Quintilian Institutio Oratoria: Book 2 (Bk. 2)

QUINTILIAN Institutio Oratoria Book 2

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Quintilian Institutio Oratoria Book 2

Edited by TOBIAS REINHARDT and MICHAEL WINTERBOTTOM

OXFORD

U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS

OXfORD U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford 0 x 2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department o f the University o f Oxfoid. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland (2apeTown D a r e s Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hui^ary Italy Japan M a u d Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark o f Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Tobias Reinhardt and Michael Winterbottom 2006 The moral rights of the authors haw been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2006 All rights reserved No part o f this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, o r transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford Univeisity Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Quintilian. (Institutions oratoriae. Liber 2. English] Institutio oratorio. Book 2 / Quintilian; edited by Tobias Reinhardt and Michael Winterbottom. p. cm. Includes index. I S B N - 1 3 : 9 7 8 - 0 - 1 9 - 9 2 6 2 6 5 - 6 (alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0 - 1 9 - 9 2 6 2 6 5 - 9 (alk. paper) 1. Quintilian. Institutionisoratoriac. Liber 2. 2. Oratory-Early works to 1800. I. Reinhardt, Tobias. II. Winterbottom, Michael, 1934-DL Title. PA6649.B02 2006 808.5'l-dc22 Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddies Ltd., King's Lynn, Norfolk ISBN 0 - 1 9 - 9 2 6 2 6 5 - 9 1 3 5 7 9

978-0-19-926265-6 10

8 6 4 2

Preface This commentary, the first in English on the second book of Quintilian, began life as an Oxford thesis by MW, approved for a doctorate as long ago as 1970. It was TR's suggestion that it should at last be revised for publication. MW is primarily responsible for the Introduction Part I, the notes on chs. 1-13, and a number of the non-technical notes in chs. 14-21; TR for Part II of the Introduction, and the technical notes in chs. 14-21. But we have read and criticized each other's work at every stage, and revised our own accordingly. The whole book is the outcome of a happy and fruitful collaboration. The two halves of the work are, however, not completely consistent in the format of citation. We include a new Latin text, paragraphed with more attention than was MW's Oxford Classical Text of 1970, and incorporating changes argued for in the Commentary (for a list, see pp. li f.). There is no apparatus criticus. Variants of any import are cited and discussed in the Commentary; the OCT may be consulted for the rest. We have not thought it necessary to provide a translation, in view of the recent publication of D. A. Russell's monumental Loeb edition. Where our interpretation differs markedly from his, we argue for it in the Commentary, sometimes after consultation with him, and always at our peril. Donald Russell, an examiner of the original thesis, has been our main inspiration; he has read and commented on drafts of our work, and patiently advised us when we were puzzled. Doreen Innes too read the book in draft. Both have contributed far more to it than would appear from our references to them. We are also grateful to friends to whom we turned for advice on particular passages: Kathleen Coleman, Michael Frede, Arnd Kerkhecker, Harm Pinkster, Nicholas Purcell, and Antonio Stramaglia. Robin Nisbet and Peter Walsh lent or gave books. We are greatly indebted to Rolando Ferri for providing us with a photocopy of Ammendola's Italian commentary. We were fortunate to have Leofranc Holford-Strevens as our copy editor, and to profit from his learning and acumen. Hilary O'Shea, the OUP Classics editor, was, as always, warmly supportive. Finally, and most important, we thank our wives, Eva and Nicolette, for their patience and support throughout our work on this book.

Oxford; February 2006

TR MW

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Contents Abbreviations Introduction The Author and the Book Teaching Rhetoric Classroom Procedure (a) Listening (b) Writing (c) Reading Quintilian and Theon Defining Rhetoric Historical Context The Main Argument Sources Strategies Note on the Text Text

ix xxiii xxiii xxiv xxvi xxvi xxvii xxviii XXX

xxxiv xxxiv xxx vii xlii xlvi li 1

COMMENTARY Appendix: Parallel Passages in Sextus, Philodemus, and the Prolegomena

395

Index of Latin Words and Phrases Index of Greek Words and Phrases General Index

403 417 420

35

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Abbreviations Greek authors are normally cited as in LSJ, Classical Latin authors as in OLD, later Latin authors as in TLL; but some modifications have been introduced for the sake of clarity. For Quintilian editions and commentaries, see generally Winterbottom's OCT (1970), i, pp. xvi f. Periodicals are normally abbreviated as in L'Atinee philologique. All items cited in the introduction as well as all items cited more than once in the commentary are listed below; otherwise references are given ad loc. In the commentary, we give a full reference for articles of wider relevance to the question at issue, and an abbreviated reference to articles which are pertinent to a particular problem. Citation of Theon, Progymnasmata: where the Greek text is preserved, the first number is that of the page in the old edition by L. Spengel in Rtietores Graeci, ii (Leipzig, 1854), 59-130; the lines are those as printed in the 1997 Bude edition of M. Patillon and G. Bolognesi (whose lineation inevitably differs a little from Spengel's own); the pagereferencein brackets is that of the Bude itself, and it is added because the editors have reordered the exercises (see below, p. 76). After the end of the mutilated Greek text, the editors complete the book from the Armenian version, numbering the pages from 131 to 144. Here we do not cite line numbers, and give citations in the French translation. References to Philodemus' Rhet. are given by volume number, page and, where necessary, line number of Sudhaus's edition, as well as by page and line number of Longo Auricchio's edition where available; see also the Appendix (p. 395 n. 1). Italics are sometimes used in citations of Latin parallels to signal words that occur in the immediate context of the lemma, though not in the lemma itself. Adamietz Adams, Biiingualism Allen

J. Adamietz (ed.), M. F. Quintiliani Institutionis Oratoriae liber III (Munich, 1966) J. N. Adams, Bilingualism and the Latin Language (Cambridge, 2003) J. Allen, 'Failure and Expertise in the Ancient Conception of an Art', in T. Horowitz and A. I. Janis (eds.), Scientific Failure (Lanham, MD, 1994), 81-108

x

Alpers-Golz

Ammendola Annas

Appel von Amim, Dio Afifahl Astin Atherton Austin, 'Quintilian' Barnes

Barvvick

Bauman

Blank

Blank, Technicity

Blank, 'Versionen'

Abbreviations R. Alpers-Golz, Der Begriff ZKOTJOZ in der Stoa und seine Vorgeschichte (Hildesheim and New York, 1976) G. Ammendola (ed.), Af. Fabi Quintiliani Institutio Oratoria (Turin, 1928) J. Annas, 'Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy and Private Property', in J. Barnes and M. Griffin (eds.), Philosophia Togata (Oxford, 1989), 151-73 B. Appel, Das Bildungs- und Erziehungsideal Quintilians (Donauworth, 1914; diss, phil.) H. von Amim, Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa (Berlin, 1898) G. Afifahl, Vergleich und Metapher bei Quintilian (Stuttgart, 1932) A. E. Astin, Cato the Censor (Oxford, 1978) C. Atherton, 'Hand over Fist: The Failure von Stoic Rhetoric', CQ2 38 (1988), 392-427 R. G. Austin, 'Quintilian on Painting and Statuary', CQ 38 (1944), 17-26 J. Barnes, 'Is Rhetoric an Art?', DARG Newsletter; 2/2 (Discourse Analysis Research Group, Univ. of Calgary, 1986), 2-22 K. Barwick, 'Das rednerische Bildungsideal Ciceros', Abhandlungen der Sachsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Philosophisch-historisdie Klasse, 53/3 (Berlin, 1963) R. A. Bauman, The Crimen Maiestatis in the Roman Republic and Augustan Principate (Johannesburg, 1970) D. Blank, Sextus Empiricus: Against the Grammarians (Oxford, 1998) D. Blank, 'Philodemus on the Technicity of Rhetoric', in D. Obbink (ed.), Philodemus and Poetry (Oxford, 1995), 178-88 D. Blank, 'Versionen oder Zwillinge? Zu den Handschriften der ersten Bucher von Philodems Rhetorik\ in G. W. Most (ed.), Editing Texts - Texte edieren (Gottingen, 1998), 123-40

Abbre\'iations Bonndl, Lexicon Bonner, Declamation

Bonner, Education Bornecque Brandstatter Brink

Brittain Brou wer Butts

Calboli Caminas

Campbell Clarke

Cole Colson

Cooper

Cope

xi

E. Bonnell (ed.), Lexicon Quintilianeum (Leipzig, 1834) S. F. Bonner, Roman Declamation in the Late Republic and Early Empire (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1949) S. F. Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome (London, 1977) H. Bornecque (trans.), Quintilien: Institution oratoire(4 vols., Paris, 1933-4) C. Brandstatter, De notion um 7toXitik6s et ootoTris usu rhetorico (Leipzig, 1894) C. O. Brink, 'Quintilian's De causis corruptae eloquentiae and Tacitus' Dialogus de oratoribus\ CQ2 39 (1989), 472-503 C. Brittain, Philo ofLarissa: The Last of the Academic Sceptics (Oxford, 2001) R. Brouwer, 'Sagehood and the Stoics', OSAPh 23 (2002), 181-224 J. R. Butts, 'The Progymnasmata ofTheon', Ph.D. thesis, Claremont (UMI, Ann Arbor, 1986) G. Calboli (ed.), Cornifici Rhetorica ad C. Herennium (Bologna, 2 1993) J. G. Caminas, Delator: una aproximacion al estudio del delator en las fuentes romanos (Santiago de Compostela, 1983) G. Campbell, Lucretius on Creation and Evolution (Oxford, 2003) M. L. Clarke, 'The Thesis in the Roman Schools of the Republic', CQ2 1 (1951), 159-66 T. Cole, The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece (Baltimore and London, 1991) F. H. Colson (ed.), M. Fabii Quintiliani Institution is Oratoriae liber I (Cambridge, 1924) J. M. Cooper, 'Ethical-Political Theory in Aristotle's Rhetoric, in Furley-Nehamas, 193-210 E. M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric (London and Cambridge, 1867)

xii

Corsi

Courtney Courtney, Poets Cribiore Daremberg-Saglio

Decl. mai. Decl. miti.

De Falco Dingel

Dionisotti

Dover During Erler

Eucken

Abbreviations Marco Fabio Quintiliano, La formazione delVoratore, i: introduzione di M. Winterbottom, traduzione e note di S. Corsi (Milano, 1997) E Courtney, Archaic Latin Prose (Atlanta, 1999) E Courtney (ed.), The Fragmentary Latin Poets (Oxford, 1993) R. Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind (Princeton and London, 2001) C. Daremberg and E Saglio, Dictionnaire des antiquites grecques et romaines d'apres les textes et les monuments (5 vols., Paris, 1877-1919) L. Hakanson (ed.), Declamationes XIX maiores Quintiliano falso ascriptae (Stuttgart, 1982) M. Winterbottom (ed.), The Minor Declamations Ascribed to Quintilian (Berlin and New York, 1984) V. De Falco, Demade oratore (Naples, 1955) J. Dingel, Scholastica Materia: Untersuchungen zu den Declamationes minores und der Institutio Oratoria Quintilians (Berlin and New York, 1988) A. C. Dionisotti, 'From Ausonius' Schooldays? A Schoolbook and its Relatives', JRS 72 (1982), 83-125 K. J. Dover, Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968) I. During, Aristotle in the Biographical Tradition (Goteborg, 1957) M. Erler, 'Epicurus as deus mortalis: Homoiosis theoi and Epicurean SelfCultivation', in D. Frede and A. Laks (eds.), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology; its Background and Aftermath (Leiden, 2002), 159-81 C. Eucken, Isokrates (Berlin and New York, 1983)

Abbre\'iations Fairweather Fantham

Frede, Theodicy

Friedlander

Furley-Nehamas Gabler Gaunt

Gei gen mii Her Giannantoni Goldberg

Goujard Goulet Granatelli1

Granatelli2

xiii

J. Fairweather, Seneca die Elder (Cambridge, 1981) E. Fantham, Comparative Studies in Republican Latin Imagery (Toronto and Buffalo, 1972) D. Frede, 'Theodicy and Providential Care in Stoicism', in D. Frede and A. Laks (eds.), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (Leiden, Boston, and Cologne, 2002), 85-117 L. Friedlander, Roman Life and Manners under the Early Empire, trans. L. A. Magnus, 4 vols. (London, 1907-13) D. J. Furley and A. Nehamas (eds.), Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays (Princeton, 1994) X. Gabler, De elocutione M. Fabi Quintiliani (Borna-Leipzig, 1910) D. M. Gaunt, M. Fabii Quintiliani Institutio Oratoria: Selections from the Latin Text and Digests of the Intervening Material (Melbourne, London, and Toronto, 1952) P. Geigenmiiller, Quaestiones Dionysianae de vocabulis artis criticae (Leipzig, 1908) G. Giannantoni (ed.), Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae (Naples, 1990) S. M. Goldberg, 'Appreciating Aper: The Defence of Modernity in Tacitus' Dialogus de oratoribus, CQ2 49 (1999), 224-37 R. Goujard (ed.), Caton: De I'agriculture (Paris, 1975) R. Goulet, Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques (Paris, 1989- ) R. Granatelli, 'M. Fabio Quintiliano Institutio Oratoria 2, 1-10', Rhetorica, 13 (1995), 137-60 R. Granatelli, translation of book 2 in A. Pennacini (ed.), Quintiliano, Institutio Oratoria (Turin, 2001), i. 156-279

xiv

Grube Gudeman

Hammerstaedt Hand, Tursellinus Harrison Heerdegen

Heinimann Hellegouarc'h

Heumann-Seckel

H-Sz Hubbell

Hiilser Irwin

Jocelyn Jordan

Abbreviations G. M. A. Grube, 'Theodorus of Gadara', AJPh 80 (1959), 337-65 A. Gudeman (ed.), P. Cornelii Taciti Dialogus de Oratoribus (Leipzig and Berlin, 2 1914) J. Hammerstaedt, 'Der Schlussteil von Philodems drittem Buch iiber Rhetorik', CErcll (1992), 9-W7 F. Hand, Tursellinus seu De particulis Latinis commentarii, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1829-45) S. J. Harrison, 'Vergil on Kingship: The First Simile of the Aeneid, PCPhS 34 (1988), 55-9 F. Heerdegen, Untersuchungen zurlateinischen Semasiologie, iii: Ein lexikalisches Beispiel (Erlangen, 1881) F. Heinimann, 'Eine vorplatonische Theorie der T€Xvq\ MH 18 (1961), 105-30 J. Hellegouarc'h, Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la Republique (Paris, 21972) H. Heumann and E. Seckel, Handlexikon zu den Quellen des romischen Rechts (Graz, 10 1958) J. B. Hofmann and Anton Szantyr, Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik (Munich, 1965) H. M. Hubbell, 'The Rhetorica of Philodemus', Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, 23 (1920), 243-382 K. Hiilser (ed.), Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker, 4 vols. (Stuttgart, 1987-8) T. H. Irwin, 'Stoic Naturalism and its Critics', in B. Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge, 2003), 345-64 H. D. Jocelyn, 'Vergilius Cacozelus (Donatus Vita Vergilii)', PLLS 2 (1979), 77-109 H. Jordan (ed.), M. Catonis praeter librum de re rustica quae extant (Leipzig, 1860)

Abbre\'iations Karadimas

Kaster1

Kaster2

Kennedy Kennedy, Art Kiderlin1

Kiderlin2

Kiderlin3 Kiderlin4

Kiderlin5

Kiderlin6

Kiderlin7

xv

D. Karadimas, Sextus Empiricus against Aelius Aristides: The Conflict between Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Second Century A.D. (Lund, 1996) R. A. Kaster (ed.), C. Suetonius Tranquillus, De Grammaticis et Rhetoribus (Oxford, 1995) R. A. Kaster, 'Controlling Reason: Declamation in Rhetorical Education at Rome', in Y. L. Too (ed.), Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity (Leiden, 2001), 317-37 G. A. Kennedy, 'The Ancient Dispute over Rhetoric in Homer', AJPh 78 (1957), 23-35 G. A. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, 1963) M. Kiderlin, 'Zu Quintilianus', Neue Jahrbucherfur Philologie, 131 (1885), 113-38 M. Kiderlin, 'Kritische und exegetische Anmerkungen zu Quintilianus', Blatter fiir das bayerisdie Gymnasialwesen, 22 (1886), 1-19, 199-215, 349-77 M. Kiderlin, 'Zu Quintilianus', Neue Jahrbucherfur Philologie, 133 (1886), 200-202 M. Kiderlin, review of Meister's edition, Neue Philologische Rundschau, 1887, 87-91 [books 1 and 2]; XVodienschrift fur klassische Philologie, 1887, 43-9 [books 3 and 4]; Neue Philologische Rundschau, 1887, 134-8 [book 12] M. Kiderlin, 'Kritische Bemerkungen zum XII. Buche des Quintilianus', Zeitschrift fur die osterreichischen Gymnasien, 39 (1888), 385-414 M. Kiderlin, 'Zum ersten und zweiten Buche des Quintilianus', Neue Jahrbiicher fiir Philologie, 147 (1893), 69-78 M. Kiderlin, 'Altes und Neues zu den ersten drei Biichern des Quintilianus', Neue Jahrbiicher fiir Philologie, 147 (1893), 711-18

xvi

KideHin8

Krapinger

K-S

L.A.

Lausberg

Lebreton Leigh Lofstedt

Long, 'Harmonics' Long-Sedley L-P

LS LSJ

Mansfeld Mansfeld, Prolegomena

Abbreviations M. Kiderlin, 'Zum zweiten Buche von Quintilians Institutio Oratoria', Philologus, 6 (1893), 496-505 G. Krapinger, (QuintilianJ, Die Bienen des armen Mamies (Grofiere Dek lam a tione n, 13) (Cassino, 2005) R. Kiihner and C. Stegmann, Ausfuhrliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache: Satzlehre, 2 vols. (Leverkusen, 3 1955) F. Longo Auricchio (ed.), 1966) J. S. Watson, Quintilian's Institutes of Oratory (London, 1856) W. S. Watt, 'Notes on Quintilian', Grazer Beit rage, 15 (1988), 139-60 R. Webb, 'The Progymnasmata as Practice', in Y. L. Too (ed.), Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity (Leiden, 2001), 289316 F. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles (10 vols., Basel and Stuttgart, 2 1967-9) U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 'Der Rhetor Aristeides', in Kleine Schriften, iii (1969), 426-53 M. Winterbottom, 'Some Problems in Quintilian Book Two', Philologus, 108 (1964), 119-27 M. Winterbottom, 'Quintilian and Declamation', in Hommages a Jean Cousin (Paris, n.d.), 225-35 M. Winterbottom, 'On Impulse', in D. Innes, H. Hine, and C. Pelling (eds.), Ethics and Rhetoric: Classical Essays for Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday (Oxford, 1995), 313-22 M. Winterbottom, 'Cicero and the Middle Style', in J. Diggle, J. B. Hall, and H. D.

xxii

Winterbottom5

Winterbottom6 Winterbottom7 Wohrer

Abbreviations Jocelyn (eds.), Studies in Latin Literature and its Tradition in Honour of C. O. Brink, PCPhS suppl. 15 (1989), 125-31 M. Winterbottom, 'Quintilian the Moralist', in T. Albaladejo, E. Del Rio, and J. A. Caballero (eds.), Quintiliano: historia y actualidad dela retorica (Calahorra, 1998), 317-34 M. Winterbottom, Problems in Quintilian (BICS Suppl. 25, 1970) M. Winterbottom, 'Quintilian and the vir bonus\ JRS 54 (1964), 90-7 J. Wohrer, De A. Comelii Celsi Rhetorica (Vienna, 1903)

Introduction THE AUTHOR AND THE BOOK Marcus Fabius Quintilianus was born at Calahorra in northern Spain, around AD 35, but spent much of his life in Rome. He wrote his only surviving book, the Institutio Oratoria, after his retirement from practice as an advocate and from teaching rhetoric (n. on 2. 12. 12 iam pridem), and before the death of the emperor Domitian in 96; for the lost book De causis corruptae eloquentiae, see n. on 2. 4. 42 alio... libro. His talents had attracted imperial favour, leading to award of a public salary by Vespasian (d. 79), attainment of the ornamenta consularia, and employment as tutor to Domitian's greatnephews.1 One important structural principle of the Institutio is to follow the career of the orator from birth to retirement. Accordingly, Book 1 goes into considerable detail on the early stages of his education, at the school of the grammaticus, who taught literature with special reference to poetry. Book 2 begins with a chapter on the transition to the teacher of rhetoric {rhetor). The rhetorical training began with preliminary exercises (progymnasmata)2 that led up eventually to the practice of declamatio, the making of speeches on fictional forensic or deliberative themes. Quintilian discusses this early stage in 2. 2-9, the various progymnasmata being listed in 2. 4.3 The merits of declamation are weighed in 2. 10, but, after three chapters on the extent to which rules are necessary at all for the orator (11-13), Quintilian drops his chronological thread (see n. on 2. 10. 1 quarum antequam uiam ingredior) in favour of a magisterial survey of the rhetorical system which underpinned both declamation and the real-life oratory for which declamation was designed as training. This survey lasts until the end of Book 11. It takes in, along with a good deal more, the five traditional heads, of invention (the 1 F o r further details and bibliography, see esp. Raster 1 3 3 3 - 6 . 2 F o r information on the background and the main texts, see below, pp. 7 5 - 7 . There is an excellent and wide-ranging discussion in Webb. 3 W h e n Quintilian comes to the chapter on full declamation (2. 10), the transition is emphatic: in his primis operibus contrasts with suasorias iudicialesque materias, 'quarum antequam uiam ingredior, pauca mihi de ipsa declamandi ratione dicenda sunt'. Yet he several times uses dedamare and declamatio in connection with progymnasmata o r to cover both them and full declamation: see nn. on 2. 1. 3 ita... sciat, 2 . 2. 12 declamationis, 2. 5. 16 declamando, 2. 7 . 1 iis... aetatibus, and esp. the introductory n. to 2 . 6 . F o r his use o f the word dictio, see on 2 . 2 . 6. F o r the developing usage o f the word declamatio and its cognates, see Stroh.

xxiv

Introduction

devising of subject-matter: Books 4-6, arranged around the parts of the speech), arrangement (dispositio; Book 7), style (elocutio, Books 8-9), memory (11. 2) and delivery (actio; 11. 3). Only in Book 12 does Quintilian return to his orator, whose career ends in the retirement discussed in the final chapter, 12. 11. The first half of Book 2, then, concerns the teaching of rhetoric at school. But its second half (chs. 14-21) is an introduction to Quintilian's survey of rhetorical precept, and in some degree corresponds to the Prolegomena found at the start of many later Greek treatises on the art. We therefore offer separate introductions to these very different parts of the Book. Teaching Rhetoric '[The student] does not need to know much about the children—where they sat, what they learnt, how they were disciplined (or bribed) into obedience; nor will he be invited to inquire into the wider context which the child itself experienced—the interplay of family, work and home, or the way in which schooling helped to teach behaviour and inculcate sex and dass roles.' These words were written in 1975 by Ralph Samuel, in the course of an attack on current priorities of teachers and researchers in English history.'1 Quintilian was writing for students in Roman schools, their fathers, who will often have themselves been taught in the same way, and their teachers. He does not, accordingly, go out of his way to give the sort of information that Samuel desiderates; for his readers were well aware of it. But he often lets slip items of great interest in these areas; and at times he raises issues that will continue to be relevant so long as there are children to be taught and teachers to teach them.5 It is undeniable, however, that to a modern reader the education given by Quintilian sounds strange enough. He was not part of a system. If it is sometimes said that he held a public chair of rhetoric, funded by the emperor, that does not mean that he was anything remotely like a modern professor. 4 Samuel, p. xiii. 5 Three instances. 'Britain's brightest teachers should not have to take classes o f struggling pupils, the leader o f the country's top independent schools said last night, in remarks condemned as "outrageous" by state school heads' ( T h e Iitdependent, 5 Oct. 2004, p. 19); compare Quintilian's remarks in 2. 3. 'Parental power is anathema (sic] to good schooling' (headline o f an article by Yasmin Alibhai-Brown in The Independent, 7 Mar. 2 0 0 5 ) ; compare Quintilian 2. 7. 1. Nor is the place of morality in education forgotten, at least across the Atlantic: 'Taking up o n c e again the cause o f moral e d u c a t i o n . . . might be a key strategic m o v e in establishing for the residential elites a unique and marketable identity in contemporary American higher education' (Peter Gomes, quoted in The New York Review of Books, 2 4 Mar. 2005, p. 21).

The Author and the Book

xxv

And, unlike a modern teacher, he was a private entrepreneur, running a school to make a profit, and untrammelled by any regulation from above. There was no 'national curriculum', and no outside assessment. The rhetor did what he liked, answerable only to the fathers who paid him to provide their adolescent sons (not their daughters)6 with a secondary education, and who might withdraw them if they felt that they were not getting their money's worth. Equally strange today, he taught nothing but rhetoric. The boys learnt to speak in front of others, first simpler progymnasmata, then full declamationes. Quintilian may have been more insistent than others on the reading and close study of prose texts. But the core of this education was the spoken exercise; and what was learnt in this obsessive way at school stayed with the student for ever. The influence of declamation on post-Republican Latin (and later Greek) literature is acknowledged, though perhaps not always justly assessed.7 If we are not told in what kind of building Quintilians school was housed, we do gather that teaching was conducted in a single room (n. on 2. 2. 14 pueros adulescentibus permixtos sedere), and by himself in person, though he remarks on the employment of classroom assistants (n. on 2. 5. 3 adiutores).8 The age range is not made clear. A pupil (Quintilian thought) should enter the school when he was fit to be transferred from the school of the grammafiats (2. 1.7 cum poterit). He is equally vague about pupils' departure. We have to rely on other information to hazard the guess that pupils normally learnt rhetoric from 13 or 14 to 18. The range, in any case, was wide enough to present problems, for the single room contained both boys and young men; Quintilian made the age-groups sit separately (perhaps by years), and was well aware of the sexual tensions that could arise (2. 2. 14-15). Quintilian disapproved of corporal punishment at any age. But he often speaks, in a humane tone, of'correction' (n. on 2. 2. 7 acerbus). Pupils might be jollied along with attractive subject-matter and concessions on stylistic exuberance, but only while they were still comparatively young (2. 4. 4-8). There was some scope for individual attention (n. on 2. 5. 3 praeire). Prizes may not have been offered, but there was always the bait of showing off one's skills in speaking in front of the class or before regularly assembled larger audiences, including fathers (2. 7. 5 uelut praemio studii, with n.). F o r the education o f girls, see Bonner, Education, 2 7 - 8 (tutors), 1 3 5 - 6 (grammar schools). Bonner, Declamation, 1 4 9 - 6 7 is still authoritative. " Around 1650 the boys at St Paul's School, London, 'all 150 o f them, sat in one r o o m sixty feet l o n g . . .At one end sat the high master, John Langley, . . . a n d at the other the surmaster, although he spent more time walking about to supervise. There were eight classes, and the pupils were divided by achievement, not age' (Tomalin, ch. 2). Quintilian does not mention classes in Book 2 , but elsewhere see 1. 2. 2 3 - 4 (obscure) and 10. 5 . 21. 6 7

xxvi Introduction

Fathers indeed are always there in the background; they have, in Quintilian's account, been deeply interested in their sons' progress ever since birth, and the teacher is, as for Juvenal, in loco parentis (n. on 2. 2. 4 sumat...parentis... animum). In return, teachers might expect the affection of their pupils (2. 2. 8, 2. 9. 1). And they used their authority not merely to teach the syllabus but, consciously and unconsciously, to inculcate values. Quintilian wrote, and no doubt said, much that tended to the establishment of maleness. Effeminacy, in all departments, was frowned upon (n. on 2. 5. 9 uirilis tamen). The Institutio, though, went far beyond this. Quintilian's concept of the orator was deeply moral: the first part of uir bonus dicendi perituswas as important as the second. It was left to the advanced programme of Book 12, which concerned pupils who had left the rhetor's school, to suggest how a student might be trained to become a good man.9 But it had always been the job of the teacher, grammaticus and then rhetor, to do everything possible to inculcate it in practice (cf. e.g. 2. 2. 5 'let him talk much of the honourable and good; the more often he has admonished, the less often will he need to punish', and n. on 2. 4. 20 formatur).10 Classroom

Procedure

It is not easy to form a coherent view of exactly what went on from day to day in Quintilian's school.11 Details will be given at various points in the Commentary, but it may prove helpful to provide an overview here of what may have been the procedure in the teaching of progymnasmata. (fl) Listening Central to the teaching of the progymnasmatawas listening to the teacher. The master 'should himself say something, or rather much, every day for his hearers to take home with them' (2. 2. 8, with n.): in the fbnn, that is, of notes (com men tarii: 2. 11. 7 n.) to be studied and learned. An important part of such spoken teaching12 would be the provision of models (of varying 9

See Winterbottom* 3 2 1 - 2 .

See recently, on the inculcation o f values, Webb 3 0 3 - 5 (progymnasmata) and Raster 2 (declamation). 1 1 Let alone in other schools. We use some evidence from a work on preliminary rhetorical exercises by the Greek rhetor Theon (date uncertain), which shows striking similarities to Quintilian (below, pp. 7 6 - 7 ) . But Theon seems to presuppose the teaching not o f a class, but o f private pupils individually (note esp. pp. 1 0 2 - 3 : 'si le jeune h o m m e est intelligent... s'il Test s u p e r e r i e u r e m e n t . . w i t h the Bude n.). 1 2 For the possibility that certain papyri represent models o f progymnasmatic exercises composed by teachers, see the important remarks o f Stramaglia 1 , e.g. 109, and Stramaglia 2 225-32. 10

The Author and the Book

xxvii

fullness: see b), below) when a pupil was to write an exercise.13 The pupil was expected to imitate such models.14 This sort of thing goes back to the very roots of declamation: the speeches given by the Greek sophists when teaching their pupils. Isocrates, in a striking passage (13. 18), says that it is essential that a teacher should present himself as an example, napdSeiy^a, 'so that those who have received his imprint ( t o v s cKrvnaiOevTas) and are capable of imitating him may at once become more accomplished orators than the others' (for the metaphor see n. on 2. 2. 8 ipse... referant). Perhaps relevant here is the process described in a chapter of Theon (14) preserved only in Armenian, by which a pupil may come, by stages, to be able to recall (for example) every detail of the style, content, and structure of an oratorical composition that he has listened to. The point of this process of recollection, it emerges, is that the student should be able to reproduce what he has heard, not orally, but in writing. (b) Writing15 When a pupil was to write an exercise, the teacher (see 2. 6) might either (i) give a division, the headings recommended for the treatment of the theme set, and then develop them to some extent, with arguments and emotional passages, before a pupil set to work on the subject at all (i.e. he would give a model for at least some parts of the exercise in advance),16 or (ii) give advance hints of what might be said, but then let the pupil go to work, repairing any omissions after he had already given his speech and developing some passages in detail (i.e. he would give model extracts afterwards). Quintilian thought method (i) more appropriate for beginners, method (ii) for more advanced pupils. He was prepared eventually to permit a pupil to speak without any advance help at all (2. 6. 5-6). When the teacher had given the amount of guidance he thought appropriate, the pupil, it seems, excogitated and wrote out (2. 6. 3 'cogitationem.. .et 1 5 We should distinguish from this the dictation of totae materiae mentioned in 2. 4. 12 as a means o f correcting a pupil s defective written (not spoken: note 13 stilus) work. But even here the pupil was to imitate such a fair-copy and 'low it as his own'. 1 4 Here may lie the deepest root of 'declamatory* influence on Latin literature (cf. the remarks o f Webb 291, citing Theon 70. 2 4 - 9 [p. 15|). If the teacher favoured a particular style, it might show even at the progymnasmatic stage; it certainly would when he gave model declamations to older pupils (and a fortiori to public audiences for display and advertisement, at occasions o f the kind referred to in 11. 2. 39). That is why Quintilian insists that a teacher should be a Phoenix, 'tam eloquentia quam moribus praestantissimus' (2. 3. 12).

Not to be engaged in until the pupil was capable o f it: Theon 71. 2 (p. 16). This is presumably (one aspect o f ) what is referred to in 2. 5. 16 'declamabit... praeceptor ut sit exemplo suis auditoribus' (which may cover advanced declamation also). 15

xxviii

Introduction

stilum') an exercise of the same kind. The writing was crucial: 'I want narrations to be composed in writing, with all possible care' (2. 4. 15): and no doubt this applied no less to all the other preliminary exercises (cf. 2. 7. 2). Writing up an exercise avoided the dangers of thoughtless extemporization (2.4. 15 and 17).17 What happened then? Quintilian mentions the correction of a pupil's written effort, with provision of a complete fair copy if need be (2. 4. 10-14; cf. above, p. xxvii n. 13). In some schools, it seems, a student would learn by heart everything' he had written, and declaim it on fixed days (2. 7. 1). Quintilian is doubtful about that: it would be appropriate only for some really good effort (2. 7. 5). The implication of 2. 7. 1 ('iis de quibus nunc disserimus aetatibus') may be that he looked more favourably on such occasions when students were older. But none of this prevents us from supposing that the pupil might always, or sometimes, deliver in class an exercise he had written; the applause discouraged in 2. 4. 9-12 might presumably erupt on such occasions.18 In any case, 2. 7 stresses the desirability of pupils' learning passages of oratory and history by heart (for the part played by memorizing generally, see on 2. 7. 2 ediscere), as opposed to compositions of their own. (c) Reading Quintilian in 2. 5. 1 recommends a practice by which the rhetor provided his younger pupils with an exposition (enarratio) of prose texts, related to that which the grammaticus gave for poetry. In the school of the grammaticus, the teacher seems19 to have given a model reading of a passage, following which each pupil came up to the teacher's chair in turn to read the passage (of course aloud) himself (a practice rejected for the rhetorical school in 2. 5. 5). 20 Quintilian prefers to appoint one pupil as reader for a given occasion (2. 5.6). This 'reading' may have sometimes or always been in fact a recitation from memory; and diction and delivery were not forgotten. The wording of 2. 5. 7 (see n.) suggests that the exposition of the law caserelevantto the passage, and 1 7 In a similar vein, Q. will later ( 2 . 1 1 - 1 2 ) criticize adults who relied on improvisation rather than o n careful preparation. See below, p. 176 n. 20. 1 8 2. 7 . 1 is not lucidly phrased. But it does not seem to exclude the memorization and deliver)' in class o f at least s o m e exercises. 1 9 But the discussion in Bonner, Education, 2 2 5 - 6 largely deduces the practice o f the grammatici from what Quintilian says o f the rhetor's school in 2. 5. 2 0 Reading by the whole class in unison may be alluded to in Sen. S. 2. 13 and Macrobius, Saturnalia 1. 24. 5 (cited on 2. 5. 3 praeire). Note also, for the school o f the grammaticus, Quintilian 1 . 2 . 15 (with Colson's n . ) and Hentieneumata Celtis § § 3 7 - 9 (Dionisotti 100). This last and (for the school o f the rhetor) Juv. 7. 1 5 2 - 4 perhaps raise more questions than they settle; M W is very grateful to Antonio Stramaglia for drawing both passages to his attention and discussing them with him.

The Author and the Book xxix

by extension the rest of the enarratio, preceded this reading. Quintilian is only giving us the highlights of a system which his readers may have been familiar with from their days at the school of grammar, and we can only speculate. One possibility is as follows. The teacher dictated the passage to a group of pupils. They copied it down on their tablets or papyrus sheets, and took it away to study (and perhaps memorize) overnight. Next day, a reader is appointed and the exposition given.21 Finally, the pupil read or recited the passage. This is entirely conjectural. But a student listening to the reading would be able, on this hypothesis, to recognize the features that the teacher had pointed out, and understand better a passage that he might have found puzzling during his work at home the evening before. Comparable is the process by which we might read a portion of an unfamiliar classical text, then study a good commentary, and finally reread the text. Quintilian in 2. 5 leaves us to deduce that (as was surely inevitable) only selected passages from speeches were 'read' in this manner.22 When in 2. 5. 7-12 he speaks of the reading of an oratio, and of an exposition covering the whole speech from proem to epilogue, this is not to be taken literally. Rather, Quintilian must be giving general headings for such a commentary, from which the teacher would choose what was appropriate to the extract under discussion. Thus if (for example) the proem of Cicero's Pro Caeliowas being studied, the teacher would describe the circumstances of the case, discuss the tone of the passage, and show how it lays the basis for the argumentative strategy of the whole speech.23 Further, we may speculate that this reading would be tied in with the particular exercise currently being studied. Thus (to take the same example), if the exercise were the commonplace, and the subject pro amore (see 2. 4. 23), it would make sense for the class to read a portion of Pro Caelio.21 Quintilian did not think that this sort of enarratio of prose texts was suitable for the older students (2. 5. 1), and in any case he was not always able to employ it himself (2. 5. 2-3). But presumably passages for private 21 Bonner, Education, 2 2 5 envisages the grammaticus giving this in conjunction with his own initial reading. For Theon's practice, see above, n. 11, and n. on 2 . 5 . 5 non utique. 2 2 In 2 . 5. 24 lie is talking o f something different, the selection o f good passages from authors who were not consistently excellent. But note 2. 7. 2 , o n the memorization of passages from o r a t o r ) ' a n d history: separate, it seems, from the e>wrr<jrioprocess. 1. 11. 14 may show that such memorized passages were also recited in class; alternatively, Quintilian may there be speaking o f enarratio. 2 3 When Theon similarly talks in terms o f whole speeches in c h 13, he should presumably be understood in the same way. It m a y be observed that in ch. 2 he had given parallels to the various exercises that take the form of extracts from Plato, Herodotus, and the like. 2 4 Comparable is the recommendation in Theon 7 2 . 9 - 1 6 (p. 17): the pupil should write his exercise on a theme used by an ancient writer, and then read that parallel text.

xxx

Introduction

reading were regularly set or recommended to pupils (cf. 2. 2. 8, and see below, p. xxxiii).25 Reading, in private or in class, was, like a teacher's speeches, meant to be remembered and to provide models for imitation (10. 1. 19); and vital they were, for without lectionis exemption 'the whole effort will drift, with no one to steer it' (10. 1. 2).

Quintilian and Theon We argue in the introduction to 2. 4 that Quintilian had available to him, besides Theon (or something very like Theon), another simpler Greek source which was not unlike (say) Hermogenes, and which in particular followed in essentials the order of exercises that Theon altered but that despite him remained canonical. We can on this hypothesis hope to identify a traditional core of this part of the Institutio, Greek in origin, and observe how Quintilian has adapted that material for his own use. The order in which the exercises are treated in the various witnesses is discussed below, pp. 76-7. For our present purposes, two facts are of importance. 1. Quintilian treats all the exercises discussed by Theon except for Ethopoeia and Description, though he assigns three of them, Myth, Chria, and Gnome, to the grammaticus (1. 10). 2. Quintilian does not formally list and discuss what we shall call Theon's Techniques, already listed in an early passage in the Greek version of his book, but only discussed at length in the Armenian version, discovered last century and made generally available to classical scholars with the publication of the remarkable Bude edition as late as 1997.26 The significance of these two facts may now be considered. 1. The border dispute between grammatici and rhetores over the progymnasmata is discussed in Quintilian 2. 1 (see the introductory n. there). The grammatici at their most pleonectic claimed to teach all the exercises. Theon appears to regard them all as the province of the rhetor. Quintilian maintains a compromise position: Myth, Chria, and Gnome (and some others not mentioned by Theon) are so simple that they can appropriately be taught by the grammaticus; and they accordingly appear in 1. 10. 2-6. But equally he appears to think that two of Theon's exercises are inappropriate for treatment at the progymnasmatic stage. But that does not mean that he ignores them. On the contrary, he mentions Description (e Kpaois) in the course of 2.4, in 25 26

For 1. 11. 14 see above, p. xxix n. 2 2 . Granatelli 1 and even the notes to her translation show no knowledge o f this new evidence.

The Author and the Book xxxi

a digression on the style of Narration; significantly enough, he does so in order to warn against narrative that is either 'dry and jejune' or 'tortuous and revelling in those irrelevant Descriptions to which many are tempted by their wish to imitate the licence of poets' (3; transl. Russell). Even though he regarded fullness as preferable at this early stage to meagreness, Quintilian perhaps felt that it was best not to make a formal progymnasma of something that might easily be misused. Descriptions could find a place later on, though Quintilian nowhere lays much stress on them. Perhaps he felt some deepseated distaste for a feature that was essentially extra quaestioneni (11. 3. 164; cf. arcessitis in 2. 4. 3, translated above, and see n. on 2. 4. 3 descriptionibus). As for Ethopoeia (called by Quintilian Prosopopoeia), it is not mentioned until the discussion of deliberative oratory (including suasoria) in 3. 8 (see the n. on the difficult passage 2. 1. 2 sed... inrumpunt). 2. Theon's Techniques are not ignored either. They are not put on a strict level with the exercises by Theon, whose Bude editors called them 'exercices d'accompagnement'; for whereas the exercises were taught, one at a time and in succession, pupils were trained in the Techniques throughout the progymnasmatic stage. They are discussed successively in the 'new' Armenian chapters of Theon: Reading (ch. 13), Listening (ch. 14), Paraphrase (ch. 15), Elaboration (ch. 16), and Contradiction (ch. 17). Theon has already told us earlier that 'we shall use Reading, Listening, and Paraphrase from the start, but Elaboration and especially Contradiction only when we have achieved some £ ( 6 5 . 23-6: p. 9). Quintilian is well aware of these chapters, or some close relative of them. But he does not discuss them in 2. 4; not illogically, for they do not concern exercises of the kind discussed there. Instead, and without identifying them formally, he exploits the Techniques (so far as Book 2 is concerned) at various points in 2. 5-9. We have seen the stress laid on Reading in 2. 5 P That he there (3) remarks that 'the Greeks' practised the enarratio of prose texts that he himself favoured may be a sign of his use of Theon's book or something like it. For particular coincidences between Quintilian and Theon on this topic, see nn. on 5.6 adsuescant, 5. 7 exposita causa and inuentione, 5. 9 ratione eloquendi, 5. 18 qui legendi sint and 5. 21 durescere (also on 2. 2. 8 ipse aliquid.. .dicat quae... refera nt). So far as Listening is concerned, we refer to our earlier discussion of model speeches (above, pp. xxvi f.). Elaboration and Contradiction will crop up in the discussion below. 2 7 Note in that chapter the opposition of Thucydides and Herodotus in Theon (see on 2. with n.) on the danger o f imitation o f the old concerning Lysias (for the danger o f any single

Sallust and Livy ( 1 9 ) , reminiscent o f that o f 5 . 18 qui legendi sittt), and the stress (also in 19, orators alone, reminiscent o f Theon's warning model cf. also Quintilian 10. 2. 2 3 - 6 ) .

xxxii

Introduction

In 10. 5, the discussion of what is to be written by those striving for etjts, Quintilian starts with translation from Greek, but soon comes on to paraphrase (5). For Quintilian it is something to be applied to poetry, to Latin speeches in a spirit of emulation, even to one's own work. He remarks strikingly (8) that the exercise gives us the incentive to look very carefully at a piece of writing, 'not passing it over in casual reading', but weighing up its virtues. This, in fact, is a means of encouraging critical reading of texts. Quintilian had mentioned paraphrase in passing at 1. 9. 2, as something to be applied to a piece of poetry with the aim of abbreviation or ornamentation. This was appropriate at a very early stage of rhetorical education, so early that even Quintilian was happy to leave it to the grammaticus. And Suetonius too mentions it in this context (Gramm. 4. 5). Theon, on the other hand, as we have seen, thought it should be taught, as a Technique, from the start of the course in progymnasmata. Quintilian, who has not mentioned it in Book 2, now recommends it for a much older student. It is notable, too, that he associates with it the (thoroughly sophistic) exercise of'expanding what is by nature brief and amplifying the insignificant' (10. 5. 11; cf. 1. 9. 2); he may here be working into his system what Theon (c. 16) had called Elaboration. This treatment of Paraphrase gives us a clue to Quintilian's whole procedure in adapting Theon-type material. He does not regard the exercises listed in Theon as necessarily to be restricted to the early stages of the rhetors school (or even, in some cases, to that of the grammaticus). Instead, he is open to their use much later on. And this was still more true of Theon's Techniques. This indeed is the key to a good deal of Book 10. It is at the start of that book that Quintilian starts to speak of the pursuit of e£t?.28 He says at the opening of the book (10. 1. 1) that it is debatable what most contributes towards this quality: writing, reading (these two are paired at 10. 1. 8) or speaking. And the book contains, amongst other things, chapters on reading (1), writing (how to write, 3; what to write, 5), and the closely associated imitation (2). Amidst all this there is much to remind us both of Book 2 and of Theon. It is clear that Quintilian, entirely approving of the Greek's procedures, felt that they should be extended over a much longer timescale, perhaps even over a lifetime. 2« w h e n Theon (cited above, p. xxxi) says that 'we shall u s e . . .Elaboration and especially Contradiction only when we h a w achieved some it is not clear (as the Bude editors acknowledge: p. xxix nn. 4 5 - 6 ) at what stage this became true; but he is thinking o f some point within the period during which students were trained in progyttinasinata. But Quintilian indicates that / f t s needs to be established ( 1 0 . 1. 44 'confirmare facultatem dicendi', 10. 5. 1 'hexin parantibus') at a very late stage o f the rhetorical education, when the theoretical precepts have been mastered (10. 1. 1, 4 ) and the young man Is contemplating a career as an orator ( 1 0 . 1. 4 5 ) ; we should think o f him as having left school altogether (note 10. 5. 19, and cf. the next n.). But the process could go o n much longer; thus declamation was still useful for the 'complete orator, already famous in the forum' (10. 5. 14).

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The Techniques are now adapted to an older youth, who has cut himself adrift from the rhetorReading has become an entirely private activity, and the reader must now supply for himself the enarratio formerly supplied by the teacher.30 Listening (Quintilian uses the word auditio at 10. 1. 10 paired with reading; cf. 10. 1. 15, 16) is now attendance not at a model speech, but at a real-life oration. Correction, discussed in 10. 4, is neither the process described in 2. 4. 10-12 (cf. 2. 2. 7), where a kindly teacher points out errors in a pupils work, nor yet that seen in Theon ch. 17, the Contradiction that dares to find fault in a Demosthenes. Rather, it is the process of going over one's own work and giving it a final polish on the basis of one's mature judgement. But it is in the two chapters on Writing that the echoes of the second book are most obvious. One must write with all care and as much as possible (10. 3. 2; cf. 2.4. 15, and also 10. 7. 7, 28). Writing is a remedy against empty loquacity and words that are born only on the lips' (10. 3. 2; cf. 2. 4. 15 'the garrulity of extemporization'). Writing stores away treasures of words for future use (10. 3. 3; cf. 2. 7.4). As we read 10. 5, which (as we have seen) recommends paraphrase for a youth who has left school, we realize that we are being given a partial reprise of elements of Book 2. We are recommended to write Theses (with the comment that Cicero exercised himself on them even when he was a great man), and to employ the associated exercise of supporting and refuting them (10. 5. 11). Then come Commonplaces, again with a comment suggesting their utility not just for the youth who had left school but even for the mature: 'we know that orators wrote them out' (10. 5. 12, looking back to 2. 1. 11). And finally (10. 5. 14) declamation itself recurs, recommended specifically as something which, if properly exercised, will be of high use 'not just while one is growing up, but when one is the complete orator, already famous in the forum'. Quintilian is quick to warn that one can spend too long in the declamation school (10. 5. 17-8; cf. 12. 11. 15); but he is clear that declamation, like the simpler exercises that preceded it, continues to be of service as worth writing (and surely also sometimes speaking) right on into adult life. 2 9 Note how in 10. 2 . 1 9 - 2 1 one is advised to 'consult one's powers', for people are different and cannot d o everything; compare 2. 8 (to which Quintilian refers back in 10. 2. 20), where it is for the teacher to decide what each pupil is capable of. In 10. 2. 21 Quintilian summarizes the point: 4 |the teacher) guides and forms the minds o f others; it is harder to shape one's own nature'. 3 0 Thus ( 1 0 . 1. 22) a reader should be acquainted with the cases in connection with which the speeches he reads were spoken (cf. 2. 5. 7 'exposita causa'). Further, in 10. 2, the chapter o n imitation, Quintilian makes the point ( 2 7 ) that a model is t o be followed not just in vocabulary but in the whole conduct o f a speech; one needs to pay close attention to the strategies o f the speech and to its emotional effect; compare 2. 5 . 7 - 9 . The prolonged discussion o f H o m e r in 10. 1. 4 6 - 5 0 exemplifies, at the start o f Quintilian's reading-list, the sort o f things he hoped a reader would look for.

xxxiv

Introduction

Theon, then, or something much like Theon's book, is plundered by Quintilian much more widely than in Book 2. He finds the exercises that Theon listed for progymnasmatic purposes relevant far beyond that stage. Here, in fact, is a striking instance of a general rule stressed by Rafaella Cribiore: 'paideia... proceeded in a circular motion, by revisiting previous material' (Cribiore 187, looking back to p. 129).31

DEFINING RHETORIC In the second half of Inst. Or. Book 2 Quintilian develops his theoretical conception of rhetoric in careful interaction with earlier views on the matter. This conception is characterized by two views in particular: that rhetoric, for it to be deserving of that name, has to be technical, grounded in an elaborate system of rules and precepts, and that only a uir bonus, endowed with what tradition calls the four cardinal virtues, can be an orator in the full sense of the term. In ancient debates about rhetoric and oratory, this is a fairly extreme position, and a survey of certain aspects of the political and historical context in which Quintilian was writing the Institutio will help to clarify why he adopts it. This will be followed by a summary of the main argument in 2. 14-21, which is meant to tie in with the introductions to individual chapters in the commentary. We shall then briefly consider views similar to Quintilian's in the works of Aelius Aristides, which have given rise to suggestions that both writers draw on the same influence. At the end we shall survey some literary strategies which the author employs as he sets out his argument.

Historical Context It was a widely shared perception among Roman intellectuals of the second half of the first century AD that Roman oratory had declined since the days of Cicero, both with respect to its stylistic qualities—here the detrimental effects of declamation practice were cited, though these were set against a wider background of views on the decline of literary culture in general and oratory in particular—and with respect to the moral stature of the orators in 3 1 This section o f o u r Introduction may be compared with L - P i. 2 4 7 - 5 4 , a discussion which contains m u c h o f value, especially o n the way in which Cicero in deOratore 1. 1 4 9 - 5 9 (a passage that deeply influenced Quintilian's tenth book) raised some o f the progymnasmata to a higher level; but it is in o u r view open to criticism, and was written too early to be able to take into account the new evidence about Theon.

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question. In particular, a conception of rhetoric which, as is suggested by the Institutio and the almost contemporary Dialogusde Oratoribus by Tacitus, was very prominent at the time was that of a group of orators and teachers of rhetoric whom one might call the 'naturalists' (thus Winterbottom7 95). It was characterized by a complete rejection of rhetorical theory. The naturalists turned rhetoric into an art of improvisation, and it is no coincidence that Quintilian castigates them in 2. 11-12 (see the introductory notes to these chapters), before he embarks on delineating his alternative position (put differently, this contrast is instrumental in connecting the two halves of the book). However, there is a particular group of naturalists which is especially relevant (see p. 175 and Winterbottom7). The most famous orators of the time were delatores, professional accusers ('informers') of usually lowly origin who destroyed the lives of honourable men and their families out of greed and personal ambition (see Rutledge and Riviere). The delatores were relied on by the imperial court and could be seen as one of the instruments of enforcing monarchic power. And although this was not peculiar to them (see p. 184), their manner of speaking was of the naturalist type as described above (see p. 183). By contrast the Institutio demands that the orator be a good man, widely read and learned, be carefully trained in the technical rhetoric which forms the body of the work, and speak in a way which is, while making the inevitable concessions to the changes of taste, reminiscent of the developed style of Cicero. Various aspects of this scenario have recently been called into question, and since we shall presuppose its accuracy in the commentary, some of these objections need to be addressed here, and reasons given why we consider them not pertinent. First, there are historical studies of the role of the delatores in the Empire like Rutledge's which urge that delatores are misrepresented in modern scholarship. It is a valid point that in the Roman judicial system there was no formal office equivalent to a state prosecutor and that, while attacks for gain and fame on high-ranking individuals are what made the informers infamous (see also Bauman's study on the crimen maiestatis), these prosecutions are not representative of the role they had in the Roman state (for the broader role of the delatores see Caminas). And it is clear from the evidence gathered by Rutledge, especially his useful prosopographical survey (183-290), that informers did not typically act upon 'requests' issued by the princeps or his amid. Likewise, it is true that Roman society continued to require that a man made his mark in life even when the political circumstances had severely restricted the freedom to do so, and that the role of the informer in this sense too had an important social function. Rutledge also shows that our sources too often cite inferior motivation for a particular prosecution when inimicitiae, revenge, or pietas—all condoned and even

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respected reasons—would provide more plausible explanations. Finally, Rutledge is also right to point out that it can be demonstrated even from 'senatorial' sources that the senate was well capable of showing obsequious behaviour without being prompted by informers. It will be clear that one can happily concur with these observations, which are in any case worth bearing in mind, and at the same time be able to demonstrate from Tacitus and Quintilian that the two of them essentially agreed both in their judgements on the informers and in their assessment of their social and political role (see p. 184). But doubt has been cast on this last point too, e.g. by Goldberg with regard to Tacitus' Dialogus. Quintilian, who was writing while Domitian was still emperor, has few direct references to orators known to have been informers, and where he does make them, he tends to comment on points of style, sometimes favourably. It is in Tacitus' Dialogus, which is likely to have been written or at least published a few years after Domitian's death, that the connection between the delatores and naturalist rhetoric is more apparent. At the beginning of the Dialogus we hear that Maternus—who at the end seems to become Tacitus' mouthpiece in explaining the decline of oratory— wants to withdraw from public life and from public pleading, and instead become a poet. Against him Aper is set as the representative of contemporary rhetoric, hostile to theory and in favour of naturalist rhetoric.32 He praises the benefits of oratory, which for him include the opportunity to help other people, but also to gain financially and in terms of prestige. Aper cites two delatores, Eprius Marcellus and Vibius Crispus, as shining examples of the positive effects of oratory (both were at the beginning of their careers in 69, the dramatic date of the dialogue).33 Both men gave up prosecuting early in their lives and enjoyed very successful political careers, but the way in which Maternus responds makes it necessary to assume that the readership was to construe them primarily as delatores: Maternus ignores Aper's arguments for the benefits of oratory and instead rejects public speaking as a profession completely in a marked backward reference to the two individuals (12. 2): 'lucrosae huius et sanguinantis eloquentiae usus recens et ex malis moribus natus atque, ut tu dicebas, in locum teli repertus' (referring back to 5. 6 and 5. 7 'accinctus'). For the readership to follow this sequence of events, namely that Maternus can simply ignore the positive effects of oratory (cf. 5. 5), it had to see Vibius and Marcellus primarily as delatores, not as self-made men who 3 2 Tac. Dial. 2. 2: 'Aper o m n i eruditione imbutus contemnebat potius litteras quam nesciebat, tamquam maiorem industriae et laboris gloriam habiturus si ingenium eius nullis alien arum artium adminiculis inniti uideretur." 3 3 Tac. Dial. 5. 7 and 8. 3. O n T. Clodius Eprius Marcellus and Vibius Crispus see Rutledge 2 2 5 - 8 , 2 7 8 - 8 2 respectively.

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rose from humble beginnings against the odds. With this it is quite compatible that Tacitus' first readers may have taken Maternus' views with a pinch of salt, as well as noticed that, as a character and also as an interlocutor, Aper radiates an energy and positive aggression which is difficult to match for the other speakers. But that is due to Tacitus' insight that, in a way (cf. 1. 3), there is something to be said both for the views expressed in Maternus' closing speech and for Aper's (including those of his second speech), not to his having any doubts as to what to make of Eprius Marcellus and Vibius Crispus. So we see why Quintilian feels a need to press the idea of the orator as a good man.

The Main Argument Chapters 2. 14-21 not only discuss in survey-form questions conventionally treated in connection with attempts to conceptualize rhetoric as a discipline, but also make a specific argument for Quintilians own conception of rhetoric in the process.3'1 It is argued here that the main steps of this argument are derived from Stoic doctrine which, however, has been modified in crucial respects.35 In that connection, one needs to be aware that in Quintilians day Stoicism was part of the mental habitus of an educated Roman. We contend that Quintilian, in setting out his argument, relies on this fact by occasionally expecting his readership to bring its knowledge of Stoic philosophy to the text (see below, section 'Strategies'). He chose this mode of presentation, one may assume, because, given Stoicism's reputation for being arcane and counterintuitive and given that the current vogue had it that philosophy was not needed to produce good oratory, it would not have served his purpose to overemphasize this influence. Chapters 2. 14-21 and the first two chapters of Book 12 frame the vast collection of rhetorical precepts which form the body of Inst. Or., to which 3 4 This entails that not all the chapters 2. 1 4 - 2 1 include arguments which go towards building up Quintilian's overall position. 2. 19 and 2. 2 1 , on whether nature o r teaching matters m o r e in rhetorical instruction and on the subject-matter o f rhetoric respectively, primarily represent material which is conventionally included in discussions o f the nature o f rhetoric. For the subject o f 2. 19 cf. e.g. Prolog, p. 50. 2 6 - 5 3 . 17; for the subject-matter of rhetoric see Rabe's index s.v. SXq. On the way in which Q.'s exposition and arrangement differs from other extant discussions o f rhetoric as a technical discipline, see the Appendix, pp. 3 9 5 - 7 . 3 5 As far as Book 2 and 12 are concerned, we would therefore see a deeper influence o f Stoicism than e.g. Atherton 4 2 3 : 'Quintilian's rhetorical education (like Cicero's) is directed to the formation of an ideal orator, the " R o m a n u m quendam sapientem" (12. 2. 6 - 7 ) who undoubtedly has some Stoic blood in his veins; but Quintilian seems to distance himself consciously from the Stoic model, while his appeals to support from the Stoa only on a few disputed points suggest independence elsewhere', and an influence which extends further than Natali assumes, who does not take into account that the Stoicizing argument continues in 2. 2 0 .

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they give meaning and purpose, and for which they above all provide justification. Chapter 2. 15 considers the finis of rhetoric, finis being sometimes used in the sense 'definition ( o p o ? ) , sometimes in the sense 'goal' ( r f ' A o ? ) . The ambiguity is harmless if one takes into account that many definitions of rhetoric which philosophers and rhetoricians produced over the centuries conform with a basic pattern: they classify rhetoric generically, for instance as an art (ars, re^in7) or as a science (scientia, imoTijixv}), and then add a second qualification which says what it is for or what it aims to do. In this way, discussing what someone has posited as rhetoric's goal means discussing a defining feature of rhetoric (cf. 2. 15. 38). Now there was a strong tradition from the sophists of the fifth century onwards of seeing 'persuasion' as the goal of rhetoric or for making it a defining feature of rhetoric, a notion encapsulated in the description of rhetoric as a vadovs Srifxiovpyos (Plat. Grg. 453 A 2, where Socrates is summarizing what Gorgias had said before). Quintilian pointedly rejects this; one of the arguments cited is that morally bad people can be persuasive too (2. 15. 3; and Quintilian stipulates that the title 'orator' be reserved for the uir bonus), another is that on this definition failure to persuade threatens the status of the orator as a craftsman and of oratory as an art: 'nam et ipse [sc. the rhetorician Apollodorus] oratorem fortunae subicit, ut, si non persuaserit, nomen suum retinere non possit' (2. 15. 12). Quintilian then reveals his favoured solution at the end of the chapter: according to him any embarrassment can be avoided if one posits bene dicere as the goal of rhetoric, and scientia bene dicendi as its definition (2. 15. 33-5). Quintilian makes it clear that this is a Stoic view, by citing wellknown Stoic philosophers as the creators of these formulae,36 yet in itself all this is neither self-explanatory nor obviously plausible. However, the background a reader would have to supply to make sense of these claims is clear enough. Any technical expertise a human being can have is seen as complex knowledge in the rexvirrjs, and calling rhetoric a scientia implies that it is a particularly stable body of knowledge. The force of bene dicere (ev Acyciv) is clear from Alex. Aphr. in Top. p. 1. 13-14 Wallies ( = fr. 57 Hiilser): [5c. 01 ano rfjs Zroa?] to . . . A€y€iv iv raj To. aArjBrj kcli ra 7Tpoar/Kovra A€y€u> efvat Ttdefxevoi. Quintilian will later (2.17. 22-5 with nn. ad loc.) elaborate what bene means for him in this context, thereby modifying the Stoic view, but here in 2. 15 he seems to stick with it and expects his readers to realize that, for otherwise they were bound to be puzzled by the second major claim of this chapter: that the uir bonus alone is capable of bene dicere (2. 15. 34): 'nam [5c. haec definitio, i.e. rhetorice est scientia bene dicendi] et orationis omnes uirtutes semel 3 6 That the definition is Stoic is certain; that the Stoics identified a formal goal of the art o f rhetoric is contentious (see p. 364).

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complectituret protinusetiam mores oratoris, cum bene dicerenon possit nisi bonus', where the cum is causal. In 2. 16 Quintilian considers the question whether rhetoric is useful. Those who make persuasion the goal of rhetoric would find it easy to make their case: they could argue that rhetoric is useful because it can be used to persuade an audience that an innocent man must not be convicted and in general that rhetoric, in virtue of being persuasive, can be employed for a variety of good causes, including the establishment of civilized societies (cf. e.g. the proem to Cic. Inv. 1). Quintilian has largely given away this line of argument in the previous chapter: while he of course maintains the view that rhetoric which does not persuade or has no hope of persuading is a pointless concept, he does not make persuasion a fonnal goal of rhetoric, on whose attainment its status as a technical discipline depends. One might therefore expect him to provide an argument why rhetoric as he conceives of it is useful. In fact, however, in 2. 16. 11 Quintilian refers back to the two points made in the previous chapter—that persuasion should not be a defining feature of rhetoric, and that only the uir bonus is capable of speaking well—and goes on to assert that, given these two points, one cannot but admit that rhetoric is useful. What follows is not obviously an argument for this assertion, for we are presented with a laus eloquentiae, on one level reminiscent of certain passages in Isocrates and of the proem of Cicero's Inv., which praises speech and, in another step, rhetoric as the clearest manifestation of human rationality, and as a wonderful thing to perfect and admire. It is only when one has read the rest of the book and the arguments for the view that rhetoric is a virtue in 2. 20 (clearly marked as constructed by philosophers) that it becomes possible to see why 2. 16. 12-19 hints at an alternative argument for the usefulness of rhetoric: in developing our rhetorical ability we follow nature, inasmuch as we consciously observe and follow nature's will, and because this is beneficial, rhetoric is useful. This too is a Stoicizing notion, alluding to the Stoic conception of the human good, 'following nature' or 'living according to nature', which amounts to the cultivation of virtue (see e.g. Irwin 346-9). At the same time, there is a contrast here with the naturalist position, in that Quintilian implicitly lays claim to a naturalist rhetoric too, but one that is grounded in a more complex and philosophical view of human nature. In 2. 17 Quintilian considers whether rhetoric is an art (ars, rexvrj); again a relevant alternative would be the naturalist view that it is a natural faculty which is merely developed by practice (uis, Swa^is). The chapter is structured in such a way that arguments against rhetoric's technicity which have been put forward are considered and rejected or refuted one after the other, and at the end (2. 17. 41) Quintilian names two definitions of an art which he

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accepts and which are immune against all the objections considered before: 'ars est potestas uia, id est ordine, efficiens' and 'ars constat ex perceptionibus consentientibus et coexercitatis ad finem utilem uitae'; the second of these, assigned in the sources to the Stoic Zeno, has to be taken as the official definition. It is important to note that the definition is not an esoteric piece of learning but the standard definition of an art, widely accepted beyond the confines of the Stoic school (see n. on 2. 17. 41 ab omnibus fere probatus); and indeed it can be shown that Quintilian, as he discusses the various objections to the technicity of rhetoric in 2. 17, already relies on the definition to which he is to commit himself at the end of the chapter—and he can only do so because the definition is standard. Crucially, however, as Quintilian moves along in 2. 17, he stresses time and again that the claim that rhetoric is an art becomes unchallengeable if it is modified by the two claims made in 2. 15: that bene dicere is the goal of rhetoric, and that the uir bonus alone is capable of bene dicere. As to the definition itself, we provide a brief explanation of its elements and otherwise refer to the commentary on ch. 17. An art is made up from 'items of knowledge' (perceptiones), which are embodied in its precepts. To possess an art is to know these precepts and to be able to 'operate' them. These items of knowledge must be mutually coherent (consentientes) and organized (coexercitatae, sc. as opposed to disjointed bodies of knowledge). There should be no two precepts contradicting each other, and the precepts given must be true. An art has a goal {finis), and this goal must be good and useful. An art may be described in the abstract, as it were, as an ordered body of knowledge {avarrj^a in Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 2. 10) or as a disposition of the mind of the artist (Stadeois in Philod. Rhet. i. 69. 5 Sudhaus = p. 123. 5 L.A.); cf. 2. 18. 3 for ars in this second sense (with nn.). This second point leads on to 2. 20, concerned with the question whether rhetoric is a virtue, for it is easier to understand that rhetoric could ever be a virtue if we already conceive of it as a disposition of the mind of the orator. (It is fittingly at the beginning of this chapter, in 2. 20. 2, that the clearest reference to the activities of the delatores is made.) To follow Quintilian's argument here, we must take into account that for the Stoics virtue is knowledge, and in particular organized and complex knowledge, a view they took over from the early Platonic dialogues. In particular, operating rcx^-knowledge can be seen as very similar to virtuous action conceived in this sense (see the introduction to ch. 20 for further detail); one of the characterizations given for virtue by the Stoics is actually 'the art of living'. Quintilian then proposes to offer two types of arguments for the view that rhetoric is a virtue, philosophical and rhetorical ones; he accepts both sets and says the difference between them is primarily one of form and exposition. The philosophical arguments are given in 2. 20. 5-7. It is argued that, just as there

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is prndentia (povT)ais, one of the four cardinal virtues accepted by the Stoics) operating in the field of 'what should and should not be done', so there is prudentia operating in the field of'what should and should not be said'. This second kind of prudentia is then identified as rhetoric. So we are given an explanation why rhetoric itself can be conceived as a virtue, and it is made clear that this virtue is in some way subordinate to or a function of prudentia, hence establishing a link with one of the cardinal virtues. If we take this interim conclusion and read on to section 8, it appears that the perfect orator does not just have prudentia: he must also have the other cardinal virtues— and that means, have the relevant knowledge—as a necessary condition for his success: 'nam quid orator in laudando faciet nisi honestorum ac turpium peritus, aut in suadendo nisi utilitate perspecta, aut in iudiciis si iustitiae sit ignarus?' We believe that these considerations more than suggest to the reader that Quintilian means to adopt the Stoic doctrine of avraKoXovOia, i.e. the notion that having one virtue implies having all the others (on this doctrine see Long, 'Harmonics', 110-12). Therefore 2. 20 not only shows why rhetoric as envisaged by Quintilian is a virtue but also why it is to be had only by the uir bonus. Cicero has Antonius recount this doctrine of the mutual implication of virtues in de Orat. 1. 83, where the summary is concluded with the remark 'sed haec erat spinosa quaedam et exilis oratio longeque a nostris sensibus abhorrebat'. This appraisal may help explain the somewhat indirect way with which the view is alluded to by Quintilian. If we now read the first chapters of Book 12, it is striking that 'virtue is knowledge', the crucial tenet which grounds the argument of Book 2, is in evidence, e.g. 12. 1.3 'morally bad people lack prudentia and intellegentid (cf. 12. 1. 30), or 12. 1. 4, where it is confidently asserted: 'quod si neminem malum esse nisi stultum eundem non modo a sapientibus dicitur, sed uulgo quoque semper est creditum, certe nonfietumquam stultus orator', or 12. 2. 17, where the uir bonus is described as 'uirtutes ipsas inente com plexus'. Needless to say, this is not common usage: after all, common opinion would have it that one can be a morally bad man and supremely cunning at the same time. But we have no difficulty in finding parallels for the equation of stultus and malus in Stoic texts, e.g. Sen. Ben. 4. 26. 2 (and passim), Ep. 59. 17; Lact. Inst. 5.17.25-6,29 (SVFiii, fr. 298, under the heading 'mutua uirtutum coniunctio', i.e. avraKoXovdia): Denique, ut concludam disputationem, non posse eundem iustum esse ac stultum, eundem sapientem et iniustum, docet ipsa ratio. Qui enim stultus est, quid sit iustum ac bonum nescit et ideo semper peccat. Ducitur enim quasi captiuus a uitiis, nec resistere ullo modo potest, quia caret uirtute, quam nescit. Iustus ab omni peccato se abstinet; quod aliter facere non potest, quam si habcat recti prauique notitiam. Rectum autem discernere a prauo quis potest nisi sapiens? Ita fit ut numquam possit

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esse iustus, qui stultus est, neque sapiens qui fuerit iniustus factis dictisque per ignorantiam recti ac boni erratio.

Stultitia igitur est in

Sources Quintilian's overall position is sometimes described as neo-Ciceronianism. This is fair, especially if one believes that the somewhat unfavourable light in which Ciceronianism appears in Tacitus' Dial., in particular in the overdone and implausible contributions of Messalla, is actually a response to Quintilian rather than to Cicero. However, as we have seen, Quintilian's position in the theoretical chapters of Book 2 is that rhetoric is about bene dicere, and that only the uir bonus can do it, and here Quintilian is never further apart from Cicero (12 pr. 4 is a kind of acknowledgement of this fact). The main difference from Cicero's position consists in the integration of moral knowledge and Tf'xwj-knowledge (see May-Wisse 11-12); apart from that he talks about ideal eloquence and the ideal orator in terms which sound distinctly Platonic (Or. 9-10). This raises the question whether Quintilian's position was unique among ancient rhetoricians, and whether we can trace the influence to a particular individual within the Stoic school. On these questions important findings have been made by Sohlberg (but cf. earlier Radermacher, 'Schrift'). He observed that, if we assemble the numerous statements on the perfect orator which Aelius Aristides (born 117) makes in his substantial corpus of speeches, what we find looks remarkably similar to certain elements of Quintilian's conception of the orator perfectusr,37 and he argued that this points to a common Stoic source. We present some of the points of contact first. In his speech 'Yirep prjropiKrjs (Or. 45 Dindorf) he says that true rhetoric comprises all four cardinal virtues (p. 72 D.), that the orator must be a good man, intent on making other men good as well, ending with a general characterization (p. 98 D.): El yap Set avveAovra eiireovSev iariv aAAo prjTopiKrj rj povr)ois Xoyajv Svvafxtv -rrpooeiArjtfivia. (vs firj fxovov avros epSetv ra fie At lotci. aAAa kcli crepovs neideiv Quintilian 2. 20. 5. Later (p. 133 D.) he says: "Eotiv apa pTjTopiKrjs epyov kcli povciv opOoos kcli p,y) /jlovov avrov a 7TpaTTOVTa.aAAa kcli trepovs ircidovra a Set 7TparrtLV ttape^cadai, in its context reminiscent of the Stoic conception that dialectic and rhetoric have a role to play in correct thinking. Again (p. 144 D.) he says the perfect

3 7 One crucial difference between the two is, however, that in Aelius there is no single passage which makes a coherent case for his view. This limits the possibility of, for instance, comparisons between the two with a view to identifying innovations in Quintilian. Sohlberg tends to be ignored by the scholarship on Aelius Aristides, e.g. by Moreschini and Karadimas.

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orator is rarer than the Phoenix—which is what the Stoics say about the sage (e.g. SVFiii, fr. 658; Sen. Ep. mor. 42.1; see Brouwer 195-9); and at pp. 145-6 D. rt Srjra avrr) ye Kaff eavrrfv rj prjToptKrj Kai o pr/Tajp; eyo> fiev yap ovk aiTOKvrjaatfji av avai tovtov apiarov ctvai nepi Aoyovs ootis avrjp apiOTOs.38 He then (p. 146 D.) continues by saying that the status of the good man as perfect orator would not be under threat if the political circumstances leave him no option but to abstain from public appearance (since the speech is laid out as a response to Plato's anti-rhetorical arguments in the Gig., Aristidessays that this situation in particular would make it easy for the good man to counter Plato's claim that rhetoric was a form of flatter)' driven by greed). In Or. 46 dialectic is called a part of rhetoric (p. 350 D.), a claim which in a suitable context marks a particular understanding of rhetoric (Quintilian and other texts treat them as species of the same genus, e.g. 2. 20. 7). So much for mere points of contact. One might wonder whether it would not be possible to explain all this with the assumption that Aristides is deploying arguments against Plato which were originally put forward by Socrates in the Gorgias and the Phaedrns. It is indeed true that the main ideas of Aristides' defence of rhetoric can be traced back with varying degrees of accuracy to Plato, though not to a single passage. It is not easy to make a judgement here because the Stoics are very likely to have developed their views on rhetoric by elaborating and coherently organizing the arguments of precisely those Platonic passages to which Aristides might be referring on the alternative view. The matter is complicated further by Aristides' lack of interest in rigorous philosophical argument;39 the various elements of what we would take as the Stoic argument for rhetoric appear in his speeches in a more disjointed fashion than they do in Quintilian, and little effort is made to provide genuine arguments for the views held. Nor does it seem possible to argue that it is more economical to assume Aristides had access to a Stoic source, since he knew Plato's dialogues very well indeed, and the views of ultimately Platonic origin which we find in both Quintilian and him are obviously useful to him; so he might have excerpted them himself. In the end, it is perhaps nuances which matter, e.g. the prominence given to p6vqois in the passages quoted above cannot be properly accounted for through reference to Plato (where the connection of rhetoric with justice is more important, esp. in the Grg.)> while povr)ois is central to the way in which the Stoics accommodate rhetoric within their system; and the emphasis 5 8 Cf. Or. 47. 4 9 (p. 4 5 7 D.): kok tovtov rjp\eTO avSpa ayaOo i> ftvai Kai irepi A oyovs ayaOo v.

o

TrpeofivTepos Xeyeiv ore

tov

avrov eirj Kai

Wflamowitz's assessment ( 4 4 9 ) , 'um die philosophischen Lehren hat e r sich nie gekiimmert', is accurate, as a casual comparison with Sextus' Adv. Rhet. m a y confirm. 39

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laid on the fact that the lack of opportunity for the apioros avrjp to practise his orator)r in the public sphere would not impair his status (p. 146 D.) makes more sense in a Stoic context (see above and below).'10 Sohlberg suggested as common source for Quintilian and Aristides a particular individual: Diogenes of Babylon (C.240-151 BC), the scholarch of the Stoa who succeeded Zeno of Tarsus, himself successor to Chrysippus.'11 Diogenes was widely read: the Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, i (Florence, 1989), 38-40 lists over 105 identified passages from Diogenes in the Herculaneum papyri, and Cicero draws on him extensively (cf. e.g. Annas). We have quite a number of fragments from his flepi p-qropiK-qs (SVFiii, pp. 235-43), all of which come from Philodemus' Rhet:12 The most important fragment for our purpose (.SVTfr. 117 = Philod. Rhet. ii. 211) has been re-edited by Obbink-Vander Waerdt; we give their translation (p. 368): |gap of 6-8 words) that the statesman always fills all offices in the city [gap of 10-12 words) not only [gap of 2-3 words) prudence [gap of 2-3 words). And he is not only a good dialectician and grammarian and poet and orator, and perfect in method, having become good at all the arts, but also, in addition to (that kind of) practical utility, he shares in the government of cities, and not only with those inhabiting Athens or Lacedaemon. For among the foolish there exists no city, nor any law, but in the confederacy made up of gods and sages he is even truly called general and admiral, treasurer and collection agent, and he is said to administer the rest of the offices in like fashion, since the statesman must of necessity have knowledge of all these matters. But even so, one must point out | text breaks off). The similarities with both Aristides and Quintilian are conspicuous. There are, however, differences too, most prominently the stress on the sage's involvement with political life. We have seen above that Aristides goes out of his way to allow for the possibility of the occasional non-involvement of the Stoic orator.13 The normal expectation of the Stoic orator's involvement in political life is according to Obbink-Vander Waerdt predicated on an early conception of Stoic natural law whereby its sphere of influence is restricted to sages, i.e. there is a clear borderline between the sages living in their perfect world in which divine reason operates, and the world of the foolish, vividly 4 0 It seems unlikely to us that Aristides could h a w read Quintilian. 1 1 No complete edition of his fragments has appeared since von Arnim (SVFiii). O n him see the article in Goulet, and Obbink-Vander Waerdt. 4 2 T h e assignment to Diogenes ( m a d e by von Arnim) of items in this particular group o f fragments is, however, sometimes dubious. 4 * This point fits better with the assumption o f a Stoic source than with the alternative that Aristides had simply read Plato: for neither the Gorgias nor the Phaedriis suggests political involvement o f the orator in those sections where Socrates considers an alternative rhetoric, better than that practised in his day.

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characterized by Diogenes through the absence of community, society, and its institutions. There is no trace of such a conception of natural law in either Aristides or Quintilian (unsurprisingly, since for the practising orator this is a somewhat impractical assumption to make), and we also note that the close involvement with political life is less than prominent in Quintilian;44 this can probably be readily accounted for by the political circumstances of Rome in the late first century AD. We would thus suggest that on the evidence available, it may well be that Diogenes of Babylon was the source from which Quintilian and Aristides got their Stoicizing conception of rhetoric, taking into account the similarity of views and the apparent wide circulation of Diogenes' works. It would, however, be wrong to think that the central views on rhetoric as present in Quintilian 2. 14-21 and 12 on the one hand and Aristides on the other were peculiar to Diogenes within the Stoic school. Finally, the need to conceive of the master of a rexvrj as a morally good man was also felt in fields other than oratory, in particular medicine (Quintilian himself compares rhetoric and medicine on several occasions), and this may support the view that there are insufficient grounds for regarding Quintilian's position as influenced by Diogenes of Babylon in particular; that is not to say that he could not have read a treatise of his in which such views appeared(that is possible or even plausible), but rather that we cannot say Quintilian adopts Diogenes' position as distinct from that of other Stoics). Von Staden traces the development of analogous views in the field of medicine (157) 45 and points out the parallel with Cato's uir bonus dicendi peritus in Quintilian (164). Among his findings are, first, that a doctor's conduct in non-professional matters was an issue of wider interest, which is clear from the fact that primary evidence for relevant views comes not only from medical treatises (where experts in front of an audience of experts style themselves as they would like to be) but also from inscriptions displayed in public and legal texts (op. cit. 163), and second, that a difference between classical Greek and Roman attitudes can be observed: as far as the evidence goes, the emphasis on a combination of technical knowledge and skill and moral quality is much more prominent in late Hellenistic and Roman sources.46

** Cf., however, 12. 1. 26 and Winterbottom 5 323. 4 5 Von Staden 157: 'If a practitioner o f medicine displayed superb skill and exemplar)' devotion in the performance of all professional duties, did the Greeks consider the moral qualities exhibited in his non-professional o r private life relevant to evaluating whether he was a good doctor? Did they think that character, morality, and general conduct outside the professional sphere stand in a direct relation t o professional competence? And, in particular, are there significant differences between the classical, Hellenistic, and Roman responses to such questions?' Cf. the quotation from ps.-Soranus, p. 52.

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Introduction Strategies

We imagine that Quintilian had formed the view early in life that rhetoric should be grounded in rules and that an orator should be a good man, and it may well be that one day he came across a Stoic treatise which provided a coherent argument for what was for him up to this point not more than an instinctive conviction. He may then have decided to make this argument the backbone of his own exposition on the subject. At the same time he did not want to simply argue for a Stoic conception of rhetoric, because it was impractical for a practising orator and also because it would have won rhetoric as he conceived of it no supporters. So he had to devise strategies to make his perfect orator more palatable. One of these strategies, we argue, is the use Quintilian makes of Cato's famous dictum that the orator is (or should be) a uir bonus dicendi peritus. A first reference to this in Quintilian's time familiar sayingis in 1 pr. 9 'oratorem autem instituimus ilium perfectum, qui esse nisi uir bonus non potest, ideoque non dicendi modo eximiam in eo facultatem sed omnis animi uirtutes exigimus'. References to the uir bonus are then made throughout the main part of the work, before Quintilian's perfect orator is in 12. 1. 1 explicitly identified with the Catonian model: 'sit ergo nobis orator quem constituimus is qui a M. Catone finitur uir bonus dicendi peritus, uerum, id quod et ille posuit prius et ipsa natura potius ac maius est, utique uir bonus'. The definition is then referred to a number of times in book 12. Occurrences later than Quintilian are conveniently listed by Jordan.'17 To appreciate what Quintilian is doing with the phrase, we must try and establish what force and connotations it had when it was first coined, and how it was used in the subsequent period prior to Quintilian. The commonly held view that Cato did not express an old-fashioned Roman, pre-philosophical conception of a public speaker but virtually translated the Stoic dogma,'18 about which he learnt (as some of the proponents of this view suggest) in the context of the famous embassy of philosophers to Rome in 155 BC (of which Diogenes of Babylon was a member), is unsatisfactory. Surely the elder Cato could formulate such a view without being exposed to Stoic lectures, and it is unlikely that the statement in question was made as late as 155. But we do not need to rely on arguments from plausibility exclusively. Long ago Scholl pointed out that the 'definition' of the orator was to be set against the background of another fragment of Cato's preserved in Servius (see below). See also Monfasani. «« e.g. Radermacher, 'Schrift'; M o r r ; L - P i. 133; contra Schflll; Nesselrath 2 2 0 - 1 n. 5 0 2 suspends judgement. 47

Defining Rhetoric The question is whether the definition of the orator was meant and construed as Stoicizing from early on, so that it would be used in an argumentum ex auctoritate, or whether it was perceived as an expression of old-fashioned Roman virtue; in this second case Quintilian would have given his orator, despite his Stoic core, a distinctly Roman face. The parallel referred to above is Serv. in G. 1. 46 (fr. 6 Jordan): 'Cato in oratione ad filium "uir bonus est, Marce fill, colendi peritus, cuius ferramenta splendent".' The fragment is sometimes incorrectly referred to as a parallel definition of the farmer (so e.g. Goujard, p. xxviii). Unless we assume that Senilis misquotes Cato, we can observe (trivially) that uir bonusis the subject, and colendi peritus the complement; the relative clause is in its function equivalent to a second complement (the broader context, not quoted here, does not suggest otherwise). If anything is characterized here, it is uir bonus alone. This does show at least that we are not dealing with a characterization which someone other than Cato modelled on the better-known definition of the orator. If we knew that fr. 6 was earlier than the definition of the orator, then that would be useful, since it would make the similarity between the definition of the orator and the relevant Stoic fragments appear more coincidental. Unfortunately it is not possible to date the two sayings relative to each other. Now while bonus could mean 'morally good' in Cato's time (along with 'good' in other respects, 'fitting, noble, wealthy' and 'brave'; cf. WaldeHofmann and TLL s.v.), and while this is one factor in fr. 6 (we could compare passages from Cato's De agricultural which deal with agriculture and its role in character formation), this is surely not the prevalent aspect of the meaning (Mynors on G. 1. 46 tellingly comments: 'you can still tell a good farmer by the shine of his tools'). The adjective was capable of reflecting the value system of an aristocratic society, in which wealth, good fortune, competence, and moral goodness were not always dearly distinguished. And it seems more likely to us, given the similarity which does remain between the two sayings, that the sense of bonus in the definition of the orator is comparable.'19 In addition, while on the core idea expressed in the phrase there may be common ground between Cato and the Stoics, the larger doctrinal framework into which the tenet was integrated in Stoic doctrine cannot conceivably have appealed to Cato (and saying this does not amount to crediting him with a crude and simple anti-Greek attitude); so there is also some psychological implausibility in assuming Stoic influence on him at this particular point. * 9 Similarly Petersmann; Petersmann, 'Bild'. Courtney 51 comments on the preface o f Cato's De agriculfura ('et uirum b o n u m quom laudabant, ita laudabant, bonum agricolam bonumque c o l o n u m ' ) and C a t o fr. 6 Jordan: 'Note the differentiation in order between tiir bonus, uirum bonum, indicating membership o f a class, and bonum agricolam bonumque colonum, which specifies a quality/

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Three passages in the period between Cato and Quintilian make reference to the uir bonis dicendi peritus. In de Orat. 2. 85 Cicero, without explicitly referring to Cato, has Antonius, who represents in Cicero a form of oratory that is grounded in practice and commonsense, set out his ideas about a good orator, which include telling a young man who is a uir bonus without having rhetorical prowess that he should find himself a different occupation.50 Seneca the Elder (Con. 1 pr. 8-9) castigates the loose morals of young men interested in rhetoric, and sets Cato against them as a counter-example, stylized as an oracle. From the younger Pliny (Ep. 4. 7. 4-5) we learn that Herennius Senecio branded the arch-delator Regulus a 'uir malus dicendi imperitus', which is interesting because it suggests that the Catonian dictum had already entered the critical discourse about the informers before Quintilian used it in the Institutio. In any event, none of these passages makes any suggestion that the definition was seen as an expression of Stoic thought. So we suggest that the phrase was—before Quintilian adopted it—perceived as a genuine instance of old-fashioned Roman uirtus, and that it was Quintilian who connected it with Stoicism in the sense that he made it an emblem for a Stoicizing conception of rhetoric.51 An analogy for appropriating a Roman authority figure is provided by 12. 1. 27, where Quintilian cites the famous inverted simile from Verg. A. 1. 148-56, in which Jupiter as he quells the storm incited by Juno is compared to a uir pietategrauis ac meritis. Harrison 55 rightly calls this 'a highly Roman role-model'. And whether Quintilian knew about the alleged correspondence with an incident in the life of the younger Cato (cf. Plut. Pomp. 44) or not, it would be perverse to suggest that this uir grauis has Stoic features. The simile, or so we argue, has a function similar to that of the formula from Cato: to allow readers to identify his perfect orator with an archetypal Roman figure of authority. A related attempt to avoid too overt a reliance on Stoicism can be seen in the use of Plato Quintilian makes, esp. in 2. 15. 24-32. It is in his discussion of Plato's views on rhetoric as set out in the Gorgias and the Phaedrus that Quintilian first elaborates on his view that only the virtuous, and in particular the just man, can be an orator. Instead of simply imposing a Stoic view on his readers, Quintilian develops it from his reading of Plato's dialogues, therefore being able to invoke Plato as an authority for certain aspects of

3 0 This sense o f uir bonus is put into context by passages in which Antonius emphasizes the need for the orator to present himself and his client as a good m a n (2. 1 8 4 , 2 . 2 0 6 , 2 . 211, 2. 231, 2 . 3 4 9 ) , and by his reference to the jury as good men (2. 198). 51 Differently Leigh 132, who finds Quintilian's use o f the uir bonus conception m o r e conventional.

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his position.52 There is, it may be pointed out, no incompatibility between the role assigned to Cato by Quintilian (on our argument) and the use of Greek authorities here. While Quintilian appears to have been interested in taking the Stoic edge off his perfect orator and in representing his efforts as in line with Roman tradition in crucial respects, on the other hand he did not (nor could he reasonably) work towards a narrowly Roman conception of oratory. We end with some miscellaneous observations on literary technique. It has been established by Radermacher that Quintilian, Sextus Empiricus, and to a lesser degree Philodemus in his Rhet. draw on the same doxographical source on rhetoric (whether it is correct to see this source as a coherent and selfcontained text by an identifiable author rather than something more fluid is, however, a separate question); see the Appendix, which incorporates Radermacher's findings. We believe that Quintilian has rearranged this material in a major way so as to suit his argumentative purposes (see the introductory note to the Appendix). This is, however, less than obvious, for Quintilian takes some care in generating a narrative thread within the material as he has arranged it, creating a 'dialogue' between rhetoricians or philosophers where his source-material may well have provided nothing more than tenets in juxtaposition (see in particular the notes on 2. 15. 10 a quo non dissentit Theodectes, 2. 15. 12 atqui, 2. 15. 17 superiores, 2. 17. 1 transeamus.. .ad earn quaestionem quae sequitur). This technique is not unparalleled: similar observations could be made with regard to other writers who are dealing with a rich and complex doxographical tradition; thus some of the great ancient commentators on works by Aristotle can be found to stage controversies between philosophers who developed their views independently and centuries apart from each other. Another strategy, briefly referred to earlier, has to do with Quintilian writing on two levels, for the general reader, e.g. a pupil, on the one hand and for readers with a slightly broader education on the other. At times he may be found to be working on what one might call the principle of calculated unintelligibility, employing a notion or a tenet which would be lost on a reader who is just seeking basic instruction on a particular problem but which adds an integral step to a broader argument once a reader brings a somewhat wider expertise to the text (p. 273). For this technique of hinting at rather than expounding especially Stoic doctrine we might compare the works of Pliny the Younger, Quintilian's contemporary, and it is arguable that Seneca could adopt the essayistic manner of the Epistulae partly because he could 5 2 Aelius Aristides refers to Plato too o f course, and for similar views (cf. the passages cited and referred to above, pp. xlii f.), but his discussion is much less meticulous and scholarly than Quintilian's; however, this could be explained by his different style ofwriting (cf. p. xliii). Hence it is difficult to argue for a shared source from shared references to Plato.

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count on a certain degree of familiarity with Stoicism on the part of the audience. Finally, for all that has been said in this chapter, it should be clear that Quintilian is not consistently arguing in 2. 14-21 in a linear and sustained way; rather, he advances interrelated thoughts and arguments in a way which makes them acquire what force they have in synopsis only, once one has absorbed and pondered the whole (p. 279).

Note on the Text The text given here is a modified version of that printed in Winterbottom's OCT of 1970. The opportunity has been taken to repunctuate and in particular to reparagraph the text. A number of changes of wording are listed below. In this book the text is based on the two primary manuscripts, both of the ninth century: Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana E. 153 sup. (A) and Berne, Burgerbibliothek 351 (B). It is our view that all other manuscripts of Quintilian descend directly or indirectly from A or B, and that their only use in Book 2 is as a source of conjectures. For details, see the Latin preface to the OCT; for an English summary see L. D. Reynolds (ed.), Texts and Transmission (Oxford, 1983), 332-4. List of changes from OCT: 1. 2 prosopopoeias usque ad suasorias obelized 1. 4 historicorum criticorumque bracketed 1.8 at si rhetor for si rhetor 4. 3 lasciua for lasciuiat 4. 18 restruendi for destruendi 4. 28 diuersa for aduersa 4. 29 necesse uero for fnec uerof 4. 30 appareatque obelized 5. 2 nostrum obelized 6. 1 digerere for derigere 6. 5 praeuia for breuia 6. 7 expertos for expertas 9. 2 alacresque for alac res 10. 11 nam et in for nam et 12. 2 ilium uehementis impetus obelized 12.5 certa for cetera 12. 6 intenderint obelized 13.3 <si> collibus^brcollibus 13. 9 sit obelized 14. 2 quoque^br quoque 15.10 actor obelized 15. 30 <cum> scribere for scribere 16.5 his for iis 17.7 sero iam for sero

lii

17.14 17.30 17.34 19.2 20. 3 20.5 20. 8 21.8

Note on the Text Gryllo for Grylo restruere/or destruere effecit for efficit utrisque obelized acum is no longer obelized uirtus for uirtutis ac turpium for et turpium quia multiplicem for multiplicem

M. FABI QVINTILIANI INSTITVTIONIS ORATORIAE LIBER SECVNDVS 1. Teniiit consuetudo, quae cotidie magis inualescit, ut praeceptoribus eloquentiae, Latinis quidem semper, sed etiam Graecis interim, discipuli serius quam ratio postulat traderentur. Eius rei duplex causa est, quod et rhetores utiqiie nostri suas partis omiserunt et grammatici alienas occupauerunt. 2. Nam et illi dedamare modo et scientiam declamandi ac facultatem tradere officii sui ducunt, idque intra deliberatiuas iudicialisque materias (nam cetera ut professione sua minora despiciunt), et hi non satis credunt excepisse quae relicta erant (quo nomine gratia quoque iis habenda est), sed ad fprosopopoeias usque ad suasoriasf, in quibus onus dicendi uel maximum est, inrampunt. 3. Hinc ergo accidit ut quae alterius artis prima erant opera facta sint alterius nouissima, et aetas altioribus iam disdplinis debita in schola minore subsidat, ac rhetoricen apud grammaticos exerceat. Ita, quod est maxime ridiculum, non ante ad declamandi magistrum mittendus uidetur puer quam dedamare sciat. 4. Nos suum cuique professioni modum demus. Et grammatice, quam in Latinum transferentes 'litteraturam' uocauerunt, fines suos norit, praesertim tantum ab hac appellationis suae paupertate, intra quam primi illi constitere, prouecta (nam tenuis a fonte adsumptis [historicorum criticorumque] uiribus pleno iam satis alueo fluit, cum, praeter rationem recte loquendi non parum alioqui copiosam, prope omnium maxim arum artium scientiam amplexa sit), (5) et rhetorice, cui nomen uis eloquendi dedit, officia sua non detrectet, nec occupari gaudeat pertinentem ad se laborem; quae, dum opere cedit, iam paene possessione depulsa est. 6. Neque infitiabor aliquem ex his qui grammaticen profiteantur eo usque scientiae progredi posse, ut ad haec quoque tradenda sufficiat; sed aim id aget, rhetoris officio fungetur, non suo. 7. Nos porro quaerimus quando iis quae rhetorice praecipit percipiendis puer maturus esse uideatur; in quo quidem non id est aestimandum, cuius quisque sit aetatis, sed quantum in studiis iam efifecerit. Et ne diutius disseram quando sit rhetori tradendus, sic optime finiri credo: cum poterit. 8. Sed hoc

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ipsum ex superiore pendet quaestione. Nam si grammatices munus usque ad suasorias prorogatum tardius rhetore opus est; at si rhetor prima officia operis sui non recusat, a narrationibus statim et laudandi uituperandique opusculis cura eius desideratur. 9. An ignoramus antiquis hoc fuisse ad augendam eloquentiam genus exercitationis, ut thesis dicerent et communes locos et cetera citra complexum rerum personarumque quibus uerae fictaeque controuersiae continentur? Ex quo palam est quam turpiter deserat earn partem rhetorices institutio quam et primam habuit et diu solam. 10. Quid autem est ex his de quibus supra dixi quod non cum in alia quae sunt rhetorum propria, turn certe in illud iudiciale causae genus incidat? An non in foro narrandum est? Qua in parte nescio an sit uel plurimum. 11. Non laus ac uituperatio certaminibus illis frequenter inseritur? Non communes loci, siue qui sunt in uitia derecti, quales legimus a Cicerone compositos, seu quibus quaestiones generaliter tractantur, quales sunt editi a Quinto quoque Hortensio, ut 'sitne paruis argumentis credendum' et 'pro testibus' et 'in testes', in mediis litium medullis uersantur? 12. Arma sunt haec quodam modo praeparanda semper, ut iis cum res poscet utaris. Quae qui pertinere ad orationem non putabit, is ne statuam quidem inchoari credet ciun eius membra fundentur. Neque hanc, ut aliqui putabunt, festinationem meam sic quisquam calumnietur tamquam eum qui sit rhetori traditus abducendum protinus a grammaticis putem. 13. Dabuntur illis turn quoque tempora sua, neque erit uerendum ne binis praeceptoribus oneretur puer. Non enim crescet sed diuidetur qui sub uno miscebatur labor, et erit sui quisque operis magister utilior. Quod adhuc optinent Graeci, a Latinis omissum est, et fieri uidetur excusate, quia sunt qui labori isti successerint. 2. Ergo cum ad eas in studiis uires peruenerit puer ut quae prima esse praecepta rhetorum diximus mente consequi possit, tradendus eius artis magistris erit. Quorum in primis inspici mores oportebit. 2. Quod ego non idcirco potissimum in hac parte tractare sum adgressus quia non in ceteris quoque doctoribus idem hoc examinandum quam diligentissime putem, sicut testatus sum libro priore, sed quod magis necessariam eius rei mentionem facit aetas ipsa discentium. 3. Nam et adulti fere pueri ad hos praeceptores transferuntur et apud eos iuuenes etiam facti perseuerant, ideoque maior adhibenda turn cura est, ut et teneriores annos ab iniuria sanctitas docentis custodiat et ferociores a licentia grauitas deterreat. 4. Neque uero sat est summam praestare abstinentiam, nisi disciplinae seueritate conuenientium quoque ad se mores adstrinxerit. Sumat igitur ante omnia parentis erga discipulos suos animum, ac succedere se in eorum locum a quibus sibi liberi tradantur existimet. 5. Ipse nec

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habeat uitia nec ferat. Non austeritas eius tristis, non dissolutasitcomitas, ne inde odium, hinc contemptus oriatur. Plurimus ei de honesto ac bono sermo sit (nam quo saepius monuerit, hoc rarius castigabit); minime iracundus, nec tamen eorum quae emendanda erunt dissimulator; simplex in docendo, patiens laboris, adsiduus potius quam inmodicus. 6. Interrogantibus libenter respondeat, non interrogantes percontetur ultro. In laudandis discipulorum dictionibus nec malignus nec effusus, quia res altera taedium laboris, altera securitatem parit. 7. In emendando quae corrigenda erunt non acerbus minimeque contumeliosus; nam id quidem multos a proposito studendi fugat, quod quidam sic obiurgant quasi oderint. 8. Ipse aliquid, immo multa cotidie dicat quae secum auditores referant. Licet enim satis exemplorum ad imitandum ex lectione suppeditet, tamen uiua ilia (ut dicitur) uox alit plenius, praecipueque praeceptoris quem discipuli, si modo recte sunt instituti, et amant et uerentur. Vix autem did potest quanto libentius imitemur eos quibus fauemus. 9. Minime uero permittenda pueris, ut fit apud plerosque, adsurgendi exultandique in laudando licentia; quin etiam iuuenum modicum esse, cum audient, testimonium debet. Ita fiet ut ex iudicio praeceptoris discipulus pendeat, atque id se dixisse recte quod ab eo probabitur credat. 10. Ilia uero uitiosissima quae iam humanitas uocatur inuicem qualiacumque laudandi, cum est indecora et theatralis et seuere institutis scholis aliena, turn studiorum perniciosissima hostis; superuaaia enim uidentur cura ac labor parata quidquid effiiderint laude. 11. Vultum igitur praeceptoris intueri tam qui audiunt debent quam ipse qui dicit; ita enim probanda atque improbanda discernent. Sic stilo facultas continget, auditione iudicium. 12. At nunc proni atque succincti ad omnem clausulam non exsurgunt modo uerum etiam excurmnt et cum indecora exultatione condamant. Id mutuum est et ibi declamationis fortuna. Hinc tumor et uana de se persuasio, usque adeo ut illo condiscipulorum tumultu inflati, si parum a praeceptore laudentur, ipsi de illo male sentiant. 13. Sed se quoque praeceptores intente ac modeste audiri uelint; non enim iudicio discipulorum dicere debet magister, sed discipulus magistri. Quin, si fieri potest, intendendus animus in hoc quoque, ut perspiciat quae quisque et quomodo laudet, et placere quae bene dicet non suo magis quam eorum nomine delectetur qui recte iudicabunt. 14. Pueros adulescentibus permixtos sedere non placet mihi. Nam etiamsi uir talis qualem esse oportet studiis moribusque praepositum modestam habere potest etiam iuuentutem, tamen uel infirmitas a robustioribus separanda est, et carendum non solum crimine turpitudinis uerum etiam suspicione. 15. Haec notanda breuiter existimaui. Nam ut absit ab ultimis uitiis ipse ac schola ne praecipiendum quidem credo; ac si quis est qui flagitia manifesta in eligendo filii praeceptore non uitet, iam hinc sciat cetera quoque,

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quae ad utilitatem iuuentutis componere conamur, esse sibi hac parte omissa superuacua. 3. Ne illorum quidem persuasio silentio transeunda est, qui, etiam cum idoneos rhetori pueros putauerunt, non tamen continuo tradendos eminentissimo credunt, sed apud minores aliquamdiu detinent, tamquam instituendis artibus magis sit apta mediocritas praeceptoris cum ad intellectum atque imitationem facilior, turn ad suscipiendas elementorum molestias minus superba. 2. Qua in re mihi non arbitror diu laborandum ut ostendam quanto sit melius optimis inbui, quanta in eluendis quae semel insederint uitiis difficultas consequatur, cum geminatum onus succedentis premat, et quidem dedocendi grauius ac prius quam docendi; (3) propter quod Timotheum clarum in arte tibiarum ferimt duplices ab iis quos alius instituisset solitum exigere mercedes quam si rudes traderentur. Error tamen est in re duplex: unus, quod interim sufficere illos minores existimant et bono sane stomacho contenti sunt (4) (quae quamquam est ipsa reprensione digna securitas, tamen esset utcumque tolerabilis si eius modi praeceptores minus docerent, non peius), alter ille etiam frequentior, quod eos qui ampliorem dicendi faailtatem sint consecuti non putant ad minora descendere, idque interim fieri quia fastidiant praestare hanc inferioribus curam, interim quia omnino non possint. 5. Ego porro eum qui nolit in numero praecipientium non habeo, posse autem maxime, si uelit, optimum quemque contendo: primum quod eum qui eloquentia ceteris praestet ilia quoque per quae ad eloquentiam peruenitur diligentissime percepisse credibile est; (6) deinde quia plurimum in praecipiendo ualet ratio, quae doctissimo cuique plenissima est; postremo quia nemo sic in maioribus eminet ut eum minora deficiant, nisi forte Iouem quidem Phidias optime fecit, ilia autem quae in ornamentum operis eius accedunt alius melius elaborasset, aut orator loqui nesciet aut leuiores morbos curare non poterit praestantissimus medicus. 7. Quid ergo? non est quaedam eloquentia maior quam ut earn intellectu consequi puerilis infirmitas possit? Ego uero confiteor. Sed hunc disertum praeceptorem prudentem quoque et non ignarum docendi esse oportebit, summittentem se ad mensuram discentis, ut uelocissimus quoque, si forte iter cum paruolo faciat, det manum et gradum suum minuat nec procedat ultra quam comes possit. 8. Quid si plerumque accidit ut faciliora sint ad intellegendum et lucidiora multo quae a doctissimo quoque dicuntur? Nam et prima est eloquentiae uirtus perspicuitas, et, quo quis ingenio minus ualet, hoc se magis attollere et dilatare conatur, ut statura breues in digitos eriguntur et plura infirmi minantur. 9. Nam tumidos et corruptos et tinnulos et quocumque alio cacozeliae genere peccantes certum habeo non uirium sed

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infirmitatis uitio laborare, ut corpora non robore sed ualetudine inflantur, et recto itinere lassi plerumque deuertunt. Erit ergo etiam obscurior quo quisque deterior. 10. Non excidit mihi scripsisse me in libro priore, cum potiorem in scholis eruditionem esse quam domi dicerem, libentius se prima studia tenerosque profectus ad imitationem condiscipulorum, quae facilioresset, erigere; quod a quibusdam sic accipi potest tamquam haec quam nunc tueor sententia priori diuersa sit. 11. Id a me procul aberit. Namque ea causa uel maxima est cur optimo cuique praeceptori sit tradendus puer, quod apud eum discipuli quoque melius instituti aut dicent quod inutile non sit imitari, aut, si quid errauerint, statim corrigentur. At indoctus ille etiam probabit fortasse uitiosa et placere audientibus iudicio suo coget. 12. Sit ergo tam eloquentia quam moribus praestantissimus qui ad Phoenicis Homerici exemplum dicere ac facere doceat. 4. Hinc iam quas primas in docendo partis rhetorum putem tradere incipiam, dilata parumper ilia quae sola uulgo uocatur arte rhetorica; ac mihi oportunus maxime uidetur ingressus ab eo cuius aliquid simile apud grammaticos puer didicerit. 2. Et quia narrationum, excepta qua in causis utimur, tris accepimus species, fabulam, quae uersatur in tragoediis atque carminibus, non a ueritate modo sed etiam a forma ueritatis remota, argumentum, quod falsum sed uero simile comoediae fingunt, historiam, in qua est gestae rei expositio, grammaticis autem poeticas dedimus, apud rhetorem initium sit historica, tanto robustior quanto uerior. 3. Sed narrandi quidem quae nobis optima ratio uideatur turn demonstrabimus cum de iudiciali parte dicemus; interim admonere illud sat est, ut sit ea neque arida prorsus atque ieiuna (nam quid opus erat tantum studiis laboris inpendere si res nudas atque inornatas indicare satis uideretur?), neque rursus sinuosa et arcessitis descriptionibus, in quas plerique imitatione poeticae licentiae ducuntur, lasciua. 4. Vitium utrumque, peius tamen illud quod ex inopia quam quod ex copia uenit. Nam in pueris oratio perfecta nec exigi nec sperari potest; melior autem indoles laeta generosique conatus et uel plura iusto concipiens interim spiritus. 5. Nec umquam me in his discentis annis offend at si quid superfuerit. Quin ipsis doctoribus hoc esse curae uelim, ut teneras adhuc mentes more nutriaim mollius alant, et satiari uelut quodam iucundioris disciplinae lacte patiantur. Erit illud plenius interim corpus, quod mox adulta aetas adstringat. 6. Hinc spes roboris; maciem namque et infirmitatem in posterum minari solet protinus omnibus membris expressus infans. Audeat haec aetas plura et inueniat et inuentis gaudeat, sint licet ilia non satis sicca interim ac seuera. Facile remedium est ubertatis, sterilia nullo labore uincuntur. 7. Ilia mihi in pueris natura minimum spei dederit in qua

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ingeniiim iudicio praesumitur. Materiam esse primum uolo uel abundantiorem atque ultra quam oporteat fusam. Multum inde decoquent anni, multum ratio limabit, aliquid uelut usu ipso deteretur, sit modo unde excidi possit et quod exculpi; erit autem, si non ab initio tenuem nimium laminam duxerimus et quam caelatura altior rumpat. 8. Quod me de his aetatibus sentire minus mirabitur qui apud Ciceronem legerit: 'uolo enim se efferat in adulescente feainditas.' Quapropter in primis euitandus, et in pueris praecipue, magister aridus, non minus quam teneris adhuc plantis siccum et sine umore ullo solum. 9. Inde fiunt humiles statim et uelut terram spectantes, qui nihil supra cotidianum sennonem attollere audeant. Macies illis pro sanitate et iudicii loco infirmitas est, et, dum satis putant uitio carere, in id ipsum incidunt uitium, quod uirtutibus carent. Quare mihi ne maturitas quidem ipsa festinet, nec musta in lacu statim austera sint; sicet annos ferent et uetustate proficient. 10. Ne illud quidem quod admoneamus indignum est, ingenia puerorum nimia interim emendationis seueritate deficere; nam et desperant et dolent et nouissime oderunt et, quod maxime nocet, dum omnia timent nihil conantur. 11. Quod etiam rusticis notum est, qui frondibus teneris non putant adhibendam esse falcem, quia refbrmidare ferrum uidentur et nondum cicatricem pati posse. 12. Iucundus ergo turn maxime debet esse praeceptor, ut remedia, quae alioqui natura sunt aspera, molli manu leniantur: laudare aliqua, ferre quaedam, mutare etiam reddita cur id fiat ratione, inluminare interponendo aliquid sui. Nonnumquam hoc quoque erit utile, totas ipsum dictare materias, quas et imitetur puer et interim tamquam suas amet. 13. At si tam neglegens ei stilus fuerit ut emendationem non recipiat, expertus sum prodesse quotiens eandem materiam rursus a me retractatam scribere de integro iuberem: posse enim eum adhuc melius; quatenus nullo magis studia quam spe gaudent. 14. Aliter autem alia aetas emendanda est, et pro modo uirium et exigendum et corrigendum opus. Solebam ego dicere pueris aliquid ausis licentius aut laetius laudare illud me adhuc, uenturum tempus quo idem non permitterem; ita et ingenio gaudebant et iudicio non fallebantur. 15. Sed ut eo reuertar unde sum egressus, narrationes stilo componi quanta maxima possit adhibita diligentia uolo. Nam ut primo, aim sermo instituitur, dicere quae audierint utile est pueris ad loquendi facultatem, ideoque et retro agere expositionem et a media in utramque partem discurrere sane merito cogantur, sed ad gremium praeceptoris et dum <maiora> non possunt et dum res ac uerba conectere incipiunt, ut protinus memoriam firment, ita cum iam formam rectae atque emendatae orationis accipient, extemporalis garrulitas nec expectata cogitatio et uix surgendi mora cirailatoriae uere iactationis est. 16. Hinc parentium imperitorum inane gaudium, ipsis uero contempt us operis et inuerecunda frons et consuetudo pessime dicendi et

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malorum exercitatio et, quae magnos quoque profectus frequenter perdidit, adrogans de se persuasio innascitur. 17. Erit suum parandae facilitati tempus, nec a nobis neglegenter locus iste transibitur. Interim satis est si puer omni cura et summo, quantum ilia aetas capit, labore aliquid probabile scripserit; in hoc adsuescat, huius sibi rei naturam faciat. Ille demum in id quod quaerimus aut ei proximum poterit euadere qui ante discet recte dicere quam cito. 18. Narrationibus non inutiliter subiungitur opus restruendi confirmandique eas, quod avaaK€vr\ et KaraoKevri uocatur. Id porro non tantum in fabulosis et carmine traditis fieri potest, uerum etiam in ipsis annalium monumentis, ut, si quaeratur an sit credibile super caput Valeri pugnantis sedisse coruum, qui os oculosque hostis Galli rostro atque alis euerberaret, sit in utramque partem ingens ad dicendum materia, (19) aut de serpente, quo Scipio traditur genitus, et lupa Romuli et Egeria Numae; nam Graecis historiis plerumque poeticae similis licentia est. Saepe etiam quaeri solet de tempore, de loco, quo gesta res dicitur, nonnumquam de persona quoque, sicut Liuius frequentissime dubitat et alii ab aliis historici dissentiunt. 20. Inde paulatim ad maiora tendere incipiet, laudare claros uiros et uituperare improbos. Quod non simplicis utilitatis opus est. Namque et ingenium exercetur multiplici uariaque materia, et animus contemplatione recti prauique formatur, et multa inde cognitio rerum uenit exemplisque, quae sunt in omni genere causarum potentissima, iam turn instruit cum res poscet usurum. 21. Hinc ilia quoque exercitatio subit comparationis, uter melior uterue deterior; quae quamquam uersatur in ratione simili, tamen et duplicat materiam et uirtutum uitiorumque non tantum naturam sed etiam modum tractat. Verum de ordine laudis contraque, quoniam tertia haec rhetorices pars est, praecipiemus suo tempore. 22. Communes loci (de iis loquor quibus citra personas in ipsa uitia moris est perorare, ut in adulterum, aleatorem, petulantem) ex mediis sunt iudiciis et, si reum adicias, accusationes; quamquam hi quoque ab illo generali tractatu ad quasdam deduci species solent, ut si ponatur adulter caecus, aleator pauper, petulans senex. Habent autem nonnumquam etiam defensionem; (23) nam et pro luxuria et pro amore dicimus, et leno interim parasitusque defenditur sic ut non homini patrocinemur sed crimini. 24. Thesis autem quae sumuntur ex rerum comparatione (ut rusticane uita an urbana potior, iuris periti an militaris uiri laus maior) mire sunt ad exercitationem dicendi speciosae atque uberes. Quae uel ad suadendi officium uel etiam ad iudiciorum disceptationem iuuant plurimum; nam posterior ex praedictis locus in causa Murenae copiosissime a Cicerone tractatur. 25. Sunt et illae, paene totae ad deliberatiuum pertinentes genus: ducendane uxor, petendine sint magistratus; namque et hae personis modo adiectis suasoriae erunt.

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26. Solebant praeceptores mei neque inutili et nobis etiam iucundo genere exercitationis praeparare nos coniecturalibns causis cum quaerere atque exequi iuberent cur armata apud Lacedaemonios Venus et quid ita crederetur Cupido puer atque uolucer et sagittis ac face armatus et similia, in quibus scrutabamur uoluntatem, cuius in controuersiis frequens quaestio est; quod genus chriae uideri potest. 27. Nam locos quidem, quales sunt de testibus, semperne his credendum, et de argumentis, an habenda etiam paruis fides, adeo manifestum est ad forensis actiones pertinere ut quidam neque ignobiles in officiis ciuilibus scriptos eos memoriaeque diligentissime mandatos in promptu habuerint, ut, quotiens esset occasio, extemporales eorum dictiones his uelut emblematis exomarentur. 28. Quo quidem (neque enim eius rei iudicium dififerre sustineo) summam uidebantur mihi infirmitatem de se confiteri. Nam quid hi possint in causis, quarum uaria et noua semper est facies, proprium inuenire, quomodo propositis ex parte diuersa respondere, altercationibus uelociter occurrere, testem rogare, qui etiam in iis quae sunt communia et in plurimis causis tractantur uulgatissimos sensus uerbis nisi tanto ante praeparatis prosequi nequeant? 29. Necesse uero his, cum eadem iudiciis pluribus dicunt, aut fastidium moueant uelut frigidi et repositi cibi aut pudorem deprensa totiens audientium memoria infelix supellex, quae sicut apud pauperes ambitiosos pluribus et diuersis officiis conteratur: (30) cum eo quidem, quod uix ullus est tam communis locus qui possit cohaerere cum causa nisi aliquo propriae quaestionis uinculo copulatus. fAppareatquef eum non tam insertum quam adplicitum, (31) uel quod dissimilis est ceteris, uel quod plerumque adsumi etiam parum apte solet, non quia desideratur, sed quia paratus est, ut quidam sententiarum gratia uerbosissimos locos arcessunt, cum ex locis debeat nasci sententia. 32. Ita sunt autem speciosa haec et utilia si oriuntur ex causa; ceterum quamlibet pulchra elocutio, nisi ad uictoriam tendit, utique superuacua, sed interim etiam contraria est. Verum hactenus euagari satis fuerit. 33. Legum laus ac uituperatio iam maiores ac prope summis operibus sufifecturas uires desiderant. Quae quidem suasoriis an controuersiis magis accommodata sit exercitatio consuetudine et iure ciuitatium differt. Apud Graecos enim lator earum ad iudicem uocabatur, Romanis pro contione suadere ac dissuadere moris fiiit. Vtroque autem modo pauca de his et fere certa dicuntur. Nam et genera sunt tria sacri, publici, priuati iuris; (34) quae diuisio ad laudem magis spectat, si quis earn per gradus augeat, quod lex, quod publica, quod ad religionem deum comparata sit. Ea quidem de quibus quaeri solet communia omnibus. 35. Aut enim de iure dubitari potest eius qui rogat, ut de P. Clodi, qui non rite creatus tribunus arguebatur, aut de ipsius rogationis, quod est uarium, siue non trino forte nundino

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promulgata siue non idoneo die siue contra intercessionem uel auspicia aliudue quid quod legitimis obstet dicitur lata esse uel ferri, siue alicui manentium legum repugnare. 36. Sed haec ad illas primas exercitationes non pertinent; nam sunt eae citra complexum personarum temporum causarum. Reliqua eadem fere uero fictoque certamine huius modi tractantur; (37) nam uitium aut in uerbis aut in rebus est. In uerbis quaeritur satis significent an sit in iis aliquid ambiguum, in rebus, an lex sibi ipsa consentiat, an in praeteritum ferri debeat, an in singulos homines. Maxime uero commune est quaerere an sit honesta, an utilis. 38. Nec ignoro plures fieri a plerisque partes; sed nos iustum pium religiosum ceteraque his similia honesto complectimur. Iusti tamen species non simpliciter excuti solet. Aut enim de re ipsa quaeritur, ut dignane poena uel praemio sit, aut de modo praemii poenaeue, qui tam maior quam minor culpari potest. 39. Vtilitas quoque interim natura discernitur, interim tempore. Quaedam an optineri possint ambigi solet. Ne illud quidem ignorare oportet, leges aliquando totas, aliquando ex parte reprendi solere, cum exemplum rei utriusque nobis clans orationibus praebeatur. 40. Nec me fallit eas quoque leges esse quae non in perpetuum rogentur, sed de honoribus aut imperiis, qualis Manilia fuit, de qua Ciceronis oratio est. Sed de his nihil hoc loco praecipi potest; constant enim propria rerum de quibus agitur, non communi, qualitate. 41. His fere ueteres facultatem dicendi exercuerunt, adsumpta tamen a dialecticis argumentandi ratione. Nam fictas ad imitationem fori consiliorumque materias apud Graecos dicere circa Demetrium Phalerea institutum fere constat. 42. An ab ipso id genus exercitationis sit inuentum, ut alio quoque libro sum confessus, parum comperi; sed ne ii quidem qui hoc fortissime adfirmant ullo satis idoneo auctore nituntur. Latinos uero dicendi praeceptores extremis L. Crassi temporibus coepisse Cicero auctor est; quorum insignis maxime Plotius fuit. 5. Sed de ratione declamandi post paulo; interim, quia prima rhetorices rudimenta tractamus, non omittendum uidetur id quoque, ut moneam quantum sit conlaturus ad profectum discentium rhetor si, quem ad modum a grammaticis exigitur poetarum enarratio, ita ipse quoque historiae atque etiam magis orationum lectione susceptos a se discipulos instruxerit. Quod nos in paucis, quorum id aetas exigebat et parentes utile esse crediderant, seruauimus. 2. Ceterum sentientibus iam turn optima duae res impediment© fuerunt, quod et longa consuetudo aliter docendi fecerat legem, et robusti fere iuuenes nec hunc laborem desiderantes exemplum fnostrumf sequebantur. 3. Nec tamen, etiam si quid noui uel sero inuenissem, praecipere in posterum puderet; nunc uero scio id fieri apud Graecos, sed magis per

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adiutores, quia non uidentur tempore suffectura si legentibus singulis praeire semper ipsi uelint. 4. Et hercule praelectio quae in hoc adhibetur, ut facile atque distincte pueri scripta oculis sequantur, etiam ilia quae uim cuiusque uerbi, si quod minus usitatum incidat, docet, multum infra rhetoris officium existimanda est. 5. At demonstrare uirtutes uel, si quando ita incidat, uitia, id professionis eius atque promissi quo se magistrum eloquentiae pollicetur maxime proprium est, eo quidem ualidius quod non utique hunc laborem docentium postulo, ut ad gremium reuocatis cuius quisque eorum uelit libri lectione deseruiant. 6. Nam mihi cum facilius, turn etiam multo uidetur magis utile facto silentio unum aliquem (quod ipsum imperari per uices optimum est) constituere lectorem, ut protinus pronuntiationi quoque adsuescant, (7) turn, exposita causa in quam scripta legetur oratio (nam sic clarius quae dicentur intellegi poterunt), nihil otiosum pati quodque in inuentione quodque in elocutione adnotandiun erit: quae in prohoemio conciliandi iudicis ratio, quae narrandi lux breuitas fides, quod aliquando consilium et quam occulta calliditas (8) (namque ea sola in hoc arsest, quae intellegi nisi ab artifice non possit), quanta deinceps in diuidendo prudentia, quam subtilis et crebra argumentatio; quibus uiribus inspiret, qua iucunditate permulceat, quanta in maledictis asperitas, in iocis urbanitas; ut denique dominetur in adfectibus atque in pectora inrumpat animumque iudicum similem iis quae dicit efficiat; (9) turn, in ratione eloquendi, quod uerbum proprium ornatum sublime, ubi amplificatio laudanda, quae uirtus ei contraria, quid speciose tralatum, quae figura uerborum, quae leuis et quadrata, uirilis tamen compositio. 10. Ne id quidem inutile, etiam corruptas aliquando et uitiosas orationes, quas tamen plerique iudiciorum prauitate mirentur, legi palam, ostendique in his quam multa inpropria obscura tumida humilia sordida lasciua effeminata sint; quae non laudantur modo a plerisque, sed, quod est peius, propter hoc ipsum quod sunt praua laudantur. 11. Nam sermo rectus et secundum naturam enuntiatus nihil habere ex ingenio uidetur; ilia uero quae utcumque deflexa sunt tamquam exquisitiora miramur, non aliter quam distortis et quocumque modo prodigiosis corporibus apud quosdam maius est pretium quam iis quae nihil ex communis habitus bonis perdiderunt, (12) atque etiam qui specie capiuntur uulsis leuatisque et inustas comas acu comentibus et non suo colore nitidis plus esse formae putant quam possit tribuere incorrupta natura, ut pulchritudo corporis uenire uideatur ex malis morum. 13. Neque solum haec ipse debebit docere praeceptor, sed frequenter interrogare et iudicium discipulorum experiri. Sic audientibus securitas aberit nec quae dicentur superfluent aures; simul ad id perducentur qucxl ex hoc quaeritur, ut inueniant ipsi et intellegant (nam quid aliud agimus docendo eos quam ne semper docendi sint?)

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14. Hoc diligentiae genus ausim dicere plus conlaturum discentibus quam omnes omnium artes, quae iuuant sine dubio multum, sed latiore quadam comprensione per omnes quidem species rerum cotidie paene nascentium ire qui possunt? 15. Sicut de re militari quamquam sunt tradita quaedam praecepta communia, magis tamen proderit scire qua ducum quisque ratione in quali re tempore loco sit sapienter usus aut contra; nam in omnibus fere minus ualent praecepta quam experimenta. 16. An uero dedamabit quidem praeceptor ut sit exemplo suis auditoribus, non plus contulerint lecti Cicero aut Demosthenes? Corrigetur palam si quid in declamando discipulus errauerit, non potentius erit emendare orationem, quin immo etiam iucundius (aliena enim uitia reprendi quisque mauult quam sua)? 17. Nec deerant plura quae dicerem; sed neminem haec utilitas fi-igit, atque utinam tam non pigeat facere istud quam non displicebit. 18. Quod si potuerit optineri, non ita diffidlis supererit quaestio, qui legendi sint incipientibus. Nam quidam illos minores, quia facilior eorum intellectus uidebatur, probaueriuit, alii floridius genus, ut ad alenda primarum aetatium ingenia magis accommodatum. 19. Ego optimos quidem et statim et semper, sed tamen eorum candidissimum quemque et maxime expositum uelim, ut Liuium a pueris magis quam Sallustium (et hie historiae maior est auctor, ad quem tamen intellegendum iam profectu opus sit). 20. Cicero, ut mihi quidem uidetur, et iucundus incipientibus quoque et apertus est satis, nec prodesse tantum sed etiam amari potest; turn, quem ad modum Liuius praecipit, ut quisque erit Ciceroni simillimus. 21. Duo autem genera maxime cauenda pueris puto. Vnum, ne quis eos antiquitatis nimius admirator in Gracchorum Catonisque et aliorum similiumlectione durescere uelit; fient enim horridi atque ieiuni. Nam neque uim eorum adhuc intellectu consequentur et elocutione, quae turn sine dubio erat optima, sed nostris temporibus aliena est, contenti, quod est pessimum, similes sibi magnis uiris uidebimtur. 22. Alterum, quod huic diuersum est, ne recentis huius lasciuiae flosculis capti uoluptate praua deleniantur, ut praedulce illud genus et puerilibus ingeniis hoc gratius quo propius est adament. 23. Firmis autem iudiciis iamque extra periculum positis suaserim et antiquos legere (ex quibus si adsumatur solida ac uirilis ingenii uis deterso rudis saeculi squalore, turn noster hie cultus clarius enitescet) et nouos, quibus et ipsis multa uirtus adest. 24. Neque enim nos tarditatis natura damnauit, sed dicendi mutauimus genus et ultra nobis quam oportebat indulsimus; ita non tam ingenio illi nos superarunt quam proposito. Multa ergo licebit eligere, sed curandum erit ne iis quibus permixta sunt inquinentur. 25. Quosdam uero etiam quos totos imitari oporteat et fuisse nuper et nunc esse quidni libenter non concesserim modo uerum etiam contenderim? 26. Sed hi qui sint non cuiuscumque est pronuntiare. Tutius circa priores uel

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erratur, ideoque hanc nouorum distuli lectionem, ne imitatio iudicium antecederet. 6. Fuit etiam in hoc diuersum praecipientium propositum, quod eorum quidam materias quas discipulis ad dicendum dabant, non contend diuisione digerere, latius dicendo prosequebantur, nec solum probationibus implebant sed etiam adfectibus, (2) alii, aim primas modo lineas duxissent, post declamationes quid omisisset quisque tractabant, quosdam uero locos non minore cura quam cum ad dicendum ipsi surgerent excolebant. Vtile utrumque, et ideo neutrum ab altero separo; sed si facere tantum alterum necesse sit, plus proderit demonstrasse rectam protinus uiam quam reuocare ab errore iam lapsos, (3) primum quia emendationem auribus modo accipiunt, diuisionem uero ad cogitationem etiam et stilum perferunt, deinde quod libentius praecipientem audiunt quam reprehendentem. Si qui uero paulo sunt uiuaciores, in his praesertim moribus, etiam irasciuitur admonitioni et taciti repugnant. 4. Neque ideo tamen minus uitia aperte coarguenda sunt; habenda enim ratio ceterorum, qui recta esse quae praeceptor non emendauerit credent. Vtraque autem ratio miscenda est et ita tractanda ut ipsae res postulabunt. 5. Namque incipientibus danda erit uelut praeformata materia seamdum ariusque uires. At arm satis composuisse se ad exemplum iridebuntur, praeuia quaedam demonstranda uestigia, quae persecuti iam suis uiribus sine adminiculo progredi possint. 6. Nonnumquam credi sibi ipsos oportebit, ne mala consuetudine semper alienum laborem sequendi nihil per se conari et quaerere sciant. Quodsi satis prudenter dicenda uiderint, iam prope consummata fuerit praecipientis opera; si quid errauerint adhuc, erunt ad ducem reducendi. 7. Cui rei simile quiddam facientes aues cemimirs, quae teneris infirmisque fetibirs cibos ore suo conlatos partiuntur; at cum uisi sunt adulti, paulum egredi nidis et cirarmuolare sedem illam praecedentes ipsae docent, turn expertos uires libero caelo suaeque ipsorum fiduciae permittunt. 7. IUud ex consuetudine mutandum prorsus existimo in iis de quibus nunc disserimus aetatibus, ne omnia quae scripserint ediscant et certa, ut moris est, die dicant; quod quidem maxime patres exigunt, atque ita demum studere liberos suos si quam frequentissime declamauerint credirnt, cirm profeaus praecipue diligentia constet. 2. Nam ut scribere pueros plurimumque esse in hoc opere plane uelim, sic ediscere electos ex orationibus uel historiis alioue quo genere dignorum ea cura uoluminum locos multo magis suadeam. 3. Nam et exercebitur acrius memoria aliena compleaendo quam sua, et qui erunt in difficiliore hirius laboris genere uersati sine molestia quae ipsi composuerint iam familiaria animo suo adfigent, et adsuescent optimis,

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semperque habebunt intra se quod imitentur, et iam non sentientes formam orationis illam quam mente penitus acceperint expriment. 4. Abundabunt autem copia uerborum optimorum et compositione ac figuris iam non quaesitis sed sponte et ex reposito uelut thesauro se ofiferentibus. Accedit his et iucunda in sermone bene a quoque dictorum relatio et in causis utilis; nam et plus auctoritatis adferunt ea quae non praesentis gratia litis sunt comparata, et laudem saepe maiorem quam si nostra sint conciliant. 5. Aliquando tamen permittendum quae ipsi scripserint dicere, ut laboris sui fructum etiam ex ilia quae maxime petitur laude plurium capiant; uerum id quoque turn fieri oportebit cum aliquid commodius elimauerint, ut eo uelut praemio studii sui donentur ac se meruisse ut dicerent gaudeant. 8. Virtus praeceptoris haberi solet, nec inmerito, diligenter in iis quos erudiendos susceperit notare discrimina ingeniorum, et quo quemque natura maxime ferat scire. Nam est in hoc incredibilis quaedam uarietas, nec pauciores animorum paene quam corporum formae. 2. Quod intellegi etiam ex ipsis oratoribus potest, qui tantum inter se distant genere dicendi ut nemo sit alteri similis, quamuis plurimi se ad eorum quos probabant imitationem composuerint. 3. Vtile deinde plerisque uisum est ita quemque instituere ut propria naturae bona doctrina fouerent, et in id potissimum ingenia quo tenderent adiuuarentur: ut si quis palaestrae peritus, cum in aliquod plenum pueris gymnasium uenerit, expertus eorum omni modo corpus animumque discernat cui quisque certamini praeparandus sit, (4) ita praeceptorem eloquentiae, cum sagaciter fiierit intuitus cuius ingenium presso limatoque genere dicendi, cuius acri graui dulci aspero nitido urbano maxime gaudeat, ita se commodaturum singulis ut in eo quo quisque eminet prouehatur, (5) quod et adiuta cura natura magis eualescat et qui in diuersa ducatur neque in iis quibus minus aptus est satis possit efficere et ea in quae natus uidetur deserendo faciat infirmiora. 6. Quod mihi (libera enim uel contra receptas persuasiones rationem sequenti sententia est) in parte uerum uidetur. Nam proprietates ingeniorum dispicere prorsus necessarium est; (7) in his quoque certum studio rum facere dilectum nemo dissuaserit. Namque erit alius historiae magis idoneus, alius compositus ad carmen, alius utilis studio iuris, ut nonnulli rus fbrtasse mittendi. Sic discernet haec dicendi magister quomodo palaestricus ille cursorem faciet aut pugilem aut luctatorem aliudue quid ex iis quae sunt sacrorum certaminum. 8. Verum ei qui foro destinabitur non in unam partem aliquam sed in omnia quae sunt eius operis, etiam si qua difificiliora discenti uidebuntur, elaborandum est; nam et omnino superuacua erat doctrina si natura sufficeret. 9. An si quis ingenio corruptus ac tumidus, ut plerique sunt, incident, in hoc eum ire patiemur? Aridum atque ieiunum non alemus et

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quasi uestiemus? Nam si quaedam detrahere necessarium est, cur non sit adicere concessum? 10. Neque ego contra naturam pugno; non enim deserendum id bonum, si quod ingenitum est, existimo, sed augendum, addendumque qucxi cessat. 11. An uero clarissimus ille praeceptor Isocrates, quem non magis libri bene dixisse quam discipuli bene docuisse testantur, cum de Ephoro atque Theopompo sic iudicaret ut alteri frenis, alteri calcaribus opus esse diceret, aut in illo lentiore tarditatem aut in illo paene praecipiti concitationem adiuuandam docendo existimauit, cum alterum alterius natura miscendum arbitraretur? 12. Inbecillis tamen ingeniis sane sic obsequendum sit ut tantum in id quo uocat natura ducantur; ita enim quod solum possunt melius efficient. Si uero liberalior materia contigerit et in qua merito ad spem oratoris simus adgressi, nulla dicendi uirtus omittenda est. 13. Nam licet sit aliquam in partem pronior, ut necesse est, ceteris tamen non repugnabit, atque ea cura paria faciet iis in quibus eminebat, sicut ille, ne ab eodem exemplo recedamus, exercendi corpora peritus non, si docendum pancratiasten susceperit, pugno ferire uel calce tantum aut nexus modo atque in iis certos aliquos docebit, sed omnia quae sunt eius certaminis. Erit qui ex iis aliqua non possit: in id maxime quod poterit incumbet. 14. Nam sunt haec duo uitanda prorsus: uniirn, ne temptes quod effici non possit, alterum, ne ab eo quod quis optime facit in aliud cui minus est idoneus transferas. At si fiierit qui docebitur ille, quem adulescentes senem uidimus, Nicostratus, omnibus in eo docendi partibus similiter utetur, efficietque ilium, qualis hie fuit, luctando pugnandoque, quorum utroque certamine isdem diebus coronabatur, inuictum. 15. Et quanto id magis oratoris futuri magistro prouidendum erit! Non enim satis est dicere presse tantum aut subtiliter aut aspere, non magis quam phonasco acutis tantum aut mediis aut grauibus sonis aut horum etiam particulis excellere. Nam sicut cithara, ita oratio perfecta non est nisi ab imo ad summum omnibus intenta neruis consentiat. 9. Plura de officiis docentium locutus discipulos id unum interim moneo, ut praeceptores suos non minus quam ipsa studia anient, et parentes esse non quidem corporum sed mentium credant. 2. Multum haec pietas conferet studio; nam ita et libenter audient et dictis credent et esse similes concupiscent, in ipsos denique coetus scholarum laeti alacresque conuenient, emendati non irascentur, laudati gaudebunt, ut sint carissimi studio merebuntur. 3. Nam ut illorum officium est docere, sic horum praebere se dociles. Alioqui neutrum sine altero sufficit, et sicut hominis ortus ex utroque gignentium confertur, et frustra sparseris semina nisi ilia praemollitus fouerit sulcus, ita eloquentia coalescere nequit nisi sociata tradentis accipientisque concordia.

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10. In his primis operibus, quae non ipsa parua sunt sed maiorum quasi membra atque partes, bene instituto ac satis exercitato iam fere tempus adpetet adgrediendi suasorias iudicialesque materias. Quarum antequam uiam ingredior, pauca mihi de ipsa declamandi ratione dicenda sunt, quae quidem ut ex omnibus nouissime inuenta, ita multo est utilissima. 2. Nam et cuncta ilia de quibus diximus in se fere continet et ueritati proximam imaginem reddit, ideoque ita est celebrata ut plerisque uideretur ad formandam eloquentiam uel sola sufficere. Neque enim uirtus ulla perpetuae dumtaxat orationis reperiri potest quae non sit cum hac dicendi meditatione communis. 3. Eo quidem res ista culpa docentium reccidit ut inter praecipuas quae corrumperent eloquentiam causas licentia atque inscitia declamantium fuerit. Sed eo quod natura bonum est bene uti licet. 4. Sint ergo et ipsae materiae quae fingentur quam simillimae ueritati, et declamatio, in quantum maxime potest, imitetur eas actiones in quarum exercitationem reperta est. 5. Nam magos et pestilentiam et responsa et saeuiores tragicis nouercas aliaque magis adhuc fabulosa frustra inter sponsiones et interdicta quaeremus. Quid ergo? numquam haec supra fidem et poetica, ut uere dixerim, themata iuuenibus tractare permittamus, ut expatientur et gaudeant materia et quasi in corpus eant? 6. Erat optimum; sed certe sint grandia et tumida, non stulta etiam et acrioribus oculis intuenti ridicula, ut, si iam cedendum est, impleat se declamator aliquando, dum sciat, ut quadrupedes, cum uiridi pabulo distentae sunt, sanguinis detractione curantur et sic ad cibos uiribus conseruandis idoneos redeunt, ita sibi quoque tenuandas adipes, et quidquid urn oris corrupti contraxerit emittendum si esse sanus ac robustus uolet. 7. Alioqui tumor ille inanis primo cuiuscumque ueri operis conatu deprehendetur. Totum autem declamandi opus qui diuersum omni modo a forensibus causis existimant, hi profecto ne rationem quidem qua ista exercitatio inuenta sit peruident; (8) nam si foro non praeparat, aut scaenicae ostentationi aut furiosae uociferationi simillimum est. Quid enim attinet iudicem praeparare qui nullus est, narrare quod omnes sciant falsum, probationes adhibere causae de qua nemo sit pronuntiaturus? Et haec quidem otiosa tantum; adfici uero et ira uel luctu permoueri cuius est lubidrii nisi quibusdam pugnae simulacris ad uerum discrimen aciemque iustam consuescimus! 9. Nihil ergo inter forense genus dicendi atque hoc declamatorium intererit? Si profectus gratia dicimus, nihil. Vtinamque adici ad consuetudinem posset ut nominibus uteremur et perplexae magis et longioris aliquando actus controuersiae fingerentur et uerba in usu cotidiano posita minus timeremus et iocos inserere moris esset; quae nos, quamlibet per alia in scholis exercitati simus, tirones in foro inueniunt. 10. Si uero in ostentationem comparetur declamatio, sane paulum aliquid inclinare ad uoluptatem audientium

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debemus. 11. Nam et in iis actionibus quae in aliqua sine dubio ueritate uersantur, sed sunt ad popularem aptatae delectationem, quales legimus panegyricos totumque hoc demonstratiuum genus, permittitur adhibere plus cultus, omnemque artem, quae latere plerumque in iudiciis debet, non confiteri modo sed ostentare etiam hominibus in hoc aduocatis. 12. Quare declamatio, quoniam est iudiciorum consiliorumque imago, similis esse debet ueritati, quoniam autem aliquid in se habet epidicticon, nonnihil sibi nitoris adsumere. 13. Quod faciimt actores comici, qui neque ita prorsus ut nos uulgo loquimur pronuntiant, quod esset sine arte, neque procul tamen a natura recediuit, quo uitio periret imitatio, sed morem communis huius sermonis decore quodam scaenico exornant. 14. Sic quoque aliqua nos incommoda ex iis quas finxerimus materiis consequentur, in eo praecipue quod multa in iis rdincuntur incerta, quae sumimus ut uidetur, aetates facilitates liberi parentes, urbium ipsarum uires iura mores, alia his similia; (15) quin aliquando etiam argumenta ex ipsis positionum uitiis ducimus. Sed haec suo quoque loco. Quamuis enim omne propositum operis a nobis destinati eo spectet ut orator instituatur, tamen, ne quid studiosi requirant, etiam si quid erit quod ad scholas proprie pertineat in transitu non omittemus. 11. Iam hinc ergo nobis inchoanda est ea pars artis ex qua capere initium solent qui priora omiserunt; quamquam uideo quosdam in ipso statim limine obstaturos mihi, qui nihil egere eius modi praeceptis eloquentiam putent, sed natura sua et uulgari modo scholarum exercitatione contenti rideant etiam diligentiam nostram, exemplo magni quoque nominis professorum, quorum aliquis, ut opinor, interrogatus quid esset schema et noema, nescire se quidem, sed si ad rem pertineret esse in sua declamatione respondit; (2) alius, percontanti Theodoreus an Apollodoreus esset, 'ego' inquit 'parmularius'; nec sane potuit urbanius ex confessione inscitiae suae elabi. Porro hi, quia et beneficio ingenii praestantes sunt habiti et multa etiam memoria digna exclamauerunt, plurimos habent similes neglegentiae suae, paucissimos naturae. 3. Igitur impetu dicere se et uiribus uti gloriantur: neque enim opus esse probatione aut dispositione in rebus fictis, sed, cuius rei gratia plenum sit auditorium, sententiis grandibus, quarum optima quaeque a periculo petatur. 4. Quin etiam in cogitando nulla ratione adhibita aut tectum intuentes magnum aliquid quod ultro se offerat pluribus saepe diebus expectant, aut, murmure incerto uelut classico instincti, concitatissimum corporis motum non enuntiandis sed quaerendis uerbis accommodant. 5. Nonnulli certa sibi initia priusquam sensum inuenerint destinant, quibus aliquid diserti subiungendum sit, eaque diu secum ipsi clareque meditati, desperata conectendi facilitate, deserunt et ad alia deinceps atque inde alia non minus communia ac

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nota deuertunt. 6. Qui plurimum uidentur habere rationis non in causas tamen laborem suum sed in locos intendunt, atque in iis non corpori prospiciunt, sed abrupta quaedam, ut forte ad manum uenere, iaailantur. 7. Vnde fit ut dissoluta et ex diuersis congesta oratio cohaerere non possit, similisque sit commentariis puerorum in quos ea quae aliis dedamantibus laudata sunt regerunt. Magnas tamen sententias et res bonas (ita enim gloriari solent) elidunt: nam et barbari et serui; et, si hoc sat est, nulla est ratio dicendi. 12. Ne hoc quidem negauerim, sequi plerumque hanc opinionem, ut fortius dicere uideantur indocti, primum uitio male iudicantium, qui maiorem habere uim credunt ea quae non habent artem, ut effringere quam aperire, rumpere quam soluere, trahere quam ducere putant robustius. 2. Nam et gladiator qui armorum inscius in rixam ruit et luctator qui totius corporis nisu in id quod semel inuasit incumbit fortior ab his uocatur, cum interim et hie frequenter suis uiribus ipse prosternitur et fillum uehementis impetusf excipit aduersarii mollis articulus. 3. Sed sunt in hac parte quae imperitos etiam naturaliter fallant. Nam et diuisio, cum plurimum ualeat in causis, speciem uirium minuit, et rudia politis maiora et sparsa compositis numerosiora creduntur. 4. Est praeterea quaedam uirtutum uitiorumque uicinia, qua maledicus pro libero, temerarius pro forti, effiisus pro copioso accipitur. Maledicit autem ineruditus apertius et saepius uel cum periculo suscepti litigatoris, frequenter etiam suo; (5) adfert et ista res opinionem, quia libentissime homines audiunt ea quae dicere ipsi noluissent. Illud quoque alterum quod est in elocutione ipsa periculum minus uitat, conaturque perdite, unde euenit nonnumquam ut aliquid grande inueniat qui semper quaerit quod nimium est; uerum id et raro prouenit et certa uitia non pensat. 6. Propter hoc quoque interdum uidentur indocti cop iam habere maiorem, quod diciuit omnia, doctis est et electio et modus. His accedit quod a cura docendi quod fintenderintf recedunt; itaque illud quaestionum et argumentorum apud corrupta iudicia frigus euitant, nihilque aliud quam quod uel prauis uoluptatibus aures adsistentium permulceat quaerunt. 7. Sententiae quoque ipsae, quas solas petunt, magis eminent aim omnia circa illas sordida et abiecta sunt, ut lumina non inter umbras, quem ad modum Cicero dicit, sed plane in tenebris clariora sunt. Itaque ingeniosi uocentur, ut libet, dum tamen constet contumeliose sic laudari disertum. 8. Nihilo minus confitendum est etiam detrahere doctrinam aliquid, ut limam rudibus et cotes hebetibus et uino uetustatem, sed uitia detrahit, atque eo solo minus est quod litterae perpolierunt quo melius. 9. Verum hi pronuntiatione quoque famam dicendi fortius quaerunt; nam et clamant ubique et omnia leuata, ut ipsi uocant, manu emugiunt, multo discursu anhelitu, iactatione gestus, motu capitis furentes. 10. Iam

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collidere manus, terrae pedem incutere, femur pectus frontem caedere, mire ad pullatum circulum facit: cum ille eruditus, ut in oratione multa summittere uariare disponere, ita etiam in pronuntiando suum cuique eorum quae dicet colon accommodare actum sciat, et, si quid sit perpetua obseruatione dignum, modestus et esse et uideri malit. 11. At illi hanc uim appellant quae est potius uiolentia: cum interim non actores modo aliquos inuenias sed, quod est turpius, praeceptores etiam qui, breuem dicendi exercitationem consecuti, omissa ratione ut tulit impetus passim tumultuentur, eosque qui plus honoris litteris tribuerunt ineptos et ieiunos et tepidos et infirmos, ut quodque uerbum contumeliosissimum occurrit, appellent. 12. Verum illis quidem gratulemur sine labore, sine ratione, sine disciplina disertis; nos, quando et praecipiendi munus iam pridem deprecati sumus et in foro quoque dicendi, quia honestissimum finem putabamus desinere dum desideraremur, inquirendo scribendoque talia consolemur otium nostrum, quae futura usui bonae mentis iuuenibus arbitramur, nobis certe sunt uoluptati. 13. Nemo autem a me exigat id praeceptorum genus quod est a plerisque scriptoribus artium traditum, ut quasi quasdam leges inmutabili necessitate constrictas studiosis dicendi feram: utique prohoemium et id quale, proxima huic narratio, quae lex deinde narrandi, propositio post hanc uel, ut quibusdam placuit, excursio, turn certus ordo quaestionum, ceteraque quae, uelut si aliter facere fas non sit, quidam tamquam iussi secuntur. 2. Erat enim rhetorice res prorsus facilis ac parua si uno et breui praescripto contineretur; sed mutantur pleraque causis temporibus occasione necessitate. Atque ideo res in oratore praecipua consilium est, quia uarie et ad rerum momenta conuertitur. 3. Quid si enim praecipias imperatori, quotiens aciem instruet derigat frontem, cornua utrimque promoueat, equites pro cornibus locet? Erit haec quidem rectissima fortasse ratio quotiens licebit, sed mutabitur natura loci, si mons occurret, si flumen obstabit, < s i > collibus siluis asperitate alia prohibebitur. 4. Mutabit hostium genus, mutabit praesentis condicio discriminis: nunc acie derecta nunc cuneis, nunc auxiliis nunc legione pugnabitur, nonnumquam terga etiam dedisse simulata fuga proderit. 5. Ita prohoemium necessarium an superuacuum, breue an longius, ad iudicem omni sermone derecto an aliquando auerso per aliquam figuram dicendum sit, constricta an latius fusa narratio, continua an diuisa, recta an ordine permutato, causae docebunt, (6) itemque de quaestionum ordine, cum in eadem controuersia aliud alii parti prius quaeri frequenter expediat. Neque enim rogationibus plebisue scitis sancta sunt ista praecepta, sed hoc quidquid est utilitas excogitauit. 7. Non negabo autem sic utile esse plerumque, alioqui nec scriberem.

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Verum si eadem ilia nobis aliud suadebit utilitas, hanc relictis magistrorum auctoritatibus sequemur. 8. Equidem id maxime praecipiam ac 'repetens iterumque iterumque monebo', res duas in omni actu spectet orator, quid deceat, quid expediat. Expedit autem saepe mutare ex illo constituto traditoque ordine aliqua, et interim decet, ut in statuis atque picturis uidemus uariari habitus uultus status. 9. Nam recti quidem corporis uel minima gratia est; nempe enim aduersa fsitf facies et demissa bracchia et iuncti pedes et a summis ad ima rigens opus. Flexus ille et, ut sic dixerim, motus dat actum quendam et adfectum; ideo nec ad unum modum formatae manus et in uultu mille species. 10. Cursum habent quaedam et impetum, sedent alia uel incumbunt, nuda haec, ilia uelata sunt, quaedam mixta ex utroque. Quid tam distortum et elaboratum quam est ille discobolos Myronis? Si quis tamen ut parum rectum improbet opus, nonne ab intellectu artis afiierit, in qua uel praecipue laudabilis est ipsa ilia nouitas ac difficultas? 11. Quam quidem gratiam et delectationem adferunt figurae, quaeque in sensibus quaeque in uerbis sunt. Mutant enim aliquid a recto, atque hanc prae se uirtutem ferunt, quod a consuetudine uulgari recesserunt. 12. Habet in pictura speciem tota facies; Apelles tamen imaginem Antigoni latere tantum altero ostendit, ut amissi oculi deformitas lateret. Quid? non in oratione operienda sunt quaedam, siue ostendi non debent siue exprimi pro dignitate non possunt? 13. Vt fecit Timanthes, opinor, Cythnius in ea tabula qua Coloten Teium uicit. Nam cum in Iphigeniae immolatione pinxisset tristem Calchantem, tristiorem Vlixem, addidisset Menelao quem suramum poterat ars efficere maerorem, consumptis adfectibus non reperiens quo digne modo patris uultum posset exprimere, uelauit eius caput et suo cuique animo dedit aestimandum. 14. Nonne huic simile est illud Sallustianum: 'nam de Carthagine tacere satius puto quam parum dicere'? Propter quae mihi semper moris fuit quam minime alligare me ad praecepta quae xadoXiKa uocitant, id est, ut dicamus quomodo possumus, uniuersalia uel perpetualia; raro enim reperitur hoc genus, ut non labefactari parte aliqua et subrui possit. 15. Sed de his plenius suo quidque loco tractabimus; interim nolo se iuuenes satis instructos si quem ex iis qui breues plerumque circumferuntur artis libellum edidicerint et uelut decretis technicorum tutos putent. Multo labore, adsiduo studio, uaria exercitatione, plurimis experimentis, altissima prudentia, praesentissimo consilio constat ars dicendi. 16. Sed adiuuatur his quoque, si tamen rectam uiam, non unam orbitam monstrent, qua declinare qui crediderit nefas, patiatur necesse est illam per funes ingredientium tarditatem. Itaque et stratum militari labore iter saepe deserimus compendio ducti, et si rectum limitem rupti torrentibus

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pontes inciderint circumire cogemur, et si ianua tenebitur incendio per parietem exibimus. 17. Late fusum opus est et multiplex et prope cotidie nouum et de quo numquam dicta erunt omnia. Quae sint tamen tradita, quid ex his optimum, et si qua mutari adici detrahi melius uidebitur, dicere experiar. 14. 'Rhetoricen' in Latinum transferases turn 'oratoriam', turn 'oratricem' nominauerunt. Quos equidem non fraudauerim debita laude quod copiam Romani sermonis augere temptarint. Sed non omnia nos ducentes ex Graeco secuntur, sicut ne illos quidem quotiens utique suis uerbis signare nostra uoluerunt, (2) et haec interpretatio non minus dura est quam ilia Plauti 'essentia' et 'queentia'. Sed ne propria quidem; nam 'oratoria' sic effertur ut 'elocutoria', 'oratrix' ut 'elocutrix', ilia autem de qua loquimur rhetorice talis est qualis eloquentia. Nec dubie apud Graecos quoque duplicem intellectum habet (3) (namque uno modo fit adpositum—ars rhetorica, ut nauis piratica, altero nomen rei, qualis est philosophia, amicitia), nos ipsam nunc uolumus significare substantiam, ut grammatice 'litteratura' est, non 'litteratrix' quem ad modum 'oratrix', nec 'litteratoria' quem ad modum 'oratoria'. Verum id in rhetorice non fit. 4. Ne pugnemus igitur, cum praesertim plurimis alioqui Graecis sit utendum; nam certe et philosophos et musicos et geometras dicam, nec uim adferam nominibus his indecora in Latinum sermonem mutatione. Denique cum M. Tullius etiam ipsis librorum quos hac de re primum scripserat titulis Graeco nomine utatur, profecto non est uerendum ne temere uideamur oratori maximo de nomine artis suae credidisse. 5. Igitur rhetorice (iam enim sine metu cauillationis utemur hac appellatione) sic, ut opinor, optime diuidetur ut de arte, de artifice, de opere dicamus. Ars erit quae disciplina percipi debet: ea est bene dicendi scientia. Artifex est qui percepit hanc artem: id est orator, cuius est summa bene dicere. Opus, quod efificitur ab artifice: id est bona oratio. Haec omnia rursus diducuntur in species. Sed ilia sequentia suo loco; nunc quae de prima parte tractanda sunt ordiar. 15. Ante omnia, quid sit rhetorice. Quae finitur quidem uarie, sed quaestionem habet duplicem; aut enim de qualitate ipsius rei aut de comprensione uerborum dissensio est. Prima atque praecipua opinionum circa hoc differentia, quod alii malos quoque uiros posse oratores dici putant, alii, quorum nos sententiae accedimus, nomen hoc artemque de qua loquimur bonis demum tribui uolunt. 2. Eorum autem qui dicendi facultatem a maiore ac magis expetenda uitae laude secernunt, quidam rhetoricen uim tantum, quidam scientiam sed non

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uirtutem, quidam usum, quidam artem quidem sed a scientia et uirtute diiiuictam, quidam etiam prauitatem quandam artis, id est KaKorexviav, nominauerunt. 3. Hi fere aut in persuadendo aut in dicendo apte ad persuadendum positum orandi munus sunt arbitrati; id enim fieri potest ab eo quoque qui uir bonus non sit. Est igitur frequentissimus finis rhetoricen esse uim persuadendi. Quod ego uim appello, plerique potestatem, nonnulli facultatem uocant; quae res ne quid adferat ambiguitatis, uim dico 8vvafj.iv. 4. Haec opinio originem ab Isocrate, si tamen re uera ars quae circumfertur eius est, duxit. Qui cum longe sit a uoluntate infamantium oratoris officia, finem artis temere comprendit, dicens esse rhetoricen persuadendi opificem, id est 7T€i9ovs Srjmovpyos; neque enim mihi permiserim eadem uti declinatione qua Ennius M. Cethegum 'Suadae medullam' uocat. 5. Apud Platonem quoque Gorgias in libro qui nomine eius inscriptus est idem fere dicit, sed hanc Plato illius opinionem uult accipi, non suam. Cicero pluribus locis scripsit officium oratoris esse dicere adposite ad persuadendum, (6) in rhetoricis etiam, quos sine dubio ipse non probat, finem facit persuadere. Verum et pecunia persuadet et gratia et auctoritas dicentis et dignitas, postremo aspectus etiam ipse sine uoce, quo uel recordatio meritorum cuiusque uel facies aliqua miserabilis uel formae pulchritudo sententiam dictat. 7. Nam et Manium Aquilium defendens Antonius, cum scissa ueste cicatrices quas is pro patria pectore aduerso suscepisset ostendit, non orationis habuit fiduciam, sed oculis populi Romani uim attulit, quem illo ipso aspectu maxime motum in hoc, ut absolueret reum, creditum est; (8) Seruium quidem Galbam miseratione sola, qua non suos modo liberos paruolos in contione produxerat, sed Galli etiam Sulpici filium suis ipse manibus circumtulerat, elapsum esse aim aliorum monumentis, turn Catonis oratione testatum est; (9) et Phrynen non Hyperidis actione quamquam admirabili, sed conspectu corporis, quod ilia speciosissimum alioqui diducta nudauerat tunica, putant periculo liberatam. Quae si omnia persuadent, non est hie de quo locuti sumus idoneus finis. 10. Ideoque diligentiores sunt uisi sibi qui, cum de rhetorice idem sentirent, existimarunt earn uim dicendo persuadendi. Quem finem Gorgias in eodem de quo supra diximus libro uelut coactus a Socrate facit. A quo non dissentit Theodeaes, siue ipsius id opus est quod de rhetorice nomine eius inscribitur, siue, ut aeditum est, Aristotelis; in quo est finem esse rhetorices ducere homines dicendo in id quod factorf uelit. 11. Sed ne hoc quidem satis est comprehension; persuadent enim dicendo uel ducunt in id quod uolunt alii quoque, ut meretrices adulatores corruptores, at contra non persuadet semper orator: ut interim non sit proprius hie finis eius, interim sit communis cum iis qui ab oratore procul absunt. 12. Atqui non multum ab hoc fine

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abest Apollodorus, dicens iudicialis orationis primum et super omnia esse persuadere iudici et sententiam eius ducere in id quod uelit. Nam et ipse oratorem fortunae subicit, ut, si non persuaserit, nomen suum retinere non possit. 13. Quidam recesserunt ab euentu, sicut Aristoteles dicit: 'rhetorice est uis inueniendi omnia in oratione persuasibilia.' Qui finis et illud uitium de quo supra diximus habet, et insuper quod nihil nisi inuentionem complectitur, quae sine elocutione non est oratio. 14. Hermagorae, qui finem eius esse ait persuasibiliter dicere, et aliis qui eandem sententiam, non isdem tantum uerbis explicant ac finem esse demonstrant dicere quae oporteat omnia ad persuadendum, satis responsum est cum persuadere non tantum oratoris esse conuicimus. 15. Addita sunt his alia uarie. Quidam enim circa res omnes, quidam circa ciuiles modo uersari rhetoricen putauerunt; quorum uerius utrum sit, in eo loco qui huius quaestionis proprius est dicam. 16. Omnia subiecisse oratori uidetur Aristoteles cum dixit uim esse uidendi quid in quaque re possit esse persuasibile, et Iatrocles, qui non quidem adicit 'in quaque re', sed nihil excipiendo idem ostendit; uim enim uocat inueniendi quod sit in oratione persuasibile. Qui fines et ipsi solam complectuntur inuentionem. Quod uitium fugiens Eudorus uim putat inueniendi et eloquendi cum ornatu credibilia in omni oratione. 17. Sed cum eodem modo credibilia quo persuasibilia etiam non orator inueniat, adiciendo 'in omni oratione' magis quam superiores concedit scelera quoque suadentibus pulcherrimae rei nomen. 18. Gorgias apud Platonem suadendi se artificem in iudiciis et aliis coetibus esse ait, de iustis quoque et iniustis tractare; cui Socrates persuadendi, non docendi concedit facultatem. 19. Qui uero non omnia subiciebant oratori, sollicitius ac uerbosius, ut necesse erat, adhibuerunt discrimina. Quorum fuit Ariston, Critolai Peripatetici discipulus, cuius hie finis est: 'scientia uidendi et agendi in quaestionibus ciuilibus per orationem popularis persuasionis'. 20. Hie scientiam, quia Peripateticus est, non ut Stoici uirtutis loco ponit; popularem autem comprendendo persuasionem etiam contumeliosus est aduersus artem orandi, quam nihil putat doctis persuasuram. Illud de omnibus qui circa ciuiles demum quaestiones oratorem iudicant uersari dictum sit, excludi ab iis plurima oratoris officia, illam certe laudatiuam totam, quae est rhetorices pars tertia. 21. Cautius Theodorus Gadareus, ut iam ad eos ueniamus qui artem quidem esse earn, sed non uirtutem putauerunt. Ita enim dicit, ut ipsis eorum uerbis utar qui haec ex Graeco transtulerunt: 'ars inuentrix et iudicatrix et enuntiatrix, decente ornatu secundum mensionem, eius quod in quoque potest sumi persuasibile, in materia ciuili'. 22. Itemque Cornelius Celsus, qui finem rhetorices ait dicere persuasibiliter in dubia ciuili materia. Quibus sunt non dissimiles qui ab aliis traduntur, qualis est ille: 'uis uidendi

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et eloquendi de rebus ciuilibus subiectis sibi cum quadam persuasione et quodam corporis habitu et eorum quae dicet pronuntiatione'. 23. Mille alia, sed aut eadem aut ex isdem composita, quibus item cum de materia rhetorices dicendum erit respondebimus. Quidam earn neque uim neque scientiam neque artem putauerunt, sed Critolaus usum dicendi (nam hoc Tptftr} significat), Athenaeus fallendi artem. 24. Plerique autem, dum pauca ex Gorgia Platonis a prioribus imperite excerpta legere contend neque hoc totum neque alia eius uolumina euoluunt, in maximum errorem inciderunt, creduntque eum in hac esse opinione, ut rhetoricen non artem sed 'peritiam quandam gratiae ac uoluptatis' existimet, (25) et alio loco 'ciuilitatis particulae simulacrum' et quartam partem adulationis (quod duas partes ciuilitatis corpori adsignet, medicinam et quam interpretantur exercitatricem, duas animo, legalem atque iustitiam, adulationem autem medicinae uocet cocorum artificium, exercitatricis mangonum, qui colorem fuco et uerum robur inani sagina mentiantur, legalis cauillatricem, iustitiae rhetoricen). 26. Quae omnia sunt quidem scripta in hoc libro dictaque a Socrate, cuius persona uidetur Plato significare quid sentiat; sed alii sunt eius sermones ad coarguendos qui contra disputant compositi, quos eXeyKTtKous uocant, alii ad praecipiendum, qui 8oyfxariKoi appellantur. 27. Socrates autem seu Plato earn quidem quae turn exercebatur rhetoricen talem putat (nam et dicit his uerbis TOVTOV TOV rponov ov vp,€ts noAtTcveode), ueram autem et honestam intellegit; itaque disputatio ilia contra Gorgian ita cluditlin OVKOVV aray/07 TOV prjropiKov SIKCLIOV etvai, TOV 8C 8iKatov fiov\eo9ai 8Uaia 7TpaTT€iv. 28. Ad quod ille quidem conticescit, sed sermonem suscipit Polus iuuenili calore inconsideratior, contra quem ilia de simulacra et adulatione dicuntur. Turn Callicles adhuc concitatior, qui tamen ad hanc perducitur clausulam: roy /xcA ' AOVTCL op9d)s prjropiKov eoeaOai 8iKaiov apa 8ei etvai Kai €iTioTrjfxova roiv 8iKaL(xiv, ut appareat Platoni non rhetoricen uideri malum, sed earn ueram nisi iusto ac bono non contingere. 29. Adhuc autem in Phaedro manifestius facit hanc artem consummari citra iustitiae quoque scientiam non posse. (Cui opinioni nos quoque accedimus.) An aliter defensionem Socratis et eorum qui pro patria ceciderant laudem scripsisset? Quae certe sunt oratoris opera. 30. Sed in illud hominum genus quod facilitate dicendi male utebatur inuectus est. Nam et Socrates inhonestam sibi credidit orationem quam ei Lysias reo composuerat, et turn maxime <cum> scribere litigatoribus quae illi pro seipsi dicerent erat moris, atque ita iuri quo non licebat pro altera agere fraus adhibebatur. 31. Doctores quoque eius artis parum idonei Platoni uidebantur, qui rhetoricen a iustitia separarent et ueris credibilia praeferrent; nam id quoque dicit in Phaedra. 32. Consensisse autem illis superioribus uideri potest etiam Cornelius Celsus, cuius haec uerba sunt: orator simile tantum ueri petit', deinde paulo post non enim bona conscientia sed uictoria litigantis est

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praemium'. Quae si uera essent, pessimorum hominum foret haec tam perniciosa nocentissimis moribus dare instrumenta et nequitiam praeceptis adiuuare. Sed iHi rationem opinionis suae uiderint. 33. Nos autem ingressi formare perfectum oratorem, quem in primis esse uirum bonum uolumus, ad eos qui de hoc opere melius sentiunt reuertamur. Rhetoricen autem quidam eandem ciuilitatem esse iudicauerunt, Cicero scientiae ciuilis partem uocat (ciuilis autem scientia idem quod sapientia est), quidam eandem philosophiam, quorum est Isocrates. 34. Huic eius substantiae maxime conueniet finitio rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam. Nam et orationis omnes uirtutes semel complectitur et protinus etiam mores oratoris, cum bene dicere non possit nisi bonus. Idem ualet Chrysippi finis ille ductus a Cleanthe, 'scientia recte dicendi'. 35. Sunt plures eiusdem, sed ad alias quaestiones magis pertinent. Idem sentiret finis hoc modo comprensus: 'persuadere quod oporteat', nisi quod artem ad exitum alligat. 36. Bene Areus: 'dicere secundum uirtutem orationis'. Exdudunt a rhetorice malos et illi qui scientiam ciuilium officiorum earn putauerunt, si scientiam uirtutem iudicant, sed anguste intra ciuiles quaestiones coercent. Albucius non obscurus professor atque auctor scientiam bene dicendi esse consentit, sed exceptionibus peccat, adiciendo 'circa ciuiles quaestiones et credibiliter'; quarum iam utrique responsum est. 37. Probabilis et illi uoluntatis qui recte sentire et dicere rhetorices putauerunt. Hi sunt fere fines maxime inlustres et de quibus praecipue disputatur. Nam omnis quidem persequi neque attinet neque possum, aim prauum quoddam, ut arbitror, studium circa scriptores artium extiterit nihil isdem uerbis quae prior aliquis occupasset finiendi; quae ambitio proail aberit a me. 38. Dicam enim non utique quae inuenero, sed quae placebunt, sicut hoc: rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam, cum, reperto quod est optimum, qui quaerit aliud peius uelit. His adprobatis simul manifestum est illud quoque, quem finem uel quid summum et ultimum habeat rhetorice, quod reAo? dicitur, ad quod omnis ars tendit; nam si est ipsa bene dicendi scientia, finis eius et summum est bene dicere. 16. Sequitur quaestio an utilis rhetorice. Nam quidam uehementer in earn inuehi solent, et, quod sit indignissimum, in accusationem orationis utuntur orandi uiribus: (2) eloquentiam esse quae poenis eripiat scelestos, alius fraude damnentur interim boni, consilia ducantur in peius, nec seditiones modo turbaeque populares sed bella etiam inexpiabilia excitentur, cuius denique turn maximus sit usus cum pro falsis contra ueritatem ualet. 3. Nam et Socrati obiciunt comici docere eum quomodo peiorem causam

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meliorem faciat, et contra Tisian et Gorgian similia dicit polliceri Plato. 4. Et his adiciunt exempla Graeco rum Romanorumque, et enumerant qui, perniciosa non singulis tantum sed rebus etiam publicis usi eloquentia, turbauerint ciuitatium status uel euerterint; eoque et Lacedaemoniorum ciuitate expulsam, et Athenis quoque, ubi actor mouere adfectus uetabatur, uelut recisam orandi potestatem. 5. Quo quidem modo nec duces erunt utiles nec magistratus nec medicina nec denique ipsa sapientia; nam et dux Flaminius et Gracchi Saturnini Glauciae magistratus, et in medicis uenena et in his qui philosophorum nomine male utuntur grauissima nonnumquam flagitia deprehensa simt. 6. Cibos aspernemur: attulerunt saepe ualetudinis causas. Numquam tecta subeamus: super habitantes aliquando procumbunt. Non fabricetur militi gladius: potest uti eodem ferro latro. Quis nescit ignes aquas, sine quibus nulla sit uita, et, ne terrenis inmorer, solem lunamque, praecipua siderum, aliquando et nocere? 7. Num igitur negabitur deformem Pyrrhi pacem Caecus ille Appius dicendi uiribus diremisse? Aut non diuina M. Tulli eloquentia et contra leges agrarias popularis fuit et Catilinae fregit audaciam et supplicationes, qui maximus honor uictoribus bello ducibus datur, in toga meruit? 8. Non perterritos militum animos frequenter a metu reuocat oratio, et tot pugnandi pericula ineuntibus laudem uita potiorem esse persuadet? Neque uero me Lacedaemonii atque Athenienses magis mouerint quam populus Roman us, apud quem summa semper oratoribus dignitas fuit. 9. Equidem nec urbium conditores reor aliter effecturos fuisse ut uaga ilia multitudo coiret in populos nisi docta uoce commota, nec legum repertores sine summa ui orandi consecutos ut se ipsi homines ad seruitutem iuris adstringerent. 10. Quin ipsa uitae praecepta, etiam si natura sunt honesta, plus tamen ad formandas mentes ualent quotiens pulchritudinem rerum claritas orationis inluminat. Quare, etiam si in utramque partem ualent arma faciuidiae, non est tamen aecum id haberi malum quo bene uti licet. 11. Verum haec apud eos forsitan quaerantur qui summam rhetorices ad persuadendi uim rettulerunt. Si uero est bene dicendi scientia, quem nos finem sequimur, ut sit orator in primis uir bonus, utilem certe esse earn confitendum est. 12. Et hercule deus ille princeps, parens rerum fabricatorque mundi, nullo magis hominem separauit a ceteris, quae quidem mortalia essent, animalibus quam dicendi faailtate. 13. Nam corpora quidem magnitudine uiribus firmitate patientia uelocitate praestantiora in illis mutis uidemus, eadem minus egere adquisitae extrinsecus opis; nam et ingredi citius et pasci et tranare aquas citra docentem natura ipsa sciunt, (14) et pleraque contra frigus ex suo corpore uestiuntur et arma iis ingenita quaedam et ex obuio fere uictus, circa quae omnia multus ho minibus labor est. Rationem igitur nobis praecipuam dedit, eiusque nos socios esse cum dis inmortalibus

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uoluit. 15. Sed ipsa ratio neque tam nos iuuaret neque tam esset in nobis manifesta nisi quae coneepissemus mente prom ere etiam loquendo posse mus; quod magis deesse ceteris animalibus quam intellectum et cogitationem quandam uidemus. 16. Nam et mollire cubilia et nidos texere et educare fetus et excludere, quin etiam reponere in hiemem alimenta, opera quaedam nobis inimitabilia, qualia sunt cerarum ac mellis, efificere nonnullius fbrtasse rationis est. Sed, quia carent sermone quae id faciunt, muta atque inrationalia uocantur. 17. Denique homines quibus negata uox est quantulum adiuuat animus ille caelestis! Quare, si nihil a dis oratione melius accepimus, quid tam dignum cultu ac labore ducamus, aut in quo malimus praestare hominibus quam quo ipsi homines ceteris animalibus praestant? (18)—eo quidem magis quod nulla in parte plenius labor gratiam refert. Id adeo manifestum erit si cogitauerimus unde et quo usque iam prouecta sit orandi facultas; et adhuc augeri potest. 19. Nam ut omittam defendere amicos, regere consiliis senatum populum, exercitum in quae uelit ducere, quam sit utile conueniatque bono uiro: nonne pulchrum uel hoc ipsum est, ex communi intellectu uerbisque quibus utuntur omnes tantum adsequi laudis et gloriae ut non loqui et orare, sed, quod Pericli contigit, fulgere ac tonare uidearis? 17. Finis non erit si expatiari parte in hac et indulgere uoluptati uelim. Transeamus igitur ad earn quaestionem quae sequitur, an rhetorice ars sit. 2. Quod quidem adeo ex iis qui praecepta dicendi tradiderunt nemo dubitauit ut etiam ipsis librorum titulis testatum sit scriptos eos de arte rhetorica, Cicero uero etiam quae rhetorice uocetur esse artificiosam eloquentiam dicat. Quod non oratores tantum uindicarunt, ut studiis aliquid suis praestitisse uideantur, sed cum iis philosophi et Stoici et Peripatetici plerique consentiunt. 3. Ac me dubitasse confiteor an hanc partem quaestionis tractandam putarem; nam quis est adeo non ab eruditione modo sed a sensu remotus hominis ut fabricandi quidem et texendi et luto uasa ducendi artem putet, rhetoricen autem maximum ac pulcherrimum, ut supra diximus, opus in tam sublime fastigium existimet sine arte uenisse? 4. Equidem illos qui contra disputauerunt non tam id sensisse quod dicerent quam exercere ingenia materiae difificultate credo uoluisse, siait Polycraten, cum Busirim laudaret et Clytaemestram; quamquam is, quod his dissimile non esset, composuisse orationem quae est habita contra Socraten dicitur. 5. Quidam naturalem esse rhetoricen uolunt et tamen adiuuari exercitatione non diffitentur, ut in libris Ciceronis de oratore dicit Antonius obseruationem quandam esse, non artem. 6. Quod non ideo ut pro uero accipiamus est positum, sed ut Antoni persona seruetur, qui dissimulator artis fiiit; hanc autem opinionem habuisse Lysias uidetur. Cuius sententiae talis defensio est,

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quod indocti et barbari et serui, pro se cum locuntur, aliquid dicant simile principio, narrent, probent, reflitent et, quod uim habeat epilogi, deprecentur. 7. Deinde adiciunt illas uerborum cauillationes: nihil quod ex arte fiat ante artem fuisse; atqui dixisse homines pro se et in alios semper, doctores artis sero iam et circa Tisian et Coraca primum repertos; orationem igitur ante artem fuisse eoque artem non esse. 8. Nos porro quando coeperit huius rei doctrina non laboramus, quamquam apud Homerum etpraeceptorem Phoenicem cum agendi turn etiam loquendi, et oratores plures et omne in tribus ducibus orationis genus et certamina quoque proposita eloquentiae inter iuuenes inuenimus, quin in caelatura clipei Achillis et lites sunt et actores. 9. Illud enim admonere satis est, omnia quae ars consummauerit a natura initia duxisse: aut tollatur medicina, quae ex obseruatione salubrium atque his contrariorum reperta est et, ut quibusdam placet, tota constat experimentis (nam et uulnus deligauit aliquis antequam haec ars esset, et febrem quiete et abstinentia, non quia rationem uidebat, sed quia id ualetudo ipsa coegerat, mitigauit), (10) nec fabrica sit ars (casasenim primi illi sine arte fecerunt), nec musica (cantatur ac saltatur per omnis gentes aliquo modo). Ita, si rhetorice uocari debet sermo quicumque, fuisse earn antequam esset ars confitebor; (11) si uero non quisquis loquitur orator est, et turn non tamquam oratores loquebantur, necesse est oratorem factum arte nec ante artem fuisse fateantur. Quo illud quoque exduditur quod dicunt, non esse artis id quod faciat qui non didicerit, dicere autem homines et qui non didicerint. 12. Ad cuius rei confirmationem adfemnt Demaden remigem et Aeschinen hypocriten oratores fuisse. Falso; nam neque orator esse qui non didicit potest, et hos sero potius quam numquam didicisse quis dixerit, quamquam Aeschines ab initio sit uersatus in litteris, quas pater eius etiam docebat, Demaden neque non didicisse certum sit et continua dicendi exercitatio potuerit tantum quantuscumque postea fuit fecisse (nam id potentissimum discendi genus est). 13. Sed et praestantiorem si didicisset futurum fuisse dicere licet; neque enim orationes scribere est ausus, ut eum multum ualuisse in dicendo sciamus. 14. Aristoteles, ut solet, quaerendi gratia quaedam subtilitatis suae argumenta excogitauit in Gryllo; sed idem et de arte rhetorica tris libros scripsit, et in eorum primo non artem solum earn fatetur, sed ei particulam ciuilitatis sicut dialectices adsignat. 15. Multa Critolaus contra, multa Rhodius Athenodorus. Agnon quidem detraxit sibi inscriptione ipsa fidem, qua rhetorices accusationem professus est. Nam de Epicuro, qui disciplinas omnes fugit, nihil minor. 16. Hi complura dicunt, sed ex paucis locis ducta; itaque potentissimis eorum breuiter occurram, ne in infinitum quaestio euadat. 17. Prima iis argumentatio ex materia est. Omnis enim artes aiunt habere materiam (quod est uerum), rhetorices nullam esse propriam (quod esse falsum in sequentibus probabo).

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18. Altera est calumnia nullam artem falsis adsentiri opinionibus, quia constitui sine perceptione non possit, quae semper uera sit; rhetoricen adsentiri falsis; non esse igitur artem. 19. Ego rhetoricen nonnumquam dicere falsa pro ueris confitebor, sed non ideo in falsa quoque esse opinione concedam, quia longe diuersum est ipsi quid uideri et ut alii uideatur efficere. Nam et imperator falsis utitur saepe, ut Hannibal, cum inclusus a Fabio, sarmentis circum cornua boum deligatis incensisque, per noctem in aduersos montes agens armenta speciem hosti abeuntis exercitus dedit; sed ilium fefellit, ipse quid uerum esset non ignorauit. 20. Nec uero Theopompus Lacedaemonius, cum permutato cum uxore habitu e custodia ut mulier euasit, falsam de se opinionem habuit, sed custodibus praebuit. Item orator, cum falso utitur pro uero, scit esse falsum eoque se pro uero uti; non ergo falsam habet ipse opinionem, sed fallit alium. 21. Nec Cicero, cum se tenebras ofifudisse iudicibus in causa Cluenti gloriatus est, nihil ipse uidit, et pictor, aim ui artis suae efificit ut quaedam eminere in opere, quaedam recessisse credamus, ipse ea plana esse non nescit. 22. Aiunt etiam omnes artes habere finem aliquem proposition ad quem tendant, hunc modo nullum esse in rhetorice, modo non praestari eum qui promittatur. Mentiuntur; nos enim esse finem iam ostendimus et quis esset diximus, (23) et praestabit hunc semper orator (semper enim bene dicet). Firmum autem hoc quod opponitur aduersus eos fortasse sit qui persuadere finem putauerimt; noster orator arsque a nobis finita non sunt posita in euentu. Tendit quidem ad uictoriam qui dicit, sed cum bene dixit, etiam si non uincat, id quod arte continetur efifecit. 24. Nam et gubernator uult salua naue in portum peruenire, si tamen tempestate fuerit abreptus, non ideo minus erit gubernator, dicetque notum illud: 'dum clauum reaum teneam'; (25) et medicus sanitatem aegri petit, si tamen aut ualetudinis ui aut intemperantia aegri alioue quo casu summa non contingit, dum ipse omnia secundum rationem fecerit, medicinae fine non excidet. Ita oratori bene dixisse finis est. Nam est ars ea, ut post paulum clarius ostendemus, in actu posita, non in effectu. 26. Ita falsum erit illud quoque quod dicitur, artes scire quando sint finem consecutae, rhetoricen nescire; nam se quisque bene dicere intelleget. Vti etiam uitiis rhetoricen, quod ars nulla faciat, criminantur, quia et falsum dicat et adfectus moueat. 27. Quorum neutrum est turpe, cum ex bona ratione proficiscitur, ideoque nec uitium; nam et mendacium dicere etiam sapienti aliquando concessum est, et adfectus, si aliter ad aequitatem perduci iudex non poterit, necessario mouebit orator. Imperiti enim iudicant et qui frequenter in hoc ipsum fallendi sint, ne errent. 28. Nam si mihi sapientes iudices dentur, sapientium contiones atque omne consilium, nihil inuidia ualeat, nihil gratia, nihil opinio praesumpta falsique testes, perquam

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sit exiguiis eloquentiae locus et prope in sola delectatione ponatur. 29. Sin et audientium mobiles animi et tot malis obnoxia ueritas, arte pugnandum est et adhibenda quae prosunt; neque enim qui recta ilia depulsus est reduci ad earn nisi alio flexu potest. 30. Plurima uero ex hoc contra rhetoricen cauillatio est, quod ex utraque causae parte dicatur. Inde haec: nullam esse artem contrariam sibi, rhetoricen esse contrariam sibi; nullam artem restruere quod effecerit, accidere hoc rhetorices operi. Item aut dicenda earn docere aut non dicenda; ita uel per hoc non esse artem, quod non dicenda praecipiat, uel per hoc, quod, cum dicenda praeceperit, etiam contraria his doceat. 31. Quae omnia apparet de ea rhetorice dici quae sit a bono uiro atque ab ipsa uirtute seiuncta; alioqui ubi iniusta causa est, ibi rhetorice non est, adeo ut uix admirabili quodam casu possit accidere ut ex utraque parte orator, id est uir bonus, dicat. 32. Tamen quoniam hoc quoque in rerum naturam cadit, ut duos sapientes aliquando iustae causae in diuersum trahant, quando etiam pugnaturos eos inter se, si ratio ita duxerit, credunt, respondebo propositis, atque ita quidem ut appareat haec aduersus eos quoque frustra excogitata qui malis moribus nomen oratoris indulgent. 33. Nam rhetorice non est contraria sibi. Causa enim cum causa, non ilia secum ipsa componitur; nec, si pugnent inter se qui idem didicerunt, idcirco ars, quae utrique tradita est, non erit (alioqui nec armorum quia saepe gladiatores sub eodem magistro eruditi inter se componuntur, (34) nec gubernandi quia naualibus proeliis gubernator est gubernatori aduersus, nec imperatoria quia imperator cum imperatore contendit). Item non euertit opus rhetorice quod effecit. Neque enim positum a se argumentum soluit orator; sed ne rhetorice quidem, quia apud eos qui in persuadendo finem putant, aut si quis, ut dixi, casus duos inter se bonos uiros composuerit, ueri similia quaerentur; non autem, si quid est altero credibilius, id ei contrarium est quod fuit credibile. 35. Nam ut candido candidius et dulci dulcius non est aduersum, ita nec probabili probabilius. Neque praecipit umquam non dicenda nec dicendis contraria, sed quae in quaque causa dicenda sunt. 36. Non semper autem ei, etiamsi frequentissime, tuenda ueritas erit, sed aliquando exigit communis utilitas ut etiam falsa defendat. Ponuntur hae quoque in secundo Ciceronis de Oratore libro contradictiones: artem earum reriun esse quae sciantur; oratoris omnem actionem opinione, non scientia contineri, quia et apud eos dicat qui nesciant, et ipse dicat aliquando quod nesciat. 37. Ex his alterum, id est an sciat iudex de quo dicatur, nihil ad oratoris artem; alteri respondendum. 'Ars earum rerum est quae sciuntur'. Rhetorice ars est bene dicendi, bene autem dicere scit orator. 38. 'Sed nescit an uerum sit quod dicit.' Ne ii quidem qui ignem aut aquam aut quattuor elementa aut corpora insecabilia esse ex quibus res omnes initium duxerint tradunt, nec qui interualla siderum et mensuras solis ac

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terrae colligunt; disciplinam tamen suam artem uocant. Quodsi ratio efficit ut haec non opinari sed propter uim probationum scire uideantur, eadem ratio idem praestare oratori potest. 39. 'Sed an causa uera sit nescit.' Ne medicus quidem an dolorem capitis habeat qui hoc se pati dicet; curabit tamen tamquam id uerum sit, et erit ars medicina. Quid quod rhetorice non utique propositum habet semper uera dicendi, sed semper ueri similia? Scit autem esse ueri similia quae dicit. 40. Adiciunt his qui contra sentiunt quod saepe, quae in aliis litibus inpugnarunt actores causarum, eadem in aliis defendant. Quod non artis sed hominis est uitium. Haec sunt praecipua quae contra rhetoricen dicantur, alia et minora et tamen ex his fontibus deriuata. 41. Confirmatur autem esse artem earn breuiter. Nam siue, ut Cleanthes uoluit, ars est potestas uia, id est ordine, efficiens, esse certe uiam atque ordinem in bene dicendo nemo dubitauerit, siue ille ab omnibus fere probatus finis obseruatur, artem constare ex perceptionibus consentientibus et coexercitatis ad finem utilem uitae, iam ostendimus nihil non horum in rhetorice inesse. 42. Quid quod et inspectione et exercitatione, ut artes ceterae, constat? Nec potest ars non esse si est ars dialectice (quod fere constat), cum ab ea specie magis quam genere differat. Sed nec ilia omittenda sunt: qua in re alius se inartificialiter, alius artificialiter gerat, in ea esse artem, et in eo quod qui didicerit melius faciat quam qui non didicerit esse artem. 43. Atqui non solum doctus indoctum sed etiam doctior doctum in rhetorices opere superabit, neque essent eius aliter tam multa praecepta tamque magni qui docerent. Idque cum omnibus confitendum est, turn nobis praecipue, qui rationem dicendi a bono uiro non separamus. 18. Cum sint autem artium aliae positae in inspectione, id est cognitione et aestimatione rerum, qualis est astrologia nullum exigens actum, sed ipso rei cuius studium habet intellectu contenta, quae deaiprjriKri uocatur, aliae in agendo, quarum in hoc finis est et ipso actu perficitur nihilque post actum operis relinquit, quae rrpaKTiKr) dicitur, qualis saltatio est, (2) aliae in effectu, quae operis quod oculis subicitur consummatione finem accipiunt, quam 7TOTJTiKTjv appellamus, qualis est pictura: fere iudicandum est rhetoricen in actu consistere; hoc enim quod est officii sui perficit; atque ita ab omnibus dictum est. 3. Mihi autem uidetur etiam ex illis ceteris artibus multum adsumere. Nam et potest aliquando ipsa per se inspectione esse contenta. Erit enim rhetorice in oratore etiam tacente, et si desierit agere uel proposito uel aliquo casu impeditus, non magis desinet esse orator quam medicus qui curandi fecerit finem. 4. Nam est aliquis ac nescio an maximus etiam ex secretis studiis fructus, ac turn pura uoluptas litterarum cum ab actu, id est

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opera, recesserunt et contemplatione sui fruuntur. 5. Sed effectiuae quoque aliquid simile scriptis orationibus uel historiis, quod ipsum opus in parte oratoria merito ponimus, consequetur. Si tamen una ex tribus artibus habenda sit, quia maximus eius usus actu continetur atque est in eo frequentissima, dicatur actiua uel administratiua; nam et hoc eiusdem rei nomen est. 19. Scio quaeri etiam naturane plus ad eloquentiam conferat an doctrina. Quod ad propositum quidem operis nostri nihil pertinet (neque enim consummatus orator nisi ex utroque fieri potest), plurimum tamen referre arbitror quam esse in hoc loco quaestionem uelimus. 2. Nam si parti utrilibet omnino alteram detrahas, natura etiam sine doctrina multum ualebit, doctrina nulla esse sine natura poterit. Sin ex pari coeant, in mediocribus quidem futrisquef maius adhuc naturae credam esse momentum, consummatos autem plus doctrinae debere quam naturae putabo; sicut terrae nullam fertilitatem habenti nihil optimus agricola profuerit, e terra uberi utile aliquid etiam nullo colente nascetur; at in solo feaindo plus alitor quam ipsa per se bonitas soli efificiet. 3. Et si Praxiteles signum aliquod ex molari lapide conatus esset exculpere, Parium marmor mallem rude; at si illud idem artifex expolisset, plus in manibus fuisset quam in marmore. Denique natura materia doctrinae est: haec fingit, ilia fingitur. Nihil ars sine materia, materiae etiam sine arte pretium est; ars summa materia optima melior. 20. Ilia quaestio est maior, ex mediis artibus, quae neque laudari per se nec uituperari possunt, sed utiles aut secus secundum mores utentium fiunt, habenda sit rhetorice, an sit, ut compluribus etiam philosophorum placet, uirtus. 2. Equidem illud quod in studiis dicendi plerique exercuerunt et exercent aut nullam artem, quae arexvia nominatur, puto (multos enim uideo sine ratione, sine litteris, qua uel impudentia uel fames duxit ruentes), aut malam quasi artem, quam KaKorexviav dicimus; nam et fuisse multos et esse nonnullos existimo qui facultatem dicendi ad hominum perniciem conuerterint. 3. Maratorexvia quoque est quaedam, id est superuacua artis imitatio, quae nihil sane neque boni neque mali habeat, sed uanum laborem, qualis illius fuit qui grana ciceris ex spatio distante missa in acum continuo et sine frustratione inserebat; quem cum spectasset Alexander, donasse dicitur eiusdem leguminis modio, quod quidem praemium fuit illo opere dignissimum. 4. His ego comparandos existimo qui in declamationibus, quas esse ueritati dissimillimas uolunt, aetatem multo studio ac labore consumunt. Verum haec quam instituere conamur et cuius imaginem animo concepimus, quae bono uiro conuenit quaeque est uere rhetorice, uirtus erit. 5. Quod philosophi quidem multis et acutis conclusionibus coDigunt, mihi uero etiam planiore hac proprieque nostra probatione uidetur esse perspicuum.

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Ab illis haec dicuntiir: Si consonare sibi in faciendis ac non faciendis uirtus est (quae pars eius prudentia uocatur), eadem in dicendis ac non dicendis erit. 6. Et si uirtutes sunt ad quas nobis, etiam antequam doceremur, initia quaedam ac semina sunt concessa natura, ut ad iustitiam, cuius rusticis quoque ac barbaris apparet aliqua imago, nos certe sic esse ab initio formatos ut possemus orare pro nobis, etiamsi non perfecte, tamen ut inessent quaedam, ut dixi, semina eius facultatis, manifestum est; (7) non eadem autem iis natura artibus est quae a uirtute sunt remotae. Itaque cum duo sint genera orationis, altera perpetua, quae rhetorice dicitur, altera concisa, quae dialectice (quas quidem Zenon adeo coniunxit ut hanc compressae in pugnum manus, illam explicatae diceret similem), etiam disputatrix uirtus erit: adeo de hac, quae speciosior atque apertior tanto est, nihil dubitabitur. 8. Sed plenius hoc idem atque apertius intueri ex ipsis operibus uolo. Nam quid orator in laudando faciet nisi honestorum ac turpium peritus, aut in suadendo nisi utilitate perspecta, aut in iudiciis si iustitiae sit ignarus? Quid? non fortitudinem postulat res eadem, cum saepe contra turbulentas populi minas, saepe cum periculosa potentium ofifensa, nonnumquam, ut iudicio Miloniano, inter circumfusa militum anna dicendum sit?—ut, si uirtus non est, ne perfecta quidem esse possit oratio. 9. Quod si ea in quoque animalium est uirtus qua praestat cetera uel pleraque, ut in leone impetus, in equo uelocitas, hominem porro ratione atque oratione excellere ceteris certum est, cur non tam in eloquentia quam in ratione uirtutem eius esse credamus, recteque hoc apud Ciceronem dixerit Crassus: est enim eloquentia una quaedam de summis uirtutibus,' et ipse Cicero sua persona cum ad Brutum in epistulis turn aliis etiam locis uirtutem earn appellet? 10. 'At prohoemium aliquando ac narrationem dicet malus homo et argumenta sic ut nihil sit in iis inquirendum.' Nam et latro pugnabit acriter, uirtus tamen erit fortitudo, et tormenta sine gemitu feret malus seruus, tolerantia tamen doloris laude sua non carebit. Multa fiunt eadem, sed aliter. Sufficiant igitur haec, quia de utilitate supra tractauimus. 2 1 . Materiam rhetorices quidam dixerunt esse orationem; qua in sententia ponitur apud Platonem Gorgias. Quae si ita accipitur ut sermo quacumque de re compositus dicatur oratio, non materia sed opus est, ut statuarii statua; nam et oratio efficitur arte sicut statua. Sin hac appellatione uerba ipsa significari putamus, nihil haec sine rerum substantia faciunt. Quidam argumenta persuasibilia; quae et ipsa in parte sunt operis et arte fiunt et materia egent. 2. Quidam ciuiles quaestiones; quorum opinio non qualitate sed modo errauit (est enim haec materia rhetorices, sed non sola). 3. Quidam, quia uirtus sit rhetorice, materiam eius totam uitam uocant. Alii, quia non

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omnium uirtutum materia sit tota uita, sed pleraeque earum uersentur in partibus, sicut iustitia fortitudo continentia propriis officiis et suo fine intelleguntur, rhetoricen quoque dicunt in una aliqua parte ponendam, eique locum in yOucr) negotialem adsignant, id est TrpayfxaTiKov. 4. Ego (neque id sine auctoribus) materiam esse rhetorices iudico omnes res quaecumque ei ad dicendum subiectae erunt. Nam Socrates apud Platonem dicere Gorgiae uidetur non in uerbis esse materiam sed in rebus, et in Phaedro palam non in iudiciis modo et contionibus sed in rebus etiam priuatis ac domesticis rhetoricen esse demonstrat; quo manifestum est hanc opinionem ipsius Platonis fuisse. 5. Et Cicero quodam loco materiam rhetorices uocat res quae subiectae sint ei, sed certas demum putat esse subiectas; alio uero de omnibus rebus oratori dicendum arbitratur, his quidem uerbis: 'quamquam uis oratoris professioque ipsa bene dicendi hoc suscipere ac polliceri uidetur, ut omni de re quaecumque sit proposita ornate ab eo copioseque dicatur.' 6. Atque adhuc alibi: 'uero enim oratori quae sunt in hominum uita, quandoquidem in ea uersatur orator atque ea est ei subiecta materies, omnia quaesita audita lecta disputata tractata agitata esse debent.' 7. Hanc autem quam nos materiam uocamus, id est res subiectas, quidam modo infinitam, modo non propriam rhetorices esse dixerunt, eamque artem circumcurrentem uocauerunt, quod in omni materia diceret. 8. Cum quibus mihi minima pugna est; nam de omni materia dicere earn fatentur, propriam habere materiam quia multiplicem habeat negant. Sed neque infinita est, etiamsi est multiplex (et aliae quoque artes minores habent multiplicem materiam, uelut architectonice— namque ea in omnibus quae sunt aedificio utilia uersatur—(9) et caelatura, quae auro argento aere ferro opera efficit; nam scalptura etiam lignum ebur marmor uitrum gemmas praeter ea quae supra dixi complectitur), (10) neque protinus non est materia rhetorices si in eadem uersatur et alius. Nam si quaeram quae sit materia statuarii, dicetur aes, si quaeram quae sit excusoris, id est fabricae eius quam Graeci x a ^ K € V T l K V v uocant, similiter aes esse respondeant; atqui plurimum statuis dififerunt uasa. 11. Nec medicina ideo non erit ars quia unctio et exercitatio cum palaestrica, ciborum uero qualitas etiam cum cocorum ei sit arte communis. 12. Quod uero de bono utili iusto disserere philosophiae officium esse dicunt, non obstat. Nam aim philosophum dicunt, hoc accipi uolunt uirum bonum. Quare igitur oratorem, quem a bono uiro non separo, in eadem materia uersari mirer? (13)—cum praesertim primo libro iam ostenderim philosophos omissam hanc ab oratoribus partem occupasse, quae rhetorices propria semper fiiisset, ut illi potius in nostra materia uersentur. Denique cum sit dialectices materia de rebus subieais disputare, sit autem dialectice oratio concisa, cur non eadem perpetuae quoque materia uideatur?

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14. Solet a qiiibusdam et illud opponi: omnium igitur artium peritus erit orator si de omnibus ei dicendum est. Possem hie Ciceronis respondere uerbis, apud quem hoc inuenio: 'mea quidem sententia nemo esse poterit omni laude cumulatus orator nisi erit omnium rerum magnarum atque artium scientiam consecutus.' Sed mihi satis est eius esse oratorem rei de qua dicet non inscium. 15. Neque enim omnis causas nouit, et debet posse de omnibus dicere. De quibus ergo dicet? De quibus didicit. Similiter de artibus quoque de quibus dicendum erit interim discet, et de quibus didicerit dicet. 16. Quid ergo? non faber de fabrica melius aut de musice musicus? Si nesciat orator quid sit de quo quaeratur, plane melius; nam et litigator rusticus inlitteratusque de causa sua melius quam orator qui nesciet quid in lite sit; sed accepta a musico, a fabro, sicut a litigatore, melius orator quam ipse qui docuerit. 17. Verum et faber, cum de fabrica, et musicus, cum de musica, si quid confirmationem desiderauerit, dicet; non erit quidem orator, sed faciet illud quasi orator, sicut, cum uulnus imperitus deligabit, non erit medicus, sed faciet ut medicus. 18. An huius modi res neque in laudem neque in deliberationem neque in iudicium ueniunt? Ergo cum de faciendo portu Ostiensi deliberatum est, non debuit dicere sententiam orator? Atqui opus erat ratione architectorum. 19. Liuores et tumores in corpore cruditatis an ueneni signa sint non tractat orator? At est id ex ratione medicinae. Circa mensuras et numeros non uersabitur? Dicamus has geometriae esse partes. Equidem omnia fere posse credo casu aliquo uenire in officium oratoris; quod si non accidet, non erunt ei subiecta. 20. Ita sic quoque recte diximus materiam rhetorices esse omnis res ad dicendum ei subiectas. Quod quidem probat etiam sermo communis; nam cum aliquid de quo dicamus accepimus, positam nobis esse materiam frequenter etiam praefatione testamur. 21. Gorgias quidem adeo rhetori de omnibus putauit esse dicendum ut se in auditoriis interrogari pateretur qua quisque de re uellet. Hermagoras quoque dicendo materiam esse in causa et in quaestionibus omnes res subiectas erat complexus. 22. Sed quaestiones si negat ad rhetoricen pertinere, dissentit a nobis. Si autem ad rhetoricen pertinent, ab hoc quoque adiuuamur; nihil est enim quod non in causam aut quaestionem cadat. 23. Aristoteles tris faciendo partes orationis, iudicialem deliberatiuam demonstratiuam, paene et ipse oratori subiecit omnia; nihil enim non in haec cadit. 24. Quaesitum a paucissimis et de instrumento est. Instrumentum uoco sine quo formari materia in id quod uelimus effici opus non possit. Verum hoc ego non artem credo egere, sed artificem. Neque enim scientia desiderat instrumentum, quae potest esse consummata etiam si nihil faciat, sed ille opifex, ut caelator caelum et pictor penicilla. Itaque haec in eum locum quo de oratore dicturi sum us differamus.

COMMENTARY The second book has no proem. The Institutio as a whole has one, and the MSS signal proems for Books 3, 4, and 6; editors rightly mark others for 5, 7, 8, and 12. Where such obvious markers are lacking, Q. may make the move to a new book clear at its start (9 cum sit proximo libro de tropis dictum, sequitur pertinens adfiguras... locus ipsa rei natura coniunctus superiori'; 11 'parata, sicut superiore libro continetur, facilitate scribendi'). 10 begins 'sed [!] haec eloquendi praecepta', referring back to Books 8-9. There is nothing like this in 2; but the transition is clearly marked at the end of Book 1. From 9. 4. 146 (cited below, p. 394, where ends of books are surveyed) it appears that that book was contained in a single papyrus roll (uolumen); and if that long book was, so doubtless were the others. But Q. clearly saw the Institutio as a structured whole; and he explains the structure to us at 1 pr. 21-2.

Chapter One Pupils are being sent to rhetores later than they should be (1), for rhetores think that their job is merely to teach declamation, while grammatici are intruding on the domain of rhetoric (2), with paradoxical results (3). The two professions should keep to their own limits: grammar has a vast territory already (4), and rhetoric should not give ground (5), even though some grammatici are quite capable of teaching the earlier stages of rhetoric (6). A child should move to the rhetor's school when he is capable of it (7); but that is bound up with the former question of the spheres of the two professions. In my view, a rhetors services are needed from the narrative and encomium exercises onwards (8). Further, thesis and commonplace, and all the other generalized exercises, were employed to train eloquence long ago, and rhetoric should hold on to them (9). What is more, the exercises I have specified, narrative, encomium, and commonplace, are entirely relevant to real-life oratory (10-12a). But all this does not mean I am recommending undue haste; for a while the pupil may properly be taught by both gramtnaticus and rhetor in tandem (12b—13). The chapter presents problems, but Q.'s own position is clear enough. He asserts that grammmatici are invading rhetorical territory, even to the extent of teaching suasoriae (for this, see n. on 2.1.2 sed... inrumpunt). But he is not

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so purist as to demand that they give up all interest in the preliminary rhetorical exercises, progymnasmata (we use this tenn for convenience, though Q. himself does not).1 For in 1. 9 he has assigned to them various 'dicendi primondia quibus aetatis nondum rhetorem capientis instituant [sc. grammatici]' (1), including the more elementary types of narrative. But of the more demanding progymnasmata he goes on to say (6): 'cetera maioris operis ac spiritus Latini rhetores relinquendo necessaria grammaticis fecerunt; Graeci magis operum suorum et onera et modum norunt': with the apparent implication that, while no rhetor, Greek-speaking or Latin-speaking, had ever claimed the earlier exercises, Latin teachers had (misguidedly) conceded the later ones to the grammaticus. It is these advanced progymnasmata that Q. wishes to claim for the rhetor, and these that he will discuss in 2. 4. At the end of 2. 1, however, a complication is introduced; for we are told of the custom of letting children do advanced grammatical and elementary rhetorical work at the same age, but under two different teachers, grammaticus and rhetor in tandem: a custom still found in Greek schools, but no longer in Latin. There must surely be some connection between this phenomenon and the discussion in §§1-3; 'quod adhuc optinent Graeci, a Latinis omissum est' (13) seems to recall 'Latinis quidem semper, sed etiam Graecis interim' (1), while the faint irony of 'fieri uidetur excusate' is reminiscent of 'quo nomine gratia quoque iis habenda est' (2). But Q. does not spell the connection out. If, then, we may put §§1-3 and 13 together, we obtain the following picture. In the past (there is no indication of dates), both in Greek and Latin schools, there had been some overlap at the transition between the schools of grammaticus and rhetor, easing an early transition from one to the other; and the rhetor accordingly had taught the bulk of the progymnasmata. But, at some point, the overlap fell out of use in all Latin and some Greek schools, and it became the fashion, again in all Latin and some Greek schools, to make the transition at a later age; accordingly, except in some Greek schools, the progymnasmata, elementary and more advanced alike, came to be taught by the grammaticus. Q.'s own view is that there should be a return to the former practice of both Greek and Latin schools: that is, an early transition, with overlap, and the teaching of the majority of the progymnasmata by the rhetor. Difficulties arise when we try to correlate what Q. says with the accounts given in two passages of Suetonius' De grammaticis et rhetoribus. In the first 1 Q. uses various phrases involving prim-: 2. 2. 1, 2. 4 . 1 and 3 6 , 2 . 5. 1; pritnae exercitationes in the third o f these passages might consciously represent the Greek word (which is found in the text o f Theon only at 61. 2 6 |p. 4 ] , though it presumably occurred in his title).

Chapter Three

37

(4. 4-6) Suetonius relates that 'ueteres grammatici' taught rhetoric as well as grammar; hence, when the professions divided out, 'posteriores... uel retinuisse uel instituisse [sc. feruntur]... quaedam genera meditationum ad eloquentiam praeparandam,.. .ne scilicet sicci omnino atque aridi pueri rhetoribus traderentur'. Suetonius gives four examples of such progymnasmata, but complains that the desidia and infantia of some grammatici has led to their being removed from the syllabus. Later on, discussing (past) rhetorical education at Rome, Suetonius asserts (25.4) that methods varied from teacher to teacher. He gives another, longer selection of preliminary exercises, and ends with the words 'donee sensim haec exoluerunt et ad controuersiam uentum est'. We need Suetonius' interpreters (Kaster ad loc., and earlier Clarke 165; contra, unconvincingly, Patillon, p. xii, with n. 18) to tell us that he means by this not that progymnasmata fell out of use altogether, but that they ceased to be taught by rhetores. And, putting the two passages together, we deduce that they had been taken over by the grammatici (or at least the less lazy among them). The chronology of these developments is unclear; but there is no substantial discrepancy between Q. and Suetonius (Kaster1 100, 271, 280). Indeed, Suetonius may be understood as providing valuable confirmation of the encroachment of which Q. complains so bitterly (Webb 296): as bitterly indeed as he elsewhere complains, and in similar language, about another vexed demarcation dispute, that between philosophy and rhetoric (see n.below on 1 suas partis omiserunt). Q. makes no systematic effort to elucidate the background to the development he deplores. Instead, he gives us, first, an impressionistic and tendentious sketch of the history of ypa/x/zart/oj (see on 4 appellation is): at the start it was a poor, 'slender' thing; later it came to embrace maximae artes. Secondly, he argues (9) from the origins of some of the exercises that they should be taught by the rhetor, for it was from them that the whole of rhetorical education took its rise. In both these passages, Q. is thinking not of Rome but of Greece. Kaster1 100 calls his account 'historically less well informed' than that of Suetonius; but, whether he is right or wrong in what he says, he is not here talking about the same things as the later writer. 1. 1 tenuit consuetudo... ut... traderentur: cf. 8. 5. 2 'consuetudo iam tenuit ut.. .uocaremus'. In both cases the meaning seems to be 'has taken hold, come to prevail' (note inualescit). OLD s.v. teneo, which ignores these passages, cites under 3d an interesting medical parallel from Celsus (5. 26. 34A 'si nondum plane tenet, sed adhuc incipit [sc. gangrena]'). The secondary sequence2 in both passages is striking (contrast 3 'accidit ut... facta sint'); 2 At Vegetius, Mil. 2. 8 . 1 'uetus. . . c o n s u e t u d o tenuit u t . . . promoueretur centurio', the modern custom has been described in what precedes.

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Commentary

cf. 2. 10. 2 'ita est celebrata ut... uideretur', and K-S ii. 179: this sequence is regular where e.g. din is present (cf. here inualescit, which may act like diu). We are most grateful to Harm Pinkster for help with this sentence. inualescit: cf. Plin. Ep. 6. 2. 5 'increbruit passim et inualuit consuetudo'. The tense of deserat (9) confirms that the process was still continuing, though presumably only in the Greek schools, the Latin ones having all completed it. Latinis... Graecis: for this criticism of Latin rhetores cf. 1. 9. 6, as cited above, p. 36. Here and in 13, Q. apparently means by Graeci Greek teachers domiciled in Rome (and Italy generally?); cf. below, p. 120. We do not know what Greek teachers elsewhere did. But one forms the impression from the progymnasmatists that the exercises were to be taught as a set by the same person, presumably the rhetor (cf. in particular the passage of Nicolaus cited below on 2. 4. 1 aliquid simile). Thus Theon (who is called a ao^tar^? by the Suda) appears to be writing his book qua rhetor,; indeed, he may have gone on to write a rhetorical techne (see n.on 2. 4. 21 tertia.. .pars). In his introduction (59. 1-11 [p. 1]) we find a quite different complaint, that, whereas the old rhetores (orators rather than teachers, as always in Theon) thought it essential to have a grounding in philosophy, nowadays they rushed into action without any training whatever, let alone progymnasmata (cf. Lucian's ironical remarks at Rh. Pr. 14). interim: as often in Q. = interdum (OLD s.v. 4). Cf. 12. 10. 37 'non tamen alto semper feremur; nam et litora interim sequenda sunt'; Sen. Dial. 4. 21. 8 'timeat interim, uereatur semper. See below on 2. 3. 3 interim. quam ratio postulat: in effect = 'than is (in my view) reasonable'. For similar phrases, see TLL s.v. postulo 268. 79-83, esp. Cic. Har. 3 'longius... quam sapientis hominis cogitata ratio postulasset'. There is some contrast with consuetudo (see also n. on 2. 8.6 rationem), more explicit in 9.4. 59 'aliud ratio, aliud consuetudo poscet'; for this contrast in Charisius and the Elder Pliny see J. W. Beck, Philologus, NF 2 (1889), 261-3. duplex causa: the ground given up by the rhetores and that taken over by the grammatici not being coextensive (see 2). quod et: et, omitted by A, is essential; for the same correlation see 2 'et illi... et h i . . . ' and 4-5 'et grammatice . . . et rhetorice...\ utique: a favourite word in Q., and one whose exact sense is often difficult to pin down. A good deal might be said about Q.'s usage, but we restrict ourselves here to discussing together the instances in Book 2. For the vexed 2.14. 1, see n. there. (i) With a negative: so (a) 2. 5. 5 (here 'absolutely not', rather than 'not necessarily': see Colson on 1.8. 14); (b) in the phrase 'non utique .. .sed': so

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2.15. 38 {'not what [i.e. all] I find, but what I approve of'), 2. 17. 39 ('rhetoric's aim is not to say true things always but to say probable things always'). (ii) Positively: 'invariably', 'without exception', as in 2. 13. 1 (following inmutabili necessitate, cf. 4. 2.24 'an sit utique narratio prohoemio subicienda'; 4. 2. 32 'quia nec breuiter utique nec dilucide semper sit utile exponere'; 4. 2. 129); cf. 2.4. 32 ('utique superfluous, but interim actually harmful'). (iii) In the present passage, we seem to have to choose between 'ours especially' and 'at any rate ours'; and as it has just been intimated that all Latin, but not all Greek, rhetores have sold the pass, we should plump for the latter. The choice is often difficult (so e.g. at 1. 8.6,6. 2. 26, 9. 3. 74, 11. 3. 132, 147), but 'especially' seems highly plausible or certain at e.g. 4. 1. 53, 4. 3. 9, 4. 4. 2, 8. 3. 23, 'at any rate' at e.g. 9. 2. 93. suas partis omiserunt: for Afifahl 82 the metaphor in partis is from the stage, 'role'. But nothing points to anything so specific. The image is rather of an area in contention between rivals, as in the passages we cite in the next paragraph; for omitto in a military context see OLD s.v. 3. The plural may give some sense of 'aspects of their jobs' (cf. 2. 3. 15, 2. 4. 1); but it is appropriate for a region also (OLD s.v. pars 12a). We come here to the first example of echoes in this chapter of what Q. (in the wake of Cicero) has to say of another group of invaders of allegedly rhetorical ground, the philosophers: 1 pr. 17 'desertam... partem [cf. below, §9] oratoriae artis . . . occupauerunt (sc. philosophi]'; 1. 10. 11 'haec... pars, quae ab oratoribus relicta a philosophis est occupata; 2. 21. 13 'cum., .iam ostenderim philosophos omissam hanc ab oratoribus partem occupasse\ For further instances see on 2 inrumpunt, 5 possessione, 9 deserat earn partem. 1. 2 dedamare.. .despidunt: rhetores, that is, thought their task was solely to give model (and display) declamations and teach the theory and practice (Colson on 1 pr. 18) of declamation, furthermore restricting themselves to suasoriae and controversiae (for materia(e) thus cf. 2. 10. 1, 3. 4. 16,11. 1. 48; and generally n. on 2. 21. 20 positam... testamur). They looked down on 'the rest' as too trivial for them (cf. 1 pr. 4 'contemnentes tamquam parua quae prius discimus studia, siue non ad suum pertinere ojficium opinati.. 5 (cf. 21) 'minora ilia'; 2. 5.4 'infra rhetoris officium'). The parenthesis should (so Corsi's translation) be taken as commenting not on 'idque.. .materias' alone (for then one would, problematically, expect cetera to refer to the genus demonstratiuum), but, however awkwardly, on the whole of the sentence so far. cetera then refers, as the context demands, to the pre-declamation exercises; 'nam.. .despiciunt' is taken up, as Corsi remarks, by 'si... non recusat' in §8. The restriction itself is odd; if it implies that Q. thought that declamation should be extended to practice for epideictic oratory, he does not

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seem to have made such an innovation himself. It would seem, rather, that he is doing no more than emphasizing the narrowness of the field of the rhetores. professione: perhaps with some lingering verbal force ('too trivial to be compatible with the claims they make for themselves'), as more clearly in 2. 5. 5 'promissionis eius atque promissi quo se magistrum eloquentiae pollicetur', where see n. excepisse: 'took up', 'took over' (TLL s.v. excipio 1252. 41-54). quo nomine: similar expressions with words connoting thanks are commonly found. They are extensions of such usages as Cic. Att. 1. 16. 16 'Antonio tuo nomine gratias egi'; so e.g. Sen. Ep. 83. 3 'hoc nomine ago gratias senectuti'. quoque: 'id est insuper, hoc est non solum his non est... irascendum sed ultro gratiae habendae sunt' (Badius). sed... inrumpunt: these words raise an intricate problem. The crucial background is that the prosopopoeia (or ethopoeia: for the varying terminology see e.g. Lausberg, §§820-9; a crisp statement at Raster1 102), 'speech in character', normally featured among the progymnasmata (for the Greek theorists, see below, p. 76; Suet. Gram. 4. 5 includes it under the name adlocutio). It was something that might be treated at different levels of sophistication. Thus Theon can mention it in connection with the early exercise Myth (75. 17-18 [p. 34)); and when he comes on to give it separate discussion (c. 8), he talks (118. 1 [p. 73]) of his precepts as an introduction (eiaayojyq), with the implication that it would be much more complicated at a more advanced stage. Q. appears to have thought it too difficult to be treated at all among the progymnasmata. He nowhere spells this out, but merely omits mention of it in 2. 4. Later, he discusses speeches in character under the topic of deliberative oratory and its declamatory form, the suasoria. He there says (3. 8. 49) that they are dijficillimae, for in them 'ad relicum suasoriae laborem accedit etiam personae difficultas'; that is, they involved taking the role of a given character, as opposed to merely acting as an anonymous adviser. On the same lines, he adds (52) that he (ego marking his unusual approach) has put prosopopoeia under suasoriae 'quia nullo alio ab his quam persona distat'. His main interest therefore is in the kind of prosopopoeia that involved advising. He is well aware (53) that there were other kinds, not involving advice, which were commonly set for exercises on mythical and historical subjects. One example, 'Priami uerba apud Achillem', is exactly the sort of thing we find in the Greek progymnasmatists (see Adamietz ad loc.). But even these types Q. does not seem to think appropriate at the progymnasmatic stage; in discussing prosopopoeia here and not in 2. 4, he implies that he does not think any form of it an elementary exercise (contra Russell on 3. 8. 50). Rather, he regards pros-

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which 3. 8.49 (cited above) suggests should attach itself to prosopopoeias, not to the nearer suasorias. But we can escape this objection'1 by taking the clause with both nouns, the former to be understood as alluding to prosopopoeia as a progymnasmatic exercise, which is what, as we have seen, it normally was. The grammatici are then said to be going beyond what Q. regards as their proper limits by making prosopopoeia a progymnasma, and, worse still, by going on into the sphere of suasoria.5 Q. would then be talking in the terms employed by the grammatici themselves, and giving no hint of his later discussion of prosopopoeia under the head of suasoria. But Dr Holford-Strevens may be right to remark that this view requires reading <et> usque ad. There is genuine doubt what Q. meant to say at this point, and we have therefore obelized. usque a d . . . inrumpunt: cf. 8 'si grammatices munus usque ad suasorias prorogatur'. usque ad must mean the same in both passages, that is (contra Spalding on 8) up to and including (the treatment of)': not the usual sense, but note 1. 7. 14 'usque ad Accium et ultra', 'up to (and including) the time of Accius, and beyond', 8. 3. 62 'usque ad aures', 'so far as to enter the ears' (but not the mind). onus dicendi: used (in the plural) at 11. 3. 136 of the physical arduousness of oratory. inrumpunt: cf. Cic. de Orat. 3. 108 'qui in nostrum patrimonium inruperunt'. Cicero is there talking of the philosophers' usurpation of loci communes; these were part of the rhetorical territory now claimed by the grammatici, so that the two demarcation disputes here overlap. 1. 3 aetas: Q.'s favourite abstract for person; cf. e.g. 2. 2.14 'infirmitas';2. 3.1 'mediocritas praeceptoris'; 2. 3. 10 'prima studia tenerosque profectus', 'elementary students' (similarly 2. 2. 3 'teneriores annos'). At least in the case of aetas, however, there is nothing very individual about his usage: see various passages in TLL s.v. II B. 2, esp. Cic. Clu. 13. But from the pen of a teacher it has a pedagogical ring: 'age-group'. altioribus: cf. 8. 3. 2 artes altiores. Here 'higher' rather than 'deeper', as subsidat shows. iam: A's order (iam altioribus) might suggest that iam is to be taken with the comparative (as in e.g. 2. 4. 33; TLL s.v. iam 125. 12-84). But it is purely temporal (as in Liv. 27. 39. 7 'inter mitiora iam transibant hominum ingenia'), positioned as in 4 'pleno iam satis alueo'. 4 More drastically, one might think o f reading 'ad suasorias usque et prosopopoeias'. 5 W e find it artificial to see in sttasoriae a 'reference. . . t o advanced exercises like "proposal for a law"' (Loeb ad loc.); its natural reference is, here as in §8, t o the familiar deliberative exercise found in the Elder Seneca and discussed by Q. from 3. 8. 10.

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debita: TLL s.v. debeo 103. 25-105. 23 gives a melange of uses of the participle; here more or less = 'worthy of'. scholar used of the schools of philosophers, rhetores and grammatici, but not of the primary school (ludus); see e.g. Bonner, Education, 56. subsidat: 'stay behind, stay put'; cf. Cic. Fam. 6. 8. 2 'consilium petis quid sim tibi auctor, in Siciliane subsidas an . . . proficiscare'. But the verb also hints at the resulting loss of motivation (cf. 3. 8. 60 'saepius subsidere . . . impetum dicendi'), and the prefix is felt (see above on altioribus). ita... sciat: the clear implication of this sardonic remark is that to speak a progymnasma was (in some sense) to declaim. Cf. above, p. xxiii n. 3. 1. 4 nos: emphatic. Q. lays down the law alike to the pushy grammatici and conniving rhetores sniped at in mittendus uidetur. modum: cf. 1. 9. 6 'Graeci magis operum suorum et onera et modum norunt'; so 'fines suos norit' below (note 10. 7.6 'habebunt modum et finem'). quam... uocauerunt: the information is not given without point, for Q. is going to draw attention to the root meaning of ypap,p,aTiKrj, so long outdated. litteraturam: a word (used in 2. 14. 3) that never quite established itself in this sense; see TLL s.w. grammatica 2173. 19-2174. 6 and litteratura 1531. 28-52. Raster's discussion of the whole problematic terminology may be consulted (Kaster1 89-93, on Suet. Gram. 4. 1-3). Note esp. Varro, L fr. 107 Goetz-Scholl 'ars grammatica quae a nobis litteratura dicitur' (also his fr. 108, cited below on appellationis) and Sen. Ep. 88. 20 'prima ilia, ut antiqui uocabant, litteratura'. fines suos: cf. Sen. Ep. 88. 3, cited on appellationis below, praesertim: with a participle as at e.g. 11. 2. 38 (add to TLL s.v. 865.63-71). ab hac... prouecta: cf. 2. 16. 18 'unde... iam prouecta sit orandi facultas'. appellationis: cf. Varro, L fr. 108 Goetz-Scholl 'ipso nomine profiteri se litteras clamat [sc. grammatice], unde etiam Latine litteratura dicitur'. Q., wishing to ait the profession down to size, chooses the narrowest possible interpretation of ypa/x/xara (the ambivalence could be maliciously exploited: see Kaster1 88-9). His account turns into an ahistorical (ibid. 99-100) chronological sequence the sort of distinction between meanings of the word ypamxaTiKr) that is found in Sextus, Adv. Gramm. 44-6: primi illi, by which Q. will intend the pioneers of ancient Greece, stayed with the root meaning at its slimmest; then there was a striking advance in scope. Compare (and contrast) Sen. Ep. 88. 3 'grammatice circa curam sermonis uersatur, et, si latius euagari uult, circa historias, iam ut longissime fines suos proferat, circa carmina'. paupertate: used of the limitations of the Latin language in 8. 3. 33 and 12. 10. 34; here of the scant pretensions of early grammar. Its slender means

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(cf. tenuis below; tenuitas could be made a complaint even against the developed profession, as 1. 4. 5 shows) are played off against later riches (note copiosam below). intra quam...constitere: 'to which they confined themselves'; cf. 1. 5. 7, 3. 1. 1, 3. 4. 13; OLD s.v. consisto 3c, citing Gels. 1 pr. 66 ne isti quidem ipsi intra suam professionem consistere ullo modo possunt'; add Decl. min. 279. 14 'maledictum.. .quod intra uerba constitit'. For the perfect in -ere, see E. B. Lease, CR 13 (1899), 251-3; note the clausula -tere prouecta. adsumptis: with the common implication of external aid (note 7. 4. 7 'adsumptis extrinsecus auxiliis'). For this verb with uires see e.g. Ov. Met. 13. 886. historicorum criticorumque: so A; B has poetarum historicorunique, though poetarum has been added above the line by a second hand which by no means always purveys the truth. We shall argue for the deletion of the genitives, and start by expounding the resulting sentence (with whose juxtaposed adverbial phrases we may compare 2. 6. 5 'iam suis uiribus sine adminiculo progredi'). In the absence of the genitives it falls to 'cum... amplexa sit' to add flesh to what is put only vaguely in 'tenuis.. .fluit'. The river of ypapuxaTiK-q as it trickles from its source is but slight (Sen. Oed. 42 'tenuis Ismenos fluit', Lact. Inst. 3. 1. 6 'de tenui fbnte admodum exilis emanat [sc. oratio]'): this is the 'poor' phase at which the art is concerned only with letters in the narrowest sense, reading and writing. Then new strength is taken on, and the river now flows brimming between its banks (Ov. Met. 1. 343 'plenos capit alueus amnis'; also 9. 4. 7 'totis uiribus fluit'): the picture is attractive, but satis reminds us that the stream has been flooding over recently and needs embankments (observe 9. 4. 118 'satis plena uel nimium'). The 'new strength' is first provided by the ratio reete loquendi (cf. 1. 4. 1-2), no mean thing in any case (for alioqui thus cf. 2. 15. 9; OLD s.v. 2a). But more is to come: the greatest arts, particularly of course poetry (1.4. 2 again), but also 'ceteris artibus quibus instituendos priusquam rhetori tradantur pueros existimo' (1. 10. 1), music and 'geometry'. Q., then, has been alluding to what the grammaticus professes to teach. That does not include history (see our next paragraph), or prose literature in general,6 which are after all not 'arts' as poetry is; grammatici would need to study them to help them with their enarratio poetarum, but they did not teach them (so Colson on Q. 1. 4. 4 'nec poetas legisse satis est [sc. grammaticis]: excutiendum omne scriptorum genus, non propter historias modo, sed uerba'; Bonner, Education, 218); this is how we should understand Dionysius Thrax' definition of 0 However, for papyrus evidence o f reading o f Isocrates' Cyprian orations in the school o f the grammaticus, see Cribiore 2 0 3 - 4 .

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ypa^aTiKr/ as 'an cfjcneipia for the most part of what is said in poets and ovyypa€is' (Sextus, Adv. Gramm. 57; cf. Varro fr. 107 Goetz-Schiill, where ars grammatica is defined as 'scientia... <eorum> quae a poetis historicis oratoribusque dicuntur'), and perhaps also Isid. Etym. 1.41.2 'haec disciplina [sc. historia] ad grammaticam pertinet, quia quidquid dignum memoria est litteris mandatur' (see generally Nicolai 186-97). We may now return to the vexed genitives. They are odd in themselves: 'assumptis historicorum criticorumque uiribus' (to take one version) would have to mean 'with strength added by the introduction of enarratio historiae and iudicium into the syllabus'. But they present other grave problems, long ago pointed out by Kiderlin3 200-1. It would seem from the MS evidence that we could at least be sure of historicorum, but oddly it is this word that presents the main difficulty. What has history to do with the teaching of the grammaticus? The historiae that concerned him were not 'history', but something much more like 'background information' (see 1. 2. 14, 1. 4.4 and 1. 8. 18-20, with Colson's n.on the last passage; Sen. Ep. 88. 3, cited above on appellationis; Juv. 7. 231), of course including some history, but by no means restricted to it. It is in this context that enarratio poetarum can be called historice (1. 9. 1); but historicorum could not allude to this. The only way in which what we mean by history would come even into the over-inflated grammatical syllabus of which Q. has been complaining is the teaching of historica narratio (2. 4. 2, where Q. claims it back for the rhetor). And when, in 2. 5. 1, Q. recommends enarratio of history (and oratory) by the rhetor; we are not given the impression that this is something that has been usurped by grammatici from rhetores; rather it sounds like something hitherto little taught by anyone, at least in Latin schools. But even granting that grammatici taught history, why is there no mention, in particular, of oratory (see Varro cited above)? For historicus cannot, like avyypaevs, mean 'writer of prose'. In this light, oratorum, t's correction of criticorum (on which he stumbled only because the first hand had written the nonsensical oriticorum) becomes attractive; it is certainly more called for than is criticorum.7 If any genitives were desirable here, we might perhaps settle for the composite reading poetarum historicorum oratorum (see Winterbottom6 69; Q.'s usage seems not to allow the addition of -que to the third element, though Cicero's would): precisely the words that a learned glossator might have imported from Varro (Doreen Innes acutely remarks that all three are alluded to in 3. 8.49, arguably the source of the possible gloss in 2). But any genitives at all 7 KpiriKTf was certainly part o f the remit o f a grammaticus: Brink on Hor. Ep. 2. 1. 51 (pp. 4 1 4 - 1 9 ) ; but that could not make criticorum (a word Q. does not use elsewhere) a proper companion for historicorum here.

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intrude on and muddy a sentence that is perfectly formed already, and mention of history and oratory in this context of the grammatical syllabus is misguided. pleno iam satis alueo: the word-order (for which cf. 11. 3. 55 'et longus et plenus et clarus satis spiritus') is mannered, perhaps to bring out the contrast with tenuis, perhaps because of a poetic allusion (Donald Russell, pointing to the glyconic). 1. 5 et rhetorice... non detrectet: picking up 'et grammatice... norit' (4). For non with a jussive subj., see e.g. 2. 16. 6 'non fabricetur militi gladius' (K-S i. 192). But if it were not for et...et one would expect nec rhetorice (K-S i. 192-3). cui nomen . . . dedit: cf. Cic. Orat. 61 'sed et Graece ab eloquendo prjraip et Latine eloquens dictus est'. Q. again argues from etymology. While ypannariKir) has gone far beyond the implications of its 'poor' name, rhetoric, whose name is wide to start with, has weakened itself by shirking its duties, uis: = 8vvap.is (2. 15. 3 'uim dico 8vvap.iv); OLD s.v. uis 14b. officia sua non detrectet: so 12. 7. 3 'non detractauerunt hanc officii partem'; Dig. 26. 7. 39. 6 'non uidetur leuis culpa contra iuris auctoritatem mandatum tutelae officium detrectare'. opere cedit: cf. 10. 1. 35 'optima sui operis parte cesserunt', where Peterson cites Cic. Mil. 75 'nisi sibi hortorum possessione cessissent'. possessione: cf. 12. 2. 5, Cic. de Orat. 3. 108 'de nostra possessione depuls? (both concerning invasion by philosophy). depulsa est: with abl. as in e.g. 2. 17. 29; K-S i. 366. 1. 6 haec quoque: everything up to and including suasoriae. We may compare the early practice in Rome by which grammatici taught rhetoric in addition (above, p. 37): Suet. Gram. 4. 4 (with Kaster's n., adding Greek evidence). Note also later cases: Gramm. 7. 2 (Antonius Gnipho), 10. 2 (Ateius Philologus, 'inter grammaticos rhetorem, inter rhetores grammaticum'); Nicolai 197-215. sed cum...non suo: i.e. this does not justify extension of the fines of ypapLpaTiKr}. 1. 7 nos porro quaerimus... uideatur: Q. turns to a new quaestio (for porro cf. n. on the word in 2. 3. 5), which turns out to be intimately linked with the previous one. The emphatic nos reminds us of his personal view: however capable some grammatici may be (6), grammaticus and rhetor have their own sharply distinguished spheres of activity, and so the age of transition needs to be determined. rhetorice: even more strikingly personalized in 2. 17. 26.

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non i d . . . poterit: the same principle is invoked at 12. 6. 1 (cf. also Decl mai. 3. 5 'sed neque te militaris aetas fefellit, cuius certissima mensura est posse fortiter facere...). The epigrammatic cum poterit is elaborated at the start of the next chapter. For Roman practice, see 2. 2. 3 'adulti fere pueri ad hos praeceptores transfemntur' (with n.); Bonner, Education, 137 (by the age of fifteen; Cicero's son was with a rhetor at eleven or twelve: Q. fr. 3. 3. 4). finiri: 'specified'; OLDs.v.finio 5a, citing Ov. Fast. 5.65-6 'finitaque certis | legibus est aetas unde petatur honor'. 1. 8 usque ad suasorias: see 2 'sed.. .inmmpunt', with n. Were it not for that passage, one would here take usque exclusively and assume that the grammatici had usurped all the progymnasmata but stopped short of declamation proper. Gesner rightly rejected the gloss that follows in A: 'quae sunt apud rhetorem materiae inter rudimenta dicendi.' The fact is correct enough (see Tac. Dial. 35. 4, cited in the n. just mentioned). at: Q.'s practice (see Bonnell, Lexicon, s.v. s/V/3) suggests that B is wrong to omit the particle. At 2. 6. 6, however, where quodsi and si are not parallel, A seems wrong to add at. operis sui: Q. continues to insist on the correct boundary between rhetor and grammaticus. a narrationibus statim e t . . . opusculis: cf. 1.6. 25 'a primis statim positionibus'; the usage is not properly covered in OLD s.v. (2). Q. mentions the two exercises with which he begins the course outlined in ch. 4, narrative and encomium (no doubt ignoring anaskeue and kataskeue as being for him subordinate to narrative (2. 4. 18). opusculis: the diminutive (cf., perhaps, narratiunculasin 1. 9. 6) signals the elementary nature of these exercises. This word is not found elsewhere in Q. 1. 9 antiquis: the reference of antiqui and antiquitas in Q. must always depend on the context. Note e.g. 2. 5. 21 (Gracchi, Cato); 3. 6.62 (old writers of artes); 9. 3. 16 (Terence). Peterson on 10. 1. 40 remarks: 'In general he uses veteres or antiqui in contradistinction to those who were to him novi, i.e. the writers of the post-Augustan period: including in the former Cicero himself as well as his predecessors.' But no more precise rule can be given; and it is important for the understanding of the present passage that Q. also uses antiqui of Greeks; cf. e.g. 3. 4. 1 (Aristotle), ad augendam eloquentiam: so 1. 11. 13. genus exercitationis: so 2.4. 26 and 42, 10. 5.4, 10.6. 5, 11. 3. 29; Petr. 2. 5. thesis: Q. discusses the exercise below in 2. 4. 24-5, where see nn. Cf. 12. 2. 25 'Peripatetici studio... se quodam oratorio iactant; nam thesis dicere exercitationis gratia fere est ab iis institutum'. This ensures that the reference (like that of ueteres in 2. 4. 41) is to the Greek past (a possibility raised but not

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refuted by Clarice 160). For Peripatetic interest in thesis, see e.g. Kroll on Cic. Orat. 46, citing esp. D.L. 5. 3 (Aristotle), Theon 69. 1-3 (p. 13): 'one may take examples of exercise in theses from Aristotle and Theophrastus; there are many books of theirs so entitled.' communes locos: see 2. 4. 27-32. The reference is again to Greece: see 3. 1. 12 (treated by Protagoras and Gorgias), with Adamietz's n.; the information derives from Aristotle (Cic. Brut. 46). et cetera: Halm thought of deleting. The proposal is tempting, for it is really only these two exercises that could strictly be said always to be untrammelled by 'circumstances and persons', especially persons (for a particular problem with the exercise involving proposal of a law, see n.on 2. 4. 33 legum laus et uituperatio). But it is clear from 2. 4. 36 that Q. did in fact regard progymnasmata as in principle non-particular, cetera therefore will mean 'the rest of the progymnasmata, and 'citra... continentur' will have to refer rather loosely to exercises not based on cases (vnoOeoeis), real or declamatory. Further, we know from 2.4.41 (where see n.) that Q. thought that 'in general' {fere) the exercises discussed in ch. 4 were those used by the ueteresbefore (he seems to say) the introduction of declamation 'proper' in the late fourth century BC, and he is therefore consistent in implying in our passage that the exercises were all very old (for the development of the syllabus, see below, pp. 75-6). We should not take it that cetera is not meant to include narrative and encomium just because they have been mentioned already in 8. A quite separate phase of the argument starts at an (see the summary above, p. 35): though it is true that in 'ex his de quibus supra dixi' (10) Q. will lump together the exercises he has named in both sections. citra complexum... continentur: cf. 2.4. 36, 3. 5. 7, and esp. 5. 10. 53 'citra complexum personarum ceterorumque ex quibus fit causa', which ensures that in our passage the relative clause is to be taken with rerum personarumque, not with cetera. Q. means the 7T€pioTaois, the particular circumstances that distinguished v-rroQeais from deois (3. 5. 5, 7). For citra = sine (not well served by OLD) cf. e.g. 2. 16. 13, 12. 6. 4 (parallel to sine); TLL s.v. 1204. 33-1205. 50. uerae fictaeque controuersiae: from 10. 2. 12 and many other passages (see Tac. Dial 31. 1 with Gudeman ad loc.) it is clear that the contrast is between actual cases, where the materia was uera ('real'), and declamations, where it was ficta, adsimilata, and the like. Thus a ficta controuersia was merely scholastic (cf. 7. 3.30), while a uera controuersia was an actual legal case (note 7. 1.64 'singulas lites controuersiasque'). There might, however, be scholastic debate of a uera controuersia (6. 4. 21, cf. 10. 5. 20). See further on 2. 10. 2 ueritati; also 2.4. 36 'uero fictoque certamine [see below on 11 certaminibus]'.

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continentur: 'are based on', as in e.g. 3. 5. 11 'eas Ocoeis...quae personis causisque contineantur'; Bonnell, Lexicon, s.v. contineo 8. ex quo... solam: summing up the argument of 9: rhetoric should hold on to the territory it first carved out for itself, pal am est: cf. 11. 3. 168; OLD s.v. palam 2b. deserat earn partem: cf. 1 pr. 17 cited on p. 39, reminding us again of the frontier dispute with philosophy. quam et primam habuit et diu solam: see 2. 4. 41 and nn. Q. envisages Greek rhetorical education as arising from sophistic and philosophical exercises, surviving as progymnasmata, on which (from the time of Demetrius of Phaleron) declamation 'proper' supervened. No doubt this was elaborated in his lost De causis corruptae eloquentiae (alluded to in 2.4. 42 'alio... libro', on which see n.). R. Giingerich, AAHG 26 (1973), 192 conjectured 'prima... sola'. The basis of his argument is that 'sicher kann er [der Relativsatz quam... solam) so nicht auf die historische Entwicklung der Rhetorik gehen, die Quintilian gut kennt'; but Q. is talking not of the history of rhetoric but of the history of rhetores. 1. 10 quid autem... incidat: Q. turns to another phase of his argument. The exercises specified above (i.e. in 8-9), narrative, encomium, thesis, and commonplace, are entirely relevant to the crucial, forensic aspect of the orator's activity. This point is established in 10-11, where the exercises are taken in the same order, though thesis is oddly omitted (not to mention cetera). Q. naturally comes back to the same point later when discussing all the progymnasmata in 2. 4. We may compare Theon, who in his first chapter goes through the exercises commenting on their utility in the real world; typically he says (of narrative and myth): 'everything we do in forensic U7rode acts [i.e. particular as opposed to general questions] is here too' (60. 9-10 [p. 2]). Thus, of thesis (above, §9), Theon remarks that it only needs to be filled out with circumstances to become hypothesis (61. 6-13 [p. 3]), and so relevant to oratory. cum... turn certe: only (it seems) here and in seven passages of Cicero, almost all late. As e.g. Brut. 232 'cum omnibus turn certe mihi notissimae' shows, the sense of certe is 'in particular'. in...genus incidat: cf. (more technically) 3. 4. 15 'species in haec tria incident genera'. qua in parte... uel plurimum: 'in this department [i.e. narratio] indeed perhaps the greatest importance lies.' Cf. 7. 7. 8 'plurimum tamen est in hoc, utrum...', 11. 2. 1 'estque in ea non dubie plurimum'; and see n. on 2. 7. 2 plurimum. For the importance of narratio, see Cic. Part. 31 'narratio est rerum explicatio et quaedam quasi sedes et fundamentum constituendae fidei'.

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1.11 certaminibus: as usual in Q. of real' contests in the courts (e.g. 5.12.22); cf. Gk. ayaWs. communes loci... uersantur: commonplaces are 'of obvious utility' as exercises, according to Theon 60. 19-22 (p. 2), in view of the way orators exploit them (see nn.on 2. 4. 22-3, 27). For the two types cf. 2. 4. 22 'de iis loquor quibus citra personas in ipsa uitia moris est perorare', 2.4. 27 'locos... quales sunt de testibus.. derecti: derigo 'was probably the only genuine ancient form' (Munro on Lucr. 6. 823; cf. 711 s.v. dirigo (!) 1233. 33-46). In the MSS of Q., A (like the related b) shows a decided preference for di-, perhaps a reflection of its generally interpolated nature; the instance at 2. 6. 1 (where A and B agree on di-) is probably corrupt (see n.). quales legimus a Cicerone compositos: the clause would be an improbable way of referring to loci communes in Cicero's published speeches. It might mean 'read in a collection by Cicero' (parallel to the lost work of Hortensius mentioned below); cf. perhaps 5. 7. 6 'quod... et permixtum defensioni legimus in orationibus plurimis et separatim editum'. This would involve the assumption that Q. had himself read a book of Ciceronian loci in uitia that do not survive and of which there is no other mention (unless, as Valla thought, in Parad. 5 'genus exercitationum earum quibus uti consueui cum ea quae dicuntur in scholis OeTixtos ad nostrum hoc oratorium transfero dicendi genus'); it is true that Cicero compiled a volume of (philosophical) proems (Att. 16. 6. 4), but hardly for publication. We favour Spalding's alternative view that Q. means: 'read (i.e. in another author) to have been composed by Cicero.' Compare in that case 10. 5. 12 'turn loci communes, quos etiam scriptos ab oratoribus scimus' (not, then, read by Q.). quaestiones generaliter tractantur: cf. 2. 4. 22 'illo generali tractatu', 3. 5. 9 'hae [sc. quaestiones]... quas infinitas uoco et generales appellantur'; 5. 7. 35 'generalem alterum [sc. tractatum]... specialem alterum Quinto quoque Hortensio: there is no other reference to this work of his (ORF 311), though this type of compilation is referred to in 2. 4. 27 and 10. 5. 12 (just cited). Subtle interpretations have been suggested to explain quoque; but Q. is merely saying that Hortensius, as well as his great rival, concerned himself with the publication of loci. ut... testes: such questions are referred to later at 2. 4. 27, 3. 5. 10, 5. 13. 57; Theon 69. 14-17 (cf. 4) (p. 13) classifies them as SeriKa K€d\aia. As to witnesses in particular, the whole chapter 5. 7 is relevant (esp. 3-4); see also Cic. de Orat. 2. 118 (with the context; also 135), Part. 49 'de toto genere testium quam id sit infirmum saepe dicendum est'; further refs. in L-P on Cic. de Orat. 2. 116. paruis: the passage (with 2. 4. 27) should be added to TLL s.v. parvus 565. 29.

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medullis: a (not strictly paralleled) vivid way of stressing the crucial part played by these loci; cf. 2. 4. 22 (in the same context) 'ex mediis sunt iudiciis', Cic. de Orat. 2. 318 'ex ipsis uisceribus causae' (with L-P ad loc.). With the alliterative phrase cf. esp. Ov. Met. 10. 492 'mediaque manente medulla' (the play may be felt, wrongly, to be etymological). 1. 12 arma: cf. 12. 5.1 'haec arma habere ad man urn'; and see n. on 2. 16. 10 arma facundiae. quodam modo: as often softening the metaphor. praeparanda: the weapons are not just to be 'in promptu habenda' (7. 10. 14; cf. 8 pr. 28) but always in preparation, 'on the whetstone*. utaris: utare (A) would be a form unparalleled in Q.: see E. R. Lease, CR 13 (1899), 253, and cf. 11. 3. 14. putabit: like putabo in 5. 12. 19 ('I shan't bring myself to believe'), statuam: for Q.'s rich use of imagery from statuary, see Afifahl 54-6 (in our book see esp. 2. 3. 6, 2. 13. 8-10); wider illustration of artistic analog)' in J. Brzoska, De can one decern oratorum Atticorum quaestiones (diss. Breslau, 1883), 81-101. Valla noted: 'de statua metallica loquitur quod opus fusorium est, non sculptile.' fundentur: 'are being cast'; cf. 7 pr. 2 'neque enim quamquam fiisis omnibus membris statua sit nisi conlocetur'. festinationem: as often of undue haste (so e.g. 1.4. 22; also 2. 4. 9 festinet), here in wishing the rhetor to take over a narrationibus statim (8). calumnietur: 'misrepresent'. For the construction with sic... tam quam cf. 2. 3. 10 'a quibusdam sic accipi potest tamquam...'; cf. also 9. 4. 53 'ideoque reprehenditur.. .tamquam... alliget'; K-S ii. 456. traditus: tradendus A (no doubt affected by abducendum). It is true that in 2. 2. 1 Q. speaks of the handing over of the child. But that section does not follow on 2. 1. 13 chronologically; it merely recapitulates the conclusions of 2. 1. And traditus has special point: given that a boy has been handed over to the rhetor; the question still remains whether he is at once to be taken away from the grammaticus. abducendum: cf. Cic. de Orat. 2. 40 'hos a te discipulos abducerem'. 1. 13 tempora sua: cf. (to some extent) 2. 4. 17 'erit suum parandae facilitati tempus'. binis: 'pro duobus' (Valla); but the two teachers are thought of as working as a pair (OLD s.v. bini 2a; H-Sz 212). quod... omissum est: the reference here to the difference between the practice of Latin and Greek schools seems to look back closurally to the first section of the chapter, and to expand on the information given there: see above, p. 36. omissum est picks up semper (as well as omiserunt) in 1; and

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Commentary

in view of interim there, adhuc optinent must be read to imply 'still [to a large extent] maintain'. fieri... excusate: cf. Plin. Ep. 9. 21. 3 'quod... excusatius facies'. Spalding asked (hypercritically) 'potestne dici fieri aliquid, cum omittitur?' but cf. 2. 3. 4, where 'idque interim fieri' has a similar negative reference. uidetur: used, as at the end of 3, to mark a widely held view of which Q. disapproves. The excuse, which he regards as lame, is that others (i.e. the grammatici) have taken over what the rhetores were doing when they were operating in parallel with the grammatici. One naturally assumes that this labor was the task of teaching the more advanced progymnasmata.

Chapter Two A boy, then, should be sent to the school of the rhetor when he is mature enough to cope with the first progymnasmata taught there (1). In choosing a teacher, it is essential to be sure of his character and his ability to impose his authority: something that is particularly important when pupils are at this age (2-4a). He must be like a father, firm but not grim, praising where praise is due, correcting kindly, and giving speeches as examplars (4b-8). In class, only older pupils should be allowed to applaud each other's efforts, and that with restraint. Students should build up judgement by paying careful attention to what the teacher approves (9-11). Current practices are harmful (12). The teacher should expect an attentive hearing for his own speeches, and he should watch how his pupils react (13). Boys and youths should not be seated together, and (of course) there must be no kind of immoral behaviour (14-15). In this chapter Q. writes with his customary high seriousness of the character to be looked for in choosing a rhetor. He would have approved of, and may have inspired, the advice given by his old pupil Pliny to Corellia Hispulla: 'iam circumspiciendus rhetor Latinus, cuius scholae seueritas, pudor, in primis castitas constet' (Ep. 3. 3. 3; see also 2. 18, 4. 13. 3-11). The commentary will provide parallels from Quintilian himself and from the discussion in ps.Plutarch's De liberis educandis (Plu. Moralia 1 A-14 C, henceforward in this chapter '[Plu.]'). For parallels in the field of medicine see Hp. Medic, (ii. 31012 Loeb); ps.-Soranus (Rose, Anecdota Graeca, ii. 245): 'Perspiciamus autem qualem oporteat esse medicum. Sit ergo moribus clemens et modestus cum debita honestate, nec desit ei sanctitas, nec sit superbus . . . Sit etiam modestus moribus, ut utraeque res conueniant sibi simul, quantum possibile est, et artis perfectio et bonitas morum'; cf. 2. 3. 12. For the problems (caused both by

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pupils and teachers) to which Q. is reacting, see esp. Petr. 3. 2-4, Sen. Ep. 88. 2 'professores turpissimos', Tac. Dial. 29. 3-4 (all passages where bias should be allowed for); Bonner, Education, 104-6; and generally Winterbottom5 317-34. 2. 1 diximus: Q. alludes to his argument in 2. 1 (to which see our introduction) that rhetores should teach the bulk of the progymnasmata, starting as soon as a pupil is ready to cope with them. 2. 2 libro priore: 1. 2. 5 'praeceptorem eligere sanctissimum quemque, cuius rei praecipua prudentibus cura est,... licet' (cf. 1. 3. 17). It was vital to avoid such a man as Q. Remmius Palaemon, who was, according to Suet. Gram. 23. 2, 'infamis omnibus uitiis, palamque et Tiberio et mox Claudio praedicantibus nemini minus institutionem puerorum uel iuuenum committendam' (for the possibility that he taught Q., see Kaster1 230). aetas ipsa: cf. Plin. Ep. 3. 3. 4: 'adulescenti [a handsome one].. .cui in hoc lubrico aetatis non praeceptor modo sed custos etiam rectorque quaerendus est'; [Plu.] 12 B for the possible miscreancies. Q. talks interestingly of the physical vulnerability of adolescence in 11.3. 28-9. 2. 3 adulti fere pueri... iuuenes: for their arrival as pueri, cf. Suet. Gram. 4. 5. Isidore (Etym. 11. 2. 3) was to make pueritia last 'usque ad quartumdecimum annum', which ties in well enough with the normal age of transition to the rhetor (see n.on 2. 1. 7 non id... poterit); cf. Gaius, Inst. 1. 196: those who define puberty by age 'eum puberem esse existimant '. iuuenes etiam facti implies that one did not become a iuuenis all at once, but grew into the part. As boys might not leave school till they were eighteen (the unsupported assertion of Bonner, Education, 137), there was an awkward age-range (see 2. 4. 4-5 for the different requirements of pueri and adulta aetas; Sen. Con. 3 pr. 15 'pueri fere aut iuuenes scholas frequentant'; Tac. Dial. 33. 2 'iuuenes iam et forum ingressuri' being trained at school), granted that a single room had to do for them all (see below, on 14 pueros adulescentibus permixtos sedere). It is thus only an approximation when Q. says in 10. 5. 1 that his first book is devoted to pueri, the second to robusti (for whom see below on 14 infirmitas). Q. does not in these chapters distinguish sharply between adulescens and iuuenis, and he would no doubt have been hard put to it to define the terms by age. Nor is he unusual in this respect: note e.g. the censorial edict cited in Suet. Rhet. 25. 2 '...ad quos iuuentus in ludum conueniat;... ibi homines adulescentulos dies totos desidere'; and generally B. Axelson, Melanges...

Commentary

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offerts a Jules Marouzeau (Paris, 1948), 7-17; P. K. Marshall, CPh 58 (1963), 143-9 at 145. perseuerant: 'continue'; OLD s.v. perseuero 4a. maior: than with younger children; [Plu.] 12 B agrees: Se'ov... nXeiio TOJV fJL€ipCLKlU)V 7TOlflodcLl T7]V €l)AdfietCLV KO.I (f>vX(lKr)V rj T(x)V nOLlSlDV. teneriores annos: another abstract (n. on 2. 1.3 aetas); cf. 1. 10. 34 teneris aetatibus. iniuria: TLL s.v. 1670. 67-1671. 15 (with examples mostly concerning sexual assault on women); 11. 1. 84 (cf. 53). sanctitas docentis: cf. 1. 2. 5 'praeceptorem... sanctissimum', taking the place of the sanctus parens of Juv. 7. 209 (cited on 4 sumat... parentis... animum). ferociores: probably sc. annos. Cf. Sal. Cat. 38. 1 'adulescentes... quibus aetas animusque ferox erat', and esp. Cic. Sen. 33 'infirmitas puerorum et ferocitas iuuenum'; Isid. Diff. 1. 213 'ferox iuuentus dicitur'. The quality ('high spirits') is not in itself bad, but can lead to bad. grauitas: the attribute of the amicus recommended for a child in 1. 2. 5. 2. 4 sat: the shorter form is found (according to PHI) 15 times in Q., always with following est? of the 113 cases of satis, thirty precede est. summam... abstinentiam: cf. Cic. Att. 5. 9. 1 'summa modestia et summa abstinentia' (where Shackleton Bailey translates 'propriety'), suam (A) is tempting, but quoque sufficiently underlines the point: the teacher must control both himself and his pupils. Q. continues (as with licentia in 3) to think especially of sexual misconduct. disciplinae seueritate: so Tac. Dial. 29. 4 (cf. 28. 3 'seueritate ac disciplina'); cf. 1. 2. 5 'eligere... disciplinam quae maxime seuera fuerit licet'. ad se: to be taken with conuenientium. The verb is again used of going to school at 2. 9. 2. adstrinxerit: 'tightly restrain'; cf. Cic. Brut. 40 'disciplina Lacaedaemoniorum astricta legibus', Att. 10. 6. 2 'uellem suscepisses iuuenem regendum; pater enim nimis indulgens quicquid ego astrinxi relaxat'; V. Max. 2. 10. 8 'astricti continentia mores'. sumat... parentis... animum: cf. Hor. Ep. 2. 2. 110 'cum tabulis animum censoris sumet honesti'; rather differently at 9. 2. 80 ('put oneself in the position of'). The comparison is crucial in a society where the father's responsibilities for education were so embedded in tradition (Bonner, Education, 10-19; note 1. 1. 1 'igitur nato filio pater spem de illo primum quam optimam capiat'); if a child was not kept at home to be taught (and Q. needed 8

Cf. Ferri on [Sen.] Oct. 4 4 7 for the practice o f Senecan tragedy.

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to argue this case in 1. 2), it was essential to find a teacher who would be as careful of his welfare as the father, and fit to 'take over from him' (OLD s.v. succedo 5b). He should, indeed, be 'nobis (fathers, pupils, or both?] familiariter amicus' (1. 2. 15). And children should reciprocate: 'praeceptores suos .. .anient et parentes esse non quidem corporum sed mentium credant' (2. 9. 1; also 8 below). Hence Juvenal's well-known 'qui praeceptorem sancti uoluere parentis | esse loco' (7. 209-10, with Mayor's n.; cf. 239 [of the grammaticus] 'pater ipsius coetirs'). For parallels in Libanius, see Cribiore 113-14. A. Kappelmacher, 'Studia Juvenaliana', Dissertationes philologicae Vindobonenses, 7 (1903), ch. 3 thought that Juvenal might have been a pupil of Q.'s; more sceptically, Colson, p. xv with n.6. Q. shows every sign of living up to his own precept; see e.g. 7. 3. 30 and 12. 11.5, both cited on 2. 12. 12 bonae mentis iuuenibus. 2. 5 non austeritas eius tristis: cf. Sen. Dial. 3. 20. 2 'tantumque abest... quantum.. .ab austeritate tristitia, a seueritate crudelitas'; Q. 12. 10. 80 (stylistic) 'seuera non tristia,.. .iucunda non dissoluta\ The noun is apparently not elsewhere used of the strictness of a teacher (of paedagogi once in Ambrose: see TLL s.v. 1557. 53); but for the adj. note Cic. Orationum deperditarum fragmenta, fr. xiv. 20 Scholl (p. 447) 'Quid arm hoc homine nobis tam tristi ac seuero? Non possirnt hi mores ferre hunc tam austerum et tam uehementem magistruni (of Clodius, represented as criticizing the morals of April visitors to Baiae). austeritas here is much like grauitas in §3 (Cic. Pis. 71 'austerior et grairior'). dissoluta: 'lax'; cf. (of ex-philosophy students) 12. 3. 12 'in publico tristes, domi dissoluti'. comitas: not incompatible with seueritas (Cic. Brut. 148 on Crassus and Scaevola). odium., .contemptus: these feature in psychological generalizations at 4. 1. 14 'humiles abiectosque contemptus et turpes ac nocentes odium [sc. sequitur]', 12. 8. 14. castigabit: could cover both reprimand and corporal punishment; the latter was perhaps administered even in schools of rhetoric (see Mayor on Juv. 1. 15; Cribiore 71-2), but note 1. 3. 15. minime iracundus: it is easy enough to supply sit here, but in 6-7 'nec malignus nec effitsus' and 'non acerbus minimeque contirmeliosus' float free (see n.on 2. 13. 1 prohoemium). dissimulator: not thus elsewhere (unless at Tac. Hist. 2. 56. 2, where it might imply concealment, as in 2. 17. 6 below), of someone who pretends not to notice something. For the verb in this sense (OLD s.v. 3; also s.v. dissimulatio 3), see e.g. Sen. Dial. 4. 33. 1 'saepe autem satius fuit

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Commentary

dissimulare [sc. iniuriam] quam ulcisci'. For 2. 17. 6 'dissimulator artis' see n. there. simplex: 'straightforward', covering generous openness (so Spalding) and clarity (Gesner: 'qui ambages omnes atque anfractus evitet, nihil astute reticeat, et candide aperteque omnia pandat'). Reflecting on his own Institutio, Q. writes at 12. 11. 8: 'conscius sum mihi... quaeque antea scierim quaeque operis huiusce gratia potuerim inquirere candide me atque simpliciter in notitiam eorum, si qui forte cognoscere uoluissent, protulisse.' He would wish any rhetor to be able to say the same. patiens laboris: so of the strong lungs needed by the orator in 1 pr. 27. adsiduus potius quam inmodicus: for adsiduus cf. 1. 3. 14: corporal punishment is not necessary 'si adsiduus studiorum exactor adstiterit', i.e. if someone is always there [cf. 1. 1. 11, 1. 2. 5], sitting or standing, requiring work. In the present passage the contrast with inmodicus suggests a different sense: the teacher should be persistent in his own labours (Cic. de Orat. 2. 162 gives a diverting picture of teachers who are 'adsiduis, uno opere eandem incudem diem noctemque tundentibus'), without taking it to extremes. For inmodicus applied to labor see TLL s.v. immodicus 486. 1-2. It is not often used of a person who goes beyond the modus; note however 9. 3. 74: 'Gorgias in hoc [i.e. use of word-play] inmodicus'. The whole phrase then enlarges on and qualifies patiens laboris (so Ammendola). 2. 6 interrogantibus: more on questions in class at 2. 5. 13. dictionibus: a very wide word (L-P on Cic. de Orat. 1. 22; note Tac. Dial. 34. 2), which could cover any kind of speech. Here it does not mean 'declamations' (nor does it at 2. 4. 27; see also n. on 2. 4. 12 totas... materias), though that would be in question here for the more advanced pupils; the term is presumably chosen to include spoken progymasmata. malignus.. .effusus: 'niggardly' and 'lavish' with praise; transferred from meanness concerning material objects (thus PI. Bac. 401 contrasts malignus and largus), and its opposite (Cic. Cael. 13 'quis in largitione effusior?'; and see below, 2. 12. 4). For the transferred senses cf. for malignus perhaps Hor. Carm. 2. 16. 39-40 'malignum... uulgus'; and for effusus Petr. 48. 7 'efifusissimis... laudationibus'. For the importance of praising the young, see 5. 12. 22 (also 5.13. 44). We learn from 2.11. 7 that passages praised by the teacher in a pupil's speeches might be copied down by his peers. securitatem: 'complacency' (cf. Tac. Dial. 35. 3 'pari securitate et dicant et audiantur', of young people in the schools), that might lead to reduced effort (Sen. Ben. 5. 12. 2 'securitatem ac segnitiam'); the state is one in which not enough aira is being applied (cf. in this book 2. 3. 4,2. 5. 13). Excessive praise might also lead to conceit: [Plu.] 9A.

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2. 7 non acerb us: sharpness is also deprecated in a teacher at an earlier stage: 'nec sum adeo aetatium inprudens ut instandum protinus teneris acerbe putenV (1.1. 20). For further humane remarks on correcting pupils, see below, 2. 4. 10-14; 2. 5. 16; 2. 6. 3-4; 2. 9. 2. fugat: Q. may be thinking of Hor. Ars 474 'indoctum doctumque fugat recitator acerbus]\ but only vaguely, if at all, as the different sense of acerbus shows. obiurgant: cf. Cic. Amic. 89 (on advising friends) 'monitio acerbitate,... obiurgatio contumelia careat'. quasi oderint: it is implied that the teacher should love his pupils (like a father: see on 4 above), just as he should be loved in turn (below, §8). 2. 8 ipse aliquid.. .dicat quae.. .referant: for the rhetor's own contributions, cf. 2. 4. 12 'nonnumquam hoc quoque erit utile, totas interim dictare materias, quas et imitetur puer...'; 2. 5. 16 'declamabit.. .praeceptor ut sit exemplo suis auditoribus', 2. 6. 1 'quidam materias quas discipulis ad dicendum dabant... latius dicendo prosequebantur', 2. 6. 5 'incipientibus danda erit uelut praeformata materia secundum cuiusque uires. At cum satis composuisse se ad exemplum uidebuntur...'. All these passages, like the present one, refer to the provision by the rhetor of fair copies, which the pupils will imitate (this is of course to be distinguished from full formal declamations by the teacher, of which we get a glimpse at 11. 2. 39). We already knew of this practice (in progymnasmata) from the Greek text of Theon, who at 70. 32-71. 1 (p. 15) interestingly says that the teacher should compose avaoKevas rtvas Kal KaraoKevag for the young to recite (avayyeiAai), to give them a pattern for imitation. But further light has been thrown on the topic by the newly published Annenian supplement. Theon followed up his treatment of the progymnasmata by chapters on Reading and Listening (chs. 13-14: 134-9 [pp. 102-7], with discussion in Patillon, pp. xcviii-civ; something had already been known of Listening (aKpoaois) from the Greek text [61. 33-62. 10: p. 4]). The latter involved, if the Bude editors are right in their interpretation, the 'production orale d'un texte devant des auditeurs' (p. cii), a text which the pupil was then to imitate in writing. Theon does not express himself very dearly, at least in the French translation from the Armenian, but the text involved would seem to have been limited to 'auteurs reputes et confirmes', and it is stressed that the pupil was not to be allowed a free choice (139 [p. 107]); it is implied that the text was not necessarily oratorical (138 [p. 106]). It is not easy to square what Theon says with the remarks of his editors, who equate the 'production orale' with other kinds of aKpoaots of which we know, and comment (p. ciii): 'l'essentiel de telles lemons, lorsque le maitre est un orateur-rheteur, est

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constitue par une declamation (also p. civ: 'rien n'interdit de penser qu'ils pouvaient aller entendre des declamations'). Be that as it may, Q. certainly envisages the teacher speaking a dictio, which the pupil takes away to imitate in writing, apparently in his own time (preparatory to speaking it in class; see on 2. 4. 15 stilo componi). And this was to happen cotidie, just as Theon recommended: 62. 9-10 (p. 4) for the writing, corresponding to the daily Listening (139 [p. 107]).9 Hence in what follows Q. can contrast models provided by reading (here privatereadingby the pupil: not the type of reading discussed in Theon ch. 13, for which see below, p. 121) with those given viva voce by the teacher. Such provision of models by the rhetor was nothing new; the fifth-century sophists taught in the same way, and Isocrates, in a striking passage (13. 18) cited by Patillon, pp. xxi f., says that it is essential that a teacher should make himself a napdSeiyfia, 'so that those who have received his imprint (€KTVTTOJ84VT€S) and are capable of imitating him may at once become more accomplished orators than the others'. That terminology continues into Theon: cf. Theon 61. 32-3 (p. 4) rv7rovp,€vot yap TTJV ^VYRIV and KOXCJV 7TapaS€iyfiaTa>v KaXXiara Kai fiifx-qaofieda', 70. 35—71. 1 (p. 15) onojs TV7Tajd€VT€s Kara rifv €K€iv(uv ayojyrjv p,tp,r)oao9a(. SwrjOoiioiv, and perhaps (from the Armenian) 137 (p. 105) 'lorsque quelqu'un admire ce qu'il y a de bon chez tous et entreprend d'y conformer sa pensee, du fait qu'il existe en lui une sorte de matrice du discours, que chacun peut modeler d'apres sa propre n a t u r e . S e e further n. on 2. 7. 3 et... expriment, Webb 290 with n. 1, 300. secum... referant: i.e. in their notebooks (see n. on 2. 11.7 commentariis); cf. Tac. Dial. 20.4 'referre domum aliquid inlustre et dignum memoria'. When Seneca says 'qui ad philosophum uenit, cotidie aliquid secum boni ferat' (Ep. 108. 4), he is speaking metaphorically (though he mentions writing-tablets in 6). licet... plenius: a different emphasis in 2. 5.16, where Q. is arguing for the desirability of reading Cicero and Demosthenes. suppeditet: probably intransitive (despite the Loeb), as in 1. 1. 31, 1. 12. 14. ut dicitur: calling attention to a cliche. The phrase is documented in Otto, Sprichworter, 378; it no mi ally occurs, as here, where the living voice is being contrasted favourably with other means of communication.

9

C o m p a r e the practice of t h e young Cicero, ' c o t i d i e . . . et scribens et legens et commentans',

as well as listening to the orators o f the day

(Brut.

305).

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si modo recte sunt instituti: we should observe the tense here. Parallel passages at 2. 3. 11 ('apud eum [sc. praeceptorem] discipuli quoque melius instituti') and 2. 10. 1 ('in his primis operibus .. .bene instituto') both imply a completed school training, which is not in question here. Q. may then be thinking rather of the good earlier influences (family, paedagogus, grammaticus) that have formed the boys' character ('bien eleves' Bornecque); cf. Cic. Brut. 239 'M'. Glabrionem bene institutum aui Scaeuolae diligentia'; Amm. Marc. 29. 2. 12 'recte institutis ne cum inimicorum quidem incommodis in delicta conuenit ruere uoluntaria'. et amant et uerentur: cf. 2. 9. 1 'praeceptores suos .. .anient [sc. discipuli]'. For the distinction between the two verbs, see Cic. Q. fr. 1. 3. 3 'et amabat ut fratrem et iam ut maiorem fratrem uerebatur'. quanto libentius... fauemus: cf. 2. 9. 2; contrast 10. 1. 126 'amabant autem eum [sc. Senecam] magis quam imitabantur'. 2. 9 adsurgendi: in other contexts a mark of respect (e.g. Cic. Pis. 26). exsurgunt in 12 means the same thing, and is opposed to running forward. exultandique: cf. 12 'cum indecora exultatione' (see n.). Q. seems to mean physical leaping (Plin. Ep. 7. 24. 7 'in theatrum cursitabant, exultabant plaudebant'; TLL s.v. exsulto 1947. 44-7), though with a strong flavour of the extended sense of 'rejoice', in triumph at the success of their classmate: cf. Ov. Met 6. 283 'exulta uictrixque inimica triumpha'. licentia: Q. may remember Cic. Off. 1. 103 'pueris non omnem ludendi licentiam damus'. testimonium: cf. Ciceronian phrases like 'testimonium.. .laudum suarum' (Cic. Amic. 98); the word (not well treated in OLD s.v. 3) came virtually to equal laus (already Cic. Ac. 2. 3 'priuabo ilium potius debito testimonio quam id cum mea laude communicem'), no doubt partly because of the frequency of laudator)' testimonials in court; see A. H. J. Greenidge, The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time (London, 1901), 489-91. Cf. 3. 1. 22 'curae testimonium meruisse contentus'. ita fiet... credat: cf. n.on 2. 4. 14 iudicio non fallebantur. 2. 10 ilia... humanitas: these words should be taken together (cf. 12. 1. 24 'haec quae uulgo dicitur bonitas'), 'what is now called humanitas', defined by laudandi. licentia in §9 seems too far away to be easily understood, despite TLL s.v. humanitas 3079. 22-4. humanitas: used here in the sense rejected by Gel. 13. 17. 1 'beneuolentiam erga omnis homines promiscam', with the emphasis on promiscam. One might translate 'good manners', 'good form'. Tacitus is similarly scathing of

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another use of the word: 'idque apud imperitos humanitas uocabatur, cum pars seruitutis esset' (Agr. 21. 2). inuicem qualiacumque laudandi: 7. 2. 19 'qui inuicem accusent' illustrates the Silver usage where inter se would have been written earlier (K-S i. 617). In our passage the object 'qualiacumque' complicates the construction, but cf. 11. 3. 168 'quas inuicem Demosthenes atque Aeschines exprobrant'. theatralis: worthy of behaviour in the not (highly regarded) theatre, where claqueurs organized applause (Goodyear on Tac. Ann. 1. 16. 3 'dux olim theatralium operarum', adding Cic. Sest 115). Cf. Plin. Ep. 2. 14. 13 'theatris quoque ['even for theatres'] indecora laudatio', of 'howled' applause in the courts. hostis: of a (feminine) abstract, as in 12. 1. 2 'facultatem dicendi sociam scelerum, aduersam innocentiae, hostem ueritatis'. uidentur: B's uidetur is not quite impossible (it would have been very open to officious correction), superuacua then being feminine sing., agreeing only with cura (K-S i. 46, citing Tac. Ann. 12. 65. 2 'conuictam Messalinam et Silium'). effuderint: not meant to be very complimentary. Q. uses the verb of unprepared speech at 10. 3. 17, 10. 7. 7, and 11. 2. 39 (grandiloquently, even satirically, at 11. 3. 158); note also Petr. 124. 2 'ingenti uolubilitate uerborum effudisset'. 2. 11 uultum igitur... dicit: Q. returns to the point he was making at the end of 9 ('ex iudicio praeceptoris discipulus pendeat'); but he now extends it to the students listening to the boy speaking. ita enim... discernent. sic... iudicium: s/, not sic (P), is transmitted. If it were right, one might think it picked up ita (as at e.g. 2. 7. 1). But that produces no good sense; and in any case it is natural to take ita enim as looking back to what has preceded (as at e.g. 2. 8. 12). In that case, si would have to be equivalent to si quidem. That would necessitate the awkward move of taking stilofacultas continget as a fxev clause, with auditione iudicium taking all the weight; 'if, as is the case, while facultas comes as a result of writing, judgement comes as a result of listening'. But the future tense is then unexpected. This last objection also applies if 'si... iudicium' is punctuated as a separate sentence; it is overcome by Russell's <et> si (reported in the OCT), but a conditional clause seems in any case inappropriate. We are therefore thrown back on sic: 'in this way, ability will come through writing, judgement by listening.' sic is not to be taken as parallel to ita (this is not, pace Spalding, a case of variation); for, while 'ita... discernent' comments almost parenthetically on 'uultum... dicit', sic introduces a comment on the whole of

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'uultum... discernent': Q. concisely summarizes the benefits of disciplined dictio in class for both speaker and audience. stilo... iudicium: the writing is that done by the pupil (ipse qui dicit) in preparing the speech (the cura ac labor of 10; for stilus thus cf. 2. 4. 15,10.6. 1) that he will recite in class, while the listening is naturally the role of the other pupils (qui audiunt). It is odd that there is no mention of the speaking of the exercise, as opposed to its writing. Clarity is not helped by the vagueness of facultas, a word normally defined by a genitive. What 'faculty' is in question here? One would think that writing improved merely the ability to write (cf. 10. 3. 10 'cum facultas ilia contigerif). These problems would be alleviated if we made some addition, e.g. stilo <et dictione>: writing the exercise and then speaking it improves the student's ability (in declamation), and listening to him promotes judgement in the hearers. But this would spoil the crisp epigram; and crispness sometimes leads to obscurity. continget: with abl. as in e.g. 1. 1. 33 'donee exercitatione contingat emendata uelocitas'. iudicium: cf. 10. 1. 17 'in lectione certius iudicium, quod audienti frequenter aut suus cuique fauor aut ille laudantium clamor extorquet' (of 'real' oratory). There even established iudicium can be swayed by audience reaction, and reading is a surer way of judging a speech. Here, where iudicium is still being formed (cf. 9 'ex iudicio praeceptoris discipulus pendeat', 13), Q. tries to remove the disadvantages of auditio by recommending the discouragement of wild applause in school: only a hope, as 'at nunc. shows. 2. 12 proni: 'bending forward' ready to rush forth (like a runner on the blocks: cf. Ov. Met. 10. 652-3 'cum carcere pronus uterque | emicat'); there is no metaphor here, despite Afifahl 115. succincti: this is metaphorical: 'girt up' and ready for the dash (Mart. 12. 24. 7 'suceinctus... cursor'). Both this and proni make one expect not exsurgunt but a verb meaning that the students await the clausula; the chronology is telescoped. a d . . . dausulam: to be taken with exsurgunt (cf. 11. 3. 135 'plerosque (sc. speakers] ...ad singulas clausulas sententiarum uideo adsurgentis'); the rhythm of atque (preferred here to ac for this reason) succincti marks the end of the colon. Q. is talking not of what moderns call 'clausulae', that is rhythmical endings to sentences, but of endings generally (though no doubt rhythm would also often be on show); see 8. 5. 13-14 (with Russell's n.), where Q. complains that 'nunc aliud uolunt, ut omnis locus, omnis sensus in fine sermonis feriat aurem. Turpe autem... ducunt respirare ullo loco qui addamationem non petierit'. Long before, note Cic. Orat. 168

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Commentary

'condones saepe exclamare uidi cum apte uerba cecidissent' (more specifically of rhythmical endings); and much later cf. Jerome, Ep. 52. 4 (cited by Norden, AK 281 n. 1). Audiences might even anticipate the ending: see Russell on 'Longinus' 41. 2. indecora: cf. Plin. Ep. 2. 14. 13, cited above on 10 dieatralis. exultatione: again probably of physical leaping (see on 9 exultandique). In Pers. 1. 82 'trossulus exultat tibi per subsellia leuis' the verb more certainly goes beyond the physical ('ecstasies of motion' Conington); see J. C. Bramble, Persius and the Programmatic Satire (Cambridge, 1974), 44 n. 1. Jahn ad loc. cited Plu. Moralia 4 1 c at Kpaxryal Kai ot dopufioi xai ra 777^Sr}/xara TOJV 7rap6vT(ov (startling the inexperienced listener out of his wits). Add Suet. Nero 24. 1 'exultationes succlamationesque populi'. conclamant: the general topic of applause in declamation schools is fully treated by Norden, AK 274-5. In the courts the practice might be encouraged by the use of hired claques (Plin. Ep. 2. 14. 4-14, with an anecdote of Q.'s); for Seneca's views on applause in philosophy classes see Ep. 52. 9-14. id mutuum est: apparently to be classified under TLL s.v. mutuus 1738. 29-34; the pupils do each other a reciprocal service (Dig. 19. 5. 5. 4 'mutuum officium praestamus'), thereby determining the success of a declamation. declamationis: the deplorable behaviour described here was presumably liable to occur whether a progymnasma or a full declamation was being spoken (note the mention of both pueri and iuuenes in 9); for dedamatio used of the former, see above, p. xxiii n. 3. tumor: here of undue pride: cf. 1. 2. 18 'mens... tumescit inani persuasione\ uana de se persuasio: cf. 2. 4. 16 'adrogans de se persuasio'. again of spoiled students; Decl. min. 314. 17 'uana .. .persuasio'. inflati: the same metaphor as in tumor (Cic. Tusc. 3. 19 'inflatus et tumens animus'); Liv. 24. 6. 8 'inflatus adsentationibus'. 2. 13 se quoque: i.e. as well as the young speakers discussed since 9. There should be no wild applause for the teacher either, for he is not interested in knowing their opinion of his performance: his is the only judgement that matters. iudicio: 'in conformity with the taste [OLD s.v. iudicium 11a; not well served by TLL] of...'; cf. 10. 1. 130 'uelles eum suo ingenio dixisse, alieno iudicio'. et placere quae bene dicet... delectetur: the construction is: 'et delectetur < e a > placere [sc. discipulis] quae bene dicet.' If his pupils express approval

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of him, he should take satisfaction (not from any applause he may receive, and) not for his own sake, but for his pupils' sake, because of his awareness that he has instilled in them the right judgement that enables them to recognize the good things in his dictiones. It becomes clear that the whole paragraph is united by the interconnected themes of praise (that given by pupils to each other and to their teacher, and by him to them) and iudicium (theirs and his). 2. 14 pueros adulescentibus permixtos sedere: cf. Tac. Dial. 35. 3 'pueri inter pueros et adulescentuli inter adulescentulos'; Philostratus, VS 604, where at Produs' declamations naiSes sit separated from p,eipdxia by the boys' 7rai8ayaryoi. Q. implies that all the teaching took place in a single large room. studiis moribusque: the two went closely together in Q.'s mind: see on 2. 3. 12 eloquentia... moribus, and Winterbottom5 320-2. Cf. Juv. 7. 237 (of the grammaticus) 'exigite ut mores teneros ceu pollice ducat'; Floras, Vergilius orator an poeta 3. 7 (p. 187 Rossbach, p. 214 Malcovati2) 'quam imperatorium, quam regium est sedere a suggestu praecipentem bo nos mores et sacrarum studia litterarum'; and (cited by Valla on 2. 3. 12) Cod. lust. 10. 53(52). 7 'magistros studiorum doctoresque excellere oportet moribus primum, deinde facundia'. The mention of studia prepares the way for the discussion of the teacher's intellectual qualities in 2. 3. modestam habere potest etiam iuuentutem: i.e. he may be able to keep even older boys (as opposed to pueri) from acting as their testosterone levels would prompt them. OLD s.v. habeo 15c provides no good parallel, nor does even the very mixed bag in TLL s.v. 2424. 42-73; it may be that the verb is as colourless here as at 2. 11.2 'plurimos habent similes neglegentiae suae'. The phrase then becomes equivalent to moderari (so Ammendola); that verb is avoided by Q., but cf. Sen. Con. 1. 8. 8 'esse adulescentem... patri et moderandum et continendum'. uel: the translators ignore the word, and indeed it is not clear what it could imply. It seems possible that we should read uel <sic>y 'even if they can be controlled without separate seating'; cf. e.g. Man. 2. 413-14 'mascula se paribus uel sic, diuersa suorum | respondent generi', glossed by Housman 'quamquam aduersis fulgent contraria signis' (from 410). Donald Russell suggests to us that Q. may be distinguishing the wimps from the toughs among the iuuenes, but the parallels cited in the next note make this unlikely (and uel would remain odd). infirmitas: another abstract (n. on 2. 1. 3 aetas), here for itifirmi, in the interests of variation; cf. 2. 3. 7 puerilis infirmitas. The iuuenes are the

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Commentary

robustiores (cf. 2. 5. 2), with firmins aetatis robur (1. 8.6; cf. n. on 2. 5. 23 firmis iudiciis), contrasted with pueri at 1. 8. 12 (as in Tac. Dial. 35.4); similarly in 3 teneriores annos and ferociores (sc. annos) are contrasted. carendum... suspicione: the early editors already saw the echo of Caesars famous dictum on his wife: 'meos tam suspicione quam crimine iudico carere oportere' (Suet. Jul. 74. 2). crimen and suspicio are naturally often linked (e.g. Cic. de Orat. 2. 330) or contrasted (Cic. Mil. 96). 2. 15 notanda: 'merely mention', as in 1. 5. 17. nam ut...credo: the movement is similar to that in 4. 2. 60 'nam id quidem, ne qua contraria... dicamus, si cui praecipiendum est, is reliqua frustra docetur'; cf. 11. 3. 13 'sed nos de eo nunc loquamur cui non frustra praecipitur' (also 1 pr. 26). absit ab: cf. Cic. S. Rosa 56 'quamquam abest a culpa, suspicione tamen non caret. ultimis uitiis: cf. Juv. 2. 34, without the homosexual implication of our passage (for which cf. 1.3. 17: probra arising from corporal punishment). For the Wees of which Q. is thinking (esp. criticized in teachers of younger boys), see Suet. Gram. 23. 2 (cited on 2. 2. 2 libro priore), with Raster's n.Q. is not meaning to differentiate between the turpitudo he has just mentioned and the ultima uitia. si quis est... uitet: [Plu.] 4 C-F complains that there were fathers who took little trouble in choosing teachers for their sons; contrast the care taken by Horace's (S. 1. 6. 81-4). flagitia: a danger for children taught at home as well as at school (1.2. 4). iam hinc sciat: 'let him be aware, from now on,...'; cf. Col. 4. 24. 1 'in annum sequentem quam laetissimas iam hinc eligat materias'. Cf. the tone of Liv. 8. 7. 7 'uisne... congredi mecum, ut nostro duorum iam hinc euentu cematur quantum eques Latinus Romano praestet?', 40. 35. 14 'ego iam hinc praedico... me exercitu eo qui nunc est rem publicam administraturum'. Elsewhere in Q. iam hinc is used where transitions are being signalled (so 2. 11. 1, 3. 1. 1, 8. 3. 40, and 10. 3. 4, where see Peterson's acute n.), 'now', 'starting from here'; hinc iam is used thus in 2. 4. 1 (see n.). ad utilitatem iuuentutis: for the purpose and envisaged audience of the Institutio, see Winterbottom in Corsi 10-13 (at p. 12: 'Quintiliano muta il suo destinatario in funzione del contesto'). conamur: the verb is employed not so much modestly (as in 2. 20. 4), as with the implication that Q.'s efforts would be wasted if parents took no trouble in choosing a rhetor. hac parte omissa: if the father neglects this aspect of his duty (see on 2. 1. 1 suas partis omiserunt).

Chapter Three Some think that boys should be sent initially to a second-rate rhetor (1). But that can lead to the forming of habits that prove hard to unlearn (2-3a). The motive behind the practice is, beside a ccrtain casualness, a feeling that more accomplished speakers lack either the will or the ability to teach beginners (3b-4). Both contentions are flawed (5-6). Further, afirst-rateteacher will consciously adapt himself to a boy's inexperience (7), and he will be lucid where a weaker rhetor is inflated and obscure (8-9). What I said in Book One about imitating fellow-pupils is consistent with my present contention, for the best teacher will have the best pupils (10-11). Thus, the rhetor should be outstanding in eloquence as well as in morality (12). The final section makes it clear that this chapter forms a pair with 2. 2, where it was contended that the rhetor to whom our pupil is sent must be morally impeccable. Now Q. argues that he must also be first-rate technically (even a grammaticus should be eloquent: 1. 4. 5). The starter is not to be fobbed off with anything less, but must go straight to one of the praestantissimi praeceptores (like Q.) desiderated at 1.1. 10. As in 2. 2, Q. is advising a father faced with the problem of how best to educate his son. 3. 1 ne illorumquidem... putauerunt:'not.. .ofthose [fathers) either' (cf. similar transitions at 4. 2.125 'ne illud quidem praeteribo', 6. 1. 37,10. 7. 28); OLD s.v. ne1 6b. Q., embarking on a discussion of fathers who 'pueros... apud minores... detinent' (the verb is used in 12. 11. 14 of teachers holding back pupils for their own reasons), looks back to his remarks in 2. 1 on the frequent delay in moving children to the school of the rhetor in thefirstplace; hence the tone of etiam cum: 'even when they have [at last] come to the conclusion that a boy is fit for the move'. tamquam.. .superba: explaining why some fathers think inferior rhetores more appropriate in the early stages. The emphasis falls on cum.. .facilior (taken up specifically at 7) and turn... superba (cf. below 4 quia fastidiant, answered briefly and cuttingly at the start of 5). For minores at an earlier stage see 1.2. 10. mediocritas praeceptoris: characteristically (see n. on 2. 1. 3 aetas), for mediocris pracceptor. 3. 2 optimis inbui: similarly of the young pupil who will benefit from early reading of the great epic poets (1. 8. 5, where Colson remarks that inbuere is

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used 'in its regular sense of first impressions'). In 1. 1 . 5 (where a similar conclusion is drawn: 'non adsuescat ergo., .sermoni qui dediscendussit') the young mind ('rudibus animis'; cf. below 3 'rudes', 1. 1. 36 'animo rudi', 1. 8. 4 cited below, 1. 11. 2 'mentem.. .teneram adhuc et rudem inficiunt [sc.uitia]') is implicitly compared both to a newly made container that will retain the first flavour it receives ('inbuas ' Hagenbuch; ' imbuas' would give better rhythm) and to a woollen garment before dyeing ('nec lanarum colores... elui possunt'). In our passage, what follows suggests that steeping is in question. For insidere thus cf. 1. 1. 11 'nec insidere [sc. dicta uitiose] illi sinat', 1. 6. 44 'si quid uitiose multis insederit', and esp., in a related context, 1. 8. 4 'tenerae mentes tracturaeque altius quidquid rudibus et omnium ignaris insederit', where the 'dye' is sucked deep inside; Sen. Dial. 6. 1. 7). Here the verb suggests the effect of some agent causing a stain that cannot be washed out; cf. Cic. Man. 7 'ilia macula.. .quae penitus iam insedit...in populi Romani nomine', Sest. 63 'ilia in re publica macula... maneret, quam nemo iam posset eluere'. For semel cf. Enn. Ann. 476 Skutsch 'quom illud quo iam semel est imbuta ueneno', perhaps imitated by Hor. Ep. 1. 2. 69-70. geminatum onus: 'causing to unlearn', followed by 'teaching [properly]'; Q. proceeds (with a confirming anecdote) to assert that the former is the more burdensome (12 pr. 1 'onus .. .quanto me premi ferens sentio') to those who take over (cf. 2. 1. 13 'qui labori isti successerint'), and is prior,; not only in time but especially in importance (12. 11. 11 'id quod prius quodque maius est'). For the idea cf. 2. 6. 2. 3. 3 Timotheum: the story (which has the tone of a chria) does not occur elsewhere. Spalding rightly identified Timotheus with the aulete of Lucian's Harmonides, where note §1: Hannonides, a Theban, was Timotheus' pupil; Timotheus once won a victory TOV o/xaW/zou [the better-known citharode and poet from Miletus: RE 9] oot -rr oir/oavTos to pe \os. In view of the aulete's connection with Alexander the Great (Ath. 538 F, cf. 565 A), he must have been a younger contemporary of his namesake. clariun in arte: cf. 3. 6. 64 'Hippocrates clarus arte medicinae' (for in, 1. 6. 35 'darum... in litteris'). duplices... quam: cf. Plin. Nat. 19. 9 'ideo duplex quam ceteris pretium>; K-S ii. 460. duplex below is a casual repetition. duplex: unus...(4) alter: cf. 9. 4. 121, where duplex obseruatio [= duae obseruationes} is defined by clauses starting altera... altera (also 9. 2. 66, with Reid's n.on Cic. Ac. 1. 19 'ratio triplex: una... altera... tertia'). The error afflicts fathers who misjudge the situation in two different ways.

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interim: 'for the time being' (as at 2. 4. 5); but it is difficult to rule out the alternative 'sometimes' (so below in 4; 2. 1. 1 n.), picked up by ille etiam frequentior (cf. 4. 5. 20 'interim... nonnumquam... saepe...'). bono sane stomacho: cf. 6. 3. 93 (of jokes) 'lenta et, ut sic dixerim, boni stomachi'; Martial 12 pr. 'aduersus quod difficile est habere cotidie bonum stomachum'. The expression fwohl volkstiimlich': Otto, Sprichworter, 332) alludes to a stomach that has no trouble digesting (Cels. 1. 2. 9 'secunda mensa bono stomacho nihil nocet, in inbecillo coacescit'). Its fortunate owner in consequence has the gift of good temper and tolerance (cf. the remark of Cicero reported at 6. 3. 112), that leads in the present case to a deplorable couldn't-care-less attitude (4 'ipsa reprensione digna securitas', i.e. quite apart from the bad effect on the child involved). The intensifying sane (Hor. Ep. 2. 2. 132 'bonus sane uicinus') points the irony. The phrase should not be taken with contend, which is here absolute (Cic. Brut. 134 'non modo contentus esses, sed melius non quaereres'). 3. 4 utcumque: 'one way or another'; for parallels see Winterbottom's n. on Decl. min. 278. 11, adding Sidonius, Ep. 7. 14. 2 'esse asperum, utcumque tolerabile tameii (cited by H-Sz 635, and misunderstood by Anderson). The word is used in another sense in 2. 5. 11. Q.'s usage deserves investigation. descendere: the minora being seen as 'infra rhetoris officium' (2. 5. 4); so below, inferioribus (neuter). Such imputed intellectual snobbery is taken up in the first alleged reason (where note fasti diant cf. 1. 4. 6 'ne quis... tamquam parua fastidiat grammatices elementa'; 12. 9. 7 'illo fastidio... non agendi causas minores).Cf. Cic. Q. Rose. 31 'quo quisque est sollertior et ingeniosior, hoc docet iracundius et laboriosius; quod enim ipse celeriter arripuit, id cum tarde percipi uidet discruciatur' (note stomacho in what precedes). 3. 5 porro: apparently adversative, as in e.g. 2. 17. 8 nos porro (but not 2. 1. 7 nos porro): see Gabler 38, referring to J. P. Krebs and J. H. Schmalz, Antibarbarus der lateinischen Sprache, 2 vols. (Basel, 7 1905-7), ii. 325 (not properly covered in OLD). See rather differently Hand, Tursellinus, iv. 485 (who finds the usage only in Q.): 'utitur.. .hac formula turn, quum suam sententiam cum quadam confidentia et gravitate effert'. eum qui nolit: cf. 1.4. 23 'si quis et didicerit satis et (quod non minus deesse interim solet) uoluerit docere quae didicit'; 10. 5. 19 'quod non est infiniti operis si docere sciant et uelint (sc. praeceptores]'. in numero... habeo: 'count among', as in 10. 1. 118. 3. 6 nisi forte... elaborasset: quidem and autem act here like Greek /xev and it is the two clauses taken together that constitute the 'absurd idea' (OLD s.v. nisi 2b) that is being rejected (for an analogous use see 2. 17. 3; see also

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5. 11.34 'haec uherius quoque procedere solent' (also Decl. min. 321.4,323. 14). On Q.'s Wanderbilder Afifahl comments (p. 71) that they aie 'bei den Romern sehr selten. Um so auffallender ist es daher, daft Q. solche Bilder in grofierer Zahl verwendet hat' (though his remarks at 12. 10. 78 hardly suggest that he was much acquainted with mountains). Afifahl cites a parallel from Lucian, Pro imaginibus 13: it is for the taller oftwo walkers to adapt to the other by stooping (cf. summittentem se ad mensuram'). 3. 8 quid si: adding a further point, as in 9. 2. 83, Cic. Fin. 2. 105. perspicuitas: described as summa uirtus in 1. 6. 41 (cf. 8. 2. 22: part of prima uirtus; another is mentioned at 8. 3. 41). The idea goes back at least to Aristotle (Rhet. T2, 1404 b l-2), and Theophrastus made clarity one of his four virtues of style: J. Stroux, De Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi (Leipzig, 1912), esp. ch. 2; Lausberg, §§528-37. quis: as often in Q. after a relative: Bonnell, Lexicon, 749-50; Tac. Hist. 3. 58. 2 'quanto quis clarior, minus fidus'; OLD s.v. quis2 lb. ingenio minus ualet: cf. Cic. Quinct. 4 (as cited at 11. 1. 19) 'quod ingenio minus possum, subsidium mihi diligentia comparaui'. s e . . . attollere: cf. Sen. Con. 7 pr. 5 'modo nimis se attollit, modo nimis se deprimit'; Plin. Ep. 9. 26. 2 'debet... orator erigi attolli, interdum etiam efferuescere ecferri' (also 5. 17. 2). The word, like dilatare (8. 4. 14), was used by Q. as an equivalent for augere and amplificare in their stylistic senses (cf. 8.6. 68; also 2. 4. 9, with n.). In our passage too Q. is of course thinking of stylistic inflation; but the reflexive, and the following simile, make one think of the physical sense also, and Spalding's suggestion of a covert allusion to the fable of the frog (Phaed. 1. 24: note 5 latior, for narrative based on Aesop's fables, taught by the grammaticus, see 1. 9. 2) is not absurd. in digitos eriguntur: cf. 11. 3. 120 'in unguis eriguntur' (also 125 'summis digitis'). Afifahl 11 aptly cites Sen. Ep. 111.3 '[philosophus] non exsurgit in plantas nec summis ambulat digitis eorum more qui mendacio staturam adiuuant longioresque quam sunt uideri uolunt'. Just as we have seen that the simile reflects back on what precedes it, so the simile itself can be felt to apply to oratorical circumstances as well as more widely; cf. Sen. Suas. 2. 17 (of a declaimer) 'insistens summis digitis—sic enim solebat, quo grandior fieret'. Similarly, plura infirmi minantur (Curt. 7.4. 13: the Bactrians say 'canem timidum uehementius latrare quam mordere') might glance at 'weak' speakers (below 9 'infirmitatis uitio', Tac. Dial. 19. 1 'infirmitate ingenii'; note 2. 12. 4 'maledicit... ineruditus apertius et saepius'). 3. 9 tumidos: of bombastic speakers at e.g. 10. 2. 16 'pro grandibus tumidi'; and for the style itself e.g. 8. 3. 18 'fitque corruptum quia in piano tumet'; 12. 10. 73 'corruptum dicendi genus, quod... inmodico tumore turgescit';

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12. 10. 80 'grandia non tumida'. 2. 8. 9 'ingenio corruptus ac tumid us' alludes to the cast of mind (cf. 2. 2. 12 tumor, with n.; 11. 1. 50 'tumidum ac sui iactantem'; and esp. 12. 10. 16-17, where Asianic style is associated with the character of the Asian race, 'tumidior.. .atque iactantior') that might lead to such excesses. Cf. Afifahl 25; Norden, AK 298 (which in effect provides a commentary on our whole passage), adding Liv. 45. 23. 16 (spoken by a Rhodian) 'non negauerim et totam Asiae regionem inaniora parere ingenia, et nostrorum tumidioiem sermonem esse'. Fairweather, in a section on ' Vitiosa: some general terms denoting bad taste' (pp. 214-27), illustrates from well beyond her author; and see her General Index s.v. tumidus. For Gk. oyxog used in both approval and disapproval, see Geigenmiiller 108-9. corruptos: 'debased'. Q. uses the adjective liberally of those exponents of the new non-Ciceronian style who were his particular bugbear, and of the style itself; note e.g. 2. 5. 10 'corruptas... et uitiosas'; 8 pr. 17 'Asiani aut quocumque alio genere corrupti'; 10. 1. 125 'dum corruptum et omnibus uitiis fractum dicendi genus [exemplified by Seneca] reuocare ad seueriora iudicia contendo'; 10. 1. 129 (of Seneca) 'in eloquendo corrupta pleraque, atque eo perniciosissima quod abundant dulcibus uitiis'; 10. 2. 16 'pro... laetis corrupti'; and passages cited above on tumidos. Such parallels help to give an indication of the content of Q.'s lost treatise De causis corruptae eloquentiae (for his allusions to it, see Reuter, ch. 1; Brink), 'quare nemo ex corruptis dicat me inimicum esse culte dicentibus' (8. 3. 7) epitomizes his objection to the 'debased': they took the virtue of cultus too far. Particularly revealing is 8. 3. 57 (part of the discussion of cacozelia): 'corrupta oratio in uerbis maxime inpropriis, redundantibus, compressione obscura [cf. 6. 5. 2], compositione fracta, uocum similium aut ambiguarum puerili captatione consistit.' The usage (which of course has strong moral overtones) goes much further back: note Cic. Brut 202 'cauenda est presso... oratori inopia et ieunitas, amplo autem inflatum et corruptum orationis genus'; and often in the Elder Seneca (Fairweather, General Index s.v. corruptus). In our book note the list of vices (2. 5. 10) to be pointed out to pupils in corruptae orationes. tinnulos: a contemptuous word; cf. Tac. Dial. 26. 1 'tinnitus Gallionis', Fronto, p. 154. 5 van den Hout2 'neque ita cordaces... neque ita tinnulas [sc. sententias]'. The allusion, according to Norden, AK 290-1, is to the debased rhythmical tendencies of the day: 'er tadelt vor allem die Vergewaltigung der Wortstellung dem Rhythm us zuliebe, und zwar eines ganz weichlichen und weibischen Rhythmus, der auf das Ohr keinen andern Eindruck mache, als das Klingeln von Schellen und Glockchen.' But what exactly is the sound alluded to? tinn- words are predominantly connected with the 'ringing' noise of brass instruments (Cat. 64. 262 'tereti tenuis tinnitus aere ciebant'; note Q. 11. 3. 31 'sonis homines ut aera tinnitu dinoscimus', and see Austin's n. on

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12. 10. 31 'ny iucundam et in fine praecipue quasi tinnientem') like cymbala and sistra (cf. Q. 9. 4. 66 [of runs of short syllables] sonum reddant paene puerilium crepitaculorum'). Bells, of course, were called tintinnabula (PI. Trin. 1004 'tinnit tintinnabulum'), and were made of brass; but tinnulus in literary contexts would not point unambiguously to them. The use of KOJSIOV in 'Longinus' 23. 4 hardly helps; perhaps we should rather compare KporaXov (note Philostr. VA 8. 6, where a hypothetical sophist is imagined KporaXov 8IKT)V KTVTT: some such addition is needed; cf. 1.11. 14 'et haec dum infirma aetas maiora non capiet'. For a similar expression see 2. 8. 13 'erit qui ex iis aliqua non possit'. The traditional stopgap, aliud, which goes back to Philander, is not convincing. res ac uerba conectere: fitting words to objects would be an even earlier stage, and we take it that Q. is talking rather of fitting facts into a consecutive narrative and words into a coherent pattern; cf. 11. 2. 2 'rerum ac uerborum contextum sequi'. protinus: cf. 1. 11. 14 'ut protinus pronuntiationem uocem memoriam exerceat'. In these two passages and some others (e.g. 1. 1. 35, 2. 5.6,2. 15. 34, 4. 2. 29, 5.13. 26; Hand, Tursellinus, iv. 625; Bonnell, Lexicon, s.v. I a gives a list that needs correction and expansion; OLD s.v. 4), the word appears to be equivalent to simul The usage, which may be unique to Q., is perhaps related to the logical sense (OLD s.v. 5) seen in e.g. 2. 21. 10. In the present passage, 'right from the start' is not satisfactory, because the training of memory, though of the highest importance at the early stage (1. 1. 36), is not the primary purpose of the exercises described, which is to build up loquendi facultas. cum iam... accipient: we return to the later stage, when the students are in the process of picking up the 'pattern of correct oratio during the preliminary exercises assigned by Q. to the rhetor, at 2. 7. 3 that process is marked as

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complete by the difference of tense: 'formam [see n. on et... expriment] orationis illam quam mente penitus acceperint expriment' (cf. 10. 5. 19 'iuuenis qui rationem inueniendi eloquendique... acceperit'). In 1. 5. 1 we are told that oratio should have three virtues, 'ut emendata, ut dilucida, ut ornata sit' (cf. 11.3. 30). Q. immediately goes on to assign teaching of the 'emendate loquendi regulam' to the gramniaticus (so at 1. 6. 20 'recta locutio' = opdo€7T€ia). That was also presumably the aim of whoever inculcated the loquendi facultatem' mentioned earlier in our section. But at the later stage the rhetor is concerned not with correct 'talking' (sertno) but with correct 'speaking' (oratio; cf. n.on 2. 3. 6 loqui). rectae: confirming the correctness of emendata oratio; the word is not used as in either 9. 2. 79 or 10. 5. 8 (see also 2. 5. 11 'sermo rectus', with n. on rectus), but cf. 10. 1. 44 'rectum dicendi genus', 89. Similarly below, 17 'ante discet recte dicere quam cito'. accipient: the future must be continuative or inchoative; cf. perhaps 1.11. 14 'haec dum infirma aetas maiora non capiet; ceterum cum legere orationes oportebit, cum uirtutes earum iam s e n t i e t . . I t seems to be used from the viewpoint of one looking forward from the earlier stage of education: 'when (much later) they will now be...'; for cum iam with the future cf. 11. 3. 159 'cum iam incipiendum erit', and perhaps 12. 11.7 'cum iam secretus .. .conlocarit et sentiet...'. The future does, however, seem to clash with est, and one wonders if Q. wrote accipiunt. garrulitas: well glossed by its first preserved use, Ov. Met. 5. 677-8 'nunc quoque in alitibus facundia prisca remansit | raucaque garrulitas studiumque immane loquendi'. Q. is kinder to extemporization in 10. 7 (1 'maximus... studiorum fructus est'); but he stresses there that it only comes with long practice, 'nec quisquam tantum fidat ingenio ut id sibi speret incipienti statim posse contingere' (18). And without the discipline of writing it has unhappy results even for an adult: 'inanem modo loquacitatem [cf. also 10. 5. 22] dabit et uerba in labris nascentia' (10. 3. 2). Cicero (de Orat. 1. 149-50), who also sees writing as crucial, complains that those who speak extempore 'linguae celeritatem incitant uerborumque frequentia delectantur'. [Plu.] Moralia 6 c-7 A also dwells on the dangers of extempore speech (fxaraioXoytas rrjs eoxdrrjg OLITIOV), especially for the young, though he regards mental preparation (see below), not writing, as the vital factor. cogitatio: oKe'ifrts ([Plu.] Moralia 6 c), 'preparation without writing', is discussed in 10. 6; Q. (again in the wake of Cic. de Orat. 1. 150) regards it as a half-way station between writing a speech (10. 3) and extemporizing it, 'inter scribendi laborem externporalemque fortunam' (10. 6. 1). Like extemporization, it cannot be mastered quickly (10. 6. 2-3, referred back to

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in 10. 7. 18). In our passage, Q. means something less elaborate: the pupil does not stop to think. At this age, writing is the key to success. uix...mora: the words go together (not cited by OLD s.v. uix 2b; K-S 1. 219-220). The habit is criticized in maturer dedaimers, whom (10. 7. 21) 'peruersa ducit ambitio ut exposita controuersia protinus dicere uelint'; cf. Fairweather 233-4, and add Gel. 9. 15. 9. For Greek extemporization see Russell, Declamation, 79-81, and n.on 2. 21. 21 Gorgias... uellet. circulatoriae: characteristic of those who attract an impromptu circle of listeners in the street (Ammendola compares Gk. oxAaytoyos); cf. 10. 1 . 8 'nobis... copia cum iudicio paranda est, uim orandi, non circulatoriam uolubilitatem spectantibus', with Peterson ad loc., citing e.g. Sen. Ep. 40. 3 'istam uim dicendi rapidam atque abundantem aptiorem esse circulanti quam agenti rem magnam ac seriam docentique'. uere: probably to be taken with the adjective; cf. e.g. 11. 1. 35 'uir duilis uereque sapiens', OLD s.v. lb. iactationis: 'showing off'. Q. disliked iactatio in several manifestations: see e.g. 1. 5. 11,4. 3. 2, 11. 1. 25; for his comments on this vice, and others related to it, see Winterbottom's introduction at Corsi 14-15. 4. 16 parentium: for their keenness to see their little dears perform, see 2. 7. 1 with n. on patres. contemptus operis: cf. esp. 12.6. 2 'inde [i.e. from starting one's oratorical career too young] et contemptus operis innascitnr et fundamenta iaciuntur impudentiae'. inuerecunda frons: a person's brow being regarded as an indicator of his character. Cf. Val. Max. 8. 2. 2 'nummos... quos... fronte inuerecunda... captauerat' ('shamelessly'); Q. 12. 5. 4 'optima est... emendatio uerecundiae ['shyness'] fiducia et quamlibet inbecilla frons [i.e. one that blushed too readily] magna consdentia sustinetur'. malorum: of course rhetorical vices. For the gen. cf. Cic. Cat 2. 9 'stuprorum et scelerum exercitatione adsuefactus'. de se persuasio: cf. n. on 2. 2. 12 uana de se persuasio. 4. 17 erit.. .tempus: cf. Caes. Gal. 3. 4. 1 'ut iis rebus... admini strand is tempus daretur'. In our passage erit suum is equivalent to dabitur (note also 2. 1. 13 'dabuntur illis turn quoque tempora sua'), facilitatis (given by the corrector of A) is not needed. n e c . . . transibitur: referring forward to the discussion of extempore eloquence in 10. 7. sum mo., .la bore: as the digression (IB) nears its end, Q. recalls its start ('quanta maxima possit adhibita diligentia', 15). Similarly, the emphatic scripserit picks up stilo. probabile looks further back, to the need for the

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teacher to show generous approval of any good work (2. 2. 6; also 2. 2. 9 probabitur, contrast 2. 3. 11 'indoctus ille etiam probabit fortasse uitiosa'), though that has been reinforced in 12. hoc: accusative (Liv. 24. 5. 9 'inde a puero in omnia familiaria iura adsuetum'). naturam faciat: cf. Cic. Fin. 5. 74 consuetudine quasi alteram quandam naturam effici' (ND 2. 152 is different). See Colson on 1. 2. 8 'fit ex his consuetudo, inde natura'; Otto, Sprichwdrter, 90-1, adding, for secunda natura, Grillius, Comm. in Cic. Rhet. p. 26. 89-90 Jakobi. The Greek proverb is given by Julian, Misopogon 353 A as edos Sevrepr} 4>vats; to Otto's refs. add D.H. Comp. 25 (p. 134. 19-20 Usener-Radermacher). Cf. also 2. 5. 2 'longa consuetudo... fecerat legem' (with n. on consuetudo). Watt 143 suggested the addition of morem before naturam, asking pertinently: 'how does one construe the genitives huius reiV One might think rather of adding consuetudine (cf. the passages just cited); for the genitive of the thing to which one becomes accustomed cf. e.g. 1. 3. 11 'ne [remissiones]... faciant... otii consuetudinem nimiae', and above 'consuetudo pessime dicendi' (16). The matter is complicated by the variants. A has sibi rei, perhaps discouraging to any such addition, but B's rei sibi might admit 'huius rei sibi' or 'huius rei sibi '. For the order cf. 9. 2. 37 (from Livy) 'magnas opes sibi magnumque nomen facere', 12. 10. 61 'et ripas sibi faciat'. Contrast 5. 14. 31 'ac sibi uiam, si quando non acceperit, faciat', where sibi is quite emphatic and faciat pointed. ille.. .cito: an epigrammatic summary provides closure of the digression. The qualified optimism of this exhortation is characteristic: cf. 12. 11. 30 'aut euademus in summum aut certe multos infra nos uidebimus' (Q.'s last words before the final address to his friend Marcus Vitorius). recte recalls rectae in 15 ('correct'), cito apparently refers to the Wee described in 'nec expectata cogitatio et uix surgendi mora' (15), rather than to speaking too fast (though see the Senecan passage cited on 15 circulatoriae). 4. 18 restruendi: as Russell was the first to see, B's reading is correct (destruendi A); cf. 2. 17. 30 (restituere B; destruere A, but the first letter has been corrected), 10. 5.12 (restructio b [here a primary MS]; destructio B). The words in de- are obviously more familiar to scribes, and are indeed (in our sense) transmitted without variant at 3. 9. 5, 5. 7. 36, and 7. 3. 19. Outside Q., Russell compared Stat. Theb. 10. 878-9 'tabulataque saeuus | restruit (v./. destruit)'; PHI knows no other parallel. Q. is our first witness to both re- or de- in this sense, but later de- naturally established itself. For the prefix re- in this destructive sense, see OLD s.v. re- 'reversal of a previous process': thus e.g. resigno, resuo, retexo.

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Commentary

avaoK€vrj et KaraoKcvrj: defined by Hermogenes 11. 2-3: dvaoKevrj eortv avarpoTTT] TOV TrpoTtOevTos TTpdypiaTos, KciTaoKevr) 8E rovvavrtov fiefiaiauois; Lausberg, §1122. Theon (see Patillon, pp. xciii-xcvii) does not, likeQ. and the later progymnasmatists, give them a section of their own, but instead introduces them under each of the 'disputable exercises', chria, myth, narrative, thesis, and law (see in summary 65. 18-23 [pp. 8-9]); he remarks on how near this exercise comes to a case in court (78. 11-13 [p. 38], referring back to 60. 6-10 [p. 2]). Q. from now on diverges from known Latin sources (see above, p. 76), though cf. Suet. Rhet 25. 4 'saepe fabulis fidem firmare aut demere, quod genus.. .dvaoKevds et KaraoKevds Graeci uocant', with Raster's n.). He will return to the exercise when discussing the acquisition of facility at a later stage (10. 5. 12), there speaking of its application to general statements, sententiae. fabulosis et carmine traditis: see on 2 fabulam... remota-, Q. seems again (see n. on 2 poeticas) to be combining fabula and argumentum in one phrase, while annates represent historical narrative; for the juxtaposition of poetry and annals, cf. Cic. Rab. Post. 43 '[uera laus] quae non poetarum carminibus, non annalium monumentis celebratur...'. porro appears to be almost equivalent to enim (OLD s.v. porro 6b 'explaining or enlarging upon a point'); Q., who has restricted the rhetors remit to historical narrative (2), now remarks that dvaoKevq and KaraoKcvrj can be applied to stories found in history, not just to those found in myth, and his implication may be that this exercise should be confined, or largely restricted, to history. But he blurs the distinction by giving examples not from 'real' history but from quasi-mythical stories found in the Roman annalists; cf. 'Nicolaus' in Rh. Gr. i. 287-8: the tale ofCandaules in Herodotus. For the practice of the Greek progymnasmatists, see below on in utramquepartem. credibile: naturally the main line of attack (Hermogenes 11. 8 dvaoKcvdocis.. .CK TOV dmddvov; Patillon, p. xcv). Naturally too, judicial narrative needed to be believable (4. 2. 31). super caput: in galea, as Livy has it in his version (7. 26. 3-5). He at least seems unperturbed by the probability of this story. os oculosque: as in Livy; cf. also Cic. Phil. 8. 20 (where uerberauit happens to follow), Verg. A. 8. 152. alis euerberaret: a new and vivid addition to Livy's story, perhaps prompted, so P. Hardie, Cosmos and Imperium (Oxford, 1986), 151 n. 78, by Virgil's wording in a related scene in A. 12. 861-6 (note 866 'clipeumque euerberat alis'); Eutropius 2. 6. 3 has 'alis et unguibus Galli oculos uerberauit'. in utramque partem: cf. Hermogenes' doctrine (differing from Theon's) that neither dvaaKcvq nor kclraoKevrj should be practised on myth, but only on TOJV €<J> EKARCPA rrjv CMXEIPIQOIV Sexofxeviov (11. 4-7); cf. also Aphthonius

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10. 11-12 and 13. 22-3. Yet all but one of Hermogenes' examples are taken (like Aphthonius' single one) from the area of myth. Similarly, Suet. Rhet. 25.4, cited above on avaoKevq et KaraaKewq, associates the exercise with myth; Nicolaus 31. 9-10 mentions a (standard) mythical topic (to TTcpl Advr)s eirovv 8iriy>7/xa, apparently corrupt; also 33. 3), but also (31. 22-32. 5; 32. 14-18) real-life oratory (Demosthenes, Timocr.). 4. 19 aut de serpente: apparently understand si quaeratur, while the force of de extends to 'lupa... et Egeria'. For the story see Liv. 26. 19. 7 ('famam in Alexandra magno prius uolgatam, et uanitate et fabula parem'); Gel. 6. 1. 1-5. lupa Romuli et Egeria Numae: Liv. 1. 4. 6-7 (with a suggested rationalization), 19. 5 (simulat; also 1. 21. 3 uelut). The genitives are elliptical, for brevity. nam: elliptically, as at 2. 17. 15 'nam de Epicuro...', and in the passage of Sallust cited at 2. 13. 14: 'I don't need to give Greek examples, for...'. plerumque is thus emphatic. For this usage, see Bonnell, Lexicon, s.v. e; OLD s.v. 5. See also nn.on 2. 4. 27 nam and 2. 21. 9 nam scalptura. licentia: see n. above on 3 poeticae licentiae. For the sentiment see Juv. 10. 174-5 'quidquid Graecia mendax | audet in historia'. Mayor ad loc. gives many interesting parallels, including Q. 10. 1. 74 (on Clitarchus). The joke attributed to Atticus in Cic. Brut. 42 ('concessum est rhetoribus ementiri in historiis, ut aliquid dicere possint argutius') has nothing to do with rhetorical historians. For the convergence of poetry and history see 10. 1. 31 '[historia] est.. .proxima poetis, et quodam modo carmen solutum est'; Norden, AK 91-3; A. J. Woodman, Rhetoric in Classical Historiography (London and Sydney, 1988), 98-101. de tempore... persona: Theon 94. 10-11 (p. 59) recommends discussion of 7Tp6oa>7TOV npaypa TOTTOS \povos rponos atria. Liuius: much in Q.'s mind in this section; he was (2. 5. 19) good reading for pueri. Livy's 'doubts' (see e.g. 1. 3. 2) seem to be meant (by Q.) to extend to time and place as well as person. 4. 20 paulatim... incipiet: even in this discussion of progymnasmata, Q. preserves the forward movement of his book, as the envisaged student gradually becomes older. He seems to be delaying his source's treatment of commonplace (see above, p. 76), perhaps because he judged it more difficult than encomium. incipiet: the pupil has to be understood as subject; cf. K-S i. 6-7. laudare... uituperare: the verbs seem to be in a kind of apposition to maiora rather than to be governed by incipiet For the exercise see Suet. Rhet. 25. 4 'uiros illustres laudare uel uituperare' (with Kaster ad loc.), Theon 109. 19-112. 21 (pp. 74-8) {eyKupuov and ifioyos); Lausberg, §1129.

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Commentary

Like the associated exercise of comparison, it was obviously good training for ever)' kind of real-life oratory (cf. 3. 4. 11 'Isocrates in omni genere inesse laudem ac uituperationem existimauit'). Q. mentions only the usefulness of exempla; but Nicolaus 48. 4-16 regards practice of encomium as generally useful for all kinds of orator)', citing Isocrates' Panegyricus and the De corona. formatur: as often of moral moulding (2. 16. 10 'ad formandas mentes'; 12. 2. 27 'moribus... formandis'). The thought, so characteristic of Q. (Winterbottom5 320-1), finds parallels in the Greek progymnasmatists, almost entirely in connection with the more elementary exercises: thus Theon on chriae (60. 17-19 [p. 2]), and Hermogenes (1. 3-5) on myth (note esp. anaXous ovras [sc. TOVS WOU?] a(iovot TTXarrets; T. Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds (Cambridge, 1998), 120-51 ('Maxims and Morals'). It is here that such moral training could have its widest effect, for, as Morgan shows (summary, p. 203) to judge from papyri few advanced beyond these early exercises. For an even earlier stage, note Bonner, Education, 173-5. See further above, p. xxvi n. 10. multa... cognitio rerum... potentissima: cf. 10. 1. 34 'est et alius ex historiis usus...ex cognitione rerum exemplorumque, quibus in primis instructus [cf. also 12. 11. 22] esse debet orator; nec omnia testimonia expectet a litigatore, sed pleraque ex uetustate diligenter sibi cognita sumat, hoc potentiora [cf. also 10. 1. 15] quod ea sola criminibits odii et gratia uacant'. For exempla from history, see L-P on Cic. de Orat. 1. 40; for Greek, Doreen Innes compares D.H. Pomp. 6 (final words). iam turn: the words would ordinarily refer explicitly to the past, as in e.g. 2. 5. 2. Here presumably: 'already at that stage I am discussing, it equips with examples the student who will later be able to use them as necessary.' 4. 21 hinc: again (cf. 18 non inutiliter subiungitur) Q. comments on the connection between the previous exercise and the one'coming up' (cf. 10. 3.5). comparationis: ovyKpLois, dealt with in Theon 112. 23-115. 12 (pp. 78-82); Lausberg, §1130. Theon too (like the later progymnasmatists) makes the exercise follow on praise, and he concentrates on comparison in that context; but he has already made it clear in 60. 31-61. 6 (p. 3) that it had far wider relevance. Similarly, Hermogenes remarks that it can also be applied in commonplace (18. 16-17); and below, §24, Q. applies it to thesis. The exercise is discussed by F. Focke in Hermes, 58 (1923), 331-2; he goes on to make the link with Plutarch's comparisons (p. 332; see C. Pelling, Plutarch and History (Swansea, 2002), 349-63) and to discuss comparison in encomium generally (pp. 332-9; note Cic. de Orat 2. 348). uter: depending on the verbal force in comparationis (Cic. Off. 1. 152 .. comparatio, de duobus honestis utnim honestius'). Q. thinks of compar isons of pairs of people, just as he had talked of praise of persons; but Theon

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(112. 24-5 [p. 78]) discusses comparisons irpoadniriov re KOLI I T p a y p L d r o j v , just as he had appended praise of inanimate things in 112. 16-19 (p. 78). duplicat: cf. e.g. Nicolaus 60. 4 SurXovveoTiv €VTav9aeyKojp,tov; also Theon 61. 2-4 (p. 3), with Patillon's n. 20. contraque: i.e. uituperationis. For similar locutions (OLD s.v. contra 10b) cf. 3. 7. 2 'laudare testem uel contra'; 5. 13. 57 'laudamus aut contra' (also 2. 5. 15). tertia... pars: epideictic, sometimes called encomiastic (3. 4. 12), detailed precepts for which follow in 3. 7. Q. envisages teaching on this topic both at the elementary and at the advanced level. Similarly, Theon (61. 20-9 [pp. 3-4], with Patillon, pp. lxxiv f.), defends the inclusion (discussed again, in different terms, by Nicolaus 47. 12-48. 18) among the (non-particular) progymnasmata of one of the main divisions of hypothesis (i.e. rhetoric in its particularized form) by saying that he is influenced by school practice to give the easier parts of the doctrine here, while deferring the more precise TcxvoXoyia to the appropriate place.1*' The mention in our passage of 'the third part of rhetoric' may therefore be pointed. 4. 22 communes loci: Hermogenes 11. 21-12. 5: irpoaayopevop.evos S e KOIVOS T07T0S.

avtjyoiv 8lOTl

e^ei

D.pp.OTT€l

rov

6p.oXcyyovp.evov

/ c t t t t t 7 t ( z l ' t o ? p€V

o

ronos

7rpdyp.arog lepOGvXoV.

o ...

KOIVOS Aeyerai

l>7T€p 7TCLVTOS S e

apioreoos; Lausberg, 126-8. Whereas Hermogenes' exercise is a step on the way to declamation rather than real life, Q. goes on to make clear the connection with the realities of the court (so Nicolaus 46. 20-2: 'It is obvious to everyone that commonplace promises practice for legal oratory'); though see below on ponatur. Q. returns to the topic in 10. 5. 12. de iis loquor... perorare: Q. differentiates these from the loci of 27 below (cf. n. on 2. 1. 11 communes loci... uersantur). He may have split up the two types, placing theses between them, because he wished to grade the exercises in order of sophistication or attractiveness, and felt that the loci e.g. de testibus called for maturer students. citra personas: cf. on 2. 1. 9 citra complexum... continentur, Plin. Ep. 1.10. 7 '[Euphrates] insectatur uitia, non homines'; Theon 106. 23-7 (p. 62), differentiating commonplace from encomium in that no specified persons are involved. i n . . . uitia... perorare: cf. 11. 1. 61 'in matrem perorandum'; Sen. Ep. 108. 13 'aim Attalum audirem in uitia... perorantem'; as in the parallels just cited, there is no reference to the peroration: TLL s.v. peroro I A. 14

T h e i m p r e s s i o n is given that he p r o p o s e s himself t o w r i t e a p r o p e r Ars rhetorica,

Aelius T h e o n o f A l e x a n d r i a is ( o n one p u n c t u a t i o n o f the Suda)

as indeed

said t o h a v e d o n e . Again, the

closing w o r d s o f t h e b o o k ( 1 4 4 |p. 112|) m i g h t seem t o look f o r w a r d t o a rlx>'»?: 'Tels sont d o n e les exercices qu'il c o n v i e n t d e pratiquer avant d ' a b o r d e r la cause.'

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Commentary

adulterum, aleatorem, petulantem: cf. 5. 10. 20 'locos appello non, ut uulgo nunc intelleguntur, in luxuriem et adulterium et similia...'; so Rh. Gr. vii. 503. 16-7 KOIVOV TOTTOV KARA /xoi^cta?. In our passage, too, one would expect instances of vices rather than of the vicious. But Q. means 'the adulterer etc. as a type' (cf. Hermogenes' Kara ttgyros... UpoovXov); as he (or a dose colleague) says in Decl. min. 244. 5 'communis est locus aduersus adulteros omnes, proprius aduersum hos adulteros'. Note Cic. de Orat. 3. 106 '[loci communes] quorum partim habent uitiorum et peccatorum acrem... incusationem,.. .ut in depeculatorem, in proditorem, in parricidam'; also Sen. Con. 2. 1. 25 'in diuitias dixit, non in diuitem'. mediis... iudiciis: cf. on 2. 1. 11 medullis. si reum adicias: cf. 25 'personis modo adiectis'; Theon 106. 15-22 (p. 62). For the opposite process, working back from particular cases to the underlying questions, see 10. 5. 13. hi quoque... solent: i.e. even the generalized loci 'in adulterum' etc. can be 'brought down' to something more specific. For deduci cf. 5. 10. 61 'genere in speciem [note the singular] deducto'; also Fortunatianus, Ars rhet. 2. 10 (p. 107. 20 Halm) 'deductione generis ad speciem'. Note also TLL s.v. descendo 651. 38-52, e.g. Serv. on A. 11. 599, adding Q. 7. 1. 23. See n. on 2. 14. 5 diducuntur in species. ponatur: pono is the normal term for the setting of the theme of a controversia (e.g. 2. 21. 20, where see n. on positam... testamur, 3. 8. 53, 4. 2. 28, and some of the passages assembled in Bonnell, Lexicon, s.v. IV; OLD s.v. 15b [defective]); see on 2. 10. 15 positionum. Here the verb is used analogously of the setting of a progymnasma theme. adulter... senex: cf. the corrupt 7. 1. 28. Theon 106. 11-15 (p. 62) (cf. 109. 12-18 [p. 66]) talks of loci which are ov\ anXoi, like the one 'against a general who is a traitor', but this terminology is attacked by Nicolaus 39. 4-17. habent... defensionem: commonplaces of this kind, normally directed against vices, can sometimes even {etiam) involve their being defended. Theon 106. 9-10 (p. 62) mentions loci in favour of benefactors, like killers of tyrants (cf. also Nicolaus 36. 16-18, with further discussion later in that chapter), but not these rather paradoxical defences, reminiscent of Gorgias' encomium of Helen and similar sophistic products (cf. 2. 17. 4). 4. 23 nam et pro luxuria et pro amore dicimus: Q. gives first two examples of loci in favour of vices. He may be thinking of free-standing loci, of loci included in declamations or forensic speeches, or of both. In any case, he doubtless has in mind passages in Cicero's defence of Caelius; see Austin on

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Cael. 39-42, adding Lys. 24. 17 (cf. Q. 6. 2. 15 'ueniam petere adulescentiae, defendere amores'). As Spalding points out, Cicero (29) twits the accuser with use of commonplaces 'in rem, in uitia, in mores, in tempo ra', and asks the jury not to apply them to the defendant. luxuria: here of course the extravagance (often with a marked sexual element) of the debauchee, who frequently appears in declamation (e.g. Sen. Con. 2. 6, 3. 1, 3. 3; note Theon 106. 8-9 [p. 62]: a commonplace Kara. . .OLOOJTOV), not the general luxury of the day, constantly deplored in the schools (see Winterbottom on Ded. min. 301. 10). et leno... crimini: Q. now moves to speak unequivocally of declamations (rather than forensic speeches) including commonplaces: we sometimes speak on behalf of a leno or a parasitus in such a way as to defend not the man but the way of life that is held against him. It would hardly be possible to do this without also defending the man (as taking on his case of course demanded), and Q. is writing epigrammatically rather than precisely. He means that within such a speech one may sometimes abstract from the case (contrast 22 'si reum adicias') and speak of the defendant as a member of a group for which something can, surprisingly enough, be said. leno... parasitusque: mentioned together at 11. 3. 74 and 178 (cf. Decl. mai. 9. 10). Being a leno could in itself be the object of a charge (cf. 5. 10. 47), but it might also be made a reproach against someone faced with or involved in some other charge (cf. Sen. Con. 10. 1. 13); crimen could cover either (OLD s.v. 1 and 2a). Being a parasite presumably was not an offence, only a matter for reproach, employable e.g. in the sort of fictional case alluded to at 4. 2. 95-6. 4. 24 thesis: Hermogenes (cf. Theon 120. 13-18 [p. 82]) reports the definition rrjv 0€oiv ctvai e-TriaKeijfiv nvos 7rpdypLaros 6etopovfjL€vov dpLotopovaav nda-qs ISiKrjs nepiaTaaeoig (24. 2—4); it differs from commonplace OTI o fiev TOKOS eariv ofxoXoyovfxevov npaypLaTos avt;r)ois, -q 8e Ocats dpLta^7]Tov[j.€vov 7TPDYPLA.Tos £r)TR)ots (25. 13-15); see Lausberg, §§1134-8, adding Suet. Rhet. 25. 4 'quaedam... ad usum communis uitae instituta turn utilia et necessaria turn perniciosa et superuacanea ostendere,.. .quod genus Oeoeis... Graeci uocant', with Raster's n. Hermogenes 25. 16-20 (differently Theon 128. 5-7 [p. 94]) distinguishes (a) a simple type, e.g. should one marry, and (b) a double, e.g. should one be an athlete rather than a farmer. As Q. deals at first only with the double variety, 'theses.. .quae sumuntur' in effect means 'those theses that are taken'; in 25 he turns to the simple variety. It would be tedious to illustrate the topics Q. mentions exhaustively. For town and country life, see Winterbottom on Decl. min. 298. For lawyer and soldier, Q. himself gives the obvious example (Cic. Mur. 22). For marriage, see

104

Commentary

3. 5. 8 (with Adamietz ad loc.); Decl. min. 257. 5 'et hoc dicerem si quaereretur hoc iudicio an mihi aliqua ducenda esset' (with what follows); Theon 121. 10 (p. 83), and the later progymnasmatists. For political ambition, see Theon 123. 8 (p. 86) 'whether the Wise Man will go into polities', worked out in what follows; also Cic. de Orat. 3. 112, Part 66. The theorists (Lausberg, §1134) distinguish two main types of thesis, practical and philosophical. Q. mentions only the former, presumably thinking the latter too difficult at this stage, or agreeing with Nicolaus (76. 20-2) that it is those concerned with philosophy who ra>v <j>voiKdiv Siaipeoeojv (fipOVTlOVOlV.

For a wider perspective on thesis, see the discussion in 3. 5. 5-11: 'Item conuenit quaestiones esse aut infinitas aut finitas. Infinitae sunt quae remotis personis et temporibus et locis ceterisque similibus in utramque partem tractantur, quod Graeci Oe'oiv dicunt' (5), as opposed to vnodeoeis, which are 'finitae .. .ex complexu rerum personarum temporum ceterorumque' (7). The examples given when Q. returns to thesis as an exercise in 10. 5. 13 look back to 3. 5. 8-11, not to our present passage. mire: with the adjectives (cf. 6. 3. 42). exercitationem: exercitationesK If the singular needed defence, 12. 2. 20 'ad exercitationem dicendi... uberior would provide it. Q. returns to the exercise in 10. 5. 11: 'in hoc [sc. developing facility] optime facient infinitae quaestiones, quas uocari thesis diximus, quibus Cicero iam princeps in re publica exerceri solebat.' speciosae: cf. 11. 3. 84 'cum speciosius quid uberiusque dicendum est'. suadendi officium: deliberative oratory, including school suasoriae,; cf. 3.8.6 '[pars deliberatiua] officiis constat duobus suadendi ac dissuadendi'. Theon 120. 22-3 (p. 83) associates commonplace with the SiKaorripiov, thesis with the eKKXrjoia (deliberative oratory) and aKpoaois (which presumably includes declamation; see n.on 2. 2. 8 ipse aliquid.. .dicat quae... refer ant). Nicolaus thinks thesis deliberative with encomiastic headings (esp. 73. 6-9). iudiciorum disceptationem: so A; iudicium disceptationemque B. The reference is clearly to judicial oratory, but the wording raises difficulties. For A's reading, cf. Cic. de Orat. 1. 22 'earn partem dicendi quae in forensibus disceptationibus iudiciorum aut deliberationum uersaretur' ('that part of oratory which is involved with disputes before the courts and in deliberative assemblies' May-Wisse), with the parallels given by L-P ad loc. In our passage the singular disceptationem seems awkward (and not fully defended by de Orat. 3. 111 'quae in ciuitate et forensi disceptatione uersantur'): 'discussion of law cases', 'discussion in the courts'? On the other hand, the parallels for B's (less rhythmical) reading (Cic. Cluent. 88,90,96; Fam. 5. 2. 8) are not exact, as

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only one case is being alluded to, whereas we need a reference to law cases in general. Still, even in that sense the locution seems possible, and it may have been chosen to give variety of construction. nam., .tractatur: Q. illustrates only the less obvious of the two practical applications of theses. 4. 25 sunt et illae... genus: Q. makes two separate points: there is another type of thesis (the single type: see on 24 thesis), and this type (unlike the first) is almost always relevant to deliberative oratory alone. Hence our comma after illae. namque... erunt: Q. explains why this kind of thesis is connected with the genus deliberatiuum: as soon as particular persons are added to the topic, the result is (not anything to do with controversiae or forensic oratory but) a suasoria-, this again (see on 24 suadendi officium) includes both declamation and real-life oratory. Cf. 3. 5. 8 'infinita est "an uxor ducenda" (cf. Bonner, Declamation, 3-4), finita "an Catoni ducenda", ideoque esse suasoria potest' (with Adamietz). et haepoints the parallel with loci communes, which become accusations si reum adicias (22); et is then not strictly logical, but if we omit it (so B) hae is left with little raison d'etre. petendine sint magistratus: similar to 'an res publica administranda' (cf. Bonner, Declamation, 4) at 3. 5. 8, where a particularizing case is again illustrated. 4. 26 coniecturalibus causis: cf. Rhet. Her. 1. 18 'coniecturalis [sc. constitutio] est cum de facto controuersia est' (Gk. aro^aa/xo?); Lausberg, §85. Q. again stresses the practical utility of the exercise, whether for declamation (see Dingel 69-88) or for oratory; controuersiis will cover both (cf. 2. 1. 9 'uerae fictaeque controuersiae', with n.). cur... similia: for such queries Reitzenstein 168 compared the opening of epigrams like AP 7. 422 (for aroxaoajpeda cf. coniecturalibus here); cf. also questions of ritual raised in Callimachus' Aitia (e.g. fr. 3 Pfeiffer, where the editor comments: 'prima poetae (somniantis) quaestio de causa sacrificii Gratiis sine tibiis et coronis in Paro insula oblati'). cur armata... Venus: for the fact, see Paus. 3. 15. 10; there was another such statue on Acrocorinth (Paus. 2. 5. 1, also mentioning a Cupid with bow); see further Granatelli2 854. The question was also asked, and answered, by Lactantius (D/v. Inst. 1. 20. 29-32: Sparta), and by the Greek epigrammatists, e.g. AP 16. 173, 176; 9. 320 is mysterious: see Gow-Page's helpful nn.in The Greek Anthology: Hellenistic Epigrams (Cambridge, 1965), ii. 334-5. quid... armatus: this exercise clearly lies behind Prop. 2. 12 (see Butler and Barber's n.); cf. esp. Isid. Etym. 8. 11. 80 (on C u p i d ) . . ideo alatus pingitur, quia nihil amantibus leuius, nihil mutabilius inuenitur. Puer pingitur quia

106

Commentary

stultus est et inrationabilis amor. Sagittam et facem tenere fingitur, sagittam quia amor cor uulnerat, facem quia inflammat'. Reitzenstein 167-8 traces the discussion of Cupid's wings through different genres (cf. also Ferri on [Sen.] Oct. 557-8); for art, Granatelli2 854. ita: 'in the way that it is'; K-S ii. 499. scrutabamur uoluntatem... est: Q. now makes it clear why such questions were of relevance to rhetoric; answering them required examination of people's motives, and that was part of the pattern of argumentation prescribed for conjectural cases. One major division of conjectural cases was the question an uoluerit (7. 2. 44), and this could be called uoluntas (Lausberg, §156); under this head came investigation of motives for actions (7. 2. 35; cf. also 7. 1. 62 qua mente, 7. 2. 3 quae causa facti). In at least the first of the questions mentioned by Q. in our passage what is at issue is not the attribution of motives familiar in court, but speculation about the intentions of an artist (Patillon, p. x n. 9 compares for this Nicolaus 69. 4-11; see also p. xv n. 27). quod... potest: for chriae see 1. 9. 3-5 with Colson's nn.; Lausberg, §§1117-20 ('an instructive, short anecdote'). Scholars have found it difficult to see how Q.'s examples here could be described as even a kind of chria; for they do not fall into any of the categories mentioned in 1.9. 4-5, even if they are recast to avoid the interrogative form. It is true that the statement of the causa (ama) was one of the key elements in treatment of a chria (1. 9. 3 'subiectis dictorum rationibus'); but that is not enough to justify the phrase. Patillon (p. x n. 9) connects with the 'practical' chriae of 98. 31-2 (p. 21); cf. Q. 1.9. 5. But that is not the same thing. Russell comments: 'Because it involves discussing and justifying an authoritative opinion'; but these mythological 'beliefs' are hardly that. R. Volkmann, Animadversiones criticae in nonnullos veterum scriptorum de praeexercitamentis rhetoricis locos (Jauraviae [Jauer, now Jawor], 1869), 1 (also Volkmann, Rhetor ik, 35 n. 1) emended chriae to diesis, but the exercise seems no more that than the other. Radermacher's deletion of the phrase is probably the best solution, though observe a similar comment at 6. 1. 20 ('quod est unum repetitionis genus'; and uideri potest is common in Q.); it might, too, seem to interrupt the movement from 'uoluntatem, cuius in controuersiis frequens quaestio est' to 'nam locos... manifestum est ad forensis actiones pertinere'. We doubt if Q.'s usage of potest uideri would support the idea (Granatelli2 855) that he mentions the notion in disapproval; and even if he did we should still like to know why others thought on these lines. Indeed, even those who delete the phrase are faced with that problem. If deletion is accepted, we still need to confront the question of what the exercise is, and why Q. places it where he does. Reitzenstein 167-8 argued that

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the discussion of Cupid's wings began life as an anaskeue; and Reichel 123 observed that according to Theon 95. 8-11 (p. 60) the refutation of a myth should involve not only destructive criticism but an explanation 'where such a story originated'. But if Q. thought of his exercise like that, he should have placed it after §19. Perhaps the truth is that he did not feel it fitted in anywhere (it is not found at all in the Greek progymnasmatists), and so appended it as a kind of footnote; Volkmann's suggestion that the exercise corresponds to Suetonius' problemata (Gram. 4. 5) deserves consideration. The structure of this part of the chapter is in any case loose; Q. reverts to commonplaces in 27 (see n. on nam), and appends a long digression before going on to the last exercise. 4. 27 nam: Bonnell, Lexicon, s.v. £: 'adj. q u i d e m, ubi saepius transitum modo facit', citing e.g. 10. 1. 50 (OLD s.v. 4; for the frequent transitional nam without quidem, cf. 41 below, 2. 21. 9, Bonnell, s.v. jS). It is not always easy to distinguish this use from cases (Bonnell's category e) where (as in 2. 4. 19) nam signals a suppression: thus here one might supply: 'I don't need to stress the utility of loci like those de testibus, f o r . I n any case there is reference back to the other kind of commonplace, discussed separately in 22-3, and especially to its relevance to the forum ('ex mediis... iudiciis'), a note also sounded in 26. de testibus... habuerint: see the parallel argument in 2. 1. 11 (with nn.ad loc.), showing that Q. here by quidam means people like Hortensius. in officiis ciuilibus: 'in public life', perhaps with particular reference to the courts (Peterson on 10. 3. 11); cf. 2. 15. 36 (more technical), with n. memoriaeque.. .mandatos: cf. 11. 2. 1 'quasdam copias, quibus abundare quasque in promptu semper habere debet orator, eadem ilia uis [sc. memoria] praesentat'. dictiones: see n.on 2. 2. 6 dictionibus. emblematis: the abl. as in Cic. Ver. 4. 37 'scaphia cum emblematis' (NeueWagener, i. 440). The simile is taken from the raised decoration on a cup or other artefact (Valla cited Servius on A. 5. 536 'impressa signa,...id est emblemata'), or, better, from the separately produced panel set into a mosaic pavement, as in the Lucilian fragment at e.g. Cic. de Orat. 3. 171; the loci 'stand out' from the speech, and seem hardly to be an integral part of it. 4. 28 neque... differre sustineo: Q. acknowledges the arrival of the digression; he will sign it off at the end of 32. The topic could have been delayed till 10. 7. fades: so in 12. 6.4 'alia ueri discriminis fades'. For its constant variety, see n. on 2. 13. 17 cotidie nouum.

108

Commentary

proprium: opposed to communia below; so in 5 pr. 5 'quae in commune ad omnis quaestiones pertinent' contrasts with 'quae in quoque causae genere propria sunt'. propositis... respondere: cf. 2. 17. 32. ex parte diuersa: A reads aduersa, but diuersa is supported by 5. 13. 12 'resoluere ex parte diuersa dicta'; cf. Decl min. 269.11 'scio dici simile aliquid etiam ex parte diuersa' (343. 2 is different; it may be significant that these are the only instances given by PHI, which provides none at all for ex parte aduersa). altercationibus... occurrere, testem rogare: cf. 6. 3. 4 'multa et in altercationibus et interrogandis testibus [cf. 6. 3. 46].. .dixit facete [sc. Cicero]' (an altercatio in the senate is reported, with relish, in Cic. Att. 1. 16. 8 and 10); 10. 1. 35 [philosophers] 'altercationibus atque interrogationibus oratorem futurum optime praeparant' (with Peterson's n.); 12. 3. 3 'quid fiet [i.e. to a speaker without knowledge of the law] in altercatione, ubi occurrendum continuo.. .est' (with Austin's n.). Precepts for altercatio are given in 6. 4; for the interrogation of witnesses see 5. 7. 26-32. uelociter makes an important point; cf. 6.4. 8 altercatio requires 'ingenio ueloci ac mobili, animo praesenti et acri'. uulgatissimos: 'commonest' (add to OLD s.v. uulgatus 4), but with some sense of disapproval, 'cliche-ridden' (OLD 3), as perhaps in Decl. mai. 6. 7 'nam ilia quidem uulgatissima orbitatis uox est'. ante praeparatis: cf. n.on 13 rursus... retractatam; cf. Tac. Dial. 18. 2 'ante praedixero', where Gudeman lists many parallels. 4. 29. This perplexing section was discussed by Winterbottom1 126, supplemented by Winterbottom6 69-70. The opening words are wrongly transmitted as nec uero. Valla corrected to necesse est, refined by Zumpt to necesse uero; Kiderlin's objection (Kiderlin5 398 n. 1) that Q. did not use necesse without the copulative is perhaps countered by 7. 2.48 (see also Lucr. 3. 543, with Kenney's n.). We have printed Zumpt's conjecture merely as a stop-gap, not being convinced of the aptness of uero (one wonders about namque to replace nec uero), and feeling that the whole of 29 is in need of overhaul. Comparing the similar passage 9. 4. 113 'nonne ergo refrigeretur sic [sc. as the result of over-carefi.il patterning of words] calor et impetus pereat...?', we suggest (exempli gratia): 'haec nonne [or 'nonne haec'] iis [i.e. the speakers], cum eadem pluribus iudiciis dicunt, aut fastidium moueant uelut frigidi et repositi cibi [perhaps not now nom. plur. but gen. sing.; cf. Cic. Inv. I. 25] aut pudorem deprensa [now neut. plur.] totiens audientium memoria. What follows can then be hived off as a parenthetic exclamation; for the subjunctive conteratur cf. e.g. Cic. Cael. 63 'o magnam uim ueritatis, quae.. .defendat', K-S ii. 292.

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Commentary

few possessions on many different occasions (the officia will be those imposed by the host-guest relationship: TLL s.v. officium 519. 51-3) and as a result wear them out (there maybe a glance at contritus, 'hackneyed': OLD s.v. contero 4d). Afifahl 104 compares PI. Ale. 1, 113 E 8 oKevapiiovKaTaT€TpqjLpL€vojv. It maybe more than coincidence that just below (114 A 7: cited by Afifahl 103 to illustrate fastidium in our passage) Socrates talks of the delicacy (rpvas) that finds it displeasing to taste the same Aoyo?. 4. 30 cum eo quidem, quod: cf. (without quidem) 10. 7. 13 (with Peterson's n.), 12. 10. 47 (with Austin's). The exact implications of the phrase vary with the context (K-S ii. 272); here it is much like aecedit quod. uix... copulatus: Kiderlin6 75-6 claimed that it cannot be Q.'s point that 'je allgemeiner eine erorterung ist, desto besser kann sie mit einem falle zusammenhangen'; but it is precisely Q.'s contention that an absolutely general locus on e.g. avarice would fit into a context where such a locus was required with no need for any adaptation at all. But in fact almost no commonplace is so 'common' (i.e. so all-purpose) that it could be put into a speech without at least some words to fit it into the context. And, Q. seems to imply, such a link passage helps to make a locus 'stick out like a sore thumb'. (We are indebted here especially to the help of Donald Russell.) tam communis.. .qui: K-S ii. 298. aliquo... uinculo: 'some link arising out of the particular question' (Russell). This strange phrase seems to be a substitute for 'propriae quaestioni aliquo uinculo'. For the tendency to replace datives by genitives, see E. Lofstedt, Late Latin (Oslo, 1959), 126-7; Shackleton Bailey, Propertiana, 222, citing Liv. 10. 13. 14 'uinculumque ingens immodicae cupiditatis iniectum est'. fappareatquef: Q. now moves (see Summary, p. 75) to a new objection to the use of ready-made loci: they are obvious 'attachments', for two different reasons that follow ('uel quod... uel quod'). Radermacher may be right to suggest a lacuna, for the objection to the use of a link (uinculum) between locus and context has not been more than hinted at. That objection would seem to be that the link would be all too naively transparent to the listener (cf. perhaps the mention of 'commissuris..., ut in opere male iuncto, hiantibus' in 12. 9. 17, more fully cited below in the next n.). What now follows concerns not the link but the whole locus, though there is a connection between these topics: the link makes the locus look 'attached', and the locus in any case is obviously attached because... The right sense is therefore given by Russell's translation: 'and even so it would be obvious that...'; but that asks a lot of the Latin. Spalding suggested (on 10. 3. 16)

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'appareat alioqui'; perhaps 'appareat que', even then [cf. e.g. 1. 5. 42]'. insertum... adplicitum: even an insertion would be 'obvious' (cf. 8. 5. 28 'adferunt lumen clauus et purpurae loco insertae'; Hor. Ars 15-16, with Brink's n.) and lack real coherence with the context: 4. 3. 15-16 [loci 'de luxuria, de auaritia, de religione, de officiis', here thought of as digressions] 'cum sunt argumentis subiecta similium rerum, quia cohaerent egredi non uidentur; sed plurima sunt quae rebus nihil secum cohaerentibus inseruntur...'; and esp. 12. 9. 17 'inuiti... recedunt a praeparatis et tota actione respiciunt requinintque num aliquid ex illis interuelli atque ex tempore dicendis inseri possit; quod si fiat non cohaeret, nec commissuris modo, ut in opere male iuncto, hiantibus sed ipsa coloris inaequalitate [cf. dissimilis in our passage] detegitur'. But even more glaringly obvious is something 'attached', like 'uites arboribus adplicitae' (1. 2. 26; for the practice see Mynors on Verg. G. 2. 221). Cf. generally Cic. de Orat. 3. 106 '[loci] proprii causarum et inhaerentes in earum neruis esse debent'. 4. 31 paratus: 'to hand'. Cf. of loci Cic. de Orat. 2. 118, Tac. Dial. 31. 5; cf. 4. 3. 16 'alia sic praeparata adferimus'. u t . . . sententia: Q. continues to write with less than his usual clarity. It would be strange in this context if locos meant anything other than 'commonplaces'; and sententiae would seem to be epigrams (discussed in 8. 5). Some speakers, on this interpretation, drag in (cf. above, n. on 3 arcessitis) lengthy commonplaces for the sake of the epigrams to which they give rise, whereas an epigram should arise naturally (rather as in 4. 1. 54 'non compositum domi sed ibi atque ex re natum') from commonplaces. Q. talks in the same breath of loci = commonplaces and sententiae in 5. 13. 42 (note also 5. 13. 31, cited below on 32 haec) and 11. 1.49; cf. also Tac. Dial. 22. 2 and perhaps 20. 4. But this is not without problems. An epigram may still arise naturally from a commonplace even if that commonplace has been dragged in. Further, 'ut.. .sententia' does not provide an illustration of the way in which commonplaces are dragged in just because they are 'to hand'. An alternative, to which we rather incline, is to suppose (however casual the writing) that locos means 'passages' in a speech (cf. e.g. 1. 11. 12 and the similar 2. 7. 2 'electos ex orationibus... locos'; also nn.on 2. 6. 2 locos, 2. 11. 6 uidentur) brought in merely for the sake of the epigrams they contain; uerbosissimos may support this interpretation, 'ut... sententia' would then be not an illustration of the way in which commonplaces are introduced without integration, but a parallel to it. A compromise position is taken by Russell, who makes it a parallel ('similarly'), while taking locos to mean commonplaces.

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4. 32 haec: a vague neuter, apparently covering both15 commonplace and epigram, to which what follows applies equally: both will combine utile and dulce (cf. 2. 7. 4 'iucunda... utilis') only if they are arise out of the case in hand. Cf. 7. 1.41 'plerique eloquentiae famam adfectantes contenti sunt locis speciosis modo uel nihil ad probationem conferentibus' (note also 5. 13. 31 'quod accidit praecipue cupidis sententiarum, ut ducti occasione dicendi non respiciant quid dixerint, dum locum praesentem, non totam causam intuentur'); but in our passage Q. seems to say that such things will only count as speciosa if they are relevant. One could escape this by taking speciosa haec as the subject, et utilia as the predicate: much better sense, but awkward Latin. ad uictoriam tendit: as the speaker must (within limits: cf. n.on 2. 15. 32 uictoria litigantis est praemium). utique.. .interim: see n.on 2. 1. 1 utique. PHI gives no exact parallel, but note Cels. pr. 51 'non utique.. .sed saepius. superuacua... contraria: cf. Sen. Con. 3 pr. 12 'non minus deuito superuacua dicere quam contraria'. euagari: the digression began in 28. 4. 33 legum laus ac uituperatio: for praise of a law cf. 7. 1. 47, Decl. min. 308. 3 (with Winterbottom's n.), 320. 3; for praise of Law at a generalized level, see Antiphon 6. 2-6, printed side by side with 5. 14, 87-9 in Radermacher, Art. Scr. 76-8. The Greek progymnasmatists, however, talk (Lausberg, §1139) not of praise and blame (note, however, Nicolaus 78. 15-19: the exercise is primarily forensic, but is akin to deliberative oratory, and also in some degree to panegyric, Kado €7raivovvT€s rj ifieyovres rj Kvpovv rj aKovpovv €6eXop.€v)y but of the recommendation of a law to a legislative body (see further below on apud Graecos... uocabatur). In practice this makes little difference. For all its Roman colouring, Q.'s discussion (33-40) is based on the headings found in the Greek progymnasmatists; he starts (33) with an open recognition of the deliberative aspect of the exercise; and he only mentions praise again in 34. In two places (36, 40) Q. makes remarks that call in question the very basis of this progymnasma. What is it doing in a series of exercises that are meant to be general, not particular (so below, §36; cf. 2. 1. 9, with n.on et cetera)? Theon seems unconcerned. At 61. 13-15 (p. 3) he says that accusation and defence of laws is 'not the least part of a hypothesis'; but this is part of a series of commendatory remarks on the utility of the progymnasmata as a training for real-life oratory. Later theoreticians faced up to the problem. Hermogenes (26. 11-19), though he appears reluctant to admit this exercise at all (it may 1 5 But it may be noted that the way in which 'oriuntur ex causa' takes up 'ex l o c i s . . . nasci' (blurred by the parenthesis in the Loeb translation) ties the remark especially to epigram.

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be significant that Libanius does not give models for it: the one example in the corpus, viii. 568-71 Forster, is spurious; the law discussed is comparable with that in Aphthonius), quotes 'some' as distinguishing 'during a financial crisis a law is proposed that offices should be put on sale' (particular) from the same without the first clause (general). A little more subtly, Aphthonius (46. 20-47. 6), again citing 'some', recognizes that there are some, but not all, elements of hypothesis here. His example is of a law ordering the death of an adulterer taken in the act, with no further details given (cf. Lysias' first speech). (Another approach would have been to say that not all the progymnasmatic exercises were generalized: one cannot, for example, praise Achilles without taking account of a host of circumstances associated with that famous name.) Q. solves, or evades, the difficulty by dividing the points 'common to all laws' (34): those in the first group (35) are irrelevant to the elementary exercises (though some even of these appear in the Greek lists), while those in the second (36-40) are relevant both to real and to fictional cases. iam maiores... uires: looking back to 20 'inde paulatim ad maiora tendere incipiet'; Q. (like the Greek rhetoridans) places the exerdse last of all, conscious of its (Roman) complexities. As the next sentence shows, he continues to be aware of the need to relate an exercise to the declamation (and ultimately real-life oratory) to come. apud Graecos... uocabatur: this may refer to the Athenian custom of regularly appointing nomothetai (boards, not as Q. implies individuals) to consider changes in the laws, and make final decisions on them (D. M. MacDowell in OCD3, s.v.); 'the procedure resembled an ordinary trial by jury' (id. in OCD2 s.v.). Others (e.g. Russell) more convindngly connect Q.'s statement with the yparj napavofjauv, brought against the proposer of a law that was contrary to an existing law, or in general 'unsuitable' (Mac3 Dowell in OCD , s.v. graphe paranomon); here again there would have been a large body of judges. It is certainly cases arising from this graphe that gave rise to the speeches of Demosthenes (Timocr., Aristocr,., Lept.) used by Theon 69. 18-21 (pp. 13-14) to illustrate vopnov avaaK€vr)\ but the speech of Lysias also mentioned there was connected by Sauppe with the nomothetai (see Butts 180 n. 34). Cf. in any case Dingel 109-10: in the Decl. min. cases involving discussion of laws (or rogationes) are a 'Sonderform der controversia (so called in 261. 1; contrast 255. 1, cited below on suadere ac dissuadere). It may well be that the Roman Q. was no better informed on these matters than Greek theoreticians writing long after such institutions had passed away. The intelligent Theon 128. 28-129. 8 (p. 95) first talks generally of the e^eraats of laws, then distinguishes between laws being proposed, which receive SoKifxaoia, and laws already enacted: 'disputes arise between ot

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SiKa&nevoi that aim not at annulment of the laws, but at their interpretation on each side to the best advantage.' Theon is interested in the avaaKcvr) and K(lTaOK€Vr) of laws, and hence concentrates on the first of these situations, the proposal of new laws, which 'we either accuse and confute or defend and establish' (cf. 61. 13-15 [p. 3]). Nicolaus too distinguishes (78. 10-12) the proposal of new laws, involving eioriyrjots and avriXoyia, from the examination of old ones, involving Karrjyopta and anoXoyia. Hermogenes talks confusedly of vopuuv 9 e acts Kal Karrjyoptat (26. 12-13), Aphthonius more sensibly of avvrfyopia Kal Karrjyopia voptov redevros (47. 7).

suadere ac dissuadere: the Roman Republican (note fuit) custom of advocating a law before a oontio, for which see F. Millar's remarkable book The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic (Ann Arbor, 1998), passim, would be mimicked by a sort of (pre-)suasoria in the schools. Cf. Decl. min. 255. 1 (the theme ends 'fert quidam legem ne recipiantur' [sc. transfugae]) 'proxime ad suasorias accedit hoc genus; nam et suasoriarum et [del. Ritter] legis suasio et dissuasio est' (Dr Holford-Strevens suggests deletion of the first rather than the second et). utroque autem... (34) omnibus: the progress of thought in 33-4 seems to be as follows (excellent discussion by Kiderlin2 210-11): Praise and dispraise of a law may take the form either of a controversia or of a suasoria. But in either case there are only a few fixed things to say. (This might appear to need qualification,) for there is a further division, into three types of law. But this division is in fact only of limited importance: it is useful rather for praise (than in any other way of advocating a law). The questions that arise (i.e. points that allow something to be said on both sides, as opposed to the tripartite division, which is useful largely for praise) are applicable to all types of law (that is, the tripartite division is not here relevant). So (after all that) we return with 'ea quidem...' to the simple picture with which we started ('pauca.. .et fere certa'). nam: introducing the whole o f ' n a m . . . comparata sit'; Q. explains (see the summary of the argument above) why the division into three types of ius does not (despite appearances) affect the general statement that has just preceded. et genera sunt tria: editors have often wished to delete et, but we regard it as pointed in stressing that laws, in addition to differing in the way they are made, also differ in kind. As to the tripartite division, Q. shows in the next sentence ('quod lex, quod publica, quod ad religionem deum') that he was aware that ius sacrum was normally regarded as part of ius publicum (R. G. Nisbet on Cic. Dom. 136); similarly, in Cic. Dom. 32 ius reipublicae (cf. 33 iure publico) is set alongside ius religionis. Valla commented: 'Melior hec diuisio quam est ilia in Diggestis [sic] \ referring to e.g. Dig. 1. 1.4.

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4. 34 quae diuisio ad laudem magis spectat: in Decl. min. 274. 1 (partly cited in the next n.) we are told that the distinction between public and private law may be made use of in a comparison of two laws (for which see Winterbottom's n., adding Hermogenes, Stat. 87. 2-9; comment in Rh. Gr. iv. 828. 15-829. 3 and vii. 662. 2-22); but that too is a matter of praise (cf. 21 above). per gradus augeat: the figure is 'gradatio, quae dicitur /cAi/xa£' (9. 3. 54). Public law is a step above (mere) law, while ius sacrum is 'higher' than other aspects of ius publicum (see above on 33 et genera sunt tria); cf. also 7. 7. 7 'haec fere quaeruntur: utra lex potentior, ad deos pertineat an ad homines [cf. Grillius, Comm. in Cic. Rhet: p. 78. 74-5 Jakobi '(quae lex) causam hominum contineat, quae deorum'], rem publicum an priuatos...' (the first alternative in each case being 'more powerful'), Decl. min. 274. 1 'quaeri solet an priuata altera, altera publica sit'. 4. 35 iure...eius qui rogat: with a glance at the constitutional formula found in e.g. Cic. Phil. 1. 26 'consules populum iure rogauerunt'. P. Clodi: see Cic. Dom. 34-8, where the orator says it is clear that Clodius 'non fuisse tribunum plebis, hodie esse patricium'. The crux was Clodius' adoption, which Cicero denied to be legal: 'dixi apud pontifices istam adoptionem... contra omne pontificum ius factum...; qua sublata intellegis totum tribunatum tuum concidisse.' A religious law being in question (Dom. 36, 38), Q. punctiliously uses rite (in Cicero's speeches only certain at Dom. 134 and Har. 23, each time with clear religious implications). For the background, see W. J. Tatum, The Patrician Tribune (Chapel Hill and London, 1999), 104-8; and for Cicero's argument W. Stroh in J. Powell and J. Paterson (eds.), Cicero the Advocate (Oxford, 2004), 346-50. trino... nundino: 'the reference is to the minimum interval between the promulgation of a bill and the meeting of the assembly that voted on it': R. G. Nisbet on Dom. 41 (cf. 45); Macrobius, Sat. 1. 16. 35 'unde etiam mos tractus ut leges trinundino die promulgarentur'. A nundinum being the eight-day interval between one market-day and the next, voting could take place no sooner than twenty-five days after promulgation; see A. Kirsopp Michels, The Calendar of the Roman Republic (Princeton, 1967), 203. tritium nundinum was originally a genitive plural, whose first recorded appearance as a neuter singular is at Liv. 3. 35. 1; see Ogilvie ad loc. and O. Primavesi in C. Neumeister (ed.), Antike Texte in Forsdiung und Schule (Frankfurt, 1993), 123-45, at 144. non idoneo die: i.e. on a dies nefastus. There seems no parallel for the phrase, though cf. Cels. 2. 8.40 'non idonea temporal We begin to understand lata from this point; indeed strictly it should be understood with promulgata

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too, the objection in that case being that a law was being or had been proposed without having been published in advance for the correct period, auspicia: Q. may continue to think of the De domo (39-40). legitimis: 'pro solennibus', as Spalding remarks, comparing Nep. Phoc. 4. 2 'legitimis quibusdam confectis' (add Sen. Con. 6. 5). Q.'s phrase is more or less equivalent to Cicero's 'legitimum aliquod impedimentum' (Agr: 2. 24). manentium legum: i.e. (as Spalding saw) the laws not abrogated by the passing of the new law. repugnare: cf. Ar. Rtiet. A\5, 1375 b 8-9 (transl. Rhys Roberts) 'or perhaps that the law in question contradicts [eVavrt'o?] some other highly-esteemed law, or even contradicts itself (cf. 37 'an lex sibi ipsa consentiat'); Hermogenes 27. 4-5 (vofupov, with the example 'it is contrary to the old laws'; cf. Theon 132 [p. 100]). For leges contrariaesee 7. 7. Cf. also Decl. min. 254.9 'at enim contra legem rogatio est' (add 261. 4, 339. 3-4). 4. 36 sed haec . . . causarum: see nn. on 2.1.9 et cetera, 2.4. 33 legum laus ac uituperatio. reliqua: the points so far mentioned apply only to real oratory; but those to be discussed next come up for treatment in much the same form (for eadem fere cf. Caes. Gall. 6. 17. 2 'de his eandem fere quam reliquae gentes habent opinionem') both in real life and in the schools (cf. 2. 1. 9 'uerae fictaeque controuersiae', with n.); cf. Aphthonius 47. 12: 'you will work it out with the headings used in reality [rj 77pay/xart^].' huius modi restricts the remark to the criticism of laws. Q.'s headings have some overlap with those of Theon and the later rhetoricians (see nn. below); and Theon's overlap in turn with his headings for the establishment/confutation of chria, fable, and narrative, as the table in Butts 243 shows. 4. 37 quaeritur satis significent: A has an satis, but see H-Sz 544, OLD s.v. an2 7a. For satis significare, cf. e.g. 6. 2. 12 'proprie tamen mihi huius nominis exprimenda natura est, quatenus appellatione ipsa non satis significari uidetur'. The intransitive use is not easily paralleled, but note Cic. Tusc. 2. 46 'utor, ut quam maxime significem, pluribus [sc. nominibus]', glossed by Dougan 'significanter loquar' (cf. Decl. min. 261. 2, cited in the next n.). ambiguum: 'being clearly enough expressed' could in itself be opposed to either obscurum (cf. Decl. min. 261. 2 'primum incusamus legem non satis significanter scriptam et multa obscura in se habentem') or ambiguum; cf. 7. 10. 2 'aliud est enim obscurum ius, aliud ambiguum' (cf. 7. 5. 5 of scriptum). Our passage, however, directs us towards the latter, though there may not in this context be much practical difference. Theon's treatment of the heading EX TOV aoaovs covers a wide range of verbal flaws (129. 13-

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131 [pp. 95-9]), overlapping a good deal with Q.'s discussion of ambiguity in 7. 9, and including a flaw which Q. reasonably classified under res (see the next n.). sibi ipsa consentiat: see Aristotle cited on 35 repugnarc, cf. Theon 131 (p. 99), under the head of aoaes (why not under v-rrevavTiovl). in praeteritum: retrospectively'; cf. 9. 2. 20, Sen. Con. 10. 5. 16 'nam decretum in futurum factum est, non in praeteritum'. in singulos homines: Cic. Dom. 43 'uetant leges sacratae, uetant XII tabulae leges priuatis hominibus inrogari; id est enim priuilegium' (with R. G. Nisbet ad loc., and also on Dom. 26); cf. Decl. min. 254. 2 'an rogationem ferre oporteat ad singulos pertinentem' (cf. 7-8), 339. 3, 5-6. commune: picking up communia omnibus in 34. honesta... utilis: these are naturally the major heads of deliberative oratory (3. 8. 22). For both cf. Ded. min. 255. 1 'dicet is qui legem feret non esse honestum recipere transfiigas, nihil prodesse' (taken up in 3-7). For the latter, Decl. Min. 253. 3 'rogationem fero utilem ciuitati', 261.6 'his adiciamus quod etiam inutilis est [sc. lex]'. Hermogenes 27. 1-2 has to ov^epov, putting alongside it, however, not t o KCLXOV but t o SIKOLIOV (and also t o vpe'v-ov), which Q. will make a part of honestum (38). 4. 38 nec ignoro.. .complectimur: Q. typically (e.g. 4. 2. 2 'in qua sciens transcurram subtiles nimium diuisiones quorundam plura eius genera faciendum') tries to reduce the complications; but he reintroduces them (equally typically: note 5. 10. 90, 5. 11. 30) by going on in §§38-9 to divide both honestum (dwelling on the subdivision iustum) and utile. iustum pium religiosum: cf. 3. 8. 26 'fas iustum pium aecum, mansuetum quoque... subici possunt honestati'. iustum is Hermogenes' SIKCLIOV (27. 1; cf. Theon 132 [p. 100]). iusti... solet: species is probably singular (though A's solent is possible), as better suited to simpliciter. 'the species iustum (of the genus honestum) is not normally discussed under a single heading.' simpliciter: apparently 'in one way only', rather as in 8. 2. 1 'proprietas ipsa non simpliciter accipitur'. re: the action against which the law is directed. dignane.. .poenaeue: cf. Theon 133 (p. 101), under the head not of dSiKov but of a£ia; also Nicolaus 77. 6-8. 4. 39 quoque: here too a subdivision is needed, after all. natura.. .tempore: cf. the more normal contrast in 12. 1. 41 'quaedam iusta natura, condicione temporum inutilia'. For tempus cf. 3. 8. 35 'est utilitatis... in tempore quaestio: "expedit, sed non nunc"'; Hermogenes 27. 8: 'it is harmful both now and for the future'.

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optineri: 'be enforced'; cf. perhaps 11. 2. 45 'id... a pueris ['from childhood'] optinendum'; Cic. Tusc. 5. 118 'ilia lex quae in Graecorum conuiuiis obtinetur', Part. 130 'quae autem scripta non sunt, ea aut consuetudine aut conuentis hominum et quasi consensu obtinentur' (also n. on 2. 5. 18 optineri). So Ded. min. 261. 5 'sed ne seruari quidem potest [sc. lex]'; this is Theon's Bvvarov (131-2 [pp. 99-100]). Spalding cites Dem. 24. 68. ex parte: cf. 7. 1.49 'quaeramus ergo num infirmari in aliquam partem lex possit'. exemplum: 'it is not clear what Q. has in mind' (Russell). 4. 40 Manilia: the lex of 66 BC conferring on Pompey wide powers in the east, supported by Cicero in his Pro lege Manilia. constant.. .qualitate: on the principle stated at 36, a law made for a particular occasion cannot be treated in a (generalized) progymnasma. Theon indeed defines a law as being OVK eis riva \povov atfxupiafxevov (128. 28 [p. 95]); limitation in time characterizes a decree (134 [p. 102]). For the background see Patillon n.458, though, as Dr Holford-Strevens remarks, he does not mention the relevance here of the distinction between vop.os and ifjr/^aiv 7rpdyfia els KadoXiK-qv Kat evrexvop rtva TrepiXrjifiiv rreoeiv; that is to apply to Kaipos itself the doctrine that to look for general rules is in principle misguided. Further, Q.'s standpoint, which is worded to appeal to Roman common-sense and pragmatism (note esp. the comparison with military tactics at 3-4), has much in common with that of Antonius in Cicero's de Oratorc, thus on theparts of the speech Cicero makes Antonius stress the need for judgement (note e.g. 2. 307-8, with appeal to the indicium and prudentia of the orator; and see n. below on 2 consilium), well before Theodorus wrote. Q.'s discussion of the parts of speech is full of language reminiscent of Theodorus, as the commentary on the present chapter will document; and similar things may be found elsewhere, for instance in the discussion of compositio (9. 4. 117 'quaedam... tradi arte non possunt num in quern [sc. casum] transeamus ex quo praecipi potest?... num praescriptum eius rei ullum est?'; also 133 'non quia negem hoc fautf bene esse compositum, sed quia legem hanc esse componendi in omnibus principiis recusem'). But he explicitly differs from Theodorus on the virtues of narration (see on 5 constricta), and on one aspect of the proem (4. 1. 23). He once criticizes

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the opposed rigidities of Apollodorus and Theodorus with the comment, 'tamquam perierit haec ratio media et nihil cum ipsius causae utilitate sit deliberandum' (5. 13. 59). Such unworldly professors, he remarks, do not speak in the forum, and their precepts are found wanting in the battles of the courts; we should always remember that Q. himself was advocate as well as rhetor. As a result, and because of his Ciceronian roots, he may well be more flexible than any of the rhetoricians he had read. The present chapter starts from utilitas. But a new theme is unexpectedly introduced at 8, where two important criteria are solemnly proclaimed, quid deceat, quid expediat': and 9-14a show how what is fitting, too, can sometimes counsel divergence from the rules. The argument is founded on arts, first sculpture (9-10), then painting (12-13); and the application to rhetoric comes in only by way of analog)' (11, 12b + 14a). Q. takes one of his examples from a discussion of decorum in Cicero's Orator, but the other two seem to evince an interest in Greek art for its own sake. 13. 1 nemo., .feram: Q. has argued vehemently against those who reject rules; now he reassures us: his own will be less dogmatic than those of other writers. plerisque: noteworthy: it does not sound as if Q. has only Apollodorus and his followers in his sights. quasdam leges: Q. often uses the analogy of laws, frequently seen as tying a speaker down: 4. 1. 62, 4. 2. 84, 4. 5. 3 (cited below on propositio), 5. 10. 101 'uelut adstricti certis legum uinculis', 8 pr. 2 'ad certas quasdam dicendi leges alligati'; in Greek cf. Theon 74. 30-1 (p. 33) OVK del 8£ XPV Kaddnep •qvayKaofxemi nvi iiTcodat vopxp. Cicero had used this language esp. in connection with rhythm (e.g. de Orat. 3. 176 'ut uerba neque adligata sint quasi certa aliqua lege uersus ...'). Q. calls such slavish obedience to rules a superstitio at 4.1.64 (cited below on 5 auersoper.. .fignram), 4. 2. 85 (cited below on 5 recta an ordine permutato); similarly 5. 13.60 'omnes fere qui legem dicendi quasi quaedam mysteria tradiderunt, certis... nos praeceptis alligauerunt'. The word superstitio significantly recurs in 12. 2. 26 (cited below on 16 nefas; leges follows) of those bound (constricti) uncritically to one philosophical sect. constrictas: see (as well as 12. 2. 26) Cic. Flacc. 15 'psephismata... non iure iurando constricta'; Tusc. 2. 5 (of rigid philosophers) 'necessitate constricti'; Liv. 4. 13. 11 'constricti legibus' (opposed to a man 'libero exsolutoque legum uinclis'). Cf. 2. 16. 9 'ut se ipsi homines ad seruitutem iuris adstringerent', with n. feram: with allusion to the technical sense (OLD s.v. fero 28a). utique: 'invariably' (see n. on the word in 2. 1. 1, and esp. 4. 2. 24, on the position of the narration), extending in spirit, if not in grammar, to all the

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parts to be mentioned below, though, when Anon. 26 tells us that the Apollodoreans 'say that none of the parts of a speech is to be omitted', he adds 'but especially not the proem'. Q. illustrates the rigidity he means by reference to (a) the order of the parts of a speech (proxima, post hanc, turn) and (b) the rules for composing those parts (id quale and quae lex deinde, where deinde implies that the technographer lays down first that the narrative must be present and at this point in the speech, then how one should compose it). It is in connection with proem and narrative that we can be most confident that Q. is in general taking the Theodorean part against the Apollodoreans (above, p. 199). As to the proem, Q. (see n.on 5 prohoemium) and Anon. (21-5) insist that it is not always necessary, as the Apollodoreans claimed (Anon. 26-9; Schanz 43-4). On the narratio (Schanz, 40-2), Q. agreed with the Theodoreans: (a) that it was not always necessary (4. 2. 4-23; cf. 7. 10. 11 'ubi omnino non exponendum'; add the throwaway remark in Theon 76. 15-16 [p. 36), Sen. Con. 2. 1. 36, and Anon. 116-23, answering the Apollodorean case reported in 113-15); and (b) that it did not, if included, necessarily have to follow the proem (4. 2. 24-30, where note the Theodorean language of 25 'hoc... interim mutat condicio causarum', 26 'quod fiet utiliter...'; cf. Anon. 124-31). For the identity and order of the parts of a speech see 3.9. 1-5. Q. takes us through some of them again in 5-6, and more fully in 7. 10. 11-12, emphasizing the need for flexibility; for similar passages, see n.on 2. 5. 7 inuentione. prohoemium: Spalding commented on the free-floating nominatives, comparing 2. 2. 5, where see n. on minime iracundus. id quale: for the points at issue see on 5 below. The Apollodoreans (Anon. 28) recognized only one of the usual three (4.1. 5) functions of the proem, the winning of goodwill; but Q. (4. 1. 50-1) felt that the sub-divisions they made within that head re-introduced the others: 'Q.'s criticism seems to be directed against the organization of their teaching rather than its essence' (Russell). lex... narrandi: for flexibility in composing the narratio (the subject of the long chapter 4. 2) see esp. 4. 2. 83-7 (esp. 84 'neque enim est una lex defensionis certumque praescriptum: pro re, pro tempore intuenda quae prosint'); cf. 103, on the suggestions that follow there: 'pleraque sunt frequentissime custodienda, immo numquam nisi ratio coegerit mutanda.' For the particular points in dispute, see on 5 below. propositio: discussed in 4.4 (note 2 'ea non semper uti necesse est'). It may be added that in the treatment of partitio in 4. 5, there are similar hints of controversy, e.g. 1 'quidam utendum semper putant'; 3 'ne illos quidem

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probauerim qui partitionem uetant ultra tris propositiones extendere;... hoc tamen numero uelut lege non est alliganda, cum possit causa pluris desiderare'. ut quibusdam placuit: see 4. 3. 1; much of that chapter is concerned with the desirability and position of the digression. certus ordo quaestionum: cf. below 6; see also the discussion of the order of quaestiones and loci in 7. 10. 5-8, esp. '(7) Hoc est quod scriptor demonstrare non possit nisi certa definitaque materia (8) Praeceptoris est in alio atque alio genere cotidie ostendere quis ordo sit rerum'. Similarly Theon 125. 24-7 (p. 90) on the order of TOTTOI in a thesis: it depends on the particular 7TpofiAr}iia. fas: cf. 8. 3. 36, 10. 2. 9. To accept such an imperative would be to subject oneself to superstitio (see on 1 quasdani leges). Cf. also 16 nefas, with n. 13. 2 erat: see on 2. 4. 3 erat. praescripto: cf. 4. 2. 84, cited on 1 lex... narrandi; also deplored in 9.4. 117, Cic. Orat. 36. contineretur: cf. 4. 2. 116 'id... exemplis magis quam praeceptis ullis continetur'. consilium: discussed in 6. 5 (where the distinction from iudicium is explained); cf. esp. 11 'Illud dicere satis habeo, nihil esse . . . in orando... prius consilio, frustraque sine eo tradi ceteras artis... Aptare etiam orationem locis temporibus personis est eiusdem uirtutis'. Cicero had shown the way (de Orat. 2. 330): 'quando utendum sit aut non sit narratione, id est consilii.' conuertitur: the subject appears to be consilium (in effect the orator with judgement), which alters in accordance with (cf. Cic. Amic. 93 'qui ad alterius non modo sensum ac uoluntatem sed etiam uultum atque nutum conuertitur') the way things 'move'. Cf. 8. 3. 13 'ubi maxima rerum momenta uersantur' ('at great turning points in events'; cf. Liv. 3. 27. 7 'puncto saepe temporis maximarum rerum momenta uerti'; Q. 6. 3. 9 is rather different); Liv. 27. 9. 1 'adeo ex paruis saepe magnarum momenta rerum pendent'; Sen. Dial. 5. 21.1 'bellum cuius maxima momenta in occasionibus sunt'. The word is tricky to deal with. TLLs.v. momentum 1393. 79-1394. 1 seems relevant; but these examples from Q. do not appear in the article at all. 13. 3 praecipias: the verb governs the three following subjunctives: TLL s.v. praecipio 448. 54-63. imperatori: cf. the military analogy in 7. 10. 13 'haec est uelut imperatoria uirtus', viz. to react to different circumstances with different dispositions (exemplified in some detail); and generally see n.on 2. 5. 15 de re militari. aciem instruet: cf. Vegetius, Mil. 3. 14. 4 'acies dicitur exercitus instructi frons quae aduersum hostem spectat'.

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derigat frontem: cf. 5. 13. 11 'derecta fronte pugnandum'. The meaning is hardly different from that of derigere aciem in Caes. Gal. 6. 8. 5 'signa ad hostem conuerti aciemque derigi iubet'. promoueat: frequently used of troop movements: TLL s.v. promoveo 1895. 13-31. equites pro cornibus locet: their regular position; cf. Vegetius, Mil 2. 15. 1 'equites locantur in cornibus', 3. 16. 1 'constructa acie peditum equites ponuntur in cornibus'; Li v. 1. 37. 3 '[equites] utrimque ab cornibus positos'. For pro cornibus see e.g. Liv. 23. 29. 5, Tac. Ann. 14. 34. 2. mutabitur: Francius' mutabit gives correspondence with the two further instances in 4. But the three verbs would not even so be in strict anaphora, and the whole complex is less cluttered, and easier to punctuate, if we keep the passive. occurret: cf. Vegetius, Mil. 3. 6. 32 'ne aestate aquae penuria obsit euntibus, ne hieme difficiles aut inuiae occurrant paludes'. < s i > : best added (ed. Aid.) to introduce the third longer element of the tricolon. 1.2. 14 ('si de loquendi ratione disserat, si quaestiones explicet, historias exponat, poemata enarret') is not parallel, but cf. 12. 11. 13, where a third ut is omitted, perhaps by accident. asperitate: cf. 12. 9. 2: asperi colles encountered by armies. For asperitas of difficult terrain see TLL s.v. 821. 48-73; often of hills, perhaps not of forests, though see s.v. asper 808. 32-809. 10, citing Plin. Nat. 6. 19 'solitudines saltuosis conuallibus asperas'; in Verg. A. 11. 902 'deserit obsessos colles, nemora aspera linquit' aspera is usually taken as 'wild', but we might understand it to refer to the difficulty of the terrain which Turnus is rashly abandoning. prohibebitur: the subject is perhaps ratio (as it is for mutabitur above), but better imperator, easily enough understood considering that it is he rather than his plan that is confronted with the mountain and river just mentioned. 13. 4 mutabit: sc. rationem. acie derecta: cf. e.g. Liv. 34. 28. 6; also n. on 3 derigat frontem. cuneis: wedge-shaped formations; see Vegetius, Mil. 3. 19. 5 'cuneus dicitur multitudo peditum, quae iuncta cum acie primo angustior deinde latior procedit et aduersariorum ordines rumpit'. For the ablative cf. Liv. 39. 31. 3 'cuneo institit pugnare'. dedisse: the perfect infinitive may here carry a genuine reference to the past (cf. the discussion in K-S i. 134; further references in Nisbet and Rudd's n. on Hor. C. 3. 18. 15-16); a perfect infinitive is contrasted with a present, again governed by proderit, at 2. 6. 2 'plus proderit demonstrasse rectam protinus uiam quam reuocare ab errore iam lapsos'. For instances with satis, see 2. 1. 2

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excepisse, and other passages cited by K-S. Note also 1. 1. 34 paenitebit curasse. For 2. 17. 25 dixisse see n. there. simulata fuga: TLL s.v. fuga 1470. 24-8. proderit: introducing the concept of utUitas. 13. 5 ita: Q. sets off (as in 1) on a stroll through the parts of speech, significantly again (see above on 1 utique) showing particular interest in proem and narrative. prohoemium: for its necessity or otherwise, see 4. 1. 72 'Haec de prohoemio, quotiens erit eius usus. Non semper autem est; nam et superuacuum aliquando est...'; 7. 10. 11 'ubi adsumendum prohoemium, ubi omittendum'; Cic. de Orat. 2. 320-1 (Aristotelian). For its length, see 4. 1. 62 'modus autem principii pro causa; nam breue simplices, longius perplexae... desiderant'. derecto: cf. 4. 1. 68 'derecto ad Ciceronem... principio' (in the Sallustian invective). auerso per.. .figuram: cf. 4. 1. 63 'sermonem a persona iudicis auersum (a7TooTpor) dicitur)' (cf. 9. 2. 38); also 4. 2. 103 (some banned it from narratio). In 4. 1 Q. proceeds (63-8) to discuss its desirability in the proem, in terms that strongly recall our chapter: note esp. 'quidam in totum a prohoemio summouent... (64)... Quod si accidat, quo iure aut qua tanta superstitione prohibeamur dare per hanc figuram sententiae uires? (65) Neque enim istud scriptores artium quia non liceat sed quia non putent utile uetant. Ita, si uincet utilitas, propter eandem causam facere debebimus propter quam uetamur [cf. 2. 13. 7].' After naming other figures in 69, he goes on: 'Non tamen haec, quia possunt bene aliquando fieri, passim facienda sunt, sed quotiens praeceptum uicerit ratio [showing that not only apostrophe was outlawed by some]'. We cannot be sure that it was the Apollodoreans who banned figures from the proem in this way (see Anon. 19 for moderate figures in proem compared with epilogue), but Q. certainly answers in a Theodorean way. constricta: more or less = concisa, but with more emphasis on the compactness of the result; cf. Sen. Ep. 76. 26 'haec quamuis latins exsecutus essem priore epistula, constrinxi et breuiter percucurri', and n.on 2. 4. 5 adstringat. The participle is not used adjectivally in this sense again until much later (TLL s.v. constringo 546. 20-7). Brevity is one of the traditional virtues of narrative (discussion in 4. 2.40-51). The Theodoreans, true to their principles, omitted both it and lucidity 'quia nec breuiter utique nec dilucide semper sit utile exponere' (4. 2. 32), retaining only plausibility (Anon. 103, giving a different and perhaps inconsistent reason; cf. Nicolaus 14. 4-7). Q. is not a signed up Theodorean here.

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latius fusa: cf. e.g. 17 'late fusum opus'; 3. 4. 4 'rem tarn late fusam tarn breuiter adstrinxerinf; 10. 5. 11 'fundere quae natura contracta sunt' (with Peterson ad loc.). continua an diuisa: continuity is normal (4. 2. 79 'narratio est probationis continua propositio'), but division may take place e.g. because of the intermingling of proofs (4. 2. 82 'quid prohibet, si id utile est causae,.. .diuidere narrationem et probationes subiungere partibus'); cf. 7. 10. 11 'ubi utendum expositione continua, ubi partita'; D.H. Is. 14 and 15; Lausberg, §292. This was another point of dispute between Apollodoreans and Theodoreans: see Anon. 132-3 (Schanz 47); note the qualification in 4. 2. 82, just cited (ay fj xP€^a Anon.). Similarly in 4. 2. 101: 'miscenda sit an separanda narratio cum ipsa causae condicione deliberandum est'. recta an ordine permutato: ordine permutato does not imply complete reversal (cf. Loeb), any more than it does in Lucr. 1. 827. For the ordering of narrative, see 4. 2. 83-7, reflecting scholarly dispute: '(83) Namque ne iis quidem accedo qui semper eo putant ordine quo quid actum sit esse narrandum, sed eo malo narrare quo expedit....(84) [cited on 1 lex...narrandi]... (85) Nec saepius narrare duxerim nefas [cf. below, §16]... amends est enim superstitione praeceptorum contra rationem causae trahi (86) Me . . . fecisse hoc in foro quotiens desiderabat utilitas... scio'; 7. 10. 11 'ubi ab initiis incipiendum, ubi more Homerico a mediis uel ultimis'. 13. 6 quaestionum ordine: cf. n.on 1 certus ordo quaestionum. cum in eadem... expediat: not only will the order vary from case to case: even within the same case the different sides may be well advised to follow different orders; cf. 7. 1. 2-3. rogationibus plebisue scitis: a variation on lex (I) and praescriptum (2); see also on 15 decretis. The meanings of the words are discussed in Gel. 10. 20. hoc quidquid est: for this depreciative phrase cf. 6. 3. 11. The change to the singular is a little disconcerting. 13. 7 non negabo.. .plerumque: rather vaguely put; Q. means that conformity to the rules is on the whole expedient, utile of course picking up utilitas (for autem thus, see on that word in 2. 12. 4). alioqui nec: for the locution cf. 5. 10. 119 'haec non idcirco dico quod inutilem horum locorum.. .cognitionem putem, alioqui nec tradidissem', 10. 3. 7 'omnia enim nostra dum nascuntur placent, alioqui nec scriberentur' (with Peterson's n.);24D/g. 18. 2. 4. 3, 45. 1. 38. 25. Cf. 2. 17. 27 'neutrum est turpe,.. .ideoque nec uitium' (with n.); 2. 17. 35 'ita nec probabili probabilius' (with n.). 24

But in 2. 17. 33 the nec following alioqui correlates with two further cases o f nec.

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uerum... sequemur: cf. 4. 1. 65, cited on 5 auersoper. ..figuram. Compare the argument of Cic. Leg. 1. 42: 'ita fit ut nulla sit omnino iustitia, si neque natura est, eaque quae propter utilitatem constituitur utilitate ilia conuellitur.' magistrorum auctoritatibus: i.e. 'the views of professors whom we regard as authorities'; for auctores see further on 2. 5. 19 niaior est auctor. For the plural cf. e.g. Cic. ND 3.9 'Mihi enim unum sat erat, ita nobis maiores nostros tradidisse. Sed tu auctoritates contemnis'; Plin. Ep. 1. 20. 4 'hie ille mecum auctoritatibus agit ac mihi... orationes Lysiae ostentat'. 13. 8 equidem:'my rule is...'. Q. looks back to 'id praeceptorum genus.. in 1; his precept will be flexible. praecipiam... monebo: it is difficult to know how to punctuate these words: how far does Q. think he is citing Verg. A. 3. 436 'praedicam et repetens iterumque iterumque monebo'? One supposes, with Spalding, that he deliberately changed praedicam to suit his own context; and he did not have to concern himself with the position of inverted commas. Q. in any case, according to the investigations of C. N. Cole, CR 20 (1906), 47-51, 'not infrequently' cited Latin poets from memory. iterumque iterumque: so the oldest MSS of Virgil. According to Mynors' app. crit., many of the ninth-century witnesses give iterum iterumque (commented on as early as Bede [GL vii. 253. 29-31 Keil], and occurring also in the MS of Julius Victor, p. 445. 37 Halm = p. 102. 22-3 Giomini-Celentano). A of Q. reads this also, perhaps as a result of this current variant in the parent text. The same variants affect A. 2. 770, where one of the capital MSS joins later witnesses in the unmetrical version, and MS N of Stat. Theb. 9. 355, 10. 133. in omni actu: 'in all he does'; cf. e.g. Sen. Ep. 120. 10 'idem erat semper et in omni actu par sibi'. deceat... expediat: for the relation between them see 11.1. 8-9, concluding 'quotiens... pugnabunt, ipsam utilitatem uincet quod decet'. In the present case, Q. goes on to say, both countenance flexibility, 'expedit a u t e m . . ( c f . n. on 2. 12. 4 autem) summarizes what has preceded; 'et interim decet' is the bridge to a new topic (above, p. 201). ordine: Q. seems to mean the order of parts of the speech (see on 1 utique); it is striking that this is for him, as apparently for the Theodoreans, the most important aspect in which rigidity is to be deprecated. But he has also mentioned in this chapter the order of questions (1, 6) and order within narrative (5). It is therefore possible that he is referring more generally to the whole scheme of precepts, with their sub-divisions. statuis atque picturis: for Q. as an art critic see Austin, 'Quintilian' and comm. on 12. 10. 1-9.

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habitus: 'bearing', 'posture', as in two other lists of this kind: 6. 1. 14 'uultu habitu aspectu moueri solet [sc. ira]', 11. 3. 2 'adfectus omnes languescant necesse est, nisi uoce, uultu, totius prope habitu corporis inardescunt' (also 11. 3. 119, in an interpolation); note too 2. 15. 22 'cum., .quodam corporis habitu' (in a definition of rhetoric), 9. 1. 13 (cited below on 11 Jigurae... sunt), 11. 3. 67 'pictura, tacens opus et habitus semper eiusdem' (as opposed to things in movement, like that provided by gesture and expression), status will then mean specifically 'stance' (cf. 11. 3. 124 'in pedibus obseruantur status et incessus'; also 1. 11. 16, 11. 3. 159; cf. Nisbet and Rudd on Hor. C. 3. 4. 54), not anything more general (note 11. 3. 89 'effingere status quosdam et quidquid dicet ostendere': 'attitudes' Russell). Spalding seems then to be right, pace Russell, to deny that habitus in our passage means 'dress' (as in e.g. 2. 17. 20), though that would be relevant to 10 and perhaps 13. 13. 9 nempe enim: cf. 8 pr. 6, 12. 10. 46 (cj.). Q. provides three of seven CL instances, six of them from precisely the same period (Pliny, Tacitus; but also Paulus the jurisconsult, second to third century). Hand, Tursellinus, iv. 165 commented: 'recentiores scriptores, Quintilianus, Plinius composuerunt vocabula nempe enim ita, ut alterum utrum videretur abesse posse: sed nempe argumentation! addit afifirmandi vim.' sit: why subjunctive? The corrector of A, regarding it as jussive, emended nempe to neque; but the highly idiomatic nempe can hardly be wrong. Radermacher, adding a colon after pedes and then writing 'erit [or est] a summis', made it part of a kind of conditional complex (for which cf. 9.4.14); Watt 143, varying this, tried 'aduersa si facies... pedes, est a summis'. K-S ii. 122, though citing Radermacher's text, takes sit as potential, which looks out of place after 'gratia est'. Other possibilities are to read Jit (but this perhaps goes less well with the succeeding participles), est, or sic: for the omission of a copulative, cf. below 9 'ideo... manus... et species'; for s/cthus see LS s.v. I.B. 2 'on this condition, if this be done, etc.' (cf. 4. 1. 24). We have obelized. flexus ille... motus: ut sic dixerim (out of 23 instances given by PHI, 8 are in Q., and 4, perhaps significantly, in Decl. min.) shows that Q. felt flexus to be a less daring expression than motum. flexus can = 'the act of curving' (as in Tertullian, Spect. 10. 8 'de gestu et corporis flexu'), but it must here mean merely '(represented) curve' (OLD s.v. flexus2 3a), as opposed to the impression of movement, ille is used vividly, as though we really uidemus. actum quendam: quendam apologizes similarly (see the previous n.): this is only an impression of action; analogously in metaphor: 'rebus sensu carentibus actum quendam et animos damus, qualis est "pontem indignatur Araxes"' (8. 6. 11). Note too 9. 2. 4 'motus est., .orationis atque actus, quibus detractis iacet et uelut agitante corpus spiritu caret'.

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adfectum: like animos in 8. 6. 11, just cited. B's factum is impossible, nec ad unum modum formatae: Q. alludes to the gestures made with the hands; cf. 11. 3. 88 'ut si.. .citharoedum fbrmatis ad modum percutientis neruos manibus ostendas', 97 'sic formatam Ciceronis manum cum diceret.. species: of facial expression also in a simile at 9. 3. 101 'oratio habet rectam quandam uelut faciem, quae ut stupere inmobili rigore non debebit, ita saepius in ea quam natura dedit specie continenda est.' 13. 10 cursum habent: shorthand for 'are represented running'. There is probably no connection with the late idiom discussed by E. Lcifstedt, Philologischer Kommentar zur Peregrinatio Aetheriae, 147 (note Peregr. 18. 2'decurrit habens impetum [sc. Eufrates]'). elaboratum: cf. Cic. Verr. 4. 126 'Silanionis opus tam perfectum, tam elegans, tam elaboratum' (see on 2. 3. 6 elaborasset); but in our passage the word conveys a touch of disapproval, as in 12. 10. 40 'nihilque arcessiti et elaborati requirente'. discobolos Myronis: the fifth-century-BO sculptor Myron is mentioned in 12. 10. 7; see Austin ad loc. for the famous Discobolos (Overbeck 544-5), mentioned by Plin. Nat. 34. 57 and described by Lucian, Philops. 18 (stooping, turning away, crouching); a copy is illustrated in J. Boardman (ed.), The Oxford History of Classical Art (Oxford, 1993), 96 (discussion pp. 94-5). afuerit: the sense, whether the form is future perfect indicative or perfect subjunctive, is 'thereby prove himself not to have acquired an understanding of the art' (almost 'to have been absent when understanding of the art was being distributed'). We are indebted to Dr Holford-Strevens for his help with the wording of this note. ipsa ilia: A gives ilia ipsa (this order in 6. 3. 4). Halm (app. crit. to 1. 1. 18) wrote: 'solet Quint, dicere hie ipse, is ipse, sed aeque constanter ipse ille.' Cf. n. on 2. 15. 7 illo ipso. nouitas: cf. (on one use of figured speeches) 9. 2. 66 'ipsa nouitate ac uarietate magis quam si relatio sit recta delectat'. Q.'s comment here is strikingly enlightened. 13. 11 figurae.. .sunt: for the two types cf. 9. 1. 18 'in sensu et in uerbis', 1. 8. 16 lquaeque lexeos quaeque dianoeas uocantur'; Lausberg, §§602-3. For the doubled -que see on 2. 5. 7 quodque.. .quodque. The comparison with figures here is influenced by the analog)' seen between them and the body: see 9. 1. 10-11 'nam duobus modis dicitur [sc. figura]: uno qualiscumque forma sententiae, sicut in corporibus, quibus, quoquo modo sunt composita, utique habitus est aliquis: altero, quo proprie schema dicitur, in sensu uel sermone aliqua a uulgari et simplici specie cum ratione mutatio, sicut nos

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sedemus, incumbimus, respicimus'; 9. 1. 13 'sed si habitus quidam et quasi gestus sic appellandi sunt, id demum hoc loco accipi schema oportebit quod sit a simplici... dicendi modo poetice uel oratorie mutatuni; Lausberg, §600 'Unadorned speech is compared to the expressionless position of a body at rest... or perhaps to an ancient statue, whereas the figura (the schema) is the bodily position of the person or the statue deviating from that position of rest', recto in the next sentence therefore picks up the use of the word of sculpted bodies in 9 and 10. recto: 'direct expression', as opposed to figured: see n. on 2. 5. 11 rectus, adding 9. 2. 5, 45, 79 'si persona obstaret rectae orationi,.. .decurrebant ad schemata'; 10. 5. 8 'hoc oratio recta, illud figura declinata commendat' (also 6. 1. 2).

recesserunt: cf. 9. 2. 1 'iis sententiarum figuris.. .quae ab illo simplici modo indicandi recedunt'. 13. 12 speciem: here of beauty (contrast 9 'in uultu mille species'). Apelles: the fourth-eentury-BC painter, highly praised at 12. 10. 6 ('ingenio et gratia . . . praestantissimus'), where see Austin's n. For the Antigonus (Overbeck 1882-4), see Plin. Nat 35. 90 'pinxit et Antigoni regis imaginem altero lumine orbam, primus excogitata ratione uitia condendi; obliquam namque fecit, ut quod deerat corpori picturae deesse potius uideretur, tantumque earn partem e facie ostendit quam totam poterat ostendere\ Austin on 12. 10. 1-9 comments that '[Q.'s] art-criticism has a clear affinity with that of Pliny', and that he 'would probably have had access' to his book; if he did not read the Nat., he seems to have had its artistic source before him (see also below on 13 nam ... aestimandum). latere tantum altero: there is no need for altero, conjectured by Meister; cf. e.g. Col. 4. 29. 9 'eaque rasura ita deducitur ut medullam contingat uno latere, atque altero paulo ultra corticem destringatur'. deformitas: for other aspects of Antigonus' ugliness, see Sen. Dial. 5. 22. 4. operienda: cf. 8. 6. 59 'quotiens dictu deformia operit [sc. circumitus]'. siue... siue... possunt: the first alternative looks back (ostendi picking up ostendit), the second forward to the example ofTimanthes (13 digne picking up pro dignitate). Q. discusses in 8. 4. 4-5 a passage of Cicero (Verr. 5. 170) where words eventually fail: the verbal equivalent ofTimanthes' picture. 13. 13 Timanthes: late-fifth-century-BC painter; G. Lippold in RE s.n. 1. For this picture, Overbeck 1734-9; E. Pfuhl, Malerei und Zeichnung der Griechen (Munich, 1923), ii. 696-7, with illustration no. 638. Euripides' play LA (e.g. 1550) has long been recognized as the inspiration of the picture; see A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, The Dramatic Festivals of Athens (Oxford, 2 1968), 172.

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opinor: it was Spalding's view that this word is meant to throw doubt on Cythnius; but Lippold was no doubt right to regard it as relating to the name of the painter of the picture. In describing it Cicero did not give the name (Cic. Orat. 74 'pictor ille'), and nor did Valerius Maximus, as so often following Cicero (8. 11 ext. 6 'ille alter aeque nobilis pictor', i.e. as famous as Euphranor). But Pliny did (Nat. 35. 73), and, as we have seen (above on 12 Apelles), Q. probably knew either him or his source (indeed the phrasing here—see below on nam...aestimandum—seems to prove that he had read Pliny's own words; for another possible source, see on Coloten below). In that case, the uncertainty must be a pretence. Q. is not normally coy about his knowledge of art, which he parades not only here but in 12. 10. 1-9. He may well be following Cicero's use of the verb (cf. ut arbitror in 11. 1. 59) 'to diminish the suggestion of pedantry or affectation in displays of exact or recondite knowledge'; see Douglas on Brut. 58, where Landgraf on S. Rose. 46 and W. Kroll, Studien zum Verstandnis der romischen Literatur (Stuttgart, 1924), 290 with n. 16 might have been cited; add e.g. Scaur. 4 'in quo, ut opinor, Socrates.. .permulta disputat', Parad. 8 'sapientem ilium, Biantem ut opinor', Hort. fr. 52 Grilli 'Thales, ut opinor, primus'; and elsewhere Sen. Con. 10. 5. 27 'Zeuxin, ut puto'. Q. discusses this sort of thing at 9. 2. 61-2, citing Verr. 4. 5; for Greek, note W. Schmid, Der Atticism us, ii (Stuttgart, 1889), 290 (Aristides). Alternatively, Q., following a passage of Cicero, is being modest or cautious in adding a detail Cicero had not mentioned. Coloten: for this painter see Lippold in RE s.n. Kolotes 4, who can add no detail to our passage. For this sort of artistic competition cf. e.g. the contest between Parrhasios and Timanthes (Plin. Nat. 35. 72; cf. Ael. VH 9. 11). Austin, 'Quintilian', 22 remarks that the mention of a contest suggests the influence of the anecdotal Duris of Samos; cf. K. Jex-Blake and E. Sellers, The Elder Pliny's Chapters on the History of Art (London, 1896), pp. lxiv f. Certainly Q. had access to some lost source here. n a m . . . aestimandum: clearly drawing primarily on Cic. Orat. 74 (discussing decor) 'si denique pictor ille uidit, cum immolanda Iphigenia tristis Calchas esset, maestior Vlixes, maereret Menelaus, obuoluendum caput Agamemnonis esse, quoniam sum mum ilium luctum penicillo non posset imitari'; but note also Val. Max. 8. 11 ext. 6 'Quid? ille alter nobilis pictor, luctuosum immolatae Iphigeniae sacrificium referens, aim Calchantem tristem, maestum Vlixem, lamentantem Menelaum circa aram statuisset, caput Agamemnonis inuoluendo nonne summi maeroris acerbitatem arte non posse exprimiconfessus est? Itaque pictura eius haruspicis et amici et fratris lacrimis madet, patris fletum spectantis [leg. spectantium?] adfectu aestimandum reliquit', Plin. Nat. 35. 73 'eius [sc. Timanthis].. .est Iphigenia oratorum laudibus celebrata, qua stante ad aras peritura cum maestos pinxisset omnes

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praecipueque patruum, et tristitiae omnem imaginem consumpsisset, patris ipsius uultum uelauit quem digne non poterat ostendere.' Q. seems to have been aware of all three texts, including, interestingly enough, Valerius', though J. Cousin, Etudes sur Quintilien (Paris, 1936), i. 328 exaggerates the similarity of Q. 6. 3. 10 to Valerius 5. 1 ext. 3. For his final words see below on dedit aestimandum. addidisset: in Plin. Nat. 35. 108 '[Nicomachus] Vlixi primus addidit pilleum', the painter adds to a pre-existing conception of how Ulysses should be painted (cf. Q. 12. 10. 8 [of Polyclitus] 'ut humanae formae decorem addiderit supra uerum'; note also 12. 10. 4 'Zeuxis atque Parrhasius .. .plurimum arti addiderunt'), while here Timanthes adds a detail to a picture in progress: cf. perhaps Ov. Ep. 13. 155-6 'plus est quam quod uideatur imago: | adde sonum cerae, Protesilaus erit'). For other uses of the verb in connection with art, cf. Ov. Met. 10. 518, Man. 3. 26-9 'facile est... | auroque atque ebori dears addere [from Virg. Aen. 1. 592], cum rudis ipsa | materies niteat'. consumptis adfectibus: cf. 4. 2. 120 'tristia miserabiliter dicere licebit, non ut consumantirr adfectus sed ut tamen uelut primis lineis designentur'. dedit aestimandum: gave what? Sense, and the parallel in Valerius (cited above on nam... aestimandum), point to maerorem or the like, though the run of the sentence would suggest the hardly possible caput or uultum. Q. seems to have known the Valerian passage (note too 9. 2. 25 'aliqua ipsis iudicibus relinquimus aestimandd; but also Grillius, Comm. in Rhet. Cic. p. 1.17 Jakobi), and varied it unsuccessfully. 13. 14 illud Sallustianum: so 1. 3. 13 'illud Vergilianum'. Q. cites words from Jug. 19. 2 transmitted to us as 'nam de Carthagine silere melius puto quam parum dicere'. For the figure involved, see n.on 2. 4. 19 nam. propter quae: successive treatment of quod expedit and quod decet has shown the desirability of not laying down immutable rules. alligare: cf. 5. 13. 60 and 8 pr. 2, both cited above on 1 quasdam leges. KaOoXiKa: used in 8. 5. 7 of sententiae of (allegedly) universal validity (see Fortunatianus, cited below on ut dicamus quomodo possumus). Similarly Cic. Att. 14. 20. 3 'accipe a me, mi Attice, KOLOOXIKOV OeiLprj^xa earum rerum in quibus satis exercitati sumus', 'a general rule'. Among Greek texts note esp. D.H. Comp. 12, cited above, p. 200, and to LSJ's passages add Nicolaus 53. 18-19 Kavova ... KadoXiKov.

uocitant: uocant B. uocitare recurs in Q. only at 1. 7. 28. ut dicamus quomodo possumus: with a wry glance at the limitations of Latin abstract vocabulary. Elsewhere Q. uses uniuersalis without apology (3. 5. 5,12 of quaestiones; also 1.9. 3 and 8. 5. 3 uox); it appears in Plin. Ep. 10.65. 2, but not apparently again until much later, perpetualis is not found in this

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sense until Fortunatianus, Ars rhet. 3. 8 (p. 125. 21 Halm) 'generalibus egressionibus et sententiis perpetua libus' (see above); but note (as well as 2. 12. 10 'perpetua obseruatione dignum') Cels. 1 pr. 63 'perpetua praecepta'. Seneca had already used generalis of rules (Ep. 94. 31, 35), while Quintilian himself uses communis (2. 5. 15, 11. 3. 180). 13. 15 sed... tractabimus: 'a general reference to the many places in which Q., discussing some rule . . . , will show that experience must often temper the rigidity of theory' (Russell). The passages from Book 4 on proem and narrative cited above (on 5) make good examples. circumferuntur: cf. 2. 15. 4 (the alleged ars of Isocrates); Plin. Ep. 2. 5. 12 (books of principia). decretis: used to translate philosophical 86yp,ara in Cic. Ac. 2. 27 (see Reid ad loc.); note Sen. Ep. 95. 9 'adice nunc quod artes quoque pleraeque . . . habent decreta sua, non tantum praecepta'. But in our passage the flavour may be administrative (see on 6 rogationibus plebisue scitis). technicorum: the noun, later employed in Greek esp. of gram matici (cf. also PI. Phdr. 273 E, where the adj. is used of competence nepi X6yOJV), recurs in Gel. 17. 5. 3 'rhetoricus quidam sophista,... ex istis acutulis et minutis doctoribus qui TCXVIKOL appellantur'; A. Vardi, ZPE 137 (2001), 42 n. 4 says that the word 'seems to connote basic learning and dogmatic use of technical rules'. In our passage, Q. appears to be using it as an equivalent to the much commoner word Taxvoypafoi, artium scriptores, as 'Augustine' does in three passages of his De Rhetorica (pp. 138. 20; 142. 17; 147. 30 Halm). tutos: in effect the participle of tueri used passively, as in 12. 4. 2 'haec [sc. exempla].. .aut uetustatis fide tuta sunt aut...'. For the sense, cf. 8 pr. 2 'si haec sola didicerunt satis se ad eloquentiam instructos arbitrantur'. multo labore... dicendi: Q. emphasizes other aspects of the art, culminating in a key concept of this chapter (see on 2), consilium, before returning to rules in 16 'his quoque [sc. decretis]'. The words ars dicendi may therefore be provocative: precepts are subordinate. One recalls that Q. himself is not writing an ars rhetorica but an Institutio. experimentis: see n. on 2. 5. 15 praecepta... experimenta. altissima: cf. Val. Max. 7. 2 ext. 7 'altioris . . . prudentiae'. praesentissimo: see TLL s.v. praesens 843. 30-2. constat: cf. n.on 2. 7. 1 constet. 13. 16 rectam uiam: apparently 'the right direction, line', as opposed (see TLL s.v. orbita 921. 33-9) to the single fixed track laid down rigidly by some authors (compare Eng. 'get into a rut'); contrast rectum limitem below, 'the direct road', as opposed to a diversion, circumire; cf. 4. 2. 104 (of a digression) 'uelut recto itinere depulsi'; 4. 3. 14 'cum tot modis a recto itinere declinet

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oratio' (again concerning digression); 10. 1. 29 'depulsa recta uia' (and resorting to deuerticula: see on 2. 3.9 lassi); Ov. Met. 7.782-4 'nec limite callida recto | in spatiumque fiigit, sed decipit ora sequentis | et redit in gyrum'. Such expressions are not always easy to categorize, for Roman roads tended to be straight, not just direct, and, as such, they were the 'right' way to go. Note 1. 6. 22 'Recta ['correct'?] est haec uia: quis negat? Sed adiacet et mollior et magis trita', alongside 3. 6. 83 'si non statim rectissima linea tensa [i.e. very straight], facilior tamen et apertior uia' (at 10. 7. 16 the recta uia is clearly a straight road); 2.6. 2 'demonstrasse rectam... uiam', with n.; 2. 17.29 'neque enim qui recta uia depulsus est reduci ad earn nisi alio flexu potest', the right road; 12. 2.27 'rectissimamque ad uirtutem uiam deliget', the most direct, but also the most correct, road. qua: Badius wrote qua, to conform with 4. 3. 14, cited in the previous n. Note however Curt. 5. 8. 5 'declinauit uia militari'. nefas: see n.on 1 fas (also on quasdam leges). Cf. esp. 4. 2. 85 (cited on 5 recta an ordine permutato); 12. 2. 26 '[philosophi] qui uelut sacramento rogati uel etiam superstitione constricti nefas ducunt a suscepta semel persuasione discedere: oratori uero nihil est necesse in cuiusquam iurare leges'. per funes ingredientium: an analog)' used in Plin. Ep. 9. 26. 3 ('per funem in summa nituntur') for the courting of danger in oratory; Hor. Ep. 2. 1. 210— 11 'ille per extentum funem mihi posse uidetur | ire poeta' focuses rather on the difficulty (Otto, Sprichwdrter, 151). In our passage, of course, neither danger nor difficulty is in question: the slowness is caused by self-induced anxiety about keeping to the rules (rather similarly 5. 10. 123 'infinitam... tarditatem'). Cf. Lucian, Rh. pr. 9, where the teacher points out the footprints of Demosthenes and others and says to his pupil: 'You will have the good fortune to wed Lady Rhetoric if you travel in these footsteps [cf. 2. 6. 5 'praeuia... uestigia', with n.] like those who walk on ropes; but if you turn off course even a little or step out of line or let your weight tilt you to one side, you will fall off the direct road (rrjs opdrjs 68ov) that leads you to the marriage.' For tightrope-walkers see the remarkable collection of passages in Mayor's n.on Juv. 14. 272; helpful references in TLL s.v. funambulus, incuding Daremberg-Saglio, ii. 1361-3. itaque... cogemur: Q. gives two different scenarios involving road travel: 1) Leaving a circuitous road in favour of a short cut; Nicholas Purcell, to whom we are greatly indebted for his help with this passage, remarks that 'this might happen when a highway climbs in zigzags to make wagon transport possible, while the bends are short-circuited by footpaths'. He also suggests an alternative case, 'when it goes round a mountainous or otherwise difficult area, because cutting the straight route would be impossible or prohibitively expensive, though anyone travelling on foot or with pack-animals would

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continue to take more direct routes through the middle' (but see next n.). 2) Leaving a direct road when it is temporarily blocked. stratum militari labore iter: Q. is not using a circumlocution for uia militarist which by this time did not necessarily connote a road built by soldiers; see R. Rebuffat, Latomus 46 (1987), 52-67; M. Rathmann, Untersuchungen zu den Reichsstrafien in den westlichen Provinzen des Imperium Romanian (Mainz, 2003), esp. 31-9. His point seems to rest on the heavily engineered nature of a road built in difficult territory. compendio ducti: the short cut is tempting and potentially delusory (cf. 3. 8. 3 'utilitatis specie ducti', 8. 2. 17 'ducti specie nitoris circumeunf\ not, at least primarily, as in Verg. Aen. 1. 401 'qua te ducit uia'). Contrast 4. 2. 46, where Q. remarks that an 'amoenum ac molle iter'—not, one supposes, a 'Roman road'—'etiamsi est spatii amplioris, minus fatigat quam durum aridumque compendium'; and note, much later on, Virg. Maro Gramm. Epist. 3 (pp. 39-40 Lofstedt) 'sicut... uia quidem regia et publica una est, quae ad metropolitanam ducat urbem, multas tamen ex se procedentes habet semitulas, quae quidem ipsae ad eandem perueniunt urbem (nam si duo fquolibetf unum iter ingressi fiierint et unus eorum per latam et publicam uiam pergere distinauerit, alter uero semitulam quasi compendiosiorem gradi malluerit, nihilominus tamen in eadem urbe conueniunt)...' (to be added to Winterbottom's remarks at BICS 25 (1978), 156). rectum limitem: see on rectam uiam above. inciderint: TLL s.v. 2 incido 909. 47-52 gives some late parallels. Halm's interciderint is highly plausible; cf. Flor. 2. 18. 6 'interciso Herculaneae uiae limite' (also Q. 7. 4. 14 '[miles] dicit se fluminibus interclusum'). tenebitur: in effect 'blocked', as in Luc. 5. 135-6 'in immensas cineres abiere cauemas | et Phoebi tenuere uiam'; also Verg. A. 2. 505 'tenent Danai qua deficit ignis'. per parietem exibimus: this nonchalant solution does not say much for the solidity of Roman house walls. TLL s.v. paries 389. 30-44 has a fine list of passages where walls are dug through etc. 'fere fiirandi uel adulterandi causa'. 13. 17 cotidie nouum: because cases vary so much (2. 4. 28 'causis quarum uaria et noua semper est facies'; 2. 5.14 'omnes... species rerum cotidie paene nascentium'): they are 'uariae atque multiplices' (4 pr. 6; cf. 4. 1. 26; 5. 7. 24; 10. 5. 10 'ilia multiplici personarum causarum temporum locorum dictorum factorum diuersitate'). quae... experiar: cf. 1 pr. 2: 'ut mihi si non inueniendi noua, at certe iudicandi de ueteribus iniungere laborem non iniuste uiderentur [sc. quidam]'. Q., having cast doubt on the validity of rules, ends his preliminaries with a statement of his policy in expounding them.

Chapter Fourteen Latin renderings of rhetorice have been suggested (oratoria, orcitrix), but such translation is not always a success (1), and these two words are not only harsh but also inexact, for they are adjectival in form, and we need a noun. It is true that the Greek pTjTopiKtj is itself ambiguous (2) (for it may be epithet or noun), whereas what we want is an unambiguous noun. But there is no Latin word available to translate prjTopiKrj in the way that litteratura translates ypafifiariK^ (3). So let there be no dispute [about accepting rhetorice]; after all, we commonly use Greek words (e.g. philosophus), and Cicero called hisfirstwork on the subject libri rhetorici(4). My book henceforward will be divided under three heads: art, artist, product (5). The Greeks had long ago named the major arts, and the Romans often used the Greek terms rather than substitute a more or less clumsy Latin coinage. Q. accordingly favoured the noun grammatics even though the respectable litteratura had long existed (see n. on 2. 1. 4 litteraturam, and 3 below). This is in the tradition of a remark of Cicero (Fin. 3. 5) 'quamquam ea uerba quibus instituto ueterum utimur pro Latinis, ut ipsa philosophia, ut rhetorica, dialectica, grammatica, geometria, musica, quamquam Latine ea dici poterant, tamen, quoniam usu percepta sunt, nostra ducamus' (similarly Ac. 1. 25).25 As that passage shows, Cicero did not object to rhetorica, with its Latinized suffix, as a noun. Q., however, argues (not quite pellucidly) in this chapter (1-4) that, even though prjropiK-q is ambiguous in Greek between noun and adjective, it is the best that can be done in the absence of a proper Latin nominal equivalent. He means, though he does not say, that he approves the use not of the Greek word itself but of the transliteration rhetorice (acc. cen, gen. -ces; for the ablative, see n. on §3 id in rhetorice non fit). His own practice confonns with this recommendation. He also employs the adjective rhetoricus, with its Latin suffix, though he uses the locution ars rhetorica only in §3 below; elsewhere wefindinstead thefollyLatin ars orandi( 1 pr. 4,2.15. 20, 9.4. 3), ars oratoria (e.g. 1 pr. 5), and ars orandi (1 pr. 4). Similarly he uses the noun dialectice and adj. dialecticus (see n. on 2. 17. 14 ei... adsignat); he does, however, use musica as a noun (e.g. 2. 17. 10, 2. 21. 17), despite his 2 5 Q. offers disputatrix as an alternative t o dialectica in 12. 2 . 13; for geometria there are only paraphrases, and the evidence is late (Cassiod. Inst. 2.6.1 = p. 150. 2 0 Mynors terrae dimensio)\ we have found no renderings for musica.

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teachers'disapproval (8. 3. 34), though much less often than musice (common in Book 1). 14. 1 rhetoricen: the way in which the word is placed first here is an instance of Q.'s propensity to structure his text through quasi-titles (cf. 2. 4. 22 communes loci, 2. 8. 1 uirtus pracceptor is; cf. 2. 4. 24, 2. 4. 33). Latinum: on terms and phrases used to refer to the Latin language see T. Fogen, Patrii sermonis egestas (Munich and Leipzig, 2000), 51-60; Latinum is unemphatic (as opposed to Latinitas, which means 'good Latin'), sermo Roman us below identifies Rome as the centre of the Latin-speaking community but is here merely used for variation. The phrase lingua Romano, which one would expect to mean 'Latin as it is spoken in Rome', is attested from the early Empire in the sense 'Latin language', but while the notion 'Latin as spoken in Rome' is in evidence from Plautus onwards through Cicero and Ciceronians like Q. (8. 1. 3), it seems to have faded in the late Republic and early Empire, and there is no secure instance of the phrase lingua Romana in this sense (oratio Romana in 8. 1. 3 comes close, but there Romana is predicative); on all this see J. N. Adams, 'Romanitas and the Latin language', CQ2 53 (2003), 191-7. oratoriam.. .oratricem: the former word caught on in the fourth century (TLL s.v. oratorius 902. 20-42, citing both nominal and adjectival uses); the latter appears of the art only in this chapter (TLL s.v. orator 900. 81-901. 2), though Q. has no prejudice against formations in -trix (e.g. 2. 20. 7 disputatrix). As will appear, Q. regarded each of the two as an adjective, understanding ars, not a noun. See generally J. C. Rolfe, 'Die Ellipse von ars', ALL 10 (1896-8), 229-46. nominauerunt: for the unexpressed subject ('writers of earlier handbooks, scholars') cf. 5. 13. 16 'id quoque (obscurum uocant) quod...'; contrast 2. 15. 2 'quidam [five times] ...nominauerunt'). We do not know who Q. is referring to; the perfect tense may suggest that the writers in question were experimenting, and their coinages not widely used; contrast uocant in 2. 15. 3. quos equidem: equidem contrasts Q. with those who coined these words ('I for my part'), but also looks forward to sed. Similarly 6. 2. 3 'quos equidem non contemno, sed...'; cf. Verg. A. 9. 207-10 'equidem de te nil tale uerebar,... sed...'; TLL s.v. 721. 78-722. 4. The word-order is due to the attraction of equidem by a pronoun in the vicinity; J. B. Solodow, The Latin particle 'quidem' (University Park, PA, 1978), at 37-8. quod... temptarint: explaining debita. The subjunctive, which surprised Spalding, is perhaps influenced by the mood of fraudauerim (for which see K-S i. 177; Gabler 63); but it may well be causal (K-S ii. 384-5).

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copiam Romani sermonis: cf. Lucretius' famous phrase patrii sermonis egestas (1. 832; 3. 260), aimed specifically at the absence of technical vocabulary. ducentes ex Graeco: cf. 1.6. 37 'ex Graeco... duci', but 1.6. 13 'a Graeco ductum' {a B; A omits the preposition). For parallels in other authors see TLL s.v. duco 2153. 38-2154. 53. secuntur: picking up a different sense of ducere. we may give a lead, but the words (and ideas: omnia, and nostra below, widen the reference) do not follow willingly (Hor. Ars 311 'uerbaque prouisam rem non inuita sequentur'; OLD s.v. sequor 8b). They have to be dragged, kicking and screaming, into Latin (note 4 'nec uim adferam'). sicut... uoluerunt: utique does produce good sense if it is given a restrictive meaning here,26 but because of its position it is unlikely to restrict quotiens. 'At least whenever' would require utique quotiens, cf. 12. 10. 29, where it means 'especially whenever', and is not encouraged by B's suis utique. (Neither utique quotiens nor quotiens utique is paralleled in PHI.) Rather, utique restricts the following suis uerbis: 'whenever the Greeks have wished nostra signare, at least by use of Greek words'; for utique thus placed (before nostri) cf. 2. 1. 1 with n. The main area where Latin terms were translated into Greek ones is the technical language of Roman administrative, legal, and military institutions. Q. cannot be thinking of transliterations like 8ou£ (Eus. HE 9. 5. 2) and KovaioTojp (IG Rom. 3. 238). He must be thinking either of new derivations from existing Greek terms which have been given a new meaning (cf. VTTCLTOS, from which are derived vnareia consulatus, VTTCLTIKOS consularis, avOvrraros proconsul) or of new compounds formed on Roman models (y€vpo7Toi6s pontifex; ayKuXo-irovs 8ipos sella curulis). Naturally, Roman official language is an area which required inventiveness on the part of Greek-speakers; in other areas (like rhetorical terminology) this need was virtually non-existent. For all these words see H. J. Mason, Greek Terms for Roman Institutions: A Lexicon and Analysis (Toronto, 1974); I.-M. CervenkaEhrenstrasser, Lexikon der lateinischen Lehnwdrter in den griechischsprachigen dokumentarischen Texten Agyptens (Vienna, 1996- ), whose first fascicle includes an extensive bibliography; earlier D. Magie, De Romanorum iurispublici sacrique uocabulis sollemnibus in Graecum sermonem conuersis (Leipzig, 1905). Perhaps the tense of uoluerunt is meant to bring out the fact that the set of Greek terms for Roman administrative and military institutions had been virtually complete since the establishment of the Empire. With 'suis uerbis signare nostra' cf. 1. 5. 58 'sicut illi (the Greeks] a nobis nonnumquam mutuantur' sc. when there is no suitable Greek word. 26

This restriction w o u l d n o t be expressed by quotieitscwnqite

(Watt 143).

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14. 2 interpretatio: 'translation, as in 5. 10. 8 'pistis appellant, quod etiam si propria interpretatione dicere fidem p o s s u m u s . . G a i u s , Inst. 3. 93 'ilia uerborum obligatio, DARI SPONDES? SPONDHO, adeo propria ciuium Romano mm est, ut ne quidem in Graecum sermonem per interpretationem proprie transferri possit'; OLD s.v. 5. dura: cf. 8. 3. 33, cited in the next n. At 4 below Q. speaks of'indecora in Latinum sermonem mutatione', showing that to -rrpeirov is involved. Plauti 'essentia': the texts relevant to the name are: 3. 6. 23:'ovatav\ quam Plautus essentiam uocat (neque sane aliud est eius nomen Latinum).' 8. 3. 33: 'Multa ex Graeco formata noua, ac plurima a Sergio Flauio [so A; B is not available here], quorum dura quaedam admodum uidentur, ut [quae] "ens" et "essentia".' Sen. Ep. 58. 6: 'cupio, si fieri potest, propitiis auribus tuis "essentiam" [so Muretus; quid sentiam MSS] dicere... Ciceronem auctorem huius uerbi habeo, puto locupletem; si recentiorem [sc. user of the word essentia than Cicero] quaeris, Fabianum, disertum et elegantem.' Calcidius ad Tim. 35 A 1-4 p. 78. 2-3 Waszink (where Cicero translates ovaia as 'natura'): 'Docet [sc. Plato] nos substantiam siue, ut Cicero dicit, essentiam duplicem esse, unam indiuiduam, alteram per corpora diuiduam.' Sidonius Apollinaris c. 14, prefatory letter (p. 314. 4-8 Mohr): 'Lecturus es hie etiam nouum uerbum, id est essentiam; sed scias hoc ipsum dixisse Ciceronem; nam essentiam nec non et indoloriam nominauit, addens: "licet enim nouis rebus noua nomina imponere"; et recte dixit.' On the most natural reading of the present passage and 3. 6. 23, Q. thought that (i) 'Plautus' used the word essentia and (ii) coined it. However, 8. 3. 33 clearly implies that 'Sergius Flavius' coined it. The most economical solution to this problem—which is independent of the problem raised by the Seneca, Calcidius, and Sidonius passages—is to emend to 'Sergius Plautus' in 8. 3. 33; this was first suggested by D. Detlefeen, Uber einige Quellenschriftsteller des Plinius (Gliickstadt, 1881), 5, cf. K. Barwick, 'Quintilians Stellung zu dem Problem sprachlicher Neuschopfiingen', Philologus, 91 (1936-7), 89-113, at 97-8 and Adamietz 123-4 on 3.6. 23. This seems plausible given that we know of a Stoic Plautus from Quintilian himself (10. 1. 124), that Fronto contrasts stylistically—and for sobriety—a Stoic Sergius with another Stoic, Seneca (p. 154. 3-13 van den Hout2), and that [Apul.] Tlepi eppL-qveias 1 p. 190. 4-8 Moreschini attributes a Latin equivalent for the Stoic notion of a proposition to a Sergius (a^iaj^jLa/irpoTaais = effatum). Note also that in the gensSergia the cognomen 'Plautus' is attested early (cf. the C. Sergius Plautus mentioned in Liv. 31.4.4 and 31. 6. 2). The chronological order of 10. 1. 123-4 suggests that Plautus wrote in the mid-first century AD, and it is possible that he was a source

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for Pliny the Elder (see his Index Auctorum to bks. 2 and 18, where a Sergius Plautus is mentioned). The real problem is caused by the information provided by Seneca, Calcidius, and Sidonius that Cicero used the word essentia. (That Fabianus used it around the middle of the first century AD does not in itself cast doubt on the assignment to Plautus, both because of the inferred date of Fabianus and because Seneca's point is that essentia is to be found in good writers. He may well have left out Plautus because he did not count him among these; cf. the Frontonian passage quoted above.) That Cicero did use essentia is beyond reasonable doubt: Muretus' emendation essentiam for the manuscripts' quid sentiam in the Senecan passage quoted above seems in itself unimpeachable. And it seems implausible that Calcidius should read Seneca, although it cannot be ruled out. However, the evidence from Sidonius Apollinaris' letter to Polemius prefixed to the epithalamium (poem xiv), quoted above, is problematic. The quotation conspicuously resembles Cic. ND 1. 44 'sunt enim rebus nouis noua ponenda nomina, ut Epicurus ipse npoXrjifjiv appellauit, quam antea nemo eo uerbo nominarat' (cf. Fin. 3. 3, 3. 10). There, however, both Latin terms in question are not mentioned. Further, when we look at Cicero's treatises and the division of subject-matter in them, it is not obvious how the two terms could occur in the same passage (they belong to different areas of philosophy). Indoloria, incidentally, is not to be found in the Cicero texts we have either (on the word see TLL s.v. 1223. 23-32); Madvig on Cic. Fin. 2. 11 has doubts about Cicero's using indoloria at all, but as an experiment it seems a possibility. On balance, we should assume that Sidonius draws on some kind of glossary, in which odd technical terms were collected, perhaps with the ND quotation (for that is apparently what it is) attached. All this means that with Sidonius we are even more in the dark than with the others as to where he got his information from. But since it seems clear that Cicero used essentia, we can continue with the discrepancy between Seneca and Quintilian. In order to sustain what has been said above we have to assume that (i) Q. did not know that Cicero had used the word and (ii) that he had not read Seneca's letter. The latter is entirely possible, given Q.'s general view of Seneca. For Q. not to know that Cicero had used the word, we have to assume that the latter used it at a place that was out-of-the-way for Quintilian but less so for other writers; three possibilities come to mind: (i) one of the lost books of the Academica, (ii) one of the lost passages of the Timaeus translation (17 A 5, 20 A 2, 37 E 5, 52 c 4), or (iii) a letter of Cicero which has not come down to us. As to the Timaeus translation, Cicero certainly did not translate ovota as essentia at any of the places where his translation is available, and given what Calcidius tells us in the passage quoted above, we might expect a hint that Cicero used

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essentia at another place in the same work, i.e. his Timaeus, if he had done so. An inconsistent use of the term in Tim. also seems unlikely on independent grounds. We thus turn to the first possibility. In general, references to Cicero's philosophical works in Q. are rather sparse (see pp. 423-4 in vol. v of the Loeb), which suggests that he knew them less well than his other works. Plasberg, in the rarely used editio maior of the Academica (Leipzig, 1908), gives for the second part of the Ac. 2 parallels which may be reminiscences of the Academicus IV, the book of the second edition of the Academica which corresponded to this section of the Ac. 2. On Ac. 2. 118 'Plato ex materia in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse censet a deo sempiternum' Plasberg writes: 'Hinc fbrtasse Seneca epist. 58, 6: cupio... essentiam dicere... Ciceronem auctorem huius uerbi habeo... quo modo dicetur ovala, res necessaria, natura continens fundamentum omnium?' See also the notes below on 5 cauillationis, and on 2. 21. 1 nihil...sine rerum substantiafaciunt. queentia: the other texts relevant to this word are 8. 3. 33 (cited in the previous n.) and Priscian in GL iii. 456. 21-2 'excipitur [i.e. from the rule that verbs in -eo form their present participles in -ens] eo et queo, quae euphoniae causa iens pro eens et quiens pro queens faciunt'. In our passage, queentia is entirely satisfactory (Svvapis alongside ovoia). In 8. 3. 33 (see Winterbottom6 138) it is tempting to substitute queentia for quae ens; otherwise it seems best to follow Regius in deleting quae, leaving ens as appropriate enough company for essentia. Against Halm's queens is the testimony of Priscian. The result is to attribute three coinages to Plautus—essentia, queentia, and ens; but that there were plurima is attested by 8. 3. 33, and there is no reason why Q. should have felt doubt about only two. ens according to Priscian was used by Caesar; but then essentia was used by Cicero. ne propria quidem: the translation is not just harsh, it does not even get the exact meaning over 'properly' (cf. the parallels given above on interpretatio), in the sense, as Q. goes on to explain, that oratoria and oratrix are adjectives, and so should not be used to translate a noun like eloquentia. propria is not used in its familiar sense (for uerba propria see on 2. 5. 9 ratione eloquendi); for the sense here cf. OLD s.v. proprius 5. effertur: 'is formed' (Gk. eK€perai: see LSJ s.v. €K€pa) II. 10b); cf. 9. 3. 7; TLL s.v effero 144. 28-81. B's efferetur might perhaps be defended as implying 'will prove, on examination, to be formed'; see n. on 2. 3. 11 a me procul aberit. elocutoria.. .elocutrix: these adjectives are not attested elsewhere; Q. doubtless coined them to make his contrast with the noun eloquentia, just as he will coin litteratrix and litteratoria to make a point in 3 below. ilia... rhetorice: i.e. 'rhetoric as we are using it'—as a noun, ilia is used like inverted commas here.

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talis est qualis: the same sort of word, i.e. a noun. Cf. Spalding: 'ejusmodi est nomen, quod, si reddere velim, reddere debeam simili ei forma, quae est in eloquentia, ut ergo [s/c] dicatur orantia.' nec dubie... (3) amicitia: for the argument see the summary above, p. 216. It is true that there is some lack of cogency: Q. accepts the ambiguous rhetorice even though he has rejected oratoria and oratrix for presenting precisely the same ambiguity. But at least rhetorice avoids the need for any dura interpretatio: a consideration to which he will return in 4 ('indecora in Latinum sermonem mutatione'). nec dubie: used in the same concessive sense at 3.4. 1. We have punctuated what follows to show that, as in that parallel passage, uerum introduces the reply to the concession, and to make it clear that nos... substantiam (note the asyndeton) is parallel to, but contrasts with, nec dubie... habet. quoque: some such supplement seems essential to make Q.'s point, that in Greek prjropiKri is ambiguous between noun and adjective (though we might prefer to say that it is always an adjective) just as he has told us oratoria and oratrix are. If the supplement is not made, we seem to be left with the implication that prjropiK-q is ambiguous in Greek as well as in Latin. But we have not been told that it is ambiguous in Latin (if that makes any sense), and one would expect rather the statement that it is ambiguous in Latin as well as in Greek. In any case, Q. would seem from §4 to regard rhetorice as a Greek word even in its Latin garb. intellectum: 'meaning', cf. e.g. 1. 5. 2 (and OLD s.v. 5) and the similar use of vovs (LSI s.v. III). 14. 3 adpositum: cf. 8. 6. 40 'eiriOerov, quod recte dicimus adpositum', and elsewhere in Q., to whom the noun is apparently unique (TLL s.v. appono 303. 80-304. 2). ars rhetorica, ut nauis piratica: Q. gives first (though, for his readers' sake in Latin) appositional p-qTopiK-q in the phrase most relevant, then a parallel (hence ut is indispensable, despite its omission in B) from another area. The parallel had to involve an adjective in -/CMS, with inevitable Greek connections; but Q. means it to be familiar Latin (cf. e.g. Liv. 34. 32. 18; whereas vavs 7T€tp(iTIKT) is not attested), as familiar as the comforting philosophia and amicitia. He avoids complicating matters by mentioning that piratica could be used as a noun (as he himself does in 3. 8. 44; his teachers still had doubts, according to 8. 3. 34). ut grammatice.. .oratoria: i.e. just as in translating ypapumTiKr} we want a noun litteratura, not an adjective, whether in -oria or -trix. From the suffix - trix female agent nouns are formed too, but that is not the issue here, litteratura: see n. on 2. 1. 4 litteraturam.

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id in rhetorice non fit: Spalding: 'in rhetorice, vocabulo Graeco, non tarn apta fit versio Latina, quam in altero grammatics? (e.g. oratura was impossible). We can mentally supply inverted commas around rhetorice here (and translate 'as in the case of the word rfietorice), i.e. Q. can be seen as switching code so as momentarily to imitate Greek speakers. As in 2. 15. 10 'de rhetorice', 2. 15. 36 'a rhetorice', 3. 5. 3 'in rhetorice' (cf. 1. 10. 18 'in musice'), the ending -e corresponds to -rj (this correspondence is conventional, see Adams, Bilingualism, 474-6), and the Greek dative is used as a stand-in for the Latin ablative (on this over-extension of the dative, see ibid. 498-9). 14. 4 philosophos et musicos et geometras: all words, in fact, that have already occurred in book 1 (philosophus e.g. in 1.1.23; the other two in 1.10.4). (It no longer matters what kind of words they are, adjectives or nouns; they are just meant to be instances of Greek words.) Apologies of Latin writers for Greek terminology are frequent (another instance from Q. is in 1. 6. 16);27 but Q.'s point here is that the overriding principle is to use nota uerba, and if these happen to be Greek words, so be it. nec uim adferam: see above on 1 secuntur. For this (strong) locution, cf. (literally) 1. 10. 32 ('pudicae domui'), 5. 14. 22 'uitae .. .ut hostis', OLD s.v. affero 9b; metaphorically 2.15.7 'Antonius... oculis populi Romani uim attulit' (cf. 8. 3. 5 'ferrum adfert oculis terroris aliquid'), 5. 13. 57 'communes loci... magnam uim animis iudicum adferunt', 8 pr. 21 'inuentis uim adferimus'. nominibus his: for this inversion cf. 2. 17. 1 in parte hac and TLL s.v. hie 2739. 33-48. The order hac de re below is normal enough. scripserat: the pluperfect seems to be used from the standpoint of Cicero after he disclaimed Inv. (see on 2. 15. 6 quos... probat) and wrote the later rhetorical works. Graeco nomine: the De Inventione was known to Q. as libri rhetorici (cf. 2. 15. 6). It was also known as Rhetorica; cf. J. Tolkiehn, 'Der Titel der rhetorischen Jugendschrift Ciceros', BPhXV 1918, 1196-1200. See also n. on 2. 17. 2 Cicero uero etiam... dicat 14. 5 igitur rhetorice: Q., after giving a resounding closure (note denique) to the discussion of terminology, uses his chosen word at the head of a new topic. What had been in effect a Greek word in inverted commas in §1 is now given citizen rights. cauillationis: as often, of hair-splitting over words (cf. 10. 7. 14 'infelix ilia uerbomm cauillatio'). According to Sen. Ep. 111.1, Cicero used it to translate oo Kara ras T e x a s ' 1} y a p roc ouoraots

dirdoi/s

Kavova re

r e ^ i ' i j ? TY/V dp\V''

xal

cvrevOcv

etXrjv fXTjSev 7Tapa\t7rr), IKCIVOJS avrov €X€LV TVV in tor i]per] v <j>T]oopL€v, where eVtcmj/ATj is not used in contradistinction to T^Xv7}- This is also the thinking behind assigning to rhetoric the status of a 'stochastic art' (Allen 86-90; and the notes on 2. 17. 22-5). Alternatively one can adjust the re'Ao? of an art in such a way that it can be achieved under all circumstances. Since Q. wanted to operate a strong notion of re^n; so as to be able to argue that rhetoric is also a virtue and only to be possessed by the uir bonus, he had to take the second route, making 'speaking well' the goal of rhetoric. ut interim... interim...: Q. points out, chiastically, the two undesirable results of Theodectes' phrasing: his finis does not fit the case (taking up 'at contra.. .orator'), and it is over-inclusive (taking up 'persuadent enim... corruptores'). For proprius/communis of finis cf. RLM 138. 21-2 (the issue is, somewhat confusingly, the definition of the ojficium of the orator 'negant quippe proprium finem esse oratoris officii persuadere'). 15. 12 atqui: despite the two problems apparent in the Theodectean formulation, Apollodorus only altered it in such a way as to avoid the first (by including mention of judicial oratory and the judge), while still falling foul of the second (note 'et ipse' below). Q. is probably not suggesting that Apollodorus responded to Theodectes; rather, he is providing a narrative thread. fine: = reAos. For fine refers to finem in 10; and both the infinitive of the formula and the genitive of iudicialis orationis fit with this. Apollodorus: cf. 3. 1. 17-18 'Apollodorus Pergamenus qui praeceptor Apolloniae Caesaris Augusti fuit... Apollodori praecepta magis ex discipulis cognoscas, quorum diligentissimus in tradendo fuit Latine C. Valgius, Graece Atticus. Nam ipsius sola uidetur ars edita ad Matium, quia ceteras missa ad Domitium epistula non agnoscit'. Q. quotes from Apollodorus' own Greek work (e.g. 3.6. 35) and from Valgius' translation (3. 5.17). For A. rhetoric had rules which applied universally (see n.on 2. 11.2 Theodoreus an Apollodoreus), and it was confined to forensic oratory (cf. 3. 1.1). Thus here 'iudicialis orationis' does not imply that A. had other views on the branches of oratory: he merely did not recognize other branches. It has been said that the absence

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of any phrase like KARA TO IVSEXOPCEVOV is significant of the contrast with Theodorus (Schanz 50 n. 2; Brzoska in RE s.n. Apollodorus 64, col. 2890). But this view relies on the assumption that eius quod in quoque potest sumi persuasibile in Theodorus' definition in 21 corresponds to «-ard to evSexofjLfvov, which is far from clear. In any case, KARA TO IV8EX°T used in these definitions not to express any lack of rigidity in the attitude of the definers but to counter such objections as that made by Q. here to Apollodorus, i.e. one would introduce such phrases to maintain a strong notion of technicity. super omnia: cf. 12. 9. 12 'super omnia perit ilia... modestia', and (with complement) Plin. Nat. 18. 189 'super omnia est bifera uite bis anno uindemiare'. Similarly Q. 10. 1.3 'dicere ante omnia est'. uelit: see n. on 10 ducere... uel it; here the subject may be iudicialis oratio understood from what precedes. Alternatively, this may be a case of a thirdperson verb derived from a 'general' infinitive (e.g. Cic. de Orat. 1. 30 'neque uero mihi quicquam... praestabilius uidetur quam posse dicendo tenere hominum mentis,... impellere quo uelit'; K-S i. 17); see Spalding, who cites Sextus 79, where the subject is expressed (ot Aeyovres); also 84. Cf. 22 dicet, and see nn. on 2. 16. 3 faciat, 2. 16. 19 uelit. ut s i . . . non possit: this finis results in an orator forfeiting his (very valued) name if he fails to persuade on a single occasion; cf. RLM p. 138. 13-17. JL£VOV

15. 13 recesserunt ab euentu: i.e. have avoided wording that implied any need for the successful outcome (cf. 8. 3. 12) of cases pleaded by the orator. For the verb, cf. e.g. Cic. Att. 12. 4. 2 'si ab omni uoluntate... recedam iJjiXaisque uelim grauitatem... eius laudare', 'keep clear of talk of his whole political outlook and choose simply to praise his grauitas\ Cf. 2. 17. 22-5 with nn. for a similar way of conceptualizing the goal of rhetoric independently of the outcome; but Q.'s discussion here and elsewhere in the present chapter, e.g. in 16, does not engage with (indeed reveals no knowledge of) the issues raised there. Aristoteles dicit: the passage is discussed in detail by Winterbottom6 71-2. We only give a short summary, adding some new points. The reference here is usually connected with Rhet.Al. 1355b 26-7 €OTOJ 8-q -q PQTOPIK-q Swapis N€PL CKCLOTOV TOV Oeajprjoai TO ivSexopcevov mOavov, which is, however, much more carefully translated in §16 below (see n.; et ipsi in 16 seems to ensure that the two definitions attributed to Ar. are not regarded by Q. as being the same). There are three possible explanations for the divergence: (i) Q. is here citing a passage quite other than that in the Rhet. (e.g. from the Gryllos, a possibility considered by Granatelli2 880). (ii) Q. or his manuscripts may be wrong in attributing this definition to Ar. at all. (iii) We could be dealing

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with a definition which was originally drawn from 1355 b 26-7 but then modified' by the rhetorical tradition (which retained the attribution to Ar.). In Proleg. we find p. 29. 7—9 p-qTopin-q ion 8vvap,is rexvixr) TOV nept CKCLOTOV iv8exop,€vov 7nOavov Xoyov, which corresponds to what wefindhere

in Q. except for the addition of Texyiicq, while in p. 54. 19-20 we find ion 8vvap,is TOV nept exaorov evSe^o/Ltevov mBavov (closer to the original Rhet. passage, though deajprjoai is omitted); again in p. 103. 12-4 and 172.8 there are hybrids. I n all four cases the definition is assigned to Aristotle; see also Granatelli2 879-80 on the evidence from the Rh. Gr. While the third explanation appears to us as the most plausible one, it remains odd that Q. should include both definitions; MW (in the OCT) therefore suggested changing A ris to teles i n § 13 to qu i. persuasibilia: the adjective (Gk. mOavos) is cited by TLL only from this book of Q. (also 16, 17,21; 21. 1) and one passage of the Vulgate. The adverb is even rarer: 2. 15. 14 and 22 (from Celsus, who according to Wohrer 135-6 coined the word). qui finis: here 'definition'. illud uitium de quo supra diximus: i.e. the first of the two diagnosed in Theodectes' formulation, that 'persuadent.. .dicendo... alii quoque' (11). But in oratione, taken to mean 'in formal speech', might seem to be added to evade that fault. One might therefore consider deleting the words, which have no counterpart in Aristotle. An additional argument for deletion would be that speech is the final product, not the area in which invention is undertaken, or the subject-matter to which invention is applied. PQROPLKTJ

15. 14 Hermagorae: for this mid-second-century BC rhetorician from Temnos, see Adamietz on 3. 1. 16; D. Matthes, Hermagorae Temnitae Testimonia et Fragmenta (Leipzig, 1962); M. Heath, CQ2 44 (1994), 114-29; Brittain, ch. 7. His crucial contribution to 5fas/5-theory is marked by frequent references in Q., esp. in Book 3. On the basis of our passage (fr. 2 Matthes) and other evidence (fr. 3-5), Thiele 22-3 reconstructed his complete definition of rhetoric thus: rj p-qropiKri COTIfrvvapusirepl Xoyov irpayp-arevovoa. riXos exovoa t o Xiyeiv TT€IOTII«X)S, ooov ifi iavrfj. But Q. suppresses details not relevant to his point here. Differently M. Heath, 'Hermagoras: Transmission and Attribution', Philologns, 146 (2002), 287-98, at 296-7, discussing the evidence of the Rh. Gr.; see also Matthes 122. For Hermagoras' position on the materia of rhetoric, see 2. 21. 21-2 with n. In Adv. Rhet. 62 Sextus says something quite different on the epyov of rhetoric according to Hermagoras. finem... persuasibiliter dicere: finis means 'goal' here, as is clear from the infinitive construction, eius: that is, rhetorices.

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persuasibiliter: see n.on 13 persuasibilia. eandem...non isdem tantum uerbis: cf. above, §1 on the tendency of rhetoricians to vary the wording of definitions. For tantum ('only not in the same words') see Winterbottom6 72. P. K. Marshall, AJPh 95 (1974), 81 objected that our passage differs from parallels adduced there in being negative; but non isdem is the equivalent of mutatis in 3. 6. 34 'plurimi deinceps, mutatis tantum no minibus', finem: 'goal'. cum... conuicimus: in 6-11. For the verb, cf. 12. 1. 41 'nisi ea non esse facta conuicerimus'; OLD s.v conuinco 4b. 15. 15 addita sunt... uarie: from here until 20 Q. continues to discuss definitions which specify persuasion, but he now focuses attention on the scope of rhetoric implied or stated in them. circa... uersari: a locution esp. favoured by Q. (in our book, 2. 15. 20, 2. 21. 9); elsewhere e.g. Sen. Ep. 88. 3 'grammatice circa curam sermonis uersatur'; TLL s.v. circa 1090. 23-9. Contrast Cic. Inv. 1. 7, e.g. 'materiam artis earn dicimus in qua omnia ars... uersatur'. ciuiles: TTOXITIKCL (^rrj/xara). 'Probleme, die RROXIS und TTOXtrat betreffen' (Throm 92), not issues concerning the ordinary man (which TTOXLTIKOS and ciuilisy cf. Suet. Gram. 10. 7, could in principle mean, too); these would include legal issues affecting private individuals (for the noXis provides the framework for such legal disputes). The contrast was primarily with the type of abstract question philosophers concern themselves with (for the use of the term 9eois in the sense 'topic for philosophical discussion' prior to Hermagoras cf. e.g. Chrysippus' book title Oe'oeis XoyiKai, D.L. 7.189 = SVFii, fr. 13). To this type of question Hermagoras made at least a nominal and implicit claim by identifying the TTOXITIKOV ^rrj/xa as the subject area of rhetoric, and dividing it into 'general questions' (deoeis) and 'particular questions' (unodeoeis) (Cic. Inv. 1. 8 = fr. 6a Matthes; 2. 21. 21-2 = fr. 6c Matthes); cf. Posidonius' attack on Hermagoras Plut. Pomp. 42. 5 ( = fr. 43 EdelsteinKidd = test. 5 Matthes) and Cicero's criticism in Cic. Inv. 1. 7-8, both directed against the inclusion of the 'general question' within the realm of rhetoric (it is, however, unlikely that Hermagoras made serious efforts to act on this farreaching claim). On all these matters see also Matthes 121-33 (esp. 123 n. 3). For the contrast with omnes res cf. 2. 21. 2 and various passages in Philod. Rhet. (esp. i. 202). See also n.on 36 ciuilium officiorum below. 15. 16 subiecisse: Q. (following Cic. Inv. 1. 7 '[Gor^ias] infinitam... huic artificio materiam subicere uidetur') uses the active verb several times in connection with the 'assignment' of materia to the sphere of rhetoric (cf. 19; 2. 21. 23; 3. 1. 1). OLD s.v. subicio classifies under 7 'to put under

250

Commentary

(a category, head, etc.)'; but there is more than a touch of 5 ' . . . put... under the control of. The passive is even more common: cf. below, §22, and often in 2. 21, where see n. on 4 subiectae. Aristoteles... dixit: here the ref. is clearly to Rhet. A2, 1355b26-7 quoted on 13 Aristoteles dicit (cf. also Top. Z12, 149b25); on the status of the definition, i.e. that it can genuinely be seen as 'Aristotle's view' (as opposed to being an evSogov put up for discussion), see G. W. Most, 'The Uses of endoxa: Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Rhetoric', in Furley-Nehemas 167-90, at 17980. On Svvafjug and its Latin rendering uis see n. on 2 uim. Iatrodes: unidentifiable rhetorician (Kroll, RE Suppl. vi [1935], 126), mentioned only here and at 3. 6. 44 (his view on the number of generales status); in both passages A gives the more familiar name Patrocles. fines: 'definitions', referring back to the two uis definitions earlier in the section. et ipsi: i.e. like that attributed to Aristotle in 13, where see n. Eudorus: the definition fits with what we know of Eudorus, for whom see RE s. n. (10), cols. 915-16; H. Dorrie, 'Der Platoniker Eudoros von Alexandria', Hermes 79 (1944), 25-39; J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London, 1977), 115-35 and the article by Dillon in Goulet, iii. 290-3; P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, ii (Berlin and New York, 1984), 509-27; fragments collected by C. Mazzarelli, RFN 77 (1985), 197-209 and 535-55; literature is listed by L. Deitz, 'Bibliographie du platonisme imperial anterieur a Plotin: 1926-1986', ANRW II. 36. 1 (1987), 124-82, at 148. Flourishing around 25 bc, he is the earliest representative of what has come to be called Middle Platonism, similar in outlook and approach to Antiochos of Ascalon. Our passage may be a fragment of the 8iaip€ois TOV KARA tXoootav Xoyov, characterized by Stob. Eel. ii, p. 42. 7-13 W-H asfiifiXiovagtoKTrjrov, iv Grg- 501 A for the equation with ip.ir€ipia (Dodds ad loc.: 'The cook remembers that these ingredients produced a "nice" dish last time, but has no notion why'); cf. Apul. PI. 2. 8: rhetoric as 'usus nulla ratione collectus—sic enim dXoyov rpifirjv elocuti sumus'. 'Mit den Stichwortern der platonischen Diskussion nimmt Kritolaos offenbar die ganze Thematik derselben auf' (Wehrli). See also Nesselrath 200-5 on 'Nicht-Techne'; F. Olivier, De Critolao Peripatetico (Berlin, 1895; diss, phil.), 49. To describe a field of expertise as clearly delineated as that of a r€x^V> usus had to undergo a semantic loan shift modelled on rpifir). Athenaeus fallendi artem: for Athenaeus see RE s.n. 21. Cf. 3. 1. 16 (where see Adamietz's n.) 'cui [sc. Hermagorae] maxime par atque aemulus uidetur Athenaeus fiiisse' (which does not much help with his dating); Q. also draws upon him at 3. 3. 13, 3. 5. 5 and 3. 6. 47. As in the case of Hermagoras (see on 14 Hermagorae), though more seriously, there is conflict between Q. and Sextus, for the latter's report (Adv. Rhet. 62) that *A0rjvaios • - • Xoycjv 8vvap.iv ttpooayopevei rrjv prjropiKrjv OToxa^ofjLcvrjv rrjs

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is incompatible with Q.'s placing of Athenaus under those who thought rhetoric 'neque uim neque scientiam neque artem'. How is this difficulty to be resolved? (a) Thiele 185 thought that both attributions are true, but that Athenaeus spoke of ars fallendi only in jest. (b) This Athenaeus may be different from Sextus' (cf. Kennedy, Art, 321 n. 89): a counsel of despair.39 (c) Brzoska (in RE) here emended to Athenodorus, who appears at 2. 17. 5; but why should that rhetor be specified as Rhodius only in the second passage? (d) Spalding thought that 'indignabundus noster' himself traduced Athenaeus' definition ('duriora usurpavit vocabula'); but it is not clear why he should have reserved his anger for this particular persuasion-definition. More likely, perhaps, (e), Q. repeats a source's unfriendly comment on a definition whose wording he did not himself know (so Cope 29: 'Athenaeus' fallendi ars may be meant for an interpretation of the art of persuasion). The Greek may have been KaKOT€\via (on which cf. 2. 20. 2, with our n.). 40 The passage should in any case caution us against assuming simpliciter that Sextus and Q. rely on a single common souce (see above, p. 227 and below, p. 395). TCJV AKOVOVTOIIV 7T€I0OVS

15. 24 plerique autem... inciderunt: autem seems to exclude Critolaus and Ariston (despite Wehrli 70, 84), for Q. is distinguishing from them others in the group of those who thought rhetoric neither uis nor scientia nor ars. The reference is quite uncertain; Q. may be thinking primarily of rhetoricians rather than philosophers. More important is that Q. uses them as a device to confront the main perceived enemy of rhetoric, Plato. He argues in §§24-31 (cf. the argument of §5 above) that Plato had been grievously misrepresented (and not only for what he wrote in Gorgias: alia uolumina prepares for the mention of Phaedrus in §§29 and 31).'" The passage (together with a contemptuous footnote on Celsus in §32) makes an effective close to the

39

T h i s is a separate issue f r o m the q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r the Athenaeus o f o u r passage is t h e s a m e

a s that o f 3. 1. 16. 40

Q . m a y have h i m s e l f translated this a s ars fallendi,

n o t suspecting that this w o u l d expose

h i m t o Spalding's a s t o n i s h m e n t that A t h e n a e u s could b e classed as o n e o f those who d i d n o t think r h e t o r i c a n a r t . D o n a l d Russell suggests t o us that artem might be deleted, leaving

fallendi

t o b e g o v e r n e d b y us urn. 41

Q . d o e s n o t m e n t i o n Laws 9 2 7 d - 9 3 8 c o n persuasion in a d v o c a c y . In a r g u i n g that t h o s e

w h o read t h e Grg. as a n t i - r h e t o r i c a l m i s u n d e r s t o o d Plato Q . is different from m o s t ' r h e t o r i c a l ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f this text. It is the s t a n d a r d view o f t h e Proleg.

that the Grg. is a n assault o n

r h e t o r i c straightforwardly revealing its a u t h o r ' s a n t i - r h e t o r i c a l attitude, a n d only o c c a s i o n a l l y is it a s s u m e d that it is a n t i - r h e t o r i c a l for the sake o f the a r g u m e n t (e.g. p. 1 2 0 . 2 3 - 1 2 1 . 2 : Plato tried t o practise t h e weaker Aoyos). Aelius Aristides, who engages with Grg. intensively in Or. 2 - 4 , is in line with t h e s t a n d a r d view o f the Proleg., a n d even w h e r e his a r g u m e n t s for rhetoric derive f r o m the Grg. itself, he believes he has found Plato o u t r a t h e r t h a n has revealed his t r u e a t t i t u d e ( O r . 2 . 4 3 8 - 4 2 , 4 4 6 ) . It is the philosophers who p r i o r t o Q. identified a p r o - r h e t o r i c a l t h r e a d in t h e Grg. (see Brittain 3 2 2 ) .

260

Commentary

discussion of opponents of rhetoric, before Q. turns to those 'qui de hoc opere melius sentiunt' (33). excerpta: excerpting for private purposes is mentioned at e.g. Cic. Inv. 2.4, Plin. Ep. 3. 5. 10 (his uncle), 6. 20. 5; TIL s.v. excerpo 1227. 77-1228. 21. But Q. is here talking of published extracts from Plato, which for some provided a substitute for reading the real thing (the practice was far from confined to this author). Note the warning of Seneca (Ep. 33. 5): 'depone istam spem, posse te summatim degustare ingenia maximorum uirorum: tota tibi inspicienda sunt, tota tractanda.' The tradition of epitomizing Plato's works started with an epitome of the Laws undertaken by Aristotle (mentioned in D.L. 5. 21); see I. Opelt, 'Epitome', RAC 5 (1962), 944-73, esp. 950-2 on excerpts from philosophical texts. hoc totum: sc. uolumen. existimet: Grg. 462 c 6-7 (Polus): rivos ifx-ntipia; Socrates: nvos Kai r)8ovrjs airepryaaias. Kiderlin8 500-1, to supply a translation for anepyaotas and to remove the difficulty of the phrase 'peritia gratiae', wanted to insert 'excitandae' or 'efficiendae' before 'existimet'. But this spoils the triple cretic clausula; Q. is not translating Plato—it is merely an allusion, and word-for-word correspondence is not necessary; finally, if Suet. Tib. 67. 2 can write 'existimant quidam praescisse haec eum peritia fiiturorum [sc. prouidendorum]', we can do without the gerundive here. 15. 25 ciuilitatis particulae simulacrum: 463 D 1-2 eonv yap rj p-qropiKT) TOV ipov Xoyov 7ToAiTiKrjs popLov eiScoXov. Apul. PI. 2. 8 and Amm. Marc. 30. 4. 3 (who both talk without nuance of 'Plato') give umbram for CISOJAOV; but simulacrum (OLD s.v. 5a, though the meaning given there— 'sham appearance of an action—is too narrow) properly gets over the force of the Greek word: rhetoric is a 'mere image', i.e. derivative from and inferior to what it is an image of. These passages, together with 33 below and 2. 17. 14, are the only witnesses to ciuilitas = TTOXITLKV}. quartam partem adulationis: so too Amm. Marc. loc. cit. This is not a translation of Plato (cf., however, 466 A 6 KoXaKetas.. .p,opiov), but a deduction from the passage 463 A 6-465 D 9. quod... rhetoricen: quod loosely attaches a parenthetic explanation of the words just cited (it is only the words simulacrum and adulatio that are picked up in §28), based esp. on Grg. 464 b 6-8, 465 c 2-5; modern readers may consult Dodds's diagram in his commentary, p. 226. Q. is here summarizing a passage where Plato had used -1/07 adjectives with T€X**I understood, with the possible exception of two passages, 464 b 8, on which see Dodds's n., and 465 c 5, where hiKaioavvr) and SiKaoTiKr/ are variants: the balance of probability must surely lie with the latter. Where he can, Q. uses Latin nouns to represent Kara

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these words: thus medicina, iustitia (twice, possibly influenced by his text of Plato), cocorum artificium (not nrs!),42 mangonum (sc. artificium), rhetorice (whose credentials had been established in 2. 14. 1-4). Where he cannot, we must assume his adjectival equivalents to be intended as (virtual) nouns: exercitatrix, legalis, and cauillatrix (note the couplings 'medicinam et exercitatricem', 'legalem atque iustitiam'). The odd one out here is the strange legalis, but it is unsatisfactory to understand pars at either occurrence. interpretantur: perhaps showing that Q. relied on, or at least had available, a translation of the dialogue. exercitatricem: a hapax = yvfjcvaoTiKr). legalem: coined to translate vocoderiK-q. Similarly Apul. PI. 2.9 'haec eadem (sc. ciuilitas] utilitati animae procurat duobus modis; altera namque legalis est, iuridicialis [supporting SixaariKr] in Plato] altera'.13 mangonum: Q. [or the author of the posited translation] more Romano substitutes their 'expertise' for Plato's /co/x/xom/oj, 'art of embellishment', which at least also dealt in colours (465 B 4). Apuleius [PI. 2. 9) retains the (ars) unguentaria, but some of what he says of it is oddly reminiscent of our passage: 'non modo utilitatem corporum minuit, sed robur etiam uiresque frangit et uerum colorem ad desidiam sanguinis mutat.' qui... mentiantur: cf. Sen. Ep. 80. 9 'mangones, quidquid est quod displiceat, id aliquo lenocinio abscondunt'. The practice was so familiar that it led Pliny the Elder to coin mangonico (note esp. Nat. 23. 26 for a juice that 'inlinitus... laetiore quodam colore et cutis teneritate mangonicat corpora'), and mangonium. Pliny also attests to the fattening-up of slaves by mangones, who smeared the whole body with terebinth resin 'ad gracilitam emendandam... capacioraque ciborum facienda corpora' (Nat. 24. 35). For mentiantur (the subjunctive is due to virtual oratio obliqua; Q. is reproducing 465 B 4-5 oxr/naoiv.. .a7rarwaa), cf. 8. 3. 6 'fuco ementitum colorem' (also 12. 10. 76, with Verg. Eel. 4. 42). cauillatricem: = oo<J>ioTtKr). The word is found elsewhere only in 7. 3. 14, where it is noun enough to be accompanied by an adjective (arguta). See n. on 2. 14. 5 cauillation is. 15. 26. In this section Q. relies on a division of the Platonic corpus by character of the dialogues, which is similar to, though not identical with, divisions we find in Sextus, P.H. 1. 221, Albin. Prol. 3, Gal. PHP 2. 3. 9-10 De Lacy = 2. 179 Miiller, Procl. in Parm. 631. A philological study of the passage in Albinus is Niisser 101-68. The motivation and evident rationale of the 4 2 C £ Grg. 4 6 5 a 2 - 3 : cooker)' seems to be a r i x ^ l (cf- 2. 21. 11 and n. on ciborum... communis), but is really, according to Socrates, only a matter o f eniretpia Kai r/x/iij; cf. 4 6 5 a 2 - 7 . 4 3 O n e might therefore consider reading ' a l t e r o . . . altero'.

262

Commentary

divisions is well characterized by Tarrant, Interpreters, 77. It is in D.L.'s discussion of the division of dialogues that a name is put to the author of the whole construct (3. 56): Thrasyllus, court philosopher of the emperor Tiberius. A collection of his fragments is in H. Tarrant, Thrasyllan Platonism (Ithaca and London, 1993), 215-49; see also J. Mansfeld, Prolegomena, 58-107. Given the similarities but also the differences between Q. and D.L., it is perhaps more likely that Q. and D.L., i.e. Thrasyllos, relied on the same earlier ideas in drawing up their division than that Q. relates a revised version of Thrasyllus' division. Moreover, the fact that what we might call a philosophical need for such a unified interpretation of Plato arose as early as the first half of the first century BC (before Thrasyllus, that is) supports this view. See also A. A. Long, 'Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy', CQ2 38 (1988), 150-71, sketching the background against which models for reading Plato's dialogues would have been developed. The divisions used by Q. and D.L. are similar in the following respects: on the most general level, the dialogues are divided into those which expound doctrine, i.e. views held by Plato, and hence are meant to instruct, and those which put an interlocutor's views to the test (in D.L. the former are called ixf>TjyrjTiKol SidXoyot, the latter £ q r r j T i K o i , stressing the aspect of inquiry). Q. is operating with this distinction in our passage in order to show that Plato may advance arguments in the persona (cf. -npooojirov, D.L. 3. 52; quoted below on cuius persona... sentiat) of Socrates—in this case, arguments against rhetoric—without endorsing them; connected with that, both Q. and D.L. rely on the notion that Plato, whatever he has Socrates say against rhetoric, nevertheless understands that there is 'true' rhetoric too (intellegit in 27, 7repi s ripajrea pdXXov. Cf. also 272 E 2—3, and the anecdote (allegedly from Tisias' writings) in 273 B 2-C 4. References to Tisias' instruction on TO CIKOS are collected in Radermacher, Art. Scr.; see also W. Siiss, Ethos: Studien zur alteren griechischen Rhetorik (Leipzig and Berlin,

268

Commentary

1910), 2-17; F. Solmsen, Antiphonstudien (Berlin, 1931), 47-63; T. A. Schmitz, 'Plausibility in the Greek Orators', AJPh 121 (2000), 47-77. 15. 32 illis superioribus: cf. n. on 17 superiores. Here the meaning is clearly 'those earlier authorities' (like Ti si as); OLD s.v. superior 4b. The mention of fifth-century rhetoricians sparks off this footnote on Celsus (see n.on 24 plerique autem... in cider unt), who can be seen as the fairly recent representative of a long bad tradition, in opposing which Q. now has the support, as he imagines, of Plato. Cornelius Celsus: fr. rhet. 2 Marx (see n.on 22 Cornelius Celsus). For these views of Celsus cf. Julius Severianus 3 (p. 356. 8-10 Halm; p. 73 Castelli Montanari) 'in ceteris fere studiis uerum quaeritur, finis autem oratoriae uirtutis est uerisimilia dixisse uel tantum contendisse, quantum res passa sit ad uictoriam'. For the relation of Julius Severianus and Celsus see L. Radermacher, RE s.n. Iulius 481, col. 805-11, with references to earlier discussions, including W. Schafer, Quaestiones Rhetoricae (Bonn, 1913; diss, phil.), esp. 46f., where Celsus pr. 39 is compared for the idea of uictoria (the context, however, is very different), as well as Castelli Montanari's edition, 47-58. bona conscientia: cf. 6. 1. 33, 9. 2. 93; the phrase is first attested in Seneca, uictoria litigantis est praemium: Q. of course thought victory important (5. 8. 1 'propter quam dicitur uictoria'; cf. also 2. 4. 32); but morality was more important still: 'tendit quidem ad uictoriam qui dicit, sed cum bene dixit, etiam si non uincat, id quod arte continetur effecit' (2. 17. 23). quae... adiuuare: Q. proceeds to react sharply to Celsus' brutally frank formulation, in which he may have found the very mention of a praemium of any sort provocative (note 12. 7.3 'accusatoriam uitam uiuere et ad deferendos reos praemio duci proximum latrocinio est'). His language is heightened by the ethical topic and by the desire to give closure to the long section on his opponents before he turns to his own view (////... nos...). Note the superlatives pessimorum and nocentissimis; for mores metonymically = homines, see TLL s.v. 1 mos 1524. 41-51, citing also 2. 17. 32 (cf. nn.on 2. 1. 3 aetas and 2. 2. 14 infirm ita s); and the final words, 'nequitiam praeceptis adiuuare', strive for epigrammatic grandeur. nocentissimis moribus dare instrumental cf. 12. 1. 1 'si uis ilia dicendi malitiam instruxerit, nihil sit publicis priuatisque rebusperniciosiuseloquentia, nosque ipsi.. .pessime mereamur de rebus humanis si latroni comparamus haec arma, non militi' (Austin's nn. compare Cic. de Orat. 3. 55, where 'furentibus quaedam arma dederimus' itself looks back to Plato: see L-P ad loc.). rationem opinionis suae: cf. Gel. 14. 3. 8 'quae igitur est opinionis istius ratio?'; D. 22. 1. 2 pr. ratio means 'justification' here (so Russell), not 'reasoning'. Cf. OLD s.v. ratio 5a.

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269

uiderint: cf. 8. 3. 39 'quod uiderint qui... Ego..Ov. Ars. 2. 371 'uiderit Atrides; Helenen ego crimine soluo'. Palmer on Ov. Ep. 12. 211 cites further parallels, commenting: 'this phrase is used when the speaker throws the responsibility of a course of conduct on another, while, we may add, often expressing his own opinion in contrast. Cf. K-S i. 149. 15. 33 uirum bonum: the Greek 'behind' the tag uir bonus is o oo6s or o G7Tov8aios (see SVFvol. iv, index s.v. ao^os and onovSaios), in the sense that many of the arguments Q. cites in support of his rhetoric grounded in morality were devised to describe the Stoic sage. But instead of using sapiens, which would immediately have disqualified his views in contemporary discussion (see p. xlvi), Q. recontextualizes Cato's saying of the uir bonus dicendi peritus (cf. esp. 1 pr. 9 'oratorem autem instituimus ilium perfectum, qui esse nisi uir bonus non potest, ideoque non dicendi modo eximiam in eo faailtatem sed omnis animi uirtutes exigimus', and 12. 1. 1 with Austin's n.), thus giving his heavily Stoicized perfect orator a distinctly Roman look. reuertamur: Q. has so far done little more than mention this group (1), though he has in effect argued that Plato should be classed with it (28-9). rhetoricen... iudicauerunt: for the idiom, cf. 5. 11. 39 'qui nullam adulterant non eandem esse ueneficam dixit'; Cic. de Orat. 3. 143 'quem [sc. oratorem] si patiimtur eundem esse philosophum'; some of the passages cited in TLL s.v. idem 191. 27-67; and K-S i. 627. The construction is not normally used as an alternative to idem ac or idem qui (note the different phrasing of'ciuilis... scientia idem quod sapientia est' below). Rather, it is used to assign a quality to a subject already mentioned (cf. the two examples cited). Thus the sentence should mean 'rhetoric is also polities'. However, what the sense seems to require here is 'rhetoric is the same as polities', because the overall context is concerned with defining rhetoric (or identifying defining features of it) rather than with establishing how rhetoric is connected with or encroaches on other subjects. Q. now moves on to assessments of rhetoric which integrate it with fields of expertise like politics and philosophy. These stand—at least in the context of idealizing academic discussion—in high regard, so that 'association' with them can help to make plausible Q.'s promotion of rhetoric to something that is much more than a useful commodity in suitable contexts or a ladder for the social climber. In EN 1181a 12—19 Ar. criticizes the sophists for teaching as noXiTtKrj something that is so trivial and impoverished that they can call it the same as or even inferior to prjTopiKrj, which was much what Gorgias said in the dialogue, and what Isocrates held (Or. 15. 80-3); in doing this, Ar. continues, they completely ignore how difficult devising good laws and implementing

Commentary

270

them is. The figure of the legislator is central to Aristotle's conception of TTOXTRIKTI; this is clear especially from EN A9,1099b2<W2 and A13,1102a7-12 (the divergence of this use of 'politician' from conventional use is acknowledged in Z8,114lb23—9); see M. Schofield in M. Schofield and C. Rowe (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge, 2000), 310-20. As to the connection with rhetoric, Aristotle thought that it was strictly speaking not a unified art in the sense that its precepts were 'rhetorical' alone, but that it drew on two other fields of knowledge, dialectic (concerned with formal techniques of argument) and ethics so broadly conceived that it would properly be called TTOXITIKT] (Rhet. A2,1356a25-7 wore

ovpfialvet

rrjs nepi

rrfv py]TopiK7)v

r a -qOr) TTpaypLareias,

otov

Trapaves

rjv SiKaiov

eon

TI rrjs

StaXeKTiKijs

npooayopevetv

efvai

Kai

iToXtriKr/v;

see

Cooper 200); so when Aristotle subordinates rhetoric to philosophy in EN A2, 1094 b 2-3, he simplifies to the point of being misleading. In Plato's dialogues, at least in those which take a positive stance on rhetoric, we do, however, find rhetoric 'subordinated' to politics as he conceives of it. The dispute continued throughout the Hellenistic era, partly fuelled by the presence of philosophical schools which took very dim views of both rhetoric and politics; see M. Schofield in Schofield/Rowe (op. cit.), 435-56 on Epicurean and Stoic political thought, (and J. Moles, ibid. 423-32 on 'the Cynics and polities'). In Philod. Rhet. ii. 239-40 the problem ei f) prjTopiKri Kai TTOXITIKV) eonv is discussed; cf. Cicero's protest in INV. 1. 6 'ab eis qui earn [sc. ciuilem scientiam] putant omnem rhetoris ui et artificio contineri magnopere dissentimus'), though mainly from the restricted viewpoint of whether a rhetorical education makes one into a politician; on Inv. 1. 6 see Norden, AK i. 7 n. 2. Q. clearly thinks of ciuilitas as having a broader, more profound sense (cf. also Cic. de Orat. 3. 109), though it is not certain that anyone who identified rhetoric and iroXmK-q was using the word in this way. (The reference is certainly to this long-standing discussion rather than to the later development by which TroXniK-q came to mean prjTopiKr), a use perhaps not found before Aristides, according to Brandstatter). Cicero., .uocat: Inv. 1. 6 'quare hanc oratoriam facultatem in eo genere ponemus, ut earn ciuilis scientiae partem esse dicamus'. ciuilis... sapientia: while Inv. 1. 6 is similar to Q. in that there some connection is made (or rather implied) between morality and rhetoric, the passage is of course different in respect of how strong this connection is made out to be (surely none of the authorities cited or alluded to would have classed rhetoric itself as a virtue, which is the cornerstone of Q.'s argument; see the commentary on ch. 20). Q. is quite happy not to pause long enough to point

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this out. And, as Donald Russell points out to us, it is puzzling that Q. thought Cic. actually identified ciuilis scientia with sapientia. quidam... Isocrates: Isocrates called the rhetoric he practised i\oooia, e.g. Or. 4. 10 rrjv nepi TOVS Aoyovs i\oooiav (cf. Epist. 6. 8). This disposes of B's philosophiae (sc. partem). Q. will be be thinking of Isocrates' speeches rather than the rexy*) attributed to him (see 4). Isocrates' views are perhaps best explained (cf. e.g. Eucken, passim) as a critical response to Platonic philosophy with its lofty metaphysics and the notion of virtue-knowledge on the one hand, and the anodyne and stereotypical teachings of the professional rhetoricians on the other. Isocrates thought that young men should be able to express themselves adequately and skilfully, and should be driven by a healthy sense of ambition, grounded in an understanding of glory which ties it to traditional, common sense' morality. All this is to be seen against the background of the cultural pessimism and even scepticism present in the more intellectual strands of the sophistic movement. If this picture is reasonably accurate, then it is clear that—however much Q. may make of Isocrates equating' rhetoric and philosophy—the latter cannot really be cited in support of Q.'s views. 15. 34 huic... finitio: with the unwieldy 'huic eius substantiae' cf. Decl. min. 328. 12 'irascor quidem huic eius pertinaciae', Sen. Ben. 2. 3. 3 'huic eius animo numquam parem gratiam referam'), and there is no need (with B) to omit eius. The reference must certainly be to the ova la of rhetoric (eius) as implied by Isocrates' identification of it with philosophy (see on §33 above; also Winterbottom6 73). The next sentence then explains why the definition propounded fits rhetoric's philosophical nature so well (the reason being that bene introduces an evaluative element that can cover the orator's morals as well as his technical efficiency). For this to become a plausible move, one needs to appreciate the overall train of thought in §§33-4: philosophers and statesmen are conventionally held to be people with a conscience, so an indirect reference to them creates some background for the view that the perfect orator is a good man. huic in the sentence under discussion clearly invites the reader to make the appropriate connection. Otherwise one might think that it was not altogether obvious how as bland a phrase as 'the science of speaking well' could carry a complex conception of rhetoric: through what comes before the reader is invited to fill bene with content (see nn. below). finitio: after what has been said about the potential confusion arising from Q.'s use of finis in two senses, one is surprised to find the unambiguous finitio here, which could have been used alongside finis = re\os (but see below). In any case, it seems no coincidence that finitio and substantia occur together

272

Commentary

here (definitions do not just reveal what words mean, they grasp the essence of a thing designated by a word; cf. 1 'qualitate ipsius rei'). In expressing himself in this way, Q. makes it clear that he has finally cut through the variety of different fines that have been offered, and that we are now given a definitive answer. Perhaps finitio was saved to be able to have this highlighting function. But while it is clear here, a distinction between finitio = definition and finis = 'goal' would have been unsatisfactory as an overall solution. Where the two appear together, it is as rivals for the sense 'definition' (5. 10. 54 and 7. 3. 20). In fact finitio is normally used for this sense elsewhere than in 2. 15, and almost exclusively in connection with the status finitiuus (but note 7. 3. 20 and 25). rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam: another 'type' definition (so Granatelli2 ad loc.); see p. 229 n. 32. This turns out to be the formulation favoured by Q. (38). Kiderlin1 123-4, finding it awkward that no author is named, inserted 'Cleanthis' after 'substantiae' above; but in that case Q. would hardly have needed to point out that Chrysippus' definition was 'derived' (cf. 4 'haec opinio originem ab Isocrate... duxit') from Cleanthes'. Q. may be intentionally vague. For Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 6 attributes the wording €7TIOTTJFIAQ TOV ev Xeyetv both to Xenocrates (fr. 13 Heinze = fr. 90 Isnardi Parente) and to ol ano rfjs Zroas tXoooot (no name either in D.L. 7. 42; one Stoic who can be specified is Panaetius' pupil Mnesarchus: Cic. de Orat. 1. 83). We shall discuss later (see the introductory note to ch. 20) why eTTtar-qpaq rather than re'xviq figures in the definition. Sextus remarks, more or less correctly, that, while Xenocrates used the word 'in the old way' to mean the same as rexvq, the Stoics meant by it something present only in the sage: they took eTTtar-qpnq to entail the possession of firm KaraXiqifjeis. As to the import of ev, we must turn first to Alex. Aphr. in Arist. Top. p. 1. 11-12 = fr. 57 Hiilser: (the Stoics) to 8e ed A eyetv ev TW ra aX-qdrj Kai ra vpoa-qKovra A eyetv elvat TtOepevot, then for further elucidation—one might ask on what grounds speaking the truth is speaking well—to SVF iii, fr. 16. 16-19 (Stob. Eel. ii, p. 77. 16 W-H): there we learn that living well means living according to nature in the sense that by acting virtuously, i.e. in accordance with right reason, we implement the rationality that is characteristic of nature. We can apply this notion to rhetoric, which is (like dialectic) a virtue: e6 Xe'yetv is one way of living according to nature. These issues will be pursued further when Q. continues his work on this particular aspect of the argument for the kind of rhetoric he advertises (see the commentary on 2. 16. 11-19, and the introductory note to the chapter). On the Peripatetic conception of a science see n. on 19 scientia... persuasionis.

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273

semel complectitur: cf. 11. 1. 66 ut semel plura complectar'. It strengthens the prefix in the verb (for which cf. above, §13). For the point made—that bene dicere is to encapsulate all the virtues—see the previous note (and p. xxxviii). protinus: 'at the same time'; cf. nn. on the word at 2. 4. 15, 2. 5. 6. bonus: for the omission of uir, cf. e.g. 12. 1.8 'malus atque iniquus'; see P. Hirt, Substantivierungdes Adjektivums bei Quintilian (Berlin, 1890), 18 with n. 1. We would take this sentence as a clear instance that Q. is relying on his readership to bring their knowledge of Stoic philosophy to bear on his text. For while, within the context of Stoic doctrine, it makes eminent sense to say that only the good man can speak well, this claim is counterintuitive from the perspective of common sense. Chrysippi: of Soloi, third scholarch of the Stoa. For his fragments on rhetoric see SVF ii, pp. 95-110.; see also Hiilser, i. 56-65. On Chrysippus' treatises on the matter see Cic. Fin. 4. 7 'quamquam scripsit artem rhetoricam Cleanthes, Chrysippus etiam, sed sic ut si quis obmutescere concupierit nihil aliud legere debeat'; D.L. 7. 202, where four books nept rijs prjropiKrjs 7rpos AtooKoupibrjv are recorded. On Stoic rhetoric in general, and Chrysippus' in particular, see Atherton and p. xxxvii. In Plut. De Sto. rep. 1047 A a different Chrysippean definition of rhetoric seems to be given: rrfv p-qTopiKrjv opt^erai T€\vr]v nepi fKoafxov kcll eiprjfxevov Xoyov rd^iv (see on

this R. Volkmann, Rhetorik, 10 n. 4); 45 the passage has been bracketed by some scholars, presumably because it is so different from the 'standard definition' (although there is a genuine problem of transmission here too), but 35 tells us that there were further definitions available in the works of Chrysippus. In general, it is not unusual to find multiple definitions of the same thing in Stoic contexts; some items had on the Stoic view to be defined on more than one level of description, and there is a historical dimension to this which accounts for definitions being adjusted in the face of criticism; see O. Rieth, Grnndbegriffe der stoischen Ethik (Berfin, 1933). Cf. SVF i, fr. 491 (Cleanthes); ii, fr. 292 (Chrysippus). ductus a Cleanthe: on Kiderlin's view (see above on rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiani) this implies that Cleanthes wrote ev Xc'yeiv, Chrysippus opduts Xeyeiv (which need not simply mean that Chrysippus wanted to make plainer the ethical content of the definition: the Stoics had strong views on what was 'correct speech', see Atherton 410-15). As the text stands we cannot know (and find it difficult to guess) what Cleanthes wrote.

45

ChernissintheLoeb reads . . .

-nepl Koaptov (Xylander) elpofie'vov Xoyov koi

r a f i r , translating

'an art concerned with the order or arrangement o f continuous speech'; see also his note (b).

Commentary

274

Cleanthe: o f Assos, second scholarch o f the Stoa (D.L. vii. 1 6 8 - 7 8 ) . H e was considered the teacher o f Chrysippus (D.L. vii. 1 7 9 ) . See further the entry o n h i m in Goulet ii. 4 0 6 - 1 5 . T h i s passage, and Cic. Fin. 4 . 7 quoted above, are the only rhetorical fragments o f Cleanthes given b y SVF i, frr. 4 9 1 - 2 . 15. 3 5 sunt p l u r e s . . . pertinent: see n. on 3 4 Chrysippi.

V o l k m a n n (loc. cit.

ibid.) wrote: ' S o ist das (sc. the Plutarch definition] nicht sowohl eine Definition der Rhetorik an sich, als mit Bezug a u f ihre Hauptquelle', by which he probably means a definitio

by partitio

(cf. 5. 10. 54, Cic. Top. 2 8

with Reinhardt ad loc.) as opposed to a definition that gave the substantia

of

rhetoric (see p. 2 2 9 ) . T h i s is presumably the sort o f thing meant by ad alias quaestiones magis pertinent' (contrast Spalding o n

ad alias quaestiones':

' n o n ad hanc, utrum soli viro b o n o t r i b u e n d u m eloquentia?'). i d e m . . . oporteat: another 'type' definition (Granatelli 2 ad loc.); see p. 2 2 9 n. 32. Q . n o w answers an obvious o b j e c t i o n — t h a t an element stating or implying a moral requirement can be introduced even into a persuasiontype definition, i.e. oporteat

= 'morally ought'. His answer is that even such a

definition is subject to the c o m m o n flaw o f persuasion definitions: that success is made a criterion o f the field o f expertise in question being an art o r t h e expert an artist ( 1 2 - 1 3 ) . In fact, however, n o one seems to have taken such a line, and this explains the m o o d and tense o f sentiret.

it is

counterfactual ( W i n t e r b o t t o m 6 73). Q . is not just making up possible definitions to refute ('qui foret labor infinitus': Spalding); rather, there is a special point in suggesting and overthrowing this one. sentiret: 'would mean', cf. OLDs.x.

9, citing Gel. 13. 2 5 . 1 3 'tribus uocabulis

idem sentientibus dixit'. Q.'s point is that this definition could be classed with the bene dicendi

scientia

type were it not for a fatal flaw.

finis h o c m o d o c o m p r e n s u s : Q.'s return to finis

makes finitio in 3 4 stand

out (see n. there); for comprensus see n.on 1 comprensione uerborum. nisi q u o d a r t e m . . .alligat: so persuadere

means 'to succeed in persuading'.

15. 3 6 Areus: this is probably Areus Didymus, with w h o m Augustus was intimate (Suet. Aug. 8 9 ) . In 3. 1. 16 Areus is classed chronologically with e.g. Caecilius and Dion. Hal., which would chronologically fit with acquaintance with Augustus. Areus Didymus had Stoic leanings, see H . v o n A m i m , RE ii/1 ( 1 8 9 5 ) , s.n. Areios 12, col. 6 2 6 ; the context here is Stoic, and the definition we get here would fit that school too (see 7. 3. 12). u i r t u t e m orationis: a subjective genitive would m a k e the moralistic element disappear; a defining genitive ( ' t h e virtue which is speech') seems u n i n telligible, and oratio

can mean 'rhetoric' only in the sense o f ' o r a t o r y ' (as in

'X's rhetoric was impressive'), cf. OLD s.v. 9; in order to preserve the m o r a l istic slant o f the definition within the b o u n d s o f Latinity, one would have to

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275

translate 'the virtue inherent in speech', i.e. the virtue (itself an integral part o f the mental make-up o f the speaker) as it is implemented

in speech.

This,

however, seems impossible to square with any Greek equivalent o f

uirtus

orationis; apery Xoyov and similar phrases, notably aperr) Xegecos, mean

Virtue of language o r style', and tend to be free o f moral import (cf. e.g. Ar.

Rhet. ny

1404 b 37 n

TOV PXJTOPIKOV

Xoyov apcri7; Strab. 1. 2. 6 = Posidonius

fr. 4 Theiler (not in Edelstein-Kidd); Rh. Gr. viii. 56. 18 [Sopat. A a t p c a t ? ] ) . Is it possible that Areus had something like Sallust, De deis

10. 1.5dperrj

Xoyovp,ev povr}oisy Ovpov

et

mundo

avSpeia, eiridvpias 8e oajpoovvr]

in mind when he defined rhetoric, and that Q . (or whoever translated Areus' definition) misunderstood him? Despite the Platonist

overtones

o f the passage (less o f a problem in a period o f syncretism like the first century AD), it would be a meaningful thing to say for Areus that rhetoric is speaking in accordance with the aperrj Xoyov in this sense, given that the Stoics make rhetoric a subvirtue o f povr)ots (see n n . o n 2. 20. 5 - 6 ) . a rhetorice: i.e. prjropiKr] (dat.); see n. on 2. 14. 3 id in rhetorice ciuilium officiorum:

TOJV TTOXITLK&V.

non fit

See n. on 15 ciuiles. For a vaguer use o f

eiuilia officia, see 2 . 4 . 27, with n. Another 'type' definition (Granatelli 2 ad loc., and see p. 2 2 9 with n. 32). si scientiam uirtutem iudicant: as the Stoics did (n. on 20 hie...

ponit).

anguste: 9 . 1 . 14 'id ipsum anguste [id] Zoilus terminauit ['defined']' (also 7. 4. 40). intra c i u i l e s . . . coercent is meant to define the way in which the def. is too narrowly phrased. Cf. Tac. Ann.

1. 11 'consilium coercendi intra

terminos imperii' (with Heubner on Hist. 2. 18. 1). See also 2. 1. 4 n. on

intra quam constitere.

Albucius: C. Albucius Silus, well-known rhetor (Sen. Con. 7 pr., Suet.

Gram.

30, with Kaster 1 3 1 3 - 1 6 ) . Q. draws on his otherwise unknown theoretical writings at 3. 3. 4 and 3. 6. 6 2 .

auctor: see n.on 2. 5. 19 maior est auctor.

exceptionibus: a legal term, see OLD s.v. 2 'a limiting clause or proviso in a law, agreement, etc.'; cf. 6. 3. 104. i a m . . . responsum est: 15 (in fact referring forward to ch. 2 1 ) , 17. 15. 37 recte sentire et dicere: cf. above 34 'scientia recte dicendi' and n. o n correctness. Thinking and speaking go together because dialectic (and rhetoric is its sister science) is thought o f as ensuring the correct thinking which underlies correct utterances; see Pap. Here. 1020 ( = fr. 88 Hiilser; the text in SVF vol. ii, fr. 131 is inferior). Spengel 492, commenting on our passage, rightly says: 'Die Stoiker glaubten wohl mit ihrem eu Xeyeiv beides zu umfassen'. Rare exceptions to the rule o f truthful speaking were, however,

Commentary

276

made; whether we take this to be Stoic doctrine depends entirely on our interpretation o f 12. 1. 38, see Atherton 424. fines:

although the genitive rhetorices

and the infinitives

sentire/dicere

precede, Q. must be referring back to all the fines that came before; this suggests that finis is meant to be ambiguous here. p r a u u m . . . s t u d i u m . . .finiendi: for similar complaints in Q . cf. 3. 3. 8 'cupidi nouitatis', 3. 6. 22 s t u d i u m . . .diuersa tradendi', 3. 11. 21 'haec adfectata s u b t i l i t a s . . . ambitiose

laboret', 8. 3. 63 'non equidem in omnis earn

particulas secabo, quarum ambitiose

a quibusdam numerus augetur'. This is

in Q.'s mouth a Roman protest against Greek complications (cf. Calboli on Rhet.

Her. 1. 1; Winterbottom in Corsi i. 1 4 - 1 5 ) ; but note e.g. Ar.

Rhet.

r 13, 1414 b l5—18 (looking back to PI. Phdr. 267 c 2), the exchange between Socrates and Hippias KOLIVOV TI

in X.

Mem.

4. 4. 6 (Hippias

boasts

neipaifxai

A EYE tv aei), and Philodemus' gibe (Rhet. Suppl. p. 6. 1 8 - 9 Sudhaus;

p. 15. 2 8 - 3 1 L.A.) about those who discover viroSeiyfidraiv erepoTrjTas for the fun o f it,

to

nXovoiov

TOJV

xpiofxevajv €7TIatvovoas.

procul aberit a me: cf. n. on 2. 3. 11 a me proeul aberit. 15. 38 non . . . quae inuenero, sed quae placebunt: cf. 1 pr. 2 'ut mihi si non

inueniendi noua, at certe iudicandi de ueteribus iniungere laborem non iniuste uideientur'. r e p e r t o . . . peius uelit: cf. 10. 5. 5 'optimis oceupatis imus necesse sit esse deterius'. With reperto

quidquid aliter dixer-

understand eor. cf. K - S i. 773,

citing e.g. Curt. 3. 1. 24 'adsumptis qui ex Macedonia nuper aduenerant'. finem: see the introduction to the present chapter, the other notes on this

section, and that on 2. 14. 5 cuius est summa bene dicere. For a closely matching phrase cf. Cic. Fin. 2. 5 'finem siue extremum siue ultimum'; also 1. 29 'quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum'. ad q u o d . . . tendit: cf. 2. 17. 22 'aiunt enim omnes artes habere

finem

aliquem propositum ad quem tendant'; Lucr. 6. 2 6 - 7 'exposuitque b o n u m summum

quo tendimus omnes | quid fbret.'

n a m . . .dicere: a clear example of the different linguistic form o f a opos and a reXos (see the introduction to the chapter). Opposed to the which is identified unambiguously as 'goal' by uel summum above (and et summum

et

finis,

ultimum

below), is rhetoric's essence as expressed in the

formula 'scientia bene dicendi' (cf. 1 'qualitate ipsius rei'). It seems inconceivable that Q. could have written like this and at the same time seen the potential confusion arising from the use o f finis in two different s e n s e s — which may suggest that he saw no problem in the ambiguity, on the grounds that for him there is an intimate conceptual connection between reXos and definition.

Chapter Sixteen Now for the question, Is rhetoric useful? Some attack it (1) as productive of many ills, and as most of use when it stands for falsehood against truth (2) (note the accusations o f the comic poets against Socrates) (3). They adduce examples, Greek and Roman (4). But on this basis many classes o f people and things could be dismissed as bad ( 5 6). For all that, there can be no denying that eloquence has often been employed for good (7-9); indeed it can add force to moral precept. So, even if it may be used for evil purposes, that does not make it bad in itself (10). In any case, this whole dispute may be left to those who see rhetoric merely in terms of persuasion; on our view the orator is a good man [sc. who cannot do harm), and rhetoric is the science o f speaking well; rhetoric as we define it can only be useful (11). Indeed God's gift of speech is what most distinguishes man from other creatures (12). Animals have many physical advantages over men (13—14a). That is why God gave men Reason (14b). But Reason would be of less use if it were not accompanied by speech (15). Some things animals do (not all imitable by men) may suggest they have a share in reason; it is because they lack speech that they are called irrational (16). Finally, men who are denied speech can benefit little from their intellect. Therefore, nothing can be more worthy o f being cultivated than rhetoric (17). It is a branch of study that has grown in stature, and may grow further still, which suggests that its cultivation brings rewards (18). Quite apart from the appropriateness to a good man o f the tasks it can perform, it is remarkable that out o f words used by everybody the most splendid oratory can be fashioned (19). W i t h i n the broader scheme o f 2. 1 4 - 2 1 , this chapter has two main functions: it refutes those who think that rhetoric is dangerous and, in providing a laus eloquentiae,

hints at the way in which Q . conceives o f it as useful. It also

provides s o m e relief between the rather dry chapters 15 and 17 (cf. 2. 17. 1). T h e usefulness o f self-consciously persuasive speech and the training which goes with it was discussed from the fifth century BC onwards, the

first

elaborate text on the matter being Ar. Rhet. A\, 1 3 5 5 a 2 1 — b 7 . It is facile to see the issue as one m o r e or less coherent theme which is present throughout the classical period o f rhetoric. Differences between classical authors, reflecting their different attitudes to rhetoric and their different objectives in discussing the issue, are frequently ignored. T h e y do, however, exist, as may b e demonstrated by c o m p a r i n g Aristotle's purpose in the passage quoted and Quintilian's here. Aristotle is thus summarized by Russell (ii. 3 7 0 n. 1): '[Aristotle] argues ( 1 ) that we need rhetoric to avoid the reproach o f letting

278

Commentary

a g o o d cause fail; ( 2 ) that "scientific" p r o o f does not convince everybody; ( 3 ) that we need to k n o w how to refute opposing arguments, and o n l y dialectic and rhetoric can help us here; ( 4 ) that it is right to acquire skill to defend ourselves by speech even more than by physical strength.' It is implied by ( 4 ) that rhetoric is a neutral skill, open to misuse, and it is argued that its positive potential, which coexists with the negative one, justifies its existence; this ties in well with the point made in ( 3 ) , that an important feature o f rhetoric is its providing ( o r being) a faculty o f analysis, which likewise is not a good o r bad thing in itself. In ( 2 ) the ambiguity o f the term useful' b e c o m e s apparent, for it is used in a sense less prominent in m o s t other discussions, viz. as opposed to useless, whereas normally (e.g. in Q . ) the contrast is with 'detrimental': 4 6 scientific p r o o f and rhetorical p r o o f modelled o n it may simply fail to persuade, despite being valid and arguing to a true conclusion, and hence achieve n o positive goal, and it is characteristic o f rhetorical argument that it is persuasive. W e thus see that for Aristotle usefulness is tied to persuasiveness, and that persuasion is the goal o f rhetoric (a view which Q . pointedly refuses to accept, cf. 2. 15). Given that, Q.'s position is m o r e difficult, and he is operating under c o n straints which did n o t apply for Aristotle. First, as we have seen, the n o t i o n o f persuasion would normally be central t o a plausible argument for the usefulness o f rhetoric. S o the task for Q . is t o maintain the usefulness o f rhetoric without relying, o r relying primarily, o n this notion. Second, what is at stake for Q . but not for Aristotle when the usefulness o f rhetoric is discussed is its technicity. For both on the original, Sophistic understanding o f rexvq (i.e. a skill devised by humans in the process o f evolution and as a means to deal with the adversities o f primitive life) and o n the Stoic argument underlying Q.'s discussion in 2. 1 4 - 2 1 , a craft had to b e useful to deserve the name; b o t h a skill designed to achieve a bad end and a knack only occasionally reaching its goal would not qualify. Conversely, if rhetoric can be used for bad purposes, it has been found not to b e a r e x ^ - B y arranging the discussion as he does (discussing utility here and technicity in 2. 17), Q . gives the impression that the utility and the technicity o f a craft were separate issues; this up to a point helps his case, for despite explicitly acknowledging this connection in 2. 1 7 . 4 1 , he may have found particular difficulty in arguing plausibly for it. O n what grounds, then, does Q . claim that rhetoric is useful? W e believe that Q . gives two ( c o m p a t i b l e ) answers. T h e first one, given at the end o f the survey o f arguments for and against rhetoric's usefulness from its effects,

T h e adjective imitilis is ambiguous (see OLD s.v. 2 and 4 ) , as are s o m e of its Greek equivalents (so avoje\r)s, see LSJ s.v. 1 and 2; axpycrros, up to a point; ax/njotfios means 'useless' only).

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amounts to defining the problem out of existence: if the orator is a uir bonus, he can do nothing harmful when speaking in public, hence rhetoric as practised by him cannot be but useful. On this reading the laus eloquentiae which occupies the second half of the chapter is not closely related to the theme of usefulness and amounts to a divertimento before the discussion becomes technical again in 2. 17. The second answer makes the laus eloquentiae more relevant to Q.'s overall argument, by assuming that he drew on the rhetorical tradition of laudes eloquentiae on the one hand, but selected this material and slightly skewed it in such a way as to hint at a Stoicizing conception of rhetoric's usefulness. (We believe that this second interpretation becomes plausible if one takes a synoptic view of 2. 15-21 in its entirety.) Since the influence from rhetorical laudes eloquentiae is uncontroversial and obvious, we begin by describing the Stoicizing features of the section, and for that purpose it may be helpful to ask first why rhetoric could be useful on the Stoic view, and then to trace similar ideas in our chapter. After that we will survey the various laudes eloquentiae which arguably exercise an influence on our passage. Maintaining a position originally brought to prominence by the sophists of the fifth century BC but developed further by Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics saw a craft primarily as something that enabled humans to find and sustain their natural position in the world, and to function as they are designed to. For them a craft is a coherent body of knowledge, i.e. an ordered system of tfaraArjj/rfi?, which itself is integrated with other systems of knowledge whose make-up is similar in kind, including moral virtue; only KaraXrufiets can lead to right statements and actions predicated on them, which in turn are necessary for a happy life; rhetoric thus ultimately, like moral virtue, to which it is linked, contributes to evSatnovia. Against this background rhetoric, the sister-discipline of dialectic, is useful in two ways: it is conducive to the well-orderedness of the speaker's soul, thereby enabling us to live in accordance with nature, and it removes irrationality, which involves wrong perceptions, from the world around us, hence aligning the world we live in with the divine order. Q. of course would have found no favour with his contemporaries had he said this in exactly this way, but these ideas are, or so we argue, hinted at in 1-19. However, certain features give the passage a Stoic tinge which must have been instantly recognizable to the contemporary readership (see nn. below): that there is a first god, the father of all things (12); that there is an equivalence of nature and the creator god's actions, and that animal behaviour is both natural (13-14) and 'rational' (16); that using the faculty of speech for rhetorical purposes amounts to a op/wm? (on this conception in Platonic, Epicurean, and Stoic contexts see Erler; it is conveyed by the lightning and thunder of Pericles' speech in 19); and that perfecting the

280

Commentary

faculty of speech amounts for humans to living in accordance with nature (17), whose rational working we may observe in animal behaviour (16-17). A number of earlier texts show resemblances with our passage: Isocrates, Or. 3. 1-9 on the role of Aoyo? in the development and running of civilized society (cf. 15. 253-7 [Antid.], which is almost identical; 4. 28-50 [ Paneg.] on the beginnings of Attic and Hellenic culture); the 'craftsman myth' in Plato's Protagoras, good for detail on the different devices with which nature has equipped the various species (see also W. Nestles commentary [Stuttgart, 8 1978] ad loc. for further references, as well as his appendix on the myth [pp. 58-61], which provides important literary parallels for the theme) but otherwise arguing towards a rather different conclusion (aiScu? and StV*? as the divine gifts which complete human progress towards civilization); the protreptic to the study of animals in Aristotle's Depart anim. A5, overlapping with our passage in the emphasis on the teleological organization of the world; the prooemium of Cicero's Inv., and a number of passages in his de Orat., esp. 1. 30-4 (see L-P ad loc.); and his ND 2. 121-68 (with Pease's commentary), which argues for Stoic theology and for the existence of divine providence from the general well-orderedness of the universe, the world, the animal kingdom, and the human race with all its faculties and skills, including rhetoric (see below). A later text which draws on the myth in the Protagoras and on the Isocrates passages, and interestingly so in a context related to Q.'s argument (see p. 259 n. 41), is Aelius Aristides, Or. 2. 394-9, on which see J. Wissmann, 'Zur Rezeption des "Protagoras-Mythos" durch Aelius Aristides', Philologus, 143 (1999), 135-47. 17 On the face of it Isocrates is closest to our passage: speech is presented as a natural faculty of humans, its development amounts to a perfection of the human being (Or. 3. 5), the orator is a good man (Or. 3. 7), and speech is inextricably linked to thinking in that the latter is perceived as the mind's debate with itself (3. 8). But there are differences too: the goodness of the orator is quite different in kind from the intellectualized morality the Stoics (and Q.) promote; there is little emphasis on the connection between speech and rationality (to view thinking as the mind's rhetorical debate with itself is quite different); there is no correspondence between nature and the influence of a creator god, and no suggestion that rationality is pervasive in the animal kingdom (instead the animals are merely presented as well-equipped for the struggle for life). The section in Cic. ND is also worth comparing, because of its general similarity and a number of verbal reminiscences (see below), which suggest that Q. actually had it in mind when he composed our passage. 4 7 There is a survey o f laitdes eloquentiae in H. K. Schulte, Untersucliungen oniamsche Bildungsideal (Frankfurt, 1935), 9 - 5 8 .

iiber das cicer-

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Rhetoric is treated in 2. 148-9. The faculty of speech, which can be developed into eloquence, is there as in our passage presented as a gift nature has endowed us with (nature is identified with the creator god in 2. 87-8); its role in the world is described thus: quae primum [sc. domina rerum, uis eloquendi] efficit ut ea quae ignoramus discere et ea quae scimus alios docere possimus; deinde hac cohortamur hac persuademus, hac consolamur afflictos hac deducimus perterritos a timore, hac gestientes conprimimus hac cupiditates iracundiasque restinguimus, haec nos iuris legum urbium societate deuinxit, haec a uita inmani et fera segregauit.' (That persuasion is mentioned here should not trouble us; it is not of course the case that the Stoics—and Q. in 2. 14-21—positively do not want rhetoric to be persuasive.) Relevant for the present purpose is the emphasis on rhetoric's role in implementing order and rationality, and quelling its opposites. The issue of usefulness also receives a carefully balanced treatment in Tacitus' Dial., written either shortly before or, perhaps more probably, shortly after the Institutio: in Aper's first speech usefulness is one of the four headings under which rhetoric is discussed, and Aper adds (5. 7): 'plura de utilitate non dico, cui parti minime contra dicturum Maternum meum arbitror. Crucially, for Aper the usefulness seems to consist primarily in the beneficial effects on one's own career: a shadow is cast on the use rhetoric has in defending other people, e.g. friends (5. 5-6), by mention of the delator Eprius Marcellus, and the use he made of rhetoric when he clashed with Helvidius Priscus (5. 7). Maternus (in 40. 4) then points out the harmful effects rhetoric had on the Roman state as a whole. Given that Q. is not very explicit about how his conception of rhetoric was formed with the delatores of the first century AD in mind, the Dial, helps us understand why Q. saw the need to make his conviction that rhetoric is useful tie in with his claim that the perfect orator had to be a uir bonus (see section II. 1 of the general introduction, and the introductory notes to chs. 11 and 12). The utility of rhetoric exercised many philosophers in the Hellenistic period (cf. Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 27-43; von Arnim, Dio, 87-114; Barwick 25; and Brittain 298-312), and it was certainly philosophers who made the most pertinent attacks on the technicity of rhetoric, which is a connected issue (cf. Sextus 26, and the introductory note on ch. 17). However, in the present chapter Q. does not make a point of disagreeing with philosophers, and rather seems to set up the declaimers in particular as his opponents at the beginning of the chapter; see §§1-4 nn. That the theme was not neglected in the declamation schools is clear from Decl. min. 268. 16-20 (with MW's nn.); also Val. Max. 8. 9 on the uis eloquentiae. The topic easily enabled the dedaimer to enlarge on the praises of reason and speech.

282

Commentary

16. 1. The section down to 4 begins with a general reference to quidam; the reference to the forces of rhetoric used against it as well as the somewhat mechanical run through arguments against rhetoric's usefulness in oratio obliqua suggest that Q. has declaimers in particular in mind. The comic poets and Plato in 3 are then cited as instances of a particular line of argument ('cuius... ueritatem ualet' in 2 fin.). In 4 the discussion returns to the general level of the quidam. inuehi:TLLs.v. 132. 1 'praevalet notio maledicendi'; cf. Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 43 Toaavra.. .ev KaraSpofjLrjs fxepei Aeyerai rrepi prjropiKrjs.

sit: the parallels for this 'parenthetic' subjunctive in Q. are 4. 2. 39 'deinde, quod sit monstro simile, placet actio, causa non intellegitur', 12.11. 3'alii, quod indignum uideatur,riderent, alii erubescerent' (for 2.17.4'is, quod his dissimile non esset, composuisse orationem... dicitur', seen, there); add Decl. min. 278.8 and299.3,Dcd. mai. 13.19. K-S ii. 308-9 distinguishes various types; Q. seems, unusually, to employ this subjunctive to soften an assertion that might otherwise seem overstated. Watt 159 expressed doubts about the whole construction, and favoured Halm's est here; but the passages defend each other. in accusationem orationis utuntur orandi uiribus: though Q. may not have philosophers particularly in mind (see above on quidam), this epigram recalls a stock criticism of Plato, voiced e.g. by Crassus in Cic. de Orat. 1. 47 'mihi in oratoribus inridendis ipse [Plato in Grg.] esse orator summus uidebatur' (adapted by Tac. Dial. 24. 1 on Aper and the antiqui: 'quanto... ingenio ac spiritu . . . ab ipsis mutuatus est per quae mox ipsos incesseret!'; Prol. p. 121. 7. Milton gave the idea a new twist in De idea Platonica 37-8 'iam iam poetas urbis exules tuae | reuocabis, ipse fabulator maximus'. orationis: why the shift from rhetorice to oratio* Q. may simply be striving for variation, or for epigrammatic expression (orationis... orandi). Alternatively, rhetorice above is rhetoric in the full sense, which Q. endorses and for whose usefulness he argues in the present chapter, oratio is a neutral term, applied to persuasive speaking as commonly practised. orandi uiribus: the heightened language of the indirect speech of 2 illustrates the uires. uires is primarily physical power and retains this connotation in many occurrences. On Q.'s use of orare see n. on 2. 15. 3 orandi. 16. 2 eripiat: TLL s.v. eripio 795. 10-43. Note esp. Decl. min. 268. 18 (an orator is addressed) 'eripuisti periculo reum: unde scio an nocentem?'; also 6. 1. 35 'quo L. Murenam Cicero accusantibus darissimis uiris eripuisse praecipue uidetur'. scelestos: a heightened and emotive word (cf. Vretska on Sal. Cat. 51. 32: 'scelestus mag wohl archaisch-sakralen Beiklang gehabt haben'; and Petersmann 672).

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cuius fraude damnentur interim boni: cf. (again) Decl. min. 268. 18 'damnatus est aliquis accusante te: unde scio an eloquentiae uitium sit?' For fraude cf. M. Kaser, Das romische Privatrecht, i (Munich, 1971), 250: 'Fraus legi facta heifit in der alten Zeit, die alle Normen nach dem typischen Wortsinn auslegt, jede bewuSte Verletzung eines Verbotsgesetzes, wobei die Verietzungsabsicht unterstellt wind. Seit der jiingeren Republik versteht man unter dem Ausdruck nicht nur die bewufite Verletzung des Wortlauts, sondern besonders auch die Umgehung des Gesetzes, die seinen Wortlaut einhalt, aber seinem Sinn zuvviderhandelt.' Oratory is of course a prime instrument to commit the particular transgressions mentioned. Note that fraus here covers everything down to wars. consilia ducantur in peius: we turn to deliberative oratory (as in Decl. min. 268. 19). in peius is standard even in sentences where there is a neuter plural noun (1. 1. 5 'nam bona facile mutantur in peius'). As to the point being made, Q.'s perfect orator is of course not affected by this type of criticism; cf. 12. 1. 26 'regenda senatus consilia et popularis error ad meliora ducendus'. In 27 Q. points the contrast still further by quoting Verg. A. 1. 151 on the power of the orator to check popular 'seditio' (in Virgil, however, there is no emphasis that the good man appearing is an orator; on the passage see Harrison). seditiones.. .turbaeque populares: cf. Decl. min. 268. 19 'nonne grauissimas seditiones, nonne turbidissimas contiones eloquentissimus quisque habuit?' bella... inexpiabilia: B's inexpugnabilia is impossible (for the corruption see Walters' app. crit. at Liv. 2.17.2); 5. 10.44 is no parallel. It is civil wars that cannot be expiated (compare the connection made between oratory and civil war at the end of Tac. Dial.). For the phrase see TLL s.v. inexpiabilis 1325. 65-71, citing e.g. Liv. 4. 35. 8, where the tribune who 'ruat caecus in certamina' is the sort of speaker whom Q. himself would have deplored, inexpiabilis is another emotive word. turn maximus sit usus cum... ualet: cf. Plat. Grg. 480 E-481 B (note 481 B 1—2 €774 r a TotavTo. €fxoiy€ 8ok€i. . .7) prjToptKr) xpyaip-°s

cfvat). For

maximus

usus cf. 2. 18. 5. ualet: F. Meister, Philologus, 18 (1862), 516 proposed ualeat. This would spoil the double cretic clausula (a more important consideration than usual in such a declamatory passage). For similar indicatives in temporal clauses in oratio obliqua even in Cicero, see Lebreton 369; H-Sz 548 point out that they become more frequent as archaisms in Sallust, Curtius, and Tacitus. 16. 3 nam et: et probably correlates with et contra below (cf. 8. 6. 20), though the sense 'even Socrates' is tempting (cf. n. below on 7 et...fuit).

284

Commentary

Socrati obiciunt... docere eum: for this construction of the word see OLD s.v. obicio, citing e.g. Cic. Att. 1. 16. 10 'obicit mihi me ad Baias fuisse'. comici: of course with primary reference to Aristophanes' Clouds—see esp. 98-9, 112-15, 882-5; though as Spalding points out other comic poets were involved (see Sen. Dial. 7. 27. 2); so comici does have genuine plural force. Equally, Socrates was not the only thinker to incur the charge; indeed he was classed with sophists who positively asserted their job was to do this (in Cic. Brut. 30 Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Protagoras, and many others are said to have been men who 'docere se profitebantur... quemadmodum causa inferior— ita enim loquebantur—dicendo fieri superior posset'). See the material collected by K. J. Dover in his edition of Clouds (Oxford, 1968), pp. xxxii-lvii. faciat: cf. n.on 2. 15. 12 uel it. et contra... Plato: a counter-charge (Plato representing Socrates). The reference is to Phdr. 267 A 6 - 8 Tcioiav Si Topyiav re iaoopiev evSeiv ot 7rpo TCJV dXrjdcjv rd eiKora e?Sov (vs rt/xrjrea fxdXXov, rd re ai5 ap-iKpa ficydXa Kai rd ficydXa ap.iKpd aiv€o6ai TTOIOVOIV Sid pojpn]v Xoyov. The

charge is not quite the same as that against Socrates: hence similia. For Isocrates' defence against the charge see Or. 15. 15-16.

16. 4 exempla Graecorum Romanorumque: cf. Rhet Her. 2. 44 for those 'qui rhetoricam uituperant propter alieuius oratoris uituperandam uitam'; and Cic. de Orat. 1. 38 (note 'si uelim et nostrae ciuitatis exemplis uti et aliarum', paralleling the genitive here), with L-P i. 114. perniciosa: cf. 2. 15. 32. For the accompanying dative cf. 3. 7. 21; TLL s.v perniciosus 1590. 26-44. ciuitatium status: cf. 11. 1. 85 'statum ciuitatis'; for the meaning 'arrangement, constitution, order' see OLD s.v. status2 8a. The whole phrase is put into the plural, as in the closely related Decl. min. 268. 19, where (note 'populi Romani statum'), as here, we move on to examples of individual 'states'. Lacedaemoniorum ciuitate expulsam: we should apparently understand eloquentiam from above rather than orandi potestatem from below. A gives a before Lacedaemoniorum, but this is a late usage (judging by the examples referred to at TLL s.v. expello 1638. 37-9); for the plain abl. cf. e.g. Tac. Dial. 32.4 'eloquentiam uelut expulsam regno suo', Sen. Nat. 4b. 13. 9 'ungentarios Lacedaemonii urbe expulemnt'. The story that eloquence was actually banned at Sparta recurs quite frequently. See esp. Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 20-1: o puiv KprjriKos vopLodir-qs €ip£as inifiaiveiv rrjs vr/oov TOUS iv Xoyois dXa^ovevoafxivovs, o Si ZiTapTtdrrjs AvKoOpyos ... TOV avrov rots ZnapTidTats vopiov

clorjyrioaTo. Plutarch (apop. Lac. 226 D) speaks of a ^evrjXaoia applied to sophists; consistent with this, but perhaps somewhat dubious, Chamaeleon fr. 35 Wehrli ( = Athenaeus 611 A ) : eiKoruis o3v noXXal TCOV -noXecjv Kal

Chapter Seventeen fidXtora

r) AaKcSatpLOvttoVy OJS XafxatAeiov

npooUvTat

ovre

285

(ftrjoiv ev r<x> trepi UtpLwvtBov, ov

pr)TopuiXoTtp,i as

16. 5 quo quidem modo: 'on this basis', with quidem giving emphasis to quo. The reductio ad absurdum that follows can be elaborately paralleled, e.g. Arist. Rhet. AlA355h2-6 et & oTt pteydXafiXdijjeievav o ^pai/xtdStKOJS rrj Totavrr) 8vvdpt€t Tutv Xoycui', TOVTO ye KOIVOV ioTt Kara navraiv row dyaOcjv 7TXT}V dperrjs..., otov toxvos vytetas ITXOVTOV aTparryyias (cf. the argument at Plat. Grg. 456 c 7-457 c 3); Isoc. Or. 15. 252 (cf. X. Mem. 1. 2. 27); Man. 4. 756 'cura nocet, cessare iuuat, medicina malorum | dat causas, laeduntque cibi

Commentary

286

parcuntque uenena'. Also Proleg. p. 183. 7-9 TOVTOJ rcu Aoyoj ( = quo... modo) fxeXXoifxev Kai avrov TOV 6eov Karrfyopeiv ano TCJV OKr}7TT<XIV Kai Kepavvaiv Kai tpe TOVS £K€IVOJV Aoyovs irpoOevres rd iv avrois acxfyiapara SicXe'yZojpev); however, we can compare Aristotle, who divides sophistical refutations on the most general level into those napd ri)v Aif-w and those efjaj rrjs Xe&ojs (SE 4, 165 b 23-4); cf. 2. 14. 5 n. on cauillationis. The argument that follows is another aspect of the naturalist view. Rhetoric is something that is inborn in men; they have always attacked others and defended themselves in speech. But rhetorical doctrine came later, at the time of Co rax and Tisias; oratio then came before ars, and cannot be the result of it. Philod. (Rhet. suppl. p. 6 . 7 - 1 1 ; p. 15. 2 - 1 0 L . A . ) dismisses the a r g u m e n t in this way: eyaj fiff yap ot^iai Siori tea v Aoyox irore ireifteii' avv\tup-q&Q rwas ISiatras, aAA' ov\, ort ye fieXreiov ratv TEYX'ENTUV, earai 8e8ei\OJI, ovSe KARA TO iSioi' rov Aeyetv ovSe ITVKVOI' ovrws 59

tVetVoi ('I think that, even if it is c o n c e d e d that s o m e non-specialists s o m e t i m e s p e r s u a d e by s p e e c h , he will n o t h a w s h o w n that t h e y do it better t h a n t h e trained, o r in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r o f speaking, o r frequently, as the)' d o ' ) .

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Q. says he could answer this by saying that rhetorical teaching in fact is preCorax and Tisias; that it already appears in Homer; and so, by implication, that one could argue that not only have people always defended and attacked in speech, but rhetoric has existed and been taught since time immemorial. But he rejects this line because he has a better refutation, applicable to any version of the argument (i.e. wherever it fixed the beginning of rhetoric): that there was (and is) a natural rhetoric that is 'completed' by art (cf. 3. 2. 1: Proleg. p. 171. 19—20: TOV Acyeiv rj vois atria, TOV 8e a5 Ae'yeiv rj pijTopiKrj). This is precisely the argument of Proleg. pp. 268-9 (see on 6 defensio)y and Kennedy 25 is wrong to contrast that with Q. Any differences between the two accounts are due to the fact that the Prolegomena have a historical interest and want to establish when the teaching of rhetoric began, while Q. argues from the standpoint of a defender of rhetoric against the claim that it is not an art. nihil quod ex arte fiat ante artem fuisse: cf. 10 below and Proleg. p. 3. 9-13 ^JV . . . RJ PTJTOPIKRJ ore OVK fjv €i 8i OVK tfv, ov8i yeyovev, €K>

TCJV pr) OVTOJV ooa ye Kara

dvOpionovs

atqui... semper: cf. Proleg. p. 14. 9-10:

inei

ov8iv

KTOJV OVTOJV

yiverai. jjv rj prjTopiK-q ay oi5 avdpajnoi

For the argument cf. Philod. Rhet. i. 27 = p. 57. 6 - 1 0 L.A.: irpo TOV KaTafiXrjBrjvai ra? rexyas (i.e. before rhetorical handbooks were composed) fic'Xreiov eprjTopcvov. ifi ots 8e ovveorrjoav x^ipov (an even more exaggerated view). Philodemus, like Q. in 9, replied (i. 28) that rouro* pev yap m> rpomp Kai rrjv rroirjTiKrjv KOI rrjv larpiKrjv Kai 77oAAas aAAas OVK etvai T€\vas Xeycopicv (1. 28 = p. 57. 30-4 L.A.; see also Sudhaus's suppl. pp. 15-16; cf. Proleg. p. 3. 20-1). Cf. also ii. 110: aAA' on npo

yeyovaaiv

€a\aTov

8e Kara pixpov

avveredrj

T(x)V OOif>lOTlK<xiV T€XVoXoyi(x)V fjoav Xoyiopor etvai

dOerei

yap

els T€\vr)v.

TToXlTlKol prjTOp€S,

OU^i rOUTO 7TpOS TOV

o«5ro? o Aoyo? ovre TO rrjv noXiTiKrjv prjTopiKrjv rexvrjv

. ..

sero iam: B omits iam. sero means 'late in the day' (not, pace Spalding, 'too late'); cf. 6. 3. 103, where the word is again explained in an added clause. Spalding did not recall the locution sero iam, but PHI registers it at Cic. Orat. 155 (and perhaps Cluent. 31), Liv. 23. 44. 1, Decl. mai. 9. 7 (with a past tense; cf. Petr. 7. 4 'iam sero.. .intellexi'). For the lateness of rhetoric among the arts, see Cic. Brut 26, Q. 12 pr. 3. circa: see n. on 2. 4. 41 circa Demetrium Phalarea. Tisian et Coraca: cf. 3. 1. 8 'artium... scriptores antiquissimi Corax et Tisias Siculi'. The texts on these shadowy fifth-century figures are collected by Radermacher, Art. Scr. 28-35, and more recently discussed by T. Cole, 'Who was Corax?', ICS 16 (1991), 65-84 (with an extensive bibliography), under whose scrutiny virtually the whole biographical tradition about the pair crumbles, including the view that these are two individuals (rather than a Tisias nicknamed 'the crow'). But since the ancient sources, including Q. and

316

Commentary

Cicero, take the accounts that were current to be historically accurate, Cole's in themselves convincing arguments have no bearing on the interpretation of Q. The argument that rhetoric came into being with the (two) Sicilian(s) is paralleled e.g. in Proleg. pp. 24. 5-27. 10. 17. 8 nos... actores: for the argument, see the summary, above, p. 301. nos porro: cf. n.on 2. 3. 5 porro. laboramus: A has laboramus exquirere, with equally good rhythm. The infinitive is unexceptionable (TLL s.v. laboro 801. 82-802. 17; note Catul. 67. 17 'nemo quaerit nec scire laborat'). But the indirect question is highly idiomatic (esp. with a negative; see TLL 803. 33-44). praeceptorem Phoenicem cum agendi turn etiam loquendi: see on 2. 3.12 Phoenieis Homerici. The passage {II. 9. 443) is often employed in the Proleg. (e.g. p. 23), but usually to show that Homer knew of the word p-qrajp. The combination of instruction in morals and oratory is in itself attractive to Q. (and Cicero; see 12. 2. 6). et oratores plures... actores: granted that what Q. is trying to show is that (one might argue that) there was 'huius rei doctrina' as early as Homer (to which Phoenix is relevant), it is unclear why he continues like this. If we reject the assumption that he is merely begging the question, then his point must be that (a) the many oratores in Homer,60 (b) his awareness of different kinds of oratorical style, and his mention (c) of competitions in oratory and (d) of lawsuits are inconceivable in a context where speaking was not taught. None of the considerations Q. adduces is cogent. As to (b), it would be easy to riposte that it was obseruatio of such differences between orators that led later to the theory of the three styles (see n. on 6 aliquid dicant... deprecentur); (c) might have appeared faintly plausible to contemporaries given the modern practice of competition in declamation; (d) might be thought to derive some force in the present context from the reference to Corax and Tisias, for their pioneering teaching of rhetoric was said to have been motivated by the lawsuits following the fall of the Sicilian tyrants (so the Aristotelian account reported in Cic. Brut. 46). Q. is not doing much more than alluding to passages which were or might be used in arguing for indications of rhetoric in Homer; note 3. 1. 8, where, before mention of Corax and Tisias, he writes: 'primus post eos quos poetae tradiderunt mouisse aliqua circa rhetoricen Empedodes dicitur'. Similarly in 10. 1. 46-50, after saying of Homer that he 'omnibus eloquentiae partibus exemplum et ortum dedit', he shows how the poet can be discussed under rhetorical heads61 without asserting that he was 60 Radermacher, Art. Scr. 3 - 6 collects more o r less serious ancient references to 'heroum rhetorice'. 61

Cf. the procedure o f the ps-Plutarchean De uita et poesi Horneri (Radermacher 10).

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conscious of them (note 48 'legem prohoemiorum non dico seruauit sed constituit'). omne.. .genus: cf. Iliad3. 221-3 (Odysseus); 1. 247-9 (Nestor); 3. 213-15 (Menelaus). The three heroes were seen as exponents of the three styles, grand, middle and plain; cf. 12.10. 64, Gel. 6. 14. 7 'sed ea ipsa genera dicendi iam antiquitus tradita ab Homero sunt tria in tribus: magnificum in Vlixe et ubertum, subtile in Menelao et cohibitum, mixtum moderatumque in Nestore'. For discussion and further references see Kennedy 26-9, and Radermacher, Art. Scr. 6-8. An objection to the argument seems to appear in Philod. Rhet. ii. 71, where oratory among the heroes is closely linked with the ability of the modern uneducated man to speak (cf. illud quoque in 11). certamina... act ores: cf. Iliad 15. 283-4 dyoprj 8E £ navpoi Axaiojv \ VIKOJV, OTTTTOT€ Kovpoi eptaaeiav nepi p,V9AJV; 18. 497-508 (shield of Achilles). 17. 9 enim: explaining non laboramus (8). omnia quae ars consummauerit a natura initia duxisse: for the phrasing, cf. 3. 5. 1 'facultas orandi consummatur natura arte exercitatione', Cic. Inv. 2. 65 'initium.. .eius [sc. iuris] ab natura ductum uidetur'. For the concept, cf. 2. 19 Introduction; see also n. on 2. 15. 29 consummari. aut: 'otherwise'; OLD s.v. 7, citing e.g. 1. 12. 5-6. medicina... reperta est: cf. 3. 2. 3 (cited on 5 dicit Antonius obseruationem quandam esse, non artem). Cf. Celsus pr. 32-5 (contentions of the empiricists), esp. 35 'Haec similiaque cum cotidie inciderent, diligentes homines notasse quae plerumque melius responderent; deinde aegrotantibus ea praecipere coepisse. Sic medicinam ortam, subinde aliorum salute, aliorum interim perniciosa discernentem a salutaribus.' ut quibusdam placet, tota constat experimentis: parallel to the dispute in rhetoric, there was a division between empirical and rational doctors. The former thought that unassisted experience could give rise to medical expertise and did not believe, as the rationalists did, that doctors could gain any knowledge of the underlying causes of disease. On the views of the empirical school, see R. Walzer, Galen on Medical Experience (Oxford, 1944); K. Deichgraber, Die griechische Empirikerschule (Berlin and Zurich, 2 1965); V. Nutton, 'Empiriker', NP iii (1997), 1016-18; Allen 103-6. Q.'s language is again reminiscent of the proem of Celsus, De medicina; note esp. 10 (copied by Valla into the margin of his MS of Q.): 'post quos [i.e. those who "rerum quoque naturae sibi cognitionem uindicarunt"] Serapion, primus omnium nihil hanc rationalem disciplinam pertinere ad medicinam professus, in usu tantum et experimentis earn posuit'. It is entirely possible that Celsus used the analog)' of medicine and rhetoric in his own De rhetorica, and influenced this passage of Q.

318

Commentary

uulnus deligauit: as in 2. 21. 17 used as an obvious example of a simple medical procedure (cf. also 4. 2. 84; Cels. 5. 26. 24A). febrem quiete et abstinentia... mitigauit: Cels. pr. 33-5 (see above on medicina... reperta est) uses the example of the discovery and 'noting' of the benefits of regulation of food in illness. In 3.4. 2-18 he gives advice on the amount of food to be taken at various stages of a fever (note 4 'abstinendus a cibo primis diebus est'). He links quies and abstinentia at e.g. 3. 2. 5, 4. 12. 4. For mitigauit cf. Plin. Ep. 1. 12. 9 'increuerat ualetudo, quam temperantia mitigare temptauit'; the verb is common in medical texts (TLL s.v. mitigo 1151. 19-51). non quia rationem uidebat: he did not see the underlying cause, as a rationalist doctor would have claimed to do (see above on ut quibusdam placet, tota constat experimentis); cf. Cels. pr. 36, where ratio and experientia are contrasted (note also 65 'exterae gentes, cum subtilem medicinae rationem non nouerint, communia tantum uident'). Q. uses the indicative for a rejected reason (uidebat), as he does in 2. 4. 31. In both cases the explanation given in K-S ii. 385-7 (that indicative is used when the causal relevance of an undisputed fact is denied, cf. e.g. Cic. Leg. 2. 31 'neque uero hoc, quia sum ipse augur, ita sentio, sed quia sic existimare nos est necesse') does not fit. 17. 10 casas: used in 9.4.4 of early buildings (as opposed to domus; cf. Vitr. 2. 1. 7); so also Lucr. 5. 1011. Vitr. 2. 1 describes the developments leading to the art of building using 'empirical' language: note esp. 2 'obseruantes aliena tecta', 7 'obseruationibus studiorum e uagantibus iudiciis et incertis ad certas symmetriariun perduxerunt rationes'; cf. also Sen. Ep. 90. 9-10. primi illi: cf. 8. 3. 36 'illi rudes homines primique'. cantatur ac saltatur: for the former impersonal use cf. Plin. Ep. 7. 4. 9, Apul. Met. 5. 15; the latter seems to be unparalleled in CL. aliquo modo: though without art. ita: = itaque, marking the conclusion of the argument (OLD s.v. 5b, with meagre illustration). si rhetorice... 11 fateantur: Q. resolves in his own favour two related questions: (a) that concerning 'indocti et barbari et serui' (6) and (/J) that concerning formal speech before Corax and Tisias (cf. the plural cauillationes in §7). The basis of the answer to both is contained in 9-10: rhetoric, like other arts, is rooted in things that men have always been able to do naturally. But that (Q. now makes clear) does not mean that any utterance (see n. on 2. 5. 11 sermo; and for loquitur and loquebantur below, cf. n. on 2. 3. 6 loqui) can be called rhetorice or that any speaker is an orator. In effect, he is defining the problem out of existence: rhetorice and orator, as he uses the words, cannot

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cover speeches by speakers who have, by reason of their circumstances or period, not been formally trained. And, it transpires, the same considerations can be used to refute another (illud quoque) related objection to the technicity of rhetoric (lib). The whole passage §§5-13 is a continuous argument, and is best printed as a single paragraph. confitebor: cf. 19 'confitebor.. .concedam...'; Kuhner on Cic. Tusc. 1. 35 arbitrabimur. 'saepe enim apud Ciceronem futurum... vices sustinet praesentis, ubi Graeci optativo c. av uti solent.' 17. 11 non quisquis loquitur orator est: looking esp. to point (a) (see previous n.on 10 si rhetorice. ..11 fateantur), while the next clause looks to point (j9). Similarly oratorem factum arte' looks primarily to (a), while 'nec ante artem fuisse' looks to (/J). From the clause under discussion alone one might conclude that loqui means 'to speak in a recognizably untrained way, to chat' here, but 'et turn... loquebantur' shows that it is used indiscriminately of speaking (the orators too engage in loqui). illud quoque: for this new argument, that the untrained too can make speeches, cf. Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 16 eincp re ivSexerai yeveoOai pr/Topa per) pL€Taa\6vTa ye iKavo)S ArjpidSov pt/jriop, avTtos

rfjs pr)TopiKr}s Kai Kara

TC)(vr)s, OVK av €ir} TIS T€\vr) pr}roptKrj.

rponov

7rap€iAr)api€v

pirj

KOJ7rr}AaTr)s yap

Philod. Rhet. ii. 97 Ataxivrfs

p-qropeveiv oa(os yap

/xcraa^ovra

tov opioAoyeiTai

Aeyet ort

( c f . ii. 1 2 5 vots . . . KaTevorjOr)

ivSex^rai

pr)TopiKrjsy

ArjpidSrjs

TO rrjs rex^rjs

apioros

cos

yeyovevat

OVK epiadev. epyov

8e

Kai 7T€pl

cos 8'

dnoreXeiv,

€7T€i ovyKcxioprjTai rivag a8i8d.KTios A e y e i v ) . If we trust Sudhaus' restorations here, Critolaus employed the argument (ii. 98 Kpir6\a[os OVK a7rap]re[i]rai; the name seems certain enough, but this part of Rhet. has not yet been re-edited; see also §15 below). This, as argued in the introduction (p. 304), does not mean that he invented it (nor is this suggested by the verb which Sudhaus has supplied); Hubbell 371-2, thought that a similar argument could equally well prove from Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 20 that Clitomachus and Charmadas were responsible (simply because they are mentioned as 'arguing in this way'), but this can be rejected on independent grounds: they are given in a forward reference there (the argument presently under consideration appears in §18; that at least Charmadas did, however, attack on these lines is clear from Cic. de Orat. 1. 91). 62 As the argument further on shows, Philodemus rejected this view on the basis of the definition of art, which insisted on certainty of results (ii. 98, cf. ii. 71 t o 8y eiKofioAeiv OVK opOofioAet TTXY)V ei ITOV aiTavlios). The definition of

62

See the introduction to this chapter for a general discussion o f the underlying source(s).

320

Commentary

art presupposed in Philod., Sextus, and Q. is largely the same.63 So the question arises why Q. does not use the same refutation as Philod emus.6'1 A possible answer might be this: Q. is (and has been since 2. 15) relying on two related notions of technical rhetoric, a simpler one (rhetoric as the result of training and grounded in rules and precepts) and a more complex one (rhetoric in the described sense, but inextricably linked to moral virtue), and he is switching between them as it suits his argument. When he cited evidence for 'rhetoric' from Homer in §8, he was surely not hoping to uncover his orator perfectus there; likewise, when considering people like Demades and Aeschines in 12, he would not want them to be instances of his perfect orator (Demades had a bad reputation; see Thalheim in RE iv [1901], 2703-4; for Aeschines see below on 12 'Aeschinen hypocriten'). Rather, they are orators in the less loaded sense, and to say that they 'always achieve their goal' (which would have to be bene dicere then) cannot be in Q.'s interest. exduditur: 'is refuted' (cf. Eng. 'is ruled out of court'). Cf. Cic. Tuli 31 'opprimitur et excluditur omnis tua defensio', Grillius, Comm. in Cic. Rhet. p. 32.67-8 Jakobi 'ecce excludit ilium [sc. Tullius Platonem] dicendo (also p. 32. 69-70), and some of the examples cited by TLL s.v. excludo 1270. 7-50. dicere... didicerint: 'there are men who can make speeches without having learned' (Loeb). The meaning is ensured by the context, but the expression is strange. It would seem that Q. makes the paranomasia dicere/didicerint (cf. 2. 21. 15, with n.) substitute for the correspondence of prjropcveiv and pr)TopiK7} (see Sextus cited above). The presence of homines (contrast plain qui non d id ice rit above) is unaccountable. 17. 12 Demaden remigem: this example is used in the same context certainly by Sextus and presumably by Philodemus (see n.on 11 ill mi quoque); cf. De Falco 13-14. Demades (less specifically a vavrrjs in Proleg. p. 66. 14; so too Suda s.n.) gave rise to the proverb ano Kw-nqg im firjpa (Paroem. Graec. ii, p. 303; Syrianus in Hermogenem ii. 3 Rabe). For Demades' self-made success see below on continua dicendi exercitatio. Aeschinen hypocriten: Philodemus linked Aeschines with Demades (see n. on 11 iUud quoque); Sextus simply says there were 'very many others' like Demades. For Aeschines as an actor, see Dem. 18, e.g. §313: /xyrj/xow/ooraro?, 6 3 O n both Sudhaus' and Longo Auricchio's reconstruction o f the papyrus (i. 7 0 S. = p. 123. 1 4 - 1 5 L.A.), Philodemus did not make his definition cover both stochastic and other arts, but excluded the former; Barnes 7 restores the text so as to cover both. 44 Philodemus loc. cit. refers to Aeschines and Demades as Q. does, so the divergence between him and Q. is to be seen against the background o f an otherwise close similarity.

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(with the excellent commentary of Wankel ad loc.), and the vitae of Aeschines. Like Demades, he was regarded as a self-made orator (for his lack of education see [Plut.] Vit. XOr. 840 F); cf. the story in the vitae (Martin i, p. 4) that when asked to teach rhetoric in Rhodes he refused, etnovra p,r)8y avrov etSevat. For his 'natural' eloquence see Caecilius fr. 126a Ofenloch [his ISea TOV Xoyov] eortv... a r e ^ o j pcev Kat 7Tpo7T€rr)s vTTOKpirrjs aptoros,

Kai €vx€pu)S

em

rpaytKos

TO XotSopetv

e^ayopevr],

€\ovaa

vo€ojs Kat

pLeXcrrjs.

GeoKptvrjs

[ c f . Q . 2 . 12. 4 ] atoxpais

he r t eixftves

Kat evayojyov,

Kat d.7Tp€7T<x)S prjropt

Kat olov

av yevotro

TLVI €K

hypocriten: Q. uses the Greek word instead of histrio (see e.g. 10. 5. 6) also at 11. 3. 7 (only otherwise in CL at Suet. Nero 24. 1). falso: nam: cf. Cic. Off. 3. 74, Nep. Ale. 9. 2. neque orator esse... potest: no one can be called orator who has not 'learnt'. Q. has moved from the position taken in §11 that an orator must have been made by ars-, the slippery nature of Q.'s use of the verb discere in this passage is apparent from the nn. below on quamquam... genus est and 13 sed... sciamus. But he is arguing in his opponents' terms. hos... dixerit: Q., not disputing that Demades and Aeschines were orators, asserts accordingly that 'one may say' (for quis dixerit cf. 3. 3. 13; K-S i. 634) that they both did 'learn' in the end. Cf. Val. Max. 8. 7 ext. 8 'Socraten... constat aetate prouectum fidibus tractandis operam dare coepisse, satius iudicantem eius artis usum sero quam numquam percipere' ('better late than never'). quamquam.. .genus est: Q. now proceeds to qualify the assumption that they had not learnt earlier, dealing chiastically with Aeschines first because he has more to say about Demades. In Aeschines' case the learning at least extended to that picked up in the school of a grammaticus; as for Demades, he may have 'learnt' (the kind of training is not specified), and (even if he did not) he could have learnt enough by practice, the best form of learning. quas pater eius etiam docebat: 'which his father actually taught'; cf. Dem. 18. 258, 19. 281. At (Plut.) Vit X Or. 840 u Aeschines is said himself to have taught ypaptptara with his father (cf. Philod. Rhet. ii. 172 optotajs Aioxtvrjs ecus fjv {moKpiT-qs Kat ypaptptartKos €7revr}Tevev). ab initio: 'from early on in his life'; contrast 2. 20. 6 'ab initio formatos', where the process is traced back to (as we should say) our genes. Demaden neque... certum sit: for these doubts see De Falco 91-2. Q. concedes their validity in 13 ('si didicisset'). continua dicendi exercitatio: cf. 1 pr. 27. Cf. fr. lix De Falco=Stobaeus, Eel. iii. 655 W—H: Ar)p,d8r]s epojT-qdcis TIS avrov StbdoKaXos yeyovojs etrj "TO TUJV YA9R)vata)v" €i] "firjpa". His fr. lxx = [Max. Conf.] Loci communes 1 7 (Migne PG 9 1 . 8 2 8 a ) , which makes Demades say that three things are needed

Commentary

322

in education, vois peXcrt) xpwos ( r e x b e i n g notably omitted), is only doubtfully attributable to the orator. tantum quantuscumque fuit: this is not meant slightingly; in the absence of any written production (cf. also Cic. Brut 36 'is cuius nulla exstant scripta Demades'), Q. is in genuine doubt about Demades' quality (cf. Q.'s remark about himself at 6. 2. 36 'ipse, quantuscumque sum aut fui': one cannot judge one's own abilities); hence his omission from the 'canon' in 10. 1. But at 12. 10. 49 (cited below on 13 sed... sciamus) Q. links Demades with Pericles as in agendo clarissimi); and note 13 'et praestantiorem'. nam id potentissimum discendi genus est: cf. 11. 2. 36: 'excepta, quae potentissima est, exercitatione'. Q. here makes (or comes close to making) the perilous concession that an orator might do without ars so long as he had had enough practice, combined no doubt with some natural talent (see above on Aeschinen hypocriten and tantus quantuscumque fuit); yet in his discussion of the relative importance of ars and natura in 2. 19 he will not mention exercitatio at all. 17. 13 sed .. .sciamus: 'on the other hand, one can say that he would have been even more outstanding if he had learnt; for he never ventured to write down his speeches, though we know he delivered them with great effect' (Russell, slightly adapted). As Spalding saw, this is a concessive ut (K-S ii. 249 n. 3); Halm's cum is unnecessary, though it would be more readily understood, didicisset must here mean 'formally learnt' (like didicisse in 12; cf. n.on 12 neque orator esse. ..potest); it was such training that would have given Demades the confidence and ability to write down his speeches (see below). The passage has been found difficult (see Winterbottom1 124),65 but it should (as Ammendola observed) be seen in the light of 12. 10. 49, where Q. reports the view that 'aliam esse dicendi rationem, aliam scribendi putauerunt, ideoque in agendo clarissimos quosdam nihil posteritati mansurisque mox litteris reliquisse, ut Peridem, ut Demaden'. If Demades had 'learnt', he would have acquired the ratio scribendi (one recalls the emphasis on writing in Quintilian's system). This would have given him the confidence to publish his speeches, and that in turn would have enabled us to judge him 'even more outstanding' than we can do on the basis of reports of the spoken speeches (note 12. 10. 54 'aut eos [sc. Demosthenes and Cicero] praestantissimos oratores alia re quam scriptis cognoscimus?'). It may be added that, if he had been trained, Demades would also have learnt how to improve his speeches by preparing them in advance, a process that might involve at least «

Corsi connects with 4 2 - 3 : those who leam are better than those who don't.

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some memorization of a written text (10. 7. 29 'scribendum ergo quotiens licebit'; cf. 30 for Cicero's practice).66 As it was, he had to rely on his extempore powers (for which see Plut. Dem. 10, where note iravres ajfjLoXoyovv rrj vaci xpaifxevov avtKrjTov etvai). For Q.'s views on writing and extemporization, see n.on 2. 4. 15 garrulitas. On this passage and the issue of speeches assigned to Demades see also I. Worthington, 'The Context of [Demades] On the Twelve Years, CQ2 41 (1991), 90-5, esp. 90-1. ut eum multum ualuisse in dicendo sciamus: dicendo contrasts sharply with seribere. For Demades' powers, see Cic. Or. 90 (wit); Demetrius, Eloe. 282-6 (Seivorqs); Plut. Dem. 10; Diod. Sic. 17. 15. 5 (Seivorrjs rov Xoyov). 17. 14 Aristotdes... adsignat: Q. is more alive than most ancient readers to the ambiguities of Aristotle's position; contrast Cicero's interestingly different assessment of Aristotle's writings on rhetoric 'ille eadem acie mentis... haec quoque aspexit quae ad dicendi artem, quam ille despiciebat [cf. Off. 1. 4 'contempsit'], pertinebant' (de Orat. 2. 160). Note the comment of Atherton 419: 'Aristotle's attitude to rhetoric is a curious mixture of contempt and sophistication' (citing evidence from the Rhet.), and May-Wisse 165 n. 124: 'the notion of Aristotle's contempt for rhetoric probably derived from the tradition about the hostility between him and Isocrates'. ut solet... excogitauit: Q. is talking of Aristotle's dialogues 'of scientific discussion', where, according to Jaeger's view in Aristotle (Oxford, 1948), 28, he 'set speech against speech, thus reproducing the actual life of research in the later Academy'; this assessment is based not on actual fragments, which are very scanty indeed, but on references to the dialogues like Cic. de Orat. 3. 80: 'qui Aristotelio more de omnibus rebus in utramque partem possit dicere et in omni causa duas contrarias orationes .. .explicare', or Att. 13. 19. 4, where he calls Aristotelian those dialogues in which Aristotle appears as a character and conducts the discussion (this is the only conceivable basis for the claim that the dialogues provided a glimpse of the 'life of research of the later Academy'). A survey of what little we know about the content and structure of Aristotle's dialogues is in H. Flashar (ed.), Die Philosophic der Antike, iii (Basel and Stuttgart, 1983), 281-5. subtilitatis suae argumenta: a rather awkward phrase, less natural than Plin. Nat. 18. 335 'Aristoteles, uir immensae subtilitatis'. Ancient verdicts on Aristotle are collected by During 353-65 (positive) and 373-84 (negative). in Gryllo: Rose collects the exiguous fragments of this lost dialogue in his Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta Aristotelis (Leipzig, 1886), 75-6, 66

his

We see from this passage how writing in preparation assisted writing up later. Cicero had could be worked u p for publication.

commentaru, which

Commentary

324

to which add D.L. 5. 22, which gives the (not necessarily original) title as rpvXXos

rj nepl

p-qTopiK-qs.67

We do not know what, if anything, the dialogue was meant to prove, or whether Q. misrepresents it. For discussions see F. Solmsen, Die Entwicklung der A ristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik (Berlin, 1929), 196-229; Throm 57 n. 1; V. Buchheit, Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos Epideiktikon (Munich, 1960), 110-16 with 234-5; Kennedy, Art, 83; M. Lossau, 'Der aristotelische Gryllos antilogisch', Philologus, 118 (1974), 12-21. Solmsen thought that Aristotle, in a spirit of perversity, was trying to show that rhetoric was not an ars. (He lays stress on excogitauity though this is probably quite neutral; cf. Cic. de Orat. 2. 160.) It seems most likely, however, given what we hear about the general nature of Aristotelian dialogues, that the dialogue gave both sides of the question 'Is rhetoric an art?', 'quaerendi gratia' as Q. says; this is also the line taken by Lossau, who cites evidence for the Peripatetic practice in utramque partem dicendi in the spirit of inquiry (similarly Granatelli2 892, on a pars destruens which may have been matched by a pars construens). It may well, then, have included (some of) the basic stock of material around which Q.'s, Philodemus', and Sextus' main source was built (so also Barnes 4). Q. (note sed) implies that the dialogue was unfavourable to rhetoric; but he probably did not have first-hand knowledge of the book. It does not seem to have been observed in connection with this passage that Grillius, Comm. in Cic. Rhet. p. 2.41-47 Jakobi says: 'Aristoteles autem dicebat esse artem, sed malam, quia contra ueritatem nititur et studio defensionis fidem ueritatis impugnat. Et dabat Aristoteles argumenta et exempla uerissima. Nam in Ariopago, ubi erant seuerissimi iudices, stabant praecones et non permittebant prooemia dicere oratoribus aut epilogos aut locos communes, ne per hoc obscuritatem ueritas pateretur.' Aristotle does not say all this in Riiet. Al, 1354a23, to which Jakobi refers the allusion, and it is not quite impossible that he took this line in the Gryllos, if only to construct one side of an argument on either side. It would be interesting to know where Grillius' knowledge about the procedure originated from, e.g. about the praecones (Q. 6. 1. 7?). Cf. n.on 2. 16. 4 Athenis... ubi actor mouere adfectus uetabatur. 6 7 Q. 3. 1. 13 ( o n Gorgias as teacher o f Isocrates) is also confidently attributed to the Gryllos by Ross in his Aristotelis fragmenta selecta (Oxford, 1955). Another possibility is the ouvayusyr) retf'wK so P. Teichert, De fontibus Quintiliairi rhetoricis (diss. Braunsberg, 1884), 2 2 . Aristotle made a celebrated attack on Isocrates (the material on which is collected and discussed in Diiring 2 9 9 - 3 1 4 ) , and it may be that his teacher's name was mentioned in that connection; for such an attack the Gryllos would be the better place, since the ovvaytuyr) was, on the evidence we h a w , factual not polemical. Nevertheless, 3. 1. 13 is at best only a possible fragment of the dialogue.

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Gryllo: so B; As grippo implies the spelling gryllo. Cf. Solmsen, op. cit. 197 n. 2: TpvAo? scheint die eigentlich attische gewesen zu sein'. Solmsen may have consulted F. Bechtel, Diehistorisdien Personennamen des Griechisdien bis zur Kaiserzeit (Halle, 1917), which lists a rpGXos but no rpvXAos. LSI s.v. o ypvXos 'pig, porker', which is likely to be the origin of the personal name,68 says that 'later' the word was spelt ypvXXos. However, in the volumes of LGPN published so far, there is only one man called /puAos (Chalcis 332/1 BC), but seven called TpuAAos-, including three in vol. ii (Attica), the latter from the fifth and fourth centuries BC. de arte rhetorica: the title is of course stressed (cf. 2). fatetur: Rhet. Al, 1354 a 6-13, analysed by Cooper 193 n. 2. e i . . . adsignat: Rhet. A2, 1356a25 avp.fiaiv€t rrjv prjropiKrjv otov 7rapav€s TI rrjs SiaXeKTiKrjs elvai KOL rrjs nepi. rd rjBv] npayp,ar€iag, ijv SIKCLIOV £OTI 7rpooayopeveiv noXiTiKrjV, 30—1 €OTI yap fiopiov TI rrjs 8iaX€KTIKR}s Kai 6p.otajp,a. These passages ensure that the MS reading dialecticis is wrong; the form of the corruption suggests strongly that Q. wrote dialectices rather than dialecticae, in accordance with the rule stated on p. 216 above; an exception is 3. 4. 10 (where Meister emended to -ices), while 1. 10. 37 is ambiguous. 17. 15 Critolaus: fr. 25 Wehrli. On Critolaus and his role in the debate see nn.on 2. 15. 19 Ariston and 23 Critolaus. Philod. Rhet. ii. 102 speaks of Critolaus' vpos TOVS p-qropas how it operates, and also how perception and rational thought can be understood evidently form part of the shared cultural background of Q.'s readership. We begin with a brief account of regular Tcx^based reasoning and then consider in what way rhetoric, on the argument considered and rejected by Q., is different; after that the evidence from Sextus and Philodemus will be considered. A rixy-q is an organized system of items of knowledge which cohere with each other, which have propositional content and are true. These items of knowledge ultimately derive from perception, but that is not the main point of the argument here. A doctor is someone who has acquired this rexvir] a s the result of private study, teaching, and experience, and the re^y) has become a mental disposition of his, a 8id6eois (so Philod. Rhet i. 69). An individual precept, i.e. one of the items of knowledge which make up the art, might be '(If the patient has a fever,) bring it down by wrapping cloths soaked in cold water around her calves.' A doctor would approach a patient, perceive certain symptoms correctly, match these perceptions to the relevant items of knowledge which constitute the rexvq and then act on these perceptions according to the rex^n by treating the patient in a certain way (if she had fever, he would wrap soaked cloths around her calves); if medicine really was an art, there should be no error, and the treatment should produce an effect. Rhetoric, if it was an art, would work on the same principle. However, on the argument considered by Q. rhetoric commits an error when the orator makes statements which are false (here statements are on a par with the doctor's actions). The calumnia is, as it were, a backward reasoning from the observation that orators do in fact say things which are false: for someone to act in accordance with the art of rhetoric and lie, the

Commentary

328

items of knowledge which make up the re^n? of rhetoric69 must themselves be false. And since the items of knowledge which make up an art—KaraXrufjeis, perceptiones—are impressions which have been assented to, i.e. that is how they came about at some stage, through observation of successful actions originally attempted on a trial-and-error basis (it does not matter whether the orator developed such a KaTaXrpjtts himself or acquired it through learning, for it must have come about in this way at some stage),70 this state of affairs is described as 'falsis opinionibus adsentiri\71 The reason why Q. uses the noun opinio in this phrase is that he needs a term for 'item of knowledge' which (unlike a perceptio) does not have built into it the notion of truth; it is an untechnical, ordinary-language notion (and has nothing to do with the Stoic concept of 86$a). Q.'s reply will be considered in a moment; before that we introduce the first of the two supposed parallels.72 In Adv. Rhet. 10-12 Sextus quotes the definition of T€x l which Q. too adopts (which is worth noting, given that Q. relies on the definition without formally introducing it), and goes on to say: vr

rj Se ptJTOpiKlJ

OVK €OT ( OUOTTJFIA €K K,

U)S TTUpilOTTjOOfie I' OVK tipv OVK etot KaTaXr/ifieis, (JjevSrj Be ion ra Xeyopeva TT}S prjTopiKrjs etvat OeioprfparUy rotavra ovra " O U T C D TrapaTretoreov T O W StKaordg" Kai "opyrjv KtvrjTeov rj e ' A e o r " Kai "potato avvr/yoprfTeov rj UpoovXcu"' < o t * > ip<j>atvet TO KaOrfKitv OVTU) T O O ? StKaorag rrapaTreiOetv Kai opyrjv rj eXeov Ktvetv- "mep OVK ioriv a\r)0rj, Kai 8ta TOVTO aKardXiprTa. ov TOIVVV avrtov etotv at KaraX-^fieiS' to prjTOpiKrj.

TUiv

awetaepxerai

TO prj8c

rrjv pijTopiKrjv

v ~ d t v .

Rhetoric advances falsehoods and hence does not fit the definition of rex™) because one cannot have a KardXiqifiis of if/ev8rjy which agrees with Q.'s calumnia. But Sextus continues that precepts like 'one ought to cheat the 69

W i t h coitstitui w e c a n c o m p a r e f o r m u l a t i o n s which suggest that (i) a n a r t is c o m p l e x , i.e.

c o m p r i s e s m a n y precepts w h i c h m a y h a v e been a c c u m u l a t e d over t i m e , a n d that (ii) it is o r g a n i z e d , i.e. t h e precepts are interrelated; both ideas are present (chiastically) in SVF fr. 56: T/^I'IJ- avcrrrjp.a yap IJI' Kai a9poiop.a 70

KaTaXifpis.

T h e t e r m perceptio

ii,

karaXrppfojv.

T h e c l a u s e ' q u a e s e m p e r uera sit' m a r k s the technical use o f perceptio

in the sense o f

had b e e n established by C i c e r o a s the s t a n d a r d r e n d e r i n g o f

KardXrpfjis; see Fill 3 . 17 in particular, b u t it o c c u r s twice in Inv. and o n c e in Rhet. Her. before its first a p p e a r a n c e in the technical Stoic sense o f KaraX-qipn in Ac. 1. 4 5 ; it was rarely used after C i c e r o (see TLL s . v . ) — w h i c h increases the likelihood that readers w o u l d c o n n e c t it with h i m — a n d o c c u r s twice o n l y in Q., here and in 4 1 ; o n its use in Cic. see H . - J . H a r t u n g , Ciceros bei der Ubersetzunggriechischer 71

philosophischer

Termini

Methode

( H a m b u r g , 1 9 7 0 ) , index s.v.

T h a t 'falsis o p i n i o n i b u s assentiri' is equated with telling falsehoods in § 1 9 pins d o w n t h e

m e a n i n g o f the p h r a s e 72

T h e r e is a s t r o n g prima facie plausibility for a g r e e m e n t with Sextus, given that there t h e

a r g u m e n t i m m e d i a t e l y following the supposed c o u n t e r p a r t t o o u r a r g u m e n t here is arguably v e r y similar t o the o n e Q. considers in § § 2 2 - 5 ; s o t h e b r o a d e r q u e s t i o n o f a s h a r e d s o u r c e is a t stake here t o o .

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jury in such-and-such a way' declare the duty of thus misleading the judges (i.e. a moral ought'), and this is not true according to Sextus.73 The argument which follows then makes it clear that the objection was to the 'falsehood' of the na payyeXfxara of rhetoric if they are taken as moral imperatives. Barnes 13 has argued that this is to mistake the imperative of the instructor for a moral imperative: 'If a chess master says: "You ought to move your bishop to KR3," it is wholly impertinent to reply: "That is false—I have no duty to move the bishop there; indeed, I have no duty to play chess at all".' However, Sextus was not quite unaware of this: in 12 he lists some of the precepts of rhetoric like 'this is the way one ought to burgle a house', and then comments favSrj yap ion ravra, Kai OVT€ KaOr/Kovra OUTC Oeajprf/iara. That ipcvBrj is elaborated on in this way—we take the Kat to be explicative—makes it seem unlikely that Sextus simply failed to see a distinction between the moral and the technical 'ought'; rather, he feels entitled to merge the two categories because he has chosen precepts encouraging morally reprehensible behaviour. (This is not justified either, but it is different from mere confusion of two senses of 'ought'.) We return to Q. and to his rebuttal of the calumnia, in order to answer the question whether the latter is the same argument as the one brought forward by Sextus. Q. says the orator does not assent to false opiniones since he is not himself deceived, even if he tells a lie. In the absence of examples similar to those in Sextus and given that Q.'s other, non-rhetorical examples are straightforward cases of misleading behaviour, this suggests that he is thinking of factual untruths as opposed to what Sextus would take (not without misunderstanding, as we have seen) as morally reprehensible untruths. To give an example, if according to the first Hermagorean OTAOIS an orator counters the charge 'X has committed the murder of Y' by saying, against his better judgement as far as truth is concerned, 'X has not committed the murder of Y' because he thinks he can convince the jury of this, then he would put forward a lie (and the calumnia does have a point on the reasoning reconstructed above). Is Q.'s rejoinder actually sufficient to maintain the technicity of rhetoric in the face of the counter-argument? If we assume that Q.'s orator, uir bonus that he is, would lie for a good cause only, then first the harmony of his soul which is the virtue of rhetoric (see the commentary on ch. 20) would not be impaired by this, given that he knows the truth himself, and he would, as it were, trade local disorder (that is what a lie would amount to) for achieving global order, e.g. the acquittal of an innocent and just man (this kind of consideration was invoked, as we recall, in the argument for rhetoric's usefulness in 2. 16. 11-19). Q. and Sextus share the 73

See also the mangled argument in Philod. Rhet. suppl. 12-13.

330

Commentary

assumption that the items of knowledge which make up rhetoric include false ones; on Q.'s argument they seem to be false for a different reason; the difference between the arguments is likely to be due to the fact that they have fitted out the same skeleton of an argument with different examples, suitable to their respective argumentative needs (rhetoric as wielded by a good man is a worse target from Sextus' point of view than the rhetoric of scoundrels). Sextus' argument as it stands is similar to the argument in §26 below, which, however, does not argue from the mechanism of the art. Parallels in Philodemus do not require detailed discussion. At Rhet. i. 22 Philodemus refers to an argument that most theorems (deajp-qpara) of other arts were true, but those of rhetoric were false, and therefore rhetoric was no art; he retorts with a reductio ad absurdum: if that were true, then philosophy, medicine, and music would not be arts either. In Rhet. ii. 90 he records the argument that orators ov p,d\\ov... airaTtooiv rj diTaTUJVTai, and at ii. 88 (cf. 89) an answer to this. The details of the argument are ludicrous, and bear no relation to Q. except for the general contrast of deceiving and deception. See §26 for a similar argument, with our n.on uti... uitiis rhetoricen... criminantur. 17.19 dicere falsa pro ueris: for the circumstances where this is permissible see §27 and n. quid: cf. 3. 8. 25 'ubi constat quid fieri non posse'; K-S i. 634. nam et imperator.. .21 non nescit: the passage is elaborately structured, and its structure marked. At the beginning there is {a) a parallel generality between the orator and the general ('nam et imperator... saepe'), an example is provided ('ut Hannibal.. .dedit'), and a conclusion appended ('sed ilium fefellit, ipse quid uerum esset non ignorauit'). There follows (b) a new instance (but not of a general; contrast the Loeb 'generals also'): 'nec uero Theopompus.. .praebuit', with embedded conclusion: '(nec) falsam de se opinionem habuit, sed custodibus praebuit'. Then we (c) return to the orator: 'item orator... fallit alium'. The conclusion here ('non ergo falsam habet ipse opinionem, sed fallit alium') picks up that to the Hannibal case, and one might think that the series was over, with ring composition (in which case ita would be natural here rather than item). But then we get (d) a new instance, concerning Cicero (the conclusion 'nihil ipse uidit' again looks back to the Hannibal case), and another (e) from painting, a quite different field (see n. below on 21 pictor... nescit for a suggestion why it is included here), with the conclusion 'ipse ea plana esse non nescit'). The recurrent ipse binds (a), (d), and (e) together. The double negatives (non ignorauit; non nihil uidit; non nescit) (again) bind (a), (d), and (e) together. And (b) and (c) are closely bound by nec [(c) non} falsam opinionem habuit [(c) habet} sed.

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Hannibal., .dedit: Q. abbreviates Liv. 22. 16. 5-17. 3. Cf. also Fron. Str. 1. 5. 28, Appian, Hann. 14-15. boum: so B; bouum A. Cf. TLL s.v. bos 2135. 23-78. 17. 20 Theopompus.. .euasit: for this story about the late eighth-century Spartan king, see Polyaenus 8. 34. permutato: the verb is again used of changing clothes in 3. 7. 6. opinionem... praebuit: related uses are collected in TLL s.v. 389. 29-41, the closest parallel being Caes. Gal. 3. 17. 6 'tantam.. .opinionem timoris praebuit'. item... alium: see n. on 19 nam et imperator... 21 non nescit. orator., .fallit alium: cf. Gel. 11. 11. 1 (from Nigidius Figulus): 'Inter mendacium dicere et mentiri distat. Qui mentitur, ipse non fallitur, alterum fallere conatur: qui mendacium dicit, ipse fallitur' and SVF iii, fr. 554 = Stob. Eel. ii. 7, p. 111. 10-17 W-H. Cf. also the cynical remark of Servius on Aen. 9. 134 'in arte rhetorica tunc nobis conceditur uti mendacio, cum redarguere nullus potest'. For further detail see n. below on 27 mendacium dicere et sapienti... concessum est. 17. 21 nec Cicero... nihil ipse uidit: see n.on 19 nam et imperator.. .21 non nescit for the structure of this passage. For the phrasing cf. 10. 1. 70 'nec nihil profecto uiderunt'. cum se tenebras... gloriatus est: parallels, literal and metaphorical, for tenebras ojfudisse may be found scattered in TLL s.v. offundo 531. 67-532. 17. Jerome, Ep. 50. 2. 2 'nam s i . . . iactasset manum, uerba tornasset, tenebras ilico ante oculos iudicibus offiidisset' may reflect our passage; so H. Hagendahl, Latin Fathers and die Classics (Goteborg, 1958), 160. As to the boast, no extant passage of Cicero can be pointed to (it is fr. inc. 17 Miiller). J. Humbert, 'Comment Cicero n mystifia les juges de Cluentius', REL 16 (1938), 275-96, comparing it with the quotation from the correspondence with Brutus (fr. ep. VII. 10 Watt) at 8. 6. 20 (cf. 55) 'populo imposuimus' (though the following words 'et oratores uisi sumus' do not fit well), and with Q.'s remark at 11. 1. 21 about Cicero's tendency to boast of his prowess in his private correspondence, deduced, plausibly, that it too came in a letter, less securely that the letter was addressed to Brutus. Two further passages are relevant, {a) Julius Rufinianus 13 (RLM 42. 19-20) .ut pro Cluentio fecit Cicero, in qua oratione tenebras se offudisse iactauit iudicibus Cluentianis'. Rufinianus goes on to cite four passages from the speech; these are not intended to throw light on the boast, though in the first Cicero remarks that he will keep to prosecutors' divisio 'ut omnes intellegant nihil me nec subterfugere uoluisse reticendo nec obscurare dicendo'. Rufinianus seems to draw on Q. elsewhere, and it may be

Commentary

332

unnecessary to posit a common source; A. Schafer, Quaestiones Rhetoricae (Bonn, 1913), 46-8 thought of Celsus. (b) Plut. Cic. 25 (ignored by Humbert) Movvarta) . . . TTOTC avvrjyoprjoas, a>? ancxftvydjv rrjv StKTjv €K€tvos £8t(I)K€V eraipov avrov Zafiivov, o u r o u Aeyerai Trpo-ntoeiv VTT opyrjs o KiKcpoov COOT ei7T€iv yap €K€tvr)v, (L Movvarie, rrjv 8LKT)V aneiftvyes Sta oeavrov, OVK IPLOV -rroXv OKOTOS IV (FMJTI TUJ SiKaorrjpiai 7REPIXEOLVTOS'" on which see RExvi/1 (1933), s.n. Munatius no. 1 and iA/2 (1920), s.n. Sabinus no. 1. It seems unlikely, in view of Cic. Fam. 7. 2. 2-3, that Plutarch is wrong to connect the boast with the case of Munatius (Plancus Bursa). Thus either Cicero made the same claim twice, or Q. is wrong to connect a single claim with the Cluentius case. Assuming that the boast was made about the Cluentiana, C. J. Classen, 'Cicero Pro Cluentio 1-11 im Licht der rhetorischen Theorie und Praxis', RUM1 108 (1965), 139 has a suggestion what in particular Cic. was talking about (but see also 112-13 n. 35); William Ramsay, in William Smith (ed.), A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology; 3 vols. (London, 1844-9), i. 807 (s.n. Cluentius), refers the claim to the fallacious reasoning at §64 [a reference owed to Dr Holford-Strevens]. pictor.. .nescit: we do not expect a further illustration from outside the realm of oratory (see n. on 19 nam et imperator. ..21 non nescit); it may be that the mention of tenebrae in the Cicero example caused Q. to think of pictorial illusion; see 2. 12. 7 and the next n. efficit7*1 ut quaedam eminere..., quaedam recessisse credamus: cf. 8. 5. 29 (metaphorical) 'eminentium et planorum gratiam perdunt'. The choice of the word recessisse supports Russell's translation 'some objects are in the foreground and others in the background'. But the technique alluded to is easily confused, and may often be identical, with that by which deployment of light and shade make some objects stand out as though in relief; note Cic. de Orat. 3. 101 *umbram aliquam et recession, quo magis id quod erit inluminatum extare atque eminere uideatur', and other passages cited on 2. 12. 7 eminent and quem ad modum... clariora sunt. recessisse: the tense is carefully chosen. We think that some parts of the picture have (previously) 'withdrawn', leaving others now foregrounded. For the word (corresponding to recessus in the passage of Cic. just quoted), cf. Plin. Ep. 3. 6. 2 (of a lifelike statue) 'pendent lacerti, papillae iacent, uenter recessit' (again the perfect). 17. 22 aiunt... mentiuntur: for the weak sense of mentiri (i.e. falli, errare) see TLL s.v. mentior 780. 9. Material on the view that an art must have a reXos 74

eJfecit(B)

is defensible, b u t the present c o r r e s p o n d s t o

iititur above.

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and that, if it is to retain that label, failure is impossible, is collected and arranged in chronological order by Nesselrath 173-8 and 178-82 respectively. Both views were commonly held. In the parallel texts cf. e.g. Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 13-15: €7t€t Trdaa T£XVR!

T)

TOV

(1)9

1

PRJTOPIKRJV, eiTrtp

7rai>iXoao(f>ta KUI ypappaTiK-q, e\'0/t€l'0l', KuO&ITCp IClTpi KTj T6 K(ll K vfie pVTfT IKY) , t>6 JJOD KUI TTjV e'ort re'^n/, t o erepov TOVTUJV eTrayyeXXeoOat. OUTe Se eartjKOS exei TCXOS (ouSe yap act 7repiyiveTai rre/it] rrjs TUIV dvriSl KU)V vtKijSy aAA' 7to£

TO TToXl) to>

o t £ eTepov

pev 7TpOTiOerai o pr/Tiop

TO TTOXU itepevov, ivtmjaev,

(ire

eirel

Sid rravrog

ttas

erepov

pr/Twp ras

eTepov

eavrut

Se e^UKoXoOovv ovyxpivopevos

e-Trixetprjaeis

e\ei

reXos)

ovre

TTOXXUKIS eXet^Orj

TOV (lis pdXXov

TJ

avTOV SIOXVOVTOS

(and for more elaborate discussion of the 'end' of rhetoric see 60-71); Philod. Riiet. ii. 105 with 125 eXeyero naaa Texyv) TIR/xdveiv del TOV reAou? rj Kara TO IrXetoTov. R) Se pr)TopiKr) puqSeTepov yevovs pieTex^tv... (but) aTravlios Tvyxdvetv. (Clearly both Sextus and Philodemus do allow for occasional failure; that this is best explained as a lowering of the requirements for technicity for argument's sake will become clear from evidence cited below.) However, since the results which certain supposed Te'xvai (medicine and navigation are typical instances) produced evidently included occasional failure, there was a need to devise a conception of Te'xvrj which accommodated that very possibility. These arts are called oToxaoTtKai Texvai in Hellenistic debate, but the term (if not the adjective) goes back to Plato, who in Phileb. 55 E-66 D applies the verb aroxd^eadai to practical, i.e. nonmathematical, expertises (on the early history of the term see Alpers-Golz 168 n. 300). The occasional failure of these arts was put down to their subjectmatter and external factors (e.g. the success of a navigator does not depend on his skill alone; cf. Blank 135). But to speak of 'the notion of a stochastic art' conceals the fact that there were competing views on the subject. Two arguably prominent ones can be extracted from a passage in Alexander of Aphrodisias' Quaestiones, in I. Bruns, Supplementum Aristotelicnm, ii/2 (Berlin, 1892); the first of these is plausibly categorized by von Arnim as a Stoic fragment (SVF iii, fr. 19 init., which should be compared for its improved text over Bruns's edition), the second is likely to represent the (or a) Peripatetic view (this is suggested by the terminology', see below). The two passages are: (i) II. 61. 4—6:

eiTutv

OTOXUOTLKUIV T^XVUIV TCXOS eivat

7 r o t e i v TTPOS TO TOV t T p o K e i p e v o v Tvyxdvetv, T€V£OVT(II

re'Aou? Tat?

ov

OTO^aOTt/cat?

TIS

Ae'yoi t o

TTCUS OV\ op.ota»j

TUIV TexvuiVy

TTUVTU T 7 6 earn docere aut n o n dicenda'. But this spoils the snap o f the d i l e m m a in 30; as to 3 5 , ' n e q u e praecipit u m q u a m non dicenda' denies ' n o n esse artem quod n o n dicenda praecipiat', while 'nec dicendis contraria' denies 'quod, c u m dicenda praeceperit, etiam contraria his doceat'. 17. 31 alioqui: 'on any o t h e r assumption' ( L o e b ) , with particular allusion to Q.'s o w n morally based definition o f rhetoric. I n what follows, Q . c o m e s down firmly in favour o f the view that the o r a t o r will not normally take on 'unjust' causes. In 12. 7 . 4 - 7 (referring back to 12. 1. 3 9 - 4 4 ) he gives advice on how t o c h o o s e one's cases; in writing such passages, he has Cic. Off. 2. 4 9 - 5 1 m u c h in mind. 17. 3 2 hoc q u o q u e . . . cadit, u t . . . : this is the kind o f admirabilis (cf. Ded.

mai. 1 . 1 1 ) almost ruled out in §31. F o r the phrasing, cf. Decl.

casus min.

2 5 2 . 2 'neque e n i m in rerum n a t u r a m cadit u t . . . ' , with W i n t e r b o t t o m ' s n. q u a n d o etiam p u g n a t u r o s . . . credunt: etiam pugnare

marks the extreme case;

is not now being used metaphorically (contrast 2 9 , and again 3 3 ) .

O n e would expect the allusion t o be to Stoics, though for ( s o m e o f ) them only avXot were subject to enmities ( S V F iii, frr. 6 2 5 - 6 ) . Russell notes ad loc.: ' S t o i c i s m recognized patriotic duties, and so it is conceivable that two Wise M e n might find themselves in opposing armies.' And Q . may b e thinking o f the sort o f d i l e m m a caused by civil war. si ratio ita duxerit: the verb looks to b e intransitive ( n o t e ita; 'se la ragione lo vorra C o r s i ) , as in 5. 13. 5 5 'quae ratio et ultra ducit'; but in favour o f ' i f reason led them to this' ( L o e b ) cf., in a related context, 1 2 . 1 . 34 'si quando e u m a d defensionem n o c e n t i u m ratio duxerit'. a t q u e ita q u i d e m . . . indulgent: Q . will reply to the c h a i s e s in such a way as to show them t o b e false even when rhetoric is taken in a n o n - m o r a l sense; he is not, that is, content to sweep the problem under the carpet as he did in §31 ( ' q u a e . . . seiuncta'). T h e promise is fulfilled especially obviously in § 3 4 , where Q . explicitly says that his argument works b o t h for g o o d m e n and for those w h o regard persuasion as their objective. n o m e n . . . indulgent: for the construction cf. OLD s.v. indulgeo

5, TLL s.v.

1253. 19 seq. ( p o s t - C i c e r o ) ; o u r passage is at 1254. 9 - 1 0 . T h e n a m e was not to be bestowed lightly: 'proditorem transfugam praeuaricatorem

donabimus

oratoris illo sacro n o m i n e ? ' ( 1 2 . 1. 2 4 ) . 7 4 In Kiderlin7 714 he prefers the order 'et dicendis contraria' as better explaining the omission after contraria.

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indulgent: indulgeant (A) could be explained as being the verb of a subordinate clause in oratio obliqua. 17. 33 causa... componitur: cf. 7. 2. 22 'totam causam nostram cum tota aduersarii causa componimus' (of comparison), and esp. Cic. Caei 22 'res cum re, causa aim causa, ratio cum ratione pugnabit' (with Austin's n.). In our passage too there will be talk of fighting (pugnent), and componitur hints at the pairing off of gladiators for combat (OLD s.v. compono 3b), an allusion brought out into the open in 'quia... componuntur' below. nec si pugnent.. .didicerunt: another way in which rhetoric might be argued to contradict itself. When Q. comes to his parallels, the idea of 'an art imparted to both' is most rigorously illustrated by the case of gladiators trained under the same master, less so by the case of steersmen and generals, for they would presumably often not have been formally taught at all. armorum: sc. ars; cf. Liv. 2. 46. 4 (also Cic. de Orat. 2. 84 'ars... ludicra armorum'). sub eodem magistro eruditi: cf. Suet. Jul. 26. 3 'tirones [i.e. novice gladiators] neque in ludo neque per lanistas sed... per equites Romanos atque etiam per senatores armorum peritos erudiebat'. The normal word for a trainer of gladiators is indeed lanista; but Cicero uses magister in S. Rose. 17 (partly for variety, but see also Landgraf ad loc. on the motif of surpassing one's master): 'hie autem nuper se ad eum lanistam contulit, quique ante hanc pugnam tiro esset... facile ipsum magistrum scelere audaciaque superauit'. 17. 34 naualibus proeliis: cf. TLL s.v. proelium 1654. 47-8 (also 1650. 17-20 of staged sea-fights); for the ablative ibid. 1656. 34-44. imperatoria: a final piece of variation after armorum and gubernandi (Q. may not have felt able to venture on gubernatoria: TLL s.v. gubernatorius 2349. 18-19 cites from the Latin Origen 'gubernator est qui didicit gubernatoriam', i.e. Kv^epvrjTiKrjv). There seems to be no proper parallel for ars imperatoria in this sense (TLL s.v. ars 664. 80-665. 1); cf. Cic. de Orat. 1. 210 'ars imperatoris'. euertit: corresponding to restruere at 30. The word is specifically used of refutation (7. 2. 12 'euerso quo defendimur relicum est quo premimur'; TLL s.v. everto 1032. 76-1033. 10), as well as of the destruaion of physical opera (ibid. 1030. 24-79). eflfecit: efficit AB. The perfect is supported by 30 'nullam artem restruere quod effecerit', and gives superior rhythm. positum a se argumentum: a se is stressed. For the verb, cf. 5. 12. 6 'quaedam argumenta ponere satis non est: adiuuanda sunt'; Cic. de Orat. 2. 214 'sicut argumentum, simul atque positum est, arripitur'; TLL s.v.

Commentary

344

argumentum 545. 76-8. The Greek counterpart is nde'vat (for its use of propositions or arguments see Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus s.v. riOevai no. 3). soluit: Au€T (LSJ S.V. XVOJ 4d). An exact parallel is not forthcoming, but cf. 5. 13. 13 'singula quaeque [sc. argumenta] dissolueris'. sed . . . credibile: i.e. nor does rhetoric either [contradict itself], for whether it is two amoral speakers who are pitted against each other or two good men (true orators), there is no contradiction between their arguments: they are only ueri similia on both sides, and plausibilities cannot be contraria to each other. The claim 'euertit opus rhetorice quod effecit' can be taken in two ways, (i) An orator puts up an argument and then himself refutes it. Q. denies that this happens at all. (ii) Rhetoric itself puts up and refutes its own arguments, in the sense that A, a rhetorically trained orator, refutes an argument put up by B, another rhetorically trained orator. Q. answers that, though this does indeed happen, it does not prove that rhetoric contradicts itself. For As argument is not contrary to that of B. Neither A nor B is doing more than putting forward a probable argument, and all that can be said is that one is more probable than the other. Q. has taken over a view that Cicero argued for philosophy, that nothing is more than probable (Tusc. 2. 5 'nos qui sequimur probabilia nec ultra quam id quod ueri simile occurrit progredi possumus'; for ueri simile as a trademark term for Academic rhetoric, see Brittain 319-42 andT. Reinhardt, 'Rhetoric in the Fourth Academy', CQ2 50 (2000), 531-47). But the application of this to rhetoric (here and at §39) should be problematic for Q., who will very soon speak unabashedly of ueritas (§36; cf. e.g. 12. 1.45 'non aliter autem ueri similia quam uera et confirmantur et refelluntur').77 The Stoic doctrine, of course, was more rigorous; cf. e.g. Zeno on the need to hear just one speech in a trial {SVF i, fr. 78 = Plut. De Sto. Rep. 1034 E): t r p o s TOV EITTOVRA ' ptjSi TOLOUTUJ Tivi

Seure'pou

Xnyco

Xeyovrog-

Trepas

p.rj&£ VTRRJKOVOE KXrjOeis OVK aKovoreov

apa

8IKT)V

xptvpevos' yap rj

8iKaoijs etV

to

fyrovpevov

vnriKovoas

TOV Sevrepov

rptv ap.cu pvOov

o Zrjvtav,

(IKOVOTJS" avreXeyev

(ITRE^EI^EV o t t p o r e p o s EITTLUV, OVK (LKOVAREOV TOV ereperioev

CIT OVK (lTreSei^er TJTOC

5'

opoiov

arrE'Sei£EV

yap

rj OVK

tvs ei

aWSeiner

Xeyovros.

ut dixi: referring to the possibility left (just) open by 'uix admirabili quodam casu' in 31. contrarium: returning to the terminology of §30. The replies to two charges, 'nullam esse artem contrariam sibi' and 'nullam artem restruere quod effecerit', have become interwoven. 77

Superficially similar passages elsewhere are in fact c o n c e r n e d with different p r o b l e m s ; thus

in Inv. 1. 9 a n d 1. 4 7 C i c e r o says that the o r a t o r tries t o invent t r u e a n d plausible a r g u m e n t s , a n d in Ac. 2.7

( ' a u t u e r u m sit a u t ad id q u a m p r o x i m e a c c e d a t ' ) the issue is that sceptics a i m at t r u t h

a n d plausibility w h e n devising a r g u m e n t s and yet end up s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t .

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345

17. 35 nam u t . . . aduersum: we know no parallel for the examples, and it is not made plain exactly how they illustrate Q.'s claim (see n. above on sed... eredibile). The point seems to be that two propositions which are fo mi ally incompatible (e.g. 'the accused is guilty' and 'the accused is not guilty') are not actually contrary to each other if they are both merely plausible to a different degree, 'just as' two different shades of white are not contrary to each other. aduersum: varying eontrarium; cf. OLD s.v. aduersus111a. ita nec: cf. Sen. Dial. 4. 15. 4 'ut seruire non possunt, ita nec imperare'; n. on 2. 13. 7 alioqui nec. probabili probabilius: varying 'credibilius... eredibile' (34), which in turn varies uerisimilia. For a shift between eredibile and persuasibile see n.on 2. 15. 16 Eudorus. neque praecipit... dicenda sunt: cf. n. on 30 item... doeeat. 17. 36 non semper... defendat: a rather defensive footnote to this section, not replying to any of the specific charges brought in §30, and dropping the language of ueri similia (cf. n. on 34 sed... eredibile). Q. seems to revert to the concerns of §31 about the selection of cases; strictly speaking, rhetoric is not present where the case is unjust, and it will normally defend the truth—but not always.78 The appeal to communis utilitas (see also n.on 27 cum ex bona ratione proficiscitur) is echoed in the fuller discussion of these matters in 12. 1 (37 'asperiora quaedam adhuc dictu si communis utilitas exegerit facere conceditur; ne hoc quidem nudum est intuendum, qualem causam uir bonus, sed etiam quare et qua mente defendat', 43; cf. also 3. 7. 25 'quod [i.e. calling the foolhardy brave, etc.] quidem orator, id est uir bonus, numquam faciet, nisi forte communi utilitate ducetur'; the phrase is frequent in Cicero, from Inv. 1. 68 on). ei: i.e. rhetoric. B omits the word, but it supplies a subject for defendat. ponuntur... contradictiones: these objections to the technicity of rhetoric are 'put on the table' by Cic. (or rather 'Antonius' in de Orat. 2. 30, reported more or less accurately); OLD s.v. pono 15b provides some half-parallels. In 5. 13. 42 (cf. Sen. Suas. 2. 17) the phrase is used of a dedaimer posing an imagined objection. On the subject itself see the introduction to ch. 17, L-P ii. 220-2 (and i. 190-4). The contradictiones (this covers 'artem earum rerum... nesciat') amount to the following: art is concerned with things that are known (the claim), but any forensic speech is a matter not of knowing but of opining, because (rt) the orator speaks before an audience who does not know, and (b) he sometimes 7 8 Q. might have added the sensible point he makes (as an objection to which he tacitly assents) in § 3 9 that the o r a t o r cannot know that his cause is true.

346

Commentary

himself says things he does not know. Q. in §37 brushes aside reason (b), and returns to reason (a). He first, however, cites the claim, fallaciously proving that rhetoric qualifies as an art on that criterion. Then he turns to reason (a), but in citing it changes his target from 'an orator sometimes says things he does not know' to 'he does not know if what he says is true' (38), and again to 'he does not know if his case is true' (39a). These two reformulations of (a) are introduced as imaginary objections reminiscent of diatribe. In 39b ('quid quod... similia') Antonius is a reference point only in the sense that Q. is responding to the unstated background considerations of Antonius' argument. In 40 Q. returns to close interaction with de Orat. 2. 30, but there the issue is no longer rhetoric's relation to knowledge. artem.. .nesciat: cf. the contention of Charmadas at de Orat. 1. 92 artem uero negabat esse ullam, nisi quae cognitis penitusque perspectis et in unum exitum spectantibus et numquam fallentibus rebus [cf. Q. below at §41 j contineretur; haec autem omnia quae tractarentur ab oratoribus dubia esse et incerta, quoniam et dicerentur ab iis qui omnia ea non plane tenerent et audirentur ab iis quibus non scientia esset tradenda sed exigui temporis aut falsa aut certe obscura opinio. Crassus replies at 1. 107-9 that this was only a question of terminology; on a less rigorous definition of art, rhetoric clearly qualified. This is reminiscent of Plat. Theaet. 200 D-201 C, where Socrates proves the non-identity of knowledge and true judgement with reference to a courtroom situation. In 201 BC he argues that .. what happened at the scene of the crime can only be known by an eyewitness. Obviously, no amount of teaching could put the members of the jury in the same position as an eyewitness who saw what happened with his own eyes'; so Burnyeat ad loc. See also id. and J. Barnes, 'Socrates and the Jury: Paradoxes in Plato's Distinction between Knowledge and True Belief, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. vol. 54 (1980), 173-91 and 193-206 respectively. It would of course be fitting for the Academic Charmadas to use an argument from the Theaet. omnem actionem: naoa ITpa£is (Wilkins; cf. L-P); but Russell seems right to translate 'entire pleading' (note 'dicat... dicat' in the explanation that follows). aliquando: added by Q. to blunt the edge of Antonius' assertion ('ea dicimus quae nescimus ipsi'). 17. 37 ars... orator: one cannot help feeling that Q. has run out of patience here, earum reram in 'ars earum rerum quae sciuntur' must refer to the subject-matter of rhetoric (and of course that is necessary to pick up the thread from above), but bene dicere is not rhetoric's subject-matter

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in Q. 79 Put differently, there is fallacy here in that scire is used in two different senses in 'sciuntur' (are known) and 'scit' ('knows' in the sense 'is able to'). autem here means 'and' (so the Loeb): 'rhetorice est ars bene dicendi' is preparatory in that it does not yet counter the charge, 'bene... orator' is the actual rejoinder. The difference in status between the two clauses is marked by autem; cf. K-S ii. 93 on the use of autem to mark the minor premiss of syllogisms. One might say the conclusion ('rhetoric says what it knows') has been omitted here. 17. 38 'sed nescit... dicit': the objections here and in §39 go beyond what Antonius explicitly said in de Oratore. qui ignem... tradunt: cf. 3. 3. 13 'alioqui tantum initia erunt, ut mundi uel umor uel ignis uel materia uel corpora insecabilia'. The references are (of course) respectively to Heraclitus; Thales; Empedocles; and the Atomists. Q. has now switched back to talking about knowledge of the subject-matter. corpora insecabilia: the only occurrence of the term in this technical sense prior to Q. is Vitr. 2. 2. 1 'atomos quas nostri insecabilia corpora, nonnulli [e.g. Cicero] indiuidua uocitauerunt'. One wonders who is meant by nostri. By the middle of the first century BC there was an apparently quite substantial body of popular Epicurean prose texts in circulation (see C. J. Castner, Prosopography of Roman Epicureans from die Second Century B.C. to the Second Century A.D. (Frankfurt, 1988), s.nn. Amafinius, Catius, Rabirius), which Cicero criticizes for their linguistic ineptness (Ac. 1. 5-6; cf. Fam. 15. 19. 2). corpora insecabilia may have occurred there. qui... colligunt: the reference is to such astronomers as Aristarchus of Samos (who wrote a treatise TTepl /icycBcLv Kai a7ToaTr}p,aT(ov r/Xtov Kai oc\-qvr)s, which is extant); on him see M. Folkerts, NPi (1996), 1089-90. interualla siderum: cf. Cic. Tusc. 5. 10 'studioseque ab iis [the preSocratics] siderum magnitudines interualla cursus anquirebantur et cuncta caelestia'; Sen. Ep. 88. 13 'o egregiam artem\... interualla siderum dicis, nihil est quod in mensuram tuam non cadat'; Augustin. Conf. 10. 25. These passages, including ours, probably refer to the distances between the sidera rather than (as in Plin. Nat. 2. 83; cf. Aristarchus' title) to their distances from the earth; see Cic. Div. 2. 91 'reliqua uero tria interualla infinita et immensa, a Sole ad Martis, inde ad Iouis, ab eo ad Saturni stellam'. For this kind of genitive cf. Suet. Dom. 19 'ut omnes [sc. sagittae] per interualla digitorum innocue euaderent'; OLD s.v. interuallum la. colligunt: 'reckon'; cf. Vitr. 1. 6. 11 'sunt autem nonnulli qui negant Erastosthenem potuisse ueram mensuram orbis terrae colligere', Plin. Nat. 79

Intriguingly, though, Sextus considers if eS

Xeyctv could

be the

v\i) o f rhetoric

in 4 8 - 5 9 .

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Commentary

6. 205 'abunde orbe terrae extra intra indicato, colligenda in artum mensura aequorum uidetur'. But in such abstruse calculations the meaning 'infer' hovers (cf. Ammendola on the present passage, and 5. 14. 32 'indubitata colligunt'); note 'propter uim probationum' below. Quite different is 1. 10. 39 'quorum loco rum extremae lineae eandem mensuram colligunt'. 17. 39 dolorem capitis: cf. 5. 10. 82. non utique... sed: see n. on 2. 1. 1 utique. 'Not necessarily' (Loeb) weakens a strong (note the repeated semper) statement: rhetoric does not (the objector asserts) aim at always saying what is true, but at always saying what is probable. propositum habet... dicendi: cf. TLL s.v. propono 2071. 40-51, esp. 45-7. ueri similia: cf. n.on 34 sed... credibile and Cic. Off. 2. 51 (written from a practical point of view): 'iudicis est semper in causis uerum sequi, patroni nonnumquam ueri simile, etiam si minus sit uerum, defendere.' scit... dicit: seit is emphatic; like Socrates, rhetoric knows that it does not know. For this retort, cf. 20 'cum falso utitur pro uero, scit esse falsum'. 17. 40 adiciunt.. .quod... defendant: this further point in fact also derives from de Orat 2. 30 ('nos contrarias saepe causas dicimus...ut uterque nostrum eadem de re alias aliud defendat, cum plus uno uerum esse non possit'); it might be thought to go better in the context of the allegedly selfcontradictory nature of rhetoric (30-6). For such inconsistencies of behaviour, see 11. 1. 73-4, referring to the Cluentius case (note Clu. 138-9). For the construction cf. 12. 2. 25; TLL s.v. adicio 672. 54-68. alia et minora: Sudhaus (ap. Radermacher) wrongly wished to delete et. There are two reasons for ignoring these other arguments: they are trivial in themselves, and they are cognate to arguments already refuted, tamen implies that though themselves minora they are connected with praecipua. For et... et tamen see K-S ii. 34. ex his fontibus deriuata: Afifahl 121 compared Hor. Carm. 3. 6. 19 'hoc fonte deriuata clades'. 16 'hi complura dicunt, sed ex paucis locis ducta' is closely parallel. Q. by dealing with the few main points {loci, fontes) has managed to avoid the trivial detail {complura, minora); for this use of fons (as a metaphor for a type of argument) cf. Cic. deOrat. 2. 141 'argumentorum fontes' (cf. 2. 117, with L-P ad loc.). 17. 41. For the main texts on rhetoric as an art and secondary literature see the introduction to this chapter. confirmatur.. .inesse: this is not so much a proof as the drawing of a conclusion from premisses Q. has established (or claims to have established) earlier on. Thus the re'Ao? of rhetoric was arrived at by elimination in 2. 15. 38,

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that rhetoric is grounded in perceptiones is the outcome of 38-9, that these cohere with each other is clear from 33-6, and the usefulness of rhetoric is established in 2.16. 11-19. (Hence A's ostendemus cannot be right, as was seen by Kiderlin" 366-7, who identifies the earlier passages.) The reverse operation can be found in Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 10-42, where Sextus first cites the definition accepted by Q. here, then states that, while KaraArpjitis are always true, many of rhetoric's precepts are false, and concludes that rhetoric does not exist (with this cf. Cic. Ac. 2. 22 and Reid's notes for the argument that perceptiones must be true if there are to be artes). Cf. Hermogenes, TJepl ardoeajv ad in it. together with Syrianus ad loc. (Syrian i in Hermogenem comment aria ii. 6-8 Rabe), who shows that Hermogenes is there fitting (€apfxo^€i) the common definition of re^vr; to rhetoric; see the material from Olympiodorus to be cited below. ut Cleanthes uoluit... efficiens: Zeno's successor as the head of the Stoic school in c. 3 B.C. (see n.on 2. 15. 34). The definition is also attributed to Cleanthes by Olympiodorus in Grg. p. 69. 26-7 Westerink: KXedvBrjs TOIVVV Aeyei on "re^inj eoriv 68co rravra dvvovoa". Olympiodorus continues by saying that Chrysippus realized that Cleanthes' definition was too wide (70. 1—3): odev o Xpvoimros ITpooOels TO "/xera (ftavTaotaiv" etnev on "re'^Jj eonv e£is o8o) npoiovoa /xerri avTaoidjv\ According to David, Prol. philos. pp. 43. 30-44. '5 Busse (CAG XVIII. 2 = fr. 393A Hiilser), Cleanthes' definition applied to vots too, where the term is understood to cover not just the vois of individual rational beings, and Chrysippus' addition narrowed down its scope in the following way: Te^vT) Se iortv rj TLOV KaOoXov yvtoais perA Xoyov, rj re\vrj COTIV e£is oSu> fiaSt^ouoa perd (ftavraatas"' Kal yap 77 rexvrj res Kal yvu>ais eOTiv, riAAu Kal oSut fiaSi^ec irdvra yap Kara rd£tv TToiei. "pera avTaaias" Se iTpoOKeiTat Sid rrjv ifivaiv Kal yap rj vats eaTtv (e\ei yap TO etvai ev rois exovotv avrrjv, oTov ev dvOpajTTiUy ev AiOioy ev £uAo>) Kal oSutfiaSl^ei(/card yap TU£IV irpoepxeTai), aAA' ov per a <j>avraoias uiairep rj Texvrf Kal yap O Texvtrijs Kexpijpei'ns TUJ Xoyw, r/viKa fiovXeTai Ti Troirjoaiy TTporepov SiaTimoi ev eavTui o fiouXerat irotrjoai Kal eiO* O U T O J ? diToreXei avro, 17 Se <j>uois ovSev TOIOVTOV iroier ovSe yap TrpoSiaTvrroi ev eavrr} o fiouXerai KaraaKevdaai. That Chrysippus' modification of Cleanthes' definition was made on the grounds that it applied both to vois and to Tc'xvr) is up to a point confirmed by Sextus, Adv. Math 7. 373 (SVF vol. ii, fr. 56 = [part of] fr. 260 Hiilser), from which it is clear that 'according to Chrysippus the presence of presentations in the soul is a necessary condition for the acquisition and practice of techne (Mansfeld 58). Mansfeld also comments on the general similarity of Olympiodorus and Q. here (both set out Stoic definitions of Te'xvrj and apply

350

Commentary

them to rhetoric), and concludes from this (ibid., 60): 'These samples (Quintilian's text being the earliest) suffice to show that the context in which these definitions were cited is traditional, viz. a discussion of techne in general in relation to a specific discipline... It is clear too that these definitions tend to appear in clusters.' This seems an entirely appropriate assessment, but if we consider—see previous note—how Q. structures the chapter so as to be able to conclude with these two definitions of rhetoric, then it will be clear that 2. 17 is very much a unity of his own making. The Schol. on Dionysius Thrax, however, (p. 118. 14-16 Hilgard = see SVF vol. i, fr. 72) gave a very similar definition to Zeno: co? SrjAot ael o Zr/vcov, Xeyouv "rexvT] iorlv ££is oBoTronqTiKr)", roureart BC oBov Kai peOoBov iroiovod

TI. Olympiodorus, however, assigns the 'standard' definition to Zeno (in fact, he is the only source to connect Zeno's name with it: p. 70. 7 W.). This leads some to question the attribution to Zeno in the scholia (von Arnim in particular), but, as M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa: Geschichte einer Bexvegung, ii (Gottingen, 4 1972), 36 pointed out, Z.'s view on nature (Cic. ND 2. 57 'Zeno igitur naturam ita definit ut earn dicat ignem esse artificiosum ad gignendum progredientem uia'; cf. D.L. 7. 156) seems to confirm the attribution to Zeno. Multiple definitions, however, are not uncommon in Stoic contexts. potestas: apparently translating Bvvafxis rather than Small terminological variations would not be surprising, but it is also possible that Q. thought potestas was the better translation here; see Sparshott 282-3, who offers this consideration (not, however, his favoured solution): It is possible that he thought it really was a better translation than of hexis in this context, because with the different slant Chrysippus has introduced it seems reasonable to say that clairvoyance (mantike—Chrysippus' example of a hexis, which surely must mean in this context the gift of second sight rather than the professional practice of the skilled interpreter of omens) is a gift or a capacity rather than a tendency, and the same might go for Chrysippus' other examples, a hot temper or a weak head for akohol. These can indeed be seen as temperamental weaknesses, deficiencies in normal powers, rather than dispositions to act. uia, id est ordine: the juncture seems unparalleled (though cf. Ter. Han. 706 'immo ut recta uia rem narret ordine omnem'). uia combines with ratione (Sandys on Cic. Or. 10) to mean 'methodically'; note also 'artificio et uia' (Cic. Fin. 4. 10). For the Greek background see Cope on Arist. Rhet. A1, 1354a8 68a> noieiv. The same idea is expressed in Philodemus' definition of art (Rhet. suppl. p. 35) by earrjKorco? Kai fiefiaiojs ouBe aroxaaTiKcos (text

uncertain in the last colon; Barnes 7 restores to 17 re oroxaoTiKdis). Opposed to the methodical approach is procedure by trial and error, eiKrj (Arist. Rhet. ibid.; Sen. Ep. 29. 3 'non est ars quae ad effectum casu uenit'); cf. Cic. Brut. 46

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'nam antea neminem solitum uia nec arte... dicere'; D. H. Comp. 25 680O re Kai T€)(vr)s xcopts iTTirrjhcvovTOJV. efficiens: used absolutely (not cited at TLL s.v. ejficio 178. 25-35); A's 'uiam id est ordinem' is the result of someone not not taking this point. Contrast the Greek iravra avvovoa. This appears to be the only Latin version of the definition. nemo dubitauerit: a favourite locution of Q.'s (according to PHI found seven times in Inst., twice in Decl. min.; otherwise only in Dig., three times). The verb will be perfect subjunctive (of the dixerim type: H-Sz 332), not future perfect = perfective future (for which cf. n. on 2. 4. 7 ilia...). ab omnibus fere probatus: this is most probably accurate even for the Hellenistic period, see Nesselrath 148-9 and M. Heath, Hermogenes: On Issues (Oxford, 1995), 61; for the Stoics see SVF i, fr. 73; to whose references add Ps.-Soranus in V. Rose, Anecdota Graeca, ii (Berlin, 1864), 247. It is a fortiori true for the imperial period; see the material collected by Nesselrath 149-50. The Greek is (Olymp. in Grg. p. 70. 7-9 W. andfrequentlyelsewhere; cf. SVFi, fr. 73; fr. 392-414 Hiilser): rixvr] iarl avarqpa €K KaraXrufteajv ouyyeyvpvaopi vwv 7rpos rt reAos evxprjoTov TOJV iv TOJ j3t'a> (a frequent variation is the simple n - below on uitae). For two versions of this dative, i.e. €vxpVaTOV TV definition in Cicero see Cic. de Orat. 1. 92 and 1. 108, with L-P i. 191. perceptionibus: the 'items of knowledge' which represent the laws and precepts of an art. See esp. Cic. Fin. 3. 17 'rerum autem cognitiones, quas uel comprehensiones uel perceptiones uel... /caraA^et? appellemus licet'. For the meaning of the term see the texts collected in section 41 Long-Sedley; M. Frede, 'Stoic epistemology', in K. Algra etal. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1999), 295-322. A's praeceptionibus would = (if anything) npoXruf/eis (cf. TLL s.v. praeceptio 421. 10-31), which are not in point here. consentientibus: representing avarr)p,a, see Barnes 5-6. But the prefix in constare is relevant too. coexercitatis: coined as a translation of ovyy€yvp.vaop.€vois (cf. Cicero's more elegant rendering in ND 2. 147-8 'quanta uero ilia sunt, quae uos Academici infirmatis et tollitis, quod et sensibus et animo ea quae extra sunt percipimus atque conprendimus; exquibus conlatis inter se et conparatis artes quoque efificimus partim ad usum uitae partim ad oblectationem necessarias'; Reid's n.on Ac. 2. 22 'ars... constat'); see Barnes 6. uitae: of course governed by utilem. The dative suggests but does not prove that Q.'s Greek material read evxprjorov r /?ioj (which would be awkward but not impossible to render in Latin). The only attempt to explain what the genitive phrase t&v iv tojfiiipexactly means in the case of rhetoric is in the Scholia

Commentary

352

on Hermogenes Flept

(Rh. Gr. iv. 45. 5-6) iv ravrat 8i KOLI irepl a \pr)oiiJLOS rj p-qropiKr) SeiKvvei, ort iv fiovXats Kai SiKaor-qpiois Kai navraxov ordaecuv

(the author goes on to specify -rravraxov further).

17. 42 et inspectione et exercitatione: 'theory and practice'. For inspectio cf. 2. 18.1, 3; the word (used literally at 5. 5. 2 of looking at documents) tries to render Gk. Oeatpia. cum... differat: for the relation between rhetoric and dialectic see above 14, and 2. 20. 7. The Stoics considered rhetoric and dialectic to be species of the genus AoyiK-q (cf. fr. 35-43 Hiilser); Zeno's famous illustration (e.g. Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 7 = fr. 35 Hiilser) that rhetoric is like the open palm and dialectic like the clenched fist carries this notion too, in that the same hand represents both disciplines. specie., .genere: contrasted e.g. at 12. 10. 22; Tac. Dial. 25. 4. qua in r e . . . i n ea esse artem: Q. is continuing to offer subsidiary arguments for the view that rhetoric is an art. Whenever a faculty can be exercised in an artful or an artless fashion (and this distinction is certainly made by anyone witnessing performances in public speaking), the faculty is capable of being developed into an art; similarly, whenever training has any effect at all, the faculty in question is capable of being developed into an art. inartificialiter... artificialiter: representing arixvajs and t^w^ws. The former is not attested elsewhere (though Q. uses the adjective), the latter is found first here. 17. 43 atqui... superabit: atqui introduces the minor premiss (TLL s.v. 1090. 59-1091. 13), but the conclusion goes unstated (contrast 7); the argument concerns the second point alone ('in eo quod...esse artem'). Q. is probably not being controversial here (see Nesselrath 215-19); Philodemus' assertion (Philod. Rhet. i. 20-1 = p. 47. 9-14 L.A.; suppl. p. 12) that TUV drC'XVOJV ovSi els iv rat rrjs rixvrjs ipycv (cf. Opere) VIKCL TOV rex^iTrjv. iv 8i rat rfjs PRJTOPIKIJS ov8£ TOVTO KadoXtKov is made in an Epicurean context. But cf. Arist. Met. Al, 981 a 12ff. for a discussion of the possibility that innetpta may be of more practical importance than re^ir/. tam multa tamque magni: tarn multi is normal enough (examples in OLD s.v. tam lb). For tam magnus see H.-Sz. 848 (on section 206); OLD ibid. magnus is used here as in 10. 2. 15 'in magnis quoque auctoribus'. docerent: attracted to the tense and mood of essent omnibus confitendum est: hardly by the naturalists of 2.12-13 (see pp. 182-5). rationem... non separamus: i.e. regard rhetoric (in our strict sense) as practised only by the good man, because (one is left to suspect) he is the definitive TexviTt]^:. For the expression cf. 2. 15. 31 'qui rhetoricen a iustitia separarent', and esp. 2. 21. 12 'oratorem, quem a bono uiro non separo'.

Chapter Eighteen Arts arc either (fi) theoretical, (b) practical, (1) or (c) 'poetic'. It is normally supposed that rhetoric is a practical art (2). However, it can be theoretical, as in retirement (3-4), and it is in a sense 'poetic' too. But if we have to choose, we must call it practical (5). The basic rationale of this threefold division of arts goes back to Aristotle at least (though attributed to Plato in D.L. 3. 84); in the sources it competes with a simpler, twofold division into theoretical and practical arts, of which it may be an elaboration. The tripartite model appears as a division of €7rioTrjpLai in Met. K7. 1064a 16-19 and Top. Z6, 145a 15-18; of Sidvoia in Met. El. 1025b25-8 (see Ross ad loc.); of rexvrj not, apparently, in Aristotle, but see e.g. Sextus, Adv. Eth 197, with Bett ad loc. We do not know of any other attempt to place rhetoric in this scheme, except in the Rh. Gr. (see n. on 2. 18. 3). 80 For the twofold division into theoretical and practical arts see Cic. Ac. 2. 22 'Cumque artium aliud eius modi genus sit, ut tantum modo animo rem cernat, aliud, ut moliatur aliquid et faciat, quomodo aut geometres cernere ea potest, quae aut nulla sunt aut internosci a falsis non possunt, aut is, qui fidibus utitur, explere numeros et conficere uersus? Quod idem in similibus quoque artibus continget, quarum omne opus est in faciendo atque agendo', with the notes by Reid and A. Haltenhoff, Kritik der akadeniischen Skepsis: Ein Kommentar zu Cicero, Lucullus 1-62 (Frankfurt, 1998), 150. Cf. also the division of Beaeis into theoretical and practical ones, e.g. 3. 5. 11 'hi Oeoiv a causa sic distingunt ut ilia sit spectatiuae partis, haec actiuae: illic enim ueritatis tantum gratia disputari, hie negotium agi' and Hermogenes, Prog. p. 25. 10—12: (Lvopiaoav Si TIV€S ravras piev npaKTiKas. €K€ivas Si BeojprjTtKas' ravras

piiv yap ivSex^rai

Kai 7rpaxBfjvai. ixetvojv Si t o TeXos rj

Beat pi a.

Depending on the conception of re'xvrjy the term finis may be seen to acquire different nuances. In ch. 17 the finis is the aim of the art of rhetoric (qua 'active'), to persuade or to speak well. It is that again in 18. 1, in that it 'leaves nothing behind'; similarly, for Galen (n. on 1 saltatio below) such an active art leaves no diroreXeapiay and for Cicero (ibid.) there is no outside 8 0 On the tripartite scheme in Q. see also W. Tatarkiewicz, 'Classification o f Arts in Antiquity', JH1 24 (1963), 2 3 1 - 4 0 , at 2 3 4 - 5 .

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Commentary

extremum, but in 18. 2 it is the 'end product' of a 'poetic' art. As to a theoretic art, Hermogenes (quoted above, talking of a Oiois) can say the reAo? is the 8c(upta, i.e. reflection undertaken while arguing the Oiotg. 18. 1 inspectione: cf. 2. 17. 42 n. id est cognitione et aestimatione rerum: cf. Arist. EE A5, 1216 b ll15 ov9iv yap irepov iori rrjs aorpoXoylas ov8i Trjs nepl (ftvoecas intOTripi-qs

ovBi yeajpierpias (for these instances cf. Sextus, Adv. Eth. 197; Adv. Rhet. 5; D.L. 3. 84) nX-qv TO yvcjpLoai Kat Oeujprjoai rrjv voiv TOJV 7Tpayp,DTOIV TOJV VTTOK€IPL€VCJV RATS IMORRIPLAIS; see M. J. Woods on EE 1214a9-14 and 1216b 16—25 for commentary, cognitione (cf. intellectu below) in Q. represents yvojptoai, but aestimatione is an odd counterpart for Oeajprjoai. astrologia: see esp. Ar. Met. AS, 1073b2-5; and again Sextus, Adv. Eth. 197. nullum . . . quae Otoip-qnicq uocatur: the example of astrology leads to the substitution of a singular construction for the plurals that might be expected after aliae. quae is (as in 'quae npaKnKr) dicitur' below) attracted to the gender of an in effect substantival Greek word (K-S i. 38-9). in hoc finis est . . . dicitur: 'in hoc finis est' is varied and amplified by the two following phrases, of which finis is rather awkwardly the subject. On to this triad is tacked another unexpectedly singular relative clause (see previous n.), even though on this occasion the illustration ('qualis . . . ' ) follows (so too in 2 'quam TTot)TiK-rp> appellamus, qualis ...'). See pp. 226-7 on finislTtXos. saltatio: cf. Galen xiv. 686 Kiihn, where dancing is the example of arts that iv T(X) yiveodai TO thai €\ovoiv, piera 8i TO navoaoOai ri}s ivepyetas ovBev

avTojv a-noTeXcopia SetKvvrai. Cf. also Cic. Fin. 3. 24 'Vt enim histrioni actio, saltatori motus non quiuis sed certus quidam est datus, sic uita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus conueniens consentaneumque dicimus. Nec enim gubernationi aut medicinae similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius quam modo dixi et saltationi, ut in ipsa insit, non foris petatur extremum, id est artis effectio.' Contrast Q. 1. 11. 18 'nam Lacedaemonios quidem etiam saltationem quandam tamquam ad bella quoque utilem habuisse inter exercitationes accepimus.' For citations of dancing in critical discussions of rexvai see 2. 20. 3 n. on p.aTaLOT€\via. 18. 2 in effectu: cf. Cic. Fin. 3. 32 'peccatum est patriain prodere, parentes uiolare, fana depeculari . . . quae sunt in effectu', i.e. sins where the offence lies in the result. Here in Q. the result is a tangible, visible one (D.L. 3. 84 €OTI yap avTojv ISetv ipyov 7T€7rotr)p.€vov). For the art of painting producing tangible results see also Cic. ND 2. 35 'ut enim in uite, ut in pecude, nisi quae uis obstitit, uidemus naturam suo quodam itinere ad ultimum peruenire, atque et pictura et fabrica ceteraeque artes habent quendam absoluti

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operis effectum, sic in omni natura (ac multo etiam magis) necesse est absolui aliquid ac perfia'; on 'absolui . . . ac perfici' (cf. -rrorjTiKriv here) see Galen I.e. (n. on 1 saltatio above) where arts like dyaXparo-noi-qTiK-q Kai ^loypa^ia Kai TCKTOviKTj . . . ev TO) ivepyeiv ouSev €\ovatv oXojs aivop,€vov epyov DXX (os av rivos fjLeXXovros eocoOai ITapaoKevaoriKai. Cf. Sextus, Adv. Eth. 197, where the word aTroreXeapLaTiKri is used (again in connection with C,coypata). pictura: cf. Sextus and Galen, cited in the previous n. fere . . . consistere: a conclusion foreshadowed at 2. 17. 25. hoc: ablative (cf. 1 'ipso actu perficitur'): 'Rhetoric consists of action, for it is by this that it accomplishes what belongs to its duty' (Russell). The force of this is, partly, that rhetoric is immune to the charge that it, unlike any other supposed art, destroys its own results (2. 17. 34): it has, in that sense, no results. omnibus: the reference is not quite clear; Q.'s point may be that this much is agreed between those who make persuasion the end of rhetoric, and those who adopt bene dicere as rhetoric's finis. Y

18. 3 mihi autem . . . adsumere: for this contention cf. Proleg. p. 17. 10, where rhetoric is said to be deaiprjTtKr) Kai npaKTiKri (see also Rh. Gr. v. 4-5 Walz). ex illis ceteris artibus: i.e. the other two types of art, the theoretic and the 'poetic'. That the phrase should be understood thus is shown by the parallel looseness in 5 'una ex tribus artibus' and by the following sentence, which explains {nam) in what sense rhetoric shows features of a theoretic art. §5 then is concerned with similarities with 'poetic' arts. A case could also be made that rhetoric takes over something from individual arts covered by these two types, but Q. is not concerned with that here. Note that ceteris has to mean 'the other two out of three'. et potest: perhaps picked up irregularly by 'sed . . . quoque' in §5. Alternatively, 'it also can', i.e. apart from its active role. For Q.'s overall argument this is crucial: his uir bonus has moral virtue and, connected with that, the virtue 'rhetoric'. It is, accordingly, important to demonstrate that rhetoric and moral virtue are similar in kind and structure, and what Q. is saying here, effectively, is that rhetoric is, like moral virtue, a disposition of the mind of the speaker, a SidOeais. The naturalist, by contrast, would probably reject as absurd the suggestion that rhetoric was 'present' in the speaker if it was not 'used', re'xvr) can be used in the abstract sense and with reference to the Siddeots of the mind of the rcxvtrrjs. Cf. e.g. Philod. Rhet i. 69-70 = p. 123. 4-15 L.A. >2?a[ri]*' roivvy [ k ] c u Xeyerat rjt^r/ napd roi[? "EXX]rj[aiv I£is rj [Si]a0[eais] with Barnes 7; Stoic texts in which virtue is called a

356

Commentary

Siddeois are, for instance, D.L. 7. 89 (SVF iii, fr. 39) and Plut. Virt. mor. 441 A (SVF iii, fr. 459). erit . . . in oratore etiam tacente: cf. Sen. Ben. 4. 21. 4 'quomodo est disertus etiam qui tacet' (with the further example of a steersman 'qui in sicco est', reminiscent of 2. 17. 24). proposito: 'on purpose' (cf. TLL s.v. propono 2073. 7-11, citing Dig. 48. 19. 11.2 'delinquitur . . . aut proposito aut impetu aut casii). impeditus is to be taken with casu alone. 18. 4 nam . . . fruuntur: it is not immediately obvious what the causal connection is. The sentence may simply explain all of what preceded from 3 erit onwards. Alternatively, the sentence looks back to 3 'inspectione esse contentd. etiam ex secretis studiis fructus: i.e. as well as from the active life of the forum (contrasted with secreta studia at 12. 6. 4), which had its 'magnos... fructus' in the form of wealth and honour (12. 11. 29). Cf. 12. 11. 4 'studiorum fructus', of the (tangible) fruits of retirement; Q. is, here as there, thinking of himself and his book (so Corsi). The noun is taken up by fruuntur. ab actu . . . recesserunt: the understood subject seems to be litterae, though studia (or oratores) might seem more appropriate. For the phrase, cf. 11. 1. 35 'administrationi rei publicae . . . a qua longissime isti qui philosophi uocantur recesserunt'. id est opera: apparently added to make clear that actu means 'activity' (so too in 1 and 5). contemplatione sui: cf. Sen. Nat. 3 pr. 2 (of old age) 'sibi totus animus uacet et ad contemplationem sui . . . respiciat'. 18. 5 effectiuae: looking back to 2 'aliae [artes] in effectu'; the word does not reappear in this sense till Augustine. quod . . . ponimus: referring to history alone. But scriptis (of course) goes with orationibus too: a speech that was never written down at any stage could not be 'poetic' in the sense of leaving something tangible behind it. Q.'s association of written speeches with history glances at the Aristotelian Aegis ypaiKrj, which included the products of sophists and historians; see Winterbottom4 126. See generally for the connection between history and oratory 10. 1. 31-4 with Peterson's nn.; Norden AKi. 81-91, and S. Rebenich, 'Historical Prose', in S. E. Porter (ed.), Handbook of Classical Rhetoric (Leiden, 1997), 265-337. artibus: again (cf. n. on 3 ex illis ceteris artibus) of classes of art. Kiderlin' 714-15 sought to cure a further illogicality by writing una. Cf. also n. on 2. 20. 1 ex mediis artibus ... habenda sit.

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est in eo frequentissima: rather as in 12. 2. 7 'quis philosophorum aut in iudiciis frequens aut dams in contionibus fuit?' (TLL s.v. frequens 1300. 43-75). actiua uel administratiua: the former word is contrasted with spectatiua (pars) at 3. 5. 11, and with contemplatiua at Sen. Ep. 95. 10 (of philosophy); TLL s.v. activus 445. 9-32, remarking that administratiua here (another coinage?) = otVoro/^/oj; but a Greek parallel seems to be lacking.

Chapter Nineteen As to the question, 'Does nature contribute more to eloquence than teaching?', we need to be clear what is at issue (1). If one or other is altogether missing, then nature, but not teaching, can make headway in the absence of the other. But if both are present, nature is more crucial in middling orators, but the perfect owe more to teaching. This can be illustrated from agriculture (2), and from sculpture. To sum up, nature is the material on which teaching works. Art cannot do without material, while the unworked material has some value; but the highest art is better than the best material (3).

Ever since the Sophists, it had been a commonplace of educational and rhetorical thought that three things—vois, Texyy, and /xeAerrj—were all needed by a successful speaker. It was then inevitable that there should be a disagreement about the relative importance of each. On the issue in Q. see Appel 46-58, Austin on 12.1.9, Adamietz on 3. 5. 1, Varwig, E. Fantham, 'The Concept of Nature and Human Nature in Quintilian's Psychology and Theory of Instruction', Rhetorica, 13 (1995), 125-36; for Cicero, who has Crassus discuss the division in de Orat. 1 (natura 113-33; ars 134-46; exercitatio 147-59), see L-P ad loc., with general introduction i. 209-11, and Vretska on Arch. 12-16; Brink on Horace, AP 408-18; Russell on 'Longinus' 2. 1. For the early stages of the debate see P. Shorey, Vuats, fxeXerrj, emoT-qnr), TAPhA 40 (1909), 185-201; Heinimann. As Appel shows (57-8) Q. tended to reduce the triad to a two-pronged division into natura and doctrina, i.e. exercitatio tends to be ignored; and the usual quaestio was which of these two was more valuable. Q. in general held a balance. On the one hand, 'omnino superuacua erat doctrina si natura sufficeret' (2. 8. 8); on the other, 'nihil praecepta atque artes ualere nisi adiuuante natura' (1 pr. 26). Both were essential. Art was thought of as 'completing' nature (e.g. 2. 17. 9 and n.; 6. 4. 12; 11.3. 11). There was nothing very original in all this; the maybe contemporary treatise by 'Longinus' (ch. 2) says much the same, and so had Cicero (see L-P): Antonius certainly, as one

358

Commentary

would expect, had made ars a bad third in the triad (de Orat. 2. 147), and Crassus too did not doubt the extreme importance of natura (de Orat. I. 113). But certainly there was no disposition on Cicero's part to underplay the claims of ars (see esp. Brut. 111 'quid dicam opus esse doctrina? sine qua etiam si quid bene dicitur adiuuante natura, tamen id quia fortuito fit semper paratum esse non potest'; Fin. 4. 10 'ars... est dux certior quam natura'; Appel 72-3). On the other hand there is no exact parallel to the complex solution to the well-worn quaestio given in this chapter. That in Philod. Rhet. suppl. p. 3 is equally complex, but on quite other lines. However, while the positions taken by Q. can be paralleled in other authors, it is fair to say that in the late first century the whole question was more worth discussing than usual: people were actually claiming that natura was enough (see the introductions to chs. 11 and 12), so that it is one of Q.'s tasks to establish his own notion of natura, by drawing on the rhetorical tradition on the one hand and Stoic philosophy on the other. (Hence 2. 16. 11-19 on why rhetoric is natural cannot be separated from the discussion here: there natura is at issue both qua universal principle and qua one's own vois.) And, of course, the rhetorical discussion resonates in many ways with analogous philosophical quaestiones like how we come to acquire virtue, what role our naturalvot? plays in this (cf. Q. 12. 2. 1; Cic. Arch. 15 'illud adiungo, saepius ad laudem atque uirtutem naturam sine doctrina quam sine natura ualuisse doctrinam', Part. Or. 64, Hor. Ep. 1. 18. 100), to what extent imitatio brings this development about; cf. e.g. Q. 3. 2. 3 with Adamietz ad loc., Varwig, 74-8, and contrast Cicero as discussed by E. Fantham, 'Imitation and Evolution', CPh 73 (1978), 1-16. All this is relevant to Q., since he wants rhetoric to be a virtue. 19. 1 naturane plus... conferat an doctrina: see the introduction above. quam... uelimus: Spalding glossed: 'quomodo latius comprehensam quaestionem hoc potissimum loco intellegamus, et quibus limitibus definiamus,' and comments: 'Patet ex sequentibus, pro vario quaestionis ambitu, varie quoque debere responded.' This is plausible, and explains the following nam: Q. says that the question does not really matter to him; but if it is to be discussed, we must decide what form it is to take. Are we to decide which could best do without the other, or which is more important in a blend of the two? The answers to the two questions will naturally be different. in hoc loco: said by Spalding to mean 'in hac materia, in hac disputatione'; his 'hoc potissimum loco' in the gloss quoted above suggests an alternative interpretation. The former seems preferable (cf. also Ammendola's 'in questa materia'), since using in hoc loco for 'here' would be unusual for Q. (3.6. 59 is

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the only parallel, where Russell translates 'in this context'), locus may have a connotation of'commonplace' (the juxtaposition with quaestio, another term reminiscent of rhetorical exercise, suggests this too). 19. 2 natura.. .poterit: cf. 1 pr. 26 'Illud... in primis testandum est, nihil praecepta atque artes ualere nisi adiuuante natura. Quapropter ei cui deerit ingenium non magis haec scripta sint quam de agrorum cultu sterilibus terris'. sin ex pari coeant: i.e. if we take the case of natura and doctrina being blended 'on equal terms' (cf. TLLs.v. ex 1124. 73-5, supplemented by TLL s.v. par 276. 2-4, citing e.g. Decl. min. 379. 2). ex pari recalls ££ UJOV, as Amm endola observes. in mediocribus futrisquef... putabo: the passage is discussed by Winterbottom6 74. utrisque in itself makes good sense ('where both are but moderate' Watson), but the plural is unexpected, and a complication (the quality of the component parts) is introduced that is forgotten when we come to the case of the consummati. Worse, we have to move, without warning, from mediocribus sc. natura et doctrina to consummates sc. oratores. It is tempting to emend utrisque in such a way as to allow mediocribus too to refer to orators (cf. 5. 13. 3, 6. 4. 5, 12. 1. 24). Radermacher suggested utique, in the sense 'at least' (see 2. 1. 1 n.), but the word adds nothing to the sentence, and looks superfluous alongside quidem. Kiderlin's 'utriusque <magnum>, maius' (Kiderlin2 367-9) is highly ingenious, but perhaps introduces an over-fussy qualification into what should be a straightforward contrast. It is perhaps best to delete utrisque altogether, as Regius did. The intrusion might have arisen from a variant on utroque in 1, where the older editors read utraque, not without reason. adhuc: not to be taken with maius ('still greater'), but in a sort of temporal sense (cf. n. on 2. 6. 6 adhuc), the time scheme being that of Q.'s exposition, which proceeds in steps (perhaps Ammendola thought along similar lines: 'maggiore ancora (come nel caso precedente)...'). Where there is no doctrina at all, 'natura... multum ualebit'. When doctrina is mixed in, nature still has a greater influence. There is some flaw in the logic, for, when doctrina is not present at all, nature, though of weight, cannot be more weighty than doctrina. sicut terrae... efficiet: the parallel illustrates the cases of (a) doctrina without natura; (b) natura without doctrina; (c) the combination of the two. The complication introduced by the (argued) contrast of mediocres and consummati oratores is ignored in the illustration, as it will be in 3, both in the parallel from sculpture and in the rephrasing based on the notion of materia. For the agricultural image, cf. 1 pr. 26, cited above on natura...

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Commentary

poterit, and generally Afifahl 112-15. Elsewhere cf. Cic. Tusc. 2. 13 (illustrating the cultivation of the soul through philosophy; cf. the introductory note above on 'parallel' discussions in philosophical contexts) 'ut agri non omnes frugiferi sunt qui coluntur..., sic animi non omnes culti fructum ferunt. atque.. .ut ager quamuis fertilis sine cultura fructuosus esse non potest, sic sine doctrina animus': a rather different analysis; [Plut.] De liberis educandisl E. profuerit: proderit would mean that the good husbandman might as well not try (and having tested the soil will not); profuerit represents him as having laboured and laboured in vain. We are indebted to Dr Holford-Strevens for his help with this note. uberi: ubere A after correction, uberi is overwhelmingly the more usual form (Neue-Wagener, ii. 83). bonitas soli: cf. Col. 4. 22. 8. 19. 3 et si., .marmore: this second parallel again illustrates (a) doctrina without natura, (b) natura without doctrina (unworked Parian marble), and (c) the combination of the two. Cf. Sen. Ep. 85. 40, where Seneca asserts that a great artist like Phidias would have made the most of inferior material. For imager)' from sculpture, see Afifahl 54-6. Praxiteles: the fourth-century Athenian sculptor (see Austin on 12. 10. 9). For his work in marble see Plin. Nat. 36. 20. molari lapide: probably not a millstone as such (so the translations; cf. TLL s.v. molaris 1337. 5-15), but a piece of the volcanic rock out of which millstones were commonly made (TLL ibid. 1336. 64-1337. 4; Ebert in RE xv. 2517-18). But as the TLL entry shows (1337. 16-45) the word could be used very loosely. Parium marmor: the best type (cf. Nisbet-Hubbard on Hor. Carm. 1. 19.6). rude: in a state of nature; cf. n.on 2. 12. 3 nam... creduntur. illud idem: i.e. the block of Parian marble. denique: concluding the chapter with a final point (OLD s.v. 2a). Certainly the epigrammatic final sentence merely summarizes the chapter (cf. OLD s.v. denique 3), but 'denique natura... fingitur', while leading up to the summarizing sentence, does seem to be a new point in that it applies the Praxiteles example to the art of rhetoric. materia: cf. n. on 2. 4. 7 materiam. The rephrasing is perhaps suggested by the preceding parallel from sculpture; note fingit.. .fingitur (cf. 3. 9. 9). materiae... pretium est: 'material has value', materiae is perhaps dative (cf. 2. 5. 11), perhaps genitive (cf. Ov. Trist. 1. 9. 43, Plin. Nat. 12. 118).

Chapter Twenty A more important question: Is rhetoric a morally indifferent art or a virtue? (1) Some speakers have practised 'non-art' or 'ill-art' (2). And there is also 'vain-art', a mere waste o f time, like the man whom Alexander saw throwing chickpeas (3). One might classify thus people who spend their lives in declamation. But the rhetoric I am concerned with is indeed a virtue (4). Philosophers prove this at length; I will show it by a lucid proof o f my own (5a). The philosophers say: (a) If virtue (the part of it called prudence) is to be in harmony with oneself in what is to be done and not done, it [sc. virtue] will also be found in the field o f what is to be said and not said (5b). (b) We have seeds of virtues like justice within us; and we similarly have seeds of the ability to speak. Yet that is not true of those arts which have no connection with virtue (6). (c) So, as speech falls into two types, dialectic and rhetoric, even dialectic will be a virtue; and a fortiori rhetoric will (7). But my proof is drawn from what rhetoric does. An orator cannot operate without virtues; so if rhetoric is not a virtue, oratory cannot be complete (8). Further, an animal's virtue is that in which he excels; in man that is reason and speech. Cicero pronounces on this in several places (9). The objection that a bad man can speak according to the rules o f rhetoric can be refuted (10).

This chapter is a cornerstone of the argument that the perfect orator is a uir bonus dicendi peritus, in that it argues that rhetoric is a virtue, and that it is connected with moral virtue. A twofold strategy is adopted here: on the one hand Q. makes these notions plausible from the point of view of the ordinary man, by creating a contrast between uirtus and media ars (1), nulla ars (2), mala ars (3), and nana ars (4)—from which it naturally emerges that rhetoric is if anything a bona ars, given what we have leamt in previous chapters. On the other hand, he does continue his Stoicizing argument, and the reference to mediae artes (a notion devised within the Stoic school), as well as the highlighting of the fact that some of the arguments offered from (5) have been put forward by philosophers, make this clear enough. The Stoic doctrines in the background of this chapter were not unheard-of among educated Romans. In Cic. de Orat. 1. 83 Antonius is speaking, reporting arguments of the Stoic Mnesarchus: '...oratorem autem, nisi qui sapiens esset, esse neminem, atque ipsam eloquentiam, quod ex bene dicendi scientia constaret, unam quandam esse uirtutem et, qui unam uirtutem haberet, omnis habere easque ipsas esse inter se aequalis et paris; ita, qui esset eloquens, eum uirtutes omnis habere atque esse sapientem.' How far away this is from the consider-

Commentary

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ations one would usually find on the matter in rhetorical handbooks is illustrated by the concluding sentence (ibid.): 'sed haec erat spinosa quaedam et exilis oratio longeque ab nostris sensibus abhorrebat.' (Later in the same work, in 3. 55, Crassus argues for rhetoric to be a uirtusiri an attenuated sense, and distinguishes his view from the Stoic one in 3. 65.) We provide some general background for the arguments 'of the philosophers' put forward in this chapter (5-7). The Stoics gave a prima facie confusing number of definitions and descriptions of what virtue is, and to make sense of them and to relate them to the notion of an art one needs to start from the philosophical positions the Stoics responded to. It is a commonplace that many of their views have to be understood and interpreted as developed in interaction with Platonic dialogues. At the centre of Stoic teaching on virtue is the Socratic claim that virtue is knowledge. This claim is one reason why Socrates thinks he can learn something about piety by questioning the self-declared paragon of piety Euthyphro in the dialogue of the same name (if a virtue were just a habituated pattern of behaviour, such questioning would not be a promising exercise), and why in the early dialogues devoted to individual virtues failure of his interlocutors adequately to answer his 'what is xV question, where x is a virtue, amounts to refutation of their claim to virtue. Further, the technique of the Socratic eAeyxo?, however we conceive of it in detail, is designed to show up inconsistencies in somebody's views, and having a virtue entails (as an underlying assumption of the dialogues, in the sense that it is a view accepted by Socrates and his interlocutors alike) that one has consistent views on matters relating to the virtue in question. We can infer from this that the claim 'virtue is knowledge' is to be understood in such a way that virtue is complex knowledge and may be said to consist of 'items of knowledge', which have propositional content, are connected with each other, and are true and consistent with each other. Since the way in which such an ordered system of items of knowledge would be brought to bear on a situation requiring moral action is similar to applying craft-knowledge to problematic situations, it is unsurp rising that a recurrent theme of the early dialogues is whether virtue is (or can be described as) a rexvyl see, e.g., the index s.v. virtue/craft in T. Irwin, Plato's Ethics (Oxford, 1995). Although the view disappears in the later dialogues as a topic for discussion, it is never comprehensively rejected or refuted by Socrates or an interlocutor. Aristotle too, despite thinking that ultimately there were important differences between virtue and craft-knowledge, uses the craft-analogy extensively for explanatory purposes.81

81

See e.g. S. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (New York and Oxford, 1991), 1 9 0 - 8 .

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Now virtue is for the Stoics a science (eViarrj/ATj), science being defined as a avarr}fia of especially firm items of knowledge (emar-qpLai, so the word is used in two senses; cf. e.g. SVFiii, fr. 112. 41-3 = Stob. Eel. ii. 73. \9-23 W-H elvai Be rrjv e7Tiarr]pLr)v KaTaXrpfjiv dapoovvr} (see SVFiii,

frr. 255-6). 'Practical wisdom'

(povrjaig)

is itself defined as

eTTia-rqpar)

ayaddiv Kal KaKcov Kal ovBerepaiv (e.g. SVF iii, frr. 262, 266) or, closer to what we learn in our passage, ETTLAR-qpnq TOV Voia Bet Trpdrreiv. nota By ov

(e.g. SVF iii, fr. 268. 42). The virtues dialectic and rhetoric, both of them necessary for the good life, are related to these cardinal virtues by being in some sense comprised under p6vrjais; in [Andronicus], Depassionibus 2. 3. 1-2, p. 241 Glibert-Thirry ( = fr. 91 Hiilser) a number of virtues, rhetoric and dialectic among them, are listed as 'being worshipped at the same altar' (avpL^ajpiog) as p6vrjaig.S2 The relationship between dialectic and rhetoric is very close, so much so that the difference between the two is presented in many texts as merely residing in the mode of presentation of arguments (e.g. D.L. 7. 42 = fr. 33 Hiilser; see the notes on 7 below); Q. himself, on more than one occasion, refers to the close relationship between the two (2. 17.42; 2. 20. 7). Dialectic, as we have seen, is defined as emorr/pir] TOV ev BiaXeyeadat (SVF iii, fr. 267; cf. ibid, the definition of rhetoric: e-MAR-QPIR) TOV ev Xe'yetv), and eS BiaXeyeaOat or Xe'yew is to be understood as speaking what is true and fitting (see n. on 17. 22 aiunt... mentiuntnr; Q. elaborates on bene dicere in 2. 17. 22-5 generally). Further, according to the doctrine of dvraKoXovdia there is mutual implication between the various virtues necessary for the good life: having one entails having all of them (see SVFiii, frr. 295-6), on the grounds that they share their OeajpypLara (D.L. 7. 125 = SVFiii, fr. 295). It is this assumption which allows Q. to make the connection between possession of the virtue of rhetoric and possession of moral virtue (see nn. on 8 below). 82

Other texts give other 'subvirtues' for ^porqois, e.g. Stob. Eel

ii, p. 60. 1 8 - 2 0 W - H wrorarrea^at evfiovXtav,

(= SVF iii, fr. 264. 2 0 - 2 = 61H Long-Sedley): ?g pev ovv povrioet evXoyioriav, ayxlvotav, I'oui'e'xeim'. <ei)aro^i'ai'>, evfiaxiav.

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Commentary

There is, however, one problem which may be related to the ambiguity arising from the classification of virtue as both eVtcrrrj/Arj and 'art of living':83 rhetoric is according to Q. the scientia bene dicendi (eVtarrj/xrj TOV ev Xeyeiv, see above), but at the same time rhetoric was regarded as an art (this was the conclusion of ch. 17, which is relied on in 20. 7 'non eadem.. .remotae'). There is no doubt that this ambiguity is inherent to Stoic doctrine and was not produced by Q.'s adaptation of it,84 and a commentary on Quintilian is not the place to advance the understanding of this particular difficulty; some of the problems arising from the double classification have been set out with great clarity by Atherton 420-2. We add just one observation: Atherton points out that no Greek text identifies the goal of the art of rhetoric on the Stoic point of view, and she suggests that the Stoics may not have specified one. Now Q. is unambiguous about the goal of rhetoric qua art: it is bene dicere. And in Q. this view is integrated with other Stoic views, like the notion that speaking well amounts to acting in accordance with nature (2. 16. 11-9). 85 One might also think that Sextus in Adv. Rhet. would not have missed a chance to attack the Stoics for making rhetoric an art but specifying no end for it (it is one of his objections against skills which are claimed to be arts that they have no end); this supports the idea that 'speaking well' as the end of the art of rhetoric is genuine Stoic doctrine (in which case relevant sections from Q. should be included in any new edition of Stoic fragments that may be undertaken in the future).86 20. 1 ilia... maior: as concerning morality; Q. had depreciated the previous topic as irrelevant to his purpose (2. 19. 1). ex mediis artibus... habenda sit: cf. Plin. Nat. 9. 101 'pectines... ex eodem genere habentur'. In Q. 2. 18. 5, the addition of una eases the expression. mediis artibus: this notion is Stoic. 'Intermediate arts' admit of degrees and are not complete and whole as the arts at the disposal of the sage are (see the 85 In connection with the notion o f the 'art of living' the expression 'craft-analog)'' is sometimes used (cf. above, p. 3 6 2 ) ; but while this is appropriate for Platonic and Aristotelian contexts, it is not clear that for the Stoics the make-up and operation of a craft was just an explanatory model for virtue; cf. SVF iii, fr. 202 ( = Philo, Leg. Alleg. 1. 57), where a distinction between practical (e.g. tcktovikt), xa^'<evriKv) and theoretical (e.g. aarpovofiia. yeaifierpia) arts is introduced, followed by the statement that virtue was both a theoretical and a practical art. 8 4 Stoic fragments that categorize rhetoric as a science have been given above; Chrysippus defines rhetoric as an art in Plut. De Sto. Rep. 1047 a ; Diogenes o f Babylon calls rhetoric an art in PHerc. 1506 col. 8 ( = Philod. Rhet. ii. 211 = SVTiii, fr. 1 1 7 ) — s e e the new edition in ObbinkVander Waerdt, with their c o m m e n t a r y ( 3 6 9 - 7 0 , 374). 8 5 Saying this is quite compatible with assuming that in 2. 17. 2 2 - 5 Q. is elaborating his understanding o f bene dicere; see Atherton 422 n. 68. 8 6 Sextus does discuss eS ^eyew as a possible v\i) o f rhetoric in § § 4 8 - 5 9 ; see Barnes, n. 51.

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contrast of dperat and p.4oat r^xyat in SVF iii, frr. 505, 525, from Philo and Porphyry respectively; the index of SVFs.v. renvoi). We can compare the Stoic notion of media officia = KaOr/Kovra d8tdopa (SVF iii, frr. 491-2), which like the intermediate arts can be invoked for explaining actions of people who are not virtuous; see e.g. Cic. Fin. 3. 58 ex quo intellegitur officium medium quiddam esse quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis.' However, we must note that 'intermediate' is a broad category; Atherton 422 n. 67: 'I do not see how peoos could be used by a Stoic as co-extensional with "ordinary, non-wise": for it typically designates actions just insofar as they are performable by wise and non-wise alike, not such actions as performable or actually performed by just one of those jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive groups.' Cf. the contrast between KaBrjKov 'appropriate action' and KCLTopdiopLo. 'virtuous action'; qua actions these can be identical, but the former is common to the virtuous and the non-virtuous, and only turns into the latter when performed by a virtuous person with the right intentions. This notion of'intermediateness' filtered into the rhetorical tradition too; see Proleg. p. 12. 19, where it is npaypta.. . tppeaov Kai at egeort rtvt Kai Ka\d)s Kai KaK&s xprjoaodac TOIOVTOV yap fj Svvapus; cf. Nicolaus, Prog. p. 2 Felten. Philod. Rhet. i. 129 aligns rhetoric with TCJV aSiafopcoraTajv redraw. But it is unlikely that the distinction in Q. here is simply tralatitious material, no longer recognized as Stoic. utiles aut secus: cf. 10. 2. 13 'oportune proprieque aut secus'; not common elsewhere (Cic. Fin. 4. 60; Liv. 7. 6. 8, 10. 19. 3). In all these cases aut secus introduces a less attractive opposite. etiam philosophorum: meaning that this is not purely a tenet of rhetorical theory. This is something of a falsification: the position was hardly standard or even widely held among rhetoricians (cf. May-Wisse 239 n. 63, on de Orat. 3. 55). The same is true of the philosophers: reference is principally to the Stoics (see 2. 15. 20), and indeed Cic. de Orat. 3. 65 says that only they thought rhetoric a uirtus (see L-P ad loc.). Cicero makes Varro, representing the Academics, say the same in Ac. 1. 5; Varro was a follower of Antiochus of Ascalon, who reintroduced dogmatism to the Academy and is frequently characterized as an eclectic philosopher. Varro, following Antiochus, may have held this view; however, there is, perhaps significantly, no other evidence on Antiochus' views of rhetoric. uirtus: see the introductory note for the sense of uirtus at issue here. There appears to be no other systematic extant discussion of this topic. Plutarch wrote a lost treatise El dperrj rj prjropiKri (Index Lampriae no. 86 in the Loeb edition of Plutarch's Mor., vol. xv by Sandbach, pp. 16-17 with n.); it seems to have polemicized against the Stoics: see D. Babut, Plutarque et le stoicisme (Paris, 1969), 23 and 229. Note also how uirtus is delayed until the end of the

366

Commentary

sentence here, and a similar word-order marks the end of Q.'s introduction to the actual arguments in 2. 20. 4 fin. ( ' . . . uirtus erit'). 20. 2. Q. proceeds in 2-4a to rule out of consideration various rhetorical activities that he does not count as artes at all, before turning to 'true' and virtuous rhetoric in 4b. The possibility that rhetoric could be a media ars is not really discussed at all. in studiis dicendi: vaguely 'the practice of speaking' (Russell). Q. must be talking (at least primarily) about real-life oratory (contrast Ammendola, who holds that the reference is to rhetorical exercises); Q. will come to the schoolroom in 3-4. studia dicendi is otherwise found in Q. only at 1.2. 25, where it means something like 'enthusiasm for speaking'. art\v'ia\ defined by Ar. EN 1140a21—2 as perd Xoyov tfievBovs nocqTiKr) but here used less technically: the are^o? cannot identify and make plain the causes for his own actions. It is in this sense that Plato called rhetoric no re'^rj but an drexvos rpifir) (Phdr. 260 E 5). Cf. the uneducated collector of books in Lucian, Adv. ind. 2 who is ridiculed as belonging to the arexvoi because he is unable to distinguish between proper books and ra KifiS-qXa (an ability that makes the parasite a re^tr^!? in Par. 4). multos... ruentes: cf. what Q. says of the naturalists in 2. 11-12 (where see nn.); they lacked ratio (2. 12. 11, 12) and litterae (2. 12. 11), and rushed in where true artists feared to tread (cf. 2 'in rixam ruit'). qua... fames duxit: such people turned to oratory because they needed the money. For the taking of fees, see 12. 7. 8-12: better not, but there are exceptions (9 'ad usus necessarios', 12 'pauper'). Q. puts that point unsympathetically here, for fames is malesuada (Verg. A. 6. 276), and the coupling with impudentia does not help. quasi artem: the effect of quasi is to put inverted commas around artem; see K-S i. 455 n. 5. KdKOTtxvtcLV. cf. nn. on 2. 15. 2 and 2. 15. 24 Athenaeus fallendi artem. The word could be used of bad art in the sense of inartistic art (so Demetrius, Eloc. 247; Athen. 631 e; Plut. Mor. 706 d-E; and Jocelyn 83 on the pairing KCLKorexvia ~ KaKot,rjAia); in that sense it is first attested, in Heraclitus, fr. B129 DK; cf. M. Marcovich, Heraclitus (St. Augustin,22001), v. ii, at 70. Here the force of the term is not that a skill is not methodical but that it serves a harmful purpose (cf. Q.'s renderings mala quasiarshere and prauitas artis in 2. 15. 2); cf. e.g. Proleg. p. 45. 18-20 (and p. 31. 9); SVF ii, fr. 95 (cf. 2. 17. 41 with n. for the definition of re^rj referred to): T€\vys pcv yap opos OSTOSovorr)pa €K KaraXrufie OJV oiryyeyvpvaapcvojv. Vpos TI re A os €vxPVaTOV (T°V evxpr/orov 8ia ra? KaKorexvias vyiios ITpooridepcvov); Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 49. KaKOTcxvia was often used polemically of forensic rhetoric to make the point

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that it was used for bad purposes or by bad people, see Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 12 'by the schools ofCritolaus and of Plato'; cf. Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 1.8 o nXdrajv KaKOT€xviav irpoaeiTre rrjv aotfuaTiKrfv;87 the term is attested for Epicurus too (fr. 51 Usener = Amm. Marc. 30. 4. 3); cf. also Marius Victorinus, Ars Gramm. GL 6. 187. 9-11. See n. below on 3 pLaraiorexvia. n a m . . . conuerterint: Q.'s clearest hit at the delatores, who not merely took fees, but profited from the estates of those they successfully accused (see above, p. xxxv). facultatem dicendi: see 2. 15. 2 n. on dicendi facultatem. 20. 3 iiaTaioTcxvia: Q.'s translation 'superuacua artis imitatio' is unparalleled. The crucial feature of PLARAIOTEXVIA is that it is pointless, either because it leaves no tangible re'Ao? (e.g. Proleg. p. 32. 4-5: fiaraiorexvia 84 iortv t/ /xera rrjv £v4pyeiav re'Aos ou KaTaXip,7rdv€i [cf. Q.'s relinquit in 2. 18. 1], OJS opxr)OTIKR)) or because it has no T4XOSSS in the sense of 'a goal useful for life' (referring back to the relevant colon in the standard definition of art to which also Q. subscribes, cf. 2. 17. 41 n.; e.g. Rh. Gr. vii. 108. 15-18 and David, Proleg. phil. p. 44. 11-17 Busse = CAG xviii. 2). The examples for fxaraiorexvta typically cited include dancing (see above; also ropedancing, e.g. Galen, Protr. i. 20 Kiihn) and games (e.g. the iroXvrpujTos Keyxpos in Proleg. p. 263. 5, cf. n. on qualis... dignissimum below); the latter may serve to illustrate the ambiguity of the phrase 'having no T4,Ao . . . se minibus a natura datis temperantia modestia iustitia et omnis honestas perfecte absoluta est', 5. 43; Tusc. 3. 2 'sunt... ingeniis nostris semina innata uirtutum'; Sen. Ep. 108. 8 'omnibus enim natura fundamenta dedit semenque uirtutum', 90. 46, 120. 4; Ben. 4. 17. 2-4. ad quas: to be constructed with initia. initia... ac semina: for the juncture cf. Tac. Dial. 33.4, with Gudeman's n., adding Cic. Fin. 4. 18 cited above. concessa natura: cf. 12. 10. 43 'his.. .adiutoriis quae sunt ab eadem nobis concessa natura'. iustitiam: according to Stoic theory, humans are by nature social animals, not motivated solely by self-interest, but naturally concerned for other humans and predisposed to identifying with them; naturally, the development of justice featured in this connection; see M. Schofield in M. Schofield and C. J. Rowe (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge, 2000), 449-50. On this see SVF iii, frr. 214-27. rusticis... ac barbaris: for barbarians as a type of the unsophisticated cf. n. on 2. 11.7 barbari et serui. For rustics, cf. 2. 21.16 'rusticus inlitteratusque', 6. 3. 13 'non indocti modo sed etiam rustici' (capable of witty replies), 12. 10. 53 'indocti.. .atque interim rustici'. The two are combined by Apul. Apol. 66 (cf. 10, 44), but distinguished in Calp. Eel. 2. 61 'rusticus est, fateor, sed non et barbarus Idas'. imago: cf. Cic. Fin. 5. 43 'parui uirtutum simulacris, quarum in se habent semina sine doctrina, mouentur.' pro nobis: tempting as it is to regard this as a Christian psychological error (on this type of error see Reid's app. crit. on Cic. Ac. 1. 26; R. M. Ogilvie, 'Monastic Corruption', G&R 18 [ 1971], 32-4), it is to be preferred to pro bonis (B, read by Radermacher). Cf. 2. 17. 6 'quod indocti et barbari et serui, pro se cum l o q u u n t u r . . b o n i s (as well as marring the rhythm) introduces a blurring element: it is not to the present point that defence speaking should be for good men. 20. 7 non eadem.. .remotae: 'this natural foundation, however, does not exist in arts which have no relation to virtue' (Loeb). For the arts dissociated from nature and virtue we probably have to think of skills like those occasionally ridiculed by Plato (e.g. Grg. 463 E 5-466 A 3, with Dodds ad loc.). cum duo., .genera orationis: cf. e.g. Sen. Ep. 89. 17 (division of the pars rationalis) 'omnis oratio aut continua est aut inter respondentem et interrogantem discissa; hanc SICLXCKTIK-QV, illam PRJROPIKRJV placuit uocari'; D.L. 7.41. Contrast Cic. Orat. 113, where oratio and disputatio are said both to be in disserendo. Q. has already used the dose tie between the two as a proof that

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rhetoric is an art (2. 17.42 cum ab ea specie magis quam genere differat'; see n. ad loc.). perpetua... concisa: cf. Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 6-7, contrasting to iv avvrofxia k€1[jl€vov with to Aiyciv cv fjLTjK€i Kai 8i€^68tp (i.e. with amplification); cf. also 2. 10. 2 (with n.). For the former, cf. TLL s.v. perpetuus 1643. 60-1644. 10, for the latter TLL s.v. eoneido 35. 70-36. 13 (both undifferentiated). The two are again contrasted in 2. 21. 13. quas.. .Zenon .. .similem: this story is also told in the passage of Sextus just cited, Cic. Fin. 2. 17 and Or. 113-15, Isid. Etym. 2. 23. 1 (attributed to Varro); for Zeno symbolizing a different conceptual distinction with his hand see Cic. Ac. 2. 145 and n. on 17.42 cum... differat. And see Atherton, passim. compressae... manus: cf. 11. 3. 104 (this verb also in Cic. Or. and Ac. 2 locc. citt.). explicatae: the more usual form; B has explicitae (similarly at 11. 3. 92, where A is lacking). Cf. TLL s.v. explico 1724. 53-8 and 1738. 69-71; more generally, Neue-Wagener iii. 521-6. Q. uses the verb of opening the hand at 11. 3. 100, 102. etiam disputatrix uirtus erit: cf. Cic. Ac. 1. 5 'utramque uim [ i.e. the Svva^is of dialecticians and orators] uirtutem esse nostri putant' (with Reid's n.); Fin. 3. 72 (dialectic as a uirtus). For Greek parallels, see above, p. 363. disputatrix: cf. n. on 2. 14. 1 oratoriam... oratricem. Q. uses the word again at 12. 2. 13 'haec pars dialectica siue illam dicere malumus disputatricem', there as an adjective, here virtually as a noun, varying dialectice. It does not appear elsewhere. Compare Cic. Ac. 2. 91 'dialecticam inuentam esse dicitis, ueri et falsi quasi disceptatricem [StayvojoTtKrjv?] et iudicem'. adeo... nihil dubitabitur: 'so true is it that...'; cf. e.g. 11. 1. 63 'primaque haec expositio fuit, quamquam ad praesentem quaestionem nihil pertinebat: adeo... nihil prius intuendum credidit quam quid deceret', Sen. Dial. 4. 10. 5 'Democritum... aiunt numquam sine risu in publico fuisse: adeo nihil illi uidebatur serium eorum quae serio gerebantur'; OLD s.v. adeo 5. speciosior atque apertior: apparently 'more attractive and more intelligible' to the ordinary man. For the former word cf. 2. 4. 24; for the latter see nn. on the similar pair at 2. 5. 20 'iucundus incipientibus quoque et apertus'. The only parallel for our pair in CL seems to be the rather different Decl. min. 315. 9 (concerning a topic providing free scope for attractive treatment). 20. 8 sed...uolo: this can only be the planior probatio announced in 5 (where see n.). uolo suggests that this argument is Q.'s own invention. Although Q. continues to draw on Stoic thought in what follows, he can indeed claim to be arguing from the practice of the orator now.

374

Commentary

plenius... atque apertius: cf. n. on 5 planiore hac proprieque nostra probatione. planius (Spalding) has superficial attractions (this is after all the planior probatio). But it would add nothing to apertius (Cic. Q. Rose. 43 'planius atque apertius dicam'), whereas plenius gives us a desirable contrast to the crabbed argumentation of the philosophers, just as apertius marks the contrast to its esoteric obscurity. The series of questions in this section, indeed, seems intended to suggest the fullness and accessibility of rhetoric (7 'speciosior atque apertior') as opposed to the more austere 'dialectic' of 5b—7; as Alcuin put it (after referring to the analogy of the hand) 'ilia [sc. dialectica] breui oratione argumenta condudit, ista [sc. rhetorica] per facundiae campos copioso sermone discurrit' (PL 101, 953 A). nam quid.. .oratio: Q. announces that he wants to support the same view as that argued for in §§5-7 from the practice of oratory (ipsis operibus); he ends the section by saying that, if rhetoric is not a virtue, then oratory cannot be perfect ('ut, si uirtus non est, ne perfecta quidem esse possit oratio'). It is then puzzling that the chapter seems to argue for a different view: that perfect oratory is impossible without the orator's being in possession of moral virtue. Q. makes no real effort to mediate between the two positions, but the fact that he presents it as obvious that the perfect orator must have moral virtue suggests that he relies on the assumption that all virtues are interconnected and can only together be present in a human being; see the introductory note to this chapter on the Stoic doctrine of avraKoXovOia. The orator's 'possession' of the cardinal virtues is exemplified in two prima facie contrasting ways. He has theoretical knowledge 'honestorum ac turpi urn' (i.e. moral sense, ooxftpoavvy)),of utilitas(p6vr]ois), and of iustitia(8iKaioovvr]). And he 'has' bravery (avSpeia) in the sense that he isbrave. Q. would not have seen a contrast here, just because for him virtue was knowledge. Accordingly, he can argue in 12. 2. 15-17 that the orator must be trained in moral philosophy, because moral concepts are constantly requiring treatment in oratory, but that he will be incomparably better at treating these concepts if he is a good man himself and 'haec non uodbus tantum... perceperit sed . . . uirtutes ipsas mente complexus ita sentiet'. In aligning three of the virtues with the three genera of oratory (in laudando, in suadendo, in iudiciis), Q. is ultimately following Aristotle, who distinguished the three by their aims (Rhet A3, 1358 b 20-9): expedient and harmful for deliberative oratory, just and unjust for forensic, to xaAov Kai to aioxpov ( = honestorum ac turpium; cf. also 3. 5. 3) for epideictic (rots & i-naivovoi Kai tf/eyovoiv); for later statements see Cic. de Orat. 1. 141 (with L-P's n.). It was an easy step to make these ends into topics for oratory (see n. on 2. 21. 12 quod... dicunt). But the crucial step by which the orator must himself display these virtues was only made possible by the Stoic

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doctrine that rhetoric is a virtue and the orator necessarily virtuous: though the Aristotelian insistence on the importance of Tjflo? laid a firm foundation for such a view. honestorum ac turpium: often contrasted. For ac (etA) cf. 12. 1.3. cum... dicendum sit: even before he comes to specific mention of the Milo case, Q. is thinking of Cicero, who had to deal with unruly contiones (popularis and turbulentus are paired at Cluent. 94, 113; Prov. 39; Brut 273) and offended the great (cf. Off. 2. 51 'ei...qui potentis alicuius opibus circumueniri urgerique uideatur, ut nos et saepe alias et adulescentes contra L. Sullae dominantis opes pro Sex. Roscio Amerino fecimus'). inter circumfusa militum arma: see Mil. 1-3; the soldiers could be regarded as being there to keep order (3 'ilia arma, centuriones, cohortes non periculum nobis sed praesidium denuntiant'); cf. Asc. Mil. 36 (p. 37 Stangl) 'exceptus est acclamatione Clodianorum, qui se continere ne metu quidem circumstantium militum potuerunt'). si uirtus non est: Q. would be expressing himself very awkwardly if these words meant 'if virtue is not present sc. in the orator'; rather, one has to supply rhetorice as subject and translate 'if rhetoric is not a virtue'. 20. 9 quod s i . . . credamus: a new move; the planior probatio is over, but Q. adds a new consideration, uirtus now means not 'moral virtue', but 'that at which something is best, its excellence', aperrj in its original sense (this invalidates the argument). For the apcrai of animals and men, cf. e.g. 1.1.1 'sicut aues ad uolatum, equi ad cursum, ad saeuitiam ferae gignuntur, ita nobis propria est mentis agitatio atque sollertia' (also 5. 11.5, 12. 11. 12-13); Cic. Fin. 2. 40 (with Reid's n.), 4. 37; Sen. Ep. 76. 8-9, esp. 'id in quoque optimum esse debet cui nascitur, quo censetur. in homine quid est optimum? ratio: hac antecedit animalia, deos sequitur'; and generally 2. 16. 12-17, with nn. quod s i . . . pleraque: 'but if the virtue of any animal lies in that in which it surpasses . . . ' (Russell); for the attraction (ea... qua for id... quo) see K-S i. 34-5. in leone impetus: his vigorous energy; cf. e.g. Ov. Met. 10. 551, Gel. 5. 14. 9 ('impetu corporis'), and esp. Sen. Ep. 41.6 'impetu acer, qualem ilium natura esse uoluit'. in equo uelocitas: Arist. EN 1106a 19-20 r) TOV tmrov apery) ITTTTOV re G7Tov8aiov void Kai ayaOov Bpapetv...; Cic. Fin. 2. 40 'ad cursum equum . . . natum'. Cicero's comment (Leg. 1. 45) on the catachresis of using uirtus of a horse suggests that, when used in this way, it was felt to be a loan-translation. porro: used to introduce a 'minor premiss'; cf. n. on 2. 17. 37 ars... orator for a similar use of autem.

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Commentary

ratione atque oratione: the two aspects of \oyos, paired at Cic. Rep. 2. 66, Fin. 4. 10, and esp. Off 1. 50: they tie human society together and separate us most obviously from animals, 'in quibus inesse fortitudinem saepe dicimus, ut in equis, in leonibus, iustitiam aequitatem bonitatem non dicimus; sunt enim rationis et orationis expertes'. recteque... dixerit Crassus: tacked rather awkwardly on to the previous question. Q. quotes from de Orat. 3. 55, disingenuously, as the discussion of L-P iv. 198-200 ('Die Transformierung stoischer Gedanken in 3,55') shows. The shift from eredamus to dixerit may correspond to a difference in tense between the corresponding statements in the indicative; a translation like 'why should we not believe . . . and why should not Crassus have been right to s a y . . w o u l d bring this out. ipse Cicero sua persona: as at 2. 17. 6 (see n. on non ideo ut pro uero accipiamus) and 10. 5. 2 Q. is careful to distinguish Cicero from a character in de Oratore (see also 11. 1. 21 on the distinction between views expressed by Cicero, e.g. in letters, and those expressed by characters in his dialogues more generally); with regard to Plato Q. makes the same distinctions between authorial intention and views expressed by characters (see 2. 15. 5 nn., 2. 15. 26 on cuius persona... sentiat, 2. 21. 1 on ponitur), but he sometimes infers Plato's intentions from statements made by characters in his works (2. 21.4 nn.). A's a sua is not needed (n. on 2. 15. 26 cuius persona sentiat), though TLL s.v. persona 1719. 1-3 gives a few late parallels. cum ad Brutum in epistulis turn aliis etiam locis: the letter to Brutus is not extant (fr. 14 Watt: p. 166), but it doubtless was no more pertinent than other places to which Q. may allude: Ac. 1. 5, Part. 78. 20. 10 a t . . . requirendum: the objection is: can rhetoric be a virtue if bad men can make good speeches? This is mentioned again at 12. 1. 23-32. Q. is at this stage well beyond the point where he could countenance it: orator is a moral tenn (see n. on 2. 15. 3 orandi), and the motive must be good if we are to say that a speech is a good one. nam: cf. n. on the word in 2. 11. 7. nam e t . . . fortitudo: cf. the similar rejoinder in 12. 1. 23 'nam nec omnibus qui fuerint manu prompti uiri fortis nomen concesserim, quia sine uirtute intellegi non potest fortitudo'. For definitions of bravery, see PI. La. 192 d 10 (povifxos KapTepia); Arist. EN T 10, esp. 1116a 11-12 Kal on KaXov alpelrai Kal v7TopL€'v€C, Cic. Off. 1. 62 'Itaque probe definitur a Stoicis fortitudo, cum earn uirtlitem esse dicunt propugnantem pro aequitate. Quocirca nemo qui fortitudinis gloriam consecutus est insidiis et malitia laudem est adeptus; nihil enim honestum esse potest quod iustitia uacat', where Dyck considers the definition to be Panaetius' own; Sen. Ben. 2. 34. 3 'fortitudo est uirtus

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pericula iusta contemnens aut scientia periculorum repellendorum excipiendorum prouocandorum; dicimus tamen et gladiatorem fortem uirum et senium nequam, quem in contemptum mortis temeritas impulit'. There is a close parallel to Q.'s argument here at SVTiii, fr. 511 (Clement of Alexandria) Kairoi 7rpaoo€Tat riva Kai Irpos

TOJV

per) yvojOTiKotv opOcos, dXX ov Kara Xoyov,

olov em dvSpeias* eviot yap CK vo€OJS OvpLoeiSeis y€vop.€voiy elra avev TOV Xoyov TOVTO dpeiftavres, aXoyajs £M TO. noXXa opjiojot Kal ojioia rots av8peiots Spojoiv,

(Lore

evtore

EVKOXOJS.

..naoa

o3v rj 8ia

ra

aura TOV

KaropOovv,

EMOTRJPLOVOS

olov

fiaodvovs

rrpatjis €virpayia.

RJ

vnojieveiv he 8ia

TOV

dv€7TtoTTjpLovos KaKonpayia; cf. Sen. Ep. 95. 57 'actio recta non erit nisi recta

fuerit uoluntas'. latro: as opposed to a soldier fighting for a good cause (cf. 2.16.6, with n.). tolerantia.. .doloris: for this virtue cf. SVF iii, fr. 275 rj... vnopLovrj r\v Kaprepiav KaXovoiv. multa... aliter: for the expression cf. 6. 4. 2 'neque alia dicuntur in altercatione, sed aliter'. The epigram marks the end of the topic. quia de utilitate supra tractauimus: in 2. 16. Q.'s point is that that chapter has already supplied another argument in favour of rhetoric's being a virtue.

Chapter Twenty-One As for the material of rhetoric, it has been variously said to be 'speech', persuasive arguments (1), 'political questions' (2), the whole of life, and the practical department of ethics (3). My view is that it is everything that is 'subjected' to it for speaking. Compare the views of Plato (4) and Cicero (5-6). Some have thought material so defined limitless or not specific to rhetoric (7); but they are wrong (8-11). 'It is the philosophers job to discourse on concepts like the good.' But both philosophers and orators are good men, and it is not surprising if they deal with the same material (12); in any case it is they who are trespassing on our territory. Finally, dialectic has its material defined in the same way (13). 'This means the orator will have to be expert in all subjects.' Cicero did indeed approach that position. But for me it is sufficient to say that an orator should not be without knowledge of what he is to speak about (14). What he needs is proper briefing on each occasion (15). An orator's speech will be superior to anything that the person, e.g. a craftsman, who briefed him could have produced (16). And if e.g. a craftsman is called on to speak on some point, he will not be an orator, he will merely be acting like an orator (17). Technical subjects do come up in all kinds of oratory, showing that more or less everything can be 'subjected' to rhetoric (18-19). Common parlance supports my view (20); and remember how Gorgias left his topic to the choice of the audience (21a). Compare too the views o f

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Commentary

Hermagoras (21b-22) and Aristotle (23). As for the instrument of rhetoric, it is needed not by the art but by the orator; and I shall come to him later (24). The subject of this chapter wasforeshadowed(with a forward reference) in 2. 15. 15 (see n. on 2 ciuiles quaestionesbelow), where a bipartite division is given ('rhetoric has been seen as concerned either with res omnes or with res duties')] the discussion down to 22 inclusively then often alludes to these types. From the earliest time onwards it was a criterion for the technicity of a particular field of expertise whether it had a subject-matter of its own; Heinimann 106 (with n. 5) names it as one of four criteria on which a skill's claim to being a T4XvV was already judged by the sophists of the fifth century BC. In Q. the issue arose briefly within the wider discussion of whether rhetoric is an art (see 2. 17. 17 with n.); cf. Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 2. 48-59 ('rhetoric has no vXrj, and so is not an art'), which has several points of contact with our passage. The present chapter, however, considers 'academically' the issue of subject-matter independently of that of technicity, the argument for which may be regarded as complete by the end of ch. 17. The candidates for the materia of rhetoric proposed here differ in kind (see the summary above), and a look at the development of the issue will help to explain why this is so (see also Nesselrath 164-70). In the early Platonic dialogues, where aperq is often likened to rexyr) and to productive art in particular, Plato sometimes uses the term epyov. This term is ambiguous and can mean 'product', sc. of the art (the competent rexytrtj? can be judged from the quality of his epya according to Crat. 429 A; this shades into RE'Aos, which however is the general goal; cf. the introduction to ch. 18, p. 353), or the 'occupation' or 'activity', i.e. what the T€XVITH)S normally does in accordance with his art (in which case it can exist alongside the RTAO?; e.g. Rep. 353 A 10—11 €t OV TOVTO €K(10T0V €IT) € pyOV O OLV rj pLOVOV Tl rj KaXXlOTa T(I)V dXXcuv d-nepydt^Tai). Plato thus made an important contribution to the conceptuali-

zation of the question what the subject-matter of an art is. His own answer or rather that ascribed to him by the rhetorical tradition is discussed in 2. 21. 4: in the Gorgias he says that rhetoric is concerned with things designated by words, in the Phaedrus its subject-matter is seen in law-courts and assemblies, as well as private and domestic affairs. When Aristotle comes to assign an area to rhetoric in Rhet. A2, 1355 b 25-34, productive arts are not on his mind and he seems to use epyov in the sense of'occupation':

eoroj s17 RJ prjTopiKrj Svvapis rrept CKUOTOV TOV Oeiaprjoai to ivbexopevov TTIOUVOV. TOVTO yap 0vSep.1t1? ere pas iort re^viysepyov' TLUV yap aXXojv 4K& arrj rrept to avrrj vrroKeipevov ion SiSaOKaXiKrj Kat TreidTiKrj, 01 ov larptKr] TTepl vyieivutv Kai vooepcuv Kai ytaiperpta Trepi rri vufifieSifKora TTdOrj rot? peyeOeai Kai dpiOprjTiKrj -repi

Chapter Twenty-One dpiOpcuv, oftoltus Se ai XOLTTat TUIV TZXVLUV Kai SoOevrog tog el-new SOKCI SwaaOai Oecopeiv TO

379 I-TRTArrjfTAN" RJ

Se

pr/ropiKij

-TTepi TOV

TTIOUVOV.

By contrast, there is no clear evidence that the Stoics had an interest in identifying the vX77 of a given re'xvr). This is not to say that they did not make statements about their conception of a particular art which could be interpreted as statements on subject-matter, but the vXrj or the epyov are on the evidence of the fragments simply not what Stoics talked about in relation to T€\vdi. Nesselrath 166 plausibly explains this with reference to the Stoics' interest in the epistemological and functional aspects of re^ny; Stoic views on metaphysics may have played a role too. Q.'s view was that anything that came up' in a case would form the subjectmatter of rhetoric, and that 'omnia fere' could come up (see 19, and n.on 4 subiectae): thus in practice he differed little from those who (like Gorgias) said that absolutely everything was in the province of rhetoric. In 21-2 Q. virtually equates his position with that of Hermagoras, who made 'political questions' the subject-matter of rhetoric (whether Q. is right to do so is another question, see nn. ibid, as well as on 2. 15. 15 ciuiles and 20 excludi... totam). On the other hand Q. denied that this meant the orator had to be impossibly learned: he must be merely versatile in being able to pick up quickly the technical detail any case demanded. (Acknowledging this did not mean that Q. had to tone down his uir bonus, who otherwise corresponds closely to the Stoic wise man; for the Stoic view was that the wise man was only potentially the master of all T€\vai. To exercise one in particular, he too had to acquire the ewoiai peculiar to it first; see Plut. De comm. not. 1058 F and Stob. Eel. ii, p. 67. 13 W-H = SVTiii, fr. 654.) For previous treatment of the question see esp. Cic. In v. 1. 7 'materiam artis earn dicimus in qua omnis ars... uersatur... Has autem res alii plures alii pauciores existimarunt'. Cicero there accepted the Aristotelian solution, regarding it as a limitation of Gorgias' view (see 5 and 21-2 with nn.); but in the de Orat. (1. 45-7, with L-P i. 127-37) Crassus' position is that of Q. (see §§5-6). Q.'s discussion in the present chapter is largely inspired by these two Ciceronian passages. 21. 1 ponitur: the word stresses Q.'s view that the historical Gorgias is not to be held liable for the assertion: Q. knew that Gorgias held other views (see 21); cf. n.on 2. 15. 5 apud Platonem... suam on Q. distinguishing between Plato's authorial intentions and views expressed by characters in the dialogues. This use of ponere can be seen as an extension of OLD s.v. 19 'to express in art, depict'. Gorgias... faciunt: to understand Q.'s reply adequately we have to first set out the context in Grg. After a phase in which Socrates received no answer to

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the question what Teyyy] Gorgias is skilled in (and instead was given eulogies of that Te'xvT]), the reply in 449 A 5 is prjTopiKr/. Socrates asks further what rhetoric is concerned with (449 d 9 [17 pqropiK-q] nepl rt TOJV OVTOJV €OTIV IMARRIPLR};). And he adds for illustration that weaving is concerned with the manufacture of clothes, and music with the making of times (in both cases there is a reference both to the occupation of the artist and to the final 'product', which is not material in the second case, since music is not a productive art). To this Gorgias replies (449 E 1) that rhetoric is nepi Xoyovs. Socrates retorts that other arts involve speaking too, namely on the subjectmatter peculiar to them (in 451 c 1-2 dpi9pn)TiKr) and A o y i o T i K - q aie given as examples; productive arts drop out because they involve speaking in a recognizably secondary sense). In reply to that Gorgias says that rhetoric is about rd p,€yiora TOJV dvOpojTreiojv TRPAYPLATOJV... Kai apiora (451 D 7—8). We can observe that Gorgias' reply irepi Xoyovs might initially be taken as referring to what Q. calls the opus of rhetoric, because of the way in which Socrates cites weaving and music (see above). And one might wonder why Gorgias does not reply to Socrates' claim that other arts too are irepi Xoyovs by saying that these do not study or teach persuasive discourse from a formal point of view; in this regard Dodds on 449 E 5 rightly points out that the distinction between formal features of discourse and its content had not yet been clearly made. Now Q. considers two possible interpretations of the claim that the materia of rhetoric is oratio, a claim which he identifies with Gorgias' statement that rhetoric is nepi Xoyovs (Socrates asked nepl T'I TOJV OVTOJV it is, which is a broader question):94 (i) the materia of rhetoric is 'sermo quacumque de re compositus', which Q. dismisses as being the opus rather than the materia of rhetoric (as indicated above, this is a possible initial interpretation of 7repi Xoyovs, but then Gorgias was not asked precisely the question Q. is posing); (ii) the materia of rhetoric is 'uerba ipsa', dismissed by Q. because mere words, without reference to reality, could not be the raw material of oratory, which deals with meaningful collocations of words, and is intimately connected with the reality behind the words. (Here one may wonder whether Q. is not discussing the issue in terms of the ambiguity of Aoyos rather than oratio, since the latter is not normally used in Latin in the sense of words as opposed to things referred to in speech.) We highlighted above, citing Dodds, how Gorgias might have disarmed Socrates' objection that all arts involve speaking: by saying that rhetoric studies and generates formal persuasive 94

To take G o r g i a s ' reply t o b e specifically a b o u t the material vXr) o f r h e t o r i c

may

I*

t r a d i t i o n a l ; cf. S e x t u s , Adv. Rhet. 4 8 (where, however, the w o r d i n g is nepi Xoyov a n d n o specific reference t o G o r g i a s o r Grg. is m a d e ) .

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discourse irrespective of content; the point Q. is making now (as it were advancing beyond the discussion in the dialogue) is that, even if we take Aoyo? to mean 'word' exclusively, thus potentially isolating it as the study of formal features of discourse, there is still a sense in which this characterization is inadequate. statuarii: for his materia see 10. nihil., .sine rerum substantia faciunt: i.e. it is things, and facts, that give reality to words that would otherwise have no reference and be mere sequences of soimds. For the phrase cf. 9. 3. 100 '[sententias] sine substantia sectari... est ridiculum'. substantia is used as the equivalent of Gk. ovoia, as already in Seneca (e.g. Dial. 7. 7. 4); for the alternative essentia see n.on 2. 14. 2 Plauti *essentia! Later substantia came to mean almost the same as materia, esp. in legal contexts (cf. Gaius2. 79 where the two words are paired; OLD s.v. no. 3; Heumann-Seckel s.v. no. 1). See further C. Arpe, 'Substantia', Phiblogus, 94 (1940-1), 65-78. quidam argumenta persuasibilia: the reference is presumably to the author of the definition given at 2. 15. 13, and others of his kind; on Q.'s efforts to create a narrative thread in the material he is working with see p. xlix. quae... egent: Q. objects that they too (like oratio in the first sense) are rather opus than materia. They too are the result of art, and themselves need materia to give them significance. 21. 2 ciuiles quaestiones: TTOXITLKOL ^r/r^/xara. See 2. 15. 15 n. and 20, where Q. criticizes those who restrict rhetoric to ciuiles quaestiones, saying that it cuts out plurima officia, including panegyric. Cf. Proleg. p. 240. 20-1 rj p.ev PRJTOPIKT) vXrjv ra ITOXLTLKO., adding r/ Be St AXFKTT KTJ nepi NARROW 8taX€x9rjO€Tai. quorum opinio... errauit: i.e. this view is not so much wrong as unduly restricted. Cf. 3. 8. 67 'breuitas... aut copia non genere materiae sed modo constat.' 21. 3 quidam... materiam eius totam uitam uocant: this view seems to be different from the one expressed by Crassus in Cic. de Orat. 3. 54, cited in §6 below. It seems to entail that life would provide man with situations requiring moral action (see the next sentence) which would create opportunities for public speaking. We are hesitant to believe that quidam were Stoic philosophers. The Stoics of course held that oXov TOVfiiovearl T€\vr) r) apcTTj (SVF iii, fr. 202; cf. fr. 560; see the introduction to ch. 20); cf. again Cic. de Orat. 3. 54, a passage which pointedly draws on Stoic views and terminology. But it seems a pedantically narrow interpretation of the phrase rov fiiov Te'xvr) and of the genitive in it that life should be the subject-matter of rhetoric. The quidam would then be more likely to be Stoicizing rhetoricians.

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alii... npayfjuariKov: here too it is unlikely, despite the many Stoic features, that those who held this view were actually Stoic philosophers. It is not so much that rhetoric qua sister-discipline of dialectic was usually classed with to AoyiKov rather than the moral part (for it is a feature of the Stoic system that items recur at various places, cf. the introduction to ch. 20), but the terminology given for the moral part of philosophy is unexampled (see below). Suspicion is also raised by the reference to the virtues' having a finis (in the context, one would take this to mean that each virtue has its own finis, but the juxtaposition with the plural officiis gives pause); for Stoic virtues, being €irioTrjp,ai, do not possess a finis peculiar to themselves (see Atherton 422). The singular suo fine, especially in juxtaposition with propriis officiis, is puzzling. quia... intelleguntur: this was indeed a Stoic view: though the presence of one virtue implied that of all the others, each had a separate field of action (cf. Plut. De Sto. rep. 1046 E-F = SVF iii, fr. 299 and 243 = 6IF Long-Sedley; so too Cic. Fin. 5. 67 'proprium suum cuiusque [sc. uirtutis] munus est, ut fortitudo in laboribus periculisque cernatur'); see Long, 'Harmonics', 111. Q. names three of the four primary Stoic virtues. eique locum... TrpaypaTiicov: it is this part of the argument that makes the alii difficult to identify, because negotialis seems nowhere else to be used in such a context (in e.g. 3. 6. 57 and Inv. it renders npaypariKos in the ardoisdoctrine; the use in 3. 7. 1—see Adamietz ad loc.—is equally irrelevant). Nor is there evidence for npaypariKos = TTP&KTIKOS in an ethical context (the noun 7Tpd$is does appear passim). But perhaps the fact that the term is without parallel in this use is an accident of transmission; cf. Russell ad loc. (Loeb, vol. i, p. 408 n. 3): 'The Academic Eudorus of Alexandria (Stobaeus 2. 42 Hense) divided ethics into (1) theory of value, (2) study of impulses and emotions, (3) study of action. He does not discuss rhetoric, but his categories of "encouragement, discouragement, and consolation" clearly describe deliberative rhetoric.' 21. 4 subiectae: the passive participle, which appears at 2. 5. 22 and a number of times in this chapter,95 is equivalent to Gk. vnoKeipevos (cf. rd vnoKetpeva 7rpdypara and R) vnoKeipevrj VXTJ, found, though in different senses, at Arist. Rhet. Al, 1355a36 and NE 1094b12). But we need in translating to bring out that the material is not merely 'underlying' but 'subjected' to the speaker. This presents difficulties, partly because English does not use the verb 'to subject' thus, and no verbal force is felt in 'subject-matter'. In 96

95

T h e usage g o e s b a c k t o C i c e r o ; see 6 b e l o w (cf. de Orat

96

C f . Cic. de Orat

2. 116, Part. 38, 8 8 ) .

3. 1 1 8 'cui l o c o o m n i s u i r t u t u m et u i t i o r u m est silua subiecta'.

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the Commentary, we have compromised by using 'subjected' in inverted commas. Where the verb is active (cf. n. on 2. 15. 16 subieeisse), the 'subjecting' is done by the scholar assigning the area. When it is passive, Q. normally uses the word of things that are assigned to rhetoric by circumstances, i.e. that 'come up' as topics for the speaker (note 19 'omnia fere posse credo uenire in officium oratoris, quod si non accidet, non erunt ei subiecta'; also 3. 1. 1 'materiamque ei res omnes de quibus dicere oporteret subiecimus'), normally a public speaker (cf. the implication of 23), though he may be a rhetor (see n.on 20 positam.. .testamur). And at 13 Q. talks in the same way about the material of dialectic. Cf. Ar. Rhet. A2, 1355b33: rhetoric is the faculty of seeing what is plausible irepl TOV boOivros, cited above p. 232. Socrates... rebus: cf. 1 with nn.To what particular passage in the Gorgias does Q. refer? From the Phaedrus passage—see below—it would seem that Q. means a passage where Socrates shows that rhetoric is concerned not with words but with the use of words to do things, and by extension with things themselves. In the Gorgias such a change comes when Socrates forces Goigias to admit that rhetoric is not about words but about something else, using words (cf. 451 D 5—6 ion TOVTO TOJV OVTOJV 7rept o 06TOI ol Aoyoi eioiv of? rj prjTopiK-q xprjrai;). This 'something else' proves to be persuasion in the courts and other assemblies (454 b 5-6 rijs midovs.. .rijs iv rots SiKaoTrjptois KCLL iv rot? aXXois o^Aot?; cf. the Phaedrus passage). Certainly rd ovra in 451 D is a natural counterpart for res. Q. says Socrates seems (uidetur) to be arguing in this way. Two (compatible) explanations for the contrast of uidetur and palam are possible: (i) Q. had some difficulty eliciting the statement he was looking for from the Gorgias. but found a clear statement in the Phaedrus. (ii) He may be implicitly relying on a classification of Platonic dialogues according to the intention of their author (cf. 2. 15. 26-9 and nn.); in this division the Gorgias is classified among those dialogues which are designed to refute other people's views, while the Phaedrus is seen to expound doctrine positively (in a classification of Platonic works in D.L. 3. 49-51 which is similar to the one Q. is relying on, the Phaedrus is classed as v^-qyqriKog as opposed to £rjrrjTiKos). in Phaedro... demonstrat: 261 A 7—B 1: ap' ovv ou to p,iv oXov r) prjropiKr) av €t7] T€\vr] iJjvxayajyia TIS 8id Aoymv, ov pcovov £v BiKaarrjptoig KCLI ooot dXXoi SypLoaioi ovXXoyoi aXXd KCLI iv t'Stot?, -q avrr/ apuKptov re Kal pieydXajv

nipt; The unequivocal demonstrat may be due to Q.'s understanding of the Phaedrus as a whole (see previous note). quo... fuisse: it would make little sense to say that the agreement of the two dialogues make plain (manifestum) that this was Plato's opinion, given

384

Commentary

that the Grg. is supposed to be «r'AeyKriKos (2. 15. 26), i.e. not exhibiting Plato's (or Socrates') views. The reference of quo must be to the Phaedrus exclusively, which Q. took to contain dogmatic statements (cf. 2. 15. 29). rebus... priuatis ac domesticis: cf. e.g. Cic. Q. fr. 1. 1. 17 'in domesticis rebus et priuatis'; Off. 1. 4 'neque publicis neque priuatis neque forensibus neque domesticis in rebus' makes the same sort of contrast as in our passage (cf. also 12. 9. 21 'non magis umquam in causis oratio quam in rebus cotidianis ac domesticis sermo deficiet'). 21. 5 Cicero... subiectas: apparently with reference to Inv. 1. 7, where Cicero, after rejecting the view of Gorgias (cf. below, §21) as over-broad, records his agreement (cf. also 9) with Aristotle, 'qui... tribus in generibus rerum uersari rhetoris officium putauit, demonstratiuo deliberatiuo iudiciali' (for the use of officium here cf. the passages from Plato and Aristotle discussed in the introductory note where the term cpyov features). Q., however, will not contrast Aristotle with Gorgias (see n. on 23 Aristoteles... cadit). It is not clear to us how Q.'s statement here that Cicero, following Aristotle, restricted the material to certas demum res, is to be reconciled with that in §23 that the threefold division of the genera covers all possible material. quodam loco... alio uero... 6 atque adhuc alibi: Q. typically avoids overpedantic referencing; cf. 11. 1. 92 (quodam loco of a passage in Orat). adhuc alibi ('in yet another place') seems strictly unparalleled; OLD s.v. adhuc 8a cites 3. 6. 21 'non magis quam si aliud adhuc . . . nomen inuenerit'. uero marks the move to explicit approval of a universal materia (omni de re, omnia) in the second and third quotations. alio uero... his quidem uerbis: de Orat. 1.21: Crassus will not ask orators to know everything (cf. below on 14), 'quamquam...'; he adds that this may seem 'immensum infinitumque' (Inv. 1. 7 on Gorgias; and below, §7), and that he will restrict his treatment to forensic and deliberative oratory. Similarly in 1. 64-5: Crassus first gives the orator a very wide scope, then produces qualifications ('sin cuipiam nimis infinitum uidetur quod ita posui "quacumque de re"'; cf. below on 14 solet... dicendum est). As Q.'s next citation illustrates, 'in Buch III triumphiert die "maximalistische" Konzeption der Beredsamkeit' (L-P i. 59, a discussion that documents the varying positions on this matter held in de Orat.). uidetur: this is no doubt what Cicero wrote, and perhaps what Q. transcribed; but B and the corrector of A agree on the unrhythmical (and less Quintilianic) uideatur. 2 1 . 6 adhuc: see n. on 5 quodam loco... alio uero... 6 atque adhuc alibi. alibi: de Orat. 3. 54.

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materies: materia B (for the same variants see 8. 6. 8, again in a citation from Cicero; Q. elsewhere uses -ia). Cicero may well have used the older form in -es more consistently than his MSS suggest (Neue-Wagener i. 561-2). 21. 7 hanc... uocamus: Kiderlin's haec (Kiderlin" 369-70) is tempting; it would enable us to retain infinita (A before correction, B) and propria (B) below. More important is the sense of the clause. The translation 'but this "material", as we call it' (Loeb) seems to imply that this is Q.'s unusual terminology (nos is certainly emphatic); yet he has just cited the word from de Orat., and it is also appears e.g. in In v. 1. 7-9. It seems preferable then to understand (with Watson) 'this material of oratory, as we define it'; for uocare thus, cf. above, §§3 and 5. quidam.. .esse dixerunt: Q. appears to refer to a tight-knit group, perhaps no more than two writers (they agreed, after all, on using the unusual word circumcurrens, or a Greek equivalent: see next n.), who at different points in their argument variously called a materia so defined limitless and not proper to rhetoric (for infinitum cf. n. on 5 alio uero... his quidem uerbis; for non propriam cf. 2. 17. 17, with n.). They must have been working after the view was conceived that everything 'subjected' to rhetoric was its materia—which was, despite §5, before Cicero wrote Inv. 1. 7. circumcurrentem: apparently only here metaphorically, rixyi) neptrpexovoa, though quoted by LSJ in connection with this passage (s.v. nepirpex^ I- 3), does not actually seem to occur in a Greek text. TLL gives the Greek equivalent as 7Tcpi(j)dpTjto?, see below. Ammendola glosses 'encidopedica: perche di ogni argomento essa parla.' Perhaps the suggestion is that rhetoric is like an itinerant trader (cf. OLD s.v. circumforaneus 2). Alternatively, the force of circumcurrens might be that such an art cannot choose its subject, and so is vulgar and promiscuous; nepibpopLos in Theog. 581 and 7T€pioiTos in Call. ep. 28. 3 and 38. 2 are used in a similar way, and with a sexual connotation (cf. also 8id8pop,os in Eur. El. 1156, and indeed nepiopr)Tos at Anacreon 8. 2 Gentili). 2 1 . 8 cum... fatentur: Q. regards these writers as basically on his side, for they agree with him that rhetoric speaks on all material (he means all material 'subjected' to it), only differing in their characterization of it. propriam.. .negant: it is possible to construct tortuous explanations of the received text; cf. F. Becher in JAW 51 (1887), 17. But all its problems were solved at a stroke by Kiderlin1 130-2, who added 'quia in eadem uersetur et alius, finitam' after materiam, words very easily overlooked. Q. then first states the reasons for the claim that materia so defined is (a) not 'proper' and (b) limitless. He then discredits those reasons chiastically:

386

Commentary

'sed neque infinita est.. .(10) neque protinus non est materia rhetorices [i.e. proper to it].. architectonice: used before Q. only in Plin. Nat 1. 35, and there only as the transliteration of a Greek title. LSJ quotes the Greek word only from Sosi pater. See J. C. Rolfe, ALL 10 (1898), 236. ardutectura (from Cicero) is far more common. Equally, architecton (from Plautus) is rare compared with architectus (from Cicero). 21.9 caelatura: caelare is primarily used of metal (TLL s.v. 76. 23-77. 58); cf., however, Plin. Nat 34. 193 (of glass) 'argenti modo caelatur' and 37. 28 'hoc uitium crystallorum artifices scalptura occultant', and the broader sense of caelatura 'ornament' in Varro, Men. 420 'appellator a caelatura caelum, Graece ab ornatu koct/aos, Latine a puritia mundus'. nam scalptura: the use of nam is both causal (see next note) and transitional ('moreover'), as scalptura had not been mentioned before; cf. n.on 2. 4. 19 nam. scalptura: sculptura A (after correction). At 12. 9. 16 sculpta there is no variant; there, however, A is not available. The standard opinion is that there is a distinction between scalpo of surface work ( = and sailpo of deeper work, high relief, and statuary ( = y\vi»', so LS s.v. scalpo), which supports scalptura here, given the materials mentioned. C. Hiilsen, 'Epigraphischgrammatische Streifziige', Philologus2 10 (1897), 385-93, criticized the distinction, and dismisses sculptura and its cognate forms in any sense as late, vulgar, or provincial spellings. Ernout-Meillet s.v. scalpo clarify the matter by showing that in the classical period (Ovid is the latest author cited) there was only scalpo (on which point they agree with Hiilsen), and hence no contrast between scalpo and sculpo along the lines indicated above, but that this contrast did emerge in imperial times. The wide range of materials mentioned here is striking, and the argument depends on it (scalptura is cited as evidence that an ars can have a very wide range of materia). The use of gems is standard and arguably covers ivory (see also J. Kollwitz, 'Elfenbein', RLAC 4 (1959), 1106^11, at 1117 on 'Ritztechnik'; contrast Ov. Met. 10. 248, where 'sculpsit ebur' is used of cutting figures); on marble see Plin. Nat. 36. 15, on glass see D. Plantzos, Hellenistic Engraved Gems( Oxford, 1999), 38, who discusses techniques but does not offer a Latin parallel; we have not been able to parallel the use of scalpere of woodcarving, but perhaps here one is not supposed to think of little objects, but of surface work carried out on wood used for intarsia. lignum: ligna A. But the singular is appropriate for wood regarded as material (Juv. 11. 118; OLD s.v. 3). 21.10 protinus: for this usage (confined to Q.?) see Peterson on 10. 1. 3 ('of logical consequence, as frequently continuo in Cicero'); OLD s.v. 5.

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et alius: apparently meaning in particular the philosopher; but see 12, with n. on nam ... mirer? excusoris: found in CL only here and in an inscription recording an 'excusor argentarius' (TLL s.v.); a medieval instance is recorded in ODML s.v. For the verb cf. Verg. A. 6. 847 'excudent alii spirantia mollius aerd. 21.11 unctio et exercitatio.. .ciborum... qualitas: for their regulation in medicine cf. e.g. Cels. 1. 2. 7 'exercitationem recte sequitur... unctio' (with food following in 8); also (in voice training) Q. 11.3. 19. unctio is of course constantly associated with the palaestra (for which see 2. 8. 3 with nn.); cf. e.g. 11. 3. 26 'adsueta gymnasiis et oleo corpora'. ciborum... communis: hence the Platonic notion of cookery being a form of flatter)' of medicine (2. 15. 25 n.). Note that cookery is here called an art (see ibid., n.on quod... rhetoricen). 21. 12 quod... dicunt: for this objection, see Cic. de Orat. 1. 56 (Crassus) 'cum illi in dicendo inciderint loci, quod persaepe euenit, ut de dis immortalibus, de pietate, de concordia..., de omni uirtutis genere sit dicendum, clamabunt credo omnia gymnasia atque omnes philosophorum scholae sua esse haec omnia propria, nihil omnino ad oratorem pertinere'. Q., like Crassus himself (e.g. de Orat. 3. 107; cf. Q. 12. 2. 5), disagreed: all this was, in theory and in practice, part of the orator's field; cf. 1 pr. 11-12 (of certain things found in philosophical books) 'ea iure uereque contenderim esse operis nostri proprieque ad artem oratoriam pertinere', while in oratory itself (cf. Colson's n.) 'frequentissime de iustitia fortitudine temperantia ceterisque similibus disserendum est' (cf. 12.1. 8 'hoc quis non uidet, maximam partem orationis in tractatu aequi bonique consistere?', 12. 2. 15-17, 28; Tac. Dial. 31. 2); note also 1 pr. 16 'Haec.. .quae uelut propria philosophiae adseruntur, passim tractamus omnes [i.e. not just orators]. Quis enim non de iusto, aequo ac bono.. .loquitur?' nam.. .mirer?: this answer builds on the demonstration in §§10-11 that the same material may be used by two different arts: it is not surprising that philosophers and orators deal in the same concepts, for (in Q.'s Stoic terms) both are boni uiri, with knowledge of virtue in theory and practice (for the orator cf. esp. 1 pr. 9, 18). 21.13 cum praesertim primo libro... uersentur: Q. reinforces the notion that philosophy and rhetoric are sisters under the skin by referring back to his earlier claim (originating in de Orat. 3. 56-62) that, after a split in an originally united realm, philosophy had taken over the better half; cf. 1 pr. 13-17, esp. 17 'nunc necesse est ad eos auctores [the philosophers] recurrere, qui desertam, ut dixi [14], partem oratoriae artis, meliorem praesertim, occupauerunt, et

388

Commentary

uelut nostrum reposcere, non ut illorum nos utamur inuentis, sed ut illos alienis usos esse doceamus' (cf. 12. 2. 8). hanc . . . partem... quae rhetorices propria semper fuisset: as in 1 pr. 17 'oratoriae artis', Q. talks as though the united realm had been Rhetorice rather than Sapientia. Cf. also n. on 2. 1. 1 suas partis omiserunt. denique... uideatur: Q. adds a final argument, linked to what has gone before by also concerning philosophy and the idea of shared material. rebus subiectis: i.e. all topics 'subjected' to it. Contrast Proleg. p. 240 cited on 2 ciuiles quaestiones, where dialectic concerns everything, while rhetoric is restricted to political questions. Q. here argues from dialectic to rhetoric rather as in 2. 17. 42 and 2. 20. 7 (where cf. disputatrix and the contrast of perpetua and concisa oratio). Dialectic was an integral part of Stoic philosophy, with many elementary controlling functions, which explains its integration with all other aspects of the system or, as Q. takes it, its applicability to any subject-matter. On this wider role of dialectic and (by extension) rhetoric see D.L. 7.46-7 and Pap. Here. 1020 (SVFii, fr. 131 = fr. 88 Hulser), as well as A. A. Long, 'Dialectic and the Stoic Sage', in J. M. Rist (ed.) The Stoics (Berkeley, 1978), 101-24, at 107-9. materia: materiae (AB) is doubtless the result of the proximity of perpetuae. The Renaissance correction to materia is the most economical, though Halm's materia esse is also possible. 21. 14 solet... opponi: po/i/(B) is in itself tolerable (cf. 3. 11. 16),though it spoils the rhythm; but igitur shows that this is another objection (cf. 2. 17. 23) to Q.'s position, not a fresh assertion. It brings us, all the same, on to new ground, that of the knowledge expected of the orator. possem... hoc inuenio: Q. quotes from de Orat. 1. 20, on which see L-P i. 42-3, who plausibly associate this maximalist position with the 'sophistische-isokrateische Tradition'; contrast the less extreme Stoic view that the sapiens, and only he, is potentially the master of all the arts (in order actually to master any given art, he has like everyone else to acquire the theorems peculiar to it; cf. SVFiii, fr. 654). sed mihi... non inscium: Cicero went on to qualify his position (see n. on 5 alio uero... his quidem uerbis). In his own qualification, however, Q. draws on de Orat. 1. 59-70 (which itself builds on 1.51; see n. below on 15), where Crassus, conceding that 'quacumque de re' may seem over-broad (see again n. on 5 alio uero... his quidem uerbis), says (65): 'si quae ceteris in artibus atque studiis sita sunt orator ignoret, tantumque ea teneat quae sint in disceptationibus atque usu forensi, tamen his de rebus ipsis si sit ei dicendum, cum cognouerit ab eis qui tenent quae sint in quaque re, multo oratorem melius quam ipsos illos quorum eae sint artes esse dicturum'. Crassus proceeds to

Chapter Twenty-One

389

give military matters, law, and philosophy as examples of subjects on which an orator may properly rely on those who brief him. Q. will follow this argument in §§15-17, but he would disagree that philosophy is such a subject; it was not good enough to go to a Sextus Pompeius {de Orat. 1. 67: though note there 'etsi haec quidem nosse debet orator'): an orator ideally needed (as Crassus himself asserted later in the dialogue) a thorough grounding. Similarly in Bk. 12 he will not argue that the orator should have universal knowledge; but philosophy is indispensable. non inscium: not (entirely) ignorant'; as will soon appear, his knowledge might be very newly acquired. The phrase is therefore, in this context, not a litotes, as it so often is: for poetic examples, see C. Weyman, JbKlPh, Suppl. 15 (1887), 506; in prose note Rhet. Her. 3. 20 'ab iis qui non inscii sunt eius artificii ratio curandae uocis petatur': the speaker must rely on those who are not, like himself, ignorant. 21. 15. The mannered repetition of forms of dicere and discere (one thinks of passages like Verg. G. 1. 405-9) enforces the similarity of these kinds of briefing. Indeed they are in effect identical: the orator needs to be instructed in any case he takes on (see 12. 8, which starts 'proxima discendae causae ratio'); if on occasion (interim) a case involves an art unfamiliar to him, he will need briefing in that too. This is precisely Cicero's approach to the topic in de Orat. (see n. on 14 sed mihi...non inscium), where note esp. 1. 51 'quicquid erit.. .quacumque ex arte..., orator id, si tamquam clientis causam didicerit [cf. 62, 66, 69; also Q. below in 16 'sicut a litigatore'], dicet melius et omatius quam ipse ille eius rei inuentor atque artifex'. Cf. generally OLD s.v. disco 2b. Cf. n. on 17. 11 dicere... didicerint. 21. 16. The type of argument offered here goes back (via Cicero's de Orat. 1. 58-63, esp. 65-6) to Plat. Grg. 456 b-c, where Gorgias claims that a rhetorician would be more successful than a doctor in persuading a patient to submit to medical treatment, and then generalizes. non... musicus?: with melius understand dicet quam orator. Q. proceeds to answer this objection on Ciceronian lines (see above on sed mihi...non inscium). For the builder, cf. de Orat. 1. 62-3 (see below on 17 non erit... quasi orator); for the musician cf. Sextus, Adv. Rhet. 51 Kai yap larpiKr) ev X€y€i nepi TiXoacxf>ia and rhetoric * 10-47 'Is rhetoric an art?' *2. 17 [owing to the state of transmission of the work, one cannot informatively single out one fragment or a small number of particular fragments; see the passages discussed in Blank, Technicity] see the index in Proleg. s.v. pijToptKrj/et eTrtOT^pij, rexvij, ipiretpia 10-15 The standard definition of an art; the following paragraphs criticize the definition as applied to rhetoric element by element Cited 2. 17. 41 as Q.'s favoured solution; the criticism of the individual elements can be paralleled from Sextus, where, however, it follows the definition in a natural fashion. In Q. the criticism is distributed over several sections, and mostly precedes the definition itself, proving his point that the definition is 'ab omnibus fere probatus' — 45. 5^16.10; 295. 21-4 10-11 rhetoric is not built from KUTOXI'PFJEIS Cf. 2.17. 18 and 27 (here it is significant that in Q. this argument precedes the definition of the art in §41, whose knowledge it presupposes—a less natural arrangement than in Sextus) i. 22, cf. ii. 90 (with ii. 88-9) — — It is not true that orators, in seeking to deceive others, deceive themselves too: 2. 17. 18-19 Cf. ii. 113 (fr. iv), ii. 90 (fr. xviii) = ii. 121; Barnes, n.59 —

Q. Philod. Proleg. Sextus Q. Philod. Proleg. Sextus Q. Philod. Proleg. Sextus Q.

Philod. Proleg. Sextus Q. Philod. Proleg. Sextus Q. Philod. Proleg.

Parallel Passages Sextus Q. Philod.

399

12 Critolaus and Plato cited as doubters o f the Wxi^-status o f rhetoric 2. 15. 23 (Critolaus), cf. 2. 17. 15 Cf. ii. 98, 102, 104 (merely related contexts); cf. also Sudhaus' index s.v.

Proleg.

KpiroXaos —

Sextus Q. Philod.

13-15 Consideration of the te'Ao? (14 'rhetoric has no stable t o W ) 2. 17. 22-5 ii. 125 (and ii. 105); cf. i. 19 rhetoric has no end peculiar to itself

Sextus Q. Philod.

15 'Attainment of the reXos does not invariably occur' Cf. 2. 15. 12, 2. 17. 22 Cf. i. 2 5 - 6 'no other art claims to reach its goal always'; the term epyov

Proleg.

See index s.v. reXos pijToptKrjg

Proleg.

occurs in i. 26. 22 (p. 55. 22 LA.); cf. n.on 2. 17. 22 aiunt... mentiuntur —

Sextus Q. Philod. Proleg.

16 'Possibility of becoming an orator without training', witness Demades 2. 17. 11-12 Demades and Aeschines cited ii. 97 Demades and Aeschines cited, cf. i. 36-7 (contra i. 45) 66. 13-15 Demades (also 199. 15-17).

Sextus Q. Philod.

17 Humble men can speak effectively 2. 17. 6 Cf. suppl. p. 6. 7-11 (p. 15. 2 - 1 0 LA.): eyw pev yap oipai Stem KUV Xoywi t 7 0 t e TrelOeiv avvxcopijOy rtvas 18 tunas, rlAA* ov\, o t i yefieXretovTCUV rexveiTtuv, ear at 8e8ei\u>S, ovSe Kara t o tStou TOV Xeyetv ovSe TTUKVOV OVT COS ws exeivot. See also Blank, Technicity,; 179-80

Proleg. Sextus

Q.

268. 20-3

Trained speakers can be unconvincing, especially rhetoricians

-

Philod.

Cf. i. 87 (p. 147. 2 1 - 3 4 L A ) , with Barnes, 10

Sextus

Philod.

20-5 Further circumstantial arguments against the technicity o f rhetoric, ascribed to Critolaus and the men of the Academy, including Clitomachus and Charmidas Cf. 2. 15. 23 for Critolaus; Q. generally makes next to no reference to Academics (see Barnes, 4) from the Hellenistic period (but see Agnon in 2. 17. 15) —

Sextus Q. Philod.

20-4 Cities, Sparta in particular, expel rhetoricians but not other artists 2. 16. 4 (Sparta) L 14 fr. v (p. 31 LA.), (cf. i. 16 fr. ix = p. 41 L.A.), cf. ii. 100 fr. iii and i. 359

Proleg.

Q.

Proleg.

Proleg.

—

—

—

400 Sextus

Appendix

Philod. Proleg.

25 By contrast, philosophers were not expelled, except those who rebelled against traditional religion (Epicurus referred to 2. 17. 15, but for a different reason) — — *26-42 Why rhetoric is not useful to anybody *2.16 Why rhetoric is useful for the orator and his community Cf. i. 16-17 (p. 41 L.A.) 'states do expel rhetoric but not arts they perceive as useful' (cf. Q. 2.16.4) See index s.v. p-qropiK77 43 Summary: these arguments used by men of the Academy (see above on Sextus 20-5) — — [43-7 The arguments of the apologists] 43 (Some apologists argue) there are two types of rhetoric, that in use among the wise, and that in use eV peoois dvOpcoTToiSy and it is only against the latter that the arguments against the utility of rhetoric have force. (Dismissed by Sextus in 45: the wise man is exceedingly rare.) The conception of two realms for the arts is Stoic, cf. n.on 2. 20. 1 mediis artibus Cf. 2. 16. 11 (Q.'s concern is the uir bonus alone); cf. 2. 20. 1 ('Is rhetoric a virtue or a media arsV) ii. 211, on which see Obbink-Vander Waerdt —

Sextus Q. Philod. Proleg.

47 Rhetoric argues to contradictory conclusions 2. 17. 30-6 — —

Sextus Q.

*48-59 The subject-matter of rhetoric *2.21, parts of 2. 15 (the question how rhetoric can be defined or what its reXos is inevitably raises the issue) — passim in connection with definitions, e.g. 104. 7-11 48-59 mainly concerned with 'speech', 'words' or 'arguments' as subjectmatter of rhetoric; no opinions of rhetoricians recorded in the whole section 2. 21. 1 words or speech as the materia of rhetoric', Gorgias cited — — *60-87 The goal of rhetoric; see above on Sextus 2-15 *2. 15

Q. Philod. Proleg. Sextus Q. Philod. Proleg. Sextus Q. Philod. Proleg. Sextus

Q.

Philod. Proleg. Sextus Q. Philod. Proleg. Sextus Q.

Parallel Passages Philod. Proleg.

— passim in connection with definitions

Sextus

60 Every art has a goal, rhetoric has none, so it is not an art

Q.

Philod.

401

-

—

Proleg.

—

Sextus Q. Philod.

61-73 Persuasion as the goal; Plato cited again, and Ariston pupil o f Critolaus 2. 15. 3 - 2 3 —

Sextus Q. Philod.

61 Plato, Ariston Cf. 2. 15. 5 Plato, 2. 15. 19 Ariston —

Sextus Q.

Philod.

62 Hermagoras, Athenaeus, Isocrates Cf. 2. 15. 14 Hermagoras; 2. 15. 23 Athenaeus (information apparently unrelated to Sextus, see n. ad loc.); 2. 15. 33 Isocrates (similarity could be construed but is not apparent) —

Sextus Q. Philod.

68 Rhetoric argues to contradictory conclusions 2. 17. 30 —

Proleg.

Proleg.

Proleg.

Proleg.

—

—

—

—

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Index of Latin Words and Phrases See the introductory note on the General Index. adsistere 192 abiectus 193 adstringere 54 abruptus 181 adsumere 44 abstinentia 54 adsurgere 59 abundam 86 aduersus 345 abundare 86, 150 accedere opinioni 266; a. sen tent icte pectore aduerso 241 accipere 79 adulatio 260 accipere pro 190,311 adulescens 53, 139 acer 154 adulter 102 acerbus 57 acquit as 339 acies 170 aestimatio rerum 354 aciem instruere 203 aetas 42 acie derecta 204 alacer 160 actio xxiv, 256, 346 aleator 102 actiua (ars) 357 alere 157 actor 244 aliena (opp. sua) 150 actus 171, 196, 207 alioqui 44, 243, 342 acus 131 alioqui nec 206 acutus 159 alligare 212 adatnare 139 altercationes 108 addere 212 altus 213 adeo 373; id adeo 298 amare 59 adfectus 209, 212, 338 ambiguus 116 adfici 169 ambitiosus 109 animo adftgere 150 ampliftcatio 127 ad spent adgredi 158 an 116; expecting the answer 'no' 157 adhuc 92, 147, 299, 384 an uero 133 adipes 168 anguste 275 adiutor 124 anhelitus 194 adiuuare 155 animus 297 adlocutio 40 annates 98 adminiculum 146 annos ferre 90 administratis (ars) 357 antiqui 47 admomtio 145 antiquitas 47 adpHcitus 111 aperte 146, 374 adpositum 222 apertus 137, 373 adsentiri 328 appellatio 43 adsiduus 56 arcessere 82 adsignare 323 architectonice 386

404

Index of Latin Words and Phrases

architect us 390 argumentum 79, 98 aridus 81,88, 157 arma 51, 343 arsfallendi 258; a. orandi 216, 255; a. oratoria 216; a. rhetorica 216,222; a. unguent aria 261 artium script ores 213 articulus 187 artifex 126 artificialiter 352 Asiani 70 see Asianism aspectus 240 asper 154 aspere 159 asperitas 204 astrologia 354 at 147 atque 163 atqui 352 attoUere 69, 88 auctor 136,207,245 auctoritas 207,240 auditorium 179 auertere 205 augere 157 auribus modo accipere 145 auspicia 116 austeritas 55 austerus 90 aut 317 autem 190,347 sec quidem bene dicere xxxviii, 225, 226, 273,304, 320, 334, 336, 346, 364 bonus xlvii, 130, 153, 181,273 bona mens 198 bona (neut. pi.) + gen. 130 bona oratio 225 see optimus

cacozelia 70, 71 cadere 393 caelatura 87, 386 caelestis 297 calor 264 calumniari 51 candidus 136 cant are 318 capi 131 casa 318 castigare 55 cauillatio 223,314 cauillatrix 261 celebrare 164 certamina 50 sacra certamina 156 certus 156 cert a uitia 191 cibus cibos partiri 147 cicatrix 91 circa 118 circa rem uersari 249 circulatoritts 96 circulus 195 circumcurrens 385 circumferre 213, 235 circumforaneus 385 citra 48 ciuilis 249,381 ciuilitas 270 clatnare 194 clare 180 claritas 291 clarus in re 66 classicutn 180 clausula 61, 264 coalescere 161 coarguere 146, 263 coepisse 119 coetus 160 coexercitatus xl, 303, 351 cogitatio 95, 145

405 Index of Latin Words and Phrases cognitio rerum 354 collidere mams 194 colligere 347, 369 color 131, 195 com ere 131 comici 284 comment arii 181 se commodare 154 commode 151 communis 108, 180,213 communes loci 48, 50 comm uti is habitus 130 communis intellect us 300 comparare 172 compendium compendio d uct i 215 complecti 273 componere 153, 343 compositus 188 compositus ad 156 compositio leuis et quadrata compositio 128 comprehendo 133 comprensio 133, 231 comprensio uerborum 230 conari 64, 191 conatus 83, -I- gen. 168 conciliare 125 cottcisus 205, 373 concitatio 158 concitatus 264 conclamare 62 conclt4sio 369 concordia 161 confer re 161 congerere 181 coniecturales causae 105 con scientia 268 con sen tire 160 consentietis xl, 303, 351 consilium 125,203,213 consist ere intra rem 44 consonare 370 constare 149, 213

const ituere lectorem 124 constrictus 201,205 consuescere ad 170 consuetudo 37, 38, 122 consularis 218 consulatus 218 consumtnari 265 consumptis adfectibus 212 contemplatio sui 356 contemplatiua (ars) 357 content us 67, 177 conticescere 264 contineri 49, 203 c on titiger e 61 con tin uus 206 contio 114 in contione producere 242 contra 101 contradictories 345 contritus 110 contumeliosus 255 conuertere 203 conuincere 249 copia 83, 150 copiosus 190 copulare 110 corpus 181 in corpus ire 167 corpora insecabilia 347 corruptor 245 corruptus 70, 156, 192 genus corruptum 135 umor corruptus 168 cotidianus sermo 88 cotidie 133 creber 126 credere sibi 147 credibilia 251, 267 crimen 64, 103 criticus 45 cubilia 296 cultus 70, 130, 172, 173 cum 'whereas in fact' 149, 158 cum eo quidetn quod 110

406

Index of Latin Words and Phrases

cum interim 4- indie. 186; 4- potential subj. 1% cum ... turn certe 49 ctmeus 204 cura 155 cursum habere 'to run 209 debitus 43 decet 201, 207 declamare xxiii n. declamatio xxiii n. declinare uia 214 declinatio 235 decoquere 87 decorum 201 decreta 213 deducere 102, 225, 243 defensio 313 deficere 91 deflexus 130 deinde vs. inde 153 delectatio 172 delenire 138 deligare 318 demonstratiuum genus 173 denique 360 depellere 46 deprecari 198,314 deprehendi 109, 168 derigere 50, 143, 204, 205 descendere 67 descriptio 82 deserere 157, 180 deseruire 124 desidia 37 destinare 180 destruere 97 deterere 87, 157 sanguinis detractio 167 detrahere 326 detrectare 46 deuertere 72, 180 deuerticulum 72

dialect ice 216, 325, 373 dialect icus 216 dictare 241 dictio 56, 107 diducere 225,243 digerere 143 dignitas 240 digredi 93 diligentia 132 disceptatio 104 discernere 154, 156 discrimen 170,252 discurrere 94 discursus 194 disertus 68, 193, 197 dispositio xxiv, 176,256 disputatio 264 disputatrix 216n., 373 dissensio 230 dissimulator 55, 312 dissolutus 55, 181 distincte 123 ex parte diuersa 108 in diuersa 155 diuidere 143, 206 diuisio 141, 145, 187 dominari 127 sinedubio 240 due ere 186 dulcis 90, 112, 139, 154 durescere 137 durus 219 ediscere 149 educare 296 effatum 219 effectus 354 efferri 221 ejftcere 351 effringere 186 effundere 60 effusus 56, 190 egone? 178

407 Index of Latin Words and Phrases egredi 93 elabi 178 elaborare 68, 209 elaborare in rem 156 elidere 182 elimare 151 elocutoria 221 elocutrix 221 eloqui 68 emblemata 107 emendatio 145 eminere 192 emittere sanguinem 168 emugire 194 enim 92, 179 enitescere 139 ens 221 enuntiare 129 enuntiatrix 256 epidicticos 173 equidetn 217 eripere 282 errare 340 esse erat idiomatically for esset 81 et esse et uideri 196 essentia 219-221 etenim 136 ethopoeia 40 etiam 177, 193,240 etiam naturaliter 187 eualescere 155 euentus 247 euertere 343 ex pari 359 exceptio 275 excerpta 260 excidere 87 excipere 40 exclamare 179 excludere 296, 320 excogitare 323 excusate 52

excusor 387 exercitatio 387 exercitatrix 261 expatiari 166,306 expedit 201, 207 experiment a 133,213 expert ns 147 exponere 125 expositi4$ 136 expressio 85n. exprimere 84, 85a, 150 exquisitus 130 exsculpo 87 exultare 59 exultatio 62 fiber 390 fabrica 308 fabricari 308 fabricator mundi 293 fabtda 79,98 facere silentium 124 fades 107 facilitas 266 facultas 61, 252, 266, 341 facultas dicendi 232, 367 fallere 187, 340 fas 203 fastidiumrnouere-1- dat. 109 febris 318 fecunditas 88 femur 195 ferox 54 annos ferre 90 leges ferre 201 festinare 89 festinatio 51 fetus 296 ftcta controuersia 48 ftducia 241 figura 205, 209 fmgere 165 fin ire 47, 229

408

Index of Latin Words and Phrases

ftnis xxxviii, 198, 227n., 239, 257, 292, 353 finitio 235, 271 firtnus 335 flexus 208 floridus 135 flosculus 138 forma 150, 153 form are 100,209 fortis 190 fortiter 185 fortitudo 376 fraus 283 frigidus 109, 197 frigus 192 frons 96 frontem derigere 204 fructus labor is 151 frustratio 368 fulgere 300 fundere 51,87 funis per futies ingredient ium 214 furere 194 fusus 87 latiusfusus 206 garrulitas 95 generaliter 50 generosus 83 geometrae 223 gestus 194 gigtiere 161 glossemata 124 gradatio 115 grammatice 216 grammaticus xxiii, xxv, xxvi, xxviii, xxx, xxxii, 35, 44, 45, 46, 55, 59, 63, 65, 69, 77, 78, 121, 123, 124, 132, 139, 152,321 grandis 167, 179 gratia 240 grauis 154 grauitas 54

gremium 94,124 gubernator 336 gymnasium 154 habere -I- prcd. 63 habitus 130, 208 haec utilitas for utilitas huius rei 134 et hercule 123 hinc iam 78 hist or ia 79 historiae 45 hoc quidquid est 206 honest um 117,374 horridus 138 hostis 60 humanitas 59 hutnilis 88 hypocrites 321 iactatio 96, 194 iaculari 181 iam hinc 64, 176 iam turn 100 ianitor 177 ianua 177 idem 'also' 294, 371 idoneus 119 nonidoneodie 115 ieiunus 81, 138, 157, 197 ille ... ille 157 illud Sallustianum 212 imago 163, 372 imperatorius 343 imperitus 339 impetus 179, 186, 196, 375 implere 144 seitnplere 167 inan is 168 inartiftcialiter 352 inbeciUus 158 inbuere 65 incidere 124 incidere 215 inclinaread uoluptatem 172

409 Index of Latin Words and Phrases incompositus 188 inconsideratus 264 incumbere 159 incutere 194 indicare 81 indoloria 219, 220 indulgere 140, 342 ineptus 196 itiexpiabilis 283 infantia 37 infelix 109 infirmitas 63,84, 88 infirm us 197 inflari 62, 71 ingeniosus 193 ingenitus 295 ingemum 139, 153 ingredi 295 initia 372 iniuria 54 inlitteratus 389 inluminare 91 inmodicus 56 inopia 83 inornatus 81 inquirere 198 inrumpere 127 inscitia 178 inscius 389 insecabilis 347 insert us 111 insidere 66 inspectio 352,354 inspirare 126 instituere 59, 118 instrumentum 393 intellect us 222, 296 communis intellect us 300 intemperantia 337 intendere 192 intercidere 215 interdicta 166 interim 38,67, 92, 121, 160 interpretatio 219

interuaUa siderum 347 inuehi 282 inuenire 132, 171 inuentio xxiii, 256 inuicem 60 inurere 131 inutilis 278n. ioci 171 ipse ille 209 irasci admonitioni 145 ire in rem (colloquial?) 157 it a 60, 106, 135 ita = itaque 318 it a enim 60 iucundus 91, 134, (vs. utilis) 151 iudicium 61, 73, 93, 141, 200, 203, 256 iudicio 62 ius publicum 114 ius sacrum 114 iustitia 372 iuuenis 53 labi 145 labor are 316 lacus 90 laetus 83, 92, 160 laminam ducere 87 lasciuia 83, 138 lasciuio 83 lasciui4s 83 Latinitas 217 Latinum 217 latro 287, 377 latus latere altero 210 laudare 99 lector 124 legalis 261 leno 103 leuata manu 194 leuatus 131 leuis 128 lex 202 liber alis 158

410

Index of Latin Words and Phrases

liberocaelo 147 I ice titer 92 licentia 92, 99, 164 poetica licentia 82 lima 193 limare 87 lima t us 154 limen 176 linea 144 lingua Rom ana 217 lis 179 litigator 390 litter ae 194 litteratum 43,216,222 liuor 391 locus 111, 144, 359 see communis loqui 300, 318, 319 vs. eloqui 68 ludibrium 170 lumina 193 lux 125 luxuria 103 macies 84,88 magnus 181, 188 magus 165 maior (auctor) 136 maledicta 127 maledicus 189 malignus 56 maius xli mala mo rum 132 mango 261 mangonicare 261 mangonium 261 mattus manum dare 68 materia 86, 91, 143, 249, 378 medicus 52, 336, 337, 390 mediocritas 65 meditari 180 meditatio 164 rnedius 102

mediae artes 364 media officio 365 medulla 51,236 memoria xxiv, 149, 256 mensio 257 men sura 391 mentiri 332 mimus 79 minores 135 mire 104 mirefacere 195 miror de re 326 miseratio 242 modestus 196 modo, 'superfluous' 177 molaris lapis 360 mollire 296 mollis 187 molli manu 91 molliter 84 momentum 203 monumenta 242 mores 63, 268 mot us 208 munus 234 murmur 180 musica 216 musicus 223, 389, 390 must a in lacu 90 m ut us 294, 297 mutuus 62 nam 182 namet 188 nam introducing praeteritio 326 nam used eliptically 99 nam used for transitions 107, 118 nam ... quidem 107 narratio 47, 78, 202 narratiuncula 47 natura 97, 122, 129 vs. /empus 117 see Nature natus in 155

459 Index of Latin Words and Phrases nauaUa proelia 343 tiauis piratica 222 tie ... quidem used in transitions 65 nec 206 nec dubie introducing concession 222 necessario 339 necesse without copulative 108 tie fas 214 dies nefastus 115 negot talis 382 netnpe etiitn 208 neque ... nequerursus 80 tieruosus 189 nexus 158 nihil used adverbially 326 nimius 137 nitidus 131, 154, 174 «/7or(a) 174 noettia 177 tiotnitiare 217 non tnagis taking up non 159 non orator 251 non with a jussive subjunctive 46 notare 64 notus 180 nouerca 166 nouissitne 163 nouitas 209 nudus 81 null us nullus est 'does not exist' 169 nulla in parte 298 nullo tnagis ... quam 92 nutnerosus 188 numerus 391 in numero habere 67 tritium nundinum/tiundinae 115 obicere 284 obiurgare 57 obscurus 116 obseruatio 196 ex obuio 295 occupare 39

occurrere 204 se offerre 150 officium 110,239 officia ciuilia 107 offundere 331 omittere 39 opifex 236, 394 opinari 211 opinio 191,329 optimus 135, 150 optimi iuuenes 198 optineri 118, 134 opuscula 47 orare 233, 370 arsorandi 216,255 oratio 95, 129, 134, 210, 274, 370, 374 (vs. sermo) 68, 151 orator 175, 307 oratoria 217 oratrix 217 ordo 350 ordine permutato 206 quaestiotium ordo 206 omatus 257 ostentatio 172 scaenica ostentatio 169 otiosus 125 paedagogus 59, 63, 74 paene 133, 393 palaestra 154 palaestricus 154, 156 palam est 49 panegyricus 173 par ex pari 359 parasitus 103 paratus 111 paretichiresis 141 parens rerum 293 paretites 96 paries 215 partnularius 178

412

Index of Latin Words and Phrases

pars 39 nulla in parte 298 particula 160 partitio 187, 202 parua argumenta 50 paruolus 242 passim 196 paulum aliquid 172 paupertas 43 pecunia 240 penicillum 394 perceptiones xl, 349, 351 percipere 224 perdite 191 perferre 145 periculum 179, 190 see General Index, style perm ulcere 127 perm ut are 331 ordine permutato 206 perorare 101 perpetualis 212 perpetuus 373 perplexus 171 perpolire 194 perquam 341 perseuerare 54 persona 101, 263 perspicuitas 69, 291 persuasibilis 248 persuasibiliter 249, 257 persuasio 253 de se persuasio 62 pes 194 pestilentia 166 petulans 102 philosophus 223 phonascus 159 pictor 332 pictura 355 piratica 222 plane plane uelim/uolo 149 plebis set turn 206

plurimum 49, 149 poeticus 79 ponere 102, 379 pontifex 218 popularis 288 porro 67, 98, 375 positio 174 possessio 46 post paulo ... interim 121 potest uideri 106 praeceptor 316 praecipere 203 praecepta 133 praedulcis 138 praeformare 146 praeire 123 praelectio 123 praemium 152 praemollire 161 praeparare 169 ante praeparata 108 praescriptum 203 praesens 213 praesertim 43 praestare 335 praesumere 86, 341 praeterfluere 132 in praeteritum 117 praeuius 146 presse 159 pressus 154 prima atque praecipua 231 priores 141 priuilegium 117 probatio 176, 179,375 proconsul 218 procul abesse 73 prodigiosus 130 in contione producere 242 professio 40 professor 177 proftcere 90 prohibere 204 prohoemium 205

413 Index of Latin Words and Phrases protnouere 204 pronwitiatio 257 pronus 61, 158 propior 139 propositio 202 proposition 140, 335, 348 proposito 356 propriutn 108 prors us exist imo 14 8 prosequi 143 prosopopoeia 40 prosternere 186 protinus 94, 124, 273 prouetiire 191 prudentia xli, 200 pueri xxv, 37, 44, 47, 53, 62,63, 65, 73,83, 92, 121, 135, 139, 141, 149,186 pueritia 53 pugtui 170 pulcherrima res 251 pullatus 195 quadratus 128 quaerere 150 quaestio 192,230,381 qualitas 118 quamquam used like a particle 243 in quantum maxime potest 165 quasi 157 quasi as inverted commas 366 quatenus 92 queens 221 queen tia 221 quid ergo? 68 quid si 69 quidam apologetically 208 quidem ... autem 67 quidem ... sed 230 quidem (not adversative) ... sed 164 quin immo 134 quis (after relative) 69 quo nomine 40 quo quidem modo 285

quod est pessimum qualifying what follows 138 quodque ... quodque 125 quoque 177 ratio 38, 146, 176, 268, 295, 339, 376 ratio recte loquendi 44 recedere 210, 332 recipere 92 recitare 173 recordatio 240 rectiis 129, 210 rectus limes 213 oratio recta 95, 129,210 recta uia 144, 213 reddere im aginem 164 reformidare 91 regerere 181 legum repertores 290 reponere 109, 151,297 repugnare 116, 146 reri 290 res (ac uerba conectere) 94 res publico 105 restruere 97 retractare 92 retro agere expositionem 93 reuocare 124, 144 rhetor see General Index rhetorica 216 rhetorice 46, 78, 216, 217 rite 115 rixa 186 rixari 186 robust us 64, 80, 122 (iure) rogare 115 rogatio 206 Romanus (of language) 217 rudis 193 ruere 186,366 rumpere 186 rursusre- 92 rus 156 rusticus 182,372,389

414

Index of Latin Words and Phrases

saltare 318 sanctitas 54 sane 67 sane -I- subjunctive 94, 158, 367 satis putare 89; s. signiftcare 116 scalptura 87, 386 scelestus 282 schema 177 schola 43 scholasticus 171 scientia xxxviii, 232, 253 ar titan script ores 213 sculptura 386 secreta studia 356 securitas 56 sella curulis 218 semina 111 senex 102 sensus 180 sens us hominis 308 sententia 111,241 sententiam dictare 241 separare 144 sequi 218 sequi ut 185 sermo 129, 263 sermo communis 391 sermo Romanus 217 sermo (vs. oratio) 68, 95, 151 sero 315 seueritas 85 seuerus 85,91 si iam 167 si tamen 234 sic 'on this condition' 208 sic quoque 174 sic ... tamquam 51 siccus 85 sidera 287 simplex 56 simpliciter 117 simulacrum 170, 264 simulata fuga 205 sine dubio 240

sine dubio ...sed 172 sinuosus 81 sociare 161 solid us 139 soluere 186,344 soni acuti, graues, medii 159 sordidus 193 sparsus 188 species 187,209,210 speciosus 104, 373 spes 158 spiritus 83 sponsioties 166 sponte 150 squalor 139 statim 47, 90 statua 51 status 208 sterilia 86 sterilitas 86 stilus 61,93, 145 bonus stomachus 67 studia 63 studia dicendi 366 stultus xli sua (amare) 92 Suadae medulla 235 Suadela 236 suasoria 40 suasorius as an adjective 41, 163 suauis 90 subicere 249 res subiectae 382, 388 subsidere 43 substantia 271,381 subtilitas 323 subtiliter 159 succedere 55 succinct us 61 sumere 174 summa 224, 292, 337 suo quoque loco 174 supellex 109 superfluere 132

415 Index of Latin Words and Phrases superiores 251 superstitio 201 Slippeditare 58 supplicatio 288 suscipere 190 suspicio 64 tacit us used prcdicativcly 146 tam 352 tam ... quam 74 tam ... qui 110 tantum 249 technici 213 tectum intueri 180 temerarius 190 temeritas 190 temptare 217 tempus 117 tempus erit + dat. gerundive 96 tendere ad 276 tenebrae 193, 331 tetiere (intrans.) 37 teneri 215 tenuis 87 tepid us 197 terram spectare 88 testatum est (passive) 242 testimonium 59 testis 50, 108 texere 296 theatralis 60 thema 166 thesis 47, 103, 104 tinnulus 70 tiro 171 titulus 307 tolerantia 111 tonare 300 tractare de 252 trahere 186 trino ... nundino 115 tristis 55 turn ... cum 'only when' 151 turn maxime 91

tumidus 69, 156, 167 tumor 62, 70, 167, 168 tumultuari 196 turpis 374 tutus 213 eo ualidius quod 124 uariare 195 uel 141 uebcitas 375 uenenum 286 uerba res (ac uerba conectere) 94 uere 96 uereri 59 ueritas 163, 165 uero 68 uerus 267 uera controuersia 48 uestibulum 176 uestire 157 ueteres 47 uetustas 193 uetustate proftcere 90 uia 350 uia militaris 215 rectam uiam demonstrare 144 uictoria 112 uideri 52, 180 uincere 86 uiolentia 196 uires 179 uires orandi 282 uiridis 167 uirilis 128, 139 uirtus 128,365 uis xxxix, 46,138,179, 183,196, 223,232 uitium 89, 174 uituperare 99 uiuax 145 uix 96 unctio 387 unguentarius 261 uniuersalis 212

416

furiosa uociferatio 169 uocitare 212 uolutnen 35 uoluptas 138, 172, 198 urbanus 154 usque 41, 42,47 usus 232, 233 usus dicendi 258 ut dicit ur 58 ut ... ita 93, 163 ut opinor 177 ut sic dixeritn 208

Index of Latin Words and Phrases ut uere dixeritn 166 ut uidetur 174 utare 51 utcumque 67, 129 utilis 112, 117, 151 utilitas xli, 134, 198, 339, 345 utique 38, 124, 201,218 utique vs. interim 112 uulgaris 177 uulgatissimus 108 uulsus 131

Index of Greek Words and Phrases dy(iXfL(iT07r0iijTtKrj 355 ayxuXoTTovs 8{pos 218 dytuviOTiKOS 263 TA d8idopa 291 TO aStKOV

117

TO aiaxpov 374 aKpoaois 57, 104 dvaoKevfj 57, 98 vofituv dvaOKtvi] 113

dvarpeTTTiKOs 263 dvSpeia 374 dvOvTraros 218

dvruKoXouOia xli, 363, 37In., 374 dvtufeXrjs 278n.

a£ta 117

d£ttvfia 219 UTrayyeXTiKOS 256 aTT68CI£IS 369 dTTOpTJTtKOS 263 a7ToaTpoq 205 dTTOTeXea/xa 353 dperr/ Xegeias 275, 375; a. Aoyou 275 dpiOfiijTtKij 380 dpioros dvrjp xliv TO do