Race, Ethnicity, and Place in a Changing America

Race, Ethnicity, and Place in a Changing America

Acknowledgments

This book could not be published without the support of many people. Jean-Pierre Mileur, the Dean of Harpur College of Arts and Sciences, financially supported the second “Race, Ethnicity and Place Conference (REP II) in 2004, which was the impetus of this book. We are very grateful to him. Orlando Taylor, Graduate Dean of Howard University, and Douglas Richardson, Executive Director of the Association of American Geographers, also financially sponsored REP II, which was held on the campus of Howard University, and served with John W. Frazier as co-directors of that Conference. This book could not have come to fruition without their support and the support of their staffs. We thank them, too. We similarly acknowledge the strong support of our entire Binghamton Geography faculty. In particular, we thank Florence M. Margai, who served on the 2003–2004 REP II Planning Committee and contributed a chapter to this text. Norah F. Henry, Associate Dean for Administration, and Mark E. Reisinger provided constructive criticism on a number of the chapters in this volume. Lucius S. Willis and Kevin Heard contributed many of the original graphics and improved others used in the text. We thank these colleagues for their time and talents. We also thank all of our authors, who not only agreed to restructure their conference presentations into a form suitable for undergraduates, but responded promptly to our requests and those of reviewers for changes in their manuscripts. We gratefully acknowledge the constructive criticism of several anonymous reviewers; their suggestions improved the volume. Thanks are also due to Jennifer Fox Frazier, who served as our editorial assistant. Finally, we are especially grateful for the thoughtful guidance, suggestions, and assistance of the entire staff of Global Academic Publishing. We especially express our thanks to Mary Beth Willis, Director of Publications, Angela Hwang, Marketing Director, and publication staff, Lori Vandermark Fuller, Jennifer Winans, and Ashley Rambus.

JWF ELT

Dedication This book is dedicated to the memory of our colleague and good friend, William Dakan, who passed away unexpectedly on December 3, 2005.

Contents Acknowledgments Foreword

Orlando Taylor, Howard University and Douglas Richardson, AAG

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Prologue Part I PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN RACE AND ETHNICITY Chapter 1

Race, Ethnicity, and Place in a Changing America: A Perspective J. W. Frazier

1

Chapter 2

Nightmarish Landscapes: The Orwellian World of Malcolm X J. A. Tyner

25

Chapter 3

Public Policy Impacts on School Desegregation, 1970–2000 J. R. Logan, D. Oakley, and J. Stowell

33

Chapter 4

The New Metropolitan Geography of Immigration: Washington, D.C. in Context A. Singer

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Chapter 5

U.S. Immigration and Racialized Assimilation W. Li

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Part II U.S. AFRICAN AMERICAN, AFRICAN, AND CARIBBEAN GEOGRAPHIES Chapter 6

Black American Geographies: A Perspective E. L. Tettey-Fio

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Chapter 7

People on the Move: African Americans Since the Great Migration J. W. Frazier and R. Anderson

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Chapter 8

Lending and Race in Two Cities: A Comparison of Subprime Mortgages, Predatory Mortgages, and Foreclosures in Washington, D.C. and Akron, Ohio D. H. Kaplan and G. Sommers

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Chapter 9

Concentrated Poverty, Race, and Mortgage Lending: Implications for Anti-Predatory Lending Legislation J. T. Darden and L. Jezierski

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Chapter 10

Race, Location and Access to Employment in Buffalo, N.Y. I. Johnston-Anumonwo and S. Sultana

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Chapter 11

The Formation of a Contemporary Ethnic Enclave: The Case of “Little Ethiopia” in Los Angeles E. Chacko and I. Cheung

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Chapter 12

The New African Americans: Liberians of War in Minnesota E. P. Scott

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Chapter 13

The Distribution and Socioeconomic Status of West Indians Living in the United States T. D. Boswell and T. A. Jones

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Part III U.S. HISPANIC/LATINO GEOGRAPHIES: CHANGING SPATIAL PATTERNS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS Chapter 14

Latinos in America: Historical and Contemporary Settlement Patterns M. E. Reisinger

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Chapter 15

Latinos in New York City: Ethnic Diversity, Changing Settlement Patterns, and Settlement Experiences K. D. Galligano and J. W. Frazier

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Chapter 16

Placing Transnational Migration: The Sociospatial Networks of Bolivians in the United States M. D. Price

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Chapter 17

Immigrant Accommodation and Intra-Ethnic Friction: The Case of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in San Antonio R. C. Jones

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Chapter 18

Patterns and Issues in the Latinization of Allentown, Pennsylvania M. E. Reisinger, J. W. Frazier, and E. L. Tettey-Fio

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Chapter 19

Population Change in the Texas Panhandle and Resultant Latino Occupational Structures: 1980–2004 L. E. Estaville, E. J. Montalvo, and B. J. Brown

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Part IV ASIAN AND PACIFIC-ISLANDER GEOGRAPHIES: CULTURAL PERSISTENCE AND CHANGING PATTERNS Chapter 20

Asians in the United States: Historical and Contemporary Settlement Patterns J. W. Frazier

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Contents Chapter 21

This Land is My Land: The Role of Place in Native Hawaiian Identity S. M. Kana‘iaupuni and N. Malone

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Chapter 22

Little Tokyo: Historical and Contemporary Japanese American Identities J. M. Smith

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Chapter 23

The Invisible Immigrants: Asian Indian Settlement Patterns and Racial/ Ethnic Identities E. H. Skop and C. E. Altman

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Part V DIVERSITY, CULTURE, AND PLACE Chapter 24

Cultural and Economic Change in Indian Country E. J. Zolnik

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Chapter 25

The Geography of Whiteness: Russian and Ukrainian “Coalitions of Color” in the Pacific Northwest S. W. Hardwick

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Chapter 26

The Persistence of Greek American Ethnicity among Age Cohorts Under Changing Conditions S. T. Constantinou and M. E. Harvey

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Chapter 27

Disparities in Economic Status among Native-Born and Foreign-Born Populations in Paterson, New Jersey T. Y. Owusu

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Chapter 28

Changes in the Heartland: Emerging Ethnic Patterns in Louisville, KY W. Dakan

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Chapter 29

Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Health and Health Care in the U.S.: A Geographic Overview F. M. Margai

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Works Cited

393

About the Authors

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Foreword

The human geography of the United States reflects both continuity and change due to a number of global, national, and local forces, one of the overarching themes of Race, Ethnicity, and Place in a Changing America. Some patterns, such as the black ghetto, have persisted due to unfortunate circumstances, while new places have taken on special meaning and purpose for groups, such as the Eden Center in northern Virginia for the Vietnamese. As ethnic groups relocate, they reshape inherited landscapes, remaking places to reflect their presence, such as Puerto Ricans and other Latinos. Also, for some native cultures, such as Hawaiians, place is an essential ingredient of cultural identity. Each of these examples reveals the complexity and breadth of issues associated with race, ethnicity and place. In a world where the media, telecommunications, and the Internet have drastically altered how individuals conceive of themselves and their place in the world, it is essential that scholars, politicians, journalists, and all citizens are aware of the many ways in which the place one lives, works, or visits affects and is affected by race and ethnicity. It is equally important to share research findings related to these topics with students and others. Race, Ethnicity, and Place in a Changing America was designed to achieve this goal. Although the concept of this text evolved from a national conference on Race, Ethnicity and Place convened at Howard University in 2004, co-sponsored by the Association of American Geographers (AAG), Howard University and Binghamton University, a substantial effort after the conference resulted in this volume. Editors John W. Frazier (founder of the REP Conferences) and Eugene L. Tettey-Fio requested that authors recast their conference presentations into a format suitable for undergraduates. The authors have met this challenge and the result is a strong text covering such important topics as migration, cultural conflicts over space, place-based identities, changing ethnic and racial landscapes, spatial dimensions of health inequalities, institutional roles in shaping human geography, and racial/ethnic relations. Because each of these issues is too large for any one scholar or institution to address alone, collaborations and partnerships are increasingly essential for continuing this research agenda. In nearly every case, the essays in this book have an interdisciplinary perspective, spanning disciplines from geography, economics, political science, communications, sociology, social work, history, business, law, and medicine. The research tools of multiple disciplines and their focal points require scholars and other leaders to form partnerships that allow them to address these questions in a holistic way. Just as disciplines cannot address these issues in isolation, neither can institutions. Higher education institutions, often because of their own location or place, have different missions, thus, the research foci they may bring to a project vary widely. It is essential that these different perspectives be brought together, so that institutions (and the scholars who work there) can share in the future development of these issues. For example, Howard University — one of the co-sponsors of the 2004 conference — is the nation’s largest producer of African American Ph.D. recipients in many of the social, behavioral and economic sciences, and a central component of its institutional mission commits addressing issues of African Americans and other groups historically marginalized in the United States. Although Howard does not currently have a geography department, its predominantly African American faculty includes individuals who have focused their careers on issues of race and ethnicity. On the other hand, Binghamton University’s geography department has made the study of race, ethnicity and place a special focus of inquiry and its faculty has published widely on this topic and sponsored the first national conference on this topic in 2002. Thus, Howard and Binghamton, because of institutional differences and strengths, can do things together that neither can do alone. Similarly, organizations like the Association of American Geographers play a critical role not only in organizing diverse individuals in an individual discipline, but also in bringing specific problems or questions to the forefront for national public and disciplinary discussion. Government at all levels, and corporate America as well, must be full partners in these efforts, since in many cases, the solutions to problems require governmental or corporate action.

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It would be a mistake to think that issues of race, ethnicity, and place can be confined to one nation, and thus, the partnerships that are necessary to address these issues must be global as well. Migration, for example, often involves movement from one country to another, with resulting effects on both countries. The research questions these issues raise are best addressed by partnerships of universities and scholars that span national boundaries, with perspectives that are influenced by the particularities of the place where they are located. The Association of American Geographers, Binghamton University, and the Howard University Graduate School have pledged to continue their partnership and to seek other collaborators. The partners have embarked on a variety of related projects, from joint grant submissions to collaborative international research, and these possibilities continue to grow. Additional conferences on the topic of race, ethnicity, and place also are planned for the future. In 2006, Texas State University, under the leadership of Lawrence E. Estaville (local conference director), will join the AAG, Binghamton, and Howard to plan the next Race, Ethnicity and Place Conference to be held in San Marcos, Texas (http://[email protected]). As in previous conferences, the program at this next conference will be broadly based. However, it also will take advantage of its location to stress Latino issues from a geographic perspective. Also, within a global context, scholars from Latin America and other regions will be invited to participate in this next conference. Many of those attending the Race, Ethnicity and Place Conference at Howard University, among them AAG Past-President Larry Brown and Tom Boswell, current Chair of the AAG Ethnic Geography Specialty Group, commented that this event, on the campus of the world’s leading historically black university, was among the most significant conferences in which they had participated during their careers. There was indeed a general consensus of something important happening at the meeting, a sense of auspicious beginnings. It will now be up to all of us — working together — to ensure that those beginnings are carried through to real and meaningful endings. The 2006 San Marcos conference will certainly build on previous successes and contribute to this goal. Race, Ethnicity, and Place in a Changing America provides one of the most rigorous and comprehensive assessments available on racial and ethnic geographies and explains why they are important to all of us. Orlando Taylor, Graduate Dean, Howard University Douglas Richardson, Executive Director, Association of American Geographers

Prologue

THE CHANGING AMERICAN SCENE Two of the most significant changes occurring in the second half of 20th century America involved racial and ethnic composition of the population and the national focus on civil rights policy (housing, school desegregation, etc.). Debates about U.S. immigration after WWII resulted in profound changes in the magnitude and origins of immigration flows into the country. In the same period, the U.S. was steeped in the conflicts of the Civil Rights Era. The laws that emerged on these two fronts dramatically changed how America would treat immigration and racial issues in the future and also modified American human geography throughout most U.S. regions. Cultural and ethnic landscapes, the visualization of cultural imprints by the occupying group, capture the racial and ethnic changes in particular American places. Some of these landscapes and places illustrate the nature and range of changes that have occurred, and that are likely to continue, in places across the nation in coming decades. Audrey Singer, in a subsequent chapter, informs us that the public library in Montgomery County, Maryland, “welcomes visitors in 11 languages.” The welcomes are not for tourists. Rather, Montgomery County, like other suburban Washington, D.C. areas, is experiencing a rapidly changing population due to recent immigration that has made the nation’s capital a gateway city. In the same county, African-American family homes of professional, white collar workers are decorated to reflect ethnic ties — among the decorations are pieces of African art, a Civil Rights era painting, and a colorful poster highlighting a recent jazz festival — and, at the same time, such homes express the achievements of the black middle class (Wiese, 2005). These examples illustrate the increasing suburbanization of the black middle class and the rise of ethnic diversity. In suburban Minneapolis, black patrons of a barbershop exchange stories. They are not African Americans; they are Africans, “Liberians of War,” living their “Liberian Way.” Earl Scott (chapter 12) explains the importance of social spaces for Liberian immigrants to reminisce about their homeland. Here in the American Heartland, Liberians have carved out landscapes and remain distinct from the local African-American population, despite their common cultural ties. Liberians are not the only immigrants who have settled in the heartland. Asian ethnic groups also have settled in inconspicuous and perhaps unexpected places, including Minnesota. The Hmong people of Southeast Asia provide a good example. Following the Vietnam War, this culture experienced genocide for their support of Americans. Since receiving refugee status, more than one million Hmong people have immigrated to the U.S. and more than 60,000 have settled in the Minneapolis-St. Paul region, where hundreds of their successful businesses help define the new Hmong landscape there. The African ethnic scene described for Liberians is repeated in other American cities by other African immigrants, Ghanaians in New York, Somalis in Maine, and Ethiopians in Los Angeles, among others. Meanwhile, black ethnic Caribbeans have created cultural landscapes in various places, including Miami, Florida (Haitian and Trinidadian). Miami also is home to “Little Havana” and became the center of Cuban-American politics and culture after Castro overthrew Battista in 1959. Their position grew even stronger due to subsequent migrations of Cubans of varying social and economic status. The U.S. subsidized “freedom flights” and other efforts contributed to this diversity. Thus, “Little Havana,” too, is a distinctive ethnic landscape of a newly emerging America in the last four decades. No region has changed more during the last generation than the American South. Its booming economy and warm climate have attracted migrants of all backgrounds. Among the newcomers are Mexican immigrants, legal and illegal, who have been attracted by the potential for a better life. Charlotte, North Carolina, once a black-white city, realized a greater percentage increase in its Latino population than any American city of comparable size. It is now classified as an immigrant “gateway” city (Singer, 2004). Atlanta, Georgia, the largest city of the South, also has experienced significant increases in ethnic immigrants and has been a favored destination for the “reverse” migration of African Americans, who for the first time since the Great Migration, have

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begun returning South in very large numbers (see chapter 7). However, African Americans “returning home” are not only being attracted to the employment opportunities of large metropolitan regions like Atlanta, some are returning to their Southern roots in rural places in North Carolina and are drawn there for non-economic reasons (Cromartie and Stack, 1989 and Stack, 1996), Similarly, Latinos are moving to small towns as well as cities, settling for example in rural Tennessee and Kentucky, as well as other rural southern areas, in their search for a better life (Smith and Fuerseth, in press). In the south central U.S., other racial/ethnic patterns illustrate change. San Antonio, Texas, has long been the residence of many people of Mexican ancestry. In recent years this community has prospered and become one of America’s most rapidly growing metropolitan regions. The established Mexican community of San Antonio has distanced itself from recent Mexican immigrants on the basis of class, and has created an interesting urban geography in that community. Further north, in the Texas Panhandle, other changes are occurring. Once occupied by Anglos, this region has experienced an out-migration of Anglos, who are being replaced by Mexican immigrants who perceive the region’s value differently. The region’s composition is changing as a result. Both of these examples are presented in more detail in subsequent chapters. On the Pacific Coast, the influence of the Mexican-American population was significant for most of the 20th century. It remains so today, despite the growing dispersion of Latinos into other U.S. regions. Latinos have become a political and economic force in California. They also have brought controversy. Illegal immigrants, including Mexicans, have brought serious problems to that state, which in combination with Texas, is expected to have 35 million Latinos by the year 2050. Chinese Americans also have created unique geographic places in the United States, including Chinatowns and more recently “ethnoburbs” in California. Wei Li has described them as a novel form of clustered immigrant suburban settlement of ethnic people and their businesses with complete institutional structures. She and her colleagues described the process of their formation: “… Waves of new wealthy and middle-class immigrants from the global Chinese Diaspora settled in Los Angeles suburbs, where they strengthened their ties to the Pacific Rim through business activities; their financial resources created the demand for a strong ethnic banking sector — and, indeed, for the second wave of Chinese-American banks … (which have) been instrumental in creating the San Gabriel Valley ethnoburb by financing new Chinese residential settlements and transforming the local business structure and its landscapes” (Li et al., 2002, p. 792).

Li discusses the racial encounters of Asian Americans later in this text and argues that racial experiences are important to first-generation immigrants’ paths both to assimilation and their settlement choices. Further northward on the Pacific Coast in Oregon, white Europeans have settled in what Susan Hardwick terms “Causcasia,” indicating the long-term dominance of the European-white population. She relates a fascinating story in chapter 25 of Russians and Ukrainians, who are refugees and fundamentalist Christians guided to the area by religious networks tied to the former Soviet Union. Her analysis reminds us that not all recent immigrants and landscapes represent non-whites. More importantly, she illustrates the important roles of institutions in shaping geographic settlement patterns and in operating in the political arena, where these groups have attempted to be classified as a “coalition of color,” using racial classification as a means to access competitive government funding to address their community needs. In the country’s largest metropolitan area, New York City, a great deal of racial/ethnic change continues to occur. New York City has always been noted for its diversity and as a global city. Manhattan’s Lower East Side witnessed a sequence of cultural occupants, including the Dutch, Germans, Jews, Italians, and others. Beginning in the 1950s, Puerto Rican settlement became significant there too. In fact, Puerto Ricans were the dominant Hispanic group in the City for decades. One of the most significant changes in the City in the recent decades has been the diversification of Latino groups, accompanied by continued white flight. There also has been a noticeable out-migration of Puerto Ricans to nearby states, most notably to Connecticut and Pennsylvania. These are topics of two subsequent chapters. Distinctive Latino clusters have arisen in places like Long Island and multicultural neighborhoods have taken form in some city boroughs. Ninety miles away, in south-

Prologue

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eastern Pennsylvania, small post-industrial cities like Allentown and Reading are being transformed by the arrival of Puerto Ricans relocating from the City and directly from the island. Recently, they have been joined by a wide variety of Central and South American Latinos. Distinct settlement patterns and cultural landscapes are emerging as a result. These brief examples indicate the increasing racial and ethnic diversity that is changing the composition of the American population and the appearance of landscapes. The newer landscapes are troubling for some Americans who see them as undermining the American culture and leading to the decline of America’s position in the world. It is important to note that, as new landscapes appear, the remnants and expansion of persistent geographic distributions remain.

CULTURAL PERSISTENCE OF NON-ANGLO LANDSCAPES IN AMERICAN PLACES There are places and landscapes that serve as evidence of the perseverance of subcultures who have struggled to successfully retain their cultural identities, despite the hardships resulting from second-class citizenship. These are important reminders of how the dominant culture in a society can restrict the access of subcultures to opportunities. They also speak to the societal failures to improve the living conditions of all Americans and to create policy to eradicate the Black ghettos and other places that exist because subcultures are denied equal access and are restricted in American geographic space. The magnitude and ubiquity of the geographic expression of such places are not well known by most Americans, perhaps because of another American failing, the lack of geographic education at all levels of the U.S. education system. This is why the average American was so appalled by the plight of the inner city New Orleans population that was trapped during Hurricane Katrina. Millions open their wallets to assist and criticized the government’s lack of preplanning and poor initial response. Unfortunately, American cities are filled with such places and conditions. Several American regions help us visualize this type of cultural persistence in the shadow of a dominant culture. The persistence of culture is expressed through ethnicity, which is a deliberate effort to distinguish one’s own group from another through strong group self-identity linked to group characteristics, common ancestry, and attachment to a particular place. Sometimes a place shapes culture and other times culture acts as an agent, sculpting a landscape that reflects its presence. Numerous examples exist and discussion of a few illustrates the importance of recognizing these American landscapes and places, which are occupied by American subcultures. Perhaps nowhere is the bond stronger between place and culture than in the case of native Hawaiian culture and the Islands. Shawn Malia Kana’iaupuni and Nolan Malone make the argument in chapter 21 that, despite the multicultural mixing and sustained Anglo efforts to “dismember” the Hawaiian nation, the natives’ sentiment toward place has been the key connection between native Hawaiian people and their heritage and selfdetermination. Among other American examples are those of Native American Indians and early immigrant subcultures who have persisted for more than a century. In Tahlequah, Oklahoma, for example, after the “Trail of Tears,” the Cherokee nation created and preserved a lasting commercial and cultural center. This place remains a symbol of Native American cultural perseverance, as does the recently opened Native American Museum in Washington, D.C. Other examples include the early Asian immigrants who also left landscape reminders of their earlier American history. In California, which has long been one of America’s cultural hearths for Chinese and Japanese Americans, Chinatowns and “Little Tokyo” are thriving examples. Little Tokyo, although never fully recovered from WWII-related depopulation and dispossession by the U.S. government, has persisted as the place of cultural focus for Japanese Americans. James Smith discusses the historical and contemporary importance of this place to Japanese-American identity in chapter 22. These are specific examples of cultural perseverance. Other less attractive examples speak to American failures to solve the legacy of black slavery, which resulted not only in the division of black immediate families and scattered them across the South, but left a legacy of fear and hatred among many whites who refused acceptance of African Americans as equals and as neighbors, despite a war fought over slavery and later amendments

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to the U.S. Constitution. Separate schools, unequal access to employment, housing and services, and imposed segregation in northern and southern places resulted in African American landscapes of despair and fear that have persisted as black ghettos in the 21st century. Despite obvious African-American gains in socioeconomic status and their corresponding suburban landscapes, millions of blacks remain trapped in inner city slums. Even successful African Americans routinely must absorb racist behaviors of American society (Cose, 1993). No matter how significant Black progress has been, the daily conditions experienced by too many African Americans should be constant reminders to all Americans that the nation has failed to adequately address its unique race problems.

Part I Perspectives on American Race and Ethnicity Section one contains five chapters that provide varied approaches to the study of American race and ethnicity in a place context. Chapter one lays the foundation for the book by providing definitions and context for the basic concepts it presents. The next two chapters examine aspects of race but from very different perspectives. Chapter two provides a stark contrast to Martin Luther King, Jr.’s perception of future American racial landscapes by exploring the racial landscape images of Malcolm X. In doing so, we see how the human condition and state of mind are expressed on the landscape but also how our surroundings shape our consciousness and our possibilities. Chapter 3 illustrates the effects of policies (usually considered abstract) in practice (praxis). School desegregation policies (usually recalled as an across-the-board-positive landmark) are examined for pros and cons and how people were actually affected by institutional decisions. The final two chapters in this section deal with important perspectives on immigration. Chapter 4 explains “gateway cities,” where they emerged and the roles they played in immigrant choices and settlements. It also provides a typology of gateway cities and provides a discussion of the nation’s capital as a relatively new gateway, explaining its influence on immigrants and the impact of immigrants on this particular region. Chapter 5 explores the roles of race and place in contemporary immigration. It uses history and compares models of assimilation with the author’s own experiences and observations of the U.S. In doing so, the argument is made that “racialized assimilation” occurs among many contemporary first-generation American immigrants and influences their settlement patterns. In summary, Section One provides the conceptual introduction to the text and illustrates the variety of approaches taken by social scientists to examine aspects of race, ethnicity and place in a changing America.

Chapter 1

Race, Ethnicity, and Place in a Changing America: A Perspective JOHN W. FRAZIER PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE IN AMERICAN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY Culture, and the human geography it produces, persists over a long time period. However, culture changes slowly, as does the visible landscape it produces and the ethnic meanings imbued by the group that shapes it. That many examples of persistent and new cultural landscapes exist in the United States is not surprising given the major technological, demographic, and economic changes in American society since World War II (WWII). America emerged from WWII as one of two superpowers, developed and embraced technology that took Americans to the moon, created an electronics revolution that greatly modified the ways that Americans work and live, and built a globally unique interstate highway system, new housing stock, millions of additional automobiles, and otherwise increased its production to meet the challenge of nearly doubling its population between 1950 and 2000. The post-WWII baby boom and massive immigration fueled population growth and modified American society in important ways, creating different needs and growing aspirations. A larger African American middle class also emerged during this post-war period. Leadership in a growing global economy enabled unprecedented economic growth that supported these changes. Some less positive changes occurred during this period as America repositioned itself in global affairs, while experiencing great domestic and global economic, social and political challenges. America fought and lost a war in Vietnam, experienced an energy crisis, and suffered through double-digit inflation and severe economic recession, which contributed to a more conservative mood in Washington, D.C. For many people of color, economic and social disparities with whites were magnified between large inner cities and their surrounding communities. The human geography of the U.S. was modified and reflected some of these major changes. Perhaps the biggest of the geographic changes was the rapid consumption of rural lands, their transformation into thousands of new small communities independent of their nearby large cities, and the relocation of much of the white middle class and economic activities to emerging suburbs. While suburbanization had begun prior to WWII, it intensified in the post-war era and made America a commuting nation dependent on the automobile and foreign oil. While undeniable gains were made by African Americans, suburbanization also increased racial segregation and literally pushed the worlds of blacks and whites farther apart. Americans witnessed the remainder of the Great Migration until 1970, which brought millions of additional African Americans to northern and western cities and, when the economy changed, left millions jobless. Racial strife increased. One of the more obvious results of these culturally-based geographic patterns in American cities has been the unequal distribution of resources that created and concentrated poverty and caused the deterioration of neighborhoods and living conditions. This was true in the early industrial cities, where immigrants were segregated into high-risk ethnic neighborhoods, such as the tenements of New York City or the housing adjacent to the Chicago rail yards and garbage dumps that killed many children. Inner cities since 1950 are no different. Poverty and the risks of infant mortality remain high, despite the national economy being second to none in the world. Poverty begets the crime

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John W. Frazier

and the drug cultures, which add to the ills of poor living environments, especially those containing American minorities. In stark contrast to the outer cities of large, old metropolitan areas, inner cities disproportionately contain areas of poor housing, persistent unemployment, low wages, and a declining tax base. American ghettos persist as landscapes of fear and despair that encompass horrendous conditions, despite a half-century of national growth and prosperity. Typically invisible to middle-America, these conditions became more apparent when Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in 2005. Hundreds of thousands of residents evacuated, but the very poor, predominantly black, inner-city residents who lacked resources and access to transportation were left behind to experience one of America’s most devastating natural disasters and its aftermath. The conditions and racial distribution of New Orleans is typical of many other American cities, including Detroit, Milwaukee, Chicago, Cleveland, Buffalo, Rochester and others, that experienced ghetto formation generations ago. America’s outer suburbs are the antithesis of such conditions, and represent the relatively new, prosperous and spreading American landscapes. In short, the early industrial cities with sharp class distinctions and contrasting living conditions also provided the basis for the suburbanization of industry, commerce, and the white middle class, while disproportionately restricting those of lesser means, especially non-whites, to declining sections of large cities. The new environments of suburbia, attracted private investment, but were subsidized by federal spending and federal guaranteed residential loans. The dominant (Anglo-American) culture created new geographic forms, but retained its position of privilege. In general, suburbia meant “white suburbia.” Despite the power of the white majority, some African Americans struggled and pushed into suburbia, creating their own ethnic landscapes (Wiese, 2004). However, these cultural and ethnic landscapes receive little attention in the social science literature to date. The black-white settlement geography is only one part of the increasingly complex, post-WWII American landscapes. Immigration and internal migration have greatly complicated most aspects of American life, economy, politics, and geography. More recent patterns from late 20th century immigration overlay pre-existing patterns. The millions of immigrants (“foreign-born”) who entered the U.S. since WWII differed substantially from the predominantly European immigrants that entered in the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries. The most recent immigrants are likely to be from Latin America or Asia. They represent two economic groups: poverty with low/no skills, and those with social and economic capital in hand. These immigrants represent a far more heterogeneous set of Asian and Latin cultures, literally from scores of ancestral homes and speaking numerous languages. Because of this increased cultural and economic diversity, some contemporary immigrants are living in ethnic enclaves. Others are creating places quite different from the general pattern associated with their European predecessors, leading to both practical and theoretical issues concerning their assimilation processes, including non-assimilation or what has been termed “segmented assimilation.” The history of American racism complicates contemporary immigrant assimilation in a number of ways, as will be discussed later, as has the massive influx of illegal immigrants that contribute to the perception that changes in racial and ethnic composition amount to a “siege” of American culture. Others describe it as enrichment. Because American racism is unique in its character and has such a long and complex history, including its geographical imprints, a brief review of race as a widely applied social construct is useful.

RACE AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT Many Americans would like to dismiss discussions of race and racism because they are uncomfortable topics that lead to responsibility for racist actions. However, American racism and associated prejudice predate the republic and remain an issue, so we must discuss them. Race is a social construction unsupported by science. A number of recent statements about American racism dismiss the “biological truths” of racial distinctions as scientific inaccuracies (e.g., Bamshad and Olson, 2003; Graves, 2004). After illustrating that science cannot justify America’s socially constructed racial schema, Graves, among others, argues that the social construction of

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the African-American race was rooted in the ideology of “whiteness” for the purpose of social domination that has continued to the present day. His analysis supports the contention that race is significant in America because Americans have made it significant on all levels. There is a long history of racial classification in America that goes beyond black-white schemas. When considering race, many Americans think of skin color, which is not surprising given the history of American racial relations. Despite the discrimination and wars against native Indian cultures, it was slavery that led to the Civil War and sharpened American focus on skin color. Prior to the Civil War, however, there is no doubt that white prejudice against blacks was nationally ubiquitous and visible to outsiders. One of the best examples was provided by Alexis de Toqueville, nearly a generation prior to that war: “The prejudice of race appears to be stronger in the states that have abolished slavery than in those where it still exists, …” (Reeve, Brown, and Bradley, 1945, quoting A. de Toqueville, 1835).

Post-Civil War activities intensified racial prejudice and Social Darwinist, Herbert Spencer, was “welcomed like royalty” into the U.S. because of his support of capitalism (Kevels, 1985) and his racist ideas flourished. By the early 1900s WEB Dubois spoke of America’s color line and the belief of the superiority of one race (white) over another race (black). Racialism had penetrated the popular and scientific realms, leading to the public endorsement of eugenics. The latter involved the “science” of improvement of human stock through selective breeding and other restrictive, racially-motivated policies, including anti-miscegenation laws that avoided the negative results of association with the “darker races.” Black-white tensions continued as the basis for repetitive racial conflict throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Jim Crow Laws and various institutional mechanisms segregated whites and non-whites nationwide. Because of slavery, the Civil War, and the Civil Rights Era, black-white racial issues were incorporated into high school curricula in the late 20th century, making Americans aware of racial issues and discrimination. However, little effort has been made to dismiss the notion of the biological basis of racial categories or the racial geography that has resulted from the deliberate efforts of various American institutions to restrict AfricanAmerican living space. It has been the creation of negative images of minority cultures and their concomitant denial of access to equal education, employment, and housing opportunities by white society that has contributed to the continuing perception of the inferiority vs. superiority of cultures. Rather than address the persistence of these patterns and trace the resulting racial geographies associated with them, some Americans are satisfied with generalization and implied explanation that equity differences are explained by the fact that “all cultures are not equal.” Certainly, different cultures have different strengths and weakness. However, to suggest cultures are “unequal,” unable or unwilling to take advantage of technology or other benefits, and that this explains the “haves” and “have-nots” of the world is a misuse of generalization that dismisses centuries of deliberate social constructions of race and their debilitating consequences for minorities. It is also indicates a return to Social Darwinism. These prejudicial constructions are limited neither to American society, nor to African Americans. Until recently, high school textbooks largely ignored indigenous cultures, or treated them poorly. American Indian cultures have been portrayed as savages with little human understanding or sentiment. Only in the last quarter of the 20th century did the interactions between colonial and Indian cultures, such as native culture support for the concepts of liberty and self-government, begin to appear in high school texts. This does not deny the influence of Europeans but recognizes the results of other cultural interactions, and casts them in a more accurate light (Loewen, 1995). The characterizations of American Asian and Latino cultures as non-white “races” with negative characteristics have been largely ignored until recently. Such omissions lead to the impression that the playing field in America has always been level for all racial/ethnic groups. There are many examples of racial constructions of these groups. The U.S. Census Bureau created the “Mexican race” for use in the 1930 Census, and in the 1940s opinion leaders and the media combined to produce a racial image of the “zoot-suiters” (referring to Mexicans in particular dress) that contributed to a 1942 riot. This social construction portrayed all Mexicans as zootsuiters and all zoot-suiters as criminals.

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Most Asians fared no better than Mexicans. Three Asian immigrant groups, who provided essential, inexpensive labor for some of the most difficult and dirty jobs to help develop the American West Coast, were the Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos. Together, they were classified as “Orientals” who constituted an “Asiatic Coolie Invasion” (Organized Labor, 1906). Each of these three immigrant groups was initially welcomed as hard workers but, after economic stresses occurred for whites, faced later prejudice, discrimination and exclusion (e.g., the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act). The social construction of the Chinese ethnic group as a “race” is provided in the following paragraphs for clarity. Kay J. Anderson has argued that racial ideology, rather than prejudice, was the key explanatory variable in the Western construction of “Chinatowns.” She illustrated the role of missionaries, traders and opinion leaders of the West in creating stereotypical images of the Chinese as “conscious agents of Satan,” who were backward, peculiar, immoral and treacherous (Anderson, 1987, p. 591). This became the foundation for characterizing the Chinese immigrants in North America as undesirable outsiders and a threat to local culture. Anderson used Vancouver to illustrate the role of racial ideology linking social construct to place. By 1886, the Chinese, largely a bachelor society, were already under the control of the government and were geographically concentrated in a small neighborhood of Vancouver. While the Chinese contributed to their self-definition and local cultural landscape, the local white European culture created the essence of “Chineseness” and created the regional image of Chinatown “on capricious grounds” (p. 583). According to Anderson, the Chinese were described as “the same everywhere,” dirty, undesirable and a threat. Their “evils” were concentrated in “unsanitary sink{s},” or in their “morally aberrant communit{ies}” (Anderson, p. 586). The local government used this racial classification as a justification for monitoring, restricting and discriminating against Vancouver’s Chinatown. Again, Anderson’s view was that this was not merely prejudice. It was racial ideology that combined race (“Chineseness”) with place (“Chinatown”) for the benefit of Western white society, and to justify its discriminatory, and often harsh, actions against an immigrant population. In the U.S. the Chinese were victimized by white violence and discrimination in “Chinatowns” in San Francisco, Oakland and other cities. The physical appearance of late 19th and early 20th century “Chinatowns” differed significantly from the late 20th century image of bright and colorful landscapes attractive to tourists and diners. Early enclaves consisted of small, crowded, unattractive structures criticized by local whites as despicable, repulsive, and threatening to local geography. This type of social construction allowed the white majority a basis for ridding local society of its problems. Chinatown, a den of inequity wedged into white society, was the place that magnified the shortcomings of this race. Despite the protests of Chinese merchants and leaders, and their efforts to correct these false race-based images, the strength of social construct created by whites prevailed and resulted in prejudicial discriminatory behavior by the white population and its institutions towards the Chinese people. Many Chinese fled eastward to escape prejudice and discrimination and developed Chinatowns in Chicago, Boston, and New York City, or returned home to China (especially after the passage of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act). Before we attribute social constructions of race to “old” American history, consider a different construction of the Post-WWII characterization of American Asian ethnics for a different purpose. In response to the demands of African Americans during the Civil Rights Era for fairer treatment in housing, employment, and education, Asian Americans were elevated to the status of a “model minority” for African Americans to emulate. Like African Americans, Asian Americans had faced prejudice and discrimination. However, unlike African Americans, they were perceived as having family values, a drive for advanced education, perseverance, and other features that allowed them to overcome roadblocks and become highly successful in the American economy. The message to other minorities was “quit whining and emulate the behavior of Asians.” Later, many Asian American scholars responded by debunking this image and indicated that it would be more appropriately termed the “model minority myth.” These examples illustrate how race in America is a majority culture social construct that stereotypes a minority group. In a contemporary context, social constructions of others, including other minority ethnic groups, also occur. In this case, one group stereotypes another and demonizes it as an alien group that creates

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negative impacts on society. Such conditions contribute to poor ethnic relations, rioting and other forms of conflict. Important concepts in social conflict theory and racism are culture and ethnicity.

CULTURE AND ETHNICITY Culture refers to an entire way of life of a group of people. A culture maintains values, beliefs, practices, and behaviors that help define and differentiate one group from others. These traits are learned, or exchanged within and between groups and are passed from one generation to the next. Many traits are common among cultural groups but cultural identification entails a unique set of individual elements and processes that together create a unique cultural identity. Biological and ideological characteristics, social institutions, and technology are typically used to identify a specific cultural group. Wilbur Zelinsky, in discussing the American culture and its landscapes, observed that certain characteristics, while not uniquely American, were uniquely American in their combination. He also suggested that American culture was linked to northern Europe, especially Great Britain. This implied the importance of the English language, representative government, a focus on the individual, and the preponderance of the Judeo-Christian outlook among its members. However, it involves much more. Cultural groups may also have an affinity for a particular environment, which can influence cultural identity. Because the host environment provides a range of opportunities for indigenous resources and accessibility to others, it may contribute to cultural identity. An example of the attachment of environmental features to culture identification is the term “mountain people,” which implies more than living at high elevation. Such descriptions are meant to help identify cultural groups by location and the influence of environment on the group. Mountain people, for example, live in rough and isolated terrain that keeps them at relatively low levels of economic development and separated from other societal groups, which leads to distinctive qualities. The Hmong people are an example of a culture defined in part as a “mountain people” of South Asia. They supported the U.S. during the Vietnam War, suffered genocide afterwards, and were admitted later into the U.S. as refugees. Perhaps one of the best known perspectives on environmental influence on cultural development is the “Turner hypothesis,” which credited the environmental conditions of the North American frontier as a significant force that shaped the “rugged individualism” trait of the American culture (Hofstadter and Lipset, 1968). Beyond environmental influences, a culture may have a sense of synergy with environment, feeling inextricably linked with nature. This also can be a defining element of that particular cultural group. In such cases, the culture self-identifies using aspects of nature and place. For example, indigenous populations often have a very different association with their environments than those cultures in advanced industrial societies. Examples within the U.S. include American Indian, Eskimo, and native Hawaiian cultures. Their relationships with their environments contribute to their cultural identification and, therefore, helps distinguish their cultural traits. Later in this text, this association of native cultures with place is explored for the case of native Hawaiians. Culture, then, can be understood to be a set of values, beliefs, technology, and institutions that brings meaning to and preserves a group’s existence. Cultural continuity is provided by a common language and cultural history. Both function as powerful sources for strengthening individual ties to the group. Particular social institutions, such as schools and social organizations, reinforce and maintain culture. The cultural system contains individual elements that combine to form a unique set of interrelationships, dynamic in nature, always open and adaptive to new information, ideas, and technology. It also seeks stability through continuity. Ideology refers to the comprehensive vision of a culture. Cultures encompass strong beliefs, often involving deities or a particular political ideology, or both. This is why a shared sense of the divine is often a component of ethnic identity. Cultural ideology and associated emotions sometimes result in malicious actions toward other groups, including open conflict directed at the destruction of the enemy culture and/or its cultural symbols. Ideology also results in expressions within the culture, such as memorializing a special place or sacred space associated with some event or person important to the host culture. When two cultures value the same

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land or place, cultural conflict typically ensues due to competition over the depth of beliefs and sentiment toward the place. Technology refers to the tools available to a society to make its living, to communicate and exchange with others, and to transform its surroundings. As with other traits, technological devices and expertise vary by culture, as does the vision of technology’s role in the future of the society and the globe. In America, a constant increase in technology has created a historical framework for discussing progress and development of the nation. By the middle 1850s, canals and railroad systems were both established in the U.S. Their creation attracted numerous ethnic immigrants to work in their development. These technologies allowed for the rapid development of the American Midwest, the stunning transformation of Chicago from trading outpost to the rail center of the nation and one of the leading industrial cities in America. By the 1860s the Transcontinental Railroad connected eastern and western coasts and stimulated even greater growth by century’s end. The creation of the automobile industry with its assembly line revolutionized American industry and transportation systems. Air travel followed on the heels of the auto and by WWII America was an air power. Post-WWII saw a rapid development of commercial aviation and the space race that placed a human on the moon by 1969. A person born in the late 1890s literally observed the transformation of American travel. In the early 1900s some workers operated with horsedrawn wagons, such as in the delivery of ice to homes and businesses. In that same lifespan, a human traveled to the moon and safely returned. The electronics revolution during the same lifetime changed the ways that Americans traveled, worked, and played. It also provided global military advantage. It is little wonder, then, that American culture is perceived as different from others on the basis of technology in combination with other distinctive traits. It should be clear by the discussion thus far that culture also has transforming powers. The group imposes boundaries between its areas and that of others, gives meaning and sentiment to place and objects, and transforms the land by imprinting its cultural presence. While the dominant culture may control the geographic space of a nation, any cultural group can and typically does leave its cultural imprint on the land it occupies. Cultural groups create spaces and places of their own to celebrate and perpetuate their culture. The transformed visible cultural pattern on the earth’s surface is called a cultural landscape. It therefore is the material expression of the occupying culture, an affirmation of what is valued by that culture. It represents a set of ideas about life — family, the social group and social relations, relations with nature, and the value given to objects that embody its beliefs — present in every culture. The landscape contains cultural markers symbolizing what is important, those deeply embedded values, and what is unique about the group. This is true of American culture. However, changes in the human enterprise are constant and evolving cultural landscapes represent not only the inseparable elements of history and historical geography, as visibly apparent expressions of human occupation of various places, but contemporary expressions that result from recent immigrant settlements. As we will see later in this text, cultural landscapes, one of geography’s central concepts, take on many forms but one of the most dominant examples among American immigrant ethnic groups is the clustering of ethnic businesses that serve commercial and cultural functions. Ethnicity involves a group-constructed identity using one or more of its cultural attributes. Ethnic identity connects group members through a shared sense of what is unique and therefore distinguishes “us” from “them.” Common attributes contribute to characteristics that may also make groups distinct from other groups, influencing how others within the larger society see them (“they-ness”) (Ringer and Lawless, 1989). The shared traits can involve, for example, language, cultural history, cultural traditions, and religion. There also is a shared sense of aspirations and sometimes vulnerability among those in an ethnic group. National origin may be important but is not synonymous with ethnicity. Ethnicity is a social construct that defines the “we-ness” of group membership and often involves connection to place. Immigrants, by definition residents of a new land, often find it necessary to reaffirm their ethnic identity, which involves preserving cultural value and distinctiveness and preserving ties to a homeland. Ethnicity, however, is not the equivalent of race. However, racism certainly can cause a shared sense of vulnerability and, therefore, contribute to ethnic identity. This is particularly true when struggle is a part of the group’s cultural history, as in the cases of African Americans and Jews. Religious customs and cultural celebra-

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tions are two ways that ethnic affinity is strengthened. For example, American Jews celebrate cultural and religious holidays, which strengthen their ethnicity. It is also important to note that “racial” differences within a community, within the context of different skin color, need not preclude a common ethnic identity. Puerto Ricans are a good example. Black and white Puerto Ricans are included in this ethnic group. Ethnicity also has been defined within the context of ethnic polarization as a “strategic construction” of cultural boundaries, a process driven by economic and political differences and concerns (Ballard, 2002). As such, ethnicity can be a deliberate process of amplifying cultural distinctiveness and “moral solidarity” to protect community interests. This, of course, is not limited to minority ethnic groups. The majority, or host culture, closes ranks to sustain its power base, whereas the minority ethnic group seeks refuge because it feels threatened. Both tend to organize geographic space in ways meaningful to their group. Sometimes, when both groups seek the same spaces, this results in contested space. A simple example involves suburbanization in the 20th century. African Americans sought a place in the suburbs but were rebuffed by the white majority. Despite this, African Americans created their own cultural landscapes and carved out living space in suburbia as “places of their own” (Wiese, 2004). This notion of physically and economically defending one’s ethnic group from discriminatory actions of the host culture is but one dimension of ethnicity. Even among European groups, who have been permitted to assimilate into the broader American culture and economic system without experiencing long-term exclusion, there is a need for belonging, or for ethnic affinity. This is why “Irish-only” enclaves still exist in the Catskills, various ethnic celebrations (German, Italian, etc.) remain popular, and some ethnic groups, such as Greek Americans, retain a sense of ethnicity decades after assimilating into the American culture. Affinity takes on many forms and can even lead to claims for aid by contemporary white, first generation immigrants, as demonstrated by Susan Hardwick in chapter 25 of this text. Important dimensions of culture include prejudice and privilege, which can lead to cultural and ethnic conflict.

PREJUDICE, PRIVILEGE AND CONFLICT An important understanding related to culture is that the creation of a feeling of “we-ness,” while establishing a sense of coherence and wellness within the group, results in that group perceiving its cultural system as superior to all others. Accordingly, although adaptive, each culture seeks preservation of their perspective and goes to some length, including conflict with others, to perpetuate their superior system. The result is power struggles between cultures. In making this argument, Roger Ballard argued that European-based cultural systems, because they emerged from the Enlightenment perspective that elevated personal freedom to the position of a universal value, are particularly given to feelings of superiority. They tend towards “hegemony,” the “use of ethnocentric judgments to justify their own position of socioeconomic privilege” relative to other cultures and subcultures (Ballard, 2002, p. 140). A dominant culture also constructs an image of other cultures that is the antithesis of their own positive cultural image. Typically, the dominant culture believes that it should convert others to their superior cultural values. Further, cultural superiority justifies prejudice and discrimination towards others who have not sought or achieved the same universal values. Prejudice is an attitude that expresses intellectual beliefs about another societal group. It is an inflexible pre-judgment, or bias, against a person or group without cause. While direct contact with that “other” may have some influence in prejudice, it is among the lesser causes of prejudice, which typically occurs prior to contact. Prejudice results from a number of sources; among the most important are historical and socio-cultural. Prejudice passes from generation to generation through social institutions and, therefore, maintains animosity. This is why we speak of long-term ethnic conflict across the globe, including, for example, the ethnic conflict between the Irish and English that has periodically resulted in conflict over two centuries. Other factors, such as persistent negative social conditions, including urban poverty, are credited as sources of prejudice as well. As noted earlier, prejudice can be due to unfounded suspicion. However, it also is caused by ethnic and racial intolerance and often leads to dislike and even hatred. Obviously, prejudice interferes with the fair treat-

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ment of “others” (Allport, 1954). Although an indirect relationship, prejudice is related to discrimination, the behaviors that include the harsh treatment and exclusion of “inferior” groups from access to resources and equality. Privileges are extended to those of the dominant cultural group because of their superior qualities and withheld from others. These privileges may be on ethnic or racial grounds. In the case of European-based cultures, like the U.S., the racial construction of “whiteness” as descriptive of all things good about Anglo culture (and of those who assimilate with it) amounts to the antithesis of being non-white. That status results in white privilege, or a system that provides access to resources and other preferences based on race and culture. Social psychologist Beverley Tatum has discussed the difficulty for some white students in accepting this concept in her college classroom. She spoke of a white woman who, after being presented the unsought benefits of white advantage, concluded that the list of unasked-for advantages was substantial: “ … she hadn’t always noticed she was receiving them. They include both major and minor advantages. Of course, she enjoyed greater access to jobs and housing. But she also was able to shop in department stores without being followed by suspicious sales people.… She could send her child to school confident that the teacher would not discriminate against him.… She could also be late for meetings, and talk with her mouth full, confident that these behaviors would not be attributed to the fact that she was white. She could express an opinion in a meeting or in print and not have it labeled as the ‘White’ viewpoint” (Tatum, 1999, p. 8).

Together, prejudice and privilege help define what resources are open to societal groups and where they are welcome to live geographically speaking. They place the “us and them” dichotomy into economic, political, and geographic contexts. In particular cases, these occur within a racial context. However, they also become the basis of conflict between minority ethnic groups, too. Such conflicts can arise from economic differences but occur within the context of racial and ethnic stereotyping and end in violence. In a contemporary context, a good example is the conflict between Latinos and blacks in the U.S. Despite facing some of the same challenges and vast economic disparities, these two groups have exhibited a great deal of mistrust and animosity toward one another in recent decades, especially since the rapid increase in Latino legal and illegal immigration. Notwithstanding occasional collaboration on a common issue, tensions have increased between blacks and Latinos across the U.S., from Miami to Chicago, and from Chicago to Los Angeles and Washington state, and points in between. One dimension of this mistrust and conflict lies in black resentment of the increasing number of immigrant Latinos relocating in formerly predominantly black neighborhoods and the competition they bring to the housing and job markets in those areas. The black perspective is that progress made during the Civil Rights era has been lost, in part by the willingness of Mexican immigrants and other Latinos to work for below market wages. Further, when Latino businesses open in black neighborhoods, selling to largely an African-American market, they refuse to employ blacks. Hispanics are cast by African Americans as criminals and as economic threats. On the other side, some Latinos have characterized blacks as unwilling to perform hard work, favoring government welfare, and as having a tendency toward criminal behavior. Racial stereotyping by both sides quickly antagonizes the other. The actual conflict pertains to scant resources and jobs available for minorities in the urban economy. One of the most frequently quoted perceived racist comments against blacks occurred in 2004 and was attributed to Mexican President Vincente Fox , who indicated that Mexicans in the U.S. were performing labor “that not even blacks want to do in the United States.” Unfortunately, name calling and stereotyping sometimes turn to violence, including in the nation’s schools. High Schools in the West, including several in California, have experienced serious conflicts between Mexicans and blacks. Reports from Midwestern, Eastern and Southern states illustrate that tensions are there as well. Tensions and racial/ethnic problems have taken on various forms and involve contested space and unfair competition. One of the better examples of a controversial urban program occurred in Detroit, a predominantly black city. There an outspoken critic (some say racist), African American Claude Anderson openly criticized Latinos as having motives for non-assimilation into the economy, specifically to undermine the economic posi-

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tion of African Americans. Susy Buchanan reported on the impact of Anderson’s economic development plan endorsed by the Detroit City Council: “His recommendation was that the city spend $30 million to develop something called ‘African Town’ — an inner city business enclave for blacks that would keep them from spending money in immigrant businesses. Anderson and others argued that the city had provided incentives to Mexicantown and Greektown, two neighborhoods marked by ethnic businesses and restaurants. Why shouldn’t they do the same for black businesses? … Anderson went further, Hispanics, he said in the kind of comment that lit up many citizens of Detroit, ‘have surpassed Blacks now and make-them third-class citizens’… The blacks-only funding plan outraged many…. Detroit Mayor, Kwame Kilpatrick, who is African American, vetoed.… But the Council overrode his veto, although it did ultimately strike the requirement (for all-black funding)” (Buchanan, 2005, p. 14).

Unfortunately, ethnic and racial conflict over resources and space continue to be a problem in the U.S. When this occurs, ethnic and racial groups turn to social institutions to protect their interests.

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE Social institutions are vehicles that support common cultural goals and objectives. Because ethnicity is a part of culture, they also support the existence of ethnicity, including minority ethnic groups within the dominant American culture. They can influence all aspects of an individual’s life from birth to death. They permeate marriage and family, govern financial transactions, guide worship where it exists, and often structure burial ceremonies. They are in the market place and they take on many forms, social, political, and economic, but share the same purpose of supporting and perpetuating the health and strength of the culture they are designed to serve. Educational institutions, for example, are dedicated to teaching particular knowledge and skills that support cultural interests. Governments and legal institutions create and administer the affairs of culture, including the governing body of law and its interpretation, and the military. Social institutions have great power. Subsequent chapters of this book will have much to say about American institutions because they have shaped American immigration policy, including the numbers and sources of migrants from time to time, the rights of American subcultures in many different ways, and have contributed directly to the settlement patterns of suburbia mentioned earlier. Institutions also serve economic functions (market institutions), such as in lending money for home mortgages and real estate agencies that present available properties to interested buyers. Both of these institutions played major roles in shaping the racial distribution of urban Americans (discussed in detail in later chapters). Finally, social institutions also can be ethnic organizations that seek to support their group in many ways. The Chinese Benevolent Association is an example. It has provided guidance and support to sustain many Chinese immigrants in America and has served as an umbrella organization for their other ethnic institutions as well. In summary, social institutions appear in many contexts, support members of a group, and perpetuate culture and ethnicity. They are the mechanisms of social structure that, although they change from time to time, are the permanent means of governing and supporting the culture. This leads to a consideration of what constitutes the uniqueness of the Anglo-American culture.

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ANGLO-AMERICAN CULTURE The United States continues to change as a nation yet maintains its central beliefs that guide its behaviors as a culture. This supports the notion that, although the U.S. is a relatively young nation, it definitely has cultural qualities that some social scientists believe constitute an “American culture.” Recall the tendency of European-based cultures to see western democracy’s individual freedom as a “universal value.” This Enlightenment-based concept projected social evolution in a rational manner wherein democracy and personal freedom would be globally achievable (Gray, 2000 and Ballard, 2002). In this vision, individual freedom is a personal right that supersedes group value and association. Personal freedom is the path to a more perfect society. This, of course, ignores the “non-universal” visions of cultures that stress group welfare over individual freedom. The concept also assumes that western democracies have evolved a set of superior cultures. This justifies their political hegemony and messianic desire to “share” (“convert”) their superior values with others (Ballard, 2002). As such, the Euro-American approach uses the importance of individual freedom to act superior and to argue that their cultural virtues should be emulated as universals, applicable for all others to follow. During the post-1950 period chronicled earlier, the U.S. maintained a set of unique cultural motifs that created many of the societal and landscape changes discussed earlier. When discussing American culture, Zelinsky was clear that American cultural history was tied with that of northern Europe, especially with the British. An overall set of American cultural traits evolved under these ties with Great Britain and resulted in an Anglodominated U.S. cultural system that had a distinctly American flavor. Zelinsky explained American cultural characteristics as “the basic values and axioms that define aspiration and direction” and as an “ethos — that powerful mood of this and all other distinctive cultures …” (Zelinsky, 1973, pp. 39–40). His American cultural traits included “a reverence for individualism,” a high valuation placed on “mobility and change,” “a mechanistic world vision” that values “growth and bigness,” which also explains America’s reverence for technology and its cures, and a “messianic perfectionism” with a drive to share their culture with others. Related to the last trait, Zelinsky stated: “… the notion that the United States is not just another nation, but one with a special mission — to realize the dream of human self-perfection and, in messianic fashion, to share its gospel and achievement with the remainder of the world. This moral expansiveness (some would call it ‘moral imperialism’) exists over and beyond the usual flexing of economic or military muscle …” (Zelinsky, 1973, p. 61).

He elaborated the expressions of each of the motifs as American cultural landscapes. Several examples are provided here. The strongest trait attributed to Americans is the “intense, almost anarchistic individualism” that permeates American society and is expressed in American landscapes. This is American’s most dominant value and drives institutional decisions as well as individual behaviors. Having many dimensions, it has transformed American landscapes in diverse and important ways: “… the fanatical worship of extreme individualism indeed an almost anarchistic privatism, affects so many phases of our existence so deeply that no one can interpret either the geography or the history of the nation without coming to grips with it … a critical force … in shaping the cultural landscape” (Zelinsky, 1973, pp. 41–42).

Among the numerous patterns attributable to American individualism is American political fragmentation, the notoriously inefficient and costly legal and administrative maintenance of small geographic territories (towns, villages, etc.). These jurisdictions, maintained within larger regional contexts, with duplication of services (e.g., police and fire departments), represent enormous unnecessary costs to local taxpayers. Zelinsky argued that this landscape example of American individualism had resulted in “tens of thousands” of local expensive governments that, despite increasing costs and financial problems, persevere because of Americans’ need for autonomy and individualism. He argued that America’s “haphazard morphology” of metropolitan regions with their “lack

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of aesthetic or functional association” with adjacent entities constitutes an additional landscape expression of American individualism. Further, the uniquely American drive for personal autonomy has been “symbolized by the metal-and-plastic bubble around each American,” the automobile, which gives uniqueness to another form of human cultural geography, the American transportation and commuting system, where non-auto modes struggle for survival and the auto culture thrives despite increasing costs and periodic fuel shortages. The automobile culture also serves the American drive for secluded living in an ever expanding metropolitan region, whose outer suburbs emphasize the maximum spaciousness and separation that money can buy. During all of the post-1950 changes noted earlier, the American cultural-political economy guided the organization of space and the creation of American landscapes based on cultural motifs. Meanwhile, a growing number of recently arrived immigrant cultures, as well as the subcultures already occupying the nation, made their cultural marks in various places. The growing volume of immigrants in recent decades, along with their ability to settle in exclusively white American locations, has made contrasting cultural landscapes more visible and cultural conflict more apparent. Several geographic concepts and social science theories relate to these geographic settlement structures, social and economic assimilations, and cultural landscapes.

GEOGRAPHIC CONCEPTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE THEORY Human geography is influenced by numerous factors related to the creation, maintenance and changes in geographic patterns and, therefore, they are important to an understanding of American geography presented in this text. A few of the most important of the concepts are discussed below. Globalization is a term frequently used by the popular media and in academic literature. Academically, it is a hotly debated topic because some see it as the modern-day tool of unbridled capitalism that exploits weak countries by connecting them to a world economy that serves the interest of corporations and lays waste to the global environment. Others use the rapidly expanding economies and declining poverty in China and India as examples of the positive outcomes of this process. Trade agreements between nations are a key part of promoting the globalization of capital and labor. There is no doubt that connecting the world’s economies has risks and opportunities, but the big question is for whom. Here we use the term to describe processes that have led to a more interconnected and interdependent world. In this context, globalization has resulted in the restructuring of national and regional economies due to global competition. It has led to the deindustrialization of the U.S. manufacturing base, the rise of the service and high-tech sectors with polarized skill and wage levels, and regional shifts in employment that created internal migrations and therefore the redistribution of the U.S. population since WWII. Perhaps most importantly for this text, it created employment shortages in high and low tech jobs in the U.S. that are increasingly filled by a growing number of immigrants, who not only fill jobs, but also are entrepreneurial in creating new small businesses that support ethnic immigrants. Three additional geographic concepts are related and are important in subsequent chapters: movements, gateways, and networks. Movement refers to motion, which implies directionality between an origin and destination. It also recognizes that certain forces (push and pull) influence motion either by impeding it (barriers) or facilitating it (assisting in some way). Various phenomena spread throughout geographic space over time. Innovations are a good example. How they move, the direction they take and the speed with which they travel, are influenced by the nature of the innovation, the support it gets from opinion leaders, and any geographic and cultural barriers that may slow its acceptance. In the context of this text, the key movements influencing changing places and landscapes are immigration and migration. American history and geography of the 19th and 20th centuries were greatly influenced by both types of movements. More than 30 million immigrants, largely from northern and western Europe, came to the U.S. due to a variety of causes, but generally seeking better living conditions for themselves and their families. Most entered without financial or social capital and settled in the inner portions of American industrial cities, near their work places. In addition to urban ethnic neighborhoods, broader regional patterns also resulted from these processes, such as the Scandinavian logging and agricultural settlements in the Upper Midwest. Internal migrations have continuously reshaped American regions. A few

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examples include the “Gold Rush,” the “Great Migration” that brought millions of African Americans to northern cities, and the more recent mass movement of northern and Midwestern residents to the “Sunbelt” states. Gateways are cities that serve as entry ports, or receiving areas, for immigrants. However, as Audrey Singer notes, they also are the places that foreign-born enter to live and work. Thus, they are also places influenced by ethnic groups who may be different in terms of language, culture, and ethnicity. Singer states their functions: “The word ‘gateway’ also implies that the region functions as a symbolic destination. Such portals hold out opportunities for newcomers, and beckon to others, as well-known centers populated by significant numbers of immigrants. As such, cities and localities become identified with immigrants, and their reputation itself may generate further settlement as social networks circulate information on employment, housing, and educational opportunities there” (Singer, 2004, p. 4).

A network is the path connecting two or more points. In geography, the network concept has multiple applications. For example, in the physical world, a system of networks is highways (termed “edges” or “ties”) that connect markets (“points”) with services and retail operations (“points”) by providing easy access and movement between two or more points. In this context, contemporary applied geographers consider the existence and strength of such linkages when analyzing store productivity or when locating a new facility (a “new point”). Historically, transportation systems (“networks”), including the canals and rail roads, were vital to American economic development and urbanization because they efficiently linked resources (“points”) and markets (“points”), while also providing easy access for arriving European immigrants to work in the exploding factory system of the late 19th and early 20th centuries in various cities. The development of Chicago, for example, occurred because of the linkages provided by the canal and rail networks. Chicago became the nation’s rail hub and the primary industrial center of the American interior, linking agriculture, timber, meat production, and industrial outputs with various U.S. markets and served as a magnet for European immigrants. Networks are also important to geography because they represent the social linkages between people and places. The spread of innovations over space and time, discussed above, provides as an example of movement. Diffusion theory was developed to explain the spread of ideas and innovations and utilizes social networks in part to explain the timing of the adoption of an innovation. In this sense, social networks involve influential people, such as opinion leaders, and friends and family, who influence the adoption of a new product or idea by the broader population. These social relationships involve nodes (points) and linkages (ties), or the paths that connect people. The individual actors are points within the network and the linkages are the social ties between them. Social networks are known to be important to immigration and internal migration. Migrants keep connected (tied) to their previous communities and influence future migration decisions. For example, if a migrant communicates to others in the homeland that she has been successful in finding employment and is happy in her new location, then her social contacts at her previous home location are more likely to consider migrating to the same destination. There are other more complicated relationships, such as the “socio-spatial networks” discussed by Marie Price in chapter 16. She examines the ways in which Bolivian immigrants stay connected to their homeland and how these connections and perceptions of place influence their behaviors. Two central geographic concepts are space and place. These are guiding principles in geographic research. The spatial theme of geography emphasizes the importance of location and its linkages, or connections, to other locations. Geographers theorize about locations and about identifiable patterns associated with locations. Geography poses the theoretical questions: What forces create a geographic pattern (why has a particular group clustered in a particular area)? How and why do spatial patterns change (Why have new Latino subregions emerged in Northeastern cities)? This implies that a region with spatial structure exists, i.e., it contains a geographic distribution of points that is non-random. Phenomena are distributed as the result of some process, or set of processes, and assume a spatial form. Accordingly, before WWII, the distribution of U.S. Latinos could be characterized as a region in the borderlands of the American Southwest and California, due to what Haverluk termed the “Mexican Legacy,” America’s long association with Mexico, the Mexican War, the Mexican Cession, and the Gadsden Purchase, among other factors (Haverluk, 1998). However, this U.S. Latino geography

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changed significantly with the influx of Puerto Ricans and Cubans. Similarly, the early 20th century distribution of African Americans involved a geographic pattern that reflected the legacy of slavery. The Great Migration changed the nature of African-American geography and the contemporary reverse migration of blacks to the South will likely add a new geographic dimension in the future. These are examples of the application of the spatial theme in human geography. It focuses on the analysis of population distributions and movements at the regional scale that bring spatial variation and spatial structure to the nation. There, of course, are many other examples as well. Space also is a commodity, something of value. Because space has economic or social value, it can become “contested space,” desired by more than one group. Space also can be manipulated for a specific purpose, as in the “Chinatown” example presented earlier. A related geographic concept is place. Its meaning overlaps with space but place has a more specific connotation. Place is space at a micro-scale, which has been infused with cultural and ethnic meaning. Groups shape space to symbolize what they value and hold dear; in this sense, place becomes a part of their identity. Place is a dynamic concept particularly suited to the study of local geographies. Harner nicely summarized the dimensions of place that make it suitable for the study of human geography: “Place is process, continually constructed and transformed.… Place is the interaction between extralocal forces, local histories, cultural constructs, and individual human agency.… Through struggle, meaning is built into inanimate objects that give place symbolic significance. This meaning can become part of social identity” (Harner, 2001, p. 661).

Geographic studies of place are localized and typically field-oriented analyses of landscapes that differentiate an ethnic group and its territory, and sometimes become contested space between two groups. Because race and ethnicity are distinguishable concepts, it is important to make a distinction between ethnic and racial geography. Both are parts of multicultural geographies.

ETHNIC, RACIAL AND MULTICULTURAL GEOGRAPHIES Earlier it was noted that race and ethnicity are not equivalent. Both are social constructs but race is a social classification created by another culture, often the culture in control of the broader society in which a minority ethnic group lives. Ethnicity refers to the self-construction of an identity that amplifies particular cultural traits for the purpose of creating a group distinction and a set of common aspirations. Racism and persecution can contribute to feelings of vulnerability. Therefore, racism can contribute to the formation of an ethnic identity. Given this distinction, it is important to clarify the difference between racial and ethnic geography. McKee has defined ethnic geography as “the study of the spatial and ecological aspects of ethnicity” (McKee, 2000; Preface, p. xv). Numerous examples of ethnic geography are available, including those dealing with the new Latino geographies (Areola, 2005), emerging Latino settlements in the South (Smith and Furuseth, forthcoming), the creation of ethnic spaces and places in multi-ethnic cities (Chacko, 2003), the formation and evolution of urban and suburban ethnic enclaves (Allen and Turner, 1996; Li, 1997), and the ethnic transformation of places (Miyares, 1997), among others. In all of these cases, ethnic groups are creating new human geographies by their actions, often times due to migration, adjustment, and conscious decisions to create places of their own. McKee presented the broad ethnic core regions of the U.S., including the broad settlement patterns of African Americans and provided an explanation for the “spatial zonation” of American ethnicity. Such a classification is acceptable for ethnic purposes because it entails group description of common ancestry and the formation of cultural tradition, living as a minority in a larger or “host culture” (p. 41). This broad living area includes the region where the African-American ethos was formed. African-American landscapes emerged there over time. However, this broad classification makes no mention of the processes that resulted in black settlement and restrictions within this geographic zone. Such discussion mandates a movement from ethnic to racial geography. Clearly, the factors cited by McKee, distance decay, environmental affinity, and the nature of internal,

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voluntary migration streams, to explain the formation of other ethnic regions of his classification, did not apply to African-American geography prior to the Great Migration. The discussion of historical and contemporary African-American geography must include the persistent role of racial ideology that shaped their geography and disproportionately the poor and unequal living conditions of many African Americans. Race as a social construct not only created the initial forced migration of blacks, but also guided forced migration streams from the northern section of the South to the plantation agriculture of the Cotton Belt. The same construct would limit housing choice and employment opportunities in the North, lead to three periods of ghetto formation (Rose, 1971) and explode into the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s. Today, that legacy continues to haunt numerous American cities. It would be ludicrous to refer to such racial geographies as “just another set of ethnic patterns.” Racial and ethnic geographies, then, are distinctive by purpose. Ethnic geography explores the impact of movements, adjustments and the formation of landscapes and places forged by the actions of ethnic groups. Racial geography recognizes the role of the controlling society in the creation of the racial ideology that governs the use of space, often restricting access to places and to resources to preserve the privilege of the controlling group. It is important to note that the creation of racial geography does not preclude the creation of cultural/ethnic landscapes. As Wiese has illustrated, for example, despite white racism and often violent actions to keep African Americans out of white suburbia, blacks struggled and pushed their way into suburban areas, where they created African-American landscapes and “places of their own” (Wiese, 2004). Thus, racial and ethnic geographies evolve and change, creating new settlement geographies. Quality of life in the places that result is determined by the actions of individuals and agencies, technology, and the resources of the environment. The living quality also depends on the goodwill and fairness of others. This involves power relationships, which sometimes become the most important forces in shaping the quality of life and the geographic patterns in an area. Multicultural geographies are the study of both racial and ethnic geographies. They consider at several geographic scales the processes that determine the nature of spatial patterns, cultural landscapes, and places. They pay particular attention to spatial inequities and other group differences that result in a particular lifestyle and quality of life. Multicultural geographies examine the processes, particularly the social institutions that influence, control, and transform geographic space. They recognize and interpret the unique attributes of the spaces and places, including their expression and problems, as they influence the groups that occupy them. Multicultural geography courses provide students with perspectives on the importance of complex geographic patterns and the processes that produce them. In the process they inform us about the persistence and changes associated with the American scene. This volume is a compendium of works by geographers and other social scientists who have been working on both the ethnic and racial geographies of the U.S. Together, they inform us of America’s multicultural geographies, both past and present.

THE NEED TO REVISIT THE MULTICULTURAL PAST America, like most societies, is extremely complex. Knowledge of the cultural histories and geographies subsumed within the dominant Anglo-American culture is necessary to understand this complexity in contemporary society and its challenges. While some of the very basic facts related to American subcultures and increasing ethnic diversity are presented in small doses in the secondary education curriculum, a comprehensive context for these issues in contemporary America is rarely provided. Among the historical and geographic stories too infrequently detailed in the American educational system are those of even the broadest ethnic groups that have long been present and contributed to the evolution of the American economy, including African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians. The United States began as an agrarian society that supported its Southern economy through slavery. The legacy of slavery is a uniquely American racism that maintains a black-white divide. The Great Migration of the 20th century resulted in millions of African Americans relocating to northern and western cities, and in

Race, Ethnicity, and Place in a Changing America

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the formation of a national ghetto system. Despite the rise of an African-American middle class, racial inequalities created by discriminatory institutional practices and white avoidance behavior remain obvious in the nation’s segregated metropolitan regions, and disproportionately place blacks and other minorities in schools with much higher poverty rates than their white counterpart schools. These conditions remain a challenge. The 19th century experienced rapid industrialization and urbanization based on rapid technological change and related transportation improvements that connected the nation by canals and rails. This growth and expansion necessitated a large, cheap labor force, which was provided largely by Western European immigrants. The Northern economy was built on unfair wages and harsh working conditions that led to labor unrest and unionization. Over a period of time, the diverse European groups that provided much of that labor were observed to have assimilated, socially and spatially, into the broader American society and its host Anglo culture. This was the basis of the “straight-line assimilation” model of the Chicago School. This model was developed to explain urban expansion. It was influenced by physical concepts of the period, especially ecological niche, the social fluidity attributed to the factory system, and rapid changes in transportation technology that permitted relative ease of access to urban core and periphery. A series of concentric zones (ecological niches) containing residents, radiated from a circular central business district and constituted its conceptual diagram. Adjacent to the CBD was the zone of transition, an area of varied uses, including rooming houses for recent poor immigrants seeking factory work. New and old slums mixed with warehouses, factories, and other uses there as well. Subsequent zones contained niches of residential land use, ranging from the adjacent zone of working-class homes, to higher valued and, finally, to even better homes in the commuter zone. Key to this conceptualization was the desire and ability of immigrants and their decendents to move to a better zone based on their socioeconomic success made possible by the class fluidity of capitalism. This amounted to spatial absorption by the host culture of immigrants who fit the new niche. This process became known as straight-line assimilation. However, the other American cultural histories and geographies that are less often told and much less understood include Hispanics. The shared border with Mexico and the rapid expansion of western agriculture in the 20th century resulted in a “Mexican Legacy” that shaped early Hispanic and Mexican American settlement geography and interactions between Anglos and Spanish-speaking people in the U.S. Mexicans frequently lost their lands and became part of the lower stratum of the American socioeconomic-political hierarchy by virtue of their changing land ownership and occupational status. Restrictions and guest worker programs became the norm for Mexicans residing in the western U.S. In the early decades of the 20th century, increase in the Mexican population, especially in California, led to low-quality residences in overcrowded barrios for many Mexican Americans. While new colonias were constructed and a modest size Mexican-American middle class emerged, Anglos relocating from the eastern U.S. had become the dominant political, economic, and cultural force in the region. Discrimination and animosity remained and inequality prevailed. Since the 1970s, millions of Latinos have entered the American middle class but millions of other Latinos, including Mexican Americans, remain locked in barrios, living in the shadow of wealth that surrounds them. Also, after the Cuban Revolution that established Fidel Castro’s regime, large numbers of Cuban exiles migrated to Florida and were classified as refugees. Many of these early arrivals represented the wealthy fleeing Cuba and, with U.S. government assistance, were able to develop a strong base for future Cuban arrivals. This picture stands in strong contrast to other Hispanic migrant cases, including Puerto Ricans, who are American citizens, and Dominicans, who represent some of the poorest Latinos residing in the U.S. These trends greatly diversified American Latino ethnic groups and created an entirely new set of Latino geographies in Post-WWII America. These are complex scenarios that deserve more than a passing glance in the social studies curriculum. Asian ethnic groups have a heritage in the American West somewhat similar to Mexicans. Initially praised for their willingness to work hard for a fair wage, they later were attacked as “Coolie labor” and restricted geographically. Their groups were sharply restricted from entering the U.S. after the Great Depression, until immigration laws changed after WWII. Similar to the Mexicans, the Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino groups contributed a great deal to the construction of western infrastructure and to its cheap labor force that built a strong economy. Like African Americans, they were resented, racialized as different and inferior to the Anglo

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culture, and restricted socially, economically and geographically. Today, Asian immigrants are among the most rapidly growing percentage of the total U.S. population and represent a vast number of ethnic groups of multiple origins. Some come with their social capital in hand and enjoy almost immediate economic success. Others are unskilled refuges with little hope for assimilation or economic success. These groups are forcing a reconsideration of traditional straight-line assimilation theory because many have moved directly to American suburbs (Li, 1998). The cultural and geographic histories of these important ethnic groups are part of the American heritage and must be incorporated more fully into the story of America’s incredible and unprecedented economic and technological gains. These need not replace coverage of traditional accounts of American’s founding fathers, which some analysts fear. Rather, such accounts must be more fully and accurately reported. Similarly, social scientists must reconstruct theories of settlement and assimilation to explain the forces of inclusion and exclusion of particular groups in American society, past and present. Finally, given the emergence of new geographic settlement forms, such theory must move away from singular explanations, as though they apply to all and become the basis for political arguments for English-language only and other non-inclusive remedies to America’s social problems. One of America’s biggest challenges in confronting the legacy of racial and ethnic inequalities lies in transforming educational institutions and the policies that control their well-being. The multicultural settlement patterns, organization of school district boundaries, funding mechanisms, and the curriculum are problems that require attention. The levels of government that are theoretically controlled by the electorate have commandeered the system and made the electorate pawns. The result is a Prussian-style education system that marches lock step through the academic year, in spite of the needs of students, and then tests them each June, in spite of what they have not learned. Such a system has minimized the cultural histories and contemporary issues associated with the legacy of slavery and racial ideologies. It also has not addressed the significance of a rapidly changing ethnic population mix that will dramatically reduce the significance of the historically strong host culture. Before exploring some of the new patterns emerging across the U.S., it is informative to examine some of the numerical trends in America’s prominent minority groups and the growth of particular ethnic groups in recent decades.

IMMIGRATION TRENDS: INCREASING DIVERSITY BY THE NUMBERS America has been changing from a predominantly white, non-Hispanic nation to a more multicultural and multiracial society. Using the broad racial/ethnic categories of the U.S. Census, this shift is quite obvious between 1940 and 2000. In 1940, nearly 90 percent of Americans were non-Hispanic white. In the year 2000, a half-century later, that proportion had dropped to seventy-five percent. By 2050, whites are likely to be a slim majority of about 52 percent (Frazier, Margai, and Tettey-Fio, 2003). This racial/ethnic diversification is due to a number of factors, especially immigration and birth rate differences between white non-Hispanics and Hispanics. The major racial/ethnic categories and their changes in the share of the total U.S. population between 1940 and 2000 also are reported in Table 1.1. These data indicate that the African-American population changed little in its proportion of the total U.S. population between 1940 and 2000, especially relative to the other two growing minority groups. The black proportion of the total population increased only 1.3 percent between 1940 and 1970 and only 1.2 percent in the following thirty years, 1970 to 2000. However, the total black population increased from just under13 million in 1940 to more than 34 million by 2000. Latinos, on the other hand, accounted only for slightly more than 1 percent of the total U.S. population in 1940 but jumped to 4.5 percent by 1970, and to 12.5 percent of the total in 2000. Thus, while the black population experienced very modest gains in the sixty years reported in Table 1.1, the Hispanic total reached over 35 million in 2000 and became America’s largest minority group.

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The Asian population was relatively miniscule in 1940, when approximately a quarter of a million Asians resided in America, less than 1 percent of the total American population. The Asian total had increased to about 1.5 million by 1970 but still accounted for less than 1 percent of the U.S. total. However, although a relatively small percentage of the total in 2000, at 3.7 percent, Asians realized the largest percentage increase between 1970 and 2000, and therefore were America’s fastest growing minority on a percentage basis. While these numbers indicate the substantial increase in diversity in the American population, they do not express the cultural diversity within each group that contributes to an increasingly multicultural society. Table 1.2 clarifies this within-group diversity by reporting the national origin for each unique foreign-born population in the U.S. with a minimum of a half-million people in 2000. A number of observations are possible from that table. 1. Fourteen different source nations are represented, indicating the diversity of foreign-born in the U.S. in 2000 for those groups with at least one-half million people. These 14 foreign-born groups together account for only about 61 percent of the 31,107,889 total foreign-born population in 2000, suggesting an even greater diversity if all source nations had been listed in the table. 2. Mexico stands out as the chief source nation of the U.S. foreign-born. It alone provided nearly 30 percent of the total in 2000. 3. The sources of the next four largest foreign-born American populations are in Asia and together account for nearly five million foreign-born and about 12 percent of the U.S. total. 4. Of the 14 sources, six are in Latin America and five are in Asia. This illustrates the shift in U.S. immigration policy since 1952 and especially since 1965, when immigrant sources shifted from Europe to Latin America and Asia. Many of these groups have shaped their new landscapes so that they are reminded of their culture and homeland. Table 1.1 Major Racial/Ethnic Group Changes in Percentages of the Total U.S. Population, 1940, 1970, and 2000+ Group

Year and Population in Thousands 1940

1970

2000*

White, non-Hispanic

116,353 (88.5%)

169,653 (83.4%)

211,460 (75.1%)

Black

12,866 (9.8%)

22,539 (11.1%)

34,650 (12.3%)

Hispanic

1,861 (1.4%)

9,073 (4.5%)

35,308 (12.5%)

Asian/Pacific Islander

255 ( 100% Pct Loan to Value > 80% Pct Women 65+ Percent Pct Not in Residence in 1995 Poverty Percent 2000 Poverty % Change 1990–2000 Significant at 5% level

Control for Subprime Pct 0.42 -0.04 0.43 0.09 0.20 0.17 0.22 0.00 0.20 0.26 0.05 -0.13 -0.04 0.19 -0.14

Table 8.4 Denial Rates by Income

Income Under $20K $20K–$30K $30K–$40K $40K–$50K Over $50K

2001–2003 Foreclosures 162 824 870 607 479

FCLS Index 1.17% 2.60% 1.70% 1.00% 0.65%

Subprime Pct 11.86% 14.26% 9.99% 6.52% 3.61%

Subprime Foreclosures 34.57% 40.90% 34.94% 27.68% 25.89%

HMDA Deny Rate 37.7% 39.3% 33.8% 27.2% 18.6%

The next table (Table 8.5) examines the differences between neighborhoods categorized by minority composition. The figures show a clear pattern: neighborhoods with at least 50 percent minorities have more than triple the foreclosure incidence as neighborhoods that are over 90 percent non-Hispanic white. Subprime and predatory rates are likewise much higher in minority neighborhoods, and more foreclosures occurred from loans made by subprime lenders. Denial rates for HMDA registered loans are greater in majority-minority neighborhoods. Putting together income and minority composition shows that both variables are important and operate somewhat independently. Within the $20,000 to $30,000 set of neighborhoods, majority-minority neighborhoods have more than double the incidence of foreclosure and a far higher subprime presence than do small minority neighborhoods. Similarly, wealthier neighborhoods with a substantial minority presence have a lower foreclosure incidence and a slightly lower proportion of subprime loans than do poorer neighborhoods. In regard to the proportion of foreclosures that originated with a subprime lender, there are some similar trends here as well.

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David H. Kaplan and Gail Sommers Table 8.5 Denial Rates by Neighborhood Composition

Minority Composition Small Minority Minority 1/10 to 1/4 Minority 1/4 to 1/2 Majority Minority

Foreclosures 1301 470 360 811

FCLS Index 0.94% 1.05% 1.74% 3.05%

Subprime Pct 5.82% 5.83% 11.26% 15.33%

Subprime Foreclosures 28.67% 34.04% 35.83% 40.32%

HMDA Deny Rate 25.0% 28.5% 36.2% 43.0%

In general, our data indicate that the racial geography of the Akron area plays an enormous role in structuring the geography of foreclosures and of subprime lending. Socioeconomic status — manifested through household income, poverty rates, and unemployment rates — also exerts a powerful effect. Yet, the racial effect is independent and a way to graphically illustrate this is through an examination of both foreclosure incidences and subprime percentages among the reasonably affluent. The next two figures (Figures 8.5 and 8.6) assume a household income of $40,000 — generally a population with reasonable credit and the ability to afford a mortgage. The foreclosure incidence is low, less than 6 percent of all housing units in any event. Yet, the level of foreclosures is quite sensitive to the minority composition, as calculated by a simple regression model. All white block groups have roughly half the incidence of foreclosures as do all minority census block groups. The same dynamic applies when looking at the percentage of loans that are from subprime lenders. Only about one of eight mortgages in all-white neighborhoods — both in Akron city and in suburban Summit County — are from subprime lenders. In all-minority neighborhoods, closer to one out of five mortgages are from subprime lenders.

COMPARING THE TWO CASES The two cases mentioned above differ by location, method, and units of analysis. The Washington, D.C. case tracks the activities of a single lender — alleged to be engaged in predatory practices — in order to assess the extent to which loans made by this lender target particular neighborhoods. The Akron, Ohio, case examines the universe of all loans made for home purchases (not including refinances and home improvement loans) between 1999 and 2001, and then considers all foreclosures for a period of 16 months between 2001 and 2003. From these data, it is possible to examine the distribution of loans from subprime lenders, lenders alleged to be predatory, and the pattern of foreclosures. There are several points of agreement between these two case studies that reflect common aspects of today’s lending environment. First, the geographical distribution of all of this loan activity — from individual lenders alleged as predatory, to all subprime loans, to foreclosures — cannot be attributed to chance. It differs markedly from the general distribution of houses and mortgages. Second, the loan activity reported here is correlated with the minority composition of neighborhoods and this is especially apparent for African-American neighborhoods. Third, this predisposition of subprime loans, predatory loans, or foreclosure outcomes towards minority neighborhoods exists independently of the socioeconomic status of those neighborhoods. Income matters a great deal, of course, but race matters above and beyond the effects of income. Fourth, given the racial geography of American metropolitan areas and our use of small spatial units (blocks or block groups), we feel that we can reasonably infer that the geographical targeting demonstrated in these analyses corresponds to the racial targeting of specific households.

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Lending and Race in Two Cities Figure 8.5

Minority Percentage and Foreclosure Incidence: $40K Foreclosure Incidence

6% 5% 4% Akron Suburbs

3% 2% 1% 0% 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 Minority Proportion

Figure 8.6

Minority Percentage and Subprime Loans: $40K Pct. of SubPrime Loans

25.0 20.0 15.0

Akron

10.0

Suburbs

5.0 0.0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 Minority Proportion

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David H. Kaplan and Gail Sommers

Subprime lending provides an option to those households that could not otherwise qualify for a mortgage. Moreover, borrowers in the subprime market represent higher degrees of risk and so may be more likely to foreclose. In this respect, the growth of subprime lending since the early 1990s represents a positive development and it would be a shame to go back to a period where many households were shut out of the mortgage market. Ironically, neighborhoods with a high percentage of subprime lending are those neighborhoods previously ignored by conventional mortgage lenders. According to current data, they continue to suffer lower rates of conventional loans and higher denial rates among residents who do apply for a loan. This makes the issue of subprime lending less one of affording a choice to those who may not qualify for prime loans, and more one of constraints imposed by living within a neighborhood that many mortgage lenders ignore. The racial geography of subprime lending, predatory lending, and foreclosures is most disturbing, and such targeting continues to be confirmed by our aggregate analysis. It could be the case that there are other factors at play, including below-average credit scores that reflect past payment histories. Micro-level information, based on the credit histories of individual households, is the only way to uncover whether this contributes to the discrepancies reported here. In any event, it is essential to provide greater levels of protection to these households, in order to make sure that they are not penalized for being poor or for being black.

Chapter 9

Concentrated Poverty, Race, and Mortgage Lending: Implications for Anti-Predatory Lending Legislation JOE T. DARDEN AND LOUISE JEZIERSKI INTRODUCTION The differential access to mortgage loans based on race, class, and residential location of population groups is a serious public policy issue. It appears from reports that populations that are black or Hispanic and reside in areas of concentrated poverty are more likely to be denied prime loans and forced to obtain subprime loans (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2000 and 2002). While prime loans are made to borrowers at the prevailing interest rates, subprime loans have interest rates that are less favorable. Indeed, some community groups consider interest rates of many subprime loans so unfavorable to the borrower that they have been called “predatory” (see National Community Reinvestment Coalition, 2002). Although the concepts of subprime and predatory lending are related, there are some slight differences. A subprime loan is made to a borrower with less than perfect credit. In order to compensate for the additional perceived risk associated with subprime loans, some lending institutions charge excessively high interest rates. Such excessively high interest rates make the loan a predatory loan.

THE CONCEPT OF A PREDATORY LOAN A predatory loan is an unsuitable loan designed to exploit vulnerable and unsophisticated borrowers. Predatory loans are a subset of subprime loans. Thus, predatory loans are subprime, but not all subprime loans are predatory. A predatory loan has one or more of the following features: (1) charges more in interest and fees than is required to cover the added risk of lending to borrowers with credit imperfections, (2) contains abusive terms and conditions that trap borrowers and lead to increased indebtedness, (3) does not take into account the borrower’s ability to repay the loan, and (4) often violates fair lending laws by targeting women, minorities, and communities of color (National Community Reinvestment Coalition, 2002, p. 4).

Targeted Groups by Subprime and Predatory Lenders African Americans, Hispanics, and low-income residents in concentrated poverty neighborhoods are disproportionately targeted by subprime lenders in the home mortgage market. High levels of subprime mortgage lending indicate markets where borrowers are paying unusually high costs for credit. While some subprime lenders may perform a useful service by making credit available to high risk borrowers who could not otherwise borrow money, other lenders seem to be exploiting uninformed borrowers and borrowers who could otherwise qualify for conventional loans (ACORN, 2003).

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Joe T. Darden and Louise Jezierski

Exploitation can occur in one of three ways: (1) equity stripping, i.e., charging borrowers exorbitant fees that are routinely financed into the loan, (2) rate-risk disparities, i.e., charging borrowers a higher rate of interest than their credit histories would indicate is justified, or (3) excessive foreclosures, i.e., making loans without regard to a borrower’s ability to pay (Immergluck and Wiles, 1999). Some states have tried to address this practice through “anti-predatory lending” legislation. As of March 2003, eleven states had passed anti-predatory lending legislation. Thirty-two states had introduced legislation, and seven states had not taken action to address the problem. This chapter: (1) determines the variation in subprime lending, and (2) explores the factors that may be related to the passage of antipredatory lending legislation.

DATA AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS Data from the 2000 U.S. Census on population by race, loan data from the Center for Community Change (Bradford, 2002), and information on state anti-predatory lending legislation were analyzed as follows. Metropolitan areas were divided into: (1) states that have passed anti-predatory lending legislation, (2) states that have introduced anti-predatory lending legislation, and (3) states that had not introduced such legislation as of March 2003. Variation in subprime lending was analyzed by computing the mean percent of subprime loans received by blacks, Hispanics, and Asians and the loan disparity ratio by race. Only refinance loans, which are prevalent in the subprime market, were used. Certain demographic and political variables were examined to determine which factors might have contributed to state variations in the passage of anti-predatory lending legislation.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK It is hypothesized that predatory lending is inherently a problem of geography in terms of neighborhood characteristics by race and class. Thus, predatory lending follows other patterns in American society, such as residential segregation. Residential segregation among America’s 330 metropolitan areas reveals a pattern of racial stratification. Blacks are the group most residentially segregated from the white majority population, followed by Hispanics. Asians are the least residentially segregated group (Iceland, Weinberg and Steinmetz, 2002). Blacks are more likely than any other group to reside in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty (Jargowsky, 2003). Blacks are followed by Hispanics, while Asians are least likely among racial minority groups to reside in concentrated poverty. Among all racial groups, blacks are more likely to be victims of subprime lending. Hispanics are less likely than blacks to be victims and Asians are least likely to experience subprime lending, in part because they are least likely to live in areas of concentrated poverty. Since mortgage lenders are reluctant to make any loans in areas of concentrated poverty, subprime loans emerge as more competitive in such neighborhoods than are prime loans. Since blacks are more likely than any other racial group to reside in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty, they are most victimized by predatory lending.

THE CONCEPT OF CONCENTRATED POVERTY Unlike the poverty of individual families, which is defined merely on the basis of income, concentrated poverty has a geographic or spatial dimension. It is defined as the percentage of metropolitan-wide poor individuals in each racial category living in census tracts (neighborhoods) with poverty rates of 40 percent or higher. Such neighborhoods increased between 1970s and 1990, especially among blacks (see Wilson, 1987; Massey, Gross, & Shibuya, 1994). However, between 1990 and 2000, there was a substantial decline in high poverty

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113

neighborhoods. According to Jargowsky (2003), the number of people living in high poverty neighborhoods where the poverty rate was 40 percent or higher declined in the 1990s. Concentrated poverty declined among all racial groups, and especially among blacks. Despite the decline, in 2000, blacks remain the one racial group with the highest percent of the population living in concentrated poverty. While 19 percent of the black population lived in concentrated poverty, only 6 percent of the white population did so, making blacks three times more likely than whites to live in concentrated poverty. Of the total concentrated poverty population, 39 percent were blacks, 29 percent were Hispanics, and 24 percent were whites. Asians constituted only 4 percent of the concentrated poverty population (Jargowsky, 2003). Thus, Asians are expected to receive fewer subprime loans than blacks and Hispanics.

RELATIONSHIP OF CONCENTRATED POVERTY TO SUBPRIME LENDING Subprime lending is clearly related to concentrated poverty. This is evident when blacks and Hispanics are compared in the 20 largest metropolitan areas. While 15 percent of blacks on average reside in concentrated poverty neighborhoods, only 9 percent of Hispanics do. This is reflected in a higher average rate of subprime loans — 48.5 percent for blacks, compared to 29.1 percent for Hispanics. The percent of subprime loans was determined by dividing the total number of loans made to applicants by race, by the number of subprime loans ° 100. The black vs. white mean racial disparity ratio was 2.73 and the Hispanic vs. white mean racial disparity ratio was 1.61. The racial disparity ratio compares the percent of subprime loans to whites and blacks, and to whites and Hispanics. A ratio of 1.00 is equivalent to racial equality. A ratio greater than 1.00 indicates more subprime loans to blacks or Hispanics.

THE IMPACT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SUBPRIME LENDING A study by Bradford (2002) concluded that subprime lending is widespread and growing. High levels indicate markets where borrowers have unusually high risks of losing their homes. The sheer geographic concentration of these loans, therefore, may have a significant negative impact not just on individual borrowers, but on entire neighborhoods. The subprime market is fertile ground for predatory lending (Bradford, 2002). Moreover, the prevalence of subprime loans with abusive characteristics has been devastating to families and neighborhoods (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2002; Immergluck & Wiles, 1999; Stein, 2001). Yet, Fannie Mae argues that up to half of all subprime borrowers could qualify for lower cost conventional financing (Zorn, 2000). Stein (2001) estimated that U.S. borrowers lose $9.1 billion annually to predatory lending practices. Clearly, predatory lending has become one of the most critical policy issues facing the financial services industry, particularly mortgage lending (Carr & Kolluri, 2001). Despite the need to take action via legislation to combat predatory lending, such action thus far has been limited. Moreover, it is not known what factors influence some state legislators to pass anti-predatory lending legislation while other states do not. The next section addresses this question and provides knowledge about the patterns of anti-predatory lending by states.

RACE AND VARIATION IN SUBPRIME LENDING BY STATES States That Have Passed Legislation Subprime lending varies by race and by state. The results presented in Table 9.1 reveal the variation in subprime lending to blacks, Hispanics, and Asians in states that have passed anti-predatory lending legislation. Table 9.1 shows the variation by race in the mean percent subprime loans and the mean racial disparity ratios.

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Among the eleven states that had passed anti-predatory lending legislation as of 2003, seven states had sufficient populations of each racial minority group (blacks, Hispanics and Asians) for comparison purposes. In California, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, New York, Georgia, and Pennsylvania, the mean percent of subprime loans was highest for blacks, lower for Hispanics and lowest for Asians. Such high mean percentage of subprime loans to blacks is reflected in the black-white disparity ratios. In these seven states, the mean disparity ratio ranged from 2.35 in New York to 3.48 in Georgia. In other words, blacks were more than three times more likely than whites in Georgia to receive subprime loans. Among Hispanics, the mean Hispanic-white disparity ratios ranged from a high of 2.20 in Pennsylvania to 1.45 in New York. The disparity ratios were lowest among Asians, ranging from 1.21 in California to 0.61 in Georgia. Table 9.1 Racial Variation in Percentage Subprime Loans and Racial Disparity Ratios in States that Passed Anti-Predatory Lending Legislation

N Black

Mean Hispanic Percent Subprime Loans

N Hispanic

Mean Asian Percent Subprime Loans

N Asian

Mean Black/White Disparity Ratio*

Mean Mean Asiasn/White Hispanic/White Disparity Disparity Ratio* Ratio*

States

Date of Passage

Mean Black Percent Subprime Loans

California

10/01

39.6

12

27.7

22

19.7

14

2.45

1.68

1.21

Colorado

6/02

46.4

2

27.6

6

18.5

1

2.74

1.77

1.07

Connecticut

6/02

45.3

4

28.0

3

+

+

2.76

1.91

+

Florida

3/02

55.4

16

35.9

10

25.1

3

2.46

1.50

1.00

Georgia

4/02

48.5

7

23.5

1

9.0

1

3.48

1.59

0.61

Kentucky

3/03

40.7

2

+

+

+

+

2.95

+

+

Michigan

12/02

41.8

8

26.2

4

8.4

1

3.14

1.98

0.55

New York

10/02

56.6

4

33.8

2

20.8

2

2.35

1.45

0.88

North Carolina

7/99

50.4

9

+

+

+

+

2.72

+

+

Pennsylvania

6/01

53.6

3

38.1

1

19.9

1

3.15

2.20

1.15

Virginia

3/03

48.7

5

+

+

+

+

2.52

+

+

N = number of metropolitan areas + Data on Hispanics was insufficient for analysis for Kentucky, North Carolina and Virginia. Data on Asians was insufficient for analysis for Connecticut, Kentucky, North Carolina and Virginia. * A ratio of 1.00 equals racial equality. A ratio greater than 1.00 equals a higher rate of subprime loans to blacks, Hispanics, or Asians. Source: Computed by the authors from data obtained from Bradford (2002).

Among the 11 states that have passed anti-predatory lending legislation, the mean percentage of black subprime loans ranged from a low of 39.6 in California to a high of 56.6 in New York. However, New York State had the lowest black/white disparity ratio among states that have passed anti-predatory lending legislation. The ratio ranged from 2.35 in New York to 3.48 in Georgia (Table 9.1). Georgia was one of three states where black applicants received more than three times the percentage of subprime loans than whites. The other two states were Michigan (3.14) and Pennsylvania (3.15).

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115

States That Have Introduced Legislation In addition to the eleven states that had passed anti-predatory lending legislation as of March 2003, 32 states had introduced such legislation in the House or Senate. A sufficient black population existed for analytical purposes in 24 of the 32 states, which included 78 metropolitan areas. In those 24 states, the mean percent of subprime loans to blacks was 47.2 percent and the mean black-white disparity ratio was 2.80. In other words, blacks were more than twice as likely as whites to receive subprime loans. Among Hispanics, a sufficient population existed for analytical purposes in 19 states, which included 48 metropolitan areas. The mean percent of subprime loans was 30 and the mean Hispanic-white disparity ratio was 1.73. This is lower than the mean disparity ratio for blacks vs. whites. Concerning Asians, a sufficient population existed for analysis in 12 states that included 16 metropolitan areas. The mean percent of subprime loans to Asians was 19 percent, and the mean Asian-white disparity ratio was 1.08. This is lower than the mean ratio for blacks vs. whites, and Hispanics vs. whites. In fact, the Asian-white ratio almost reflected equality with whites in terms of the percent of subprime loans received. In general, the percentage of subprime loans and disparity ratios varied by race in states that had introduced legislation. The case was similar to states that had passed legislation — blacks received the highest percentage of subprime loans, followed by Hispanics. Asians received the lowest percentage of subprime loans. States That Had Not Introduced Legislation A sufficient number of blacks existed for analysis in three states that contained four metropolitan areas. In those three states, the mean percent of subprime loans received by blacks was 51, and the mean disparity ratio was 2.70. Caution is advised in interpreting the results for Hispanics and Asians, since the analyses were based on a single state and metropolitan area. The percent of subprime loans for Hispanics was 32.4 percent, and the disparity ratio was 1.92. This is lower than the ratio for blacks. The percent of subprime loans to Asians was 19.0 percent, and the Asian-white disparity ratio was 1.50. This is the lowest ratio among the three racial minority groups. In sum, regardless of the status of anti-predatory lending legislation, the percent of subprime loans to blacks was the highest, followed by Hispanics. Asians were least likely among the three racial groups to receive subprime loans. Asians also had the lowest disparity ratios when compared to whites.

FACTORS RELATED TO PASSAGE OF ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LEGISLATION In this section, we explore some factors that may be related to the passage of anti-predatory lending legislation. Although exploratory, this discussion may shed more light on the question as to why some states had passed legislation, while other states had introduced it, and some states had not considered such legislation, as of March, 2003. The factors explored are as follows: (1) the severity of the problem, (2) the percent Democratic control of the legislature, (3) the percent of black legislators, and (4) the percent of metropolitan population in the state. Severity of the Problem The problem of subprime lending varies among states and among racial groups. In the previous section, we revealed that blacks had a higher percent of subprime loans in states that had not introduced legislation, although the black/white disparity ratio was lower. On the other hand, Hispanics and Asians had higher racial disparity ratios in states that had not introduced legislation. We applied a statistical method, analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test whether or not statistically significant differences exist between the percentage of black sub-

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prime loans and black/white disparity ratios, in states that had passed and in states that had not passed antipredatory lending legislation. The results of ANOVA revealed no statistically significant differences between the states. The number of cases for Hispanics and Asians was too small for statistical analysis. Thus, the severity of the problem of subprime lending was not the significant contributing factor to explain why some states had passed anti-predatory lending legislation as of March of 2003 and other states had not. The Percent of Democratic Control of the Legislature In most states, the Democratic Party is more likely to have a higher proportion of racial minority constituents than the Republican Party. The Democratic Party, we assume, would be more responsive to the needs of racial minorities. Thus, whether the Democratic Party or the Republican Party is in control of the state legislature may influence the passage of anti-predatory lending legislation. Table 9.2 presents the mean percentage of Democratic control of the state legislatures in 2002. Although states that had introduced legislation had a higher percentage of Democratic control than states that had passed legislation, the key difference is revealed when states that have not introduced legislation are compared. The Governor, the Senate, and the House show low Democratic control, constituting only 28.5 percent among Governors, only 40.8 percent in the Senate, and 34.2 percent in the House. ANOVA results revealed no significant differences between the states in the percentage of Democratic control of the Senate. However, the percentage of Democratic control of the House was significant at a .005 level between states that had not introduced anti-predatory lending legislation and states that had introduced or passed such legislation. Table 9.2 ANOVA Results Mean Percentage of Democratic Control of the State Legislature as of 2002 States That Have Passed Legislation

Mean

Governor

Senate

House

45

48.1

50.3

States That Have Introduced Legislation Mean

50

55.5

56.3

States that Have Not Introduced Legislation Mean

28.5

40.8

34.2*

*Percentage Democratic control significant at the .005 level. Sources: Computed by the authors from data obtained from state assembly Web sites and www.worldalmanac.com

The Percent of Black Legislators Since blacks are the group most targeted by predatory lenders, it is logical to expect, therefore, that black legislators would be more likely than other legislators to support passage of anti-predatory lending legislation. However, ANOVA results revealed that, while the percent of black legislators was indeed higher in the Senate and the House in states that had passed legislation, the results were not statistically significant (Table 9.3).

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Concentrated Poverty, Race, and Mortgage Lending The Percent Metropolitan Population in the State

It is reasonable to expect that the higher the percent of metropolitan population in a state, the higher the likelihood that the legislators will be influenced by those population groups who are more likely to experience subprime loans. Blacks are disproportionately resident in metropolitan areas. Thus, states with the highest percentage of metropolitan residents are expected to be among those that have passed anti-predatory lending legislation. Metropolitan populations, in general, have a higher proportion of racial minority groups and groups that are more concerned about fairness in lending patterns. ANOVA results revealed that states that had passed anti-predatory lending legislation had average populations that were 81 percent metropolitan. This was a significant difference at the .05 level from those states that had not introduced legislation. These states had an average metropolitan population of 50.6 percent (see Table 9.4). Table 9.3 ANOVA Results Percent Black Legislators N

Mean

SD

NS

States That Have Passed Legislation

11

9.9

6.13

NS

States That Have Introduced Legislation

31

3.14

7.39

NS

States That Have Not Introduced Legislation

7

6.48

3.07

NS

States That Have Passed Legislation

11

10.81

6.11

NS

States That Have Introduced Legislation

31

8.12

8.75

NS

States That Have Not Introduced Legislation

7

3.28

3.54

NS

Senate

House

Note: Nebraska has a unicameral legislative body that runs on anon-partisan ballot. Thus, only 49 states are included. SD= Standard Deviation NS= Not Significant Sources: Computed by the authors from data obtained from state assembly Web sites and www.worldalmanac.com

Table 9.4 ANOVA Results Percent Metropolitan Population Mean

SD

N

Significance

Legislation Passed

81.0

14.5

11

*

Legislation Introduced

67.1

20.1

32

Legislation Not Introduced

50.6

18.2

7

*Significant at the .05 level. Sources: Computed by the authors from data obtained from state assembly Web sites and www.worldalmanac.com

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The data and analyses presented in this chapter revealed that mortgage lending (prime or subprime loans) varies by race and neighborhood characteristics. It follows spatial patterns in American society similar to those of racial residential segregation and concentrated poverty. An examination and analysis of demographic and mortgage lending data led to the conclusion that among racial groups, whites are least likely to live in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty and least likely to receive subprime loans. Among racial minority groups, blacks are most likely to live in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty and most likely to receive subprime loans. Asians, on the other hand, are least likely to live in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty and least likely to receive subprime loans. The status of anti-predatory lending legislation to address the problem also varies by states. Although the percent of subprime loans received by each racial minority group varied between states that had passed and states that had not passed anti-predatory lending legislation as of March, 2003, the difference was not statistically significant. Regardless of the status of anti-predatory lending legislation, blacks received the highest percentage of subprime loans, followed by Hispanics. Asians received the lowest percentage of subprime loans. The mean percentage of loans received by blacks was higher in those states that had not introduced or passed anti-predatory lending legislation. However, the difference was not statistically significant. Four factors were explored for their relationship to state passage of anti-predatory lending legislation. Those factors were: (1) the severity of the problem, (2) the percent of Democratic control of the legislature, (3) the percent of black legislators, and (4) the percent metropolitan population in each state. Although race clearly matters in explaining the pattern of subprime lending, ANOVA results revealed no significant difference between the percentage of black subprime loans and black/white disparity ratios between states that had passed anti-predatory lending legislation and other states. Since anti-predatory lending legislation is very recent, possibly not enough time has passed for the legislation to have had an impact. The percent of Democratic control of state legislatures matters in explaining state passage of anti-predatory lending legislation. The percentage of Democratic control of the House was higher and statistically significant in states that had passed or introduced legislation, compared to states that had not. While the percent of black state legislators matters in explaining passage of anti-predatory lending legislation, the strength of its influence was not statistically significant. Finally, the higher the percentage of metropolitan population in a state, the more likely it is that the state will have passed anti-predatory lending legislation. While this study has explored four factors related to state variation in anti-predatory lending legislation, the explanation is clearly more complex. Future research should consider important qualitative factors. Among these is the factor of local neighborhood consumer group mobilization. Whether the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) or other neighborhood groups were actively involved in various communities in the states probably had an impact that contributed to passage of legislation. Clearly, more study is needed to better understand this very important policy issue, which is deeply linked to race and the concentrated poverty of neighborhoods.

Chapter 10

Race, Location and Access to Employment in Buffalo, N.Y. IBIPO JOHNSTON-ANUMONWO AND SELIMA SULTANA Differences in the residential, employment, and household characteristics of African Americans and European Americans as well as racial differences in the journey to work are well documented. There are many studies about the commuting behavior of non-whites, but the specific impact of the exodus of jobs to suburban locations on African American men and women who live in inner cities is still widely debated. An earlier study of Buffalo, N.Y. which, examined racial differences in commuting focused only on women (Johnston-Anumonwo, 1995); and in a follow-up study, men were included in the analysis (Johnston-Anumonwo, 1997). The purpose of the present study then is to examine the question of racial differences in locational access to jobs in Buffalo, N.Y. by presenting new data for the year 2000. The study retains the critical inquiry on whether suburban employment imposes longer commute times on African Americans than on European Americans. The results strongly complement those for 1990 and also 1980 by highlighting the fact that many African American men and women continue to endure relatively long commutes to get to work in spite of transportation, locational, and socioeconomic hindrances. Following a review of the background literature of the journey to work for African Americans, a brief description of the study area and data is provided, and then the findings are presented followed by the conclusions reached.

THE JOURNEY TO WORK FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS Inquiries about racial disparities in employment accessibility are central to the spatial mismatch hypothesis (Kain, 1968). When it was first proposed in the 1960s, the hypothesis emphasized that employment opportunities are expanding in suburban locations, but because of continuing segregation of blacks in inner cities, there exists a spatial mismatch, such that black inner-city residents face difficulties in reaching the growing job opportunities in suburbs (see Holzer, 1991; Kain, 1992; McLafferty and Preston, 1997; Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1998; and Preston and McLafferty, 1999 for some comprehensive reviews). There has been little change in the residential segregation of blacks between 1960s and now (Darden, 1990; Denton, 1994; Massey and Hajnal, 1995), and this is true for Erie County New York (with Buffalo as its central city). A sharp pattern of disproportionate representation of Blacks in the central city prevails in Erie County. Erie County was 7 percent black in 1960 and 10.1 percent black in 1980 with 94.7 percent and 92.4 percent of the black population respectively living in the central city in both time periods (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1963; 1983). By the year 2000, the county was 13 percent black (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004 — Quick Facts), and the 2000 census tract map of the residential distribution of blacks in the County displays persistent central city concentration and limited suburban presence. Early research on the effect of the exodus of jobs to suburban locations on the workplace accessibility of inner city African Americans rarely included female workers even though African American women have historically had high levels of labor force participation. There are now more studies that have investigated spatial mismatch concerns and commuting constraints of women (e.g., Sultana, 2003; Thompson, 1997; McLafferty and Preston, 1992; Johns-

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ton-Anumonwo, 2000). The available studies on the journey to work of female workers highlight two key trends. First, black women have longer travel times than white women. Second, unlike white women who typically have shorter commutes than white men, the journey-to-work time of black women is generally as long as those of Black men (McLafferty and Preston, 1991, 1992 and 1996). For example, McLafferty and Preston (1991) report that in 1980, African American women in metropolitan New York spend 10 minutes longer on the average for their home-towork trip than European American women. Many early studies reported longer commuting times for African American men than European American men as well (e.g., Greytak, 1974; Ellwood, 1986). The research finding that being black is associated with longer work-trip times can readily be attributed to racial differences in the use of a private automobile, but racial differences in other locational and socioeconomic variables that are known to affect journey-towork time are also relevant. Holzer et al. (1994) found less automobile ownership among central city residents and greater reliance on public transportation. Blacks are affected more than whites by these mobility constraints since they live disproportionately in central cities. The journey-to-work literature is replete with findings that workers who use public transportation usually spend a longer time getting to work than those who use a private car. Similarly, those earning high incomes have longer work-trip times than those who have low incomes (e.g., U.S. Department of Commerce, 1982; Pisarski, 1996; Ihlanfeldt, 1992; McLafferty and Preston, 1992). Although the spatial mismatch hypothesis specifies the growing trend of workplaces in suburban locations, there are still insufficient empirical inquiries of the impact of suburban workplace destination on the commuting behavior of African American men and women. One study of race and commutes in Detroit found that in 1980, blacks who worked in the Central Business District worked closer to home than whites, but for suburban destinations, blacks commuted longer than whites (Zax, 1990). This different commuting pattern, according to Zax, suggests that racial residential segregation restricts black suburbanization and contributes to longer commutes for blacks who have to work in suburban Detroit (see also Zax and Kain, 1996). Other studies have examined the role of suburban residence versus inner city residence on the labor market outcomes of blacks and whites (e.g., Jenks and Mayer, 1990; Fernandez, 1994; Ihlanfeldt and Young, 1994; McLafferty and Preston, 1996; Stoll, 1999; Sultana, 2005). These, and the findings of more recent studies on large cities about racial differences in access to transportation, employment location, residential mobility, and unemployment levels (e.g., Stoll, 1996; Mouw, 2000; Martin, 2004) all support the spatial mismatch hypothesis which posited that African Americans suffer from distant suburban employment. But for a variety of reasons, including methodological ones about appropriate measures of accessibility (e.g., Hodge, 1996; Perle et al., 2002, disagreement persists about whether or not African American workers in U.S. metropolitan areas are more distant from centers of employment than European Americans are. This chapter reports on an empirical inquiry about the question of the spatial mismatch of African Americans resident in Erie County (Buffalo) New York. Using data from the 2000 census, the study investigates whether African American working men and women in Buffalo experience greater commuting difficulties than European Americans while taking into consideration racial differences in key factors that affect work-trip length — namely, automobile use, location, occupation, and income. In Buffalo, the majority of African Americans still live in segregated neighborhoods. In fact, Buffalo remains a city with one of the highest levels of racial residential segregation in the United States, ranking third according to the 2000 census. Buffalo is a representative example of a city that experienced massive de-industrialization starting in the 1970s when manufacturing jobs slumped in the urban economy, and moved out of the central city to the suburbs. The prevalent trend was one of job decentralization. One can expect to find evidence of journey-to-work constraints for inner city African American residents of Buffalo. A specified set of research questions is examined. Do African American men and women in Buffalo spend a longer time commuting than European American men and women? Does unequal access to private automobiles lead to differences in the journey-to-work time of African Americans and European Americans? If differential access to private automobiles is responsible for longer commute times among African Americans, then there should be no racial difference in the work-trip times of private auto users. Is location of the workplace responsible for any racial difference in commuting? Finally, is there any difference in the commute times of African American and European American workers with similar occupation or income?

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DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA The range of factors necessary for a full understanding of racial disparities in commuting means that detailed data about working individuals are preferred. The Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS), which is a database with information on individuals’ socioeconomic characteristics and their locational and work-trip attributes, meets this requirement. The 2000 five percent Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) for Erie County, New York, is used for this study. In 1980, for the first time, the census included information on journey-to-work time (i.e., the time spent traveling from home to work), so it is now possible to conduct some longitudinal analysis about changes in the length of work trips over a period of 20 years. Travel time, the actual number of minutes spent from home to work as reported by the respondent, is the measure available for work-trip length. The travel mode is the means of transportation that the worker uses to get to work, e.g., public transportation or private automobile. While socioeconomic and demographic information provided in the PUMS is quite detailed, detailed information about location is not provided in these public use data sets in order to protect the confidentiality of respondents. Only two very broad locational categories are used for this study — central city location and non central city location. In other words, locations outside the census-designated central city limits are classified simply as non central city locations (i.e., suburb). Income, the worker’s personal earnings in 1999, is divided into two categories: (a) below $25,000 or (b) $25,000 and above. Only employed white and black (based on respondents’ self-classification of “race”) males and females who are sixteen years old and older are selected for the study. The five percent PUMS is used so that the sample size for the study would include a large number of black workers in this predominantly white upstate New York county. Because the focus is on the journey-to-work, the sample selected for the study consisted of a total of 18,083 respondents who worked outside the home. This comprises 15,971 whites (88.3%) and 2,112 blacks (11.7%). Of these, there are 977 African-American men, 8,254 EuropeanAmerican men, 1,135 African-American women and 7,717 European-American women. These then are the four racesex groups that constitute the basis of much of the comparisons in the study. Racial differences in journey-to-work time are assessed using simple t-test statistics and analysis of variance. Only racial differences that are significant at 95 percent level of confidence and above are reported. The results are presented next starting with racial differences in means of transportation used for the work trip.

FINDINGS Blacks Rely More on Public Transportation Black workers in Buffalo continue to use public transportation more than whites do in 2000. Out of the total sample of workers reporting a work trip, about 95 percent of whites used a private car compared to 78.4 percent of blacks (Table 10.1). Indeed, 16 percent of blacks ride the bus, compared to only 1.8 percent of whites (see Figures 10.1 and 10.2). This greater reliance of black Americans on buses conforms to well-documented patterns, and it is expected to increase their average work-trip time since public bus transportation is typically a slower and more time consuming mode of travel. Table 10.1 Racial Differences among Private Automobile Users and Bus Riders Erie County 2000 PUMS Auto Users Bus Riders Total Sample BLACKS 1,655 338 2,112 %Blacks 78.4% 16.0% WHITES 15,145 286 15,971 % Whites 94.8% 1.8% note: total sample includes all other modes (not shown on this table — see Figs. 1 and 2)

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Ibipo Johnston-Anumonwo and Selima Sultana Figure 10.1

Figure 10.2

Race, Location and Access to Employment in Buffalo, N.Y.

123

Blacks Spend More Time for the Work Trip The overall average work-trip time of the 18,083 respondents in the sample is 21.3 minutes (this is similar to the value reported in the aggregate data set, Census Transportation Planning Package — CTPP 2000, and it represents a slight increase from the reported mean travel time of 19.7 minutes in 1990 (U.S. Bureau of Census)); but the work trips of blacks are longer than for whites. Blacks spend 23.7 minutes versus 21 minutes for whites (significant at p = < 0.01). This means that African Americans spend almost 3 minutes longer on the average for their work trip than European Americans. Table 10.2 displays racial differences in commuting time. Table 10.2 Racial Difference in Mean Travel Time by Travel Mode Erie County 2000 PUMS FULL SAMPLE 18,803 Blacks 2,112 Whites 15,971 difference BUS RIDERS 624 Blacks 338 Whites 286 Difference AUTO USERS 16,800 Blacks 1,655 Whites 15,145 difference

21.31 minutes 23.74 minutes 20.99 minutes 2.75 minutes 37.38 minutes 38.72 minutes 35.81 minutes 2.91 minutes 20.89 minutes 20.97 minutes 20.88 minutes 0.09 minute

Since more African Americans use public transportation, and since research consistently confirms the pronounced lengthening effect of public transportation on workers’ commute times (e.g., U.S. Department of Commerce, 1982; McLafferty and Preston, 1992; Holzer et al., 1994; Taylor and Ong, 1995), one should make allowance for this, and examine only workers with the same mode of travel. Among bus riders, blacks spend almost 3 minutes longer than whites (38.7 versus 35.8 minutes); but this difference is not statistically significant. When the work-trip times of private automobile users are examined, there is no overall racial difference in Erie County in 2000 (20.97 versus 20.88 minutes). By the year 2000, black and white auto users in Erie County in general more or less spend the same time for their commutes (Figure 10.3). Greater dependence on public transportation does not offer much explanation for continuing longer work-trip times of many blacks because when the sample is examined further by workplace location or by occupation, and income status, significant racial differences persist in the travel time of many auto users. For the remainder of the study, all comparisons about racial differences in work-trip time are restricted to respondents who use a car. We find that in spite of the use of a private automobile, some black commuters spend a longer time than white counterparts. The continuing racial differences in travel time among auto users with similar locational and socioeconomic profiles are reported below. We start with those with the same residence-workplace location. Black Central City Residents Spend a Longer Time Than Whites If a work trip begins and ends in the same area, it is likely to take a shorter time than if the trip starts in one area and ends in another area. For instance, trips that begin in the central city and end in the central city may take a shorter time than those that start in the central city and end in the suburbs. That is, intra-area trips typically take a longer time than opposite direction trips (Hanson and Johnston, 1985; Johnston-Anumonwo, 1995). Racial differences in geographic location of the home and workplace are likely to contribute to racial gaps in commute times, so it is more accurate to compare workers with the same home and work location.

124

Ibipo Johnston-Anumonwo and Selima Sultana Figure 10.3

We find that black male and female auto users who live in the central city and whose workplaces are in Buffalo central city spend longer times than white counterparts (Table 10.3). In Figure 10.4, black respondents who reside and work in central city locations are seen to spend a longer time than the white respondents. Also, among those workers with non central city destinations (i.e., reverse commuters), black women spend three minutes longer than white women and black men spend four minutes longer than white men (significant at p = < 0.01 in Table 10.3; see also Figure 10.5). This finding is consistent with the argument of the spatial mismatch hypothesis that inner city blacks have long commutes to suburban work destinations. Based on these findings therefore, there is evidence of continuing commuting constraints for Buffalo inner city African American men and women in the year 2000. In fact this study also finds that suburban black women have longer commutes than white counterparts with suburban jobs. Black Women With Suburban Work Destinations Spend a Longer Time Getting to Work When we focus on those workers with non central city destinations (i.e., to concentrate on suburban destinations in general), we find that whether they live in the central city or outside the central city, black women spend 3 minutes longer than white women if they work in suburban locations (significant at p = < 0.01). Generally therefore, in the year 2000, all black women auto users with work destinations in the suburbs of Erie County spend more time commuting to work. Primarily because of insufficient sample sizes for blacks who reside outside the Buffalo central city, and precisely because the spatial mismatch hypothesis is concerned with the situation of inner city workers, we restrict some of our conclusions of the remaining racial comparisons to respondents with central city homes. Central City Blue-Collar African Americans Spend a Longer Time Getting to Work The two socioeconomic factors examined are occupation and income. The common expectations are that lowstatus, low-wage workers will be less able to afford long commutes. Black and white workers usually differ in socioeconomic status. Black workers should have shorter commutes if their lower earnings disallow long commutes.

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Race, Location and Access to Employment in Buffalo, N.Y. Table 10.3 Racial Differences in Journey to Work Time (minutes) Erie County 2000 N=18,803 MEN 9,231

WOMEN 8,852

Blacks

Whites

Blacks

Whites

977

8,254

1,135

7,717

23.8

22.4

23.7

19.5

863

7,299

20.4

19.3

374

685

17.1

14.9

232

553

23.7

20.7

82

1,515

25.0

24.9

150

4,283

20.4

17.3

69

118

21.1

17.8

41

36

30.3

23.9

*

**

AUTO-USERS 792

7,846

21.6

22.4

ns

*

City-to-City Commuter 284

690

17.6 15.2 Reverse Commuter 207

633

26.1 Suburb-to-City Commuter

21.9

100

1,738

23.3 24.6 Suburb-to-Suburb Commuter 169

**

**

ns

4,274

19.8 20.9 Reverse Commuter Only

ns

**

**

ns

**

Service 40

104

23.9

24.3

ns

ns

Manufacturing 92

201

31.2

23.5

*

note: **=significant at p=X Y @ i

i

2

Where: I.D. = the index of dissimilarity Xi = the percent of the first population living in a particular census tract (the ith census tract) Yi = the percent of the second population living in that same census tract (the ith census tract) [ ] = The absolute value of the difference between the two percentages

Part III U.S. Hispanic/Latino Geographies: Changing Spatial Patterns and Their Implications Section three contains six chapters that present settlement, changing patterns, landscape transformations, settlement experiences, and other issues for Hispanic/Latino populations. Chapter 14 begins with a comprehensive overview of Latino settlement and the growing Hispanic ethnic diversity. It also provides a discussion of various issues of importance to Latino Americans. The next three chapters focus on Latino settlements and particular issues in three large U.S. metropolitan areas. Chapter 15 focuses on the changing Latino settlement patterns in New York City, especially those related to ethnic diversity. It also touches upon different “settlement experiences” that immigrants have had, thus sharpening the focus of an important concept introduced in the previous chapter. Chapter 16 focuses on Bolivian immigrants, in detail, focusing specifically on the spatial aspects of their social networks, and how their transnational status and surroundings influence their actions, in relation both to the Washington, D.C. region and their homeland. Chapter 17 examines the issues of assimilation and cultural acclimation of Mexicans. It provides a tropical twist by examining the relationships between recent Mexican immigrants and Mexican-Americans — people who share a country, a home country, and a culture, but who suffer from class tensions. The remaining two chapters move to small city and rural environments recently influenced by Latino inmigration. Chapter 18 is a case study of Allentown, PA, one of the Northeast’s smaller cities that has become attractive to Puerto Rican and other Latino migrants from a range of Latin American cultures. It deals with the experiences of Latino migrants by examining the settlement pattern over two decades and concludes that, rather than assimilation, a case of sequent occupancies (one culture replaces another departing culture) has occurred in this city. This chapter also deals with the ways in which Latinos have changed the local landscapes architecturally, socially, and otherwise, and how their settlements have affected Allentown residents who are not Hispanic. Chapter 19 focuses on the Hispanic and Anglo population changes in the Texas Panhandle. Like some other rural areas, this region has experienced Anglo depopulation due to declining economic opportunities. Yet, Latinos, especially direct arrivals from Mexico, perceive opportunity in the same abandoned places. Arriving Latinos do not replace the occupations once held by Anglos, but accept low-paying jobs and contribute to a new occupational structure in the regions.

Chapter 14

Latinos in America: Historical and Contemporary Settlement Patterns MARK E. REISINGER INTRODUCTION In the year 2000, 35.3 million Latinos were counted by the U.S. Census. An additional 3.8 million Latinos were enumerated in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The Latino population was approximately 12.5 percent of the U.S. total. Latino-Americans now represent the largest single minority population in 21st century America. They constitute many subcultures but are bound together by language and other shared characteristics. Mexicans represented 7.3 percent, Puerto Ricans 1.2 percent, Cubans 0.4 percent, and other Latinos 3.6 percent of the total population (Guzman, 2001). The sheer numbers of Latinos make them an important and visible segment of the U.S. population. Many other factors keep them in the news and high on public policy agendas. Latinos share a common Spanish heritage, an oftentimes disadvantaged minority status, and a public image as newcomers who are welcomed by some and resented by others. Their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics are transforming America (Pinal and Singer, 1997). Geographically, Latinos are concentrated in a handful of states and cities, but also are dispersing to places unfamiliar with Latino cultures. The settlement patterns of Latinos have significant historical dimensions and exhibit important spatial patterns. In addition, the rapidly increasing and dispersion of the Latino population in the United States has resulted in growing economic and social inequalities, increased political participation and power, and antiimmigrant movements that border on racism. This chapter has several purposes. First is an examination of the past and present spatial patterns of Latino settlement in the United States. The chapter focuses on the three main groups of Latinos in the United States: Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans. Following an examination of the settlement patterns is a look at the economic and social bifurcation between Latinos and whites, as well as between various Latino groups. The growing political power of Latinos in the United States is also investigated. Finally, this chapter tackles the issues of illegal migration and anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States.

MEXICAN-AMERICANS The history of Latino settlement geography has been documented by Haverluk (1997), who reported the importance of the historical legacy between the U.S. and Mexico. The ancestors of Mexican-Americans were the first Europeans to settle in what is now the borderland region of the southwestern United States stretching from Texas to California. Four major areas of settlement evolved by the extension of successful colonies in northern Mexico. The initial settlement of the borderlands region was in New Mexico. Santa Fe was founded in 1610 and served as the provincial capital and principal center of the region. Albuquerque was founded in 1706 following a Pueblo Indian revolt that temporarily forced the Spanish out of the northern settlements. At the close of the Spanish period in 1821, most of the borderlands’ population lived in New Mexico (Nostrand, 1979).

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A second region of Spanish settlement in the borderlands region was southern Arizona. Texas was the third area of Spanish settlement in the borderlands. By the late 1700s, San Antonio had become the major provincial settlement in Spanish Texas. Other settlements followed and by 1850, some 14,000 Mexican-Americans lived in the region (Meinig, 1971). California was the last of the borderland areas to witness Spanish and Mexican settlement. The threat of Russian and British intrusion into California led to its settlement in 1769. In that year a mission/presidio complex was built at San Diego. Within twenty years, additional settlements were built. By 1850, over 9,000 Californios inhabited this part of the borderland region (Nostrand, 1979). In the 1850s, after the Mexican-American War, there were perhaps 80,000 Mexican-Americans living in the five southwestern states that have become known as the Latino-American borderland (Nostrand, 1975). Today, the greatest numbers of the Mexican-American minority live in the borderland region. Parts of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas are the major cores of this area, but a portion of southern Colorado is also part of the region. These areas represent the early nuclei of Spanish and Mexican settlement as well as expanded areas of the earliest colonizations (Nostrand, 1970). Many of the Mexican immigrants who have entered the United States since the early twentieth century also live in parts of this region. Mexican Labor Migration Mexican labor migration to the United States dates to the middle of the nineteenth century and Mexican immigration during the twentieth century occurred in two distinct waves (Arreola, 1985). The first took place from approximately 1900 to 1930, after which the Great Depression slowed the flow. The second was initiated by the war economy of the 1940s, and continues undiminished to the present. The mining frontiers of the western United States were the first major attraction for Mexican migrant labor. Mexican laborers from the northern states of Sonora, Chihuahua, Durango, and Zacatecas responded to the demand for workers in California, Nevada, and Arizona (McWilliams, 1968). The major catalyst for dispersing the Mexican migrants in the United States were the railroads. Railroads integrated the Southwest into the United States industrial economy and Mexican labor became important for factory and mining employment as well as railroad construction (Garcia, 1981). When the United States passed legislation in 1902 encouraging western irrigation projects, Mexican labor again proved important to the success of citrus and cotton cultivation in California, Arizona, and the lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas. The mobility of Mexican labor also became vital to the beet sugar industry of Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska and to the expansion of truck-farming in southern California, Arizona, and Texas (Carlson, 1973). The Depression of the 1930s slowed the flow of Mexican migrants to the United States, and high unemployment north of the border initiated a reverse movement of Mexican migrants back to Mexico (Hoffman, 1974). In 1942, however, the United States government initiated the Bracero Program, a contract farm labor program. Under this agreement, Mexican laborers were transported to agricultural areas in the United States to bolster labor shortages brought on by World War II. The Bracero Program benefited Mexican migration in that it pointed the way north and provided a view of the economic opportunities that awaited legal and illegal immigrants in the United States (Arreola, 1985). Regional Concentrations of the Mexican-American Population The Mexican-American population is largely concentrated in the borderland region. However, areas outside the borderlands house significant numbers. In 1980, Mexican-Americans were located in four regional concentrations outside the borderlands: the upper Midwest, the Mountain West, the Pacific Northwest, and the South. Economic opportunity during World War I brought Mexicans to the upper Midwest states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin. The industries continued to draw immigrants during the Second World War as migrants established large permanent settlements in the industrial cities of the Midwest (Arreola, 1985). Unlike the Mexican migrants who moved to the cities of the upper Midwest, Mexican-American populations in the Mountain West and Pacific Northwest had their origins in rural activities. Mexican and Mexican-

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Americans began moving to these areas as mining, livestock herding, and agricultural economic activities began to demand their labor in the second half of the nineteenth century. Over time, temporary rural centers developed services that catered to Mexicans and permanent settlements became established. The Yakima River Valley and southeastern Washington, as well as the Willamette Valley of Oregon, are major agricultural areas that have developed Mexican communities far from the borderland region (Moore, 1976). The Mexican-American population expanded considerably in the South from 1970 to 1980. The states from Virginia to Florida, west to Louisiana, and including Arkansas, Tennessee and Kentucky all experienced significant increases in their Mexican-American populations. Reasons for the dramatic growth in the MexicanAmerican population are unclear. Most live in places of less than 10,000 people and this suggests an agricultural orientation, although industrialization has brought on some of the area’s growth (Arreola, 1985). By 1990, the Mexican-American population in the Southwest totaled 11.2 million. Approximately 83 percent of all Mexican Americans lived in just five states: California, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado. California ranked the highest with 6.1 million Mexican Americans, followed by Texas with 3.8 million. Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado each counted less than one million Mexican Americans. Although the number of Mexican Americans increased to 15.3 million in the six Southwestern states by 2000, the region’s proportion of the total U.S. Mexican-American population decreased to about 75 percent. This is an indication of the increasing dispersion of the Mexican-American population to other regions of the United States between 1990 and 2000. According to Census 2000, California continued to have the largest Mexican-American population with 8.4 million. Texas and Arizona followed with 5 million and 1 million, respectively. New Mexico and Colorado again counted less than 1 million Mexican Americans in 2000. According to Census 2000, 11 percent of Mexican Americans lived in the Midwest, an increase from 8.5 percent in 1990. The South also saw a substantial increase in the relative number of Mexican Americans from 3.4 percent in 1990 to 7 percent in 2000. Florida’s Mexican-American population more than doubled from 161,499 to 363,925 during the 1990s. The proportion of the Mexican-American population living in other regions of the country includes: the Northeast with 2 percent and the Northwest with 4.7 percent. Mexican Americans: An Urban Population Mexican Americans are often stereotyped as a rural population because of their connection with agricultural employment. However, Census 2000 showed that 88 percent of the Mexican American population lived in metropolitan areas. This percentage was higher than the overall proportion of 78 percent for the U.S. population. Approximately 50 percent of the Mexican-American population resided in the central cities of their metropolitan areas. While the central city areas contain large numbers of Mexican Americans, there has been dispersion to suburban locations in some cities in recent years. By 2000 the Mexican-American population in the borderland region was nearly 90 percent urban. Fourteen SMSAs had greater than 100,000 Mexican Americans in 2000. Many of the other major cities in these regions had Mexican-American populations greater than 50,000. Mexican Americans outside of the borderland region also are largely urban. The largest concentrations of Mexican Americans in 2000 were in the cities of the upper Midwest: Chicago, Detroit, Milwaukee, East Chicago, and Aurora, OH. In most cities, Mexican Americans are a minority population and live in distinct districts within the urban area (Camarillo, 1979). Before the second half of the nineteenth century, borderland cities were predominantly Mexican and populations concentrated around the town plaza. As Anglo populations increased, MexicanAmerican districts became isolated as the city expanded around or away from the old town center. The MexicanAmerican district became known as a barrio, by literal translation, a neighborhood (Camarillo, 1979). Barrios, sometimes referred to as colonias (suburbs) because they were located far from the city center, were also formed in the borderlands as urban expansion engulfed agricultural settlements housing MexicanAmerican workers. Other rural communities, such as railroad and mining settlements, followed a similar pattern evolving into urban barrios (Camarillo, 1979).

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Geographic isolation, housing restriction, and voluntary congregation perpetuated residential segregation in the borderland cities. Mexican Americans are often segregated in the central cities of their metropolitan area (Dagodag, 1974). Two general processes can explain these patterns. First, barrios became engulfed as described above. A second process involves the filtering down of housing from one group to another. As Anglos or other minority groups vacate central city locations, lower-income populations, including Mexican Americans, move into the inner city neighborhoods. Mexican Americans populated many eastside districts of Los Angeles in this way (Camarillo, 1979). Similarly, in Chicago, the Mexican-American population expanded by 84 percent between 1960 and 1970, expanding mostly into older ethnic neighborhoods (Berry, 1976).

PUERTO RICANS Puerto Ricans represent the second largest group of persons of Latin American ancestry living in the United States. According to Census 2000, there were 3.4 million people of Puerto Rican origin living in this country, outside the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. This number represented 9.6 percent of the United States total Latino population. An additional 3.8 million Latinos were enumerated in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Guzman, 2001). Since all Puerto Ricans, whether living in Puerto Rico or on the mainland are considered U.S. citizens, the total Puerto Rican population is approximately 7.4 million, with approximately 51 percent living in Puerto Rico and 49 percent living on the U.S. mainland. Puerto Rican Migration Patterns Puerto Ricans have been living in New York City since the 1830s. The first year in which the U.S. Census listed Puerto Ricans as a separate group was 1910. At that time there were just over 1,500 persons who were born in Puerto Rico and living in the United States. Between 1910 and 1920 about 10,000 more were added to the U.S. population. Emigration to the mainland increased during the 1920s when about 41,000 new Puerto Rican residents were added to the United States mainland population. The economic boom that followed WW I and the limitations placed upon European immigration through the Immigration Act of 1924 prompted this surge. The decade of the 1930s witnessed a decline in the flow of Puerto Rican migrants. During this period the Puerto Rican population increased by only about 17,000. This decline was due to a decrease in the number of job opportunities as a result of the Great Depression. In fact, between 1931 and 1934, there was a net return migration of 8,694 to Puerto Rico. By 1940, New York City had established itself as the primary residence of Puerto Ricans living on the mainland. At this time 88 percent of all Puerto Ricans born in Puerto Rico but living on the mainland were residing in New York City. Between 1940 and 1945 the flow of Puerto Ricans to the mainland saw a small increase due to the jobs created by WWII (Senior, 1965). Immediately after World War II the flow of Puerto Ricans grew rapidly, for a number of reasons. First, there was backlog of persons that would have liked to move from the island during the early 1940s but could not because of the War. Second, many Puerto Rican men had fought in WWII and had been trained in the United States and, as a result, developed an awareness of the opportunities on the mainland. Third, by 1946 there were already over 100,000 Puerto Rican-born residents on the mainland. Many provided information to friends and relatives back home. They also helped new arrivals find jobs, and frequently offered a place to stay and food for new migrants. Fourth, the Puerto Rican government created a Migration Division within its Department of Labor that facilitated movement to the mainland and assisted new arrivals in making the necessary adjustments. Fifth, the cost and effort of traveling to New York City were greatly reduced. Sixth, heavy population growth in Puerto Rico was creating population pressure and heavy strains on the island’s labor force capacity. Seventh, a shift in the island’s occupational structure was beginning to take place. There was about to be a radical decline in agricultural employment. In 1948, Puerto Rican development activities were organized under a plan established in cooperation with the U.S. government. Known as “Operation Bootstrap,” its objective was to attract

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corporations from the mainland in an effort to reduce Puerto Rican unemployment and dependence on the agricultural economy. However, much of the industrial activity that relocated there was capital intensive and required few Puerto Rican workers. Both increasing population pressure and declining agricultural employment provided strong incentives for Puerto Ricans to leave the island. Each of these seven factors encouraged emigration, especially when it is recalled that Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens and have the freedom to move to the mainland without restriction and that there was a very big gap between the economic opportunities that existed on the mainland and those in Puerto Rico at this time (Maldonado, 1976). Between 1946 and 1950 the number of Puerto Ricans living in the United States increased by almost 121,000 persons. It also became apparent by 1950 that the number of second generation Puerto Ricans born on the mainland was becoming significant. The decade of the 1950s represents the period of heaviest flow to the United States. The total increase (including both first and second generations) between 1950 and 1960 was almost 600,000 persons (Maldonado, 1976). During the decades of the 1960s and 1970s the flow to the mainland began to ease progressively. Between 1960 and 1970, the net flow was 144,724, and between 1970 and 1980, the flow was down to 85,116. Three main reasons are offered for this decline: (1) there was narrowing of the income differentials between the U.S. and Puerto Rico; (2) the push factors in Puerto Rico were reduced as the standard of living began to improve, mainly due to the efforts of Operation Bootstrap; and (3) a significant amount of return migration developed that partially offset the emigration from Puerto Rico (Morales, 1986). Emigration of Puerto Ricans to the U.S. mainland increased once again during the 1980s with a net flow of nearly half a million. Wage differentials between the island and the mainland and differing employment levels played a role in this heavy emigration. Certain groups of emigrant Puerto Rican workers, such as nurses and engineers, particularly benefited from this divergence when they moved to the United States (Rivera-Batiz, 1989). For example, Rivera-Batiz and Santiago (1996) point out in 1980 the annual earnings of male workers in New York City were on average 2.5 times those of male workers in Puerto Rico, and the earnings of female workers in New York City were 1.9 times those of female workers in Puerto Rico. This earnings gap widened during the decade and by 1990, the average annual earnings of New York City had risen to 2.8 times those of Puerto Rican workers; earnings for New York City female workers were 2.4 times those of female workers in Puerto Rico. In addition, a gap in unemployment rates also persisted. In 1980, the unemployment rate in Puerto Rico was twice that in New York City for both men and women. This gulf widened during the decade. In some areas of the United States in the late 1980s, especially in the Northeast, the unemployment rate dropped below 5 percent, while Puerto Rico’s unemployment rate hovered around 20 percent (Santiago, 1991). The 1990s again witnessed a slowing of the rate of emigration to the U.S. mainland. The situation during the 1990s was similar to that of the 1970s discussed above. In addition, it is possible that some of the decline can be attributed to Puerto Rican officials and the U.S. Coast Guard who worked to curtail illegal immigration from the Dominican Republic, many of whom would take on Puerto Rican identities and then move again to the United States (Boswell and Cruz-Baez, 2000). Even so, the net flow of Puerto Ricans to the mainland exceeded 250,000 during the 1990s. Puerto Rican Settlement Patterns Like virtually all immigrant groups before them, Puerto Ricans living on the mainland tended to concentrate in a few areas. In 1980, approximately 95 percent of all mainland persons of Puerto Rican ancestry lived in large cities (50,000 or more population). Additionally, about 75 percent of the Puerto Ricans were concentrated in the central cities of large metropolitan areas and only 20 percent lived in their suburbs. The remaining five percent lived in smaller urban centers and rural areas (Boswell, 1985b). Collectively, the eleven states with the largest Puerto Rican populations contained 95 percent of all first and second generation Puerto Ricans living on the mainland in 1970. The largest single concentration was in the

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Northeast, with New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut forming the main cluster. These three states contained three out of every four mainland Puerto Ricans in 1970. A second cluster was found in Illinois, mainly in the industrial area of metropolitan Chicago and adjacent northwest Indiana. The New York metropolitan area has played a dominant role throughout much of the history of Puerto Rican migration to the United States. Originally the main attraction of New York was economic opportunity in the form of jobs and higher wages. It was not until WWI that the Puerto Rican element became noticeable in the City’s population. The first settlement with significant numbers occurred in the area of Brooklyn Heights, next to the Brooklyn Navy Yard, in response to a demand for workers during the war years. At about the same time another cluster was developing in south Harlem, just to the north of Central Park and east of Morningside Park (Boswell, 1976). After WWII, when immigration picked up, the Puerto Rican population overflowed from southern Harlem to East Harlem and across the Harlem River to South Bronx. From Brooklyn Heights, the growth spread northward to Williamsburg and southward to south Brooklyn. In 1940, about 70 percent of New York’s 61,000 Puerto Ricans lived in Manhattan with the largest concentration living in East Harlem (Boswell, 1976). The Puerto Rican population in New York City grew to 245,880 by 1950. By this time, however, it became apparent that a shift away from Manhattan was beginning to take place, as its share of the city’s Puerto Rican population declined to about 56 percent. By 1970, Manhattan’s share of the Puerto Rican population declined to only 23 percent. By then, the Bronx contained the largest share of the city’s Puerto Rican population with 39 percent. Brooklyn was second with 33 percent, and the boroughs of Queens and Staten Island had a total of about 5 percent (Boswell, 1976). A more detailed analysis of the distribution of Puerto Ricans in New York City during the 1950s and 1960s reveals three interesting characteristics. First, the primary area of concentration tended to be adjacent to the major areas of black settlement within the city. The residential proximity of blacks and Puerto Ricans is a reflection of their disadvantaged economic status and the consequent need to compete for the city’s lowest quality housing. Second, Puerto Ricans did not numerically dominate the neighborhoods in which they lived to the same degree as other immigrant groups have in the past (Kantrowitz, 1973). Three factors have been cited for the low degree of neighborhood domination by Puerto Ricans: (1) a general housing shortage which made it necessary for Puerto Ricans to live wherever there was available affordable space; (2) slum clearance which caused them to leave neighborhoods which they may have dominated; and (3) the availability of public housing which was offered at relatively low rents (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970). The third characteristic of Puerto Rican settlement in New York City was the amount of segregation within the Puerto Rican population based upon different levels of economic achievement. Wealthier Puerto Ricans tended to live in areas such as the better suburban neighborhoods of the Bronx and Queens, whereas the poor were more concentrated in the central city areas like Harlem and the Lower East Side (Kantrowitz, 1973). While the Puerto Ricans within New York City were dispersing out of Manhattan and into the other four boroughs, they were also moving to locations outside the city. New Jersey’s Puerto Rican population more than doubled between 1960 and 1970, with notable communities developing in Newark, Jersey City, Patterson, Camden, and Passaic. In New England, sizable concentrations evolved in Boston, Bridgeport, and Hartford. To the west, communities developed in Rochester and Philadelphia to provide manufacturing labor. In the Midwest, heavy industry attracted Puerto Ricans to Cleveland and Loraine (Ohio), and to Chicago. In the South, Miami developed a sizable Puerto Rican community, which has been overshadowed by the city’s much larger Cuban community. In California, Los Angeles had the only noticeable Puerto Rican concentration, and here again was overshadowed by the more numerous Mexican-Americans (Hernandez-Alvarez, 1968). The largest single concentration of Puerto Ricans remains in the Northeast, with New York and the neighboring states of New Jersey, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut forming the main cluster. Together these five states accounted for approximately 60 percent of the Puerto Rican population in 2000. However, this is a decrease from 68 percent in 1990. New York remains the leader with 31 percent of the mainland Puerto Rican population in 2000 (down from 40 percent in 1990). Between 1985 and 2000, 10 percent of New York City’s Puerto Rican population,

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some 195,000 people, left the City (Nathan, 2004). Puerto Ricans left New York City for a number of reasons. The lack of appropriate employment opportunities, fear and safety concerns, and the high cost of housing acted as push factors from New York City (Reisinger, 2003). During the 1990s, many New York Puerto Ricans (Nuyoricans) returned to the island. Others headed for central Florida, near Orlando. However, a large number have also flooded into several smaller cities in the Northeast’s rustbelt. In New York, there are concentrations of Puerto Ricans in Buffalo and Rochester. In New Jersey, the two main clusters are in the northeast corner of the state, adjacent to New York City, and in Camden County, near Philadelphia. Massachusetts’s Puerto Ricans are concentrated in the metropolitan area of Boston and Hampden County, including the industrial cities of Springfield and Holyoke. Connecticut’s Puerto Ricans cluster in Hartford, Bridgeport, Waterbury, and New Haven. In Pennsylvania, they are concentrated in the Philaelphia metropolitan area and in the state’s southeastern cities, such as Allentown, Harrisburg, Reading, Lancaster, and York. A significant cluster of Puerto Ricans is forming in Florida. According to Census 2000, Florida had the second largest mainland Puerto Rican population after New York. Florida is the state that has experienced the largest growth during the 1980s and 1990s. The largest clusters of Puerto Ricans in Florida are found in three general areas: southeastern Florida (including Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties), the center of the state focusing on Orange County (Orlando), and the metropolitan area of Tampa and St. Petersburg (Boswell and Cruz-Baez, 2000). Orlando is gaining Puerto Ricans faster than any other mainland U.S. city. In addition, there was a net flow of 9,420 Puerto Ricans from the island between 1995 and 2000. The U.S. mainland Puerto Rican population is clearly an urban one. Approximately 93 percent live in large urbanized areas (metropolitan areas with a population of fifty thousand or more), and 71 percent live in the central cities of these large urban areas. Unfortunately, Puerto Ricans are highly segregated from the white populations in these urban areas.

CUBAN AMERICANS Cuban Americans represent the third largest component of persons of Latino ancestry living in the United States. Currently, there are approximately 1.2 million Cuban Americans (Guzman, 2001). Emigrants from Cuba have not, until the 1980s, been representative of Cuba’s total population. The earliest Cuban immigrants were especially selective of professionals and entrepreneurs, creating a serious brain drain in Cuba. The selectivity characteristics of the Cuban migrants have been dynamic, so that later arrivals have been significantly different than those that arrived earlier. The socioeconomic concentration of Cuban migrants has been accompanied by a spatial concentration in their American destinations (Boswell, 1985a). The two metropolitan areas of Miami, Florida and Union City-West New York in New Jersey are home to the vast majority of Cuban Americans (Boswell, 1985a). Cubans represent the first large group of refugees who moved to the United States as their country of first asylum. As a result, they have been accepted automatically as refugees motivated by political persecution. This status has entitled them to federal government benefits that were not available to most other immigrant groups who have migrated primarily for economic reasons (Bernard, 1976). Cuban Americans have made remarkable progress in adjusting to living conditions in the United States. It is probably accurate to state that there has never been a large non-English speaking immigrant group in the United States that has exhibited more rapid upward socioeconomic mobility than the Cubans (Jaffe et al., 1980). Migration Patterns of Cuban Americans It seems reasonable to ask why the United States has become the home of the vast majority of Cuban emigrants, rather than one of the nearby Latin American countries that has more in common with Cuba in terms of language and culture. The answer is to be found in the cultural and economic characteristics that bound Cuba

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to the United States from the middle of the 1800s until 1959 (Boswell, 1985a). By the mid-1800s, there had developed a sizable exodus of Cubans in response to the political turmoil on the island. Key West, Tampa, and New York City became particularly notable as places of refuge for Cuban political exiles that were plotting to overthrow their Spanish rulers. In addition, American entrepreneurs and businessmen played a major role in reviving the Cuban economy after the Spanish-American War and Cuba’s independence from Spain. Between 1898 and 1959 Cuba became as economically dependent upon the United States as it was on the Soviet Union between 1959 and 1989. It was not surprising that, when Fidel Castro’s forces overthrew the government of Fulgencio Batista in January 1959, an out-migration of backers of the ousted government occurred. It is unlikely, however, that the magnitude of the exodus was anticipated. Between 1959 and 1980, approximately 794,000 Cubans immigrated to the United States. Except for Puerto Rico, no other island in the Caribbean has experienced a comparable outmigration in such a short period (Boswell, 2000b). More than 215,000 Cubans migrated to America between 1959 and 1962. In the beginning the majority were members of the economic and political elite openly affiliated with the Batista government. When the agrarian reform law was passed in mid-1959, with the purpose of breaking up large landholdings, members of the landholding aristocracy began to leave. In July, 1960, a law was passed authorizing the confiscation of all American-owned property. In October of the same year, and urban reform law was passed that was designed to expropriate private rental properties in the cities. By this time, middle-class entrepreneurs were feeling the widening impact of the Revolution (Gallagher, 1980). The 1959 to 1962 era of Cuban immigration to the United States is sometimes referred to as the wave of “Golden Exiles.” The implication is that the vast majority were former members of the elite classes in Cuba. This concept is only partly correct; the refugees were a highly diverse group. Virtually all occupations were represented among the immigrants. It is incorrect to think of all of them as having been elites in Cuba prior to their arrival in Florida. However, approximately 37 percent were from what might be considered the high-level employment categories (lawyers, judges, professionals, etc.) (Fagen et al., 1968). It is clear that these groups of refugees were over-represented relative to the Cuban population. All legal transportation between the United States and Cuba came to a halt in 1962 with the Cuban missile crisis and the subsequent U.S. military blockade. Legal migration to the United States ended for a three-year period until September, 1965. It is estimated that close to 56,000 Cubans were able to immigrate to the U.S. during this period. Approximately 6,700 escaped in boats or planes, 6,000 prisoners from the Bay of Pigs expedition and their family members were allowed to leave in exchange for medicines and medical supplies, and another 43,300 entered the U.S. through intermediary countries (Gallagher, 1980). Fidel Castro announced on September 28, 1965 that he would permit Cubans with relatives living in the United States to emigrate beginning on October 10. A number of tragedies occurred as people left the country on boats that were not always seaworthy. As a consequence, the United States and Cuba signed a “Memorandum of Understanding” that established airlifts of immigrants from Cuba to Miami. These flights became known as “Freedom Flights.” Air transportation began on December 1, 1965 and continued until April 6, 1973. It is estimated that 297,318 people arrived in the United States during the seven-year airlift. In addition, 4,993 came by boat during the two-month boatlift. Thus, a little over 302,000 Cubans migrated directly to the United States between October 10, 1965 and April 6, 1973 (Gallagher, 1980). History repeated itself in April, 1980 when again mass emigration was allowed to the United States. The mode of transportation was by sea and the point of departure selected by Castro was the small port of Mariel, approximately 30 miles west of Havana. The Mariel Boatlift lasted for close to five months (April 21 to September 26, 1980) and included 124,779 people. Included in this number were many of Cuba’s social undesirables such as people with criminal records and patients from mental institutions. Approximately 26,000 of the Mariel refugees had prison records, but many had been jailed for political reasons and minor crimes. It is estimated that fewer than 5,000 (4%) were hard-core criminals (Boswell, 2000b).

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The influx of Mariel refugees was not welcomed in Florida, for a number of reasons. There was a perception that the Mariel boatlift was being used by Castro to empty his jails and mental institutions. A second reason was that the U.S. economy was undergoing a recession at the time. It is estimated that the unemployment rate in Dade County jumped from about 5 percent to 13 percent primarily due to the Mariel influx. In addition, the apartment vacancy rate was reduced to less than 1 percent, creating an acute housing shortage and resulting in high rents. Another reason for the cool reception of the Mariel refugees was that by 1980 public opinion in the U.S. was in favor of reducing immigration. A final factor was that 70 to 75 percent of the Mariel refugees settled in southern Florida, especially Dade County (Boswell, 2000b). After the heavy flow of Cuban immigrants during the five months of the Mariel boatlifts, immigration to the United States once again declined. As the economic and social conditions deteriorated in Cuba in the late 1980s, the incidence of balseros (rafters) slowly increased. Nine thousand (9,000) Cubans came to the United States by this means between 1989 and 1993. On August 12, 1994 Castro announced that anybody who wanted leave the island would be allowed to do so. By the time 1994 ended, more than 37,000 Cubans left for the United States (Boswell, 2000b). On August 19, 1994, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno stated that Cuban rafters would not be allowed in the United States. President Clinton confirmed that rafters would be intercepted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard and taken to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and would eventually be returned to Cuba. On September 9, 1994, the United States announced it would allow 20,000 yearly visas for eligible Cubans to discourage future rafters from entering the United States. By December, 1994, the number of rafters declined to zero and this stage of Cuban immigration was over (Boswell, 2000b). The next phase is the one that has taken place since 1994 and is marked by another ebb and flow of refugees to the United States. The flow has been relatively small, but as conditions change in Cuba it will not be surprising if immigration does not increase again to approach 20,000 per year. Settlement Patterns of Cuban Americans Somewhat surprisingly, and unlike the Mexicans and Puerto Ricans discussed earlier, Cubans are becoming more concentrated. States with a substantial proportion of the Cuban population in 2000 included: New Jersey (6.2%), California (5.8%), New York (5.0%), and Texas (2.0%). Additionally, within Florida and these states, Cuban Americans are found almost exclusively in cities. The U.S. Census Bureau determined that 95 percent of all families of Cuban descent were living in metropolitan areas. Boswell (2000b) reported that 90 percent of the Cuban-origin population lived in 16 cities. The growth of the Cuban population in several of Florida’s cities is apparent. The emergence of the Union City-West New York metropolitan area in New Jersey as the second leading concentration of Cuban Americans is due to a small number of Cuban families that lived there prior to Castro’s assumption of power in Cuba. They served as an attraction for the in-migration of other Cubans coming directly from Cuba and indirectly via a stepwise process through New York City during the 1960s and 1970s (Gallagher, 1980). Additionally, there were jobs available in blue-collar occupations such as light industry, warehousing, and transportation that provided economic opportunities for Cuban migrants. By the late 1970s, two-thirds of West New York’s population was of Cuban descent (Gallagher, 1980). The Cuban Refugee Program has had a major effect on the distribution of Cuban emigrants outside the state of Florida. When established in 1961 by President Kennedy, its purpose was to help Cuban immigrants adjust to living conditions in the United States through job placement, temporary financial assistance, and other welfare benefits. Another of its goals was to lessen the burden of concentration on South Florida by redistributing “relocatable” Cuban families to areas outside the state. Individuals with higher educational levels and skills, and those with some knowledge of English, were considered more easily resettled. If individuals were offered an opportunity to relocate outside South Florida but refused, they were denied further federal government assistance and considered to be on their own. Of the 494,804 Cubans who registered with the Cuban Refugee Program between 1961 and 1981, approximately 61 percent were resettled in this manner (Boswell, 1985a).

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Cuban-American Settlement in South Florida Prior to 1959, there were no major concentrations of Latinos living in Dade County, Florida. Although it has been estimated that there were approximately 20,000 Cubans living in metropolitan Miami at that time, they were generally a middle-class population that was scattered throughout the urban area. When Castro took power and began to severely limit the amount of money that Cuban emigrants could take out of the country, most refugees to Miami arrived virtually penniless. Most resided in an area on the southwestern edge of the city’s central business district. This area had begun to deteriorate both as a residential and retail district prior to the arrival of the Cubans. Relatively inexpensive housing was available here and it was close to the transition zone that surrounded the CBD and contained the types of businesses that offered the Cubans the best employment opportunities. In a relatively short period of time Cubans were able to invade and then dominate this area that became known as Little Havana (Gallagher, 1980). A study of Miami’s Little Havana suggests that most of the Cuban residential areas expanded through the contagious diffusion process (Boswell, 1985a). The areas closest to the main Cuban concentration of settlement were the next encompassed by the expansion process. One exception was the Hialeah area, which was settled by a leap-frog or a hierarchical process. This area had many of the same advantages that Little Havana originally had for Cuban settlement and developed into a second concentration of Cuban activity. In the 1980s, Hialeah was Dade County’s second largest city and contained a population that was about 78 percent Latin (Boswell, 1985a). Two types of barriers were found to constrain the expansion of Cuban settlement. First, most Cubans avoided neighborhoods that were dominated by blacks. Second, very wealthy areas had land values beyond the reach of most Cubans and this also provided a barrier. Despite these barriers, a clear distance decay relationship existed between the distance that neighborhoods were located away from the core of Little Havana and the proportion of their population that was comprised of Cubans. Usually, the greater the distance, the lower the percentage that was Cuban (Boswell, 1985a). A suburbanization trend in the residential patterns of Cuban Americans became apparent in the 1980 Census. It determined that only 39.5 percent of all families of Cuban descent lived in the central cities of metropolitan areas. Approximately 57.2 percent lived outside central cities but still within metropolitan areas (Portes et al., 1981). It appears likely that the core of Little Havana served as a port of entry for the new immigrants and they later moved to the middle or fringe areas of the metropolitan area (Boswell, 1985a).

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BIFURCATION DURING THE 1990S This section analyzes the economic situation of Latinos at the beginning of the 21st century. An analysis of Census 2000 data (Summary File 3) reveals that although the 1990s are generally considered a period of widespread prosperity, it did not yield greater income or neighborhood equality for Latinos. U.S. Census data show that non-Hispanic white incomes averaged just under $50,000 in 2000 — $15,000 more than Latinos. This pattern of differences is very similar to what was already in place in 1990. There were some changes, however. In absolute terms, white incomes increased over $4,500 between 1990 and 2000, an increase of approximately 10 percent. The percentage increase for Latinos was 6.6 percent from $32,677 to $34,833. The breakdown by geographic regions shows that the Latino-white disparity was by far the greatest in the Northeast where Latino median household incomes were $18,809 less than whites. The Latino-white median household income differential was $7,977 in the Midwest, $13,350 in the South, and $11,763 in the West. The difference in the Northeast might be explained by the relatively low incomes of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans who constitute a large share of Latinos in that region (Logan, 2002). In the 50 metropolitan areas with the largest Latino populations, income disparities with whites tend to be smaller than those for blacks. However, in none of these places have Latinos achieved parity with whites in median household income. The

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largest income disparity is found in Newark, NJ ($27,501). Boston, New York, and Philadelphia also have income disparities between Latinos and whites that are above $25,000. The smallest disparity is found in Fort Lauderdale, a clear anomaly where Latinos’ incomes were less than $2000 below whites’. In addition, Latinos earned nearly 96 percent as much as whites in Ft. Lauderdale. In no other case is the income disparity below $5000 or do Latinos have incomes more than 85 percent that of whites. Neighborhood Gap An analysis of the national and regional averages for the median household income of the neighborhood (census tract) where the average group member lived in 1990 and 2000 shows again that non-Hispanic whites have a considerable advantage over Latinos. The average white lived in a neighborhood with a median household income of $51,459, while the average Latino lived in a neighborhood with a median household income of $39,308 (a difference of $12,421). Latinos have a decidedly better position in the American class structure than do blacks, and they live in better neighborhoods. At the same time, they have lower incomes and live in poorer neighborhoods than do nonHispanic whites, even compared to whites with similar incomes. Similar to blacks, their neighborhood gap is not attributable to income differences with whites alone (Logan, 2002). This neighborhood gap between Latinos and whites is once again greatest in the Northeast. In that region, the average white lives in a neighborhood with a median household income of $54,700 and the average Latino lives in a neighborhood with a median household income of $36,614. The neighborhood gap increased in absolute dollar amount in 45 metro areas. In only one case (Ft. Lauderdale) do Latinos live in better neighborhoods. The average Latino in Ft. Lauderdale lives in a neighborhood with a median household income of $47,807 and the average white lives in a neighborhood with a median household income of $46,408. The trajectory for Latinos is clearly negative. Their incomes and the quality of their neighborhoods are declining relative to whites in both absolute dollar amounts and as a proportion (Logan, 2002). There are important regional differences, however, with especially large disparities in the Northeast and a better relative position in the Midwest. Income disparities and neighborhood gaps manifest themselves in the quality of schools and school segregation between Latinos and whites (Logan et al., 2002). Latino Socioeconomic Bifurcation In addition, a bifurcation in the social and economic characteristics among Latinos has become apparent at the beginning of the 21st century. The variation is most visible between Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Central Americans and the newer immigrant groups from South America. For example, Mexicans are the least educated of the older Latino groups, with an average education of only 10.2 years (for those aged 25 and above). Puerto Ricans average 11.4 years, and Cubans 11.9 years. Other Latino groups range both below the Mexicans and above the Cubans. Salvadorans and Guatemalans have the least education (below 10 years) among the new Latino groups. But Latinos from most South American origins are better educated than Cubans, averaging 12.6 years (Logan, 2001). Compared to Puerto Ricans and Mexicans, Cubans in the United States have always been regarded as economically quite successful. The mean earnings of employed Cubans are above $13,500, compared to about $10,000 for Puerto Ricans and $8500 for Mexicans. Only 18 percent of Cubans fall below the poverty line, compared to 26 percent of Mexicans and 30 percent of Puerto Ricans. Among the other Latino groups, Dominicans stand out for their very low incomes, with mean earnings below $8000 and more than a third in poverty (36 percent) (Logan, 2001). The major Central American groups are roughly equivalent to Puerto Ricans in average earnings, though they are less likely to fall below the poverty line. Latinos from South America do considerably better, and on average they earn more and have lower poverty rates than do Cubans.

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Levels of unemployment among Latino groups are generally consistent with their average earnings. However, there are some inconsistencies. Puerto Ricans have an unemployment rate of 8.3 percent and an average income of $9,893. Meanwhile, Hondurans have an unemployment rate of 10.8 percent and average earnings of $10,244. In addition, Latinos from the Dominican Republic have higher than average unemployment and they are the group most likely to be receiving public assistance (above 8 percent — in both respects they are less successful than Puerto Ricans) (Logan, 2001). Those from South America have the lowest levels of unemployment and are even less likely to receive public assistance. The modest educational levels of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Central Americans have relegated them to the lower levels of the labor market. They have found jobs in the marginal sectors of the service and manufacturing economy. Meanwhile, Cubans and South Americans’ higher levels of education have offered them better occupational opportunities. The result has been a noticeable bifurcation in social and economic characteristics between the various Latino groups.

THE GROWING POLITICAL POWER OF LATINOS While Latino voter participation traditionally lags behind that of whites and African Americans, a growing population and extensive voter outreach efforts meant 1 million more Latinos voted in the 2004 presidential election than in the 2000 (NALEO, 2004). Latinos had the potential to significantly sway the outcome in pivotal states such as Florida (where NALEO estimated 160,000 more Latino voters in 2004 than in 2000), Arizona (a 70,000 rise), New Jersey (23,000), New Mexico (11,000) and Colorado (8,000). These projections would seem to have bolstered Sen. John Kerry given that Latinos identify themselves as Democrats more than as Republicans by a two-to-one margin. However, according to the exit polls, Bush’s share with Latinos went from 35 percent in 2000, (Gore had 62 percent of the Latino vote in 2000) to 44 percent for Bush (to Kerry’s 53 percent) in 2004. And though there are some different poll numbers floating around that minimize Bush’s performance among Latinos, Democrats have to acknowledge that Bush did make gains with this important group. The Latino population is diverse in its politics. Priority issues vary regionally. Latinos in California are more likely to focus on immigration and alien residency, for example, while Latinos in New York and Chicago place more importance on the war in Iraq (NCLR, 2004). Differences can also be profound within a state. In Florida, the state’s large Cuban-American population has strongly tended to be Republican (Botelho, 2004). Meanwhile, thousands of Latinos have come to the state, particularly central Florida, in recent years from other parts of Latin America. There has been greater diversification in recent years, which has made the Latino voting population very difficult to predict. In a poll conducted by La Raza prior to the 2004 Presidential election, Latinos were asked to rank the issues of greatest importance to the their community: x More than one-third (34%) selected education/schools. x More than one-fifth (22%) identified the economy/jobs. x Eight percent selected immigration, six percent identified civil rights, and five percent selected health care. x No other issues, including national security (1%) or the war on terrorism (2%), exceeded the poll’s margin of error (3.3%). In the same survey 58 percent of Latinos said political candidates do not sufficiently address issues important to their communities (NCLR, 2004). Alberto Gonzales, a Mexican American, who has followed President Bush from the Texas Statehouse to the White House, was Bush’s choice to succeed John Ashcroft as attorney general. When confirmed, he became the first Latino attorney general. Gonzales served in Bush’s administration when the president was governor of

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Texas, and was named White House counsel in January, 2001. His name often has been forwarded as a likely Supreme Court nominee of the Bush’ administration. In another example of the growing importance of the Latino vote, Former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Mel Martinez and Colorado Attorney General Ken Salazar, were the first Latinos elected to serve in the U.S. Senate in nearly thirty years (NALEO, 2004). Senator-Elect Mel Martinez became the first Cuban American elected to serve in the upper house of Congress; both are the first Latinos elected to the Senate from Florida and Colorado. The fact that a Democrat and a Republican Latino with such distinct backgrounds and experiences were both elected to the U.S. Senate demonstrates the strength and diversity of the Latino community. After the 2004 election, the number of Latinos in Congress remained the same at 19. Seven states (California, Arizona, Texas, New York, Illinois, Florida, and New Jersey) have Latino representatives in Congress. Latino members of Congress have formed the Congressional Latino Caucus and Congressional Latino Conference (NALEO, 2004). Both organizations were formed to promote issues affecting Latino Americans through the legislative process. Latinos seized the opportunity to continue their political progress by winning several state legislative seats according to an analysis conducted by the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO, 2004) Educational Fund. Overall, in state legislative contests, Latinos lost one seat in State Senates, but gained eight in lower state houses. New Mexico elected the greatest number of Latinos (15) to the State Senate. California and Texas will have seven Latino members in the State Senate and New York will have four (NALEO, 2004).

ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND THE RISING TIDE OF ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENT The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimated that the total unauthorized immigrant population residing in the United States in 2000 was 7 million, which constituted 2.5 percent of the total U.S population of just over 281 million (INS, 2000). According to INS estimates, the unauthorized immigrant population grew by about 350,000 people per year during the 1990s. This conclusion is derived from a draft report given to the House immigration subcommittee by the INS that estimated the illegal population was 3.5 million in 1990. The Census Bureau also developed estimates at the time of the 2000 Census that suggested that the illegal immigrant population was about eight million. For the illegal population to have reached 8 million by 2000, the net increase had to be 400,000 to 500,000 per year during the 1990s (Camarota, 2004). The Unauthorized Latino Population — Origins The growing unauthorized population has resulted in a rising tide of anti-immigrant feelings in many parts of the United States. In this section the origins of the unauthorized population and their destinations will be analyzed using the 2000 INS data. The increasing animosity toward illegal immigrants and, immigrants in general, and how this may translate into new policy initiatives also will be examined. Mexico continued to be the leading source of unauthorized immigration to the United States in the 1990s. The estimated unauthorized resident population from Mexico increased from about 2.0 million in 1990 to 4.8 million in January 2000. Mexico accounted for nearly 69 percent of the total unauthorized resident population in January, 2000; the top fifteen countries of origin, including Mexico, accounted for 89 percent of the total. The estimated unauthorized immigrant population from El Salvador dropped in the 1990s because many of these unauthorized immigrants were granted temporary protected status (TPS) early in the decade. In 1997, many long-term illegal residents from Cuba, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador were allowed to stay and work in the United States under provisions of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). Unauthorized residents from Central American and other countries were effectively shifted from unauthorized to lawfully resident by other legislative changes and judicial decisions in the latter part of the 1990s (INS, 2000).

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Three South American countries — Colombia, Ecuador, and Brazil — had relatively large increases in estimated unauthorized residents in the United States from 1990 to 2000. The Unauthorized Latino Population — Destinations About 4.5 million of the estimated 7.0 million unauthorized residents in 2000 were highly geographically concentrated in the five states; California, Texas, New York, Illinois, and Florida. California and Texas had the largest numerical increases in the number of unauthorized residents in the 1990s. More than one third of the INS estimated 3.5 million total increase in the unauthorized resident population in the 1990s occurred in these two states. The INS estimated that approximately 5.5 percent of Texas’s total population is unauthorized residents. In addition to California and Texas, seven States — Illinois, Arizona, Georgia, North Carolina, New York, New Jersey, and Colorado — had increases of more than 100,000 unauthorized residents between 1990 and 2000 (INS, 2000). Many states that had relatively few unauthorized residents in 1990 experienced rapid growth of the unauthorized population in the decade. Three principal examples are Georgia, North Carolina, and Colorado. In addition, Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Nebraska, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin saw significant increases in their unauthorized populations. This was a significant trend in unauthorized population change for these states in the 1990s and may provide an explanation for the growing anti-immigrant sentiment in many parts of the United States (INS, 2000). Anti-Immigrant Sentiment The illegal immigrant situation has received much publicity and has become highly politicized. A frequent argument against illegal immigration is that it allegedly depresses wages and increases unemployment. Undocumented or illegal immigrants often perform low-skilled tasks shunned by American workers. Areolla (2000) argues that the illegal Mexican immigrants have little difficulty finding these jobs in the United States and that they do not displace American labor to a great extent. A second charge against illegal immigrants is that they “freeload” on social services. This practice has not been well documented, and the evidence suggests the opposite. Undocumented workers pay state and local taxes and must have federal and social security deducted from their earnings. Studies suggest that illegal Mexican immigrants make very little use of social services beyond public schools for their children, who are entitled to a public education. In California and Texas, undocumented Mexicans have used public assistance services. However, they have contributed many times the amount annually to the support of such services (Arreola, 2000). Immigration has been a source of controversy in American politics since the first part of the nineteenth century. Throughout, critics of immigration have argued that mass immigration would flood the country with people who were culturally alien and would fail to contribute economically. Hence, the Irish, Southern and Eastern European, Jews, East Asians (Chinese and Japanese) and, most recently, South East Asians and, in particular, Latinos from Central and South America, have successively been the target of anti-immigrant sentiment. Originally, opposition came from nativist Americans, or those who believed that the purity of the Northern European Protestant stock would be corrupted by the new arrivals. The 1924 Immigration Act was specifically designed to favor Northern and Western Europeans. Today, a racist-nativist sentiment persists in some places. There are three main dimensions to the current debate. First, opponents of immigration argue that many Latinos, and especially immigrants of Mexican origin, hold a greater allegiance to the mother country than to the U.S. Unlike earlier waves of immigrants, they maintain their linguistic and cultural identity across generations. Second, illegal immigration is widespread across poorly policed borders. Third, they argue that during difficult economic times, the new immigrants, especially their children, constitute a strain on hard-pressed welfare and social services (AFSC, 2003).

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For the past 150 years, attitudes towards immigrants have changed cyclically, often undergoing rapid shifts in response to economic or political conditions. In periods of social and economic turmoil, such as the years following WWI or the post-WWII McCarthy Era, anti-immigrant sentiments tend to flare up as people look for someone to blame. During times of economic growth and social stability, nativism tends to die down. As always, it is difficult to tell to what extent media and political figures reflect public attitudes, and to what extent they create them (AFSC, 2003). Politicians have often turned waves of nativist feeling to political advantage, voting for policies that penalize immigrants. Two particularly clear examples are the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, which banned Chineseborn laborers from entering the country, and “Operation Wetback,” in which more than 500,000 people of Mexican descent (including numerous U.S. citizens) were rounded up and deported to Mexico. Anti-immigrant feeling ran high in the early 1990s, partly because the country faced a prolonged recession, and partly because of the marked growth of immigration, particularly in California. Some observers believe that the growth of anti-immigrant sentiment in that period was also a reflection of racial anxieties among the white population, as it became increasingly obvious that white Americans would eventually cease to be the majority, a shift that has already occurred in California and is projected to occur after 2050 for the country as a whole (AFSC, 2003). In addition, a series of economic changes related to globalization were becoming increasingly apparent to most U.S. working people. Such changes included steadily declining real wages, shrinking benefits and protections, the marked growth of temporary and contingent jobs, declining rates of unionization, increasing privatization, and cutbacks in health care and education. Although most of these changes may be traced back to the early 1970s, it was not until the 1990s that they became more widely recognized and discussed. In 1994, California voters passed an anti-immigrant measure known as Proposition 187, a law that excluded undocumented immigrants from public schools, medical assistance, and other government services. That year, a New York Times/CBS News survey found that 61 percent of U.S. residents thought that immigration levels should be reduced, up from 49 percent in 1986. Although Proposition 187 was ultimately ruled unconstitutional, many of the same measures were incorporated in federal legislation passed in 1996 (AFSC, 2003). The end of the 1990s brought a period of economic expansion and rising wage levels, and antiimmigrant sentiment grew more muted in many parts of the country. The tide turned once again, however, following the World Trade Center attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Rather than being stigmatized as an economic drain, immigrants became demonized by some as dangerous terrorists, as the violent acts of a few extremists are blamed on all immigrants, regardless of who they are or why they are here. Anti-immigrant politics also have given rise to an increase in vigilante activity, particularly in the U.S.Mexico border region. Vigilantes have vowed to stop “illegal” immigration by patrolling the border with binoculars and guns, “arresting” at gunpoint anyone they presume to be an undocumented immigrant. Despite the threat of bloodshed, several political figures have defended such vigilante activity, including former INS Commissioner Doris Meissner, who has said that ranchers near the border “have legitimate concerns about the trespassers on their property.” In one 17-month period in 1999 and 2000, at least 30 incidents of vigilante violence were reported in a single section of the Arizona-Mexico border. Other ranchers, by contrast, have installed humanitarian aid stations on their land to assist border crossers who might otherwise face sickness or death due to dehydration (AFSC, 2003). Roots of Anti-Immigrant Activism European Americans have held a dominant position in the United States, both culturally and politically, for the country’s entire history. Among some non-Hispanics whites, racial anxieties over losing their majority status have lead to a backlash, combining with resistance to multiculturalism and other movements that seek to include communities of color as equal partners in all aspects of U.S. society (SPLC, 2001). While illegal immigration is a serious problem, although hardly a new one, the criticisms have little foundation in fact. It is difficult to know how the Mexican American and other Latino communities will develop

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over time. The same criticisms were directed at Italian, Jewish and Polish communities at the beginning of the twentieth century. As for constituting an economic burden on social services, in the longer run the opposite is likely, for immigrants play a large part in bringing down the average age of the American population. As such they or their children may be the very people who will pay the taxes to finance the pensions and medical care of older, longer established Americans.

Chapter 15

Latinos in New York City: Ethnic Diversity, Changing Settlement Patterns, and Settlement Experiences KEITH D. GALLIGANO AND JOHN W. FRAZIER INTRODUCTION Founded in the 1600s by Dutch colonists due to its coastal location, New York City is the “metropolis of the world” and an area of opportunity. As a result, diverse migrants come to this area seeking economic and political stability, and the “American Dream.” Before the 1960s, European ancestries dominated New York City’s foreign-born population, primarily a result of the 1924 National Origins Act, which favored European migrants by restricting non-Europeans through the use of national quotas. However, after 1965, the number of non-European migrants increased dramatically because changes in U.S. policy extended immigration opportunities to non-Europeans by favoring family reunification (1965 Hart-Celler Act) and political circumstances (1980 Refugee Act) over country of origin. This produced large increases in Hispanic1 and Asian populations. Also, increased economic disparities between developing and developed countries resulting from globalization have “pushed” many immigrants from developing countries into urban areas of developed countries in search of economic stability. As a result of these external factors, “white flight,” and black reverse migration to the South, New York City’s population has continued to diversify racially and ethnically. Latino immigration provides an excellent example of this diversity. The Latino population of New York City has diversified greatly, resulting in the historically dominant Puerto Ricans representing less than a majority of the total Hispanic population for the first time in 1990 (Alba, 1995). This is a product of large increases in Mexican, Dominican and “Other Hispanic” ancestries after 1965. Due to the increasing diversity in origin within the Latino population of New York City, interethnic discontinuities may exist in socioeconomic status, settlement, and migration patterns. This chapter examines the socioeconomic status, settlement and migration patterns of Dominicans, Mexicans, and South Americans in New York City. These ethnic groups exhibit the largest percentage increases in population between 1990 and 2000 in New York City, compared to other Latino subgroups. It should be noted that the South American ancestry group consists of an aggregate of ancestries originating in South America because they are not listed separately in the 2000 U.S. Census.

CHANGING RACIAL AND ETHNIC PATTERNS IN NEW YORK CITY Puerto Rican Settlement As a result of forced shifts in Puerto Rico’s primary agricultural export — from coffee to sugar and then back to coffee — and mechanization of farming techniques, unemployment rates soared in Puerto Rico in the

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late 19th and early 20th centuries. Many of the unemployed became involved in family based part-time businesses, like sewing, in order to survive. Others took advantage of favorable U.S. immigration policy as well as the prospects of economic prosperity and moved to the mainland U.S., primarily to New York City. Migrants were “pulled” into this city for economic opportunity, a result of the labor shortage produced by World War I and the booming economy of the 1920s. Two acts that helped Puerto Ricans take advantage of favorable economic opportunity in America were the Jones Act of 1917, which gave citizenship to Puerto Ricans, and the Johnson Act of 1921, which severely limited the flow of foreign immigrants into America (Sanchez, 1994). Migration of Puerto Ricans to New York City continued to increase marginally in the 1920s, until the beginning of the Great Depression. It rose once again during the labor shortages of WWII. Sanchez states that the efficient decrease in migration from Puerto Rico to New York during economic lapses can be somewhat contributed to family networks, which communicated the lack of job opportunities to Puerto Rico (Sanchez, 1994). In addition to social networking, migration rates increased and decreased due to recruitment. Through the use of U.S. federal funding, migrants were frequently given free transportation to the United States, in order to encourage migration in times of labor shortages. Furthermore, foreign recruitment agencies, like the Migration Division of Puerto Rico’s Department of Labor in New York City, were created to help educate potential migrants on job opportunities. Although the jobs that were available to Puerto Ricans were low-skilled, bluecollar jobs, migrants continued to come to the mainland due to more favorable employment conditions (Sanchez, 1994). With the increased migration of Puerto Ricans into New York City in the mid 20th century, ethnic enclaves, or colonias, that were geographically isolated, helped foster and perpetuate social and cultural unity of “traditional” Puerto Rican society. Within New York City, the main colonias included: East and South Central Harlem, and northern Kings County (Brooklyn) (Sanchez, 1994). In these colonias, many Latino-specific commercial, professional, and retail amenities developed, which did not exist elsewhere in New York City, making colonias a prime destination for Puerto Rican migrants. Early colonias depended heavily on employment opportunities. The Brooklyn colonia was created due to the American Manufacturing Company, which employed and recruited Puerto Ricans (sometimes directly from Puerto Rico) to make rope from hemp, provided free transportation to and from work for its workers, and allowed use of company-owned buses for recreation (for a minimal fee). Sanchez argues that this service allowed “Puerto Rican workers to familiarize themselves with the city neighborhoods, transmitting this information in letters to friends and family in Puerto Rico” (Sanchez, 1994, p. 54). The second major colonia area, the Harlem community (or el barrio), unlike the Brooklyn colonia, grew due to the existence of Latino-based services, rather than a specific industry. The largest Puerto Rican commercial market in New York City, as well as the offices of many Puerto Rican professionals and entertainment venues, developed in el barrio. As a result, many Puerto Ricans would travel from Brooklyn to Manhattan for goods and services. Other differences between the two colonias existed in housing quality and availability, which favored the Manhattan community. Consequently, a rift between Puerto Rican establishments developed. As the size and population of New York City Puerto Rican colonias increased, many Puerto Ricanowned commercial businesses were established. The owners of these businesses became the “backbone” of the definition of the Puerto Rican community in New York City, due to their involvement within the community. Latino businessmen helped create Puerto Rican organizations and clubs, and gave advice to new migrants. In spite of the perceived friendly nature of merchants and professionals, competition between similar establishments was significant. Professionals and merchants helped protect cultural solidarity in the colonias, as did the common language and traditions. While English was the primary language of business, Spanish was the community language and provided an invisible bond. Also, community functions, like La Prensas (or balls) and sporting events also played a pivotal role in Puerto Rican solidarity, while Puerto Rican music helped cure “homesickness” and provided a common interest (Sanchez, 1994). After WWII, the Puerto Rican community in New York City was unique, due to the interconnection between the island and mainland, which transplanted native Puerto Rican beliefs, attitudes and customs to New York City neighborhoods. Although most migrants who entered New York City planned to return to Puerto

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Rico, many stayed, creating new family networks. Sanchez separates the post-Great Migration movement of Puerto Ricans into three stages. The first migration was dominated by low-skilled, blue collar workers, who moved from Puerto Rico to primarily New York City between the end of WWII and 1960. During this migration wave, the Puerto Rican population of New York City increased nearly tenfold — from 61,463 to 612,574 — the majority of which were under the age of 30. While many of these new immigrants moved into the traditional colonias of Spanish Harlem and Brooklyn, a new concentration in the South Bronx emerged. The majority of these new migrants were able to obtain low-level, blue-collar jobs in urban industries. Unlike the first-stage migrants, second-stage migrants (1960–1970) faced economic hardships and discrimination, due to fluctuations in the U.S. economy. As a result, many Puerto Ricans moved into non-New York City urban areas of the northeast in search of blue-collar jobs. The last migration (1970 to the present) “has been marked with high levels of return migration,” as a result of fewer low-skilled occupational opportunities and low wages (Sanchez, 1994, p. 215). Return migrants to Puerto Rico were lured by the new economic opportunities established by Operation Bootstrap, an American based plan to industrialize Puerto Rico by relocating American corporations to the island. The early years of Operation Bootstrap were very successful, as seen in the doubling of the per capita income of Puerto Ricans between 1954 and 1964, but by the 1970s, the agrarian sector was destroyed, as farming was replaced by capital-intensive industries. As a result, unemployment and dependence on America for food supplies increased. Although the Puerto Rican population originally was easily able to assimilate occupationally into the U.S. economy, by 1980, the New York City Puerto Rican workforce was “undermined” by four indirect effects of capitalism. First, the restructuring of New York City’s economy away from manufacturing occupations to low-skilled service jobs lowered wages. Second, industrial technological innovations increased unemployment. Third, many corporations relocated to Sunbelt and other regions to take advantage of cheap labor. Fourth, increased competition for low-skilled service jobs resulting from an increase in undereducated non-European immigrants to New York City contributed to unemployment. As a result of these four reasons, the Puerto Rican population is considered “impoverished” in comparison to other Latino ethnicities in New York City. Many Puerto Ricans departed New York City in the 1980s and 1990s for perceived opportunities in smaller cities, such as those in southeastern Pennsylvania.

LATINO SETTLEMENTS IN NYC: THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND METHODS The changing U.S. immigration laws, the deaths of people of European ancestry, and the political and economic instability in many developing countries, have contributed to the growth and diversity of the U.S. Latino population. By 2000, Latinos in America differed by place of origin and socioeconomic status, and it is likely that these differences changed settlement patterns and experiences in the U.S. (Clark, 2002). New York City is no exception to this trend. We employed three analytical stages to examine these patterns. The first stage examined population trends and geographies of Hispanics, Asians, blacks and whites in New York City by studying predefined areas of racial concentration (AORCs), 1970 and 2000, at the census tract level to illustrate the diversification of New York City’s population. The second stage evaluated the differences in socioeconomic status and migration flows of Latino in-migrants from predefined regions to New York City using SF4 and U.S. Census Migration Data (CMD) for the selected Latino ethnic groups: Mexicans, Dominicans, and South Americans. These ethnic groups exhibited the largest percent change in population between 1990 and 2000. The final step of the analysis presents the settlement patterns and socioeconomic status, inferred by housing, nativity and poverty characteristics of Dominicans, Mexicans, and South Americans, to determine differences in location and social status, or the “settlement experience.” 2

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THE STUDY AREA Two clusters of Latino concentrations exist on the Eastcoast of the U.S. — the New York City and the Washington, D.C. regions. The Washington, D.C. region includes the District of Columbia, as well as suburban counties in Maryland (Montgomery and Prince Georges) and Virginia (Fairfax and Arlington), and Virginia cities (Fairfax, Falls Church and Alexandria). The 5 counties (boroughs) of New York City — Bronx, Kings, New York, Richmond, and Queens — define the New York City region. The study area was determined by establishing a population threshold for inclusion for each ethnic group. Each ethnic group had to have a minimum population of 10,000. Only New York City met that requirement; Washington, D.C. had an insufficient number of Dominicans. Thus the New York City area was selected as the study area. “Tract” level analysis is the most suitable: tracts are theoretically homogenous neighborhoods and inferences can be made from spatial analysis. While New York City consists of five counties (or boroughs), for administrative purposes, it also is reduced to fifty-nine different community districts. This research uses community districts, counties, and tracts to describe phenomena spatially.

LATINO DIVERSITY, MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT PATTERNS IN NEW YORK CITY Population Trends and the Distribution of Areas of Racial Concentration in New York City: 1970–2000 Many factors contribute to the racial/ethnic structure of New York City, including U.S. immigration policy and the negative economic effects of globalization in developing countries. Many of the new racial/ethnic groups in New York City have settled in highly concentrated areas, due to political, social and economic constraints (Lobo, 2002; Alba, 1995). As new immigrants settled, whites departed to suburban areas, away from areas of minority settlement. So that by 2000, a population that was once dominated by black and white racial groups diversified dramatically, and included large Asian and Hispanic populations. The most significant contributor to the diversification of New York City’s neighborhoods between 1970 and 2000 was the decrease in white population (due to white flight), rather than the population increase of any one minority group. However, Asians, blacks, and Hispanics experienced significant increases in population during this time period. Asians had the most significant increase in population at the tract level, followed by Hispanics and blacks, respectively. Hispanics will likely become the largest minority group in New York City in the near future. The significant increase in the population of non-white groups and white flight resulted in not only the diversification of New York City’s neighborhoods, but also the change in number and location of areas of racial/ ethnic concentration. In 1970, New York City’s neighborhoods were dominated by black and white populations, which were highly isolated from one another. After 1970, as the population of non-white racial/ethnic groups increased and whites continued to depart from areas with increasing minority populations, many racially diverse “mixed” neighborhoods developed. These areas gradually changed into minority concentration areas, as white residential succession completed. Compared to the other minority groups examined, areas of black concentration presented the least dramatic change in number and location. Black settlement in New York City predated other minority settlements, thus black residential patterns were established early, isolating black settlement in various parts of the City (Alba, 1995). As a result, by 1970, areas of black concentration clustered in: northern New York (Central Harlem), central Kings (Crown Heights North, Bedford/Stuyvesant and Crown Heights South/Windgate) and central Queens (Jamaica/St. Albans/Hollis). The size of these clusters grew substantially between 1970 and 2000, as areas of white concentration that were located on the fringes of the black clusters gradually changed into ar-

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eas of black concentration. In 2000, areas of black concentration comprised nearly 22 percent of the City’s census tracts. Very few areas of Hispanic concentration existed in the five-county area in 1970. Hispanics primarily settled in traditional Puerto Rican enclaves of southern Bronx/northern New York Counties and northern Kings County, in white-Hispanic neighborhoods. However, by 1980, these neighborhoods quickly changed from combined white-Hispanic neighborhoods to areas of Hispanic concentration, due to “white flight.” Also, by 2000, Hispanic settlement had dispersed into northern Queens County, into the Jackson Heights/North Corona and Elm Hurst/South Corona community districts, a result of the diversification of the Hispanic population from primarily Puerto Rican to a multitude of ancestry groups that tend to locate away from one another (Massey, 1981). By 2000, over 17 percent of New York City’s neighborhoods were areas of Hispanic concentration. Similar to Hispanic settlement trends, small numbers of areas of Asian concentration existed in 1970, which were clustered in Chinatown in southern New York County. By 1990, the size of the Chinatown cluster increased dramatically, and Asian settlement diffused into northern Queens County in the Flushing/Bay Terrance community district. Between 1990 and 2000, Asian settlement dispersed from Flushing/Bay Terrance cluster into surrounding neighborhoods, and areas of Asian concentration developed in the Fresh Meadows/Briarwood and Bayside/Douglaston/Little Neck community districts of Queens County. Also, large numbers of white-Asian neighborhoods developed by 2000, located on the fringes of areas of Asian concentrations and will likely develop into areas of Asian concentration, if white residential out-migration continues. Latino Migration Patterns into New York City Since 1970 New York City became increasingly diverse racially and ethnically, partially as a result of an increase in Hispanic populations. What are the Hispanic origins and the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of Hispanic in-migrants? Hispanics were highly mobile between 1995 and 2000 within New York City, with almost 42 percent of the Hispanic population moving at least once. Of the three Hispanic ethnic groups analyzed, Mexicans (58%) had the highest tendency to live in a different residence between 1995 and 2000, followed by South Americans (49%) and then Dominicans (43%). However, the majority of movement was intra-urban; 72 percent of Hispanics resided in a different house in 1995 but in the same city. However, large regional differences existed in the origins of out-of-state migrants among these three Hispanic groups. The largest proportion of Mexican non-New York State domestic migrants originated from the West, while the largest proportion of non-New York State domestic migrants of Dominicans and South Americans originated in the Northeast and South, respectively, reflecting regional concentrations of each group. For example, the majority of Mexicans still reside in the West region. Regarding the sources of foreign immigrants, 36 percent of Mexicans, 29 percent of South Americans, and 18 percent of Dominicans who lived in a different residence in 2000, originated from a foreign country after 1995. This trend reflects the liberalization of U.S. immigration law and the attraction of New York City as a gateway for many Latinos. Mexican immigration to New York City, for example, is a fairly new phenomenon compared to the other ethnic groups. However, under immigration law, immediate family members are able to reunite with family, which many Mexicans, as well as others, are opting to do. New York City is likely perceived as an internationally friendly city with economic opportunities for immigrants who also have a support network of family and friends in place in the City. Figure 15.1 illustrates the regional origins of New York City in-migrants from U.S. Census regions, between 1995 and 2000. Hispanic in-migrants moved to New York City from primarily northeastern states, yet large flows also existed from California and Florida, both traditional “gateway states.” At the county level (not shown on the map), Hispanics moved to New York City from both urban and rural counties of the northeast region that are in close proximity to New York City. Hispanics from non-northeastern regions migrated primarily from urban counties that contain a “gateway city” (for example Los Angeles and Miami-Dade counties). These patterns illustrate the continued importance of New York City as a destination of domestic Hispanic migrants. Significant, yet modest differences (p < .01) between the six migratory regions were found to exist for the four socioeconomic variables (median household income, nativity, education and age) analyzed. Hispanic

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migrants originating in the Northeast and New York City regions were younger, more likely to be foreign-born, and of lower socioeconomic status compared to the migrants from the other regions. Latino migrants originating from the West region tended to have the highest education levels, and Latino migrants originating from the Midwest region had the highest income levels, suggesting that migrant selectivity could be influenced by socioeconomic status. Figure 15.1

Settlement Patterns and Well-Being: Latino Ethnic Groups in New York City The migratory flows of the selected Latino ethnic groups (Dominicans, Mexicans and South Americans) into New York City varies by domestic and foreign origin. The socioeconomic and demographic attributes of Latino migrants that move to New York City differ substantially by region. Because past research illustrates that these differences in origin and socioeconomic status result in different settlement patterns, one can infer that location and the social status, or the “settlement experience,” of these ethnic groups may differ in the settlement areas within New York City (Massey, 1981; Haverluk, 1997). Between 1990 and 2000, New York City became less segregated, primarily the result of “white flight.” Thus, New York City is an increasingly multicultural city. However, inter-ethnic differences in spatial segregation exist between the selected Latino populations and the major racial/ethnic categories reported by the U.S. Census (Asians, blacks and whites). Dominicans, for example, are highly segregated from whites in 1990 and 2000, while Mexicans and South Americans are only moderately segregated from the white non-Hispanic population. Furthermore, Dominicans were significantly more segregated from these whites than from blacks. The Mexican and South American populations showed the reverse trend. South Americans and Asians locate in the same neighborhoods in New York City. Mexicans and South Americans were significantly less segregated from each other, compared to Dominicans and South Americans and Dominicans and Mexicans, suggesting that Dominicans may be unusually isolated from Mexicans and South Americans.

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Figure 15.2

Figure 15.2 shows the locations of selected important Latino enclaves. Figure 15.3a and Figure 15.3b display the multiethnic enclaves and those that were dominated by a single Latino ethnic group. Figure 15.3a reveals several multiethnic enclaves. The majority of the multi-ethnic enclaves existed in the Jackson Heights/ North Corona and South Corona/Elmhurst community districts, suggesting large levels of ethnic diversity in these areas in both 1990 and 2000. Between 1990 and 2000, the number of Mexican/South American multiethnic enclaves increased dramatically, while the number of Mexican/Dominican and South American/ Dominican remained relatively small, implying the isolation of Dominicans in the study area. In 1990 and 2000, small numbers of Dominican enclaves met the population criteria of any AORC type (Asian, black and white), indicating that Dominican enclaves are either dominated by the Dominican population, or, have large proportions of other Latino populations. Conversely, the number of Mexican and South American enclaves that were found to meet AOAC (Area of Asian concentration) and AOWC (Area of white concentration) population thresholds increased dramatically between 1990 and 2000, indicating increased racial/ethnic mixing among the groups. Between 1990 and 2000, the location of Dominican enclaves, or concentration areas, has remained highly clustered in northwestern New York County in the Washington Heights/Inwood community district. However, small amounts of dispersion are evident, as Dominican enclaves developed in the Riverdale/ Kingsbridge/Marble Hill and Bedford Park/Norwood/Fordham community districts of southern Bronx County by 2000. Very few Mexican enclaves existed in 1990; those that did were located in four of the five New York City counties. The number of Mexican enclaves increased 508 percent between 1990 and 2000, and became mildly clustered in the following community districts: Sunset Park/Windsor Terrace in western Kings County, in East Harlem in northeastern New York County, and North and South Corona in northern Queens County in 2000. In comparison with the other ethnic groups, Mexican enclaves are the least clustered in 1990 and 2000. Like the number of Mexican enclaves, the number of South American enclaves were fairly small in 1990, but were moderately clustered in the Jackson Heights/North Corona and Elmhurst/South Corona community districts in northern Queens County. By 2000, the majority of the tracts in these community districts developed into South American enclaves. Accordingly, the levels of spatial dependency of South American enclaves increased dramatically between 1990 and 2000, and were the highest clustered type of ethnic enclave in 2000.

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Figure 15.3b

Interethnic differences in the social status of these Latino populations residing within enclaves prevailed in 2000. South Americans displayed the lowest percentage of individuals in poverty within enclaves (19.54%), followed by Dominicans (32.54%), and Mexicans (37.95%). Furthermore, the percentage of South Americans in poverty within enclaves was less than the citywide average for the total population (21.25%), suggesting that South Americans who settle in enclaves may not be economically disadvantaged. Surprisingly, 47 percent of South American households within enclaves were overcrowded in 2000, the second largest proportion in comparison to the other evaluated Latino populations, suggesting that some South Americans are sharing living space while getting a foothold in the U.S. in general and New York City in particular.

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Mexican households living within these enclaves, on the other hand, by far live within the most overcrowded units, with over 75 percent of households reporting more than one person per room. Finally, poverty levels of “new immigrants,” (entered the United States 1990–2000), living within the “new immigrant areas,” varied greatly. Recent Mexican immigrants had the highest percentage of individuals living in poverty within “new immigrant areas” (35%), followed by Dominicans (33%) and South Americans (26%).

NEW YORK LATINOS: FUTURE PROSPECT New York City, like other geographic regions, is subject to changes. Diverse ethnic groups have long created their unique cultural landscapes and fashioned parts of this city as places of their own. Increased Hispanic settlement has significantly altered the urban landscape of New York City. However, since Hispanics migrate to New York City from a large number of domestic and foreign origins, distinct demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural differences exist between Hispanic populations. As a result, Latino ethnic subgroups settle in many notable neighborhoods and the settlement experience of different Latino ethnicities varies greatly. Some Latino ethnic groups tend to reside in multiethnic/racial neighborhoods, while others are highly isolated in specific areas of the City. Furthermore, significant differences exist in the social status among different Latino populations, putting into question issues of social equity. These issues must be addressed nationwide as Hispanics numbers increase for Latinos are a growing economic and political force that is not likely to be a silent minority in the 21st century. The dispersion of Latinos across America will strengthen their clout in particular places, and their growing presence within regions like New York City will likely make their voices increasingly louder in local political arenas.

NOTES 1

2

The terms Hispanic and Latino are used interchangeably in the research.

Locations of AORCs are based upon previous research conducted by Frazier and others (2003). They used population percentages at the tract level as thresholds to designate areas of minority concentration (AOMCs). A shortcoming of this procedure is that it could fail to account for an area with a high population density of a specific group. On the other hand, density measures also have limitations, including large areas with non-residential land use that yield low racial/ethnic densities.

Chapter 16

Placing Transnational Migration: The Sociospatial Networks of Bolivians in the United States MARIE D. PRICE IMMIGRATION, GLOBALIZATION, AND PLACE One of the less appreciated consequences of globalization has been the increase in economic migrants, especially the movements of international laborers. As global capitalism recreates economic space, it inevitably triggers labor movements (both domestic and international). The United Nations Population Division estimated that 185 million people lived outside their country of birth for at least 12 months in 2000, or roughly 2 percent of the world’s population. One in six of these people are found in the United States, the county that in absolute terms attracts more immigrants than any other. The 2000 U.S. Census counted 31 million foreign-born individuals, which equaled 11 percent of the U.S. population. Immigrants, both legal and undocumented, continue to settle in the United States. The most recent Census Bureau figures in 2004 estimated that 36 million foreignborn resided in the U.S., representing over 12 percent of the total population. The narrative of the immigrant nation is a well-developed theme in United States, and interest in immigration seems to grow with the intensity of the immigrant flows themselves. The booming economy of the 1990s witnessed a parallel surge in immigration to the U.S, comparable to the great wave of immigration at the turn of the 20th century. The major difference between these two great immigrant waves is the composition of the foreign-born by region of birth. In 2000, over half of the foreign-born (52%) were from Latin America; one-quarter of the foreign-born (26%) were from Asia. By contrast, Europeans accounted for just 16 percent of the foreignborn population in Census 2000. Given the large number of recent immigrants, and their racial and ethnic diversity, it is nearly impossible to discuss race and ethnicity in the U.S. without addressing the impact of immigrants. Perhaps the most dramatic demographic shift is the increase of Hispanics, now the largest minority group in the United States. A recent U.S. Census Bureau report estimated that there were over 41 million Hispanics (both native-born and foreign-born) in 2004, which is approximately 14 percent of the total U.S. population. Well over half of all Hispanics are of Mexican ancestry but there are significant numbers of Hispanics with ancestry in the Caribbean (Cuba and the Dominican Republic), Central America and South America. This chapter will focus on a small and relatively new group of Hispanic immigrants from the Andean country of Bolivia. By studying a small group that is concentrated in a few cities, it is possible to document how a new immigrant community gains a foothold in the United States, and how it maintains connections with its place of origin. This case study is based on an analysis of census data, government documents, newspaper accounts, and interviews with Bolivians in both the United States and Bolivia. Through the Bolivian experience, the importance of transnational linkages between sending and receiving communities is revealed, even when actual travel between countries can be limited (commonly due to the expense of travel or problems with legal status). The case study also demonstrates the importance of place, both real and remembered, in the everyday practices and experiences of Bolivian immigrants.

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Before turning to the Bolivian example, I want to highlight two biases perpetuated in the migration literature that undervalue both place and scale. First is the tendency to focus on immigration (and receiving countries) rather than emigration (and sending countries). One’s perception of migration changes sharply when viewed from the economic periphery in countries such as Bolivia. Today, emigration is often a response to social and economic crises brought about by structural adjustment policies and neo-liberalism, political upheaval, demographic growth, and the accelerated integration of developing economies into global markets. Throughout Latin America, individuals, households and communities are responding to these changes by considering themselves part of an international (if not global) workforce. As one former Bolivian migrant told me “we send workers everywhere, not just to the U.S. and Argentina. In this village there are pioneers who have moved to Israel, Japan, Spain and Germany to find work. If they find it, others follow.” Thus, it is vital to understand migration as a dynamic system that impacts sending and receiving communities in different ways. Secondly, immigration scholars rely on the nation-state as the container of convenience when analyzing immigration flows. Most migrants move, not to countries per se, but to particular cities that are significant in the global economy (Benton-Short et al., in press). Thus the impact of immigration looks extremely different when one shifts scale from nation-level data to urban-level data. Nationally, immigrants made up 12 percent of the total U.S. population in 2004. In classic immigrant destinations such as metropolitan New York or Los Angeles, the foreign-born make up one-third of the total population (Singer, 2004). In metropolitan Washington, the leading destination for Bolivian immigrants, one-in-six residents are foreign-born (U.S. Census, 2000). Metropolitan areas in the U.S. host the majority of the foreign-born. From that scale, the intensity of the immigrant question becomes much more important when examining labor markets and the supply of basic services (most notably education, housing, public transportation and healthcare). This case study seeks to correct these imbalances in the immigration literature by documenting the impact of immigration on sending and receiving localities and focusing on the urban scale. But before developing the Bolivian example, it is important to consider the concept of the transnational migrant.

THE RISE OF THE TRANSNATIONAL MIGRANT The concept of transnationalism as applied to migration began to surface in late 1980s, largely through the work of anthropologists studying the social and economic impacts of migration on households and sending communities (Thomas-Hope, 1988; Georges, 1990; Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991; Basch et al., 1994). Transnationalism is an attempt to theorize the complex linkages and dual identities that a globalized economy is bound to generate. In the book Nations Unbound (1994), the authors offer a working definition of transnational migration as “the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” and in the process “immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural and political borders” (Basch et al., 1994, p. 7). Whether or not transnational migration is anything new is a subject of considerable debate. Nancy Foner’s detailed work comparing New York City’s immigrants over 100 years is a clear reminder that the processes we call transnational today have a long history (Foner, 2000, p. 169). She offers the compelling example of Italian immigrants at the turn of the 20th century who maintained social, political and economic links with their communities of origin while at the same time building social networks among themselves in their new home. Italian immigrants did this for many of the same reasons that today’s “transnational migrants” maintain linkages: there were relatives left behind, and many others who either returned or intended to return to Italy. Further, lack of full acceptance in America stimulated migrants’ continued involvement with home (Foner, 2000, p. 171). Similarly, Italian government officials over a century ago recognized that members of the diaspora were an important resource that should not be lost. Similar efforts occur today when politicians court and respond to the needs of emigrants abroad. Foner is correct in observing that there is a tendency to overuse the concept and ascribe transnational qualities to all international migrations (1997). Migration scholars Castles and Miller suggest that the defining aspect of the transnational migrant is that “transnational activities are a central part of a person’s life” (2003, p. 30). In this Bolivian case study, I contend that the transnational migrants are those who actively maintain link-

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ages with their sending countries, and in the process create an identity that is someplace in-between being Bolivian and being American. Not all Bolivians are transnational migrants. Yet transnationalism is fostered within the Bolivian community by the continuous flows of immigrants form particular localities, the availability of employment in the U.S., improvements in communication and money transfer technologies, and uncertain legal status that makes it important to maintain linkages with one’s home country. Together, these factors increase the likelihood for transnational connections to be maintained for both the good of the individual migrant and the sending community. The decision to emigrate is still a difficult one, yet as transnational livelihoods become more common, sociospatial networks are created that cater to a transnational existence where individual migrants live someplace in-between being a settler and a sojourner. An outgrowth of transnationalism is the idea of a transnational community (Levitt, 2001). Alejandro Portes (1997) argues that transnational communities are fueled by the dynamics of globalization itself and have become a popular means for places on the economic periphery to respond to the pernicious and transformative reach of global capital. The formation of such communities is an unanticipated and a relatively understudied outcome of globalization. To quote Portes: “What common people have done in response to the process of globalization is to create communities that sit astride political borders and that, in a very real sense, are ‘neither here nor there’ but in both places simultaneously. The economic activities that sustain these communities are grounded precisely on the differentials of advantage created by state boundaries. In this respect, they are no different from the large global corporations, except that these enterprises emerge at the grassroots level and its (sic) activities are often informal” (1997, pp. 2–3).

Transnational communities are a response to structural economic forces but human agency, cultural practices, and cumulative-causation models are equally important in explaining their existence (Massey et al., 1994). Transnational communities need to be understood as fluid spatial fields rather than concrete and discrete spaces, which poses a challenge to conventional notions of ethnic space. Whether transnational communities can be maintained into the second or third generation remains to be seen. In many immigrant gateways such as Washington, D.C., transnational communities are not ethnic enclaves, like a Chinatown, which can be clearly identified by outsiders. Today’s transnational communities are more likely to be heterolocal in nature; that is, communities without propinquity (Zelinksy and Lee, 1998). Folded into the suburban fabric of the major metropolitan areas in the United States, for example, transnational communities exist through weekend religious, sporting, and other cultural events. Through such activities a sense of community is maintained and real ties between sending and receiving communities are nurtured. In order to place the workings of a transnational community, I turn to the case of Bolivian migration to metropolitan Washington, D.C. There are four aspects of this immigrant group that will be addressed: 1) these are economic migrants who decided to leave their country based on poor economic conditions there and greater economic opportunities in the United States; 2) the study area in Bolivia, the Valle Alto of Cochabamba, has an established history of emigration, especially to Argentina and the United States, so that strategies to cope with longdistance livelihoods exist; 3) once in metropolitan Washington, immigrants have developed extensive social networks, this facilitates the difficult transition into a new country, reinforces the likelihood of future migrations, and maintains a transnational flow of goods, people and information; and 4) transnational linkages between Valle Alto villages and Bolivian residents abroad materially sustain these Bolivian localities, while providing a valuable emotional space for Bolivians in Washington, even if they are unable to visit that place for many years.

BOLIVIANS IN METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON At the national level, Bolivians are a tiny immigrant group representing 0.2 percent of the foreign-born in 2000. Yet, if we shift to individual states, the picture is different. In the state of Virginia, which has the largest number of Bolivians, they represent nearly three percent of the state’s foreign-born. In metropolitan Washing-

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ton, individuals born in Bolivia total some 20,000, which makes them about 2.5 percent of Washington’s foreign- born. Yet, the most striking statistic is that 37 percent of Bolivians recorded in the 2000 Census reside in metropolitan Washington, making it the top destination for this immigrant group (Table 16.1). This percentage is four times greater than the second most popular destination, metropolitan New York. Table 16.1: Top Metropolitan Areas for Bolivian Immigrants Top Metropolitan Areas for Bolivian Immigrants Washington, DC — MD — VA — WV, PMSA New York, NY, PMSA Los Angeles — Long Beach PMSA Miami, FL, PMSA Orange County, CA, PMSA Houston, TX, PMSA United States

Total Number of Foreign-Born Bolivians 19,558 4,384 3,245 2,981 1,665 1,191 53,278

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000, Summary File 3

Figure 16.1

Percent of all Bolivians in U.S. 37 8 6 6 3 2 100

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Bolivian emigration to Washington has its roots in the late 1960s, but the numbers of migrants were very small and mostly of European ancestry. The vast majority of Bolivians today have settled here in the past 20 years and are more representative of Bolivia’s mixed ancestry of Indian and European. From 1980 to 1990, the Bolivian community in Washington tripled in size. It then doubled in size from 1990 to 2000, nearing 20,000.1 Bolivians initially came to Washington in the 1980s because there were plenty of jobs and relatively little competition from other Latino immigrants. The community grew via chain migration, family unification policies, and an ethnic economy in which small Bolivian businesses based on home services (especially house cleaning and child care) and construction grew by employing other co-ethnics or sponsoring immigrants. As Figure 16.1 illustrates, Bolivians reside throughout the metropolitan area but they are more likely to live in the suburban counties than in the District of Columbia proper. Arlington, Annandale, and Springfield, Virginia, as well as Wheaton, Maryland, are important areas of concentration for Bolivian immigrants. In these localities one is likely to find restaurants that serve Bolivian specialties such as peanut soup or salteñas. There are also likely to be social organizations such as soccer leagues and folkloric dance groups. Yet it is not possible to find a “Little Bolivia,” that is, an ethnic enclave of only Bolivians. The localities in which Bolivians are concentrated tend to be the same areas popular with many other immigrants in the region, and this reality precludes the formation of a distinct ethnic enclave (Price et al., 2005). Rather than a discrete neighborhood, it is a vibrant network of immigrant-created organizations that maintain social networks and supply a sense of belonging and familiarity that support Bolivian immigrants and a transnational livelihood. One young woman who came from Bolivia as a child and now works for a state government, described her upbringing in Arlington as part of a rich and protective Bolivian social world in which weekends were filled with Bolivian activities, family and friends. “As a child in the U.S., I lived Bolivian and ate Bolivian. I had never been to a Bennigan’s (a chain restaurant) until I was a college student. In Arlington this is possible.” Such an ethnic cocoon can facilitate immigrant economic integration into the American mainstream but it may impede social integration. Bolivian migrants have a different socio-economic profile than the average Hispanic migrant (who typically is Mexican). The considerable distance traveled and the expense of travel from South America tends to screen out poorer and less educated potential migrants. In general, those who come to the U.S. have a level of education comparable to U.S. averages, and in some cases higher. Based on U.S. Census data regarding people who reported Bolivian ancestry, 96 percent had high school diplomas, 36 percent had bachelor’s degrees or higher, and 11 percent had Master’s degrees or higher; each of these levels exceeded U.S. averages for educational attainment. Of those reporting Bolivian ancestry, only one in four was born in the United States, underscoring the relative youth of this immigrant flow. This group also had a median household income of $47,000, which was $5,000 more than the U.S. median household income (U.S. Census, 2000). While these data do not capture all Bolivian immigrants, they do suggest that those who come to the U.S. arrive with more social capital, which tends to place them in a privileged position relative to other Hispanic immigrants. Bolivian educational attainment does not automatically translate into professional recognition in the United States. Many Bolivians who settle in the U.S. do not have their professional credentials recognized and find employment in jobs for which they are over qualified. It is not uncommon for medical doctors to work as lab technicians or as home healthcare aides. Bolivian-trained engineers and architects may get jobs in construction. For these people, migration to the U.S. almost always results in earning more money than one could in Bolivia but also experiencing a loss in social status, either temporarily or permanently. Perhaps most surprising to new Bolivian immigrants, is that migration to the U.S. often results in a new racial identity. Many Bolivians who consider themselves white in Bolivia are surprised to learn they are not viewed as “white” in the U.S. but as non-white Hispanic and part of an ethnic minority. Bolivia has its own national hierarchy regarding race that carefully distinguishes white, mestizos (mixed-race peoples) and Indians (Klein, 1992). Fitting into U.S. racial categories is not easy, and many Bolivians immigrants who sit atop the racial hierarchy in their own country experience racism for the first time as a minority in the United States. For some immigrants the difficult transition to an American lifestyle, coupled with the experience of discrimination and lower social status, drives them to return. Bolivian immigrant Israel Canelas wrote a small

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paperback book, The Dishwashers of the North (1994), describing his experiences in Northern Virginia in the 1980s. The dishwashers he refers to are recent immigrants in low-status jobs. The book testifies to the tough circumstances facing recent immigrants such as over-crowding, distance from family, language problems, legal status, alcoholism, racial discrimination, and exploitation by Americans and other Bolivians. The fact that such a book exists and is sold in the bookstores in Cochabamba indicates that there is public interest in the topic of emigration. Canelas’ stated intent is to debunk the myth of Bolivian immigrant success. He implores readers not to journey north but to do their best to remain in Bolivia. Bolivians arrive as legal migrants and as undocumented ones. Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS)2 data from 1990–98 recorded 5,644 Bolivians intending to reside in the Washington metropolitan area (Singer et al., 2001). There are also many undocumented arrivals, with Bolivians crossing the border illegally (using Mexican coyotes and paying up to $8,000 to enter) or legally entering on a tourist visa and then overstaying their visa and thus becoming an illegal migrant. For example, from July 1998 to July 1999, over 18,000 nonimmigrant tourist visas where issued by the U.S. Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia (a typical figure for much of the 1990s). Embassy staff interviewed also acknowledged that visa seekers from Cochabamba were disproportionately greater (both in visas granted and denied). The costs and benefits associated with straddling such vast distances intensify when an immigrant enters the U.S. illegally or overstays a visa. In the summer of 2003, Catalina Morrales sat in front of the newly constructed church and plaza in the small village of La Loma in the Department of Cochabamba. The handsome additions were built with money sent form villagers working in Washington, and they are so recognized by a bronze plague placed in the plaza. All six of Catalina’s adult children live in metropolitan Washington; the boys work in construction and the girls clean houses. The first two entered in 1999, another two followed in 2000, and the last two left in 2002. All entered without papers. “They left” she says, “because there is no work here.” Her children left with their spouses and have had their own children in the U.S. whom Catalina knows only through photos. “When my children get their residencia (green card) they will come every year to see me, but now they can’t.” Given their undocumented status in the U.S., a trip home without legal residence would result in their deportation and the imposition of a ten-year ban from legal entry to the U.S. as tourists or immigrants. Yet those who cannot physically return to their homelands use money and social networks to maintain contact with far away homes. The Importance of Place: The Bolivian Context As geographers Rachel Silvey and Vicky Lawson (1999) observe, migration studies in geography in the 1960s through the 1980s often took a developmentalist perspective in which the “origins and destinations (of migrants) were the unproblematic stages upon which migration was played out” (1999, p. 122). We now know that these stages matter greatly, providing the sociospatial setting in which identities are shaped, decisions to move or not to move are made, and for those places that send labor abroad, sometimes transnational connections are fostered. Bolivia is a poor country, one of the poorest in the Western Hemisphere. Labor mobility has been a time-honored strategy in Bolivia for dealing with limited resources and the country has experienced significant demographic shifts in the past century from the highlands to lowland frontiers, from rural areas to cities, and increasingly to labor markets abroad. Much of the scholarly work on Bolivian emigration has focused on an older and far greater stream of migrants to Argentina (Whiteford, 1981; Benencia and Karasik, 1994; Dandler and Medeiros, 1988), where 1.5 million ethnic Bolivians live, many of them of mestizo and Indian ancestry. Within this context of internal mobility, certain areas of Bolivia are known for producing emigrants, especially the Department of Cochabamba. Considered in colonial times through the 19th century as the breadbasket of Bolivia, this department is known now as a region that expels labor (Larson and Harris, 1995). Part of the problem is limited land resources and the division of land between more and more people reduces the amount of land available to any one person. Climatic change has found the valley drier throughout the 20th century, which

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has limited its agricultural productivity. Furthermore, as free trade has opened up new markets, cheaper grains from elsewhere in South America has made grain production in Cochabamba less financially viable. Opportunities elsewhere within Bolivia also contributed to the tendency for people to leave rural Cochabamba, especially the region known as the Valle Alto. In the 1950s and 1960s peasant farmers were attracted to the tropical plains around Santa Cruz where both large-scale mechanized farming and land colonization schemes turned the plains into Bolivia’s most dynamic and productive agricultural region (Stearman, 1985). Like other developing countries, rural people moved to urban areas and the city of Cochabamba grew disproportionately faster than its surrounding municipalities. In the 1970s and 1980s, Cochabamba peasants also took advantage of the coca boom (the plant used to produce cocaine), moving into the forests of the Chapare to plant coca (Sanabria, 1993). This particular flow of settlers slowed in the 1990s with international and internal pressure to reduce coca production. International labor flows from Cochabamba were evident by the 1960s as seasonal migration to wealthier Argentina began with sugarcane harvests in northern Argentina and evolved into more permanent settlement of Bolivian immigrants in the city of Buenos Aires (Repado, 1981). By the 1980s, employment opportunities in the United States became widely known and the trickle of economic migrants to cities such as Washington, New York, Miami, and Los Angeles began. As Argentina’s economic situation worsened in the 1990s, the search for foreign employment destinations became more targeted to the U.S. (Figure 16.2). Figure 16.2 Teenagers in the Valle Alto share their plans to emigrate to the United States where most already had extended family living and working in Washington. (Photo by author).

When driving the dirt roads of the Valle Alto, the villages that have migrants working in Washington are easily spotted. These are the settings where new and large homes rise above the one-story whitewashed adobe structures that dominate small villages. New cars, bicycles, and satellite dishes dot the landscape. Renovated plazas and schools, new churches, basketball courts, and soccer fields are found. Yet there is often a strange quiet about these places, which tend to be disproportionately populated by the young and the old, with working-age people scarce. The rhythms of village life are punctuated by long lines of people at the end of the

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month looking for remittances sent via wire transfer services. Also common are lines of women and children waiting for international calls outside the village telephone service. There are the festive days, especially around Christmas, Carnival, and August when triumphant migrants return with gifts and lavish parties are thrown. However, the long days of waiting for news, money or a telephone call from a loved one far away are not uncommon. Data obtained from the Department of Migration in Cochabamba show the importance of the United States as a destination. In the year 2001 alone, over 7,000 of the 20,000 Cochabambinos who moved abroad, indicated the United States was their intended destination (35%).3 From this same government registry data for the years 1994–2003 (although incomplete for some years), show that over 24,000 people from the Department of Cochabamba reported travel to the United States with the intent to reside there. It should also be noted that these patterns can suddenly shift given political changes both in the U.S. and elsewhere. During the first five months of 2003, the number of Cochabambinos leaving remained the same but the destination shifted to Spain (40% of the flow), while the U.S. received just 16 percent of the flow. Tourist and immigrant visas became more difficult for Bolivians to get after the terrorist attacks in September, 2001. In contrast, Spain had opened its doors to immigrants from its former colonies. Within the Department of Cochabamba, most emigrants seem to come from the city of Cochabamba and its environs, and the villages south of the city in an agricultural area referred to as the Valle Alto. When asked why them came to Washington, nearly every immigrant mentions jobs. The Washington metropolitan area is affluent, with one of the highest median household incomes in the country; and it is growing. Thus, there is a sizeable population demanding cleaning services, nannies, home improvements, new housing, and ready-made meals. Up until the mid-1980s, there were relatively few Hispanics in the metropolitan area. This meant that there was less competition for domestic, service, and low-skilled jobs that immigrants often fill, especially when compared to the larger Hispanic immigrant destinations such as Los Angeles, New York City, and Miami. But most importantly, the social networks Bolivians rely upon to emigrate, lead them to the suburbs of Washington.

BOLIVIAN SOCIAL NETWORKS Although Washington is the principal destination for Bolivians, their imprint on the region is surprisingly limited as no discrete ethnic enclave exists. Socially, however, a remarkable network of soccer clubs, cultural and village-based associations, travel services, and media exist that support the Bolivian community and build upon their transnational identity. Thus there is a contradiction between the limited physical expression of their community and the complex social networks that have evolved that support Bolivian immigrants abroad and maintain important transnational linkages with their communities of origin. Adult recreational soccer leagues are an essential component of Bolivian immigrant life. What is more interesting, is that they are often organized along Bolivian regional/provincial lines so they provide an opportunity for laborers to get together with other people from their home villages once or twice a week and play a game that they love. On Sundays, wives, sisters, sons, and daughters come to watch the games and socialize. In metropolitan Washington there are at least four exclusively Bolivian soccer leagues, each with a dozen teams or more. One Bolivian league, INCOPEA, has organized its teams to represent various villages in the Valle Alto. The league uses soccer events to raise money for building basketball courts, schools, churches, and new soccer fields in the villages represented by the teams (Price and Whitworth, 2004). Thus team Tiataco supplied money to build a social hall in the center of their village, while team Achamoco raised funds to build a new Catholic church and improve the village school. For many immigrant men, soccer leagues are the first and often only Bolivian organization they join while living in the U.S. Yet through soccer they maintain contact with people from their village or province, learn of job opportunities, socialize, and play a game they love with people who know them. In many ways soccer leagues epitomize the real yet ephemeral social spaces that Bolivian immigrants carve for themselves in Washington. Yet such networks are vital for the transnational linkages that sustain Bolivians in the U.S. and communities in Bolivia.

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Like soccer, folkloric dance groups are also important for fostering transnational ties, especially for the children of immigrants. Through dance, children and teenagers learn to take pride in Bolivian culture and perform at numerous festivals in the U.S. and Bolivia. As one young woman described to me, “I didn’t feel very Bolivian until I joined a dance group. At first my mom made me go, but now I do it because I love it.” There are nearly two dozen Bolivian dance groups in greater Washington. Most of the groups purchase their costumes directly from sources in Bolivia. For over a decade, most major Washington, D.C. parades include a Bolivian dance troop marching down the street in their brightly colored costumes complete with layered mini-skirts and boots. Such groups are a public face of Bolivian culture present at such events as the Cherry Blossom Festival, the Latino Festival, and Independence Day parades on the Mall. Yet, dance groups are also networked among metropolitan areas. Groups travel to compete in regional competitions, such as the one held in Alexandria, Virginia in 2004 that included 15 groups from Washington, New York and Florida. The best funded groups even travel to Cochabamba to participate in the Virgin de Urkupiña festival in August where thousands of people dance in the streets. Village-based associations are another expression of transnationalism used by many immigrant communities. Such groups are formed to channel resources, provide social outlets and to organize charity work for the communities of origin. One group, the Comité Pro-Tarata, represents over 300 people from the small town of Tarata in the Valle Alto. Their various activities have included reconstructing a historic tower in their town plaza and sponsoring artists from Tarata to perform at annual events in Washington. Another group, representing the village of Mizque, sent money and goods to the village after a major earthquake in 1998. Another group Comité Pro-Boliviana organizes yearly charitable contributions of clothes, toys and medicines for Cochabamba. In addition to cultural organizations, print and broadcast journalism are vital tools for information exchange among Bolivians. Bolivian-produced Spanish language newspapers and radio shows draw an audience in Washington and Cochabamba. Free weekly/monthly newspapers such as Bolivia Today or El Bolivariano have existed for nearly a decade. In 2004, the largest newspaper in Cochabamba, Los Tiempos, began a weekly U.S. edition of its paper just for the Washington community. A radio show (Radio Barinquen) has a weekly simulcast show (Viva mi Patria Bolivia) between Washington and Cochabamba where callers from either continent can all in and communicate with each other and the rest of the Bolivian community. And, like many other immigrant communities, Bolivians use their independence day (August 6) to organize a massive outside gathering of Bolivians to celebrate their national culture, and cuisine. Figure 16.3 is an independence celebration in the late 1990s that brought over 10,000 Bolivians together at an Arlington, Virginia high school. Finally, the Bolivian School (Escuela Bolivia) was established in 1998 through cooperation with the Bolivian Embassy and the Arlington County School District; the school runs on Saturdays in an Arlington elementary school. Most of the instructors are volunteers and the curriculum is taught in Spanish. Using Bolivian textbooks, children learn music, culture, government, geography, and history of Bolivia. The cost is minimal (only $60 a semester) and typically 100–200 students enroll. Although anyone can enroll, most of the students are either Bolivian by birth or their parents are Bolivian. One of the school’s founders, Emma Violand-Sanchez, is Bolivian-born and works for the Arlington County School District. The purpose of this school is to make sure that the children of immigrants maintain their identity with and understanding of Bolivia. In a transnational world, such an education is valued not just by individuals but by the state, as the Bolivian Embassy contributes to this program.

TRANSNATIONAL MIGRANTS/TRANSNATIONAL SPACES The aim of this case study is to ground transnational migration by selecting two points (Washington and Cochabamba) and articulating the social fields created by migrants that link these localities. In so doing, it suggests that transnational flows, rather than being amorphous, are tied to specific points on the map. Transnational lives become ones in which identity can be uncoupled from place (like the U.S.-born child raised in a Bolivian social world). Yet real places, be they the villages of the Valle Alto or the suburbs of Washington, are also changed by these transnational labor flows.

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From the Bolivian perspective this transnational experience is driven by economic need. Structural, political and environmental forces have conspired time and again to drive Bolivians out. Consequently, systems of reciprocity and labor migration have been modified and adapted through time to accommodate basic survival. Today in Latin America’s neo-liberal climate, dollars freely circulate in the country and most shops will take them as willingly as they take their national currency. People leave and yet they return (perhaps with a hybrid identity). A recent Bolivian President, Sanchez de Lozada, who was forced out of office in 2004, was referred to as the “Falso Gringo” because of his heavily accented Spanish after years of living and working in the United States. Perhaps the maintenance of linkages to one’s country of birth is instilled in Bolivians from an imbedded sense of reciprocity that is nurtured through time and experience. A pattern of exporting labor to sustain rural places and livelihoods is well established, especially in the Valle Alto. Moreover, one cannot underestimate the value of staying connected to far away places as an emotional safety net when the lives of immigrants in Washington can be extremely challenging economically, socially and culturally. Immigration is the human face of economic globalization: the flows may shift, but there is little room for doubt that the number of people who leave their country of birth for employment elsewhere will continue to grow. Given that, it is important that we as scholars develop multiple field sites and make linkages between real

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places. In conducting this work, sensitivity to scale results in understanding different kinds of flows of people and different levels in which places are impacted. In addition to awareness of scale, there is also the need to be sensitive to the differentiation of place — the different meanings migrants ascribe to the places they leave and where they settle, but also the different ways these same people are perceived in places. Lastly, the socio-spatial challenge of transnationalism is to understand how place, space, and identity are reconceptualized by the experiences of immigrants resulting in new social spaces that are neither here nor there but some place in between.

NOTES 1

This figure is only the foreign-born counted in the U.S. Census in 2000, the children of Bolivians would not be counted thus the ethnic community is certainly larger. 2

INS became CIS (Citizenship and Immigration Services) in 2003 and was transferred from the Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland Security. CIS no longer makes the intended zip code of residence data available for legal permanent residents entering the U.S. 3

The next most popular destination was Chile (19%) and then Argentina (17%). This is a significant departure from earlier patterns, in 1994 one-third of all people leaving Cochabamba for abroad were headed to Argentina.

Chapter 17

Immigrant Accommodation and Intra-Ethnic Friction: The Case of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in San Antonio RICHARD C. JONES INTRODUCTION “The Changing Heartland,” the “Hispanic Disapora,” “Tragedy in a Place of Quiet Serenity” are bylines of popular articles that have captured the attention of Americans in the past few years and placed on the map towns such as Morganton and Siler City, North Carolina; Rogers, Arkansas; Dalton, Georgia; Denison, Iowa; and Garden City, Kansas (Foust et al., 2002; Yeoman, 2000; Campo-Flores, 2001; Fountain, 2002; Stull and Broadway, 2004). Latino immigrants, especially Mexicans, have arrived in homogenous rural communities of the Midwest and traditionally bi-racial communities of the South, in such numbers that the only way to express it is demographic metamorphosis. At the same time, communities with long histories of immigration continue to receive immigrants and are finding challenges as they reshape urban landscapes. Such is the case of San Antonio, Texas. Located in a border state, San Antonio has a Mexican-American population that traces back generations. It also has experienced substantial Mexican immigration in recent decades. One might suspect that given its legacy with Mexico and having a large Mexican-American population in place, this community would provide a relatively friendly environment that would readily accommodate the newer Mexican immigrants. As we shall see, this is not the case for a number of reasons. This chapter investigates the spatial patterns and the accommodation (social and cultural adjustment to the larger society) of Mexican immigrants in relation to Anglos and Mexican Americans in Bexar County (San Antonio), Texas — a metropolitan county with 1.4 million persons in 2000. Census tract data from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census; photographs; and household interviews are employed to describe and visualize these patterns. This chapter spotlights first-generation immigrants — not the second and later generations that are the focus of most assimilation studies. Obviously, changes in the attitudes and behaviors of the immigrants themselves cannot be used to form final opinions on accommodation. However, in the U.S. (as in San Antonio) a 60 percent increase in Latino immigration over the 1990s suggests that first-generation assimilation (or lack of it) is an important issue that researchers and policy makers would be wise to address now, rather than defer to future generations.

ACCOMMODATION OF MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE SOUTHWEST The literature reveals two separate processes involved in immigrant accommodation: (1) integration, defined as social interaction with the host society at various levels, and (2) acculturation, defined as adoption of host society cultural traits. These are, in fact, two distinct dimensions of accommodation, suggesting a typology (Figure 17.1). A situation of low acculturation and high integration is exemplified by many Chinese, Asian Indian, and Arab communities in the United States. These groups provide a good example of selective acculturation (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996) — the adoption or exercising of cultural traits that benefit their integration (such as education, hard work, and honesty), while rejecting others that impede it (such as aberrant religious or marriage practices).

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Conversely, an ethnic group may lose or be forced to abandon its culture, and at the same time lack any significant societal contacts. The situation of high acculturation and low integration would apply to an urban immigrant underclass such as “Cholos” (chicanos) or black Caribbean and African migrants, who acculturate into dysfunctional inner-city subcultures, and thus remain isolated and marginalized, a process termed dissonant acculturation (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996; Berry, 1990; Hintzen, 2001; Smith, 2001; Stoller, 2001). Integration accompanied by acculturation is exemplified by Western European groups that have been in the U.S. for generations and are ethnically and culturally indistinguishable from the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) mainstream. Finally, the joint absence of both acculturation and integration is exemplified by Hmong and Mexicans. These groups are separated by low socio-economic status and discrimination from the traditional mainstream, but they are not socialized into an urban underclass. Figure 17.1

Immigrant Accommodation Typology, with Examples Integration

High

Chinese, Asian Indians, Arabs

European Groups

BARRIERS TO INTEGRATION

Low

Hmong, Mexicans

Urban “Cholos,” Afro-Caribbeans

Low

High

Acculturation

The literature recognizes several barriers to integration that tend to separate different immigrant groups on the integration dimension of the above typology. These include: (1) discrimination toward that group by the host society, (2) the pressure to conform to dissonant norms, (3) lack of incentives to interact with the larger society, (4) low levels of community and family resources, and (5) immigration status. These barriers are represented by the horizontal dashed line in Figure 17.1. Where, as in the case of Mexican immigrants, the group faces discrimination on the job (in part owing to undocumented status), temporariness, and low socioeconomic status, the level of integration with the larger society is lower than in the cases of “model minorities” such as those indicated at the top of the figure.

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The popular articles initially cited reflect nativism and discrimination towards Mexican migrants in Southern and Midwestern communities. These migrants practice their culture under the microscope of community disapproval, which coupled with their legal status causes many of them to “navigate under the radar” and keep a low profile. In the Southwest, Mexican immigrants often face this same covert and overt disapproval on the part of “Anglo” residents (Ortiz, 1996; Ramos, 2002, p. 29). This is not really surprising, given the upper southern and midwestern roots of most Anglo-Texans (Meinig, 1969; Jordan et al., 1984). However, in the Southwest, Mexican immigrants would seem to have the benefit of a mediating culture — that of Mexican Americans — to represent their interests and concerns. As two immigration scholars noted: “(American) mainstream culture, which is highly variegated in any event — by social class and region, among other factors — changes as elements of the cultures of the newer groups are incorporated into it. The composite culture that we identify with the mainstream is made up of multiple interpenetrating layers and allows individuals and sub-populations to forge identities out of its materials to distinguish themselves from others in the mainstream” (Alba and Nee, 2003, p. 13).

Based on this notion of the reconstituted cultural mainstream, some would argue that a single “composite culture” of Mexicans and Mexican Americans exists in the Southwest, and that this culture is slowly merging with Anglo culture. In support of this notion one might cite the increasingly conservative political leanings of upwardly mobile Hispanics (Michelson, 2001), or recent reports suggesting that Hispanic residential segregation is declining in the Southwest, even as it increases elsewhere in the country (Fields and Herndon, 2001). Few, however, have examined the social and spatial relationships between Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the Southwest. It is often assumed that Mexican Americans constitute a step in the process of transforming Mexicans to Americans. However, Dan Arreola’s book Tejano South Texas (2002) dispels that notion, by documenting a new culture and cultural province defined by foods, music, fiestas, language and political organizations, which are resilient and quite separate from core (interior) Mexican culture. Other research suggests that an adversarial relationship exists between Mexicans and Mexican Americans. The immigration literature, for example, expounds on reciprocal stereotypes — by Mexicans of the “cholo” or “pachuco” (Mexican American) who has abandoned his roots and country (López-Castro, 1986), and by Mexican Americans of the poor, uneducated immigrant fleeing Mexican poverty, corruption, and crime (Shain, 1999; 2000). Mexican Americans may attempt to distance themselves from their Mexican roots by criticizing Mexico in various ways to others, avoiding travel there, and deemphasizing Spanish in the home — part of a process that has been referred to as disidentification with one’s own ancestry group (Kibria, 2002, p. 88). Interestingly, the majority culture of both countries looks down on Mexican Americans, identifying them with the vices of the other country. Arguably, this mutual estrangement has contributed to the emergence of the Tejano cultural region. As Mexican Americans move more into the mainstream owing to economic and political success — i.e., as they move closer to Anglo majority norms — they may become less concerned about discrimination against immigrants of their own ethnic group. Hispanic support of immigrants in the middle 1990s (Rosales et al., 2001) hinged upon issues such as Proposition 187 in California and IRIRA (The Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996); this support declined as Hispanics advanced economically in the late 1990s. The Hispanic political agenda shifted to emphasize crime, gangs, and drugs, rather than immigration (Lee et al., 2001; Michelson, 2001; Michelson and Pallares, 2001; Ono, 2002). For this research on San Antonio, the following questions were asked: (1) Has the segregation of Latino immigrants (from both Anglos and Mexican Americans) increased or decreased since 1990? (2) Are Mexican homes clustered together, and do they stand out on the urban landscape? (3) Do Mexican immigrants exhibit low or high levels of accommodation with Mexican Americans, and how does this compare to their accommodation with Anglos? Before discussing findings of this research, a brief geographical and historical sketch of San Antonio is offered to provide context for the analysis.

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SAN ANTONIO: GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The Spanish found San Antonio an ideal site and situation for establishment of their five missions and civil settlement in the early 1700s. The city provided spring water and agricultural land on the San Antonio River, limestone and timber along the Balcones escarpment, a healthful climate, and a position midway between their provincial capital in Coahuila and their strategic East Texas missions. During the Spanish (1720–1821) and Mexican (1821–36) periods, the city was the administrative capital of south Texas and the effective boundary between Mexico and Anglo-Texas — a place quite different from either Austin, the administrative core, or Nacogdoches, the frontier outpost for upper southern Anglos (Meinig, 1969). After Texas independence (1836–45) and statehood (1846+), the demographic and industrial growth of the state was concentrated in the latter areas, particularly Dallas, Houston, and (later) the High Plains. The border region — mostly hot, dry ranching country — grew slowly, largely due to natural increase, even after railroad connections were forged to the south and west. Until the 1960s, San Antonio exemplified the familiar south Texas pattern of an Anglo elite and a “Mexican” working class. The city’s business elite was overwhelmingly European (German, English, Irish, Polish, Belgian) and its service and manufacturing workers were Mexican (Jones, 2005). Hispanics had limited opportunities in politics, higher education, and business. This changed after 1960. The American Civil Rights Movement, political activism on the part of South Texas Hispanics (beginning in Crystal City in 1963), and rapid demographic growth stimulated by migration from Mexico reversed these trends and led to the emergence of Mexican Americans as a political and economic force in San Antonio and South Texas. In 1973, COPS (the Communities Organized for Public Service) was founded to campaign for flood control in Hispanic neighborhoods (Rosales, 2000). It evolved into a broad social movement dedicated to bringing better jobs and social services to Hispanics in the inner city. In the 1970s and 1980s San Antonio-based organizations such as MALDEF (the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund), LULAC (the League of United Latin American Citizens), SVRP (the Southwest Voters’ Registration Project), WVRI (the Willie Velasquez Research Institute), and HACU (the Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities) became forces for change in San Antonio and the entire Southwest. San Antonio’s Hispanic “minority” has since grown to a majority, aided by the strong representation and mobility of Hispanics in the military, health care, tourism, and trade sectors — mainstays of the city’s economic base. With their newfound economic and social mobility, San Antonio’s Hispanic community is today on equal political footing with Anglos in city government as well as in the schools, the community college district, and the hospital district. Furthermore, they enjoy a much more equitable access to social services and infrastructure than in the recent past. Onto this picture of an emerging Tejano political-economic force, another pattern has been superimposed in recent years — rapid immigration from Mexico. Over the 1990s the population of Bexar County grew 18 percent while the Mexican American population grew 28 percent, and the Latino immigrant population, 58 percent. These new Mexican immigrants are more urbanized and educated than past waves; still, they are typically of much lower socio-economic status than their hosts, and they are politically powerless given their (often) undocumented status. They present a series of dilemmas to their hosts. For Mexican Americans specifically, the question is this: How can these new Mexican immigrants be embraced as equals when they compete for lower-echelon jobs currently filled by Mexican Americans, and when their allegiances, culture, and needs are so different from those of mainstream Mexican Americans?

RESULTS: SPATIAL PATTERNS AND ACCOMODATION PROCESSES Spatial Patterns and Segregation in San Antonio: 1990–2000 A reference map of San Antonio, including the neighborhoods interviewed and photographed for this chapter, is provided as Figure 17.2. The location of San Antonio’s Latino immigrants (foreign-born) are shown in

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Figure 17.3, which illustrates the concept of locational inertia: turn-of-the-century jobs in food and garment manufacturing on the near southwest side that attracted Mexican migrants initially but have since disappeared, coupled with the existence of extended family in this area, keep families from moving en masse to the suburbs (Jones, 2005). The Mexican immigrant pattern (Figure 17.3) is quite close to the Mexican American pattern (not shown), implying correctly that immigrants seek out areas of their own ethnicity and language, in addition to areas of less-expensive housing. The somewhat greater downtown and near north side presence of immigrants reflects ties to jobs in the downtown tourist industry, and in construction and warehousing in the booming northern half of the city, respectively.

Figure 17.2

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PERCENT MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS BY CENSUS TRACTS 2000

Percent Immigrants2000 2000 Fig. 5. % Mexican Mexican Immigrants 0 - 3.37 3.37 - 5.47 5.47 - 9.67 9.67 - 14.47 14.47 - 33.53

3

0

3

6 Miles

Residential segregation is conceptually related to a group’s social acceptance by the mainstream society. It was the basis for the question raised by two sociologists, Park and Bogardus, “Would you accept [a particular outgroup member] as your neighbor?” It became the basis for the original social distance scale developed to measure the acceptance of immigrants in U.S. society during a period of ethnocentrism and isolationism (Park, 1924; Bogardus, 1925). More recently, segregation is measured by the standard Dissimilarity Index (DI), based on the absolute difference between a census tract’s percentage of a particular ethnic or ancestry group in a city (here, Mexican immigrants), and that tract’s percentage of another group (here, either Mexican Americans or Anglos). The summed differences for all tracts (standardized to a 1–100 scale) is a good indicator of how separated a particular group is from other groups in the city. The higher the index, the more the groups are separated. To illustrate, consider several groups’ segregation from the rest of the population in San Antonio in 2000 (see Table 17.1), based on 226 Bexar County census tracts and the SF3 and SF4 sample files from the U.S. Census. The city’s German ancestry population, owing to its nineteenth century rural presence to the northwest, northeast, and southeast and to its cultural assimilation, was broadly distributed across the city, and DI = 29.8. Its Filipino population, tracing to the early 1900s and currently holding military and professional occupations, was spread across the north side but also clustered around the military bases: DI = 42.8. The city’s Hispanic population, with a long history but experiencing rapid recent influxes of lower-status migrants, was concentrated on the south and west sides inside Loop 410, with a DI of 47.5. Finally, San Antonio’s Arab population, of recent vintage, were clustered around professional job opportunities near the South Texas Medical Center on the near northwest side of the city: DI = 54.2 (Jones and Crum, 2004).

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Table 17.1 Dissimilarity Index for Selected Ancestry Groups in Bexar County (San Antonio), 2000* Dissimilarity Group Population Index German English Filipino Black Chinese Hispanic Asian Indian Arab

142,172 82,130 5,236 100,025 3,779 757,033 3,858 9,636

29.8 34.7 42.8 45.6 47.5 47.5 50.3 54.2

County total

1,392,931

—

* based on the difference between a census tract’s percentage of the given ancestry group, and the tract’s percentage of all other groups. See text.

Regarding segregation of Mexicans and Mexican Americans from other groups in San Antonio, the results are informative. Mexican immigrants and Anglos (non-Hispanic whites) were relatively segregated from each other in 2000: the DI was 56.5. This was somewhat higher than Mexican American-Anglo segregation in the same year: 50.8. Both figures represented declines from 1990, in keeping with patterns found across the Southwestern U.S. The segregation of Mexican immigrants from Mexican Americans stands in stark contrast to the above figures: it was only 15.0 in 2000 (also a decline from 1990), emphasizing that Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans live in the same areas of the city. To place the DI of 50.8 (above) in context, consider recent figures on “Hispanic-White” segregation in 2000: Houston (55.7), Dallas (54.1), Phoenix (52.5), San Diego (51.0), and Denver (50.2). Similarly, Los Angeles’ Hispanic/white DI in 2000 was 63.2, while New York’s was 66.7 and Chicago’s, 62.1 (Logan et al., 2004). Apparently, the larger the city, the more powerful the forces of segregation. The reasons for this have not been systematically addressed in the literature, but appear related to the lower socioeconomic status of Mexicans, the competitive multi-ethnic nature of large cities, and the relatively low value of Mexican ethnic identity capital (Kibria, 2002) in such settings. It is important to note that, unfortunately, the DI is an overarching statistic that sometimes obscures processes at work in different parts of a city (such as the inner city and the suburbs). In San Antonio, one of these processes is spatial substitution between Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the inner city — defined here as inside Loop 410 (the inner ring in Figure 17.2). Over the past decade, Mexican American and Mexican immigrant populations have increased in the inner city. However, the growth of the Mexican immigrants was proportionately higher and resulted in an increased concentration of Mexican immigrants who replaced many Mexican Americans who moved in substantial numbers to the suburbs. Thus, a spatial substitution process, in which Mexican immigrants are replacing Mexican Americans, has taken place. Inner City Mexican Cultural Landscapes: Field Research Another shortcoming of the DI is a scale issue. Mapped at the census tract level, it can obscure what is happening at the more micro level, street by street. The demographic maps presented in Figures 17.2 and 17.3 indicate that Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans tend to occupy the same census tracts. However, this

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provides no insight as to what occurs in small neighborhoods or city blocks. Are Mexican residences clustered together along the street, and do they stand out on the urban landscape? Field research conducted in San Antonio neighborhoods, which are numbered in Figure 17.2, revealed that there is a loose clustering of Mexican immigrant homes, often adjacent to unattractive (or disamenity) features such as creek beds, railroad tracks, or manufacturing and warehousing. This is illustrated by the photograph that appears as Figure 17.4. However, freestanding homes are not the only structures occupied by Mexicans. Many reside in apartment complexes, trailers, and homes converted to apartments, including those in old mansions near the city center. Sometimes garages are transformed into living quarters for Mexican migrants. In the inner city, rental apartments and home conversions prevail, whereas in the suburbs an even mix of rental and owned homes is prevalent. Over 70 percent of the Latino foreign-born in San Antonio reside in the inner city in these varied housing types. As noted earlier, their residences are located within a few miles of jobs in the inner city or on the city’s near north side. It is often impossible to determine whether a home is occupied by a Mexican immigrant or by a Mexican American family without interviewing the family or asking the neighbors. However, as depicted in Figure 17.5, some first-generation Mexican homes do exhibit certain features, as noted by Arreola (1988): colorful wood trim, yard statuary, small shrines, potted plants, and prickly pear cactus (nopales). While some clustering may occur, it is often the case that a Mexican immigrant family’s home is not adjacent to another Mexican immigrant household. In Figure 17.5, an Anglo family lives in an old Victorian home to the left, while a Mexican American family lives in a less-adorned wood home to the right. Neighborhoods with large numbers of Mexican immigrants are also identifiable by their high levels of yard and street activity. Examples include fiestas (with music and piñatas) in yards, families sitting on porches or under trees, men fixing cars on the street or in driveways, boys playing basketball or soccer on the street, musical ice cream trucks plying their goods, and in general a much more lively street atmosphere than in Anglo or Mexican American neighborhoods. However, there is not a single type of Mexican immigrant neighborhood landscape. Rather, diverse conditions exist within an area generally dominated by those of Mexican ancestry. Figure 17.4. Mexican Immigrant Home Adjacent to Industrial District

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Figure 17.5. Mexican Immigrant Home Identifiable by Yard Activity

Social Accommodation Processes: 2004 Survey Results The research results presented in this section were derived from a survey conducted by the author in 2004 in five different neighborhoods that experienced high growth rates of the Latino foreign-born between 1990 and 2000. These neighborhoods are labeled in Figure 17.2 and were selected non-randomly to represent different locations (inner city vs. suburbs), different socio-economic levels, different job opportunities, and different ethnic compositions. A questionnaire was administered to one of the heads (male or female) of household. Forty composition questions on family demography, contacts, acculturation, discrimination, and self-esteem were part of the survey. These questions were administered in a format that required choices from a list of responses. These close-ended questions were supplemented by two open questions inviting commentary on personal experiences of acculturation and discrimination. The sampling was designed to represent the characteristics noted above and to secure in-depth qualitative data. Seventeen in-depth interviews were completed on a face-to-face basis. The results are discussed using a narrative approach, rather than employing tabular statistics. Demographically, the sample is cosmopolitan in its Mexican context. Unlike some previous samples of San Antonio immigrants (Jones, 1995 and 1996), two-thirds of the present sample were born in metropolitan areas of Mexico, and about half came from interior as opposed to border states in Mexico. This origin profile reflects the economic crisis in Mexico between 1982 and 1994 and that country’s oscillation between depression and recovery ever since. This crisis was not exclusively lodged in rural areas, as in the past, but was equally severe in large urban areas. Although cosmopolitan, our sample is socioeconomically marginal by U.S. standards, less than a quarter having completed high school (vs. more than 4/5 in the U.S.); their median family income of $15,000 is less than one-third the U.S. median. The average interviewee had been in the U.S. for 13 years, was 37 years old, and was as likely to be male as female. Our inner-city respondents (12 of the 17) are spatially perched on the fringes of the booming downtown tourist district where the men work as cooks, waiters, construction workers, and craftsmen, while the women toil as cleaners, shop-tenders, craftspersons, and the like. Regarding integration, no measure indicated that members of our sample are deeply involved with either Mexican Americans or Anglos, on a social basis or otherwise. To the contrary, between half and two-thirds have

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principally Mexican friends and neighbors. These findings are somewhat surprising given that Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans tend to live in the same neighborhoods. In addition, a substantial proportion of our sample worked under a Mexican-American boss or supervisor. These findings suggest that there is a certain social distancing occurring between the two groups of Mexican ancestry. This contention is supported by responses to the question, “Do you think that the Mexican community of San Antonio is more in contact with the (Anglo-Mexican American) community than some years ago?” All respondents answered positively in reference to Anglos, but several answered negatively in reference to Mexican Americans. Overall, however, it must be stressed that Mexican immigrants’ contacts with neither group are particularly strong. Our Mexican immigrant sample appears to lead a somewhat isolated and estranged existence. The following statements from three respondents support the observation that Mexican immigrants feel distant from their new neighbors: “Here, neighbors are very isolated and families don’t visit like in Mexico. I can’t send my kids into the street to play.” “(Even after 20 years), I feel one hundred percent Mexican, and my friends are totally Mexican.” “Here, the Mexican has constructed buildings, has constructed houses, has done many things, but the American does not see them; he zips about here and there, and when he doesn’t need us any longer, he has la migra [U.S. immigration authorities] cast us back into Mexico.”

As can be surmised from these comments, our Mexican immigrant sample is not acculturating, either. All but one respondent were functionally monolingual, and although some language shift was evident (one-half had used the Tex-Mex expressions “jonke” [junk] and “te llamo para atras” [I’ll call you later], this is hardly indicative of socialization into Tejano culture. Almost exclusively, our respondents preferred Mexican food and Mexican music; and interestingly, American food and music were preferred over Tejano. Our interviewees identified themselves as “Mexican” in two out of three cases. The other preferred terms were “Hispanic” and “Latino”; interestingly, none preferred the terms “Mexican American” or “Chicano.” Perceived discrimination against Mexicans in the schools, on the job, and in public agencies is apparently an important barrier to Mexican integration and acculturation in San Antonio. In response to the question “Do teachers here give less attention to Mexican than to other students?” a fifth of the respondents agreed. Mexican American teachers (owing to their bilingualism) were believed to be less discriminatory towards Mexican students than Anglo teachers. In contrast, job supervisors and public servants of Mexican ancestry were viewed by Mexican immigrants as treating them in a more discriminatory fashion than Anglos in the same positions. In response to the questions “Do bosses here mistreat workers because they are Mexican?” and “Do public servants here help Mexicans less than they help other persons?” one-half of our sample agreed, but indicated that those of Mexican ancestry treated them with more discriminatory behavior than did Anglos. The statements below were typical among our respondents: “At work, they haven’t given me a raise for two years. The (Mexican-American) manager says: ‘I will check on this, but the boss may say to get rid of you.’ Thus, your request is ignored, or the boss never replies.” “Personally, I feel that Mexican (-American) bosses mistreat Mexicans more than American bosses. They abuse us more, they pay us less.” “Once I was driving a car that emitted a lot of smoke. An American policeman stopped me and said ‘Send a Mexican-American agent, I can’t understand him.’ The American said to the Mexican-American official ‘I’m going to give him a warning, but he has to get this problem fixed.’ The Mexican American said to me ‘OK, go ahead.’ But before leaving he said: ‘He’s [the American cop] a good guy. He’s giving you a chance. But if it were me, I would put you in jail and impound your car.’ And there are many experiences such as this by people I know.”

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It is also interesting that earlier (pre-1990) arrivals are not better-adapted to U.S. life than later arrivals. Their contacts and acculturation are basically the same, except that earlier arrivals identify themselves as “Hispanic” almost as frequently as “Mexicano,” whereas later arrivals see themselves almost exclusively as Mexicans. This suggests some level of acculturation — but not into Mexican American culture. When it comes to perception of discrimination on the job and in public agencies, however, earlier arrivals actually perceive more such discrimination than later arrivals, particularly from Mexican American bosses and public servants. Just what this means is open to question. Our sample exhibits low socioeconomic attainment on all three criteria — education, income, and occupation. Although earlier arrivals earn more than later arrivals, their median income is still only $22,500 — not even half the U.S. average, despite averaging twenty years in the United States. Recent arrivals may discount their low incomes, believing the American dream is still attainable. Earlier arrivals, perhaps feeling they have worked hard and deserve more compensation, conclude that there is discrimination against Mexicans in U.S. society.

CONCLUSIONS The United States has entered an era of accelerated immigration from Latin America and Asia that brings challenges for immigrant accommodation to the American “heartland” as well as to metropolitan gateway cities. The challenges are taking on many forms as expressed in this text. Racial conflict, ethnic diversity, and class distinctions are among the factors complicating racial/ethnic geographies and leading to societal challenges. It is true that the American mainstream is in a state of flux due to the accommodation of new groups. However, this process will take generations to play out, especially given the rapidity of the current influx that shows no indication of slowing. Meanwhile, regional complexities are resulting in new multicultural geographies and unique adjustment challenges on a local and regional basis. Resurgent waves of Mexican immigration in the U.S. are revealing a new rigidity in Anglo acceptance of Mexicans, evident in stricter welfare policies, backlash against bilingual programs, incidents of violence at the border, a new Border Patrol policy that has proven deadly for undocumented border crossers, and the rise of a new anti-Hispanic ethnocentrism as evidenced in the writings of scholars such as Samuel Huntington and Peter Brimelow. In the Southwest, the existence of a mediating culture, that of Mexican Americans, might be expected to lessen these problems, but an emerging literature, as well as the findings of this chapter, suggest otherwise. In fact, a somewhat adversarial relationship appears to exist, which the recent literature is only beginning to explain in terms of the economic success and changing political priorities of Mexican Americans, who now distance themselves from newcomers of common ancestry. In other words, intra-ethnic friction inhibits the accommodation of Mexicans into established Mexican American society. In San Antonio, despite the fact that Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants tend to live in the same neighborhoods, friendships and neighboring are quite limited and the perception of discrimination against Mexicans by Mexican American job supervisors and public servants (e.g., police) is widespread among immigrant families. Consequently, first generation Mexicans have not acculturated to Mexican American norms, nor have they acculturated to Anglo norms. The barriers to Mexican accommodation and well-being, which were discussed in this chapter, include discrimination, the lack of incentives for integration due to their temporariness and undocumented status, and their low levels of community and family resources. Related to this last point, Kibria’s notion of ethnic identity capital (politico-economic power and adjustment potential possessed by groups whose cultural traits are revered by the host society) is relevant (Kibria, 2002). Whereas first-generation Europeans, Asian Indians, and Cubans have such capital, groups like the Indochinese and Mexicans do not. The latter often lack the socio-economic status to lend credibility (in American eyes) to, and finances for, the formal promotion of their cultures. Finally, where there is a continuing antagonistic relationship between the origin and host countries, as between the U.S. and Mexico, there will be a carryover or halo effect resulting in stereotyping and disrespect of immigrants (although not refugees) from that country. This chapter has presented evidence for a negative image of Mexican immigrants by both

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alienated Americans and Mexican Americans who wish to maintain their status (and status quo) by distancing themselves from immigrants and thus controversy. Other research indicates that Mexican accommodation is more rapid for the second generation. English skills are better, cultural baggage is less, legal status is not a problem, and even though family resources are still modest, this generation is part of the Mexican American majority in San Antonio, with all the advantages that entails. Nevertheless, in San Antonio, the economic and social elite are still Anglo, so there is a second strong barrier to accommodation, because discrimination against Mexican Americans by Anglos is persistent. In a sense, the Tejano subculture is defined and fueled by these two types of discrimination, one which separates it from Mexico, and the other which separates it from mainstream Anglo culture. Only time will tell whether Mexican American culture redefines the American mainstream, dissolving the Tejano-American boundary, or whether it will endure indefinitely.

Chapter 18

Patterns and Issues in the Latinization of Allentown, Pennsylvania MARK E. REISINGER, JOHN W. FRAZIER, AND EUGENE L. TETTEY-FIO INTRODUCTION The Latinization of the United States has become pervasive, affecting nearly all major regions and communities of various sizes. Puerto Ricans, once highly concentrated in New York City neighborhoods, have decentralized within the northeastern U.S. in particular, and have begun to migrate to other regions as well. Because of changes in U.S. immigration policy, these American citizens have been joined by other highly diverse Latino cultural groups in recent decades, including those from the Dominican Republic, Central America, and South America. This chapter explores certain dimensions of the Latinization of Allentown (located in Lehigh County), Pennsylvania, although a similar process is unfolding in at least three other small cities in southeastern Pennsylvania. We use census data and interviews to explore the nature of Latino settlement in Allentown and certain Latino experiences and perceptions since arriving. We also provide photographs that illustrate the Latino imprints on this post-industrial city, once exclusively controlled by European Americans, particularly the Pennsylvania Dutch. Despite numerous issues regarding the Latinization of Allentown, we framed this chapter around five specific sets of questions. 1. Questions surrounding migration and population change. How many Latinos live in Allentown? Why have they selected Allentown? 2. Questions of geographic settlement patterns. We asked where Latinos live in Allentown and how this settlement structure relates to other ethnic settlement patterns described in social science literature. 3. Questions related to Anglo and Latino perceptions. We are interested in early cultural conflicts and whether or not Latinos feel they are treated fairly by their Anglo neighbors (Hispanics with whom we spoke did not differentiate European-American identities, rather they termed non-Latino whites as Anglos). 4. Questions about employment and fair treatment in the regional labor market. We asked whether or not Latinos were over represented in particular job categories and whether or not they felt fairly treated in the labor market. 5. Questions related to the cultural landscape of Allentown. We asked what types of Latino imprints are visible on the streetscapes of Allentown. Where possible, we used the reports of New York Times reporter Laurence Stains, who visited Allentown and wrote of Latinization as he observed it through interviews and direct observations in 1994 (Stains, 1994). His work is helpful in providing a baseline for Latino landscapes, perceptions and cultural conflicts a decade earlier than our observations.

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WHY ALLENTOWN? MIGRATION THEORIES AND LATINO MIGRATION TO ALLENTOWN Geography is only one among many disciplines that share interest in understanding and explaining migration patterns. For example, economists tend to focus on the role of labor and labor markets; sociologists, on institutional changes. The most frequently-heard explanation for migration is the push-pull theory, which states that some people move because they are pushed out of their former location, whereas others move because they are pulled or attracted to someplace else. This idea was first put forward by Ravenstein (1889), who concluded that pull factors were more important than push factors. Ravenstein posited that the desire to get ahead (economically) is more responsible for the voluntary migration of people than the desire to escape. Lee (1966) expanded upon some of Ravenstein’s ideas. He began by classifying the elements that influence migration into the following groups: 1. 2. 3. 4.

factors associated with the migrant’s origin; factors associated with a the migrant’s destination; obstacles between the two that the migrants must overcome (intervening obstacles); and personal factors.

Using Census migration data from 1985 to 1990, Reisinger (2003) showed that the greatest number of Latino migrants to the Allentown area came from the New York City metropolitan area. A similar pattern is apparent in the Census migration data from 1995 to 2000. That data indicates that approximately 2700 Latino migrants came to Lehigh County from New York City. In addition, there is a substantial flow of migrants to Lehigh County from adjacent Pennsylvania counties and directly from Puerto Rico. Reisinger (2003) argues that it is difficult to use any one theory to explain migration patterns. The authors’ field research in Allentown in 2004 included four focus groups of Latinos, who were asked to explain their reasons for moving to Allentown. Their responses support Reisinger’s position. While many Latinos stated that their reason for moving to Allentown was for job and employment (see Inés’s comments), many others had different reasons. “When I arrived here the goal was to obtain a better quality of life, a good job and I am in the process; I am working in the area that I am graduated from in my country, that is, accounting.” Inés

Marriage and family reasons, tranquility and safety, housing costs, and the ability to purchase a home were all ranked very high as reasons for relocating to Allentown (see Miriam’s comments below). Unlike the simple economic theories and views documented above, many Latinos reported that fear was the main reason for leaving New York City and coming to Allentown (Reisinger, 2003). In addition, Allentown’s social and physical structure is changing and is attractive to Latino migrants. Results from the same research indicate that only a small majority of Latino migrants know English very well. With its many Spanish speaking residents, Allentown is highly attractive for this demographic. “Look, I came from New York; I lived most of my life there. And somebody said to me that here was very tranquil and safe for children, but in reality it is not as safe as they made me believe (several laugh). When I moved here, we bought a house and that is the reason that we live here.” Miriam

What Reisinger (2003) was trying to illustrate is the fact that, though there are many accurate and interesting theories concerning migration, it is clear that there is more to the migration puzzle. One has to take into account all factors when explaining migration patterns, including the fact that different places may provide certain individuals and groups with greater utility than their current location. Simmons (1968) defined place utility as “… a measure of attractiveness or unattractiveness of an area, relative to other locations, as perceived by the individual decision maker” (also, see Wolport, 1965).

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A utility function to summarize the relationships between variables describing the migrant household, its current location, and potential alternative locations would be difficult to devise because a migrant’s judgment of utility is often subjective. In any case, a migrant’s relocation decision can be very complex and include economic and noneconomic considerations.

LATINO-WHITE SEGREGATION IN THE ALLENTOWN REGION Since Latinization is occurring throughout the U.S. in large and small communities, it is important to place the Allentown region in a broader context of segregated communities. By 1990 the local Latino population had reached 12, 274, up from about 4,000 in 1980. Between 1980 and 2000 the local Latino population quadrupled to 26, 058 and Latinos were now about 25 percent of the entire Allentown population. How segregated is this population in the metropolitan region? How does it compare with other communities with large and growing Latino populations? One way to examine such questions is through the use of the dissimilarity index, which is a measure of segregation, or spatial unevenness of groups in a community. It is derived by comparing the sum of the differences in the proportion of the two groups — in this case Latinos and white non-Latinos — in a geographic area. The index values range from zero (no segregation) to 100 (complete segregation). Table 18.1 reports these indices for the twenty metropolitan regions with the highest values in the U.S. Table 18.1

Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

DISSIMILARITY INDEXES 2000 Area Name Lawrence, MA-NH PMSA Reading, PA MSA Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA MSA Bridgeport, CT PMSA New York, NY PMSA Newark, NJ PMSA Hartford, CT MSA Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA PMSA Springfield, MA MSA Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA MSA Chicago, IL PMSA Lancaster, PA MSA Waterbury, CT PMSA Lowell, MA-NH PMSA Tyler, TX MSA Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA Worcester, MA-CT PMSA Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI PMSA New Haven-Meriden, CT PMSA Salinas, CA MSA Boston, MA-NH PMSA York, PA MSA

White/Latinos Index 75 72 68 67 67 65 64 63 63 62 62 62 61 61 60 60 60 60 60 59 59 58

Four of southeastern Pennsylvania’s small metro regions appear in this list. Reading has the second highest index in the nation, indicating that only the Lawrence, Massachusetts-New Hampshire metro area has a higher level of Latino-white segregation. Allentown is number ten in this ranking and, while being less segregated than metro regions

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like New York, Newark, and Los Angeles, it has a higher degree of segregation than Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston and other metropolitan areas with significant Latino populations. How is this relatively high level of Latino-white segregation reflected on a local level? This question is addressed in the next section below. Assimilation or Sequent Occupance? Before visualizing the settlement evolution of Latinos in Allentown, it is important to have an understanding of the theory of immigrant ethnic settlements in the U.S. Many years ago, geographers coined the phrase “sequent occupance.” This phrase described a process in which one cultural group replaced another due to the host culture’s abandonment of the area, or from forces that pushed it out. In either case, the new culture brought its ways of life to the region and imprinted them on the visible cultural landscape. Certainly, remnants of the old culture remained visible, but the new arrivals eventually transformed the appearance of the place to reflect their ways. A more popular view of ethnic settlement in the 20th century involved the notion of an “invasion” of a new ethnic group into the host community, typically in center city of industrializing societies, and gradually the new group became assimilated, or absorbed, into the host culture. This classic one-way assimilation model was what Stains had in mind when he suggested that the newly-arriving New York City Puerto Ricans would easily assimilate in Allentown: “Is there anything about the Puerto Rican experience or culture that would keep it from doing what virtually every other immigrant group has done — intermarry, and melt into the main stream?” (Stains, 1994, p. 62).

Accepting this historical explanation of spatial and social assimilation, Stains suggested that educational and employment opportunities would hasten the assimilation of Puerto Ricans, who also tended to have a weak ethnic identity. Puerto Ricans have migrated to Allentown for decades and it has been slightly more than a decade since Stains’ observations. While a generation may be an insufficient period to gauge the validity of Stains’ claim for rapid assimilation, we should expect some strong signs if his assumptions are valid. Specifically, we should expect the spatial integration of Latinos into neighborhoods in the outer city and into suburban Allentown, as opposed to continued high concentration in the inner city, where these Latinos first settled more than two decades ago. In addition, less segregation and more Latino-Anglo social relationships, especially neighbors and those sharing social institutions, would develop and be visible. We explore the questions of settlement structure and social assimilation through the use of census data and focus groups conducted in 2004. First, we briefly explore the literature on recent ethnic settlement geography. Immigrant Ethnic Settlement Patterns of the Late Twentieth Century Immigrant ethnic settlement patterns have become much more complex than the one-way assimilation model mentioned above. Social scientists have studied the settlement structure associated with various ethnic groups and have discovered multiple settlement forms. Among these, geographers Skop and Li (2003) noted that, while “chain migration” still links some new migrants to traditional inner city ghettos such as Cubans in Little Havana, newer forms also mark metropolitan regions, including those described as multiethnic ghettos (no single ethnic group majority) and more novel forms such as Wei Li’s “ethnoburb” (Li, 1998). Li’s ethnoburb contains ethnic business concentrations and distinct residential clusters, as identified in Los Angeles’ Chinatown, Monterey Park, and the San Gabriel Valley (Li, 2006). Some of these newer ethnic forms also involve enclaves and clusters in both urban and suburban settings. Geographer Christopher Smith and sociologist John Logan also reported the evolving, complex ethnic settlement patterns, and the growing influence of Asians in Flushing, New York, including clustering in nearby suburbs (Smith and Logan, 2006). Latino settlement patterns also have been discussed in the literature, including in suburban California (Clark, 1998). Given the increasingly complex and varied patterns of ethnic settlements, what should we expect for Latinos in the Allentown region after more than two decades of in-migration? Have Latinos moved in significant proportions to the suburbs and created new enclaves there? Or, have they remained in inner city Allentown? Some hints are in the

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literature on New York City Puerto Rican settlements. Sociologist Nathan Kantrowitz found that New York City Puerto Ricans, while tending not to dominate their neighborhoods, did reside in close proximity to poor blacks due to their low socioeconomic status (Kantrowitz, 1973). The persistent pattern of poverty and low incomes among most Puerto Ricans led to their classification as the other “underclass,” and linked them to African Americans socially and spatially. Economic bifurcation of New York’s Puerto Rican population over time, however, also led to distinct classes and settlement patterns; the poorer lived on the Lower East Side and in Harlem, while those with more resources resided in suburban Bronx and Queens (Kantrowitz, 1973; Boswell, 1976). Puerto Rican settlements also evolved outside of New York City. As the Puerto Rican colonias (communities) continued to mature and second-generation, U.S. mainland-born Puerto Ricans moved to employment-age, many left the colonias because they were more upwardly mobile than their parents. These Puerto Ricans became integrated into the broader Anglo society of the metropolitan area (Hernandez-Alvarez, 1968). Where are Puerto Ricans and other Latinos residing in the Allentown region? Stains, speaking of a Puerto Rican family, explained their early attraction to center city: “Buying a $67,000 row house in Allentown will save them money: the payment of $650 on their Federal Housing Authority mortgage will be $100 less than the rent on their three-bedroom apartment in Bay Ridge” (Stains, 1994, p. 67).

In a broader context, Stains suggested that the migration decision was “beyond economics,” that Puerto Ricans as a culture suffered from “urban discomfort,” which pushed them out of the threatening and unpleasant streetscapes of the City and attracted them to the tranquil environs of southeastern Pennsylvania. However, the affordable home ownership of row houses abandoned by Anglos and the opportunity for a better education have placed them in the inner city of Allentown. The initial settlement, then, revolved around those opportunities between Linden and Second Streets in the “older neighborhoods, from the Lehigh River to 10th Street, in the dilapidated brick row houses the native Allentonians don’t want to live in any more” (p. 58). The continued influx of Latinos, Puerto Ricans, and other Hispanic groups created a growing need for housing. At the same time, many families had entered the labor force and were accumulating capital that could move renters to ownership and allow others to leave starter homes for better neighborhoods. Where would newcomers reside? Where would mobile Latinos relocate? What sort of geographic distribution would result? One way to understand the relatively high level of Latino-white segregation in the metro region is to examine Allentown in relation to Lehigh County. In 2000, approximately 82 percent of Lehigh County Latinos resided within the city of Allentown. In the same year, approximately 73 percent of all Latinos resided within 1.5 miles of its original settlement area, the intersection of Second and Linden Streets. While a modest number of Latinos moved outside the city limits by 2000, clearly Latinos remained highly concentrated in the central city and this explains the relatively high rate of Latino-white segregation in the region. Figure 18.1 provides a time series of boundaries of Latino concentration within the city, beginning in 1980, when Latinos were in the inner city cluster described by Stains. As the map illustrates, Latinos spread within Allentown in a largely contagious fashion. The map portrays concentrations of Latinos of 20 percent or more at the city block level, a threshold that was more than triple their national percentage in 1980. This threshold was applied to successive time periods for consistency. Also, while space does not permit details, it can be noted that scores of these inner city blocks are 50 percent or more Latino. It seems logical that as whites fled Allentown (the white population of Allentown declined 22.3% between 1990 and 2000), Latinos replaced them in readily available, very affordable housing. This leads us to conclude that rather than social assimilation by 2000 Latinos were merely replacing white, non-Hispanics in a more sequent occupance mode.

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Mark E. Reisinger, John W. Frazier, and Eugene L. Tettey-Fio Figure 18.1

SOCIALIZATION: PERCEPTIONS OF ANGLO TREATMENT AND SOCIAL DISTANCE It is difficult to address socialization directly. Are the cultural issues reported by Stains in the early 1990s still present? He reported cultural conflicts of various kinds and suggested that such clashes tend to be “more intense” in small cities undergoing rapid ethnic changes. His observation of some local Anglos included perceptions of Latinos brandishing a “Big Apple attitude” and being indiscrete, boisterous, and loitering, as well as having an association with crime, gangs and drugs. There was a fear among some natives that the Latino influence was a threat to women and children. On the other hand, Stains suggested that Latinos saw themselves as practicing their culture, including their “island impulse” to be outdoors, sharing conversation and listening to music. They also are quick to express affection through an embrace (abrazo) and to kiss one another, something far less common among Anglos. Stains quoted a Latino who captured the cultural difference in social interaction: “Picture a Latino and an Anglo talking: the Latino is moving forward, and the Dutchman is moving backward” (Stains, p. 59).

Despite such cultural differences, which sometimes translated into clashes and discrimination, the Latino population has continued to grow through migration into the new century. One way to address the existence of cultural issues is to ask Latinos: How fairly are you treated by native Anglos today? We pursued that broad question by asking our interviewees to respond to a questionnaire and then, through focus groups, elaborate their feelings and experiences with Anglo Allentonians. We asked them to respond to a series of short questions about fair treatment using one of three responses: “treated fairly,” “not treated fairly,” “no opinion.” Seven topical questions were asked, including perceptions of fair treatment by neighbors, police, retail sales clerks, educational institutions, and in the workplace, among others (see Table 18.2). The majority of our interviewees felt fairly treated by Anglos in all seven areas. However, the responses can be divided into two types of majority positive responses. In the first class of responses, at least two-thirds of our respondents reported fair treatment. The second

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involved only a slim majority, who reported being fairly treated by Anglos in local government agencies and at the workplace. We will focus only on neighbors and treatment in the workplace in the remainder of this chapter. Table 18.2 Issues of Fair Treatment in Various Contexts Retail shopping places Neighbors Police Healthcare providers Schools Local government support and recreation facilities Workplace

86% 70% 72% 67% 64% 55% 53%

Regarding treatment by Anglo neighbors, 70 percent indicated that they received fair treatment. A few reported very positive feelings about their neighbor’s treatment. One, Maritza, had a very positive reception in a recent move into her new northern Allentown neighborhood: “ My neighbors gave me a warm welcome and I include both Anglos and Hispanics. In the area where I am, Americans gave me better treatment than Hispanics” (Maritza, 2004).

However, there are the different experiences as well. One Latino man, who moved to Allentown in 1966, felt that many Anglos simply do not like Hispanic people and unfairly associate all Hispanics with crime and the drug culture of Allentown: “When we first arrived here, we were very suspected by our neighbors. We bought a house the first year. My mother and my brothers worked and saved. In the second year, we bought another house on the same street. Neighbors said ‘No way can they have that much money without dealing drugs.’ We were under investigation for the next year” (Felix, 2004).

Felix also explained that today things are not nearly as bad as Anglos perceive them and he finds it upsetting that some Anglos negatively classify Latinos and their neighborhoods: “They now refer to our Hispanic neighborhoods as the ghetto” (Felix, 2004).

Perhaps the most common perception of Anglo treatment, which expresses the cultural difference that still drives a wedge between some Latinos and their Anglo neighbors, is related to social distance. It was expressed multiple times. A Latino woman, who has lived in Allentown with her family for nearly eight years, told us: “My neighbors are nice. They are fair to my family. They wave and say ‘hi’ ... But, I don’t know, they just won’t let you get close to them. In my culture, we cook for our neighbors. It is more the warmth of a family. Here, they won’t let you get close” (Ruth, 2004).

Thus, some elements of the social distance unveiled by Stains remain evident a decade later. Another indicator of ethnic separation lies in the sharing of institutions. While social interaction is inevitable in some venues, language and culture differences still seem to keep people apart in Allentown. One such institution is the church. Many storefront churches appeal strictly to Latinos, while others, including Roman Catholic, Lutheran and other denominations, pro-

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vide separate services for Spanish and English-speaking audiences. We observed a Latino ethnic festival to celebrate the diverse Latino cultures in the city’s largest Catholic Church. It was held after mass on a Sunday and the event was highly publicized within the Church by posters and on placards in the parking lot. We attended the event and witnessed very few Anglo visitors from the Church in attendance. Perceptions of Crime and Its Local Geography Stains also mentioned the concern of the spreading of Latino influence away from city center. That too remains an issue where crime is considered. Latinos are quick to point out that crime is an issue but that it also has a geographic dimension, rather than being associated with Latino neighborhoods. In this vein, a Latino woman told us of her experience and the geography of crime: “... Allentown has good and bad parts.... But, let me tell you, when I arrived I was not in a very good area and I saw the boys doing disorder, drinking beers and leaving bottles in front of houses. I began to listen that in the downtown things are not going so well ... people are arriving from outside and are a bad influence in the town” (Maritza, 2004).

Another Latino woman, who moved away from the downtown area added: “The place where I am is good.... Yes, I listened about the shootings but we are distant and they do not affect us ... the problem (crime) in Allentown is by places, by sectors” (Norma, 2004).

Thus, perhaps like other cities that have low-income and problem inner cities, Allentown seems to evolve in the model of an ethnic ghetto, where in many cities this has meant African Americans have replaced fleeing whites and are associated by public perception with rising crimes in particular declining inner city neighborhoods. The problem is that some Latinos perceive white attitudes as “blaming” Latinos generally for the rise in crime. The Latinization of Allentown appears to be a classic case of a poor ethnic group being attracted to the affordability of inner city neighborhoods. Once established, they push out into other neighborhoods, replacing natives that have fled. This appears to represent the classic ghetto expansion process, wherein the sequence involves a new ethnic group replacing the host culture. In such a case, the ethnic newcomers may have some social interaction with the hosts but rather than assimilate, they remain imbedded within their culture. Some Latinos are interacting with whites, especially those who are moving to neighborhoods further away from the problems of the urban downtown core. It may be too early to fully assess social and racial integration in Allentown. Yet, the strengths of culture and cultural differences, whether perceived or real, remain. Participation and experiences in the labor force help us better understand the depth of some of these cultural differences. Cultural landscapes also can reveal the reflection of these significant new ethnic groups in a region once dominated by industrial and European influence. We now turn to these subjects.

LATINOS’ EXPERIENCES IN THE ALLENTOWN LABOR MARKET This section of the chapter analyzes the situation of Latinos’ in the Allentown labor market. If you recall from the above discussion, the workplace is where Latinos felt the least fairly treated. This may be due to a language barrier and discrimination. These issues are examined from the responses generated during the focus group discussion. In addition, structural issues, such as spatial mismatch between residence and employment, the existence of a dual labor market, and unemployment, are examined.

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Language Barriers and Discrimination in the Workplace The inability to speak English well may have a significant impact on a person’s labor market outcome. From our focus group discussions, this became apparent for the Latinos living in Allentown. The following quote from Inés (2004) is indicative of this: “When we arrive here we need to speak English and if you don’t know English you begin at the bottom. I began in the factory at the bottom, but now the same factory promoted me to administration.”

Feelings of discrimination in the workplace also became apparent during the focus group discussions. Several of the people that participated in the discussions felt that discrimination was responsible for not being promoted at their workplace or for the dismissal of Latinos from their jobs. The two comments below by Julian (2004) and Felix (2004) are indicative of such feelings: “For example, I have worked for Kraft for 24 years and I was fighting for the position of industrial mechanic for seven years and they denied me, no matter how qualified I was” (Julian, 2004). “They dismissed a Latino because of racism and it continues. In the biggest companies and the scholarly district of the city, prejudice exists for simply being Hispanic. You can have all the education and be bilingual but simply being Latino is a mark against you in finding a job” (Felix, 2004).

Structural Issues in the Allentown Labor Market The spatial mismatch hypothesis argues that low-skilled minorities living in U.S. inner cities incur poor labor market outcomes because they are disconnected from suburban job opportunities. Over the second half of the twentieth century, dramatic changes have occurred in U.S. metropolitan areas. In particular, the concentration of jobs has continuously decreased in central cities and increased in the suburbs. Over the same period, many minority households have remained or located in central cities while whites have continuously decentralized to suburban residential areas. The combination of these two trends is said to have created a situation of spatial mismatch to the extent that minorities are now located far away from suitable suburban employment opportunities (Gobillon et al., 2003). A spatial mismatch between residences and employment opportunities may also affect the unemployment rates for minorities. There are several different underlying mechanisms that explain how distance to job opportunities could be harmful: x x x x x x

x

Workers’ job search efficiency may decrease with distance to jobs (they get little information about distant jobs). Workers residing far away from jobs may have few incentives to search intensively. Workers may incur high search costs that cause them to restrict their spatial search horizon to the vicinity of their local neighborhood. Workers may refuse jobs that involve commutes that are two long because commuting to that job would be too costly in view of the proposed wage. Employers may refuse to hire or prefer to pay lower wages to distant workers because commuting long distances make them less productive. Employers may discriminate against residentially segregated workers because of the stigma or prejudice associated with their residential location. Employers may think that their white local customers are unwilling to have contacts with minority workers.

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Thus, there are several consequences that are thought to be a result of the spatial mismatch between jobs and residences for minorities. First, minorities incur greater costs of time and travel to suburban employment opportunities. Second, minorities may have higher unemployment rates than other workers. These issues were examined using 2000 U.S. Census data. Eight percent of the Latino labor force in Allentown travels 90 minutes or more to work while only two percent of Allentown’s Anglo population has that travel time to work. In addition, 25 percent of Allentown’s Latino population has a travel time of 30 to 60 minutes to work. The corresponding value for the Anglo population is 18 percent. It appears evident that there is a spatial mismatch between Latino residences and employment opportunities in the Allentown labor market. The mismatch not only affects the cost in time of travel but also impacts the mode of travel to work. Another indication of the cost of traveling these distances to work can be illustrated by the means of travel-towork data. Fifty-six percent of the Latinos living in Allentown either used public transportation (29%) or carpooled (27%) to work. By contrast, only 15 percent of the Anglo population used these two means of travel to work (12% carpooled and 3% used public transportation). As noted, it is suspected that the spatial mismatch between residence and employment opportunities affects the unemployment rate of minorities. The 2000 Census data indicates that this is the case for Latinos in the Allentown labor market. The Latino male unemployment rate for 2000 was11.8 percent and the female rate was 16 percent. This compares to Anglo rates of 5.6 percent for males and 6 percent for females. The fact that Latinos live relatively farther from employment opportunities than Anglos and are segregated in specific parts of the city, may provide an explanation for their higher unemployment rates. Allentown’s Dual Labor Market The dual labor market approach to analyzing local labor markets revolves around three basic hypotheses. First, the labor market is permanently dichotomized into a primary and secondary sector of labor opportunities. The primary sector includes jobs that are characterized by a high degree of job security, good working conditions, high earnings, career and promotional opportunities, and adequate fringe benefits. The secondary sector is different. It offers little on-the-job training, poor promotion prospects, low-paid jobs, repetitive work, and no security. The sector generally refers to the lowest level of the hierarchy of business activity (Peck, 1996). Second, well-defined procedures and norms govern job security, pay increases, and promotions in the primary labor market. The operation of secondary labor markets comes closest to the assumptions of the competitive market of the neoclassical approach; employment and wage rates are contingent on the demand and supply for labor. Third, mobility between the two markets is strongly limited and controlled. In particular, certain groups in the secondary market, such as older workers, women, and immigrants, have the least chance to move up (Peck, 1996). Workers with modest levels of education, skills, or ability to speak English would most likely find opportunities in the secondary labor market. To determine if there is a dual labor market operating in the Allentown area, we analyzed 2000 U.S. Census occupational data. Latino males were found to be over-represented in jobs such as production, transportation, material moving and laboring, food preparation and serving, building and grounds cleaning, personal care and service, and healthcare support. These are occupations usually considered to be part of the secondary labor market. Latino males in the Allentown labor market were under-represented in primary labor market jobs such as professional and related occupations, management, business and financial services, and sales and related occupations. Female Latinos in the Allentown labor market were as over-represented in certain occupations as the Latino males. The highest proportion, 28 percent, of Latino females were employed in production jobs. Not surprisingly, Latino females also were under-represented in the primary sector of the labor market. Apparently, a dual labor market is operating in Allentown with Latino males and females filling many of the jobs in the secondary sector of that market, while Anglos are filling the majority of the jobs in the primary sector.

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CULTURAL LANDSCAPES A Latino ethnoscape — “the landscape of group identity” (Appadurai, 1990 and 1996) is becoming increasingly apparent in the City of Allentown. Religious institutions are a major cultural identifier. Figures 18.2 through 18.5 illustrate a varied Latino religious landscape in Allentown. Traditionally associated with Roman Catholicism, the Allentown Latino religious landscape shows that a number of Protestant denominations also are represented in the community. Figure 18.2 is a photograph at St. Paul’s Lutheran Church. The signage reflects both an English- and Spanish-speaking congregation. This is not unusual in Allentown. Many of the inner city churches offer both English and Spanish services. In many cases the Spanish-speaking members of the congregation now outnumber the Englishspeaking members. In some cases the church congregations have become entirely Latino (see Figure 18.3).

Figure 18.2 St. Paul’s Lutheran Church — notice service times announced in both English and Spanish.

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Mark E. Reisinger, John W. Frazier, and Eugene L. Tettey-Fio Figure 18.3 A former Anglo Methodist Church that now has an all Latino congregation.

Figure 18.4 One of the many “storefront” Latino churches that have recently appeared in Allentown.

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Figure 18.5 A “storefront” Pentecostal Church.

Figures 18.4 and 18.5 show examples of the many “storefront” churches that recently have begun to appear in Allentown. Often the established place of worship for these denominations is located far away from the Latino community. Latinos of those faiths therefore have established their own places of worship locally. Because of the small number of worshippers, the first floor of a residential building is used to hold services. Food constitutes another major cultural identifier. The area between American Parkway and North 12th Street is developing as an ethnic business enclave and provides evidence of the critical mass of Latino consumers concentrated in this area of Allentown. This becomes apparent in at least two important ways: the types and ownership of food outlets and the types of food offered for sale. Elvis Diaz, from the Dominican Republic by way of New York, opened a C-Town that is now Allentown’s biggest Latino-oriented grocery store (see Figure 18.6). Neighborhood bodegas are thriving in Allentown as well. Dominguez Grocery (Figure 18.7) is also operated by a transplanted Dominican. The store is bulging with an enormous variety of foods that cater to Latino tastes. Figure 18.8 shows a sidewalk tropical fruit and vegetable market with produce trucked in from the Hunt’s Point market in the Bronx. The sidewalk market and the types of items sold there are indicative of the growing demand for Latino ethnic foods. This demand is not only being met by Latino-owned stores, but is also being met by long established chain food stores in the city. For example, Little Apple Grocery, an IGA chain store, sells numerous food items that cater to Latino tastes, including tropical fruits and root crops (see Figure 18.9). Interestingly, the Latino produce is displayed prominently close to the entrance of the store and the fruits and vegetables that are usually in demand by Anglos are relegated to a less prominent positions. The religious and food cultural markets provide evidence that a Latino ethnoscape has emerged in Allentown.

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Mark E. Reisinger, John W. Frazier, and Eugene L. Tettey-Fio Figure 18.6 C-Town is a Dominican owned grocery chain.

Figure 18.7 A Dominican owned bodega.

Patterns and Issues in the Latinization of Allentown, Pennsylvania Figure 18.8 Sidewalk fruit and vegetable market.

Figure 18.9 Little Apple, an Anglo owned grocery chain sells foods that cater to its Latino customers.

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SUMMARY This chapter has addressed several issues related to the Latinization of Allentown, PA. The research was framed around five general sets of questions, to which we now return in this summary. The first issue was concerned with migration to (and population change in) Allentown. We illustrated that Allentown experienced a dramatic demographic shift between 1980 and 2000, and that the population of the city is now about 25 percent Latino (of which 67 percent is Puerto Rican). The growth of the Latino population is largely due to in-migration of Latinos from the New York City area and from other origins in the Northeast and overseas. Many Latinos stated that their reason for moving to Allentown was for job opportunities. Others had different reasons, such as marriage and family reasons, tranquility and safety, housing costs, and the ability to purchase a home. Second, we were concerned with questions of Latino settlement patterns in Allentown. We showed that Latinos are highly segregated from Anglos in the Allentown area. One way to understand the relatively high level of Latino-white segregation in the metro region is to examine Allentown in relation to Lehigh County. In 2000, approximately 82 percent of Lehigh County Latinos resided within the city of Allentown. In the same year, approximately 73 percent of all Latinos resided within 1.5 miles of its original settlement area, the intersection of Second and Linden Streets. We concluded that rather than social assimilation tied to spatial assimilation, by 2000 Latinos were merely replacing white, non-Hispanics in a more sequent occupance mode. The third issue that we explored in the Latinization of Allentown had to do with Anglo and Latino perceptions. Drawing on Stains (1994) work we demonstrated that Anglos were concerned with Latinos brandishing a “Big Apple attitude” and being indiscrete, boisterous, and loitering, as well as having an association with crime, gangs and drugs. There was a fear among some Anglos that the Latino influence was a threat to women and children. To gain some sense of Latino perceptions of Allentown, we conducted interviews and asked how fairly treated they felt in a number of different circumstances. The majority of our interviewees felt fairly treated by Anglos in the areas about which they were questioned. For example, 70 percent indicated that they received fair treatment by their Anglo neighbors. There are different experiences however, and some Latinos felt that many Anglos simply do not like Hispanic people and unfairly associate all Hispanics with crime and the drug culture of Allentown. The most common perception of Anglo treatment was related to social distance. Another area of concern in this chapter had to do with employment and fair treatment in the regional labor market. We found, from our interviews, that the place of employment was where Latinos felt the least fairly treated. Structural issues, such as spatial mismatch between residence and employment, the existence of a dual labor market, and unemployment, were also examined. U.S. Census data illustrated a spatial mismatch between Latinos’ residential location and places of employment. The mismatch might be at least partly responsible for higher unemployment rates among Latinos. In addition, we found that a dual labor market exists in Allentown with Latinos (especially males) concentrated in secondary occupations. Finally, we illustrated with photographs that a Latino ethnoscape is becoming increasingly apparent in the city of Allentown. We concentrated on two major cultural identifiers, religion and food, to show how the cultural landscape of the city is changing. The religious landscape is being modified through the establishment of “storefront” churches and the language change from English to Spanish in formerly all-Anglo congregations. The grocery industry has changed in a variety of ways in Allentown. First, was the appearance of the Latino (Dominican) owned bodega. Second, Anglo-owned chain grocery stores began to offer produce and other items to cater to Latino tastes. The most recent change has been the opening of C-Town, a Latino (Dominican)-owned chain store based in New York City. In both cases, religion and food, Latinos have brought their culture with them to Allentown and it is becoming clearly imprinted on the landscape. Between 1980 and 2000, the Latino population of Allentown has quadrupled. Although the Puerto Rican population is the largest Latino group in the city, the Latino population is very diverse; there are substantial numbers of Mexicans and Dominicans living in Allentown. The rapid pace of the Latino influx would have strained the social fabric anywhere, but the strain has the potential to be particularly acute where it upsets the Germanic (Pennsylvania Dutch) sense of order in small cities like Allentown.

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Many questions arise concerning the link between these population shifts and what it means for the future of small cities. As cities continue to search for methods to deal with dwindling budgets and increased competition in attracting highly selective and mobile capital, the probability of growing urban isolation and inequality by racial and ethnic groups should undoubtedly be viewed as a social problem on the rise.

Chapter 19

Population Change in the Texas Panhandle and Resultant Latino Occupational Structures: 1980–2004 LAWRENCE E. ESTAVILLE, EDRIS J. MONTALVO, AND BROCK J. BROWN INTRODUCTION The Great Plains of North America was the topic of the cover article in the May 2004 issue of the National Geographic Magazine. It devoted 52 pages to portraying journalistically the environmental consequences of human settlement and the subsequent depopulation of the huge region once called “the Great American Dessert” and later “the Breadbasket of the Continent.” The National Geographic Magazine report builds on these conflicting perceptions to highlight the environmental and economic challenges facing an increasingly concerned region. These anxieties about the environmental stresses and depopulation of the Great Plains are well documented in a considerable scholarly literature (e.g., Blouet and Luebke, 1979; Lawson and Baker, 1979; Luebke, 1980; Caldwell, Schultz, and Stout, 1983; Nickles and Day, 1997). We wish to add to this body of research in a different way, by underscoring the in-migration that is counterbalancing the depopulation of one part of the Great Plains. As Latinos replace some departing Anglos in the Texas Panhandle Plains, significant restructuring of the labor market is occurring. Differential perceptions of place utility of this region by Anglos and Latinos have led to changes in the labor force tied to ethnicity. A distinctive Latino occupational structure has resulted.

THE TEXAS PANHANDLE PLAINS The vastness of the Great Plains reaches deep into Texas and terminates at the Rio Grande (Figure 19.1). As defined by the Center for Great Plains Studies at the University of Nebraska, most of West Texas and much of Central Texas, including the Edwards Plateau, are parts of the Great Plains. Although broken by such picturesque landscapes as the Texas Hill Country and Palo Duro Canyon, so flat is this immense Texas territory that the Spanish termed much of it as the “llano estacado” (staked plains) because during their explorations they had to plant stakes every so often to ensure they could find their return routes. Figure 19.2 illustrates the region’s flat topography and the existence of oil. The Great Plains in the “Panhandle” of Texas are called the Texas Panhandle Plains. The Texas Panhandle Plains region covers some 52,200 square miles, about the size of the state of Arkansas, and is a droughtprone land that receives less than 20 inches of annual precipitation. It lies over a large portion of the Ogallala Aquifer, a principal source of water for agriculture and communities that has been seriously depleted by years of “water mining.” First attracted by the opportunities of cattle ranching and the farming of such crops as wheat, cotton, and sorghum, and later by oil and natural gas discoveries, much of the region now suffers from economic decline, having been devastated in the 1980s by the “oil bust” and serious droughts in recent years (Kraenzel,

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1955; Blouet and Luebke, 1979; White, 1994; Nickles and Day, 1997). Nevertheless, perceptions of economic opportunities vary in the Texas Panhandle. Through most of the 20th century, the Texas Panhandle was the home of Anglos who were the predominant ethnic group and who became prosperous in ranching, farming, and working in the oil and gas fields. Significant numbers of Latinos, mainly of Mexican heritage, did not arrive in the region until the beginning of the federal Bracero Program in 1942. In 1970, the first census after the 1964 close of the Bracero Program, the Latino resident population in the Texas Panhandle had grown to 113,200 people (Blouet and Luebke, 1979; Frugitt, Brown, and Beale, 1989; The Farmworkers Website, 2004; U.S. Census, 1970). Today, most of the region’s people are either Anglos or Latinos, who differ somewhat in their perceptions of the region’s economic opportunities. Figure 19.1. The 54 Study Counties and 12 Focus Counties in the Texas Panhandle Plains.

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Figure 19.2. The Flat Topography and Oil in the Texas Panhandle Plains.

PLACE UTILITY THEORY Place utility theory provides insight into how voluntary migration occurs when individuals or families perceive that other places may offer superior benefits or utilities — economic, social, political, or environmental — in comparison to their current home. Potential migrants assess the utilities of their present location with other potential destinations to determine if they should migrate (Wolpert, 1965; Root, 2003). Because economic reasons have traditionally been the most important factors in the migration decision-making process, we focused our research efforts on population change and the Latino occupational structure that resulted within this theoretical context. However, we did include some social factors in our fieldwork in order to explore whether or not they played a role in the push or pull of Anglos out of and Latinos into the region.

DATA We used all 54 counties of the Texas Panhandle in our population change analysis. For our analysis of the Latino occupational structure in 2000 and our fieldwork, we selected 35 counties of the Texas Panhandle from the original 54 that had populations of at least 25 percent Latino in the 2000 Census, thus allowing for substantial numbers of Latinos for sampling in our fieldwork. From these 35 Texas Panhandle counties, we then selected the ten counties that had the largest increases in Latino populations from 1980 to 2000 (Table 19.1). Because we wanted both Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Amarillo and Lubbock, represented in our sample, we also added Hale County. Finally, to ensure adequate spatial coverage throughout the region, we divided the Texas Panhandle study area into four quadrants to determine that at least one county was present in each quadrant. The results required the addition of one more county, Nolan County. From this four-step selection process, twelve counties became the focus counties for the analysis of the 2000 Latino occupational structure and our fieldwork (Figure 19.1).

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Lawrence E. Estaville, Edris J. Montalvo, and Brock J. Brown Table 19.1. Ten Largest Population Percentage Increases of Latinos in the Texas Panhandle Counties, 1980–2000. County Moore Ochiltree Hansford Andrews Yoakum Deaf Smith Parmer Howard Potter Sherman

Percent Increase in Latino Population, 1980–2000 27.88% 22.43% 19.85% 18.22% 18.14% 16.74% 16.52% 16.44% 16.41% 15.96%

The timeframe of our population change study includes three decennial censuses — 1980, 1990, and 2000. However, because the greatest increase in Latino population in the Texas Panhandle occurred in the 1990s, we concentrated our Latino occupational analysis on the 2000 census data for the twelve focus counties. We extracted the data for the Latino occupational analysis from the 2000 Summary File 4 (SF 4), which is a robust yet confidential sample of the original census data (see the 2000 U.S. Census for the specific parameters of this sample). We also conducted in 2004 all of our survey interviews in the twelve focus counties. Our fieldwork in the twelve focus counties centered on interviewing residents in an effort to better understand the results of our population and occupational analyses and to discover any trends that were not readily discernable in these census data investigations. We used two very similar survey instruments, one of 11 questions for Anglos and the other consisting of 13 questions for Latinos. Both of the surveys highlighted each group’s perceptions of outmigration in general from each county and specifically Anglo out-migration as well as Latino in-migration. We further probed the reasons for Anglo out-migration and Latino in-migration and the locations of their respective destinations and places of origin, thereby attempting to seek answers regarding their assessments of place utility prior to moving. Questions about the recency of the migrations and possible chain migrations were useful. During each of the 94 conversations, we followed up with questions in impromptu ways to understand the responses more fully and to uncover other relevant or unanticipated information.

STUDY FINDINGS Population Change Analysis In 1980 the total population of the 54 counties of the Texas Panhandle was 881,000, which decreased to 868,000 in 1990, but, unlike the declining trend across the entire Great Plains, then rebounded to 913,000 in 2000 (Table 19.2). The Anglo population in the Texas Panhandle did indeed mirror that of the entire Great Plains by decreasing from 662,000 (75 percent of the total population) in 1980 to 609,000 (70 percent) in 1990 and to 577,000 (63 percent) in 2000. Conversely, the Latino population increased from 169,000 (19 percent) in 1980 to 188,000 (22 percent) in 1990 and to 267,000 (29 percent) in 2000. Thus, over the two decades, Anglo population declined by 85,000 (13 percent), while Latino population increased by 98,000 (58 percent), thereby more than offsetting the Anglo decrease. The strong Latino population growth in the 1990s (79,000 people or 43 percent) was the main contributor to the increase in the total population of the Texas Panhandle in 2000 (U.S. Census, 1980, 1990, 2000).

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Population Change in the Texas Panhandle: 1980–2004 Table 19.2. Population Trends in the Texas Panhandle, 1980–2000.

Anglo Population

Latino Population Total Population (includes other ethnic groups)

1980

1990

2000

662,000

609,000

577,000

75.14%

70.16%

63.20%

169,000

188,000

267,000

19.18%

21.66%

29.24%

881,000

868,000

913,000

At the county level, from 1980 to 1990, except for one county, each of the 54 counties of the Texas Panhandle lost Anglo population (Figures 19.3 and 19.4). Twelve counties had more than 7 percent Anglo losses in the 1980s. In the 1990s, only four counties had gains in their Anglo populations, all of which were less than 3.5 percent. In the same decade, 23 counties lost more than 7 percent of their Anglo populations. For the entire study period, 1980–2000, only three counties experienced increases in Anglo population — all less than 2.5 percent. In contrast, 41 counties lost more than 7 percent of their Anglo populations, 16 of which lost more than 14 percent. The total decrease in Anglo population in all of the 54 counties between 1980 and 2000 was 85,000 people, a 13 percent decrease, which caused for the first time in the 20th century, Anglos to become minorities in ten counties of the Texas Panhandle (U.S. Census, 1980, 1990, 2000). Figure 19.3. Population Percents of Anglos and Latinos in the Texas Panhandle.

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Lawrence E. Estaville, Edris J. Montalvo, and Brock J. Brown Figure 19.4. Percent Change in Populations of Anglos and Latinos in the Texas Panhandle.

On the other hand, from 1980 to 1990, all but four counties in the study area showed increases in Latinos. In the 1990s, Latino increases were even more vigorous. All but three of the 54 counties had increases in Latino population, with 26 counties experiencing Latino gains of 7 percent or more. Over the twenty-year period, 53 of the 54 counties had Latino increases, 25 of which were more than 10 percent. The total increase in Latino population in all of the 54 counties between 1980 and 2000 was 98,000 people, showing an extraordinary growth of 58 percent (U.S. Census, 1980, 1990, 2000). Latino Occupational Analysis The results of these significant population changes in the Texas Panhandle — Anglo out-migration and Latino in-migration — from 1980 to 2000 produced a distinctive Latino occupational structure at the end of the 20th century. To examine this 2000 Latino occupational structure, we relied on U.S. Census data for the twelve focus counties. Overall, the twelve focus counties in 2000 showed that Latinos comprised one-third of the total Texas Panhandle workforce of 115,320 workers and that half of the Latino labor force worked primarily in two occupational sectors — Production/Transport/Material Moving (29%) and Service (21%). Latinos made up 51 percent of the workers in Production/Transport/Material Moving sector in the twelve counties. Twenty-nine percent of the Latino workforce, 10,537 Latinos, worked in this sector, mostly in meatpacking plants and as general laborers and truck drivers. More than 43 percent of Service sector workers in the twelve counties were Latinos, and 7,656 Latinos, or 21 percent, of the Latino labor force worked in this employment sector, largely in food preparation and serving, and building and grounds maintenance.

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Latinos comprised nearly a quarter of the Sales and Office jobs, mainly retail cashiers and sales, and more than a third of the Construction/Extraction/Maintenance jobs, especially construction (Figure 19.5) and extraction (oil and gas) labor and vehicle and electrical maintenance. However, only 15 percent of the Latino workforce and 13.5 percent of all Latinos worked in these jobs, respectively. Interestingly, although Latinos comprised 56 percent of the Farming/Fishing/Forestry employment sector (almost all agricultural in the Texas Panhandle), less than 10 percent of the Latino workforce, or 3,430 laborers, worked on farms and ranches in the twelve focus counties, which emphasizes the increasingly high degree of mechanization of these huge agricultural operations. Also noteworthy is that the proportion of Latinos in the Management/Professional sector, 14 percent, corresponds to their 11 percent representation in the workforce. This indicates some upward occupational mobility by the turn of the 21st century in the Texas Panhandle. Figure 19.5. Construction Work is only One of the Important Employment Sectors for Latinos in the Texas Panhandle.

Tables 19.3a, b, c divide the twelve focus counties into three groups (see Figure 19.1): a) four counties — Deaf Smith, Moore, Parmer, and Yoakum — mostly located in the western part of the Texas Panhandle and that have large numbers of livestock feedlots and associated meatpacking plants; b) three counties — Hansford, Ochiltree, and Sherman — located on the northern edge of the Texas Panhandle and that possess more diversified economies split among oil and gas production, ranching, and feedlot operations; and c) five counties — Andrews, Hale, Howard, Nolan, and Potter — that are within the Amarillo and Lubbock Metropolitan Statistical Areas or near other cities in the Texas Panhandle and are thus influenced by urban occupations (University of Texas at Austin, 2005). In the four counties of the first group (Table 19.3a), Production/Transport/Material Moving averaged 37 percent of the Latino workforce, and the meatpacking industry primarily employed these workers. Because of the several small towns in these counties, particularly Hereford, Dumas, Farwell, and Denver City, the proportion of the Latino workforce in the Service sector averaged almost 20 percent, mainly in food preparation and serving, and building and grounds maintenance. Yoakum County stands out in this group because Denver City is the traditional center of the county’s oil and gas industry within the southern fields of the Texas Panhandle. In Yoakum County, the oil and gas industry employed nearly 20 percent of the Latino workforce.

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Lawrence E. Estaville, Edris J. Montalvo, and Brock J. Brown Table 19.3a. Latino Occupations in the Twelve Focus Counties of the Texas Panhandle in 2000. Total for Twelve Counties

Deaf Smith

Moore

Parmer

Yoakum

Total Workforce

115,329

7,122

8,599

3,855

2,861

Latino Workforce

36,147

3,560

3,456

1,680

1,112

% Latino of Workforce

33.12

49.99

40.19

43.58

38.87

13.86

24.84

14.22

14.43

14.32

11.34

13.15

6.94

9.40

9.53

43.14

65.15

46.93

57.00

51.79

21.18

21.69

20.54

16.49

18.17

24.49

39.49

23.37

35.17

27.57

15.37

15.79

10.24

16.31

14.93

55.74

57.92

60.41

54.91

66.67

9.49

6.26

5.12

10.65

10.79

37.01

54.46

30.29

44.57

47.74

13.48

10.39

9.20

7.08

18.97

50.96

76.34

65.24

74.61

60.55

29.15

32.72

47.95

40.06

27.61

Management/ Professional

Service

Sales/Office

Farming/Fishing/ Forestry Construction/ Extraction/ Maintenance Production/ Transport/ Material Moving

% Latino of Total Workforce % of Latino Workforce % Latino of Total Workforce % of Latino Workforce % Latino of Total Workforce % of Latino Workforce % Latino of Total Workforce % of Latino Workforce % Latino of Total Workforce % of Latino Workforce % Latino of Total Workforce % of Latino Workforce

The three counties in the second group (Table 19.3b) had the highest average, 22 percent, of the three county groups for agricultural occupations, mostly ranching and feedlot operations, in the Latino workforce. At the same time, these three counties had a substantial proportion of the Latino workforce, 41 percent, employed as general laborers, maintenance workers, and truck drivers in the oil and gas industry in the northern fields of the Texas Panhandle. Because total population of these three counties was less than 8,000 people, the percent of the Latino workforce in Service jobs, 16 percent, was the smallest of the three county groups.

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Population Change in the Texas Panhandle: 1980–2004 Table 19.3b. Latino Occupations in the Twelve Focus Counties of the Texas Panhandle in 2000.

Total Workforce Latino Workforce % Latino of Workforce Management/ Professional

% Latino of Total Workforce % of Latino Workforce

Service

% Latino of Total Workforce % of Latino Workforce

Sales/Office

% Latino of Total Workforce % of Latino Workforce

Farming/Fishing/ Forestry

% Latino of Total Workforce % of Latino Workforce

Construction/ Extraction/ Maintenance

% Latino of Total Workforce % of Latino Workforce

Production/ Transport/ Material Moving

% Latino of Total Workforce % of Latino Workforce

Hansford

Ochiltree

Sherman

2,419

4,146

1,373

615

1,110

278

25.42

26.77

20.25

7.89

11.01

6.83

9.27

10.00

12.23

33.13

35.16

23.08

17.40

16.76

14.03

14.35

11.81

9.20

11.22

10.45

8.63

50.49

82.80

52.10

16.75

18.65

31.29

35.14

35.97

19.64

16.91

21.71

7.91

44.53

35.22

43.37

28.46

22.43

25.90

Urban centers influenced the Latino occupational structure of the third group of five counties (Table 19.3c). Only 2.9 percent of the Latino workforce consisted of agricultural workers in the third group of counties. The Latino workforce in the five counties still had substantial proportions of jobs in the Production/Transport/Material Moving sector (particularly meatpacking, laborers, and truck drivers) at 25 percent, as well as in the Construction/Extraction/Maintenance sector (largely construction and building and grounds maintenance) at 14 percent. However, the Latino workforce in this third group was the highest of the three groups in the Service sector (26%), in Sales/Office employment (19%), and in Management/Professional positions (13%), all emphasizing urban occupations. In sum, Latino workers in the Texas Panhandle varied geographically in their occupations but generally were workers in meatpacking and feedlot operations, the oil and gas industry, and restaurants, as well as in general labor and truck driving. In 2000, most Latinos worked in low-paying jobs that were mainly at the bottom of the occupational ladder — jobs that many Anglos refused to continue to do. Anglos, therefore, moved in the decade of the 1990s, especially from the rural areas of the Texas Panhandle in search of more rewarding occupations in nearby cities or in large metropolitan areas elsewhere in Texas, while Latinos moved into the region in search of better jobs in comparison with those they had in South Texas or Mexico, if they had jobs at all. Our fieldwork corroborated this generalization.

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Lawrence E. Estaville, Edris J. Montalvo, and Brock J. Brown Table 19.3c. Latino Occupations in the Twelve Focus Counties of the Texas Panhandle in 2000. Andrews

Hale

Howard

Nolan

Potter

Total Workforce

5,064

14,646

12,092

6,430

46,722

Latino Workforce

1,641

6,362

3,277

1,598

11,458

% Latino of Workforce

32.41

43.44

27.10

24.85

24.52

15.16

20.74

14.42

11.69

10.77

11.94

13.36

16.42

13.95

9.83

44.42

53.27

41.95

54.08

31.69

22.55

20.23

33.08

25.84

27.33

28.49

38.86

22.33

22.74

20.47

18.40

20.75

16.84

19.52

21.31

39.06

68.26

50.98

51.55

33.73

1.52

5.85

3.17

3.13

0.74

42.02

46.18

29.78

30.00

28.34

21.02

9.31

12.69

12.02

14.55

40.58

66.77

34.19

33.94

36.13

24.56

30.51

17.79

25.53

26.23

Management/ Professional

Service

Sales/Office

Farming/Fishing/ Forestry Construction/ Extraction/ Maintenance Production/ Transport/ Material Moving

% Latino of Total Workforce % of Latino Workforce % Latino of Total Workforce % of Latino Workforce % Latino of Total Workforce % of Latino Workforce % Latino of Total Workforce % of Latino Workforce % Latino of Total Workforce % of Latino Workforce % Latino of Total Workforce % of Latino Workforce

Fieldwork Outcomes We interviewed 94 people in the twelve focus counties in a non-random, “by convenience” sample. We attempted to interview as many people as possible when we visited each county seat. To gain a better understanding of the socioeconomic conditions and Latino occupational structure of each of the twelve focus counties and the perceptions of economic opportunities of the region, we interviewed Anglos and Latinos in a variety of occupations, ranging from government officials, college administrators and hotel employees to shop owners, restaurant waitresses, students, and construction workers. Of the 94 individuals, 50 were Anglo (18 males, 32 females), who had a mean age of 48 years and who all possessed a high school education, with several having college degrees. The 44 Latinos (19 males, 25 females), had a younger mean age of 35 years and a significantly lower educational attainment than the 50 Anglos; about 20 percent of the Latinos had not completed high

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school. We found that many Latino males, mainly laborers did not wish to be interviewed, perhaps fearing we were U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents. Several Anglo governmental officials told us that they were too busy with their work to talk with us. Nevertheless, we believe that our face-to-face survey sample of 94 people is a solid one that produced information from almost all sectors of the region’s socioeconomic structure and confirmed the major findings of our analyses of population change and Latino occupational structure in the Texas Panhandle. It also gave us fresh insights and confirmed our place utility theoretical framework for the study. In the interviews, 58 percent of Anglos and 49 percent of Latinos thought that people were leaving their counties and that the declining economy was the major reason for this out-migration. Seventy percent of the Anglos surveyed said they knew of another Anglo individual or family member who moved out of their county to search for better economic opportunities in mostly urban areas. When asked the same question, 64 percent of Latinos declared that they, too, knew Anglos who had left their county. A 45-year-old Latina restaurant worker contended that the primary reason for Anglos leaving is that they do not want the types of jobs that most Latinos have. She cautioned: “ It’s hard to land a good job. If you find a job here, you’d better keep it.”

When asked about the increasing numbers of Latinos in their home counties, 82 percent of Anglos felt that the numbers of Latinos were increasing as they searched for better jobs and economic prosperity. Sixtyseven percent of Latinos confirmed that they were searching for places with more economic utility. After finding successful economic circumstances in their counties, 18 percent of Latinos had encouraged other Latinos from other places to move into their county to live, thereby substantiating that some Latinos did indeed engage in chain migration into the region. The question, “Do increasing numbers of Latinos cause Anglos in any way to move from the county,” resulted in some passionate responses by both Anglos and Latinos as they agreed that the dynamic does, in fact, take place. Yet, most Anglos and Latinos were unsure if more Latinos really caused Anglos to move. While most Anglos viewed Latinos in positive ways as valuable members of their communities, some Anglos had negative comments about their Latino neighbors. For instance, a middle-aged female manager of one town’s Chamber of Commerce emphasized: “Oh, you’re talking about the wetbacks.… I think that they should learn English so we don’t have to use our tax money to print things out in English and in Spanish.”

Another Anglo woman, a 35-year-old part-time hotel clerk, expressed concerns about not being able to find a job because of the increasing need for bilingual workers: “ I can’t find a job and it’s hard to find a job because I don’t speak Latino ... so I’m moving to Dallas.”

This latent bigotry seemed to be the exception rather than the rule in our twelve focus counties. Some Latinos felt a degree of discontent toward Anglos. A migrant from Mexico at an early age and now a 35-year-old male owner of a Mexican food restaurant expressed his thoughts about Anglo out-migration and Anglo behavior toward Latinos: “The Anglos leave because they don’t like to do the jobs we do, but they don’t want to pay us enough to work either or for the food they like to eat.”

Another migrant from Mexico who is a 44-year-old woman with only a sixth-grade education disagreed: “I came for the American dream, and opportunities are here for anyone who wants to work hard.”

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Most Anglos and Latinos have learned to work together, but, interestingly, Anglos and Latinos both complained of inadequate Latino representation in county and municipal government. However, neither group articulated reasons for this lack of Latino community leadership.

CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH Like most of the Great Plains, the 54 counties of the Texas Panhandle Plains have experienced Anglo depopulation since 1980, yet this out-migration has not been the only salient population development. As place utility theory predicts, Anglos, in fact, do perceive declining economic opportunities in their longtime home in the Texas Panhandle and are pulled to better jobs mostly in urban places in Texas. However, Latinos, especially those who come directly from Mexico, evaluate the economic opportunities positively in relationship to other possible places and decide to move into a new homeland to create a better life for themselves and their children. By 2000, the out-migration of Anglos and in-migration of Latinos had caused significant occupational restructuring in which Latinos had taken most of the low-paying agricultural, meat processing, service, and laborer jobs. When Anglos find better jobs in large urban areas, Latinos do not replace the Anglos in higher-paying occupations because those types of jobs are generally lost, but, instead, Latinos provide mainly low-cost labor for a Texas Panhandle economy that continues to struggle with profit margins. Three important questions remain to be answered: 1) Will Latinos become the majority population in the Texas Panhandle? 2) When will Latinos begin to capture political control in the counties they currently comprise the majority population? and 3) How will the continued Anglo out-migration and Latino in-migration, along with economic restructuring more dependent on a labor-intensive workforce, affect future environmental degradation in a very sensitive ecosystem?

Part IV As i a n a n d Pa c i f i c -I s l a n de r G e ogra p h i e s : Cultural Persistence and Changing Patterns Section four continues the themes of changing geographic settlement patterns, racial discrimination against minorities, and the infusion of cultural and ethnic meaning into particular places. It illustrates how America’s early Asian immigrants carved their respective niches in spite of racial discrimination. The historical settlement patterns, experiences, and adjustments of the three largest Asian groups in the early 20th century are reviewed in Chapter 20, which also provides contemporary geographies of more recent immigrant Chinese, Koreans, and Vietnamese. Three additional chapters explore other contemporary issues and patterns. Chapter 21 examines the role of place-people connections in current native Hawaiian identity, the factors that challenge its maintenance, and the place-based educational strategies that seek to ensure its preservation. Chapter 22 examines ethnic identity for Japanese-Americans. After tracing the early geographies of Japanese-American migration, it explores the early ethnic life of Los Angeles’ Little Tokyo, a traditional urban ethnic enclave with distinctive landscape characteristics. It explains the etching of cultural features onto the landscape, and how racism and nativism led to its decline. It reveals the ethnic persistence that reshapes ethnic identity and adjusts to political and economic pressures of the host society. This chapter provides an example of how agencies (social institutions) create landscapes that “reflect and impact” contemporary ethnic identities and are a part of place-making. One of America’s fastest growing Asian ethnic groups in recent times is Asian Indians. Chapter 23 examines the settlement patterns and ethnic identities of this controversial “racial classification.” As in the case of other immigrants, commercial spaces have become important symbolic and landscape markers for this otherwise “invisible” immigrant group. This chapter examines the methods of “identity re-formation” used by Asian Indians, who tend to be geographically dispersed in metropolitan regions but remain connected by various forms of interaction that reinforce their ethnic identities.

Chapter 20

Asians in the United States: Historical and Contemporary Settlement Patterns JOHN W. FRAZIER INTRODUCTION The term “Asian” describes a substantial range of cultures spread over thousands of miles of the globe. Even descriptive Asian sub-phrases can be deceiving. For example, “East Asian,” meant to refer to people in one geographic region, actually describes distinctly different cultures separated by the great distance from Pakistan to southern India. Grouping dissimilar cultures into a single class has obvious drawbacks. However, it facilitates addressing three greatly different cultures as Asians in pre-1965 America: the Chinese (who initially brought to the U.S. numerous dialects that were not understandable to one another), the Japanese, and the Filipinos. Although from very different cultures, these immigrants to America were viewed monolithically as “Orientals” whose presence was termed an “Asiatic Coolies Invasion” by the early 20th century (Organized Labor, 1906). These Asians shared more than locations in the Pacific. Each found resentment rooted in fear and racism, related to the contexts that existed at the time of their arrival in the U.S. The result was prejudice, discrimination, and hardship, as well as actions that halted the future entry of their people. Geographic settlement patterns of these early arrivals were governed by social institutions. Prior to the Great Depression, thousands of Asians had entered America. However, by the beginning of World War II, Asian immigration had been reduced to a trickle, and would remain so until major changes in U.S. immigration law in the 1960s. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the historical and contemporary patterns of Asian immigration to the U.S., especially Asian immigration and settlements from the mid-19th century through the Great Depression, which is the topic of the first part of this chapter. The historical contexts for early Asian immigration and their eventual exclusion are provided. In a contemporary context, the term “Asians” also facilitates the discussion of numerous Asian ethnic groups that are contributing to changing America and its human geography. The second section of the chapter examines the massive influx of Asians to the U.S. commencing in the mid-1960s and continuing into the early 21st century. The emergence of new geographic patterns, specific Asian ethnic places, and Asian-American landscapes are presented.

ASIANS IN AMERICA PRIOR TO 1965 In 1845, American journalist John Louis O’Sullivan set forth the concept of Manifest Destiny as a defense for U.S. expansionist behavior. By the time gold was discovered in Sutter’s Creek, attracting prospectors of all ethnic backgrounds (white Easterners as well as foreigners) to California, politicians and business leaders endorsed the concept of Manifest Destiny as a God-given right for the expansion of American democracy across North America. The public of a young and expanding nation was easily convinced of their nation’s moral and economic superiority. They, too, endorsed the mission of westward expansion as right, or perhaps even as an

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obligation, which would result in so much European progress. Constantly improving technology and advancements on the frontier strengthened these convictions. Prior to 1965 and, in fact, before World War II, three groups from the Pacific entered the United States in distinctive waves. These were the Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos. Each group provided cheap labor vital to the expanding U.S. economy. The Chinese The Chinese were the first Asian ethnic group to enter the U.S. in large numbers. By 1850, although Hispanic California was already “whitening” from U.S. eastern migrants, the Gold Rush greatly increased that flow and also attracted to California for the first time a large influx of Chinese. Chronic poverty and strife had pushed the Cantonese of China towards “Gold Mountain” in an effort to become rich and return home. Initially, the numbers were moderate: only 50 Chinese resided in California in the 1840s. That changed quickly as more Chinese sought riches and others were recruited as laborers. By 1852, the Chinese population of San Francisco had reached 25,000 and continued to grow for decades. The former Chief of Police, writing in 1931, recalled “the Chinese were coming in from the Orient at about 1,400 on every steamer” (Cook, 1931, p. 1). By 1876, more than 150,000 Chinese had entered the U.S. and 116,000 resided in California (McClain, 1994). Given the initial labor shortages, especially for the difficult and hard work associated with field labor and construction, it is no surprise that the Chinese were welcomed, as noted by Norton: “Here were men who would do the drudgery of life at a reasonable wage, when every other man had but one idea — to work at the mines for gold.... The result was that the Chinaman was welcomed; he was considered quite indispensable. He was in demand as a laborer, as a carpenter, as a cook; the restaurants which he established were well-patronized; his agricultural efforts in draining and tilling the rich lands were praised. Governor McDougal referred to him as, ‘One of the most worthy of our newly adopted citizens.’ In public functions he was given a place of honor ... their cleanliness, unobtrusiveness, and industry were everywhere praised” (H. K. Norton, 1924, p. 1).

Nowhere was their labor more necessary or desired than in the building of western railroads. Railroad companies recruited them. In 1863, the Pacific Railroad employed only a few (about 50) Chinese workers, but by 1867, the Chinese accounted for 80 percent of their labor force and totaled approximately 20,000 laborers. Only a few short years later, the Panic of 1873 resulted in depressed prices and vast surpluses of agricultural goods, including those of California. However, in 1877, the western economy hit bottom and unemployment became an enormous issue. Labor now had two enemies, greedy capitalists and the Chinese who benefited California development. By 1880, fifty thousand Chinese lived in San Francisco, which by that time had become the focus of anti-Chinese activities. In 1877, Irish-born Denis Kearney became one of the leading labor voices of California, speaking against capitalism and the Chinese. His ability to attract listeners to his orations against big business and Chinese immigrants, who together caused white workers to suffer low wages and unemployment, led to the formation of the Workingmen’s Party in 1877. He quickly rose to the leadership and unions rallied across the state for support of striking railroad men, an eight-hour day, taxes on the wealthy, and for immigration restrictions. California’s 1877 Depression was a short-term context for racial oppression. Kearney’s slogan “bullets will replace ballots” marked the threat of violence that exploded in a three-day riot against the Chinese. Hostility was directed towards places that symbolized Chinese existence, the laundries they operated profitably, and the Pacific steamship wharves to which Chinese arrived. Several Chinese were killed in this riot, and major property damage occurred. Violence against the Chinese occurred at various places along the West Coast, and was supported by others, including those in the South. Norton expressed this in 1924, when describing the earlier Los Angeles riot:

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“Their (labor radicals’) method of procedure was in most cases to sack and burn the Chinese laundries and other commercial establishments operated by the Orientals. It was left for Los Angeles to furnish the most terrible example of all. Here nineteen Chinamen were hanged and shot in one evening. The massacre was accompanied by theft of over $40,000 worth of their goods.... It was in the South, in fact, that the violent opposition to the Chinese had first found strong supporters. Here were many who were accustomed to assert the superiority of their race and to attach the idea of servitude to all inferior races” (H. K. Norton, 1924, pp. 283–96).

Kearney’s Party extended its threats to those who would employ Chinese labor and its influence to the 1878 California Constitution Convention, pressing for new laws against the Chinese, and later to the passage of national legislation. The state would virtually exclude Chinese residents from their civil rights and employment. Federal law would restrict further Chinese immigration. Much has been written about the legal barriers established to Chinese citizenship and civil rights. One example of legal exclusion helps clarify the position of the California courts, including the state Supreme Court. In the People vs. Jones (1869), a White appellant convicted of robbery of a Chinese man was released because: “Under the laws of this State, Chinamen are disqualified from being witnesses or giving testimony in any case in which a white man is party ...” (Grant, 1994, p. 88).

As Grant noted, the Supreme Court not only supported Chinese exclusion under California law, it degraded the Chinese in its findings, describing them as: “... a degraded, brutal, and vicious race, peculiarly addicted to crime and vice, and demanding more stringent regulations for their government than are required for the general mass of citizens ...” (findings quoted by Grant, 1994, p. 90).

The politics of Chinese exclusion, which officially occurred with passage of the U.S. 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, must be viewed in broader-than-regional context. Racism was prevalent throughout American regions by 1882. Also, the U.S. had engaged Chinese and Japanese in treaties to stimulate American foreign trade in the Pacific. A treaty with Japan in 1858 had followed Commodore Perry’s “opening” of Japanese ports five years earlier. In 1868, the Burlingame Treaty between the U.S. and China confirmed U.S. trading privileges and appealed to American expansionist interest in the Pacific; it also contained articles requiring the protection of Chinese immigrants that were so desperately desired for the provision of cheap labor. This agreement eventually led to a conflict between federal executives (presidents) and Congress, as well as to discontent among Californians toward the federal government. Hune’s analysis of this controversy revealed that Presidents Hayes and Garfield opposed legislation that would restrict Chinese immigration due to its potentially negative implications for global trade (Hune, 1994). However, she also clarified the influence of prevailing racial attitudes on these two presidents and the fact that few politicians considered the victims of the proposed policy: “... At first glance, it would appear that Chinese restriction was a matter of congressional policy to which the executive office eventually acquiesced. However, a closer examination of the attitudes and actions of the presidents of this period suggest that Chinese restriction was also a matter of executive policy and that the legislature and the executive office were not in basic conflict. George Sinkler has noted that the racial attitudes of presidents have tended to mirror the times and the general populace. Thus in their private and public papers, Hayes, Garfield, and Arthur expressed their own misgivings about the presence of the Chinese, whom they viewed as unassimilable and a potential danger to American civilization.... ... Thus, although the vetoes of Presidents Hayes and Arthur forestalled the adoption of Chinese restriction, their other activities also prepared the way for the passage of a restriction bill while ensuring a

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The passage of the 1882 law was the only U.S. immigration law ever directed at a single racial/ethnic group. It reduced Chinese immigration to a trickle (although “paper sons” continued to enter in small numbers for decades). The decline in the Chinese population was precipitous, falling from 105,000 in 1880 to 85,000 in 1920. The contexts described earlier resulted in the victimization of the Chinese and, as shown in the next section, Chinatown, as a place, became a social construct created by European cultures for self-serving purposes. Chinatown as Social Construct As noted earlier, the Chinese sought refuge from white violence and discrimination by congregating in what would be termed Chinatowns, which became fixtures in San Francisco, Oakland, and later in other cities. The eastward migration of Chinese fleeing prejudice and discrimination resulted in the growth of eastern Chinatowns, including those in Chicago, New York City and Boston. The physical appearance of late 19th and early 20th century Chinatowns differed significantly from America’s contemporary image of bright and colorful landscapes that attract tourists and diners. They consisted of small, crowded unattractive structures that gained the criticism of local whites. Despite this fact, over time, Chinatowns became popularized as unique landscapes expressing social organization and cultural pride. Some social scientists have suggested that these communities function as “points of contact” for other immigrants seeking cultural assimilation, while others see Chinatown as a reaction to white prejudice and discrimination. Kay J. Anderson has taken issue with these positions by suggesting “Chinatown is a social construction with a cultural history and a tradition of imagery and institutional practice that has given it a cognitive and material reality in and for the West” (Anderson, 1987, p. 581). She argued that, rather than prejudice, the key explanatory variable in the Western creation of Chinatowns was racial ideology, which combines race (Chinese) and place (Chinatown) in the creation of a racial classification that was meant to benefit Western white societies. The creation of a negative racial class was linked to a place of unnecessary and unacceptable “evils,” which justified the use of powerful white institutions to define the boundaries and contents of the place and to support actions to drive away the vile race occupying it. Anderson used Vancouver to illustrate the use of this social construct. By 1886, the Chinese, largely a bachelor society, were already under the control of the government and were geographically concentrated in a small neighborhood of Vancouver. Admittedly, the Chinese contributed to their self-definition and local cultural landscape. However, the local white European culture created the essence of “Chineseness” and the regional image of Chinatown “on capricious grounds” (p. 583). According to Anderson, the stereotyping of Chinese was rooted in 18th century western interpretations of China. Traders, visitors, and other Western opinion leaders, including Protestant missionaries, offered highly unfavorable characterizations of the culture. Not only were Chinese backward and “peculiar,” they also were treacherous, immoral, “conscious agents of Satan” (Anderson, p. 591). In Vancouver, as in San Francisco and other American communities, the Chinese were described as undesirable outsiders and their living quarters as a despicable, repulsive, and threatening local geography. This social construction allowed the white majority to create a racial classification that not only affirmed white identity and privileged status, but also provided a basis for ridding local society of its problems. Racial classification used place (Chinatown), to create a “social fact” and imbedded racial ideology (Anderson, 1987). Anderson explained the creation of the social construct by equating notions, like the “Chinaman seems to be the same everywhere,” with the Chinese as “dirty and undesirable” and their Chinatowns as “unsanitary sink[s]” and “morally aberrant communit[ies]” (Anderson, p. 586). Local government institutions then designated “official definitions of Chinatown” as essential to monitor questionable activities and, then, to limit their

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locations, such as by controlling Chinese laundries (p. 587). Much of this was offered in the name of “sanitary reform,” to eliminate “fear of contamination from the Orient” (p. 586). Although gambling and prostitution were widespread in the city, Chinatown became the location of choice to stop vice. Local political and police actions were necessary to rid white society of these drug lords, prostitution houses, and gambling operations. The “disgrace” of their existence was attributed to the Chinese “menace,” and white participation in vice was simply a verification of the problems of the undesirable Chinese race. Chinatown, a den of inequity wedged into white society, was the place that magnified the shortcomings of this race. Despite the protests of Chinese merchants and leaders and their efforts to correct these false race-based images, the strength of social construct created by whites prevailed and resulted in prejudicial and discriminatory behavior by the white population and its institutions towards the Chinese people. Anderson’s powerful explanation of the social construction and “evaluative classification” of Chinatown can be compared to Wilson’s description of the 20th century black ghetto “underclass.” It is striking that in both constructs, racial classification results in the demonization of a particular group in a way that permits depersonalization. The human geography of both places is perceived as crowded, filthy, and dangerous. Both groups also participate in “aberrant behaviors” that threaten the social order cherished by the ruling class (Wilson, 1987). Even this brief comparison suggests the validity and power of Anderson’s explanation. For American Chinatowns, historical experiences of violence and institutional controls were strikingly similar to those of Vancouver. We noted particularly their experiences in San Francisco, but those of other communities, such as Oakland, have also been documented (Frazier, Margai, and Tettey-Fio, 2003). We also noted the roles of California State and local institutions, especially the courts, and of the federal government in actions that led to the only U.S. immigration law ever to target a specific racial/ethnic group. With the creation of the quota system in the 1920s, the fate of Chinese immigration became fixed for decades. The additional insult came with the treatment of Chinese who sought entry as “paper sons,” those permitted entry due to “proven” family relationships with former Chinese immigrants. Angel Island, the Western port of entry, became synonymous with questionable treatment of entering Chinese. Millions of Europeans entering through Ellis Island faced few questions and a simple physical exam, while Chinese often were detained at the Angel Island facility for months in unpleasant conditions. The Chinese developed a sense of bitterness for this very unfortunate period and worked to preserve Angel Island as a landmark and symbol of what was involved in becoming a Chinese American. The Japanese Although a few Japanese entered the U.S. prior to the Civil War, their total population in the U.S. in 1880 was about 150 (Buell, 1994, p. 26). In 1885, the Japanese government legalized emigration, although with the stipulation that Japanese emigrants owed allegiance to their home nation. Shortly thereafter, Japanese emigration companies worked with American labor contractors, for great profit, to provide cheap Japanese labor that was in demand on the American Pacific Coast. Pushed away by poor Japanese agricultural conditions and pervasive poverty, and attracted to the prospect of employment, the Japanese increasingly answered the call of labor contractors. By 1891, more than one thousand annually entered the U.S.; 12,000 entered in the single year of 1900. The trend continued and soon the Japanese replaced the Chinese as a problem: “In the five years between 1898 and 1903, the number of emigrants (Japanese) going to foreign countries, excluding Korea and China, were 84,576. Eighty percent went to the United States. In the year 1900, four times as many Japanese entered America as in the previous year. Naturally, this irritated the sensibilities of California — easily aroused after a riotous twenty-year struggle with the Chinese immigrants” (Buell, 1994, p. 608).

A series of labor-related and civil actions followed. When word of a potential health plague emerged in San Francisco in 1900, arguably forwarded for political reasons, city officials quarantined Japanese and Chinese districts, and nowhere else (Buell, 1994). Increasingly, public health fears and labor concerns led to public meet-

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ings led by labor and the agitation for inclusion of Japanese in a modified Chinese Exclusion Law (Buell, 1994). The Japanese response, sometimes termed the “First Gentlemen’s Agreement,” was to tighten emigration. This was not enough to quiet growing concern among labor leaders. California’s economy had returned to prosperity by the time of the Spanish-American War, particularly in San Francisco. This prosperity had favorable impacts on labor. Despite the demise of the Workingman’s Party only a few years earlier, a new political party, the Union Labor Party, emerged and became very influential. Although the government of Japan promised emigration concessions, its immigrants kept coming. Japanese labor continued to supply Hawaiian sugar plantations. Many of the same Japanese laborers made it to America’s Pacific Coast, attracted by its higher wages. Incoming annually from Hawaii to the U.S. mainland, their numbers increased from slightly more than 1,000 in 1902 to nearly 14,000 in 1904 (Buell, 1994). The labor movement of California feared the same from Japanese as it did from Chinese “Coolie labor,” as reported in Organized Labor: “Thousands of fair-minded and well-meaning people who were biased and ignorant on the question of Japanese immigration have, during the last year, entirely changed their views on the subject. They have learned the truth, that the Japanese coolie is even greater a menace to the existence of the white race, to the progress and prosperity of our country than is the Chinese coolie.... The great calamity which befell San Francisco will furnish the Orient with lurid tales of opportunity for employment and profit. California, the land of fabulous wealth, revenue, and mountains of gold, and San Francisco with its wonderful wages, will be exploited before the ignorant coolies until they will come in shiploads like an endless swarm of rats.... Great as the recent catastrophe has been, let us take care, lest we encounter a greater one. We can withstand the earthquake. We can survive the fire. As long as California is white man’s country, it will remain one of the grandest and best states in the union, but the moment the Golden State is subjected to an unlimited Asiatic coolie invasion, there will be no more California” (Organized Labor, 1906, pp. 1–2).

In the previous year, the San Francisco Chronicle had published a large piece suggesting that the increasing Japanese “menace” held serious consequences for California and the nation. The paper “greatly exaggerated” the Japanese population in the U.S. at 100,000 (Buell, 1994). The agitation provided by the media and labor was constant. An earthquake, fire, and the position of President T. Roosevelt prevented immediate exclusionary policy. However, anti-Japanese sentiment continued and was fueled by racist convictions, as well as economic fears associated with continued Japanese immigration and the relocation of Japanese after the San Francisco fire: “But the reconstruction of the city again resurrected anti-Japanese sentiment. Ten thousand Japanese had been affected by the fire. In an effort to find new homes and business locations, many invaded the Western districts of San Francisco which hitherto had been ‘white man’s land.’ Meanwhile, other sources of irritation manifested themselves. Immigration by no means had ceased. For the first six months of 1906, the excess of Japanese arrivals over departures in San Francisco alone was 5,772, a figure which led the Chronicle to declare, ‘If the next Congress does not act in this matter, it will assume very grave responsibilities’ ” (Buell, 1994, p. 41).

Labor publications chided whites for patronizing Japanese businesses and requested cooperation. A wave of violence, including burglary, arson, of property destruction, and murder, followed.

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A single event in 1906, however, brought international attention to San Francisco. The city’s School Board, controlled by the Mayor and directed by the Exclusion League, issued a decree that mandated all Asian children attend segregated schools. This would require Japanese children, 93 of a total enrollment of 25,000, to attend school in Chinatown. The absurdity of the expressed purpose, which was dealing with overcrowding, was quickly recognized. The racial overtones were obvious. An international incident unfolded. The Japanese were offended and said so. President Roosevelt immediately criticized the action and argued it violated a U.S. treaty with Japan. After posturing on both sides, the 1907 Gentlemen’s Agreement was reached. President Roosevelt got the School Board to discard the segregationist plan, and the Japanese government agreed to voluntarily restrict emigration to the U.S. and Hawaii. The Agreement also banned further Korean immigration as laborers. This opened up opportunities for Filipinos in Hawaiian, and later U.S., agriculture. Another outcome of the Agreement was a change in the location of Japanese in the U.S. Prior to the Agreement, the Japanese resided in urban centers and were the targets of labor unions. After the Agreement, the Japanese migrated to the California countryside and competed with white farmers. Not surprisingly, institutional efforts to drive out the Japanese turned to land law. McClain noted that states could discriminate against Japanese due to constitutional law: “... the Supreme Court affirmed that states, in the absence of overriding treaty provisions, could deny aliens the right to own real property within their borders. Farming, as noted above, was the preponderant occupation of the Japanese immigrants. The treaties between the United States and Japan, while guaranteeing certain rights to Japanese immigrants, said nothing about agricultural land. Here, then, was an opening for the western states to accomplish their objectives, and California led the way” (McClain, 1994, p. x).

In 1913 and 1923, the state passed “Alien Land Laws.” The first law restricted land ownership by “aliens ineligible for citizenship,” but allowed “three-year leaseholds” (McClain, p. x). The 1923 law, although avoiding racist language, was designed to eliminate Japanese landholdings in the state. It closed loopholes in the 1913 law that was successfully exploited by the Japanese, including ownership through their children and the use of corporations to hold agricultural lands. The new law also added criminal penalties for those attempting to circumvent the laws. Other western states followed with similar laws modeled after California’s (McClain, 1994). The Japanese and others challenged these laws. However, except for the success in striking down that portion that prohibited aliens from being guardians of their minor children’s land, the Supreme Court upheld the challenges. Hardship, of course, resulted for the Japanese residents. However, the biggest blows to Japanese immigration and Japanese-American civil rights were yet to come. In 1924, a provision of the Federal Immigration Act barred Japanese immigration. The ultimate insult came with the outbreak of WWII, when Japanese Americans were taken from their homes and businesses and placed in internment camps. This was, and continues to be, one of the most embarrassing events in American history. The Filipinos U.S. political involvement in the Philippines came at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War with the 1899 Treaty of Paris, which transferred the Philippines (and Puerto Rico) to the U.S. Increased migration followed. Ethnically diverse, rural Filipino populations were “pushed” away from the countryside by the economic hardships of their homeland and were “pulled” toward the potential of employment and education in America. According to Melendy, Filipinos entered America in two distinct waves, one between 1903 and 1942, entailing young Filipino men seeking advanced education, and another between 1907 and 1935, including a stepwise movement to Hawaii and then to the U.S. (Melendy, 1977). He explained the early acceptance of thousands of Filipinos as a perceived American “obligation” tied to the “White Man’s Burden” that likely would result in young Filipino leaders returning home as advocates teaching American values (Melendy, 1977).

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The Hawaiian plantations and mills became employment opportunities for young Filipino males, who replaced restricted Japanese and Chinese workers. Recruiters actively sought Filipino workers and the president of the Hawaiian Immigration Board informed the U.S. government “that the Philippine Islands had become the only available source of plantation labor” (Melendy, p. 34). Thus, thousands of Filipino laborers were allowed entry to Hawaii on an annual basis. The result was a burgeoning Filipino population that reached 21,031 in 1920 and 63,052 by 1930. The Great Depression dramatically stopped this growth trend by 1932 and in 1940 there were fewer Filipinos residing in Hawaii than in 1930, due to return migration to the Philippines. The relative location of the American West Coast to Hawaii and the Philippines was a significant geographic factor in Filipino entry into the U.S. Its economic growth and employment opportunities made California attractive to both Filipinos traveling directly from Manila and for those relocating from Hawaii to the U.S. In 1910, approximately 400 Filipinos lived in the U.S. (Hawaii excluded). This population was widely scattered among California, Alaska, and Louisiana (New Orleans had the greatest concentration), as well as other locations. However, by 1920, the U.S. Filipino population exceeded 5,000 with approximately 50 percent of that total residing in California. Other settlements were scattered among the Northeastern U.S., Alaska, and Washington (Melendy, 1977). Filipino population increases of the 1920s were even more dramatic, and included not only California and other West Coast states, but eastern urban centers due to immigration from the Philippines and relocations from Hawaii: “During these years, some 45,000 Filipinos arrived on the Pacific Coast; about 16,000 … from the Hawaiian Islands. While most immigrants remained on the West Coast, many moved to Chicago, Detroit, New York, and Philadelphia. California’s Filipino population increased about 91% in the 1920s. In 1930, California (reported) … for the ten-year period, 1920–1929, just over 31,000 disembarked at the ports of San Francisco and Los Angeles … In 1923 … one-third came from Hawaii, where a major sugar strike was in progress … 35 percent of the total arrived from Manila, 56 percent moved from the Hawaiian Islands, and the remaining nine percent came from Asian seaports …” (Melendy, pp. 41– 42).

Like their Asian predecessors, these young Filipino men (one-half in the age group 22–29) generally did not speak English and were of darker skins than the white society that received them. Not surprisingly, these low-paid, low-skilled young “foreigners” employed in agriculture fisheries, and services, became the targets and scapegoats when the Great Depression hit California and other states. Young Filipino men were characterized as criminals, gamblers, and sexual predators. Of course, the white majority’s concern for racial segregation and separation had been well established with the Chinese. This led to the passage of miscegenation laws in California and other states (Foster, 1932) that forbade whites from marrying blacks, mulattoes, or those of the Malay race. These laws effectively kept many from marriage and resulted in economic and social hardships for Filipinos and others. Among the financial penalties were denials of monetary allowances, health care and insurance, all of which required that military couples be legally married. One of the unique curses faced by Filipinos was related to their legal status. The 1916 Jones Act conferred the status “American national.” However, the 1917 U.S. Immigration Law made Filipinos ineligible for citizenship. As “nationals” they could migrate freely to the U.S. mainland, but once here, they were denied the privileges associated with citizenship status. They faced economic discrimination and employment restrictions. Of particular importance were the Depression years, when Filipino legal status made them eligible for federal public works projects, but denied them the employment preference provided citizens for project employment. Other legalities also negatively influenced their employability. The Merchant Marine Law, for example, required that sailing crews be “75 percent American,” causing Filipinos to compete with aliens and face fewer prospects for employment. Filipino professionals also faced employment difficulties. For example, Filipinos could sit for federal qualifying examinations for professional employment, but faced exclusion at the state level, due to variable licensing laws. Finally, Filipinos faced discrimination in efforts to lease agricultural lands (Nomura, 1994). During the same period, Filipinos, like the Chinese who preceded them, saw their stock as “steady, ideal workers” shift dramatically to “shiftless deadbeats” who gambled away their wages, chased white women, and

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mixed “with near-moron white girls” (Melendy, 1977, p. 61). As a result, discrimination against them intensified. In addition to the hardships already described, they also experienced difficulty with credit and were restricted from property ownership in the 1940s. In 1929, California sought federal restrictions against future Filipino entry into the U.S. on moral and racial grounds. By 1934, a single act made that unnecessary. The 1916 Jones Act had granted legislative power to the Philippines under the direction of a governor-general appointed by the U.S. president. The 1932 GareHawes-Cutting Act, after a 10-year transition period, granted full independence to the Philippines. In 1934, the Tydings-McDuffie Act solved “the Filipino problem.” It not only confirmed independence for the Philippines, it brought Filipino entry into the U.S. to a virtual halt by reclassifying their status. In short, as a foreign Asian nation, the Philippines now faced a 50-persons-per-year immigration quota. This was accepted by both governments. Later exceptions were tied to labor shortages defined by the U.S. Commerce Department. Of particular note in this regard was the effort of the state of California, which sought Filipino labor in place of the Mexican guest workers of the Bracero Program. As a result, the Filipino population of the U.S. continued to grow, but modestly, through 1960. This would change in 1965.

BACKGROUND: THE TRANSITION FROM PRE- TO POST-WWII AND THE 1965 IMMIGRATION ACT Previous sections of this chapter demonstrated that successive waves of Asian immigrants, after initially being welcomed as hard-working laborers, faced discrimination, violence, segregation, and exclusion. Their pay was low, their accommodations poor, and eventually they became geographically segregated due to limited mobility, residential decision-making, and discrimination. Each of the Asian immigrant groups experienced occupational as well as geographic segregation and were excluded from advanced sectors of the economy. The Chinese were overrepresented in mining and service occupations at the beginning of the 20th century. For example, they were the majority of laundry workers in 1910 (Bonacich, 1984). The Japanese were narrowly concentrated in a set of occupations, including farm labor, services, and manufacturing. Filipinos were overrepresented in agricultural labor and, by the 1930s, in lower levels of the service sector (Bonacich, 1984). Second-generation Asians in 20th century America thus saw little improvement. Segregated AsianAmerican communities and their employment problems were subjects studied by sociologists and geographers of the Chicago School and others in the 1920s, including Park, Mears, and Smith (Woo, 1994). Issues of underemployment, unemployment, wage inequities, and lack of promotions were the patterns of the day among the Chinese and other second-generation Asian Americans due to discrimination by the dominant white society. All of this occurred despite good English language skills. Geographer Mears suggested that Asian Americans were trapped in the occupations of their parents and had little chance of success outside their segregated neighborhoods unless they were willing to work for less, or had exceptional educational qualifications compared to white competitors (Mears, 1928). This meant remaining in the pursuits of their parents, such as agriculture, or seeking opportunities in specific areas of the service sector. These were permitted because Asian Americans in such positions as accounting required little interaction with whites, who generally wished to minimize professional and social contacts with Asians (Woo, 1994). Woo, in her 1994 report to the U.S. Department of Labor, spoke of the barriers faced by this second generation: “Even as they began to professionalize, they also encountered barriers to entering more remunerative and satisfying work. Despite being college-educated, they found it hard, if not impossible, to find jobs outside the racial-ethnic enclaves encased by formal and informal discriminatory practices. Whatever their professional training, they often could not find jobs commensurate with their education. Their situation would not radically improve until the onset of World War II, which made it necessary for the nation to utilize a wider band of its human resources, including this untapped supply of technical reserve labor” (Woo, 1994, p. 12).

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It took a global war and major labor shortage to open up the domestic labor market, skilled and unskilled, to Asian immigrants (Japanese excluded). Wartime industries required factory workers, technicians, engineers, clerical workers, and other positions. The fact that China was fighting a common enemy, Japan, helped the status of Chinese Americans, who also raised war funds and worked hard. The status of Filipinos also rose slowly. Frazier, Margai, and Tettey-Fio (2003) noted the remarkable emergence of the Chinese Americans in Oakland during WWII, after years of discrimination and exclusion. This became the case in other American cities and states and represented a transition in Asian-American status in American life. After WWII, a number of factors led to the liberalization of U.S. immigration laws. The U.S. became one of the world’s two superpowers and entered a Cold War that would last for nearly a generation. The spread of communism resulted in the “Red Scare” and the desire of America to protect those negatively affected by communist regimes. This led to immigration preference for refugees. In spite of periodic recession, the U.S. economy expanded, and then experienced a structural shift as it moved from emphasis on manufacturing employment to increasing reliance on service sector employment. Many of the new service employment opportunities were unskilled and low-paying, but these were supported by the higher-paying jobs for doctors and other health care professionals, engineers, technicians, and later computer scientists. This expansion occurred at rates unmatched by the production of educational credentials necessary to fill professional positions. By the 1960s, America had a shortage of physicians, for example, that resulted in a maldistribution among city and suburb and urban and rural regions of the nation. The same was true for nurses, pharmacists, and dentists. The labor shortage extended to other professions, as well. Finally, the 1960s can be characterized not only by the expanding economy, but also by racial conflict, the Civil Rights era, and a more liberal view in Washington. All of these factors contributed to the rethinking of U.S. immigration policy that culminated in passage of the 1965 Hart-Celler Act. This act abolished the quota system and established hemispheric limitations that sought redress of the discrimination of previous immigration laws. The new law applied the numerical limits to the multiple category preference system established by the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act. The provisions of the law permitted preference for trained professionals that would benefit the labor needs of the U.S. economy, which greatly facilitated the entry of health care professionals, engineers, technicians, computer scientists, and others, especially those from the Eastern Hemisphere. Another key feature of this law was its exemption from the numerical limits those with immediate family ties in the U.S., including spouses, offspring, and parents. Although debated in Congress, few thought that this liberalization of immigration policy would have a dramatic impact on diversification of the U.S. population. They were wrong. The influx of Asians and Latinos set immigration records in the 1990s and resulted in a new racial-ethnic mix and changing geographic patterns around the nation, both at regional and local scales. A number of other pieces of federal legislation have contributed to increased immigration. These fall into two classes. One provides asylum for political refugees and the other expands employment-based immigration law. Among the latter class is the 1990 U.S. Immigration Act, which allocated 140,000 immigrant visas to the “employment” category. Also, U.S. high-tech corporations successfully lobbied Congress to pass legislation that increased the number of annual H-1B visas meant to bring immigrants with special skills to fill unfilled but increasing numbers of high tech jobs. The H-1B visas now stand at 195,000 annually and those holding these visas can apply for permanent residency while in this status. In the remainder of this chapter, three issues are examined. First, the growth and increase in Asian ethnic diversity since 1960 is explored. Second, the economic bifurcation of the Asian-American population is examined, especially within the context of continuing discrimination, the model minority myth, and the metropolitan locations of this ethnically diverse group. Finally, we report the contemporary geography of the Asian population with an emphasis on concentration in American “gateways,” dispersion from these entry points, and new urban/metropolitan settlement patterns that have required new theories of assimilation.

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SELECTED ASIAN-AMERICAN TRENDS SINCE 1960 Growth and Diversification The growth of the Asian-American population since the 1965 Immigration Law has been dramatic. In 1960, the U.S. Census reported nearly one million Asian/Pacific Islanders. This represented about 1 percent of the total U.S. population. By 1970, the Asian total was just over 1.5 million. This population continued to increase, reaching approximately 3.7 million by 1980 (more than doubling the 1970 figure), 7.2 million in 1990, and reaching nearly 12.3 million in 2000, which accounted for about 4.4 percent of the U.S. population. In 2003, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that Asian population growth between 2000 and 2002 increased 9 percent and reached approximately 13 million (Armas, 2003). The same report credited immigration with about two-thirds of that growth. In addition to this rapid growth, the Asian-American population has greatly diversified. By 1980, the U.S. Census Bureau reported twenty different Asian ethnic groups in the U.S. Among the newcomers of this post-1965 era were Koreans, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians, and the Hmong people. All of the better-established Asian ethnic groups increased their proportional representations between 1960 and 2000, except the Japanese, who lost their ranking as the third largest Asian-American group to Asian Indians in the 2000 Census. The Chinese and Filipinos retained their number one and two population rankings among Asian Americans. The increasing diversity among Asian Americans due to the 1965 immigration law perhaps can best be appreciated by examining the increases among several of their most rapidly growing ethnic groups between 1960 and 1970. Table 20.1 reports those data and the percent change by group, for the years 1960 and 1970. The data illustrate that the one-year entries of these four ethnic groups together increased approximately sixfold for the two years in question. The most dramatic increase occurred within the Asian Indian population, which built strongly on a very low base. The increase of Filipino entries was extremely dramatic, increasing from nearly three thousand in 1960 to 31,203 in 1970. This was not an aberration. The U.S. Census reported that between 1965 and 1974, the U.S. Filipino population increased 950 percent to 210,269 in 1974. Only Mexicans accounted for a larger number in that period. Table 20.1 also illustrates the significant gains for Chinese/Taiwanese and Koreans. By 2000, Asian ethnic diversity in the U.S. was clear (Armas, 2001). Table 20.2 reports Asian ethnicity as a percent of the total U.S. Asian population. Three groups, the Chinese, Filipinos, and Indians, account for just over one-half (57%) of the total U.S. Asian population. The next three, Koreans, Vietnamese, and Japanese, constitute an additional nearly 30 percent. Approximately 13.5 percent are spread among other Asian ethnic groups, such as the Hmong, Cambodians, and Laotians. Thus, numerous Asian ethnic groups, speaking different languages and representing very different cultures, are represented among the Asian-American population at the beginning of the 21st century. Economic Bifurcation: The Model Minority Myth and the Persistence of Discrimination Whenever aggregate statistics are employed to profile the U.S. Asian/Pacific Islander population, a strikingly positive picture emerges. Such was the case in the U.S. Census 2000 profile in the “U.S. Department of Commerce News” that reported that married couples accounted for 80 percent of their households and that 42 percent earned annual incomes of $75,000 or more (McKinnon and Grieco, 2001). The report went on to summarize other important dimensions of this positive profile: x Forty-four percent of Asian and Pacific Islanders age 25 and over had a bachelor’s degree or higher and 86 percent had at least a high school diploma in 2000. x In 1999, Asian and Pacific Islanders had a record-low poverty rate of 10.7 percent. x There were 2.5 million Asian and Pacific Islander families; 13 percent were maintained by women with no spouse present and 7 percent by men with no spouse present. x Asian and Pacific Islander families tended to be relatively large. For example, 23 percent of Asian and Pacific Islander married-couple families had five or more members.

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There is no doubt that many Asian families are doing very well economically and that family values and a strong work ethic are vital parts of Asian cultures. However, this aggregate depiction hides a number of serious equity issues according to Asian-American social scientists. It also supports the Asian model minority myth in America. Deborah Woo introduced her executive summary of a report written for the U.S. Labor Department: “For Americans who are not of Asian ancestry, meaningful, empirically-based discussion of the realities of a glass ceiling for Asian Americans, runs up against a powerful counter-image: a mediasaturated view of Asian Pacific Americans as highly educated and occupationally successful. Complementing this picture of upward mobility is that part of a generally non-violent and law-abiding citizenry, relatively passive politically, and overall culturally resourceful. However, is it the comparative educational and occupational success of Asian Americans — over and against that of African Americans, Latino-Americans, and Native Americans — that has generated the idea of Asian Americans as a ‘model’ for other minorities. Insofar as this understanding has come to occupy the status of conventional wisdom in the contemporary United States, it has eroded our collective capacity to confront an alternative reality” (Woo, 1994, p. 1).

Table 20.1 Number of One-Year Entries to U.S. by Asian Ethnic Group Immigrants, 1960 and 1970

Number of 1-Year Entries: Year and Percent Changes Asian Ethnic Group Filipinos Chinese/Taiwanese Asian Indians Koreans

1960 2,954 3,681 391 1,507

1970 31,203 14,093 10,114 9,314

% Change from 1960–1970 956% 283% 2,487% 518%

Totals

8,523

64,724

659%

Table 20.2 Asian Ethnic Groups as a Percent of the Total 2000 U.S. Asian Population Asian Ethnic Group Chinese Filipinos Indians Koreans Vietnamese Japanese Other

Percent of U.S. Asian Population, 2000* 22.3% 19.3% 15.5% 10.0% 10.0% 9.4% 13.5%

Total

100.00%

* calculated by author from U.S. Census, 2000.

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Woo makes several points about the reported aggregate incomes. First, she noted that the geographic concentration of the majority of Asians in the American West, especially California, meant relatively higher earnings in a region of high standard of living. Put simply, higher average incomes in California are necessary due to much higher living costs (e.g., housing). When Western incomes are put into national averages, they artificially inflate the purchasing power of Asian Americans. Also, the existence of a “glass ceiling” and income disparities are issues not conveyed by positive, aggregate national profiles. Woo found that inferences related to mobility based solely on educational data were misleading. Both occupational segregation (such as Asian college-educated women concentrated in low-level clerical positions) and lower returns on educational accomplishments compared to whites, challenge the upwardly mobile, financially successful stereotype associated with the model minority (Woo, 1994). Barriers to promotion and equal pay for comparable work and education suggested the existence of a “glass ceiling,” blocking promotion and its associated status, as well as the existence of “race-typed jobs” guided by prejudice and carrying lower salary schedules (Woo, 1994). The Asian professionals’ glass ceiling and Asian-white income disparities were considered as early as the 1970s. Jobu, for example, argued that Chinese suffered socioeconomic disparities with whites due to a low return of education (Jobu, 1976). In the 1980s, Fong and Cabezas suggested that professional Asian women of the three largest ethnic groups suffered job segregation and associated poor wages (Fong and Cabezas, 1980). In 1987, Martinelli and Nagasawa (1987), in rejecting the model minority concept, reported that white men were twice as likely to hold managerial positions as Japanese-American men because the Asian men received less return from their education than their white counterparts. In 1988, Lau argued that separate tracking for Asian employees resulted in the glass ceilings experienced by Asian professionals (Lau, 1988). Similarly, Cabezas and Kawagnchi (1988) reported that Asian Americans commonly earn less than whites due to their marginalization into unimportant jobs with little security and low pay. Similar findings continued into the 1990s (such as Duleep and Sanders, 1992) and support Woo’s contentions that a number of visible and invisible barriers, often rooted in prejudice, have created an Asian glass ceiling and related income disparities. There is a strong perception among Asian-American professionals that they are invisible at promotion time, face unfair subjective criteria, or are directed to specific employment that holds little hope for advancement (Woo, 1994; Cabezas, Tse, Lowe, Wong, and Turner, 1989). The lower end of the income distribution occupied by Asians who are unskilled workers and the unemployed, also has received attention. For example, Ong (1993) noted the significant proportion of Asian Americans living in poverty. The Hmong, Cambodian, and other refugee immigrant groups experienced double-digit poverty rates in the 1980s and, in 1989, Asian Americans overall experienced a 14 percent poverty rate, compared to the 13 percent national rate. Sections of Chinatowns in Chicago and Boston and ethnic enclaves elsewhere experienced relatively high poverty rates as recent Asian immigrants became entrapped in local ethnic economies with little mobility due to no skills and poor education. Some research on the economic differentiation of Asian Americans reveals that their economic status is somewhat related to their time of arrival in the United States. A number of social scientists recognized two distinct waves of Asian immigration to the U.S. after 1965. Waldinger and Bozorgmehr (1996), for example, noted that the highly educated Chinese, Asian Indians, and Koreans characterized the first wave, whereas uneducated and unskilled refugees from Southeast Asia led the second wave. The latter settled in inner cities, such as Los Angeles and Oakland, where they swelled poverty rolls and found economic survival a challenge (Waldinger and Borzorgmehr, 1996; Allen and Turner, 1997). A host of other authors have pointed out the fallacies of the model minority hypothesis that was first presented during the Civil Rights era to combat the complaints of the black minority against the white-dominated economic system. This hypothesis, as noted by Woo, suggested that Asians are good, hardworking people, who, despite facing the barriers of an unjust and discriminating system, found ways to overcome them through peaceful means. This is due, the hypothesis argues, to Asian perseverance, pride, patience, and, above all, the emphasis they place on family values, education, and the work ethic. These are the keys to success that permit all minorities to overcome systemic obstacles. Cheng and Yang (1996), among others, have offered empirical evidence to debunk this model minority myth. Their findings support the

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works reviewed above. They supplied data from labor, household income, and wage statistics to illustrate that Asian success varies by ethnicity and is related to the entry of Asian minority groups of differing education and skill levels (two waves above). Their data also illustrated that Asian Americans earn less than whites in terms of equal financial rewards for similar skills and work. They conclude that, “Asian ethnic groups do not seem to be progressing at comparable rates (compared to whites), no matter how hard they try” (p. 324). Asian Americans invest time learning the skills of the job, typically at a lower than standard wage, and then face a glass ceiling and lower pay scales compared to whites in certain occupations (Cheng and Yang, 1996). David Wong’s research has also indicated that substantial economic differentiation among Asians, coupled with ethnicity, has resulted in Asian class distinction and residential segregation (Wong, 1999 and 2000).

ASIAN-AMERICAN GEOGRAPHIES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY A complex Asian-American geography is evolving at the beginning of this century. The historical importance of “Chinatown” has already been noted. Recently, American Chinatowns are experiencing a number of problems, despite the public perception that they are booming tourist areas. As noted earlier, some low-skilled immigrants became entrapped in these inner-city ethnic enclaves. Part of Boston’s Chinatown was included in its federal economic development zone proposal, due to the substantial poverty levels there in the 1990s. Similarly, Oakland’s inner-city neighborhoods contain poor Asians, as well as Latinos and African Americans. Housing problems and poverty suffered by Oakland’s poor are obvious from the city’s Consolidated Plan, 2000, which noted examples of combined Asian and African-American concentrations, such as those in the formerly all-black San Antonio neighborhood (City of Oakland, 2000). Chinatowns like those in New York and Chicago provide a neighborhood support system for new Asian immigrants. This has resulted in substantial crowding and inadequate affordable housing. New York’s Chinatown is expanding into other formerly ethnic neighborhoods on Manhattan’s Lower East Side. In most cases, the local ethnic economies of Chinatowns do not supply adequate employment opportunities for newcomers. Some actually are based on restaurant or other service employment in the suburbs. Others may provide jobs but many of them may be in areas that result in under-employment or trap immigrants in sweatshops or other low-end jobs. In Chicago, which by 1970 boasted the fourth largest Chinatown in the U.S., Asians faced a variety of inner-city problems when immigration law changed. Just before the rapid increase in immigrants occurred, nearly one-half of the city’s Chinatown had recently been eliminated from city projects, which exacerbated other problems presented by the Chinese American Service League (CASL) in 1997: “The large influx of Chinese to Chicago in the 1960s aggravated an existing housing problem … (and) some banks had no confidence in lending money to Chinese due to racial discrimination … (also) available housing was outside of the Chinese community at a time when Chinese buyers were not always welcome …” (p. 2).

This article also explained the support functions provided by Chicago’s Chinatown, including the provision of protection, teaching English, busing Chinese to employment, and providing temporary housing. These problems still persist. The League argued that new immigrants and the elderly, many of whom are classified as “economically disadvantaged,” must fight for scarce affordable housing. They also suggested a need to attract foreign investments to move Chinatown out of its dependence on a single form of employment for immigrants (restaurants). Their desire is to upgrade the quality of life so that it is “no longer at the survival level” (CASL, 1997, p. 5). Similar concerns were echoed in a cry for revitalization of Los Angeles’ Chinatown. Times staff writer Connie Kang reported that Chinatown had “for years suffered from poor retail sales, stagnant property values and image problems,” and quoted Patrick Lee, president of the Los Angeles Chinatown Business Council as saying, “If we don’t do something now, Chinatown will become a dead town” (Kang, 2000, p. 1). Part of the problem, of course, is more wealthy Asian Americans have abandoned Chinatowns for the suburbs and, like other old commercial districts, Chinatown has had little success in drawing them back (Kang and Gee, 2000).

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This clearly indicates the economic bifurcation among the Asian American population. It also underscores the fact that Asian Americans, like all Americans, have two locations, inner city and outer city, which reflect their place in the American economic hierarchy. The suburbanization of Asian Americans therefore deserves closer scrutiny. Numerous examples of Asian-American suburbanization exist. The expansion of the American economy in the 1970s demanded scientific and technical expertise that outpaced U.S. educational production in their areas. Growth in the 1990s also required an increasingly educated workforce in various types of technological fields, such as bioengineering, microelectronics, and computer programming. All of these labor needs fueled Asian immigration to the U.S. As Ong and Blumenberg noted, “no other minority group contributed more” to this need than Asians (1994). Thus, despite the glass ceiling discussed earlier, thousands of Asians continued to enter professionally paying jobs in the 1990s and had the resources to seek housing in suburbia. These immigrants experience a very different America than those entering via the city center; they face less overt forms of discrimination and very different living environments. Their experiences, unlike their inner city counterparts, were not at all analogous to those historically persecuted laborers of the 19th and early 20th century U.S. As noted by O’Hare, Frey, and Fost (1994), some Asians are segregating by choice and are preserving their cultures. These authors provided numerous examples of suburban clusters around the nation where Asians have become significant proportions of suburbia and have chosen to cluster with countrymen: Koreans make up 21 percent of suburban Washington, D.C., the Chinese are one-third of Los Angeles suburbanites, and Japanese are one-third of Honolulu’s suburbs (1994). They also describe the existence of a large Filipino middle-class that relocated from Manila to Daly City, CA. In describing Monterrey Park, CA, where the Chinese/Taiwanese increased from three percent in 1960 to the majority by 1990 and the title, “Chinese Beverly Hills,” they noted Fong’s characterization of residents: “They are men and women generally much better educated and more affluent than either their Chinese predecessors or their white counterparts” (p. 35). These authors suggested that suburban Asians are typically well-assimilated, but economically work to preserve the customs of their homelands. There are other points to be made about Asian American experiences: both in their urban and suburban locations in the U.S. Wealth and class divide American people. So does race. While contemporary Asian Americans may seek separate enclaves in suburbia, historical experiences of rejection set the tone for separation both prior to and after WWII. Chang, for example, related the case of the Chinese in post-war Reading, PA. Already educated, working as researchers, engineers, and in other professions, the Chinese moved into the white suburbs of Reading and interacted with whites at work. However, as Chang related: “But in the Reading region, that mingling ended with the workday” (Chang, 1999, pp. 109–10). Chang also related the experiences of her mother in Hartford, Connecticut, where the choice for outsiders was to “live apart and be ignored, or ape [sic, slang term for mimicry] those around you, and be grudgingly tolerated” (p. 121). She also spoke of the distinct and socially distant communities of Los Angeles, including some that are closed by gates or guarded. She argued that race matters there, too. Quoting a friend, she continued: “Wealth presents one divide; race, another. The worlds don’t mix. The white community belongs to the country clubs. Then, all these Chinese — they’re completely separate. They never intersect” (Chang, 1999).

Then Chang described the growing isolation of the Chinese Palos Verdes community: “The Chinese in Palos Verdes represent a community within a community. They may live next door to white neighbors and send their children to the same schools, but in their own way they are as isolated from the mainstream as any Chinatown on the East Coast. These days, they might even conduct their business — import-export, clothing manufacturing, real-estate development — only with other Chinese, in Hong Kong, Taipei, Shanghai, or nearby Monterey Park. Their isolation differs in one important way from the ghettos in Boston and New York. The Chinese of Palos Verdes have achieved all the trappings of the American dream” (Chang, 1999, p. 140).

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One of the ironies in contemporary Asian-American settlement patterns is that both isolation and assimilation are occurring. Within the span of about a half-century, white Americans forced Asian segregation; then, post-1965, some Asian immigrants have chosen segregation. Both processes create isolation. However, speaking to the complexity of Asian-American settlement patterns noted earlier in this chapter, it is also true that many Asian Americans have quietly assimilated into American suburbia. These complex patterns support the concepts of segmented and racialized assimilation presented by Wei Li in a previous chapter of this text. The final point to be made about Asian-American geography is that of its rapid dispersion away from its two major centers and other “gateways” of entry. The forces that drew Asians in great numbers to California and the West Coast were discussed earlier in the chapter. It was also noted that many Chinese migrated eastward due to the violence toward them in the late 1800s. These migrants fueled the growth of Chinatowns in Eastern cities, especially New York. Despite this migration, the West remained the population center of Asian Americans for more than a century. The 2000 Census, however, noted that just less than one-half (49%) of all Asians in the U.S. resided in the West. This was the first time a majority of Asian Americans lived elsewhere. The Census reported that 75 percent of all Asians were living in just ten states, largely those with “Gateway cities” (New York, California, New Jersey, Florida, Washington, Massachusetts, Illinois, Virginia, Texas, and Hawaii). California had the largest number of Asians in 2000. Asian Americans are the most urbanized (93%) and New York City had the largest number (873,000), followed by Los Angeles (407,000). Honolulu was two-thirds Asian, which was the largest proportion of any American city (Tolbert, 2002). Despite these existing concentrations, Asian Americans are rapidly spreading geographically across the national urban landscape. In the process, new urban Asian ethnic patterns are being created. In the next section, several examples of recently emerging Asian places and landscapes are provided to illustrate the range and complexity of contemporary Asian settlements. Asian American Places and Landscapes As noted earlier, Asian Americans are the most urbanized, minority group in the U.S. Given the influx of a wide variety of ethnic groups since 1965, it should come as no surprise that there is a substantial variation in the representation of particular Asian ethnic groups within metropolitan regions. Historical and contemporary immigration patterns have led to large numbers of a specific ethnic group settling in a community. In some cases, this group represents the dominant share of the local Asian population. In other instances, recent entries mix with other Asian ethnic groups. All of these processes contribute to complex and evolving Asian ethnic patterns in 21st century. A few examples help clarify this complexity and diversity within the American urban system. The New York and Los Angeles PMSAs contained highly diversified Asian populations in 2000. Although the actual proportions of Asian ethnic groups differ in these two metropolitan regions, both contain significant Chinese populations mixed with other Asian groups. Three examples of diverse cities with a different Asian mix are Dallas, Atlanta, and Washington, D.C., where the Chinese also are an important ethnic group, there is a greater presence of Asian Indians and Vietnamese than in the previous examples. In other cases, a single Asian ethnic group appears influential due to its proportion of the total local Asian population. For example, the Vietnamese are more than one-third of the Asian population in New Orleans and constitute at least one-fifth of the Asian total in Houston, Fort Worth-Arlington, and San Jose. Similarly, Asian Indians account for about 25 percent of Detroit’s Asian population, Koreans are more than 25 percent of the Bergen-Passaic metropolitan region, and nearly 50 percent of the Asian population of Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa metropolitan region is Filipino. It was previously noted that the Asian-American population increased 9 percent between 2000 and 2002 and that nearly two-thirds of this growth was credited to immigration. It has been projected that by 2025, the U.S. Asian population will be nearly 22 million. This type of growth ensures an evolving set of Asian-American geographies. The ones described below are places where Asians have created places of their own and transformed landscapes in those places. Each place, however, illustrates the unique combination of culture and space

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in that transformation and a process quite different from that proposed long ago by the Chicago School’s spatial assimilation model. An Ethnoburb in Los Angeles’ San Gabriel Valley Wei Li’s ethnoburb concept was defined in a previous chapter. Recently, she provided an analysis of the transformation of the Los Angeles Chinese community, from the downtown Chinatown, to the San Gabriel Valley ethnoburb (Li, 2006). Using a variety of data sources, she traced the historic change in Chinese settlement and assessed the function and nature of this ethnoburb, covering the issues of assimilation, ethnic identity, and global economics. According to Li, the downtown Chinatown in Los Angeles dominated Chinese residential and business patterns until the 1960s when the Chinese began to suburbanize. Chinese immigrants had settled in Los Angeles in the mid-19th century and by 1890 had reached 4.4 percent of the county’s population. More than two-thirds of all Chinese there resided in Chinatown and worked largely as laborers, vendors, merchants and in railroad construction. Despite early 20th century decentralization of the Chinese to areas such as West Adams (“the first Chinese suburb”), Chinatown was the main business core and cultural center of the Chinese community. The large influx of immigrant Chinese in the 1960s, however, brought change. Many Chinese immigrants by-passed the downtown area and settled directly in the suburbs. This immigrant stream contained both wealthy and poor people, skilled and unskilled workers, who went directly to the suburbs. By 1980, the San Gabriel Valley Chinese ethnoburb had formed. This unusual process did not entail complete assimilation, rather it involved the spatial transformation of the Chinese community into something unique. It also ran contrary to the traditional straight-line assimilation described by the Chicago School’s spatial assimilation process, which required that the immigrant ethnic group move downtown and reside in enclaves or ghettos of the poor, uneducated and spatially concentrated inner city. This contemporary mixed-class migrant stream moved directly to the suburbs and behaved differently. This requires a different perspective of the assimilation process (Li, 2006). In particular, within an ethnoburb, the population is concentrated near ethnic residential and business clusters, while being polarized in terms of socioeconomic status. In this process, immigrant ethnic groups are better able to maintain their native culture while adapting only to parts of the host’s mainstream society, as argued by Li in chapter 5 of this text. Li also suggested that several factors facilitated the establishment of this ethnoburb. Chinese investors and realtors acquired properties sold by empty nesters for the purpose of establishing businesses and multifamily units (conversion) for Chinese immigrant families. The Chinese people and the Chinese financial institutions established important interactions that contributed to the formation of this ethnoburb. The region had a strong ethnic financial community consisting of 27 local Chinese-American and 20 foreign-Chinese bank offices, which worked together with the Chinese immigrant population to create new residential growth and other economic activity. As a result, by 2000, each of nine cities of the San Gabriel Valley reached a population of 10,000 Chinese that constituted at least one-quarter of each city’s total population. Each also contained other foreign-born groups, such as Pacific Islanders. As a result, Li claimed that the Valley had surpassed Chinatown in importance. The ethnoburb also transformed the landscape in important ways, including architecture and buildings, signage and other characteristics that resulted in a resemblance of Asian cities. Music and language added to this perception. In fact, Li maintained that the ethnoburb, besides being a concentration of Chinese businesses, also came to function as a global economic outpost. Its labor force was characterized as having both skilled, high-wage and low-skilled, low-wage immigrant workers, indicating its position in the global economy (Li, 2006). Finally, despite the importance of the ethnoburb to the Chinese population, the San Gabriel Valley is a multi-ethnic community, consisting of more than one-third white non-Hispanics, nearly one-third Hispanic, less than five percent African American and about one-fifth Asian and Pacific Islander populations, and others. Li also noted that on occasion the influx of large numbers of Chinese immigrants has resulted in competition for

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resources and employment, as well as conflict over political and cultural issues. Thus, ethnoburbs, while transforming American landscapes, are not exempt from racial, ethnic and social clashes. Korean Places in Metropolitan Los Angeles The Los Angeles region is one of the most ethnically diverse areas in the world. Yet, there still exists some segregation among ethnic groups. A recent analysis by Hans Dieter Laux and Gunter Thieme focused on the Los Angeles Korean population, in terms of its locations, residential mobility, ethnic identity, and assimilation (Laux and Thieme, 2006). In particular, they assessed the spatial decentralization of Koreans on the cohesion of their ethnic community. As has been mentioned several times in this text, the Chicago model of spatial assimilation would predict that Koreans would disperse eventually along the same lines as the general population. However, in this case, new multi-ethnic communities in suburbia have given rise to the notion of permanent ethnic enclaves. Laux and Thieme suggested that this immigrant population has achieved integration through the combination of economic success and deliberate preservation of traditional cultural values, illustrating that assimilation is a complex, multidimensional process that does not necessitate loss of ethnic identity. They argued that through an economic niche of small business ownership, upward mobility and integration are achieved by relocating to the suburban periphery, away from the urban core. Despite these changes, Koreans have maintained a strong sense of ethnic attachment. These authors use human and social capital approaches to discuss the factors that influence assimilation. Assimilation is often influenced by the cultural characteristics of ethnic origin and by the sociopolitical conditions of the host country, in this case the U.S. Human capital refers to the capabilities and skills of the immigrant group, while social capital involves the nature of interactions within the immigrant group, which have been shown to be important to first- and second-generation assimilation. For Korean immigrants, ethnic attachment, as demonstrated by the preservation of cultural traditions and the existence of strong social networks, is stronger than for other Asian ethnic groups (Laux and Thieme, 2006). This is due to Koreans being a relatively small and culturally homogeneous group, Korean ethnic churches, and the numerous small Korean-owned businesses. It is clear that social institutions play important roles in Korean ethnic identity. The social functions and services offered by ethnic churches are pivotal in the maintenance of Korean social networks. Similarly, Korean-owned small businesses reinforce ethnic identity through the provision of Korean staples and atmosphere that stimulates interaction. This results in retail independence from the U.S. market and reinforces linguistic isolation. Koreans in the Los Angeles region, in addition to settling in inner and outer city residential patterns often associated with other ethnic groups, exhibited an interesting residential mobility pattern. Laux and Thieme were able empirically to demonstrate that the classic pattern of outward mobility, from core to periphery, is still significant. However, the Korean movements among and within communities in the outer suburbs of Los Angeles were even stronger, indicating that the traditional “Koreantown” enclave is of less importance in Korean community building and mobility than suburban locations. They studied the potential relationship between the Los Angles Koreans spatial dispersion and tendency to choose suburban locations with Korean ethnic identity. They found social networks are influenced by tight associations with ethnic churches, friendship ties within their ethnic group, and “linguistic isolation” (Laux and Thieme, 2006). They concluded that the ethnic attitudes of Koreans located in the core tend to be polarized, while those of suburban Koreans reflect a population that is integrated with its ethnic group. The Vietnamese in Northern Virginia The Vietnamese population in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan region, approximately 75,000, is the fourth largest in the U.S. and largest on the entire Atlantic Coast. This location is related to a historical connection with the Pentagon. The Vietnamese first came as refugees and chain migration followed. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, this ethnic population is highly dispersed. A recent study by Joseph S. Wood reported that no cen-

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sus tract in this region had more than nine percent of this population. Wood used Zelinsky’s concept of “heterolocalism” to argue that decentralized ethnic communities have a dependency on cultural concentrations, held together by institutions such as social clubs, churches, business associations, and retail functions, to maintain culture and ethnicity (Wood, 2006). Like others in this text, Wood argued that the traditional ethnic assimilation model no longer applies to the American immigrant experience. Rather, “cultural amalgamation” occurs, wherein immigrants retain certain of their own cultural traits and adopt characteristics of the host. In the U.S., this process involves the reinvention of places and landscapes, as was the case for the Vietnamese immigrants in the Northern Virginia area. Wood maintains that the most visible marker for many ethnic communities is clustered ethnic retail activity. Thus, he focuses on the unique cultural retail landscapes created by the Vietnamese in this region. He illustrates how retail shopping centers have evolved into vital community centers with distinctly Asian decorative appearance. The Vietnamese revived older shopping areas of the 1950s in some of the region’s older suburbs. There are two primary Vietnamese retail centers located in primary highway corridors but in decline due to the creation of new modern centers in the area. The attractions to these for redevelopment lie in large available spaces at relatively low rents. They survived because Vietnamese see them as community-sanctioned places where capital investment created a distinct Vietnamese symbol in the U.S. Wood suggested that the design of these centers resemble Vietnamese market towns, where buildings are situated close to the road, are low in profile, and have large ground-openings and covered sidewalks. These centers are called “Little Saigons.” The first location (“Little Saigon”) for establishing a Vietnamese retail cluster was in Clarendon, Virginia in the 1970s. However, by 1980, this no longer was singularly Vietnamese. In 1984, Vietnamese Americans purchased and converted part (20,000 square feet) of the Plaza Seven Shopping Center into a mini-mall arcade. They named it the “Eden Center,” after a 1960s arcade in Saigon called the “Khu Eden.” The arcade was combined with the Rex Mini-mall and collectively they became the “Eden Center.” It attempts to recreate the Saigon atmosphere in America. Signage and music are Vietnamese, and so are the majority of customers. The developer continued expansion, adding a third arcade and creating a tower and pagoda to resemble Saigon’s Ben Thanh Public Market. These latter additions sparked some controversy because of increased rent and some vacancies in retail space. According to Wood, only time will tell if these were wise and economically feasible additions to the Eden Center. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the Eden Center created a sense of place for the Vietnamese in Northern Virginia. It functions as far more than a retail center. It has become a social as well as economic center that maintains ethnic familiarity. The Vietnamese appear more concentrated and unified, despite being geographically dispersed in the region. It sometimes suggests a uniformity that may be lacking, such as political unity. The Center, for example, has been the site of ceremonies of war veterans and for protests of the Hanoi government, perpetuating the effects of a war fought a generation ago. The flag of the former republic of Vietnam has been displayed there as well. Finally, Wood noted the roles of America’s Chinatowns as gateways with social institutions that perpetuated cultural heritage, and affirmed ethnic identity and cultural norms, while assisting the transition to a new society. He compared the Eden Center functions to these notorious gateways and concluded that similarities exist. The Eden Center creates a refuge for Vietnamese in America. It represents a mixture of commercialization promoting consumption, a variety of experiences, and provides a sense of place while immigrants blend their old culture with their new (Wood, 2006). Asians in Flushing, New York Just as places on the U.S. West Coast have experienced changes due to the influx of immigrant groups since the 1960s, so too have many East Coast communities. Global transformations are influencing local demographic, economics, and cultural relationships in a variety of communities. Flushing, New York is the example provided in this section. This community, like so many others, has experienced economic restructuring and a major influx of immigrants. Smith and Logan studied this area using U.S. Census data, fieldwork, and survey research (Smith and Logan, 2006). Before discussing Flushing in detail, they reported several racial/ethnic

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changes in the composition of the overall New York City population: non-Hispanic whites declined as a significant presence, from 76 percent to 35 percent, between 1970 and 2000; between 1990 and 2000, the black population increased by about 6 percent. Hispanics increased by 21 percent, and Asians by nearly 60 percent. These led to a number of important observations about Flushing, including increased racial/ethnic diversity, “the growth of all-minority (Black and Hispanic) neighborhoods, and the decline in predominately white neighborhoods.” An anticipated fourth trend did not come to pass. These researchers anticipated the emergence of Asian ethnic enclaves. Having said this, however, they pointed out that several small areas of Asian concentration did appear, including those in Flushing. Interestingly, Smith and Logan found that many Asians were either unable or unwilling to reside in suburban neighborhoods, but chose neighborhoods that were ethnically diverse and likely to evolve into increasingly Asian areas. New York City also experienced a decentralization of Asians away from Chinatown and into the outer boroughs, especially Brooklyn and Queens. The result was smaller “little Chinatowns” of urban rather than suburban flavor. These researchers also noted that significant numbers of new immigrants are middle-class and professional households that have human capital that enables them to bypass the traditional ethnic enclaves and instead select other options, resulting in the rise of multi-cultural neighborhoods. Flushing has increased its population since 1970 because of the influx of immigrants, including those from South and Central America, but especially due to increases in three large Asian ethnic groups: the Chinese, Koreans, and South Asians. These groups more than counterbalanced a decline in the African-American population and a relatively high level of “white flight” during the period. According to the research of Smith and Logan, Asians moved into the Flushing area for several reasons, including job opportunities, easy access to other parts of the City (subway to Manhattan), affordable and available housing, and perceived safety of the local environment. Also, Asians with human and financial capital moved directly to Flushing and were able to minimize the urban decay typically associated with white flight. Asian investment, including foreign investment from Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan, stimulated the economy and contributed to the continued growth of the economy. Growth and change did not occur without conflict, which resulted from two cultures competing for contested space. Opponents tended to be long-time white European residents who were located in the periphery of Flushing. They felt “locked out” of their own community, which was changing before their eyes; they were competing for limited housing, witnessing new businesses and new social institutions that catered to new immigrants, and signage was increasingly in non-English languages. This undermined their sense of place associated with an older version of Flushing. They sought to protect “old Flushing” from the interests of the businessoriented “new Flushing.” As Smith and Logan noted, the socioeconomic status, professional stature, and contributions to the local economy, did not make the Asians in Flushing “immune from local criticism” or cultural conflict (Smith and Logan, 2006). By 2000, the Hispanic population seemed to have stabilized at about 20 percent of Flushing, while the Asian population increased and constituted nearly 52 percent; Flushing had become the second most concentrated Asian population in the New York area. Asians had replaced the white flight, especially in the core of the city. As a result, the core area in which Chinese had increased most rapidly (followed by South Asians, and Koreans) was termed “Asian Flushing.” One impact of this changing landscape was political in nature. A long-term city council member, who had been perceived as anti-immigration and possibly anti-Asian, had been challenged in the 1996 election but managed to hold off that challenge. By 2000, the same council person could not run again due to term limits. As a result a four-way race ensued for that council seat. In the end, John Liu, a Chinese businessman, won the seat, which illustrated for the first time the increasing economic and political power of Asian Americans in Flushing, New York.

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The term “Asians” is a short hand that represents a wide variety of cultures scattered across thousands of miles. Among these many groups, three stand out as early 19th and 20th century U.S. immigrants: the Chinese, Japanese and Filipinos. These three cultures, after fleeing harsh conditions in their homelands, came to the U.S. to find work or to secure an education. Most planned to return to their homelands, but did not. Each contributed cheap labor and provided important contributions to the early economic development of America’s West Coast. Each also was treated poorly due to changing economic conditions and suffered a variety of indignities and forms of discrimination that rendered them second-class citizens or worse. In fact, American institutions restricted the flow of additional members of all three cultures through various actions. As a result of these various forces, each group saw little increase in their population until American immigration laws were modified after WWII. All three Asian ethnic groups, through perseverance, gradually stabilized their positions in America. These groups developed definable geographic settlement patterns, sometimes representing racial rather than ethnic geography. These patterns changed over time but often included visible cultural landscapes. U.S. immigration laws changed dramatically after WWII, culminating in the 1965 law that resulted in unpredicted large volumes of immigrants, particularly from Latin America and Asia. Asian Indians replaced the Japanese as the third largest Asian population living in the U.S., but a very wide range of additional Asian ethnic groups greatly diversified the Asian-American population. Part of this was due to legislation that permitted even more foreigners to enter the U.S. for employment reasons or as refugees. However, the family preference provision of the former law continued to have the most significant impact on migration increases. The new Asian immigrant streams, though diverse, contained a significant number of Asians that had social and human capital. As a result, there is an economic bifurcation within the Asian population and within Asian ethnic groups. This has influenced Asian settlement geography in the U.S. because, while some immigrants still initially settle in American inner cities, including ethnic enclaves, many are also able to settle directly in suburbs. This reality has forced a reconsideration of the classic spatial assimilation model to explain immigrant settlement patterns and processes in America. Conventional theory now recognizes the role of heterolocalism, or the ability of immigrant ethnic groups to disperse geographically but maintain their ethnic identities. There also is the notion that multiple assimilation (and non-assimilation) paths are open to immigrants and result in complex settlement geographies, including racialized assimilation. Cultural clashes still occur between various groups, but in some places Asian ethnic groups are gaining increased political representation in local politics. Several examples of Asian ethnic settlements and their corresponding cultural landscapes have been provided to demonstrate the uniqueness of place, as well as the human ethnic tendency to reshape landscapes as reflections of the ethnic values of the occupying culture. Thus, as with other cultures and ethnic groups, we now speak of contemporary Asian places in America.

Chapter 21

This Land is My Land: The Role of Place in Native Hawaiian Identity SHAWN MALIA KANA‘IAUPUNI AND NOLAN MALONE Some critiques of contemporary geographic growth patterns point out the rise of placelessness across U.S. landscapes. Relph (1976), in a provocative analysis of this phenomenon, argues that place has been a critical foundation of human cognition and identity throughout history. He reviews how contemporary urban and suburban (and most recently, exurban) growth patterns have diminished the unique, historical, and cultural meanings of place to human society today. This point may bring no argument from most Americans, who may not feel any overwhelming ties to a particular place, who are quite mobile in today’s global society, and who, in fact, may be quite accustomed to the increasing standardization of places, such as strip malls, retail, food, and service chains. Add to this the relative homogeneity of most suburban architectures and the constantly shifting topography of metropolitan landscapes. The objective of this essay is to expand our understanding of the significance of place to racial and ethnic diversity and to demonstrate how place continues to be an unequivocal focal point in the identity processes of some social groups and individuals today. Specifically, we examine these processes in the context of Native Hawaiians, the aboriginal people of the Hawaiian Islands.1 Our study builds on prior studies indicating that place — the consciousness of land, sea, and all that place entails — is fundamental to indigenous identity processes (Battiste, 2000; Kame‘eleihiwa, 1992; Kamakau, 1992; Mihesuah, 2003; Allen, 1992; Meyer, 2003; Kana‘iaupuni and Liebler, 2005; Memmott and Long, 2002). Although this analysis of the relationship between place and identity centers on Hawaiians, it offers important insights that may extend to other indigenous groups or cultures whose members are highly intermarried and mobile, whose language is endangered, and whose culture is known more in its commercial tourist, rather than authentic, form. Under these conditions, place is critical to the cultural survival and identity of a people, as we illustrate in the case of Native Hawaiians. Place is intertwined with identity and self-determination of today’s Native Hawaiians in complex and intimate ways. At once the binding glue that holds Native Hawaiians together and links them to a shared past, place is also a primary agent that has been used against them to fragment and alienate. Yet, place, in all of its multiple levels of meaning, is one light that all Hawaiians share in their spiritual way finding to a Hawaiian identity; one that is greatly significant to their existence as a people and culture, both past and present. And so begins our exploration into the various meanings of place to Hawaiian identity today. In addition to indigenous theories of place, this study is informed by other perspectives on the role of place in racial identity and ethnicity. For example, certain geographers view place as the context within which racial partnering, residential choices, and family identification processes are differentially distributed across spatial categories (e.g., neighborhoods, cities, metropolises) (Wong, 1999; Peach, 1980). By “spatializing” household patterns of family formation, mobility, and other behavioral characteristics, we can understand where (and why) they survive and flourish. Research shows that Hawai‘i, for instance, is one of those places in North America that is spatially significant for its flourishing intermarriage rates (Lee and Fernandez, 1998; Root, 2001).

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Perspectives in anthropology add to our understanding of the concept of identity as it relates to place. Saltman (2002) defines the relationship between land and identity as the dynamic arena within which social realities are acted out in individual cognition and perception. For example, identity may be the shared understandings between persons of the same culture that enable them to rally together for a political cause. In relation to place, Saltman argues, “identity achieves its strongest expression within the political context of conflicting rights over land and territory” (2002, p. 6); evidence of the latter is certainly found in the story we tell here. Our study draws on indigenous perspectives of place and identity that interweave the spiritual and the physical with sociocultural traditions and practices. As Memmott and Long (2002) explain, whereas Western explanations view places purely in terms of their geomorphology (with little human influence), indigenous models view people and the environment as overlapping and interacting. For example, unlike the way “Western thought classifies people and their technology apart from nature,” indigenous knowledge and beliefs may include ancestral heroes with special powers who helped to shape land and marine systems (Memmott and Long, 2002, p. 43). Likewise, both weather and agricultural or other natural events may be influenced through human rituals, song, dance, or other actions performed in specific places. And, between places and people occurs a sharing of being — places carry the energies of people, history, and cultural significance; in turn, people carry the energy of places as some part of their being (Memmott and Long, 2002). The concept of place in Hawaiian perspective reflects understandings found throughout Pacific voyaging societies and shares certain similarities with other Native American and aboriginal cultures (Memmott and Long, 2002; Lindstrom, 1999; Martin, 2001; Schnell, 2000). Place, in this case Hawai‘i, the homeland of the kƗnaka maoli or indigenous people of Hawai‘i, transcends physical realities of land (Kana‘iaupuni and Liebler, 2005). It is their honua (whenua, henua, fonua, fanua, fenua — the words meaning “earth” in MƗori, Marshallese, Tongan, Samoan, and Tahitian languages, respectively); it signifies relationships, spanning spiritual and kinship bonds between people, nature, and the supernatural world (Kanahele, 1986). The understanding conveyed by indigenous writings spanning the Pacific is that place breathes life, people, culture, and spirit (Tusitala Marsh, 1999). Place is, we argue, a key force in the interplay of internal and external influences on contemporary Hawaiian identity processes. In the discussion that follows, we demonstrate how the strength of ties to the land influences Native Hawaiian identity processes through physical, spiritual, genealogical, and historical forces. We examine some of the challenges to identity stemming from displacement, separation from the land, and migration away from Hawai‘i. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of place to identity processes for Hawaiian children and describe ongoing efforts in education that draw upon the relationships to places as a tool for cultural survival.

SETTING THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF PLACE Native Hawaiians were the first discoverers of the 1,500 mile-long Hawaiian archipelago in the Pacific Ocean. They migrated to Hawai‘i by sea using advanced navigation skills where they survived and flourished for hundreds of years prior to Western contact. Native Hawaiians evolved a complex system of resource management, developing sophisticated knowledge bases and skills to survive on these remote islands with limited resources. Cosmogonic and religious beliefs of Native Hawaiians tie the Hawaiian Islands to kƗnaka maoli beginning with creation, or pǀ (darkness, obscurity). The islands were born from PapahƗnaumoku, earth mother, and WƗkea, sky father, who also gave birth to kalo, the taro plant and main staple crop of traditional Hawaiians, and, ultimately, to people. As such, “the genealogy of the Land, the Gods, Chiefs, and people intertwine with one another, and with all the myriad aspects of the universe” (Kame‘eleihiwa, 1992, p. 2). In these beginnings, the Hawaiian archipelago is intimately connected to kƗnaka maoli through genealogy, culture, history, and spirituality. The natural elements (land, wind, rain) and creatures of the islands are considered primordial ancestors; they are the older relatives of living kƗnaka maoli. Both share an interdependent, familial relationship that requires

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mƗlama (care) and kia‘i (guardianship) for the older siblings who, in turn, provide for the well-being of the younger siblings (Kanahele, 1986; Kame‘eleihiwa, 1992). Historically, the Hawaiian Islands were divided into four chiefdoms until the late 18th century, when King Kamehameha I consolidated them through conquest. United under single rule, the archipelago then modernized rapidly through economic commerce in sugar, pineapple, shipping and related industries. By the late 19th century, Hawai‘i was a fully recognized nation-state with multiple international treaties, including one with the United States (Daws, 1968; Perkins, 2005). During the same century, however, two things were occurring that devastated Native Hawaiian ties to the land. First, Native Hawaiians were progressively becoming a minority in their own homeland (see Figure 21.1). Estimates suggest that the native population, afflicted by Western disease and to a much lesser extent, warfare, dropped by at least 90 percent in the 100 years following Captain Cook’s arrival. By the end of the century only about 40,000 aboriginal Hawaiians remained alive. Meanwhile the immigrant population gained steadily in number, including whites who outnumbered Hawaiians by the early 1900s (Nordyke, 1989). Today, Native Hawaiians comprise about one-fifth of the state population. Figure 21.1 The Hawaiian Population in Hawai‘i.

Source: Kana‘iaupuni, Malone, and Ishibashi (2005)

Second was the gradual and systematic erosion of indigenous control over the land primarily through the insertion of Western legal tactics, government, and religion. John Weeks described “while we looked to the heavens for their gods, they stole the land beneath our feet.” Gradually, foreigners took more and more control, exploiting fully Hawaiian cultural beliefs in land as collective property (Kame‘eleihiwa, 1992; Osorio, 2001). The eventual privatization of land played an important role in the displacement of Native Hawaiians. In kƗnaka maoli perspective, it was unfathomable that someone else could deny their rights to place, a precious ancestor, the same land that a family had worked and lived for generations and generations. As Kanahele describes, Hawaiians “belonged to the land. How could you ever own a place, let alone sell it as a commodity, if its true value is found in the sum of the lives, memories, achievements, and mana (spiritual power) of the generations who

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once dwelled upon it?” (1986, p. 208). In the failure of most aboriginals to recognize that they had to formally claim the private ownership of their land, white foreigners, mostly missionaries and businessmen, rapidly bought up the property where Native Hawaiians lived and worked, forcing them to move elsewhere in most cases. These displacing events culminated in 1893, when a small oligopoly of American businessmen and missionary descendents staged a coup d’état, capturing the Hawaiian Queen Lili‘uokalani and imprisoning her in the royal palace with the help of U.S. Marines (Coffman, 1998). Although the overthrow violated existing treaties and established procedures for annexation, Hawai‘i was proclaimed a U.S. territory by Congress via the Newlands Resolution in 1898 (Trask, 2002). What many do not know is that annexation occurred despite a petition signed by nearly every living Native Hawaiian at the time (an estimated 38,000 of 40,000) in protest of losing their sovereign nation (Coffman, 1998; Silva, 2004). In recognition and formal apology by the U.S. government for these actions, U.S. Public Law 103–150, signed in 1993, cites that indigenous Hawaiians never relinquished claims to their inherent sovereignty as a people or over their lands to the United States. Hawai‘i became a state in 1959. Fast forward to the present where land struggles still occupy center focus. In September of 2004, thousands of Native and non-Native supporters marched for Knj i ka Pono (Justice for Hawaiians) through the heart of WaikƯkƯ. Their purpose: to support three cases, all directly or indirectly concerning land issues. The first was to protest a Hawai‘i state law that has been used to systematically take leased land holdings from the Hawaiian monarchy (ali‘i) trusts, among others, to sell off to individuals.2 The second and third cases were to support Hawaiian rights in two cases heard by the 9th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in early 2005. The second case challenged Kamehameha Schools, which is a private trust holding the legacy land assets of the Kamehameha monarchy in endowment explicitly to fund the education of Hawaiian children (see www.ksbe.edu). It is responsible for the education of nearly 24,000 Native Hawaiian children since opening its doors in 1887. Ironically, Kamehameha Schools is being sued for providing educational services to Native Hawaiians under constitutional amendments that were designed to protect the rights of disenfranchised minorities. The third case challenged the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (DHHL) which holds for Native Hawaiian homesteaders a small fraction of the original lands belonging to the Hawaiian Kingdom that were taken by the U.S. government after the overthrow. In a state troubled by inadequate housing, especially for Native Hawaiians, the wait for DHHL lands can take decades — sometimes even occurring postmortem. All three cases concern land, aboriginal rights, and the Native Hawaiian quest for self-determination. For many, they are evidence of the continued struggle over land and continued attempts of colonizing entities to displace Native Hawaiians from their homeland and rightful place in the world (see Figure 21.2).

CULTURE, IDENTITY, AND PLACE OF NATIVE HAWAIIANS Recent research by Kana‘iaupuni and Liebler (2005) examines the role of place in identity processes of Native Hawaiians. As they point out “… the diverse ethnic mix that comprises the state of Hawai‘i, and the resulting multiracial mix of today’s Hawaiians in the state and on the U.S. Continent, complicate questions of identity for Hawai‘i’s host culture. For people of any racial or ethnic group, the characteristics of place — its location, social and ethnic composition, physical features, and historical significance to a people — can have profound symbolic and practical effects on identity and identification processes.… Living or growing up in Hawai‘i is certainly a notable experience that affects the identity processes of all its diverse residents.… But one unique characteristic that Hawaiians will always have is their genealogical connection to Hawai‘i as the ancestral homeland. No other group holds this claim” (p. 691).

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Figure 21.2 A Nation in Distress: Knj i ka Pono supporters marching with the Hawaiian flag upside down.

In questions of identity, they argue, place plays a critical role through Hawaiian traditions and customs that weave together: 1) physical and spiritual, 2) genealogical, and 3) sociopolitical ties to the land and sea. Physical and Spiritual Ties to Place Physically, a deep source of Hawaiian identity is found in ties to the land and sea, expressed in the proverb “ka mauli o ka ‘Ɨina a he mauli kƗnaka, the life of the land is the life of the people” (Oneha, 2001). As a subsistence society, living off the natural resources of the land was fundamental to the social identities of Native Hawaiians, specific to the island or region where they lived (Kanahele, 1986). The interconnections of place and people were influenced by traditional practices of collective ownership, where, unlike Western land tenure systems, rights to land/sea access were negotiated by generation and family lineage as well as personal, family and community need (Rapaport, 1999). ‘Ɩina, the Hawaiian word for land most commonly used today, also means “to eat,” signifying the physical relationship between people and the earth that they tended. Important to identity

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processes, Hawaiians to this day see a dynamic, intimate relationship in the reciprocal nature of caring for the land (mƗlama ‘Ɨina) as it cares for the people, much like a family bond (Kame‘eleihiwa, 1992). These symbolic connections of places to the ancestry and cultural values of people are made explicit through various cultural customs; one example is found in the extensive naming practices of places associated with land, sea, and heavens. No place with any significance went without a name in Hawaiian tradition (Kanahele, 1986), and today, considerable scholarship goes into documenting thousands of place, wind, and rain names in Hawai‘i to preserve the rich legendary and historical significance of places to Hawaiian cultural identity (e.g., Püku‘i, Elbert and Mo‘okini, 1974; Nakuina, 1990). Place names span past and present, and through their meanings, the significance of place is transmitted socially and across generations. These types of practices underscore the inseparability of physical and spiritual interconnections between place and people in the Hawaiian worldview. Genealogical Ties to Place Another example of this inseparability is found in genealogical traditions. Across the Pacific, identity is borne of establishing one’s genealogical ties to ancestral beginnings. Ancestral ties include not only people, but also the spiritual and natural worlds, since all things were birthed by the same beginnings. Kame‘eleihiwa argues that genealogical chants “reveal the Hawaiian orientation to the world about us, in particular, to Land and control of the Land” (1992, p. 3). In Hawaiian tradition, genealogical chants identify the lines of trust and social connection in addition to telling family histories. These traditions are still important to many in contemporary Hawai‘i. Formal introductions at public events commonly include reciting a lineage of people and places, including connections to a specific mountain, valley, wind, rain, ocean, and water. Culture-based leadership training, schools, and education programs continue to instill these practices in today’s young Hawaiians (see Figure 21.3). Central to identity processes, articulating these connections in social interactions provides important context for social relationships and negotiations between individuals and groups. Sociopolitical Ties to Place The third set of place-people identity relationships that Kana‘iaupuni and Liebler (2005) discuss is very critical to many Native Hawaiians today as it accompanies the struggle for self-determination. They state: “The importance of place to Hawaiian identity is powered not only by ancestral genealogy, but also by the collective memory of a shared history. Hawai‘i, the place, connects the Hawaiian diaspora through ‘social relations and a historical memory of cultural beginnings, meanings and practices, as well as crises, upheavals and unjust subjections as a dispossessed and (mis)recognized people’ ” (Halualani, 2002, p. 693).

As a catalyst for strengthened identity, Spickard and Fong point out in agreement that: “It is as invigorating to ethnicity when a Pacific Islander American politician recites the history of abuse that her people have suffered, as when an island spiritual leader chants a genealogy.… It is true history, but it is more than that: it is the act of rhetorically, publicly remembering, and thus it serves to strengthen the ethnic bond” (1995, p. 1375).

In this fashion, the history of colonization and cultural oppression creates a context for shared cognitive understandings that relate identity to place (Kana‘iaupuni and Liebler, 2005; Halualani, 2002). For example, calling on this understanding, Kame‘eleihiwa writes, “Hawaiians have been in Hawai‘i for at least two thousand years. As harsh as the past two hundred years have been, there is yet hope; we still exist on this earth. After all the horror that has rained down upon us, we are alive. We are a nation of survivors!” (1992, p. 321). Thus, these images of history and place fuel Hawaiian identity in the growing context of political self-determination.

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This Land is My Land Figure 21.3 Students offer a traditional Hawaiian chant.

Together, these cultural practices and social relations illustrate how place serves as a key connection linking Native Hawaiian families and children to their indigenous heritage, despite the extensive and longstanding multicultural and multiethnic mixing in the state of Hawai‘i and beyond.

THE HAWAIIAN DIASPORA: MIGRATION, INTERMARRIAGE, AND IDENTITY Although values about place and culture reach Hawaiians living outside of Hawai‘i as well as those in Hawai‘i (Oneha, 2001; Kauanui, 1998), questions about identity, and even culture and ethnicity, all may be affected by the context of place. For example, studies show that multiracial Hawaiians living in Hawai‘i are especially likely to racially identify as Hawaiian (and not as another race), compared with their counterparts in the continental United States (e.g., Kana‘iaupuni and Liebler, 2005). What this means is that the relationship between place and identity is fluid. In the context of shifting cultural and geographic landscapes, population diversity, and the effects of colonization, place serves a pivotal role in Native Hawaiian identity processes today.

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Hawai‘i — the cultural home — becomes a beacon, vital to the survival and vibrancy of the Hawaiian culture, language, and native people today. Through the economic and racial transformation of the islands, Native Hawaiian migration and intermarriage have created the Hawaiian diaspora, spread across the nation and into others since the 1700s (Kauanui, 1999; Halualani, 2002). The diaspora presents a modern challenge to Native Hawaiian identity and culture, bringing separation of people from each other, from the land, and the ancestral home. U.S. Census 2000 statistics show that fewer Native Hawaiian people moved to Hawai‘i between 1995 and 2000 than those who moved away. About 40 percent of self-reported Native Hawaiians live in the continental United States, while 60 percent continue to reside in Hawai‘i. Some Hawaiian scholars argue that the mobility of Hawaiians, the diaspora, undermines native identity. Yet, others describe how place is the powerful mobilizing force to off-island Hawaiians urging them to “come home” to struggle (see Kauanui, 1998). The voices call to the spirit, to the body, to the memory of cells and DNA — for the undeniable link is genealogical: “our mother is our land, PapahƗnaumoku, she who birth the islands” (Trask, 1993, p. 122). Recent migrations of Native Hawaiians respond to “push” and “pull” factors described by migration and economic theories (Massey et al., 1993). These theories find support in the modern Hawaiian experience of low wages, high rents, and limited educational opportunities that drive Native Hawaiians to various destinations in the continental United States. The cost of living in Hawai‘i continues to average about 30 percent higher than the rest of the nation; with some of the highest home prices in the country, the median price of a single-family home was $550,000 in 2005. For the indigenous population, which tends to have lower education and higher poverty rates (even when fully employed) than other groups in the state, it has become increasingly difficult to survive (Kana‘iaupuni, Malone, and Ishibashi, 2005). Thus, the promise of education, jobs, and lower home prices attract many Hawaiians northeast to the 48 states, and once there, they are often held by new social and familial ties. Population diversity is another threat to Native Hawaiian identity (Kana‘iaupuni and Malone, 2004). Like other Native American groups in the United States, Native Hawaiians are predominantly multiracial. They claim the highest rates of multiracial status, next to Alaska Natives: about two-thirds of Native Hawaiians are of mixed-race.3 Census 2000 data show that among all married Native Hawaiians, only 19 percent were married to other Hawaiians. Yet, the effects of increasing geographic diversity are immediately apparent in the intermarriage rates of those living in the 48 continental states compared with those still in Hawai‘i. The data in Figure 21.4 show that whereas 34 percent of married Native Hawaiians in their homeland are married to other Hawaiians, the percentage drops to only 7 percent among those residing elsewhere. Because the vast majority involves white partners, this marriage trend has been described by some scholars as a “whitening of the Hawaiian race.” For all groups, interracial mixing complicates questions of identity (see Root, 2001; Liebler, 2001; Xie and Goyette, 1997). The real question for the perpetuation of ethnic or cultural groups is what happens to the children? What we find is that the chances of identifying children as Hawaiian in Hawaiian couple families are quite high, as might be expected. But, for Hawaiians that marry out, the likelihood that children are identified as Hawaiian diminishes. Thus, rather than creating greater potential for Hawaiian population growth through intermarriage, the data show diminishing returns to Hawaiian identification in mixed-race households. Geography affects not only who people marry, but also their identity choices. In some cases, multiracial identity may permit greater ethnic options for Native Hawaiians on the continent, depending on where they live. For instance, a Native Hawaiian, Chinese, Puerto Rican individual in Northern California may opt to adopt a Chinese ethnic affiliation, while the same individual may find greater expression in her/his Puerto Rican ethnicity in New York. In other cases, individuals may adopt different situational identities, depending on the circumstances. Certainly not unique to Native Hawaiians, these individual decisions are complicated by both geographic and racial/ethnic diversity, and, for many, can be difficult to resolve (see Spickard and Fong, 1995; Franklin, 2003).

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This Land is My Land Figure 21.4 Intermarriage of Native Hawaiians, Census 2000.

Race of the Partners of Hawaiians, Hawai‘i Two or more Some other race alone, 0.9

races, 11.6 Hawaiian alone/in combination 33.9

AIAN alone, 0.1 Black alone, 2.7 OPI alone, 1.5

Asian alone, 26.9 White alone, 22.5

Race of the Partners of Hawaiians, Continental U.S.

Some other race alone, 3.4

Two or more races, 6.0

Hawaiian alone/in combination 7.3

AIAN alone, 0.7 Black alone, 2.8 OPI alone, 4.3 Asian alone,6.4 White alone, 69.2

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Kana‘iaupuni and Liebler (2005) found that, compared with those in the continental United States, mixed-race families are much more likely to report their children as Native Hawaiian if the children were born in Hawai‘i, if the family resides in Hawai‘i, or if the Hawaiian parent was born in Hawai‘i, in the absence of other explanatory factors. Moreover, suggesting that returning home is a profound event, the highest odds ratio of reporting Native Hawaiian occurred in mixed-race families that had lived outside Hawai‘i and returned home, compared with other families. Recent data from Census 2000 are consistent, confirming the deep significance of place to racial identification. As shown in Figure 21.5, Kana‘iaupuni and Malone (2004) found that mixed-race children with birth or residence ties to Hawai‘i were significantly more likely to be identified as Native Hawaiian than were other children. Still, only about half of children in interracial families with one Native Hawaiian parent were identified as Hawaiian in Census 2000 (Kana‘iaupuni and Malone, 2004). Figure 21.5

For displaced Native Hawaiians who seek to sustain their culture and identity, other mechanisms in foreign locations help perpetuate cultural identity through the continuation of traditional practices or the reinforcement of cultural values and ideals. In many of the 48 states, Native Hawaiians regularly come together for cultural gatherings involving music, art, language, and recreation. They have formed Hawaiian-based organizations and groups to assist continental Hawaiians with life away from their ancestral home. A number of Hawaiian civic clubs exist throughout the United States, especially in regions in which large numbers of Hawaiians reside (e.g., on the West Coast). Alumni associations, such as that of the Kamehameha Schools, also maintain regional districts to help keep the network of families and friends informed and connected. Smaller groups that practice traditional Hawaiian arts, such as hula and canoe paddling, exist across the continent, thereby offering practical outlets for Hawaiians living far from home. Kauanui (1999) notes a few: Hui Hawai‘i of San Diego, E ola Mau Ka ‘ƿlelo Makuahine in Huntington Beach, Na Kolea (aptly named after the golden plover birds that fly between Hawai‘i and Alaska) of San Jose, and others.

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BUILDING THE FUTURE OF PLACE It is difficult for many 21st century Native Hawaiians to share the same degree of involvement and connection with ancestral lands as Native Hawaiians could in former times. But recognition of the pivotal role that place plays in their identity processes has begun to transform the service and delivery of many educational and social programs for Native Hawaiians. The reforms integrate the rich history, stories, and knowledge about the land and sea, and at the same time reinforce the integral link between the ‘Ɨina and identity. Primarily fueled by the concern and passion of Hawaiian community members, parents, and advocates, these efforts are an organic solution to the chilling negative statistics that plague Native Hawaiian children: high rates of poverty, substance abuse, juvenile deviance and criminal activity, teenage pregnancies, poor educational outcomes, domestic abuse, depression, and suicide. For example, place-based learning is a pillar of educational reform through the Hawaiian charter school movement. Typical of this approach, schools (e.g., Kanu o ka ‘Ɩina New Century Public Charter School) boast a project-based and place-based curriculum for children that integrates community and the natural environment. Students engage in authentic experiences at particular wahi pana (sacred places) that serve as outdoor learning laboratories. They conduct science experiments to assess the relative successes of various methods to revive endangered endemic species. Their curriculum includes learning about lifestyles, knowledge, and values of Native Hawaiians. In this way, connections to the land create the space for Native Hawaiians to maintain traditional practices that nourish spiritual, physical, and educational well-being. From a sense of place grows a sense of kuleana (responsibility). Various programs in schools and other organizations encourage responsibility toward the land and sea as part of a broader educational strategy. These range from post-high leadership (e.g., Na Ala Hele i ke Ao at Chaminade University), to agricultural, resource management, substance abuse rehabilitation (e.g., Ho‘omau ke Ola offering adult outpatient and residential services), and many other programs. Programs teaching stewardship of the oceans stress Native Hawaiian thought that the sea works in partnership with the land, providing sustenance and serving as a pathway and communication link with other lands and peoples (Amona, 2004). As such, maritime programs, fishpond restoration, and voyaging and ocean learning (e.g., Polynesian Voyaging Society) are all examples of promising directions in Native Hawaiian communities today (see Figure 21.6). The results indicate progress. Studies show that best practices among successful teachers of Native Hawaiian students include experience-based, authentic activities (e.g., Kawakami and Aton, 2001). Data from Hawaiian charter schools provide evidence of higher attendance and achievement scores than exhibited by Native Hawaiian students in conventional public schools (Kana‘iaupuni and Ishibashi, 2005). Evaluation research finds higher levels of engagement (attendance, timely completion, postsecondary aspirations) among Native Hawaiian students enrolled in public school-within-school models that offer hands-on experiences at significant places within students’ communities such as streams, freshwater ecosystems, and ancient burial grounds, (Yamauchi, 2003). The findings are consistent with research on other indigenous groups. For example, studies have found that Native American students exhibit greater preference for tactile and concrete learning experiences than do their peers (Rhodes, 1990). Many studies indicate the positive effects of place-based forms of education in a wide variety of settings (Gruenewald, 2003; Becket, 2003; Kawakami, 1999; Smith, 2002).

DISCUSSION This essay has traced some of the place-people connections that influence identity. We have documented the spatial linkages between the place of indigenous Hawaiians today and their identity by locating the present in the historical locations and subjugations of place, by tracing the genealogical, cultural, and ancestral relations of Native Hawaiians and place, and by mapping how place serves a pivotal purpose for the progress of Native Hawaiians.

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In some ways, Hawaiian identity has been “conceived, manufactured, and fabricated” by external forces that do not share the interests of the indigenous peoples that they mold and shape to fit their own reality (Halualani, 2002). Identity is not simply a subjective cognitive process, but one subjected to external biases, intentional misrepresentation, and political tactics. Countless examples exist where Western powers convince the world of their right to colonize indigenous peoples by recreating them as other (than Western), from the distorted hula girl images of the Hawaiians to the purposeful portrayal of American Indians as primitive savages. Indigenous theory focuses on returning the gaze to expose the ulterior motives behind such tactics, which careful documentation reveals are influenced by Western imperialism, power, and capitalism. Even defining indigenous peoples by blood quantum, as is the case for Hawaiians and many American Indian people, is an explicit legal maneuver to ensure that they eventually disappear into oblivion. Figure 21.6 Students learn ancient and modern lessons at Kahuwai Villiage on Hawai‘i Island.

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In the Hawaiian case, the purpose — perhaps not explicit, but definitely systematic — was to dismember lƗhui, the Hawaiian nation, to de-historicize place from its people, and to justify taking the land from its indigenous people (Osorio, 2002). In the end, the place itself may have been the motivating factor, a precious land that still captures the hearts of many visitors. As Mark Twain fondly recalled — in the same speech where he betrayed the indigenous Hawaiians, calling them stupid, dishonest, immoral cowards: “no alien land in all the world has any deep strong charm for me but that one, no other land could so longingly and so beseechingly haunt me, sleeping and walking, through half a lifetime, as that one has done” (Sandwich Island Speeches cf. Wood, 1999, p. 94).

It is crucial to understand that these forces did not occur without consistent resistance. Although never with violence, Native Hawaiians successfully fought to have the island of Kaho‘olawe, however sick or devastated by bombing, returned to them by the military. We have regained place-based knowledge systems that had lapsed into disuse, including renewing traditional navigation systems via ocean and constellations; restoring ancient agricultural and aquacultural technologies that once sustained hundreds of thousands of islanders in environmentally healthy ways; reviving Hawaiian martial arts, ancient chant and hula forms; and reclaiming traditional healing practices and medicinal plant knowledge. We have struggled to revitalize the Hawaiian language from just a few thousand speakers twenty years ago to many more today. In fact, Census 2000 estimates possibly as many as 25,000 Hawaiian language speakers, making Hawaiian one of the only indigenous languages to have grown between 1990 and 2000 (Steton, 2005). The vast majority reside in the cultural home of Hawai‘i. We fight hard for self-determination, exploring multiple models of a potential future as a sovereign people. We are national leaders in the battle against environmental degradation and protection of endangered species. The most powerful driving force in these efforts is the intensity of feeling for place. The mobilizing energy comes from the land itself, from the sea, from the children (see Figure 21.7) and the compelling vision of a future where indigenous Hawaiians are in their rightful place as a vibrant, thriving people. Figure 21.7 A young marcher.

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NOTES 1

We use Native Hawaiian, Hawaiian, and kƗnaka maoli to refer to those descended from the aboriginal people that inhabited the Hawaiian archipelago prior to 1778, when Captain James Cook arrived to Hawai‘i. 2

3

The law was repealed successfully in the following spring, 2005.

According to Census 2000, 64.9 percent of Native Hawaiians report more than one race. Alaska Natives most often reported multiple races (92%), followed by Native Hawaiians, and then American Indians (53%).

Chapter 22

Little Tokyo: Historical and Contemporary Japanese American Identities JAMES M. SMITH INTRODUCTION This chapter considers processes that have provided a classic framework of constraints and opportunities for Japanese Americans in Los Angeles. These processes include market capitalism and technological change, racism, and cultural practices. In particular, geographers are interested in how these kinds of economic, social, and cultural processes produce landscapes in various kinds of places. In this case study, we consider Little Tokyo, in Los Angeles, California. This district is a traditional urban ethnic enclave, an area that has many landscape and cultural features of Japanese-American life, ranging from Japanese signage to architectural features. We are especially interested in how the social practices and cultural forms have been etched onto the landscape of this special place, how the enclave has reinforced a sense of being Japanese American, and how Little Tokyo has changed over the last one-hundred years. Although no longer the largest concentration of Japanese-American residences, Little Tokyo has been revived as a center for voluntary cultural, religious, and political practices that have reinforced JapaneseAmerican identities in the post WWII-postwar era. Like other ethnic groups, Japanese Americans build and use places to maintain businesses, create ethnic residences such as senior homes, and reinforce their identities through a sense of place. Although these places are no longer the enclave ghettos of old, and no longer spatially constrained, the residential pattern of a racially-defined people, the three remaining California Nihonmachi (Japantowns), are still socially significant as places of ethnic boundary maintenance (Barth, 1998) and survival in the face of structural and cultural assimilation.

EARLY GEOGRAPHIES OF JAPANESE-AMERICAN MIGRATION Push Factors for Japanese Migrants The onset of the Meiji Era in Japan (1868–1912), with its nationalist projects of industrialization, militarization and empire-building, provided the context for Japanese emigration to the Americas and Hawai‘i. The Japanese elites were determined to transform a mostly feudal society into a modern powerful nation-state with an effective military, overseas colonies and a strong urban-industrial economy. This proved to be a difficult shift for certain groups. For example, a combination of legislative inducements and coercion effectively removed possible threats to the Meiji regime from the samurai or warrior class, many of whom were unhappy with Western influence over their country and a loss of social status due to the reforms of the new government. Even more troublesome was the issue of the peasantry, and how they would be brought into the new order.

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Despite promises to the contrary, the Meiji regime had no intention of large-scale land redistribution or relief of heavy tax burdens on farmers. To the Meiji leadership, industrialization meant squeezing the agricultural sector. This was done through the initiation of cash economies in the rural areas, and the establishment of a land tax, to be paid in cash (Halliday, 1975; Hane, 1990). The result for rural families was even greater hardship than they had known before, as the peasants now depended on the sale of rice to pay the tax. Fluctuations in agricultural commodities prices were determined largely by financial policies set in Tokyo, which generally favored deflation and high interest rates, particularly in periods of crisis. When crops failed and debts came due, hunger and occasional famine resulted, and peasants migrated to the cities and overseas, most of the latter group to Hawai‘i and the west coast of the U.S. and Canada (Halliday, 1975; Hane, 1990, 1982; Takahashi, 1997). These changing conditions in the Japanese countryside were the key push factors in the migration of the Nikkei, a term that refers to the overseas Japanese. Approximately 275,000 Japanese entered the United States between 1861 and 1924, with 245,000 of them migrating from 1900 to 1924. Most were young and male, fitting the profile of long-distance migration that is typical for this specific historical period. Given the nature of the work that labor contractors sought to fill, and conditions in peasant villages, most were rural farmers. The predominant source region for intra-Japanese rural to urban movement, as well as international migration, was southern Japan, particularly productive riceproducing areas such as Yamaguchi, Hiroshima and Okayama prefectures in southwestern Honshu, where the peasants bore a harsh burden of land taxes (Takahashi, 1997; Hane, 1990, 1982; Takaki, 1989). Most of the Issei (those who came and stayed) had clear economic motives to leave Japan, but many did not anticipate staying in the United States. Earning money to build a home, to acquire an education, and to establish businesses were prominent reasons for emigration. The Japanese and California’s Emerging Market Economy In California, the production of winter fruits and vegetables in the Mediterranean climatic setting, combined with transcontinental freight rail and refrigeration, established economic complementarities with the demand for fresh produce in Midwestern and Eastern seaboard markets. Because of the skills of Japanese farmers in intensive wet-rice agriculture and vegetable gardening, both of which demanded heavy labor and attention to detail, trans-Pacific labor contracts were lucrative for white-owned agricultural operations (Takahashi, 1997). The use of Japanese laborers as a strategy to increase the profits of agribusiness reflects a pattern in the creation of economic geographies in the Americas from the Columbian expansion to the present day strategies of capitalist enterprises in California (Walker, 1997; Ong, Bonacich, and Cheng, 1994). Exploitation of culturally isolated workers, whether through slavery or contract, was a feature of plantation and food crop agriculture in global and regional peripheries. Characteristically, in the California context, the first-generation Japanese immigrants, the Issei, were forbidden to own land. Nevertheless, the nativist-inspired Alien Land Laws and other measures in the racialization of land tenure did not succeed in preventing the establishment of productive small farms run by Japanese immigrants, who devised creative strategies to circumvent the restrictions (Ichioka, 1988; Iwata, 1990). Initially, local elites in California and other states welcomed male Japanese migrants as temporary reservoirs of labor, cheap and politically compliant. This situation leads us to the question of why anti-Japanese racism was eventually supported by political leaders and local businesses after their initial acquiescence to, or tolerance of, the Issei. The attitude of the local state shifted dramatically with the large-scale movement of Issei into various forms of self-employment in horticulture and truck farming. The Issei were able to accomplish this major shift in status despite the strong social pressure on white landowners not to rent land to Japanese tenants, let alone sell it. By 1913, the first of the Alien Land Laws were designed to provide the coercive instrument to terminate the movement of the California Japanese into agricultural self-employment that required at least the use of land, if not its ownership (Chuman, 1976). The Issei were often disliked by the local white farmers and business leaders because they could not be effectively controlled as they moved into self-proprietorship, which enabled them to escape the role of unskilled

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workers. As successful farmers in the production of specialty truck-farming produce such as lettuce, onions, garlic, strawberries and flowers, the Issei were able to form agricultural cooperatives that established self-sufficiency by creating chains of businesses at different stages of the production, distribution, and marketing processes. Japanese immigrants ran large regional vegetable and flower markets, as well as smaller mom-and-pop operations. All of this was achieved despite the relegation of the Japanese immigrant farmers to leased lands with marginal soils, and the lack of startup capital from outside of the community (Iwata, 1990).

ETHNIC LIFE IN EARLY LITTLE TOKYO With the arrival of increasing numbers of “picture brides,” women who migrated from Japan through trans-Pacific arranged marriages without meeting their prospective husbands, the overwhelmingly male character of the Nikkei communities began to change. The Issei experience and that of their second-generation children, the Nisei, defined the early Japanese-American experience in southern California’s Nihonmachi, and in rural clusters of the ethnic group, who engaged in farming. A visitor from outside of the community in the 1920s or 1930s would have seen that Little Tokyo was built as a vibrant center of business activity, worship, and social life. For farmers who needed supplies such as seeds and tools, wholesale markets provided these necessities with business transactions conducted in Japanese, as most of the early immigrants had little or no command of English. Children would help out in the retail green groceries by washing vegetables such as carrots and daikon, a Japanese radish. They prepared flower displays and worked the cash register. Tofu, a paste made of soybeans and cut into blocks, was a key source of protein and was at that time hard to find outside of the community. Fresh fish was the other principal source of protein in the Japanese diet, and the “fish man” merchants were a common sight. They sold maguro (red tuna), ebi (shrimp) and other favored species caught in the cold waters off the California coast. At night, neon lights with mixed Japanese and English script created an exotic atmosphere of the “Orient” designed to give tourists or native Los Angelenos the impression that they were traveling to a distant locale to dine and shop, even if Little Tokyo was just a few miles from home. Religious institutions were a crucial force in the life of the community, with several dozen Buddhist temples and Christian churches providing weekly worship, marriage, and funeral service. The scent of incense and the chanting of sutras, Buddhist sacred scripts, would have reminded the visitor of the uniqueness of Little Tokyo as a place. Most services were conducted exclusively in Japanese, although English services became more common as the Nisei came of age. Most children attended Japanese school for one or two hours every weeknight and on Saturdays, with classes often held in temples and churches. Strict discipline prevailed, and Japanese values such as giri (contractual obligation), on (profound debt to parents), and respect for traditional learning and authority were emphasized. Temples and churches were also the center for social life, as they help to organize appropriate functions for young people to meet, arranged marriages, and were the focus of sports leagues in baseball, basketball, volleyball, and martial arts. These were typically exclusively comprised of Japanese Americans, for this allowed for competition in safe social spaces, in which the ethnic group members could feel more comfortable and avoid potential tensions with the majority community. Other centers of social activity included special bars that catered exclusively to men, typically serving sake, Japanese rice wine, and specialty foods. Gambling and shogi (Japanese chess) were favorite pastimes, and news and information vital to the community was available in the Rafu Shimpo, the largest of several newspapers published in Little Tokyo, which was an exclusively Japanese-language paper until 1926.

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PROBLEMS FOR THE EARLY JAPANESE AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN LITTLE TOKYO: RACISM, NATIVISM, AND THE GHETTO The Japanese-American experience in the region, like other minorities, was shaped by racism and the needs of a growing market economy. The Japanese came to California to make a living, but were confronted over competition for jobs and resources. As in the case of their Chinese predecessors, racism also was a major problem for early Japanese-American communities. A number of “nativist” social movements and political organizations emerged from the dominant ethnic group in California in the early 20th century. As with the earlier agitation against Chinese migrants, the antiJapanese movement’s advocates were found among labor groups who feared the presence of Japanese workers would lower wages. These fears were fanned by those who feared and hated the Japanese due to their different cultural practices and physical appearance. The Japanese were labeled as aliens and nativist movements claimed that they could never be successfully assimilated into American life. The racial tenor of the nativism grew increasingly shrill with the periodic rise in geopolitical tensions between the United States and Japan (Penrose, 1973; Daniels, 1977). The nativists used what is sometimes referred to as Yellow Peril. They tried to portray the JapaneseAmerican population as a fast-breeding and treasonous group preparing for a future Japanese invasion of California, which the nativists claimed to be inevitable. The nativists played on various fears and emotions. For example, Japanese men were said to want to abduct and rape white women. These images were similar to stereotypes applied to African-American males during the Antebellum and Jim Crow periods. The idea of an economic “threat” posed by the Japanese-American population was now transformed into a political threat through the prism of race. All Japanese were claimed to be a fifth column of aliens attempting to capture California for Japanese companies, as a prelude to eventual military conquest (Takaki, 1989; Dower, 1986; Daniels, 1962). The Yellow Peril idea was far more effective in mobilizing a broad base of Californians because of the multiple stereotypes it expressed. One or more of these stereotypes appealed to all classes and political persuasions within white society, while other stereotypes appealed to specific class and political constituencies. The same Yellow Peril idea that had been applied to Chinese migrants (Anderson, 1987; Chang, 2003) were used as weapons against all Japanese Americans, immigrant or native-born. Geographically, the Alien Land Laws of 1913 and 1920 prohibited the Issei from owning land, and placed spatial restrictions on Japanese Americans by limiting the areas where they could live and work. Other discriminatory practices included segregated education, which actually provoked a political crisis between the U.S. and Japanese governments in the first decade of the twentieth century. Likewise, housing segregation was imposed through informal discriminatory practices. The latter were usually accompanied by verbal and physical intimidation, not only against Japanese migrants, but also toward those whites in the local communities who were sympathetic and willing to lease land and housing to the Nikkei. Thus, the Issei and their children were confined to specific housing in both rural and urban areas. In California alone, urban segregation led to the creation of forty Nihonmachi, or Japantowns, including Little Tokyo, Los Angeles. As with the early development of Chinatowns, Japanese enclaves were originally ghettos built as a consequence of, and a response to the racism in the larger society. Anderson (1987) provides insights into the specific case of Asians in North America, and the manner in which discourses of the “Oriental” Other were applied as tools to create racialized ghettos (Said, 1978). Thus, ideology of the dominant ethnic group imposed the ghetto and reinforced outside perceptions and stereotypes of it by creating conditions of crowding and lack of hygiene through poor access to water, sanitation, and adequate living space. This was discriminatory public policy, and it imposed conditions that were then used to reinforce stereotypes of the group, such as claims that the Japanese always stick together, and therefore cannot be trusted. This combination of public policy, racism, and spatial isolation created a feedback loop of place making based on discriminatory treatment. Chinatowns and Japantowns were evidence of the racial fears and obsessions of the dominant ethnic and class groups in the host society. They were products of a specific regional type of racism in California (Omi and Winant, 1986), which shaped everyday attitudes, laws, and politics at all scales.

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However, rather than forcing Japanese immigrants to return to Japan or migrate elsewhere, the effect of this intense discrimination was to motivate the Issei to build an integrated ethnic economy that proved to be remarkably resilient (Takahashi, 1997; Bonacich and Modell, 1980). Little Tokyo, which is the most famous of the Japanese urban enclaves, does not have a single founding date, but the term was coined by white “native” Californians in the early twentieth century, and soon used by the Japanese Americans themselves. Because the Japanese were labeled “unassimilable aliens,” and denied the right to seek citizenship, they were effectively excluded from the political system, even if they were English-speaking second-generation Nisei. This meant that the Japanese community could not seek redress for grievances or crimes committed against them, let alone have any effect on the outcome of elections. Likewise, they were forced into a marginal niche economy, socially and geographically isolated and politically disempowered. These conditions worsened for Japanese Americans during the 1930s and 1940s, when increasing tensions and eventual war between the U.S. and Japan led to their incarceration in camps from the spring of 1942 until 1945. After the war, due to continued discrimination in housing practices, Japanese Americans moved to specific neighborhoods that were characterized by more tolerance and job opportunities in landscaping and small business, work in which the Japanese Americans had thrived before the incarceration. By the late 1950s and especially the 1960s, as legal barriers to assimilation began to crumble under the pressure of the Civil Rights movement, the Nikkei began to disperse to outlying suburbs such as Gardena and Torrance in the South Bay region of Los Angeles, as well as the San Gabriel Valley. These changes put pressure on Little Tokyo and the enclave began a period of demographic and economic decline, resulting in the deterioration of its built environment. In the 1970s, significant investment from Japanese corporations resulted in a process of gentrified businesses. These are institutions that charge higher prices and cater to upscale tourists, in this case from Japan. Older buildings that had been used as senior residences were torn down to make way for hotels and shopping malls. This led to considerable resistance from community activists, and the decade was marked by frequent negotiations and conflicts among the activists who wished to preserve what they termed “Lil Tokio for workin folks,” the City of Los Angeles, and Japanese companies that hoped to develop the area. By the 1980s, it was clear that redevelopment was winning out, and the decade marked the high point of Japanese corporate investment in the enclave. However, a severe recession in Japan during 1990 eventually led to a sharp decrease in foreign direct investment in Los Angeles. This forced Little Tokyo businesses and institutions to shift their attention to greater cooperation with City Hall, and an emphasis on local resources.

ETHNIC IDENTITIES, INSTITUTIONS, AND PLACE IN LITTLE TOKYO What is an Ethnic Group? An ethnic group is a form of social organization, whose members identify themselves as part of the community. From this perspective, processes of social boundary maintenance that accompany self-ascription and out-group recognition play out in daily life by providing rules of what is allowed and disallowed for ethnic group members when interacting with those from another ethnic group. This emphasis on boundary maintenance explains ethnic persistence better than a definition of ethnicity based on traits, some of which change over time with shifts in historical and social conditions (Barth, 1998). In addition, ethnic identities are expressed differently depending on the situation of different class, gender and political groups within the ethnic label. This means that the “definition” of who belongs and how one can tell who belongs is contested (Marston, 2002). This fact tells us that ethnic identities are a crucial form of human bonding, perhaps even more crucial to human societies in our own time, because the forces of globalization bring rapid and disorienting changes to places and peoples all over the world (Castells, 1997, 1996; Harvey, 2000). Japanese-American experiences play out in specific social forms such as religious practice, historical representation, and cultural consumption. These are social processes of identity construction and boundary mainte-

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nance, and lead to the constant creation and re-creation of ethnic landscapes that help Japanese Americans to maintain a reassuring sense of identity and meaning within the context of rapidly changing places such as Little Tokyo. According to geographers Kate Berry and Martha Henderson (2002), the resulting landscapes are like an “etched glass vase,” which reveals the social and cultural impact of a particular group of people on a specific place. A brief discussion of two institutions will illustrate this point, as they have historical and long-standing practical and symbolic importance: religious sites and the annual Nisei Week Festival. Religious Institutions and Japanese Americans in Little Tokyo Interviews conducted during fieldwork confirmed the importance of houses of worship to the endurance of ethnic identities. In the prewar era, these sites were the socio-spatial nexus of ethnic life. However, after the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan, over 120,000 Japanese Americans were imprisoned in camps throughout the western United States from 1942 to 1945. Little Tokyo became a predominantly AfricanAmerican enclave of migrant workers from the South who settled in Los Angeles in hopes of finding work in the armaments industries that thrived during the war. Through this process of incarceration, most Japanese Americans lost almost everything they materially owned, and when internees were allowed to leave the camps in early 1945, Buddhist temples and Christian churches played a key role as temporary housing sites for families with no money who wanted to resettle in their home region. As a result, temples and churches serving as temporary hostels were crucial in reclaiming the enclave as a Japanese-American place (Yokota, 1996; Interview with Buddhist priest).1 In the Japanese-American context, Buddhist temples and (mostly Protestant) Christian churches were key institutions in the trans-generational reproduction of ethnic differences and cultural forms (Barth, 1998). Furthermore, religious institutions were the social epicenter for singles, even after the relaxation of racially discriminatory miscegenation laws, thus reinforcing patterns of endogamous marriage, or marriage within the Japanese-American community. This pattern of a complete set of institutions is crucial for maintaining ethnic identities (Breton, 1964), and the Japanese-American community has always been characterized by its richness and depth of ethnic institutions (Fugita and O’Brien, 1991). Social research has shown that persons who attend ethnic religious institutions will also participate in voluntary activity within the group. The historical and current importance in the Japanese-American community of ethnic in-group sports leagues for example, is very closely tied to the direct involvement of churches and temples (Interviews with Buddhist priest and Community Social Worker).2 The Nisei Week Festival Since the 1930s the Nisei Week Festival has been a cultural event of singular importance in JapaneseAmerican life in Los Angeles. In the prewar era, businesses thrived as the ethnic economy, by necessity, provided the jobs and social setting for those who did not work directly in agriculture. Cultural institutions emerged as an effort to help Little Tokyo businesses increase sales during the Great Depression, and reach out to the larger community (Kurashige, 2002). This event provides a case study of how a particular site of ethnic reproduction changes form and content with shifting social, economic, and political conditions inside and outside of the ethnic community. For example, in the 1930s, as relations between the United States and Japan deteriorated due to the latter’s invasion of China, the organizers of the Nisei Week Festival began to deemphasize the ties of the Japanese-American community to Japan, and adopted a posture of “Americanism” and loyalty to community and country. This posture was reflected in the “commodification” of Japanese-American ethnicity that took place during this period, in which white tourists were brought to the enclave to enjoy exotic culinary and visual pleasures, while also experiencing Little Tokyo as an ethnic place that was politically loyal to the American system (Kurashige, 2002). This was an example of the “economics and politics of racial accommodation” (Modell, 1977). But it is also typical of how the stuff of ethnic identities can change, though the overall purpose of ethnic persistence is retained.

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In the postwar era, the annual beauty pageant associated with the Festival changed its rules of participation with shifting community identities, as multi-ethnic contestants with only partial Japanese ethnicity have forced a redefinition of the meanings of Nikkei experiences in Los Angeles. Today, the Nisei Week Festival reflects the much more flexible definition captured by the term Nikkei. For example, the annual beauty pageant associated with the Festival allows women of partial Japanese ancestry to participate, and several of these contestants have won the contest, the first in 1980. This showcase of ethnicity enables its participants to pleasurably express identities through artistic performance in the most symbolic setting for Japanese Americans in southern California (Figure 22.1). Figure 22.1 Japanese-American women in parade during the Nisei Week Festival in Little Toyko.

LITTLE TOKYO IN RECENT TIMES: A SENSE OF PLACE AND IDENTITY To a tremendous degree, the landscape of Little Tokyo has changed with politico-economic shifts at various scales, from early 20th century southern California agriculture to geopolitical turbulence and war, and in a global economy characterized by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from transnational corporations. Large Japanese companies such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi have acquired properties throughout southern California, and Little Tokyo is an excellent example of this process. However, after the Japanese economy went into a deep recession in the 1990s, the capital flows from Japan began to diminish, as did the flows of Japanese tourists visiting the area. This had an adverse effect on ethnic businesses. As if this were not enough, the Northridge earthquake of January 17, 1994 damaged some of the historic district on First Street and Los Angeles’ huge distinctive City Hall building had to be retrofitted to withstand future earthquakes. The resulting relocation of city workers meant less lunchtime business for Little Tokyo’s popular eateries. The mid-1990s were therefore probably the most trying period for the ethnic economy in the district. As a consequence, the ethnic businesses were forced to adapt to changing conditions. Like many former residential enclaves, Little Tokyo became a place of consumption geography not only for local office workers and senior residents, but for tourists from other places in California and all over the world. This trend towards

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commodification of the uniqueness of places has been given terms such as “postmodern” geographies and “the urban spaces of late capitalism” (Castells, 1997, 1996; Harvey, 1989). Ethnic institutions are key mechanisms in the making and consumption of place, which is integral to ethnic identity reinforcement as a social process (Barth, 1998; Brass, 1991). Likewise, the commodification of culture in urban settings (Harvey, 2001) is especially apparent in regions that have seen capital flight and uneven development processes intensify, particularly since the 1960s. The interplay of these processes at various scales shapes the built environment of ethnic places (Peet, 1997). Through an understanding of global and regional changes in society and economy, and the strength of ethnic groups to create their own etchings in the cultural landscape, geographers emphasize the persistence of an ethnic sense of place. Even though Japanese Americans are no longer forced to settle in urban and rural enclaves, few would contest that Little Tokyo is a distinctive urban landscape with layers of Nikkei cultural and architectural imprint. Even with social and cultural assimilation, Japanese-American ethnic identities and economies, and those of numerous socio-cultural groups, have proven to be remarkably resilient, as manifested in the ethnic geographies of Los Angeles. Perhaps the best example of how Little Tokyo has had a trans-generational effect is captured by a community center worker who has a deep local knowledge of the enclave through a lifetime of work and service. In Brian Ishii’s case, his experiences working in Little Tokyo had an unexpected effect on his daughter’s sense of ethnicity. He states that he used to bring his daughter to work with him when she was young, and she would have a chance to explore Little Tokyo. His daughter does not speak Japanese, but accompanied Ishii on a visit to Japan in 2000, where they spent a couple of weeks. He was surprised at her comfort level as they traveled: “But you know when we went to Japan, she was like twenty-one I think then, and I’m a little hazukashii [embarrassed] I guess to let other Japanese in Japan know that I’m not Japanese. But my daughter was just totally free. I was surprised — we’d be in a crowded train, you know, and she’d say, ‘Hey Dad, look at that over there!’… And then people were looking around, ‘Who said that,’ you know. But she felt totally free … I said, ‘How do you feel? How do you feel being over here in Japan?’ She said, ‘You know, I think because you brought me to Little Tokyo, I feel fairly comfortable here.’ I said, ‘You’re kidding, Little Tokyo is nothing like Japan.’ She goes, ‘Oh no, it’s not true, I mean Little Tokyo is a little bit like Japan.’ But she said that little bit helped her to feel like it’s not that far. And I thought that’s quite an interesting thing. I never even thought that” (Brian Ishii, personal interview conducted 24 March, 2005).

By having the opportunity to interact with the ethnic institutions and symbolic landscapes of Little Tokyo, Ishii’s daughter offers confirmation that place matters in the experiences and processes that shape ethnic identities. Finally, we can see in Little Tokyo material witness to Berry and Henderson’s observation (2002) that the agency of ethnic actors creates landscapes that reflect and impact the identities of those who live and work in such landscapes. Ethnic economic patterns of labor, cultural preference (e.g., Zen landscape gardening and religious architecture), and socio-cultural performance are mediated and articulated into localized landscape outcomes. These landscape elements of Little Tokyo express a constant theme in the stories of Japanese Americans and of ethnic groups generally: that ethnicity is about the “social organization of culture difference” (Barth, 1998), and the making of place which reinforces in a spatial way, the boundaries and consciousness that maintains those differences.

NOTES 1

Interview with Rev. Noriaki Ito, Higashi Honganji Buddhist Temple, Los Angeles, California. March 26, 2004. Transcript and audiotape in author’s possession. 2

As Above. Interview with Bill Watanabe, Director, Little Tokyo Service Center, Los Angeles, California. March 25, 2004. Transcript and audiotape in author’s possession.

Chapter 23

The Invisible Immigrants: Asian Indian Settlement Patterns and Racial/Ethnic Identities EMILY H. SKOP AND CLAIRE E. ALTMAN INTRODUCTION Often in vernacular language, all people from the Asian continent are labeled as “Asian.” This taxonomy is a gross overgeneralization of the variation of countries and ethnicities within the vast continent. The Census Bureau defines an Asian as “a person having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent” (American Fact Finder, 2004). Yet the Asian population living in the United States is a remarkable collection of individuals in terms of their immigration history, settlement patterns, and human and social capital. Even so, at varying times in American statistics and academics, Asians have been amalgamated into general “Asian,” “white,” or “other” categories. These vague and extensive racial or ethnic labels have been used despite distinct geographic origin, languages, social, and cultural traits. With the emergence of social and racial/ethnic consciousness in the late 1960s and 1970s, subgroups of Asians desired a more specific and representative categorization than the pan-umbrella term “Asian.” As a result, the Census Bureau created a variety of new classifications for the Asian population, including the Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and Vietnamese. The new grouping “Asian Indian” also appeared in the 1980 census and defined Asian Indians as “including people who indicated their race as ‘Asian Indian’ or identified themselves as Bengalese, Bharat, Dravidian, East Indian, or Goanese” (Xenos, Barringer, and Levin, 1989, p. 5). The 2000 Census was the first time in the history of the Census that respondents could choose more than one racial category. Even with this monumental alteration in racial self-identification, the Census Bureau reports that in 2000 only 2.4 percent of all Americans reported more than one race (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2001). On the other hand, 11.6 percent of the Asian Indian population chose the category “Asian Indian in combination with one or more other races and/or detailed Asian categories” (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002). Many of these individuals are second-generation Indians who are biracial, while others are individuals who chose “in combination” as a form of protest against the whole process of racial classification in the U.S. (Sailer, 2002). As one immigrant put it: “The impulse to call us all ‘Asians,’ using such a broad label to encompass everyone from Koreans to Pakistanis, seems both meaningless and demeaning to me. There’s no utility in lumping together an entire continent of peoples with such different cultures and religions, and refusing to allow for these differences is, I think, unfair and fundamentally colonialist” (Sailer, 2002, p. 2).

The many controversies surrounding the racial classification of Asian Indians have a good deal of influence on the immigrant groups’ settlement patterns and racial/ethnic identities. In this chapter, we focus on Asian Indians (and use the “in combination” category). We answer four key questions: What is the history of AsianIndian immigration to the United States? Where do the 1.9 million Asian Indians settle and reside in the United States? How do the immigrants negotiate their racial/ethnic identities? And finally, why do the immigrants re-

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main largely invisible as a racial/ethnic group? Our goal is to understand why racial/ethnic identities and settlement patterns matter, and how these characteristics influence the immigrant adaptation process.

ASIAN-INDIAN IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES Like many other racial/ethnic groups in the U.S., Asian-Indian immigrants have been subject to America’s xenophobia, immigration quotas, partisan politics, and/or economic and technical needs. There were few Asian-Indian residents in the U.S. very early (1700s–1800s), but more continuous and steady flows of migration have occurred for the last one hundred years at varying speeds and intensities (Lal, 1999). In 1907, in Bellingham, Washington, a group of Asian Indians were the target of racial riots. During this time the Asiatic Exclusion League tried to inhibit Indian immigration to the States. By 1913, supporters of India’s struggle for independence, primarily Indian students, came into view in the Western United States, especially California, where we still see large populations of Asians today, particularly Asian Indians. Then, the Immigration Act of 1917 disallowed any and all Asians from entering the United States. The court battle US vs. Bhagat Singh Thind in 1923, established a further deterrent to Asian-Indian immigration, stating that Asian Indians were not “white” and could not be naturalized citizens. The historical experience of Asian-Indian immigrants in the U.S. demonstrates the power of the racialization process in creating and sustaining racial categories and racial hierarchies. When they first arrived on American shores in the mid-19th century, Asian Indian labor migrants encountered both de facto and de jure racial discrimination. The combination of social tensions and economic competition provoked much hatred toward this group. Exclusionary national immigration and naturalization laws and restrictive state legislation on marriage, landholding, and voting reflected this prejudice (Juergensmeyer, 1982; Jensen, 1988). These discriminatory regulations, along with prohibitive social practices, determined that Asian Indians would be cast as racialized minorities in American society well into the 20th century. Classified as non-whites, the group was barred from becoming naturalized U.S. citizens and they experienced continuous socioeconomic inequity. The exclusionary era resulted in declining Asian-Indian immigration and population, extreme sex ratio imbalances, limited occupation choices, and forced spatial segregation in isolated communities (Leonard, 1992; Lee, 2003). Indeed, the 1940 Census saw a dramatic decrease in the number of Asian Indians living in America because of the government’s exclusionary laws. It was only during World War II, with the implementation of the Luce-Celler Bill (when India became a war ally of the U.S.) that Asian-Indian residents were granted the right for naturalized citizenship (Takaki, 1998). Between 1946 and 1965 just over 9,000 Asian Indians received citizenship (Jensen, 1988). The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 opened the way for immigration to the United States by allowing the yearly entry of 20,000 migrants from each country (Frazier, Margai, and Tettey-Fio, 2003). This prompted new emigration from India to the United States. During the last twenty years Asian-Indian immigration to the United States has increased at dramatic rates. Bouvier and Agresta (1993) are noted for their population projections for Asian and Pacific Islanders. In 1980, the estimated population for all Asian-American categories was 3,466,000. Of that 3.5 million, only 387,223 or 11.2 percent were Asian Indian. By 1990, the Asian-Indian population had nearly doubled in size to a population of 684,339. They projected that the 2000 Indian population would be around 1 million. However, the 2000 Census provides evidence that the population of Asian Indians in the U.S. far exceeded Bouvier and Agresta’s previous projections. According to The Asian Population: 2000: Census 2000 Brief, 1,899,599 respondents reported Asian Indian alone or in any combination on the 2000 Census race question. Thus, Asian Indians represent a significant racial/ethnic group within the United States that continues to grow. Indeed, as a result of liberal U.S. immigration policy, India is now the second largest source country of U.S. immigrants, just after Mexico. Nearly two-thirds (more than 65%) of Asian-Indian immigrants in the U.S. arrived between 1990 and 2000 (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2000a).

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SETTLEMENT PATTERNS OF ASIAN-INDIAN IMMIGRANTS Settlement patterns continually need to be readdressed because of newly arriving immigrants, people’s mobility, changing social capital, and time-sensitive motivations for changing residences. To explore the issue of Asian-Indian settlement patterns in the United States in 2000, it is necessary to describe Asian Indians and their spatial arrangements on a variety of scales with several different indicators. Here, we provide a snapshot of Asian-Indian settlement patterns utilizing the 2000 Census of Population. Several telling facts emerge in the results of Asian-Indian settlement. First, the largest percentage of the Asian-Indian population lives in the Middle Atlantic States that encompass New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Such a large percentage in this region is not unexpected; the area is a large gateway to the U.S., and a haven for immigrants. Indeed, the area absorbed a large number of Indian immigrant medical professionals in the late 1960s and early 1970s, resulting in a high concentration of Asian-Indian immigrants in this region (Sheth, 1995). Particularly, the urban portions of New York and New Jersey continue to be primary magnets for Asian-Indian settlement, because these areas provide a variety of opportunities for incoming migrants employed in health, educational, and service occupations (Kalita, 2003). With the expansion of the information technology industry in the U.S. economy, new areas emerge as the latest destinations for Indian immigrants. The Pacific region, which includes Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, and Hawaii, has experienced intense growth. California, especially, led all states in 1990 and 2000, where the population now numbers more than 350,000. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service data on immigrants’ state of intended residence for 1991–1998 indicates that over 20 percent of Asian-Indian immigrants reported that they intended to stay in California, suggesting that California has replaced New York and New Jersey as the principal area for new immigrant settlement (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2000a). It appears that employment opportunities play an important role in determining settlement patterns for this immigrant group (Kanjanapan, 1990). In addition to the relative dispersion at the regional level, the state level analysis reveals an even more obvious pattern of dispersal. Figure 23.1 displays key states of Asian-Indian settlement. This visualization illustrates the bi-coastal nature of Asian Indian settlement, with the majority of the population either living in New York or California. Smaller numbers of Asian Indians live in Texas, Illinois, and Michigan. Figure 23.1 Asian Indians in the United States, 2000.

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Emily H. Skop and Claire E. Altman Table 23.1 Metropolitan Areas with More than 10,000 Asian Indians in 2000

Metropolitan Area

Population Size

Metropolitan Area

Population Size

New York

453,896

Sacramento

21,366

San Francisco

158,396

Minneapolis / St. Paul

17,187

Chicago

125,208

Orlando

15,138

Los Angeles

121,745

Cleveland

14,026

Washington DC

98,179

Phoenix

13,136

Houston

57,158

Tampa

12,446

Philadelphia

57,124

San Diego

12,145

Dallas / Fort Worth

53,975

Raleigh / Durham / Chapel Hill

11,849

Detroit

49,879

Austin

11,837

Boston

48,188

Columbus

10,571

Atlanta

40,381

Portland

10,391

Miami

29,247

Denver

10,376

Seattle

24,010

Fresno

10,111

Total of Cities Above

1,487,965

Source: US Bureau of the Census. 2000. 2000 Census of Population. Summary Tape File 2-C. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office.

When we move the scale downward to the metropolitan level, we discover that Asian Indians tend to primarily live in very populous metropolitan areas. All of the top 26 metro areas for Asian Indians have over 10,000 Indians. These 26 metropolitan areas contain more than 78 percent of the entire Asian-Indian population residing in the United States. Table 23.1 illustrates some important emerging and expanding metro areas that may not commonly be thought of as immigrant destinations, particularly for Asian Indians. For example, ten years ago Tampa, Raleigh/Durham/Chapel Hill, Austin, Columbus, Portland, and Denver were not significant metropolitan areas in terms of their Indian populations. But today, each of these cities is home to more than 10,000 Asian Indians. Indeed, places like Austin, Texas and Phoenix, Arizona have experienced dramatic increases in their Asian-Indian population since 1980; while Asian Indians numbered less than 1500 in both cities in 1980, today Austin and Phoenix are home to over 11,000 Asian Indians (Skop and Li, 2006). Finally, it is a fact that Asian Indians do not settle in patterns of extensive clusterings within various metropolitan areas, except for the notable examples of residential enclaves in New York City, Northern New Jersey, and Chicago, as well as around universities with large Asian-Indian populations (Skop, 2002). Indeed, empirical studies have increasingly documented the suburban-bound trend of contemporary Asian-Indian immigrants in the United States (Allen and Turner, 1996; Zelinsky and Lee, 1998; Alba et al., 1999; Singer, Friedman, and Price, 2001; Clark, 2003; Skop and Li, 2003). This pattern of suburban settlement has been especially recognized since the release of 2000 census data (Logan, 2001; Allen and Turner, 2002; Barnes and Bennett, 2002; Logan, Alba, and Zhang, 2002; Tolbert, 2002; Fan, 2003). Results illustrate that newly-arrived immi-

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grants do not consider the often crowded and run down neighborhoods in central cities as places to reside. Many have the financial resources to afford the newer houses, nicer neighborhoods, and better schools that suburbs typically offer. Consequently, increasing numbers of Asian-Indian newcomers settle directly in the suburbs without ever having experienced living in a centralized ethnic enclave.

ASIAN-INDIAN RACIAL/ETHNIC IDENTITY FORMATION Despite the absence of recognizable, visible racial/ethnic communities, many Asian-Indian newcomers celebrate their emerging and (re)emerging racial/ethnic identities through social and religious gatherings. Here we discuss two ways in which Asian Indians (re) create and maintain a sense of cohesion and solidarity, without being spatially near other Asian Indians. Some of the immigrants sell cultural products or goods that are reminiscent of home, while others use the Internet to keep in touch with their community (both abroad and at home). Commercial spaces are significant symbolic and material markers of race/ethnicity in urban landscapes. As Lee (1992) suggests in her research on Korean small businesses in the Los Angeles area, there are many immigrants who “appropriate ethnicity as an element to sell for economic survival” (Lee, 1992, p. 264). The “ethnic-ness” offered to clients is often staged and packaged for their consumption (Helzer, 2001). Indeed, restaurants, grocery stores, and specialty stores are often intentionally contrived with the bottom-line in mind. In this manner, a process of commodification occurs — whereby racial/ethnic identities come to be treated as a product (Anderson, 1991; Lin, 1998; Walton-Roberts, 1998; and Chang, 2000). This commodification of race/ethnicity, which Figure 23.2 illustrates, encourages the racial/ethnic business community to reproduce racial/ethnic identities in profitable ways to attract clientele. That “Indian-ness” is a product that possesses a quality that consumers’ desire is the result of a variety of complex factors. In one way, racial/ethnic businesses cater specifically to Asian-Indian clientele. They provide a venue in which immigrants can gather together, buy ethnically distinctive products they cannot find elsewhere, and at the same time, simulate “home.” In another way, many Asian-Indian commercial spaces offer a kind of “ethnic tourism” for individuals looking for a diversion from the homogeneity of franchise restaurants and grocery stores (Hoelscher, 1998, p. 185). For that reason, some business owners keep non-Indian customers in mind as they (re)construct particular visions of “Indian” ethnicity. This process of commodification has become an increasingly recognized trend in which “people’s actions and experiences as consumers have an increasingly formative role to play in maintaining social life” (Miles and Paddison, 1998, p. 815). Figure 23.2 One of the many stores in Phoenix that sells cultural goods from India. Photo by first author.

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Another method of identity re-formation is through the creation of Internet spaces for Asian Indians. In cyberspace, the immigrants can gather together and affirm their racial/ethnic identities (Adams and Ghose, 2003; Adams and Skop, n.d.). As Figure 23.3 demonstrates, the Internet, web and news groups, and regular communication through e-mail, help immigrants in the U.S. to create virtual spaces of interaction with their home communities. Interestingly, the Internet is creating alternative communication linkages in the 21st century that supplement print journalism, television, radio, and other media. These Internet linkages allow virtually instantaneous interaction across great distances, the archiving and sharing of images and text, and up-to-date coordination of activities, all of which have been put to use by Asian-Indian immigrants in the United States. Indeed, many immigrants from India, whose affluence and technological skills have favored computer use and networking, are perhaps the most prolific group of immigrants to use cyberspace to recreate a sense of community. Many immigrants (and their children) utilize the Internet for a variety of purposes, including organizing religious and social events, acquiring specialty goods and services, obtaining news and information from India, and developing a base of political and economic support for local and at-home events. Users are split across various social divides: age, gender, place of origin within India, and attitudinal disposition (traditional versus nontraditional). Migration-specific variables, like time of arrival in the United States, also affect Internet use. Even as the Indian community becomes spatially distributed throughout many parts of the United States, its members are dependent to greater or lesser degrees on their local social environments for interaction. The Internet provides a means of building local community, on the one hand, and an alternative to local community, on the other. The Internet also becomes a tool for maintaining ties with homeland communities and for forging ethnically- and culturally-defined social ties and personal identities in the United States (Adams and Skop, n.d.). Figure 23.3 A popular website that links members of the Indian Diaspora across the globe. Source: Screen capture by first author.

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CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF INVISIBILITY FOR ASIAN INDIANS As the population of Asian Indians begins to burgeon in the U.S. at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, so too has academic interest in Asian-Indian history, culture, migration, social capital, and settlement patterns. Interestingly, the overwhelming theme in the literature on Asian Indians is their “invisibility” (Xenos, Barringer, and Levin, 1989; Skop, 2002). The imperceptibility of Indians takes place at all levels from the international to the neighborhood scale. Dubey (2003) was the first to point out that despite the magnitude of the global Indian diaspora, Indians are not highly visible. He reports that by the early 21st century, approximately 20 million People of Indian Origin (PIO) were living outside the political boundaries of India, but that this is a little known fact. And Kotkin (1993) also notes how “oblivious” most individuals are to the enormity of the global Indian Diaspora. Kim (2001), too, points out that, despite the fact that nearly two million Asian Indians live in the United States, there is a notable lack of coverage of the group in the national press. As a result, Asian Indians are often characterized as the “unnoticed minority” (Tinker, 1977, p. 195) and the “Invisible Americans” (Kar, 1995/1996). While a variety of explanations has been proposed, four arguments stand out to account for this “invisibility”: the immigrants’ passivity, their heterogeneity, their calculating maneuvering, and their geography of settlement. In part, “invisibility” results from the passivity and apathy of the individual Asian-Indian immigrant. In “Invisible Americans,” Kar (1995/1996) claims that by being “politically rather inactive … they became lost within the vast expanse of the American mass society; they became functionally invisible as a separate ethnic group” (Kar, 1995/1996, p. 29). Asian-Indian leaders worry about the impact of their community in broader U.S. society. Manoranjan Dutta articulates this concern as a key leader in the movement to make “Asian Indian” a category in the 1980 U.S. Census: “Asian Indian Americans have yet to make their presence known in American public life” (Dutta, 1982, p. 79). Other leaders of pan-Indian organizations argue that “a strong and broad-based politically active ‘Asian Indian’ association is necessary if Indians are ever to become an ethnic group with any power in this country” (Fisher, 1980, p. 191). But without political urgency or economic need for empowerment, Asian Indians tend to maintain the status quo and remain “invisible” (Shankar, 1998a). The overall success of Asian-Indian immigrants discourages visibility — and their continued climb up the socioeconomic ladder indicates that this apathy is unlikely to disappear. For most immigrants, economic security is their highest priority, augmented by the strong sense of responsibility that Asian Indians feel towards their families. This leads to another rationalization for why Asian Indians are detached from social, civic, and political activity in the U.S. — the immigrant’s general distaste for politics and volunteerism (Agarwal, 1991, p. 73). “The middle passage for desis (those of South Asian cultures) is comfortable and even profitable” (Prashad, 2000, p. 82). The impetus to get involved and get noticed by the American political system just is not sufficiently compelling for many Asian-Indian immigrants. Diversity has also been proposed as a second potential cause for the “invisibility” of Asian-Indian immigrants (Lowe, 1996; Mitra, 1996; Shankar, 1998b; and Davé et al., 2000) “To understand anything about India, one must come to terms with its defining, and some say dooming characteristic: diversity. This diversity analogously impedes the formation of a South Asian American panethnic identity” (Davé et al., 2000, p. 73). Most Asian Indians identify with their region first and nation second. Lacking cultural homogeneity discourages solidarity, and thus visibility in the U.S. polity. Class diversity also creates friction and distrust among Asian Indians, with lower-class participants feeling shortchanged and excluded by upper-class constructions of “Indian-ness.” Moreover, generational differences ensure a fundamental divide within the community — the types of issues concerning first-generation adults typically disengage their second-generation children. Clashing sets of regional, linguistic, religious, class, and generational interests deepen cleavages among Asian-Indian immigrants, lessening the ability of Pan-Asian Indian identities to work, and thus, Asian-Indian “visibility” to emerge. Thirdly, there are those that argue that “invisibility” is a racial strategy — to avoid self-identification by skin color or race (Varma, 1980; Kibria, 1998; George, 1997; and Morning, 2001). This calculated maneuvering of individuals is an attempt to avoid becoming racialized by the mainstream, native-born, non-Hispanic white

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majority. In other words, a favorable impression of the community as the “model minority” triggers the AsianIndian immigrant’s wish to remain “invisible” in the eyes of the native-born, non-Hispanic white American mainstream. At the same time, Varma (1980) suggests that a significant proportion of Asian Indians “fear a backlash” if they become involved in racial politics (Varma, 1980, p. 35). Nationwide campaigns seeking to discredit race-oriented social programs and affirmative action agendas have secured a prominent place in today’s political milieu. By staying “invisible,” Asian-Indian immigrants become racially undefined — and more importantly, not labeled Black, “Oriental,” or Latino (Morning, 2001, p. 65). “The desire to hold onto whiteness if only in ambiguous denial” (George, 1997, p. 42) allows Asian Indians to remain simultaneously privileged and unmarked. There is a fourth reason for the invisibility of Asian Indians in the U.S. (Skop, 2002). We argue that the immigrants’ geography plays a critical role in the racialization process. In other words, we contend that the general absence of racial/ethnic clustering by Asian-Indian immigrants in particular neighborhoods and communities discourages the immigrants (and their leaders) from articulating their interests in a collective voice. The lack of spatial propinquity and proximity reinforces Asian-Indian invisibility. Whereas many other Asian, European, and Latin American/Caribbean immigrant groups establish commercial and residential ethnic enclaves like “Chinatown,” “Little Italy,” or “Little Havana,” Asian Indians rarely construct “Little Indias” in American cities (Skop and Li, 2003). Because racial/ethnic landscapes reinforce social categories (i.e., racial/ethnic identities), when the visible markers are taken away, the social category becomes less readily constructed. Suburban America was once the citadel of native-born, non-Hispanic whites (Marcuse, 1997), but we now see many Asian Indians living in the suburbs (especially when we compare those living in the suburbs versus those residing in the central city). Zelinsky (2001) describes this phenomenon very well: “… there is the possibility that an ethnic community can exist without any significant clustering, that is, when the members of a particular group are scattered throughout a city, metropolitan area, or some larger spatial domain. Thus extreme and instant dispersion characterizes recently arrived Asian Indians. Their homes are scattered throughout the suburban reaches of the metropolitan area with only moderate tendencies toward a loose sort of clustering” (Zelinsky, 2001, p. 134).

Thus, as a result of living, working, and socializing in the suburban spaces and suburban places associated with “whiteness,” Asian-Indian immigrants have reinforced their invisible status within the larger sociopolitical community (Skop, n.d.). In many ways, this research reinforces the theme of invisibility experienced by Asian Indians living in the United States. While it is easy to capture their broad settlement patterns, either at the regional, state, or metropolitan scale, it proves more difficult to identify the ways in which the immigrants (re) create their racial/ethnic identities, and thus, how they adjust to living in the U.S. One thing is certain, as the newcomers have become settled within American mass society, they have simultaneously become largely invisible as a separate racial/ethnic group. What remains to be seen are the implications of this invisibility for both the immigrants and their children, especially given the resilience of the U.S. racial/ethnic hierarchy.

Part V Diversity, Culture, and Place Previous chapters provided examples of increasing ethnic diversity among U.S. minority populations, expressions of culture and the issues they create, and the creation and re-creation of geographic spaces and places. This final section pursues the interrelationships between these topics. Chapter 24 examines the relationship of land to American-Indian identity. It reports efforts by tribes to reclaim ancestral lands as a symbol of group identity but also considers the interrelation between land and sovereignty, and between economic development and cultural sustainability. The next two chapters remind us of the continued importance of Europeans to American ethnic diversity. Chapter 25 explores “whiteness” in a unique way, by examining its spatial and socioeconomic basis in Portland, Oregon. It illustrates how white identities have been re-created among Russian and Ukranian immigrant refugees for a unique purpose, to share in the resources provided needy minority populations. In the process, the chapter explores relationships between social institutions, shifting ethnic identities, and the geographic patterns of these recent immigrants. Greek-Americans came to the U.S. in substantial numbers during different immigration waves and settled in “Greek Towns” of some large inner cities. These visible ethnic enclaves were evidence of a GreekAmerican presence that centered on the cultural triad of language, family and church. American suburbanization contributed to the decline of Greek Towns, as the younger, educated, and affluent Greek-Americans became part of white flight. Chapter 26 examines challenges to Greek-American ethnic traditions posed by suburbanization. In doing so, it reveals the persistence of particular cultural traits that continue to define Greek-American ethnicity for multiple-age cohorts at the beginning of the 21st century. As the number of foreign-born increased after the 1965 Hart-Celler Act, particular gateway states and their cities gained a disproportionate number of immigrants. New Jersey is one example, and Chapter 27 explains the disparities of economic status among native-born and foreign-born in a case study of Paterson. It illustrates that factors other than educational attainment explain economic disparities in this increasingly ethnically diverse city. Ethnic diversity also has reached the American Heartland, both in rural and urban areas. Chapter 28 uses Louisville, Kentucky to illustrate this process. It focuses on the characteristics of that city’s highly diverse foreign-born population, including the diversity within major groups, such as Asian Americans. It also stresses landscape changes and immigrant trajectories toward middle-class status. This text closes by examining one of America’s greatest dilemmas, racial and ethnic disparities in U.S. health and health care. Chapter 29 describes health inequalities within a geographic framework for the major U.S. ethnic groups and illustrates the unique health problems of each group. It also briefly examines health intervention strategies.

Chapter 24

Cultural and Economic Change in Indian Country EDMUND J. ZOLNIK INTRODUCTION Signs of American Indian culture have never been more evident than in the first half of the first decade of the 21st century. The grand opening of the Smithsonian Institution National Museum of the American Indian (NMAI) on September 21st, 2004 in Washington, D.C. reflects the greater national visibility of American Indian culture (Figure 24.1). As the first exclusively Native-American museum in the world, the NMAI showcases the history and culture of more than a thousand tribal and indigenous groups from North, Middle and South America (National Museum of the American Indian, 2005a). Approximately 25,000 Native Americans from more than 500 tribes from Alaska to Chile — one of the largest Native American celebrations in modern history — were participants in the Native Nations Procession to kick off the First Americans Festival. In the first week of operation, patronage at the NMAI was more than 100,000 and the two museum stores set a Smithsonian record of more than $1 million in sales. The NMAI rests on the last open space on the National Mall between the Smithsonian Institution National Air and Space Museum and the United States Capitol (National Museum of the American Indian, 2005b). Native American symbols were integral to the design of the NMAI especially the eastward orientation of the entrance to capture rays of the sun at dawn as well as via a prism window and an atrium. The NMAI features three permanent exhibitions and one temporary art gallery as well as demonstrations, films, music and dance. The three permanent exhibitions known as “Our Universes,” “Our Peoples,” and “Our Lives” reflect three main exhibit themes — philosophy, history and identity — to facilitate the rotation of exhibitions from other tribes and indigenous groups into the NMAI. The permanent exhibition of “Our Lives,” also known as “Our Lives: Contemporary Life and Identities,” examines the question of Native-American identity in the 21st century. One common theme in the academic literature on American-Indian identity is that of land. As per Deloria, “certain lands are given to certain peoples. It is these peoples only who can flourish, thrive, and survive on the land” (1988, p. 177). Deloria continues to assert the culture of a people is a function of their homeland. But to sustain a culture, a people must retain or reclaim the land so as to create a viable “economic reality” (p. 179). The Meriam Report, a publication from the Brookings Institute on the condition of Indian Country in 1928, articulates the synergy between the cultural and the economic reality for American Indians: “The economic basis of the primitive culture of the Indians has been largely destroyed by the encroachment of white civilization. The Indians can no longer make a living as they did in the past.... This advancing tide of white civilization has as a rule largely destroyed the economic foundation upon which the Indian culture rested” (Meriam, 1928, pp. 6, 87). In sum, cultural sustainability is a function of economic viability, the basis of which is the land. To understand the changes in Indian Country since the last decade of the 20th century, one must examine the past cultural and economic reality of American Indians who continue to struggle to retain and reclaim their ancestral lands. The thesis of this chapter is the role of the land in the cultural identity of American Indians. Present efforts by tribes across the United States to retain and reclaim ancestral lands are a sign of the significance of the land to group identity. Furthermore, development on tribal lands is a symbol of the advancement of the eco-

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nomic reality of American Indians. Three themes are most relevant to the examination of the synergy between the cultural and the economic reality of American Indians. First, retention and reclamation of ancestral lands is the foundation of American-Indian sovereignty. The movement towards greater independence of tribal governments across the United States is the catalyst for the economic development in Indian Country. Second, economic development is the crux of the cultural sustainability of tribes. And third, Indian gaming (gambling operations) is not the only economic development strategy in Indian Country; just as Indian culture is not homogeneous, neither is the economy. Figure 24.1 National Museum of the American Indian Opening on the Mall. Smithsonian Institution Photo No. 2004-53063.

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HISTORY OF THE INDIAN PROBLEM Among all of the ethnic groups in the United States, American Indians are unique in their relationship to their ancestral lands, perhaps with the exception of native Hawaiian culture. While the study of other minority groups requires a discussion of immigration and/or settlement patterns, American Indians are the only group for whom a discussion of dispossession and relocation are more appropriate. The history of displacement in Indian Country reflects the past and present struggles of tribes and indigenous groups to reclaim and retain homelands, the possession of which no treaty could guarantee (Deloria, 1974). Beyond the struggle for their ancestral lands, American-Indian cultural renewal is all the more impressive given the legacy of ignorance of past and present occupants of the Americas. The very label Indian was and is a misnomer. Europeans did not discover a new route to India. Another European misjudgment occurred in New England, a region of first contact and the region where the European influence has had the greatest effect on the cultural and economic reality of American Indians. In this case, Europeans misinterpreted the American Indians’ relationship with the land (Attaquin, 1990; Cronon, 1983). As subsistence agriculturalists, as well as hunters and gatherers, Indian settlements were often impermanent so as to minimize the ecological demands on any one site per season. Property was not the land, but whatever the land could offer the Indians to sustain life. To that end, Indian place names were often references to the best usage of the land so as to create a literal map of life-sustainable information. For example, with regard to Connecticut (“at the long tidal estuary”) place names, Mashantucket means “place of big trees,” Nipmuck means “fresh water fishing place,” and Podunk means “where you sink in mire, a boggy place, at the miry place, at the place where the foot sinks” (Masthay, 1990, pp. 13–14, 16). But colonists saw Indian mobility as a means to deny American-Indian claims to the land. To rationalize the consequent dispossession of the Indians from their ancestral lands, the colonists put forth a Eurocentric ideology of land tenure. To the colonists the only lands to which the Indians held title as property were those brought into agricultural cultivation, which the colonists considered improvements to the land; all other lands were thought vacant and therefore free for expropriation. To further dispossess American Indians from their ancestral lands, the colonists were able to purchase land from American Indians without respect for the sovereignty of their governments, but rather only the sovereignty of the English Crown. The differences in land use philosophy and in assumptions of sovereignty led to the colonial ideology of conquest of both the land and the people in the New World. The legacy of ignorance toward American-Indian sovereignty born in the initial decades of contact helps us to understand the cultural and economic struggles of American Indians. From the American Revolution, federal and state governments were unable to effectively address the Indian Problem: “the ‘proper,’ i.e., ethical or moralistic, policies and methods of treating a people who occupy lands that a nation claims for its own” (Goodman and Heffington, 2000, p. 52). The magnitude of the Indian Problem only grew with the perpetuation of the dominant European-American relationship to the lands of the New World known as Manifest Destiny (Public Broadcasting System, 2005). The term did not enter the American nationalistic vernacular until 1845 when John L. O’Sullivan wrote: “… the right of our manifest destiny to over spread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and federaltive development of self government entrusted to us. It is right such as that of the tree to the space of air and the earth suitable for the full expansion of its principle and destiny of growth” (Brinkley, 1995, p. 352).

However, the philosophy is illustrative of two important aspects of the differences between Indians and European-Americans with regard to rights and sovereignty. First, the allusion to “Providence” invokes a natural right to possess the land. Second, O’Sullivan articulates the rights of American self-government, but not the rights of Indian self-government. Therefore, the philosophy of Manifest Destiny was to supersede the references in the Constitution of the United States to the recognition of Indian sovereignty with regard to commerce. Specifically, it states: “Congress shall have the power to regulate Commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, and with the Indian tribes” (U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. VIII, Cl. 3). Further, Manifest Destiny was accepted to the point of overshadowing Indian rights to land and property in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787:

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“The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and, in their property, rights, and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity, shall from time to time be made for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them” (U.S. Congress, Northwest Ordinance of 1787, Art. 3).

To summarize, the impetus for American expansion west of the Ohio River and the Mississippi River was economic (Public Broadcasting System, 2005). Depressions in 1818 and 1839 as well as population pressures from birth rates and immigration were all push factors for westward expansion. Furthermore, the frontier of the West was rich in inexpensive or free land whose ownership was a font of economic and political wealth for Americans, but denoted displacement for Indians. So great was the demand for land, the Indian Removal Act of 1830 lead to the displacement of tribes to lands in the Louisiana Purchase (Wikipedia, 2005). Ultimately, the race across the Great Plains and Rocky Mountains was to create a new Indian Problem of peaceful displacement in lieu of war. The solution fell to President Ulysses S. Grant to create a “Peace Policy” to relocate Indians from ancestral lands to reservations. Not only were reservations to solve the new Indian Problem, but because religious, rather than government, representatives were to administer Indian services, reservations were to Christianize and ultimately then civilize Indians to prepare for assimilation and citizenship. Also, reservations were to preclude hunting and so force permanence and an agricultural economic reality upon Indians. Unfortunately, for those Indians who did accept relocation, reservation lands were often beyond cultivation and starvation was the grim reality. For those who did not accept relocation, the results were bloody wars between Indians and the United States such as the Sioux War with the Battle of Little Big Horn and the Nez Perce War. The bloodshed led President Rutherford B. Hayes to phase out the “Peace Policy” and withdraw religious representatives from Indian service. In 1887, symptomatic of a new reservation policy to civilize Indians, the Dawes, or General Allotment, Act also sought to appease the demand for Indian lands. Rather than grant a block of land to tribes, the Dawes Act was to grant parcels of land, or allotments, to the heads of Indian households so as to create “silent and peaceful” farmers (Deloria, 1974, p. 5). Because the total area of allotments was less than the area of the original reservations, the surplus was sold to non-Indians, the proceeds of which went to Indians. The failure of allotments to solve the Indian Problem was set out in the Meriam Report of 1928. In 1934, the Indian Reorganization Act led to the elimination of allotments as well as the recognition of the right for Indian self-government. Unfortunately, the allotment policy had had a disastrous effect on total Indian lands. Between 1887 and 1932, total Indian lands went from 140 million acres to 52 million acres: a decrease of 140 percent (Goodman and Heffington, 2000). The Employment Assistance Program of 1952 was the next generation of Indian policy to force assimilation via the termination of reservations. If reservations as places were not economically prosperous, it was considered that perhaps relocation of Indians to places such as urban areas with greater opportunity for employment would improve the Indian condition. But the passage of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 was another sign of the perpetual shifts in policy toward the intransigent Indian Problem. Rather than force assimilation via termination of reservations, recognition of Indians as stakeholders in the cultural and economic reality of Indian Country was the new policy. The cases of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1983) and California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) further clarified the parameters of economic self-determination in Indian Country. In both cases, the courts recognized the rights of Indian tribes to establish and operate gaming venues on their reservations in states where gaming was legal.

INDIAN COUNTRY In 2000, the total number of American Indians and Alaska Natives was 2,475,956 — only 0.9 percent of the total population of the United States (Ogunwole, 2002). In fact, since 1890, the first census year to attempt a

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total enumeration of American Indians, the American-Indian percentage of the total United States population has never been more than 1.0 percent (Gibson and Jung, 2002). As a departure from previous census years, the Census 2000 questionnaire was the first to allow respondents to report one or more races for themselves and other household members. The race in combination population for American Indians of 4,119,301, or 1.5 percent of the total United States population, is further indication of the trend for Americans to embrace their Indian ancestry. Furthermore, the percentage increase between 1990 and 2000 was a minimum of 26.4 percent for the American Indian and Alaska-Native (alone) population — more than twice the percentage increase for the total United States population of 13.2 percent — or a maximum of 110.3 percent for the American Indian and Alaska Native in combination population. Given that the percentage increases in American-Indian and AlaskaNative populations are not due to the rate of natural increase — birth rates minus death rates for American Indians and Alaska Natives — the data highlight greater American-Indian self-identification (Hayden, 2004). As for the geographic distribution of the American-Indian and Alaska-Native alone or in combination population in 2000, that is, respondents who self-identify as American Indian, the majority (43.0 percent) resides in the West region, while the minority (9.1 percent) resides in the Northeast region. California is the state with the largest number of American-Indian and Alaska-Native alone or in combination population at 627,562, but the state with the largest percentage of American-Indian and Alaska-Native (AIAN) alone or in combination population is Alaska at 19.0 percent (Figure 24.2). Fully 41.6 percent of the American-Indian and Alaska-Native alone or in combination population in the United States resides in five states in the West region: California (15.2 percent); Oklahoma (9.5 percent); Arizona (7.1 percent); Texas (5.2 percent); and New Mexico (4.6 percent) — consistent with the 1990 state distribution (Goodman and Heffington, 2000). Like the general United States population, the American-Indian and Alaska-Native alone or in combination population is more urban than rural. Seventy-nine percent of the general United States population resides in urban areas, while 68.5 percent of the American-Indian and Alaska-Native alone or in combination population resides in urban areas (United States Bureau of the Census, 2005a; United States Bureau of the Census, 2005b). But while the balance of the state distribution is to the west, among urban places in the United States with 100,000 or more population, New York City and Chicago rank first (87,241) and eighth (20,898) as homes to the largest American-Indian and AlaskaNative alone or in combination populations. Presently, Indian Country consists of 562 tribes with federal recognition (Bureau of Indian Affairs, 2005). The Census 2000 geography divides Indian Country via legal and statistical definitions (United States Bureau of the Census, 2005c). The legal definitions include American Indian Reservations and American Indian Off-Reservation Trust Lands, as well as tribal subdivisions of reservations and off-reservation lands known as state American Indian Reservations, Alaska Native Regional Corporations (ANRC) and Hawaiian Home Lands (HHL). The statistical divisions include Alaska Native Village Statistical Areas (ANVSA), Oklahoma Tribal Statistical Areas (OTSA), Tribal Designated Statistical Areas (TDSA) and State Designated American Indian Statistical Areas (SDAISA). Census 2000 indicates the most populous Reservation and Off-Reservation Trust Land is the Navajo Nation in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah at 175,228. In addition to data on respondents who identify more than one race besides American Indian and Alaska Native, Census 2000 also asks respondents to provide the name of their tribal enrollment or principal tribe. The largest tribal group alone or in combination is the Cherokee at 729,533, while the largest tribal group alone is the Navajo at 298,197.

ECONOMIC CHANGE IN INDIAN COUNTRY Data on the economic reality of Indian Country from Census 2000 indicates the employment status and the income of the American Indian and Alaska Native (alone) population is lower than for all races in the United States. The unemployment rate for American Indians is twice that for all races, while the median household and per capita incomes for all races are 37.2 percent and 67.4 percent greater than for American Indians (Table 24.1). Further, the family and individual below the poverty level percentages were more than twice as great for American Indians in 1999. Also, the mean public assistance income was $206 greater for American Indians than

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for all races in 1999. The sectoral distributions of American Indian employment as well as the classes of the American Indian worker help to understand the present economic gap in Indian Country. American Indian occupations tend toward primary (farming, fishing and forestry), secondary (production, transportation and material Figure 24.2 States with the Largest AIAN Alone or In Combination Population and Percentage: 2000.

moving), and tertiary (service) sectors of employment that require fewer skills and lower educational attainment, and thus are not as lucrative or secure as quaternary (management, professional and related) sector employment. Further, as a legacy of the economic dependence of American Indians on government for employment, the percentage of government employment for American Indians is 7.5 points greater than for all races and the percentage of self-employed workers amongst American Indians is 1.1 points less than for all races. But while the overall economic reality in Indian Country is one of low-employment status and low income in comparison to all races, the trend in the data from the 1997 Economic Census on economic selfsufficiency is positive. An indication of the greater entrepreneurship in Indian Country is the growth in the number of American Indian- and Alaska Native-owned businesses (United States Bureau of the Census, 2001). Between 1992 and 1997, the number of American Indian- and Alaska Native-owned businesses grew by 83.7 percent; 12.3 times the percentage increase for all United States businesses of 6.8 percent, while receipts rose by 178.5 percent; 4.4 times the percentage increase for all United States businesses of 40.2 percent. California was home to the largest number of American Indian- and Alaska Native-owned businesses, while Alaska was home to the largest proportion of American Indian- and Alaska Native-owned businesses. Furthermore, the geographic distribution of American Indian- and Alaska Native-owned businesses by state and metropolitan area indicates that the greatest proportion are in states west of the Mississippi River and in nonmetropolitan areas. Average

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receipts for American Indian- and Alaska Native-owned businesses were $174,100 in 1997 and the largest numbers were in the service and construction industry. Part of the explanation for the greater entrepreneurship of Native Americans and Alaska Natives has been the increase in access to small business loans from the Small Business Administration (SBA) since 1990 (United States Bureau of the Census, 2005d). The percentage increase in the number of SBA minority loans was 16.0 percent between 1990 and 2003. Over the same time period, the number of SBA minority loans to American Indians was 9.3 times greater; more than for any other minority group and the aggregate amount of SBA minority loans to American Indians was 8.4 times greater; second only to the Asian-American minority group at 8.7 times greater. But business capital is not universally accessible in Indian Country. The Pine Ridge Chamber of Commerce — the only Chamber of Commerce in the United States on an Indian reservation — recently set a goal to establish a $10 million pool known as the Lakota Fund to help present and future entrepreneurs on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota where unemployment estimates are 80 percent (Melmer, 2005). Entrepreneurship is especially important to battle the pernicious triad of unemployment, school dropouts, and “brain drain” (those of high intellect leave) in Indian Country (Smith, 2000). Chronic unemployment due to a shortage of employment opportunity on Indian lands decreases the incentive to attain a high school or equivalency diploma education, while those who attain a postsecondary education often must migrate from their homelands to areas with greater employment opportunity — particularly urban areas. The barriers encountered by American-Indian and Alaska-Native entrepreneurs, such as access to capital, infrastructure and labor to start and operate new businesses, can be mitigated by Indian strategies. Further, “unlearning the supposed fact that Indians cannot be entrepreneurial because of the communal nature of Indian societies creates the potential for growth” in Indian Country (Smith, 2000, p. 141). Table 24.1 Economic Profile of the AIAN Alone Population: 2000 Race

Subject Category Employment Status (Population 16 Years and Over) Employed Unemployed Occupation Management, Professional and Related Service Sales and Office Farming, Fishing and Forestry Construction, Extraction and Maintenance Production, Transportation and Material Moving Class of Worker Private Wage and Salary Government Self-Employed in Own Not Incorporated Business Unpaid Family Income: 1999 (Dollars) Median Household Income Mean Public Assistance Income Per Capita Income Poverty Status: 1999 (Below Poverty Level) Family Individual

All (%)

AIAN (%)

59.7 3.7

53.0 7.5

33.6 14.9 26.7 0.7 9.4 14.6

24.3 20.6 24.0 1.3 12.9 16.8

78.5 14.6 6.6 0.3

72.0 22.1 5.5 0.3

41,994 3,032 21,587

30,599 3,238 12,893

9.2 12.4

21.8 25.7

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But while entrepreneurship in Indian Country is on the rise, by far the most successful economic enterprise in Indian Country is tribal government gaming (National Indian Gaming Association, 2005). Following the recognition of tribal rights to operate gaming venues in Cabazon, the enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) of 1988 set the parameters for the use of tribal government gaming revenues “to promote [t]ribal economic development, [t]ribal self-sufficiency and strong [t]ribal government” (National Indian Gaming Association, 2005, p. 6). According to the National Indian Gaming Association (2005), 223 tribes in 28 states presently operate 411 Indian gaming venues. In 2004, Indian gaming brought in $18.5 billion in gross tribal government revenues to Indian Country — 10.8 percent more than in 2003 — with an additional $2.5 billion in gross revenues from ancillary businesses. An analysis of how the 168 member tribes of the National Indian Gaming Association spent the revenues from Indian gaming in 2003 reveals the majority went towards education, child/elder care, cultural preservation, and charity, (20%), as well as economic development (19%). As an example of the cultural and philanthropic uses of Indian gaming revenues, tribes were able to donate more than $35 million to the construction of the NMAI. Contrary to common perceptions, gaming is but one of the reasons for the economic development in Indian Country. Taylor and Kalt (2005) report improvements in the economic status of gaming and non-gaming reservations between 1990 and 2000. For example, real per capita income was up 36 percent on gaming reservations and 21 percent on non-gaming reservations, while real per capita income was up only 11 percent overall in the United States. Likewise, family poverty was down 11.8 points on gaming reservations and 8.1 points on non-gaming reservations, while family poverty was only down 0.8 points overall in the United States. Taylor and Kalt (2005) attribute such economic progress, especially among non-gaming tribes, to the policy of Indian self-government. To return to the main thesis of the chapter, Indian self-government is only possible for tribes with a land base. To that end, the reclamation and retention of a land base is the key to tribal economic viability and cultural sustainability. To further explore the relationship between land and tribal viability, the next section presents a case study regarding the past and present struggles of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation of Connecticut to reclaim and retain a land base.

MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION The success of the Foxwoods gaming and tourism venues which the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation operates is well-known (Carstensen et al., 2000; d’Hauteserre, 1998; d’Hauteserre, 2000; Eisler, 2001; Pasquaretta, 2003). But what is less well-known is the cultural renewal of Pequots as well as for Indians throughout North America due to the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation gaming and tourism revenues. The Mashantucket Pequot Ethnohistory Project to reconstruct Pequot history and culture, as well as the Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center (a resource for scholars of American and Canadian Native history and culture as well as for an annual average of 250,000 patrons), are signs of greater regional visibility of American Indian culture (McBride, 1987; Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center, 2005a). Furthermore, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation hosts the Feast of Green Corn and Dance, known as Schemitzun (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, 2005). The annual powwow includes: the World Championship of Dance and Song with over 3,000 participants from North America, the Schemitzun Indian Marketplace with over 100 Native American artists, and a rodeo. Clearly, the Mashantucket Pequot American Indian Reservation and Off-Reservation Trust Lands are, and will continue to be, a regional, national, and international hub of American-Indian culture. But the cultural and economic success of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation would not be a reality without past and present struggles to reclaim and retain the ancestral lands of the Pequots. In 1666, a land grant from the Connecticut colony left the Pequots with a land base of 3,000 acres (Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center, 2005b). But by 1855, the land base was only 989 acres. The State of Connecticut then sold all but 214 acres to help the tribe survive financially. Questions as to the right of the State of Connecticut to sell Pequot land, albeit for economic benefit (in conflict with the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, which was to preclude the sale of Indian lands without prior approval from the federal government), would create the legal

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and political leverage for the Pequots to reclaim their ancestral lands. The act of the Connecticut state government was in conflict with the federal government. The enactment of the 1983 Mashantucket Pequot Land Claims Settlement Act granted the Pequots federal recognition, a land claims settlement, and an economic development trust fund. Critics of Pequot federal recognition called for Congress to revoke that status; Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut introduced a bill to limit the ability of tribes to acquire land in trust for commercial or gaming uses in response to the efforts of the Pequots to reclaim more of their ancestral lands (Benedict, 2000; Blakemore, 2005). Clearly, “American Indian wars are no longer fought on the [P]lains, they’re fought in … courts” as well as in Congress (Nagel, 1996, p. 53).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS Presently, the Bureau of Indian Affairs administers and manages 55.7 million acres of land for American Indians and Alaska Natives, or 7.1 percent more land than in 1932 (Bureau of Indian Affairs, 2005). But further reclamation of ancestral lands beyond the borders of American Indian Reservations is a controversial issue in the United States. For example, the Oneida Indian Nation of New York recently lost a Supreme Court land claim case to purchase former lands via the real estate market (Stout, 2005). The point of contention is the recognition of Oneida sovereignty over lands set out in the Treaty of Canandiagua in 1794 and the right to place said lands after purchase into tax-exempt, trust status. From an original land base of 300,000 acres the Oneida Indian Nation retains only 32 acres in New York. Even so, due to the success of the Turning Stone Casino Resort and 15 other economic enterprises, the Oneida Indian Nation is the largest employer in both Oneida County and Madison County, New York (Oneida Indian Nation, 2005). The economic clout of the Oneida Indian Nation notwithstanding, an 8 to 1 majority of the Supreme Court wrote: “[t]he Oneidas long ago relinquished governmental reins and cannot regain them through open-market purchases from current titleholders … [t]oday we decline to project redress for the tribe in the present and future, thereby disrupting the governance of central New York’s counties and towns” (Stout, 2005). The legal relationship between Indians and the United States is “unlike that of any other two people in existence” (National Gambling Impact Study Commission, 1997, p. 6-3). In exchange for land successions, the federal government was to hold Indian lands in trust; protect the sovereignty status; and promote the economic wellbeing of tribes. Unfortunately, the record of the federal government with regard to the “trust relationship” with American Indians is poor. Except for the Indian Health Service, the trend in per capita federal funds for American Indians has declined since 1985 (National Indian Gaming Association, 2005). The decrease in federal funds to address the triad of unemployment, school drop outs, and brain drain is all the more serious given the empirical evidence from the spatial analysis of American Indian poverty. That is, areas with high shares of American-Indian population have significantly lower levels of income than areas with low shares of American-Indian population (Leichenko, 2003). Further, while the impact of Indian gaming on American-Indian income has been very positive in some cases, overall results are mixed. Indian gaming has a positive effect on income in Oklahoma Tribal Statistical Areas (OTSAs) and Tribal Designated Statistical Areas (TDSAs), but a negative effect on income in areas with a high share of American Indians. While more research on the effects of gaming on the economic reality of Indian Country is necessary, the present research indicates gaming is not a panacea for the plight of Indians and the opportunity for high-profit gaming in the United States is finite (National Gambling Impact Study Commission, 1997; d’Hauteserre, 1998). The evolution of Indian policy from termination to self-determination meant economic development on Indian lands was necessary to decrease the dependence of tribes on federal funds. As per President Ronald Reagan in the Statement of Indian Policy from 1983: “[i]t is important to the concept of self-government that tribes reduce their dependence on federal funds by providing a greater percentage of the cost of self-government” (National Gambling Impact Study Commission, 1997, pp. 6–7). Self-determination means tribes enjoy the right to pursue an economic development strategy which retains the cultural integrity of the tribe (Smith, 2000). But regardless of the economic development strategy of the tribe, self-sufficiency is vital to cultural preservation.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author thanks the following for background information to help in the preparation of this chapter: Jon Ault, Head, Archives and Special Collections, Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center; Arthur Henick, Director of Media Relations, Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation; David Holahan, Manager of Public Relations, Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center; Kevin McBride, Director of Research, Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center; Wesley Johnson, Mayor (1995–2003), Ledyard, Connecticut; Cedric Woods, Deputy Chief Operating Officer, Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation. Special thanks to Matthew Craigie for research assistance in the preparation of this chapter.

Chapter 25

The Geography of Whiteness: Russian and Ukrainian “Coalitions of Color” in the Pacific Northwest SUSAN W. HARDWICK INTRODUCTION “Whiteness never has to speak its name, never has to acknowledge its role as an organizing principle in social and cultural relations” (G. Lipsitz, 1998, p. 1). “Denying white as a racial category, neglecting to see that whiteness has a history and a geography — as Americans have done — allows whiteness to stand as the norm” (S. Hoelscher, 2003, p. 662).

Whiteness is both a historical construction and a spatial phenomenon. According to Steven Hoelscher, unmasking the processes by which whiteness is enacted and identifying the material consequences of such a construction is the first step toward formulating workable antiracist politics (2003, p. 662). In this chapter, I examine whiteness in the context of the shifting identities and related spatial expressions of a large group of white refugees in a metropolitan area long dominated by a majority white culture.1 Portland, Oregon is located in a region variously known as Cascadia, Ecotopia, and “the last Caucasian bastion in the United States” (Kaplan, 1998). Since my focus in this chapter is on the economic, social, cultural, and political implications of whiteness, I prefer to label it Caucasia. This chapter reports on the findings of a longterm multi-method project that is documenting and analyzing the post-1980s refugee diaspora in the Canadian and American Pacific Northwest. I limit my focus to the relationships between the religious networks, shifting identities, and spatial patterns of refugees in a state that surprisingly now ranks eleventh in the nation in the total numbers of migrants arriving with refugee or asylumseeker status. The largest — ethnic Russians and Ukrainians — rarely refer directly to their whiteness, although expressions of their feelings, perceptions, and use of racial categories have emerged throughout the project that can only be understood within a whiteness problematic. Their large numbers, relative economic stability, activist religious and social networks, and political savvy — along with the color of their skin — make this group an appropriate point of analysis. I focus attention on this large group of recent migrants to Portland and environs in response to Peter Jackson’s call for studies of the constructions of whiteness at a variety of scales from the nation to the neighborhood (1998, p. 100), and the earlier pioneering work of Frankenberg (1993), Jackson and Penrose (1993), Bonnett (1997), Fine et al. (1997), and Dyer (1997). Incidentally, it was Bonnett’s disturbing comment: “it is extraordinary to note that the only sustained debate about white identity ever conducted within geography took place between 1890–1930 and concerned the possibility of white acclimatization to the ‘wet tropics’” (Bonnett, 1997, p. 193 from Trewartha, 1926), that was the nudge that most encouraged me to write this chapter for a book on race, ethnicity, and place.

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SPACE, PLACE, AND REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN PORTLAND The popular perception of Portland as a white person’s city is deeply entrenched and has been shaped by the city’s larger historical context of settlement primarily by western and northern Europeans. The dominant culture, especially in the earliest years of settlement of the city, created a homogeneous place that actively worked against incorporation of the “other” — from the earliest territorial laws prohibiting African Americans to the KKK in the 1920s to restrictions against Chinese land-ownership to anti-Japanese sentiment in the 1940s to skinhead violence in the 1980s and 1990s. These long-seated attitudes and perceptions linger among many residents of today’s new, more diverse Portland. The region’s earliest migration flows were dominated by Germans, people from the British Isles, and Scandinavians, along with Euro-American settlers from the mid-Atlantic, New England, and Midwestern states. For the past twenty-five years, new migrants from Montana, Idaho, California, and Colorado have joined other (primarily white) migrants from the northern Rockies and Great Plains. Since the mid-1980s, (primarily white) “equity immigrants” from California, in particular, have continued to flow into Portland to escape congested urban places and the high cost of living south of the state border. In the years during and after WWII, African Americans moved to Portland to work in the shipbuilding industries. Soon thereafter in the early 1950s, the city’s entire African-American community was displaced by a devastating flood that demolished the African-American settlement of Vanport, a high risk, high density housing development located on an island in the Willamette River. African Americans displaced by this flood were strongly encouraged by social service workers and city politicians to relocate in a low-income, north Portland neighborhood called the Albina district. Except for some scattered attempts at gentrification by young white urban professionals looking for affordable housing near the city’s downtown located just across the river, the Albina district remains primarily African-American today. Redlining by real estate agents and brokers in the 1950s and 1960s, along with the location of low-income housing projects funded by local and federal housing authorities in the Albina District that attracted first white, then primarily African-American workers, are the primary reasons for a lingering residential black-white spatial dichotomy in Portland. During the last decade and a half, formerly white-dominated residential districts located farther east of the Willamette River have become more diverse as new immigrants and refugees find affordable and available housing in the city’s original “streetcar suburbs” (Abbott, 1987, p. 75). The northeast and southeast quadrants of the city, in fact, are now home to native-born white, Latino, and Asian working-class families, along with refugees from Bosnia, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Russia, and Ukraine. While Portland’s population has become more diverse in recent years due to the influx of large numbers of immigrants and refugees, its demographic profile is still dominated by white/European-origin peoples. In 2000, almost 80 percent of the metropolitan area’s population was reported as white (single-race). The minority races included 7 percent black/African American, 6 percent Asian, 1 percent American Indian and Alaska Native, and 0.4 percent Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander. Over 4 percent reported more than one race, which is higher than the national figure of 2.4 percent. In addition, almost 7 percent of Portland’s population in 2000 was counted as Hispanic.

SITUATING RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT New migrants from the former Soviet Union have relocated in large numbers to the Portland metropolitan area since the early 1990s (see Figure 25.1). As I have discussed elsewhere (see Hardwick, 1993, 2002, 2003), most of these approximately 60,000 new residents are Russian and Ukrainian fundamentalist Christians who are categorized by the U.S. government as refugees. This status provides them with eight months of support for housing, employment assistance, and language training. The vast majority reside in the northeast and southeast parts of the city and in rural towns and small cities in the northern Willamette Valley, a region long known for its homogeneous Anglo-dominated population. The dramatic increase in Oregon of migrants born in the

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former USSR outnumbers increases in Vietnamese, Chinese, Asian Indians, and other Asian groups (U.S. Census of Population, 2000). The reasons for this unexpected migration stream to the Pacific Northwest are centered primarily in the religious networks that link migrants still residing in Russia or Ukraine with sponsors and church congregations in host communities in the Pacific Northwest. Figure 25.1 Young Russian Pentecostal Refugees in the Pacific Northwest, 2004

Most of the Russians and Ukrainians who relocated to the U.S. in the past decade arrived as a response to the easing of emigration laws in the former USSR during the late Cold War years, and the subsequent passage of the Lautenberg Amendment to the 1980 Refugee Act by the U.S. Congress in 1989.2 Chief among the groups who were able to prove they fit the definition of refugees were Jews and evangelical Christians such as Pentecostals, Baptists, and Seventh Day Adventists who were persecuted for their religious beliefs under the Soviet system. Following the breakup of the USSR in 1991, out-migration began in earnest. Jewish migrants from the former Soviet Union most often relocated to New York, Chicago, the San Francisco Bay Area, and Los Angeles, while the Oregon, Washington, and California Central Valley migration stream was dominated by Russian and Ukrainian evangelical groups.3 Most decided to seek a new life in communities located along the I-5 corridor linking Fresno with Bellingham, Washington after listening to Sacramento’s “Word to Russia” evangelical radio programming that encouraged them to come to the western U.S., Russian language articles in religious newsletters, and/or talking with friends and relatives who extolled the virtues of life in the American West (via phone calls, letters, and videotapes) also encouraged large numbers to leave their homeland and relocate to towns and cities along the I-5 corridor in northern California, Oregon, and Washington.

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The results of structured and unstructured interviews and responses to survey questionnaires documented that almost all Ukrainian and Russian migrants in the region relocated to the Portland metropolitan area, (which includes Vancouver, WA located directly north of the Columbia River), and its hinterland in the Willamette Valley because of their connections with evangelical religious networks. According to Irina who moved to Portland in 1997: “My sister gave me the idea really. She said we should go to Oregon to be with others who already left our city. Then the minister here sent us a letter urging us all to try to come to his church. He assured us that my father and my mother could come too.”

Religious networks, the housing location decisions of refugee resettlement agencies, and the availability of affordable housing in eastside neighborhoods are some of the factors that explain the patterns shown on the map in Figure 25.2. In addition, most newcomers prefer to live in the same neighborhoods as others who share their language, religious beliefs, and place of origin. According to an interview with the State Refugee Coordinator, more than 90 percent of newly arriving Russians choose to stay in the Portland area after their initial arrival because of the support provided by neighbors and family members from home and from outsider political, religious, and social networks. Based on counts in the Slavic Yellow Pages, there are more than 400 businesses in Portland that are owned by Russian-speaking entrepreneurs. Many are in the construction industry. Russians and Ukrainians also own beauty salons, chiropractic practices, and taxi services. They also work in restaurants, homes for the elderly, and small businesses. “A person can get medical and dental care, open a checking account, attend church, build or buy a house and die without learning English here” is a sentiment commonly expressed by newcomers. Services and support from one business to another are often exchanged or traded as needs arise. These economic networks, along with the religious networks discussed above, tighten the internal connections within and between Russian-speaking business owners and help maintain ethnic economic and cultural cohesion in the Portland metropolitan area. The location patterns of Russian and Ukrainian businesses in the urban area are somewhat surprising since most are located outside residential districts. In contrast, Russian and Ukrainian churches are embedded within or located very close to Slavic neighborhoods in eastside Portland and in Vancouver (Washington) Russian and Ukrainian neighborhoods.

THE SLAVIC COALITION AS A “COMMUNITY OF COLOR” IN OREGON This overlying narrative, analyzing why Russians and Ukrainians reside in eastside Portland and across the river in Vancouver bears further examination. An analysis only listing affordable housing, refugee resettlement agency decision-making, and religious networks leaves out other critically important and less visible confounding factors such as race, whiteness, and historical precedents. While the availability of affordable housing in northeast and southeast Portland, and refugee preferences to live near others who share their language, values, and culture help explain why Russian and Ukrainian spatial patterns look the way they do in the study area, there is much more to the story. Uncovering the racialized subtext now hidden behind the patterns shown on the map (Figure 25.2) will help shed light on some of the more complex reasons for the distribution of Russian and Ukrainian space and place in Portland. I frame this more nuanced argument by: (1) commenting in more depth on the powerful role of social service agencies in determining refugee settlement, (2) discussing the formation of the Slavic Coalition and its successful effort to urge the Portland Community of Color Coalition to allow a white group to become a participating member and thus be able to share in the funding pot, and (3) reporting on the findings of our survey questionnaires on Russian and Ukrainian identity and adjustment to their new lives in the U.S. First, it is essential to note that the refugee resettlement process in Portland is a tightly organized system dictated by rules of the federal and state governments (who control funding for individual refugee support and

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resettlement agency staff), and local agencies such as county governments (who control funding for programmatic support). In Portland, the large and very successful Immigrant and Refugee Community Organization (IRCO) was formed from two agencies founded in the mid-1970s to assist refugees from Southeast Asia. It now employs more than 140 multi-lingual staff who help find housing, teach English, and network for employment opportunities for newly arriving refugees. As such, IRCO assists voluntary organizations such as the Lutheran Social Services in placing all new refugees in appropriate housing when they first arrive in the city.

Figure 25.2 Refugee Households from the former Soviet Union in the Portland Metro area, 1989–2001

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My interviews between 2002–2005, with the staff of several of the city’s voluntary organizations revealed new information about exactly how appropriate housing is selected for new refugee arrivals. When queried about their choice of apartments and houses in eastside Portland instead of in other affordable parts of the city like the Albina district, I was told that usually a decision is made to keep as many of the white groups of refugees as possible in neighborhoods where white low and middle income families traditionally have resided. “This will make it easier for them to adjust in school classrooms and with their other neighbors,” I was told without hesitation. This “back-door racial steering” has resulted in communities of whiteness in east Portland made up of primarily native-born Oregonians and refugees from Russia, Ukraine, and Bosnia. This is in direct contrast to African refugees from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and elsewhere, who are steered to housing in the Albina district — or to outlying suburbs such as Beaverton where small pockets of other African Americans currently reside. Even though very little social or economic mixing has yet occurred between native-born African Americans and African refugees in these neighborhoods (Hardwick and Hume, 2005), it is important to note that social service agency decision-makers continue to steer white refugees to white neighborhoods and black refugees to African-American districts believing that this is the “most logical way” to handle the resettlement process. It is therefore no coincidence that Russians and Ukrainians reside in a nodal heterolocal pattern limited to neighborhoods located in eastside Portland and across the river in Vancouver and not in north Portland in the Albina District. A second contributing factor to the well-bounded black-white residential divide in Portland is the work of insider social and political “networks of ethnicity” (Mitchell, 2000). Urged by the support of a civic empowerment grant that funded an initiative called the Interwoven Tapestry Project, Russians and Ukrainians recently formed an organization called the Slavic Coalition. This group met for the first time in January, 2004 at a retreat where goals were laid out and funding possibilities were discussed for providing support for this self-identified ethnic community. According to the official description of the work of the Coalition that grew out of this retreat: “There are a lot of problems that Slavic people face in the U.S.A. It’s a lack of a bridge between Russianspeaking community and authorities (court, police); important forms and announcements — information is not available in Russian; lack of legal interpretation; poor understanding of American laws and their consequences; lack of information about social and legal systems and structures and knowing one’s rights and privileges under American Law (innocent until proven guilty, etc.); not understanding economic system (collection agencies, Better Business Bureau, etc.); no recognition of the benefits associated with citizenship and voting rights; not enough culturally specific, appropriate, or relevant activities; nor enough representation in mainstream media; lack of information about population demographics and so on” (Golovan, 2002, p. 1).

These needs are very real, especially for recent arrivals from Russia and Ukraine. But to find ways to fund programs that will help address these problems, the Slavic Coalition had to come up with some creative racializing. According to secretary Golovan’s report of the outcomes of this first organizational meeting (2002, p. 1): “It is not easy for a Slavic community to be recognized by officials as a minority group (we do not look like a minority group based on our skin color) … but we already made steps to succeed in this field. Coalition of Color finally recognized us as a minority group” (it’s an organization that unites coalitions of different minority groups like Latino Network, Asian-Pacific Islanders, African Americans, African Immigrants, Native Americans).

Key to declaring this group’s status as a community of color is an understanding of the new county and city funding system in Portland. Beginning in late 2001, Multnomah County and other government jurisdictions in the metropolitan region reorganized the process of grant distribution for services to minority groups. The county declared that it would no longer fund individual groups or agencies for programs, but rather wanted to limit funding to partnerships of minority coalitions and service providers. As a result of their successful coalition building effort, IRCO and the Slavic Coalition received a $340,000 grant from Multnomah County in early

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2004 to provide culturally-specific school-based and school-linked programming for the Slavic community. Gaining this funding would have been impossible without membership in the city’s Community of Color Coalition. Not coincidentally, these funds address the overarching goal of the Slavic Coalition: “to advocate for the Slavic community” (Retreat Agenda, 2004). Clearly the Slavic Coalition’s status as a member of the Portland Community of Color Coalition carries important messages about the changing meanings and definitions of race in local and national politics. As constructed whiteness is expressed and exposed in differing ways among and between refugee and immigrant communities in the U.S. and native-born people of color, implications for the impact of these evolving definitions for funding minority programs in Portland and elsewhere are immense. An unexpected finding of my research from survey questionnaire responses further complicated the effort to lay out a simple list of reasons to explain refugee residential patterns in the study area of the project. One hundred questionnaires were distributed to Russians and Ukrainians using our network of contacts in the metro area. These Russian language “Acculturation and Identity” surveys were developed and tested and then taken or mailed to church leaders and distributed in language and employment training classes at IRCO. To learn more about the adjustment experiences and attitudes of post-Soviet Russians and Ukrainians in the Pacific Northwest, I distributed another 250 surveys to Portland’s Slavic Coalition members and to other Russians and Ukrainians who reside in Seattle, Bellingham (WA) and Vancouver (B.C.) During this widescale distribution effort, a total of 47 surveys were completed and returned to me (even though all past efforts to use this methodology with Russians and Ukrainians failed completely, with a consistent zero return rate!). Respondents ranged in age from 18–68; 12 were male and 35 female; and 10 had lived in Oregon for less than one year, 21 for 1–5 years, and 16 for more than five years. All were born in cities and towns in either Russia or Ukraine. Survey responses seem to contradict the argument put forth by the Slavic Coalition insisting that Russians and Ukrainians need additional funding to adjust to life in the U.S. Despite strong cultural and ethnic characteristics, (all respondents claiming that Russian was the language spoken at home; and all reported still eating mostly all Russian or Ukrainian foods; being married to another person from their homeland; and belonging to a Russian or Ukrainian church and primarily participating only in Russian-speaking social circles), their responses indicated a high comfort level with life in a foreign culture and foreign place. The following sample responses to questions about the challenges of adapting to life in Portland provide evidence of the unexpectedly positive answers provided on the surveys: 1) I feel unsure of myself and foreign in the U.S.: Total agreement: 1 Agree to a certain extent: 4 Do not agree: 8 Absolutely do not agree: 34 2) It is difficult for me to understand American life: Total agreement: 3 Agree to a certain degree: 2 Do not agree: 22 Absolutely do not agree: 20 3) I feel alone in America: Total agreement: Agree to a certain degree: Do not agree: Absolutely do not agree:

2 2 7 36

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In other questions, such as the ease of finding friends among Americans; feelings of belonging in American society; and comfort in understanding American life, responses were equally positive. Although comparative survey questionnaires have not yet been collected and analyzed for non-white refugee groups in the study area, it can be assumed that despite language barriers and lack of employment skills, the whiteness of Russians and Ukrainians, along with their intact and active pre- and post-migration religious networks, greatly eases their adjustment to life in the Pacific Northwest.

CONSTRUCTING, DE-CONSTRUCTING, AND RE-CONSTRUCTING WHITENESS In this chapter, I used the Portland case study to respond to Bonnett’s call for geographers to expose the invisible traditions of geographical research on race by examining the multiple ways that “white” identities are currently being (re)constituted (1997, p. 197). Understanding whiteness as a social construct not only contributes new ways of thinking to critical race theory, it also will help other scholars sort out the interrelated and quite complex set of cultural, social, economic, and political factors that explain the spatial patterns of refugees and immigrants. For the members of Portland’s Slavic Coalition, whiteness is only seen as a quality worth redefining when it is confronted with some form of the “other” (Said, 1995). Russian and Ukrainian “othering” includes both setting themselves apart as distinct from other refugees and local residents of the city who are people of color, while at the same time, insisting that their Slavic community is a distinct minority group who possesses the same urgent social service needs as other members of the Community of Color Coalition. Thus, in the case study examined here, it appears that the benefits of constructing an identity related to whiteness can work both ways. As survey questionnaires and interviews established, adjusting to life in Portland has proceeded smoothly for many Russian and Ukrainian respondents. Most were quickly able to gain an understanding of American life, perhaps partly because their lives at home in Russia or Ukraine revolved around active membership in a church congregation that was closely linked to related congregations of believers in the U.S. American refugee sponsors were usually members of the same religious group. This made the migration and settlement of migrants from Russia and Ukraine proceed more smoothly than for other refugees from other places. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, the invisibility of this group caused by their white skin color, is another key reason why Slavic refugees are able to blend in and adapt to their new life, particularly in this white homogeneous region of the western U.S. Accustomed to living and working within a frustrating system of restrictions and scarcity in their homeland, this group of new refugees is especially adept at using whatever skills and resources they have available to them to gain a larger share of the pie. The formation of the Slavic Coalition and its successful effort to become part of Portland’s Community of Color Coalition provides evidence of the group’s resourcefulness and years of Soviet and post-Soviet era training in using the system to their own benefit. In this era of increasingly challenging economic problems in the U.S., especially in Oregon (a state with one of the highest unemployment rates in the nation), the ethics and efficacy of re-defining and re-constructing race are particularly worthy of attention. Regardless of the unusual nature of “race by choice,” this case study has been presented in this chapter to make a contribution to the debate now underway by human geographers and other scholars centered in viewing race, ethnicity, gender, and identity as social constructions (see, for example, Anderson, 1987, 1991; Jackson, 1987; Kobayashi and Peake, 1994; Bonnett, 1997; Hoelscher, 2003; and Hume, 2005). Recognizing that race is socially constructed is no longer enough. It is essential for human geographers interested in critical race theory to re-examine the impact of shifting racial identities, meanings, and definitions on the politics of people and place to begin to understand the broader implications of certain groups who have choices about their own definitions of race — while other groups do not. Race is not fictional, it has serious material and spatial effects. Further studies of racialized exclusion, constructions of whiteness by so called invisible groups, and the process of making and marking groups outside the whiteness paradigm as the “other,” are not only long overdue in our disciple, they are also essential for the evolving notion of what it means to be an American.

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NOTES 1

This article could not have been written without the generous support of Victoria Libov of the Portland Immigrant and Refugee Community Organization. The research was funded by NSF Grant Number BCS – 0214467) and undertaken in collaboration with James E. Meacham, Director of the InfoGraphics Laboratory, University of Oregon. Research assistance from Ginger Mansfield, Susan Hume, and Rebecca Marcus was also invaluable to completion of the project. Likewise, cartographic support from Erin Aigner and Will Jensen made a major contribution to the spatial analysis central to my argument. 2

Refugee status is defined by the U.S. Refugee Act as “persons living outside their homeland who are unwilling or unable to return home because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution.” 3

Because all but approximately 500 new post-Soviet residents of Portland are Jewish, and Christian fundamentalists have a common ethno-religious identity in their homeland, Jewish refugees are not discussed in this paper. In addition, upon arrival in Portland, because of their higher education levels, Jewish migrants have a different professional status and live in different parts of the metropolitan area than do most Russian and Ukrainian Baptists, Pentecostals, and Seventh Day Adventists.

Chapter 26

The Persistence of Greek American Ethnicity among Age Cohorts Under Changing Conditions STAVROS T. CONSTANTINOU AND MILTON E. HARVEY The purpose of this chapter is to present the major themes of Greek American ethnicity and to examine their change across generations. Historically, the Greek nation was burdened by a long and tumultuous history, which resulted in a synthesis of the classical Hellenic tradition and Byzantine Orthodoxy. Greek immigrants brought this complex cultural identity to America. Although Greek immigrants made some adjustments and changes within the pluralistic American society, they maintained certain core aspects of the Hellenic cultural triad: language, the family, and the Orthodox church. Language is central to the Greek Diaspora as asserted by Moskos: “one’s cultural roots and political sensitivities must be nourished by a responsiveness to contemporary Greek realities — even at a distance” (Moskos, 1990, pp. 145–146).

The Greek language links Greeks across the globe, who “… share a destiny somehow connected with other people who call themselves Hellenes” (Moskos, p. 146).

The family, by encouraging the use of the Greek language at home, acts as the transmitter of the Hellenic culture. The church and its affiliated organizations sponsor a great variety of religious services and sociocultural activities, which are well attended by all Greek generations. Regional and local organizations also reinforced the role of the church in transmitting ethnic values across generations. The process of maintenance and transmission of Greek-American ethnicity is best understood from the historical context in which Greek migration to the United States occurred.

GREEK EMIGRATION IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT At any geographic location, such as a place of residence, an individual is exposed to stressors from the external environment. When stress occurs, the individual invokes stress-coping mechanisms that may reduce the stress to tolerable levels. In a migration context, when such strategies fail, however, the individual considers relocation and initiates a search process that may lead to either migration or adjustments that result in coping at the same location. Greek emigration is an example of the migration decisions made by many individual Greeks who were willing to travel thousands of miles for a new beginning in places that were culturally and linguistically very different from their homeland. Emigration is a phenomenon that has characterized the Greek nation throughout its long history. Given the geographical limitations of the country and its insular character, the Greeks turned to the sea as a means of improving their economy. A rich seafaring tradition has been an integral part of Hellenic life from ancient times to the present. In ancient times, Greek communities existed mostly along the Mediterranean littoral, but in modern times they migrated and established settlements in distant countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and Russia (Clogg, 1999).

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United States as Destination The first documented Greek to arrive upon American shores was Don Teodoro (Theodoros), who served on the Narvaez expedition of 1528 (Moskos, 1980). The first serious effort to establish a Greek presence in America was undertaken in 1768 by Andrew Turnbull, a Scottish physician (Panagopoulos, 1966), who sponsored an estimated 500 Greek laborers from the region of Mani in the Peloponnesus to set up the ill-fated colony of New Smyrna, about 75 miles south of St. Augustine, Florida. During the years following the New Smyrna expedition, immigration from Greece was sporadic and small until the latter part of the nineteenth century, when a large number of Greeks arrived on American shores. In a historical perspective, we analyze immigration from Mediterranean Greece to the United States from the perspectives of the receiving and the sending country. Conceptually, immigration to the United States is an example of the push-pull forces that initiate and maintain a migration process. Certain political events and the role of institutions in Greece and the U.S. slowed or accelerated the influx of Greek immigrants and the rate of emigration from Greece. Greek immigration to the U.S. has been characterized by an uneven pattern (Constantinou and Diamantides, 1985), resulting from developments on both sides of the Atlantic. The high point of immigration from Greece, part of a larger flow of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, was reached during the period 1901 to 1920. As noted in earlier chapters, the U.S. passed a new immigration law that created the quota system in 1921. This law limited annual Greek entries to a total of 3,294. Three years later, in 1924, the restrictive Johnson-Reed Act limited the total immigration from Europe to 150,000 per year and further reduced each country’s quota to two percent of their total population that was residing in the U.S. during the 1890 Census. Because fewer Greeks resided in the U.S. in 1890 than in 1910, the number of immigrants from Greece was reduced to a meager 100. The McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, previously discussed in this text, maintained the highly discriminatory restrictive quota and limited Greek immigration to a total of 308. The changes in U.S. immigration law in 1965 included elimination of the quota system and creation of a limit of 20,000 immigrants from any single nation. As a result of these changes, the numbers of Greek immigrants increased. Examination of particular phases of Greek immigration to the U.S. helps clarify the impacts of the changing laws and the evolution of Greek-American settlements. A total of 735,059 immigrants arrived from Greece during the period 1820 to 2003, an annual average of 3,995. This 184-year period, when divided into eight distinct immigration phases (Table 26.1), reveals peak-immigration periods. These have been classified as shown in Table 26.1. The Great Wave and New Wave phases of Greek immigration accounted for approximately one-half of the total number of Greek immigrants to the United States. The bulk of Greek immigrants arrived during the Great Wave Phase, when a total of 341,214 entered, an annual average of 18,956. During the New Wave, a total of 157,304 Greeks arrived in the United States because of changes in the law that allowed relatives of persons already in the country to immigrate. During the remaining phases, immigration was at very low levels due to restrictive legislation and other factors. Push Factors: Conditions in Greece Wars, crop failures, political upheaval, poverty, and harsh environmental conditions in Greece were the most important determinants (or push factors) of emigration, which drained the population of Greece in a serious way during the 20th century. The 1907 immigration figures of the Great Wave indicate that 1.39 percent of the population of 2.6 million emigrated to the United States in a single year. Although the percentage may seem small, the spatial impact was felt most seriously in the rural areas of Greece. Also, most early immigrants were young males. Other periods of Greek emigration, although not of the same magnitude, were related to economic problems. Many were forced to seek employment opportunities in the U.S. Poor economic conditions during the modern history of Greece pushed impoverished Greeks to emigrate to various other nations as well, including Canada, Europe, South Africa, and Australia. Emigration from Greece continued until the 1980s, when economic improvements reduced annual migratory flows. In fact, during recent years, Greece, in a dramatic role reversal, has become a receiving country of immigrants.

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The Persistence of Greek American Ethnicity Table 26.1 Immigration from Greece to the United States Phase

Duration

Immigrants

Annual Average

Sporadic Migration

1824–1872

217

5

Early Migration

1873–1899

14,915

204

Great Wave

1900–1917

341,214

18,956

Last Exodus

1918–1924

54,440

7,777

Closed Door

1925–1945

21,376

1,018

Postwar Migration

1946–1965

75,867

3,793

New Wave

1966–1979

157,304

11,236

Declining Migration

1980–2003

60,682

2,528

725,798

4,101

Source: Adopted and modified from Charles Moskos “The Greeks in the United States,” In The Greek Diaspora in the Twentieth Century, edited by Richard Clogg, 103–119. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999.

THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF GREEK AMERICANS, 1970–2000 Generally, the spatial distribution of Greek Americans was stable over a long period of time. Greek Americans have persisted in some patterns established in their early settlement history. Some changes, however, have occurred and are noteworthy. U.S. Regional and State Trends Geographically, early Greek immigrants preferred the Eastern Seaboard, the Great Lakes, and the Pacific Coast, especially California. Also, during the 19th and early 20th centuries, Greeks were lured to the Mountain States by employment prospects, including the belief that Leonidas G. Skliris, a Salt Lake City-based labor agent, would find jobs for them. Many Greeks worked on the railroads and in the mines in that region. This regional population, however, was unstable and, by 1930, began to leave the Mountain States, returning mainly to the Northeast and the Great Lakes regions. Since WWI, the number of Greeks settling in the Midwest increased gradually. The continuing decline of the Greek-American population in the Mountain States coincided with another trend, the increased growth of the Greek-American population in the American South. The Sunbelt effect, which influenced the relocation decisions of the general population, also had an impact on the regional patterns of Greek Americans. In 1910, the South contained 5.6 percent of the total Greek American population, but, by 1990, it accounted for more than 21 percent. The most impressive increase in population growth in the South occurred from 1970 to 1990. Presently, the South has the third largest concentration of Greek Americans, after the Northeast and the Midwest. Should the present attraction persist, the South will rival the other two regions for being the home of the greatest proportion of Greek Americans. This regional shift may be due to a number of factors, including job opportunities and retirement living. By the 2000 Census, Greek Americans resided in every state. In descending order, the largest number resided in New York, followed by California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Florida, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Texas. This ranking has varied from census period to census period. For example, in the 1990 Census, California displaced Illinois from second place and Florida surpassed the traditional clusters of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio,

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and Michigan. The states with the smallest numbers of Greek Americans (fewer than 3,000) are rural: North Dakota, South Dakota, Alaska, Hawaii, Wyoming, Montana, Vermont, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Idaho. The relative importance of the Greek-American population to the total population, which can be expressed as a ratio or percentage, varied somewhat over time at the state level. Between 1980 and 2000, however, the five states with the largest percentages of Greek-American populations, remained the same, while varying their rank within the top five (see Table 26.2). Those with the smallest ratios of Greek Americans are mostly southern or rural states. Mississippi has the lowest number of Greeks in relation to the total state population, followed by North Dakota, Kentucky, Arkansas, South Dakota, and Louisiana. In summary, the bulk of the Greek-American population continues to reside in the Northeast and the Great Lakes regions, notwithstanding important shifts to the South. California also remains an important state in terms of total Greek-American population. Table 26.2 Relative concentration of Greek Americans in top 18 states. Rank

1980 Census

1990 Census

2000 Census

1

Massachusetts

New Hampshire

New Hampshire

2

New Hampshire

Massachusetts

Massachusetts

3

New York

New York

New York

4

Illinois

Illinois

Connecticut

5

Connecticut

Connecticut

Illinois

6

New Jersey

New Jersey

New Jersey

7

Utah

Maryland

Rhode Island

8

Maryland

Rhode Island

Maryland

9

Nevada

Utah

Utah

10

Rhode Island

Nevada

Florida

11

California

Florida

Nevada

12

Delaware

Delaware

Pennsylvania

13

Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania

Ohio

14

Ohio

Michigan

Michigan

15

Michigan

Ohio

Delaware

16

Florida

Maine

Maine

17

Wyoming

California

Vermont

18

Maine

Virginia

California

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U.S. County-Level Patterns An examination of the distribution of Greek Americans at the county level reveals some interesting patterns. In terms of total population, the largest concentrations of Greek Americans in 2000, were in Cook (Illinois), Queens (New York), and Los Angeles (California) counties. The number of Greek Americans in these counties was 56,579, 45,257, and 27,715, respectively. These three are among the most populated counties in the U.S. Consequently, the large Greek populations in these counties are not too surprising. A different pattern emerges from an analysis of relative distribution of Greeks. Three counties have more than two percent of their total populations being Greek Americans in 2000, Carbon (Utah), Essex (Massachusetts), and Queens (New York). Thus, only Queens leads in both measures; it has one of the largest total Greek populations in the country and has a relatively larger proportion of Greeks than any other U.S. county. Underlying the Greek-American spatial distributions are the basic processes that influence the spread of ethnic groups in a dominant population over time. Immigrants historically created initial settlement patterns based on gateways and employment opportunities. Eventually, other regional patterns evolved. An example is the early settlement of Irish Americans in New York. Later, the Irish migrated westward for canal building in the Midwest, particularly in Chicago. Also, an immigrant population grows through the influx of additional migrants and by natural increase. This may result in two situations: (a) the growth of temporary clusters in areas of economic opportunity (Greeks in the Mountain states), and (b) the emergence of new sustaining clusters in response to national population shifts (e.g., as in response to the Sunbelt factor). U.S. Metropolitan Patterns: Urbanization and Suburbanization Trends The initial waves of Greek immigrants, largely young males, avoided rural America because it invoked images of their impoverished rural homeland. They settled in ethnic enclaves in central cities within walking distance of the factories and other business establishments where they worked. When the number of immigrants reached a critical mass, Greeks organized local institutions, including a dues-paying community centered on the church. The importance of financially supporting the church was a new lesson that the early immigrants had to learn quickly. Unlike the situation in Greece, where as part of a state church they did not pay dues, Greek-American immigrants were required to support the church due to the separation of church and state. This formation of a dues-paying institution was a grassroots activity, rather than a structure imposed by church authorities in Athens or Constantinople. Initially, early Greek immigrants rented a neighborhood building that functioned as a place of worship until sufficient funds could be raised to build a church. The church provided a point of reference for the community and became the leading social institution in Greek-American life. In many cases, early Greek immigrants described their residential locations relative to the location of their church. Thus, for early Greek immigrants, the parish church was an essential part of their ecological milieu. The Greek-American community consisted of an action space, where daily activities occurred, and a functional region focused on the centrality of the parish church. Their functional region included other cultural and ethnic markers too, including grocery stores, local social clubs, and coffeehouses (kafeneia). The coffeehouses were a particularly useful institution for the maintenance of Greek culture and ethnicity because immigrants, mostly bachelors, gathered there to socialize with one another and discuss Greek and Greek-American issues. In addition, and at a time when news about their ancestral home was scarce, the coffeehouses provided a forum for exchanging information about the motherland and their particular village homes. These are typical social spaces that were and continue to be created by ethnic groups across the U.S., as indicated in other chapters of this text. Like other immigrants, Greek Americans marked their communities with Greek language, signage, and other features that gave their living space a unique cultural appearance. Eventually, due to visually apparent Greek-American ethnic markers, the term Greek Town became the common language used by non-Greeks to describe these urban ethnic landscapes. Greek Towns were located in Chicago, Detroit, and Astoria, in New York City. After WWII, the interaction of many factors led to the relocation of the Greek population and the decline of their inner-city Greek Towns. First, Greek emphasis on education meant that subsequent Greek-American generations secured better jobs and enjoyed higher disposable incomes, which led to their consideration of better neighborhoods. Second, the large influx of low-income blacks and other minority groups into American central cities accelerated

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white flight to the suburbs and the dispersal of the middle-class, including Greek-Americans, from the central city. Suburbanization contributed further to the decline of Greek Towns. It created new opportunities and more attractive environments that pulled many Greek Americans away from their traditional ethnic enclaves. This dispersal of a large part of the Greek-American population away from its church-coffeehouse-residential nexus in the old city centers presented new challenges to the preservation of Greek-American culture and ethnicity. The survival of any ethnic group requires homeland ties, national linkages, and the local initiatives of social institutions to maintain group identity from generation to generation. When locational changes occur, an ethnic group must find ways to emphasize certain aspects of culture to maintain its ethnic cohesion. This makes the geographic study of ethnicity an important undertaking, especially at the local, or place level. This chapter restricts study to the Northeastern Ohio region, specifically to the Akron-Cleveland area, where the local dynamics of the Greek-American population remain strong.

GREEK AMERICANS IN THE NORTHEASTERN OHIO REGION The suburbanization process covered in the previous section occurred in the urban areas of Akron and Cleveland, Ohio. In the case of Akron (Summit County), where our work has been more focused, Greek immigrants settled in its central city in the early 20th century. Proximity to work in the booming rubber factories was an important determinant. As Akron prospered as an industrial city, it attracted migrants from other parts of the country, including a black minority that settled in the central city. The development of the local and state highway system and the addition of a set of interstate highways (I-77, I-76), induced suburban growth and white flight from Akron city proper. Like other ethnic whites, Greek-American families relocated to particular suburbs, such as the communities of Hudson, Stow, Fairlawn, Bath, Copley, and, later, to more distant communities in Medina County, including Medina and Macedonia. Census data for the period 1970 to 2000 support these observations about Greek-American suburbanization. In 1970, the number of Greeks in the city of Akron was 1,080 (394 foreign-born and 686 natives of foreign or mixed parentage). The Census did not report ethnicity information by county, where suburbs were growing by 1970. By 1980, the Census reported 1,089 Greek persons of single ancestry in Akron and 2,003 in Summit County. The 1990 Census reported 1,318 Greek persons of single ancestry as residing in Akron, while 2,546 were living in Summit County. By 2000, the U.S. Census data indicated that persons claiming Greek as first ancestry had fallen to only 1,803 in the city of Akron, while 2,974 of the same ancestry resided in suburban Summit County. Thus, by 2000, nearly three of every four persons of Greek ancestry were living in the Akron suburbs. With this dispersal of the Greek population, Greek-American parishioners were faced with the choice of either relocating the parish church to the more affluent suburbs, where most of them lived, or upgrading the existing church. Communities such as Chicago decided to relocate whereas Akron and the four parishes in Cuyahoga County (Cleveland area) chose to renovate. This decision to renovate rather than relocate caused some spatial behavioral adjustments by many Greek Americans in these five parishes. The increasing spatial discordance between the church and the distribution of Greeks in Summit County, which is essentially conterminous with the Akron parish, was evident from a series of maps generated by Constantinou and Harvey (1981) from data from six church directories for each of the decades between 1930 and 1980. Specifically, these maps showed the gradual dispersal of the Greek population away from the downtown, along the major arteries and out to the emerging suburbs, especially to the northwestern part of the city of Akron. An inter-generational perspective of the patterns discussed in the last paragraph is also reported in this chapter from the mapping of a sample of Greek Americans by generations (Figure 26.1). These maps show that members of first, second, and third generation still form a cluster close to their church. Most of the first generation still reside close to the church along a northwest-southeast axis around the University of Akron. The patterns for the second and third generations are dispersed into the surrounding suburbs. It remains to be seen whether younger members of the third generation also will relocate to the suburbs as they accumulate wealth and position. In addition to Akron, Constantinou (1982) surveyed four Greek parishes in the Greater Cleveland Area and the parish of Saint George in Massillon, Ohio. The patterns in these four were similar to those of Akron. Survey information suggested that a small

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number of New Wave immigrants to the area, mostly professionals, did not follow the dispersal pattern of the Great Wave immigrants. Instead, they settled directly in the suburbs. Changes in the residential patterns of some Greek Americans in Northeastern Ohio have led to functional changes in their behavior. Greek Americans still place an important emphasis on the Greek church but value their suburban locations. The result has been larger religious functional regions that require longer travel distances for participation in the liturgy. It is also important for some Greek Americans to provide a cultural education for their children. In some instances, parents in our sample population travel a distance of at least 30 miles, twice a week, to take their children to a different parish where afternoon classes are taught in Greek. These parents believe that their children should be fluent in the Greek language and retain important aspects of their culture. For example, six families that reside in Akron, Ohio, traveled an average distance of 30 miles per trip to the Mother church in downtown Cleveland, where classes are offered in Greek. In an extreme case, one family traveled an average distance of 60 miles per trip to permit their child to attend Greek-American classes. The challenges presented by changing residential geography highlight one of the difficulties faced by Greek Americans, who seek to perpetrate the core elements of their culture by passing them on to their offspring. In the next section, we examine some of the core elements of Greek-American self-identity, using results from survey research. Figure 26.1

Third Generation

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DEFINING GREEK-AMERICAN ETHNICITY IN THE AKRON-CLEVELAND REGION Earlier in this chapter, we alluded to issues faced by Greek immigrants seeking entry into Anglo-American culture. The corollary issue is the erosion of aspects of Greek culture (Greek identity). The former is studied in the framework of acculturation theories, the latter in the context of maintenance of ethnic identity. As Berry (2001) asserted, acculturation consists of two uncorrelated dimensions: identification with a person’s heritage, and identification with the dominant society. After more than four generations of presence in the United States, identification with the customs and norms of the United States increased and certain Greek traditions and cultural practices were either dropped or modified. One of the characteristics of early Greek immigrants was the formation of topika somateia, or local societies whose membership included immigrants from a particular village, region, or island of Greece. Although this place-based spirit of localism was very strong among first-generation immigrants, it declined sharply among American-born members of the second and subsequent generations. With a few exceptions, most of the local societies ceased to exist with the passage of the first generation. The cultural attributes that are maintained constitute the core of the Greek-American ethnicity. This core provides the basis of Greek-American identity and serves as the glue that binds Greek Americans together. Defining this core in its entirety is no easy matter. Despite the decline of several other Greek traditions and practices, a number of ethnic elements remain as the glue of Greek-American ethnicity (Constantinou and Harvey, 1981; Constantinou, 1982; Constantinou and Harvey, 1985; Constantinou, 1989). A survey conducted among Greek Americans in the Akron-Cleveland region established a number of key dimensions of Greek-American ethnicity. The study focused on those who were actively or nominally participating in the life of the Greek-American church. The sample was drawn from church populations because studies of ethnic identity have demonstrated that ethnic group self-identification is prerequisite to being included in such studies. The inclusion of only Greek Church members in our study was a purposeful design to establish membership in the Greek community. More than 80 percent of all Greek Americans are known to be dues-paying members of the Greek Orthodox Church. Thus, a sample drawn from church records is representative of the Greek community at large. Our survey covered the six Greek Orthodox parishes in the Cleveland Standard Consolidated Statistical Area. We begin our discussion of Greek-American identity using these data from the 1980s. Although the information is dated, they are unique because they provide information on three generations of Greek Americans. After a discussion of these data, we use the results of a recent focus group to test the perseverance of these traits of Greek-American ethnicity. The questionnaire used in the survey considered many aspects of Greek-American life, established by other scholars of Greek-American ethnicity (e.g., Buxbaum, 1980). In addition to the usual questions about personal attributes, such as education, age, income, and residence, the questionnaire included more than 70 questions covering numerous aspects of Greek-American ethnicity. The questionnaire, printed in both English and Greek, was pretested on a sample of volunteers from the parish of the Annunciation in Akron, Ohio. It was then revised and distributed to adults in the six parishes. There were 446 usable responses. The sample included a few more males (53%) than females, more married families than singles (about 70% vs. 30%), and was an educated and economically well-off population (more than 58% had at least a year of post secondary education and earned more than $50,000.00 per year). Also, there was an obvious tie to Greece because slightly more than 70 percent of all respondents had visited Greece at least once. Of the total sample (446), 165 were first-generation Greek immigrants, while 167 were second-generation, and 114 reported that they were third-generation members born in the United States. Despite the sample being drawn from Church records, about 5 percent did not regard themselves as members of the Greek Orthodox Church. We used 17 measures from the survey questions that repeatedly appeared in the ethnic literature as the basis for ethnic self-identification. These included such items as the use of the Greek language at home and in correspondence, participation in ethnic institutional life, interests in Greek and Cyprus politics, and ethnic shopping, food preparation and cooking. These became the basis for our analysis of Greek-American ethnicity, which we discuss next within the context of ethnic persistence and change. Having data from three generations made the survey particularly useful for examining cross-generational patterns involving the first generation, immigrants born in Greece, the second generation, the children of immigrants, and the third generation, the grandchildren of immigrants. Discussion of the results illustrates how changing circumstances may require adaptation to retain a degree of ethnicity as cultural and ethnic norms are challenged by subsequent generations. Despite such challenges, certain core

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elements of Greek-American ethnicity are being perpetuated at the local level in this Northeastern Ohio region. We focus on the key elements that bound these Greek Americans together as a distinct community within the 1980s. This will be followed by a brief update that examines their contemporary importance.

GREEK-AMERICAN ETHNICITY: PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE The average responses to the 17 measures of ethnic self-identification are summarized by generation in Table 26.3. It is clear from the table that each of the three generations views the importance of these variables differently and that the overall importance of each declines with successive generations. In the first-generation responses, only three variables had a score of less than 3, while for the third generation only six variables had a score of 3 or higher. Those associated with use of the Greek language were among the most striking differences in the averages for the first- and third-generations. Specifically, third-generation Greek Americans were much less likely than Greek natives to rate knowledge of Greek and use of the Greek language in family communications as important dimensions of Greek ethnicity. Display of the flag of Greece was also less important to U.S.-born Greek Americans. It is interesting to note, however, that certain variables retained relatively high scores across generations. These included an emotional orientation toward the homeland (a key component of ethnicity), frequent attendance at church, and socialization with other Greek Americans. The preparation of Greek food (cooking) also maintained a relatively high rating among all three generations of Greek Americans. These examples of intergenerational cultural invariance are particularly impressive given the changing settlement geography of Greek Americans in the region. Because these measures are indicators of the trinity that is at the core of Greek American ethnicity (the Church, the Greek language, and the family) (Buxbaum, 1980, pp. 11–12), we discuss them in some detail below. Greek Language and Ethnicity The preservation of language is an extremely important component of culture and often is a dimension of ethnicity. In the case of Greek language use in America, great effort and sacrifice led to its common use in Greek homes in the early 20th century. This was the result of the concerted efforts and hard work of the family, the church, and the Greek school. Language strengthened family, preserved tradition, and served as a bond between Greek-American families. Among early immigrants, maintaining the language was an article of faith and the church organized parochial afternoon and Saturday schools to teach Greek language and culture to the Greek American youth. Despite these efforts, however, fluency in the Greek language declined in the U.S. Proportionately, as the numbers of first-generation members declined and numbers of subsequent generations increased, the use of the Greek language in the U.S. became less important. In addition, increasing numbers of Greek Americans have intermarried with other groups and converted to other religions (Constantinou, 1989). Not surprisingly, then, the importance of the Greek language in the home, as a component of Greek-American identity, declined in the Akron region (Table 26.3). This declining fluency in language beyond the first generation created a problem for understanding the church liturgy, which traditionally was chanted in Greek. Thus, a generational issue within the Greek-American population occurred, as younger people felt less of a need to speak the Greek language in their ethnic church. The language issue became even more complicated and divisive in the 1960s due to the infusion of large numbers of Greek immigrants. The language needs of the recent immigrants sparked considerable debate regarding the use of Greek language in the liturgy. This issue was formally addressed by the Clergy Laity Congress of 1970. The Congress decided, depending on the needs of the individual parish, to permit the use of either English or a combination of Greek and English, in church services after consultation with the bishop of each diocese. In cities where there are large numbers of Greeks and more than one church, a church’s membership size was largely determined by how much Greek was used in the liturgy. In communities with only one church, the dual language option creates tension that may be resolved by using both languages. In some parishes, the priest addresses this issue by labeling specific liturgies as Greek, English, or both. Thus, in addition to the normal pressures of assimilation within the host society, differences in a generational outlook and the needs of recent immigrants further complicate the retention of language as a cultural component, a dimension of Greek-American society.

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While use of the Greek language among Greek Americans declined significantly among the three generations (Table 26.3), the Greek Church, serving as a social institution, attempted to accommodate the third generation with English-based services, while meeting the needs of older and immigrant Greeks in the society. These efforts made the Church important and respected by all three generations. Table 26.3 Mean Responses by a Sample of Greek-Americans in the Cleveland-Akron Area VARIABLES Age Correspondence with Greece Frequency of attendance at Church Liturgy Knowledge of Greek Language Emotional orientation toward Greece Frequency of display of Greek flag Frequency of listen to Greek radio at home Frequency of Greek cooking at home Frequency of shopping at Greek grocery stores Frequency of exchange visits with Greek Americans Frequency of invite Greek Americans to home Frequency at Greek dances Frequency of close watch on Greek politics Protest messages to Congressmen Use Greek in family communication Vote for Greek American candidates irrespective of political affiliation Office in Greek-American organizations including the Church Committee membership

GENERATIONS First Second Third 4.21 3.69 1.83 4.17 2.78 1.99 4.24 4.01 3.28 4.32 3.39 2.65 4.38 3.83 3.45 1.39 0.81 0.66 4.14 3.14 2.39 4.52 4.01 3.53 4.08 3.32 2.77 4.53 4.53 3.99 4.58 4.58 4.28 4.35 4.26 4.12 3.76 2.59 2.11 3.94 2.96 2.27 2.27 0.44 0.16 3.58 2.17 1.86 2.62 2.83 2.14 2.67 3.16 2.38

The Greek Orthodox Church The issue of language notwithstanding, the Greek Orthodox Church remains the central Greek-American institution, as it had been during the four centuries of Ottoman rule in Greece. Greek-American ethnicity and Orthodoxy are tightly interwoven and, for the first generation immigrant, synonymous. Early immigrants knew that the church was an institution through which they could maintain their language, faith, family, and cultural traditions. Although the immigrants were not socially or geographically homogeneous, they rallied around a single purpose: maintenance and transmission of the Hellenic ethos to future generations. Thus, ethnic life revolved around the parish church and its various programs. Church programs involved religious teaching, language, and other social activities that united Greek-American families and preserved ethnicity. In the early decades of the 20th century, the organizational structure of the church went through turbulent changes. The formation of new church parishes was a phenomenon that correlated with the waves of immigration from Greece. Immigrants organized the largest number of parishes during the years from 1911 to 1930, mirroring the peak years of immigration. The Greek Orthodox Church is organized both functionally and spatially into a hierarchy. Functionally, the top of the hierarchy is the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America which is headquartered in New York City and headed by an archbishop. Subsumed under this Archdiocese are eight metropolises (formerly dioceses), and the Archdiocesan District in New York. While the archbishop is the presiding head of the Direct Archdiocesan

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District, a metropolitan (formerly bishop) presides over each of the eight metropolises which are composed of parishes in several states. In 2005, there were approximately 500 Greek Orthodox parishes in the United States organized into nine administrative units (Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, 2005). Greek Orthodox parishes exhibit a great degree of variability in terms of the extent to which they adhere to orthodox practices. Some parishes are more traditional, but others are more diluted and acculturated to American society. A critical development in the process of the Americanization of the church is the growing number of nonGreeks who have joined through marriage. As these converts assume an active role in parish affairs, the Americanization of the church will proceed at a faster pace. At the generational level, frequent church attendance was less important for third-generation Greek Americans than those of the other two generations. Despite this difference, the Greek Church remains the focal point of Greek-American identity for all three generations. In summary, there is no other Greek-American institution that rivals the Greek Orthodox Church in terms of membership, organizational structure, national visibility, or its influence on the preservation and transmission of ethnicity. Tied closely with the church is the Greek-American family unit. Social Organizations and Ethnic Networks Social institutions are the basis for a great deal of ethnic interactions. Ethnic networks develop and generate interactions between individuals at various geographic scales. Spatially, Greek-American organizations operate at three levels: national, regional and local. Networks have both a spatial and a functional dimension. National GreekAmerican organizations are of national scope and their memberships cut across local and regional origins. The American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA) is an example of such a national organization. Naturally, they bring ethnic unity to Greek Americans by providing important formal means of connecting those separated by distance and busy schedules. They are connected by an interest in broad Greek and Greek-American issues, including the Church and activities in their ancestral home. Regional organizations are those that appeal to immigrants from a certain province of Greece. Examples are organizations representing immigrants from the provinces of Epirus, Macedonia, Peloponnesus, and Sterea Hellas. The attachment of immigrants to their region and place of birth forms the underlying criterion for the formation and existence of one such network. To clarify attachment to place, one must consider that the physical geography of Greece promoted the isolation of many communities, such as the ancient city-states. Steep mountains divide the country into small valleys and plains that have little connection to surrounding areas. Such isolation promoted attachment to one’s native place. This attachment to place was transferred to the expatriates’ communities in the form of societies and organizations. Once a number of emigrants had established themselves in a certain area, they formed a society that was limited to people from the same region. A psychological need to socialize with people from similar surroundings was met through the creation of regional societies that were tied to the homeland. Local societies are those organized by immigrants from a specific village. Historically, Greeks have shown a passion for the formation of local societies, topika somateia. The criterion for the formation of a large number of such organizations was place of origin — small villages, islands, and the Hellenic Diaspora (Asia Minor, Cyprus, etc.). In 1907, there were about 100 such societies in the United States, with New York alone having thirty (Saloutos, 1964). This pattern continued, and by 1994 there was a total of 493 Greek societies (Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, 1994). Immigrants from Macedonia had 172 societies; those from the Peloponnesus had 123 societies. Research has shown that several attributes of ethnicity relate to the activities of these societies (Constantinou, 1996). Although members of different ethnic organizations, even local societies, often rise above narrower group interests and support broader ethnic causes and concerns, the local organization performs important networking functions. The Kalavasos Fraternity is an example of a local society. It represents immigrants from the village of Kalavasos on the island of Cyprus. In 2001, the village of Kalavasos had a population of 638 inhabitants (Statistical Service, 2002). As noted earlier, social networks thrive through local institutions and the Greek-American Church is one of the most vital institutions that provides important functions that unite the local church population. Members of local place-based organizations also participate in the various parish programs and activities, connecting one social institution with another. Together, these organizations (church and place-based) play an integral role in total community life.

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These are the bases for keeping many Greek Americans united through ethnic interactions, including festivals, food preparation and consumption, church discussions, and other issues important to ethnic identity. In summary, ethnic networks developed from social institutions and spatial and functional dimensions that reinforce Greek-American ethnicity. National, regional, and local institutions have created overlapping networks. In an effort to remain connected and assist the villages and towns left behind, Greek-Americans formed social institutions. These institutional networks link Greek-Americans in important ways, reinforcing Greek-American ethnic identity through fraternity, work, socialization, and worship. Social institutions indeed are the glue for maintaining ethnicity. Our survey results for 1980–81 revealed some sharp differences between the first and third generation respondents on some factors, perhaps indicating some precipitous decline in the importance of some items that historically supported Greek-American ethnicity. At the same time, the results of that survey substantiated the vital roles of the Greek-American church, family, and ethnic networks among the sample population in establishing the key dimensions of Greek-American self-identification across three generations. Attending church frequently, Greek food preparation and cooking, affinities to homeland, and socialization remained important dimensions of Greek self-identity by 1981. Social networks were key linkages in the maintenance of ethnicity. The importance of exchanging visits with other Greek-Americans, inviting Greek-Americans to one’s home, and frequently attending Greek dances as ethnic social functions, were strong factors for all three generational groups. Social networks remain a strong component of Greek-American identity.

DIMENSIONS OF CONTEMPORARY GREEK-AMERICAN ETHINICITY: A PRELIMINARY REPORT FROM A 2005 FOCUS GROUP Given the new suburban patterns, the aging of the Greek-American population, and the generational differences reported from our previous survey, we decided to update the information in 2005 via focus group analysis. Space limitations here prohibit a lengthy discussion of the results. Our major goal for this chapter is to examine the persistence of the key dimensions of Greek-American ethnicity that were self-defined among the three generations in the previous study of Northeastern Ohio Greek Americans. An initial focus group conducted by the first author in 2005 at the Annunciation Church in Akron, Ohio, was completed in time to furnish preliminary results for this chapter. A total of ten parishioners participated in an hour-long session with the author serving as the facilitator. The generational status of participants was as follows: two were first generation, three were second generation, two were third, one was fourth, and two were converts to the Greek-American Church. The same ethnic identity categories that appeared in Table 26.3 were provided as a hand-out to the participants. They were asked to select and rank the top five attributes of Greek-American ethnicity, or, alternatively, they could create their own. After the selections were completed, participants were asked to comment on their selections. The entire focus group session was taped and transcribed. The following ranking emerged from the combined ratings of the participants: frequency of attendance at the liturgy, emotional orientation toward Greece, knowledge of Greek language, Greek cooking at home, holding office in Greek-American organizations, including the church, and frequency of exchange of visits with Greek Americans. It is clear from these preliminary findings that most of the key dimensions of Greek-American ethnic identity reported in our previous study remain important as we begin the 21st century. Church, socialization with other Greeks, preparing and cooking Greek foods in the home, and an emotional attachment to Greece remain important to Greek-American identity in this Northeastern Ohio region. Only knowledge of the Greek language seems to change. Perhaps additional results from our other focus groups will clarify the role of the language factor in the current period. Table 26.4 reports the typical comments of the participants of the focus group. Although a wide range of opinions was expressed during the one-hour session, the comments seemed inevitably to return to the importance of place, socialization, family, and the Church. As aptly expressed by one participant: “I was attracted to the family and the religion ... it all comes back to the Church, the center point of keeping the Greek thing going.”

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According to the official records, 735,059 immigrants from Greece arrived in the United States during the period 1824 to 2003. The number of Greek immigrants peaked during the first two decades of the 20th century. A record of 184,201 immigrants arrived between 1911 and 1920. Smaller flows occurred since then and, after 1980, the flow of Greek immigrants declined. Table 26.4 Summary of Comments of a Focus Group Session Comment

Generation

Gender

Our faith has to be preserved: the Greek Orthodox faith saved our tradition, and should be maintained

First

M

Church is the number one. If you don’t belong to the Church, you are lost

First

F

Back in the 1930s, you said what part of Greece you were from, Arcadian, Cretan

First

M

Being Greek means being Greek Orthodox. Exceedingly difficult to separate

Second

F

Greek dances was the only contact and diversion we had. I felt I belonged somewhere

Second

F

Marrying someone who was Greek was very important. Dances: an extension of my whole life

Second

F

Third

F

Fourth

F

As a convert, I married a Greek and there was no question that I would become Greek Orthodox ... that is where we are centered

Convert

F

I was attracted to the family and the religion ... it all comes back to the church, the center point of keeping the Greek thing going

Convert

M

My Greek American identity goes hand in hand with the church and attending the liturgy. I am so proud of our Greek heritage, we have such a rich and deep heritage, it is what has kept us strong, in addition to our Orthodoxy Greek cooking at home enforces traditions and enlightens the holidays Nowadays, everybody loves the fact that I am ethnic; they see a sense of belonging heritage, things Americans don’t have anymore. My great grandparents were the complete opposite, they shortened their name

The Hellenic identity is considered the synthesis of the classical Hellenic tradition and the influence of Byzantine Orthodoxy. This is the cultural identity that Greek immigrants brought to the United States. Although Greek immigrants made some adjustments and changes within the pluralistic American society, they maintained certain core aspects of the Hellenic ethos, namely the pivotal social institutions of language, church, and family. The church and its affiliated organizations have sponsored religious services and sociocultural activities, which continue to focus on family and attract all Greek-American generations. These institutions, therefore, contribute to GreekAmerican ethnicity. Regional and local societies also reinforced the role of the church in transmitting Greek-American ethnic values across generations and provided social networks that nurture ethnicity. In broad terms, early Greek communities formed functional regions centered on the parish church, which often was located in the center of a major U.S. city. Since WWII, a gradual but constant movement of the Greek-

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American middle class to the suburbs occurred. This resulted in a larger geographic activity space for Greek Americans, who traveled longer distances to participate in ethnic activities at central city parish churches in the AkronCleveland region. Consequently, Greek-American ethnic space has been redefined and expanded. The Greek immigrant tendency to form organizations and societies is largely a manifestation of the localism and provincialism that characterized Greek society since ancient times. While many of these organizations were shortlived, some have survived to the present. As Greek immigrant numbers declined, some organizations were unable to make the transition from an immigrant to an American-born membership. The smaller societies, for the most part, could not survive. Even those that remain face obstacles in maintaining their membership rosters and in getting the youth involved. Changes in American society, such as employed parents and suburbanization, likely make participation in social activities more difficult. Based on these changes, the future may not be bright for traditional local societies. Yet, some continue to play a basic role in the social exchanges that occur through networks that these organizations foster. The story of Greek-American ethnicity is one of persistence and change in the face of changing national, regional, and local milieus. Despite important social changes, survey results have demonstrated the continuing importance of family, affinity to homeland, church, and social interactions to the maintenance of Greek-American ethnicity. As the American society and the Greek-American ethnic group evolve, there will be other factors to challenge and support the maintenance of Greek-American ethnicity. While social interactions based on church likely remain the glue of Greek-American ethnic identity, changes in technology may offer some different opportunities for ethnic maintenance. Although unstudied at present, the availability of relatively inexpensive television programming from Greece via satellite technology and the Internet may provide critical new ways to overcome the friction of geographic distance and busy schedules that prohibit third generation members from securing information about their ancestral home and culture. The Internet also may provide new opportunities for learning the Greek language and therefore supporting its use in the home. The maintenance of the language also would dramatically increase the level of awareness of changes in the ancestral land.

Chapter 27

Disparities in Economic Status among Native-Born and Foreign-Born Populations in Paterson, New Jersey THOMAS Y. OWUSU INTRODUCTION Immigration continues to contribute significantly to the growth of the U.S. population. In the last two decades, about one million immigrants have been admitted every year. Although the number of immigrants has remained high, the source regions have changed. Since the 1960s, the numbers and share of immigrants coming from Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa have increased, while the proportion of immigrants coming from traditional sources in Europe has declined. Like earlier groups, however, recent immigrants are redefining the economic, demographic, social, and cultural character of American cities, which are often their preferred destinations (Cross, 1998; Castles and Miller, 1993). Given the continuing high levels of immigration and the impact of immigrants on American society, the level of academic attention given to the issue is high (Camarato, 2001; Kraly and Miyares, 2001; 1999; Borjas; Portes and Rumbaut, 1990). The economic impacts of American immigration policy, and the economic difficulties experienced by immigrants in particular, have been the subject of considerable research effort and public debate. Some studies have concluded that immigration has become a major factor in the size and growth of poverty. According to Camarato (2001), despite a strong economy over much of the last two decades, the poverty rate for persons in immigrant-headed households not only has remained high, but actually has increased significantly. While the above assertion may be generally valid, it is of course recognized that immigrants in the U.S. are not a homogeneous group; they differ in terms of their demographic, economic, and social attributes, including educational background and skills, period of immigration, age, race, language proficiency, and so forth. Thus it is expected that their economic experiences will also differ considerably. It is known, for example, that poverty rates among immigrants in the U.S. varies significantly by region of origin. In general, immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean have the highest poverty rates, while those from Europe and Asia tend to have the lowest rates (Camarato, 2001). These findings are consistent with those from similar studies in Canada (Lo et al., 2001). Furthermore, relatively little research has focused on the experiences of immigrants groups in different urban settings. The paucity of research in this area is striking, given that the economic experiences of immigrants depends in part on the local labor market. Indeed income disparities may reflect unequal opportunities available to immigrants and native-born Americans in different urban markets. Research also shows that immigrants who work in urban areas with large immigrant concentrations can benefit from the presence of enclave businesses, although the precise effects of the immigrant enclave economy on the earning capacity of immigrants remains contentious. Urban locations also differ in unemployment rates, which adversely affect opportunities of job seekers, especially recent immigrants. The preceding observations suggest that generalizations about the economic experiences of immigrants may be misleading. What is required, therefore, are case studies that seek to analyze variations in the economic conditions of immigrant groups in different cities. These observations provide a rationale for this study. This chapter will examine differences in the economic status (measured by income) of native-born Americans and the foreign-born in Paterson, New

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Jersey, and then explain the disparity in terms of a variety of human capital and personal factors including education, occupation, period of immigration, race, and English language proficiency. The City of Paterson is located within the New York-New Jersey Metropolitan Area (see Figure 27.1), and it is the third largest city in New Jersey, with a population of approximately 170,000. The city provides a suitable urban setting for exploring various propositions in the literature regarding the economic experiences of immigrants in U.S. cities. First, immigration has not only contributed to the growth of the city’s population, but it has shaped its economic and social character. Second, in accordance with a broader national trend, the origins of immigrants coming to Paterson has changed significantly in the past three decades. The majority of immigrants coming to Paterson since the 1970s have come from Latin America, Asia, and Eastern and Central Europe. Third, the poverty rate in Paterson has varied considerably since 1970, but has remained consistently higher than the rate for most cities in Passaic County and New Jersey as a whole. The development and growth of Paterson and the dynamics of economic and demographic transition in the city are further discussed in the following sections

ESTABLISHMENT AND GROWTH OF THE CITY OF PATERSON Founded in 1792, Paterson is recognized as the first planned industrial city in America. After the Revolutionary War of 1765, Alexander Hamilton (Washington’s first secretary of state) and his associates concluded that while the war had established the political independence of the U.S., there was the need to establish its independence from a commercial and manufacturing viewpoint. With this in mind they set out to lay the foundation of a system of domestic manufacturers. After examining several localities, Paterson was selected because it offered more locational advantages than any of the other sites examined. In 1791, therefore, Hamilton and his associates formed the Society for Useful Manufacturers (SUM). A year later, the directors of SUM bought 700 acres of land above and below the Passaic Falls, and proposed to build a mill and a dam to divert the Passaic River onto their property and return it to the river below the Falls. Two days later, a six-square mile area surrounding the Falls was created as a town and called Paterson, in honor of William Paterson, the Governor of New Jersey and one of the framers of the U.S. Constitution (Carpenter, 1947). Paterson’s site offered unique physical advantages for manufacturing including the availability of water power source, abundant natural resources, and a natural river way. The Great Falls of the Passaic afforded water power not equaled in any of the states in the eastern portion of the U.S. The lack of accessible waterways was adequately compensated by good land transportation facilities, including access to many interstate roads. Its proximity to major markets in the Northeast, particularly its position between New York and Philadelphia, with their mercantile interests, and proximity to raw materials, also contributed to Paterson’s growth. Massive immigration to Paterson provided labor of all types, both skilled and unskilled. Most of the immigrants who came were an overflow of those who had originally planned to settle in New York City. From the time of its founding to the first-half of the twentieth century, Paterson experienced a period of economic growth. By 1900 Paterson was among the top five purely industrial cities in the nation. Its principal industries were cotton, locomotives, and silk. Paterson dominated the silk industry in the U.S. and became known as the “Silk City of the World.” By the turn of the century, however, Paterson was experiencing economic difficulties, including the great silk strike of 1913. Paterson also failed to keep pace with developments in the textile field. In the process, the advantages of Paterson passed to other regions. The 1929 Depression marked the final demise of the silk and locomotive industries. Economic decline in Paterson continued in post-WWII era. A wide variety of manufacturing establishments in Paterson left for suburban locations. The development of shopping malls in surrounding suburbs also forced the closure or relocation of many downtown retailing operations. The economic and social impacts of economic decentralization in Paterson were significant. Among other things, it resulted in a high rate of unemployment, poverty, and urban decay. In 1970, Paterson ranked 47th among the nation’s poorest cities, but by 1980 it was fourth among the nation’s cities with populations of 100,000 or more. The poverty rate for Paterson (25.2%) was more than double the estimated national average of 12.5 percent. Despite this economic history, Paterson’s population has been relatively stable since the turn of the century. The relative population stability stands in stark contrast to trends in many other older central cities in New Jersey in

Disparities in Economic Status among Native-Born and Foreign-Born Populations

355

particular and in the Northeast in general. Although the city’s population has remained stable, the ethnic and racial characteristics of its residents have changed. Up until 1950, the white population represented 95 percent of the total population, but by 1990, this proportion had declined to 41 percent. Massive immigration from non-traditional sources, Latin America, Asia, and Africa contributed to this ethnic diversity. In 1990, fifty-six different ethnic groups were represented in Paterson. Figure 27.2 shows the spatial distribution of the foreign-born and native-American populations in Paterson. There is a heavy concentration of the foreign-born population in the inner city, with relatively small proportions in the fringe areas. The economic and social history of Paterson makes it an ideal urban setting for exploring issues regarding immigration and the economic status of immigrants. This is especially relevant given the view that increased immigration has contributed to a high rate of poverty in U.S. cities (Camarato, 2001).

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF IMMIGRANTS The economic performance of immigrants in the labor market has been well researched. In these studies, the economic difficulties experienced by many recent immigrants have been attributed to several factors including lack of qualifications and education, restructuring and the changing economic opportunities (Hicks and Nivin, 1996), and discrimination in the labor market (Reitz and Bretton, 1995). Figure 27.1

356

Thomas Y. Owusu Figure 27.2

The primary explanation of ethnic and racial differences in economic status stems from theories of ethnic assimilation. In general, investigators using the assimilationist framework have tended to examine ethnic income and occupational inequality following the theory of human capital and status attainment. Scholars in this tradition view labor market outcomes as a function of individual human capital characteristics and resources (Singh and Kposowa, 1996). According to the human capital model, the primary determinants of a person’s earnings are his or her investments in schooling, on-the-job training, and labor market experience (Singh and Kpsowa, 1996). The model tends to downplay ascribed individual characteristics such as race, color, sex, or national origin. In immigration research, frequently other variables such as duration of residence in the receiving country, English proficiency, and region of residence are included in the earnings models as controls (Borjas, 1994). Tests of human capital theory, however, have generally found that human capital differences do not account for all of the observed income inequality between immigrants and the native-born population. Consequently, the interpretation of residual difference has been the subject of much debate. Some investigators interpret the residual as labor market discrimination, that is, unequal rates of income returns among individuals with equivalent backgrounds (Hirchman, 1978). Others have suggested that the remaining racial/ethnic inequality is due to differences in human capital, sociocultural, and psychological variables excluded from the analysis, including the quality of schooling, job performance, motivations, aspirations, ambition, hard work, and frugality (Sowell, 1981). The empirical support for this is however rather weak. In the following sections, the literature on some of the determinants of income is reviewed.

Disparities in Economic Status among Native-Born and Foreign-Born Populations

357

DETERMINANTS OF EMPLOYMENT INCOME Educational Attainment Immigrants are extremely diverse in terms of their education and skill levels; they include highly skilled persons as well as large numbers of poorly educated, low-skilled persons. Research shows that immigrants are more likely than natives to lack a high school diploma, and are also more likely than natives to have a college degree. As a result of the disparities in education, significant concentrations of immigrants are found in occupations that require both relatively high and relatively low levels of education. Also, some are recruited directly for well-paid professional and managerial positions. Immigrant women often face additional burdens because of their gender (Boyd, 1992). Largely responsible for domestic work, immigrant women find that competing demands of home and paid work often restrict their job search to the local neighborhood. Marked by gender relations in their countries of origin, many immigrant women enter the American job market at a serious disadvantage because of limited education and training and restricted access to paid employment in their countries of origin (Gabaccia, 1992). Immigrant women also confront the same barriers to employment as native-born American women, including labor market segmentation that concentrates women in poorly paid secondary occupations. English Language Proficiency Language skills — the set of skills required to communicate with others in printed, written and verbal form — are among the most basic factors affecting performance in the labor market. Thus English language proficiency is a major determinant of economic progress for immigrants in the U.S. Indeed schooling and pre-immigration labor market experience may be of little, if any, value to an immigrant with no knowledge of the language of the destination country. Previous research has shown for several immigrant receiving countries that greater proficiency in the destination language enhances labor market earnings and that this investment provides a high rate of return (Chiswick and Miller, 1995). Greater proficiency in the destination language can enhance earnings by enabling immigrants to find a better labor market match between their skills and the requirement of employers. English language deficiency acts to depress the wages of immigrants substantially below what their other human capital endowments — education, and on the job experience — suggest they should earn in the American labor market. Studies in Canada also show that immigrants who cannot conduct conversation in an official language and those who usually speak a non-official language at home, have earnings around 10 to 12 percent lower than immigrants who usually speak an official language at home, when other variables are the same (Chiswick and Miller, 2003). Although other studies have found significant effects of English proficiency on the economic condition of immigrants in the U.S. and Canada, the matter remains clouded in ambiguity. Surprisingly, some studies have not found a significant connection between English proficiency and economic performance among immigrants. One explanation is that some surveys, like the U.S. Census of Population, do ask individuals to specify qualitatively how well they speak/understand English, with responses such as very well, well, and not well. However, they ignore the importance of reading and writing. They are also based on subjective, self-reported assessments that can be subject to personal bias and are difficult to quantify. The lack of a clear relationship between language proficiency and income is also evident in the fact that Asian immigrants have the highest wages among all groups but their English proficiency levels are just slightly above the average for all immigrants. This can be partly explained by higher levels of education. Occupational Concentration Besides education and language, income disparity may also be explained in terms of the concentration of immigrants in certain occupations. It is known that immigrants, especially those in central cities, frequently live and work in communities dominated by co-ethnics, and may be isolated from the mainstream economy. Thus they may be concentrated in secondary and tertiary labor markets in which rewards for human capital tend to be relatively low. Waldinger argues that immigrant enclaves serve as economic launching pads for immigrant workers, creating oppor-

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Thomas Y. Owusu

tunities for entrepreneurship and upward economic mobility. In addition, immigrant enclaves could reduce or eliminate the need for mastery of English (Waldinger, 1996). Basic economic theory, however, suggests that a system of enclaves could also restrict opportunities for immigrants. Excess supplies of immigrants in enclaves could produce “crowding” effects that drive down wages for immigrants (LaLonde and Topel, 1991). Evidence compiled by Waldinger strongly suggests adverse effects of immigrant crowding on immigrant earnings within New York City enclaves. His analysis of earnings of workers shows that average earnings of immigrants working in ethnic enclaves are significantly lower than those of immigrants of the same group outside the enclave (Waldinger, 1996). Thus, it is possible that enclaves could simultaneously facilitate the integration of immigrants into the economy, and, as a result of crowding, reduce immigrant earnings. That is, low earnings and rapid integration may co-exist in enclaves.

DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY Data for this study were drawn primarily from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 1990 Public Use Micro Data Samples (PUMS, 1 percent sample, New Jersey). PUMS 1 percent data contain records for a sample of housing units (in metropolitan areas in the U.S. with a population of at least 100,000), with information on the characteristics of each of the housing units and the persons within it, including educational attainment, ethnic origin, hours worked, type of income, and other relevant information. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) is employed to analyze the data, using both univariate and multivariate statistics. Given that the number of weeks worked in a year and whether the employment was part-time or full time have an obvious effect on the level of employment income reported, the analysis was limited to those who reported working mainly full-time and for 40 weeks or more in 1990. This approach has the advantage of eliminating immigrants who had lived and worked in Paterson for only a short time in 1990, who may have experienced prolonged unemployment during the first year in the country. It also excluded all those who, whether on a voluntary or involuntary basis, were not employed for a large part of the year, together with those who were employed mainly part-time. In this way a better understanding could be gained concerning the determinants of employment income for most labor force participants and a fairer comparison made between groups.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Results of an independent-samples test indicate that there is a statistically significant difference (p0.05). This means that the disparity in income between the native-born and the foreign-born is not caused by differences in educational attainment between the two groups. Disparities in income remain even after controlling for educational attainment (Table 27.1). For example, among those with college degree or higher, native-born Americans earned 15 percent more than their foreign-born counterparts. Obviously, the rewards for education are higher for native-born than for the foreign-born.

359

Disparities in Economic Status among Native-Born and Foreign-Born Populations English Language Proficiency

The economic performance of immigrants in the U.S. depends in part on their English language proficiency. As expected, a high proportion of immigrants (40%) have no or limited proficiency in the English language, compared with 5 percent of the native-born. As Tables 27.2 and 27.3 show, immigrants with lower proficiency in English language, as well as those who speak a language other than English at home, have lower earnings than those who are more proficient in English and those who speak only English at home. Thus, while the educational attainment of immigrants is comparable to that of the native-born, their low English language proficiency may have served to limit the employment opportunities otherwise available to them, and led to their concentration in specific occupations, often low-skilled and low-paying. Table 27.1 Educational attainment * Income * Birthplace Education

Place of Birth

Mean

N

Mean Difference

Born in the U.S. Foreign-Born Total

$20,472 $17,478 $19,339

230 140 370

$2994 (15% more)

High School Graduate / Some College Born in the U.S. Foreign-Born Total

$23,400 $21,366 $22,789

326 140 466

$2034 (10% more)

Born in the U.S. Foreign-Born Total

$34,157 $28,823 $32,487

79 36 115

$5334 (16% more)

Born in the U.S. Foreign-Born Total

$23,678 $20,493 $22,619

635 316 951

$3185 (13% more)

Less than High School Diploma

College Graduate or more

Total

Total population Native-born Americans Foreign-born Less than High School High School / Some College College Graduate or more

$22,619 $23,678 $20,493 $17,478 $21,366 $28,823

Source: Author’s calculation

Industrial and Occupational Segregation Given the variation in wages by industry and occupation, the incomes of immigrants may be explained in terms of their concentration in particular industries and occupations. In general, immigrants are over-represented in specific industries compared to the native-born, especially in manufacturing (41% vs. 29%), wholesale and retail (23% vs.16.4%), and construction (7% vs. 4.4%). In contrast, they are underrepresented in transportation and com-

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Thomas Y. Owusu

munications (4.7%), finance, insurance, and real estate (1.9%), and professional services (11.1%). Given comparable educational attainment, this occupational segregation may be attributed to their weak language skills, recency of their migration and, perhaps, the reliance on ethnic networks in the job search process. Immigrants are concentrated not only in specific industries but also in specific occupations (Table 27.4). Specifically, immigrants are heavily concentrated in low-skilled jobs, especially precision production and craft repair occupations (19.3%), operators, laborers, fabricators (25.6%), and also in service and transportation occupations compared to 13 percent, 17.7 percent and six percent of the native-born population, respectively. In contrast, they are under-represented in professional, managerial, and administrative support and clerical jobs.

Table 27.2 English Language Proficiency * Income Ability to speak English Speaks only English

Place of Birth Born in the U.S. Foreign-Born Total

Mean

N

$24,691

452

$22,012 $24,691

38 490

$23,007

87

$21,217 $22,178

75 162

$20,295

60

$21,823 $21,236

96 156

$16,605

32

$18,111 $17,665

76 108

$31,125

4

$18,598 $20,003

31 35

$23,678

635

$20,493 $22,619

316 951

Very Well Born in the U.S. Foreign-Born Total Well Born in the U.S. Foreign-Born Total Not well Born in the U.S. Foreign-Born Total Not at all Born in the U.S. Foreign-Born Total Total Born in the U.S. Foreign-Born Total Source: Author’s calculation

361

Disparities in Economic Status among Native-Born and Foreign-Born Populations Table 27.3 Language Other than English at Home * Income Place of Birth

Mean

N

Born in the U.S.

$21,176

183

Foreign-Born

$20,285

278

Total

$20,639

461

Born in the U.S.

$24,691

452

Foreign-Born

$22,012

38

Total

$24,483

490

Born in the U.S.

$23,678

635

Foreign-Born

$20,493

316

Total

$22,619

951

Yes, Speaks another Language at home

No, Speaks only English at home

Total

Source: Author’s calculation

Table 27.4 Occupation * Birth Place

Occupation

US-Born

Foreign-Born

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Managerial/Professional

108

17.0

28

8.9

Technical/Admin Support

21

3.3

2

6.0

Sales Occupation

38

6.0

26

8.2

Admin Support/Clerical

130

20.5

25

7.9

Service Occupations

89

14.0

50

15.8

Farming/Forestry

5

0.8

1

0.3

Precision production, Craft Repair Occu

83

13.1

61

19.3

Operators, Fabricators, Laborers

74

17.7

81

25.6

Transportation/ Material Moving

87

13.7

42

13.3

Occupations Chi square=69.988; p 0.05 level, the groups that are statistically different in terms of their mean incomes are the native-born Americans (M=$24, 522) and the most recent immigrant group (M=$18,297). Although the actual difference in mean score between the groups was quite small, the data provides support for the assimilation theory.

Table 27.6a Period of Immigration * Income Period of Immigration

N

Income

Born in the U.S.

494

$24,522

1980–1990

156

$18,297

1970–1979

144

$22,251

1960–1969

114

$21,288

1950–1959

38

$20,760

Before 1950

5

$24,598

All Immigrants

316

$20,493

Total

951

$22,619

Source: Author’s data

364

Thomas Y. Owusu Table 27.6b Year of Entry (I)

Year of Entry (J)

Mean Difference (I-J)

Sig

Born in the U.S.

1980–1990

6224.8539 *

.000

1970–1979

2271.2198

.513

1960–1969

3234.5418

.218

1950–1959

3761.7348

.592

Before 1950

-75.3704

1.000

*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level Source: Author’s calculation

Gender and Income Employment income is also influenced by gender. For the population as a whole, males earned more than females ($24,695 vs. $18,990). Foreign-born males earned more ($21,738) than their female counterparts ($15,867). Indeed disparity in income was wider between foreign-born females and the U.S.-born population ($23,678) or the total population ($22,619). These findings suggest that foreign-born females face several constraints. They tend to have lower levels of schooling and lower English proficiency. Their domestic duties may also serve to limit the employment opportunities available to them. Race and Income Racial differences in income are shown in Table 27.7. Employment income was higher for whites ($25,031) than for blacks ($21,889) and “other race” ($19,641). Even among the foreign-born population, whites earned higher income ($22,053) than blacks ($19,175), and other race ($19,297). These differences may reflect racial differences in educational attainment. For example, 33 percent of whites had less than a high school diploma compared to 36 percent of blacks and 56 percent of other race. At the same time, 18 percent of whites had college degree or higher compared to seven percent of blacks and 10 percent of other race. The lower incomes of the foreign-born population may be related to their marital status. Specifically, immigrants who were divorced or separated earned considerably less ($15,694) than their married ($21,250) or single ($21,384) counterparts. To determine the combined effect of several variables on income disparity, a logistic regression analyses was performed. The goal was to correctly predict the category of outcome (or group membership) for the individual cases, based on several predictor (independent) variables, namely education, occupation, English language proficiency, place of birth, occupation, race, gender, and marital status. Cases were classified into two groups, namely a low-income group and a high-income group, based on the median income: those who earned below the median income were classified as low income and those who earned above the median income were classified as high income. Each individual variable was able to correctly predict from 48 to 60 percent of group membership. Education, gender, race, marital status, and English language ability were all found to be statistically related to income (p 18 years). The impact of the military as discussed by Roseman is evident in the relatively long duration of immigrants from places where the United States has stationed troops since the end of WWII. Theses places of origin include the Philippines, Korea, Japan, and Western Europe. Note that East Europeans have the highest average age, relative to their average duration. A large number of older Russian and Ukrainian Jewish settlers were reunited with their adult children living in the United States, particularly after the break-up of the former Soviet Union. The youthfulness of the Mexican immigrants is due to a large number of single, young men who are part of a large labor pool in selected industries. A large number of them did not arrive from the gateways of Los Angeles but from local surrounding counties where most of the employment was in the agricultural industry (Dakan, 2005). Table 28.3 Mean Age and Duration in the US Country or Region

Age

Duration

Mexico/Latin America

32.8

10.6

India

40.3

13.6

Cuba

42.2

8.6

China

42.3

14.3

Vietnam

38.6

11

Bosnia

35.7

2.9

Korea

44.3

16.4

Philippines

45.9

20.4

Japan

47.3

23.4

East Europe

51.1

18.3

Mideast

38.7

18.3

West Europe

56.4

30.8

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS: MIDDLE CLASS STATUS Language Ability In addition to arriving in different periods and with differing motivations for settlement in Louisville, the immigrant population is very diverse in occupation, education, and English language ability. These social

Changes in the Heartland

373

factors play an important role in what W. A. V. Clark has identified as a milestone in the assimilation of immigrants into American society, the arrival into the middle class (Clark, 2003). The method used to weigh the factors that affect entrance into the middle class in this chapter draw heavily from the seminal work by Clark. One of the key elements in at least economic assimilation, if not cultural assimilation, is the ability of household to use English (Carliner, 2000). The PUMS data indicate that, in general, more than half of the immigrant households have some language ability. The Census categories report persons in households that speak English “very well,” “well,” or “some” (the lowest ability in the PUMS data is “not at all”). These definitions are somewhat broad, but the Census descriptions would place the minimum use of “some spoken English” as approximately the fluency of what most Americans would have in a foreign language after a year of freshman language instruction. The language of instruction in most Asian-Indian schools is English, so it is not surprising that their skills are substantial in this area. Similarly, many European educational systems teach English as a second language. It is likely that there is a generational gap in language ability. Language ability is not presented by age groups, but it is clear that in a large number of households that, particularly among recent Asian immigrants, children are the principal interpreters for the household. Although I did not produce the table of school attendance, almost all of the immigrant children of school age are enrolled in local schools. Many are in college or community college. Educational Attainment and Professional Employment The greatest internal diversity among immigrant heads of households (Table 28.4 and subsequent tables were tabulated strictly for the approximately 10,000 immigrants identified as head of household as the household is the principal economic unit and the economic status of that unit is dependent on the major earner) lies in the highest educational level attained. This table tells a story of highly divergent trajectories as each group prepares for and participates in the economy. It is clear that within group diversity of educational attainment is high, but not nearly as high as the diversity across groups. The Mexican and Latin American populations are faced with a plurality in the lowest level of educational attainment and decline in proportion with successively higher levels of education. There are no Hispanics in the PUMS sample with post-baccalaureate degrees. Vietnamese and Bosnians have similar low levels in the graduate school ranks, yet Bosnians recorded no immigrants with less than some high school and most had a high school diploma. The Vietnamese (23.04%) were second to the Hispanics (35.58%) in inability to rise above the 8th grade, followed by the Japanese (15.25%). However, over a quarter of the Japanese graduated from college. The Asian Indians, Chinese, and Koreans had the overall highest levels of education. Fully one-third of the Chinese heads of households held professional degrees or doctorates. The Ph.D. was also common among the Asian Indians and the Koreans. The rates of higher educational attainment for these groups far surpass that of the resident population, native or immigrant, in Metro Louisville. These levels of attainment and professional accomplishment identify the individuals with such achievement as “globalized professionals” (Poulson, 2002), who would be comfortable in a number of cities linked to the global economy (see Table 28.5). The preceding table confirms the wide range of personal attainment within the immigrant community. These occupational categories include those that require credentials generally beyond that which can be earned by a bachelor’s degree only. The type of professional occupation differs across the various groups but includes accountants, clergy, lawyers, medical doctors, scientists, dentists and college professors. Immigrants from India and China clearly have relatively high concentrations in the professions which exceed the rates for the general population. East Asian Indians are more likely to be physicians than those from China, who, in turn, are more likely to be college professors. If managers were added to the list, we would see an increase in both Hispanics and Koreans, but in different types of establishments. Because of the very high concentrations in the groups noted above, immigrants overall exceed professional employment by a substantial margin over the native-born population.

374

William Dakan Table 28.4 Highest Grade Attained ( percent)

Country Mexico/LA India Cuba China Vietnam Bosnia Korea Phillipines Japan East Europe Mideast West Europe Total

8th Grade 35.58 2.39 8.84 2.08 23.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.25 0.00 2.39 7.23 7.21

12th No Grad 31.32 5.05 30.87 5.65 22.30 6.89 24.35 4.20 0.00 0.00 9.42 11.32 12.11

HS

Some

graduate 15.25 7.80 16.38 15.45 32.84 71.68 39.64 23.10 0.00 16.00 17.17 21.56 21.39

college 13.74 2.39 12.17 6.84 4.17 0.00 6.99 28.08 53.11 35.22 34.64 20.48 18.47

BA/BS 4.12 37.41 14.64 17.68 15.20 17.09 11.14 37.01 24.29 13.46 17.25 15.97 18.69

Masters 0.00 21.81 0.43 18.57 2.45 4.34 4.15 2.62 7.34 18.24 12.75 10.94 10.16

Table 28.5 Percent Professional Employment Mexico/Latin America

7.42

India

76.60

Cuba

6.38

China

61.07

Vietnam

19.36

Bosnia

7.65

Korea

27.20

Philippines

35.43

Japan

41.81

East Europe

39.80

Mideast

23.04

West Europe

34.43

Total

33.25

Professional 0.00 5.59 15.65 15.30 0.00 0.00 0.78 4.99 0.00 7.22 5.22 7.37 5.97

PhD 0.00 17.55 1.01 18.42 0.00 0.00 12.95 0.00 0.00 9.85 1.16 5.12 5.99

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

375

Changes in the Heartland Table 28.6 Regression Results Related to Middle-Class Status Odds Ratios Variable

Total

Mexico/LA

India

Cuba

China

Vietnam

Bosnia

Professional

1.00

5.44

0.22

7.23

2.90

2.96

4.11

Duration

2.07

0.74

7.86

1.15

18.05

1.80

4.05

Workers

0.31

3.42

0.24

4.50

0.25

0.25

2.64

Education

1.08

2.45

0.74

2.39

0.75

0.75

1.06

Language Access

1.52

29.21

2.13

1.80

9.79

1.91

1.71

Age

1.04

1.19

0.98

5.50

0.97

0.97

1.79

Variable

Korea

Philippines

Japan

East Europe

Mid East

West Europe

Professional

3.25

14.37

3.75

4.63

0.50

1.04

Duration

3.30

0.66

8.50

7.02

1.32

1.17

Workers

0.23

11.07

0.89

0.01

0.40

0.21

Education

0.91

0.27

0.78

1.77

1.40

1.00

Language Access

9.77

0.23

1.97

2.88

0.33

2.26

Age

5.47

1.48

1.66

1.47

1.08

1.03

The Emergence of a Middle Class Setting aside the issue of cultural assimilation, Clark notes that the hallmark of economic assimilation is the arrival of immigrants into the middle class. Using the same techniques as Clark, but with slightly altered variables (Dakan, 2004a), the impacts of the social characteristics noted above on entry into the middle class are measured. The middle class is defined as those households earning at least twice the poverty level but less than four times the poverty level and also own a home. The following variables were used to calculate the odds ratios for each of the groups presented in this chapter. Variable Selection Middle Class — binomial dependent variable based on income and home ownership Professional employment — binomial value for head of household (1 = professional) Two-worker household — binomial (1 = more than one working) Language isolation — binomial (1 = not isolated) Educational attainment — multinomial with 8 categories Age — interval — chronological age Duration — length of time living in U.S. Table 28.6 shows the results of a logistic regression of these variables on middle-class status. The odds ratio has a relatively simple interpretation and it should be noted that the ratios are calculated holding all other variables constant for each group. An odd ratio of 2.00 for a variable for a particular immigrant group indicates that a high value in the independent variable doubles the chances of a member of that group achieving middleclass status. Similarly, and odds ratio of 3.00 triples the chances of attaining middle class status.

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William Dakan

As with every other characteristic, there is diversity across all of the groups in the trajectories that impel or block their entry into the middle class. One of the relative constants across all groups is the positive impact of duration, suggesting that middle class status is, in many cases, just a matter of time. For all migrants combined, duration is twice as predictive of middle-class status as most of the other variables and language access is also extremely important. Language is a major barrier for Mexicans, Chinese, and Koreans. Surprisingly, educational levels are not quite as important for some groups when holding the other factors constant. Like many middleclass Americans, having two (or more) workers in the household was particularly important for the later arriving groups such as Mexicans, Cubans, and Bosnians. Filipinos were especially affected by the presence of an additional worker in the household. More recent arrivals from the Philippines do not appear to be in large households or connected to the military. As one-person households, they seem to be unable to acquire the assets for moving into the middle class.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND THE CULTURAL LANDSCAPE In spite of the diversity across occupations and the broader community, the relative small and growing number of immigrants is spread so thinly throughout the community that the impact on the cultural landscape is marginal as yet. The major exception is found in the increasing number of immigrant-owned or -operated businesses throughout the community. Most striking of these, because of their broad appeal to native residents and immigrants alike, is the very impressive increase in ethnic restaurants. Since 1995, over 100 new eating places with ethnic origins have been established. The cuisine includes Mexican (most regions in Mexico are represented), Vietnamese, Cuban, Chinese, Thai, Uzbek, Armenian, Bosnian, Middle Eastern of various sorts, Greek, African, and Latino. The commercial impact of immigrants is heightened by the concentration of certain groups in niche economies where there is often a near monopoly in commonly found business types. Without going into the details of acquiring the data (Dakan, 2004b), the last names of selected ethnic groups (www.pedom.com, 2004) were identified and matched against a roster of business owners’ or managers’ last names. Table 28.7 identifies the results in terms of the concentration of selected groups in certain niche business clusters. The identification of broad ethnic background (immigrants and native-born cannot be separated) indicates the diversity of niche development among the groups identified here. Hispanics manage almost half of the construction businesses, most of which are roofing contractors. Motels are the purview of the Asian-Indian population, as is common across the United States. Nail care is dominated by the Vietnamese and most of the owner-managers are women. Dry cleaners and alterations are done by Koreans. This sort of specialization can even break down into sub-categories. Asian Indians own eleven restaurants, eight of which are all of the Subway sandwich shops in the city.

CONCLUSIONS Immigrants to Louisville are anything but a monolithic group. They are as diverse in origin as they are in residential location, educational levels, occupations, and contributions to the cultural and commercial vitality of the community. They are an essential part of the growth of the community, accounting for half of the population increase in Louisville for the past decade. Because of local leadership in metro government, the schools, the University of Louisville and other local colleges, and social service agencies, the community is undergoing a palatable change from aversion to tolerance to increasing support for immigrants within the community.

377

Changes in the Heartland Table 28.7 Business Type and Ethnic Origin Business Type Origin Group Korean Construction Wholesale-Retail Grocery Convenient Professional MD/Dentist Motel Restaurant/Fast Food Beauty/Nails Dry Cleaning/Alterations Total

Chinese

Hispanic

Asian Indian

Vietnamese

Arabic

Count

3

2

7

0

1

2

%

20.00

13.33

46.67

0.00

6.67

13.33

Count

21

6

12

2

7

7

%

38.18

10.91

21.82

3.64

12.73

12.73

Count

1

0

3

0

3

3

%

10.00

0.00

30.00

0.00

30.00

30.00

Count

1

1

1

3

0

3

%

11.11

11.11

11.11

33.33

0.00

33.33

Count

4

2

8

4

4

20

%

9.52

4.76

19.05

9.52

9.52

47.62

Count

4

3

7

14

2

24

%

7.41

5.56

12.96

25.93

3.70

44.44

Count

0

1

0

8

0

1

%

0.00

10.00

0.00

80.00

0.00

10.00

Count

6

33

12

11

10

2

%

8.11

44.59

16.22

14.86

13.51

2.70

Count

0

7

1

0

67

1

%

0.00

9.21

1.32

0.00

88.16

1.32

Count

10

2

0

0

2

0

%

71.43

14.29

0.00

0.00

14.29

0.00

Count

50

57

51

42

96

63

%

13.93

15.88

14.21

11.70

26.74

17.55

Chapter 29

Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Health and Health Care in the U.S.: A Geographic Overview FLORENCE M. MARGAI INTRODUCTION Recent research efforts to document the nature and scope of health disparities have focused on various segments of the U.S. population by race/ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status, language proficiency and geography (Geronimus, 2000; Liao et al., 2004; Kawachi et al., 2005; Moy et al., 2005; and Frist, 2005). By far, the most persistent inequities with potentially ominous consequences for the health of the nation as a whole are those based on the racial/ethnic profile of the population (Carter-Pokras and Woo, 1999; Kingston and Nickens, 2000). Minority groups, who, as we know, already face major economic and social disadvantages, encounter even greater challenges when it comes to their health status. When compared to the white majority, these groups, especially blacks, Latinos and Native Americans, face more chronic health conditions, greater risk factors, inequitable access to health care resources, and limited utilization of these services. Previous attempts to explain these disparities have focused on traditional biomedical factors such as genetic susceptibility and the personal responsibility of individuals including their behavioral, nutritional and occupational characteristics. However, it is increasingly apparent that the evaluation of these individual characteristics alone cannot fully explain the observed trends in racial and ethnic disparities (Kingston and Nickens, 2000). Rather, attempts to address these complex disparities must take place within a broader context to include the settlement geography of these groups, their immigration and generation histories, levels of acculturation and assimilation into the U.S. society, the institutional policies that impact their communities, including land use and zoning regulations, housing discrimination and neighborhood segregation patterns, and the negative impacts of environmental exposures to pollution. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the patterns of health inequalities among the major racial and ethnic minorities in the United States: African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, and Asian Americans. These issues are addressed within a geographical context to illustrate the sociospatial experiences and health outcomes that are unique to each of these groups. An effort will also be made to document the key determinants, pathways, and mechanisms that account for these disparities, and outline some of the intervention strategies that are now being pursued by governmental agencies to promote health parity.

HEALTH DISPARITIES AND INEQUITIES BY RACE, CLASS AND PLACE Central to the analysis of race-based differences in health are two keywords, health disparities and health inequities, which are used interchangeably in the literature yet have different implications for health pol-

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icy. From a broad perspective, the term health disparities can be defined as the disproportionate burden of disease and disability between specific population groups and the rest of the population in the United States. But various agencies and researchers have portrayed it differently in the literature, some focusing on the disparate outcomes and others highlighting the underlying causes. For example, the U.S. Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA, 2000) described health disparities as population-specific differences in the presence of disease, health outcomes or access to health care. The Institute of Medicine characterized disparities as differences that remain after accounting for patient’s needs, preferences, and availability of health care (Smedley et al., 2002). Others have described disparities as adverse health outcomes that result from personal responsibility, provider prejudices, and a complex mixture of systemic quality and access problems coupled with historical injuries (Frist, 2005; Moy et al., 2005). Throughout this chapter, we will adopt a three-pronged approach that blends these multiple perspectives through the description of differential health outcomes, the underlying causes and systemic factors that account for these patterns, and the responses that are currently being implemented to redress the problems. Hence our discussion will place more emphasis on the term health inequities to enable us to focus on all three areas. Specifically, the use of the term, health inequities will remind us that the differential outcomes in health are not only inequitable and morally unacceptable, they also require immediate governmental response. The root causes of these disparities must be acknowledged including the contrasts between the majority and minority groups and the socioeconomic advantage that one group continues to have over the others. We follow the path of Gatrell (2002), who argues that greater emphasis be placed on health inequities since health disparities are inevitable in any population whether they are spatially-based, temporal in nature, or based on some other dimension. He contends, and rightly so, that: “... what really matters and what ‘inequity’ implies is the fact that these differentials may be avoidable, and should be capable of being narrowed; their existence is, in a sense, unethical” (Gatrell, 2002, p. 91).

Racial health inequities are not only unethical they are indeed complex, pervasive, and persistent. The disparities cut across all health domains including morbidity and mortality rates, major risk factors, health access and utilization, and overall health status. There are significant racial and ethnic differences among all forms of disease including emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and HIV/AIDs, environmental diseases such as lead poisoning and pesticide exposures, developmental diseases such as learning disabilities and birth defects, neoplastic diseases such as liver and prostrate cancer, and nutritional conditions such as hypertension and obesity. These disparities also cut across all age groups, literally, from cradle to grave. For example, black infants are two to three times more likely to die before their first birthday than white infants. Likewise, Hispanic children especially from migrant farm households face higher rates of morbidity and mortality as a result of increased exposure to farming and industrial pollutants than non-Hispanic children. These differences in survival rates extend well beyond infancy and childhood to all stages of life, the most glaring patterns evident among adults with chronic degenerative diseases. Health inequities among the different racial and ethnic groups also have an element of place. Specifically, the health status of each group is largely a function of their settlement geography (metropolitan vs. nonmetropolitan; segregated vs. non-segregated), the institutional and zoning practices, housing quality and neighborhood environmental conditions. These negative spatial dimensions of health are perhaps best witnessed in the urbanized areas where blacks, for example, face serious risks of disease and mortality. In the words of Galea and others (2004): “… the urban environment influences every aspect of health and well-being; what people eat, the air they breathe, and the water they drink, where (or if ) they work, the housing that shelters them, their sex partners and family arrangements, where they go for health care, the dangers they encounter on the street, and who (if any) is available for emotional and financial support” (p. 1018).

Characterizing these impacts as the urban health penalty many studies have shown that minority groups in these areas have excessively high rates of adverse health outcomes such as tuberculosis, sexually transmitted

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diseases, HIV/AIDS, asthma, homicides, and infant mortality. These health risks are heightened further by zoning laws and policies that fail to protect the disadvantaged groups. In examining the relationships between urban land use policies, equity and public health, Mantaay (2001), for example, concluded that zoning in New York City was clearly not a benign or neutral process. Rather, the decisions regarding the location of industrial land uses and noxious facilities often had racial and class implications that resulted in a significantly greater percentage of poor and minority people in high-risk neighborhoods. Acknowledging these locational disadvantages and the need to mitigate the negative influences on minority health, Geronimus (2000) concluded therefore that all “… attempts to understand and to reverse the growing health inequalities will be partial without considerations of the socioeconomic factors and even more critical, the historical and structural factors that have produced modern ghettoes in central cities with predominantly minority populations. About 80 percent of the residents in high-poverty urban areas in the U.S. are minority and this figure is over 90 percent in the largest metropolitan areas” (p. 867).

Yet, the analyses and interpretation of these varied historical contexts and structural determinants of health have been problematic and in some instances suppressed by ideological and political interpretations that blame these disparities on biological differences in group susceptibility to disease. Kawachi et al. (2005), in their discussion of the obstacles hindering such analyses, identified three major causal interpretations of racial disparities in health: i) Race as a Biology; ii) Race as a proxy for Class; and iii) Race and Class as Separate Constructs. Using race as biology for explaining health disparities has been based, historically, on the misconception that some groups are innately inferior to whites and therefore more susceptible to disease and disability. For example, historically, physicians purported that blacks had unique physiological features such as small brains that made them intellectually inferior, or had thick skins that resulted in a high tolerance for the sun, heat and pain. These formulations of biological determinism not only rationalized the continued use of blacks as slaves but also justified their use as subjects in federally sponsored research projects such as the Tuskegee syphilis study. Even though the biological construction of race has been refuted many times over, there are still traces of evidence pointing toward the ongoing mistreatment of blacks and other minorities in the health care system based on the false pretenses of “genetics.” As recently reported, “the genetic explanation for ethnic differentials in social position and health persists despite a considerable lack of evidence, and more than 100 years of research evidence exposing the limitations of such assumptions” (Karlsen and Nazroo, 2002, p. 624). Examples of research efforts to identify race-based genetic susceptibility to diseases are rampant and so too are reports of discrimination in health care settings. For example, in a survey of roughly 3,900 residents in Kings County, Washington, investigators found that one in six blacks had experienced discrimination in the health care facilities. In a follow-up survey that involved more detailed interviews of 51 educated and insured African Americans, many confirmed episodes of discrimination. Their experiences ranged from reports of rude behavior and racial slurs by health care workers, to instances of personnel reluctance to distribute pain medication based on the notion that the patients’ generational history of slavery increased their tolerance for pain. As a result of these experiences, many minority patients reported changing their health seeking behaviors such as delaying medical treatment or avoiding these institutions altogether. Similar conclusions were drawn in another study that reported negative health consequences as a result of experiences of interpersonal racism and perceptions of racism in the wider society (Karlsen and Nazroo, 2002). In examining the second causal interpretation of racial disparities in health, Race as a proxy for Class, Kawachi et al. (2005), characterized this perspective as one in which race is often used as a substitute construct

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Florence M. Margai

for class. This perspective, they contend, is driven by the strong empirical correlation between minority status and low socio-economic status (SES) of residents in the United States. Specifically, minority groups are overrepresented among low income and disadvantaged groups, and in the absence of data on income, researchers are likely to use race as a proxy in evaluating and explaining health disparities. Kawachi et al. (2005), argue, and correctly so, that this perspective is not only misguided, it is at best a very rough proxy, and from a statistical viewpoint, could lead to the over-controlling of the causal effect of race on health. Other researchers have arrived at similar conclusions noting that race and SES are two separate constructs, and that race remains a significant determinant of health even after controlling for the SES of individuals (Carter-Pokras and Woo, 1999; Williams, 1997). The consensus among many researchers is to use the third causal perspective which involves the use of race and class as separate constructs for explaining racial disparities in health. One of the strongest advocates of this approach is David Williams, who argues for a more deliberate and thoughtful examination of the role of race. In 1997, he proposed a causal framework for studying racial/ethnic differences in health. Figure 29.1 shows a modified version of this framework that includes the basic causes of health (culture, biology, geography, economic, political and legal structures), which impact social and occupational status of individuals. These in turn produce surface causes such as the evolution of disadvantaged neighborhoods, stressful conditions, and poor health practices in those areas. Eventually, these preceding factors take a toll on the human biological processes (such as the endocrine, neurological, immune systems), resulting in poor health outcomes. The original model has been modified further in this chapter to elucidate the importance of geography, beyond the nativity and origin of individuals, to include housing, settlement patterns, and poor environmental conditions that impact the health of residents in minority neighborhoods.

Figure 29.1

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383

Acknowledging these factors as the fundamental causes of racial health disparities, the next section will discuss the major health concerns facing each of the minority groups in their communities across the United States. We will examine the health outcomes and key indicators of disparity between each group and the dominant white majority. This will be followed by a discussion of the policy implications for the U.S. population as a whole. Given the wide-ranging scope of this topic, and the need to target the material to the undergraduate audience, the discussion will be descriptive for the most part, but supplemented with data from federal and state health agencies. Case studies, including detailed accounts of specific health outcomes are found in the articles that are cited throughout the chapter.

OVERVIEW OF HEALTH CONCERNS IN MINORITY COMMUNITIES Health Concerns in Black Communities As of the 2000 census, Black Americans constitute 13 percent of the U.S. population (roughly 34.5 million people). Several articles, including those documented in this book, have articulated the settlement history and emerging patterns of blacks in the 21st century (Jargowsky, 1997; Geronimus, 2000; and Tettey-Fio, 2003). It is important to note, however, that despite high rates of migration to northern states in the early 1900s and the sequential development of black enclaves in urban settlements across the country, roughly 55 percent of all blacks continue to reside in the South and recent trends in reverse migration point toward even greater numbers in the future. Settlement patterns also continue to point toward highly urbanized characteristics of the group. Nearly 52 percent of all blacks live in the central city of metropolitan areas (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). Further, based on the five notable dimensions of segregation (clustering, dissimilarity, isolation, centralization, and concentration), blacks are the only group to have experienced the full impact of hypersegregation in the U.S. as well as more endemic levels of discrimination (Acevedo-Garcia et al., 2003; Polednak, 1996). The spatial attributes of blacks, being urban and hypersegregated in environmentally and socioeconomically stressed neighborhoods, exact a heavy toll on their health status, resulting in a stiff urban health penalty. The long term impacts are best captured in the weathering hypothesis, in which Geronimus (1992) proposed to show that early and continued exposure of blacks to systemic and structural disadvantages such as segregation, material hardship, psycho-social conditions of acute and chronic stress, overburdened or disrupted social supports, and toxic environmental exposures often result in cumulative health outcomes. An examination of the aggregate measures of mortality (Table 29.1) shows that the top three leading causes of death among blacks are chronic health conditions: heart disease, cancer, and cerebrovascular diseases. The diseases account for almost 60 percent of all deaths among blacks. Even though these three conditions are similar to those found among whites (Table 29.1), further evaluation using age-adjusted, cause-specific statistics shows that far more blacks die of these diseases than whites. For example, the death rate from coronary heart disease among blacks is 186.6 per 100,000, as compared to only 125.6 per 100,000 for whites. The incidence rate for cancer, the second leading cause of death, is 10 percent higher, and the death rate 35 percent higher among blacks than whites. There are also specific cancers that afflict blacks more than any of the other groups. Of particular concern is lung cancer, which is the leading cause of cancer deaths among black men and women. The risk of developing lung cancer is 50 percent higher among black men and they are more likely to die of the disease than do white men. Prostrate cancer also remains a major health concern among black men who are twice more likely to be diagnosed than white men. Among African-American women, breast cancer is the common cancer risk, as with women in other racial/ethnic groups. However, even though the incidence rate of breast cancer is slightly lower for African-American women, they are more likely to die of the disease than white women. In general, the survival rates of most of these cancers among black men and women are poor. Five years after diagnosis of cancer, the survival rates are significantly lower for blacks (44%) than for whites (60%).

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Florence M. Margai Table 29.1

The risks of diabetes, HIV/AIDS, infant mortality, and homicides are also of concern in AfricanAmerican communities. The trends in HIV/AIDS have been particularly disturbing in recent years. Blacks now account for half of all new HIV cases that are diagnosed, of which 72 percent are black women, and the disease is now the leading cause of deaths among young black women between ages 25 and 34 (Dyer, 2000). Blacks also now account for a significant amount (98%) of all cumulative AIDS cases among the incarcerated. Within the context of the urban health penalty alluded to earlier, the scourge of the AIDS pandemic is most evident in the nation’s metropolitan areas such as Washington, D.C. where case rates are ten times higher than the national rate. The other health concern, Infant Mortality Rate (IMR), has been historically a key indicator of health disparities between blacks and whites. This black/white gap has persisted despite the dramatic reduction in national IMR rates over the last several decades. The rate among African Americans (14.1%) continues to be more than twice the rate of whites (5.7%). The consensus among many researchers is that Low Birth Weights (LBW), or babies born weighing less than 2500 grams, account for nearly two-thirds of the observed black/ white disparity in IMR. The racial differential in LBW is equally large, with prevalence rates of 13 percent among blacks compared to only 6.5 percent among whites. Such babies are known to face greater health risks including cognitive and developmental problems, congenital anomalies, respiratory ailments, higher rates of hospitalization, and possibly death from health complications prior to their first birthday (McCormick, 1995). Attempts to explain the black-white gap in LBW have yielded complex interactions between risk factors that go beyond personal characteristics of the mother such as age, income, substance abuse or high risk behaviors. Instead, researchers are now examining neighborhood and contextual factors such as access to prenatal care, occupational hazards, neighborhood segregation, and exposure to toxic substances. Grady (2003) for example investigated the risks of LBW among mothers in segregated and non-segregated tracts in Kings county,

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New York. She concluded that the risks were higher for black mothers regardless of where they lived. Another study reported on environmental quality and the likelihood of poor reproductive outcomes due to exposure to contaminants such as pesticides, industrial solvents, metals, and endocrine disrupting chemicals that lead to adverse reproductive outcomes (Margai, 2003). Overall the health status of blacks appears to be worsening in many respects. The gap persists in preexisting health disparities such as heart disease, cancers, and IMR, but even more disconcerting is the increasing evidence of the disproportionate number of case rates in emerging diseases such as HIV/AIDS. The reasons for these disparities are complex but linked primarily to poverty, access to health services, utilization of the services, the late diagnoses of the diseases, and disparities in treatment and participation in clinical trials (Howell, 2004). These problems of health access and utilization, and long-term consequences, are addressed later in the chapter. Health Concerns in Latino-American Communities Latinos are now the largest minority group, comprising 13 percent of the U.S. population in 2004. Demographic patterns suggest a 58 percent increase in this population between 1990 and 2000, the largest among all racial/ethnic groups in the country. These increases are due both to the arrival of recent immigrants as well as the high birth rates among the Latino population. Not surprisingly, a key attribute of this population is its relative youthfulness: the median age is 26 years and 35 percent of the population is less than 18 years, compared to the rest of the U.S. population (with a median age of 35 years with only 26 percent of the population below 18 years of age). These demographic differences are even more dramatic in certain states such as California, where by the year 2010, some experts predict that half of all children will be Latinos (Flores et al., 2002). Given the rapidly changing demographic profile of this group, several studies are now beginning to examine the detailed health statistics of the population including those of the children. Previous studies commonly used the term epidemiological paradox, or the Latino paradox, to describe the fact that even though Latinos face the same demographic/economic risk factors and sociospatial barriers as blacks, their overall health status is more favorable than blacks and better yet, comparable to those of the dominant white majority (Amaro and Dela Torre, 2002; Grady, 2003; Margai, 2003). However, closer scrutiny of health measures reveals that there are certain conditions that disproportionately impact the group. As will be shown here, these problems are linked to wider systemic problems including their immigration status, occupation, linguistic barriers, and the environmental quality of their neighborhoods. Comparing the leading causes of deaths among Latinos and whites, one finds that a major concern has to do with unintentional injuries (accidents), which account for the third leading cause of death for Latinos (see Table 29.1). The employment of Latinos in menial jobs, such as meat packing, crop-picking/farming, and construction, places them at high risk of occupational injuries and long-term health problems due to cumulative exposures to pesticides and other toxins. For example, between 1995 and 2000, Mexican foreign-born workers accounted for more than two-thirds of fatal injuries among foreign-born workers. Further, employers are likely to take advantage of the undocumented status of some of these workers by offering them low pay with no benefits. As a result, 34 percent of Latinos are uninsured, nearly three times the rate for non-Hispanic whites. Latino children, especially those from migrant families also face poorer health outcomes. Of the one million children in the United States whose parents are migrant and seasonal workers, about 94 percent of them are Latinos (Flores et al., 2002). As shown in Table 29.1, birth defects are among the ten leading causes of death among Latinos, and these health events have been linked to migrant exposure to pesticides and other hazardous substances (Cooper et al., 2001a and 2001b). Other studies have documented additional health problems among these children, including inadequate preventive care, high rates of infectious diseases, farm injuries, greater risk of nutritional disorders, and low educational attainment, as well as endocrine, neurological and behavioral disorders that also have potential links to exposure to hazardous substances (Flores et al., 2002; Schenker, 1995).

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Other health concerns in the Latino community include increasing rates of HIV/AIDS, obesity/diabetes, homicide, teenage pregnancy, and tuberculosis. However, the severity of these outcomes varies among the different subgroups. Comparing the three major Latino subgroups, Puerto Ricans face more disparate health outcomes than Mexican Americans and Cubans. For example, the age-adjusted death rate for HIV among Puerto Ricans living on mainland is 32.7 per 100,000, more than 13 times the rate for non-Hispanic whites. The diabetes rate is 172 per 100,000, compared to 122 per 100,000 for Mexican Americans, and 47 per 100,000 for Cuban Americans. The severity of health outcomes among Latinos also depends on nativity and the varying levels of Latino acculturation into the U.S. society. Acculturation has been evaluated using variables such as place of birth, year of residency in the U.S., and language use. Most studies have demonstrated negative effects of acculturation on the health of subsequent generations. The foreign born and less acculturated Latinos have been found to experience fewer health problems, but this relative advantage declines with increasing stay in the U.S. Secondgeneration Latinos or those who are more acculturated have been shown to face greater health problems such as obesity, illicit drug use, adverse birth outcomes, and high rates of teenage pregnancy. Examining the differentials in overweight conditions in the Latino community, Gordon-Larsen et al. (2003) noted that there are certain patterns of acculturation and structural factors that placed Latino youths at risk. Specifically, immigrant adolescents were likely to be influenced by what the researchers referred to as an obesegenic environment characterized by “sedentary lifestyles, large-portion sizes, heavy advertising of fatty and energy-dense foods and mass media” (p. 2030). These conditions along with the existing socioeconomic disadvantages result in greater risk factors and adverse health conditions that are worrisome for this rapidly growing population. Health Concerns in Asian-American Communities During the 2000 U.S. Census, 4.4 percent of the U.S. population identified themselves as Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (AAPI). Like Latinos, this group has undergone explosive growth in recent decades, from just one million in the 1960s to 12 million in 2000, and is expected to reach 36.7 million by 2050. Among the factors contributing to this contemporary growth pattern are the relaxation of U.S. immigration laws, the previous involvement of the U.S. military in Southeast Asia, and associated resettlement of refugees, globalization, and the increasing interconnection of U.S. and Asian economies, and the well established migration networks (Zhou and Gatewood, 2000). Asian Americans in the U.S. today represent a diverse mix of ethnic groups that differ by language, religion, immigration into the U.S., and length of stay, as well as the degree to which they have acculturated or assimilated into society. Japanese and Chinese Americans for example have a longer generational history, whereas other groups such as Indians, Koreans, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians, and the Hmong people are fairly recent immigrants with more limited levels of assimilation. Despite these notable differences, the public’s perception of Asian Americans is still misguided with long-term implications for their health. Asian Americans are often seen as foreigners, mostly medical doctors, computer programmers, accountants, nerds, high achievers and compliant workers who rarely encounter problems of racism or institutional discrimination. Further, they are misperceived as people who because of their high earning potential have no major social, economic or health needs, and are all physically and mentally healthy. This erroneous characterization, which is associated with the model minority myth, fails to acknowledge the real health concerns or disparities that exist in the Asian-American community. Researchers who have investigated the SES and health characteristics of this group have identified a line of bifurcation that separates Asian Americans into categories of varying demographic, socioeconomic and health status instead of a single homogenous population (Frazier, 2003; Zhou and Greenwood, 2000). For example, when examining the demographic profile of the group by nativity and age, the Asian-American population has a disproportionately large foreign-born component and a disproportionately young native-born component (Zhou and Greenwood, 2000). It also has diverse occupational backgrounds that relate to the unique migration patterns of each subgroup, their national origin and their basis of admission into the U.S. (family-sponsored, employer-sponsored, or refugee resettlement). Their occupations range from physicians and nurses, computer programmers, small business entrepreneurs, middle-class professionals to low

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skilled workers on farms, sweat shops and other economic entities. These differential skills translate into varying levels of SES and income by national origin. Immigrants from India, the Philippines, and Taiwan reportedly have higher income levels than those from Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos. Similarly, the poverty rates range from seven percent for Filipinos, Indians and Japanese-Americans to 42 percent for Cambodians and more than 60 percent for Laotians (Zhou and Greenwood, 2000). Examining the health indicators of Asian Americans, one finds that the patterns are equally mixed. While the group as a whole experiences a good health status with the lowest recorded death rates from the top three leading causes of death, the detailed statistical data provide clear indications of high incidence and death rates from certain types of cancers. Unlike the other groups, cancers (not heart disease) account for the leading cause of death among AAPIs (Table 29.1). Examining the cause-specific cancer rates, one finds that this group experiences the highest incidence of liver cancer (13.8 per 100,000) and stomach cancer (17.3 per 100,000), compared to those of whites (4.8 per 100,000 for liver cancers and 7.7 per 100,000 for stomach cancers). Other major risk factors for Asian-American health are smoking, exposure to tuberculosis, and hepatitis but these vary significantly by population subgroup. For example, a study by Ma et al. (2002) concluded that tobacco use was a serious public health problem among Asian Americans but the rates were significantly higher among Southeast-Asian men. The authors indicated that smoking rates varied from 33 percent among Koreans, 55 percent among Chinese, 35 percent to 56 percent among Vietnamese, to 71 percent among Laotians and Cambodians. Noting that current smokers were more likely to be foreign-born, these authors revealed that the subgroup differences were related to country of birth, immigration status, and length of stay in the U.S. Similar findings have also been noted for tuberculosis levels among Asian Americans. Even though the overall risk of tuberculosis among Asians (33 per 100,000) in the U.S. is fifteen times the rate of whites, the rates have been shown to vary among the different subgroups, highest during the first few years of immigration and then decline gradually to less than 5 percent after 10 years or more of residency. Asian Americans have also been disproportionately affected by hepatitis B (HPV), a virus that attacks the liver and results in chronic infection, scarring, cirrhosis, and possibly liver cancer and death. Even though the rates of HPV have been decreasing (due to the increasing availability of the vaccine), the reported rate among Asians is still high (2.95 per 100,000) and twice more than the white population. Yu et al. (2004), in their study of health disparities among AAPI children, contend that overall, the health issues facing this community are largely related to issues of citizenship/nativity status and the presence of cultural and linguistic barriers. These factors limit their use of health resources regardless of eligibility. They recommend the use of outreach and promotional programs to educate the Asian immigrant populations on how to access and navigate the health care system. Health Concerns in Native-American Communities U.S. citizens who are descendants of the original peoples of the Americas and still maintain tribal affiliation in their communities are classified as American Indians/Alaskan Natives (AI/AN). In 2000, there were approximately 560 federally recognized tribes residing in about 35 states (U.S. Census, 2000). Together these groups comprised roughly 4.1 million or 1.5 percent of the total U.S. population. Contrary to public perceptions of negative growth and decimation of the group by disease and/or absorption into the larger U.S. population, the trend over the last four decades shows a steady upward increase at an average annual rate of about 4 percent. Noting that this demographic trend is nearly impossible without immigration, some authors have credited the positive growth to the increasing number of self-identifying people with partial or distant Native-American ancestry (Cunningham, 1996). The increase in fertility levels has also played a part. For example, roughly 45 percent of Native American women have their first child as teenagers, as compared to 21 percent of white women. Another contributory factor has been the improvement in mortality levels that has accompanied the epidemiological transition in the U.S. as a whole, benefiting all groups. Infectious diseases that once afflicted more than 90 percent of the Native American population, killing many and weakening others, have been mostly eradicated. Despite these developments, the AI/AN population continues to be disproportionately affected by health conditions that result in significantly higher morbidity and mortality levels. A report in 2004 concluded that

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Native Americans still bear a greater burden of health risk factors and chronic diseases than any other minority population (Liao et al., 2004). This group has been previously described as the poorest of the poor in the U.S. with poverty rates of 26 percent, compared to 13 percent for the total population and only eight percent for white Americans. Further, nearly 40 percent of the Native-American adults are likely to be unemployed throughout the year and more than two-thirds have family incomes below the poverty line compared to only a third for the general population (Cunningham, 1996). As with the other minority groups, the root causes of these disparities are linked to racial stereotypes, discrimination, geographic isolation, and limited access to health services. Native Americans have been caricatured and stereotyped as lazy, alcoholic savages, wearing feathers and living in teepees. Until recently, minimal reference was made to the diversity of this group as separate nations with different names, languages, cultures, adaptive behaviors, and preferences. Also important is the settlement geography of Native Americans, which unlike the other groups, is the result of a number of signed treaties and the unique relationship between the various tribal nations and the federal government. Native Americans are allowed to exist as sovereign entities but also entitled to health and educational services provided by the federal government. Specifically, the Indian Health Service (IHS) was set up in 1955 as the primary agency responsible for providing health care to the Native-American population that resides on or near the reservations. Despite these benefits, the Indian reservations remain as relatively isolated pockets of extreme poverty, unemployment, and poor health conditions. Access to health care is still very limited due to the sparse distribution of those that are eligible for IHS services. Using a survey of AI/AN population, a study concluded that almost two-thirds of the population resides in non-metropolitan areas and 31 percent reside in non-metro areas with very low density (less than 10 per square mile). This distribution is in stark contrast to the rest of the U.S. population with 75 percent in urban areas and only 3 percent in areas with very low density (Cunningham, 1996). Examining the profile of the leading causes of death, heart disease and cancer account for the leading causes of deaths among the AI/AN population. The good news about cancer among the group is that the aggregate mortality rates are generally lower (161 per 100,000) than the overall national rate (206 per 100,000). However, in 2003, Paisano and others documented some regional variability in these levels with some AI/AN communities reporting higher levels such as in Alaska (248 per 100,000) and the Northern Plains (292 per 100,000). Among the cause-specific cancers, the most serious risks are for lung cancer, colorectal cancer, stomach, and liver cancer. The incidence rates for stomach and liver cancer among the AI/AN population is higher than the overall U.S. rates and reportedly related to the high levels of alcohol consumption. Another area of health concerns among Native Americans is the large number of deaths from unintentional injuries (accidents). This is the leading cause of death for Native Americans ages 1–44 years and the third leading cause of death for the group as a whole (Table 29.1). A study by Wallace and others (2003) showed that injury-related deaths among Native Americans was twice the rate for the U.S. as a whole and accounted for 75 percent of all deaths among children and youth. Unlike Latinos, where accidental deaths are caused by occupational hazards, Native Americans’ deaths are caused by unintentional motor vehicle accidents. Native Americans have the highest deaths from motor vehicle accidents, pedestrian events, and suicides. These crashes are caused primarily by impaired driving, often caused by alcohol abuse, which is estimated to be as high as 70 percent in some areas, compared to prevalence rates of 11–32 percent among whites and blacks. Further, some authors contend that these accidents occur due to the traffic safety and regulatory codes that are less restrictive in these sovereign nations when compared to the rest of the country (Wallace et al., 2003). Other health problems facing Native Americans include chronic health conditions such as diabetes and psychiatric problems. In a sample of blacks, Hispanics, Asians and Native Americans, the highest prevalence of obesity, current smoking, cardiovascular disease, and diabetes were found among Native Americans. Approximately 80 percent of the AI/ANs had one or more adverse risk factors or chronic conditions and one-third had three or more of these conditions (Liao et al., 2004). Mental health conditions are also problematic in these AI/AN communities. Researchers have blamed these conditions on the depressive state of life on the reservations, due to the poverty and alienation of these communities.

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EMERGING THEMES IN RACE-BASED GEOGRAPHIES OF HEALTH The preceding section of this chapter has focused on the unique experiences and health concerns facing racial and ethnic minorities in the U.S. In describing their health status, a number of geographic patterns and processes emerged, all of which underscore the complexities of the race-based dimensions of health but also suggest certain commonalities among the groups. These include: the urban health penalty, the relationships between segregation, zoning and health, the weathering hypothesis, the epidemiological paradox, acculturation, and the link between geographic isolation, alienation, and health. Even though these patterns were discussed with reference to specific minority groups, they are by no means unique to those groups. Rather, these characteristics are shared by the other minority groups, and they further illustrate the wide-ranging scope of the problems in the health care system. For example, the negative effects of acculturation, as described among Latinos, have also been demonstrated for Asian Americans and are now being explored for immigrants from the African Diaspora (Margai, forthcoming). Similarly, the epidemiological paradox, a positive dimension of Latino health, also has been noted when comparing U.S.-born blacks versus foreign-born blacks, as well as comparing Asian Americans by nativity. Comparing blacks in urbanized communities to Native Americans in the rural areas, one finds that both groups have different settlement geographies, yet face similar problems of relative isolation and alienation from the rest of society. In effect, the weathering hypothesis, as noted earlier to explain the cumulative health outcome among blacks, also applies to Native Americans and possibly other minority groups residing in segregated ethnic enclaves. Finally, access to health care is an issue of critical importance to all racial/ethnic groups. Health care access is defined here as an individual’s ability to obtain health and medical service on a timely, geographical, and financially acceptable basis. From a geographic perspective, it is a multidimensional construct that is measurable using indicators such as the availability of health services, geographic accessibility, accommodation, cultural acceptability, and affordability (Cromley and McClafferty, 2002). Studies focusing on these various dimensions have identified group disparities in all five areas. The most troubling aspect of access has been health care affordability, which reflects the prices of health services and the people’s ability to pay. This disparity has been documented using income levels and group differences in health insurance coverage. At the national level, the number of people lacking health insurance has increased significantly over the last ten years to approximately 41 million, with some estimates as high as 60 million. The differences between the groups are best seen using the age-adjusted rates of all persons under 62 years of age without health care insurance (Table 29.2). Also included in this table is the index of disparity for each group, which can be computed by taking the average of the absolute difference between the rates observed for the specific group (r) and the reference population group (R), divided by the rate of the reference group (R) (Pearcy and Keppel, 2002). The index is expressed as a percentage.1 The computed information confirms that Native Americans indeed face the greatest disparity in health care access with an index of disparity that is 207 percent different from the white population. Hispanics have an index of 168 percent. The index for blacks is lower (at 52%), yet statistically significant when compared to their white counterparts. As expected, there are serious consequences for those without health insurance (American Medical Association, 2003). These people are less likely to get routine medical check-ups or get preventive care. They are likely to face major financial problems in the event of a chronic or catastrophic health event. They are also more likely to visit the emergency hospital rooms with longer waiting times, poorer health outcomes, and greater charges for care, which ultimately are subsidized by public tax dollars. So from a societal viewpoint, disparities in health access not only result in poor health outcomes, they are expensive and have negative financial implications for the nation as a whole.

390

Florence M. Margai Table 29.2 Persons under 65 years with No Health Insurance Coverage, 2002 Race/Hispanic Origin

Age-Adjusted Percent

Absolute Diffe re nce from "best"

Percent Difference from "best"

American Indian/Alaskan Native

38.8

26.1*

207.1

Asian Only

17.2

4.6*

36.5

Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander

24.0

11.4*

90.5

Hispanic

33.8

21.2*

168.3

Black, Non-Hispanic

19.2

6.6*

52.4

White, Non Hispanic ("best" group)

12.6

Reference group

Reference Group

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About the Authors

Short descriptions of author’s affiliations and research interests appear below in the order that authors appear in the text.

John W. Frazier is Professor of Geography and Director of the GIS Core Facility at the State University of New York at Binghamton. His research interests have focused on the applied aspects of geography and racial/ ethnic studies. He is the author of books and articles on these topics. He also is the founder of the Race, Ethnicity, and Place Conferences. Eugene L. Tettey-Fio is Associate Professor of Geography at SUNY-Binghamton. His recent publications have focused on Africa, African Americans, and racial-ethnic inequalities. He is the co-author of Race and Place. James A. Tyner is Associate Professor of Geography at Kent State University. He has authored four books and over forty articles and book chapters on the topics of race, ethnicity, and migration. His latest book is The Geography of Malcolm X: Black Radicalism and the Remaking of American Space. John R. Logan is Director, Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences, and Professor of Sociology at Brown University. He has studied patterns of residential segregation and neighborhood change. His recent work examines the consequences of these processes on education. He is widely published in social science journals. Deirdre Oakley is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Northern Illinois University. Her publication entitled “The American Welfare State Decoded: Uncovering the Neglected History of Public-Private Partnerships” is forthcoming in City and Community. She is also working on a project partially funded by the National Poverty Center at the University of Michigan concerning the effectiveness of the Federal Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Communities initiative. Jacob Stowell received a Ph.D. in Sociology from SUNY-Albany. Dr. Stowell’s research interests focus on racial inequality and crime. Previously, he worked as a research assistant at the Lewis Mumford Center. He currently is Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Massachusetts-Lowell. Audrey Singer is Immigration Fellow at the Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program. Her research focuses on the economic, social, and political incorporation of immigrants. She is currently working on a study of contemporary immigrant settlement and emerging gateways in the United States, including in-depth work on Washington, D.C. She earned a Ph.D. in sociology, with a specialization in demography, from The University of Texas at Austin. Wei Li is Associate Professor of Geography at Arizona State University. Her research focus is immigration and integration. She also studies the financial sector and community development. She coined the term “ethnoburb” to describe some contemporary suburban minority settlements. Currently she conducts empirical studies in the Pacific Rim. Her book, From Urban Enclave to Ethnic Suburb: New Asian Communities in the Pacific Rim Countries, will be published in 2006. Roger Anderson is an MA student at SUNY-Binghamton. His thesis work explores the nature of black return migration to rural and urban South Florida. He is interested in professional planning.

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David H. Kaplan is Professor of Geography at Kent State University where he directs the Urban Studies Program. He has published four books, including Segregation in Cities, and research articles dealing with urban issues in a wide variety of journals. Joe T. Darden’s interests are urban social geography and residential segregation. His books include Detroit: Race and Uneven Development and The Significance of White Supremacy in the Canadian Metropolis of Toronto. Dr. Darden is Professor of Geography at Michigan State University. Louise Jezierski is Associate Professor of Social Relations in the James Madison College of Michigan State University. Dr. Jezierski received a Ph.D. in urban and community sociology and has conducted research in the fields of community development, urban policy, and social stratification (race, ethnicity, social class, and gender). Ibipo Johnston-Anumonwo is Professor of Geography at SUNY-Cortland. Her research has focused on Africa, gender roles, and transportation issues related to racial-ethnic disparities in American society. Her work has been published in leading journals such as Urban Geography. Selima Sultana is Assistant Professor of Geography at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro. Her research interests in urban and transport geography are based on coupling travel behavior studies with GIS-based methodologies. Her work has been published in leading journals such as The Professional Geographer. Elizabeth Chacko is Associate Professor of Geography and International Affairs at George Washington University. Her work deals with immigrant identity and the creation of ethnic places by immigrant communities. Her recent research focuses especially on the Ethiopian immigrant population in the United States. Among her recent publications on this topic is an article that appears in the Geographical Review. Ivan Cheung was Professor of Geography at George Washington University and currently is Director of GIScience Programs at the Association of American Geographers in Washington, D.C. His specialties include geostatistics and geospatial technologies. Earl P. Scott is a cultural geographer with a sub-specialty in cultural ecology and regional specialty in Africa. His work involves the ways cultures influence human use and organization of the Earth’s surface. He is interested in how ordinary citizens employ small-scale enterprises to advance their own well-being. Dr. Scott is Emeritus Professor of Geography and current Chairperson of the Department of African American & African Studies at the University of Minnesota. Thomas D. Boswell is Professor of Geography at the University of Miami, Coral Gables. His research and teaching interests are in world population problems, migration, ethnicity, housing segregation and discrimination, and poverty. He was a Research Associate with the Research Institute for the Study of Man in New York City (1973–74), Director of the Policy Center of the Cuban American National Council in Miami (1993–97), and recipient of numerous grants from agencies such as the Ford Foundation. Professor Boswell received the Award for Outstanding Contribution of Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing in South Florida for the Year 1996. He has published more than 40 articles in refereed journals such as: Geographical Review, Urban Geography, and The Professional Geographer. He also has authored six books.

About the Authors

425

Terry-Ann Jones is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Fairfield University in Connecticut. Her recently completed dissertation, “Comparative Diasporas: Jamaicans in South Florida and Toronto,” compares Jamaican immigrants in the two metropolitan areas, examining the racial and ethnic setting and labor markets of the two areas, and the immigration policies of the two countries. Her areas of research and teaching interest are in international migration, particularly movement between the Caribbean and North America. Mark E. Reisinger is Assistant Professor of Geography at Binghamton University. His research interests include U.S. internal migration, urban-economic geography, and racial-ethnic geographies. His recent research has focused on Latinos in America. Professor Reisinger has published in journals such as The Professional Geographer. Keith Galligano received an MA in Geography from SUNY-Binghamton and is currently employed as a senior analyst by Autozone in Memphis, Tennessee. His research has centered on ethnicity and business geography. Marie Price is Associate Professor of Geography and International Affairs at George Washington University. Her research focuses on Latin America, migration, and the impact of immigrants on cities. In 2006 Dr. Price will be a visiting fellow at the Migration Policy Institute in Washington, D.C. Richard C. Jones is Professor of Geography at the University of Texas at San Antonio. His research is on the changing spatial patterns of ethnic and immigrant groups in the San Antonio region. Recently, he has studied Mexican-American settlement patterns and issues in a local context. Dr. Jones’ research has been published in a variety of social science journals. Lawrence E. Estaville is an ethnic geographer and Professor of Geography at Texas State University. He is author of a number of books, book chapters, and journal articles. Two of his works have been honored with awards. In 1992, he led the organizational efforts to establish the AAG’s Ethnic Geography Specialty Group and was elected as its first chair. Edris J. Montalvo received an M.S. in Geography from the Department of Geography at Texas State University. He teaches at San Antonio Community College. Brock J. Brown is a cultural geographer and Associate Professor of Geography at Texas State University. He has been honored with several teaching awards. Professor Brown’s work focuses on geographic education issues. Shawn Malia Kana‘iaupuni is Director of the PASE program in Honolulu. A Native Hawaiian demographer and sociologist from Püpükea, O‘ahu, Dr. Kana‘iaupuni’s research focuses on the status and well-being of Hawaiians. Formerly a faculty member of the Sociology Department at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Dr. Kana‘iaupuni also serves on the Race and Ethnic Advisory Committee of the U.S. Census Bureau and the Native Hawaiian Education Council of the U.S. Department of Education. Nolan J. Malone is a Research Scientist for PASE. His research at PASE focuses on the well-being of Native Hawaiian learners, families, and communities, as well as on developing tools to better monitor and examine Hawaiian well-being over time. Dr. Malone completed his Ph.D. in Demography at the University of Pennsylvania and was formerly employed as a population analyst at the U.S. Census Bureau. He specializes in survey research and quantitative analysis.

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James M. Smith is Assistant Professor of Geography at Towson State University in Maryland. Professor Smith’s recently completed dissertation examined how social practices and cultural forms become etched onto local landscapes. He conducted fieldwork in Little Tokyo on a number of occasions and remains interested in the importance of ethnic identity to sense of place. Emily Skop is Assistant Professor of Geography in the Department of Geography and the Environment at the University of Texas at Austin. Her interests include international migration processes, the social and spatial constructions of racial/ethnic/gender identities, and urbanization, segregation, and inequality in the contexts of the United States and Latin America. She has published findings in International Migration Review, Geographical Review, Population, Space, and Place, and The Professional Geographer. Claire E. Altman is an undergraduate in the Department of Geography and the Environment and the Department of Sociology at the University of Texas at Austin. Her interests include identity formation processes for immigrants, social capital, and remittance activity. Ms. Altman uses an interdisciplinary approach to address geographic questions. Edmund J. Zolnik is Assistant Professor of Geography at George Mason University. As an economic geographer, Dr. Zolnik is interested in how minority status influences the ability to attain and maintain a living wage. He also is interested in ethnic groups’ sense of place. His current work considers American Indians. His recently published work, such as in Urban Geography, also assesses urban quality of life. Susan W. Hardwick is Professor of Geography at the University of Oregon. Her recent studies have focused on newly arriving refugees and immigrants, especially those settling in the Pacific Northwest. Professor Hardwick has examined immigrant settlement patterns and adaptations to their new environments. Her work is published in leading journals such as the Geographical Review. Stavros T. Constantinou is Associate Professor of Geography at Ohio State University. His published research has centered on ethnicity, particularly the nature of Greek-American ethnic identity and patterns of GreekAmerican geography. His work has been published in a number of journals, including the Annals of the AAG. Milton E. Harvey is Professor of Geography at Kent State University and specializes in spatial statistics and ethnicity. He is the author of two books and numerous articles. His work has been published in leading journals such as Economic Geography. Thomas Y. Owusu is an Associate Professor and Chair of Geography at William Paterson University. His research interests include migration, ethnicity, and urban geography. Among his recently published works are those focusing on African immigrant experiences in North American cities. William Dakan was Professor of Geography at the University of Louisville. He considered himself an urbancultural and applied geographer. He routinely addressed practical and curiosity-based problems. His most recent research centered on the rapidly changing city of Louisville, especially its rapid ethnic diversification. Florence M. Margai is Associate Professor and Chair of Geography at SUNY-Binghamton. Her research has addressed environmental pollution sources and health outcomes in host communities. Dr. Margai is the author of two books and a number of journal articles on these topics, including those appearing in The Professional Geographer and Social Science and Medicine. Professor Margai also is editor of the African Geographical Review.