http://www.masnet.org/contempissue.asp?id=1763
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At the ISNA annual conference in 2004 Muslims had emphasized the importance of voting as the Muslim community struggles for political recognition. Furthermore, call for Muslims to run for public office is raised. Since the middle of 1980s a number of Political Action Committees (PACs), such as the ISNA-PAC, attention was given to the importance of having more Muslim lobbyists.18 Financial contributions to political candidates are an indicator of political involvement, many individuals contribute directly to candidates, and others channel their contributions through political action committees (PACs). Some community contributions to congressional candidates are driven by local concerns (zoning permits for mosques, the resolution of parking and traffic problems).19 Another new development is running for public office. In 2000, there were 700 Muslim-American candidates on different levels, 153 were elected. In 2002 the number was fewer than 50, but higher percentage won. In 2000 four Muslim Americans were elected to state legislatures and in 2002 the number rose to six.20 A maturity indicator surfaces when the Muslim community supports candidates on the basis of its own interests, not on ethnicity or religion. American Muslims rely more on the positions of candidates towards important issues, first civil rights then Iraq and Palestine, the example was when Muslims support Congressman Pete Stark in California 13th District in 2002 at the expense of a Muslim candidate running against him.21 Lobbying appears as a new domain of interest for American Muslims. They adopted “constructive engagement” by focusing on direct lobbying. For example, MPAC orchestrated efforts to create community based linkages between Muslims and law enforcement officials in order to project an image of Muslims as law-abiding. During times of orange alert MPAC has served as a liaison with local police departments and FBI offices to create an environment of openness and cooperation. By enhancing the partnership between American Muslim organizations and law enforcement personnel, the aim of strengthening efforts against terrorism is achieved. It is a proactive step to dispel the belief that Muslims represent a threat to American security. On the other hand, educate others about Islam, Islamic centers— even those that had not particularly encouraged interfaith activities 18 19 20 21
Jane I. Smith, op. cit., p. 186. Mohamed Amir, op. cit., p. 52. Agha Saeed, op. cit., p. 43. Ibid., pp. 43–44.
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in the past—have held “open mosque” activities.22 In the aftermath of September 11, organizations such as CAIR had urged Muslim communities to hold open houses and Islamic centers to bring people of other faiths into their neighborhoods. The object is to build bridges within the local environment and promote a better understanding of Islam and Muslims. It is an attempt to create positive links with their surrounding on many levels: the ordinary non Muslim citizen and the local authority (like inviting the city mayor, the chief of police and members of the city council). The “open house” model reflects a revitalization of faith in the face of adversity.23 Furthermore, American Muslims had begun to take refuge in the judiciary to defend their rights. In November 2002, 16 American civil rights organizations had raised a lawsuit against the American government demanding the justice department to provide enough information about the detainees since 9/11.24 Some organizations like CAIR and The Arab Committee for Fighting Discrimination had moved in cooperation with American Union for Civil Liberties for contesting the constitutionality of some articles of the Patriot Act. Also individuals have gone to American courts to fight discriminations against Muslims in work places. Using judicial tools is a new general trend within the Muslim community. Despite its high cost, Muslims had insisted on using this tool to defend their civil rights and the image of their religion.25 Also, American Muslims had taken initiatives for more unification in educational institutions or work place in order to build a front for defending their cases and developing the awareness of Islam. The results were positive some times when they had succeeded in allocating places for worship in some American schools or helping the Muslim employees to return to their jobs which they had lost after September 11.26 22
Mohamed Amir, op. cit., p. 57. Kathleen M. Moore, “Open house: visibility, knowledge and integration of Muslims in the United State”, Phillipa Strum and Danielle Tarantolo (ed), op. cit., p. 71. 24 (In Arabic), Alaa Bayoumi, “September events had increased Muslim activity in America”, 9–6–2002, p. 1320 www.islamonline.net. 25 (In Arabic), “The experience of America Muslim on the political domain after two years of September”, Palestine Magazine, 10/11/2003, p. 11. 26 (In Arabic), “Nesma Sherif, Muslim of The United States of America between reaction and initiative”, My nation in the world, Center of civilizational studies, Cairo, 2003, p. 75. 23
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From on the long term perspective, American Muslims had realized the importance of rebuilding an infrastructure base on all level: culture, education, media and service in order to fit into the American society and complete the process of integration. Along with having advanced education in medicine, business administration, and computer sciences, the Muslims tend also to excel in the social sciences, law, communications, journalism, media, political science, sociology, and international relations. During this era of institution building, they plan to establish Muslim universities and hospitals, as well as think tanks and research centers for public policy in America.27 Adding media resources will help American Muslims in building positive image and political influence. The first nationwide American Muslim TV network began operations at the end of 2004. Bridges TV began broadcasting on the GlobeCast World TV satellite system. The network’s launch is the fruit of more than three years of work that began not long after 9/11. Bridges TV declares that its intention is to “fuse American culture with the values of Islam in a healthy and family-oriented way.”28 Although Muslim political involvement is increasing, still it is important to note that Muslim American participation varies from places where Muslims have difficulty expressing themselves within the rigid structure to other where representation of Muslim concerns on the local agenda is exchanged for political support. These measures can be used on a community by community basis to determine a scale of hospitality. For example a limited hospitality could be given in regions with a strong presence of anti-Muslim organizations.29 In addition, comparing with Arab American who had reached a more developed stage in their political participation, American Muslims are still in their first step in this direction. Many indicators could identify a relatively more advanced political role for American Arabs. In different elections of 2002, around 39 Arab American candidates had run for House representative, Senate, state legislatures, city council seats and other posts. 27 from them had won (6 for the congress).
27 Interview With Zahid Bukhari, op. cit., http://www.masnet.org/contempissue. asp?id=1763 28 Spencer Robert, “Is the New American Muslim TV Network Really Moderate?”, December 6, 2004, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200412/ ai_n9472021 29 Kathleen M. Moore, op. cit., p. 69.
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Besides the 88,5% of Arab Americans who are registered to vote, only African Americans and Jewish Americans have a higher percentage of voter registration. The national Arab American registered voter database indicates that they are well represented in 55 congressional districts in USA, making up between 1,5% and 4,5% of the total voting population.30 The Arab lobbies enjoy a relatively longer history in comparison with the American Muslim organizations. It had succeeded in pushing American Arabs into good posts within important institutions like the Congress in which six Arab Congressmen in the first administration of Bush and Spenser Ibraham for the ministry of energy. In 2000 election both lobbies, Arabs and Muslim, could not unify their endorsement behind one presidential candidate, while Arabs had tended to support Al Gore—Muslims see the Republican candidate Bush a better choice. In general the American Muslims enjoy a loose commitment to parties. That is why they could benefit from political maneuvers between the two big parties depending mainly on the attitude towards important issues.31 Empowerment is the main object of Muslim political participation. Muslim organizations had succeeded in some achievements: making the stereotyping of Muslims a matter of public debate, resolving many incidents of discrimination, mobilizing support regarding the treatment of Muslims by the government and the media. But still all theses engagement are estimated by some as “soft press-release politics and photo-op events” with little funds collected. But despite the modest results, a political shift happened in the Muslim attitude towards more participation in the system. The process has led to the emergence of leaders other than the traditional Imam, whose contributions are associated with mosque activity. So, Muslims are internalizing the value of functional specialization and prompting the roles of specialists in their community.32 Engaging in public debate and building coalitions has been recognized as an efficient way of self expressing and building influence.
30 “Facts on Arab American voters”, Arab American Institute, Estimates based on 2000 US Census data, Arab American Institute (AAIF) research, and AAIFcommissioned surveys, p. 4. 31 (In Arabic), Alaa Bayoumi, op. cit., p. 1319 www.islamonline.net. 32 Mohamed Amir, op. cit., pp. 57–58.
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The evolution of American Muslim organizations: its agenda and coalitions is a crucial indicator of this trend and it will be analyzed separately in the following section. Organizational Factor The institutional growth is remarkable: from one organization (a mosque) in the mid 20s33 to more than 250 in 1985, to 500 in 1995 to 5167. The center, the mosque, the economic and political institute, the college and organization became interested in human rights in 2003.34 The idea of organizing Muslims in US began with the formation of the Federation of Islamic Organizing in 1952 (named later Federation of Islamic Associations—FIA). Then a series of Islamic organizations appeared, the most important one was the Muslim Student Association—MSA. While the FIA had tended to emphasize ethnic identities among immigrant Muslims, the MSA had the goal to strengthen national and international ties among Muslims of all origins. Under the general structure of the MSA, a number of organizations were established like: North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), Islamic Teaching Center (ICS) which deal with financial interests and educational and cultural issues. Several other groups emerged under the aegis of the MSA focusing on the professional expertise, for example: the Islamic Medical Association (IMA), the American Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS), the Association of Muslim Businessmen and Professionals (AMBP) and the Association of American Muslim Scientists and Engineers (AMSE). The MSA grew and had become the strongest Islamic cultural center in North America. But later, by 1981 the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) became the overseeing body for a great number of emerging Islamic organizations that are functioning with their own boards and committees but responsible to ISNA and its executive council (Majlis Al-Shura).35 More than 129 affiliated organizations and an average of 30,000 Muslims attend ISNAs annual convention.36 33
Ibid., p. 45. (In Arabic), Yehya Hendi, op. cit., pp. 116–117. 35 Jane I. Smith, op. cit., pp. 170–171. 36 Farida Ejaz, “Muslim culture & diversity in US”, http://images.google.com/ imgres?imgurl=http://health.csuohio.edu/healthculture/images/photos/chart1.gif&imgre furl=http://health.csuohio.edu/healthculture/culture/muslim/muslim.htm 34
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Although ISNA is designed for all American Muslims, some African Americans still perceived it as primary devoted to the needs of the immigrant community. Another national organization of Muslims is the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), which is known for its strict adherence to the spirit and the law of Islam. Efforts to build bridges for easing the tensions between ISNA and ICNA had increased recently. ISNA focuses more on pressing social and political concerns than ICNA and less on spiritual guidance for American Muslims. As for Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA) formed in 1993, it stated the revival of Islam and the fulfillment of the Muslim needs as a goal. On the other hand, American Muslim women organizations are growing rapidly, e.g., the Muslim Women Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (KARAMA), the North American council for Muslim Women and the International Muslim Artists (IMAN), all of which work to promote the welfare of American Muslim women and to connect them on an international scale.37 Muslims are forming groups at all local, regional, gender and professional levels. More organizations related to political sphere were created recently. The American Muslim Council (AMC) in Washington, DC is a nonprofit and sociopolitical organization and was established in 1990 with the broad objective of increasing Muslim participation in political process. Besides promoting ethical values, it works to educate voters about electoral process. Many conferences have been held indicating an escalated interest in developing political power for Muslims. AMC is campaigning for official recognition of the two Islamic Eids.38 The organization leaders emphasized the creation of a new atmosphere, in which Muslims would feel more welcome at government offices, by increasing public recognition of Muslims in American society through enhancing public official’s knowledge about Muslims.39 The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) is a bipartisan organization that also concentrates on voter education and to decide political choices within Islamic framework. This organization is present at both political parties’ conventions: Republican and Democratic.40 Another politically involved organization, the American Alliance (AMA) works to foster Muslim participation in the American electoral 37 38 39 40
Jane I. Smith, op. cit., p. 171. Ibid., pp. 172–173. Mohamed Amir, op. cit., p. 51. Jane I. Smith, op. cit., pp. 172–173.
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process, both by voting and by running for public office. So, AMA has invested in political education and grass-roots mobilization. The defeat of Senator Larry Pressler, author of legislation that imposed sanctions on Pakistan, was a major achievement of this group.41 The Muslim American Alliance—MAA is a young and recent organization dedicated to organize Muslims into a major voting bloc at the national level. A focus on providing Muslim candidates for school boards and municipal posts, working for the election of Muslim mayors and state legislators, and planning for an eventual Muslim presence on the American Supreme Court had begun. A plan for widening the type and efficiency of political participation is sited: first registering Muslims to vote, participating in the American political system, and then becoming influential political activists.42 Besides establishing organizations, forming coalitions and alliances between different Muslim groups is an important trend that was adopted in an accelerated way since September 11. Reaching the Muslim grassroots is a challenge that can be fulfilled through multigroup collaboration. The Muslim public affairs groups established the American Muslim Political Coordination Council (AMPCC) in 1998. It started a dialogue with the council of presidents of ArabAmerican Organizations. These two organizations identified their shared priorities as increasing voter registration, eliminating the use of secret evidence and influencing US policy.43 In January 2002, a group of American Muslim organizations had declared the establishment of an American civil rights organizations new coalition to focus the political and media attention on the harms done to American civil rights in the aftermath of September 11 and to encourage the Congress to enlarge its role in the protection of these rights. Many American Arab and Muslim organizations had participated in this alliance: CAIR, AMC and MPAC in addition to other American civil rights organizations: The American Arab Institute (AAI), American Civil Law Union (ACLU), National movement alliance, Judicial Defense for Mexican American Fund, African in Government organization and African leaders organization.44 In the
41 42 43 44
Mohamed Amir, op. cit., p. 52 Jane I. Smith, op. cit., p. 185. Mohamed Amir, op. cit., p. 52. (In Arabic) Alaa Bayoumi, op. cit., p. 1320.
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same year also, eight Muslim organizations had established “American Muslim Taskforce” (AMT) to encourage the political involvement of Muslims and to defend Muslim civil rights.45 Recent efforts had been also made to coordinate the advice given to Muslim voters about the issues and position of candidates. Six organizations (including AMC, MPAC and CAIR) formed a national Coordination Committee for the exchange and dissemination of information.46 In 2003, the American Muslim Council and the American Muslim Alliance decided to merge as the Muslim American Congress, raising the prospect of greater efficiency through resources consolidation.47 The joint forum of the National Islamic Shura Council, which consists of the leadership of all major organizations, is another hope in that field, many Muslims think that it should become functional and it should establish an effective secretariat in Washington D.C. This forum is seen as a means for Muslim leadership in America to present the Muslim agenda for domestic and international affairs.48 On the other hand, September 11 had enhanced the relation between immigrants and African Americans within the Muslim community. The long history of the latter in struggling for civil rights had created a rapprochement with the critical situation of Muslims after 9/11 and the African Americans in general. Then we could notice an emerging coalition between African Americans and American Muslims.49 Muslims are more aware of the importance of their internal solidarity, call for looking beyond cultural and ethnical identities and focus on their commonality as Muslims. Within Muslim African Americans, Warith Deen Mohammed and his associates have founded the Coalition for Good Government to provide political vision for Muslim Americans. By engaging in the process of bringing Muslims into Sunni Islam and denouncing NOI policy of urging its members not to participate in American society, a greater participation of
45 “The establishment of American Muslim Taskforce for the participation of American Muslim in presidential election”, Islamic news agency, 20 of February 2002. 46 Jane I. Smith, Islam in America, Columbia University Press, New York, 1999, p. 186. 47 Mohamed Amir, op. cit., p. 57. 48 Interview With Zahid Bukhari, op. cit., http://www.masnet.org/contempissue. asp?id=1763 49 Agha Saeed, op. cit., p. 42.
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Muslims in local and national political life had begun. So, in the context of the new emerging atmosphere both immigrants and African Americans are headed for playing prominent role on the American political scene.50 Institutional development among Muslim organizations was a major consequence of September 11. Besides, greater cooperation among different organizations and more professionalization came out of this situation. The middle level leadership of Muslim ethnic groups: African Americans, Arab American, Pakistani American had begun to move closer together, forming coalitions and adopting common positions. Communication had been increased and intensified between generations and sub communities creating a common vision. A shared perception had been born about participation following a growing dialogue between traditionalists and modernists. Emphasis had been shifted from elite to grassroots organizations. This was obvious during the “Immigration and Naturalization Service registration” that took place in 2003. This activity was not initiated by an elite organization such as the Association of Pakistani Physicians of North America but rather grassroots organization like the Pakistan-American Democratic forum in the name of providing Muslim Americans with the necessary legal and support services.51 American Muslims are fairly better well integrated on the local level: parent-teacher associations, chambers of commerce, professional associations, school boards, rotary clubs and interfaith councils.52 As for the Mosque as an organizational unit for Muslims, it was always an important feature and it is compatible with Islamic Sharia and traditions. Mosques and Islamic schools address worship and educational matters while charities and organizations focus on the social and political domains.53 Of course, we could find some intersection from time to time. Muslims used a different perspective for mosques as God’s house and no regular membership as in American congregations. The identity of around 2000 mosques is in flux, because it is a place of worship without members, so as a result financial contribution was not sufficient. Gradual adoption of the American congregational model 50
Jane I. Smith, op. cit., p. 186. Agha Saeed, op. cit., p. 43. 52 Philippa Strum, “Executive summary”, Phillipa Strum and Danielle Tarantolo (ed.), op. cit., p. 2. 53 Mohamed Amir, op. cit., p. 46. 51
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means that Muslims began to see themselves as members of specific mosques and became more involved financially and in day to day management.54 But we could say that despite its short history, American mosques are—in general—success stories, they are increasing in numbers and growing in size. The major challenge is the uneasy position of the imam in the mosque and the absence of identity of mosques as congregations.55 Depending on a permanent leader is not an easy choice for many reasons: financial consideration is one among several. In addition, the type and the background of this leader is under serious reconsideration, because of the difficult integration of most of the overseas Imams, who found difficulty in understanding the society that they are living in and as a consequences to respond correctly to the needs and dilemmas of American Muslims. Thus, having more American imams is a new asset for Muslims in US because they will be better able to adjust in American society. American Muslim Agenda Visitors who had a chance to enter any Islamic center or mosque or Muslim organization will first hear a common argument raised by most—if not all Muslim leaders, which is: we have our own agenda, our own problems and our own approaches, and do not expect us to be the advocates of Islamic world stances. American Muslims had first to face their own crisis and dilemmas that they suffer in US. While American Muslim agenda is composed of important critical issues covering both: internal and external areas, there has been a major shift in agenda, from concern with external issues to a focus on internal ones. Due to the new tense atmosphere in US, civil rights protection had seized the most attention of American Muslims. Besides, in order to influence American foreign policy, the Muslim community had first to be involved in the domestic affairs of the United States. The internal consequences of September events had provoked Muslim community in US, but it did not create completely new
54
Philippa Strum, op. cit., p. 3. Ihsan A. Bagby, “Imams and mosque organization in the United States”, Phillipa Strum and Danielle Tarantolo (ed.), op. cit., p. 113. 55
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topics of interest, and it had increased the degree of attention by focusing on old issues and had reshuffled its hierarchy. In addition, agenda setting is altered towards being an internal affair in the hands of organizations located in US rather than dictated by events overseas. A significant observation had to be made while discussing Muslim agenda: the classification of Muslim stance had to depend on issue criteria, not on one ideological or partisan general trend that include the entire debatable subjects in one comprehensive stance. It is difficult to describe US Muslims either liberal or conservative; they favor liberal programs in the area of health, poverty and environment but are obviously conservative on social issues.56 Islamic politics would seem to be more compatible with conservatism because of religious and value issues, but becomes more compatible with American liberalism when the issues of rights, race, and the welfare of small groups are taken into consideration.57 Some conservatives have embraced Muslims as potential allies on family-centered social agendas. Meanwhile frictions between Muslims and Jews are high regarding the issue of Jerusalem.58 Looking at the year 2000, the Republican Party seems to be harvesting more fruit from Muslim participation at the presidential level, while the Democratic Party will enjoy more benefits at the level of Congress.59 Muslims in America are divided fairly among Democrats, Republicans and independents. Different alternatives had been adopted showing a new phase of sharper efforts and wider perspective among American Muslims. One of the scenarios discussed is looking at a third party, for example the American Muslim Political Coordination Council had endorsed the Green party candidate for governor of California as well as candidates from the Libertarian Party. In regards to internal issues, two important dilemmas seized most of the attention, the first is to improve the image of Muslim and Islam within the American context and the second is related to bad consequences of the first: Muslim civil rights violation and how to restrain it. A primary goal for all Muslims is to get recognition for
56
Philippa Strum, op. cit., p. 2. Interview With Zahid Bukhari, op. cit., http://www.masnet.org/contempissue. asp?id=1763 58 Mohamed Amir, op. cit., p. 53. 59 Interview With Zahid Bukhari, op. cit., http://www.masnet.org/contempissue. asp?id=1763 57
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Muslims as legitimate and contributing sector of American society and not to see Islam as a foreign religion transplanted into American soil. The repositioning of Islam as an element of American national interest and not as a threat to it depends mainly on American Muslims. “We are this nation,” said Kareem Irfan, chairman of the Council of Islamic Organizations of Greater Chicago. This statement confirms the first goal of all American Muslims who try to prove it after 9/11. The impact of September events was obvious regarding a new set of priorities for Muslim agenda. Presentations had been made on defending Islam against prejudice, creating ties with leaders of other faiths and preserving Muslim civil rights during the domestic war on terrorism.60 Current Muslim leaders are those who arrived after the liberalization of immigration laws in 1965 or second generation Muslims, or “a generation and a half ” (born overseas but educated in US). The common link between them is that they have been reared in the post civil rights environment in which values of equality and justice have become at least “law on the book if not law in action”. The apparent gap between promise and reality has led Muslim Americans to join the political action. Within this context, interpreting the right Islamic life style was not the first target anymore but broadening the interest to include a functional understanding of American society.61 Although Muslim organizations had criticized the record of human rights and civil rights protection in US, they keep emphasizing that trust in American administration still exists but the rejection is mainly toward the discrimination in implementing the law and the lack of transparency.62 Meanwhile, American Muslims shifted from a community seeking tolerance to a bold proactive one, which was not an easy process. The language adopted by Muslim organizations had witnessed different tones, first a passive one in which no direct critics appeared, then the strategy had changed from just opposing to taking practical procedures, such as holding meeting with representatives of FBI office for discussing Muslim demands to know infor-
60 61 62
Rachel Zoll, op. cit., http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl Kathleen M. Moore, op. cit., pp. 73–74. (In Arabic) Nesma Sherif, op. cit., p. 75.
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mation about the Muslim detainees and meeting with American ministry of transportation to discuss the harassments that many Muslims deal with in the airports and airplanes. So in this new phase they do not stop any criticism for the American policies—as was the case after 9\11 immediately, when they were seeking to enhance the solidarity of the American society to face the crisis. But, all the time Muslims had kept stressing on their loyalty to US and that they criticize the government as American citizens.63 American Muslims are deeply concerned with growing anti-Islamic feelings especially after 9/11. Challenging prejudice against Islam in America is one of the primary tasks of many of the Muslim organizations: various efforts to ensure accurate and unbiased information about Islamic religion in the text books and curricular materials in public school. Also on the media levels, many interviews and meetings are held to fight misinformation about Muslims in US.64 Many mosques have been so successful in reaching out to those of other faiths that non-Muslims sometimes outnumber Muslims at Friday prayers. In this regards, the ISNA has made gains, working with The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops and the National Council of Churches, which represents mainline Protestant and Orthodox churches. On the other hand, Muslims aim at building relations with other faiths as a model of tolerance for fellow Muslims overseas. “As Muslim Americans, we can set that example”.65 It is a new approach to present themselves in a new way for all Muslims around the world. Dr Zahid Bukhari said that The Muslim community has at least three roles to perform on this continent. One is to function as a minority group seeking to protect its rights. Another is to represent the larger Muslim Ummah by struggling to help out Muslims around the world in difficult times. The third responsibility of Muslims and the Muslim Ummah in America is to bring the wisdom of Islam to promote social justice and political responsibility in America for all citizens.66 Influencing American foreign policy is still on the Muslim agenda but not with the same importance and emphasis as before. 63
Ibid., p. 75. Jane I. Smith, op. cit., p. 173. 65 Rachel Zoll, op. cit., http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl. 66 Interview With Zahid Bukhari, op. cit., http://www.masnet.org/contempissue. asp?id=1763 64
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American Muslim groups rejected al-Qaeda attempt to blame the US for the Muslim problems around the world. As for Iraqi issue, there was some happiness about Saddam Hussein’s fall. However, there was concern over the question of the lengthy occupation. No direct and hard condemnation statement was made when the US began bombing Baghdad perhaps because of prevailing misgivings about the war and the Iraqi regime67 and the delicate situation of American Muslims. Within the External affairs agenda, Palestine issue still seized a noticeable attention even after 9/11, demonstration was the main tool to express this interest, and for example American Muslims held the biggest demonstration on 20th of April 2002. Usually greater the crisis in the course of solving Arab Israeli conflicts more the interest of American Muslims in Palestine. They used intensively and efficiently the Internet to expose the Israeli violations of human rights and its inhuman aggressions on Palestinians.68 Both Iraqi and Palestinian issues occupy top of the Muslim American external agenda. The American Muslims Political Context Both Muslim community status and agenda are influenced by the political context that surrounds Muslims in US. This environment could (and should) impose changes on the American Muslim ambition and situation. Muslim arrival to America passed through the same phases that all other ethnicities and different religious believers had experienced. Muslims arrived in waves depending on US immigration laws. Quota systems for particular nations curtailed the number of Muslims entering the country. After 1965 immigration act repealed the quotas based on national diversity in US. Entering the country was not based on national or ethnic origin. More than half of the newcomers were Muslim.69 Until that phase, there were no direct discriminatory laws issued that targeted Muslims only, but non European immigrants in general, and it was not the case post 1965.
67
Mohamed Amir, op. cit., p. 55. (In Arabic), Alaa Bayoumi, “Movement and aims of American Muslim on the political domain for the near future”, www.Arabmail.com 69 Jane I. Smith, op. cit., p. 52. 68
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A legally neutral environment towards Muslims for developing their cultural infrastructure was established. For example, the contributions to constructions of Islamic centers are made tax deductible and it was vital that these centers are built in order to provide Islamic environment for worship and education for Muslims.70 Before September events, several sensitivities came out between the system and its tolerant attitude towards Muslims, co-existence and mutual acceptance still dominate the American society as an immigrant society in the first place. Even after Oklahoma incidents some changes appear but did not threaten the system based on liberal integration of different religious and ethnic communities within one fabric of the American society. Before September 11, some positive developments had happened to change relatively the course of the relationship between Muslims and the American system: The senate issued on 27 July 1999—unanimously and without amendment—the decision number 133 in which there is recognition of the big achievements made by 6 million Muslims in US and President Clinton had appointed Islam Sediq— an Indian Muslim—as deputy of agriculture ministry for marketing and organizational programs (it is the highest post for a Muslim).71 And, the first Islamic invocation before the House of Representatives was in 1991 and at the senate in 1992. Since 1996, the White house has invited Muslims to a celebration of Eid al Fitr. In addition, a few Muslims have been appointed to public office.72 But, after 9/11, the relation between Muslims and US system had witnessed major disturbances that cannot be similar to any problems of the past. We can notice a change in the sensitivities between both actors. American politicians and American Muslim leaders realize that a greater cooperation between the Muslim community and US political system is an essential goal especially in post 9/11. But each side adopts a different approach to achieve this target. President Bush always reaffirmed the views of respecting Islam as a religion of peace and respect of others, and further he said that the negative comments by clergy or others do not reflect the views
70 71 72
Ibid., p. 154. (In Arabic), Esam Abdel Shafi, op. cit., pp. 167–169. Mohamed Amir, op. cit., p. 51.
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of US government or the American people.73 On the other hand, within the program of improving the American image which can be considered as a public relation campaign, US government agencies had relied on many Islamic figures that advocate the diversity of the American society and emphasized the positive side of the relationship between the system and the Muslims. Other positive signals appeared from the system itself: The US Senate considered a resolution in 2003 condemning bigotry and violence against Muslim Americans, Arab Americans, South Asian Americans, and Sikh Americans, all groups that have been targeted for hate crimes since the terrorist attacks of September 11. These communities are peaceful and law abiding and thousands of its members had served in law enforcement and the military and demonstrated their loyalties to US.74 September 11 had increased the degree of attention towards American Muslims and their representatives. Several indicators appeared in that regard: Many of the Muslim organizations had increased in value for the officials and the politicians. For the first time, the US president has visited Muslim place of worship at the Islamic center of Washington D.C. in December 2002 to celebrate the end of Ramadan with the Muslim community.75 Then, a meeting and press conference was held at the Congress attended by 35 Congressmen who called on the Americans not to attack Muslims, and not accuse Islam or Muslims, “Muslims are part of the American the social fabric”.76 President Bush held three meetings with Muslim leaderships like Omar Ahmed and Nihad Awad during September 2001 (at 14, 17 and 26). On Ramadan many representatives had organized Iftar in cooperation with CAIR. So, on the level of formal discourse, the language of wisdom, rejection of any aggression against Muslims and appreciation for Muslim role in the American society was dominant.77 Even the Arab Americans had experienced an increased attention from the system, for example: for the first time since its foundation 73 “Bush says vast majority of American respect Islam and its followers”, 13 November 2002, www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/sasia/text/1113bush.htm 74 Kathleen M. Moore, op. cit., p. 73. 75 “Bush wishes Muslims “health, happiness, and prosperity on Eid al-Fitr”, www.usinfo.state.gov\regional\nea\sasia\text\1205eid.htm 76 (In Arabic), Yehya Hendi, op. cit., p. 118. 77 (In Arabic), Nesma Sherif, op. cit., p. 74.
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in 1985, number of officials and candidates from both parties, Republican and democrat, had attended the conference of Arab Muslim Institute National Leadership in December 2002.78 Meanwhile, a wide gap between the formal discourse of US government and its policy and attitude persists since September 11. While the formal discourse of top level officials is friendly and constructive, several statements that come from middle range officials indicate more confrontational vision and attitude. For example, the inflammatory remarks made by Congressman Peter P. King against Muslim Americans on 9 February 2004 saying that a vast majority of American Muslim community leaders are “an enemy living among us”, adding that “no American Muslim is cooperating” with law enforcement officials to combat terrorism. He mentioned also that 80–85% of mosques in US are controlled by Islamic fundamentalists.79 In addition, the Congressmen, who supported Muslim issues had suffered from negative pressures which led to their loss in the election of 2002.80 On a wider scale, American Muslims face a wave of aggression in the aftermath of September 11. CAIRE had issued several reports in this regard, for example in the week following September 11, 417 incidents had been registered; the figures include all the incidents in 2000. Then, we could notice a pattern, on 25 September 2001, 652 complaints, on 22 October the number was 960 and on 20 November it was 1452 indicating aggression against Muslims in the American society. The reports estimated that the acts of discrimination of tripled in 2002 in comparison with 2001.81 In public sphere, many indicators show the uneasy climate that they live in: misunderstanding, intolerance and misrepresentation of Islam in school textbooks and hard negotiations to observe the essentials of their faith (e.g., performing prayers). All the complaints are usually handled on a case by case basis.82 There is no clear firm pattern of fighting discrimination defended by formal circles. 78 David Shelby, “Arab-American Conference draws eight presidential candidates”, 16 October 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov\xarchives\disply.html 79 Samina F. Sundas, “Protest NYC Congressman’s inflammatory remarks against American Muslims”, February 17, 2004, http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl= http://www.notinourname.net/graphics/king.jpg&imgrefurl 80 (In Arabic), Alaa Bayoumi, “Muslim status in US during 2002”, My nation in the world report, Civilizational studies center, Cairo, 2003, p. 1300. 81 Ibid., p. 1300. 82 Mohamed Amir, op. cit., p. 50.
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On policy level, American government exercised several negative procedures and issued laws that can easily target Muslims. Before 9/11 Muslim relief groups have increasingly sought grants from government, for example Mercy financial statements in 1998 showed that 21% of the funds came from federal government grants. But in post 9/11 Bush administration decided to scrutinize Muslim community charity groups. A number of these organizations has been closed under the charge of having links to terrorism. Holy Land foundation (HLF), Global Relief Foundation (GRF), Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) and Help the Needy. These gestures have been accompanied by the freezing of accounts of other charities. Suspicion about individual board members had stifled the charity work within the Muslim community. The arguments of these groups is based on the inhumanity of denying food and medical assistance to refugees. But on the other hand, some other leaders and organizations had adopted a more passive reaction like those of who belong to the organization called ‘Help the Needy’. And, despite the disruption caused by Bush administration to the large scale of Muslim charitable activities new charities like Kinder USA and Kind Hearts have been created. In response, some signals had re-appeared to deny charges of anti-Muslim bias. The American government awarded Mercy a grant to deliver school lunches to poor Albanian children at the same time that the administration issued its decision to close down other charities.83 American Muslim experience of politics has been full of uncertainties. Political candidates befriend them when they need their votes but give them a cold shoulder once in office. President Bush has felt no urgency to fulfill his 2000 campaign promise to do away with the secret evidence clause of the 1996 anti-terrorism law. Even the administration showed little interest in meeting with the Muslim and Arab community organizations until September 11.84 Latter, the Patriot act added more tension to the relations between Muslims and the US system. Bush administration has used secret evidence more than its predecessors in detaining Arab and Muslim men without charge and freezing Muslim businesses and charities chartered under US law as
83 84
Ibid., p. 50. Ibid., p. 55.
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American corporations. Supporters of those measures see themselves as part of the war on terror in which security comes first before civil rights. In many cases, the government has pursued a policy of “arrest first and investigate later”, effectively violating the constitutional guarantee of due process. Further more, Patriot act issued on 26 of October, 2001 gave the American authorities exclusive power to exercise against Muslims in expanding search and surveillance procedures in an unprecedented way. The claim of Muslims is still the same: it is a civil rights violation. Other measures initiated by Bush administration were discriminatory: the selective detentions, secret hearings and deportations of Muslims, the special registration requirements for immigrants from Muslim countries, the “Voluntary interviews” with thousands of US visa holders from those countries, the raids on Muslim owned business and homes, and the surveillance of Muslim worship places. Theses procedures followed the rushed passage of the USA PATRIOT act of 2001. The statute gave the department of justice the power to detain non-citizens indefinitely, to use foreign intelligence as evidence in law enforcement and to arrest people and seize property without regard for the Bill of Rights.85 In addition, the American authorities had taken some little mistakes like traffic tickets as an excuse to hold Muslims and did not issue a statement about the accurate numbers of detainees.86 Thus, American Muslims had to hear occasional positive formal statements while facing daily negative policies. It is a challenging political setting for Muslim community, but it can be an incentive to solidarity thereby proving its legitimate existence within the American society. Conclusion: 9/11 Impact On Muslim Community The above short history of Muslims in US shows that the crisis was always a good motive for more determination and organized effort made by Muslims, for example Second Gulf war, Oklahoma explosion, the dilemma of Arab Israeli conflict and negative images about Muslims that result from all these events pushed towards the estab-
85 86
op. cit., p. 56. (In Arabic), Esam Abdel Shafi, op. cit., p. 177.
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lishment of important American Muslim organizations and alliances that have their target to provide a fair image of Islam and to defend Muslim civil rights in US. Muslims lack experience but not potentiality. In the face of the negative pressures imposed on Muslims after 9/11, several important positive aspects emerged to motivate the development and the solidarity of this young promising community. By reviewing its short experience, we could follow a major pattern that characterizes the evolution of Muslim minority in US. As a reaction to a major crisis, the efforts had been doubled, the differences had been bypassed and the will had been reinforced in order to face the new challenges. For example, many attempts are highlighted to overcome the gap between immigrants and African Americans. Increased number of Muslim organizations had extended their activities either in degree by intensifying their involvement in their surroundings or entering new domains of activities on a National level or in political fields. In addition, new type of more dynamic and politically involved organizations had emerged. Also, a sense of seeking coalitions with different American forces had been sharpened and more groups entered the scope of Muslims attention and interests. On the other hand, increased attention and interest in Islam is the major consequence of 9/11: books on Islam are sold with amazing numbers and people are eager to watch TV programs about Islam. So, Muslim leaders had easier access to American media than before. Now, increasing awareness about Islamic religion has become much more effortless than before. Another important impact is occurring in the relations between in Muslim organizations and the Muslim countries. After 9/11, many obstacles appear to weaken the link between American Muslims and Muslim states. Rigid scrutiny is now exercised by US government. Also, most of the Muslim organizations tend to shape their independence without any foreign influence. Most importantly, the seeking of an American Islamic theology (Fikh) in which the religious leaders coming from a Muslim country are not the best choice, has become important. This notion about an American Islam is not new but it was intensely debated after September 11. On a contextual level, the relation between Muslim community and its setting is witnessing tensions and various pressures. While this environment had its positive outputs: more solidarity and more self expression and influence, it comes with other negative
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consequences as well, mainly coming from the political setting that resists and fights this new mood of participation and involvement. The main dilemma after 9/11 is that increased Muslim willingness for political participation is faced with a decreased tolerance and willingness of the American system to accept and develop such an attitude.
PART FIVE
ISSUES OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN THE DIASPORA
IMMIGRANT SETTLEMENT AND RELIGIOUS ORGANISATION: THE CASE OF FINLAND Tuomas Martikainen Åbo Akademi University, Finland The intensive organisation of immigrant religious communities during the last decades in Europe is one consequence of the large-scale post-war international migrations to the continent. Relatively soon after World War II several European countries started recruiting immigrants whose labour potential their economies badly needed. Many came from less developing European countries (e.g., Ireland, Italy and Finland), but also from outside the continent and, especially, from former colonies. Immigration led to the establishment of substantial ethnic minorities, mostly in major urban centres. One reason for the significant input of non-Europeans was that the Cold War prevented the usage of East European labour reserves. The largest immigration countries included Germany, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden. The oil crises of the early 1970s reduced the need for foreign labour force. The following decades witnessed a growing number of family reunions and an increasing number of refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants. Furthermore, since the 1980s, even the earlier European countries of emigration have turned into immigrant-receiving societies. There are several reasons for this, one of which was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War that reopened the doors for East European migration (Castles & Miller 2003: 68–92). These international population movements have fundamentally altered many areas around the continent, including their religious milieu. Contrary to the common perception, many immigrants are Europeans and of Christian background, but there are also large populations of other national and religious backgrounds, including Muslims from a large number of countries. In 2000, the total population of EU 15 was 376,144,000.1 The number of foreign citizens 1 The EU 15 are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the
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at the same time was 18,688,000, which resulted in a 5% average of foreign population. Differences between individual countries are quite high both in absolute as well as in relative numbers. Furthermore, the national, ethnic and religious compositions of immigrants in various societies are also profoundly diverse. Of all the foreign citizens present in Europe, 31% of them are from 15 EU countries, 17% are from other European countries (including Russia). It is important to remember that the figures do not include naturalised citizens, which is generally easier for Europeans than others. Between the years 1990 and 2000 circa 3 million immigrants were naturalised (Poulain & Herm 2003). Much of the European research on immigrant religions has centred on the “religious others”, or non-Christians, and, especially, Muslims. While Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs, etc. have undeniably become of major importance, other significant developments have received much less attention. Most importantly, Christian migrants in major denominations have received only marginal interest, which is surprising, as we know that they form circa half of all the immigrants in EU 15. The fervour with which studies on first and second generation “religious others” draw conclusions about general developments with regard to immigration and religion, may therefore be a more tricky business than was considered at first glance. From this point of view, this article provides a broader view on the phenomenon of “diaspora religion” that is often the case in European research. The issue of religious diversity and Christian migrants is better noted in the United States, at least in some of the main publications in the field (e.g., Ebaugh & Chafetz 2000; Haddad, Smith & Esposito 2003; Leonard et al. 2005; Warner & Wittner 1998). This article discusses issues related to the processes of religious organisation and settlement among immigrant populations. The context of this discussion is the West European, post-war experience of increased international migrations and the consequent settlement of immigrant populations. More specifically, the debate draws on developments among people of immigrant origin in Finland. The main aim of the text is to highlight different strategies and patterns of religious organisation in the new country of settlement. It will be argued United Kingdom. In 2004, the European Union expanded and has now 25 member states. The new members are the Check Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
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that the religious background of the migrant is of central importance, as it leads to different available options for future developments.2 A main starting point for the article is the model of the phases of diaspora among immigrant religions, proposed by Martin Baumann (2002, 2004). Diaspora and Religious Organisation Research on immigrant religions and issues related to it has become very popular during the last decade. For long the studies tended to be local and national in focus, but a new trend attempts to combine data from various religious traditions, localities and countries, and search for common developments as well as differences. The current volume is a good example of this interest. One field of inquiry is the process of religious settlement. Religious organisation can be regarded as one of the more important features of settlement, even though it is by no means a necessary part of it. Religious organisations, however, appear to be among the most common social institutions that immigrants create (Baumann 2002: 95–98). Martin Baumann (2002, 2004) has created a phase model of diaspora that attempts to systematise key-developments of immigrants’ religious life. The model views religious developments combined with general cultural, socio-political and structural factors as well as changing relationships to the country of origin. While the model is not intended to be a strictly chronological description of settlement, it nevertheless brings forth a time span of several generations. Religious organisations play a prominent part in the settlement process. In Baumann’s own words: “Constructing no places of worship and founding no religious associations in situations of migrant settlement seem to be the exception to the rule” (2002: 93). In the following, Baumann’s model will be summarised to the extent it is relevant with regard to religious organisation. The first phase is the migration process itself and the early settlement in the new host society. There are few relations to the new surroundings and religious needs are mostly taken care of at home. If the migrants are mainly men, then religious observance can even be neglected, 2 The material on which the argument is based is presented in detail in Martikainen 2004a.
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but if there are other family members, and especially children, efforts can be directed to find collective solutions for the upbringing of the next generation, including religious education. Efforts to reconstruct one’s life rely solely on examples from the country of origin. The second phase is characterised by extensive efforts to organise collective platforms for conducting religious, educational, cultural, etc. activities as well as founding places of worship. Links to the country of origin are intensified and religious experts may be invited to stay. The focus lies on the country of origin. The third phase is characterised by a rising self-confidence and attempts to promote sociopolitical participation in the host society. As some members of community have most likely already achieved positions of higher status, they can be used as resources in the struggle for gaining access to broader resources, such as state support for religious schools. The focus has shifted to the host society. Phases four and five depend on the outcome of the demands for greater socio-political acceptance in the host society, but despite the outcome, the emphasis on identification is clearly in the new place of settlement. During these phases it will become clearer what the societal position of the minority in question will be. Baumann has applied and created his model mainly based on Hindu immigrants in Europe and Trinidad (Baumann 2002, 2004). Undoubtedly the model describes well the general trend in this regard, but in the following I will highlight some developments that question the extent to which the model is applicable to all immigrant religions. There appear to be at least the following problematic implicit assumptions. First, the model presupposes that the migrants are of new religions or that they are not willing to join existing religious organisations. That obviously discounts the majority western migrants, who are, for instance, members of the Catholic Church or some Protestant denominations, which already have previous activity in most European countries. Furthermore, it also makes invisible those immigrants, who come later than the pioneering generation that already has established religious organisations. Second, neither religious conversion nor minor changes in religious affiliation stand out as an option. This is significant, in that many find this as an attractive solution to the problem of not finding a suitable, existing religious community. Third, the model can also be understood to presuppose that immigrants, by necessity, initially find themselves in a marginalised or disadvantaged social position. Whereas this is mostly
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true with regard to the large flock of refugees, asylum seekers and guest labour, it is far from the case with regard to the growing number of privileged labour migrants. Fourth, the model does not give much room for further outside interventions. Current policies of immigrant integration in some European countries actually promote very early organisation and, thus, open avenues for more rapid development. In the following, it will be argued that the scope of the Baumann model is narrower than it appears and that these other developments should also be taken into account in order to provide a wider perspective on religion in the diaspora. However, before the case is presented, let us take a look at the Finnish religious situation that will provide the empirical material for the discussion. Religion in Finland From a contemporary European perspective, Finland may be described as a secularised country, where religious belonging is more central than participation and belief (Davie 2000). The country emerged as a recognised entity on the map of Europe in the twelfth century simultaneously with the spread of the Catholic Church, which gradually replaced the traditional indigenous religion. Since the Reformation in the 1520s, Finland has been a mostly Lutheran society, with the exception of its easternmost part that has a historical (Russian) Orthodox population. Politically, Finland was part of the Swedish State until 1809, after which it became an autonomous Grand Duchy of imperial Russia and, in the end, gained independence in 1917. The religious developments of the last three decades have led to increasing religious individualisation and an expanding religious market. Beside groups related to New Religious Movements and New Age, several others have gained foothold, most notably those relating to Anglo-American Evangelical and Charismatic Movements (Ketola 2003a, b). Furthermore, as international migration has significantly increased, traditional religions of foreign origin have been established. In this regard, the number of Muslims has especially increased, although they still form only ca. 0,6% of the total population (Martikainen 2004b). The Evangelical Lutheran Church and a vast number of different organisations related to it dominate the national religious field. Beside the dominant Lutheran Church there exists, however, a large num-
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ber of smaller religious organisations. Their exact number is not known, but there are at least 100 different religions active in the country. The following membership figures illustrate the situation. In 2004, 83,7% of the total population were members of the Lutheran Church, 1,1% of the Orthodox Church and 1,2% belonged to other formally recognised religious organisations. 14,0% were not members of any such organisations (Kääriäinen, Hytönen, Niemelä & Salonen 2004). But formal membership is only one part of the picture. If we look at religiosity and religious participation, the picture starts to change. According to Kati Niemelä (2003: 212–215), among the most active religious segments of the population (14%), one third are not members of the Lutheran Church. They are mostly members of various minority religions, such as Pentecostalism and Jehovah’s Witnesses. However, of all of the religious organisations in the country, it is not an exaggeration to state that only the Evangelical Lutheran Church has any large-scale cultural and political influence. The Lutheran Church was, from the Reformation until the nineteenth century with minor exceptions, the only legally approved religion in Finland. With the advent of the Russian rule in 1809 the position of the Orthodox population became gradually better, but still not equal compared to the Lutherans. The Dissenter Act of 1889 allowed the foundation of new Protestant churches. One was able to leave the Lutheran Church, if one joined another registered Protestant church. However, full religious freedom was established first after independence. The Religious Freedom Act of 1922 made it a personal matter whether or not one belonged to a religious organisation. Soon after the law acquired force, a number of religious groups sought official approval and were granted it. For instance, the Catholic Church established officially its activity again in the country, after almost 400 years of legal restrictions and prohibition. The Civil Register—since 1971 the Population Register—was established for those who did not want to belong to any religious organisation. The Lutheran and Orthodox Churches received special legislation and were considered “national churches” (Sundback 1991: 127–129, 180–183). The Religious Freedom Act was renewed in 2003. The renewal did not include any substantial alterations, but rather modified some details and practices. The main change was that the spirit of the law changed from a negative (freedom from) to a positive (freedom
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to) view of religious freedom. Regarding organisation, it requires 20 people (aged 18 years and over) to create a religious community organisation (Finn. uskonnollinen yhdyskunta). The foundation process requires a charter of foundations, by-laws and a declaration stating the founders of the community. These are then sent to the Register of Associations (Yhdistysrekisteri ), which is run by the National Board of Patents and Registration (Patentti-ja rekisterihallitus). Previously these matters were taken care of by the Ministry of Education that still has an expert board that can be consulted in some cases. “A religious community organisation” is in many ways a similar organisation to a registered association, which is the most common type of voluntary association in the country. These two types of organisations actually share a great deal in regard to legislation (the Associations Act), but there are some differences as well. For instance, a religious community has more freedom to create its authority structures and it may have only one person as its sole leader, whereas the association form is based on shared democratic authority. A religious community organisation may also apply for the right to perform legally approved marriages (Seppo 2003). In 2004, there were 49 officially registered religious communities. However, even a larger group has opted to follow the registered association form of organisation. The latter group includes many immigrant religions. The reasons for this are varied, but the obvious one is that it is much easier to organise an association than a religious community. Also the benefits of being a religious community organisation do not seem to be that significant for many. In addition to these, there are also a small number of groups that have no formal organisation at all. Immigrant Religions in Finland Finland has been a country of emigration during its modern history. Large numbers of people have left the country in search of better opportunities. It has been estimated that 1,3 million people of Finnish descent currently live outside the country, whereas Finland’s present population is 5,2 million. There have been two main waves of emigration. At the turn of the twentieth century some 300,000 left to the United States and after the 1950s over 500,000 to Sweden. Other destinations have included various West European countries, Canada and Australia. The balance in immigration/emigration started to shift
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in the 1980s and from the beginning of the 1990s the number of people of immigrant origin has grown rapidly. This has lead to an ethnic pluralism hitherto unseen in the country. In 2004, there were 166,361 (3,2%) people born abroad, 133,183 (2,5%) speaking a foreign language and 108 346 (2,1%) foreign citizens (see Appendix for a more detailed picture of national origins). As the number of foreign citizens was only 12,063 (0,3%) in 1980, it is obvious that the change has been experienced as major one (Statistics Finland 2005). The new wave of immigration can be divided into three main components, of which the first is an earlier development than the latter two. First, people from western societies started to move to Finland gradually after the war, mainly as professionals and spouses. Lately this group has also grown in number due to increasing international contacts and the European integration process. In 2004, people from other western countries formed circa one third of all foreign born individuals, of whom over half are born in Sweden. Other major groups are people born in Germany, Britain and the United States. Many of these people are Finnish returnees. Second, citizens of the former Soviet Union and the former Eastern block countries have moved to Finland mainly during the 1990s. Many of them were so-called Ingrian returnees—descendants of the seventeenth century Finnish migrants to the St. Petersburg region.3 In 2004, people born in the former Socialist countries formed 41% of all foreign born, circa 69,000 people. The largest groups among these were born in the former Soviet Union, Estonia and the former Yugoslavia. Third, there are immigrants from non-western societies, mostly Asians and Africans. In 2004, the immigrants from these countries were 24% of all foreign born, making a total of some 39,000 people. The largest groups were born in Somalia, Iraq and China. About half of these people have entered the country as refugees, asylum seekers or through family reunion programmes. Finland had accepted refugees since the early 1970s, but their number did not rise significantly until the late 1980s. To date, circa 25,000 have been accepted into the country, including their children born in Finland (Statistics Finland 2001, 2005).
3 At the time the territory was part of the Swedish State which encouraged Finns to move to the area. The area came under Russian rule again in the early eighteenth century, when also the city of St. Petersburg was built.
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Religious Background As only limited data exists about immigrants’ religious affiliation prior to their arrival in Finland, statistical information allows an estimate of their potential affiliation. The three different immigrant groups serve as a useful starting point. The western and former socialist country immigrants are mainly Christians or non-affiliated, with the exception of ca. 3,000 from Turkey and ca. 7,600 from the former Yugoslavia, who are mostly Bosnian and Kosovo Albanian Muslims. The Asian and African group is more diverse in its religious background. The largest group consists of people from societies where Islam is the main religion, but among the group there are also Christians, Buddhists and Hindus as well as several smaller groups, such as Mandaeans and Ahl-i-Haqq (Martikainen 2000a, b; Sakaranaho and Pesonen 1999: 8–13). A rough estimate based on country of birth is that about 70% are “potential Christians” and 15% “potential Muslims”, while other groups are significantly smaller. The number of non-Christians would be higher if the figures were counted from other indicators, for instance according to citizenship. The reason for this is that among the foreign-born there are a large number of Finnish returnees, most of whom are Lutheran. Religious Affiliation With regard to formal religious affiliation in Finland in 2002, 37% (55,683) of foreign born, 20% (21,167) of foreign citizens and 19% (21,700) of foreign-language speakers were members of registered religious community organisations and the national churches. The Lutheran Church is clearly the largest immigrant church in the country, even though people of immigrant origin represent only a fraction of its membership. If Lutheran membership is not taken into account, about 10% have some other affiliation in Finland, of which about half goes to the Orthodox and Catholic Churches. Most people of immigrant origin are not officially related to religious communities in Finland, as illustrated in Table 1 (Statistics Finland 2003). However, there are significant variations in the extent to which different linguistic groups have a religious affiliation, as shown in Table 2. When compared with native Finns (Finnish, Swedish and Saami speakers), all foreign language groups have significantly lower
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Table 1 Immigrant members in the Lutheran, Orthodox and Catholic Churches, and those in the Population Register in 2002 (Statistics Finland 2003). Evangelical Orthodox Catholic Other Lutheran Church Church Church Members 4,406,594 Born 44,934 abroad Foreign 13,639 citizen Foreign 10,595 language English 1,020 Estonian 1,980 German 1,075 Russian 4,532
Population Total Register
56,689 4,385
7,643 3,153
50,961 684,408 3,211 96,374
5,206,295 152,057
3,136
2,033
2,359
82,515
103,682
4,404
3,304
3,397
95,313
117,013
33 70 15 3,467
356 13 176 50
241 102 42 853
6,108 9,767 2,294 24,499
7,758 11,932 3,602 33,401
Table 2 Religious affiliation in different linguistic groups in 2002. Groups that have over 200 speakers are included. In the table are combined the memberships in the Lutheran Church, Orthodox Church and registered religious communities, in particular linguistic groups (Statistics Finland 2003). 0–9%
10–19%
Albanian 1% Czech 10% Kurdish 1% Somali 10% Punjabi 1% Urdu 10% Bengali 2% Turkish 14% Bosnian 2% Bulgarian 15% Hindi 3% French 15% Chinese 5% Latvian 15% Lithuanian 7% Dutch 16% Thai 7% Lingala 16% Arabic 8% Hungarian 17% Japanese 8% Vietnamese 17% Persian 8% Estonian 18% Serbo-Croatian 9% Portuguese 18% Tamil 9% English 21% Ukrainian 24%
20–29%
30–100%
Spanish 25% Russian 27% Italian 29% Amharic 29% Romanian 29%
Danish 32% German 36% Hebrew 36% Greek 37% Tagalog 37% Polish 39% Norwegian 41% Finnish 88% Swedish 92% Saami 96%
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affiliation ratios. People coming from mainly Christian societies have ratios between 15–40% with minor exceptions, while all others have fewer than 15%. The only exception is Hebrew speakers (36%), who are most probably Jews. The majority of Muslims have a very low level of affiliation, especially in the case of Albanians, Bosnians and Kurds of the larger groups. Somali, Urdu (Pakistan) and Turkish speakers are the most commonly affiliated (Statistics Finland 2003). It should be noted, though, that the above statistics do not provide a full picture of the level of religious affiliation. The main reasons of this are that in some traditions only the head of the family joins the organisation and that not all of the immigrant religious organisations are included in the tables, because they have organised as registered associations, not as religious community organisations. However, based on scattered data we may presume that at least some of the Muslim groups (e.g. Somalis and Iraqi Shia Muslims) are de facto significantly more organised than the data above reveals (Martikainen 2004b). Immigrants have usually joined a religious organisation in the same religious tradition to which they belonged in their country of origin, if they joined any. This has been the case with Lutherans (e.g., Ingrians, Swedes), Catholics (e.g. South Europeans, Vietnamese, Chaldean Iraqis) and Orthodox (e.g. Russians, Romanians). If the group has been larger and an active one, it means they have had access to native or English language services. For instance, the International Evangelical Congregations in 14 cities provide services in several languages, including English, Arabic and Chinese (International Evangelical Church in Finland 2005). The Catholic Church belongs to those that have benefited most from increased immigration, as its membership has doubled in the last fifteen years. Also other organisations have received small numbers of new members. There are no indications of major movements between religious traditions, even though individual conversions do take place. For instance, such active missionary religions as Jehovah’s Witnesses and Mormons have only 1–2% immigrant membership (Statistics Finland 2003). The most visible change, however, has been the establishment of new religious organisations, often of non-Christian origin. In the media this usually refers to the rapid growth of the Muslim population. During the 1990s over twenty new Muslim organisations were founded, all in urban centres. They are composed mostly of people from the Middle East, Northern Africa and Somalia, and to a lesser
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extent from other African countries, as well as from Southeast Asia and the former Yugoslavia. The number of religiously active Muslims is a matter of debate, but as shown above they have not so far become official members in the new organisations to any large extent (Martikainen 2000b, 2004b). Beside the Muslim organisations, the Vietnamese Buddhists are the largest group, even though less organised. Other minor groups have also organised themselves, including Zoroastrians, Mandaeans, Ahl-i-Haqq and Thai Buddhists. Organisation and Settlement In Martin Baumann’s model of the phases of diaspora, religious organisation takes most prominent place in the second phase. It makes sense in those cases when people in question do need to recreate their lives from the very beginning. Creating organisations, finding places of worship and struggling to socialise the next generation takes time, hard work as well as requires financial backup. However, if the infrastructure is already there, as in the case of most Christian migrants, it does not require any more effort than travelling to the services. As presented in the previous section, we could see that Christians are generally more organised than other groups. That can at least in part be explained by the tradition of organising into parishes or congregations, but it also supports the current argument of the importance of existing religious infrastructure. A more pressing problem could be, and often is, unfamiliarity with multicultural congregations and language skills. It is for this reason that many Christian churches have created small group activity in different languages (e.g., Ebaugh & Chafetz 2000; Martikainen 2004a). These developments, however, happen outside the public eye, because there are no new associations, no disputes of building mosques and no requests for outside assistance. For instance, the Catholic Church has grown enormously in the Nordic countries during the last decades without practically any public notice whatsoever. Another example is commonly found among Evangelical, Charismatic and Pentecostal congregations, who actively seek immigrants and offer them meeting places and spiritual assistance (e.g. Marquardt 2005). Even though in Finland there is no major movement in changing religious affiliation, there are small numbers of such recruits.
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In cases when the immigrants do not feel at home in the existing congregations, or have no such possibilities, other processes, more like those among Hindus and Muslims, can take place and new organisations are founded. Sometimes these organisation later split, because of internal disagreements or along ethnic lines, but that is not necessary in the initial organisational phase. In other words, the time and location of the religious organisation is to a large extent dependent on the immigrant’s religious background and his or her willingness to join existing local congregations. This is also the case with migrants, who are not among the pioneering generation. They often have a fully organised religious life waiting for them. It may even be asked as to what extent religious organisation among immigrants during the last one or two decades in the traditional European countries of immigration was a result of certain structural features of the migrant populations. They were mainly young men, who aimed for earning a good income and planned a short-term stay. Therefore, religious activity was not likely high on their agenda. At least in the Finnish material there is a strong link between family values and upbringing of children being the main motivation for people to establish religious organisations. This means that if the entire families immigrated with the aim of permanent stay, the process might have started somewhat earlier, as it, to some extent, has happened in Finland (Martikainen 2004a). The financial resources of immigrants are often identified as a major problem for building churches, temples and other shrines. As most migrants have moved because of a desire to improve one’s economical situation and have entered countries of higher economical welfare, it is clear that it takes time to create the fortunes. There are, however, some important features that can affect this balance. Outside economical assistance has been enormously important in the building of mosques in Europe. Without aid, for instance, from Saudi Arabia, Libya or Turkey, there would be fewer mosques in Europe, at least among the grander ones. Another important feature is that of state policy towards immigrants and multiculturalism. For instance, the Norwegian state sponsors all registered religious communities with the same support, which has led to a record high level of formal organisation among Norwegian Muslims (Vogt 2001: 139–140). In Finland, most municipalities give small financial support for cultural associations and religious organisations, if they are formally
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organised. This appears to be a major reason for foundations of several hundred immigrant associations in the 1990s, including religious associations (Saksela 2003). To summarise, immigrant settlement and religious organisation is a complex process, where a number of different factors and structural features need to be taken into account. Immigrants’ religious background is one of the most important features that provides him or her with different options available in the new country of settlement. It is no surprise that the “religious others” have hitherto received the most attention in the study of immigrant religions in Europe. They surely deserve that. But simultaneously attention should be given to the more invisible developments in already existing religious organisations, especially in major Christian churches. As it can be estimated that about half of the European immigrant population is of Christian background, more attention should be directed to them. Conclusion The article has discussed processes of religious organisation among immigrant groups in Finland. It took as its main point of departure Martin Baumann’s (2002, 2004) model of the phases of diaspora. The discussion was set within the context of relatively recent developments among immigrant religious organisations in a new country of immigration, Finland. Whereas the number of immigrants is still low in European standards, significant organisational processes among migrants have taken place. During the last two decades dozens of different congregations, associations and churches have been founded. While Baumann’s model described many developments well, some problems with its implementation were noted. The religious background of immigrants is a specific feature that should be given more attention. There are major differences between immigrants’ social locations and in their possibilities to find places for worship and religious socialisation that depend on their religious background and interests. For instance, if you are an Ingrian Lutheran, you can become a member of majority’s church in the country. If you are a Greek Orthodox, you may become a member of an existing minority church with a good reputation in Finland. If you are a Somali Sunni Muslim, you may join a newly established mosque
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community that may still face prejudice from its neighbours. And if you are attracted to the people who regularly knock at your door, you may become a Jehovah’s Witness. The list could go on, but the main point is that immigrants do not enter a religious void. In the case of immigrant Christians there are already existing religious structures that one can often enter without going through the extensive work of establishing new communities and starting from ground zero. Immigrant settlement and religious organisation is a multifaceted process that is affected by a large number of different factors. Individual ones relating to religious background, interest in religion, linguistic skills and family situation are among the more important ones. Structural factors include existing religious organisations and possibilities in joining them. Whereas many scholars have already studied processes of religious organisation in many countries and in different religious traditions, more attention could be directed to experiences in different mainstream Christian churches, at least in Europe. References Baumann, Martin (2002). Migrant Settlement, Religion and Phases of Diaspora, Migration: A European Journal of International Migration and Ethnic Relations, 33/34/35:93–117. —— (2004). Becoming a Colour of the Rainbow: The social integration of Indian Hindus in Trinidad, analysed along a phase model of diaspora. Knut Jacobsen & Pratap Kumar (Eds.) South Asians in the Diaspora: Histories and religious traditions, 77–96. Leiden: Brill. Castles, Stephen & Mark Miller (2003). The Age of Migration: International population movements in the modern world. Third Edition. New York: Palgrave. Davie, Grace (2000). Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ebaugh, Helen & Janet Saltzman Chafetz (Eds.) (2000). Religion and the New Immigrants: Continuities and Adaptations in Immigrant Congregations. Walnut Creek: Altamira. Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, Jane Smith & John Esposito (Eds.) (2003). Religion and Immigration: Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Experiences in the United States. Walnut Creek: Altamira. International Evangelical Church in Finland (2005). The International Evangelical Church in Finland-Online. Available at: . Ketola, Kimmo (2003a). Uskonto suomalaisessa yhteiskunnassa 1600-luvulta nykypäivään. Kimmo Kääriäinen, Kati Niemelä & Kimmo Ketola Moderni kirkkokansa: Suomalaisten uskonnollisuus uudella vuosituhannella, 17–52. Tampere: Kirkon tutkimuskeskus. —— (2003b). Uusi kansanomainen uskonnollisuus. Kimmo Kääriäinen, Kati Niemelä & Kimmo Ketola Moderni kirkkokansa: Suomalaisten uskonnollisuus uudella vuosituhannella, 53–86. Tampere: Kirkon tutkimuskeskus. Kääriäinen, Kimmo, Maarit Hytönen, Kati Niemelä & Kari Salonen (2004). Kirkko muutosten keskellä: Suomen evankelis-luterilainen kirkko vuosina 2000 –2003. Tampere: Kirkon tutkimuskeskus.
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Leonard, Karen, Alex Stepick, Manuel Vasquez & Jennifer Holdaway (Eds.) (2005). Immigrant Faiths: Transforming Religious Life in America. Walnut Creek: Altamira. Marquardt, Marie (2005). Structural and Cultural Hybrids: Religious Congregational Life and Public Participation of Mexicans in the New South. Karen Leonard, Alex Stepick, Manuel Vasquez & Jennifer Holdaway (Eds.) Immigrant Faiths: Transforming Religious Life in America, 189–218. Walnut Creek: Altamira. Martikainen, Tuomas (2000a). Muslim Groups in Turku, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 20 (2): 329–345. —— (2000b). Muslims in Finland: Facts and reflections. Nils G. Holm (Ed.) Islam and Christianity in School Religious Education: Issues, approaches, and contexts, 203–247. Religionsvetenskapliga skrifter 52. Åbo: Åbo Akademi. —— (2004a). Immigrant Religions in Local Society: Historical and contemporary perspectives in the city of Turku. Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press. —— (2004b). Islam i Finland, Svensk religionshistorisk årsskrift 2004, 105–123. Niemelä, Kati (2003). Uskonnollisuus eri väestöryhmissä. Kimmo Kääriäinen, Kati Niemelä & Kimmo Ketola Moderni kirkkokansa: Suomalaisten uskonnollisuus uudella vuosituhannella, 187–220. Tampere: Kirkon tutkimuskeskus. Poulain, Michel & Anne Herm (2003). An Overview and Comparison of the State of Migration in the EU Countries: What the data reveal. The Second Workshop on Demographic and Cultural Specificity and Integration of Migrants, 7–57. Working Papers E 16/2003. Helsinki: The Family Federation of Finland. Sakaranaho, Tuula & Heikki Pesonen (1999). Johdanto: Muslimit monikulttuurisessa Suomessa. Tuula Sakaranaho & Heikki Pesonen (Eds.) Muslimit Suomessa, 8–22. Helsinki: Yliopistopaino. Saksela, Sanna (2003). Mångkulturella organisationer och invandrarorganisationer i Finland. Flemming Mikkelsen (Ed.) Invandrerorganisationer i Norden, 235–281. København: Nordisk Ministerråd. Seppo, Juha (2003). Uskonnonvapaus 2000-luvun Suomessa. Helsinki: Edita. Statistics Finland (2001). Foreigners and international migration 2000, Population 2001:8. —— (2003b). Population by country of birth, nationality, language and religious affiliation 31 Dec 2002. Helsinki: Statistics Finland. —— (2005). Population by country of birth, nationality and language. StatFin— Online Service. Available at: . Sundback, Susan (1991). Utträdet ur Finlands lutherska kyrka: kyrkomedlemskapet under religionsfrihet och sekularisering. Åbo: Åbo Akademis förlag. Vogt, Kari (2001). Islam i Norge. Knut Jacobsen (Ed.) Verdensreligioner i Norge. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 130–168. Warner, Stephen R. and Judith G. Wittner (Eds.) (1998) Gatherings in Diaspora: Religious Communities and the New Immigration. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
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Appendix: Population by Country of Birth and Citizenship in Finland in 2004 Country of birth Total population FINLAND ABROAD . . . of which European EU 25 countries Sweden Estonia Germany Britain Poland France Italy Other European countries Former Soviet Union Former Yugoslavia* Russia Turkey Norway Asian Iraq China Thailand Vietnam Iran India Afghanistan African Somalia Morocco North American South American Oceanic Unknown
Citizenship
5,236,611 5,070,250
100.0% 96.7%
5,236,611 5,128,265
100.0% 97.9%
166,361 114,417 58,352 29,191 11,238 4,274 3,354 1,357 1,277 1,170
3.3% 68.8% 35.1% 17.6% 6.8% 2.6% 2.0% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7%
108,346 72,590 35,356 8,209 13,978 2,626 2,655 810 985 997
2.1% 67.0% 32.6% 7.6% 12.9% 2.4% 2.5% 0.8% 0.9% 0.9%
56,065 38,547 6,111 4,275 3,057 1,153 26,837 4,250 3,567 3,138 3,108 2,956 1,843 1,353 12,404 4,771 1,236 4,408 2,978 831 4,486
33.7% 23.2% 3.7% 2.6% 1.8% 0.7% 16.1% 2.6% 2.1% 1.9% 1.9% 1.8% 1.1% 0.8% 7.5% 2.9% 0.7% 2.6% 1.8% 0.5% 2.7%
37,234 242 6,240 24,626 2,389 650 19,926 3,392 2,625 2,289 1,538 2,555 1,343 1,588 9,833 4,689 621 2,656 1,469 560 1,312
34.4% 0.2% 6.6% 22.7% 2.2% 0.6% 18.4% 3.1% 2.4% 2.1% 1.4% 2.4% 1.2% 1.5% 9.0% 4.3% 0.6% 2.5% 1.4% 0.5% 1.2%
The table includes entries for countries with over 1,000 people in either category. * Includes combined data of the following countries: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and former Yugoslavia. (Source: Statistics Finland 2005)
NEW RELIGIOUS PLURALITY IN SWITZERLAND: STUDYING LUCERNE’S RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY Martin Baumann Universität Luzern, Switzerland Lucerne lies in the heart of Switzerland, forming the capital of the canton Lucerne with its 350,000 inhabitants. Religiously the canton has been dominated by Roman Catholicism for centuries, forming a strong bastion against Protestant cantons such as nearby Zurich. During the last two decades, however, processes of immigration, of conversion to non-Christian religions as well as the leaving of the Catholic Church has changed the religious landscape. In the shadow of impressive church towers, which dominate the view of the scenic city, a variety of non-Christian religions settled and founded new places of faith and veneration. A religious plurality with various mosques, Buddhist centres, Hindu temples and other places of worship have been developing though hardly being noticed by the general public. New and still unfamiliar, these “new” spiritual groups and religious traditions now take steps to get better known and move into the public eye, striving for recognition and societal acceptance. This essay presents results of the research project “Religious plurality in the Canton Lucerne”, describing and analyzing the religious pluralisation of the hitherto mono-religious canton. Switzerland, situated in the centre of Europe, has been Christian by confession for half a millennium. Since the Reformation in the 16th century, cantons became either Protestant or remained Roman Catholic. Only a few cantons were home to both Christian confessions. A small minority of Jews were allowed to live in a few cantons often, however, threatened by persecution and expulsion. This general situation started to change from the mid-20th century as Switzerland and its 26 federal cantons saw a pluralisation of the hitherto mono-religious landscape. Now, with the start of the 21st century, Swiss cities and their conurbations are home to a plurality of religions. Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist and other traditions have established a home away from home in Swiss diaspora. However, to the vast majority of people in Switzerland the topic and issue of religion
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is still straightforwardly thought of in Christian terms—the existence of non-Christian religions and its multifarious plurality is new and unknown; it is a rather surprising und unfamiliar phenomenon to most people. Rather than discussing the general Swiss religious situation, this article will present the case study of the canton of Lucerne and its evolved religious plurality. We will present data and results of the religious plurality project conducted by the Department for the Study of Religions at the University of Lucerne. Part 1 presents basic demographic data of religious affiliations in the canton. Part 2 provides a sketch of the plurality of non-Christian religions established in the canton and highlights a few patterns. Part 3 reports on some of the difficulties of what now is a majority of Swiss people, who perceive in encountering religious plurality and indicates which means were employed to document and journalistically process the results of the research project. Part 4 finally describes and reflects upon the involvement of the discipline of the Study of Religions (Religionswissenschaft) in both the documentation and the inevitable influencing of the very field being studied. Among others, it became apparent to us that some of the groups and societies we studied strongly favoured our approach and project, while others, straightforwardly, disavowed and criticised it. The majority of the general population welcomed the project as instructive and useful to learn more about the existent religious plurality. Demographics Roman Catholicism is strong and dominant in the municipality and canton of Lucerne. The canton in the centre of Switzerland has about 350,000 inhabitants, Lucerne and its conurbations numbers about 110,000 people. The Swiss Census 2000 specified that 85.6% of the canton’s population adhere to Christianity while non-Christian religions are made up of the small minority of 4.9% of the population. 5.9% stated no religious affiliation and 3.7% did not provide an answer to their religious affiliation. The diagram below displays the percentage relations in a graphic form. Christianity displays an internal plurality with 70.9% Roman Catholic, 12.2% Protestant and 2.5% other Christian churches. The latter is constituted by churches like the Old Catholic Church,
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Orthodox Churches mainly brought by migrants, a variety of evangelical Free Churches and a kaleidoscope of further parishes and societies such as Jehovah Witnesses, Mormons, New Apostolic Church, and Christian Science. Religious Affiliations in Canton Lucerne, 2000. Catholicism: 70.9%
Protestantism: 12.2%
Other Christian Churches: 2.5%
no religious affiliation: 5.9% no answer: 3.7% Judaism: 0.1% Islam: 3.8%
4.9%
Hinduism: 0.3% Buddhism: 0.7%
The sector of non-Christian religions with less than 5% or about 18,000 people is mainly made up of people of Muslim faith (3.8% or 13,000 people) and small pockets of Buddhist, Hindu and Jewish people. With the exception of Jews, who were allowed to settle in the canton from the mid-19th century onwards, both Muslims and Hindus primarily trace their settlement in the canton after the waves of inflow of refugees and labour migrants from the 1970s onwards. Labour migration from Turkey, political instability in Sri Lanka and civil war in former Yugoslavia had been major reasons for the arrival of these migrants. Buddhism is made up of migrants from Asian Buddhist countries as well as by converts. In addition to these religions, we find a small community of Bahá"í followers, a missionary centre of Scientology, two other spiritual, respective esoteric circles as well as three world view societies. Conversions to new religious and spiritual movements since the 1970s have added to the emerging religious plurality; numerically, however, these have been much smaller than arriving migrants.
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The local newspapers occasionally reported about an event or festivities taking place among thus-labelled “other” or non-Christian religions. Overall, however, an awareness of the existent religious plurality alongside dominant Roman Catholicism has neither been present in the media, nor in the general public. The stock-taking of religions and spiritual groups in the canton, which was undertaken by the department for the Study of Religions in 2002–2005, provided evidence of, yet, such a small plurality: In Spring 2005, there was the Jewish synagogue, founded in 1912 and the Swiss Jeshiva Talmud College dating back to 1954. In addition, since 2003 the Chassidic Chabad Lubavitch has been active to attract religiously estranged Jews. Islam was fragmented along national and linguistic lines with five Sunnite mosques, a Shiite community, an Islamic Association for Women and a Muslim umbrella organisation. Buddhism has become established in eight convert groups and centres; two Buddhist migrant temples also existed, maintained by Vietnamese and Taiwanese Buddhists, respectively. Hinduism could be practised in five locations; the Sri Thurkkai Amman temple sustained by Tamil migrants from Sri Lanka formed the most solid and frequently visited Hindu place. In addition, we documented a further four religious, spiritual, and esoteric groups. The diffuse sphere of New Age offers occasional public lectures, classes and weekend courses. Consequently, due to a lack of a permanent organisational establishment, it was not researched and documented. During the research it became apparent that the documented religious places varied considerably according to the number of sympathisers or members and organisational structures and facilities. For example, there is the long established Jewish synagogue, although due to its uncompromising orthodox orientation, its membership has rapidly diminished. There is the splendid Sunnite mosque in a former cinema, now decorated with oriental ornaments, inaugurated by Bosnian Muslims in 2000. Likewise, the Sri Thurkkai Amman Hindu temple, the two migrant Buddhist temples and a few of the convert centres as well as the Scientology missionary centre are organisationwise well established. On the other side of the pole, we find groups or circles like the Brahma Kumaris Gita school, which has been regularly offering courses and meditation since 2002, but so far has a very small number of visitors. The same is true for the two 2003
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founded Buddhist convert meditation groups and the Chalice circle. Bahá"í numbers about 30 people and, although present in Lucerne since 1960, meetings and public lectures still have to be arranged in a hotel hall. Overall, the majority of organisational establishments came about during the 1990s and early years of the new millennium. Of earlier origin are only the synagogue (1912), a Turkish mosque and the Scientology Centre (both in 1976) as well as a Zen centre founded in 1988. In view of this shortness of its duration and small numbers of converted followers, the religious plurality is considered new. Although the number of migrants gathering in Muslim, Buddhist or Hindu places of worship is considerably higher than that of convert groups, the plurality is hidden and hardly noticed by the wider public. The mosques and the Hindu temple are located in former warehouses and are not recognizable from the outside. With regards to Islam it is fair to speak of backyard mosques. Furthermore, taking a look at the geographic localisation of the non-Christian places of worship, it is apparent that institutions founded by refugees and migrants are on the outskirts and at the periphery of the municipality of Lucerne. In contrast, convert groups and centres were founded more centrally and within easier reach. Though this pattern is, to a large extent, due to fewer financial resources available to migrants, the localisation is also of symbolic significance: migrants, whom the majority of Swiss people consider as sojourners and not as immigrants, are not seen as an integral part of Swiss population. They are relegated to less prestigious places, both geographically and metaphorically. So far, only few intra- and inter-religious contacts exist between the various groups. We therefore prefer to speak of a plurality rather than a pluralism of religions because a religious pluralism would involve interrelations and channels of communication among the people and groups (Eck, 1993; Baumann and Behloul, 2005). Muslims have organised themselves in an umbrella organisation. Nevertheless, apart from this, national and linguistic origin is of prime priority to each grouping. Likewise, the various Hindu and Buddhist groups have almost no contact among each other. The intra-religious plurality is new and unfamiliar to most of them. An attempt by one of the smaller Christian-related churches in 2004 to establish a round table of religions in Lucerne and to become active in joint social activities failed straight away. We interpret this as an indicator of
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self-centredness of each group and organisation and a lack of interest in inter-religious activities. However, this is not surprising in view of the still recent process of institutionalisation of most societies and groups. In contrast, the Roman Catholic Church with its strong numerical majority and its symbolic dominance by way of governing church towers in each village of the canton and the centre of Lucerne is inter-religiously more engaged. Local parishes maintain good contacts with Muslim leaders and occasionally visit mosques. One of the churches even provided space in its lower floor to house the Sri Thurkkai temple from 1991 to 2000. Since the temple’s move to more spacious premises due to the increased demand by Hindu devotees, the local Tamil Sai Baba group was able to rearrange the room with an altar for Sai Baba and organise its singing of devotional hymns there. Documentation and Journalistic Processing Having taken-stock of this current situation characterised by a numerically small and yet multifarious plurality, we thought about ways of documentation to foster awareness and further an acceptance of the hidden plurality in the wider public. A basic idea was that changes in the religious sphere and landscape are indicative of general changes in society. For many Swiss people in the canton a loss of the sovereignty of Christianity, due to rapid social changes and ensuing rising numbers of people leaving the Churches (since the 1980s in particular), the emerging religious plurality has been perceived as a threat. Previously unquestioned religious certainties became open to question and a matter of choice for the young generation. The last remaining social certainty, viz., what was labelled Christian bastion, has become shaken, and many have perceived these developments as a threat. Muslim people and mosques in particular were regarded by a right-wing, populist political party as suspicious and a threat capable of undermining the homogeneous Swiss Christian society. A drawing of the party published in the local newspaper of Lucerne in Autumn 2004 even substituted Lucerne’s famous Chapell tower, a widely known emblem of the municipality, by a Muslim minaret, suggesting a take over of the town by Muslims. Though the decline of Christianity’s century long dominance in the canton as well as in Switzerland in general, and the emergence of a religious plurality
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are not directly related but result of different causes (Swiss Statistical Office, 2003), religious plurality and Muslim presence in particular, was targeted as an important and menacing problem. In view of this not quite relaxed but debated situation the social scientific documentation was undertaken through various means of journalistic processing: a website was set up to enable internet publicity and easy reach of information (www.religionenlu.ch). Islam specialist, Samuel-Martin Behloul, wrote a descriptive report of the Muslim landscape in central Switzerland, focussing on the activities of the mosques and societies (Behloul, 2004). We designed a handy, free of charge catalogue which provides an overview of Christianity’s plurality and gives brief individual portrays of the 32 non-Christian groups and locations. The catalogue has also two maps which localise the non-Christian places of worship in the canton and in Lucerne municipality. The municipality, the canton of Lucerne and the research fund of the University of Lucerne financially supported the publication of the catalogue. Issued in Autumn 2004 with an edition of 7000 copies, a second edition was already in need in Spring 2005 (Dept. for the Study of Religions, 2005). Furthermore, film-maker Kerstin-Katja Sindemann produced nine documentaries of rituals and festivals in the canton celebrated by Jews, Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists (Sindemann and Dept., 2005). Finally, a well received exhibition in May 2005 presented the yet unfamiliar religious plurality to the wider public (http://www.religionenlu.ch/projekt-science.html). Parallel to the exhibition, the office of integration of Lucerne municipality launched a poster exhibition in the town with posters graphically interpreting religious plurality. The posters drew attention to the existence of “other” religions and spiritual groups alongside Christianity in the municipality and canton.1 Overall, both the offices of integration of the canton and the municipality have been eager to raise awareness of “other” faiths and to promote mutual respect. The Study of Religions and the Religious Field The initial aim of the research project was to provide information about the rarely known religious plurality in the municipality and 1 See the following websites: (www.stadtluzern.ch/default.aspx?pageid=1580 or www.religionenlu.ch/projekt-science-plakate.html).
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the canton of Lucerne. The mapping of non-Christian plurality helped raise awareness of the present plurality in order to gradually foster acceptance and acknowledgement. This information directed towards the wider public enabled the spiritual groups and religious traditions to become more visibile. Whether favoured or not they gained publicity. Inevitably, the very field of study was affected by the research, in particular as the approach entailed a journalistic processing of its results. However, as will be explained below, the research and some of its results were affected by the field itself. Of course, we informed the groups and centres about the procedures and the envisaged outcome. Most groups favoured the approach to speak about religion without the usually hidden bias of Christianity on the one hand and “other” religions on the other. A few even praised the work, as obviously a study-of-religions point of view would refrain from value judgements and treat the various spiritual groups and religious traditions in a similar way. Also, a few of the convert groups foresaw a possible advertising effect of the research. A listing in the online documentation and the handy catalogue would draw attention to their very existence in the canton, including a contact address. New religious movements like the Scientology Centre strongly appreciated the inclusion in the study. By this, their status as a religious or spiritual organisation seemed to be acknowledged, a status commonly debated and questioned frequenly. However, three world view societies, the lodges Freemason, Druid Order, and Odd Fellows, had stated that they were not to be included in the study and the documentation. According to them “religion” is fundamentally characterised by its claim towards exclusive truth. This would be a claim the lodges definitely would not hold and would insist on their self-understanding as a non-religious world view brotherhood. Despite the lodges’ idea about themselves, they were included in the study and the catalogue on the basis of their ritual gatherings, their voiced acknowledgement of a higher force or power, and amongst other criteria their often explicitly religious symbolism. From our point of view, these societies proved to be highly religious, especially so in a functional understanding of “religious”. Following, at the public presentation of the first edition of the printed catalogue spokesmen of the lodges strongly opposed their inclusion in the study and labelling them as a “religion” (that is their own notion of “religion”). The following weeks saw an exchange of arguments and a round table discussion with an accompanying atten-
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dance of a local journalist. One of the lodges finally demanded by threat of a law suit the pulping of the printed catalogue and the deletion of its name from the online documentation. By official order, we had to appear before the justice of peace in order to settle the dispute. The hearing’s result achieved a typically Swiss compromise: The second edition of the catalogue would refrain from listing the world view lodges and the lodges would not be named in the forthcoming public exhibition. However, the online documentation would continue to list the three lodges. The dispute involved a variety of issues basic to the Study of Religions: To what extent should the group studied and the scholar’s description and understanding overlap; to what extent should a scholar’s categorisation take into account the group’s self-understanding; how to set the limits of freedom of research? Despite this nerves and work absorbing quarrel, the research project was met with much appreciation in general. The department has become move well-known in the wider public as a centre for information about spiritual groups and religious traditions. In this respect, such a research project certainly is a creative way to point to the department’s very existence and its competence. Furthermore, the department has become an acknowledged partner of the municipality and the canton. This generated a joint approach to take-stock of the existing religious plurality and, last but not least, financial support for the project. Finally, an unintended effect is that the department itself has become a non-aligned, though active part within the continuously changing scene of religious plurality in the canton. References Baumann, Martin, and Samuel-Martin Behloul (eds.), 2005, Religiöser Pluralismus— Empirische Studien und analytische Perspektiven, Bielefeld: transcript. Behloul, Samuel-Martin, 2004, Muslims in Central Switzerland. From Migrants to DiasporaMuslims. Research Report. In collaboration with the Pluralism Project at Harvard University, Lucerne: Department for the Study of Religions; also in Germany. Online available at: www.pluralism.org/affiliates/baumann/report.pdf (accessed 05.08.2005) Department for the Study of Religions (Religionswissenschaftliches Seminar), 2005, Religionsvielfalt im Kanton Luzern, 2nd edition, designed and realized by KerstinKatja Sindemann as part of the research project “Religious pluralism in the Canton of Lucerne”, Lucerne: Endoxon. Eck, Diana L., 1993, “The Challenge of Pluralism”, in: Nieman Reports “God in the Newsroom Issue”, 47, 2. Sindemann, Kerstin-Katja and the Department for the Study of Religions, 2005,
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Religionsvielfalt im Kanton Luzern, nine films, Lucerne: Kneubühler. Information about the films online at www.religionenlu.ch/projekt-science-film-liste.html (accessed 05.08.2005). Swiss Statistical Office, 2003, “Eidgenössische Volkszählung 2000: Schweizerische Religionslandschaft im Umbruch”, Neuchatel, press release dated 30.1.2003.
A BRIEF WORD P. Pratap Kumar University of KwaZulu Natal, South Africa The foregoing pages have given some insight into not only how religious pluralism is a reality in our modern world, despite many modernist tendencies to become engrossed in technological worldview. On a daily basis people are perhaps oblivious to their religiousity. But the diaspora experience seems to indicate that people attach greater significance to their religious beliefs and practices as they find themselves in their new homes. As Baumann in his research indicates that establishment of religious organizations is more prolific in the diaspora context than in its natural context. It might be attributed to their attempt to establish their identity in an alien society, or it could be attributed to their desire to find meaning in a new society, or to their sense of loss resulting from the distance from their homeland and it could be due to them being intensely religious people. Be that as it may, in more than one way, religious beliefs and practices seem to persist and follow them wherever the immigrant groups go. They find new ways and invent new rituals and practices, modify their beliefs and make some room for their old belief systems. The essays in this volume reflect all of these struggles. Perhaps the one point that needs to be considered is that the diaspora contexts are more fertile grounds to study the contemporary religion. For it is here one could reconstruct the old, find new inventions, find more concrete forms of religious diversity. There is no homogenous society today in any part of our known world. All societies are increasingly becoming urbanized and thus express diversity at its deepest. It is this diversity that raises challenges not just for scholars who study these phenomena, but also for governments, societies and various organizations. For scholars of religion, nonetheless, the challenge is one of redefining what religion is. Philosophically there is no shying away from the challenge of relativism. Social scientifically there is no escaping the fact that religion is constructed in a given social, political and historical circumstances through human ingenuities and creativeness. Either way, the problem of religion
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persists both in terms of its various manifestations, as well as in terms of our inability to grasp and define it. Some Issues for the Reckoning in the Study of Religions First, one thing that the study of religions in the diaspora signals is that the tendency to study religions in any homogenous way is seriously problematic both in conceptualizing the notion of religion as well as the individual religions that we have come go give names as Hinduism, Christianity and so on. There seems to be many in what we have simplistically lumped together despite the fact that our data defies the categorizations that we seem to impose on them. Second, religious pluralism has been generally conceptualized as different religions interacting with each other, e.g., Christianity to Hinduism and vice versa. The diaspora data also indicates that religious pluralism within each of the religions is perhaps more complex than has been considered before. Not only class and social divisions such as Arab Muslims and Zanzibari Muslims are real, but the consequent invention of rituals to accommodate their social and political identities is significant. Third, studies on religions in the diaspora context also reveal that while pluralism and diversity is real both from within and from without, the immigrant community despite their diverse religious and cultural backgrounds, invents an artificial homogeneity to accommodate differences among themselves. For example, due to small numbers the old caste and sectarian boundaries may not make much difference in the face of the external others. This then leads to homogenizing different beliefs and practices, e.g., a Shaiva temple may accommodate Vaishnava worship. Fourth, much of the studies in religions have been premised on the basis of a romantic idea that texts provide us the materials as they are considered sacred by the practitioners, who might attribute them to either some divine origin or ancient sages. Hence they became our “primary sources”. Not only do we often ignore that the text itself was a product of a particular historical time and place and the result of human ingenuity, but by privileging it we ignore how religions are constructed through inventive and imaginative ways in relation to their socio-political environments. Data from diaspora
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locations give us an insight into how people invent new rituals or doctrines and reorganize their lives around them. Fifth, therefore, whatever else religions are about in some spiritual sense, they are intensely social, political, and can become powerful tools for negotiating identities and social power. It is for this reason religions are socially and politically relevant and meaningful. Their importation and repackaging through the processes of migration and urbanization in the new lands makes them just as market related as any other commodity in our information age. Finally on another note, as Martikainen points out in his essay in this volume, “Research on immigrant religions and issues related to it has become very popular during the last decade. For long the studies tended to be local and national in focus, but a new trend attempts to combine data from various religious traditions, localities and countries, and search for common developments as well as differences. The current volume is a good example of this interest” (Martikainen: p. 337). I hope this volume has furthered the insights on religious pluralism as well as on the diaspora in general.
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Dr. Cristina Rocha is an Australian Research Council Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Cultural Research, University of Western Sydney. Her writings include Zen in Brazil: The Quest for Cosmopolitan Modernity. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press (2006); “The Brazilian Imaginaire of Zen: Global Influences, Rhizomatic Forms,” in Japanese Religions in and Beyond the Japanese Diaspora. Eds. Ronan Pereira and Hideo Matsuoka. Berkeley: Center for Japanese Studies, University of California (forthcoming); “Being a Zen Buddhist Brazilian: Juggling Multiple Religious Identities in the Land of Catholicism” Buddhist Missionaries in the Era of Globalization. Ed. Linda Learman. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004. Gracia Liu Farrer is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago. Her dissertation examines the diverse adaptation patterns and transnational practices among Chinese immigrants who had migrated to Japan since late 1970s. She is the author of “The Chinese Social Dance Party in Tokyo: Identity and Status in an Immigrant Leisure Subculture” ( Journal of Contemporary Ethnography vol. 33, 2004) and “From Corporate Employees to Business Owners: a Path to Chinese Immigrant Transnational Entrepreneurship in Japan” in Deciphering the Global: Its Spaces, Scalings, and Subjects. Edited by Saskia Sassen, Rutledge: London, forthcoming. Farrer’s research interests include international migration, transnationalism, labor market, Japanese society, race and ethnicity, and social stratification. Kim-kwong Chan (Ph.D., D.Th.) is the Executive Secretary of the Hong Kong Christian Council; Honorary Research Fellow at the Universities Service Center for China Studies, Chinese University off Hong Kong; and appointed Justice of the Peace by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. He had authored and co-authored 10 books on China including Protestantism in Contemporary China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) with Alan Hunter; Witness to Power: Stories of God’s Quiet Work in a Changing China (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2000); and the recent one Religious Freedom in China: Policy,
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Administration and Regulation—A Research Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA.: Institute for Study of American Religion, 2005) with Eric Carlson. He can be reached at
[email protected]. Annette Wilke is Professor of the Study of Religion and Head of the Seminar of the Study of Religion (“Allgemeine Religionswissenschaft”) at the University of Muenster, Germany. Besides systematic studies in religion, her major fields of research are Hindu traditions (devotional, Tantric and Vedantic), goddess worship and the Tamil Hindu diaspora in Germany. She has carried out field work on goddess worship in India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Germany. Along with Martin Baumann and Brigitte Luchesi she has published the first volume on the Tamil Hindu Diaspora in Europe: Tempel und Tamilen in zweiter Heimat. Hindus aus Sri Lanka im deutschsprachigen und skandinavischen Raum, Würzburg 2003. Related articles: The Goddess Kamaksi in HammUentrop, Kolam 9&10, www.fas.nus.edu.sg, 2004; Hindu-Diaspora in Deutschland, interkulturelle Austauschprozesse und ein neues religiöses Europa, in: Zukunft der Religion in Europa, ed. B. Mussinghoff, Münster: Lit (forthcoming). Dr. Tuomas Martikainen (Ph.D.) is researcher at the Population Research Institute, Finnish Family Federation, and part-time lecturer at the Department of Comparative Religion, Åbo Akademi University, Turku, Finland. He has studied immigrant religious organizations with qualitative methods in the city of Turku, and also conducted national studies of Muslims in Finland. He has published several academic articles on the topic in English, Finnish and Swedish. His latest book is Immigrant Religions in Local Society: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives in the City of Turku (Åbo Akademi University Press, 2004). Contact: tuomas.martikainen@abo.fi Regina Yoshie Matsue (University of Tsukuba, Japan, Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences: Doctoral Program in International Political Economy, Sub-area of Intercultural Communication). Her publications include, Matsue, Regina Yoshie (2003) ‘Overseas Japanese New Religion: The Expansion of Sekai Kyuseikyo in Brazil and Australia’ Yakara Studies in Ethnology (Tsukuba Studies in Anthropology Group) 33, 20–34. Matsue, Regina Yoshie (2002) ‘O Budismo da Terra Pura
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em Brasilia’ [The Pure Land Buddhism in Brazil] in Frank Usarski (ed.) O Budismo no Brasil [Buddhism in Brazil] Sao Paulo: Lorasae Publisher, 193–219. Prof. Hajer Ben Hadj Salem: Taught at the Institut Supérieur des Etudes Appliqués aux Humanités, Mahdia. Currently working on a research project with the Office of the Under-Secretary General for the Department of General Assembly and Conference Management at the United Nations, NY. His research work includes “Methodism: A Politicized Christianity?” (Prepared and defended orally at the ENS, 1999); “Class, Gender and Race: A Post-Marxist Approach to Methodism in Early Industrial Britain”; “Workload Standards for the United Nations Language Staff: A Historical Perspective”. He has published a number of research papers in various journals. Prof. Dr. Knut A. Jacobsen teaches in the Department of the History of Religions at the University of Bergen. He has published a number of books and essays in international publications. His most recent publications include editing the volume on Theory and Practice of Yoga: Essays in Honour of Gerald James Larson, Brill 2005 and an earlier volume (edited jointly with P. Pratap Kumar) on South Asians in the Diaspora: Histories and Religious Traditions, Brill 2004. Dr. Pakinam Rachad El Sharkawy is an Associate Professor in the Political Science Department, Faculty of Economics and Political Science (FEPS), Cairo University. Her main field is comparative politics. She teaches western political systems & political development. Her major academic interests are in Political systems in the Muslim World, (mainly Turkish and Iranian systems). She has published widely. Her publications include Iranian and Turkish studies, dialogue among civilizations, Democracy in the Muslim world, development and culture. “Democracy in the Islamic World after 11th of September: an Islamic evaluation to the American discourse”, American studies regional conference, Christopher Wise & Mounira Soliman (ed.), January 24–26, 2004, Cairo, 2004. “Democracy in the Islamic World after 11th of September: an Islamic evaluation to the American discourse”.
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Dorottya Nagy is a theologian and a minister of the Hungarian Lutheran Church. She studied contextual theology in Hong Kong and presently is a PhD candidate at the University of Utrecht, the Netherlands. Her doctoral research deals with the theological aspect of the contemporary phenomenon of migration with special regard to the cases of the Chinese Christian communities in Hungary and Romania. Her writings include ‘Trend word or keyword?! Introducing transnationalism into the missiological discourse’ (2005). Prof. Barbara Ambros teaches in the Department of Religious Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA. Her areas of Research include early modern and contemporary Japanese religions; especially: pilgrimage, sacred space and mountains, local and transnational religions, ethnicity and religion, the religions of Asian diasporas in Japan. Some of her recent Publications include “Geography, Environment, Pilgrimage.” Guidebook for the Study of Japanese Religion. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006: 289–308. Local Religion in Tokugawa History (Special Issues of the Japanese Journal of Religious Studies). Nagoya: Nanzan Institute of Religion and Culture, 2001. 237 pp. (co-edited with Duncan Williams). Dr Sultan Khan is a senior lecturer in the School of Sociology and Social Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He has extensive experience in working with social movements and civil society organizations with special focus on development. His research profile comprises a number of publications on service delivery issues in the post apartheid South Africa. Most recently Dr Khan has concluded a national study on the nature, extent and scope of philanthropy amongst Muslims in South Africa and their contribution to poverty alleviation in the country. Currently, Dr Khan is researching the state of public participation in poverty alleviation in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal. Professor Abul Fadl Mohsin Ebrahim is a lecturer in the School of Religion and Theology at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. His particular interest is in Islamic Law and Bioethics. He has written extensively in these fields. Among his latest publications are Intensive Care Unit (ICU) Ethical Dilemmas—Guidelines for Muslim Families (2003) and “Objectives of Shari"ah and Legal Maxims” in Islamic law (Shari'ah)—An Introduction to the Principles of Islamic Law (2005), Ed. M.A. Vahed.
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Martin D. Stringer is currently Lecturer in the Sociology/Anthropology of Religion and Head of the Department of Theology and Religion at the University of Birmingham. Recent Publications include: A Sociological History of Christian Worship (Cambridge: CUP 2005) and On the Perception of Worship (Birmingham: Birmingham University Press, 1999) Martin Baumann is Professor of the Study of Religions at the University of Lucerne in Switzerland. His teaching and research interests include studies on diaspora and religious pluralism, Buddhism in the West, and Hindu traditions in Europe and the Caribbean. He is author of “Diaspora: Hindus und Trinidad” (2003) and “Migration, Religion, Integration” (2000). He has co-edited “Religiöser Pluralismus” (2005), “Westward Dharma: Buddhism Beyond Asia” (2002) and “Religions of the World: A Comprehensive Encyclopaedia of Beliefs and Practices” (2002). Professor Yoshiko Shibata teaches at Kobe University, Japan (Faculty of Cross-Cultural Studies/Graduate School of Human Sciences). She specializes in Cultural Anthropology and Caribbean Studies. Some of her publications include ‘Revisiting Chinese Hybridity: Negotiating Categories and Re-constructing Ethnicity in Contemporary Jamaica’ (2003) Osaka: FIEALC/Univ. of Osaka) CD-ROM. “Intermarriage, ‘Douglas’, Creolization of Indians in Contemporary Guyana: the Rocky Road of Ambiguity and Ambivalence”, In Oshikawa, et al. (eds.) South Asian Migration in Comparative Perspective: Movement, Settlement and Diaspora (2002) Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology. Dr. Igor Y. Kotin Received his Ph.D. from Oxford University. He teaches at St. Petersburg State University, Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography of Russian Academy of Sciences. He has published several articles and monographs. His publications include (1) Pobegi banyana”: Migratsia naseleniia iz Indii I formirovanie uzlov’ iuzhnoaziatskoi diaspori’.—The Banyan Shoots: Emigration from India and the Formation of nodes’ of the South Asian Diaspora. St. Petersburg. SanktPeterburgskoe Vostokovedenie. 272 pp., (2003) (in Russian). (2) Islam in South Asia. 268 pp. St. Petersburg: Petersburgskoe Vostokovedenie. 2005. His research interests are in the areas of Religion and Caste in Indian diaspora.
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Prof. P. Pratap Kumar teaches in the School of Religion and Theology at the University of KwaZulu Natal, South Africa. He is a professor of Hinduism and Comparative Religions. His publications include The Goddess Lakshmi (1997, Scholars Press), Hinduism in South Africa (2000, University of Durban-Westville, South Africa). He has jointly published with Knut A. Jacobsen the volume on South Asians in the Diaspora (2004, Brill). He is also one of the editors of the Numen Book Series of the International Association for the History of Religions. Address List Dr. Cristina Rocha 11 Yule Street Dulwich Hill NSW 2203 Australia Or Centre for Cultural Research University of Western Sydney Locked bag 1797 Penrith South DC NSW 1797 Australia Phone: (+61 2) 9685 9600 Fax: (+61 2) 9685 9610 Mob: 0410 324 971 email:
[email protected] Revd Dr Chan Kim-kwong Executive Secretary Hong Kong Christian Council 9/F, 33 Granville Road Kowloon Hong Kong e mail:
[email protected] Regina Yoshie Matsue Home Address: T305–0005 Ibaraki-ken, Tsukuba-shi Amakubo 3–17–25 Nichiei-So B-9 Japan Office Address: T 305–8573 Ibaraki-ken, Tsukuba-shi Tennodai 1–1–1 University of Tsukuba 3K-320 Japan Prof. Hajer Ben Hadj Salem 1415 Bourguiba Street Hiboune-Mahdia 5100 Tunisia Tel.: (216) 73–671–612 E-mail:
[email protected] Prof. Dr. Knut A. Jacobsen Seksjon for religionsvitenskap/ Department of the History of Religions University of Bergen
list of contributors Oisteinsgate 3 N-5007 Bergen Norway E-mail:
[email protected] Phone (47) 911 33020 (mobile) (47) 55582449 (office) Fax: (47) 55589191 Prof. Tuomas Martikainen Abo Akademi University Dept. of Comparative Religion Fabriksgatan 2, 20500 ABO Finland, Europe Work +358–(0)2–215 4842 Mobile +358–(0)40–5924202 E-mail: tuomas.martikainen@abo.fi Prof. Dr. Annette Wilke Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster Seminar für Allgemeine Religionswissenschaft Hüfferstr. 27 D-48149 Münster Tel. (d): 0251 83 31981 Tel. (Sek.): 0251 83 32667 Fax: 0251 83 31983 http://wwwfb02.unimuenster.de/fb02/allgrews Dr. Pakinam Rachad El Sharkawy Mailing address: (Home) 90d Ahmed Oraby st 4th floor, app10
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El Mohandessin El Giza Egypt (office) Dr. Pakinam El Sharkawy Political Sciences Department Faculty of Economics and Political Sciences Cairo University El Giza Egypt Prof. Barbara Ambros Department of Religious Studies University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 125 Saunders Hall CB#3225 Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA Dr. Martin D. Stringer Department of Theology and Religion University of Birmingham Edgbaston Birmingham B15 2TT UK Prof. Dr. Martin Baumann Religionswissenschaftliches Seminar Universität Luzern Kasernenplatz 3 6004 Lucerne Switzerland
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Professor Yoshiko Shibata c/o Faculty of Cross-Cultural Studies Kobe University 1–2–1 Tsurukabuto Nada-ku Kobe 657–8501 Japan Home Address: 1–3–124–705 Koyo-cho Naka Higashi Nada-ku Kobe 658–0032 Japan Dorottya Nagy Van Eysingalaan 189 NL-3527 VE Utrecht
[email protected] Prof. P. Pratap Kumar School of Religion and Theology University of KwaZulu Natal Howard College Campus Private Bag X10 Durban 4000 South Africa
[email protected] Dr. Sultan Khan School of Social Science and Development Studies University of KwaZulu Natal Howard College Campus Private Bag X10 Durban 4000 South Africa Prof. A.F.M. Ebrahim School of Religion and Theology University of KwaZulu Natal Howard College Campus Private Bag X10 Durban 4000 South Africa Gracia Liu Farrer Shoan 1–22–9 Suginami-ku, Tokyo 167–0054 Japan Tel/fax: 81–3–3247–4226 Dr. Igor Kotin, D.Phil (Oxon) Mailing address: MAERAS (Kunstkamera), Universitetskaya nab. 3. St. Petersburg Russia. 199034.
INDEX abhishekha 164 Advaita Vedànta 246 Adventism 291 Afghanistan 76, 89 n. 48, 235 nn. 2–3, 351 African American Islam 302 African Americans 11, 307, 315, 317, 319–320, 331 African Muslims 189–190, 192 n. 9, 196 African slaves 54 Africanization 177 Afro-Brazilians 151 Afro-Caribbean 178, 224, 228–229 Ahmadiya movement 179 Ahmadiyyas 301 Akalis 179 Albanian Muslims 343 Ambedkar Buddhist Association 179 American Arab Institute 318 American Civil Law Union 318 American Muslim Alliance 298, 319 American Muslim Council 298, 317, 319 American Muslim Political Coordination Council 318, 322 American Muslim Social Scientists 316 American Muslim Taskforce 319, 319 n. 45 American Muslims 11, 295, 298, 305–309, 311–314, 317, 319–325, 327–329 American Protestants 292 Amity Foundation 73 n. 4 Amman 166, 169, 256, 356 Amritsar 182, 229 Anglican 43 n. 25, 57 Anti-Chinese Riot 81 apartheid 2, 192, 192 n. 7, 193, 201–202, 204 n. 19, 205–206, 210–211 Arab Muslims 364 Arya Pratinidhi Sabha 275 Arya Samaj 179–180, 184, 275 Asians 51 n. 1, 177–178, 272, 298, 342 Assembly of God 148, 152–153
Association of American Muslim Scientists and Engineers 316 Association of Muslim Businessmen and Professionals 316 Association of Southeast Asian Nations 77 Australia 9, 36, 76, 80, 105, 110 n. 21, 140 n. 32, 147–148, 152–153, 154 n. 9, 156–157, 253, 261, 270, 277, 341 Baha"is 301 Bahá"í 355, 357 Bangladeshis 178 Baptist Church 39, 42, 48, 104 Baptists 41 n. 22, 42, 57, 290 Bayt al-Mal system 189, 189 n. 3, 197 Bengalis 273, 278 bhajan 164 Birmingham Central Mosque 224 Biserica Baptista 37 Blacks 55, 55 n. 7, 57, 57 n. 12, 58, 66, 151, 298 Bodhisattvas 142 Bosnians 345 Brahma Kumaris 273, 356 Brahmins 246–248, 259–260, 260 n. 48, 270, 272, 276 Brahmo Samaj 273 Brazil 73, 121–123, 125–128, 128 n. 13, 129–132, 135–140, 142–143, 147–152, 152 n. 7, 153, 153 n. 8, 154–158 Brazilian Catholicism 144 Brazilian Community Council of Australia 154 n. 10 Buddha Light Association 98 Buddhism 70, 78–79, 98 n. 4, 129, 130 n. 17, 142, 181, 294, 355–356 Buddhist/s 11, 56, 98, 126–128, 130, 177, 179, 181, 227, 288, 294, 298, 301, 336, 343, 346, 353, 355–357, 359 Buddhist Monastery 181 Calvinism 289 Canada 5, 27, 36, 76, 80, 105, 110
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n. 21, 147, 152, 168 n. 11, 235, 235 n. 3, 236 n. 4, 242, 244 n. 15, 253, 270, 341 Canon 54 Cantonese 3, 39, 52, 55, 64, 115, 115 n. 31 Cape Muslims 209 Catholic 15–18, 19 n. 4, 20–23, 25–29, 57–58, 60–61, 66 n. 31, 69, 73 n. 3, 102, 114, 123, 133–135, 136 n. 26, 137–138, 144, 149, 151–153, 290 n. 4, 291–294, 324, 338–340, 343–346, 353–354 Catholic Brazilians 127, 133 Catholic doctrine 27–28 Catholic Jesuit China Center 101 Catholic Tokyo International Center 26 Catholicism 20, 26, 54, 59–60, 70, 122, 129, 133–137, 144, 149–150, 150 n. 3, 292, 353–356 Central Asia 74, 88–89 Central Asian Republics 77 Chaldean Iraqis 345 Chamars 179, 272 chanting 69 Chinatown 56, 60, 115 n. 31 Chinese 1, 3, 7–9, 12, 13, 15–17, 18, 18 n. 2, 19, 19 n. 3, 19 n. 4, 20–22, 22 n. 7, 23–26, 27–29, 33, 33 n. 5, 34, 34 n. 6, 35, 35 nn. 7–8, 36–39, 40 nn. 19, 21, 41, 44–46, 46 n. 29, 47, 47 n. 32, 48–51, 51 nn. 1, 2, 4, 52–53, 53 n. 5, 54–55, 55 nn. 8–9, 56–57, 57 n. 12, 58–59, 59 nn. 14–15, 60, 60 nn. 16–17, 61, 61 n. 18, 62, 62 n. 20, 63, 63 nn. 21, 23, 64–65, 65 n. 28, 66, 66 n. 29, 67–68, 68 n. 41, 69–72, 73, 73 n. 4, 74–75, 75 n. 14, 76, 76 nn. 15, 17, 77, 77 nn. 21–22, 78–81, 81 nn. 27–28, 82–85, 85 nn. 33, 35–39, 86, 86 nn. 40, 44, 87, 87 n. 45, 88, 88 n. 47, 89, 89 nn. 48, n. 50, 90–91, 91 n. 54, 92–93, 93 n. 57, 94–95, 97, 97 n. 2, 98–99, 99 n. 5, 100–107, 107 n. 17, 109, 109 n. 20, 110, 110 n. 21, 111–116, 122 n. 5, 133, 148 n. 1, 229, 344–345 Chinese Benevolent Association 55, 57 Chinese Cemetery 53, 60–61, 63, 65, 67, 71
Chinese Christian Church 33, 33 n. 5, 35–36, 92, 97 n. 2, 107 Chinese Cultural Association 57 Chinese Diaspora 97–99, 99 n. 5, 100, 110, 114 Chinese Freemason Society 57 Chinese immigrant 15, 21, 29 Chinese Jews 83 Chinese Overseas Christian Mission 36 Chiney Dougla 55 Christendom 74, 80, 82, 88, 91, 93–95, 289 n. 4 Christian Science 355 Christians 8, 11, 36, 38–41, 44, 47–48, 52, 54, 56–57, 59, 66, 66 n. 30, 69, 74, 79, 81–83, 83 n. 32, 87–90, 92–94, 98 n. 4, 101, 104, 106, 112, 114, 179, 179 n. 2, 180, 288, 298, 301, 343, 346, 349 Chuhras 179–180, 272 Civil Register 340 Cold War 77, 335 Coloured 54–55, 192 n. 7, 195 Commonwealth Immigrants Act 177 Communist 19 n. 4, 78–79, 105–106, 114 Confucianism 70 Congregationalism 15–16, 40, 40 n. 18 Congregationalists 290 contextual theology 34, 370 Coon Carnival 210 Creole Chinese 52 Creolization 2, 51 n. 1, 54 cultural referents 166 Cultural Revolution 78 Daoism 78–79, 97 Daudi Bohras 3 Denominational 10, 42, 109 n. 20 Deobandi 203 n. 19, 204 n. 19 Deterritorialization 3 divination 56 dual diaspora 9, 121, 121 n. 3, 123 Durga 169, 250, 261, 278 Dutch East India Company 191 Dvija 186 East Africa 177–178, 183–184, 192, 270, 272 East African Gujarati 272–273 East African Hindus 184, 272
index East Indies 191 Easter 52, 66 Ebisu church 107 n. 17, 109, 109 n. 20, 110 Ecclesiogenesis 33, 33 n. 4, 34, 36, 49 Emancipation 66, 185, 255 Episcopalians 290, 295 ethnic homeland 121 Ethnicity 7–10, 15, 51, 51 n. 1, 53, 60, 65, 70–71, 109 n. 20, 114, 128–129, 149, 157, 175–177, 179, 222–224, 226, 230, 235, 237, 239, 269, 278–280, 308, 312 ethnicized 61, 70 Euro-American 54 Evangelical Lutheran Church 339–340 Evangelicalism 148, 150–151 Federation of Islamic Associations 316 festival images 164 Fidiyah 190 n. 6 filial piety 3, 70, 138 First Amendment 289, 289 n. 3, 292, 294 fortune-telling 56 Freemasonry 149 French Spiritism 148–149 Fujian 15–16, 18, 18 n. 2, 19–22, 24, 27–30, 38, 106 Fujian immigrant 18, 18 n. 2, 19–26, 28–29 Fujianese 98–99, 101, 110–111, 115, 115 n. 31 Gah San 52–53, 55, 61–63, 63 n. 22, 64–65, 65 n. 27, 66–67, 69–71 Ganesha 169 Globalization 51 n. 1, 73–74, 142 Glocalization 51 n. 1 Goddess 237–238, 241 n. 11, 244–246, 246 n. 19, 247, 250–252, 252 n. 29, 253–255, 256 n. 39, 257, 259, 263, 265 Greater China Circle 80 Gurdwara 227–228 Gujarati 4, 10, 177–178, 204 n. 19, 270 Gujarati Hindus 10, 272–274 Gujarati Mahila Mandal 274 Gurudvara 185 Guyana 270, 371
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Hakka 39, 55, 64, 71 half brain 55, 55 n. 10 Half Chinese 55, 62 Hanafi 197 Haram 308 Harijan 180 Heretic 42 Hijab 226–227, 230 Hindu 3, 9, 163–165, 166, 167 n. 7, 170 n. 14, 176–179, 179 n. 2, 180–181, 184, 186, 227, 235, 235 n. 3, 236 n. 4, 237–238, 239–241, 241 n. 8, 244, 244 n. 15, 247–249, 251, 255, 257–259, 261–267, 269–274, 276–278, 282, 301, 338, 353, 355–358 Hindu Temple Trust 184 Holiness Movement 291 Hong Kong 2–3, 17–18, 23, 25, 27, 36, 47, 56, 58, 61 n. 18, 73, 76, 76 n. 17, 80, 98 n. 4, 101, 106, 110 Hosay/Hussay 54 Ibadis 301 Indian Constitution 181 Indian Immigration Law 192 Indian Muslims 193, 195, 204 n. 19 Indian Republic 181 Indians 4, 51 n. 1, 54, 55 n. 7, 175, 177, 179, 185–186, 196, 224, 272, 274, 278, 282 Indo-Caribbeans 273 Indo-Fijians 273 Indo-Mauritians 273 Indonesia 78, 80–81 Irish Protestants 7 ISKCON 235 n. 2, n. 3, 261, 263, 273 Islam 70, 92, 94, 179, 189, 191, 193, 198 n. 12, 199, 205, 210, 212, 214, 214 n. 23, 226 n. 5, 273, 288, 294–297, 297 n. 8, 298–302, 305–306, 308, 308 n. 8, 312–314, 317, 319, 319 n. 46, 322–324, 326–327, 327 n. 73, 329, 331–336, 343, 356–357, 359 Islamic Assembly of North America 317 Islamic Council of Greater Chicago 299 Islamic Council of South Africa 191 Islamic Information Centre 179 Islamic Medical Association 316
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Islamic Relief Agency 210 Isma"ilis 301 Ismaeli Shias 3 Ja"faris 301 Jaffna 236, 238, 242, 244, 245 n. 16, 246, 246 n. 19, 247, 248 n. 22, 251, 257, 259, 260 n. 48, 263 Jamaica 8, 51, 51 n. 1, n. 4, 52–53 53 n. 5, 54, 55 n. 11, 56, 58–59, 59 n. 14, 61 n. 18, 63 n. 24, 64, 66, 71, 270 Jamiatul Ulema 204 n. 19, 214–215 Japan National Police Agency 23 Japanese Brazilians 9, 12, 119, 121–122, 122 n. 4, 123, 125, 129, 131–133, 135, 137 Japanese Buddhist monks 127 Japanese New Religions 129–130, 133, 133 n. 23, 138–139 Japanese Protestants 111 Jats 182–183, 272 Jehovah Witnesses 355 Jerusalem 88, 88 n. 48, 89, 89 n. 49, 93, 322 Jerusalem Movement 82, 88 Jesuit 16–18, 101 Jewish 4, 124 n. 10, 278, 291–293, 301, 315, 355–356 Jews 4, 11, 83, 288, 291–295, 298, 301, 309, 322, 345, 353, 355–356, 359 Judaism 70, 292, 295 Kamadchi 237 n. 5, 238–241, 241 nn. 9, 10–11, 242–245, 245 n. 17, 246–249, 251–254, 254 n. 33, 255–256, 258, 258 n. 46, 259, 261, 263, 266 Kanchipuram 246 Kardecism 149 Karma 150 Kathiyawad Arya Mandal 274 Kathiyawad Hindu Maha Sabha 274 Kazakhstan 78 Kenya 272 Khalistan 177 Khatris 272 Kin 20, 22, 25–26, 28–29, 127 Kinship 7, 16, 19–20, 26, 29, 131 Kobe 17, 51 Korea 73, 76, 76 n. 18, 77, 80, 82, 89 Kuangung altar 57 Kurds 345
Lakßmì 250, 254 Langar 184 Lillah 190 n. 5, 199, 200 Lingayatas 277 Liturgical 24, 41 n. 22, 44, 68, 112, 237 Local 2, 9, 19–20, 26, 28–29, 35, 35 n. 8, 37, 40–41, 43 n. 25, 47–51, 51 n. 2, 4, 52, 53 n. 5, 55, 55 n. 9, 58, 62, 62 n. 20, 64, 66, 66 n. 29, 68, 70, 81, 83, 83 n. 31, 84, 85 n. 38, 39, 86, 86 n. 44, 87–88, 89 n. 48, 91–92, 115, 123, 130 n. 16, 136–137, 140, 141 n. 33, 143, 177, 180, 182, 190, 212, 218, 221, 223–224, 228, 243, 247, 250 n. 25, 254–255, 264, 266, 270–271, 274–276, 282, 312–314, 317, 320, 337, 347, 356, 358, 361, 365 Macao 80 Mahars 181 Mahotsav 163–164, 168–169 Malawi 192, 272 Malaysia 36, 80, 110–111, 191, 270–271 Mandarin 39, 64 n. 25, 99, 101, 103–106, 111, 115, 115 n. 31 Mantras 244, 252, 257, 259 Màriyamman 250, 253–254 Marxist 6, 78 Mauritius 2, 184, 270 Meditation 69–70, 273, 356–357 Memons 192, 204 n. 19 Mesmerism 149 Messianity Church of Brazil 139 Methodists 290 Middle East 74, 80, 90–93, 345 Missiological 33, 35, 45, 50, 73–75, 77, 82, 89, 91, 93–95 Mixed Race 53–55 Mochis 179–180, 274 Mongolia 78, 80 Moody Bible Institute 36 Moravians 57 Mormons 291, 345, 355 Mozambique 192, 213 Murugan 166–171 Murukan 166, 166 n. 6, 167 n. 8, 248–250, 254, 258, 261 Muslim 10–11, 55, 91–92, 93 n. 57, 176–177, 179, 185, 189, 189 n. 3, 190, 190 nn. 4, 6, 191–192, 192 n. 9, 193, 195–196, 197–202, 204 n. 19, 205–207, 210–211, 213–214,
index 216–219, 221, 224, 227, 238, 249, 266, 281, 295–296, 296 n. 7, 297, 297 n. 8, 298–299, 300–301, 305–308, 308 nn. 7, 9, 309, 309 n. 12, 310–313 313 nn. 24–26, 314, 314 n. 28, 315–316, 316 n. 36, 317–319, 319 n. 45, 320–325, 325 n. 68, 326–328, 328 n. 80, 329–332, 345–346, 348, 353, 355–359 Muslim American Alliance 318 Muslim Charitable Foundation 214 Muslim Judicial Council 216 Muslim Student Association 316 Muslim Women Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 317 Muslim Youth Movement 210 Myanmar 80 Nagapooshani 239 Natal Gujarati Parishad 274 natal homeland 9, 121 National Council of Churches 324 Native 5, 21, 39, 54–55, 69, 104 n. 12, 131–132, 134, 137, 237–238, 240, 244, 247–248, 253, 261, 263, 266–267, 292, 344–345 Navacakti 237 n. 5, 238–239, 249–255, 259, 263 Neo-Buddhist 175–176, 177 Nepal 77 New Apostolic Church 355 New Chinese 51 n. 2, 57 n. 12, 54, 59, 59 n. 14–15, 60 n. 16, 76, 83, 104 Nichiren 144 Nigeria 73 non-Evangelicals 154 North American Council for Muslim Women and the International Muslim Artists 317 North American Islamic Trust 316 Old Chinese 59, 59 n. 14 Orientalism 300 Overseas Chinese Christian Church 41, 101, 107 overseas Chinese Christians 41, 101, 115 overseas Japanese 121 n. 1, 131 n. 18, 132, 368 Paganism 69 Panama 80 pastoral counselling 42–43
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Pattini Soni Association 274 Pentecostal congregations 98, 346 Polynesian 80 Population Register 340 Portuguese 123, 127 n. 12, 134–136, 138, 140, 143–144, 148–149, 151, 154–155, 192 Prajapati/s 177, 179–181 Pre-millennialism 291 Presbyterian/s 102, 104, 109 n. 20, 111, 290 Proselytizing 81, 89 n. 48, 90–91, 93–95 Protestant 6–7, 15, 36, 38 n. 17, 41 n. 22, 42, 44, 54, 57, 59, 73, 73 n. 3, 98–99, 102, 107 n. 17, 109, 109 n. 20, 110–111, 113–114, 133 n. 23, 151, 153, 288–290, 290 n. 4, 291–294, 324, 338, 340, 353–354 Protestant cantons 353 Protestantism 78, 149–150, 151 n. 5, 157, 292, 355 Protestants churches 41, 41 n. 22, 44, 54, 97, 99, 102, 109, 109 n. 20, 110, 113–114, 151, 340 Punjabi 177–182, 184, 232, 272 Puritanism 289 Qibla Movement 210 Quran 301 Rama bhaktas 277 Ramadan 190 n. 6, 204 n. 20, 205, 327 Ramakrishna Mission 273 Ramayana 180 Ramgarhia 177, 177 n. 1, 178 n. 1, 182–183 Rastafari 54 Rathotsav 163, 166, 169–170, 172 Ravidasi 181–183, 186 Reformation 289 n. 4, 299, 339–340, 353 Relativism 363 Religious Freedom Act 340 religious minorities 163, 166, 172 Roman Catholic 11, 19, 38 n. 17, 69, 102, 289 n. 4, 291, 353–354, 358 Roman Catholicism 149, 353, 356 Romanian Orthodox church 42 Rosicrucianism 149 Sai Baba 270, 358 •a«karàcaryas 246
380
index
Sanatana Dharma Sabha 275 Sanskritization 176, 238, 255 Sant 182 Saurashtra Hindu Association 274 Scheduled Castes 180, 274 Scientology 355–357, 360 Scientology Centre 357, 360 Scotland 77 Security Council 77 Seed of Light 148, 154–156 Shafi 197 n. 12, 306 n. 1, 326 n. 71, 330 n. 86 Shaiva temple 364 Shaivas 166 Shaivites 277 Shanghai 16, 19, 77, 77 n. 20, 110 Shanghai Cooperative Organization 77 Shi"iah 301 Shite 197 n. 12 Shiva Siddhanta 166 Shree Prajapati Mandal 180 Shri Valmik temple 181 Shudras 180 Sikh Missionary Society 175, 179, 181 Sikhs 176–178, 178 n. 1, 179 n. 2, 180–184, 186, 221, 229, 232–233, 294–295, 298, 336 Singapore 36, 76, 80, 110, 167, 271 Sinhalese-Tamil 236 •ivaràtri 257 Sivasubramanyar Alayam 164, 166–171 Society of Jesus 17, 24 Soofies 197 n. 12 South Africa 1–2, 10, 80, 189, 191–192, 192 n. 8, 193, 196, 197 n. 12, 213, 269–270, 271–272, 274–276, 282 South African Muslims 189, 190 South Asians 1, 7, 10–12, 175–179, 179 n. 2 South Europeans 345 Southeast Asians 100 Soviet Republic 80 Spanish Town 63 n. 24 speaking in tongue 69, 111–113 Spiritist Group of New York 155 Spiritists 148, 151, 155 Spirituality 46, 51 n. 4, 52–53, 53 n. 5, 69, 92, 236, 259, 265, 301 Sri Lanka 140 n. 32, 163–164, 166–167, 168 nn. 10–12, 169–170,
213, 235–237, 239, 241–242, 245 n. 17, 246, 251, 253, 257, 260–261, 264, 270, 355–356 Sri Prajapati Mandal 177 Sri Thurkkai Amman 356 Sri Thurkkai Amman temple 356 Sri Valmik Mandir 175 ≤rìcakra 245–246, 246 n. 18, 247, 247 n. 20, 254, 254 n. 34, 257 St Patrick’s Day 229 structural-functionalism 6 Sunni 10, 192, 203–204, 204 n. 19, 205, 207, 216, 301, 319, 348, 356 Sunni Vhoras 192 Surinam 270 Swaminarayan 182, 254 n. 36, 263, 270 Swedenborgianism 149 Swiss Jeshiva Talmud College 356 Sydney World Revival Church 152 Syncretization 61 Syrian-Lebanese 54 Tablighi 10, 197 n. 12, 203, 203 n. 19, 204, 204 n. 20, 205, 207, 215 Tabligh-i-Jamaat 179 Taiwan 16–18, 27, 80, 98, 98 n. 4, 99, 102–104, 106–107, 107 n. 17, 110–111, 111 n. 24, 112, 114–115 Taiwanese 97 n. 2, 98–107, 109, 109 n. 20, 110–112, 114–115, 115 n. 31, 356 Taiwanese Buddhist movements 98 Taliban 235 n. 3 Tamil Hindus 163–164, 170, 178, 235 n. 3, 236–237, 242 n. 13, 260 n. 48, 266 Tamil migrants 356 Tamils 9, 165–167, 167 n. 7, 168, 171–172, 273 Tantric 244–245, 252, 252 n. 29, 259 Tanzania 272 Taoism 70 Telugus 273, 275 Tèvàram 252 Thailand 76–77, 80, 279 Theosophy 149 Tirtha 167, 167 n. 7, 169–170 Tokyo International Church 99 n. 5, 105–108, 108 n. 18, 109, 109 n. 20, 110 n. 21, 113, 116 Tokyo Overseas Christian Church 97 n. 2
index Transnational 3–4, 7, 16, 18, 20, 27–29, 33–34, 41, 156, 172, 237, 239, 242–243, 261, 263, 265, 281–282 transnational communities 34 Transnational Diasporas 3, 282 Transnationalism 41, 280, 282 Transnationality 27 Transvaal Gujarati Parishad 274 tri-lingual 106, 115 n. 31 Trinidad 184, 270, 280, 338 tripolar interrelatedness 125 True Jesus Church 99, 110–111, 111 n. 24, 112–115 Tsukuba University 105, 121 Uganda 272 Umbanda 150, 150 n. 3 Unitarian 41 n. 22, 111 Universal Church 36, 41, 152, 154 Universal Church of the Kingdom of God 152, 154 Untouchables 175, 180–181, 186 Upanayana 186 Vaishnava 364 Vaishnavites 277 Valmikis 180, 184
381
Varna 179 n. 2, 180 Veda Dharma Sabha 275 Vedantins 277 Vietnam 77 Vietnamese 345–346, 356 Vinayakar 239, 248, 250, 255, 258, 260 Vìra •aiva 239, 242, 244–245, 245 n. 16 Virgin Mary 61 Vishva Hindu Kendra 184 Vishwa Hindu Parishad 235 n. 3 Westernization 300 World Parliament of Religions 292 World Revival Church 148–149, 152–153, 155–157 Yemen 78 Yoga 273, 369 Yugoslavia 342–343, 346, 355 Zakat 190, 190 n. 5, 198, 200 Zambia 272 Zanzibari Muslims 9, 364 Zanzibaris 192, 192 n. 9 Zaydis 301 Zimbabwe 76
