Protest and Social Movements in the Developing World

Protest and Social Movements in the Developing World Edited by Shinichi Shigetomi Institute of Developing Economies (I...

Author: Shinichi Shigetomi | Kumiko Makino

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Protest and Social Movements in the Developing World Edited by

Shinichi Shigetomi Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), Japan

Kumiko Makino Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), Japan

INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (IDE), JETRO

Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

© Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), JETRO 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2009901296

ISBN 978 1 84844 362 4 Printed and bound by MPG Books Group, UK

Contents List of figures List of tables List of contributors Preface 1

Rethinking theories on social movements and development Shinichi Shigetomi

PART I

2

3

5

6

1

RESOURCE AND INSTITUTIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR MOBILIZATION

Community-based local development and the peace initiative of the PDPMM in Colombia: resource mobilization under extreme conditions Noriko Hataya Institutional readiness and resource dependence of social movements: the case of provincial development forums in Thailand Shinichi Shigetomi

PART II

4

vii viii ix xi

19

51

STRUCTURE BEHIND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES

Strategies for fragmentary opportunities and limited resources: the environmental protest movement under communist China in transition Kenji Otsuka Institutional conditions for social movements to engage in formal politics: the case of AIDS activism in post-apartheid South Africa Kumiko Makino Rethinking political opportunity structure in the Argentine unemployed and poor people’s movement Koichi Usami v

79

110

134

vi

Contents

PART III

7

HISTORY AND REALITY FOR FRAME- AND IDENTITY-MAKING

Dynamics of ideal values and social movement in a corporatist state: Mexican indigenous peoples’ movements and a village’s challenge Akio Yonemura

8

Competition and framing in the women’s movement in India Mayumi Murayama

9

Opposition movements and the youth in Nigeria’s oil-producing area: an inquiry into framing Katsuya Mochizuki

PART IV 10

183

206

CONCLUSION

Resources, organizations and institutions: intermediaries for social movements in the development context Kumiko Makino and Shinichi Shigetomi

Index

159

227

235

Figures 1.1 Analytical framework and organization of this volume 2.1 Armed guerilla groups and wars in Colombia 2.2 Middle Magdalena as the focus region of the PDPMM 2.3 Flow of Peace Laboratory resources for the implementation of projects by social organizations at different levels 3.1 Local administrative hierarchy in Thailand (rural areas) 3.2 Frequency of appearance of the word ‘chumchon’ (community) in each of the National Economic and Social Development Plans 3.3 Frequency of appearance of the word ‘kan mi suan ruam’ (participation) in each of the National Economic and Social Development Plans 4.1 Complaints regarding environmental pollution problems 4.2 Fund-raising of environmental NGOs in China (2005) 4.3 Networking in environmental movements in China 6.1 Unemployment and informal employment rate, 1990–2003 6.2 Poor and indigent population ratios, 1989–2003 6.3 Number of articles on piqueteros in the Clarín newspaper 6.4 Number of roads blocked

vii

10 23 33 38 56

59

61 88 90 104 138 139 140 144

Tables 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 6.1 6.2

Budget for the Peace Laboratory in Middle Magdalena Budget of Phase II according to destination categories Project finance funds by type of project (Phase II) Number of main leaders of provincial development forums by personal background Number of forums from which leaders participated in public events in the 1990s Agencies contacting the Surin Forum around 2001 and their projects Expenses of the Surin Forum for 2000–2001 and 2003 Members of the National Piquetero Bloc Soft piqueteros which support the Kirchner government

viii

39 39 41 54 66 68 71 148 151

Contributors Noriko Hataya is a Professor at the Faculty of Foreign Studies, Sophia University in Tokyo. Her research interests are in the fields of urbanization, rural–urban migration, and community organization and participation in Latin American countries, with special focus on Colombian civic resistance. Kumiko Makino is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), JETRO. Her research interests are in the fields of politics of social policy, HIV/AIDS and civil society in South Africa. Katsuya Mochizuki is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), JETRO. He majored in international studies at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and has been engaged in many research projects on Africa since he joined the IDE. He has published articles on the issues of preventive diplomacy, human security, and peace building in recent years. Mayumi Murayama is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), JETRO in Japan. Her major research interest covers gender and employment-related issues in South Asia and Japan. She is the editor of Gender and Development: The Japanese Experiences in Comparative Perspective (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Kenji Otsuka is an Associate Senior Research Fellow in the Environment and Natural Resource Studies Group at the Interdisciplinary Studies Center, Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), JETRO. His research interests are in the fields of environmental issues and social change in China. Shinichi Shigetomi is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), JETRO. His research interests are in the fields of rural development, agricultural economics and civil society in Asia, with special focus on Thailand. He is the editor of The State and NGOs: Perspectives from Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2002). Koichi Usami is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), JETRO. He is studying social policies and the welfare state in Latin America, especially Argentina, and is interested in comparative studies of social policies among newly industrializing countries. ix

x

Contributors

Akio Yonemura is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), JETRO. His research interest is in the field of education development in Mexico.

Preface The contributors to this volume, who are all area study specialists and deeply interested in development issues, occasionally in their field of study find local people who are motivated to change their environments which are plagued with desperate problems such as poverty, environmental destruction or threats to human rights. How does this happen? Why is it possible? These are the questions with which we launched this study project. One frequently heard answer is that the situation itself impels the people to stand up for themselves. However, the structure which causes grievances among the people may at the same time function as a restriction which fetters the people to remain as they are. The mainstream social movement theories, in contrast, tell us that the actor, especially the movement organizer, is important. These theories persuasively explain how capable leaders and excellent strategies cause social movements to emerge. However, the constraints on economic resources and political freedom in developing countries may not allow the wishes of actors to be expressed in the manner commonly assumed in the theories originating in developed Western societies. We feel that the phenomena of social movements in the developing world cannot be simply explained either by the structure or by applying an actor-centered approach while neglecting the structure. Therefore, we started to examine carefully the contextual conditions – such as institutions, resources and organizations – surrounding the social movement actors, to find what conditions determine the course of action. Such work, we hoped, may help to define the space of actors for collective action. Under the project named Social Movements and Popular Participation in Developing Countries we shared cases from various developing countries and exchanged ideas over the course of two years starting in April 2006. This volume is the final report of our academic dialogue. We are grateful to have enjoyed the presentations of distinguished guest speakers, Dr Takeshi Wada (University of Missouri, Columbia, USA), Dr Zhang Yulin (Nanjing University, China) and Dr Hideo Nakazawa (Chiba University, Japan), at our study meetings. During the field survey, we learned extensively from the local people and the social movement leaders who generously helped us to obtain first-hand information. Dr James Midgley provided Shinichi Shigetomi, one of the editors, with a chance xi

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Preface

to study social movement literature during his stay at the University of California at Berkeley as a Zellerbach Visiting Professor. We would like to express our deep gratitude to these individuals and institutions. Last but not least, we want to express our appreciation to the Institute of Developing Economies and its administrative staff for supporting this research project. Shinichi Shigetomi and Kumiko Makino

1.

Rethinking theories on social movements and development Shinichi Shigetomi

In developing countries, ordinary people are often faced with threats to their personal security, and such threats include poverty, violence, the suppression of rights and freedom, and deprivation of resources. Though people may desire to voice their grievances, a formal system for doing so is usually lacking. Elections do not necessarily reflect the specific grievances of the people and very often are not implemented fairly and competitively. Bureaucrats, for their part, tend to neglect, subordinate and even exploit people rather than attempt to understand their grievances. Even in cases where some non-governmental institutions such as labor unions are included in the formal system of negotiation with the government, they may assist only a proportion of the people or respond to only some of their demands. Given such circumstances, non-formal methods become an indispensable alternative as a means for people to express their opinions and demand changes in their own fates. Such ‘conscious, concerned, and sustained efforts by ordinary people to change some aspect of their society by using extra-institutional means’ (Goodwin and Jasper 2003, p. 3) is what we refer to here as social movements. Indeed, numerous social movements can be observed in the developing world in particular. Searching through articles in the New York Times during the past 20 years, I found that about 30 percent of articles containing both the words ‘protest’ and ‘rally’ refer to areas in the developing world.1 Moreover, not all categories of social movements in developing countries are necessarily publicized by the mass media. Sometimes the problems are specific to some people at the grass-roots level but are caused by mechanisms in the public sphere, and collective actions for tackling these problems, which are often supported by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), can also be categorized as social movements. The common concerns of the contributors to this volume are through which mechanisms and in which forms social movements emerge in the developing areas, and how we can approach these issues. 1

2

Protest and social movements in the developing world

Because both North American and European societies experienced widespread social movements starting in the 1960s, analytical frameworks of social movements have become well formulated in those societies (McAdam et al. 1997, p. 143). The mainstream theories are resource mobilization (RM), political opportunity structure (POS), new social movement (NSM) and framing process (FP) theory. Those theories have persuasively identified the processes through which social movement actors successfully organize collective actions. However, by placing an emphasis on the subjectivist perspective and the attitude of social movement actors toward their environment, these theories leave the objective and environmental dimensions unexamined. Since our object of study is developing countries, where political and economic conditions differ from those taken for granted in Western theories, we assume that there is a need to bring the environmental factors back into the analysis. In the following pages of this introductory chapter, I review previous studies and present the perspective shared by the case studies in the following chapters.

WESTERN THEORIES RE-EXAMINED The concerns of social movement researchers range across a wide variety of topics, such as the emergence, cycle, form, strategy and impact of social movements. The topic which has attracted most scholarly effort, however, is how social movements occur (Goodwin and Jasper 2003, p. 11). This chapter also presents a theoretical review of this issue. Classical Theories: Structural Grievance Models Until the 1960s, the major perspectives on social movements were based on Marxism and Durkheimian sociology (Tilly 1978; Skocpol 1979; della Porta and Diani 1999; Crossley 2002). In brief, Marxist scholars understand social movements as a reflection of class relations determined by the ownership structure of the means of production. The proletariat, facing exploitation and impoverishment at the hands of the capitalist class, stand up collectively to change their fate. Meanwhile, the Durkheimian sociological approach includes some subcategories such as collective behavior theory and relative deprivation theory. According to these theories, people feel grievances and anomy and challenge the existing system when rapid changes in society make them feel insecure about their pre-existing expectations of society. These two main schools of thought assume that motivations such as grievances and anxiety automatically lead to collective action (McAdam 1999, pp. 11–12). At the same time, they attribute grievances

Rethinking theories on social movements and development

3

directly to structural problems and conflicts in society. Therefore, these classical theories are labelled as structural grievance models. These models, which explain the emergence of social movements through motivation, have been seriously questioned in the work of Mancur Olson (1965). Olson demonstrates logically that rational individuals trying to maximize their own benefits will not participate in collective action. In other words, rational individuals do not join social movements even though they have a motivation to satisfy their desire (Kitschelt 1991). Hence, the need arises for an explanation which logically interrelates the motivation and the movements. Modern Theories: Components of an Actor-Centered Model The first theoretical attempt to solve the question raised by Olson was presented as resource mobilization (RM) theory. RM theory asserts that the rise and fall of social movements is determined by the capability of social movement organizations (SMOs) to mobilize resources successfully for those movements (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Proponents of this theory argue that grievances always exist, but transform into social movements only when SMOs successfully manufacture them into movement issues (McCarthy and Zald 1973, p. 23). By stressing the capability of SMOs to mobilize and manipulate the environment, this theory placed more importance on the role of actors than the classical theories. Subsequently, some RM theorists shifted their focus to environmental factors and formulated what is known as political opportunity structure (POS) theory (Zald 1991). POS theory differs from the classical theories in that it regards the environment as the facts observed by actors rather than as direct facts that determine the behavior of actors (Goodwin and Jasper 1999, p. 33). Sydney Tarrow, the leading theorist of POS, characterizes this theory as proposing a ‘political environment that provides incentives for collective action by affecting people’s expectations for success or failure’ (Tarrow 1998, pp. 76–7). Another theorist, Charles Tilly (1978, p. 133), understands political opportunity as being the way in which ‘information about the environment comes to the actor’s attention’. With their subjectivist perspective, these theorists assume the relation between opportunity and collective action to be curvilinear (Tarrow 1996, p. 54; Tilly 1978, p. 136), which means that a one-unit increase in opportunity may have either a positive or a negative effect on the social movement, depending on how the actor sees the political situation at the time of action. According to Nomiya (1998), POS theorists share, to a greater or lesser degree, the tendency to discuss opportunities via the framing concept. Indeed, Gamson and Meyer (1996, p. 276) assert that the existence of opportunity depends

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on the manner of interpretation – that is, framing – of the environmental conditions by actors. In Europe, scholars have formulated new social movement (NSM) theory. According to this theory, in post-industrial society, conflict arises not between classes but over how to control the production of symbols and redefine social roles (Canel 1997; Johnston et al. 1994). Social movements are carried out by people who share a collective identity and expectations toward society (Melucci 1989). This emphasis on the cognitive aspect is not identical to the orientation of classical theories of the socio-psychological approach. NSM theory assumes actors who are independent as individuals, rather than people whose consciousness is guided by structural elements such as formal political positions and socio-economic divisions in society (Offe 1985, p. 831; Melucci 1994, p. 108). NSM theory also assumes that people feel grievances and desires, which may lead them to a collective action, only through the process of self-identification. Framing process (FP) theory, the most recently developed perspective among the mainstream theories, places greater emphasis on the cognitive process. The proponents of this theory argue that social movement actors can put people’s perceptions about reality into a cognitive frame and, as a result, alter people’s behavior in social movements (Snow et al. 1986). Although Snow and his co-authors mention the importance of resonance with reality and of contextual constraints (Benford and Snow 2000), they see these environmental factors as material for rational movement actors to create frames, rather than as conditions affecting the perspective of the frame-makers. This analytical position is necessary because, if this theory stresses the constraints of the present situation on the actors’ perspectives, it cannot explain how the frame functions to change that situation as well. As pointed out by Gamson (1992, p. 69), this theory sustains consistency when it is based on the social constructionist epistemology, which implies that actors are free from the real objective world and may choose a frame or a reality that is in accord with their own perceptions (Crossley 2002, p. 141). Actor-Centered Perspectives of the Modern Theories Proponents of the modern theories have criticized the classical theories, charging that classical theories assume that collective action emerges automatically out of grievances and structural problems in society. Modern theorists have identified other factors which actualize social movements, as follows. RM and POS theory regard resources, organizations and political opportunities as the factors which allow the actors with grievances to organize social movements. NSM theory examines collective identity, which interprets the structural problems into grievances and desires. FP


5

theory may function as part of both the cognitive processes of creating motivation and of observing the methods and opportunities for movements. In this way, the modern theories have made remarkable contributions by elaborating and enriching the analytical frameworks proposed for social movements. While doing so, they have continued to maintain an actor-centered perspective. First, the modern theories take a subjectivist perspective and place emphasis on the manipulative capability of movement actors (Melucci 1994, p. 109). The classical theories assume that collective behaviors are dependent on circumstances, while the modern theories regard the actors as shifting the consciousness of people through the framing process, mobilizing resources for manufacturing issues, and interpreting political circumstances as opportunities. Second, modern theories apply ‘purposive explanation’ (Tilly 1978, p. 6) to explain phenomena through the choices made by actors who have their own goals. Resource mobilization, political opportunity recognition, collective identity formation, and framing are all processes adopted by movement actors for their own purposes. The theories compete with each other in terms of rationality and the effectiveness of their means for achieving a given purpose. In fact, Tilly raised another possible approach for social movement analysis, employing the term ‘causal explanation’ (Tilly 1978, p. 6). This approach identifies the external forces that cause the behavior. Tilly assumes that the causal approach is suitable for explaining long-run changes and very large social changes (Tilly 1978, p. 229). As a result, because social movements are in many cases short-run and create modest change, studies have not paid much attention to contextual aspects until recently (Rucht 1996, p. 185). Tilly himself left the integration of these two methods, the purposive explanation and the causal explanation, as a future challenge (Tilly 1978, p. 231). So, the question of how these major processes of social movements are conditioned by environmental factors has not been seriously examined in the mainstream studies on social movements. This can be attributed to the fact that the role of actors in the mobilizing process is decisively important in developed Western societies. For example, since there is a surplus of resources in the hands of public-minded individuals and institutions in Western societies, the extent to which resources can be mobilized depends quite heavily on the performance of movement actors (Minkoff 1995, p. 4; Jenkins and Halcli 1999). There are also many highly educated middleclass people who may independently participate in the communication process in the public sphere without being bound by structural positions or collectivism (Offe 1985, p. 851; Johnston et al. 1994, pp. 6–7; Delanty 2003). The choice of actor matters in societies with broad scope for political

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action; the recognition of opportunity and the framing of movement actors may be important for the success of movements. However, when we examine developing countries as the settings for social movements, we cannot take these conditions for granted. The environmental factors, such as resource limitations, oppressive political systems, and social control within the local community, may condition the processes through which the movement actors organize collective action. Thus, in developing countries, there is a need to search for an approach which takes environmental factors into account.

DISCUSSIONS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD If one refers to databases of social science literature (Worldwide Political Science Abstracts: http://www.csa.com/factsheets/polsci-set-c.php and EconLit: http://www.econlit.org) on social movements, over 2700 items, or 30 percent, deal with developing areas.2 However, few researchers take the context of developing countries seriously in an attempt to identify the salient features of and approach to social movements (McAdam et al. 1997, p. 143). Compared to the tendency seen in modern theories which were developed based on Western societies, a noticeable difference is that the literature on developing countries places emphasis on the structural and environmental factors which create grievances among subordinate people. One important contrast in emphasis compared to studies on developed countries is that many scholars claim that class relations are important (Amin 1993; Comacho 1993; Veltmeyer 1997). Interestingly, Alan Touraine, who denies class relations as a major cause of contention in post-industrial society and who proposed the NSM approach, reclaims ‘class’ as one of the fundamental variables which frame social movements in the developing world (Touraine 1989). Analyzing Touraine’s discussion, Kajita (1985) provides an incisive contrast of social movements in developed and developing countries as follows: in advanced industrial societies, social movements tend to concentrate on matters involving society rather than the state, while those in developing countries tend to take a stand against the state, challenging the existing system of control inside and outside of each nation state. Ogushi (1995) presents a similar argument regarding the differences between European and Latin American social movements. Some scholars criticize the Marxist approach, arguing that NSM theory is a relevant approach for social movements (Singh 2001; Chowdhary et al. 1996; Wignaraja 1993). However, rather than putting emphasis on the cognitive processes (identity formation) of individuals as in NSM theory,


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these scholars instead see problems involving basic human needs, such as poverty and other developmental problems, as the motivation for social movements (Ogushi 1995). Scholars who are not involved in the argument of whether class matters or not incorporate other structural elements into their explanation of social movements. While comparing developed and underdeveloped countries, Schuurman (1989) points to urban problems in the latter area, such as a low degree of capitalist penetration and accumulation, inefficient state administration, absolute poverty and poor resource distribution by the state. Poverty and poor administration by the state transform social movements into a survival strategy for the urban population. Haynes (1997) focuses on action groups in various developing countries and explains their emergence by positing two environmental factors, namely: impoverishment (economic structure), especially that brought by structural adjustment policy; and partial democratization (political structure). Davis (1999) introduces the concept of ‘distance’ to explain the features of Latin American social movements. He argues that there is greater distance between the ordinary people and the state, in terms of geography, institutions and class relations, in Latin America than in Western countries. Because of this distance, people collectively call for the state to engage more closely and to serve the people. Interestingly, Piven and Cloward (1979) emphasize environmental constraints when they study poor people’s movements even though they deal with the phenomenum in the United States. These theorists attempt to describe the structural problems affecting subordinate people in order to explain the emergence of social movements in developing countries. However, as Eckstein (2001) shows through her extensive review on social movements in Latin American countries, the way in which social movements appear, even when the people share similar structural problems, can be quite different. This difference occurs because a macro-level structure, by definition, exists for a lengthy period and covers a wide area, so it is possible to have a variety of social movement phenomena. Therefore, we should not be satisfied with merely referring to structural problems but should proceed to specify further particulars regarding environmental factors which may directly determine the cause and shape of each social movement.

CONTEXTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES An increasing number of studies have made attempts to elaborate on environmental factors to explain social movements. One approach is to specify the context of the place and the issues within which a certain social

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movement has emerged. Criticizing Kitschelt’s (1986) method of using state-level political opportunity structures to explain the features of social movements, Rucht (1990, p. 217) proposes the concept of an arena: ‘a structurally bound setting in which conflictual interaction takes place’. Rucht asserts that this concept give a more transparent view of the role of actors, the points of contention and the process of interaction. It also, he continues, contributes to an understanding of the relation between the structure and action, while avoiding premature assumptions that connect the structure and interactions between actors. Nakazawa (2005) closely monitored the rise and fall of anti-nuclear plant movements in two localities in Japan and found that a local political setting, which he calls the ‘local regime’, determines the course of the movements. Crossley (2002) takes the concept of a field with specified actors, values and objectives, and rules of the game. In each field, the social movement develops its own shape, and the actors build a frame of reference based on the experiences they have accumulated. Another approach is to focus on institutions, as seen in the study by McCarthy et al. (1991) which shows that the institutional arrangements affecting non-profit organizations work as a channeling mechanism for social movements in the United States. Amenta and Zylan (1991) discovered a positive relation between the pension system and the Townsend Movement, a welfare movement of American senior citizens. In her recent work, Skocpol (2003) argues that professionally managed organizations have replaced membership associations among social movements in the United States, and that this is due to institutional and technical changes involving the administration of the federal government and fund procurement methods. Houtzager and Kurtz (2001) compare the farmers’ movements in Brazil and Chile and show that they develop quite differently following democratization and the opening up of political opportunities. They persuasively explain how the political, economic and legal institutions determine the fate of movements. Thus, these studies have demonstrated that formal institutions matter to social movements. Recently, scholars of social movements have begun to pay attention to neo-institutional approaches. A collaboration by social movement scholars and neo-institutionalists was recently published (Davis et al. 2005), and in the introductory chapter McAdam and Scott (2005) nicely compare the analytical frameworks of the two schools. In the collaboration, the social movement scholars focus on how the regulatory environment molds the form of social movements (McCarthy 2005), while the institutionalists borrow the concept of actors (movement entrepreneurs) in an attempt to resolve the dilemma of the institutional approach, or in other words, to explain institutional change in an institutionalist framework (Campbell 2005). Raeburn (2004), based on a study of the lesbian


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and gay rights movement inside the workplace, finds that the concern for legitimacy compelled American corporations to apply similar institutional settings which facilitated the movements. Raeburn terms this ‘institutional opportunity’. Skocpol (2003) also points out that changes in local leaders’ feelings as to what constituted legitimacy and prestige led to changes in SMOs. Minkoff (1995) applies a social ecological approach to show that, as the number of SMOs increases in the same field, the environment enhances the legitimacy of the movement and, as a result, promotes the emergence of actual movements. The above are attempts to elaborate the environmental factors which directly affect the emergence and shape of each social movement. We expect this environmental approach to furnish the missing aspects of mainstream theories.

APPROACH AND ORGANIZATION OF THIS VOLUME We established the purpose of this volume as identification of the salient features of social movements in the developing world. The modern theories, which have developed in Western countries, found resource mobilization, political opportunity recognition, collective identity formation, and framing to be indispensable processes for movement actors to achieve their goals. Because they take the subjectivist and purposive approach, these theories do not pay significant attention to the environmental factors which affect these processes. On the other hand, studies in developing countries, although they show much more interest in environmental factors, do not advance beyond references to structural problems affecting ordinary people. In order to elaborate the causes of social movements, it is necessary to specify the context in which each social movement has emerged, and institutional setting is one of the important contextual factors. We assume that, by incorporating the contextual and institutional factors into the analytical framework of the modern theories, it becomes possible to identify the environmental variables which determine how the processes work. Figure 1.1 illustrates our plan of study. Resource endowments may determine the possibility of resource mobilization. The institution of ownership, and access to the resources, also define the degree of discretion in mobilizing resources. Political institutions and the constellation of political actors may determine the breadth and shape of political opportunities, and individuals form and recognize their collective identity based on their societal position and experiences. Since framing is one of the constitutive aspects of social agents (Crossley

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Figure 1.1

Resource endowment and institutions for access

Situation of political actors and political institutions

Social embeddedness of actors who develop identity Historical and social context on which the frame is manufactured and of who receives the frame

Resource mobilization

Political opportunity structure

New social movements

Framing

Analytical framework and organization of this volume

Environmental factors to be examined

Mainstream theories

Ch. 9: Nigeria (Youth)

Ch. 8: India (Women)

Ch. 7: Mexico (Ethnic identity)

Ch. 6: Argentina (Urban poverty)

Ch. 5: South Africa (HIV/AIDS)

Ch. 4: China (Antipollution)

Ch. 3: Thailand (Local development)

Ch. 2: Colombia (Poverty and violence)

Chapter: Country (main issue)

Part III

Part II

Part I

Part


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2002, p. 141), the framing process may be affected by the situation of both frame-makers and frame-receivers in the society. Following this working hypothesis, the case studies are categorized into three parts. In the chapters of Part I, the authors examine how social movements emerge and develop given the constraints of resources and the constraints of institutions related to resource procurement. Chapter 2 deals with a social movement in a rural region of Colombia where the residents have long faced extremely severe constraints in terms of economic resources and freedom of behavior in the midst of violence from both the government and anti-government militants. Hataya raises the question of how it is possible for an SMO to implement projects under such conditions, and conducts a study on local and external factors which influence the strategies of SMOs. In Chapter 3, I focus on a civic movement which is seeking participation in local development at the provincial level in Thailand. This movement took shape when some national-level agencies found themselves in need of provincial agents for implementing local development projects, and distributed funds through such agents. Rather than relying on resource mobilization theory, however, I cast light on institutional conditions and resource endowments which may enable a certain kind of social movement. The chapters in Part II discuss how political opportunities are molded by political institutions and other environmental factors. In a society under an oppressive government, the scope and form of opportunities are strongly determined by the institutional setting. This is typified by the case of antipollution movements in China (Chapter 4). Otsuka describes narrow and often unpredictable political opportunities as ‘fragmentary opportunities’ and examines the manner and form of the emergence of movements under such conditions. In Chapter 5, Makino examines the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), a social movement organization struggling with HIVrelated issues in post-apartheid South Africa, and finds that TAC is unique in its strategy of combining formal and informal methods. She focuses on the institutional conditions of South Africa’s governance system which may be what enables TAC to adopt this strategy. In Chapter 6, Usami studies the piquetero movement of Argentina, a mass mobilization of urban poor who call for better welfare distribution by blocking major city roads. Although sharing the perspective of political opportunity structure theory, Usami attempts to identify the objective conditions – such as economic conditions, historical experiences, resources and political organizations – which actually connect the changes in opportunities to the rise or stagnation of movements. The chapters of Part III discuss the context of cognitive factors of movement actors, such as identity and framing. In Chapter 7, Yonemura

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describes indigenous people’s movements in Mexico for educational facilities and services. The people successfully convinced the government to establish schools in their communities by stressing their rights to realize their ethnic identity. Yonemura discusses the historical background which makes this identity strategy effective. Murayama, in Chapter 8, studies the women’s movement in India and identifies the salient feature of the movement as being the existence of a wide variety of SMOs. She focuses on the fact that SMOs compete with one another and differentiate themselves by framing other SMOs. Murayama reveals the historical paths which affect the bifurcation of women’s SMOs and their frame construction. According to Mochizuki in Chapter 9, ‘youth’ groups have become important actors in social movements in the oil-producing area of the Niger Delta. This concept of ‘youth’, however, does not necessarily refer to a certain age bracket, but rather is used as a frame through which marginalized people in the economic and social system can pursue their objectives. Mochizuki argues that the effectiveness of framing depends on the historically formed ‘youth’ images and the present status of people who claim to be ‘youth’. In Chapter 10, Kumiko Makino and I synthesize the findings of the case studies and present important environmental variables which assist in explaining social movement phenomena in the developing world.

NOTES 1. The articles were retrieved from the Factiva.com database. The coverage years of the New York Times are from 1 January 1985 to 31 December 2004. The developing world is defined as covering countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. 2. In these databases, I found 9578 items of literature which have keywords including ‘social movements’, ‘labor movements’, ‘peace movements’, and ‘political movements’ (including subcategories of these words), among which 2746 concerned non-Western areas (Asia, Africa, the Middle East or Latin America) (accessed on 22 February 2007) (Shigetomi 2007).

REFERENCES Amenta, Edwin and Yvonne Zylan (1991), ‘It Happened Here: Political Opportunity, the New Institutionalism, and the Townsend Movement’, American Sociological Review, 56 (2): 250–65. Amin, Samir (1993), ‘Social Movements at the Periphery’, in Ponna Wignaraja (ed.), New Social Movements in the South: Empowering the People, New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, pp. 76–100. Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow (2000), ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment’, Annual Review of Sociology, 26: 611–39.


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Campbell, John L. (2005), ‘Where do We Stand? Common Mechanisms in Organizations and Social Movements Research’, in Gerald F. Davis et al. (eds), Social Movements and Organization Theory, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 41–68. Canel, Eduardo (1997), ‘New Social Movements Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory: The Need for Integration’, in Michael Kaufman and Haroldo Dilla Alfonso (eds), Community Power and Grassroots Democracy: The Transformation of Social Life, London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books and Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, pp. 189–221. Chowdhary, Rekha, Ashutosh Kumar and J.R. Panda (1996), ‘State, New Social Movements and Democracy in India: A Theoretical Inquiry’, South Asian Studies, 31 (1–2): 60–67. Comacho, Daniel (1993), ‘Latin America: A Society in Motion’, in Ponna Wignaraja (ed.), New Social Movements in the South: Empowering the People, New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, pp. 36–58. Crossley, Nick (2002), Making Sense of Social Movements, Buckingham, UK and Philadelphia, PA, USA: Open University Press. Davis, Diane E. (1999), ‘The Power of Distance: Rethinking Social Movements in Latin America’, Theory and Society, 24 (4): 589–643. Davis, Gerald F., Doug McAdam, W. Richard Scott and Mayer N. Zald (eds) (2005), Social Movements and Organization Theory, New York: Cambridge University Press. Delanty, Gerard (2003), Community, London: Routledge. della Porta, Donatella and Mario Diani (1999), Social Movements: An Introduction, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Eckstein, Susan (2001), ‘Power and Popular Protest in Latin America’, in Susan Eckstein (ed.), Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements, updated and expanded edition, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 1–60. Gamson, William A. (1992), ‘The Social Psychology of Collective Action’, in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (eds), Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, pp. 53–76. Gamson, William A. and David S. Meyer (1996), ‘Framing Political Opportunity’. in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 275–90. Goodwin, Jeff and James M. Jasper (1999), ‘Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process’, Sociological Forum, 14 (1): 27–54. Goodwin, Jeff and James M. Jasper (eds) (2003), The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts. Malden: Blackwell Publishers. Haynes, Jeff (1997), Democracy and Civil Society in the Third World: Politics and New Political Movements, Cambridge: Polity Press. Houtzager, Peter P. and Marcus J. Kurtz (2001), ‘The Institutional Roots of Popular Mobilization: State Transformation and Rural Politics in Brazil and Chile, 1960–1995’, in Jorge I. Domínguez (ed.), Mexico, Central, and South America: New Perspectives, Volume 3: Social Movements, New York and London: Routledge, pp. 96–126. Jenkins, J. Craig and Abigail Halcli (1999), ‘Grassrooting the System? The Development and Impact of Social Movement Philanthropy, 1953–1990’, in Ellen Condliffe Lagemann (ed.), Philanthropic Foundations: New Scholarship, New Possibilities, Bloomington, IN: Iowa University Press, pp. 229–56.

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Johnston, Hank, Enrique Larana and Joseph R. Gusfield (1994), ‘Identities, Grievances, and New Social Movements’, in Enrique Larana, Hank Johnston and Joseph R. Gusfield (eds), New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, pp. 3–35. Kajita, Takamichi (1985), ‘Atarashii shakai undou: A Touraine no mondai teiji wo ukete’ [‘New Social Movements: A Review of A. Touraine’s Thoughts’], Shisou, 730: 211–37. Kitschelt, Herbert P. (1986), ‘Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies’, British Journal of Political Science, 16: 57–85. Kitschelt, Herbert (1991), ‘Resource Mobilization Theory: A Critique’, in Dieter Rucht (ed.), Research on Social Movements: The State of the Art in Western Europe and the USA, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag and Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 323–47. McAdam, Doug (1999), Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970, 2nd edn, Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press. McAdam, Doug and W. Richard Scott (2005), ‘Organizations and Movements’, in Gerald F. Davis, Doug McAdam, W. Richard Scott and Mayer N. Zald (eds), Social Movements and Organization Theory, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 4–40. McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (1997), ‘Toward an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolution’, in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (eds), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 142–73. McCarthy, John D. (2005), ‘Persistence and Change Among Nationally Federated Social Movements’, in Gerald F. Davis, Doug McAdam, W. Richard Scott and Mayer N. Zald (eds), Social Movements and Organization Theory, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 193–225. McCarthy, John D., David W. Britt and Mark Wolfson (1991), ‘The Institutional Channeling of Social Movements by the State in the United States’, Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change, 13: 45–76. McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald (1973), The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization, Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press. McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald (1977), ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory’, American Journal of Sociology, 82 (6): 1212–41. Melucci, Alberto (1989), Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society, London: Hutchinson Radius. Melucci, Alberto (1994), ‘A Strange Kind of Newness: What’s “New” in New Social Movements?’ in Enrique Larana, Hank Johnston and Joseph R. Gusfield (eds), New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, pp. 101–30. Minkoff, Debra C. (1995), Organizing for Equality: The Evolution of Women’s and Racial-Ethnic Organizations in America, 1955–1985, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Nakazawa, Hideo (2005), Jumin touhyou undou to roukaru rejiimu: Niigata ken maki machi to kongenteki minshushugi no hosomichi, 1994–2004 [Referendum Movements and Local Regimes: Maki City, Niigata Prefecture, and its Struggle for Fundamental Democracy between 1994 and 2000], Tokyo: Harvest.


15

Nomiya, Daishiro (1998), ‘Seiji kikai kouzou, keizai kouzou, ideorogii: bakumatsu no noumin undou’ [‘Structural-System Approach to Social Movements: Beyond Resource Mobilization Paradigm’], Riron to houhou, 13 (1): 23–40. Offe, Claus (1985), ‘New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics’, Social Research, 52 (4): 817–68. Ogushi, Kazuo (1995), Raten amerika no atarashii kaze: shakai undou to sayoku shisou [New Wave in Latin America: Social Movements and Leftist Thinking], Tokyo: Doubunkan. Olson, Mancur (1965), The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Piven, Frances Fox and Richard A. Cloward (1979), Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail, New York: Vintage Books. Raeburn, Nicole C. (2004), Changing Corporate America From Inside Out: Lesbian and Gay Workplace Rights, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Rucht, Dieter (1990), ‘Campaigns, Skirmishes and Battles: Anti-Nuclear Movements in the USA, France and West Germany’, Industrial Crisis Quarterly, 4 (3): 193–222. Rucht, Dieter (1996), ‘The Impact of National Contexts on Social Movement Structure: A Cross-movement and Cross-national Comparison’, in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 185–204. Schuurman, Frans J. (1989), ‘Urban Social Movements: Between Regressive Utopia and Socialist Panacea’, in Frans Schuurman and Ton Van Naerssen (eds), Urban Social Movements in the Third World, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 9–26. Shigetomi, Shinichi (2007), ‘Kaihatsu to shakai undou: tojokoku ni okeru shakai undou kenkyuu no shiza’, [‘Development and Social Movements: A Perspective for Social Movement Study in Developing Countries’], in Shinichi Shigetomi (ed.), Kaihatsu to shakai undou: senko kenkyuu no kentou, Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies. Singh, Rajendra (2001), Social Movements, Old and New: A Post-modernist Critique, New Delhi: Sage Publications. Skocpol, Theda (1979), States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Skocpol, Theda (2003), Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Snow, David A., Burke Rochford Jr, Steven K. Worden and Robert D. Benford (1986), ‘Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation’, American Sociological Review, 51 (4): 464–81. Tarrow, Sidney (1996), ‘States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements’, in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 41–61. Tarrow, Sidney (1998), Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, Charles (1978), From Mobilization to Revolution, Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing.

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Touraine, Alan (1989), Danretsu shakai: dai san sekai no atarashii minshuu undou, trans. Yukio Sato, Tokyo: Shinhyoron. (Originally published 1976 as Les Sociétés Dépendantes, Paris-Gembloux: J. Duculot, S.A.) Veltmeyer, Henry (1997), ‘New Social Movements in Latin America: The Dynamics of Class and Identity’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 25 (1): 139–69. Wignaraja, Ponna (1993), ‘Rethinking Development and Democracy’, in Ponna Wignaraja (ed.), New Social Movements in the South: Empowering the People, New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, pp. 4–35. Zald, Mayer N. (1991), ‘The Continuing Vitality of Resource Mobilization Theory: Response to Herbert Kitschelt’s critique’, in Dieter Rucht (ed.), Research on Social Movements: The State of the Art in Western Europe and the USA, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag and Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 348–54.

PART I

Resource and Institutional Endowment for Mobilization

2.

Community-based local development and the peace initiative of the PDPMM in Colombia: resource mobilization under extreme conditions Noriko Hataya

INTRODUCTION Mainstream social movement theories have developed in advanced capitalist countries where affluent resources for mobilization are available and citizen rights are protected. In Latin American countries where these two conditions are extremely limited by the political process and unequal resource distribution, social movements have developed with characteristic dynamics which are not explained simply by conventional theories (Calderón 1986, 1995; Eckstein 1989; Slater 1994; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Martías Rossi 2005; Duquette et al. 2005; Archila 2005). Colombia is a country of sharp contrasts. Violent conflicts have persisted for more than five decades under a democratic regime. Despite stable economic development backed by abundant natural resources, more than half the population are not able to meet their basic human needs. Many people suffer from fear and want. In order to bring about a change in such circumstances, sustainable development and peace-building are necessary. However, resources are extremely limited and the people’s actions are controlled by violent repression. How is a social movement in search of development and peace possible under such extreme conditions? This chapter will focus on the Program for Development and Peace in Middle Magdalena (PDPMM) as a case of a social movement for regional development and peace-building through a local initiative in Colombia. The local context in which the PDPMM emerged includes a long history of armed conflicts and extreme poverty. It shows the people’s accumulated grievances and needs leading to their demands, but also that resources were limited under a situation of extreme fear and repression. The supposed 19

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Resource and institutional endowment for mobilization

antagonist, the state, was totally absent in terms of public administration. Under such extreme situations, how was it possible for the PDPMM to develop and be accepted by the local people? This is the principal question I wish to explore in this chapter. The chapter consists of the following sections. Firstly, I will give a quick review of the Colombian political and economic process to explain the structural factors behind the current armed conflict and the extremely segmented society. Secondly, I will analyze the national strategy for peacebuilding under the US–Colombia relationship and argue why it has not been successful. Thirdly, I will describe the socio-political characteristics of Middle Magdalena as the region of focus. The forth section will analyze the history and current activities of the PDPMM. Lastly, I will argue why the PDPMM has been sustained as a current popular movement in Colombia under these extreme conditions, and then draw my conclusions.

COLOMBIAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROCESS IN THE LAST FIVE DECADES Colombia is a country of great contradictions. It has been one of the few countries in Latin America to enjoy a firmly established democratic regime since the 1960s. However, at the same time, it has suffered from internal armed conflicts for five decades. Colombia is also a country of great contrast. It is gifted with abundant natural and human resources, but more than half the population are living below the poverty line. The accumulated grievances of the populace about such discrepancies have become the principal reason for social conflict. Political Process under the Exclusionist Bipartisan Regime Colombian political violence dates back to the initial period of the republican regime. Oligarchic groups, divided into two parties, the liberals and the conservatives, have dominated the Colombian political scene since 1886. Soon after, the ‘War of a Thousand Days’ was instigated in 1899 by a radical wing of the liberals. Since then, the fight for political power between these two parties has continued. The party in presidential power has always suppressed the other. Many authors describe the Colombian political process as an exclusionist bipartisan democracy managed by a coalition of the two traditional parties: the liberals and the conservatives (Kline 1999; Livingstone 2003). The leftist wings, either the Communist Party or a radical group of the liberals, have struggled for a more equalitarian society and pluralistic political regime.

Community-based local development in Colombia

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Peasant movements emerged in the 1920s when peasant leagues and agrarian unions were formed to fight for land distribution. Labor union movements evolved in the same period. Incidents involving violations of the human rights of protesting workers1 motivated the creation of a labor union movement organization in search of the means to protect workers’ lives. The Confederation of Unionists of Colombia (CSC), the predecessor to the Confederation of Workers of Colombia (CTC) was founded in 1935. The first peak of social conflict came in the 1920s, when political power was in the hands of the Conservative Party. The Liberal Party ruled during the period 1930 to 1946, but when the election was won by the Conservative Party in 1946, state repression against the liberals began. Agrarian reform by Law 200 was declared in 1936 but substantial land distribution was never carried out. Large estate ownership was maintained through bipartisan political power (see LeGrand 1991; Machado 1981). The murder of Jorge Gaitán, leader of a radical wing of the liberals, provoked an uprising in Bogotá, which, in turn, exploded into turbulence throughout the country. This civil war was later named ‘La Violencia’ (the Violence). During the civil war, conflict for land occurred in different regions in alliance with communist or union activists, while the national government suppressed these activists by military force. Landowners armed themselves for the defense of their land, and this later became the origin of an armed self-defense force. In 1953, Rojas Pinilla launched a coup d’état and ruled by military government until 1957. During the military regime, suppression against the liberals continued, particularly toward the agrarian movement organizations and labor unions (Bergquist et al. 1992; Betancourt and García 1991). The first wave of internally displaced persons (IDPs) emerged in this period. The displaced peasants headed to other rural areas to explore agrarian frontiers. The emerging leftist armed forces penetrated these rural areas in search of sympathizers or peasant communities to control (Múnera 1998, pp. 175–214). After the military government (1953–57), the conservative and liberal heads agreed to run the presidency in turn for four terms, sharing political positions such as governors and congressmen equally between the two parties. This coalition regime (1958–74)2 was named the National Front. Since 1974, elections have been open to all the parties, but in practice the exclusionist bipartisan regime continued until the early 1990s. The leftist movement activists, who had been suppressed by the military government, continued dissident activities, organizing guerrilla groups in the 1960s such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL). The landowners hired militias, some of which later converted into paramilitary

22


groups, to oppress the leftist groups.3 Since the 1970s, cocaine trafficking groups have attempted to control the regional economy in Medellín and Cali. The economic potential of these groups made their members the target of kidnapping by guerilla groups. Cocaine traffickers took up arms and were financially supported by paramilitary groups such as MAS (Muerte a Secuestradores, or Death to Kidnappers) (see Pizarro 1991; Bergquist et al. 1992). After the end of the Cold War, most of the leftist groups lost their ideological backbone. The new Constitution of 1991 engineered Colombian democratization towards a multi-partisan regime. However, some leftist groups such as FARC and the ELN remained armed. Their principal strategies to gain resources for subsistence and armed operations are now kidnapping, extortion and income from the cocaine business (Ito 2001). Their identity of revolutionary movements against the authoritarian regime has changed to become that of armed groups named ‘narcoguerrillas’ (guerrilla groups based on cocaine trafficking) (Tirado Mejía 1998). Meantime the paramilitary groups have expanded significantly and in 1996 formed the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). In many rural communities, the local people have had to survive interference from armed groups of different natures. Figure 2.1 illustrates the distribution of the major armed groups – FARC (F), the ELN (E) and the AUC (P) – in 2005. FARC has maintained the largest military force of all guerrilla groups that have ever existed in the country, and its area of influence has extended throughout the country. The number of FARC combatants is estimated at 18 000. More than half of its war chest is estimated to be financed by the cocaine business. On the other hand, the ELN, the second-largest leftist armed group, consists of 3000 to 4000 combatants. Its military base of origin was in the San Lucas mountain range, in the central Andes. Its principal income source has been ransoms from kidnapping. The AUC, the confederation of paramilitaries, has overwhelmed the military force of the leftist guerrilla groups since the late 1990s. Since 2004, the Uribe administration has aggressively enforced peace-making negotiations with the AUC, which completed collective disarmament of a total of 25 regional blocs (bloques) in 2007. Before the disarmament campaign started, the total number of AUC combatants had reached approximately 300 000. Economic Development with Abundant Resources and Extreme Social Segregation Colombia is a rich country in terms of deposits of natural resources and a scale of market sufficiently big enough for external trade and foreign


23

CARIBBEAN SEA GUAJIRA Rihohacha Santa Marta ATLANTICO BOLÍVAR

F P PANAMA

Montería

F

E

SUCRE CORDOBA

VENEZUELA

F

NORTE DE SANTANDER

F

ANTIOQUIA

P

P

F

SANTANDER Quibdó PACIFIC OCEAN

CHOCO

P BOYACA CALDAS Tunja Yopal Bogotá

Puerto Carreño

CASANARE

VICHADA

P

Puerto Inirida

META P

VALLE Cali TOLIMA

F

Neiva

GUAINIA

Popayan Huila P

F

Florencia

NARIÑO Pasto

Mitú

GUAVIARE

PUTUMAYO CAQUETA

VAUPES

ECUADOR AMAZONAS

F E P

BRAZIL

FARC PERU ELN Paramilitary before demobilization High concentration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) (2.5 to 3 million for all Colombia)

0

200 km

Source: UNEP (United Nations Environmental Programme)/GRID-Europe & UNEP/ GROD-Arendal (2006).

Figure 2.1

Armed guerilla groups and wars in Colombia

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investment. Its economic potential ranks forth or fifth in Latin America in terms of territorial surface, population and total value of gross domestic product (GDP). After the end of monoculture specialization for coffee exports, the Colombian economy is now led by the mining sector, consisting of petroleum, coal, ferronickel, gold and related manufacturing industries. In 2006, investment in the mining sector and petroleum sector together represented more than the half of the total foreign direct investment (Proexport 2007). The increasing interest in crops for biogas and biofuel has resulted in further pressure for mega-sized development projects by multinational enterprises. Corn, sugar cane and oil palm are the representative crops for this purpose and most of the Latin American countries will be the target providers of these raw materials. Colombia is one of the major oil palm producing countries. On the other hand, Colombia is a country of contrast and segregation. The wide gap between the rich and the poor derives from the oligarchic tradition of land tenancy without successful agrarian reform. The expansion of the cocaine business has provided a firm financial base for guerilla groups. The political regime and legal machinery have been affected by corruption linked with drug money. As a result, inhabitants below the poverty line account for more than 50 percent of the total population. The Gini indicator for Colombia ranks amongst the worst three for Latin American countries (0.58 in 2005), showing a very unequal income distribution (CEPAL 2006).

THE NATIONAL PEACE PROCESS UNDER THE COLOMBIA–UNITED STATES RELATIONSHIP The geopolitical location of Colombia on the South American continent definitely provides a reason for interest by the United States in two aspects: investment and security. Currently, Colombia ranks as the sixth most important country in the region in terms of the total value of imports and exports with the United States (US Census Bureau 2006). It is also one of the stand-by partners of FTA (free trade agreement). Its oil deposits are also a key factor attracting multinational investors, mainly backed by US capital. Expansion of the cocaine business is another and more critical issue for US intervention into the Colombian political situation. The United States is the world’s largest cocaine consumer market, while Colombia is the largest cocaine exporter in the world. The anti-drug campaign has been one of the most serious challenges for the US, which has the largest number of young addicts in the world. The campaign of drug eradication


25

has triggered the combat against the cultivation of coca in producing countries. The Peace Process in the 1980s and 1990s Peace-making efforts were initiated by the Betancur administration (1982–88), mainly with the leftist armed groups. In the meantime, violence committed by the cocaine trafficking cartels, provoked by the government campaign against them, rose to a peak. In the mid-1980s, the cocaine trafficking cartel started to hire death squads for selective assassination and extortion of the justice and police authorities. The US government had already started a campaign against cocaine trafficking groups in the 1970s. The George Bush administration (1989–93) announced a ‘War on Drugs’ in alliance with Andean producing countries (Peru, Bolivia and Colombia). The new Colombian Constitution (1991) prohibited the extradition of trafficking offenders, which caused drug trafficking terrorism to cease and promoted the surrender of terrorists to the authorities. In 1990, in accordance with the expectation of the Constituent Assembly, some of the major guerrilla groups agreed to disarm. However, throughout the 1990s no administration was successful in negotiation by dialogue with FARC and the ELN, while paramilitary forces continued to expand their spheres of influence (Santamaría 2004). Plan Colombia Since the late 1990s the area of coca cultivation in Colombia has overtaken that of Peru and Bolivia (UNODC 2006), which has provided a reason for the United States to focus its crusade against coca cultivation in Colombia. The so-called ‘Plan Colombia’ (an international aid plan for Colombian peace and development) was derived from the former Colombian president, Pastrana’s, proposal to seek aid and assistance from developed countries for peace-building and development in the country. The Plan did not originally emphasize combat against drug trafficking, military aid, or fumigation to destroy coca crops. Initially, of the total budget destined for the Plan, 48.5 percent was to be provided by the Colombian government, 46.6 percent by international aid, and the remaining 4.9 percent was to be provided by credit. In the event, the US government offered $860 million, of which a major part was destined to reinforce the military and the police force, and to purchase aircraft for air fumigation of the coca crops with herbicides. Additionally, the Plan also entailed the dispatching of 500

26


US military officers and 300 contracted civilian specialists to Colombia (Livingstone 2003). Thus, the US government’s leading initiative in Plan Colombia significantly influenced the Colombian peace process run by the national government. The Plan has budgetary items concerning non-military projects, such as the promotion of alternative crops in the coca-cultivating areas, social development projects for a sustainable peasant economy, and so on. However, the budgets for these projects are much smaller than those for military aid and fumigation. The US government’s intent is to combat cocaine trafficking and leftist guerrilla groups whose operations have been financed by drug money. Thus, the discourse of aid for Colombian peace has been used to justify the logic of combating narco-terrorism. Moreover, US government interest has also been directed towards access to the natural resources of the Andean region, which would not be possible without recovering public security in Colombia (Ahumada 2003; Vargas 2003). The Current Peace Process Run by the Uribe Administration (2002 to Present) Uribe won a second term as president in 2006, due to a positive evaluation of the results of the first term (2002–06). The banner of Uribe’s first administration was ‘Democratic Security’. In fact, the so-called indicator of violence, measured by the annual number of homicides per 100 000 persons, decreased from 66 to 44 between 2002 and 2005, which shows a substantial improvement in public security. On the other hand, defense expenditure accounted for 4.5 percent of the total GDP in 2004, which was partly provided by the increased revenue from newly created taxes for this end. The number of battles on the front between the national military forces and the guerrilla groups increased to three times that of the former administration. Uribe prioritized the use of military force rather than dialogue for peacemaking. As for negotiations with the paramilitary groups, he promoted collective disarmament in exchange for amnesty and integration into rehabilitation programs.4 Total disarmed combatants were estimated at 40 000 by the end of 2006. On the other hand, peace negotiations with FARC and the ELN have not made significant advances. Reduction of the coca crop area is another factor by which to justify the enforcement of fumigation financed by Plan Colombia. The accumulated area of coca crops has slightly decreased in recent years, but the strategy of coca eradication by spraying glyphosate herbicide has had negative effects on local communities, harming non-coca crops, the environment and human health. As a result, peasants in such areas have had to leave


27

their land. The increasing number of IDPs has also been a critical problem since the mid-1980s. The Uribe administration has been under pressure to improve its policy attention toward IDPs, while the spraying of coca cultivation areas has resulted in an increase in IDPs. The accumulated IDP population from 1985 to 2005 is estimated to be more than 2 million people (CODHES 2005).

MIDDLE MAGDALENA AS THE REGION OF FOCUS Middle Magdalena is a term identifying the region surrounding the middle section of the Magdalena River. The region is composed of parts of seven departments:5 Magdalena, Boyacá, Caldas, Cundinamarca, Santander, Antioquia and Bolívar, with Barrancabermeja, principal city of the region, located in the department of Santander. The current population of the region has heterogeneous origins. Before Spanish colonization the Yariguies, an indigenous group, lived in the region, but were annihilated in the war of conquest. The central city of the region, Barrancabermeja, was founded by a Spanish explorer in 1536. During the colonial period, small towns were founded by the Spanish alongside the Magdalena River, but the land exploitation and occupation process was slow. Most of the area remained little explored until the early twentieth century. Today’s population is composed of mestizos (a mixture of Spanish and indigenous groups) and Afro-Colombians, whose ancestors came from the Caribbean and the Pacific coasts. Many of the current generation have been displaced from their birthplaces due to internal conflict in the country (Romero Medina 1994; Vargas 1992). Living conditions suggest that Middle Magdalena today is an epitome of the Colombia of fear and want. Middle Magdalena as an Enclave Economy The municipalities of Middle Magdalena are all located on the peripheries of the respective departments to which they belong. From the viewpoint of local administrations, they are considered to be marginal, remote areas for development. Thus, the infrastructure, basic public services and the transport system are extremely underdeveloped. The region has received practically no attention from local government.6 On the other hand, the region holds high economic potential thanks to its oil deposits. Since the first petroleum refinery was built in Barrancabermeja in the early 1930s, the city and surrounding area has converted into the center of an enclave economy. However, the oil money has not contributed

28


to the local development of the region, due to multilateral management by concession. Most of the local people live below the poverty line. After petroleum, the region has deposits of other mining products such as coal and gold in the central Andes, such as in the San Lucas mountain range, most of these mining products having been exploited on a small scale by primitive methods. The valley plain is suited to the cultivation of oil palm and other agricultural crops. The land has been exploited mainly by absentee landlords for either extensive cattle breeding or plantations of oil palm and rubber. Peasants in the region are either landless agricultural workers or smallholders. Most of the smallholders have not been able to obtain title deeds for the land, because the land is waste ground (registered as ‘special reserves’ by the state) which was left for them to cultivate. The Magdalena River provides fishing grounds for the local communities as well. However, most of the local economies, whether in agriculture, fishery or mining, have not developed beyond the level of self-sufficiency. Landholding by the fishermen and small mining settlers is likewise not protected, since most of them settled on their land through informal land transactions or occupation. Their land rights are quite weak in the face of any mega-sized development project that might move into the area. Middle Magdalena as a Region of Conflicts Middle Magdalena has been one of the most violent areas of the country since the mid-1980s, due to the coexistence of different armed organizations, on both the left and right wings. Annual homicides per 100 000 inhabitants in the region fluctuated between 100 and 150 in the period 1984–2000, while the national average in the same period was between 60 and 70 (PDPMM-OPI 2006). From the strategic view of the national military forces, the denomination of Middle Magdalena denotes the most crucial site of combat. Since the mid-1980s, the whole region has been under the control of either FARC or the ELN; moreover, since the late 1990s the AUC has reached most municipalities in the region and in some of them its presence has surpassed that of the leftist guerrilla groups. Under such conditions, the local people were forced to live side by side with the armed groups, mostly under their suppressive rule. Meantime, the cultivated area of coca expanded until the total area reached more than 12 000 hectares in 2003 (Zabala 2003). The intensified violence in today’s Middle Magdalena has a long history. The origin of armed conflict dates back to the 1920s, when Barrancabermeja and its surrounding area was being explored for oil deposits. Barrancabermeja became the first oil refinery base in Colombia. The exploitation of oil deposits was begun by US capital: the Tropical Oil


29

Company (Troco). The establishment of an oil refinery in Barrancabermeja converted the region into an enclave economy. From the 1920s, the population increased drastically due to labor migration from neighboring departments. Soon, in 1923, the Labor Union of Petroleum Industry Workers (the USO – Unión Sindical Obrera) was founded with the aim of demanding from Troco improvement in the labor conditions, which were far from meeting minimum needs. Since the first labor strike in 1924, worker strikes and sabotage have been the most common strategies of the USO. From 1902 to 1930, under the rule of the Conservative Party, repression of the radical activists of the liberals intensified, particularly toward those who were close to the Social Revolutionary Party (the predecessor of the Communist Party). Some of the communist activists participated in the protests organized by the USO. Some leaders of the radical wing of the Liberal Party were also allied with the USO or local peasant movements. Some of these activists later became the founders of the ELN, with their bases in the San Lucas mountain range (Romero Medina 1994). Since then, Barrancabermeja and its surrounding areas have become the center of social conflicts caused by labor movements and revolutionary communist movements, which have been the target of state suppression. During the civil war (La Violencia) period, the wave of population displacement from the warfare in neighboring departments led to the colonization of Middle Magdalena as people moved in search of a new agrarian frontier. Suppressed leaders of the radical liberals also headed to the region, joining the existing social movement organizations. The USO labor movement continued and reached another peak of protests in 1977, when a national civic strike was organized. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, social conflict caused by the combat between leftist armed groups, the military and paramilitary forces intensified. Violations of human rights by suppression against the supposed sympathizers of the guerilla groups increased. The victims of threats and menace by these armed groups were mostly local citizens, but community leaders in particular were the targets. The flow of IDPs continued, but those who decided to stay began to organize to protect themselves. The popular movement organizations founded in the 1970s and 1980s include the ATCC (Association of Peasant Workers of the Carare River), Fedeagromisbol (Farmers and Miners Federation of Southern Bolívar), the ACVC (Peasant Association of the River Cimitarra Valley) and the OFP (Popular Women’s Organization) (see Archila et al. 2006). These organizations had already developed their own activities when the PDPMM started. The absence of state protection of citizens’ rights stimulated the approach of the missionaries (both of the Catholic and Evangelical

30


Churches) and the Catholic dioceses to protect the human rights of the local people. They helped to create the backbone spirit of solidarity and resistance of the vulnerable people under fear. The Catholic Church (for example, the diocese of Socorro and San Gil, the diocese of Barrancabermeja) provided local people with technical support and orientation. These and other existing local organizations later became involved in the PDPMM as delegated operators of the projects. Middle Magdalena as a Targeted Region for the PDPMM The existence of natural resources and economic interests for the colonization of the Middle Magdalena region provoked social conflict and stimulated the penetration of armed groups. The creation of the ELN in the core area of the region was a critical incident explaining the increase in repression of local communities by military force. Further penetration by FARC and the AUC intensified conflict in the region, which made it impossible for the peasant communities to maintain their neutral position. Despite such extreme conditions, the local spirit of resistance still survived. Many villages suffered massive displacement under very severe persecution and threats, but some persisted to live on. For example, the ATCC was formed by such a peasant community of resistance. The people decided to dialogue with both the guerrilla groups and the military forces, and succeeded in creating a neutral position. A coordinator of the PDPMM in Landázuri points out that there was no choice for the peasants at that moment but to organize and dialogue with the armed groups for their survival: The people were prohibited by the paramilitary groups in this area to even mention ‘human rights.’ They were forced to chose, ‘go with the FARC, or with us, or go away, or die.’ It was impossible to keep a neutral position. If they wished to stay, they had no choice but to get organized. (Interview in Landázuri, August 2007)7

The testimony suggests that the grievances accumulated to the level of desperation made the people stake all they had on survival. All they had was their solidarity, adherence to their land and knowledge of their own rights, learned from the Catholic priests. The support and company of the dioceses encouraged them to dialogue, instead of taking up arms. Towards the 1990s, international human rights organizations, backed by Protestant missionaries, the Catholic Church or secular non-profit institutions, increased their preoccupation with the intensified armed conflict in the region.


31

This was the local context when the idea to create the PDPMM emerged.

THE PDPMM, A SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION FOR DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE The PDPMM (Program for Development and Peace in Middle Magdalena) started as a consortium of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 1996 with the aim to promote a social process for regional development and peace through local people’s initiatives. According to its former director, Francisco De Roux, the core philosophy of the PDPMM is based on the argument that the development model determines either conflict or peace. The activities of the PDPMM include economic development projects, popular education to improve governability, and the building of a humanitarian public space for peace. Combining these three, the principal aim is to build social agency through local initiatives transforming the current socio-economic and political structure of the society. Its supposed antagonist is not necessarily the state or the political regime, but could be the global development initiative, the government’s macroeconomic policy to stimulate development, and the state-initiated peace-making process which has aggravated the armed conflict and violation of human rights. The strategies of the PDPMM include resource mobilization, not only of external financing resources, but also of the existing local community organizations. The organizations were local resources that could be mobilized. So how were the external resources obtained and how were they combined and put to work along with the local resources? Development Process of the PDPMM8 The history of the PDPMM, including its incunabula, can be classified into the periods described below. The PDPMM has persisted in respecting local initiatives and a participatory methodology in carrying out projects for sustainable development and peace. The mobilization of social institutions has been key to utilizing external resources. Antecedents of the creation of the PDPMM The PDPMM was created from the idea to build ‘actions for peace’ derived from the accumulated anxieties of the local people in the desperately violent situation. Why were homicides, massacres, torture occurring daily in such a rich region? This simple question turned into a claim for ‘doing something ourselves to resolve the situation’. The Catholic diocese

32


of Barrancabermeja proposed the design of a plan of social justice and peace for the region, which was based on the anxieties shared with the USO. The history of the PDPMM dates back to 1988 when the USO and Ecopetrol (a nationalized petroleum company) signed a contract with the SEAP (Economic Society of Friends of the Country) and the CINEP (Center for Investigation and Popular Education) to analyze the regional situation of violence and social problems. These organizations formed the SEAP–CINEP consortium in 1996 to carry out this mission. The consortium created a team to carry out a diagnostic study, and this was led by Francisco De Roux. Methodology-building and initial symbolic projects (1996–98) The diagnostic study of the region was conducted through a participatory research method. Besides the CINEP research staff, De Roux resorted to the young leaders of Pastoral Social9 of the Catholic diocese of Barrancabermeja as the key persons for obtaining a briefing of the situation in the region and to make contact with the local people. From November 1995 to February 1996, three-day workshops were organized in different places in the region, with more than 100 people invited to each. The debate in the workshops centered on two basic questions: Why are there so many homicides in the region you love? Why are so many people poor in such a rich region? The diagnostic study analyzed the region by variables such as population, culture, rural economy, urban economy, petroleum, institutions, local policy, armed conflict, environment and education. The study revealed that the region of Middle Magdalena, surrounding the petroleum industry, produced more than US$2.8 million as annual value added while more than 70 percent of the population lived below the poverty line in a ‘cruel war’. In a few words, the study identified the regional dynamics as the roots of violence and poverty. On the other hand, the study, through its participatory method, discovered that many local people were now ready to build their own process to transform the vicious dynamics. The study determined the territory for the PDPMM to be the Middle Magdalena region which covers approximately 30 km2 with 29 municipalities and a population of around 780 000.10 The current focus area of the PDPMM extends to parts of the departments of Antioquia, Bolívar, Cesar and Santander. The frontier of this focus area expands from north to south along the Magdalena River valley, which is limited by the mountain ranges of Yariguies and Perijá in the east and by the mountain ranges of Santo Domingo and San Lucas in the west (Figure 2.2). The diagnostic study proposed concrete strategies and actions at the municipal level with the aim of changing the situation through popular participation. The proposal was named the PDPMM. From May 1997 to

33 Santander

Simacota

El Carmen de Chucri

San Vicente de Chucri

Barrancabermeja Betulia

Bolívar

Landázuri El Peńon

Cimitarra

Rionegro

San Alberto

Puerto Wilches

Puerto Parra

Yondó

Cesar

San Martin

Aguachica

Gamarra

La Gloria

Sabana de Torres

Middle Magdalena as the focus region of the PDPMM

CDPMM cartographic database.

Figure 2.2

Source:

Puerto Nare

Puerto Berrio

Antioquia

Cantagallo

San Pablo

Simiti

Morales

Arenal

Rio Viejo

Santa Rosa del Sur

Bolívar

Tiquisio

Regidor

Antioquia

Santander

Cesar

Bolívar

Division of Department in Middle Magdalena Region

34


May 1998, a contract was signed between the SEAP–CINEP consortium and Ecopetrol, the latter financing a one-year activity to conduct pilot projects. In each of the municipalities, a group of people, called a núcleo de pobladores (group of local inhabitants)11 was created, who served as the facilitators to encourage other inhabitants to join the process of building the local initiatives together. The people who participated in this process were convinced by the philosophy of the PDPMM: peace and the struggle against poverty and injustice would come from the people themselves and through their own proposals. The pilot projects had only a symbolic dimension to carry out the proposals made by the people. To maintain the initiative of the local people, substantial financial resources were necessary. The search for financial support was the most crucial mission of PDPMM at that time. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Japanese government gave a small fund for the PDPMM to make a proposal to the World Bank. Finally, the PDPMM obtained resources through a national government credit called the Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL) provided by the World Bank. The first phase of the Learning and Innovation Loan (1998–2000) The first ‘learning and innovation’ phase of the PDPMM was financed by the national government through credit obtained from the World Bank (1998–2000) and the national resources offered by Ecopetrol. Thus, the World Bank provided the LIL package to the Colombian government and the PDPMM, as a consortium, was the organization contracted for implementation. The PDPMM kept its autonomy in planning policy on condition that it complied with the accountability requirements of the national government and the World Bank. With the LIL finance (US$7 million over three years), the PDPMM became able to implement projects for participatory regional development. At this stage, the PDPMM was transformed into a consortium consisting of CINEP and the Catholic diocese of the Barrancabermeja. The core groups of inhabitants (núcleos de pobladores) took the initiative to formulate the strategic fields of action for local development in each municipality where they lived. They drew up a document named the ‘Municipal Proposal’ based on these strategic fields of action. Ninety local initiatives were approved for implementation by 64 local institutions, either community organizations or NGOs with long experience of working with the community. The projects covered a wide range of fields such as commercialization, communication, construction of public infrastructure, rural development, urban development, fisheries and environment issues, mining, housing, education and institutional development. The local inhabitants, with the Municipal Proposal in hand, negotiated with


35

the public employees of local municipal governments to convince them to reflect their initiatives in the Plan for Municipal Development and implement them in public policies. Besides their advocacy actions towards the municipal governments, núcleos de pobladores selected the projects which they considered to be relevant strategies for the economic and social life of their communities. Through learning-by-doing, they themselves gradually implemented the projects, partly resorting to the LIL credit and partly resorting to municipal institutions (CDPMM 2005). One of the most important lessons in this period was the importance of promoting dialog and the exchange of information among different municipalities, and making decisions on the priorities between different social sectors and local authorities, including the civil servants of municipal governments. The corporation regime (2001 to present) In 2001, the second phase of the LIL (2001–03) was approved by the World Bank. This time the PDPMM received US$5 million in total. Due to the increasing scale of funds to manage, the PDPMM changed its legal status from that of a consortium to a corporation. Thus, the Corporation for Development and Peace in Middle Magdalena (CDPMM) was founded in 2001. Both the CINEP and the Catholic diocese of Barrancabermeja have continued to support the PDPMM. However, the local people and local organizations have come to be more and more involved in the decisionmaking process, and to take more responsibility in the management of the PDPMM. After the LIL from the World Bank, the PDPMM received a grant for the Peace Laboratory project from the Europe Union (EU). The grant was agreed between the European Commission (the representative of the EU) and the Social Action12 institution established by the Colombian national government. These two parties agreed to delegate the planning and implementation of the projects to the CDPMM. The basic strategies and fields of activity of the PDPMM were maintained. The protection of human rights was strengthened by the creation of ‘Humanitarian Spaces’ in the communities most affected by conflicts. These spaces were intended to allow external actors to work alongside the people and to monitor human rights violations. The commencement of the Peace Laboratory project in Middle Magdalena is significant since it has become a model case for the other Peace Laboratory projects in different regions of the country. At the beginning of the 2000s, the AUC committed enormous human rights violations in the region, including threats toward community activists and the staff of the CDPMM.13 Receiving the Peace Laboratory grant qualified the

36


position of CDPMM in the eyes of the Uribe administration, and gave the PDPMM more legitimacy from the state. In addition to the EU grant, from 2004 to 2008, another fund came from the national government through a loan from the World Bank. This fund is called the Peace and Development Project, and has also been delegated to the CDPMM for operation. This project has focused on vulnerable people, in particular on IDPs in the region. The PDPMM did not have a policy of identifying IDPs as a targeted population for their intervention, so the projects financed by the Peace and Development Project were combined to complement the other projects financed by the Peace Laboratory. Principles and Fields of Activity According to Francisco De Roux, the former legal representative of the CDPMM up to September 2008, the principles of the program are summarized as follows. The most important principle is that life comes first. In other words, the principal mission is to defend and protect human rights. The strategy of the PDPMM is based on the argument that the development model itself determines whether conflict or peace will reign in the region. Therefore, the protagonist of development should be the local people and their own initiatives. As for the enforced displacement issue, they emphasize the prevention of IDPs rather than simply directing attention to them. They encourage local peasants amid armed conflict to stay put on their own land and not to move to the cities in search of the aid which is given to IDPs. The principal strategy for peace is to dialogue with all the social actors in the region, including the armed groups. Thus, every actor should participate in the construction of the region (De Roux 2003, 2007, and an interview conducted by the author in August 2007). The projects of the PDPMM are classified under three fields (or lines) of activity. The first deals with the defense of human rights, building a space for peace and security. This field of activity emphasizes the monitoring of violations of human rights, and building a protected public space for communities under the threat of violence. The second field of activity works on the social and cultural processes, and the enforcement of democratic governability. Projects include non-formal education, alternative education for peasant communities, and awakening the local need to build a development plan (for participative planning). During local election campaigns, the PDPMM encourages communities to participate in town meetings with the candidates in order to get involved in the decision-making of local development planning. The third field of activity deals with projects of economic production, concerning environmental protection. Most of the projects are designed to encourage local peasant and fishing communities


37

to be independent from coca crops, searching for equitable and sustainable development. These activities combined, the final goal of the PDPMM is to construct the social agency of the region through the initiative of local people, thus identified as the ‘territorial community’. Organizational Structure and Financial Management Scheme The lessons learned from the ‘learning and innovation’ period served to improve the structural organization and financial management of the PDPMM and enabled it to work in a more decentralized and efficient way. The 30 municipalities in the targeted area of the PDPMM are divided into eight subregions (Figure 2.2). The Program (PDPMM) operates through the Corporation (CDPMM) and its eight geographically decentralized subregional offices (Figure 2.3).14 These subregional offices, named ETPs (Technical and Pedagogical Teams) were built in major towns in strategic locations in each subregion. Each ETP consists of the representatives of the núcleos de pobladores, local social institutions in alliance with the PDPMM, and the technical team of the CDPMM. The subregional coordinator of the CDPMM bears institutional responsibility for the ETP. He or she and the technical team coordinate the projects to be implemented in the respective municipalities which belong to each subregion. Besides implementing a group of projects that are directly administrated by the CDPMM, the ETP coordinates the relationship between the CDPMM and local social institutions (NGOs and/or community-based organizations, CBOs) which implement their own projects through subsidies provided by the Peace Laboratory grant. The ETP provides the local organizations with technical assistance for project management, monitors the accounting and makes further technical suggestions if necessary. Besides the Peace Laboratory grant, several sources of finance support the PDPMM, such as small-scale grants from different countries, international NGOs and local public institutions. However, due to its scale, I will explain the flow of resources by focusing on the Peace Laboratory. Today, most of the budget for the PDPMM is destined for the local projects which are carried out by the delegated local NGOs or local CBOs. New projects are created through initiatives from local organizations, the núcleos de pobladores and the other social institutions. In the latter case, the proposals are approved after an open call for projects and screening by the CDPMM. There are different levels of social institutions which are involved in the PDPMM, roughly classified into three groups: (1) self-sufficient local NGOs which have the logistic and administrative capacity to replace the delegated operation of the ETP almost completely (for example, CORDIS,15 ATCC-India); (2) local social movement

38

PDA

NGO

NGO NGO CBO

PDA

ETP 3

Figure 2.3

ETP 5

ETP 6

ETP 7

NP

CBO

CBO

CBO

CBO NGO NGO

PDA

ETP 8

Flow of Peace Laboratory resources for the implementation of projects by social organizations at different levels

CBO NGO CBO

PDA

CBO

NGO CBO

CBO

PDA

NGO CBO

NGO PDA

CBO

ETP 4

Notes: PDA: Projects directly administrated by CDPMM. NP: Núcleo de pobladores. CBO: Community-based organization. ETP: Sub-regional Technical and Pedagogical Center.

CBO

ETP 2

PDA

NGO NGO CBO

NP

PDA

ETP 1

PDA

CDP MM


Table 2.1 Phase

Phase I Phase II Total Source:

39

Budget for the Peace Laboratory in Middle Magdalena Time frame

EU grant (euros)

National counterpart (euros)

Total (euros)

25 Feb. 2002–31 Aug. 2005 1 Sep. 2005–30 Jun. 2009

14 800 000 20 000 000 34 800 000

2 220 000 5 200 000 7 420 000

17 020 000 25 200 000 42 220 000

CDPMM (2005).

Table 2.2

Budget of Phase II according to destination categories

Categories 1 2 3 4 5

Services Equipment supply Project finance funds Information Expenses for operations 5.1 Local personnel 5.2 Others 6 Unexpected expenses Total

EU grant

National counterpart

Total

%

1 500 000 50 000 16 510 000 100 000 1 690 000 742 605 947 395 150 000 20 000 000

– – 2 600 000 – 2 600 000 2 600 000 – – 5 200 000

1 500 000 50 000 19 110 000 100 000 4 290 000 3 342 605 947 395 150 000 25 200 000

6.0 0.2 75.8 0.4 17.0 13.3 3.8 0.6 100.0

Note: ‘Services’ includes technical assistance, study, training, monitoring, evaluation and exchange of experiences. Source:

CDPMM (2005).

organizations which have a clear political orientation (class struggle), but vulnerable financial status (for example, the ACVC, Fedeagromisbol); and (3) CBOs which work at the village or settlement level and are the beneficiaries of the economic project through subsidies (for example the Community Action Board, JAC),16 and the teachers’ association of comprehensive basic schools17). The CDPMM administrates the accounting of each project according to the contract type. The Peace Laboratory in the Middle Magdalena is an eight-year project (2002–10) financed by an EU grant and national government resources (Table 2.1). As explained, the Corporation (CDPMM) stands as the delegated institution for planning, implementation and coordination of the project. Table 2.2 shows the budgetary distribution for Phase II according to the major items of expenses. ‘Project finance funds’ accounts

40


for the largest proportion of the total budget (76 percent). Half of the resources from the national contribution are destined for payments to the local personnel of the CDPMM,18 and the other half is to be used for project finance. The latter is administrated directly by Social Action, the governmental organization for the project. Seventy-five percent of the project finance funds for Phase II are destined for the projects continuing from Phase I. These projects were selected due to a positive evaluation of impacts and continuous demand in the local communities. The other 23.1 percent finances new projects, 71.5 percent of which should be selected through an open public call for projects. These projects, once selected, should be implemented directly by the local institutions. The other 28.5 percent of project finance funds are destined for strategic projects by agreement with state institutions. The remaining 1.9 percent is reserved for unexpected expenses (Table 2.3). As the names of the projects suggest, many of the projects continuing from Phase I are delegated to local social organizations for implementation. In fact, in 2005, of 50 running projects (including continuing projects and projects contracted with state institutions), only nine were administrated directly by the CDPMM and the remainder, corresponding to around 80 percent of the total amount of the funds for project finance, were managed by local institutions (NGOs and CBOs) (interview with the sub-director of the CDPMM, August 2007). Figure 2.3 illustrates the flow of resources of the Peace Laboratory to implement projects at the local level. A few projects are implemented directly by the CDPMM through each subregional ETP. However, the majority of current projects are implemented by local NGOs or CBOs; or administrated by local NGOs, partners of the ETPs, which delegate the implementation to local CBOs. The contract projects agreed between the CDPMM and local state institutions can also show the same flow of resources through delegation of implementation to local institutions. There are three different types of contracts to achieve these ends: (1) commercial contracts; (2) agreements of cooperation (the provision of technical assistance or services which do not provide monetary resources); (3) inter-administrative agreements (with state entities). Most of the contracts agreed with local institutions are categorized in (1). Type (2) contracts are agreed when the project requires only the provision of technical assistance and/or services, and not monetary resources. Whether direct or indirect implementation, all the projects should follow a rigid procedure. Projects which are selected by a public open call, in particular, require professional assistance. Past open calls explored the rich resources of ideas and initiatives of the local people, but at the same time revealed that professional and technical support was necessary to formulate a feasible project proposal. The CDPMM systematized the creation


Table 2.3

41

Project finance funds by type of project (Phase II)

Type and name of project

Value in euros

%

12 388 636 4 163 982 3 161 199 356 187 71 237 171 443 297 060 106 856

75.0 25.2

Strategies of Line 2 (Total) Popular Women’s Organization (OFP) Schools for non-formal education EBIDS (Comprehensive Basic Schools) Regional culture Youth network AREDMAG-PROMESAa Communication Strengthening of civil society Sexual and reproductive health Ciudadana Educativa (education center) Food and nutritional security Núcleos de pobladores SAT (Tutorial Learning System) Women’s Network Barrancabermeja Prison Infrastructure

4 232 688 106 856 284 950 391 806 284 950 89 046 397 747 213 712 235 083 534 281 534 281 142 475 676 756 35 618 71 237 99 732 134 158

25.6

Strategies of Line 3 (Total) Forest Cacao Oil palm Fisheries Alicante (River Alicante project) Fruit in the Velez subregion Fruit in the Yariguies subregion Medium-scale industry Popular economies Cabildo Verde (NGO) Cattle raising

3 991 966 605 518 712 375 427 425 320 568 203 026 356 187 322 527 534 281 250 043 89 046 170 970

24.2

Projects continuing from Phase I Strategies of Line 1 (Total) Humanitarian spaces Project ATVC Catholic diocese of Magangué Agreement on peace and regional problems Observatory for Integral Peace (OPI) Projects on lands for title deed transfer

42


Table 2.3

(continued)

Type and name of project New Projects for Phase II A. Strategic projects agreed by state institutions B. Projects to be selected by open public call Reserve fund Total

Value in euros

%

3 808 795 1 082 810 2 725 985 312 554 16 509 985

23.1 (28.5) (71.5) 1.9 100.0

Note: a AREDMAG is the Community Radio Network Association of Middle Magdalena. Source:

CDPMM (2005).

of projects with technical assistance, a feasibility study before selection, and in the process of implementation also provided constant technical assistance, monitoring and final evaluation. Every step should be accompanied by technical assistance from CDPMM with the aim of having the local institutions gain the capacity to manage the whole process of project implementation themselves. ‘Humanitarian Spaces’ as an Example Project and their Local Impact The ‘humanitarian spaces’ project is a good example for understanding the importance and impact of PDPMM projects. This is a relatively new project, but receives the largest share of the Peace Laboratory budget (see Table 2.3). The PDPMM places importance on this project since it is designed to help local people develop autonomy in the face of threats of violence, and to remain in their homeland (Páez 2007). Currently the PDPMM identifies nine areas in the region as humanitarian spaces, which have been the most conflict-ridden in the region and difficult for external organizations to approach, due to the threat to life. The main strategies of the humanitarian spaces are the reinforcement of community organization and the presence of the state as the guarantor of human rights. Sometimes the project has built a hut (which looks like a large kiosk with a big straw or wooden roof) in these communities as the initial strategy to create a humanitarian space. The hut serves as an assembly hall for multiple purposes for the local people, and provides significant benefits to the local communities. For example, in the village I visited in the South César subregion, the existing primary school building and the health post were abandoned since people suspected that the surrounding area had been


43

mined. The hut, called the ‘Maloca’,19 was indispensable for providing temporary classrooms for the children in the village. The visit of a health brigade team for vaccinations, sent by the health secretary of the municipality, used the hut for their operation. It also served as a public space for many kinds of community meetings and events, including the celebration of Mass. Obviously, the space was strategic for the ETPs and local NGOs involved in the Program (PDPMM) to approach the people. Another ‘Maloca’ provided the venue for a cultural presentation by the youth group, including high school pupils. It gave motivation to the community to carry out cultural activities in order to preserve their traditional folk music and dance. This public space for the local community to gather and chat in safety gradually helped to recover communication and people’s confidence in each other. The narrative of an old woman in this village suggests this: ‘[We are happy to have this hut, because] we used to rush back home and shut ourselves in after five o’clock in the afternoon, since the páracos [paramilitary combatants] prohibited us to be in the street after dark.’ In general, the benefits of the hut are similar in all locations. The hut has the symbolic meaning of a humanitarian space, guaranteeing a public space in which the local people can speak freely. Obviously, the physical installation of the hut serves as a common space for education on human rights, solidarity and cohabitation. The space was also necessary for the workshops on local needs in accordance with the participatory method. These workshops served to formulate further productive projects in order to ensure food security and a peasant economy independent of illicit crops. In situations where the local community were prohibited by the guerrilla groups and the AUC from speaking out about human rights, the ETP teams had to approach the people prudently. However, the presence of national and international human rights NGOs, and international organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the EU, was helpful in protecting the public space from the intervention of actors in the armed conflict. In the mining zone in the south of Bolívar department, the local communities are scattered in small mining settlements in the San Lucas mountain range, without easy access to each other. In this case, symbolic huts or other public installations have not been provided as humanitarian spaces, but most of the budget has been destined for the organization of a popular congress of the association (Fedeagromisbol) which is alternately held at one of the scattered mining settlements in the San Lucas mountain range, with money provided in the form of travel allowances and food for the people who participate in the event. In this case, the main strategy is to guarantee the public sphere in which the communities can get together and hold discussions. The field trip is indispensable for the Observatory for Integral Peace

44


(OPI) team of the CDPMM and the municipality office of ombudsman of human rights to monitor the violations of human rights in these communities. Starting from this point, the activities in the humanitarian spaces can continue to work on the strategies in Line 2, such as education and social development, and proposals for local development; and strategies in Line 3, such as the enforcement of a self-sufficient economy and the defense of land. Being supported by external people, these communities have recovered their confidence and the courage to stay and struggle for development. Thus, under the most difficult situation in the region, the ‘humanitarian space’ project aims to combine the three strategic lines or fields of activity. The local impact is not easily visible in the short term in the form of the physical or economic development of communities; but the protection of public spaces for their use free from fear, in the company of external people with whom they share solidarity, is the most fundamental benefit for the people amid armed conflict. Building a ‘Maloca’, or traveling together with other community leaders to be in the company of the people in the humanitarian spaces, are the most efficient and effective strategies for protecting their lives.

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION UNDER EXTREME CONDITIONS Based on the analysis above and on my field research, I will point to the following four factors to explain why the PDPMM was able to work under these extremely difficult conditions. First of all, most of the local people in the project area, although perhaps not all of them, have no option but to live in their locality. It is not easy to show empirically the reasons which keep them there, but I assume that the following three explanations are possible: (1) grievances accumulate beyond the limit of tolerance, and the people decide to stay to resist them; (2) support and guidance by the local Catholic priests encourages them to dialogue; (3) assumptions about how hard it is to live outside their community. The existence of people who insist on staying in their communities is a prerequisite of the PDPMM to carry out its principle of sustainable development with local initiative. However, in order to proceed to create more peaceful and livable conditions, the PDPMM utilized the following five factors. Firstly, it mobilized social and voluntary organizations such as local NGOs and CBOs, which existed even in the 1980s under intensified violence. They became the partners of the ETPs in the implementation of their projects. Without these existing counterpart organizations, the involvement of the PDPMM would have been almost impossible.


45

Secondly, the qualified leadership and talents of the former director of the PDPMM, Francisco De Roux, to negotiate with the authorities and international organizations is definitely a determining factor in the success of the PDPMM as a movement, which has now sustained its activities for more than 12 years. Besides this charismatic leader, there have been local leaders with a talent for mobilizing the people. Most of them are laypeople, but their local knowledge sometimes helps the situation. CINEP specialists, who are well experienced in popular, and non-formal education, help to seek out hidden local leaders. The close relation between the CINEP and Pastoral Social through the Catholic Church has been fundamental in enhancing and exploring human resources in the local communities. Thirdly, the PDPMM provided most of its funds to local implementation organizations, such as CBOs, NGOs and núcleos de popladores, and these funds have been used for projects enhancing the living conditions of local people. This resource input has helped the people to realize the benefits of participation in the Program. Fourthly, the PDPMM resorted to government support as well as international aid organizations such as the World Bank and the European Union. This gave the PDPMM qualifications in the eyes of the government, and legitimacy in the eyes of the actors of armed conflict. This legitimacy helped the PDPMM to continue at least until the projects bore visible benefits for local residents. In the long term, however, the existence of the government counterpart of the EU fund holds the risk of generating greater control by the government with regard to the destination and the methodology of use of the funds. Lastly, other external factors have also supported the protection of human rights for which the PDPMM has struggled. The increasing involvement and intervention of the UNHCR and a change in government attention towards IDPs benefited the PDPMM (ACNUR 2004). The presence of national and international NGOs served to monitor the government peace process.20 Their company also facilitated the PDPMM in creating the humanitarian spaces under the threat of violence. Credibility for the PDPMM gained through the Peace Laboratory backed up by the EU also helped to increase recognition of the PDPMM in the region.

CONCLUSION The PDPMM is a social movement of resistance against violence and the aggressive development model under economic globalization, with the ultimate purpose of constructing a ‘territorial community’ in which

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the initiatives of local people as social agents should be respected and protected. In practice, the PDPMM is implemented by different local social organizations such as NGOs and CBOs. As discussed, some of them are clearly identified as social movement organizations of resistance against violations of human rights. Some had origins in the peasant movement or labor movement, claiming the basic needs for survival. Other CBOs, such as JACs or individual activists (community leaders) later became the operators of the small projects financed by the PDPMM. Thus, I argue that the PDPMM was based on the alliance between the local social movement organizations and the CDPMM. The existent CBOs and the social movement organizations emerged and were sustained under the threat of violence, due to the accumulated grievances against violations of human rights. In order to carry out the economic projects to create sustainable development with local initiatives, considerable financial resources were indispensable. As shown by the example of the humanitarian spaces project, human rights protection, such as monitoring and accompanying activities, are very costly. External resources were obtained through the negotiating skill, confidence, charisma and leadership of De Roux. Networking between the CINEP and the Catholic diocese of Barrancabermeja also helped, which was possible since both were founded by the Jesuit order. The EU logo on their cars and uniform shirts helped the activists to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the paramilitary groups. The PDPMM, a social movement under extreme conditions, was made possible by combining these domestically and externally available resources.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

For example, suppression and massacre against the workers of the oil company in Barrancabermeja in 1924, and massacre of the banana export company in Urabá in 1928. The tenure of the presidency of Colombia has been four years up to 2009. During the 1960s and 1970s, the agrarian reform movement was led by a newly created peasant organization, the ANUC (National Association of Peasant Land Users). For more details on the ANUC, see Múnera (1998) and Rivera Cusicanqui (1987). In November 2005, the CNRR (National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation) was established to deal with the protection of the property of the victims. However, the CNRR has been criticized for its weak consideration for the victims of the conflict compared with the attention given to the assailants (disarmed ex-combatants). ‘Department’ (departamento) is the Colombian local administrative division. Colombia currently has 32 departments. Each department is divided into several municipalities (municipios).

Community-based local development in Colombia 6.

7. 8.

9. 10. 11.

12.

13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19. 20.

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Mass transportation is quite limited. The most efficient method is the river transport system by motorboats, but the fares are high. Surface transportation and communication systems are still underdeveloped, including paved road systems connecting towns and villages. This testimony is exactly the same narrative as cited in Sanz de Santamaría (1991, p. 290), which points out that the peasants were shown four alternatives to choose from. The description of the history of PDPMM is based on information from its website (http://www.pdpmm.org.co/pdpmm.asp?grupo=pdpmm&id=%204, accessed 15 January 2008) and my interviews with Francisco De Roux and Libardo Barderrama (current director since October 2008), conducted in August 2007. Also see Duque (2004). The secular Catholic believers’ group which serves for mission as well as for social services to support poor communities. Currently, 30 municipalities compose the area of intervention of the PDPMM, as one more municipality was added later. Núcleos de pobladores were composed of local inhabitants who came to participate in the workshops organized by the PDPMM in its initial stage of research on local needs. Later they became key persons in the encouragement of other inhabitants in Middle Magdalena to participate in PDPMM activities. The full name of the institution is the Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation. This is the institution which was established under the direct control of the executive office of the president to work with social problems such as the alleviation of poverty. Up to October 2008, 24 activists among the staff of the CDPMM and local leaders who have participated in the Program (PDPMM) have been murdered by armed groups. In January 2009 the subregions were restructured into five. CORDIS (Corporación Regional para el Desarrollo Sostenible – Regional Corporation for Sustainable Development) is a local NGO based in Landázuri municipality. JAC is a state-initiated community-based organization established in 1958 by law with the aim of integrating local communities into the National Front regime. Co-opted by the traditional political parties, the JAC is the most basic CBO to represent local communities in relation to the state. Any poor community needs to create a JAC in order to press claims for their basic needs to the local administration. These are alternative education systems introduced in the rural sectors, and are known as Integrated Basic Schools of Sustainable Development (EBIDS). Of 68 personnel (full-time staff of the CDPMM), 47 were employed through labor contract by Social Action from the national government in August 2007. The term derives from the meaning of ‘indigenous territory’ in Spanish. In César, communities used this term to refer to the hut to symbolize a common space for community use. Concerning the evaluation of the role of NGOs in the alternative peace movement process, see Alther (2006) and Romero (2002).

REFERENCES ACNUR (Alto Comisionado de Naciones Unidos para los Refugiados) (2004), Balance de la política pública de prevención, protección y atención al desplazamiento interno forzado en Colombia, agosto 2002–agosto 2004, Bogotá: ACNUR. Ahumada, Consuelo (2003), ‘Las prioridades del nuevo orden munidial y su impacto sobre la crisis regional’, in Ahumada Consuelo and Arturo Cancino

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(eds), Comunidad Andina y Mercosur en la perspectiva del ALCA, Bogotá: Centro Editorial Javeriano, pp. 175–91. Alther, Gretchen (2006), ‘Colombian Peace Communities: The Role of NGOs in Supporting Resistance to Violence and Oppression’, Development in Practice, 16 (3–4): 278–91. Archila, Mauricio (2005), Idas y venidas, vueltas y revueltas: protestas sociales en Colombia 1958–1990, Bogotá: ICANH (Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia) y CINEP (Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular). Archila N., Mauricio, Ingrid Johanna Bolívar, Alvaro Delgado G., Martha Cecilia Garía V., Fernán E. González G., Patricia Madariaga V., Esmeralda Prada M. and Teófilo Vásquez D. (2006), Conflictos, poderes e identidades en el Magdalena Medio 1990–2001, Bogotá: CINEP. Bergquist, Charles, Ricardo Peñaranda and Gonzalo Sánchez (eds) (1992), Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources. Betancourt, Dario and Martha L. García (1991), Matones y cuadrilleros: Origen y evolución de la violencia en el occidente colombiano 1946–1965, Bogotá: IEPRI (Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales) de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia and Tercer Mundo. Calderón, Fernando (ed.) (1986), Los movimientos sociales ante la crisis, Buenos Aires: Universidad de las Naciones Unidas, CLACSO (Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales) e IISUNAM (Insituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México). Calderón, Fernando (1995), Movimientos sociales y política, México: Siglo XXI. CDPMM (Corporación Desarrollo y Paz del Magdalena Medio) (2005), ‘Plan Operativo Global II Fase Laboratorio de Paz 2005–2009’, unpublished paper. CEPAL (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe) (2006), Anuario estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe, 2006, Santiago: CEPAL. CODHES (Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento) (2005), Boletín No. 68, marzo 2005, Bogotá: CODHES. De Roux, Francisco (2003), ‘Importance of Community’, AGLOS News, 3: 14–19. De Roux, Francisco (2007), ‘Dignity and Globalization’, AGLOS News, 10: 16–23. Duque, Ubencel (2004), ‘Conflictos y paz, realidad y aprendizajes significativos en la región del Magdalena Medio, correspondiente a la década del 85 al 95’, Thesis to obtain the degree of Maestría en Desarrollo Educativo y Social (Master in Educative and Social Development) submitted to Centro Internacional de Educación y Desarrollo Humano, Universidad Pedagógica Nacional, Bogotá, September. Duquette, Michel, Maurilo Galdino, Charmain Levy, Berengere Marques-Pereira and Florence Raes (2005), Collective Action and Radicalism in Brazil: Women, Urban Housing, and Rural Movements, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Eckstein, Susan (ed.) (1989), Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Escobar, Arturo and Sonia E. Alvarez (eds) (1992), The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy, Boulder, CO: Westview. Ito, Hideharu (2001), ‘An Analysis of the Economic Activities of Colombia’s Leftist Guerrillas,’ Latin America Report, 18 (1): pp. 33–43.


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Kline, Harvey (1999), State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986– 1994, Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press. LeGrand, Catherine (1991), ‘Los antecedentes agrarios de la violencia; el conflicto social en la frontera colombiana, 1850–1936’, in Gonzalo Sánchez and Ricardo Peñaranda (eds), Pasado y presente de la violencia en Colombia, 2nd edn, Bogotá: CEREC, pp. 128–51. Livingstone, Grace (2003), Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War, London: Latin American Bureau. Machado, Absalón (1981), ‘Políticas agrarias en Colombia’, in Darío Fajardo, William Ramírez Tobón and Aíde Camargo Uribe (eds), Campesinado y capitalismo en Colombia, Bogotá: CINEP, pp. 57–87. Matías Rossi, Federico (2005), ‘Aparición, auge y declinación de un movimiento social: las asambleas vecinales y populares de Buenos Aires, 2001–2003’, Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe, 78: 67–88. Múnera Ruiz, Leopoldo (1998), Rupturas y continuidades: Poder y movimiento popular en Colombia 1968–1988, Bogotá: CEREC y Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Páez Segura, José Antonio (2007), ‘Los espacios humanitarios: una pedagogía en la vida’, unpublished paper. PDPMM (Programa de Paz y Desarrollo del Magdalena Medio) – OPI (Observatorio de Paz Integral) (2006), Informe semestral de la situación de violación a los derechos humanos, violencia política, infracciones al derecho internacional humano, acciones bélicas y acciones colectivas por la paz en Magdalena Medio colombiano, Barrancabermeja: PDPMM. Pizarro Leongómez, Eduardo (1991), ‘La insurgencia armada: raices y perspectivas’, in Gonzalo Sánchez and Ricardo Peñaranda (eds), Pasado y presente de la violencia en Colombia, 2nd edn, Bogotá: CEREC, pp. 387–408. Proexport (2007), Foreign Investment Report 2007, Proexport, retrieved 15 October 2007 from http://www.proexport.com.co/VBeContent/NewsDetail. asp?ID=7011&IDCompany=22. Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia (1987), The Politics and Ideology of the Colombian Peasant Movement: The Case of ANUC (National Association of Peasant Smallholders), Geneva: UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development) and CINEP. Romero, Mauricio (2002), ‘Sociedad civil, cooperación y mobilización por la paz en Colombia’, in Aldo Panfichi (ed.), Sociedad civil, esfera pública y democratización en América Latina: Andes y Cono Sur, Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, pp. 359–80. Romero Medina, Amanda (1994), Magdalena Medio: luchas sociales y violaciones a los derechos humanos 1980–1992, Bogotá: Corporación AVRE. Santamaría Salamanca, Ricardo (2004), ‘Los procesos de paz’, in Fernando Cepeda Ulloa (ed.), Fortalezas de Colombia, Bogotá: Planeta, pp. 463–88. Sanz de Santamaría, Alejandro (1991), ‘Violencia y desarrollo en las regiones campesinas colombianas’, in Edelmira Pérez (ed.), El campesinado en Colombia hoy: diagnóstico y perspectivas, Bogotá: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, pp. 287–303. Slater, David (1994), ‘Power and Social Movements in the Other Occident: Latin America in an International Context’, Latin American Perspectives, 21 (2): 11–37. Tirado Mejía, Alvaro (1998), ‘Violence and the State in Colombia’, in Eduardo

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Posada-Carbó (ed.), Colombia: The Politics of Reforming the State, London: Institute of Latin American Studies, pp. 111–24. UNEP (United Nations Environmental Programme)/GRID-Europe & UNEP/ GROD-Arendal (2006), ‘Armed Guerrilla Groups on War in Colombia’, Châtelaine: UNEP-DEWA/GRID-Europe. UNODC (United Nations Office for Drug and Crimes) (2006), Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey, June 2006, New York: UNODC, retrieved 15 October 2007 from http://www.unodc.org/pdf/andean/Colombia_coca_survey_2005_eng.pdf. US Census Bureau (2006), ‘US International Trade in Goods and Services, April 2006’, retrieved 15 October 2007 from http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/ Press-Release/2006pr/04/. Vargas Velásquez, Alejo (1992), Magdalena Medio Santandereano, colonización y conflicto armado, Bogotá: CINEP. Vargas Velásquez, Alejo (2003), ‘El conflicto armado colombiano y su incidencia sobre la región andina’, in Ahumada Consuelo y Arturo Cancino (eds), Comunidad Andina y Mercosur en la perspectiva del ALCA, Bogotá: Centro Editorial Javeriano, pp. 153–74. Zabala Castañeda, Sonia Nadiesda (2003), ‘The Magdalena Medio . . . Region for the Life’, Paper presented for the panel discussion of COE-AGLOS Inaugural Symposium in Tokyo, Sophia University, Tokyo.

3.

Institutional readiness and resource dependence of social movements: the case of provincial development forums in Thailand Shinichi Shigetomi

INTRODUCTION Resource mobilization theory, one of the mainstream modern theories of social movement analysis, focuses on the capability of social movement organizations (SMOs) to mobilize resources and manufacture their environments by using acquired resources effectively (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977). Since the theory has been conceived and developed in the North American context of social movements, it assumes a situation where SMOs find abundant resources and have discretion in mobilizing the resources through the associative or market setting (Morris and Herring 1987, p. 162; Lo 1992; Skocpol 2003; Shigetomi, Chapter 1 in this volume). However, the availability of resources alone does not automatically create a movement. Moreover, in many developing countries, SMOs cannot expect such affluence even though resources are still important to their activities (Schuurman 1989, p. 15). In fact, the leaders of social movements face constraints in the following two ways. Firstly, they are embedded in institutional settings which determine the readiness for utilization of the resources required for the purposes of their movement. Secondly, the management of their organizations is influenced by the source of the resources. In this context, I will argue that the formation of some social movements can be better explained by the institutionalist and the resource dependence approach. In other words, the institutional environment shapes the form of social movements which mobilize resources (Scott 2001) while the resources themselves bring external control to the movements (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). For this discussion, the case of a Thai civic movement which seeks more participatory local development at the provincial level will be examined.

51

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PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT FORUMS AND THEIR BACKGROUND Since the late 1990s, there has emerged in many provinces of Thailand a new type of civic group which has tried to be involved in the local development process. These groups are new in terms of (as discussed in more detail later) profiles of leaders, form of organization and type of activities compared with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which have long been working in this field. Indeed, the new groups have a collective identity of not being NGOs or community organizations even though it is often the case that they include some NGO activists and local leaders. Since they put emphasis on coordination and networking with various issue-specific networks and organizations within the province, and between the national and local level, I will call them ‘provincial development forums’ or just ‘forums’ in this chapter. There is, at present, no commonly used categorical name for this type of group, and this reference seems suitable since many groups use a Thai word meaning ‘forum’ in the name of their organization. Common Features of the Forums There are no statistics or national-level surveys relating to the provincial development forums. However, there is a report on the forums in about half of all 76 provinces (HPL Project et al. n.d.), while I myself confirmed the existence of these forums in 23 provinces through several field trips between 2004 and 2007. These forums are by no means the provincial chapters of a national organization. Rather, they have been formed through the initiatives of individuals in each province without any sort of interprovincial coordination. However, we can find some isomorphism among the forums. Firstly, they share an ideal image of society. Most forums have: (1) popular participation in governance; and (2) control over market mechanisms (or a preference for a communitarian ideal) as the targets of their movement. This reflects the problems of the local Thai economy, society and public administration. For a glimpse of what I will discuss later, they share the recognition that the formal political and public administration systems lack the mechanism to listen to the voices of local people, and that market-oriented economic development for the past few decades has brought various economic and social problems to local Thai society. The form of movement shows some similarity too. They put more emphasis on networking with those who jointly implement certain local development projects, or between local practitioners and the outside, often national-level, project owners rather than implementing projects in the locality themselves. There are groups that limit their sphere of activities to

The case of provincial development forums in Thailand

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a certain district or municipality. However, in this case they tend to implement projects which directly promote local development since they have a more limited area for activities. The emphasis on networking, therefore, is a salient feature of provincial-level forums. Meanwhile, forums covering several provinces are rarely seen. The vision and form of the movement are reflected in the names of organizations as seen in the following list of some forums (which include the province name): the Amnat Charoen Province Community Organization Network, the Surin Forum, the Phang Nga Conservation Center and the Development Activities of Citizens Forum of Prachin Buri. These names include, in addition to the provincial names, the words such as ‘forum’, ‘citizens’ (civil society), ‘development’, ‘community’, ‘network’, and words which reflect love for the home province. In some provinces, there are two or more organizations with similar features. The content of activities may have some similarities too. Firstly, most forums pay attention to projects enhancing self-reliance and the organizational capabilities of the community. For example, they try to connect organizations such as those promoting organic farming, stronger community organizations and community radio stations. Secondly, many forums have activities relating to the conservation and management of natural resources in the locality. Popular activities include connecting community forest groups, and coordinating groups of people who have a stake in natural resources such as rivers. The forum sometimes becomes the center of collective action against environmental destruction. Thirdly, the forums actively participate in political and public administration issues. They play the role of recruiting and coordinating volunteers for poll-watch activities, sometimes submit open letters to the local government representative, and even call meetings to express critical viewpoints against government policies. The leaders of the movement share similar backgrounds. Many forums have provincial middle-class people, especially government officials working in the provinces, as their leaders. Those often identified are staff of the Ministry of Public Health (including medical doctors and nurses), and teachers and professors under the Ministry of Education. These publicly minded officials often work with NGO workers and local leaders in the forums. In fact, I found 26 groups with government officials (including those retired) as the main leaders among 34 forums in the 23 provinces surveyed (Table 3.1). Preceding Studies These forums have been almost totally neglected in scholarly analysis. Compared with the considerable accumulation of studies on NGOs and poor people’s mass mobilizations,1 most of the literature on the forums is

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Table 3.1

Number of main leaders of provincial development forums by personal backgrounda

Government officialsb NGO workers Business entrepreneurs Farmers Monks Number of forums surveyed

26 5 4 4 2 34

Notes: a The one or two most important leaders in each forum. b Includes teachers, staff of government medical institutes, state enterprise workers, and persons retired from government institutions. Source:

Survey by author for the period 2004 to 2007.

in the form of reports describing the purpose, content and results of the project, except one by Connors (2003, p. 232) which refers to activities of the forums from the viewpoint of Thai nationalism.2 Connors also mentions that the provincial-level civic assemblies (prachakhom) were formed by the initiative of a government agency (p. 229). However, most assemblies were short-lived and were by no means the origin of the present provincial forums. The origin of the forums can be more properly traced to the Social Investment Fund (SIF) project in the late 1990s, but the assessment studies on the SIF project neglect the impact on the intermediary institutions at the provincial level (Shigetomi 2009). Such poor attention may be attributed to the characteristics of the forums. Unlike the mass mobilization of poor people, the forum movement is not eye-catching, but moderate, very often cooperative with some government agencies, and small in terms of the number of active participants. It is still new compared with the NGO movement, which traces back to the 1960s in Thailand. Economic and Political Background A brief overview of the economic and political situation of Thailand may be helpful for understanding the background to the formation of provincial development forums. Eighty percent of the population of Thailand, if the Bangkok Metropolitan Area is excluded, still live in non-municipal areas (NSO 2002). The major issues of local development, therefore, relate to the rural economy and society. Rural Thailand has experienced rapid change since around 1960 (Shigetomi 2004b). The rural economy, based on paddy cultivation with


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priority on self-consumption and supported by natural resources from the surrounding forest, quickly gave way to market-oriented agriculture. The export market opportunity of upland crops stimulated farmers to clear forests for cultivation. At the same time, the farmers found other opportunities to sell their labor for non-agricultural activities. Although this non-farm source of income increased the total income of farm household in real terms, the income disparity between the rural and urban dwellers widened. Poverty in comparative terms continued to be a serious problem and a source of grievances of rural people, who always feel they are unfairly treated in the market mechanism. Increasing dependency on the money economy brought farmers new problems, such as farm debt. This dependency became more serious as the natural resources around their villages diminished. Urban culture poured into the villages and affected the behavioral norms of rural people, especially the younger generation, and this is now considered to be one of the most serious social problems in Thailand. The formal political system hardly works as a channel for local people to deliver their grievances. Up to 1973, politics had long consisted of a military dictatorship under which the bureaucracy controlled the public administration for the sake of bureaucracy (Riggs 1966). In 1973, this polity was challenged by students who successfully mobilized mass protests against the military dictatorship. Some farmers started to voice their grievances, such as disputes with landlords and moneylenders. Even though the military resumed power after violently oppressing the democracy movement in 1976, it recognized that democratization to some extent was needed to reduce the influence of the dissidents, who now joined in the Communist Party of Thailand based in the forests, and to restore stability to politics and society. At last, in the 1980s, a parliamentary political system became the normal state and political parties competed for seats in elections. However, the politicians gave priority to their interests over public policies, while political parties changed members and political alliances according to their interests rather than any political standpoint. In this situation, people could not expect to get their voice heard by the political elites through votes. It was the first time that local people, especially those in rural areas, had voted for the policies of a political party when Thaksin Shinawatra and his party won a majority in the 2001 election by campaigning on populist policies. The situation did not continue long, since Thaksin’s attitude and undemocratic administration created an excuse for military intervention. The local administration system of Thailand does not facilitate the voicing of grievances by rural people to the government, either. The central government ministries have provincial and district offices to implement their policies in rural areas (Figure 3.1). Although the subdistrict (tambon) and the administrative village (muban) are governed by representatives of

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National

Administered by government agencies

Province (changwat)

District (amphoe)

Subdistrict (tambon) Administered by representatives of the people

Figure 3.1

Administrative village (muban)

Local administrative hierarchy in Thailand (rural areas)

the residents, their autonomy is quite limited. A subdistrict has a governance body called the Tambon Administrative Organization (TAO) with an assembly of local representatives, a budget and officials for administrative works. However these officials are assigned by the central government and the budget is heavily dependent on subsidies from the government. The ‘administrative village’ receives no allocation of budget for its ordinary administration. In this setting of local administration, most development projects are designed, financed and supervised by the central government agencies, leaving only implementation to local governance bodies. These structures of economy, politics and public administration have been the cause of dissatisfaction on the part of rural people. However, these structural problems themselves have not given rise directly to the social movement which we discuss in this chapter. In order to understand how the forums emerged, it is necessary to identify the institutions which prepared the ground for the movement’s appearance.

FORMATION OF INSTITUTIONAL READINESS FOR THE MOVEMENT Through economic and political development since the 1970s, some institutional conditions were prepared in the following fields. They were:


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(1) local organizations at the community level; (2) the legitimization of the communitarian ideal; (3) the institutions of the government’s public administration; and (4) the network of provincial-level leaders. Self-Organizing Activities of Local People at the Community Level When the market economy started to intrude rapidly into Thai rural economies, the villagers had formed hardly any formal endogenous organizations, but were organized along the hierarchal mechanism of local administration. Even organizations for social purposes, such as women’s groups and youth clubs, were formed by the government and played only supportive roles for the government’s policy implementation. It was rare to find any economic groups other than those receiving loans from state agencies, such as cooperative banks and agricultural cooperatives. The political situation did not allow many NGOs and volunteers to enter remote villages until the 1980s. In this way, villagers had to struggle individually for survival and faced new economic problems like farm debt under a situation moving toward a money-oriented economy. Both the government, which experienced rural unrest in the 1970s, and NGOs, which found a space for activity after the alleviation of political oppression, started to organize rural people for the struggle against the new economic problems. They persuaded villagers to form voluntary groups which pooled some of their private resources for mutual help. A savings group is a good example. The members save money every month and lend the pooled money to some of the members at a lower interest rate than that of moneylenders. In a rice bank – also popular, especially in the region prone to drought – villagers stock a certain amount of their paddy for lending out to the members who face a shortage of rice for home consumption. These new organizations were mostly formed at the administrative village level, which often shared the same geographical area of a cluster of indigenous communities, and spread nationwide in the 1980s (Shigetomi 1998). The villagers also started collectively to conserve and manage local natural resources, such as forests and swamps, which became scarce after being exploited for agricultural and other short-term economic use (Shigetomi 2007). According to my calculation from a database covering every administrative village, more than 40 percent of villages in the late 1980s had some kind of popular economic organization at the grass-roots level, that is, a savings group, a rice bank, a buffalo bank or a cooperative shop.3 Not all the reported groups in this database, I assume, are active and they might not cover all villagers since they accept only voluntary participants. However, the leaders of these organizations can be alternative contact points for outside agencies, both governmental and non-governmental,

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for grass-roots access to people bypassing the formal local administrative system. Some projects, such as those for hearing the demands of the grassroots people and mobilizing volunteers, do not have to cover all the population, but need inputs from ordinary people who may never be contacted through the formal system. Legitimization of the Communitarian Ideal These grass-roots organizations were new for local people, and at first both local leaders and facilitators faced many problems. Even NGO projects could not escape the difficulties (Seri 2005). One of the pioneer NGOs which promoted savings groups and rice banks organized a seminar with other NGOs and rural development workers to review their past performance, in which it was said that they had not respected the initiatives of the local people (CCTD 1981). In the experiences of and reflections on rural development work, NGO workers discovered the importance of ordinary people’s perspectives based on the local culture and social structure. They later conceptualized this as ‘community culture’. This idea was, as explained above, originally shaped as an approach for rural development work. At the same time, it implied a value change, from negative to positive, about local culture. Some scholars asserted historical backgrounds for this culture, and were influential enough to disseminate a belief that Thai village communities had been governed by the principle of mutual love and self-reliance before the intrusion of the market economy (Chatthip 1991). This concept has been developed into a political and national ideal by people who are involved in macro-level politics and policy-making. Prawase Wasi (1994), a respected medical doctor and social thinker, argued that the strength of community was the key to solving the present problems of society. In this context, ‘community’ does not merely mean a unit of rural society or rural culture, but is rather a concept showing the ideal image of the state. It is important to mention that some proponents of communitarian ideals were those in a position to influence government policies to some extent. Prawase was a subcommittee chairman of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), the governmental planning agency, in the mid-1990s and influential in the ground design of the national development plan in those years. Ekkawit Na Thalang, another staunch proponent of this idea, was the secretary-general of the National Cultural Commission from 1988 to 1991 (Connors 2003, p. 237). As a result, ‘community culture’ has changed from an approach or a principle of rural development practices into an ideal for state

The case of provincial development forums in Thailand Words per 10 000 letters 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 5th 1982–86

6th 1987–91

7th 8th 1992–96 1997–2001 Plan number/Years covered

9th 2002–06

59

10th 2007–2011

Source: Counted and calculated from the documents in the homepage of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), retrieved 20 December 2007 from http://www.nesdb.go.th/.

Figure 3.2 Frequency of appearance of the word ‘chumchon’ (community) in each of the National Economic and Social Development Plans administration. In the eighth five-year development plan for 1996–2001, the word ‘community’ (in Thai, chumchon) appears 2.7 times per page, or in terms of frequency per number of Thai letters, seven times that of the previous plan. The heavy use of this word is seen in the following five-year plans too (Figure 3.2). The essence of the community culture concept resides in stressing the mutual assistance and autonomy of local people. Mutual assistance stands as the opposite to market competition, while autonomy stands as the opposite to centralized control by the state. Communitarian thought as an antithesis to market and state has become an ideal which is taken for granted, and which can hardly be denied even though it is also hard to pursue in actual policies and administration. Institutional Modification of Public Administration The highly centralized system of public administration for local development was forced to undergo some modification when political and economic crisis shook the existing order. Coping with the unrest in rural areas in the 1970s, the government recognized that rural development

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for alleviating rural poverty was an urgent task. In the mid-1970s, the Community Development Department in the Ministry of the Interior initiated a new model of community organization, including savings groups and rice banks. When Prem Tinsulanonda, who was previously the commander-in-chief of the army in a region where rural poverty and the communist movement were apparent, took the helm as prime minister in 1980, he assigned the NESDB to design a poor village development program as the focal point of the fifth national development plan from 1981. The National Rural Development Program (NRDP) was inaugurated under a national commission, which included the prime minister as the chairman and the rural development section of the NESDB as the actual program designer. Under this program, the local people could choose suitable projects for their villages from a menu of various rural development projects targeted for poor villages. This was one step, even though still small, towards popular participation and away from the former totally centralized system in which the government retained all decision-making powers concerning project content and implementation sites (Shigetomi 2000). In 1984, a year before the termination of the program, the NRDP set up a fund called the Rural Development Fund (RDF), which anticipated a more active participation of local people in rural development. It was designed to provide money for projects planned by local people. At the beginning, the NESDB directly supervised the fund, but it soon recognized that the fund should be managed under a more flexible system, and transferred supervision of the fund to the Government Savings Bank (GSB), a state enterprise which has many provincial branches. As for the problem of urban poverty, the NESDB later, in 1992, set up another fund called the Urban Community Development Fund (UCDF) for slum dwellers’ organizational activities and left the management to a non-governmental agent (the Urban Community Development Office) under the National Housing Authority, another state enterprise. This institutional framework was later applied to the management of the SIF, and the two funds were merged into one under the supervision of the Community Organization Development Institute (CODI), an independent public organization for promoting local organizations. Another incident which shook the bureaucratic regime occurred in May 1992. The military opened fire on demonstrators protesting against the army chief taking the post of prime minister after throwing down an elected government in 1991, accusing politicians of enormous corruption. Fierce criticism was aimed against not only the military but also the political and public administration system, which was not strong, democratic or efficient enough to prevent military intervention. A series of events then


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occurred to push forward political reform. One important topic of this reform was how to control the opportunistic behavior of politicians and the power of bureaucrats. Introducing non-governmental individuals and institutions into the governance was considered to be one of the solutions. For example, a volunteer organization for monitoring elections was set up under governmental sponsorship. Meetings for hearing public opinions about the draft Constitution were called in the provinces. Some government agencies started to finance NGOs too. In the process of writing the eighth national development plan, the NESDB invited many non-state actors to give opinions and asked a coordinating body of NGOs to organize provincial meetings for hearing local voices. The participation of non-state actors in the governance has some legitimacy in public administration. In the eighth five-year national development plan, the word ‘participation’ (in Thai, kan mi suan ruam) appeared on average once every two pages, or at 12 times the frequency of the previous plan (Figure 3.3). Word per 10 000 letters 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 5th 1982–86

6th 1987–91

7th 8th 1992–96 1997–2001 Plan number/Years covered

9th 2002–06

10th 2007–2011

Source: Counted and calculated from the documents in the homepage of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), retrieved 20 December 2007 from http://www.nesdb.go.th/.

Figure 3.3

Frequency of appearance of the word ‘ kan mi suan ruam’ (participation) in each of the National Economic and Social Development Plans

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Network Formation by Provincial Activists Non-state actors often had occasion to participate in the public sphere in the series of political events in the 1990s. First of all, just after the May 1992 incident, there were protest rallies organized in several provinces. In the process of political reform, non-state actors found opportunities to participate again. Poll-watch volunteers, public hearings on the draft Constitution and meetings about the eighth national development plan were organized at the provincial level. It was often the case that some provincial middle-class people, especially government officials (including medical doctors and teachers), who form the major part of the provincial intellectuals, actively participated in this series of events. Meanwhile middle-class people often took the initiative to form groups for tackling environmental problems, which became apparent and ubiquitous in the provinces in the late 1980s, following the decades of rapid economic development. These middle-class people, especially those who were students in the 1970s and had experienced the anti-dictatorship movements, came out into the public sphere when they were given the opportunity in the 1990s. They met, during the events, NGO activists, grass-roots leaders and other middle-class people who shared the same ideas, and formed loose informal networks among publicly minded people in the provinces. The institutional environment was created in this way up to the late 1990s. Considerable numbers of rural people were organized in voluntary organizations in their communities, while the promotion of community and popular participation became a widely recognized ideal. Some institutional modification in the public administration system was carried out. At the provincial level, there were some middle-class people who were ready to participate in the public sphere, forming loose networks. What was lacking was an occasion on which these people could collaborate for actual activities. Such an occasion was brought about in an unexpected and unintended manner at the end of the 1990s.

RESOURCES SWITCH ON THE MOVEMENT The Social Investment Fund and the New Resource Stream In July 1997, Thailand was abruptly hit by an economic crisis which halved the value of the baht to the dollar and cut the growth rate down to below zero. In order to survive the state of bankruptcy, the Thai government accepted financial support mainly from the International Monetary Fund


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(IMF) and the World Bank. As a part of this support, the World Bank put $1.2 million (equivalent to 48 million baht at the 1997 exchange rate) into Thailand as the Social Investment Fund (SIF).4 This program had both short-term and medium- to long-term targets. The former was to alleviate the negative impact on poor people as soon as possible, and therefore the Bank required the recipient government to distribute the funds within a short period – in the case of Thailand, only 40 months. The latter was to strengthen the capability of grass-roots and intermediary organizations, and therefore the government was obliged to distribute the funds through non-ministerial channels to the grass-roots. To manage the fund, the Thai government set up a headquarters, the Social Investment Fund Office (SOFO), under the GSB and invited a prominent economist to be the chairman and a senior NGO activist the secretary-general. For the swift distribution of funds and the close monitoring of project performances, the SOFO set up provincial committees. These were also not to be line agencies of the government. However, many NGOs, which had been accumulating the skill and social relations for assisting community organizations, were reluctant to cooperate since the fund came from the World Bank which, they believed, had been promoting unwelcome projects. In this situation, the SOFO directed its attention to government officials who showed a positive attitude to voluntary social activities. It was not difficult to find such people by tracing personal connections among government officials, since some of them had become identifiable during the political events of the 1990s. Once a person was identified, then others could be recruited through his or her network. Categorizing the occupational background of provincial committee members, around half were government officials, including those retired and working in state enterprises (Shigetomi 2009). The provincial committee had the task of screening the project proposals, approving the projects and monitoring the performance of approved projects. The committee members had to collaborate with each other and contact the fund applicants and recipients. Middle-class activists, who may have known each other before, turned into collaborators for the same purpose, distributing the funds for grass-roots development. They also built close connections with people at the grass-roots, whose situation they had not really been familiar with before. The SIF was followed by similar projects. After the termination of the main programs of the SIF, the foreign exchange profit of the fund was used to implement the subprojects of the government-initiated poverty and narcotics eradication projects, such as popular campaigns and training, which needed local people’s active participation. An NGO, the Local Development Institute (LDI), took responsibility for implementation. The Ministry of

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Public Health (MOPH) asked provincial civic groups to gather opinions from ordinary people for drafting the National Health Bill, which defines the rights of people in relation to their health. Even though the administrative hierarchy of MOPH reached down to the subdistrict (health centers) and the villages (health volunteers), it did not use these line agencies. Some other state agencies, such as the NESDB and the CODI, used a similar method to implement projects, which encouraged grass-roots people to make a community master plan for their own subdistrict. These agencies do not have line agencies in the provinces and rely on provincial civic groups to coordinate and advise people at the grass-roots. The following are similar projects (and the project owner) which I heard about from some forums: management support for the Village Fund (LDI), the coordinator of pollwatch activities (Election Commission), the project for promoting human rights (National Human Rights Commission), the project for improving residential conditions in urban communities (CODI), hearing the voices of people on government policies (National Economic and Social Advisory Board), provincial hearing for drafting the ninth national development plan (NESDB and LDI), the project of promoting sustainable agriculture (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and an NGO), coordinating research projects on local development (Thailand Research Fund). Among these projects, it is worth noting a unique project intended to develop provincial-level activists to become capable actors in local civil society. It was the Healthy Public Life (HPL) project5 which was designed by the LDI and another NGO, Civicnet Foundation, and sponsored by an independent state agency, Thailand Health Promotion Foundation, whose funds come from tobacco and alcohol taxes. The project designers chose 30 provinces with organizational potential and gave more than 2 million baht in total per province over three years. They let the provincial organizations design the projects, which promoted the participation of non-state actors in public affairs and gave 260 000 baht per year for their administrative expenses. This amount was enough for the groups to pay for their office and permanent staff. From Network to Organization The necessity of continuously managing resources stimulates a network into becoming an organization. For example, in Phang Nga Province in 1993, a government official of the Education Ministry formed a group of people, mostly her friends in provincial-level government offices, to talk about the destruction of mangrove forest and other environmental problems in the province. Later, the SOFO contacted this government official to ask her to coordinate the formation of the provincial committee


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of the SIF. The officer invited her friends in the environmental conservation circle to be committee members. She recalled that she understood the situation of grass-roots people only after committing herself to the SIF activity. After the termination of the SIF projects, she called the leaders of various local organizations and set up a group called the Phang Nga Conservation Center. It formed a network reaching to village-level leaders through four zone leaders. Up to 2004, the center took part in both governmentally and non-governmentally sponsored projects, such as a hearing on the National Health Bill, a campaign against narcotics and a youth training program (Yuphin Tatthawanit, interview on 27 April 2004). As for the case of Phetchabun Province, some activists who participated in the protest against the May 1992 incident and in the poll-watch activities during the 1990s became the provincial committee members of the SIF and then, after its termination, formed a group called the Phetchabun People’s Forum in order to maintain the network formed during the SIF project. The leading members are teachers, medical doctors, lawyers, a branch manager of a state enterprise, and farmers. It took on projects related to the village fund and the National Health Bill (Somphon Phithiyakun, interview on 30 June 2004). In Amnat Charoen Province, most provincial committee members of the SIF became members of the HPL project, and then formed the forum the Amnat Charoen Province Community Organization Network. According to a leader, they formed this forum to cope with the growing contacts from outside agencies which lacked knowledge of the human and organizational resources within the province. The forum functions as a node connecting the inside and outside of the province (Wirat Sukkun, interview on 13 September 2007). In this way, the frequent inflow of funds gave provincial-level activists an incentive to change their network into a formal organization. The funds would cover some expenses for coordination and contacts and, in some cases, facilitate the hiring of staff for full-time administration. This makes the organization a going concern. The impact of the SIF is apparent as 30 forums among the 34 which I surveyed have leaders who were involved in the SIF provincial committee. However, the movement did not take shape only due to resource input. Before the resources came, there were people who had communitarian ideals and had been involved in the political events of the 1990s (Table 3.2). The organizational activities of local people were ubiquitous and functioned well enough at that time for the leaders to continue their approach. Otherwise the collaborative links between the SIF committee members would have been dispersed along with the end of the funds. For the movement’s formation, the resources were an input while the institutions were the mechanism which shaped and guided the output. The actual process

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Table 3.2

Number of forums from which leaders participated in public events in the 1990s

Protest against May 1992 incident Poll-watch activity Meeting for drafting the 8th national development plan Meeting for drafting the 1997 Constitution Collective activities for environment conservationa SIF Number of forums surveyed Note: 1990s. Source:

a

6 12 4 10 7 30 34

Number of groups originating from environmental conservation activities in the Survey by author for the period 2004 to 2007.

of movement development will be described with reference to the case of a provincial forum in the following section.

EVOLUTION OF A FORUM AND ITS RESOURCE DEPENDENCE: THE CASE OF SURIN PROVINCE6 Formation and Institutionalization Surin Province is located in northeastern Thailand and is one of the poorest provinces, with per capita gross provincial product at US$674 (NESDB, 2007). As it shares a border with Cambodia, there were refugee camps within the province which had attracted NGOs since the end of the 1970s. These NGOs extended their services to the surrounding Thai communities and continued their activities even after the camps were removed. One of the senior NGO activists who had worked in rural Surin since the early 1980s was an early proponent of the community culture ideal. Compared with other provinces, therefore, Surin had ample NGO resources. Indeed, the NGO activists showed their leadership skills in the political events of the 1990s. One year after the May 1992 incident, a senior NGO activist organized a place to exchange ideas among people who were interested in public issues. This was the birth of the present Surin Forum.7 Among the 51 participants attending the kick-off meeting in May 1993, there were 12 teachers, 10 NGO workers, 10 business people and 9 farmers (Surin Forum 1993). In this way, NGO activists met activists from other sectors. Indeed, one leader of this forum, who teaches in a local university, recalled that he never had close contacts with NGO activists before the


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forum was established. In the early years, people gathered at this forum occasionally to exchange ideas and information, and sometimes expressed their opinion to the public. At the end of each meeting, the participants selected the coordinators for the following meeting. In this way, there was no institutionalization in the administration of the forum. When the frequency of meetings and the number of participants was still low, the forum could be managed with limited expenses and by borrowing the facilities of an NGO office. However, when the forum became involved in the movement for backing the new Constitution in 1997, the network expanded and as a result had more individuals to contact. Increasing expenses for networking, such as postage and telephone costs, required a more institutionalized administration management. The forum members decided around 1999 to employ full-time staff and have their own office.8 When the forum was in need of money to support its expanded activities, it started to receive projects and budgets brought in by outside agencies. The first one was a social mapping project proposed by the Phatthana Thai Foundation, an NGO founded by the NESDB which received a budget of 190 thousand baht (US$4800) during 1999 to 2000. The forum surveyed local organizations in the province and found ample organizational resources there. Now it had an indispensable database for networking, that is, the location, profile and the names of the leaders of local organizations. In 2000, the representative of the forum changed from an NGO activist to a lecturer of a state university, Manat Thanyakaset. Even though the Surin Forum did not participate in the SIF provincial committee, it came to share the characteristics of the provincial development forums at the beginning of the 2000s. After the social mapping project, various governmental and nongovernmental agencies requested the Surin Forum to play the role of coordination and implementation. A paper presented at the leadership meeting of February 2001 illustrated the situation that various agencies were contacting the forum (Surin Forum 2001a). Table 3.3 lists the names of agencies and their projects, categorizing agencies by their legal status. Although the document did not confirm whether the forum accepted all the proposals or not, it is remarkable that many national-level agencies had noticed the intermediary function of the Surin Forum. Indeed, the forum rode on a wave. Some of these projects gave funds to intermediary agents for their administrative expenses. In this way, the financial situation of the Surin Forum changed drastically. The account records show that revenue increased from about 43 thousand baht ($114) for the whole year of 1999 to about 320 000 baht for the 12 months from June 2000 to May 2001, 460 000 baht for the year 2002, and 400 000 baht for the year of 2003.9

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Table 3.3

Agencies contacting the Surin Forum around 2001 and their projects Agency

Government agencies National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB)

Health System Reform Office Election Commission Upper House Independent state agencies Community Organization Development Institute (CODI) SIF office (SOFO) Non-governmental organizations P-NET Foundation for Consumers Thailand Volunteer Service NGO Coordination Committee for Development The Foundation for Child Development Agent unknown

Project The 9th national development plan National Economic and Social Advisory Commission Border area developmenta Promoting sufficient economy and civil societya Health system reform Election coordination Human rights committee Provincial coordinator Livable City Project Networking on river basin Community master plan Poll-watch activities Networking consumers Community radio People’s plan Radio broadcast campaign

Educational reform Note: Source:

a

Project implemented by NGOs on behalf of the project owner agency. Surin Forum (2001a).

As the budget size increased, the management needed to be more formalized and institutionalized. At the February 2001 meeting, the leaders agreed on the necessity to make the direction of the organization clear and to deal with each activity in a more formalized way by assigning responsibility to specific members (Surin Forum 2001d). In October 2001, the forum called together various organizations in the province, including government agencies, and held a seven-day exhibition entitled ‘The People’s Assembly for Alternative Development’. Twenty participating organizations continued to discuss the course of development in their province after the event, and presented the outcome as ‘The Strategies of the People’s Network in Surin’ (‘yutthasat ruam khong khrua khai ongkon prachachon


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surin’; unpublished document) in October 2002. Now the forum had a vision which was formalized in a written document. Soon after that, the leaders of the Surin Forum agreed to undertake further institutionalization of management by formulating an implementation plan for each area of activity and an activity report every three months (Surin Forum 2002). Vision, Purpose and Strategies of the Movement Emphasizing the importance of resources from outside may give the impression that the forum was just an agent of outside agencies. However, the people gathering in the forum had their own public concerns and used the organization and resources for pursuing these purposes. The leader, Manat Thanyakaset, expressed the vision of the Surin Forum as follows: Representative democracy is not sufficient. The people should have some direct say in local resource management, elections, and the community economy. We do not want to see the rule of capitalism, the principle by which the weak are the victims of the strong, to penetrate society. There needs to be a system which places importance on culture and social mechanisms. Such a society should be formed through a changing of the consciousness of people. (Interview on 11 September 2007)

A similar ideal is expressed in the above-mentioned ‘Strategies of the People’s Network in Surin’. It consists of four strategies: (1) an autonomous community economy; (2) continuous resource and environmental management; (3) healthy communities; and (4) politics of the people’s sector. These strategy titles show that the activists share the communitarian ideology. To realize the vision, the Surin Forum declared the use of the following methods: (1) meetings for exchanging ideas and information; (2) research into the actual situation of local society; (3) campaigns for disseminating information and political ideas; and (4) collaboration with other organizations (Surin Forum 2001a). The forum clearly puts emphasis on collecting, exchanging and disseminating information. The projects which the Surin Forum independently engaged in were broadcasting a local radio program over the state radio broadcasting station at Surin, publishing a newsletter and calling meetings on political issues. The major outcomes, however, came from collaboration with other organizations. Indeed, the Surin Forum planned to implement the four strategies under the HPL project and collaborated with issue-specific networks such as alternative energy, community forests, youth, women, farmers’ associations, river basins, people’s media, sustainable agriculture, local artists,

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monks supporting local development, alternative public health, consumers, HIV patients, community master plans, locally brewed whisky, and poll-watch (HPL, Surin n.d.). The following are some examples in which the forum attained remarkable outcomes through networking with other organizations. The forum called community leaders to set up community radio broadcasting centers and to coordinate seven centers to increase their broadcasting capability. The forum collaborated with an NGO promoting organic farming and a consumer network to set up an open market (called the Green Market) in 2003. The market uses a municipal public place and allows organic farmers to sell their products there every Saturday. The NGO manages the market and certifies the organic methods of production. The Surin Forum negotiated with the municipal and provincial authorities to secure the location for the market and publicized the market to consumers through its radio program. The Surin Forum also took a leadership role in forming a network among the leaders of communities in the three main river basins in the province. Stimulated by heavy flooding in 1999, the forum formed a committee in which local leaders in the upper, middle and lower part of the river basin participate and talk about water resource use. When one of the rivers was faced with the danger of water pollution by municipal construction work, the forum organized a protest with the river basin committee and successfully stopped the construction work. Resource Dependency of the Movement To work as an intermediary organization, the Surin Forum needed funds for its coordination expenses. The major expense was the wages of fulltime staff, which accounted for 33 percent of total expenses between June 2000 and May 2001 and 66 percent in 2003 (Table 3.4). Administrative expenses for office rent, office supplies and communications, although not so large, were also indispensable for coordination. Expenses for transportation and food were also necessary for meetings. The costs of the project, which the forum ran by itself, were for radio broadcasting and newsletter publication. These never exceeded 50 percent, and became less than 20 percent after publication of the newsletter was abandoned in 2002. In other words, nearly 90 percent of expenses were defrayed for administrative costs. It is important to note that the costs of salaries for full-time staff, office rent and some office facilities were fixed regardless of the volume of activity. As mentioned above, the Surin Forum, as well as other forums, secured funds through accepting projects proposed by outside agencies. It can


Table 3.4

Expenses of the Surin Forum for 2000–2001 and 2003 June 2000 to May 2001

Salaries Meetingsa Administration Transportation Newsletter publication Radio broadcasting Seminars and training Others Total Note:

a

Sources:

71

2003

Baht

%

Baht

%

66 900 2 403 17 374 4 330 60 455 36 186 0 16 779 204 427

32.7 1.2 8.5 2.1 29.6 17.7 0.0 8.2 100.0

221 135 6 600 4 525 4 525 0 21 700 21 800 34 134 337 143

65.6 2.0 1.3 1.3 0.0 6.4 6.5 10.1 100.0

Includes expenses for food served during meetings. Surin Forum (2001b); Surin Forum (2001c); Surin Forum (2004).

therefore calculate income only during the time when the project is being implemented. Many project owners do not make generous estimates for the budget for administrative expenses, or even give one at all, since they want as much as possible of the funds to reach the target groups and projects. Even the HPL project, which aimed at strengthening the intermediary organizations, limited the administrative budget to 30 percent of the total. Under such constraints, the forum had to secure money for fixed administration costs. This situation satisfies the main conditions of the resource dependence model. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003, p. 43) argue that an organization is dependent on an external source of resources when: (1) the resource is important for the focal organization; (2) the interest group has discretion over resource allocation and use; and (3) there are few alternatives for securing the resource. In our case study, the money for administration was a crucial resource of the forum. Since outside agencies designed the project master plans, the forum did not have a free hand for resource use. Even if the forum did not like the conditions, it was not easy to find alternative sources with a similar purpose of activity. It is not realistic to assume that a social movement organization can collect money from a wide range of individual citizens or funding agencies in Thailand. Therefore, the forum had to commit to tasks they did not really wish to do if they wanted to receive funds for maintaining the organization. The more projects were added,

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the more the workload would increase. This required more money and manpower, and then more projects. This vicious circle actually occurred for the Surin Forum. From around 2000, it had been reacting positively to this circle and expanding its activities. However, when the HPL project ended in 2005, the forum lost its stable and sufficient source of income for maintaining the organization, and at the same time, the full-time staff took advantage of a good opportunity to be employed with another institution. The forum decided to break the vicious circle and return to a loose gathering of activists for exchanging information. Although the Surin Forum has returned to its original shape, the local organizations and issue-specific networks now know each other and can form collaborative links if and when they need to. National-level agencies also now know these local bodies, and vice versa. Having played its role, the Surin Forum took a bow and left the stage.

CONCLUSION The increasing resource inflow through non-governmental channels into the countryside in Thailand since the late 1990s became a boost for provincial development forums, social movement organizations which tried to influence the course of local development through coordinating and networking with various local organizations and national-level agencies. However, it was the institutional conditions which put the resources into the form of a social movement. Without the institutional readiness, the resources would have been consumed in vain. Since many provinces share the same institutional conditions, the forums, even though they were formed individually in each province, show a degree of isomorphism in organization, vision and strategies. The resources themselves were not abundant and not available discretionally for the social movement organizations in Thailand. The funds for administration, the crucial resource for the forums in coordinating and networking activities, came from outside agencies which designed project master plans and defined the guidelines of fund use. The forums took form and determined the activities they would carry out under this resource constraint. In the end, resource dependency forced the Surin Forum to change its organizational form. It is undeniable that resources are indispensable for SMOs and social movements. However, in order to know how the resources work in creating social movements, we have to identify the institutional and resource endowments which have been historically formulated in each area.


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NOTES 1. A brief review of literature on Thai NGOs can be seen in Shigetomi (2004a). As for the recent mass mobilization of farmers and poor people, Praphat (1998) and Somchai (2006) give detailed information. 2. Considerable numbers of activity reports were published by the project owners and implementers. Some examples are Chatri et al. (2004) and HPL et al. (n.d.). Chaiwat (2004) gives an account of political thought behind the movements. 3. A buffalo bank is a project for providing draft animals to poor farmers. A farmer raises a cow until it has a calf, which the farmer keeps for himself. The mother cow will be handed to the next beneficiary. A cooperative shop is a small grocery shop which villagers establish by collecting petty investments. Profits are shared by the shareholders. This database is called NRD.2C and was collected through a questionnaire distributed to every village headman. This survey has been conducted every two years since 1984. It asks if the village has a rice bank, cooperative shop, buffalo bank and members of a savings group (for the cooperative shop and buffalo bank, see note 4). The figure indicates that more than 40 percent of villages have at least one organization or a savings group member. 4. For a detailed description about the SIF in Thailand, see Shigetomi (2009). 5. In Thai, this project was called khrong kan chiwit satharana thong thin na yu. 6. This case study is based on my interviews with Manat Thanyakaset and other leaders of the Surin Forum on 9 June 2004 and 11–12 September 2007. 7. The same NGO leader once set up a forum in 1987, but it did not last long. 8. As far as I have studied the minutes of the Surin Forum’s meetings, the name of this permanent staff member appears for the first time in a meeting on 1 June 2000. 9. I found these figures in the administrative documents of Surin Forum.

REFERENCES Catholic Council of Thailand for Development (CCTD) (1981), Watthanatham thai kap ngan phatthana chonnabot [Thai Culture and Rural Development Work], Bangkok: CCTD. Chaiwat Thiraphan (2004), Mong anakhot kan muang thai kap thit thang prachathipatai lok: Bot wikhro wa duai pracha sangkhom kap kan muang phak prachachon phan withi khit choeng krabuan rabop [Looking at the Future of Thai Politics and the Course of Democracy in the World: Essays on Civil Society and People’s Politics through Systemic Thinking], Nonthaburi: Health System Research Institute. Chatri Chroensiri and his team (2004), Prachakhom nan kap kan chat kan khwam ru [Nan Forum and Knowledge Management], Bangkok: Knowledge Management Institute. Chatthip Nartsupha (1991), ‘The Community Culture School of Thought’, in Manas Chitakasem and Andrew Turton (eds), Thai Constructions of Knowledge, London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, pp. 118–41. Connors, Michael Kelly (2003), Democracy and National Identity in Thailand, New York and London: Routledge Curzon. Healthy Public Life Project (HPL), Local Development Institute (LDI), Civicnet, Mahidon University, and the Alliance of 35 Provincial Civil Societies (n.d.), Chiwit satharana khem khaeng thong thin na yu: Banthuk kan rian ru ruam kan

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khong phonla muang nai 35 changwat [Healthy Public Life: The Record of What the Civic groups in 35 Provinces have Learned], Bangkok: Local Development Institute. Healthy Public Life Project (HPL), Surin (n.d.), ‘Khrong kan saro saret ren sarunbun (SoSoSo.SoBo) thong thin surin sukhaphap’ [‘A Brochure introducing the Healthy Public Life Project in Surin’], Surin: Surin team for HPL project. Lo, Clarence Y.H. (1992), ‘Communities of Challengers in Social Movement Theory’, in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (eds), Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, pp. 224–47. McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald (1973), The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization, Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press. McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald (1977), ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory’, American Journal of Sociology, 82 (6): 1212–41. Morris, Aldon and Cedric Herring (1987), ‘Theory and Research in Social Movements: A Critical Review’, in Samuel Long (ed.), Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing, pp. 137–98. National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) (2007), Phalithaphan phak lae changwat 2548, [Gross Regional and Provincial Products 2005], Bangkok: NESDB, retrieved 18 December 2007 from http://www.nesdb.go.th/Portals/0/ eco_datas/account/gpp/book/bookgpp_2548.pdf. National Statistical Office (NSO) (2002), The 2000 Population and Housing Census, Bangkok: NSO. Pfeffer, Jeffrey and Gerald R. Salancik (2003), The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Praphat Pintoktaeng (1998), Kan muang bon thong thanon: 99 wan samatcha khon chon lae prawatisat kan doen khabuan chumnum prathuang nai sangkhom thai [Politics on the Street: 99-Day Protest of the Assembly of the Poor and the History of Mass Protest in Thai Society], Bangkok: Krirk University. Prawase Wasi (1994), Kan phatthana prachathiptai lae kan pathirup thang kan muang [Development of Democracy and Political Reform], Bangkok: Samnak phim mo chaoban. Riggs, Fred Warren (1966), Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity, Honolulu: East-West Center Press. Schuurman, Frans J. (1989), ‘Urban Social Movements: Between Regressive Utopia and Socialist Panacea’, in Frans Schuurman and Ton Van Naerssen (eds), Urban Social Movements in the Third World, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 9–26. Scott, W. Richard (2001), Institutions and Organizations, 2nd edn, Thousand Oaks, CA, London, UK and New Delhi, India: Sage Publications. Seri Phongphit (2005), Khrua khai: yuthawithi phua prachakhom khem khaeng chumchon khem khaeng [Network: Strategy for a Strong Civil Society and Strong Communities], Bangkok: LIFE Learning Institute for Everyone. Shigetomi, Shinichi (1998), Cooperation and Community in Rural Thailand: An Organizational Analysis of Participatory Rural Development, Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies. Shigetomi, Shinichi (2000), ‘Noson kaihatsu seisaku: henkaku ni okeru seido to kojin’ [‘Rural Development: Institutions and Individuals in the Process of


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Reform’], in Akira Suehiro and Shigeki Higashi (eds), Tai no keizai seisaku: seido soshiki akuta, Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies, pp. 215–58. Shigetomi, Shinichi (2004a), ‘Introduction’, in Shinichi Shigetomi, Kasian Tejapira and Apichart Thongyou (eds), The NGO Way: Perspectives and Experiences from Thailand, Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies, pp. 1–20. Shigetomi, Shinichi (2004b), ‘Four Decades of Development in the Thai Rural Sector and the Role of Government’, in Takamasa Akiyama and Donald F. Larson (eds), The Dynamics of Rural Development in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, pp. 294–379. Shigetomi, Shinichi (2007), ‘Publicness and Taken-for-Granted Knowledge: A Case Study of Communal Land Formation in Rural Thailand’, Discussion Paper no. 108, Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies. Shigetomi, Shinichi (2009), ‘The Social Investment Fund and the Emergence of Provincial Agents for Local Development in Thailand’, in James Midgley and Tang Kwong-Leung (eds), Social Policy and Poverty in East Asia: The Role of Social Security, London and New York: Routledge. Skocpol, Theda (2003), Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Somchai Phatharathananunth (2006), Civil Society and Democratization: Social Movements in Northeast Thailand, Copenhagen: NIAS Press. Surin Forum (1993), ‘Rai chu phu khao ruam surin sewana 1/2536’ [‘The Members who Attended the the First Meeting of the Surin Forum in 1993’], unpublished document dated 16 May. Surin Forum (2001a), ‘Bot thot long sonoe’ [‘An Idea to be Proposed’], unpublished document dated 18 February. Surin Forum (2001b), ‘Ktichakam prachum khana tham ngan prachakhom surin sewana’ [‘Activities of Surin Forum Working Group’], unpublished document. Surin Forum (2001c), ‘Sarup kha chai chai khong klum surin sewana tang tae duan tulakhom 2543–phrutsaphakhom 2544’ [‘Summary of Expenses of Surin Forum from October 2000 to May 2001’], unpublished document. Surin Forum (2001d), ‘Sarup phon kan prachum khana tham ngan pracha sangkhom surin sewana wan thi 18 kumphaphan 2544’ [‘Summary of the Surin Forum Working Group Meeting on 18 February 2001], unpublished document. Surin Forum (2002), ‘Rai ngan kan prachum klum surin sewana 20 prusachikayon 2545’ [‘The Minutes of the Surin Forum Meeting on 20 November 2002’], unpublished document. Surin Forum (2004), ‘Klum surin sewana ngop raidai-kha chai chai samrap raya wela 1 pi (mokarakhom–thanwakhom 46)’ [‘Revenue and Expenditure of Surin Forum for One Year (January–December 2003)’], unpublished document.

PART II

Structure behind Political Opportunities

4.

Strategies for fragmentary opportunities and limited resources: the environmental protest movement under communist China in transition Kenji Otsuka

INTRODUCTION China, during its long history, has experienced numerous cycles of grassroots movements and their repression by governing authorities. In the twenty-first century, China continues to maintain a socialist (communist) state, while shifting its socio-economical system from a planned economy to a market economy. Under the communist regime undertaking the transition towards a market economy, it is a challenging task for people to protest and act against the dominant regime in securing basic human rights. Despite government efforts to establish an environmental policy over the last 30 years since the 1970s, environmental issues are becoming serious social problems. Protests by civilian groups against damage caused by environmental pollution, or plans for development that are feared to cause future environmental pollution and destruction in China, are on the increase. Since the 1990s, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved in environmental movements have emerged despite continued social control exercised by the Communist Party and the government. Concerning environmental issues in China, only a few articles covering protest movements by local people have been published (Shi and Cai 2006; Zhang 2006, 2007), even though there are already a considerable number of studies on environmental NGO activities (Saich 2000; Ho 2001; Otsuka 2002; Economy 2004; Turner and Lü 2006; Yang 2005). Among the large variety of environmental NGOs in China, most have avoided touching on human rights issues that are considered sensitive to the party and the government. It should be noted, however, that some NGOs have played 79

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an important role as mouthpieces for victims and politically disadvantaged people who suffer, or may suffer, economical, social and, in the worst case, health problems caused by pollution and environmental destruction. This chapter focuses on environmental movements in China, especially social movements protesting against existing or potential hazards and destruction of the environment. In the study of social movements, questions generally arise as to why and how movements emerge and develop. Indeed, these movements generally arise from a certain degree of grievance by people who (may) suffer economic, social and health-related damage, and this fact can serve directly to answer the first question of ‘why?’ Grievance alone, however, does not explain the fact that there are many cases in China where no social movement occurs despite serious environmental hazards and clear discontent among the people. To explore these questions, research on social movements needs to focus on the process of their emergence and mobilization, as well as the institutional and social bases for these movements. Following this introduction, the second and third sections will review institutional and social change for social control, and environmental policy, to understand the institutional and social foundations of environmental movements. The fourth section will examine several different cases of environmental protest movements in China. The fifth section will discuss the emergence and development of these environmental movements taking place in the transitions found in communist China as reviewed in the second and third sections, and introduce the concept of ‘fragmentary opportunity’ to explain what is being observed. The last section will summarize the major findings in this chapter and conclude by suggesting aspects for further study.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL CONTROL AND DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Institutionalization of Social Control1 Several cycles of riot and suppression dating back to the late Qing Dynasty in the nineteenth century can be found in the history of modern China (Fairbank 1992). Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the CCP too has adhered to the control of social organizations and movements under the principle of ‘Democracy for the people, dictatorship for the enemies of the people’ (Mori and Kokubun 1994, pp. 20–21), and it

The environmental protest movement under communist China

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was during the war years between the Communist Party and the People’s Party just before the establishment of the PRC that a system was instituted against anti-communist organizations which served as the prototype for the registration and management of social associations constituted later (Wu and Chen 1996, pp. 19, 24). In 1950, the following year of its establishment, the PRC government constituted the Provisional Registration Method of Social Associations. Based on this the Interior Ministry constituted detailed enforcement rules that were enacted as law in 1951. Social associations, which were diversified in the late Republic, were selectively registered under this registration method, and groups regarded as reactionary organizations were suppressed (Xin and Zhang 1999, pp. 86–7). Beginning with the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP, held in December 1978, the social confusion caused by the Cultural Revolution (launched since 1966) was critically reviewed, and a policy guideline for reform and openness was adopted. As the state’s unified system of resources distribution collapsed, the ‘work units’ (danwei) subordinated to state administration transformed into independent profitmaking groups operating in the market economy. Likewise, government agencies came to establish their own respective social associations able to maintain and expand their own interests within the new situation created by these arrangements. The party and the government began to consolidate these social associations early in the 1980s, out of fear that their increase might cause social confusion. The Ministry of Civil Affairs (minzheng bu), newly established in 1978 during the preparation period for reform and openness, was charged in 1988 with the administration of social associations (Wu and Chen 1996, pp. 6, 24). Furthermore, in the 1980s, reforms were undertaken not only to the economic system, but to the political system as well. However, after the clashes between students and citizens demanding democratization, and units of the People’s Liberation Army, in Beijing on 4 June 1989 (the Tiananmen Incident), the party and the government retracted the reforms of the political system and voluntary political organizations. Democratization movements came to be strictly regulated (Okabe and Amako 1994, pp. 227–75). In October of the same year, the Regulations for Registration and Management of Social Associations were issued for the purpose of strengthening the administrative management of social associations (Wu and Li 1998, pp. 6–7; Xin and Zhang 1999, pp. 93–4). This trend, however, turned again after Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Lecture on the Occasion of the Tour to South China’ (nan xun jiang hua) in 1992, and officially recognized social associations continued to grow in number (Xin and Zhang 1999, p. 107). Meanwhile, due to the liberalization of social services and growing demand, a large number of private institutions providing social

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services emerged, mostly in the urban areas. In October 1998, two sets of administrative regulations, the Regulations for Registration and Management of Social Associations (an amendment of the 1989 regulation) and the Provisional Regulation of Registration and Management of Non-Governmental and Non-Profit Institution Units (a new regulation) were promulgated (GFZ and MMG 1999, pp. 1–7). Under this system, NGOs were officially classified into ‘social associations’ and ‘nongovernmental and non-profit institution units’. The following three features characterize the registration system for social associations and non-governmental and non-profit institution units. Firstly, the organization must be examined and screened by party and government bureaus managing the areas of the candidate organization’s activities, or examined by related organizations (so-called ‘competent authorities’, or ‘supervising institutions’).2 Only after this examination can an application for establishment and registration be filed with the civil affairs department in jurisdiction where the organization’s activities should be controlled (registration management organ). Social associations can acquire their corporate status through this process of registration. The supervising institution supervises the personnel and financial affairs, party political activities and other day-to-day activities of the NGOs, and on this basis the civil affairs department can exercise its administrative power concerning registration and management of NGOs (GFZ and MMG 1999, pp. 22–5). This is often called the ‘dual-line management’ system for NGOs. Secondly, a clear line of demarcation is drawn between central and local jurisdictions. If the area of activity of a social association is national, or covers two or more provinces, the central supervising organization and Ministry of Civil Affairs undertake its examination; if it covers a certain local administrative area, a supervising organization and civil affairs department higher than the county government of the locality undertake the work. This is called a ‘hierarchical administrative management’ system (GFZ and MMG 1999, pp. 25–7). Thirdly, the establishment of more than one organization of the same type in a single area is prohibited or restricted. In particular, the establishment of similar social associations within one area is impossible. Also a social association can establish ad hoc committees, but not branches. On the other hand, the registration authority (civil affairs department) is required to practice caution and not permit the establishment and recognition of two or more non-governmental and non-profit institution units having a similar nature. Moreover, these organizations, unlike social associations, are not allowed to establish subsidiary organizations. These prohibitions and the restricting clauses reflect the cautious attitude of the party and the


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government towards possible multiplication of NGOs (GFZ and MMG 1999, pp. 46–8, 131–6).3 Since the Tiananmen Incident of June 1989, the party and the government have strengthened their cautious stance toward anti-government and antisocial bodies and movements, and tightened their suppression. According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, quite a number of social associations, which are increasing by 20,000–40,000 every year, have a problem with internal governance. Some are accused of allying with anti-government and antisocial forces, and being a threat to social order and stability (Wu and Li 1998, p. 148). This situation lies in the background and is the cause for strengthening social control of the registration and management of NGOs. The two sets of regulations concerning the registration and management of NGOs also stipulate in explicit terms that no NGO may oppose the basic principles of the Constitution, ‘the socialist path, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the CCP, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong’s Thought’, harm national unity and security or national interests, social interests and the interests of other organizations and citizens, or carry out acts contrary to social and public morals (GFZ and MMG 1999, pp. 18, 113). A recent example is the Falun Gong incident illustrating an instance of large-scale repression of an anti-government and antisocial organization.4 In 2007, several clampdowns on unregistered NGOs took place. One involved the international NGO based in Beijing that has published both English and Chinese newsletters providing commentary and information on NGO activities over the country. Just after a party celebrating the organization’s fifteenth anniversary, it was compelled to halt its Chinese publication by the Public Security Office (PSO) of Beijing Municipal Government. The PSO of Beijing has accused the NGO of conducting social surveys without an official license.5 Another case of regulations enforced by a local bureau happened with an environmental NGO publicizing water pollution issues in the Tai Lake area. Its founder was in jail for blackmail and fraud.6 A representative of international NGOs based in Beijing referred to these two cases in claiming that the public security bureau was strengthening its control over NGO activities in fear of their increasing influence, especially with preparations under way for the Olympic Games in Beijing in the summer of 2008.7 On the other hand, one of the scholars who has conducted intensive research on NGOs in China submits a different view on social control by the government. He points that there are now more influential international NGOs that are ‘never’ controlled by the public security bureau, and that the case of the local NGO could involve a minor, but clear offence of forgery. He believes these two cases do not imply, in a significant sense, to stricter control over NGOs.8

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After 1978, in accordance with the emergence of social associations and various private institutions meeting market reforms, the new system of social control described above was developed. However, it should be noted that implementation of social control by the party and the government are not always consistent, but often ad hoc. Therefore it is not surprising that unregistered NGOs can find the space and opportunity for survival, as the aforementioned claim implies. Development of Environmental Policy on Information Disclosure and Public Participation9 Even before achieving rapid economic growth, environmental pollution and damage were already widespread across the country, because of unregulated land development and factory production. In 1964 reports already existed of conflicts in Wuhan, Hunan Province, between a chemical fertilizer factory and farmers accusing it of damage caused by pollutants discharged in its wastewater. The angry farmers sealed its outflow and were arrested by the police (Cai 1999). In 1973, in Zhaosishui Village in Dalian Town, Shahe County, Hebei Province, villagers whose crops and health were damaged by waste gas, wastewater and solid wastes discharged by a phosphate fertilizer factory appealed to the county and township government, but their pleas were rejected. Losing patience, they not only demonstrated during an official village meeting, but also stopped the supply of electricity to the factory. The county communist party ruled that their action was a ‘destructive incident of counterrevolution’ and two village leaders were deprived of their party membership and sent to prison (Wang et al. 2001). Responding to the serious negligence resulting in environmental pollution, and disruption caused by social reaction, the first national conference on environmental policy was held in the 1970s and some measures were launched. As in many other policy fields, however, it was not until the ‘reform and open door’ political line was established after the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP (December 1978) that significant changes took place. In the same month, the CCP recognized for the first time the seriousness of the environmental destruction and the need to include a policy statement on the environment in its official document, ‘Central Committee Document No. 79’. Since then, the roles of public opinion and the mass media have been considered positive factors when references to environmental policy and the experiences of developed countries like Japan were made. In 1979, China’s Environmental Protection Law was enacted, and it stipulated: ‘Any citizen has the right to supervise, impeach, and accuse bodies and individuals


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that pollute and destroy the environment.’ Stipulations also gave provision for environmental protection agencies to charge polluters for damage (Wang et al. 2001, p. 5).10 The propaganda and claim management system is also an important institution for facilitating environmental policy in China. China Environment News (Zhongguo Huanjing Bao), the official propaganda paper, has been published since 1984 to propagate national environmental policy undertaken by the State Council Committee on Environmental Protection (SCCEP). Although the purpose of this newspaper is to raise public consciousness and reflect opinions by reporting on serious pollution accidents and typical cases of environmental deterioration, politically sensitive problems such as serious pollution-related disease are not publicized in it. These more critical issues are reserved for a limited number of leaders and reported to them by confidential communication through an inner circular called Environmental Situations (Huanjing Qingkuang) (ZHNBW 1990, pp. 189–90). Also, people can make their complaints or raise their concerns on issues relating to environmental problems to administrative divisions directly, or through this paper and other newspapers (xinfang). At the environmental administrative level, the Measures for Environmental Claim Management was stipulated in 1990 and revised in 1997 (ZHNBW 1998, pp. 45–7). Some government leaders responsible for environmental policy like Qu Geping, founding director of the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), and Li Peng, founding chairman of the SCCEP, were aware of the important role public opinion played in enforcing environmental regulations (Qu 1984, pp. 295–8; GHWB 1988, pp. 38–40), and some cases when propaganda proved instrumental in enforcing regulations were reported in official meetings. China seemed to be reluctant, however, to let the mass media report on many of the more serious problems that were under the strict control of the propaganda branch of the CCP and the government. The role of the mass media and the public was not enhanced until economic, social and political changes took place in the 1990s. In October 1992, the CCP held its Fourteenth National Congress, at which Secretary General Jiang Zemin, in his political report, addressed the ‘enhancement of environmental protection’ as a main task of the open-door policy, reform and modernization of China during the 1990s. It should be noted here that this was not simply the emergence of a critical concern about the environmental crisis among CCP leaders, but also a desire for international cooperation following the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio De Janeiro in June 1992.

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Following the UNCED, in August 1992 the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council jointly issued ‘Ten Major Policies for Environment and Development’ with top priority given to ‘sustainable development strategy’ for domestic policy implementation (ZHX 1994, pp. 457–60), and the State Council published China’s Agenda 21 supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for the international community in 1994 (LGCA 1994). It was China’s Agenda 21 that was the first official document to stipulate roles in information disclosure and public participation, such as the promotion of promulgation by the mass media, and public participation in the legislative, judicial and administrative processes. After the political report presented by Secretary General Jaing at the Fourteenth National Congress of the CCP, the SCCEP held its TwentyFourth Meeting in January 1993 to deliberate on and approve the ‘Decision on Enhancement and Development of Inspection for Environmental Law Enforcement and Rigid Crackdown for Malpractices’, and the State Council issued it that March. What is important in this decision is the requirement for the propaganda branch of the Communist Party, the government and the mass media to reveal the names of organizations and persons who commit serious offenses against environmental law (ZHNBW 1994, pp. 9–10, 86). It was also in 1993 that the Committee on Environmental Protection was established, and it was renamed the Committee on Environment and Natural Resource Protection (CENRP) the next year, at the National People’s Congress (NPC) (in 1998, the National Environmental Protection Agency, NEPA and the SCCEP were reformed to create the State Environmental Protection Agency, SEPA). The CENRP of the NPC played an important role in the National Inspection for Environmental Law Enforcement and the mass media campaign Century Walk for Environmental Protection in China, both of which were launched in 1993. Through the inspection and the campaign, serious environmental disruption and poor environmental management by local governments and firms nationwide were revealed. This not only mobilized government organizations, but also the People’s Congresses, the mass media and the wider public towards environmental policy enforcement. After a three-year implementation of these activities (1993–96), the State Council officially admitted that mobilization of the mass media and the promotion of public participation were inevitable measures for environmental policy implementation. As stipulated in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, people’s access to information and information disclosure by states is considered to be key in promoting public participation in environmental policy. Besides


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environmental campaigns by the mass media as mentioned above, broad information disclosure to the public initiated by the government is seen as one of the most important measures in environmental policy implementation in China in recent years. For example, since 1997, major cities have launched an Air Pollution Index (API) report, either weekly or daily, through the mass media and the Internet, indicating the harmfulness of air pollution exposure to human health by using five categories (or a total of seven categories when two subcategories are included). Since 1998, the Industrial Environmental Performance Disclosure Program rates by color (green being the best and black the worst) the environmental performance of enterprises, disclosed by the mass media and the Internet. The World Bank, SEPA, some research institutes and local governments in China led this (Otsuka 2007). The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Law was enacted in 2001, and the first public hearing of the EIA was held in 2005 when scholars and environmental NGOs participated in a water environment project on the Old Summer Palace grounds (Yuanming Yuan) in Beijing. It should be pointed out that limits on information disclosure related to environmental issues exist, and are clearly stipulated in administrative regulations. The type of information to be kept secret and classified has been listed in the Rules and Scope of State Secrecy in the Environmental Protection Project enacted in 1990, with further amendments in 1996 and 2004. Since the 1990s, environmental information has seen wider disclosure, but detailed reports on the quality of the environment at the national and provincial levels are still confidential, and even research reports and data on pollution incidents with serious impacts and involving diseases have become classified, indicating that a ‘secrecy’ rule is adhered to (GHJF 1993, pp. 292–3; GHZB 1999, pp. 45–7; GHZB 2005, pp. 299–300). As seen in this section, since the 1990s we find political space opening up for public participation in environmental policy; however, the party and the government still keep tight restrictions on information disclosure.

SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS Under the conditions of more open and freer opportunities in the environmental policy field, people’s awareness has been transformed and they have become more active. As seen in Figure 4.1, people’s letters of complaint about environmental pollution to environmental protection bureaus and the SEPA have increased since the late 1990s when the State Council

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Structure behind political opportunities 700000

3500 Letters (nationwide) Visitors (nationwide) Visits (nationwide: number of issues) Letters (SEPA) Visitors (SEPA)

600000

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Note: Data of visits (nationwide) before 1991, letters (SEPA) before 1996, and visitors (SEPA) before 1998 are not available. Source:

ZHNBW (various years).

Figure 4.1

Complaints regarding environmental pollution problems

issued its important decision to enhance pollution control throughout the country, and this trend has continued. SEPA also focuses its inspections on serious environmental problems that attract great concern and many requests for solutions from people, which is felt as high social pressure. Furthermore, there have been an increasing number of environmental suits in recent years for compensation for environmental damage and the halting of illegal construction and production, and a deputy director of the policy and law division of SEPA has revealed that there were 21 015 cases (including criminal, civil and administrative cases) related to environmental issues in 2003, showing an increase of 25.4 percent per year on average (Li 2003). Also, mass environmental protests have been emerging in the past few years in both rural and urban areas. Following a large-scale water pollution incident in the Songhua River in 2005,11 a senior officer of SEPA has pointed


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out that China is now experiencing a rash of environmental pollution incidents along with an increase in mass environmental protests (qunti-xing shijian).12 According to Zhang (2007), mass environmental protests in the context of contemporary China are often referred to as petitions, sit-downs, demonstrations and other ‘unrests with over five persons’ protesting against environmental pollution. A series of mass protests in Zhejiang Province in 2005 (described later in the case studies) are typical cases. Against the backdrop of China’s rapid economic growth, social problems such as income disparity and the environment have attracted increased interest in the international community, including NGOs, and with the government raising the slogan ‘Small government, big society’, areas have opened up where a diversity of NGOs can develop their activities. In the field of environmental issues, the China Environmental Protection Foundation (CEPF) was founded in 1993 (registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs through the NEPA), followed by Friends of Nature (1994), the Global Village of Beijing (1996) and the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (CLAPV) in the China University of Political Science and Law (1998). Other environmental NGOs are born every year. These not only involve themselves with nationwide activities, but also conduct activities that are locally specific. Although an NGO in China is required under the NGO registration system to be registered as a social association, or non-governmental and non-profit institution, it should be noted that not all organizations can qualify for registration under the current disadvantageous system for grass-roots organizations. Those organizations unable to register officially as NGOs must register in one form or another for their survival. This is often possible by gaining status as a private enterprise, or by enlisting as a suborganization under an academic institution such as a university. Some groups ‘simply do not register at all and organize an informal group’, carrying out their activities as clubs, salons and forums (Saich 2000, p. 135). The current status of environmental NGOs can be understood by referring to a survey released by the All-China Federation (ACF) in April 2006.13 According to this survey, there are 2768 environmental NGOs in China, including 1382 organizations founded by government sectors (49.9 percent of the total), 202 organizations founded on a non-governmental voluntary basis (7.2 percent), 1116 organizations founded by university students (40.3 percent) and 68 international organizations operating in Mainland China (2.6 percent). Most of them are not registered within the administrative guidelines established by the department of civil affairs (76.7 percent). This tendency indicates that environmental NGOs in China, much like the majority of other types of NGOs, ‘prefer to register under an entity that hides their true nature’ (Ho 2001, p. 906).

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Among the types of NGOs categorized by the ACF, grass-roots organizations founded on a non-governmental voluntary basis have very limited human and financial resources. According to the survey, nearly 30 percent of such organizations have no full-time staff. The data show that fund-raising is a serious problem for all NGOs, with 76.1 percent of environmental NGOs not having regular financial funding. Based on the survey, Figure 4.2 shows the fund-raising situation in different types of environmental NGOs. This figure indicates that government-founded organizations have more capacity for fund-raising than grass-roots and university students’ organizations. % 100 60000–100000 RMB 10001–50000 RMB 5001–10000 RMB 1001–5000 RMB under 1000 RMB 0

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

Note: Source:

International organizations

University students’ organizations

Grass-roots organizations

Governmentfounded organizations

0

The data 50 001–59 999 are not available in the report uploaded in the website. ACEF, http://www.acef.com.cn/, retrieved 27 January 2008.

Figure 4.2 Fund-raising of environmental NGOs in China (2005)


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Hu (2008) also points to another aspect evident in the survey conducted by the ACF, which is that most environmental NGOs are ‘very cooperative’ or ‘cooperative’ with the government (41.0 percent and 23.6 percent respectively), with only 3.3 percent of the organizations being ‘sometimes counteractive’ to the government. As seen above, there are certain social foundations (that is, grievances and organizations) for environmental protest movements, and although the emergence of movements is observed, these environmental protest movements are still ‘fragmented’ (Ho 2001, p. 897).14 Why and how such movements can occur and develop under the present array of mixed policies, ‘varying from stringent control to tolerance and encouragement’ (Ho 2001, p. 901), is the main question to be explored.

CASE STUDIES A National NGO Mobilizing Professionals for Pollution Victims Because most environmental grass-roots NGOs in China are reluctant to take action against the government, it makes sense that they prefer conducting environmental education programs, such as birdwatching, summer camps and garbage collection, to avoid touching upon serious environmental pollution issues that often impinge on the stake of a local government having a pro-economic growth agenda. Despite the fact that environmental NGOs in China have this tendency, the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (CLAPV) is unique in its activities to help pollution victims against poor environmental policy implementation distorted by pro-growth local governments.15 The CLAPV was founded as an institute in the China University of Political Science and Law through permission received from the Ministry of Law in 1998. The founder and director of the CLAPV is a faculty law professor in the university, as well as an environmental lawyer. Because the CLAPV is not funded or staffed by the university, it needs to find funding from outside the university. In fact, it receives most of its funds from foreign foundations, and except for the two full-time staff, members manage their organization with part-time help from faculty and students of the university. The CLAPV launched a free telephone service for pollution victims in November 1999, and offers legal and financial aid to pollution victims nationwide. The CLAPV has received nearly 8000 phone calls, and as of March of 2005 it had supported over 74 lawsuits. Since 2001, CLAPV has focused on environmental disputes in western China, which lags behind

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in economic development. According to Xu (2004), the CLAPV has supported 12 cases, of which ten cases have been filed. These cases include air and water pollution damage not only to agricultural and aquaculture products, but also to human health due to emissions of pollutants from industries. They also include two class action suits and one unfilled case in which over 10 000 persons claim to be pollution victims. However, the CLAPV has won only one case and agreed to settlements in two cases. The reasons for the unsuccessful cases are attributed to intervention by local governments favoring economic growth, a lack of understanding concerning environmental law enforcement among court justices, the lack of a comprehensive environmental disputes settlement system in the legal assistance process for pollution victims, and reluctance of the government to disclose information. Although the CLAPV is confronted by many difficulties, it is expected to play a significant role in improving not only the way in which pollution disputes are settled, but also the way in which environmental law is enforced in China. To augment the effectiveness of environmental law enforcement at the grass-roots level, the CLAPV has organized a training course for local lawyers and justices, held once a year since 2001, in cooperation with the SEPA, the China Association for Lawyers and the State Academy for Justices, with financial (and partly technical) aid from foreign organizations. The government and the legal community are willing to support these training courses, because they are fully aware that China needs to reform its legal system from the ‘rule of men’ to the ‘rule of law’ in order to live in the global market economy. The training course is considered to be a boost for the CLAPV in getting wider support from legal professionals at the grass-roots level. Networking with journalists is also important for the human resource development that the CLAPV needs in order to overcome difficulties in helping pollution victims at the local level. When the staff of the CLAPV conduct a field survey at any site, they prefer to invite journalists stationed in Beijing and encourage them to report publicly, because they know many local offenders fear disclosure by the national mass media. In addition to this point, news reports on the CLAPV have helped it to gain extensive social credit, both at home and abroad. The CLAPV has also conducted workshops to promote communication and discussion for better environmental law enforcement with Chinese stakeholders and foreign counterparts. The CLAPV and the Japan Environmental Council (JEC) held a series of China–Japan Workshops on Environmental Disputes Resolution in Beijing (September 2001), Kumamoto (March 2004), Shanghai (November 2005) and Tokyo (August 2007). In addition to these workshops, the CLAPV also held


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a Workshop on Difficulties in Environmental Lawsuits in the Western Part of China, in Xian (October 2002), and an International Symposium on Lawmaking of Compensation for Environmental Damage, in Beijing (August 2004). Through its wide range of activities in environmental law implementation and study, the CLAPV has succeeded in gaining high credibility with SEPA, and the founder was also awarded the honorable title of ‘Green China Annual Figure’ in 2005, reviewed by an organization led by SEPA. The CLAPV is not only participating in lawmaking, but is commissioned by SEPA to organize it. Recent lawmaking projects focus on the Amendment of Water Pollution Control Law and Measure for Public Participation in Environmental Protection. In addition the CLAPV is conducting the lawmaking of Compensation for Environmental Damage independently from any governmental bureau, based on its experiences in support of pollution victims. Difficulties of Voicing the Suffering of Victims by Local NGOs16 Although national NGOs have difficulties in opposing local government, local NGOs face more serious difficulties. Huai River Protectors is one such local NGO, founded by a photographer and journalist with some local colleagues after his solo long-distance walk in 1999 along the Sha-Ying River, the largest tributary of the Huai River, on the banks of which he was born and raised. He had already noticed water pollution of the river when in military service during the 1970s and he has observed its rapid deterioration since the mid-1980s, caused by industrial development along the river. When he took photos and interviewed villagers during his trek, he found high rates of disease affecting the digestive system, including terminal cancer, possibly due to drinking polluted water over a long period. One of the main activities of the NGO is to raise officials’ and the people’s awareness of the seriousness of water pollution and the possibility of disease caused by it, by holding photo exhibitions on the street. The exhibitions are held not only in the founder’s hometown, but also in Beijing, whenever he participates in a training course hosted by other NGOs, conferences by the SEPA, or any other activities. Another activity is conducting field surveys, recording levels of water pollution and disease among villagers along the river by taking photos and interviewing them.17 The NGO is also crafting an organized volunteer monitoring network to watch for illegal wastewater from factories in some districts along the river. The ultimate goal of the NGO is to rescue suffering villagers and improve the water environment along the river. To do this, a medical testing and water

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purification experiment is also under way although on a small scale, with help from a charity foundation and an overseas volunteer engineer. The founder registered his organization as a non-profit institution unit named the Center for Ecological Environmental Science of Huai River System in October 2003 at the bureau of civil affairs in Shenqiu County, Zhoukou City, in Henan Province. Promoters of the official institution for Huai River Protectors include the manager of a photo studio, a journalist, a representative of the county People’s Congress, a cadre of branch offices of state institutes and others, all being his local colleagues. However, the daily management of the NGO is actually carried out almost solely by his family, with no regular source of funding. Due to the limited capacity and poor resources of the organization, the activities mentioned have not been conducted very widely in the river basin yet; however, sometimes the mass media does play a significant role in helping the NGO in reaching its goals. One influential program on water pollution in the Huai River was aired on 9 August 2004 by China Central Television (CCTV), with the title News Investigation: The River and a Village.18 The program focused on one village on the Sha-Ying River, where high cancer rates have been recorded among people living along irrigation canals surrounding the village. Villagers’ grievance and despair over their long-term exposure to serious water pollution and a high death rate due to cancer spurred a large number of viewers into urging local government officials to take the necessary measures to dig a deep well for providing safe drinking water for the villagers. During the program production, the founder and other promoters of Huai River Protectors cooperated with the CCTV by arranging interviews and giving other assistance. Since then, the Ministry of Water Resources has conducted a water safety project and the Ministry of Public Health has separately undertaken a survey on water and health along the river. Another important resource for the NGO is a good connection with SEPA and other environmental NGOs in Beijing. In the month following the official registration, the founder received the first prize of ‘Duban Environmental Best News’ from SEPA for his photos of villagers living along the river who had developed cancer. He was also awarded the honorable title ‘Green China Annual Figure’ in 2007 as one of ten persons and groups by the reviewing committee chaired by Pan Yue, deputy director of SEPA. The founder is also a member of the China Environmental Culture Promotion Association (CECPA), registered as a national social association directed by SEPA.19 Environmental NGOs in Beijing often invite him to participate in conferences and training programs. On the other hand, a most significant obstacle for the organization is the suspicion of and informal pressure from the local government, fearing


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information disclosure concerning any disastrous environmental situation within its local jurisdiction. Here again the Huai River Protectors avoids extreme actions against the government and takes care that the subject matter included in news reports does not needlessly offend local authorities. Such caution is necessary to sustain organizational development in the disadvantageous circumstances that local NGOs find themselves in. Another local environmental NGO is the Pingnan Green Association, founded by a village doctor in Fujian Province. Although he received substantial help from volunteers in the CLAPV, he faced much pressure from the local government, including suspension of his doctor’s license after participating in the Second Japan–China International Workshop on Environmental Dispute Resolution in Kumamoto, Japan in 2004. To secure his NGO activities, he is seeking to register his organization officially, but at present cannot find an appropriate department in the government.20 A Coalition of NGOs and Journalists In recent years, networking has developed among environmental NGOs. The exchange of information and know-how through email, Internet, conferences, training courses and other communication has increased. The NGOs mentioned above are also involved in such networking, and as a result coalitions of NGOs are emerging that advocate protection of the natural environment. It is possible to observe this in some debates focused on water projects (Hu with Yu 2005; Hu 2008). The debate on the dam project on the Nu River is one of them.21 The Nu River is one of only two rivers without any artificial development and is the habitat of many endangered species in China. Furthermore, the Nu River Basin in Yunnan is home to a number of ethnic minority groups. In August 2003, some large Chinese hydropower development companies announced plans to build 13 hydroelectric power stations along the river’s middle and downstream stretches that sparked heated debate involving environmental NGOs and journalists. The Yunnan provincial government earnestly promotes the dam project in the expectation of increased revenue for its budget. Against this optimistic view, it was Professor He Daming, a specialist of river engineering and director of the Asian International Rivers Center in Yunnan University, who was first to publicly state a counterview in the advisory meeting of experts on environmental problems concerning hydropower development in the Nu River Basin held by SEPA in September 2003. His counterview has stimulated protest movements by environmental NGOs and journalists in China.

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Major advocators of the protest were Green Watershed, a local environmental NGO based in Kunming, Yunnan Province; and Green Earth Volunteers and Friends of Nature, both being national environmental NGOs based in Beijing. A founder of Green Watershed has submitted his counter-proposal on the dam project, entitled ‘Protect Nu River, Develop it Carefully’, to the Yunnan provincial government through a member of the provincial Political Consultation Commission. He believes the dam project will require the relocation of 50 000 to 80 000 persons, most of whom belong to ethnic minorities, and they should be given the right to know any predictable impact on their lives that could be caused by the project. He stresses the necessity for the affected people to have a dialogue with the local government or developers. On 24 May 2004, he brought 14 local residents from the Nu River area to visit Manwan Hydropower Station in Langcan River to let them know what could possibly be the predictable impact of the planned project if it should be realized. Furthermore, he has held workshops for them on how to participate in the decisionmaking process of water projects. In addition to these local activities by Green Watershed, Beijing-based environmental NGOs, journalists and experts, 20 persons in total, conducted a field survey along the Nu River for nine days. This survey has enabled the mass media to report publicly on the biological and cultural diversity of the area. Under pressure from NGOs and journalists, SEPA has been pushed to conduct a scientific assessment of dam development on the Nu River organized by 36 experts, including environmental scientists and water facility and hydropower engineers. They reached a similar conclusion to that of ‘Protect Nu River, Develop it Carefully’, and supported the claims of the protesters. As a result, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao has announced the official view of the central government for a moratorium on the dam project. Although the local government has not yet abandoned its ambitions for the project, it is true that the coalition of NGOs and journalists has brought changes to the decision-making process in this particular case of the Nu River dam project, making the government reconsider environmental and cultural sustainability.22 NIMBY Protests in Beijing In the capital of China, Beijing, which underwent rapid urban construction in preparation for the first Olympic Games held in China in the summer of 2008, the preceding two years saw a rise of intense mass environmental protests. When SEPA publicized its official annual report of the environmental situation on World Environmental Day, 5 June 2007, a mass demonstration took place at the front gate of SEPA, with voices of objection


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raised by protesters against a waste-generated power plant project near their residential area.23 There were around 100 persons wearing uniform T-shirts24 and white clothes with slogans printed in black, such as ‘Protect Environment’, as well as holding Xeroxed paper banners with slogans saying ‘Environmental Protection Needs Public Participation’, and ‘To Invite Green Olympic to Implement Environmental Policy Well’. They started to march around the wall of the SEPA building chanting ‘Antipollution’ and ‘Implement Environmental Policy Well’ in their approach to the main gate. Police and security personnel carefully contained the mob within the pedestrian area, while a few were recording the demonstration from beginning to end with video cameras. The demonstrators were residents of Liuli Dun in Haidian District, located in the northwestern part of Beijing. The dispute over waste landfill near their community started in the 1990s.25 In 1995, the Environmental Protection Office (EPO) of the Beijing municipal government had warned the Haidian district government to avoid housing development near the landfill site. The district government, however, did not heed the warning from the EPO of Beijing, causing a dispute with new residents over the foul smell from the landfill. Residents’ complaints about the smell have been getting serious, especially since 2005, urging several representatives in the People’s Congress and some scholars supporting democratic parties in political consulting committees to take field trips and support their opposition to the landfill. It was not until November 2006 that residents became aware through newspaper coverage of the waste-generated power plant project, prompting them to organize a board meeting for homeowners near the landfill site to call on the EPO of Beijing to disclose an environmental impact assessment (EIA) report of the project. In January 2007, the EPO publicized the EIA report via its website, but this did not satisfy the homeowners. Some homeowners have submitted an administrative appeal for SEPA to recall the decision made by EPO of Beijing based on the EIA report. It was 7 June when Pan Yue, deputy director of SEPA, publicly announced the moratorium on the waste-generated power plant project. A few days later, on 12 June, SEPA issued its decision on the homeowners’ administrative appeal to the state, expressing the need for the project to be reviewed after a careful EIA involving wider public participation that reflected the new situation better by examining population increase and other social changes in the community. Although no media coverage can be found on the mass demonstration of 5 June (only a few personal blogs on the Internet), it seems clear that the incident convinced SEPA to decide in favor of the protesters’ complaints. Another case of mass protests in Beijing resulted in success for

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homeowners protesting against high-voltage power transmission lines constructed near their Olympic Games Village, a community newly developed in recent years by real estate companies.26 The protest originated from community residents fearing that installing the power lines could cause adverse affects on their health, including leukemia. They organized homeowners’ meetings and demonstrations in the community, inviting NGOs and journalists to the site, and holding round-table meetings with developers and related officials of the district and municipal government. Finally, the government decided to relocate the power line and the one pylon already built a little farther away from their community. We should note that these two cases in Beijing are different from NGO movements described in previous sections not only in the way of protest, but also in the ultimate goals sought. These latter cases, referred to as NIMBY (not in my back yard) protests, have goals focusing on ways to protect the activists themselves from a bad environment. These cases of NIMBY environmental protests in Beijing seem successful in producing results. Mass Protests in Rural Areas Turning to rural mass protests concerning environmental pollution, a series of cases occurred in Zhejiang Province in 2005. Located in the coastal area south of Shanghai where gross domestic product (GDP) shows high annual growth, the protests in Zhejiang are notable for their frequency and magnitude.27 There were four major cases reported by Internet media in that year. Zhang (2007) found three common characteristics in all these cases: seriousness of pollution and damage; reluctance of local government for stricter control of pollution caused by major industries in the area; and a failure of long-term petitions and negotiations to local government and firms by the residents. Among these cases, the protest in Huashui Town involved the largest number of farmers, counting more than 10 000 at the peak of the riot. The Huashui Town case on 10 April 2005 (sometimes referred to as the ‘April 10 incident’) was a direct clash between villagers in Huaxi Village and the local government of Dongyang City, where the Zhuxi industrial district is located. In 2001, construction of an industrial park was planned for Huaxi, the largest village with the longest history in Dongyang City. Immediately after becoming aware of the project, the villagers started to protest against illegal expropriation of their land without any permission from its upper bureau of land administration and management. However, the chief leader of the village was compelled, under pressure from the city and township government, to sign a land lease with some amount of


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compensation. In the next stage, villagers shifted their target of protest to environmental pollution problems caused by 13 industries in the industrial park, and especially focused on one agricultural chemical factory relocated several times from urban districts for being a source of serious environmental pollution. In October 2001, villagers broke into the factory to destroy its facilities, ousting workers and staff from their dormitory. Twelve villagers including the chief leader were arrested, and most of them received prison sentences. While environmental pollution and damage grew as a result of insufficient measures enforced on industrial production, villagers sent several petitions to Dongyang City, Jinhua City (the location of the upper-level government of Dongyang City while Dongyang City is the county-level government), the Zhejiang provincial government and SEPA. These petitions, however, were unsuccessful in accomplishing the protesters’ goals, except for some compensation and a few news reports by the mass media. In April 2004, the State Council issued a new policy to strengthen control of land management and curb wanton development throughout the country, and that July, the Zhejiang provincial government decided to halt the operation of 624 industrial parks and development districts including the Zhuxi industrial park. Taking action on this policy, the land and resources management bureau of Dongyang city issued a document ordering 12 companies to return their land and pay penalties. However, this policy was not implemented despite the State Land and Resource Bureau appealing to the city court to enforce it. The only change seen was the changing of the park’s name from Dongyang City Zhuxi Industrial Park to Zhuxi Industrial Functional District. In 2005, on National Consumers’ Day (15 March) the villagers tried to meet the city mayor but failed. Losing hope of attaining any results, the villagers, most of whose leaders were elderly, started to build barricades made of bamboo to block the road to the District on 24 March. But nine leaders were arrested the next day, and city and town officials and police burned all barricades. In protest against the action taken by the local government, the villagers rebuilt the barricades and stationed more than 100 elderly people to watch them. Although on 1 April the city government decided to halt production temporarily in 13 factories, villagers continued their protests despite being warned by the government. The city and town governments ordered the protesters to stop, but finally the city government organized 3000 government officials, police, militias and prosecutors, and on 10 April the clash occurred. In this clash, more than 30 people were injured and 48 buses and cars were destroyed before government forces retreated. Although after the incident eight leaders of the protest movement received prison sentences, the District was ordered to halt its

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operations, and the Zhejiang provincial government suspended some city government leaders. This case illustrates how villagers frustrated with environmental pollution go beyond the moderate means of petitions, and how their actions escalate to physically violent mass protests.

STRATEGIES FOR FRAGMENTARY OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITED RESOURCES In this section, we will discuss why and how environmental protest movements could occur and develop under communist China in transition, focusing on their political opportunities to devise the concept of ‘fragmentary opportunity’, together with other factors of grievances and resource mobilization. Emergence of Fragmentary Opportunities It should be noted from the case studies in the previous sections that there exists a controversial and complicated political opportunity structure for the environmental countermovement in China. As Tarrow (1998) points out, political opportunity structure (POS) in the context of environmental protest movements in China would also consist of both opportunities and constraints. However, the situation is more complicated and difficult to simplify into a dichotomy, as other related studies have already revealed (see the Introduction to this chapter for references). Through reviews and case studies in previous sections, it could be pointed out that political opportunities for environmental protest movements in China vary according to: different policies adopted in various sectors; a limited capacity for social control by the state; conflict of interests among different levels of government; and ad hoc intervention by the party and government. Firstly, as Ho (2001) has mentioned, one observes ‘a combination of policies varying from stringent control to tolerance and encouragement’ for environmental movements. The Ministry of Civil Affairs still holds to a strict control system for NGO registration similar to the old regime, while the SEPA keeps to a policy promoting information disclosure and public participation, even if conditionally limited. For example, in the case of the CLAPV, SEPA encouraged environmental NGO activities regardless of their being undertaken by research institutes within universities that are not registered within the administrative guideline of civil affairs. In other words, different policies apply from sector to sector for environmental movements in China.


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Secondly, although social control of voluntary organizations continues to be enforced by the party and the government, it has limited capacity for control (Saich 2000), or fails to achieve control (Ho 2001), since the majority of environmental NGOs escape official registration to enjoy voluntary activities, and some, having successfully registered officially, conduct their activities beyond the administrative jurisdiction where they have official status.28 Thirdly, as Zhang (n.d.) and Oi (1992, 1999) point out, there is an integrated structure of politics (government) and economy (firm) for local stakes under the market transition in China, but looking at vertical relationships found at different levels of government, especially between central and local authorities, one finds pro-environmentalism attitudes in the central government, while a pro-economic growth attitude is found at the local level. This is indeed a hindrance for environmental protest movements active at the local level, where they are without any support outside the locality as seen in the previous section, but some NGOs have succeeded in utilizing this gap in countering local anti-environmental behavior.29 Finally, ad hoc interventions for any social issues and movements by the party and the government should be noticed. These interventions are sometimes repressive for voluntary organizations as the recent cases of control of NGOs reveal, but sometimes supportive for them as in the cases of the Nu River protection, and the protest movement against the wastegenerated power plant project in Beijing. In other words, environmental movements in China navigate in foggy political weather that switches between favoring support and fear of strict state intervention. Thus, these institutional characteristics have shaped a unique political opportunity that has a ‘fragmentary nature’ for environmental protest movements in China. These ‘fragmentary opportunities’ are hard to predict as to when and where they will emerge or disappear, without a deeper understanding of and sensitive attention to the socio-political situation in transition. Some NGOs or homeowner groups, as seen in the previous section, can survive by finding a fragmentary opportunity through their own means. Also, a fragmentary opportunity is often discovered by analysis of available information obtained through the mass media, the Internet, conferences, party meetings or personal connections with highlevel officials, and at times, with the utmost caution, through their own activities against the current regime. Networking against Limitations to Access Resources and Information In China, since the late 1970s, the state’s unified system of resource distribution that functioned in the period of planned economy has

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collapsed under a policy line of ‘reform and open door’. Under this transition, even the government publicly proposes ‘Small government, big society’. Government sectors, however, still have an advantage in accessing resources for conducting projects in the sphere of public policy. Among environmental NGOs, as shown in Figure 4.2, government-founded NGOs have succeeded in raising more funds than other types of organizations. Other groups must find different resources and means to tackle environmental problems. In cases of grass-roots NGOs, they may be required to procure their funding from outside China and actually depend on foreign foundations and international NGOs.30 In addition to limited funding resources, a lack of human resources is also a bottleneck for most grass-roots NGOs, as mentioned above. Therefore they strategically form a network with other institutions such as international foundations, the mass media, professional personnel and students to secure resources and information. It is also important for local NGOs to build alliances with national NGOs that have networks with international organs. For example, the CLAPV is crafting a network of professional volunteers, while environmental NGOs advocating environmental protection related to water projects have succeeded in involving journalists as green volunteers under their wing. These volunteers have regular daytime positions in organizations controlled by the state bureau. With these resources, although limited, fragmentary opportunities can be located and taken advantage of in implementing protest actions. Even though small compared to government-sponsored groups, these environmental NGOs could play an important role as the mouthpiece of victims to mobilize external resources and make their voices heard by the public and the government. The CLAPV, Huai River Protectors and Green Watershed are such organizations. The environmental NGOs prefer not to employ demonstrations, sit-ins and other methods often used in mass protest, because of their desire to avoid conflict with the state (Ho 2001; Yang 2005). They apply moderate strategies compared to poorer local people, since they are well aware that there is a fragmentary opportunity that could suddenly be closed by state social control. These environmental NGOs are one typical group which organizes the environmental movement in China. The second group is the urban homeowners in Beijing. They have some surplus of resources to be mobilized and, at the same time, knowledge and information obtained through professionals such as scholars who may be fellow members of their community.31 These groups are in a better position to find fragmentary opportunities than people in rural areas (discussion follows below). Compared with environmental NGOs, this group does take risks when demonstrating against the government, but these are last-resort tactics after their patience has run out. They do, however, show deliberate consideration for any


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possible fragmentary opportunities that can be used to their advantage, as seen in the case of the 5 June (World Environmental Day) incident in Beijing in 2007. The last group is the rural poor who stand up in desperation against pollution. They have very limited resources and information to recognize the cause of damage and voice their grievances. As we saw previously, the farmers in Zhejiang Province have no way to vent their frustration and must employ violent methods for lack of knowledge in accessing any outside resources to help. In reviewing the scope of environmental mass protests emerging in rural China, Zhang (2006) discusses how ‘social crisis’ is the frequent cause for the occurrence of mass protests when a society goes beyond the ‘social latitude’, or threshold of bearing ecological and environmental destruction. As discussed above, the effectiveness of environmental movements in China depends greatly on a network connecting various institutions and groups. Figure 4.3 is a brief sketch of such a network. Considering their mutual support and reliance, we can assume this network to be a social movement industry (McCarthy and Zald 1977) for environmental issues. Under the given conditions created by fragmentary opportunities, the environmental protest can be successful only when the actors utilize this ‘industrial infrastructure’. Otherwise, their efforts end in desperation.

CONCLUSION In concluding this chapter, we will summarize the major findings obtained through several case studies of environmental NGOs and their activities, along with mass protests against economic, social and health damage caused by environmental pollution and destruction in China. First of all, ‘fragmentary opportunity’ is a key concept, important for explaining environmental protest movements under communist China in transition. Especially grass-roots NGOs in China can survive and develop themselves with only fragmentary opportunities, which are hard to predict as to where and when they will emerge, as well as disappear. For grass-roots NGOs without sufficient resources and information, networking and alliances between NGOs within and outside China are an efficient strategy. Furthermore, keeping up connections with government authorities, especially central government organizations, is also important. For victims with lesser resources and information, environmental NGOs could play the important role of public mouthpieces to raise their voice against polluters or developers. Urban protestors based in their communities do run a risk when they demonstrate against the government, but with

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Figure 4.3

Local authorities

Local courts

Victims Residents

V

Local V media

National media

Networking in environmental movements in China

Factories Developers

Central authorities

Supreme Court

Local NGOs

National NGOs

V

Watch, research, etc.

Claim, protest, etc.

Interplay

Strong interplay

Alliance

Strong alliance

Volunteers

Volunteers

International NGOs and others


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the utmost caution can do so when they see a possible fragmentary opportunity. Thus, under the given political, economic and social conditions that give rise to fragmentary opportunities, environmental protest movements in China depend heavily on a network that acts as an environmental movement industry. On the other hand, rural mass protestors cannot help but vent their frustration in the form of riots, when left without any alternative strategy. In China, the economy, politics and society are still undergoing transition and nobody is able to predict precisely what will be forged in the future. We have to pay more attention to institutional and social change under this transition for further study of the dynamics of environmental protest movements in China.

NOTES 1. 2.

3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

This part is based on Otsuka (2002). This authority is sometimes called ‘sponsoring unit’, ‘sponsoring organization’ (Saich 2000) or ‘sponsoring institution’ (Ho 2001). Included in the supervising institutions are related professional departments of the government, party work departments and organizations authorized by the government (GFZ and MMG 1999, pp. 22, 119–20). Among the authorized organizations are public institution units of government-run research institutes, and people’s and mass organizations (Wang and He 2000, p. 183). Besides this system, separate regulations are formulated for ‘foundations’ and ‘religious social associations’ as specially organized social associations, but their characteristics are the same. State leaders were shocked on 25 April 1999 when more than 10 000 members of a Qi Gong group called Falun Gong quietly surrounded the Zhong nan hai section of Beijing, the CCP headquarters building and the Chinese Cabinet Office, in protest against attacks on the group by the party newspaper and other media throughout the country. In response, the party and the government, on 22 July, decided to suppress the group, condemning it as an illegal organization under the Regulation of Registration and Management of Social Associations. The government arrested leaders and supporters, charging them with forming an antisocial cult group, and initiated a large-scale campaign, enlisting various work units and the mass media, calling upon members to leave the group. In October the same year, a new law for the regulation of cult organizations was passed, which provided strict punishment of criminal acts, such as willfully causing the death(s) of others by utilizing superstitions and cultist discourse, as well as rape and fraud (Daily China News, No. 8660, 2 November 1999). See the website of China Development Brief at http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/ node/508 (retrieved 11 June 2008). See the compilation of news articles about this story as ‘Urgent: Tai Lake Environmentalist Detained’ on the website of Pacific Environment at http://www. pacificenvironment.org/ (retrieved 11 June 2008). Conversation with the author in Beijing, September 2007. Interview with Professor Wang Ming, Director of the NGO Research Centre of Qinghua University by the author in Beijing, September 2007. This part is modified based on Otsuka (2007). About cases of environmental pollution disputes after the reform, see GHJ and Zhao (1989) and Wang et al. (2001).

106 11.

12. 13.

14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31.

Structure behind political opportunities On 13 November 2005, an accidental explosion occurred at China Petroleum Jilin Subsidiary Petrochemical Company, a large-scale state enterprise in northeastern China, and toxic chemicals in the run-off flowed into Songhua River (a major river). In Harbin, with a population of over 4 million, people had no water supply for 4 days. The director of the SEPA was forced to resign. This incident is well documented in English. A news report and statement of Wang Yuqing, deputy director of SEPA, uploaded at the SEPA website, http://www.zhb.gov.cn/, 1 December 2005. The All-China Federation (ACF) (Zhonghua Huanbao Lianhehui) is a national social organization registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs through SEPA. The President of ACF is Song Jian, former state councilor. See the ACF website, http://www.acef.com. cn/, 27 January 2008. Contents of the ACF environmental NGO survey mentioned in this section were also obtained through this website. Ho (2001) also points out another trend of environmentalism in China as ‘highly localized’, but some successful cases of NGO–journalist movements have developed beyond locality (discussed in the following section). Descriptions of the CLAPV in this chapter depend on Chinese and Japanese materials obtained through the author’s participation in research exchange projects. In Wang et al. (2001), an English report resulting from a cooperative research project between the CLAPV and IDE-JETRO, the author was also involved. Information here was obtained by the author while participating in international exchange activities with NGOs. For a brief introduction of the organization in English, see Turner and Otsuka (2006). Some years ago the website was open with a large number of photos taken by the founder. At present it cannot be accessed. For this full story (only in Chinese), see CCTV.com at http://www.cctv.com/news/ china/20040810/102281.shtml (retrieved 27 January 2008). See the website of the CECPA at http://www.tt65.net/ (retrieved 27 January 2008). See the website at http://www.pnlszj.ngo.cn (retrieved 27 January 2008). In this chapter, descriptions of the dam debate depend on Hu with Yu (2005) and Hu (2008). The China River Network was established as an NGO in September 2004. Most members are journalists. See http://www.chinarivers.ngo.cn/ (retrieved 27 January 2008). This possibly is the result for success in advocating Nu River protection. The author encountered the protest during a business trip in Beijing. Besides a uniform-like T-shirt, it should be noted that each participant had a bottle of mineral water brought to demonstrators in a large box (the outside temperature was high) indicating that the ‘mob’ was well prepared and organized. Refer to the news article and official document uploaded at the SEPA website on 8 and 12 June 2007. This story was mainly obtained from interviews with one of the leaders involved in this movement. For detailed account of the Zhejiang cases, see Zhang (2007). For example, Huai River Protectors is registered in its locality, but could open a photo exhibition in Beijing. See Shi and Cai (2006) on conflict between government sectors in a community environmental movement in Shanghai. Quoted from their study: ‘there are disparate priorities between local state authorities at different levels and between different departments’. For example, the Ford Foundation funds the CLAPV, and Oxfam America funds Green Watershed. Actually, in the case of the Beijing Olympic Games Village, there is one associate law professor who is working voluntarily at an environmental NGO, and in the case of the Liuli Dun community, they have consulted a lawyer outside the community on their actions.


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REFERENCES Cai Shouqiu (1999), Huanjing zhengce falv wenti yanjiu [A Study on Environmental Policy and Law Issues], Wuhan: Wuhan University Press. Economy, Elizabeth C. (2004), The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge of China’s Future, Ithaca, NY and London, UK: Cornell University Press. Fairbank, John King (1992), China: A New History, Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Guizhou Huanjingbaohu Ju (GHJ) and Zhao Yongkang (1989), Huanjing jiufen anli [Cases of Environmental Disputes], Beijing: Zhongguo huanjing kexue chubanshe. Guojia Huanjingbaohu Ju Faguisi (GHJF) (ed.) (1993), Huanjing baohu fagui huibian [Collected Laws and Regulations of Environmental Protection], Beijing: Zhongguo huanjing kexue chubanshe. Guojia Huanjingbaohu Zongju Bangongting (GHZB) (ed.) (1999), Huanjing baohu fagui Huibian [Collected Laws and Regulations of Environmental Protection], Beijing: Zhongguo huanjing kexue chubanshe. Guojia Huanjingbaohu Zongju Bangongting (GHZB) (ed.) (2005), Huanjing baohu wenjian huibian 2004 [Collected Documents of Environmental Protection], Beijing: Zhongguo huanjing kexue chubanshe. Guowuyuan Fazhiban Zhengfa-si and Mingzheng-bu Minjian-zuzhi Guanli-ju (GFZ and MMG) (eds) (1999), Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli, minban feiqiye danwei dengji guanli zanxing tiaoli shiyi [Commentaries of Regulation of Registration and Management of Social Associations and Provisional Regulation of Registration and Management on Non-governmental and Non-industrial Enterprises], Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Chubanshe. Guowuyuan Huanjingbaohu Weiyuanhui Bangongshi (GHWB) (ed.) (1988), Guowuyuan huanjing baohu weiyuanhui wenjian huibian [Archives of the State Council Committee on Environmental Protection], Beijing: Zhongguo huanjing kexue chubanshe. Ho, Peter (2001), ‘Greening Without Conflict? Environmentalism, NGOs and Civil Society in China’, Development and Change, 32 (5): 893–921. Hu Kanping (2008), ‘Chugoku no ryuiki kanri to kankyo hozen ni okeru koushusanka: NGO to masumedia no yakuwari’ [‘Public Participation in River Management and Environmental Protection in China: Roles of NGOs and Mass Media’], in Kenji Otsuka (ed.), Ryuiki gabanansu: chugoku/nihon no kadai to kokusai kyoryoku no tenbo [Basin Governance: Issues in China and Japan – Perspectives for International Cooperation], Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO, pp. 263–87. Hu Kanping with Yu Xiaogang (2005), ‘Bridge Over Troubled Waters: The Role of the News Media in Promoting Public Participation in River Basin Management and Environmental Protection in China’, in Jennifer L. Turner and Kenji Otsuka (eds), Promoting Sustainable River Basin Governance: Crafting Japan–US Water Partnerships in China, IDE Spot Survey No. 28, Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO, pp. 125–40. Leading Group for China’s Agenda 21 (LGCA) (1994), China’s Agenda 21: White Paper on China’s Population, Environment and Development in the 21st Century, Beijing: China Environmental Science Press. Li Hangyun (2003), ‘Huanjing baohu libukai faguan lvshi de guanghuan canyu’ [‘Environmental Protection cannot be Realized without Wide Participation

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of Judges and Lawyers’], in Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims, China University of Political Science and Law (ed.), Huanjing falv shiwu yanxiuban jiaocheng ziliaoji: di san ji [A Collection of Materials for a Training Course of Environmental Law Practice, Vol. 3], Beijing: Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims, China University of Political Science and Law, pp. 15–21. McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald (1977), ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory’, American Journal of Sociology, 82 (6): 1212–41. Mori, Kazuko and Ryousei Kokubun (eds) (1994), Seiji 1 [Politics, Vol. 1], Genten chugoku gendaishi series, Vol. 1, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Oi, Jean C. (1992), ‘Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China’, World Politics, 45: 99–126. Oi, Jean C. (1999), Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Okabe, Tatsumi and Satoshi Amako (eds) (1994), Seiji 2 [Politics, Vol. 2], Genten chugoku gendaishi series, Vol. 2, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Otsuka, Kenji (2002), ‘China: Social Restructuring and the Emergence of NGOs’, in Shinichi Shigetomi (ed.), The State and NGOs: Perspective from Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 222–44. Otsuka, Kenji (2007), ‘Environmental Policy under Multi-stakeholder Governance in China: Focusing on Implementation of Industrial Pollution Control’, in Tadayoshi Terao and Kenji Otsuka (eds), Development of Environmental Policy in Japan and Asian Countries, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 199–226. Qu Geping (1984), Zhongguo huanjin-wenti ji duice [China’s Environmental Problems and its Countermeasures], Beijing: Zhongguo huanjing kexue chubanshe. Saich, Tony (2000), ‘Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China’, China Quarterly, 161: 124–41. Shi, Fayong and Yongshun Cai (2006), ‘Disaggregating the State: Networks and Collective Resistance in Shanghai’, China Quarterly, 186: 314–32. Tarrow, Sidney (1998), Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Turner, Jennifer L. and Lü Zhi (2006), ‘Building a Green Civil Society in China’, in World Watch Institute (ed.), State of the World: Special Focus: China and India, New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 152–70. Turner, Jennifer L. and Kenji Otsuka (2006), Reaching Across the Water: International Cooperation Promoting Sustainable River Basin Governance in China, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Wang, Ming and Jianyu He (2000), ‘Chugoku no NGO to kankyo shakai kaihatsu’ [‘China’s NGO and Environmental–Social Development’], in Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development (FASID) (eds), Chugoku ni okeru seifu kiko kaikaku, kankyo, kaihatsu, Tokyo: FASID, pp. 151–85. Wang Canfa, Xu Kezhu, Hu Jing, Liu Min, Tadayoshi Terao and Kenji Otsuka (2001), Studies on Environmental Pollution Disputes: Cases from Mainland China and Taiwan, Joint Research Program Series No. 128, Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO. Wu Zhongzhe and Chen Jinluo (1996), Shetuan guanli gongzuo [Administrative Works of Social Associations], Zhongguo minzheng gongzuo congshu series, Vol. L, Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Chubanshe. Wu Zhongze and Li Yong (1998), ‘Zhongguo minjian zuzhi guanli de xianzhuang wenti he duice’ [‘Current Situation, Problems and Strategies of Management of


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China’s NGOs’], in Shi Zhengxin and Zhu Yong (eds), Zhongguo Shehui-fuli yu Shehui-jinbu Baogao, Beijing: Shehuikexue Wenxian Chubanshe, pp. 146–69. Xin Chunying and Zhang Ye (1999), ‘China’, in Thomas Silk (ed.), Philanthropy and Law in Asia: A Comparative Study of the Nonprofit Legal Systems in Ten Asia Pacific Societies, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, pp. 85–124. Xu Kezhu (2004), ‘You xibu huanjing weiquan susong yinfade ruogan sikao’ [‘A Prospect Caused by Experiences in Environmental Lawsuits in Western China’], A report presented at the Second China–Japan Workshop on Environmental Disputes Resolution, Kumamoto, Japan, March. Yang, Guobin (2005), ‘Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China’, China Quarterly, 181: 46–66. Zhang Yulin (2006), ‘Seikei ittaika kaihatsu mekanizumu to chugoku nouson no kankyofunso’ [‘Development Mechanism in Integration of Politics and Economy, and Environmental Conflicts in Rural China’], Handout in the meeting ‘Social Movement and People’s Political Participation in Developing Countries’, Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO, Chiba, Japan, November. Zhang Yulin (2007), ‘Sekkoushou no kankyoosen higai to kankyo boudou’ [‘Environmental Pollution Damage and Environmental Protest Riot in Zhejiang Province’], in China Environmental Problems Study Group (ed.), A Handbook of China Environment: 2007–2008 Issue, Tokyo: Soso-sha, pp. 152–60. Zhang Yulin (n.d.), ‘Zheng jing yitihua kaifa jizhi yu zhongguo nongcun de huanjing zhongtu: yi zhejiangsheng de sanqi “quntixing shijian” wei zhongxin’ [‘Development Mechanism in Integration of Politics and Economy, and Environmental Conflicts in Rural China: Focusing on Three Mass Incidents in Zhejiang Province’], Unpublished report. Zhongguo Huanjing Nianjian Bianji Weiyuanhui (ZHNBW) (ed.) (various years), Zhongguo Huanjing Nianjian [China Environment Yearbook], Beijing: Zhongguo huanjing kexue chubanshe (for 1990–93) and Zhongguo huanjing nianqianshe (for 1994–2006). Zhongguo Huanjingbaohu Xingzheng 20 Nian Bianweihui (ZHX) (ed.) (1994), Zhongguo Huanjing Baohu Xingzheng 20 Nian [China Environmental Administration 20 Years], Beijing: Zhongguo huanjing kexue chubanshe.

5.

Institutional conditions for social movements to engage in formal politics: the case of AIDS activism in post-apartheid South Africa Kumiko Makino

INTRODUCTION Well over ten years have passed since apartheid ended and the former liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC), was voted into power in South Africa in 1994. Tackling the legacy of apartheid is quite a tough task on its own, but the newly transformed society has had to face another crisis – namely HIV/AIDS. With more than 5 million people living with the virus, South Africa is one of the countries most severely affected by HIV/AIDS in the world. In addition to the gravity of the crisis, South Africa has also attracted attention as a major site of struggle for access to antiretroviral drugs, used for preventing mother-to-childtransmission of HIV, and for prolonging the lives of people living with HIV/AIDS in the developing world. At the center of the struggle has been the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), a South African social movement on HIV/AIDS. The salient feature of TAC is its strategy to utilize both informal and formal measures to pursue its goals. TAC has organized numerous protest marches and demonstrations, and on several occasions has even broken laws deliberately to show its impatience. At the same time, TAC has utilized formal channels, namely legal procedures and institutions for policy consultation created by the government. This chapter examines factors that have contributed to TAC’s ability to utilize both informal and formal channels. We focus on this point because we presume TAC’s success is due to the effective combination of informal and formal measures to achieve its goals. It has been TAC’s strategic choice to move back and forth between 110

The case of AIDS activism in post-apartheid South Africa

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informal and formal politics, but this choice must have been made possible by the surrounding political environment, or the ‘political opportunity structure’ in social movement theory terms. ‘Political opportunities’ are defined as ‘consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting people’s expectations for success or failure’ (Tarrow 1998, pp. 76–7). The antonym is ‘political constraints’, which means factors that discourage contention (Tarrow 1998, p. 20). Integrating several sets of definitions (including Tarrow’s), McAdam (1996, p. 27) creates four dimensions of political opportunities and constraints as follows: (1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; (2) the stability or instability of the broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; (3) the presence or absence of elite allies; and (4) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression. In sum, the scope of political participation is either due to institutional factors or the existence of fault lines among power elites. The more of these there are, the greater the chances for social movements to have a political impact. The concept tends to be used to include any kinds of environmental factors, and some have pointed out that this excessive plasticity threatens to reduce the concept’s analytic power (McAdam et al. 1997, pp. 152–3; McAdam 1996, p. 25). For analytical purposes, a mere explanation of a political environment and its characterization as ‘open’ or ‘closed’ is not enough, and it is necessary to specify how these dimensions of political opportunities have allowed or discouraged certain types of social movements at a certain time and place. As we will see below, the literature on social movements in South Africa after apartheid tends to understand the emergence of protests in terms of grievances that are characteristic to the post-apartheid society. Although the apparent opening of political opportunities by the demise of apartheid is naturally assumed, a concrete analysis on how new political institutions and elite alignments have affected social movements has seldom been conducted. This chapter is structured as follows. The next section will make an overview of social movements in post-apartheid South Africa and summarize the findings of earlier studies on the topic. Subsequent sections will follow the track of TAC’s campaigns, showing how its targets and allies have changed over time, as well as how its activities have been facilitated by newly created institutional space. We will conclude by summarizing our findings.

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SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Social Movements in South Africa South Africa had a dramatic transition from apartheid to democracy in the first half of the 1990s. The new governing party, the ANC, was previously a liberation movement that fought against the apartheid regime. The ANC played a central role in the liberation struggle, but was not the sole player. There were political movements like the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) that did not share the ANC’s ideology of non-racialism. In addition, various kinds of organizations, which were independent but supportive of (or at least sympathetic to) the ANC, played a crucial role in the struggle within South Africa when the ANC was banned and could not overtly operate inside the country. Their role was especially important in the 1980s when trade unions, ‘civics’ (residents’ associations), student organizations, women’s organizations, religious organizations and others formed a loose coalition called the United Democratic Front (UDF), mobilizing people for the struggle so widely that the apartheid government could no longer suppress the resistance by force. This led to the government’s decision to lift the ban on the ANC, and start negotiations to end apartheid. After a prolonged negotiation process, the first non-racial elections were held in 1994. The ANC won overwhelmingly in the 1994 elections and took the reins of government. The fact that ‘the movement took office’ inevitably brought a drastic change in the relations between the state and civil society (Klandermans et al. 1998). Under the old regime, the apartheid system could be blamed for every grievance, and most social movements, despite their variety and differences, were allied in regarding the apartheid system as the main enemy and target. The end of apartheid changed this situation drastically. Social movements that were actively involved in the last days of the anti-apartheid struggle faced difficulty in redefining their roles and relations with the state now that their ally, the ANC, had become the governing party. This process has been particularly well documented for the biggest labor organization, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and civic groups under the umbrella of the South African National Civic Organisation (Sanco). Both of these decided to ally formally with ANC, but at the same time tried to maintain their independence (Lanegran 1995; Glaser 1997; Adler and Steinberg 1999; Lodge 2001). In the South African context, these social movements with roots in the anti-apartheid struggle are often called ‘old’ social movements, in contrast to the post-apartheid ‘new’ social movements. The ‘old’ and ‘new’ social


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movements in this context do not correspond with the general usage of ‘new social movements’ (NSMs) in social movement literature. Although COSATU is regarded as a typical ‘old’ social movement in South Africa, this has more to do with historical factors unique to South Africa than with its class character. After democratization, the ‘old’ social movement organizations lost many of their leaders to the government. The relations between the state and organizations in civil society became characterized by a collaborative nature, and social-movement mobilization against the state was significantly reduced, at least for the first few years after the democratization. By the end of the 1990s, however, there emerged a new boom of social movements in South Africa. ‘Old’ social movement organizations such as COSATU and SANCO continue to exist, while many other organizations focusing on specific socio-economic issues, such as housing, electricity, water and health care, emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s. TAC, focusing on AIDS medications, emerged in this period; others that are relatively well known include the Anti Privatisation Forum (APF), the Landless People’s Movement (LPM), the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC), the Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC) and the Concerned Citizens Forum (CCF), to name but a few. In addition, there are numerous smaller community organizations, often not more than a group of people without any kind of staff or offices. In contrast to ‘old’ social movements such as COSATU, which raise objections but firmly stay in their collaborating relations with the ANC, ‘new’ social movements generally do not ally with any political party or hesitate to carry on strong confrontations with the central and local governments. They often resort to illegal direct action; the most well-known case is Operation Khanyisa, an SECC campaign of illegal reconnection of electricity for households whose supply of electricity has been cut off due to non-payment (Egan and Wafer 2006, p. 54; Bond 2006, p. 118). TAC also takes non-violent illegal action from time to time, as we will see below. Review of the Existing Literature on Post-Apartheid Social Movements Each social movement has different reasons and a different momentum to trigger its initial activism. However, the contemporaneousness behind the emergence of various social movements suggests some common causes that lie beneath these social movements. The start of the boom roughly coincided with the neo-liberal shift of the ANC government, symbolized by the introduction of a new macroeconomic strategy, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) program, in 1996. The introduction of GEAR evoked harsh criticism from the leftist circle, most importantly COSATU

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and the South African Communist Party (SACP), which formed the tripartite alliance with the ANC. Although the alliance is being maintained up to the present, there have been significant tensions among the alliance partners since the introduction of GEAR. ‘New’ social movements are also generally critical of GEAR. In the existing literature, the emergence of new trends in social movements has been generally attributed to people’s impoverishment and marginalization due to the ANC government’s neoliberal economic policies that emphasize fiscal austerity and cost recovery, as well as the capitalist globalization that is behind the ANC’s embrace of neoliberalism. For instance, based on a major research project organized by the University of KwaZulu-Natal on post-apartheid social movements, Ballard et al. (2005, 2006) explain the emergence of ‘new’ social movements as a reaction to globalization and neoliberalization, which have caused widening inequality and marginalization of the poor. Bond (2006), who is well known for his sharp criticism of neoliberalization of the ANC government, also interprets these ‘new’ social movements in this context, and characterizes them as struggles for ‘decommodification’. In sum, the existing literature has generally understood the emergence of ‘new’ social movements in relation to people’s disappointment and grievance about the change in the ANC, which in its 1994 election manifesto Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), had promised a bright future for those who had suffered under the apartheid regime. TAC is one of the best-known ‘new’ social movements in South Africa, and it has been chosen as a subject of case study in both of the two most important collections of studies on post-apartheid social movements (Ballard et al. 2006; Gibson 2006). Friedman and Mottiar’s study (2006), a comprehensive analysis of TAC based on intensive interviews with TAC members, partners and rivals, traces various dimensions of TAC’s strategies in which ‘morality’ is the prime source of strength. In contrast to Friedman and Mottiar’s focus on the characteristics of TAC as it is today, Mbali (2005, 2006) tries to contextualize TAC in the history of struggle of AIDS and gay rights activism. In addition, Robins has also published several articles on TAC with focus on the diversity of its activities, as well as on the motivations of participants in activism (Robins 2004, 2006; Robins and Von Lieres 2004a, 2004b). TAC is also an indispensable factor in studies that try to explain the South African government’s apparent failure of HIV/AIDS policy (Van der Vliet 2004; Butler 2005; Nattrass 2007). While much has been said in the existing literature about linkages between the emergence of ‘new’ social movements and poor people’s grievances about their socio-economic conditions, only secondary attention has been paid to the institutional environment which has facilitated their


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activism. However, TAC’s trajectory of activism shows the importance of the new institutional environment, formed during the democratic transition, in diversifying strategic options and widening the chances of success for social movements. This study focuses on this point, which has been partly touched on in Friedman and Mottiar (2006) and Robins and Von Lieres (2004a, 2004b), but not fully examined. I will discuss in full detail below how the scope for TAC to engage in formal politics has been informed by the newly created institutional environment.

TAC’S FIRST CAMPAIGNS The Beginning of TAC Launched in 1998, TAC started with a campaign for a national program for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) for HIV-positive pregnant women, and then it moved on to a fight for antiretroviral treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS in general. The combination therapy that uses three or more kinds of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs), or highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART), was established in the late 1990s; the use of ARVs first spread among HIVpositive people in the United States and other developed countries. As a result, deaths among people living with HIV/AIDS in those countries were dramatically reduced and their quality of life improved significantly. However, at the time when TAC started its campaigns, it was commonly thought that it was unrealistic to use ARVs widely in developing countries such as South Africa, because of the high cost of drugs and various technical constraints. TAC tried to change this perception. TAC founder, Zackie Achmat, is a person with a long history of social movement activism, and is openly gay and HIV positive.1 Born in 1962 in Cape Town, he got involved in anti-apartheid activism during his schooldays, and was arrested several times during the struggle. In the early 1990s, he set up the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and fought for formal protection for gay rights in the new Constitution. He also joined the AIDS Law Project and worked as a paralegal. The AIDS Law Project, which was established in 1993 as a project of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of Witwatersrand, was one of the parental organizations of TAC; it is still its closest ally up to the present. Achmat’s decision to launch TAC in 1998 was a direct reaction to the death of Simon Nkoli, a friend of Achmat and an anti-apartheid and gay rights activist who died of AIDS-related illness without being able to afford medicine that he needed to survive.

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TAC was officially launched on 10 December 1998 in Western Cape Province. Initially TAC was a subgroup of the National Association of People Living with HIV/AIDS (NAPWA), but later it became an independent organization. TAC’s first campaign was to collect signatures on a petition to demand the government to introduce a free PMTCT program for HIVpositive pregnant women (TAC 2001, p. 8). The South African government was planning to implement a pilot PMTCT program, but a few months before TAC was launched, the suspension of the plan had been announced, citing the cost as the main reason for the decision (Van der Vliet 2004, p. 56). From 1999 TAC extended its campaigns to other provinces. These campaigns were aimed at urging the government to retract its decision to suspend the pilot PMTCT program, even though the relationship between TAC and the Ministry of Health at that time was still a friendly one. TAC delegations had several opportunities to meet Health Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and they pledged to work together to lower drug prices and realize a national PMTCT program (TAC 2001, p. 9). Campaigns around the Medicines Act Court Case At the time TAC was launched, the South African government was involved in a court case brought by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association (PMA) and 40 major multinational pharmaceutical companies over the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act (No. 90 of 1997). The aim of the Act was to lower the cost of medicines by allowing parallel importation and promoting the generic substitution of medicines. However, the PMA and pharmaceutical companies claimed that the Act infringed upon their intellectual property rights, and sued the South African government. The United States government also put pressure on the South African government by placing South Africa on the watch list for economic sanctions. TAC supported the South African government with the expectation that the Act would lead to lower prices of AIDS drugs. In this context, the targets of TAC’s first campaigns were multinational pharmaceutical companies and the US government, and not the South African government as in the later campaigns. In the campaigns against the US government, protests by the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP), an American social movement, had a significant impact on the US government’s decision to remove South Africa from the watch list at the end of 1999 (Shepard 2002, p. 14). In July 2000, the 13th International AIDS Conference was held in Durban, South Africa. It was the first time this major AIDS conference had been held in a developing country, and the issue of access to ARVs in developing countries attracted much attention. Just before the conference


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started, TAC, together with the US-based Health Global Access Project (Health GAP), mobilized thousands of people for the Global March for Treatment, to highlight the issue of costly medicines as the major obstacle towards increasing access to ARVs in developing countries like South Africa. After organizing a number of demonstrations and meetings around the Medicines Act court case in late 2000 and early 2001, TAC also got permission from the court to give testimony as a ‘friend of court’ (amicus curiae) in favor of the South African government. These campaigns and court actions were not conducted by TAC on its own. Within South Africa, COSATU, which supported the South African government’s position in the court case, participated in some of TAC’s demonstrations against the pharmaceutical companies and the US government (TAC 2001, pp. 12–13). COSATU has been one of TAC’s most important allies from an early stage. International NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Oxfam also gave support to TAC. Demonstrations were held not only in South Africa but also in the US and other developed countries; big pharmaceutical companies such as GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) got a lot of bad press.2 In the end, the PMA decided to drop the case against the South African government in April 2001.

THE PMTCT COURT CASE AND THE STRATEGIC USE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS The PMTCT Court Case After the court case over the Medicines Act was settled, expectations for increased access to ARVs in South Africa were high. At this time, however, the South African government’s negative attitude towards ARVs was becoming apparent. Obstacles to the wider use of ARVs were decreasing due to the international trend of loosening intellectual property protections in the interest of public health in developing countries; this was most clearly expressed in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Ministerial Declaration of November 2001. The prices of ARVs were significantly lowered, yet, instead of the issue of cost, concerns over the safety of ARVs were more frequently mentioned by the South African government leaders from late 1999. This change started with the inception of the Mbeki presidency. After the general elections in 1999, Nelson Mandela, who had become the first black president of South Africa in 1994, retired, leaving his deputy Thabo Mbeki to ascend to the presidency. The post of Health Minister was also switched from Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, who has been very close to Mbeki since

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the struggle days. Mbeki exhibited a keen interest in dissident scientists’ views on HIV/AIDS, such as that HIV is harmless, and that symptoms of AIDS are caused by malnutrition and the side-effects of ARVs. Mbeki was heavily criticized for expressing such views in his speech at the International AIDS Conference in Durban in 2000. Tshabalala-Msimang also supported Mbeki’s stance on HIV/AIDS and often expressed her doubts about the effectiveness and safety of ARVs. Understanding and contextualizing the dissident views on HIV/AIDS and ARVs, or ‘AIDS denialism’, of Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang has attracted much attention in recent studies (for example Nattrass 2007; Fassin 2007), but we cannot explore this further here due to space limitations. For the purpose of this chapter, it is sufficient to point out that the relations between TAC and the Health Minister had deteriorated before the end of the Medicines Act court case. As this happened, the government became TAC’s primary target of activism for realizing the introduction of ARVs in the public sector, even though this was not TAC’s original intention; in Achmat’s words: ‘We never expected to fight the government. I mean, the love we had for them . . . ’ (Nolen 2007, p. 188). It was at this point that political institutions and factionalism among governing elites began to facilitate TAC’s activities to put pressure on and negotiate with the government. In August 2001, TAC took the South African government to court, challenging its policy to limit the provision of PMTCT programs to a limited number of pilot sites. TAC based its claim on Section 27 of the Constitution, which provides: ‘(1) Everyone has the right to have access to . . . health care services, including reproductive health care . . . ’; and ‘(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights’ (Republic of South Africa 1996). Although the government refuted TAC’s claim by asserting that it was unaffordable, and that the safety and effectiveness of ARVs had not been fully established, both the Pretoria High Court judgment and the Constitutional Court judgment supported TAC’s argument and ordered the government to expand public PMTCT programs.3 Significance of the Socio-Economic Rights Provisions in the New Constitution In the court case, the biggest issue was around Section 27(2) of the Constitution, that is, whether the government had taken ‘reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights’. In addition to showing the scientific proof about the effectiveness and safety of the PMTCT, TAC in its affidavits demonstrated that the total cost of the PMTCT programs


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would be less than the costs of treating all children born HIV positive in the absence of such programs. This simulation was provided by Professor Nicoli Nattrass of the University of Cape Town, one of the most respected economists in South Africa, who worked extensively with the post-apartheid South African government as well as international organizations such as the World Bank. It is worth noting that TAC avoided criticism of the government’s GEAR policy, and presented an argument that the expansion of PMTCT programs was affordable for the government without changing its fiscal policy – a popular target of criticism by post-apartheid social movements. Examining both the government’s and TAC’s cost estimates, the court decided that the government had not taken ‘reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources’. The court ruling quoted the so-called Grootboom case in 2000, in which Irene Grootboom and others, who lost their informal housing after being evicted from the land they were occupying in the Western Cape, demanded that the government provide them with shelter. The applicants claimed that their case was based on Sections 26 (the right to adequate housing) and 28 (the rights of children), which are similar to Section 27, which TAC evoked. The Constitutional Court decided that the state housing program fell short of compliance with the constitutional requirements, and that ‘it failed to make reasonable provision within its available resources’ for homeless people in the area who ‘were living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations’.4 The Grootboom case was groundbreaking in the sense that it paved the way for human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements to utilize constitutional court cases for making specific policy demands concerning socio-economic rights included in the Constitution. The Constitution, whose provisions TAC utilized, was implemented in 1997 (adopted in 1996), but the inclusion of socio-economic rights provisions in the Constitution dates back to the interim Constitution introduced in 1993, which set the basis for the current Constitution. There was no Bill of Rights in constitutions under the apartheid regime. The negotiation over the new Constitution was one of the central tasks for the democratization process that began in 1990. There were heated negotiations over the institutional design of electoral systems and administrative structure; the contents of the new Bill of Rights were also contentious. From within the ANC camp came strong voices for entrenching socio-economic rights such as nutrition, shelter and health care in the new Constitution, although the National Party, which was the governing party of the apartheid regime and had an interest in limiting the power of future government, also supported certain socio-economic rights, especially property rights (Atkinson 1994; Liebenberg 1998). There were opinions that socio-economic rights

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are not suited to judicial enforcement. Yet, several socio-economic rights were entrenched in Chapter 3 of the interim Constitution, and then a more extensive set of socio-economic rights as justiceable rights (that is, rights that can be enforced by the courts) was to be included in the final Constitution. This should be understood in the context of the history of apartheid, characterized by the denial of access to social goods and services, as well as to economic resources, by the majority of the people. This resulted in widespread poverty and gross inequality, and it was therefore expected that including socio-economic rights in the Constitution would play some role in redressing the balance (Mubangizi 2007). The provision was, however, not too radical in the sense that it did not oblige the state, for example, to provide homeless people with shelter immediately upon demand, but just to ‘take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights’. At the time of drafting the Constitution, it is doubtful whether ANC leaders had expected that the Constitutional Court would in future order them to implement specific measures, such as those in the Grootboom and TAC cases. In fact, the applicant’s claim was rejected in the first court case concerning constitutional socio-economic rights,5 but the Grootboom case set a new precedent (Wesson 2004). After the Grootboom case, the strategic usefulness of Constitutional Court cases for social movements became high, of which TAC was well aware when it launched the litigation (Heywood 2003, pp. 294–5). When the Pretoria High Court supported TAC’s claim in December 2001, the government decided to appeal against the court decision, criticizing the ruling for trampling on the separation of powers. Its claim was, however, not supported in the Constitutional Court ruling. External Support for the Court Case The litigation was not an isolated act by TAC, but was rather brought together by TAC, Save Our Babies (a loose coalition of pediatricians) and the Children’s Rights Centre (a Durban-based NGO). Besides the applicants, experts of epidemiology, medical science and economics also presented founding affidavits. Among the lawyers for TAC was a well-known human rights lawyer named Geoff Budlender, who co-founded the Legal Resources Centre in 1979, South Africa’s first public interest law center, which focused on litigation with an impact on people’s conditions under apartheid. He has a rich experience in public interest litigation. According to Heywood, one of the founding members of TAC and the executive director of the AIDS Law Project, Budlender and other lawyers’ ‘commitment and professionalism were central to the success of the case’ (Heywood 2003, p. 290).


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In this way, TAC had successfully solicited the cooperation of capable experts of various fields in the preparation for the court case. Venturing into litigation against all odds would risk demobilization of the social movement if TAC lost its lawsuit. Any chance of winning would require a high level of expertise. In the case of TAC, it may have seemed advantageous for TAC to utilize constitutional litigation strategically; its founders, such as Achmat and Heywood, had rich scientific and legal knowledge in relation to HIV/AIDS, as well as an extensive network with anti-apartheid struggle leaders. However, in South Africa there are several public-interest law centers, such as the Legal Resources Centre and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, which initiate legal actions on behalf of poor people if their cases are of public interest, and would have significant impact on public policies.6 In this sense, there is relatively wide scope in South Africa for even small, resource-poor social movements to launch strategic litigation with external assistance. Parallel to the court case, TAC also organized a number of demonstrations. One week after TAC initiated the court action, it picketed provincial health departments and the national parliament. Interfaith services, a march on parliament, and other gatherings regarding the court cases were held in Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Pretoria. TAC also called on international supporters to mail or fax the South African Minister of Health, asking her to settle the court case and meet TAC’s demands. TAC was already well known in the transnational AIDS activism circle through its activities during the Medicines Act court case, and this PMTCT court case further increased TAC’s international publicity. In addition, from 2000, TAC held Treatment Literacy workshops all over South Africa, to disseminate accurate information about the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS; this contributed to widening TAC’s activities at the grass-roots level, and strengthening its network with local community-based organizations (CBOs) and support groups for people living with HIV/AIDS. Within South Africa, COSATU, although taking a passive stance on the litigation against the government (Heywood 2003, p. 300), continued its support for TAC. This suggests that COSATU regarded TAC’s position as similar to its own, in the sense that it places value on ‘strategic engagement’; this concept meant that organizations, while supporting and recognizing the overall legitimacy of the government, would not hesitate to criticize specific policies, and are willing to engage with structures of policy-making and legislation in order to promote progressive social and economic policies (Coleman 2000, p. 5; see also Robins and Von Lieres 2004a, 2004b). TAC had succeeded in soliciting significant support from faith organizations and NGOs as well. In addition, Nelson Mandela also came out in support of TAC (Financial Times 19 February 2002). This was an unusual move because Mandela, who

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on his own volition stood aside to allow Mbeki to succeed him, had generally refrained from openly criticizing policies of the successor government. As TAC successfully mobilized support from influential organizations and individuals, as well as from grass-roots people involved in CBOs and support groups, a lot of pressure was brought onto the government’s policy to limit PMTCT sites. The fact that the Pretoria High Court supported TAC’s proposition made a strong impression on the public that TAC’s claim was legitimate and that the government’s position was unreasonable. As a result, even before the Constitutional Court decision, the number of PMTCT sites was increased in several provinces (Heywood 2003, pp. 293–4). This prompt change, though limited to certain provinces, stands in contrast to the Grootboom case, after which it took as long as three years before actual policy change happened despite the court decision in favor of the applicants. Even when the court issues an order to the government to take policy measures, the court ruling leaves significant flexibility as to what kind of concrete steps the government should take. Therefore, the actual consequences of court orders are greatly affected by the politics outside the court; that is, whether there are social forces that support the orders, and are ready to pressure government to respond promptly. Comparing the Grootboom court case and TAC’s PMTCT court case, Budlender, who defended applicants in both cases, points out: [I]t was largely the absence of social movement mobilizing in support of the judgment in the Grootboom case, which led to a three-year delay in the development of a program that includes people in crisis circumstances such as that in the Grootboom case. While in the instance of the TAC case there have been advances in the provision of treatment to persons living with HIV and AIDS beyond the scope of the judgment . . . this is because the judgment was part of a broader campaign of a social movement. (Quoted in Foundation for Human Rights 2004, p. 18)

The PMTCT court case demonstrates not only the significance of constitutional court cases as a formal channel for strengthening social movements, but also the effectiveness of combining formal litigation, which requires specialist knowledge, with informal, mass-based demonstrations.

THE ROLE OF CORPORATIST INSTITUTIONS IN THE REALIZATION OF THE ARV ROLL-OUT NEDLAC and the Negotiations for the National Treatment Plan After the PMTCT court case, the focus of TAC’s activism became the realization of ARV treatment in public health facilities. Although starting


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from the demand for PMTCT programs, the final goal of TAC had always been affordable ARV treatment for poor South Africans. Achmat had continued a personal protest, at great risk to his own life, by refusing his own ARV treatment until ARVs were available universally. TAC’s first call for a National Treatment Plan including ARV treatment in the public sector was made in a memorandum, handed to the Health Minister at the end of the ‘Global March’ at the International AIDS Conference in Durban in July 2000. In 2001 TAC set up a research committee, held workshops and conferences with health experts, and developed the ‘Bredell Consensus’ document which called for a National Treatment Plan. Up to this point the preparation work had largely been done by a small number of TAC leaders with outside experts, but in 2002 TAC commenced campaigns to popularize its idea of the Plan and to mobilize wide support for it (Heywood 2005, pp. 186–8). Concurrently, TAC sought for opportunities to negotiate with the government. However, the Health Minister did not support the idea of a National Treatment Plan, and refused to meet TAC (Heywood 2005, p. 189). Relations with TAC and the Health Minister were completely broken off in the course of the PMTCT court case. Given this, for TAC to negotiate with the government it was crucial that formal institutions existed for discussion about HIV/AIDS policy outside of the Department of Health. Specifically, TAC could utilize the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), a corporatist institution that was established by law in 1995. NEDLAC is unique as a form of corporatism, in that it has representatives from the community in addition to the conventional constituencies of tripartite corporatism (government, business and labor). The origins of NEDLAC lie in the calls from anti-apartheid forces during the transition period for the establishment of an inclusive body for policy consultation, so that the National Party government would not unilaterally decide and change important socio-economic policies. Although calling for a corporatist institution, there were also criticisms within anti-apartheid forces about its undemocratic nature – because of the concentration of power in a small number of elites – as well as the risk of marginalization of unorganized vulnerable people (Von Holdt 1993). It was against this backdrop that the community constituency was included in NEDLAC to increase its inclusivity. In fact, the community constituency participates in only one of the four chambers of NEDLAC,7 and its practical role in policy-making is fairly limited. However, the existence of such an institution enabled TAC to have access to formal policy discussion with the government and other constituencies. COSATU played an important mediating role for TAC to have access to NEDLAC. The members of the community constituency of NEDLAC

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were limited to six organizations that nationally represent particular interests, such as civics, women, youth and disabled persons; TAC was not a member of NEDLAC. Meanwhile, COSATU is the most influential member of the labor constituency. According to Heywood, it was through the mediation of Ebrahim Patel, a senior COSATU leader and the overall labor convener of NEDLAC, that TAC got involved in the NEDLAC process: Ebrahim Patel . . . persuaded TAC leaders about the potential advantages of taking the call for [a National Treatment Plan] formally into NEDLAC. In particular he pointed to the benefits that would come from formal discussions with business and labor leaders. Going the NEDLAC route also meant moving the issue of HIV/AIDS beyond the exclusive control of the Minister of Health. (Heywood 2005, pp. 189–90)

In June 2002, TAC and COSATU jointly held a National HIV/AIDS Treatment Congress, in which they called for ‘a new partnership between the national health department, provincial health departments and civil society organizations . . . to save lives’ (TAC 2002). The Congress resolutions were sent to NEDLAC, and in response a special HIV/AIDS task team was set up within NEDLAC to develop a draft National Treatment Plan, of which Mark Heywood became a member representing the community constituency (NEDLAC 2003, pp. 62–3). Since the establishment of a task team required agreement from all the constituencies, its realization means that there were some government representatives who were positive about discussing ARV treatment in the public sector regardless of the negative attitude of the Health Minister. With the support of some elites within the government, TAC managed to secure a means for participating in formal policy discussion about the National Treatment Plan outside the control of the Health Minister. Intensive negotiations took place in October and November (NEDLAC 2003, p. 62) and, according to Heywood, a draft plan was agreed among all constituencies – including government representatives from the Department of Health; its launch on World AIDS Day (1 December) that year was prepared (Heywood 2005, p. 191). However, at the last minute the government representatives indicated that they did not yet have mandates from their constituencies (NEDLAC 2003, p. 62) and the existence of the ‘agreement’ was denied. Therefore TAC’s participation in the NEDLAC task team per se did not bring about the policy change; yet it had much significance in pulling the government into the formal negotiations over the National Treatment Plan, giving the ARV roll-out a position as a policy agenda, and clearly demonstrating the factions inside the government over the issue.


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As the government refused to sign the NEDLAC ‘agreement’, TAC reactivated informal measures to put pressure on the government. In February 2003, on the day of the opening of parliament, TAC organized a march of the largest scale in which a reported 15 000 to 20 000 people participated. Moreover, TAC initiated a civil disobedience campaign in March. This was aimed at putting strong pressure on the government by resorting to non-violent illegal actions, such as sit-ins at police stations and public offices. Before this, TAC had illegally imported AIDS-related drugs from countries where cheaper generic drugs were available.8 While the previous campaigns were meant to infringe upon the intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical companies, for the first time the government itself was also targeted in the illegal actions. In launching the campaign, TAC underscored its record of incessant efforts to negotiate peacefully with the government, and emphasized that there was ‘no reasonable alternative but to increase the pressure on government through a civil disobedience campaign’ (TAC 2003a). However, TAC’s long-standing ally, COSATU, did not support the campaign. This was because the civil disobedience approach was used in the anti-apartheid struggle to express disapproval, and to deny the legitimacy of the government by breaking laws made by the apartheid regime. Adopting the same strategy against the current government was considered an affront to its legitimacy, which had hitherto been the premise for ‘strategic engagement’. With such a historical connotation, civil disobedience was a double-edged sword – effective, but risking lost opportunities to negotiate with the government through formal routes. Therefore the TAC leadership had to struggle to find a balance between the enthusiasm of grass-roots members, whose anger against the government had reached its peak, and the strategic importance of keeping channels open for dialogue with the government. As a result, civil disobedience did not last long; it was suspended in April after the TAC leadership met Deputy President Jacob Zuma, and accepted his reasoning to suspend the campaign in return for his promise to address the issue soon (TAC 2003b). Although it took another several months for the Cabinet to actually decide the ARV roll-out, the turning of the tide was clear by that time, and there was more and more pressure for policy change even within the government and the ANC. The Realization of the ARV Roll-Out and TAC’s Increasing Engagement in Formal Politics around HIV/AIDS Finally, in August 2003, the Cabinet announced that the government would roll out ARV treatment in the public health sector. It is reported that this ‘Cabinet revolt’ against Mbeki and his Health Minister was

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carefully planned by several high-level ANC leaders who were in charge of the election strategy for 2004 (Nattrass 2007, pp. 118–19). The publication of the ‘Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management and Treatment’ followed in November, and it was decided that the ARV roll-out would start in early 2004. Having achieved its goal to change government policy to include ARV treatment, the primary focus of TAC’s activities was now to ensure that the roll-out would actually happen as planned. TAC set up the Joint Civil Society Monitoring and Evaluation Forum with other NGOs, and criticized the government for delay in implementing the Plan. Upgrading of the public health care system and stopping the ‘brain drain’ of health personnel were also prioritized. TAC strengthened its ties with COSATU again in its campaigns to improve the working conditions of health workers in the public sector. Even after the Operational Plan was published, the relations between TAC and the Health Minister did not get better. Despite that, the scope for TAC to engage constantly in HIV/AIDS policy-making became wider, as Heywood and several other TAC activists were selected as new members of the South African National AIDS Council (SANAC) in November 2003. Moreover, TAC’s role in the formal HIV/AIDS policy-making was fully established, when Heywood became the deputy chairperson of SANAC after its second restructuring in late 2006 (SANAC n.d.). SANAC was set up in 2000 as the highest advisory body to the government on HIV/AIDS, promoting partnerships for coordinated action as a national response to HIV/AIDS – reflecting the international trend of a multi-sector approach towards HIV/AIDS policy. SANAC is chaired by the Deputy President, with almost half of the members being from government and the other half from civil society. As mentioned above, TAC suspended its civil disobedience campaign after a meeting with Deputy President Zuma. On that occasion, Zuma met TAC representatives as the chairperson of SANAC, and promised to give TAC opportunities to discuss the issue of ARV treatment directly with SANAC members. The appointment of Heywood as a SANAC member took place in this context. As an advisory body, SANAC does not have significant power in decision-making, and the frequency of SANAC meetings is not high. However, similar to the case of NEDLAC, the existence of SANAC as a corporatist institution specialized in HIV/ AIDS policy, for which participation of civil society representatives is guaranteed, functioned as an institutional condition for taking the HIV/ AIDS policy-making process out of the control of the Health Minister. The change in the latter half of 2006 was also accelerated by an incidental factor, in that the health of Health Minister Tshabalala-Msimang deteriorated, and she took sick leave for several months. During her absence, the Deputy President and SANAC chairperson Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka


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(who had succeeded to the position in 2005 after Zuma was dismissed on corruption allegations), and Deputy Health Minister Nozizwe MadlalaRoutledge, took the initiative to involve TAC in the formal politics around HIV/AIDS policy. TAC members, at both national and local levels, were deeply involved in the drafting process of the ‘HIV & AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa 2007–2011’. Following the Health Minister’s return to work, feuds between her and her deputy escalated, which eventually led to the dismissal of the Deputy Minister in August 2007. TAC strongly criticized the incident, organizing meetings and demonstrations to show support for Madlala-Routledge. It was as if all progress made in the previous year had gone down the drain. However, by that time the factions among the governing elites were all the more clear, and the Health Minister could no longer monopolize authority over the HIV/AIDS policy. Since Mbeki resigned as President in September 2008 and the new President, Kgalema Motlante, moved Tshabalala-Msimang from the post of Health Minister to that of minister in the Presidency, the institutional latitude which TAC had gained access to is likely to become all the more firm. Both the PMTCT and the ARV treatments are now available for more and more people in South Africa, although the pace has not kept up with the Plan. The cooperative relations between TAC members and other local stakeholders, such as local governments, clinics and hospitals, and CBOs, are getting stronger, and more institutionalized. As the level of participation in the formal institutional politics increases, it seems that the challenge for TAC is now more about maintaining the mobilization level for informal activities, rather than having access to formal politics in order to have a say in HIV/AIDS policy.

CONCLUSION Taking up TAC as a case study, this chapter has examined how the new institutional environment and elite alignments in post-apartheid South Africa have affected social movements’ choices of strategies to utilize formal and informal political avenues. Focusing on access to AIDS medication, TAC’s first campaigns were targeted at pharmaceutical companies to pressure them to lower their prices. At first, TAC was just a small group in Cape Town, yet it managed to make its agenda popular by acquiring influential allies inside and outside South Africa. Most of the measures TAC employed at its initial stage were informal, such as the use of petitions and demonstrations, while access to formal politics became important once the target of TAC’s activism

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shifted from pharmaceutical companies to the South African government. Allies that TAC had acquired during its initial activism were of much help when utilizing formal institutions. In order to realize a national PMTCT program, TAC used a Constitutional Court case, which proved to be effective. This is because socio-economic rights, including the right of access to health care, were embodied as ‘justicable rights’ in the new Constitution, for which the present government leaders had negotiated for during the transition process. A precedent in the Grootboom case, as well as cooperation of outside experts to support TAC’s argument, helped it to win the court case. In its fight for the ARV roll-out, formal institutions for policy consultation, such as NEDLAC and SANAC, were utilized. Although the establishment of SANAC was a reflection of the international trend of HIV/AIDS policy, and did not derive from the democratization process, NEDLAC has its origins in the demand by the anti-apartheid forces for an inclusive forum for policy consultation. It should be noted that neither NEDLAC nor SANAC has a strong decision-making power by itself, as they play an advisory role for the government to decide its policy. However, formal institutions for policy consultation, such as NEDLAC and SANAC, are interministerial in nature and include civil society members; the fact that these existed outside of the small circle of the ANC top elites, and the respective government departments in charge, enabled TAC to participate in substantial negotiations with government representatives as well as other stakeholders. COSATU, which is part of the governing tripartite alliance, as well as a key member of the NEDLAC labor constituency, played an important mediatory role in helping TAC to gain access to NEDLAC. In addition, the existence of power elites, who distanced themselves from the controversial AIDS denialist position of Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang, created latitude for TAC to participate in formal politics around HIV/AIDS policy. Having its roots in the anti-apartheid struggle, the current ANC government has many leaders who have experiences of working in ‘old’ social movements. The ANC’s first election manifesto, the RDP, was drafted through a participatory process to which civil society organizations, especially COSATU, made significant contributions. The establishment of NEDLAC was another example that demonstrated the ANC government’s commitment to participatory democracy and social dialogue at its early stage. However, since the inception of the Mbeki presidency, there has been an increasing tendency for the ANC government to downplay consultation and concentrate decision-making in a small number of leaders close to the presidency (Giliomee et al. 2001; Webster 2001; Chothia and Jacobs 2002). As a result, it is becoming more and more difficult to


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communicate opinions and policy proposals which are different from the President’s line, and the ‘failure’ of the government HIV/AIDS policy was at least partly attributable to the poor relations with experts outside of the government (Butler 2005). This change of political environment of post-apartheid South Africa had much to do with TAC’s strategy to utilize formal institutions. In the initial stages, when TAC had good relations with the Health Minister, it did not have to utilize formal institutions, as informal communication channels were available through personal networks built in the anti-apartheid struggle. It was when the informal communication channels were closed that the role of formal institutions, as alternative routes for securing access to the policy-making process, became important. TAC exploited the gap between the formal institutions of political participation, and the government leaders’ tendency to concentrate power. Even if the government leaders had any intention to monopolize decision-making, they could not fully do so – because government leaders are bound by the new political institutions that they themselves negotiated for during the transition process. The case study has demonstrated that the latitude for TAC to engage in formal politics has been created by political institutions that were formed during the democratization process; it also demonstrates the importance of allies to help TAC utilize the formal political structure to the maximum extent.

NOTES 1. For biographical facts on Zackie Achmat, see Nolen (2007, pp. 179–97) and Cape Argus (2002). 2. For instance, the activists made a mockery of GSK by referring to it as ‘Global Serial Killers’ (Power 2001). 3. Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others, 2002 (5) SA 703 (CC), 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC); Treatment Action Campaign and Others v Minister of Health and Others, 2002 (4) BCLR 356 (T). For backgrounds and details on the court case, see Heywood (2003). The Constitutional Court judgment, founding affidavits, and other related documents are available from the TAC website, http://www.tac.org.za/. 4. Government of Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 5. Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC), 1997 (12) BCLR 1696. 6. For instance, the Legal Resources Centre assisted non-citizen permanent residents of South Africa to have access to social grants, which were paid only to South African citizens. Access to water is another focal point. The Centre for Applied Legal Studies supported Soweto residents to win a court case against the City of Johannesburg in May 2008, in which the Johannesburg High Court ruled against the City’s prepaid water scheme as unconstitutional. 7. The four chambers are as follows: (1) public finance and monetary policy; (2) labor market; (3) trade industry; (4) development. Of these, the community constituency participates only in the development chamber.

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8. In October 2000, TAC leader Zackie Achmat brought back tablets of a generic version of fluconazole (a drug used to treat opportunistic infections such as thrush) from Thailand to South Africa, infringing the intellectual property right of Pfizer – which was exclusively selling the drug in South Africa (TAC 2001, pp. 10–11). TAC, together with MSF, also illegally imported generic ARVs from Brazil in January 2002, for which COSATU gave clear support (COSATU 2002).

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Fassin, Didier (2007), When Bodies Remember: Experiences and Politics of AIDS in South Africa, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California. Financial Times (2002), February 19. ‘Mandela Joins South African Aids Dispute’, retrieved 11 January 2008 from Factiva.com. Foundation for Human Rights (2004), Celebrating a Decade of Democracy: A Review of Public Interest Law – Conference Report, Pretoria: Foundation for Human Rights, retrieved 30 January 2008 from http://www.fhr.org.za/ attachment_view.php?aa_id=30. Friedman, Steven and Shauna Mottiar (2006), ‘Seeking the High Ground: The Treatment Action Campaign and the Politics of Morality’, in Richard Ballard, Adam Habib and Imraan Valodia (eds), Voices of Protest: Social Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa, Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, pp. 23–44. Gibson, Nigel C. (2006), Challenging Hegemony: Social Movements and the Quest for a New Humanism in Post-Apartheid South Africa, Trenton, NJ and Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World Press. Giliomee, Hermann, James Myburgh and Lawrence Schlemmer (2001), ‘Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa’, in Roger Southall (ed.), Opposition and Democracy in South Africa, London: Frank Cass, pp. 161–82. Glaser, Daryl (1997), ‘South Africa and the Limits of Civil Society’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 23 (1): 5–25. Heywood, Mark (2003), ‘Preventing Mother-to-Child HIV Transmission in South Africa: Background, Strategies and Outcomes of the Treatment Action Campaign’s Case against the Minister of Health’, South African Journal of Human Rights, 19 (2): 278–315. Heywood, Mark (2005), ‘Shaping, Making and Breaking the Law in the Campaign for a National HIV/AIDS Treatment Plan’, in Peris Jones and Kristian Stokke (eds), Democratising Development: The Politics of Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa, Leiden and Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 181–212. Klandermans, Bert, Marlene Roefs and Johan Olivier (1998), ‘A Movement Takes Office’, in David S. Meyer and Sidney G. Tarrow (eds), The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century, Oxford: Rowland & Littlefield, pp. 173–94. Lanegran, Kimberly (1995), ‘South Africa’s Civic Association Movement: ANC’s Ally or Society’s ‘Watchdog’? Shifting Social Movement–Political Party Relations’, African Studies Review, 38 (2): 101–26. Liebenberg, Sandra (1998), ‘Socio-Economic Rights’, in Matthew Chaskalson, Janet Kentridge, Jonathan Klaaren, Gilbert Marcus, Derek Spitz, Anthony Stein and Stuart Woolman (eds), The Constitutional Law of South Africa, 1st edn, Cape Town: Juta, retrieved 30 January 2008 from http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ centre_publications/constitlaw/pdf/41-SE%20Rights.pdf. Lodge, Tom (2001), ‘South African Politics and Collective Action, 1994–2000’, in Bert Klandermans, Marlene Roefs and Johan Olivier (eds), The State of the People: Citizens, Civil Society and Governance in South Africa, 1994–2000, Pretoria: HSRC Publishers, pp. 1–26. Mbali, Mandisa (2005), ‘The Treatment Action Campaign and the History of Rights-Based, Patient-Driven HIV/AIDS Activism in South Africa’, in Peris Jones and Kristian Stokke (eds), Democratising Development: The Politics of Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa, Leiden and Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 213–43.

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Mbali, Mandisa (2006), ‘TAC in the History of Patient-Driven AIDS Activism: The Case for Historicizing South Africa’s New Social Movements’, in Nigel C. Gibson (ed.), Challenging Hegemony: Social Movements and the Quest for a New Humanism in Post-Apartheid South Africa, Trenton, NJ and Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World Press, pp. 129–55. McAdam, Doug (1996), ‘Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions’, in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 23–40. McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (1997), ‘Toward an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolution’, in Mark Irving Lichback and Alan S. Zuckerman (eds), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 142–73. Mubangizi, John Cantius (2007), ‘Prospects and Challenges in the Protection and Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights: Lessons from the South African Experience’, Paper for the 7th World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law, Athens, 11–15 June, retrieved 30 January 2008 from http://www.enelsyn.gr/papers/w13/Paper%20by%20Prof.%20John%20 Cantius%20Mubangizi.pdf. NEDLAC (National Economic Development and Labour Council) (2003), NEDLAC Annual Report 2002/2003, Johannesburg: NEDLAC. Nattrass, Nicoli (2007), Mortal Combat: AIDS Denialism and the Struggle for Antiretrovirals in South Africa, Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. Nolen, Stephanie (2007), Stories of AIDS in Africa, London: Portobello Books. Power, Carla (2001), ‘Paying For Aids: Facing Outraged Victims in Poor Countries, Big Pharma Cuts the Prices of Lifesaving Drugs’, Newsweek, 19 March, retrieved 30 January 2008 from http://www.newsweek.com/id/80161. Republic of South Africa (1996), The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. Robins, Steven (2004), ‘“Long Live Zackie, Long Live”: AIDS Activism, Science and Citizenship after Apartheid’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 30 (3): 651–72. Robins, Steven (2006), ‘From “Rights” to “Ritual”: AIDS Activism in South Africa’, American Anthropologist, 108 (2): 312–23. Robins, Steven and Bettina Von Lieres (2004a), ‘AIDS Activism and Globalisation from Below: Occupying New Spaces of Citizenship in Post-Apartheid South Africa’, IDS Bulletin, 35 (2): 84–90. Robins, Steven and Bettina Von Lieres (2004b), ‘Remaking Citizenship, Unmaking Marginalization: The Treatment Action Campaign in Post-Apartheid South Africa’, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 38 (3): 575–86. SANAC (South African National AIDS Council) (n.d.), ‘The South African National AIDS Council (SANAC)’, retrieved 31 January 2008 from http://www. info.gov.za/issues/hiv/sanac.htm. Shepard, Benjamin (2002), ‘Introductory Notes on the Trail from ACT UP to the WTO’, in Benjamin Shepard and Ronald Hayduk (eds), From ACT UP to the WTO: Urban Protest and Community Building in the Era of Globalization, London and New York: Verso, pp. 11–15. TAC (Treatment Action Campaign) (2001), ‘TAC: An Overview’, retrieved 30 January 2008 from http://www.tac.org.za/Documents/Other/tachist.pdf. TAC (Treatment Action Campaign) (2002), ‘Consensus Statement of National


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HIV/AIDS Treatment Congress’, 29 June, retrieved 28 January 2008 from http:// www.tac.org.za/newsletter/2002/ns29_06_2002.txt. TAC (Treatment Action Campaign) (2003a), ‘Questions and Answers on TAC Civil Disobedience Campaign’, TAC E-Newsletter, 18 March, retrieved 30 January 2008 from http://www.tac.org.za/newsletter/2003/ns18_03_2003.htm# Questions. TAC (Treatment Action Campaign) (2003b), ‘TAC NEC Resolution’, 29 April, retrieved 30 January 2008 from http://www.tac.org.za/newsletter/2003/ ns29_04_2003.htm. Tarrow, Sidney (1998), Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd edn, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Van der Vliet, Virginia (2004), ‘South Africa Divided against AIDS: A Crisis of Leadership’, in Kyle D. Kauffmann and David L. Lindauer (eds), AIDS and South Africa: The Social Expression of a Pandemic, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 48–96. Von Holdt, Karl (1993), ‘The Danger of Corporatism’, South African Labour Bulletin, 17 (1): 46–51. Webster, Eddie (2001), ‘The Alliance under Stress: Governing in a Globalizing World’, Democratization, 8 (1): 255–74. Wesson, Murray (2004), ‘Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the SocioEconomic Jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court’, South African Journal on Human Rights, 20 (2): 284–308.

6.

Rethinking political opportunity structure in the Argentine unemployed and poor people’s movement Koichi Usami

INTRODUCTION In Argentina, road blockades by unemployed and poor people have become ubiquitous since the early 2000s. The people picketing roads to demand that the government provide more social assistance and jobs are called piqueteros. The road blocks proved quite effective for realizing these demands, but they have stagnated since 2003, when the Néstor Kirchner government restored economic stability and expanded social assistance programs. A large body of literature applying various social movement theories has described and analyzed this movement. Political opportunity structure (POS) theory is one of the most frequently used, but its ambiguity is not usually acknowledged. For example, Gamson and Meyer (1996, p. 275) criticized POS theory for trying to explain everything, without explaining anything. The POS approach, therefore, should be used only after first defining it clearly and then specifying the place, situation and other factors in which the social movement occurs. Such elaboration would reveal the conditions in which POS might function to increase road block protests. This chapter will analyze road block protests by unemployed and poor people in Argentina from their onset until their decline (McAdam 1982, p. 36), focusing on political opportunity structure. In terms of POS theory, attention is focused on such conditions as socio-economic circumstances, the experience of the protesters, their resources and the political organizations in which POS is relevant to the expansion of the protests.

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Rethinking political opportunity structure in Argentina

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CRITICISM OF PREVIOUS STUDIES AND DEFINITION OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE Previous Studies on the Piquetero Movement There are a number of studies on Argentine social movements, including the piquetero movement, applying various social movement theories. Many of these studies call attention to the relevant political factors. Barbetta and Bidaseca, for example, emphasize the transformation of the clientilism structure brought about by the piquetero movement (Barbetta and Bidaseca 2004, p. 77). Auyero is concerned with the relation between social movements and social assistance programs, the importance of brokers in social assistance programs, and the existence of clientelism in the process of social assistance programs (Auyero 2001, 2002). Political opportunity structure theory is one of the most frequently used methodologies in the analysis of road block protests in Argentina. Auyero pointed out that division of the elite activated the movement in its early stages, applying the idea of political opportunity structure (Auyero 2002, pp. 201–4). Villalón also refers to political opportunity structure in his analysis of the social movement and political, economic and societal transformation (Villalón 2007). Wolff too linked political opportunity structure to the rise of the movement, stating that ‘formally functioning but publicly delegitimized democracy presented a decisive opportunity structure to both (Ecuadorian and Argentine) movements’ (Wolff 2007, p. 12). These analyses assume a definite relationship between the piquetero movement and political opportunity structure. However, they apply POS theory without sufficiently considering its definition and limitations. Political Opportunity Structure as a Method of Analysis Political opportunity structure is said to be at the center of the political process approach, and many scholars like McAdam have applied it to social movement research. Used by a large number of scholars of diverse points of view, it has also come under criticism by many researchers. This criticism can be classified into three types. One type points to POS theory’s ambiguity as a methodology. For example, Gamson and Meyer (1996, p. 275) referred to political opportunity structure as ‘a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement’ and noted that it is ‘used to explain so much, it may explain nothing’. The second type of criticism focuses on the method’s narrow coverage in analyzing social movements. Crossley argued that political

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opportunity structure has a narrow focus upon political structure, and asserted that the object of analysis must be expanded to include the media and not be restricted to the state (Crossley 2002, p. 123). The third type criticizes political opportunity structure analysis for ultimately focusing on the subjective aspects of social movements and underrating objective political factors (Shigetomi, Chapter 1 in this volume). The criticism of POS by Gamson and Meyer and that by Crossley come from opposite directions. Gamson and Meyer’s point is quite convincing, but Crossley’s argument makes the discussion diffused and vague. A clear definition of political opportunity structure is required in order to analyze social movements from a focused point of view. At the same time, we need to describe political opportunity structure objectively, to keep the discussion from becoming bogged down in problems related to the subjective aspects of social movements. In short, a clear definition, objectivity and the specification of conditions are keys to the proper use of the political opportunity structure approach. Tarrow gives an objective and clear explanation, pointing out four elements of political opportunity structure: (1) the opening up of political opportunity, with the relationship between protest and political opportunity being neither negative nor positive but curvilinear; (2) the instability of political alignments; (3) the appearance of influential allies; and (4) conflicts within and among elites (Tarrow 1996, pp. 54–6). As the first point does not indicate an element of the political opportunity structure itself, it is the last three points which identify the main concepts which constitute political opportunity structure. To avoid the problem which Gamson and Meyer pointed out, McAdam insists on paying adequate attention to the following points in the application of POS theory: (1) not confusing structure change and power shift, that are most defensible conceived of as political opportunities, with the collective process by which these are interpreted and framed; (2) specifying the dimensions of political opportunities; and (3) specifying such relevant dependent variables as the timing of collective action and the outcomes of movement activity (McAdam 1996, pp. 24–31). In this chapter McAdam’s argument is taken into account and the relevant dependent variables are specified. McAdam’s point on the importance of the separation of political opportunity structures from other factors is well taken, but this does not mean that the conditions in which political opportunity structure functions as a cause of social movement can be neglected. In other words, identifying the conditions surrounding POS is necessary to make POS work. Resource mobilization and the socio-economic conditions of the people are among these conditions. Collective process may also be considered a condition.


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In other words, the experience of the participants in a social movement may be regarded as a condition in which political opportunity structure functions.

EMERGENCE OF THE PIQUETERO MOVEMENT AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE Neoliberal Policy and Transformation of the Welfare State This section describes the socio-economic situation in Argentina at the time the piquetero movement emerged, and then analyzes political opportunity structure in relation to piquetero movements in the 1990s. The presidential election in 1989 took place in the midst of an unprecedented economic crisis in which the inflation rate reached almost 5000 percent. Under these extraordinary circumstances, the Peronist candidate Carlos Menem, governor of the province of La Rioja, won out over the Radical Party’s candidate Eduardo Angeloz, governor of the province of Cordoba. With the country wracked by hyperinflation and social disorder, the Raúl Alfonsín administration that was in power at the time was unable to last out its six-year term until the end of 1989, and the President resigned in July. Thus Menem had to take office that month, much earlier than the day in December stipulated by the Constitution. Stabilizing the economy was the Menem administration’s principal political object, and it set about putting policies in motion to achieve this. Neoliberal economic policies such as liberalization of the economy and privatization of almost all of the principal state-owned enterprises were applied. At the same time the government promoted the deregulation of the labor market. While these neoliberal policies aimed to stabilize the economy through reducing fiscal deficit, they entailed the loss of wage and employment protection, which formal sector employees had enjoyed until the 1980s under an import-substitution industrialization development model. Deregulation of the labor market not only reduced labor costs and contributed to an increase in competitiveness, but it also brought about a deterioration of labor conditions and employment instability. The unemployment rate rose to around 15 percent in the Greater Buenos Aires area after the Mexican economic crisis in 1995. Simultaneously the quality of employment was deteriorating and the informalization of employment was increasing. The unemployment rate reached 22 percent during the economic crisis of 2002 and the percentage of the poor in the population soared to almost 50 percent that year (Figures 6.1 and 6.2). The increase in unemployment and expansion of informal employment meant

8.6

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INDEC (2003a), p. 5; Ministerio de Trabajo, retrieved 21 June 2007 from http://www.trabajo.gov.ar/.

Informal employment rate is the ratio of the number of employees who do not pay into a fund for pension contribution to all employees.

Figure 6.1

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2003

139

2002

2001

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1998

1997

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a loss of social security for formal sector workers, who were organized by labor unions. Workers who had lost their formal sector jobs no longer had a union to demand the improvement of social conditions. In short, transformation of the economic model in the 1990s eroded the social security systems implemented under the welfare state until the 1980s. However this high rate of unemployment in the middle of the 1990s did not immediately spark nationwide road block actions (Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.3). Now let us consider the political circumstance during the Menem administration, especially in regard to the government’s implementation of its neoliberal policies. Hitherto the ruling Peronist party was considered the archetypal Latin American populist party, and the Argentine National Labor Center, General Confederation of Labor (CGT: Confederación General de Trabajo), was the party’s principal supporting organization. O’Donnell called Menem’s style of governance ‘delegative democracy’ (O’Donnell 1997) because the administration’s neoliberal policies, especially economic policies, were introduced by presidential decrees and the use of political appointee bureaucrats. Under this delegative democracy style of governance, a democratically elected president used strong administrative power to realize his policies, overriding legislative and judicial power. Weyland called the Menem administration an alliance between populism and neoliberalism (Weyland 1999, pp. 397–8). He described Menem as an outsider to the existing political power and asserted that it was this position as outsider that enabled him to bring about an alliance between traditional supporters of the Peronist party and the group which wished to advance 500

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Figure 6.3

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neoliberal reform. On the other hand, Levitsky called attention to the flexibility of the Peronist party’s organization (Levitsky 2004). He stated that through its flexible organization, the Peronist party transformed what was a labor-based party into a clientist party during the Menem administration, distributing national resources to clients at various levels. On the one hand, the Menem administration could achieve neoliberal reform because of the weakening of the labor unions’ political power, and on the other, was able to retain traditional supporters of the Peronist party such as poor people with this clientist network. Whether these studies argued a new style of governance or a transformation of the Peronist party, they showed that the Menem administration realized neoliberal policies under stable political conditions. Now let us turn to the political opportunity structure in relation to social movements during the Menem administration in the 1990s. Before the presidential election in 1989, Menem was a leader of the ‘Renovation’ group of the Peronist party, which was opposed to the mainstream ‘Orthodox’ group supported by influential labor unions. However, once the Renovation group took over leadership of the Peronist party, he became the party’s presidential candidate and was supported by traditional labor unions such as the metal workers union (Levitsky 2003, pp. 51–7). After Menem won the election and introduced neoliberal policies, his government antagonized the traditional labor unions. On the issue of the neoliberal policies introduced by the Menem administration, the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) was divided into two groups, pro- and anti- Menem. But these two factions reunified in 1992 to cope with the neoliberal policies which were considered disadvantageous to labor. While the Menem administration carried out neoliberal economic reform through the delegative democracy style, when it came to social policies, it tended to negotiate with the CGT. The CGT participated in formal and informal tripartite negotiations with the government and the industrial organizations about social policies. One important result of these negotiations was a ‘macro agreement on employment, productivity and social equity’ signed by the government, the CGT and the industrial representatives in 1994. Thus a kind of corporatism as far as social policy was concerned came into existence. But social movement organizations, leftist minor political parties and dissident labor unions were unable to participate in these corporatism-style negotiations. On the other hand, there was no remarkable conflict inside the Peronist party until 1997, when Menem announced his intention to run for a third consecutive term in 1999. In spite of worsening social conditions, such as an all-time high unemployment rate, a political opportunity structure favorable to social movements, namely, the instability of political alignments, the appearance of

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influential allies, and conflicts within and among elites, did not exist at the federal level until 1997. Menem had kept the frictions within the party under control, and the corporatist type of tripartite negotiations had resulted in certain agreements. So although there was a consistently high rate of unemployment during Menem’s regime, the piquetero movement did not proliferate throughout the country. Road Blockade Protest and Emergence of the Piqueteros In this section, we will look at the emergence of piquetero protests at the local level. One of the first piquetero actions was a road blockade protest initiated in June 1996 by inhabitants in the cities of Cutral-Co and Plaza Huincul in the province of Neuquén in Patagonia. This incident was reported by the media and set the pattern for later protests. Development of the oil industry in this area predated World War II, and the state-owned oil company YPF (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales) had undergirded local development. However, under the Menem administration, YPF was privatized in 1992 and jobs cut from 4200 to 600. That year the unemployed population in the area numbered 4000 out of a total population of 30,000 people. Before it was privatized YPF had not only guaranteed workers’ jobs and wages, but also offered social services such as health care and education. So privatization stripped dismissed workers of social security as well as jobs (Orietta 1994, pp. 92–5). According to Auyero’s research, the road blockade protests in June 1996 were sparked by a local radio station announcement concerning the cancellation of the construction of a fertilizer plant which a Canadian company had contracted with the Neuquén provincial government to build. The radio station was bribed by the ex-mayor of Cutral-Co, who also offered food and money to people who went to protest. This ex-mayor belonged to the anti-mainstream group of the Neuquén Popular Movement (Movimiento Popular Neuqino) which controlled provincial politics (Auyero 2002, pp. 196–9). Here, then, are found the three necessary factors for political opportunity structure: instability of political alignments, appearance of influential allies, and conflicts within and among elites at the local political level. The mobilized people demanded that the governor provide a solution to their employment and socio-economic problems (Auyero 2002, p. 199). In April 1997 road blockade actions occurred again in Cutral-Co, and one person died in the conflict. The provincial government responded by offering 400 pesos in benefits to 600 ex-YPF employees, and 150 pesos as social assistance to the rest (Clarín, 12 February 1999). Sporadic protests in the area occurred after that incident but were not well organized. What was important about this incident was that the protesters succeeded:


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the road blockades gained them social assistance benefits. Furthermore, unemployed and poor people throughout the country learned of this. Another example of a successful road blockade is the one which took place in the city of General Mosconi, in the province of Salta in northern Argentina. Like Cutral-Co, the city of General Mosconi had long been dependent on petroleum extraction and refinement by the state-owned oil company. The privatization of YPF led to massive dismissals, and the unemployment rate in 1997 reached almost 50 percent in General Mosconi and the neighboring city of Tartagal. The protest that occurred in General Mosconi is notable for the fact that it led to the formation of the Unemployed Union (UTA – Unión de Trabajadores Desocupados). The Unemployed Union was organized by ex-YPF employees and neveremployed young people (Svampa 2003, pp. 51–77). The Unemployed Union played a key role in the bitter road block protests during 2000. The protest activities led to fatal incidents, intervention by the Peronist provincial government in the city government, and direct negotiations between the federal government and the Unemployed Union (Clarín, 23 May and 13 November 2000). Here we can observe the three political opportunity structure factors defined above. To deal with the situation, the De la Rúa government came up with a Labor Emergency Program (Programa de Emergencia Laboral) and offered monthly benefits of 100 or 200 pesos to the piqueteros (Clarín, 12 January 2000). Thus the piqueteros in General Mosconi also gained social assistance benefits through road block protests. It should be noted that the Unemployed Union became the recipient of the program and participated in its management (Svampa 2003, p. 65). In summary, the cases of Cutral-Co and General Mosconi show that there were clear political opportunity structures at the local level when the protests occurred. However, these clear political opportunity structures were limited to local areas, and they functioned under deteriorating socioeconomic circumstances. Also, the piqueteros had funds at their disposal. Although there were only a limited number of road blockades until 1999 (Figures 6.3 and 6.4), their success impressed other unemployed and poor people who had grievances about their own situation.

ECONOMIC CRISIS, POLITICAL DISORDER AND EXPANSION OF THE PIQUETERO MOVEMENT Socio-Economic Crisis and Political Disorder Road block protests increased rapidly and spread nationwide after 2001. This section describes the socio-economic crisis in 2001 as the background

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2500

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Figure 6.4 Number of roads blocked to the expansion of the protests, and then analyzes the political opportunity structure. When the Menem government introduced neoliberal policies, the growing fiscal deficit was financed by government bonds in foreign currencies. The Menem administration had decided to peg the currency at one dollar to one peso, and at the same time set a requirement, as an important part of its monetary policy, that the peso be fully backed with US dollar reserves. When Menem’s presidency ended in 1999, the opposition party, the Radical Civic Union (UCR – Unión Cívica Radical), aligned itself with the new center-left party, the FREPASO (Front for a Country in Solidarity – Frente para un País Solidario), and De la Rúa, from the UCR, took office as president in December that year. To deal with the social disparities that worsened under Menem, the De la Rúa administration declared that it would adopt the European social democratic model, the so-called ‘third way’. However, De la Rúa kept the principal neoliberal economic policies of the Menem administration, including its monetary policy. Accordingly, in 2001 the fiscal deficit increased and the total public deficit, which included public enterprises, provincial and federal governments, reached 7.79 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). To make matters worse, there was a huge capital flight during July and August, and the interest rate of public bonds soared to 22 percent (Mussa 2002, pp. 75–6). To mitigate the situation, De la Rúa tried budget cuts. However these measures failed to produce any clear results, and the new center-right economy minister came under increasing fire. Some ministers resigned in protest against the spending cuts, and De la Rúa found his political base weakening.


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Domingo Cavallo, the architect of the Menem administration’s monetary policies, brought back as economy minister to reconstruct the deteriorating economy, instituted a freeze on citizens’ bank accounts. As most poor people did not have bank accounts, it was mainly the middle and upper classes that suffered from this policy. Depositors were up in arms, and at this same time, December 2001, road block protests by the jobless were spreading. President De la Rúa was forced to resign at the end of the year. Under the next president the country defaulted on its debt and fell into an unprecedented economic and social crisis. In the Greater Buenos Aires area, the unemployment rate reached 22 percent, and the percentage of the population living below the poverty line stood at 49.7 percent in 2002 (Figures 6.1 and 6.2). The Argentine welfare system, which mainly covered formal sector workers and provided social insurance and job security, collapsed. What was the political opportunity structure in these circumstances for unemployed and poor people? The De la Rúa administration was a coalition government formed by the centre left UCR, supported mainly by the middle class and the FREPASO. The vice-president, Carlos Alvarez from the FREPASO, resigned in October 2000 to protest against corruption regarding the deliberations in the Upper House on revisions to the labor law. In March 2001, De la Rúa replaced finance minister and Radical Party member José Luis Machinea with López Murphy of the center-right group. However two other cabinet ministers resigned in protest at the budget cuts that Minister López Murphy tried to introduce. López Murphy was forced to resign and Domingo Cavallo was appointed finance minister. Protests led to the latter’s resignation as well. Finally, as mentioned above, President De la Rúa resigned, and his administration collapsed at the end of 2001. Rodríguez Saá of the Peronist party, who had been governor of San Luiz province, was elected president of the legislative assembly, composed of an upper and lower house. But he had to resign in a week under pressure from Peronist party bosses displeased with his intention to form a longterm government. Ultimately a Peronist party senator from Buenos Aires province and former vice-president under Menem, Eduardo Duhalde, was elected president by the legislative assembly on 1 January 2002. Clearly, then, two factors of political opportunity structure existed according to the definition of Tarrow: instability of political alignments and conflicts within and among elites at the federal political level. The political disorder wracking the nation also points to an erosion of the corporatist-type decision-making system, from which the piquetero organizations and minor leftist parties were excluded, based on agreement among the government, officially certificated labor unions, and company representatives.

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The evolution of the piquetero movement and the manner in which political opportunities function should be seen in terms of the circumstances at the time. Expansion and Organization of the Piquetero Movement This section will trace the spread of road block protests and the formation of a nationwide piquetero organization. As Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show, piquetero protests were increasing at this time. A search in the Buenos Aires newspaper Clarín from 1997 to 2006 revealed that the number of articles which included the word ‘piquetero’ rapidly increased after 2001 (Figure 6.3). The number of road block protests identified by the Argentine research company Nueva Mayoría, shown in Figure 6.4, rose from 58 in 1998 to 2336 in 2002, and after that year decreased to 1278 in 2003. These figures suggest a relationship between political opportunity structure at the federal level and the nationwide eruption of the road block protests. What kind of groups participated in road block protests when these actions spread nationwide? In 2000 dissident labor unions and minor leftist parties began to participate in the protests, demanding jobs and more social assistance benefits. An organization named the Classist and Combative Current (CCC – Corriente Clasista y Combativa), founded in 1994, is an example. Workers, the jobless and retired people were organized in 1996 and 1997 to demand solutions to the problems of poverty and unemployment. The CCC’s central executive council is elected by the membership and its organization is nationwide. The leader in La Matanza, a city in Greater Buenos Aires characterized by a high poverty rate, is Juan Carlos Alderete, a well-known piquetero activist (Rauber 2002, p. 6). Under Argentine law only unions registered with the labor ministry as labor union corporate entities can participate in collective bargaining and enter into agreements with employer representatives and the government. As the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) was the only national center with this status, the CCC was excluded from the formal negotiation process. The CCC was joined in the La Matanza actions by the Federation of Land, Housing and Habitat (Federación de Tierra, Vivienda and Hábitat – FTV), formed in 1998 as an alliance of poor people’s and farmers’ organizations to demand housing and affiliated with the dissident national Center of Argentine Workers (CTA – Centro de los Trabajadores Argentinos) (Rauber 2002, p. 6; Zibechi 2003, p. 136). Their leader in La Matanza is Luis D’Elía and his organization has a cooperative in a needy residential area. The federation obtained funds from the Christian Democratic sections, liberation theology-oriented clerics, government employment


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programs, labor unions like the CTA, through the operation of its cooperative and from projects of the World Bank (Bolinfo de Carlos 2007, 5 July). With resources for mobilization from such organizations, some funds could be used for social assistance. Piquetero organizations were also sometimes able to charter buses and provide food and drink to members participating in road blockades. But as the CTA, to which the FTV is affiliated, does not have labor union incorporation, the Federation has been seeking an alliance through which to expand its influence. On 6 June 2000 the two organizations blockaded National Route 2 in Greater Buenos Aires, demanding food, health care and social assistance benefits. The federal government responded by immediately distributing food and promising Work Program (Plan Trabajar) social assistance benefits (Massetti 2004, p. 25). After this, the federal and provincial governments continued to promise more social assistance benefits to piquetero organizations. For example, Aníbal Fernández, minister of labor in the province of Buenos Aires, promised to continue 420 employment program benefits to a piquetero organization, the Teresa Rodríguez Movement (Movimiento Teresa Rodríguez – MTR) (La Nación, 5 August 2001). On 7 November 2002 a number of piquetero organizations mobilized members in the city of Buenos Aires to block roads, demanding an increase in social assistance benefits from 150 pesos to 300 pesos. The government rejected this demand but gave 30 tons of food and promised to relax the conditions of eligibility for social assistance benefits (Clarín, 8 November 2002). The demands of the piquetero organizations expanded beyond social assistance benefits to include withdrawal of the court injunction ordering body searches during protests. The government invited representatives of the piquetero organizations to the presidential office to negotiate and accepted some of their demands (Clarín, 27 November 2002). Here again, a piquetero organization experienced success. CCC leader Alderete stated that the decision to mobilize for the road blockade was taken at the local permanent assembly of the organization and that negotiations took place with the city, provincial and federal governments (Juan Carlos Alderete, Interview on 15 August 2007). A member of the social organization coordination section of the CTA (Coordinador de las Organizaciones Sociales) stated that they too discuss mobilization at the local unit, where the local comrade (eje de copañero comunera) plays a key role (Coordinador de las Organizaciones Sociales of CTA, Interview on 10 August 2007). As discussed above, the piqueteros tended to organize at the federal level and tried to negotiate with the municipal, provincial and federal governments on jobs and social assistance programs. Dissident labor unions and leftist parties played an important role in organizing the piquetero groups at the national level. And they organized an association

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Table 6.1


Members of the National Piquetero Bloc

Organization

Representative

MTR Polo Obrero MTL

Roberto Martino Néstor Pitrola Beto Ibarra

FTC CUBA Local representatives

Associated organizations

Partido Obrero CTA member and Argentine Communist Party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), etc. Partido Revolucionario de Liberación Rosario, Salta, Cahaco, Santa Fe, Gálves, Villa Constitución, San Lorenzo

Note: MTR: Movimiento Teresa Rodríguez, MTL: Movimiento Territorial de Liberación, FTC: Federación de Trabajadores Combativos, CUBA: Coordinadora Urbana Barrial. Source: Prensa Obrera, 4 April 2002; Polo Obrero (2007d); Almeyra (2004), p. 145.

of the principal piquetero groups at the national level (Polo Obrero 2007c). On 5 May 2002, the National Piquetero Bloc (Bloque Piquetero Nacional) was formed in the city of Rosario, Santa Fe province, by five piquetero groups, including Movimiento Teresa Rodríguez and nine local representatives from, among others, Rosario and Cordoba (Table 6.1). A national committee was formed composed of representatives of each group. National Piquetero Bloc provides an example of the relationships among dissident labor unions, the leftist parties, and the piquetero organizations. The MTL (Movimiento Territorial de Liberación – Movement for Land and Liberation) is a member of the National Piquetero Bloc and has relations with the Argentine Communist Party. Polo Obrero is a nationwide organization of the jobless and employees and is related to the Labor Party. The MTR has 6000 members concentrated in the south of Greater Buenos Aires (Página 12, 12 and 17 February 2002). Later the National Piquetero Bloc expanded, collaborating with the Independent Movement of the Retired and Unemployed (MIJD – Movimiento Independiente de Jubilados y Desocupados), led by Raúl Castell, and taking joint action with Coordinator Anival Verón (Coordinadora Anival Verón) (Rebelión, 27 August; Polo Obrero 2007b). The principal demands adopted at the National Piquetero Bloc national congress held in the city of Rosario on 4 April 2002 were as follows: (1) wage and pension rises adequate to maintain a minimum living standard, and a rise in social assistance benefits for the jobless; (2) granting of the right of administration of social assistance programs, including payment


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of social assistance benefits, to piquetero organizations; (3) the authorization of housing construction on public land and the prohibition of removal of homes by order of officials; (4) the release of arrested members and the dropping of charges against them (Polo Obrero 2007a). Piquetero Organization Nationwide and Political Opportunity Structure Why did these dissident labor unions and leftist parties join the road block protests? It should be remembered that these dissident labor unions and leftist parties are excluded from the corporatist-type negotiations at the federal level. The Labor Party (Partido Obrero), for instance, is a Trotskyist party founded in 1963. It was banned under the military dictatorship but after democratization in 1983 was legalized and began to participate in elections. It formed the United Left (Izquierda Unida) with other leftist parties such as the Argentine Communist Party and participated in national elections (Polo Obrero 2007b). However the Labor Party had only two seats in the lower house of Buenos Aires province (Rodríguez and Rodríguez Blanco 2004, p. 107). Also it was not invited to participate in either official or unofficial negotiations on wages and social issues. Like the dissident labor unions mentioned, it is a minor political player and excluded from the existing official political institutions. For these dissident labor unions and leftist parties, the disorder in federal politics and the weakening of the corporatist-type regime provided a good opportunity to achieve their demands and expand their influence, and allying themselves with piquetero organizations was a good strategy to approach their political goals. The same thing can be said for the piquetero organizations. Alliances with dissident labor unions and leftist political parties strengthened them in terms of resources and organization to press their demands at the federal level. With these alliances, federal-level political disorder and the collapse of corporatism became a true political opportunity structure enabling them to achieve their goals. The piquetero organizations’ analysis of the political situation in 2001 and 2002 is reflected in a document presented to the first National Piquetero Assembly (Asamblea Nacional Piquetera) on 24 July 2001 (Polo Obrero 2007c). They criticized activities against the people by the government such as Menem’s graft and the bribing of senators by the De la Rúa government. The piqueteros insisted on the legitimacy of their struggle, asserting that ‘the clamor we made in the Assembly demanding the release of prisoners taken in the struggle showed the moral stature of the piqueteros’. The First National Assembly of Workers (Primera Asamblea Nacional de Trabajadores: Ocupados y Desocupados) in February 2002 was organized mainly by the influential piquetero group Polo Obrero, which has close

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ties with the Labor Party. The assembly document concluded that as the result of the mobilization of workers and people demanding food, they were able to overthrow two governments (Polo Obrero 2007d). Thus they called ‘to independent unions and all organizations of the jobless in every district’ to mobilize further, for they recognized the political opportunity by which their protest resulted in success. The Argentine Communist Party, which has relations with several piquetero groups, noted in a document issued at its 23rd National Congress that it had been alert to the need to speed up moves to construct an alternative, ‘foreseeing the opportunity that was presented to us in December, 2001’ (Partido Comunista Argentina 2007b). In short, the piquetero organizations and organizations like the Labor Party with which they were associated recognized the political disorder on the federal level as a political opportunity to realize their demands. This political opportunity structure functioned in association with the following factors: a socio-economic crisis, resource mobilization and an alliance strategy among the piquetero organizations and nationwide leftist parties and dissident labor unions.

THE KIRCHNER GOVERNMENT AND THE DIVISION AND STAGNATION OF THE PIQUETERO MOVEMENT The Conciliatory Policy of the Kirchner Government toward the Piqueteros As President Duhalde of the Peronist party was elected by the national assembly, which was composed by upper and lower house members in January 2002, he himself was considered to be a provisional president. Consequently, a presidential election was carried out in April 2003. From the Peronist party, former president Carlos Menem, then serving as governor of the province of Santa Cruz, Néstor Kirchner, and the governor of San Luíz, Rodríguez Saá, ran for president. The Peronist party was divided and none of the candidates ended up running on the ticket of the Peronist party. Former president Menem came in first in the first election, and Kirchner, who was supported by President Duhalde, came in second. Kirchner criticized Menem very strongly about his neoliberal policies in the election campaign. With public opinion polls showing Kirchner with an overwhelming lead over Menem, the latter withdrew from the second election. Kirchner was thus elected president and his administration was formed in May 2003. The Kirchner administration began dialogues with the piquetero groups,


Table 6.2

151

Soft piqueteros which support the Kirchner government

Leader

Luis D’Elía

Jorge Ceballos

Emilio Pérsico MTD Evita

Name of the group

Federación Tierra y Vivienda

Barrios de Pie

Origin of the leader

Former member of Teachers Union of the province of Buenos Aires (SUTEBA)

Former director of the community center of the Ministry of Social Development

Former Peronist party left faction leader

Members

15 000

10 000

8000

Edgardo Depetri Frente Transversal Nacional y Popular CTA leader Suporter of Peronist party

Juan Carlos Alderete Corriente Clasista Combativa

5000

50 000a

Partido de los Trabajadores del Pueblo (PTP) member

Note: a Interview with Alderete. This group has 5000 members in La Matanza, Greater Buenos Aires. Source: La Nación, 13 March 2005; Almeyra (2004), p. 145; Bolinfo de Carlos (2007).

which were divided into two camps. One, called the ‘soft piqueteros’ (piquetero blando), tried talking with the government to get their demands, and the other, called the ‘hard piqueteros’ (piquetero duro), kept up their protests. The cooperative stance of the soft piqueteros was already seen during the Duhalde administration. Luis D’Elía of the FTV (Federación de Tierra y Vivienda – Federation for Land and Housing) and Juan Carlos Alderete, for instance, met President Duhalde and demanded more employment program benefits and expansion of social assistance for the young and elderly (CTA 2007). After formation of the Kirchner administration, Minister of Labor Carlos Tomada, Minister of Social Development Alicia Kirchner and the secretary general of the presidency, Oscar Parrilli, attended a rally called by soft piquetero groups, including the FTV, Barrios de Pie and the Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados (MTD), in a suburb of Buenos Aires. At the rally the soft piqueteros expressed their support for President Kirchner, and the leader of the FTV insisted on the necessity of forming a new political alliance (La Nación, 22 June 2004). Table 6.2 shows the soft piquetero groups which expressed support for President Kirchner. Luis D’Elía, the leader of the FTV, is typically representative of a soft piquetero. He officially expressed his support for the Kirchner government, and the government responded by appointing him director of the

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Undersecretariat of Lands for Social Housing (Subsecretaría de Tierras para el Hábitat Social) (La Nación, 22 February 2006). A social worker in Buenos Aires testified that the government gave more social benefits to groups close to the government.1 Alderete himself admitted that the Kirchner government has a double standard which is selectively applied to progressives on the one side and the right wing on the other (Juan Carlos Alderete, Interview on 15 August 2007) but acknowledged the progressive aspects of Kirchner’s policy, such as price control and partial renationalization of privatized enterprises. According to Almeyra, the CCC–FTV alliance has 150 000 members and manages 100 000 employment program benefits (Almeyra 2004, p. 145). Thus the Kirchner administration succeeded in incorporating some of the piquetero groups into their support machine by giving social assistance benefits and political appointments. On the other hand, labor minister Tomada met representatives of the hard piqueteros on 22 June 2004, marking the beginning of direct negotiations with piquetero groups which were continuing their protests (La Nación, 23 June 2004). Like soft piqueteros, hard piquetero groups too manage social assistance programs. The National Piquetero Bloc, a hard piquetero group with 50 000 members, administers 30 000 employment program benefits (Almeyra 2004, p. 145). However, the government used police force to control piquetero road blocks. When economic and social conditions stabilized, public opinion began to turn against the road blockades, so that, for example, in August 2005 the police were able to prevent piqueteros from entering the center of Buenos Aires (La Nación, 30 August 2005). And the leader of the Independent Movement of the Retired and Unemployed, Raúl Castell, was arrested several times during 2004 and 2005 (Clarín, 12 March 2005). Thus the government used a carrot-and-stick approach with the hard piqueteros. Division and Conflict among the Piqueteros This double-edged policy of the Kirchner government toward the movement caused division and conflict among the piquetero groups. The leader of Polo Obrero, Néstor Pitrola, charged Kirchner with seeking to divide the movement with his offer of a 124 million peso housing package to the CCC and the FTV and a few municipalities. The object, he said, was clearly ‘to take some piquetero leaders into the government and to isolate the independent piqueteros’ (Polo Obrero 2007a). As a result of this conflict, the MTR–Argentine Communist Party group broke away from the National Piquetero Bloc. Meanwhile, the Argentine Communist Party condemned the National


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Piquetero Bloc and its Labor Party ally, charging in a November 2004 document from its 23rd National Congress that the National Piquetero Bloc had failed in its attempt to produce an alternative, because they could not form a socially independent organization due to the reductionism of the Labor Party and to strong factors related to political sectionalism. The party called for the formation of a new piquetero organization, a coordination center that would be ‘required to fight for a new hegemony in the piquetero movement’ (Partido Comunista Argentina 2007a). For its part, the National Piquetero Bloc criticized the MTL– Argentine Communist Party for splitting from the organization ‘to form a semi-official group on December 20, just three years after the rebellion of December 19 and 20, 2001’. It blamed its erstwhile allies for ‘trying to construct a centre-left group which put us on the side of the De la Rúa government. With this strategic switch, the comrades of the MTL– Argentine Communist Party withdrew from the struggle for a government of the workers’ (Polo Obrero 2007a). While these divisions and conflicts were occurring in the piquetero movement after Kirchner came to power, his government was trying to form a new center-left coalition out of the existing political parties (Cheresky 2006, p. 49). While they were linked to the government through patron–client relations, the piquetero groups were also included in this new centre-left coalition, through which their demands could be heard by the government. Five governors of the opposition party, the UCR, expressed support for the government, and a leader of the Socialist Party was appointed as vice-chief of the cabinet. The governor of Mendoza, from the UCR, was nominated as a candidate for vice-president to run along with Kirchner’s presidential candidate, his wife Cristina Kirchner, in August 2007. Political alignments were being stabilized and conflicts within and among the elite alleviated, although Argentina’s party system was undergoing radical transformation during the Kirchner administration. This meant the eroding of an objective political opportunity structure for the piqueteros and a declining need for protest. The number of road blocks accordingly fell from 2336 in 2002 to 1278 in 2003 (Figure 6.4), a level maintained after that year as well. Factors such as socio-economic conditions at the time played a big part. While GDP was increasing from around 8 to 9 percent from 2003 to 2007, the unemployment rate was decreasing from 17.3 percent to 10.4 percent in the same period (CEPAL 2006). The percentage of poor people in the population dropped by more than half, from 45.4 percent in 2002 to 21.0 percent in 2006 (CEPAL 2007, p. 11). These changes meant that social pressure was relaxing, moderating social grievances. Thus while the political opportunity structure was declining, socio-economic conditions were

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improving and piquetero alliances were decomposing under the Kirchner administration. Under these conditions, the unemployed and poor people’s road block protests stagnated.

CONCLUDING REMARKS This chapter has discussed political opportunity structure in the Argentine unemployed and poor people’s protest movement, focusing on POS definitions, circumstances in which POS is used, and its relationship with other factors. As we have seen, at the beginning of the piquetero movement in the 1990s, there were high unemployment and poverty rates at the national level, but piquetero movements sprang up only at the provincial level where there were clear political opportunity structures. The number of road blocks only increased nationwide in 2001 and 2002, when the political opportunity structure was observed at the federal level. However opportunity alone did not directly pull people into the street. Other factors made them determined to seize the opportunity. Firstly, the unemployment and poverty rates were so high that people in general felt they shared the grievances of the piqueteros, who in turn realized that they were not a minority. Secondly, they had accumulated experience of success in getting social assistance benefits through road blockade protests. Thirdly, national dissident labor unions and leftist parties offered the piquetero groups resources and nationwide organizations, enabling them to gain necessary know-how and resources for the expansion of the movement. Under these conditions, political opportunity structure functioned effectively for the piquetero movement. However, with the Kirchner administration, the political opportunity structure shrank and other factors, such as socio-economic conditions and political alliances with dissident labor unions and leftist parties, were not favorable for the piquetero movement. Some soft piquetero groups were now in a position to achieve their demands without protesting against the government. Thus after 2003, the Argentine unemployed and poor people’s road block movement stagnated. On the other hand, road blocks as a means of protest have been appearing in recent years in other arenas like the environmental movement.

NOTE 1. Social workers from the office of the Buenos Aires City government and the shanty town in Buenos Aires, interview in August 2004.


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REFERENCES Almeyra, Guillermo (2004), La Protesta Social en la Argentina (1990–2004), Buenos Aires: Ediciones Continente. Auyero, Javier (2001), Poor People’s Politics: Peronist Survival of Networks and the Legacy of Evita, Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press. Auyero, Javier (2002), ‘Los cambios en el repertorio de la protesta social’, Desarrollo Ecónomico, 42 (166): 187–210. Barbetta, Pablo and Karina Bidaseca (2004), ‘19 y 20 de diciembre de 2001: Piquete y Cacerola, La lucha es una sola. ¿Emergencia discursiva o nueva subjetividad?’ Revista Argentina de Sociología, 2 (2): 67–88. Bolinfo de Carlos (2007), ‘El Piquetero D’Elìa’, retrieved 5 July 2007 from http://www.bolinfodecarlos.com.ar/. CEPAL (2006), Balance preliminar de la economía de América Latina y el Caribe 2006, Santiago: CEPAL. CEPAL (2007), Social Panorama of Latin Amerca 2007, Preliminary version, Santiago: CEPAL. Cheresky, Isidoro (2006), ‘Un signo de interrogación sobre la evolución del régimen político’, in Isidoro Cheresky (ed.), La política despúes de los partidos, Buenos Aires: Prometeo, pp. 27–73. Crossley, Nick (2002), Making Sense of Social Movement, Buckingham, UK and Philadelphia, PA, USA: Open University Press. CTA (2007), ‘La FTV y La CCC se reunieron con Duhalde’, retrieved 5 July 2007 from http://www.cta.org.ar/. Gamson, William A. and David S. Meyer (1996), ‘Framing Political Opportunity’, in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds), Comparative Perspective on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 275–90. INDEC (2003a), Mercado de trabajo: Principales indicadores del algomerado de Gran Buenos Aires, mayo 2003, Buenos Aires: INDEC. INDEC (2003b), Incidencia de la pobreza y de la indigencia en el Gran Buenos Aires, mayo 2003, Buenos Aires: INDEC. Levitsky, Steven (2003), Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspectiva, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Levitsky, Steven (2004), ‘Del sindicalismo al clientelismo: La transformación de los vinclos partido-sindicatos en el peronismo, 1983–1999’, Desarrollo Económico, 42 (173): 3–32. Massetti, Astor (2004), Piqueteros: protesta social e identidad colectiva, Buenos Aires: FLACSO. McAdam, Doug (1982), Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. McAdam, Doug (1996), ‘Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions’, in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds), Comparative Perspective on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 23–40. Mussa, Michael (2002), Argentina y el IMF, Buenos Aires: Planeta.

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O’Donnell, Guillermo (ed.) (1997), Contrapuntos: ensayos escogidos sobre autoritarismo y democratización, Buenos Aires: Paidós. Orietta, Favaro y Mario Arias Bucciarelli (1994), ‘Efectos de la privatización de YPF: La desagregación territorial del espacio neuquino?’ Realidad Económica, 127: 88–99. Partido Comunista Argentina (2007a), ‘Hacia la construcción de una alternativa popular’, retrieved 5 July 2007 from http://www.pca.org.ar/. Partido Comunista Argentina (2007b), ‘La alternativa política del campo popular’, September, retrieved 25 September 2007 from http://www.pca.org.ar/. Polo Obrero (2007a), ‘LLamado a la Anival Veron’, retrieved 3 July 2007 from http://www.po.org.ar/. Polo Obrero (2007b), ‘Plan de lucha del Bloque Piquetero Nacional’, retrieved 4 July 2007 from http://www.po.org.ar/. Polo Obrero (2007c), ‘Primera Asamblea Nacional Piquetera’, retrieved 2 July 2007 from http://poloobrero.or.ar. Polo Obrero (2007d), ‘Primera Asamblea Nacional de Trabajadores’, retrieved 3 July 2007 from http://poloobrero.or.ar. Rauber, Isabel (2002), November. ‘Piquetes y piqueteros en la Argentina de la crisis’, Rebelión. retrieved 3 July 2007 from http://www.rebelion.org/. Rodríguez, Darío and Marciel Rodríguez Blanco (2004), ‘Lealtad peronista o desafección partidaria? Las elecciones de 2003 en la provincia de Buenos Aires’, in Isidoro Cheresky and Inés Pousadela (eds), El voto liberado: Elecciones 2003: perspectiva histórica y estudio de casos, Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos, pp. 93–113. Svampa, Maristella (2003), ‘Organizaciones de trabajadores desocupados: El modelo General Mosconi’, in Inés González Bombal (ed.), Nuevos movimientos sociales y ONGs en la Argentina de la crisis, Buenos Aires: CEDES. Tarrow, Sidney (1996), ‘States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movement’, in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds), Comparative Perspective on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 41–6. Villalón, Roberta (2007), ‘Neoliberalism, Corruption and Legacies of Contention: Argentina’s Social Movements, 1993–2006’, Latin American Perspective, 34 (2): 139–56. Weyland, Kurt (1999), ‘Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe’, Comparative Politics, 31 (4): 379–401. Wolff, Jonas (2007), ‘(De-)mobilizing the Marginalized: A Comparison of the Argentine Piqueteros and Ecuador’s Indigenous Movement’, Latin American Studies, 39: 1–29. Zibechi, Raúl (2003), Genealogía de la revuelta, Argentina: La sociedad en movimiento, La Plata City: Letra Libre.

PART III

History and Reality for Frame- and Identity-Making

7.

Dynamics of ideal values and social movement in a corporatist state: Mexican indigenous peoples’ movements and a village’s challenge Akio Yonemura

INTRODUCTION Indigenous peoples’ movements in Mexico have developed extensively since the 1970s. An important element driving this change was the advent of indianismo (Indianism), an idea that emphasizes ethnic identity. Indianismo functioned as an essential ideology for indigenous peoples’ movements, promoting their unity, militancy and independence from peasant movements by arousing awareness among these peoples that they belonged to a unique category distinct from other peasants and workers. The philosophy itself appears to have developed from a background of worldwide radicalism that was prevalent in the social movements and thinking since the late 1960s. It is notable that in this radicalism the themes of self-awareness and of the problem of identity are pivotal. However, to understand the development of these movements, consideration of Mexico’s internal conditions, which promoted the progress of those indianista (Indianist) movements, is also indispensable. This chapter considers, thus, the ideals of the Mexican Revolution and the corporatist state regime. Created by that Revolution, these two represent, in this chapter, ‘fundamentals’ for internal conditions. The chapter discusses the development of the indigenous peoples’ movements in terms of a dynamic between social movements and these two fundamentals: how social movements affected the fundamentals and, in turn, how the affected fundamentals conditioned social movements. To put it more concretely, it shows that big social movements – the 1968 student movement (the massacre in the Tlatelolco plaza) and the 1994 Zapatista Rebellion – revitalized (and reinterpreted) the 1910 Revolution’s ideals. These two movements also forced the government to modify the corporatist regime.

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History and reality for frame- and identity-making

The revitalization (and reinterpretation) of the Revolution’s ideals, and the regime’s modification, allowed indigenous peoples’ movements to progress in terms of the growth of organizations, development of self-awareness and strategies for achieving indianista goals and demands. This chapter also shows how characteristics of the corporatist regime were reflected in the process of the movements’ negotiation with the government. The rest of the chapter consists of three sections. The first section discusses these dynamics at a national level. The focal point is how the three big social movements – the Mexican Revolution which began in 1910, the 1968 student movement and the 1994 Zapatista Rebellion – have brought opportunities and provided the conditions for development needed for indigenous peoples’ movements in Mexico. The second section deals with a case study of a village of the Mixe people, an ethnic group in the state of Oaxaca. Focusing upon their fight for education, it describes the processes of actor formation, the development of their claims and strategy, and their negotiations with the government. The analysis of these processes (the dynamics at a village level) shows how the opportunities and conditions analyzed in the previous section are reflected in this example. The last section schematically summarizes the dynamics addressed by the preceding sections, focusing upon the reasons for the success of the village’s movement. The section also refers to future research tasks. Before proceeding to the next section, I will briefly refer to this chapter’s theoretical aspect. I employ a historical approach to analyze the dynamic process of the social movements’ development, but other approaches exist. These include the frame alignment process approach, proposed by Snow et al. (1986). This suggests that social movements depend on the development of a strategic and tactical framework of ideas (‘framing’) that each social movement’s ‘frame-makers’ utilize and develop. Moreover, it implicitly assumes that the frame-makers are effectively non-historical beings with unchangeable, solid identities, and that their movements’ objectives are also unchanged during the course of development. However, as the following two sections show, the development of indigenous peoples’ movements in Mexico is strongly historically determined, both in the formation of their principle actors and in the formation of the essential conditions for their development. Another approach is that of Tilly (1978, p. 229), in which he conceived of integrating the purposive and causal models into one scheme to address the dynamic characteristics of the development process. This is a logically consistent idea. However, the following analysis also shows that the assumption that, in every historical moment, a clear boundary can be drawn between the range of behavioral choices by the actors (which the purposive model addresses) and the range of external conditions given to the actors

Mexican indigenous peoples’ movements and a village’s challenge

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(which the causal model deals with), is hardly plausible. The actors’ choices and the conditions under which they act are both affected by the historical course of the country and are connected inseparably. This is especially true when those actors make historically important decisions. The rationale for applying the historical approach to the development of Mexican indigenous peoples’ movements is not only the obvious reason, that social movements in general take on historical characteristics (Crossley 2002). More than anything else, this approach’s necessity and advantage are that it allows us to understand the meanings of that development in the society’s historical context. This chapter’s approach makes it evident that the development of these indigenous peoples’ movements acted as a challenge to reset, or obtain an alternative answer to, the historical task of the Mexican Revolution: building a modern state which has a broad popular foundation that includes the previously excluded rural and indigenous populations.

THREE BIG SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ MOVEMENTS The Mexican Revolution The Mexican Revolution brought about a strong drive to legitimize and encourage the revolutionary movement. It ‘asked [intellectuals and artists] to give a frontal response to the ideal of the new Mexican society in justice. Its realization became an ardent conviction which was comparable only with a religious one. Indians and the poor should be the pillar of such society which was to be clearly seen.’ (Daniel Cosío Villegas quoted in Monteváis 1976, p. 1416). This drive was the ethos of the revolutionary nationalism which endeavored to create a new nation with a broad popular base. At the same time it was derived from demands of the peasant and laborer movements that participated in the Revolution. To meet these demands was a ‘promise’ of the revolutionary government, as written into the articles of the new 1917 Constitution. Lázaro Cárdenas, who took office from 1934 to 1940 as the last president in the revolutionary period, created the corporatist regime under which peasant and labor movements were integrated, and thus their energy was directed towards the realization of the ‘promise’ under the state’s governance (Matsushita 1998; MoralesGómez and Torres 1990). In revolutionary nationalism, an essential and special meaning was given to ‘the indigenous’ in the constitution of ‘the national’. Vasconcelos, the first secretary of the newly created Secretaría de la Educación Pública

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(SEP – Secretariat of Public Education), spearheaded nationalism. He argued that Latin America was the place for the realization of the supreme stage of world civilization – the aesthetic stage – and that the indigenous factor was essential for it. He also supported the wall painting movement, in which Rivera, Siqueiros and others participated. The indigenous heroes they painted gave a visual indication to people of the connection between ‘the national’ and ‘the indigenous’ (Monteváis 1976, p. 1421). The ideal of a nation with indigenous values created in the government a force of indigenismo (indigenism), which implies the recognition of indigenous peoples’ value, cultures and welfare not by the indigenous peoples themselves but by the mestizos (persons of Spanish–Indian mixed blood), which constituted the majority in the Mexican population. Indigenismo’s influence was initially limited. However, its range of activities broadened little by little because of the necessity for the state to integrate indigenous peoples into the main mestizo society. The government had noticed that the approach to indigenous peoples by indigenismo was effective for that purpose. In 1948 the Instituto Nacional Indigenista (INI – National Indigenist Institute) was founded. In 1952 the INI began a Spanish teaching program for indigenous peoples in the state of Chiapas, which employed mother languages as a teaching medium. The program produced young indigenous bilingual promoters who taught Spanish to their people. In 1964, the SEP began to support financially similar INI’s programs through the Servicio Nacional de Promotores Culturales y Maestros Bilingües (National Service of Bilingual Cultural Promoters and Teachers) (Vázquez 1988). The 1968 Student Movement and Advent of Indianismo (Indianism) The event of the student movement and its repression by the government (the massacre of students in the Tlatelolco plaza) happened in 1968. The movement arose from the middle class, which demanded political democracy. However, the use of naked violence by the government shocked people strongly, and brought about a serious crisis of the governing legitimacy of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI – Institutional Revolutionary Party), which as the successor of the Revolution was bound to carry out its ‘promise’.1 In the world of thought and ideology, radical trends such as dependency theory and neo-Marxism, far from abating, spread. Regarding indigenous peoples’ movements, the Barbados Declaration, issued in 1971, is important. It prepared a radical ideology – indianismo (Indianism) – for the movement. Indianismo argued that indigenous peoples themselves were actors able to exercise their rights without others’ patronage; they had the right to


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preserve their cultures, languages and land; the government’s indigenismo policies and cooperation with the government by anthropologists were severely criticized as a continuation of colonialism and ethnocide (Medina 1998, p. 156). The advent of indianismo was epoch-making in giving to their identity itself, as the suppressed people, grounds for the legitimization of their demands, in addition to confirmation of the indigenous peoples as ‘subjects’, not ‘objects’ in each national society. Thus, the matter of identity occupied an essential position in their movements. Culture, language and customs took on importance as the nucleus to constitute identity. At the same time, interestingly, liberation theology, which also believed that the poor and indigenous peoples had the ability as actors (‘subjects’) to learn, organize and demand justice, was becoming mainstream in the Catholic churches in Latin America (Berryman 1987). Revitalization of the Ideals of the Revolution by the Government A crisis of legitimacy in governance, and the radicalization of thinking, prompted the government to create policies to recover its legitimacy. Along with the political democratization policy – apertura (‘opening’2) – nationalistic policies that went through the motions of performing the ‘promise’ were created in the fields of diplomacy, culture, education and agriculture.3 The apertura policy meant modification of the existing corporatist regime. The ‘institutionalization’4 of the Revolution had made the corporatist regime a governing apparatus for the state, through the PRI,5 the seemingly permanent ruling party with an absolute majority in the parliament. The original characteristics of the social movement that the regime’s peasant and laborer sectors had taken on were lost. This policy now modified the regime and accepted the existence, activities and the qualifications for negotiation of the independent political parties and labor unions. This resulted in the vitalization of social movements. The government also implemented nationalistic policies which were related to the indigenous peoples: the reappraisal of indigenous cultures, the promotion of bilingual education and the implementation of agricultural reform. The government also gave support to set up the Congreso Nacional de Pueblos Indígenas (National Congress of Indigenous Peoples). The expansion of the bilingual education system was outstanding. It created a considerable number of indigenous bilingual teachers and promoters and, thus, their movement, the Alianza Nacional de Profesionales Indígenas A.C. (ANPIBAC – National Alliance of Indigenous Profesionals (Civil Association)). Indianismo criticized indigenismo because its thinking and practice were based upon integrationism, which treated indigenous peoples as ‘objects’ to be integrated into a mestizo

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nation, if appreciating the existence of their cultures and peoples. The ANPIBAC, in the same manner, criticized the existing bilingual education system as an assimilation apparatus based upon integrationist thinking. It called for recognition of and respect for indigenous peoples as actors (not as ‘objects’ but as ‘subjects’) in national society and advocated ‘bilingualbicultural education’, which was aimed at not only passing on indigenous peoples’ languages but also creating affirmative attitudes towards their communities’ mode of life and cultures to guarantee development on ethnic bases (ANPIBAC 1982). In 1975 the first Congreso Nacional de Pueblos Indígenas was held under the auspices of the government. The government intended to adapt the governance of the corporatist regime to the rapidly vitalizing indigenous peoples’ movements, by recognizing their existence, conceding to their demands, and co-opting their leaders. The ANPIBAC proposed the idea of bilingual-bicultural education at the Congreso Nacional de Pueblos Indígenas. The government responded to it affirmatively by founding the Dirección General de Educación Indígena (DGEI – Administration for Indigenous Education) in the SEP in 1978. It recognized the idea of bilingual-bicultural education as the ideal base for the bilingual education system which was rapidly expanding (Hernández Hernández 1988). With the creation of the DGEI, this system became a regularized part of the whole national education system (Medina 1998, pp. 157–8; Bertely 1998, pp. 86–7; Lazos n.d., p. 2). The leaders of the ANPIBAC were later co-opted and the movement vanished (López 2005). The process of the ANPIBAC’s proposal and the government’s response illustrated the vitalization of movement dynamics in the corporatist regime. It is notable that, at the same time, the intimate relation of the corporatist groups to (or the permeation of the corporatist groups into) the government administration, which is observable here, is characteristic of the corporatist regime.6 The occurrence of this permeation is essentially determined by the weak institutionalization of the state governance due to geographically difficult conditions and the historical background of the country. Under this weak institutionalization, the rule of law and governmental administration is ultimately not effective towards individuals. Groups and organizations are subjected to the state but retain a certain level of autonomy under it. Sometimes they have political (even military) and administrative dominance through the government’s de facto delegation of authority to them. Corporatism in Mexico (and in Latin America) is not what overcomes this insufficiently institutionalized situation but what is profoundly determined by it. Authorizing the idea of bilingual-bicultural education meant a national reinterpretation of the meaning of ‘indigenous’ in forming and


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implementing cultural and educational policies. Even if rarely achieved in practice (Lestage and Pérez 2003), this change brought about a potentially advantageous situation for the indigenous peoples’ movements. The expanding indigenista elements in the government affirmatively accepted this reinterpretation. Thus, they could respond to demands by the movements if they had the will and were given the authority. At the same time, there was a gradual progression in the participation of indigenous peoples in policy-making and project implementation; they assumed more administrative positions at certain levels.7 However, there were limits to these new governmental policies towards indigenous peoples. Firstly, progress occurred in the fields of education and culture, but did not in terms of economics (that is, agriculture and land reform). The Land Reform Law was proclaimed in 1972. It brought about the possibility of recovery of indigenous communities’ lands, which had been plundered during the colonial period. The law applied to groups, not individuals. Thus, peasant movements for land recovery were vitalized and stimulated to reconstruct community identities along ethnic lines, with the revival of festivals (which legitimized communities), languages, music, dance, cultures and articles of folklore (Medina 1998, pp. 147–50). Meanwhile, land problems directly touched upon the local structure of vested interests. Conflicts between the existing local political forces and movements intensified. The governments after 1982 carried out neoliberal policies to cope with the economic crisis which began in that year. In the field of agriculture, modernization was then emphasized. In 1992, the Constitution was modified, weakening the group rights of land possession and land recovery and, in the meanwhile, strengthening individual ownership (Reveles and Lorena 2007, pp. 2–8; Medina 1998, p. 159). The government had ratified the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (ILO n.d.) in 1990, and modified the Constitution in 1991 to recognize that indigenous peoples are the origin of the nation, and gave consideration to their customary laws in court cases. Thus, the gap between discourse and practice widened. In such situations, indigenous peasant movements became more independent and more militant. The failure of the government’s corporatist intention to integrate indigenous peoples under the regime, through the Congreso Nacional de Pueblos Indígenas, was becoming clear (Medina 1998, p. 159). Secondly, in the fields of culture and education, the gap between the discourse and the reality also remained large. Movements were reducing the gap, but their efforts hit a wall. The education system was originally related to nationalism. The nationally unified curriculum for formal classes, and state control over the system for guaranteeing such unity, could not be overcome by movements. Also, the appointment of indigenous persons to

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high-ranking posts was very limited. The top seat in the INI, as an institute with a mission for national integration, continued to be occupied by mestizos. Thus, indigenous peoples’ movements in the first half of the 1990s were searching for a solution to all of these dilemmas. Zapatista Rebellion and Claim of Autonomy On 1 January 1994, the news of an armed rebellion by the Frente Nacional de Liberación Zapatista (Zapatista National Liberation Front) in the state of Chiapas shook the whole country. Timed to coincide with the inauguration of NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement), the Zapatistas protested against the government’s neoliberal policies. They made their claims under the name of the great leader of the peasant movement during the Revolution, Zapata, in order to invoke the Revolution’s ‘promise’. They opened their Lacandon Declaration with reference to the 500 years of struggle by the people, although the term ‘indigenous peoples’ did not appear, and the insurrection attracted a broad range of indigenous peoples’ movements. The core of their demands rapidly evolved into recognition of their autonomy (Gutiérrez 2005). This meant going back to the people’s demands at the time of the Revolution and reincorporating the role of the indigenous peoples in the construction of the nation. They directly took on the question of power. ‘Autonomy’, which had been almost taboo in the formal political sphere, was run up the metaphorical flagpole. The response of the government to the Zapatistas was basically political pragmatism. It endeavored to weaken the Zapatista by using all possible measures, including military ones. When the impact of the insurrection and its political influences waned, the government began to ignore the demands for autonomy. In 2000, the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN – National Action Party) won the presidency, and the PRI’s rule, which had endured more than 70 years, was over. The new government also ignored the demands for autonomy and did not allow indigenous peoples to have their collective rights reflected in the Constitution (Natividad Gutiérrez 2004). The Zapatista movement and the existence of ‘autonomous zones’ controlled by it empowered indigenous peoples’ movements throughout the country. During the Cold War, the governments in the capitalist countries’ camp, which were in competition with those in the socialist countries’ camp, offered welfare to their own countries’ peoples in order to obtain political support from them. It was basically a concession to demands of the working class, and this led to the construction of the welfare state in


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advanced countries. In the same manner, the autonomous zones brought about competition to obtain indigenous peoples’ support, and the government was forced to make concessions to their demands. It also vitalized the movement dynamics which had been latent but had become quieted under the corporatist state regime (Gutiérrez 2005). In the field of education, Zapatistas began to construct their own educational system in their autonomous zones, based upon their pedagogy which reflected in educational content and processes the needs and mode of communities’ life, cultures and their demands for development as well. They counted on cooperation from their supporters abroad. The primary school system was formed, and the system began to extend to the level of lower secondary education. The government has ignored qualifications conferred by these schools (Gutiérrez 2005). However, outside autonomous zones, the government began to compromise with indianista demands, recognizing the foundation of community high schools and indigenous universities with special curriculums and methods for indigenous students. There was some backtracking in policy trends as the negative attitude of the government became clearer. However, the major thrust of education policies seems to be some acceptance of indigenous peoples’ and the indianista position even in the formal system. Pro-indigenous policies of international organizations, such as the International Labor Organization, may also be having a persuasive effect on the government (Natividad Gutiérrez 2004, p. 39).

DEVELOPMENT OF AN EDUCATIONAL MOVEMENT BY A MIXE VILLAGE, TLAHUITOLTEPEC Advent of Indianista Leaders and Refusal to Allow the Construction of a Main Road The state of Oaxaca embraces the largest amount of indigenous population in the Mexican states. In indigenous areas, a municipality – the smallest unit in the administrative organization – generally consists of a central community and other small communities. This constitution of a municipality means that a municipality still keeps the characteristics of a communal society (thus it can be also called a village). Indigenous people have always wanted to preserve their villages’ autonomy,8 and have resisted permeation and direct control by the PRI, which has been intending to integrate them into the corporatist state regime. In the Mixe people region (population 98 831 in 2000 by the population census data) there are villages such as

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Tlahuitoltepec (the subject of this section) and others with such autonomous characteristics (Vázquez García and Gómez González 2006). In 1966 a main road was constructed from Mitla (a Zapoteco people’s town, a one-hour drive from Oaxaca City) to the village of Ayutla (population 5504) in the Mixe region. Ayutla is a gateway to the region and its most developed village. It functions as the region’s actual center. The road was extended in the 1970s (Kuroda 1993), with a bus route between Ayutla and Tlahuitoltepec (population 8406) taking 50 minutes. You must take a bus (or a collective taxi) bound for Tlahuitoltepec when visiting the village. These villages, located about 2200 meters above sea level, belong to the highland zone of the region.9 In the 1970s, the region became socially and politically active: the government’s indigenista policy extended rapidly while the movement for awareness of the indigenous people’s own ethnic identity began. In 1971, the Centro Coordinador Indigenista (Coordinating Center of Indigenista) of the INI for the region was set up in Ayutla. Nineteen bilingual cultural promoters were working in Tlahuitoltepec in 1974 (Kuroda 2002, pp. 237–8). In the latter half of the 1970s, the diffusion of bilingual schools began and almost all communities came to have primary schools during the 1980s.10 In the meantime, the Salesian Church, which started to re-propagate the Catholic faith into the region in 1962, selected capable youths for scholarship in order to prepare future priests and teachers for the villages. In Tlahuitoltepec Floriberto, Mauro, Donato, Andréz and Gómez were selected and sent either to a seminario (theological school) in Mexico City, or to a normal school in the state of Puebla (Delgado et al. 2001, p. 76; Kuroda 2002). Outside their villages, they became sensible to and affected by the current social situation, ideology and social movements. Educational opportunities given by the missionaries ended up promoting leaders of indianista movements for the villages and the region. Floriberto was outstanding among them. He changed his first choice of scholarship for learning theology to that of pedagogy. He was accepted on the Masters course of anthropology in the Escuela Nacional de Antropogía e Historia (ENAH – National School of Anthropology and History) in 1974. The institute was a base of those critical anthropologists who had stimulated the indianismo in Mexico. Bonfil Batalla, a signer of the Barbados Declaration, and famous for his book Profound Mexico, was among them (Julían Caballero 2002). They no doubt influenced Floriberto. He began to demonstrate an indianista influence upon his native village during that period, as shown below. At the end of the 1970s, he returned to the village and tried to construct an ethnic movement in the region


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through an association of villages. Donato and Mauro cooperated with him (Kuroda 2002). Donato was assassinated later. In 1974, an incident occurred in the village which is important for understanding the indianista direction taken by the village amid the evolution of the indigenismo policies by the government: the village’s decision to refuse to allow construction of a main road through the center of the village (the current main road, without entering the village, passed through its southeastern edge). Thus, some 20 minutes’ walk uphill is needed to arrive at the village’s center from the nearest point of the main road. I interviewed some villagers there to know why they refused to allow the new road. Synthesizing testimonies and considering the situation at that time, what occurred may be described in the following manner. There was an opinion favorable to the construction of the road, as access to a main road was generally thought to be an absolute necessity if the village wanted to develop socio-economically11 (Nahmad 2003, pp. 483–96). However, opposition existed because its construction would cause the removal of many houses. Floriberto and a father of the Salesian Church also opposed the new construction. Floriberto’s indianista opinion that the life and culture of the village were more important than an economic development gave further justification to the first opposition. When they decided to refuse to allow the main road’s construction, the people made a consensus to adopt an alternative: constructing a road which would connect the village’s center to the main road (Kuroda 1993). The decision implied two important conditions for the future: firstly, an objectively disadvantageous condition that there would be difficulties in commercial development and the acquisition of public facilities, such as governmental offices; and secondly, a condition favorable to the indianista orientation, in that they would have an experience of not following the developmental trend, but making their own, different, decision about their future. The indianista leadership was developed under these conditions. Foundation of Experimental Normal School and Musical Training Center The village was invited to the first Congreso Nacional de Pueblos Indígenas in 1975 (Delgado et al. 2001, p. 76). The village delegation, seizing that opportunity, presented to the president, who also attended the Congress, a petition for an Escuela Experimental Normal (experimental normal school) for the village. Escuelas Experimentales Normales were a new type; they were founded in rural areas to train future teachers who would take root in rural areas.12 The Committee for Socio-cultural Betterment of the village actively worked on the process of the petition, foundation and functioning of the school (Delgado et al. 2001, p. 77). The committee, which

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had started in 1966, consisted of primary school teachers from the village (Yinet 1998, p. 10). They proposed that the school would employ their local language, Mixe, as well as Spanish; the proposal was not accepted (Delgado et al. 2001, p. 77). The school started in 1976 and rapidly produced many native teachers for one decade, until the school was abolished in 1986. Tacho, a graduate of the school, said that the teachers of the school were Marxists and told students to serve the people (Interview on 14 December 2003). All graduates were sent to other villages, but many, including him, returned a few years later as teachers of the village primary school. Along with Floriberto’s group, these teachers constituted the young intellectuals in the village. Their influence would become stronger and make it easier to unify the village in the direction of indianismo. In 1976 the government’s Regional Program for indigenous peoples offered the region an opportunity of obtaining a Musical Training Center (Instituto Nacional Indigenista, Centro Coordinador Indigenista, Ayutla, Oax., 1982). Mauro was leading cultural activities in Tlahuitoltepec. Its fife and drum band was the core of such activities.13 Mauro and other leaders in Tlahuitoltepec strongly wanted to bring the musical center to their village. A meeting of the village representatives was held in 1977 to decide where to construct it. A secret vote was held, to choose between candidates: Tlahuitoltepec, Ayutla and Tamazulapam. The first two villages got the same votes and remained as candidates for the second ballot, which Tlahuitoltepec won.14 Ayutla would have been chosen instead if other villages had considered only its convenient geographical location. However, it seemed that a sense of balance, as well as Tlahuitoltepec’s strong aspiration to host the center, worked against the monopoly of public facilities in Ayutla. In 1979 the Centro de Capacitación Musical (Musical Training Center) was founded. A band of the center won the National Award for the Band of Boys and Girls in 1985 (Nahmad 2003, p. 390). Behind the successful acquisition of the Escuela Experimental Normal and the Centro de Capacitación Musical were the government’s policies for indigenous peoples. The village was lucky to be selected as a beneficiary of those policies. These successes also brought about conditions to enforce the indianista leadership, and contributed to the village moving more clearly in the indianista direction. It was under these conditions that Floriberto returned to the village in the late 1970s and began to start his movement with Mauro, Donato and other collaborators. Their activities showed independence from the existing political order (the local forces of the PRI and the Confederación Nacional Campesina, CNC – National Peasant Confederation), and thus conflicts with them emerged.15 Discordance with


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the government also became clear by their assertion of autonomy and opposition to the governmental policies for agriculture and land. In the field of education, the movement began to demand education that would directly serve indigenous communities, and made efforts to control it. The movement was able to make a certain progress but also experienced limitations. The Indigenous People’s Movement for Association of Villages Floriberto, on coming home in 1979, organized the Comité Pro-Defensa de los Recursos Naturales (Pro-Defense Committee of Natural Resources) (Nahmad 2003, p. 515). This movement aimed to unify the Mixe villages. The organization was followed by the Comité Pro-Defensa de los Recursos Naturales de la Zona Alta (Pro-Defense Committee of Natural Resources of the High Zone) (Nahmad 2003, p. 515) in 1979, the Comité Pro-Defensa de los Recursos Naturales y Culturales Mixes (CODREMI – Pro-Defense Committee of Natural Resources of Mixes) in 1980 (Nahmad 2003, pp. 393, 517, 577) and the Asamblea de Autoridades Mixes (ASAM – General Meeting of Authorities of Mixes) in 1984 (Nahmad 2003, pp. 395, 577). In 1984, the Comisión de Apoyo y Relaciones (Committee of Assistance and Relations) was created within the ASAM to assist it through consulting activities for villages’ autoridades, who were appointed by the conventional general meeting of each village. This commission developed into a corporate body, Servicios del Pueblo Mixe (SER – Services of Mixe People) in 1988. As the name of the ASAM shows, Floriberto aimed at making an association of all villages’ autoridades in the Mixe region, together demanding the protection of their culture, language and autonomy. The movement led by Floriberto and his colleagues also demanded control over the environment, the right to land, education and so on, with efforts to be independent from local bosses (casiques) and from existing political organizations, such as the PRI and the CNC. The SER functioned as an active base of the movement under the leadership of Floriberto, at the same time serving Mixe authorities as a consulting instrument. The SER set up its office in Oaxaca City. This promoted cooperation with professionals and students who lived in the city.16 In those days, some young Mixe people entered the University of Oaxaca. Those who received higher education constituted a new generation for the movement (Kuroda 1999; Nahmad 2003, pp. 386–9, 392–3, 415, 418; Delgado et al. 2001, p. 97). Regarding education, the movement made an attempt to change the contents of instruction in the direction they wanted. The project called Instrumentación de la Educación Básica Mixe (Implementation of the

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Basic Education of Mixe) was prepared by the CODREMI in 1980 (Nahmad 2003, pp. 514, 522). It criticized the gap between idealism and reality in the bilingual-bicultural education policy, and showed their basic idea of indianista education, based upon self-government by the indigenous people (Nahmad 2003, p. 501). It was presented to the DGEI. As a result, the eponymous joint project by the DGEI and the CODREMI17 began with four appointed persons (Nahmad 2003, pp. 503–4, 571). The creation of village maps, collections of folktales and folklore, and a study for the unification of phonetic transcription of Mixe were conducted from 1981 (Nahmad 2003, pp. 522, 560–72). Setting up the Communal Secondary School and the Educational Projects The educational movement of Tlahuitoltepec was intimately connected to the activities of the CODREMI. Therefore, it had a broad vision and a full ability to act based upon the indianista ideology. In 1979, Mauro took a leading role in creating a communal secondary school. The creators of the secondary school were critical of the fact that only one existing federal secondary school in the Mixe highland zone was functioning as a nursery for cultural promoters who were working along the indigenismo line. The objective for their new school was the promotion of respect for and revitalizing of Mixe community life (Nahmad 2003, p. 529). Constructed by villagers, including the students themselves, this school was able to obtain official recognition but not financial support. The school teachers consisted of volunteers (including Mauro, primary school teachers, and volunteers from abroad). However, it was transformed into a federal school with an ordinary curriculum five years later due to financial difficulties. The attempt to build and operate the communal secondary school had a significance that was important and distinct from the other results achieved thus far in that it brought the indianista ideas (indianista control over educational content, method and administration) into the school. However, the reversion of the project from a communal to a federal school showed that the practicing indianista program very much needed the government’s financial support. So the movement, aiming to make their project more convincing, began to prepare a general educational project plan with a philosophical base that considered all levels of education, and connected educational activities to the livelihood of the community. They petitioned the government for its recognition with financial support included, and this way of petitioning became a pattern from then on. Teachers and professionals (people with higher education) in the village prepared a project called Ideas para una Educación Integral Mixe (Ideas for Integral Education for the Mixe People) in 1984.18 The project planners


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asserted the necessity of integral education from the pre-primary level to higher education for the community. Based upon this idea, the foundation of a new school at a higher secondary level was proposed. In the project, it was asserted that ‘sufficient autonomy to decide educational contents’ and the ‘village’s authority to make decisions in personnel affairs’ were required, and other criteria were set forth, such as that ‘natives of the community are preferable as teachers’ in order to meet the needs of the community (Delgado et al. 2001, pp. 93, 96). In 1984, qualification requirements for primary school teachers were changed so that four years of higher education were required. This led to the disappearance of the experimental normal school in the village two years later. The village presented a petition to the SEP, based upon the above-mentioned ‘Ideas’, for the foundation of the Centro de Bachillerato Tecnológico Agropecuario (CBTA – Agricultural and Stock Raising Technology High School). Rolando de Lassé, director of the Dirección General de Educación Tecnológica Agropecuaria (DGETA – Administration for Agriculture and Stock Raising Technology Education) and Miguel Limón Rojas (director of the INI) supported the petition, and the SEP accepted the proposal (Yinet 1998, p. 10; Delgado et al. 2001, p. 82).19 Immeidately after the CBTA was founded in the village, a special training course was set up for teachers to understand and identify with the Ideas para una Educación Integral Mixe. However, two years later, a conflict divided teachers into two groups: one group insisted that they observe labor rights and official labor conditions (that is, working hours), while the other group worked overtime for the school and the community in excess of the official working hours. The former left the school while the latter remained after writing and signing a letter of commitment to the school. As evidenced by this, the control over the school by the village generated conflict, even though such control was very limited because of the fact that the school was under the principal control of the DGETA and, therefore, was basically the same as other ordinary CBTAs in terms of administration and curriculum. Thus, dissatisfied with the result of the project, the village began preparing another one. In 1990, professionals in Oaxaca composed a plan for ‘an alternative education for Tlahuitoltepec’ (Yinet 1998, p. 10). They began to participate in the village educational movement and take leadership. In 1992, a forum was held to analyze the Acuerdo Nacional para Modernización Educativa (National Agreement for Modernization of Education),20 which had been signed by the federal government, the state governments, and the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación (SNTE – National Union of Educational Workers). The forum was in accordance with the Acuerdo’s idea calling for participation of parents and communities. In

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the next year, the program entitled the Educación Integral Comunitaria Mixe (Ayuujk) (EDICOM – Integral Education of the Mixe (Ayuujk) Community) was prepared (Yinet 1998, p. 10; Delgado et al. 2001, p. 97). ‘Ayuujk’ means ‘Mixe’ in the Mixe language, and this ethnic group began to often employ the name Ayuujk instead of Mixe for themselves. The program systematized their ideas, which coordinated education with the development of the village. The project called the Bachillerato Integral Comunitario Ayuujk Polivalente (BICAP – Comprehensive High School of Ayuujk Community), was the nucleus of the program. The villagers set up the Regiduría Municipal de Educación (Municipal Administration of Education) to intensify their educational planning activities (Yinet 1998, p. 11). Thus, they had an educational vision that, growing out of their previous experiences, had become clearer and more comprehensive in demanding autonomy. However, the gap between their vision and the reality became enlarged.21 Limitations in the government’s educational policy and problems of neoliberal agricultural policies became clearer, while people’s dissatisfactions became more pronounced in the region (Nahmad 2003, p. 414; Servicio del Pueblo Mixe, n.d.). Foundation of a Community High School (Bachillerato Integral Comunitario Ayuujk Polivalente – BICAP) The armed insurrection by the Zapatistas brought about a massive favorable change in political conditions for indigenous peoples in general, and for this village in particular. A further favorable condition developed when two figures, Limón and Lasse who had supported the above-mentioned ‘Ideas’, became the head of the SEP and his advisor, respectively. The village leaders never missed this kind of opportunity, and in 1995, they petitioned the SEP for the foundation of BICAP. Limón asked Lasse ‘to take charge of implementing this educational proposal with special attention to respect of the village’s demands and decisions’. Thus, the project started (Yinet 1998, p. 11; Lassé 2001, p. 7). In July 1996, the village project team (Equipo Interdisciplinario) conducted study tours to the states of Sinaloa and Puebla to observe pioneering examples and obtain advice from consulting groups for the implementation of the project. In August, BICAP started with 40 students, and the team members became coordinators of the new school.22 When the school began operation, they intended to obtain recognition of the school from the DGETA but failed (BICAP – Bachillerato Integral Comunitario Ayuujk Polivalente, n.d.). It was in December when the Dirección General de Bachilleratos (DGB – Administration for General High Schools) recognized the school project


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as a pilot project (Delgado et al. 2001, p. 101). It seems that the original intention of the secretary of the SEP, namely to introduce, in accordance with the community’s petition, special content and methods with input from the community, was difficult for the DGETA to accept. Hence, perhaps the secretary arranged to solve the problem by suggesting that the village team apply to the DGB to have their project accepted as a pilot proposal. In 1997, a part of the CBTA’s facilities started being used for the activities of BICAP. The CBTA was ultimately abolished two years later23 (BICAP – Bachillerato Integral Comunitario Ayuujk Polivalente, n.d.). In 1999, the DGB recognized the módulo (program) of BICAP, and it became a completely authorized school. However, BICAP again came under the control of the DGETA in 2000, when the new national president assumed his office and appointed a new secretary for the SEP. Furthermore, the school regressed to a CBTA in 2001, although the school kept its own special practices as much as possible. These changes may be assumed to be related to the new government’s negative attitude toward the Zapatistas’ demands. In 2000, instead of the indigenous university conceived in the EDICOM project and petitioned by the village, an ordinary type – without indigenous cultural elements – of technology institute (an Internet-based cyber university) was set up. The previous governmental policy of extending educational opportunities for indigenous peoples but refusing to allow them control over their own education seemed to be recurring. Even though such regression occurred, it can be safely said that the dissension voiced by the Zapatistas had turned the tables – the indigenous movements gained the upper hand in the debate and the government was on the defensive. The method and contents of BICAP’s educational practices were recognized as one module in the framework of the CBTA system, although the village’s control was weakened. Personnel remained, with little turnover. Moreover, the characteristics of the school as the ‘village’s school’ have been strengthened recently because graduates of higher education have returned to the village to work for BICAP. As explained on the BICAP website: ‘BICAP lost its special support and flexibility that had allowed freedom from the rules of certain educational subsystems . . . Although we are now forced to adapt to rules of the DGETA, we are making efforts to not lose the essence which makes BICAP unique in the country’ (BICAP – Bachillerato Integral Comunitario Ayuujk Polivalente, n.d.). This may be interpreted as saying that compromise between the village and the government has taken place. In the state of Oaxaca, 12 schools of a new type of Bachillerato Integral Comunitario (Integral Community High School, a type similar to BICAP) were founded in 2002. In the same year, an agreement to

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create an indigenous university was also signed by the state government and the Coordinación General de Educación Intercultural y Bilingüe (Administration of Intercultural and Bilingual Education) under the SEP. Thus, the state and federal governments have been forced to permit the foundation of educational institutions with indianista aspects.

CONCLUSIONS The dynamics discussed earlier in the chapter may be summarized as follows. The movements of the Mexican Revolution which began in 1910 created ideal values such as the ‘promise’ of the Revolution and the recognition of the special meanings of the existence of indigenous peoples. After the 1968 student movement incident, the ‘promise’ was revitalized by the government, and indigenista and bilingual education policies developed rapidly. Through the insistence of the indigenous teacher movement, the ideal of ‘bilingual-biculturalism’ was adopted by the government. This signified official acceptance of the movements’ reinterpretation of the special meanings and value of ‘the indigenous’, the reinterpretation that the indigenous peoples in the country were not ‘objects’ to be assimilated into the nation, but were ‘subjects’ (actors) with their own cultures and languages. The 1994 Zapatistas’ rebellion caused the revitalization of the ‘promise’ of the Revolution, again. The Zapatistas also reinterpreted the position of the indigenous peoples in the nation so as to give them extensive autonomy. Their contentions won the sympathy of a majority of indigenous peoples and the nation. These dynamics engendered conditions favorable for indigenous peoples’ movements to become robust, despite the fact that they did not enjoy economic power and had little proportional weight in the population. It is also noteworthy that characteristics of the corporatist state were reflected in the movements’ successful developmental processes. The village educational movement confirmed this logic. The government policies for indigenous peoples in the 1970s, which were modeled on the policies of President Cárdenas in the post-revolutionary period, offered opportunities for the village to receive educational facilities. The movement optimized that chance: the village successfully acquired a normal school and a musical training center. In addition to the village’s existing vigorous cultural activities, its rather poor accessibility (which persisted due to its rejection of the construction of a main road) may have also enhanced its chances for selection as a policy target. With the advent of indianista leaders in the village at the end of the 1970s, the educational movement began to take on an indianista tone. Demanding realization


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of the ‘bilingual-bicultural’ ideal, the movement proposed projects, and the government responded to the projects by accepting them to a certain degree. The government’s strongly negative attitudes regarding the proposed changes in (control by the village over) educational contents, method and administration were alleviated after the 1994 Zapatistas’ rebellion occurred. The corporatist characteristics of the society were reflected in the processes of interaction between the movement and the government. Firstly, the movement also played a partly administrative role. Preparation and presentation of a project proposal to the government by the movement not only set forth the justification for and relevancy of the project; it also displayed their necessary abilities to implement the project. In effect, the Instrumentación de la Educación Básica Mixe became a joint project with the government. Indianista leaders in Tlahuitoltepec appeared on the scene, under the influence of the ideological situation of the times, from among those students who were given scholarships by a religious group. They were followed by young people with higher education. These persons with a high-level education could deal with administrative affairs, such as planning, in a convincing manner. They also played the role of consultants for traditional village authorities. Secondly, the bilingual-bicultural ideal proposed by the movement was adopted as the norm for the SEP. However, its actual application to educational practices before the Zapatistas’ rebellion differed from its application afterward. Pre-rebellion, the SEP never accepted major changes in (community control over) educational contents or administration. Post-rebellion, there was gradual acceptance of those schools which enjoyed special curricula, methods and a certain level of autonomy for indigenous students and communities, as in the case of BICAP. However, such changes in conditions were not necessarily expressed as changes in laws or rules. They were often expressed through who was appointed to the high-ranking posts, or who remained in such posts, and through how these persons in the high-ranking posts interpreted the norms and exercised their authority. This was observed in cases of the foundation of the CBTA and BICAP in the village. The functioning of the system in such a manner is characteristic of the corporatist state which was created and developed under conditions with a low level of institutionalization, both politically and administratively. In such a situation, values (norms at the high levels) sometimes take on substantial importance because persons in charge generally have a broad range of discretion. This petition realization mechanism – petition realization through the dynamic drive of the movement and by the discretion of the persons in charge – means that a village can on occasion succeed in having its petition

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granted without expanding the movement’s influence to a broader range (that is, the regional, state or national level) in order to create new rules and laws or amend provisions. However, such successes lacked institutional stability. In the case of the village’s CBTA, a confrontation between teachers occurred over working conditions, and in the case of BICAP, although it had received consent from the head of the SEP initially, the DGETA denied it recognition; thus, BICAP was forced to begin as a pilot project. Furthermore, as a result of the change in the SEP accompanying the change of government administration, the school was placed under the control of the DGETA, which reduced its relative autonomy. Finally, let us mention future research tasks to be pursued. This chapter has dealt with the historical development of indigenous peoples’ movements in the internal Mexican context. It can be said that the movements themselves have expressed their historical meanings. The movements have often referred to the 500 years of repression from which indigenous peoples have suffered, but their basic intention is to regress to the Mexican Revolution and restart from that point. The Zapatistas’ Lacandon Declaration cited the 1917 Constitution to legitimize their rebellion, and so their movements were not for the restoration of their ancient civilization. Zapatistas doubted the legitimacy of the existing state, but they basically accepted the conception of the nation as a framework for political community, and claimed to respect human rights in social and political life which were created by modern society and guaranteed by the Constitution. Their demands for autonomy may be understood in this context: they were asking to create a new modern state in which indigenous peoples would also be able to appear as protagonists in the national society, that is, they were asking to complete the Revolution’s ‘promise’. To understand the viability of this vision, what is required is, firstly, further detailed analysis of the movements at the regional and national levels following the Zapatistas’ Rebellion, and secondly, consideration of international conditions, a point this chapter has left untouched.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4.

Tsunekawa (1988, p. 167) pointed out that many books published in the latter half of the 1960s had already warned of the regime’s accumulated social and political contradictions. This means political liberalization. Regarding the policy, see Tsunekawa (1988, pp. 162–8) and Díaz (1992, pp. 26–7). It was said that the government intended a ‘reappearance of Cardenismo’, imitating Cárdenas’s policies inscribed in the revolutionary history. The change of the name of the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana to Partido Revolucionario Institucional in 1946 explained what had happened.

Mexican indigenous peoples’ movements and a village’s challenge 5. 6.

7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16.

17. 18.

19.

20. 21.

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The PRI had monopolized the president’s seat until 2000 when Vicente Fox of the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN – National Action Party) won it. Vargas (1994) describes the process of increasing bilingual teachers in the Alianza Nacional de Profesionales Indígenas A.C. – ANPIBAC, and the formation of the bilingual education system. It shows the corporatist relationship between the state and bilingual teachers. The growth of indigenismo created leaders of the indigenous teacher movement and the peasant movement, and local bosses (casiques) as well. At the same time, some administrative posts in the INI and the bilingual education system, even if at low levels, began to be taken by indigenous persons (Medina 1998, p. 145). The authorization of bilingual and bicultural education legitimized their demands for administrative and executive posts and promoted the realization of those demands. In 1988 the director and the vicedirector of the Dirección General de Educación Indígena were of indigenous descent (Gabriel 1988, p. 280; Hernández 1988). The autonomy here is very limited, though. The selection of leaders (autoridades) without the intervention of outside forces like the PRI, and the preservation of their authority system within a municipality, are an essential part of it. For more about the Mixe people, see Kuroda (1993, 1994, 1996), Maldonado and Cortés (1999), Nahmad (1994), Reyes (1995) and Yonemura (1993). Completion of primary education is not yet satisfactory. The figures in the 2000 census showed that 69.7 percent of 15- to 19-year-olds in the Mixe district completed six years of primary education. Mauro reminisced: ‘In those days every one thought that electricity, water and development were all good things’ (Interview on 16 December 2003). They were needed in order to expand primary education rapidly to rural areas (Delgado et al. 2001, p. 77). The fife and drum band of the village in company with the village delegation participated in the first Congreso Nacional de los Pueblos Indígenas (Tacho, Interview on 16 December 2003). See ‘agenda (16 de noviembre de 1977)’ in the appendix of Instituto Nacional Indigenista, Centro Coordinador Indigenista, Ayutla, Oax. (1982). In their document there is a description that they succeeded in their projects, which were not specified though, by having a direct relationship with the government, eliminating intermediaries of the PRI and the CNC; it caused a backlash against them by these local established forces (Nahmad 2003, p. 577). In a document regarding the Asamblea de Autoridades Mixes – ASAM, there is a description that they held a general meeting in Oaxaca City in order to avoid intermediaries of the PRI and the CNC, and to promote direct negotiations with the state government (Nahmad 2003, p. 576). In the same manner, the location of the office of ASAM and the Servicio del Pueblo Mixe – SER was convenient for the activities at the regional level. The ‘Conclusions’ of this document, which asserts the autonomy in educational activities, is presented in Nahmad (2003, pp. 396–7). Ideas para una educación Integral Mixe appears in Delgado et al. (2001, pp. 84–97). It coincides with Nahmad’s citation (Nahmad 2003, p. 396). However, the text in Delgado et al. (2001), which was evidently edited, is different from the original one. This chapter is based upon the text in Delgado et al. (2001). Judging from the contents and the timing of preparation of the project, from the beginning it must have been to prepare for the coming abolition of the normal school. In effect, it was used to make a petition for a new CBTA, which came to be successfully founded in 1986 as mentioned above. A provision of this agreement was the decentralization of the administration of basic education so that it was conducted by the states. The agreement also had provisions regarding participation of parents and communities. In another village of the region, there was a project similar to that of Tlahuitoltepec.

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22. 23.

History and reality for frame- and identity-making The state government did not accept it and instead founded in 1993 an ordinary type of high school. The team members live in the village. Those who live in Oaxaca City appear not to have entered their names in the team member list. According to Yinet (1998, p. 11), the facilities of the CBTA had been used since September 1996.

REFERENCES Alianza Nacional de Profesionales Indígenas A.C. (ANPIBAC) (1982), ‘El proyecto educativo de los grupos étnicos mexicanos’, Educación: revista del Consejo Nacional Técnico de la Educación, 39: 101–21. Bertely Busquets, María (1998), ‘Educación indígena del siglo XX en México’, in Pablo Latapí Sarre (ed.), Un siglo de educación en México. Tomos II, México, D.F.: Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, Fondo de Cultura Económica. Berryman, Phillip (1987), Liberation Theology: The Essential Facts about the Revolutionary Movement in Latin America and Beyond, New York: Pantheon Books. BICAP (Bachillerato Integral Comunitario Ayuujk Polivalente) (n.d.), ‘Proceso histórico’, retrieved 18 January 2008 from http://www.bicap.edu.mx/bicap/ historia.htm. Crossley, Nick (2002), Making Sense of Social Movements, Buckingham, UK and Philadelphia, PA, USA: Open University Press. Delgado Jiménez, Mauro, Palemón Vargas Hernández, Benito Martínez Díaz, Wilfredo Gallardo Torres and Rubén Martínez Pérez (2001), ‘Bases filosóficas del proyecto educativo ayuujk y el proyecto pedagógico del Bachillerato Integral Comunitario Ayuujk Polivalente BICAP’, in BICAP (ed.), La voz y la palabra del pueblo ayuujk, México, D.F.: Universidad Pegagógica Nacional, pp. 63–112. Díaz Montes, Fausto (1992), Los municipios: La disputa por el poder local en Oaxaca, Oaxaca: IISUABJO-Dirección de Comunicación Social del Gobierno del Estado de Oaxaca. Gabriel, Franco (1988), ‘Asociaciones y organizaciones hacia una política indígena’, in Instituto Nacional Indigenista (ed.), Instituto Nacional Indigenista 40 años, México, D.F.: Instituto Nacional Indigenista, pp. 276–80. Gutiérrez Narváez, Raúl de Jesús (2005), ‘Escuela y zapatismo entre los tsotsiles: entre la asimilación y la resistencia’, Unpublished master’s thesis, Oaxaca: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social. Hernández, Ramón (1988), ‘La educación indígena’, in Instituto Nacional Indigenista (ed.), Instituto Nacional Indigenista 40 años, México, D.F.: Instituto Nacional Indigenista, pp. 269–75. Hernández Hernández, Natalio (1988), ‘Las organizaciones indígenas: ¿autonomía o dependencia?’ in Instituto Nacional Indigenista (ed.), Instituto Nacional Indigenista 40 años, México, D.F.: Instituto Nacional Indigenista, pp. 166–80. ILO (n.d.), ‘Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. Standard and Supervision. Conventions and Other Relevant Instruments’, retrieved 10 October 2008 from http://www.ilo.org/public/english/indigenous/standard/index.htm. Instituto Nacional Indigenista, Centro Coordinador Indigenista, Ayutla, Oax. (1982), ‘Reunión general regional de la escuela de música de la región Mixe’, Unpublished document.


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Julían Caballero, Juan (2002), Educación y cultura. Formación comunitaria en Tlazoyaltepec y Huitepec, Oaxaca, Oaxaca: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social. Kuroda, Etsuko (1993), Bajo el Zempoaltepetl: la sociedad mixe de las tierras altas y sus rituales, Oaxaca: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropolgía Social and Instituto Oaxaqueño de las Culturas. Kuroda, Etsuko (1994), ‘Mesutiisoka to senjuumin shakai’ [‘Mestisaje and Indigenous Society’], in Estuko Kuroda (ed.), Minzoku no deau katachi, Tokyo: Asahi shinbun sha, pp. 39–60. Kuroda, Etsuko (1996), Senjuumin mihe no shizukana henyou: Mekishiko de kangaeru, [Quiet Transformation of the Indigenous Mixe People and What I Thought in Mexico], Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Sha. Kuroda, Etsuko (1999), ‘Chihou toshi seikatsu ni sanka suru senjuumin: Mekishiko nanbu oahaka-shi no mihe no hitobito’ [‘Indigenous People Participating in a Local City Life: Mixe People in the Oaxaca City, Southern Mexico’], in Kiyotaka Aoyagi and Toshio Matsuyama (eds), Senjuumin to toshi: Jinrui gaku no atarashii chihei, Tokyo: Aoki shoten, pp. 248–69. Kuroda, Etsuko (2002), ‘Senjuumin undou ni sanyo suru made no tooi michinori: Mekishiko, oahaka-shuu no mihe no hitobito to shidousha tachi’ [‘A Long Story up to the Rise of the Indigenous People’s Movement: the Mixe People and their Leaders in Oaxaca’], in Kuroda Etsuko (ed.), Minzoku no undou to shidousha tachi: Rekishi no naka no hitobito, Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppan sha, pp. 231–49. Lassé, Rolando de (2001), ‘Presentación’, in BICAP (ed.), La voz y la palabra del pueblo ayuujk, México, D.F.: Universidad Pegagógica Nacional, pp. 7–22. Lazos Chavero, Elena (n.d.), ‘Algunas reflexiones sobre Educación Intercultural y Autonomía’, retrieved 5 October 2007 from http://www.latautonomy.org/ CH_ideasEducAut.PDF. Lestage, François and Tiburcio Pérez Castro (2003), ‘Una escuela bilingüe, ¿para quién? El caso de los migrantes indígenas en Baja California’, in François Lartigue y André Quesnel (eds), Las dinámicas de la población indígena: cuestiones y debates actuales en México, Oaxaca: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, pp. 249–63. López Bárcenas, Francisco (2005), ‘Rostros y caminos de los movimientos indígenas en México’, in Raquel Gutiérrez and Fabiola Escárzaga (eds), Movimiento indígena en América Latina: resistencia y proyecto alternativa, Puebla: Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, pp. 171–88. Maldonado Alvarado, Benjamín and Margarita M. Cortés Márquez (1999), ‘La gente de la palabra sagrada: El grupo etnolingüístico Ayuuk ja’ay (mixe)’, in Alicia M. Barabas and Miguel A. Bartolomé (eds), Configuraciones étnicas en Oaxaca: perspectivas etnográficas para las autonomías, Vol. 2, México, D.F.: Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia and Instituto Nacional Indigenista, pp. 95–144. Matsushita, Kiyoshi (1998), Gendai raten amerika no seiji to shakai [Politics and Societies in Modern Latin America], Tokyo: Nihon keizai hyouron sha. Medina, Andrés (1998), ‘Los pueblos indios en la trama de la nación: notas etnográficas’, Revista Mexicana de Sociología, 60 (1): 131–68. Monteváis, Carlos (1976), ‘Notas sobre la cultura mexicana en el siglo XX’, in El Colegio de México (ed.), Historia general de México, Vol. 2, México, D.F.: El Colegio de México, pp. 1375–548.

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Morales-Gómez, Daniel A. and Carlos Alberto Torres (1990), The State, Corporatist Politics, and Educational Policy Making in Mexico, New York: Praeger Publishers. Nahmad Sittón, Salomón (ed.) (1994), Fuentes etnológicas para el estudio de los pueblos ayuuk (mixes) del estado de Oaxaca, Oaxaca: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social; Oaxaca: Instituto Oaxaqueño de las Culturas. Nahmad Sittón, Salomón (2003), Fronteras étnicas: análisis y diagnóstico de los sistemas de desarrollo: Proyecto Nacional vs. Proyecto Étnico: el caso de los ayuuk (mixes) de Oaxaca, Oaxaca: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social. Natividad Gutiérrez, Chong (2004), ‘El mercadotecnia en el “indigenismo” de Vicente Fox’, in Rosalve Aída Hernández, Sarela Paz and María Terresa Sierra (eds), El estado y los indígenas en tiempos del PAN: neoindigenismo, legalidad e identidad, Oaxaca: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, pp. 27–51. Reveles, Acosta and Irma Lorena (2007), ‘Unforeseen Effects of the Agrarian Legislation in Mexico, 1992–2005’, retrieved 7 January 2008 from http://mpra. ub.uni-muenchen.de/5093/1/MPRA_paper_5093.pdf. Reyes Gómez, Laureano (1995), ‘Mixes’, in Marco Antonio Vásquez Dávila, Saúl Millán, Laureano Reyes Gómez and Recardo Melgar Bao, Etnografía contemporánea de los pueblos indígenas de México: región Transístmica, México, D.F.: Instituto Nacional Indigenista, pp. 169–205. Servicio del Pueblo Mixe (SER) (n.d.), ‘Memoria histórica’, retrieved 16 February 2008 from http://www.redindigena.net/ser/frameset.html. Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr, Steven K. Worden and Robert D. Benford (1986), ‘Frame Alignment Process, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation’, American Sociological Review, 51 (4): 464–81. Tilly, Charles (1978), From Mobilization to Revolution, Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. Tsunekawa, Keiichi (1988), Juuzoku no seiji keizai gaku: Mexico [Political Economy of Dependency: Mexico], Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. Vargas, María Eugenia (1994), Educación e ideología:constitución de una categoría de intermediarios en la comunicación interétnica. El caso de los maestros bilingües tarascos (1964–1982), Oaxaca: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social. Vázquez, Diego (1988), ‘El indígena y el indigenismo’, in Instituto Nacional Indigenista (ed.), Instituto Nacional Indigenista 40 años, México, D.F.: Instituto Nacional Indigenista, pp. 289–93. Vázquez García, Sócrates and Gerardo Gómez González (2006), ‘Autogestión indígena en Tlahuitoltepec Mixe, Oaxaca, México’, Ra Ximhai, 2 (1): 151–69, retrieved 8 November 2006 from http://www.uaim.edu.mx/webraximhai/Ej-04 articulosPDF/08%202006.pdf. Yinet (1998), Órgano Informativo del Bachillerato Integral Comunitario Ayuujk Polivalente [Informative journal of the Comprehensive High School of Ayuujk Community] (1998), ‘Santa María Tlahuitoltepec, una comunidad ayuujk preocupada por su educación’, June, México, D.F.: Instituto Latinamericano de la Comunicación Educativa, pp. 5–11. Yonemura, Akio (1993), ‘Mekishiko no bai-ringaru kyouiku’ [‘Bilingual Education in Mexico’], Ajia keizai, 10 (3): 19–26.

8.

Competition and framing in the women’s movement in India Mayumi Murayama*

INTRODUCTION India is considered one of the richest reservoirs of social movements. The presence of a large social movement sector is a salient feature of India. In comparison, other South Asian countries, namely, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, have active non-governmental organization (NGO) sectors engaged in development activities, but social movement organizations (SMOs) other than development-oriented NGOs seem to be few in number or, at most, not very visible in the society.1 A contrasting example to India is Bangladesh. The country is known for having large and efficient NGOs along with numerous smaller NGOs. Nevertheless, their activities are confined to economic and social development mainly in the form of projects and programs. Although there are occasional acts of protest or public debates against the government, those actions have not transformed into social movements, which entail a certain degree of sustained action. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine the reasons for the low profile of social movements in Bangladesh.2 Here, what I wish to highlight is that in India there are multiple strands of organizations, including both SMOs and NGOs, whose activities cover a wide range of issues; and, as will be discussed below, they are perceived somewhat as being competitive rather than cooperative in a particular social movement industry (SMI). The women’s movement is one of the most active SMIs in India. In terms of its visibility and volume of related literature, the women’s movement in India is far more active than those in many other countries. Some organizations, such as the Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), which successfully organized women workers in the informal sector and opened a new vista regarding the issue of informal employment, are well known even outside India. Reflecting on the diversities of region, religion, class and caste, as well as the long history of social movements since the pre-independence period, SMOs and NGOs working for women’s issues in India are numerous in number and varied in their forms, ideologies, 183

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strategies and activities. Notwithstanding, there is also an opposing view regarding the current state of the Indian women’s movement. According to Mary John, ‘not everyone believes that the multiple strands and differences which characterize the Indian women’s movement should be counted among its strengths’ (John 2005, p. 107). Others, particularly those who have been engaged or closely related with the women’s movement, have shared John’s view. The present chapter attempts to unravel the implications of the above postulation: why differences and diversities are not perceived as strengths in the Indian women’s movement. There are two interrelated dimensions, one actual and the other perceptional. Firstly, in the actual dimension, it is acknowledged that there are different and diversified SMOs in the Indian women’s movement. Then the question is how those differences and diversities in women’s movement in India have been produced historically. However, the existence of differences and diversities does not necessarily imply divisiveness or sectarianism. Therefore, the second question is why the differences and diversities, being neither positive nor negative in their own right, have been perceived as a negative element in the Indian women’s movement as a whole. There has been a large volume of literature on the women’s movement in India, much of it written by those engaged in the movement themselves.3 To refer to only a few which provide us with overall pictures of the Indian women’s movement, Radha Kumar (1993) and Gandhi and Shah (1992) give detailed accounts of the Indian women’s movement from the activist perspective. While Kumar’s work is a longitudinal study covering the history of the women’s movement since the nineteenth century, Gandhi and Shah mostly analyze the phases after the mid-1970s. Added to their own experiences, the analysis of Gandhi and Shah is based on interviews with some 35 organizations across India. On the issue of organization and autonomy, they have spared one chapter and made a critical in-depth assessment. Calman (1992) is an assessment of the Indian women’s movement by an American scholar. As a political scientist, Calman’s work presents a more detailed analysis on the structural opportunities that underpin the emergence of the women’s movement. Calman also examines the internal structure of various types of organizations and resources they availed. These three books deal with the movement before the 1990s. Regarding divisiveness among the women’s organizations, they present vivid narratives as well as valuable insights for the period prior to the 1990s. However, stronger concerns about the divisiveness of the women’s movement have been expressed by articles published in the subsequent period (Akerkar 1995; Agnihotri and Mazumdar 1995; Krishnaraj 2003; Phadke 2003; Chaudhuri 2004; John 2005). This is chiefly due to the changing environment for the women’s movement in the 1990s and after, which

Competition and framing in the women’s movement in India

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has been brought on by the rise of religious fundamentalism and identity politics, as well as economic liberalization and globalization. The articles published after the turn of the century often refer to the rise of the NGO sector as a negative factor for social movements. However, they have not substantiated the issue sufficiently. My preliminary hypothesis, derived from the available literature as well as some interviews conducted with activists and academics, is that the divisiveness that haunts the field of women’s movements in India has been created partly as a result of a particular style of frame alignment which the SMOs have adopted to establish their own legitimacy, and to canvas support in the competitive SMI market. They have used certain attributes of other SMOs to accomplish negative labeling. Consequently, actual differences embedded in the historical experiences as well as political, economic and social structure which have molded the contours of women’s movement in India have been amplified at the level of perception. Earlier a specific example of conflicts took place arising from tensions between party-affiliated (‘mass-based’ as identified by those organizations themselves) organizations and autonomous organizations, and the varied strands of ‘feminists’ were used for labeling. More recently, under the proliferation of development-oriented NGOs, the title ‘NGO’ has turned into a new label used by SMOs to distinguish their standpoints. Framing analysis in social movement research involves looking into how SMOs organize experience and guide action by rendering events or occurrences meaningful (Snow et al. 1986). Among various forms of framing efforts, negative typification of the target of opposition is accounted as one of the ways of framing (Snow et al. 1986, p. 470). The example Snow and others refer to is a case of a neighborhood movement opposing the relocation of a Salvation Army shelter to their neighborhood. They mobilized support of the residents by focusing on stereotypic beliefs about the transients, such as their being slothful, alcoholic, criminal and sex-crazed, thus being a threat to the residents. In this citation, Snow and others mentioned that the negative typifications used by the movement were beliefs and characterizations that have been associated traditionally with transient men. But they did not elaborate any further on how those traditional beliefs and characterizations were constructed. It has been pointed out that the role of framing has been viewed in purely instrumental terms, and one of the major problems of frame theory is the insufficient analysis of frame construction (Crossley 2002, p. 139). Instead of looking into the frame alignment process of specific SMOs, my focus in this chapter is on the latter point: how and why the negative typification using particular sets of labeling, that is, ‘feminism’ and ‘NGO’ has become the style of frame alignment for the Indian women’s movement.

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The chapter is comprised of five sections. Following this introduction, I will present the historical trajectory of the women’s movement in India in order to show how different type of SMOs came into birth in the practical dimension. The next two sections discuss the process of frame alignment centering on the notion and term of ‘feminism’ and the more recent process of frame alignment by SMOs conducted against ‘NGOs’. In addition to the summary of findings, the consequences of the specific style of frame alignment made in the Indian women’s movement will be examined in the last section.

EVOLUTION OF THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN INDIA Pre-Independence Period With a multitude of issues and groups, it poses a serious problem to delineate the exact contours of what constitutes the women’s movement in India today. However, as for its origin, it is almost universally agreed that the root of the Indian women’s movement goes back to the social reform movement in the nineteenth century. With the social reform movement, questions concerning women were raised for the first time: that is, about the abolition of sati (the immolation of a widow on her husband’s funeral pyre), the encouragement of widow remarriage, the prohibition of child marriage, and the spread of education among women. Although the women’s question was the central concern of social reform, it was not aimed at bringing about fundamental changes in women’s roles or capacities as presumed from the current gender perspective. Rather, the colonial context, in which the issue was problematized, imposed innate constraints on the extent and nature of the reform. While women’s status was assumed as the indicator of a society’s status by the reformers, women were also expected to be better carriers of tradition. Consequently, discourses of both modernity and tradition vis-à-vis the West pitted these notions against each other in the redefined role and status of Indian women (Chaudhuri 1993). Since the social reform movement and its campaigns were mostly male-led, it has been debated whether it really was a women’s movement. Notwithstanding, the significance of this phase, according to Gandhi and Shah (1992), was the first public propagation of the belief that it is not the destiny or fate of women to be oppressed, illiterate and ignorant; and it produced the first cadre of women’s movements (pp. 16–17). Organizations during that phase of the movement were mahila mandals (women’s clubs)


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and mahila samities (women’s associations), located in urban centers all over India. They were created with the shared goal of bringing women together to discuss women’s issues (Forbes 1996, p. 70). A nationwide consolidation of the scattered reserve of women activists into women’s organizations in the first half of the twentieth century led to the establishment of all-India women’s organizations.4 Women participated in the nationalist movement en masse mainly through the movement led by Gandhi, and in smaller numbers through the Khilafat movement.5 This led to the politicization of women’s organizations, and the women’s question, originally the cause for social reform, became a political agenda related with the freedom of the nation. The All India Women’s Conference (AIWC) established in 1927 became the single largest national voice of the divergent groups of women. Early Post-Independence Period The post-independence period leading up to the beginning of 1970s was considered, until recently, to be a ‘silence period’ or lull in the women’s movement in India (John 2005, p. 109; Kumar 1993, p. 97; Phadke 2003, endnote 1). This did not mean that women’s demands fought for in the pre-independence movements had been fully realized in the newly created state. In reality, while some of the promises to women – such as declaring the equality of men and women as a fundamental right in the Constitution, and setting up an administrative structure to cater for some of the needs of women – were implemented, it was far from what the pre-independence women’s movement expected (Kumar 1993, p. 97). The lost vigor of the movement was mainly attributed to the declining influence of the AIWC as an independent women’s voice. Gandhi and Shah (1992) describe the situation as activism giving way to the development of institutions and organizations (p. 18). With the leadership of the AIWC engaged closely with the activities of the Indian National Congress, the relationship with the ruling political party remained strong, although the AIWC claimed their position as being non- or above party politics. After independence, many of the AIWC leadership were incorporated in the government. This close stance with the Congress precluded the organization from taking a critical position against the government. Instead of being a critical organ of government policies regarding women, the AIWC was transformed into the operating machinery of various programs. The field-level programs were diversified according to the various needs of the women, such as organizing refugee relief and rehabilitation, promoting child and family welfare programs, and rural extension programs, in which the AIWC and affiliated local organizations worked closely with the government with

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regard to the formulation and implementation of programs. Today, the activities of the AIWC cover almost all the fields related to gender and development, including consumer awareness, the environment, legal aid, vocational centers, rural energy programs, women with AIDS, the literacy program and micro credit (Basu and Ray 2003). Being critical of the welfarist and accommodative approach of the AIWC in relation to the status quo, and increasingly feeling betrayed by the Congress government, women in the Communist Party of India (CPI) founded the National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW) in 1954, with the aim to secure equal rights and responsibilities in all spheres of life.6 Also, a smaller section of the activists followed the Gandhian approach, which puts emphasis on economic and social change rather than on legal and constitutional rights. They engaged themselves in voluntarism and grass-roots projects (Forbes 1996, p. 226). Since the mid-1960s, political unrest as a result of economic deterioration, and Congress rule losing ground, has given rise to a new range of social movements in many parts of India.7 These new movements included agrarian, environmental, trade unionism, subnationalism, tribal and gender-related activism, with participation from the educated new generation born after independence. With the fall of the political legitimacy of Congress rule, those new SMOs explicitly and implicitly began to question the role and nature of the state. Women’s movements during this period were developed around issues related to the livelihoods of women, such as wife-beating, the steep rise in prices of essentials and security of their meager sources of income.8 Some of the prominent movements during the early 1970s include anti-alcohol agitation, the Chipko movement against tree-felling in the hill areas of Uttarakhand, anti-alcohol and anti-price rise movements in Maharashtra, and establishment of the Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) in the state of Gujarat, which organized female workers in the informal sector. The leadership of these movements was drawn mainly from socialists, some of the radical Maoist and Gandhian line of activists. Emergence of the New Women’s Movement The year 1975 is considered to mark the beginning of contemporary women’s movements in India. There were several factors leading to the resurgence of the women’s movement. Firstly, as noted above, the political and economic crisis, which culminated in the declaration of the Emergency by the government in 1975, could be seen as the run-up to the awakening of a new consciousness regarding civil and women’s rights. Although the Emergency made a dent in the


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movements by way of the arrest of thousands of activists, its lifting in 1977 and the birth of the new Janata government in 1978 led to the renewal of some of the movements and formation of numerous new organizations. Secondly, the report of the Committee on the Status of Women in India revealed serious lapses in the development policies pursued after independence in terms of women’s status and conditions. Instead of improving the conditions surrounding women, the report showed the declining position of women, for instance in terms of sex ratio and work participation, particularly since independence (Government of India 1974). The report released just prior to the declaration of the Emergency was prepared in conjunction with the rise of transnational feminism. The Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1967 requested member countries to prepare reports on the status of women in their countries. The report entitled Towards Equality (Government of India 1974) has been regarded as the starting point, or founding text of the women’s movement (Agnihotri and Mazumdar 1995, p. 1870; John 1996, p. 3073). It was the first major effort to elucidate the extent to which promises, made in the form of constitutional guarantees of equality and justice, had failed to be met for women. The process of the research and findings of the report have contributed to mobilize academics into the field of movements as well as to extend knowledge by way of setting up courses, and establishing research centers on women’s issues in many parts of the country. What differentiates the women’s movement after the mid-1970s from previous movements is the latter’s association with feminism. The mainstream pre-independence women’s movement, which had a close association with social reform and later with broader independence movements, was encouraged by male social reformers and leaders such as Gandhi and Nehru; thereby they did not challenge patriarchy and their battle was not so much against male domination (Basu and Ray 2003, pp. 26–7). Another feature of the new women’s movement was the formation of a large number of small women’s organizations, which are termed as ‘autonomous’ groups. The term ‘feminism’ is usually associated with this autonomous sector of the movement (Katzenstein 1989, p. 61). The term and concept of ‘feminism’ along with that of ‘autonomous’ became a matter of serious debate in intellectual circles as well as in the practical terrain of the women’s movement in India. This will be discussed in the subsequent section. The issues surrounding the new women’s movements were mobilized towards the end of the 1970s, and particularly in the early 1980s included violence against women, such as dowry deaths and sex selection in the form of female infanticide and female foeticide. Katzenstein (1989) states that

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previously violence against women was given little attention, shown in the fact that issues of dowry murder or rape were not mentioned as worthy issues to be taken note of in Towards Equality (pp. 61–2). Ironically, the state of Emergency, which suspended political and civic activism, contributed to the subsequent outrage over dowry murder by delimiting media coverage to issues ‘not explicitly concerned with government’ (Calman 1992, p. 63). In 1978, Mahila Dakshata Samiti, a women’s group closely associated with the new Janata government published an investigation report on dowry-related murders, which were earlier passed off as accidents or suicide. The issue of dowry deaths has mobilized a wide spectrum of organizations ranging from autonomous to party-associated organizations. In the wake of the extensive agitation, in 1983, the Criminal Law (second amendment) Act was passed to fulfill at least partially the requests raised by the movement. The anti-dowry agitation was preceded by a surge of anti-rape protest in 1980. Although the incidence of rape had been common and frequent in India, it was rape committed by law-enforcers against the weaker sections of society that had become an issue for the women’s movement. A Supreme Court verdict in 1979 acquitted the police officers accused of raping a tribal girl called Mathura, and consequently gave rise to public protests against similar incidents of police rape in various parts of the country. According to Kumar (1993), the campaign against rape marked a new stage in the development of feminism in India, because it consolidated the network among various women’s organizations regardless of differences in ideologies and approaches. This joint action, however, was short-lived (pp. 130–31). New Challenges for the Indian Women’s Movement The issue of violence against women, considered a common concern for women irrespective of class, religion and regional differences, eventually turned into a serious challenge for the movement with the rise of religious fundamentalism and communalism in the latter half of the 1980s. Two important events from the vantage point of women’s movements were the enactment of the Muslim Women’s (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act in 1986, and the case of sati in a village in Rajasthan in 1987. The first case started in 1985 when the Supreme Court ruled that Shah Bano, a Muslim woman, was entitled to maintenance by her divorced husband under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedures Code.9 The ruling also asserted that the section ‘cut across the barriers of religion’, which allowed the misreading that secular criminal law transcended the personal laws of any religion. The judgment caused uproar among Muslim


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fundamentalists as well as a wider section of the society including some feminists, liberals and secularists; whereas others, particularly Hindu fundamentalists, upheld the judgment, saying that it showed the ‘barbaric’ and ‘anti-national’ nature of Muslims (Kumar 1993, pp. 163–4).10 Against the backdrop of the heated debate and actions that arose from it, communal violence was becoming widespread and Hindu fundamentalism was growing rapidly. Ultimately, the Congress government exercised political expediency, because Muslims constituted an important vote bank. The Act mentioned above, exempting Muslim women from the purview of Section 125, was introduced as a gesture to appease Muslims. The second case, involving an incident of sati in a Rajasthan village, posed a further challenge to the women’s movement. Roop Kanwar, a young bride, was burnt to death atop the funeral pyre of her dead husband in the presence of a crowd of several thousand people. Women’s organizations condemned it as a heinous act of murder, while the proponents of sati defended and glorified it as the practice of tradition and communal identity. The pro-sati arguments turned into a polemic against Indian feminists, accusing them of being Westernized, colonialists and cultural imperialists (Kumar 1993, p. 174). Besides the apparent inability of the state to deal with religious fundamentalism, these events raised serious problems concerning the issues of the rights and agency of individual women. The reason is that their identities are constructed and exercised on a multiple basis, namely, of being a woman, but also belonging to a certain religious group and caste or class. For instance, feminists find it difficult to frame sati within the notion of female subjectivity with questions of voluntary sati (Phadke 2003, p. 4572). More than religion per se, what has been more critical for the women’s movement is the question of identity. The pluralistic polity, which constitutes the fundamental tenet of Indian society and therefore the very precondition of the Indian social movement, makes it difficult for movements to problematize practices exercised in the name of identity, and not religion.11 Moreover, with the rise of communal violence, the fact that an increasing number of women became involved in what are termed right wing movements casts doubt on the earlier assumptions of the women’s movement that women were the victims of violence (Sarkar and Butalia 1995). Differences among women have further widened in the 1990s and beyond, with economic liberalization and globalization. The ‘new economic policy’ announced in 1991 was a drastic turn for India, which had pursued more than 40 years of a planned economy. Structural adjustments were carried out in all sectors and led to backtracking of the state’s responsibility from production and welfare sectors. All those changes have had

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important bearings on the current social movement. The main differences within the women’s movement lie in the perceptions and the approaches regarding ways to engage with the changed environment. For instance, there are varied opinions as to what liberalization and globalization imply for women (John 2005, pp. 120–24). It should be noted that in this era, the issues of women, along with poverty, have become more visible compared with the preceding periods. Numerous new organizations including so-called NGOs appeared on the scene upholding new concepts and tools such as empowerment, micro-credit and social entrepreneurship, and importantly this was often with direct or indirect support of the state and also foreign donors. Views are also divided on how to assess this current phase of the women’s movement. Manisha Desai terms the era as a ‘sustainable development phase of the movement’. Desai writes that the phase ‘took the feminist insights of small, urban, autonomous groups to mass-based urban and rural women and applied them to issues of livelihood through sustainable development’ (Desai 2002 p. 76). The distinctive feature of this phase of the movement, according to Desai, is that ‘the state sees women’s movements as partners in its efforts, and these groups are involved in implementing some of the policies, rather than just accessing state resources’ (p. 76). Conversely, many activists perceive the very feature mentioned by Desai as a source of concern. For example, Maithreyi Krishnaraj states that the arrival of the new language of empowerment has underplayed the ‘more explicit concern for equality, bypassing the power equations between men and women in the family and outside’ (Krishnaraj 2003, p. 2003; see also John 2005). Agnihotri and Mazumdar (1995) also state: ‘terms like empowerment, choice, reproductive freedom, spiritual autonomy, etc, are being appropriated by forces inimical to the goals of the women’s movement’ (p. 1869). Similarly, the emergence of a large number of NGOs is often viewed with skepticism as will be discussed subsequently. To say the least, the movement has increasingly become more institutionalized and the implications for the future course of the women’s movement are yet unclear.

FRAME ALIGNMENT WITH THE TERM AND NOTION OF ‘FEMINISM’ As the above cursory review of the historical development of the Indian women’s movement shows, the different types of SMOs were formed, firstly, in response to the changing political and economic environment, and secondly, as countervailing forces against pre-existing organizations. Noted here is that the presence of multiple strands of SMOs is assessed by a large


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number of authors to imply sectarian tendencies in the Indian women’s movement (Gandhi and Shah 1992; Kumar 1993; Akerkar 1995; John 2005). The available literature indicates that sectarianism has developed around the two major conflicts among SMOs: one between party-affiliated (mass-based) organizations and autonomous organizations, and the other between SMOs and NGOs. In this and the next sections, I will describe the nature and the cause of the tension and how negative typification has come into use by SMOs. The first conflicts polarizing SMOs along the ideological axis took place concerning the terms and notions of ‘autonomy’ and ‘feminism’. As mentioned in the preceding section, autonomous organizations in India came into being in the post-Emergency period and their number increased around the issues related to violence. In the preceding period, the dominant women’s organizations were those related to political parties, such as the AIWC associated with the Congress, and the Mahila Dakshata Samiti formed in association with the Janata Party in 1978. The leadership of the NFIW is closely related to the CPI. The All-India Democratic Women’s Association (AIDWA) was founded in 1981 under the leadership of the Communist Party of India (Marxist). However, the experiences of the Emergency have left, among many, a strong distrust against party politics. Their criticism was also hurled against left wing parties for being opportunistic, that is, engaged in the mobilization of the poor only for their own electoral interests, and for their hierarchical style (Calman 1992, p. 37). It was those women drawn mostly from the left and many from the far left who formed the new women’s groups, ‘autonomous’ in the sense that they are independent of political parties. The distinguishing feature of an autonomous organization is its association with feminism. They declared themselves to be feminist. Their insistence on being autonomous is thus rooted in their quest for a space to uphold feminism, which was denied them in left wing parties as being bourgeois and divisive (Kumar 1993, p. 106).12 It should be noted that outside India, too, the question of autonomy has been an important notion associated with feminism. According to Maxine Molyneux (1998), autonomy, along with governing principles of internal organization, have been emotive issues for feminism. From the earliest moments, women activists have argued for the necessity of a place within which to elaborate their own programs of action, goals, tactics and strategy free from outside influence (Molyneux 1998, p. 70). Some authors even find autonomy from control by other social groups as being an important element defining the women’s movement.13 The sore relationship between autonomous organizations and partyaffiliated (mass-based) organizations has been described by Nandita Gandhi and Nandita Shah, who were involved with urban autonomous groups:

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We need to look at the existing sectarianism, its arrogance and righteousness, which create islands of activity and ideas, and seas of hostile incomprehension and mistrust, as well as misunderstandings. We remember the early days of the anti-rape campaign when the Forum Against Rape and all those involved were repeatedly called ‘radical feminists’ by local Marxist-Leninist groups which had chosen to stay away from the campaign. No amount of dialogue and explanation seemed to convince them that there was a fundamental difference in the ideologies of the Forum and radical feminism. After a while, not wanting to be always on the defensive we had resigned ourselves to their accusations of being ‘anti-male’ and ‘revisionists.’ When they did decide to join activities around women’s issues instead of comradeship, we were suspicious and aloof. Needless to say, it did not do anything to improve relations between our groups. (Gandhi and Shah 1992, p. 27)

Radha Kumar also writes from a similar standpoint, about the difficulties in maintaining joint action against police rape, although it was the first time (in the year 1980) when autonomous groups, socialist and communist party fronts came together to coordinate a campaign: Given the differences in attitude and analysis of women’s oppression, as well as general ideological differences on such question as the importance of organizational identity, it was inevitable that joint action could only be maintained at a formal level, with groups and organizations also being left to act independently . . . I can still remember how annoyed many of us in Delhi felt when, on March 17, the NFIW, which was a member of the Joint Action Committee Against Rape and Sexual Harassment in Delhi, held a dharna [sit-down protest] outside the Supreme Court to demand a review of the Mathura case, without even informing the Joint Action Committee of their plan. (Kumar 1993, pp. 130–31)

How the events described above were interpreted by the party-affiliated (mass-based) organizations is not certain, since the writings from that side are less. What the available literature indicates is that confrontation between these two types of women’s organizations took place in the form of labeling, using the different schools of feminisms categorized in the West, namely bourgeois feminism, socialist feminism and radical feminism.14 The central notion of feminism as a belief that women suffer injustice because of being women has been accepted more or less widely by women’s organizations irrespective of their organizational attributes, since in this consists the fundamental cause of women’s movements to seek redress for injustice. Nevertheless, ambivalence towards Western ideas, grounded in the experiences of colonial history as well as the history of the women’s movement since the pre-independence era, has made the Western imported term ‘feminism’ an awkward customer. In such a psychological setting, older women’s organizations claim the Indian-ness of their movement.


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Aparna Basu and Bharati Ray, who compiled the history of the AIWC, which was the first and only representative women’s organization in India to date, conclude that one of the major contributions the AIWC made was the Indianization of the women’s movement. In their assessment, despite its inception by Western and Western-educated women upholding Western role models, subsequent deliberation by the organization totally rejected the Western stereotype. They claim that now not only its leadership, but also its approach to problems has an indigenous bias (Basu and Ray 2003, p. 172). On the other hand, criticism against other organizations which upheld feminism as their organizational identity took the form of negative typification, that is, labeling them as ‘radical feminists’, who were perceived to assert the most Western form of feminism, or ‘bourgeois feminism’ that stops at remaining welfaristic. According to Madhu Kishwar, the editor of the influential women’s magazine Manushi (meaning ‘humane’), label-givers assumed that the most respectable term was ‘socialist feminist’ and this was reserved for oneself and one’s friends; conversely, those one did not like were thought to be ‘bourgeois feminists’ or ‘radical feminists’ (Kishwar 1990). As far as I comprehend from the available literature, the battle of labeling in the field of feminism took place along the two axes, one indicating the degree of Indian-ness and the other indicating the extent of the quest for change from the feminist perspective. The critique against ‘radical feminism’ was based on the assumption that it was too Western, and that against ‘bourgeois feminism’ took note of an acquiescent attitude for fundamental injustice against women. It should be noted that the efficacy of negative typification depends on the shared beliefs or values about what is good or bad. That terms such as ‘bourgeois feminists’ and ‘radical feminists’ were utilized as negative codes suggests that at the opposite end, there was an implicit shared value among Indian women activists about the most desirable type of feminism, whether or not it should be named ‘socialist feminism’. There is no doubt that labeling was not on the basis of what the individual groups actually do or advocate. However, the battle over labeling using the terms and notions of ‘feminism’ at the perceptional level has brought painful confusion and complexities into the practical dimension. This seems to be the reason why some like Kishwar even went on to reject using the notion of feminism at all (Kishwar 1990).

FRAME ALIGNMENT BY SMOS AGAINST NGOS Currently, the tension between party-affiliated (mass-based) organizations and autonomous organizations is said to exist no longer, or at least to a

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much lesser degree, in the sphere of actual struggles compared to what has been written about, since the issues the organizations are concerned with increasingly converge. More recent concern is expressed about ‘NGO-ization of social movements’, and the ‘NGO’ label as a negative typification by SMOs has come into use. Many authors on the Indian women’s movement refer to the emergence and proliferation of NGOs in the space once occupied by social movements (Lingam 2002; Krishnaraj 2003; Phadke 2003; Chaudhuri 2004; Karat 2005). However, discussion is limited on what aspects of the phenomenon are actually causes of concern in India. Krishnaraj maintains briefly: ‘the extensive NGO-isation supported by international agencies has pushed in a niche concentration, replacing visible broad assertive struggles where women’s groups formed federations and were very active. Most NGOs have become conduits for delivery of government programs without independent, autonomous mobilization of people’ (Krishnaraj 2003, p. 4536). It is not in India alone that some concerns about the NGO-ization of social movements are expressed. Islah Jad, who has analyzed the Palestinian case, describes the NGO-ization of the Palestinian women’s movement as the ‘process through which issues of collective concern are transformed into projects in isolation from the general context in which they are applied and without due consideration of the economic, social, and political factors affecting these projects’ (Jad 2007, p. 623). In the analysis by Jad, NGOs are characterized by features such as their absence of links with political parties and mass grass-roots organizations, dependency on foreign aid, their project-based nature, activity in cities, being run by an urban middle-class elite and being smaller entities. In contrast, older mass organizations were open-access structures with public agendas, aiming to mobilize the largest number of people. Jad asserts that the rise of NGOs in number and importance led to further fragmentation and demobilization of all social movements as the limited life cycles of projects hinders the building of sustainable networking. In the cultural dimension, NGO-ization spreads values that favor dependency, lack of self-reliance, and new modes of consumption. Further, professionalization, characterized by the shift in leadership from people with a political orientation to professionals with the specialist skills to push work forward in a manner required by donors, produces upward rather than downward accountability and exclusion rather than inclusion. The overall effect, Jad concludes, is that NGO-ization leads to the concentration of power in the hands of administrators or technocrats of projects, and ‘might impede the spread of a social movement in continuous need of networking, deliberation, and mobilization, based on daily contact and personal connections’ (p. 628).


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Based on her extensive research on the Latin American women’s movement, Sonia Alvarez describes the NGO-ization of social movements as follows: What I refer to as the NGO boom of the 1990s is marked by a region wide shift away from feminist activities centered on popular education, mobilization, and poor and working-class women’s empowerment and a move toward policyfocused activities, issue-specialization, and resource concentration among the more technically adept, transnationalized and professionalized NGOs within the feminist field. (Alvarez 1999)

Behind the NGO boom lie changing international donor and development policies, together with structural adjustment and the growing erasure of local states from the realm of social policy, which in turn necessitates alternative professional organs to take their place for the sake of executing programs and delivering services and training. What is problematic about the phenomenon, according to Alvarez (1999), is that it is ‘potentially distancing NGOs from their key societal constituencies, compromising their ability to critically monitor policy and advocate for more thoroughgoing reform’. Coming back to the situation of India, there are two problematic areas regarding NGOs from the vantage-point of SMOs: the first being the relationship with the state, or degree of engagement in politics; and the second, the relationship with foreign influence. The relationship with the state has always been a critical factor for social movements as well as NGOs, since it determines their capability to engage with the state. Let us look into the historical development of the NGO sector and its relationship with the state. In India, as the studies on NGOs conflate so-called voluntary organizations (VOs) and NGOs, the element of voluntarism has been considered to be the significant factor of these types of organizations (Sato 2002). As the predecessors of NGOs, VOs based on religious tradition existed long before independence. This was followed by the call for self-service advocated by Gandhi during the nationalist movement. Also, through rural reconstruction movements, which were an important theme of Indian nationalism, many VOs came into being (Sato 2002, pp. 58–9). Therefore, it can be said that the birth of VOs preceded the state formation of India. In terms of the development process of VOs and NGOs, the post-independence period is usually divided into three phases: (1) up to the mid-1960s; (2) the mid-1960s to the 1970s; and (3) from the 1980s onwards (Sato 2002). Another author stretches the second phase to the end of the 1980s, with the third and current phase starting thereafter (Kudva 2005). These attempts to periodize the development of VOs and NGOs are based on changes in their relationship with the state, and basically correspond

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to the post-independence periodization of social movements in India. The first phase was a time of cooperation or complementary relations. Here, we can recall the activities of the AIWC in the post-independence period mentioned before with a very different interpretation. The second phase is marked by a contentious antagonistic relationship. Political and economic crisis with the fall of Congress rule legitimacy has led to a surge of new organizations with diverse orientations. Some had opposed the state in direct and indirect ways as non-party organizations, while others were formed primarily as economic development-oriented organizations. It is in this phase that the path of the organizations outside the state sector began to diverge, some into the movement-oriented sector and the others to the development-oriented NGO sector. Rajni Kothari calls for a clear distinction to be made between voluntary organizations and ‘development NGOs’ (Kothari 1992). Voluntary organizations, he elaborates, are involved in ‘participation in the democratic political process’ and they are non-party activist groups, but not non-political (see also Kothari 1984). Kothari makes a further distinction between ‘the merely development-oriented bureaucratic voluntary agencies and those that are relatively small and working at the grassroots, led by dedicated young men and women who have given up their professional careers to work with the people’. It is the latter type of groups and activism that Kothari values highly. They include the struggle-oriented groups and alternative development-oriented groups among the poor. In a situation where the state has failed as a liberating force of the poor and the deprived, these types of voluntary organizations or sectors, according to Kothari, show some signs of hope. They are seen to provide the ‘only bridges between the thinking sections of the urban elite and rural poor’. The third phase is the period in which ‘partnership’ between the state and VOs and NGOs is actively promoted by the state, mainly through increased state funding to the organizations. It was the seventh five-year plan (1985–90), which stipulated explicitly the participation of VOs and NGOs in rural development and poverty alleviation programs. In reality, however, the ‘partnership’ is confined in space and manner, limited and defined by numerous regulations concerning the registration of organizations and funding. Moreover, the plan document imposed certain conditions on VOs and NGOs for joining the partnership under the state’s definition for VOs and NGOs. One defining factor is the prohibition on their officers and staff to be elected or appointed as officers of any political party (Sato 2002). It is mainly this aspect of increased state funding on the condition of depoliticizing organizations, which an increasing number of VOs and NGOs willy-nilly comply with, that annoys the proponents of


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social movements. They call it the danger of co-option by the state, which is detrimental to democracy and the values of voluntarism. Added to the aspect mentioned above, what aggravates the concern of proponents of social movements in India is the increased foreign involvement. Since the pre-independence period, a note of caution against foreign intervention has been voiced in relation to the work of Christian missionaries. This critical stance has been shared by Hindu fundamentalist parties (also against Islamic organizations), communist parties and the government, on different grounds. This directly concerns SMOs, because actual foreign involvement has taken place through funding organizations. More importantly, funding is necessarily accompanied by certain explicit and implicit controls imposed by donors. Therefore, for SMOs, it has created a dilemma: the need of funding set against the need for autonomy (Gandhi and Shah 1992). This question also arises for the so-called development NGOs, but it concerns movement organizations more. Some organizations such as AIDWA are proud of running without any outside resources for consolidating their strength, including the Indian government (Armstrong 2004). AIDWA’s source of funds is the annual membership fee of 1 rupee collected from its 10 million nationwide memberships. Out of 1 rupee, one-tenth is designated for the operating costs of the central office in Delhi while the rest is used in a number of regional offices and affiliated organizations. The reason for not taking outside funding, the association states, is to pursue its own agenda without fearing appropriation through money.15 For many other smaller organizations, it would not be an easy task without outside funding even to sustain their operation, let alone to expand their mobilization efforts. Paucity of funds further affects the mobilization of a younger generation of activists. The problem is acute under the high economic growth which India has been experiencing recently. The nature of growth grounded on the notion of competition and liberalization has largely diverted the attention of potential activists from the ‘old’ type of activism to professional development organizations.16 In real terms, there is no clear-cut definition that distinguishes between SMOs and NGOs. The differentiation takes place primarily through the form of negative typification by SMOs. The perceived lack of engagement with the overall political and economic issues concerning women, and uncritical acceptance of state or foreign patronage, therefore, are major factors which SMOs apply when they try to differentiate themselves by labeling others as NGOs. In the dimension of activities, too, it seems that the distinctions between SMOs and NGOs are blurred in many respects. The conscious distinctions made by SMOs might have little meaning for grass-roots women whose needs might be different from what has been spelled out by the movement organizations. An example is that AIDWA has

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started a micro-finance operation by forming self-help groups of disadvantaged women. It has explained the imperatives for AIDWA to take up this NGO-like program to protect poor women from being exploited by other organizations undertaking micro-finance operations. It also differentiates AIDWA’s program from others by saying it is consciously inducting the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes into groups, and that it is adamantly not going to follow the Grameen model, which in its interpretation, forces a client to borrow from others to repay the loans to the Grameen Bank.17 In sum, NGO-ization is posing great challenges for self-identified movement organizations. The expansion of the NGO sector is taking place not only through the NGO-ization of social movements, but also as the result of the state’s retreat from responsibility in the domain of economic and social welfare. Firstly, the situation implies for the social movements the loss of what was once their largest ‘target’: the state. Secondly, NGOs that eventually replace some state functions also replace them in becoming the quasi-targets of other movements despite their innate inability to replace the state’s multidimensional function. This might lead to further divisions in the social movement sector. Thirdly and most importantly, SMOs have been required to seek new ideologies, rhetoric and strategies to secure their legitimacy of existence in the face of potential constituencies. So far, it seems the efforts have not gone beyond the negative typification of other organizations.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE FRAMING Let me summarize the points so far discussed. Firstly, the women’s movement industry in India is a highly competitive market constituted with multiple strands of organizations. With the increasing entry to the field of development-oriented NGOs and small grass-roots organizations formed mainly for micro-finance transactions, competition over resources including funds and prospective constituencies has been intensified, but more so over the claim to being a ‘legitimate’ organization working for women’s causes. When frame alignment has been employed not to expand the market but to compete for limited resources within the existing market, the frame alignment conducted by SMOs primarily took the form of negative typification of other SMOs. Secondly, the efficacy of terms ‘feminism’ and ‘NGO’ as labels with negative connotations reflects the characteristics of the Indian women’s movement. The distinguishing features of the Indian women’s movement are its ambivalence towards foreign (Western) influence, and its active


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involvement with politics. These characteristics are discernible when we compare the situation with that of Bangladesh. With regard to attitudes toward foreign influence, an example is the differing responses toward the transnational women’s movement in the mid-1970s. As mentioned already, the report Towards Equality (Government of India 1974) was prepared officially in response to a United Nations request. In fact, the Report did not mention the UN initiatives at all. Mary John states that the authors of the report ‘felt no compulsion to refer to the international scene, perhaps even actively suppressed it’ (John 1996). In contrast, the government of Bangladesh was so proactive in incorporating emerging gender and development discourses that it established an independent ministry of women’s affairs in 1978 – the first country to do so in the Asia-Pacific region.18 We can also cite an example from the Japanese women’s movement, which utilized the influence of the transnational women’s movement through UN initiatives as an additional resource to apply pressure on the state to take measures and comply with emerging international gender norms and standards. The different responses seem to have stemmed partly from the different positions of the countries in association with Western countries at that time. Compared with India, Bangladesh and Japan were much more deeply integrated into the streams of economic globalization and needed more foreign support in terms of monetary assistance and export markets than India. Internally, colonial experiences had contradictory bearings on the women’s movement in India. While the substantive Western influence on the advancement of women’s causes has been accepted by the movement, the outright acceptance of Western ideas would make them look submissive to Western domination. The way the term ‘feminism’ was treated by the SMOs illustrates this ambivalent position within the Indian women’s movement. Similarly, the image of NGOs as compliant servants to foreign influence through money and ideas has been amplified and used by SMOs to differentiate the SMOs as the legitimate heirs of the national movement. The active involvement of Indian SMOs in politics is related to the fact that a large number of SMOs came into birth after the Emergency. Those new organizations were characterized by their political orientation from a non-party standpoint. Since the development-oriented organizations increased in number with the support of the state and international donors, their seeming lack of a critical stance and articulation against the state has become a source of concern and critique by the older SMOs. These new development-oriented organizations have been given a negative identity by being labeled ‘NGO’ by their critics. Again, if we cite the example of Bangladesh, it contrasts with the case of India, where SMOs preceded the emergence of development-oriented organizations. In post-independent

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Bangladesh, NGOs came into being simultaneously with the birth of the new state, for the relief and rehabilitation of the war-ravaged economy. After some time, they have shifted their focus to development. Due to the lack of resources in the hands of the state, Bangladesh NGOs have never approached the state but looked to foreign donors for funding. Consequently, the stance of NGOs is to stay aloof from the state as long as the space of their operation is secured.19 In Bangladesh today there is a kind of consensus over NGOs’ non-commitment to politics. Unlike India, if an NGO or a representative of an NGO ventures out into the political sphere, for example supporting a specific political party or creating a party, the legitimacy of the act is strongly questioned by society. Finally, let us examine the consequences of the particular frame alignment taken in the Indian women’s movement. Besides creating sectarianism and divisiveness, the negative typification using a certain labeling has made it difficult for activists to deal with the label to their benefit. This is particularly true for the notion of ‘feminism’. According to Maitrayee Chaudhuri, there has been a recurrent sense of evasion and ambivalence towards the term ‘feminism’ (Chaudhuri 2004). Currently, there have been some efforts to locate the Indian feminist struggle in its diverse Indian cultural and historical settings (Phadke 2003, p. 4575), or to establish a unified feminism (for example, socialist feminism) (Dietrich 2003). However, it would undoubtedly take time to reclaim and reconstruct what has been shattered. The existence of public debates on the legitimacy of SMOs in India seems to have been providing healthy competing grounds for SMOs, since they are constantly required to reflect on their own identities and strategies. However, in reality, it is mainly the negative typification which has so far been the dominant style of frame alignment among women’s organizations. In order to broaden the field of the SMI rather than to pit organizations against each other within the existing field, SMOs would need positive framing. For SMOs, what makes this soul-searching exercise more difficult at this critical juncture is that they have taken up the challenge in a new environment where repositioning of the state, the social movement sector and NGOs is still under way.

NOTES * 1.

I would like express my deep gratitude to Patricia Uberoi who gave me guidance regarding the situation of the Indian women’s movement as well as encouragement throughout this study, and to Indu Agnihotri who has led me deeper into the field. See articles in Shigetomi (2002) on the profile of the NGO sector in four South Asian countries.

Competition and framing in the women’s movement in India 2.

3. 4.

5.

6. 7.

8. 9.

10.

11. 12. 13. 14.

15.

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In brief, I assume three factors – historicity of NGOs’ development, relations between NGOs and the state and attitude of the state and society in general toward foreign (Western) influence – have been important. While the distance between the state and NGOs has contributed to the undisturbed functioning of NGOs in the development field, it in turn created a general consensus that NGOs should stay away from the political arena. Consequently, the absence of a political space of interaction between the state and the NGO sector has led to a low degree of social movement. The dominance of development discourses in academic work on Bangladesh might also have added another reason for the underrepresentation of social movements not directly related to development. See Phadke (2003) for a recent review of the relevant literature. The Women’s Indian Association (WIA) and the National Council of Women in India (NCWI), established in 1917 and 1925 respectively, were among the early attempts to organize women on an all-India basis. For details of their activities, see Forbes (1996, pp. 72–8) and Chaudhuri (1993, pp. 113–19). The Khilafat movement (1919–24) was a political campaign launched mainly by Muslims in South Asia to exert pressure on the British government in order to protect the Ottoman Empire and retain the Khalifa, successor to the Prophet Muhammad, during the aftermath of World War I. The CPI was founded in 1925. In the pre-independence period, there was a communist-dominated women’s organization called the Mahila Atmaraksha Samiti (Women’s Self-Defense League) based in Bengal. The period between the late 1960s and the early 1970s observed the rise of various movements and movement organizations, such as the Naxalite movement, the Jharkahand Mukti Morcha, the All-Assam Students Union, the Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), the Chipko movement and Dalit Panthers, which have had significant political, economic and social impacts. See Velayudhan (1985) for a cursory account of the various movements occurring during the early part of the 1970s. The verdict of the Supreme Court upheld Shah Bano’s right to maintenance from her husband under Section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code, and asserted that this does not conflict with Muslim personal law since according to the verdict, the latter does not contemplate or countenance the situation envisaged by Section 125. The Muslim Personal Law Board differed in its opinion that under the Shariat the husband was not obliged to pay maintenance for more than three months after the divorce. The criticism from feminists, liberals and secularists was that the judgment brought issues of religion and personal law into what was essentially a question of secular criminal law, and that it only targeted Muslim personal law (Kumar 1993, pp. 163–4). Indu Agnihotri, Center for Women’s Development Studies, Interview on 5 December 2007. It is said that those who asserted feminism had undergone bitter experiences, being labeled as anti-man, ambitious, egocentric and so on, and humiliated for joining the movement due to their ‘ugly looks’ (Patel 1988, p. 119). The study done by Sonia Alvarez on women’s movements in Brazil (Alvarez 1990), cited by Molyneux (1998). In its simplest definition, bourgeois feminism or liberal feminism sees the roots of women’s oppression in the lack of equal civil rights and opportunities. It is basically reformism, seeking to improve the status of women within the system, but not contesting either the system’s operation or its legitimacy. Radical feminism argues that patriarchy, or a system of male authority, is the cause of all forms of oppression and that women-centeredness can be the basis of a future society. Socialist feminism sees male domination over women as having material bases: thus economic oppression and sexist oppression are interrelated. Sudha Sundararaman, General Secretary, AIDWA, Interview on 5 December 2007.

204 16. 17. 18. 19.

History and reality for frame- and identity-making Indu Agnihotri, Center for Women’s Development Studies, Interview on 3 September 2007; Maitrayee Chaudhuri of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Interview on 5 December 2007. Sudha Sundararaman, General Secretary, AIDWA, Interview on 5 December 2007. The Ministry of Women Affairs was incorporated into the Ministry of Social Welfare in 1982. Mahfuz Anam, Editor of the Daily Star, Interview on 29 November 2007.

REFERENCES Agnihotri, Indu and Vina Mazumdar (1995), ‘Changing Terms of Political Discourse: Women’s Movement in India, 1970s–1990s’, Economic and Political Weekly, 30 (29): 1869–78. Akerkar, Supriya (1995), ‘Theory and Practice of Women’s Movement in India: A Discourse Analysis’, Economic and Political Weekly, 30 (17): WS2–23. Alvarez, Sonia (1990), Engendering Democracy in Brazil: Women’s Movements in Transition Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Alvarez, Sonia (1999), ‘Advocating Feminism: The Latin American Feminist NGO “Boom”’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 1 (2): 181–209. Armstrong, Elisabeth (2004), ‘Globalization from Below: AIDWA, Foreign Funding, and Gendering Anti-Violence Campaigns’, Journal of Developing Societies, 20 (1–2): 39–55. Basu, Aparna and Bharati Ray (2003), Women’s Struggle: A History of the All India Women’s Conference 1927–2002, 2nd edn, New Delhi: Manohar. Calman, Leslie J. (1992), Toward Empowerment: Women and Movement Politics in India, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, CA and Oxford, UK: Westview Press. Chaudhuri, Maitrayee (1993), Indian Women’s Movement: Reform and Revival, London, UK and New Delhi, India: Sangam Books. Chaudhuri, Maitrayee (2004), ‘Introduction’, in Maitrayee Chaudhuri (ed.), Feminism in India, Delhi: Kali for Women and Women Unlimited, pp. xi–xlv. Crossley, Nick (2002), Making Sense of Social Movements, Buckingham, UK and Philadelphia, PA, USA: Open University Press. Desai, Manisha (2002), ‘Multiple Mediations: The State and Women’s Movements in India’, in David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier and Belinda Robnett (eds), Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the States, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 66–84. Dietrich, Gabriele (2003), ‘Loss of Socialist Vision and Options before the Women’s Movement’, Economic and Political Weekly, 38 (43): 4547–54. Forbes, Geraldine (1996), The New Cambridge History of India: Women in Modern India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gandhi, Nadita and Nandita Shah (1992), The Issues at Stake: Theory and Practice in the Contemporary Women’s Movement in India, New Delhi: Kali for Women. Government of India (1974), Towards Equality: Report of the Committee on the Status of Women in India, New Delhi: Department of Social Welfare, Ministry of Education and Social Welfare. Jad, Islah (2007), ‘NGOs: Between Buzzwords and Social Movements’, Development in Practice, 17 (4–5): 622–9. John, Mary E. (1996), ‘Gender and Development in India, 1970s–1990s: Some


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Reflections on the Constitutive Role of Contexts’, Economic and Political Weekly, 36 (47): 3071–7. John, Mary E. (2005), ‘Feminism, Poverty, and the Emergent Social Order’, in Raka Ray and Mary Fainsod Katzenstein (eds), Social Movements in India: Poverty, Power and Politics, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 107–34. Karat, Brinda (2005), Survival and Emancipation: Notes from Indian Women’s Struggles, Gurgaon: Three Essays Collective. Katzenstein, Mary Fainsod (1989), ‘Organizing against Violence: Strategies of the Indian Women’s Movement’, Pacific Affairs, 62 (1): 53–71. Kishwar, Madhu (1990), ‘Why I Do Not Call Myself a Feminist’, Manushi, 61: 2–8. Kothari, Rajni (1984), ‘The Non-Party Political Process’, Economic and Political Weekly, 19 (5):216–24. Kothari, Rajni (1992), ‘Voluntary Organizations in a Plural Society’, Solidarity, 133–134: 73–86. (An earlier version of the article was published in 1987 in the Indian Journal of Public Administration, 33 (3): 433–53.) Krishnaraj, Maithreyi (2003), ‘Challenges before Women’s Movement in a Changing Context’, Economic and Political Weekly, 38 (43): 4536–45. Kudva, Neema (2005), ‘Strong States, Strong NGOs’, in Raka Ray and Mary Fainsod Katzenstein (eds), Social Movements in India: Poverty, Power and Politics, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 233–65. Kumar, Radha (1993), The History of Doing: An Illustrated Account of Movements for Women’s Rights and Feminism in India, 1800–1990, New Delhi: Zubaan. Lingam, Lakshmi (2002), ‘Taking Stock: Women’s Movement and the State’, in Ghanshyam Shah (ed.), Social Movements and the State, New Delhi, India, Thousand Oaks, CA, WA and London, UK: Sage Publications, pp. 310–34. Molyneux, Maxine (1998), ‘Analysing Women’s Movements’, in Cecile Jackson and Ruth Pearson (eds), Feminist Visions of Development: Gender Analysis and Policy, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 65–88. Patel, Vibhuti (1988), ‘Emergence and Proliferation of Autonomous Women’s Groups (1974–84)’, in Neera Desai (ed.), A Decade of Women’s Movement in India (Collection of papers presented at a seminar organized by Research Centre for Women’s Studies, SNDT University), Bombay, Delhi and Nagpur: Himalaya Publishing House, pp. 117–29. Phadke, Shilpa (2003), ‘Thirty Years On: Women’s Studies Reflects on the Women’s Movement’, Economic and Political Weekly, 38 (43): 4567–76. Sarkar, Tanika and Urvashi Butalia (eds) (1995), Women and Right-Wing Movements: Indian Experiences, London and New Jersey: Zed Books. Sato, Hiroshi (2002), ‘NGOs: Intermediary Agents or Institutional Reformers?’ in Shinichi Shigetomi (ed.), The State and NGOs: Perspective from Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 57–71. Shigetomi, Shinichi (ed.) (2002), The State and NGOs: Perspective from Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Snow, David, Burke Rochford, Steven Worden and Robert Benford (1986), ‘Frame Alignment Process, Micromobilization and Movement Participation’, American Sociological Review, 51 (4): 464–81. Velayudhan, Meera (1985), ‘The Crisis and Women’s Struggles in India (1970– 1977)’, Social Scientist, 13 (6): 57–68.

9.

Opposition movements and the youth1 in Nigeria’s oil-producing area: an inquiry into framing Katsuya Mochizuki

INTRODUCTION This chapter looks at the ongoing evolution and transformation of youth organizations in the oil-producing area of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (the Niger Delta). Since the middle of the twentieth century, Nigeria’s petroleum resources have produced various social contradictions in the Niger Delta. Many of those involved are committed to a struggle over the oil, but they have pursued their own individual interests and have seldom acknowledged or understood the social position and setting of the other parties caught up in the situation. In this struggle, people have also found themselves limited in the political methods that they can employ. Furthermore, the types of action that they have been able to use have mutated as their social environment has changed. The Niger Delta has been the scene of a struggle by local people for autonomy and self-determination. As petroleum resources became critical for the Nigerian economy, this struggle became more serious and more widespread and was, in turn, suppressed. The oil boom in the national economy of the 1970s made these conflicts much worse and tensions were further exacerbated by a deepening of the economic crisis under the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the 1980s. Nigeria witnessed a series of organized protests by the local population in the 1990s. The Ogoni and other ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta demanded their fundamental rights and a fair share of the oil wealth. The youth became the nucleus of these ethnic minority movements as more active and younger elements took over their organizational process. In previous studies, authors have discussed various factors that may explain the re-emergence of youth activism as a principal force for change. Questions of leadership, organization and internal politics have been examined from the perspective of identity politics (Jega 2000; Obi 2001), and it has been 206

Opposition movements and the youth in Nigeria’s oil-producing area

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stressed that such movements were reacting to the country’s worsening socio-economic environment. There was, however, another element that influenced the emergence of the ethnic minority movements in the Niger Delta. Narrative accounts (Human Rights Watch 1999; Okonta and Douglas 2003) and an activist’s memoir (Saro-Wiwa 1995) suggest that we should also consider the international context and its impact on these movements, and indicate that this cannot be separated from the domestic factors at work inside the country. This suggests that the emergence of these movements should be understood within multiple frames. This chapter will look at such frames and the effectiveness of the framing method to explain the mobilization of the local population, and especially the youth. Social movement theorists who use the notion of frames pay attention to the role of emotion in any struggle. Activists attempt to compete with those whose vested interests lie in the status quo. In the Niger Delta, people’s grievances generate certain emotions, and activists interpret these emotions and redirect the people’s course of action accordingly. The notion of frames might help us to explain such movements and their organizations. Frames are conceived of as a means to mobilize people to address a specific issue. However, it is important to remember that both the leader and the follower have their own socio-cultural backgrounds; historical experiences of their own society are not unfettered. This chapter tries to verify the effectiveness of framing by means of a case study of popular movements in the Niger Delta. The focus is on youth organizations and their activism. What defined the terminology and historical images of the youth? How did youngsters behave in Nigerian society? It is expected that consideration of these questions will lead to an understanding of the possibilities and limitations in using frames as a method of analysis.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE YOUTH MOVEMENT The Nationalist Movement and the Youth In all societies, young people have always been among the most active elements. They involve themselves in the changes and reforms of their societies irrespective of their country or region. In Africa, ever since the colonial period, the youth who have taken part in social reforms have committed themselves to various associational activities, including literary, educational and other enlightenment-oriented organizations.

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Though the majority of these young people had been part of educated and Westernized elites, they represented the coming of a new generation that could redirect their society toward a nation state. The so-called nationalist movement has attracted academic interest within this context of African nation-building. The youth movements of the African colonies emerged and grew within the era of nationalism. Starting from the early resistance and protest movements directed against colonial authorities, nationalist thought and activity developed throughout the twentieth century and up to the independence era (Coleman 1986, Chapter 7). During the period between the First and Second World Wars, Africans at home and abroad became very active in advocating self-help and unity. The leaders of these movements were foreign African students and those who had returned home from study abroad. They focused on mobilizing racial awareness and national consciousness, especially in the cities. The youth were the most vibrant agents in colonial politics. In many West African countries, youth action led the independence movement. Such movements included students and intellectuals, both of which categories advocated social change and development. As a nucleus of the labor force, youngsters also played an important role in the economy. Thus, the youth became important in social movements throughout the independence era. In Nigeria, the country on which this chapter focuses, so-called ‘detribalized’, Western-educated and urbanized elements were preoccupied with such organizations as tribal unions for the purpose of establishing or maintaining an identity with their lineage, clan or tribe of origin in the late 1920s, and to an increasing extent throughout the 1930s and 1940s (Coleman 1986, p. 210). Special interest groups appeared, together with vocational associations and labor unions. They grew in number, spread out and integrated with each other. There were also associational organizations of young elements that had a firm political orientation. In the 1940s and 1950s, Nigerian youths were in the vanguard of the anticolonial movement; they were the rising generation in both politics and the economy, and became part of the nationalist movement that led the struggle for independence. At the end of World War II, they were organized by the nationalist parties who were to succeed in winning this struggle. In this way, the youth became a mobilizing force in the political movement for Nigeria’s independence. Youth organizations tended to protest against the colonial government and its policies. They also tried to emancipate themselves from domination by senior politicians and elders of the community, and they advocated social reform. The Union of Young Nigerians was organized on the occasion of the 1923 elections to the Legislative Council of Lagos. The main issue it


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focused on was the educational reforms of the government. These educated Nigerians debated the symbolic question of higher education. The Union was reorganized as the Lagos Youth Movement and renamed the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM)2 in 1936. In spite of its urban bias, the NYM spread and succeeded in setting up branches throughout Nigeria. The NYM further developed its organization under a prominent nationalist leader, Nnamdi Azikiwe, who had returned from the United States. Azikiwe added three new elements when he joined the NYM in 1938. These were a militant racial consciousness, an expanding and sensationalist press, and a large number of educated Nigerians who had previously been excluded or un-organized (Coleman 1986, p. 224). In the same year, the NYM published the Nigerian Youth Charter, which set forth the group’s objectives. Among these were the unification of the Nigerian tribes and the education of public opinion. It is slightly ironic, then, that the NYM split in the early 1940s because of a struggle among its leaders from different tribal backgrounds. Nevertheless, the NYM did lay the foundations for youth organizations which, thereafter, advocated Nigerian nationalism. It also established the institutional settings for the Nigerian youth movement from that time on. Marginalization within Ethnic Politics Around the time of independence, the demands of the youth for political space were blocked by ethnic rivalries in Nigerian politics, where the dominant agents were the major political parties under the control of senior politicians, including leaders of the former nationalist movement. Regionally based3 major parties began to confront each other and seek alliances in order to control the federation. In this process, ethnic minorities were marginalized. Even in the debate over the creation of administrative units, minorities in what was to become the oil-producing area failed to be able to represent themselves adequately. Continued marginalization had its source in the lack of political representation for the communities in the oil-producing areas. Though a limited number of assembly seats were occupied by members of ethnic minorities at the regional and federal levels, they seldom united on a single political issue. The sole exception was the creation of a new administrative unit, that of the State and Local Government Area, as an exclusive political space, and this was difficult too because of the political pressure coming from the dominant ethnic group in the area (the Igbo) and its major party (the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens, NCNC).4 In the mid-1960s, the growing significance of petroleum changed the political scene. The fall of international commodity prices and declining

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demand for major agricultural cash crops affected the financial base of the Nigerian government. As an alternative source of governmental revenue, the control of oil became a critical issue in the struggle for political power. Accordingly, the oil-producing area attracted political interest for the first time in Nigeria’s history. The issue of the distribution of oil revenues was one of the causes of the Nigerian Civil War (the Biafran War) during which the then Eastern Region attempted to pull out of the federation.5 The oil-producing area was located in the Eastern Region, the area where the Igbo people were in a majority. The military governor of the Eastern Region, who was sympathetic to the secessionists, resisted claims from other interested parties, including the minorities in the Niger Delta. These minorities were to some extent neutralized by the federal government after the Civil War broke out in 1967. Consequently they were isolated even from the surrounding Igbo population. These people were further marginalized in this calamity, but the educated element of the youth kept their faith in social justice and in their role in the struggle for justice.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF POPULAR PROTEST The Oil Boom and the Grievances of the Community in the Oil-Producing Areas The expansion of oil production went hand in hand with an increase in oil revenues throughout the 1970s. Particularly after the quadrupling of the crude oil price by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973, the share of oil in Nigerian export earnings increased steadily to over 90 percent. Crude oil exports greatly contributed to government revenues and to a change in the federal government’s fiscal position. It started to spend large amounts on economic development. Nigeria’s economy showed all the signs of an oil boom, and expectations rose sharply among the population. Institutional change in the oil sector also affected the community. In 1971, Nigeria joined OPEC after negotiating institutional arrangements, including the establishment of a national oil company. The most important impact of OPEC membership on Nigeria, however, was the introduction of a nationalization policy. Various indigenization measures were implemented during the oil boom in the 1970s. The Nigerian government was required to increase its shareholdings in joint ventures and to raise the number of indigenous managers in the industry. The most symbolic


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measure along these lines was the acquisition by the Federal Government of Nigeria of British Petroleum’s (BP’s) share in Shell/BP joint ventures in 1979. Royal Dutch Shell (hereafter Shell) became the sole operator of the affected joint ventures in exploration and production (Khan 1994, p. 70). Through this process, the Nigerian government secured some ownership of the oil industry and its revenues. The state oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC),6 and its subsidiaries, were also involved in oil production. The communities of the oil-producing area in the Niger Delta held certain expectations as a result. Indigenization measures were expected to increase national revenue and local employment. However, although the NNPC was committed to oil exploration, day-to-day operations continued just as before. Even after the foreign oil company became a minor shareholder, the NNPC still controlled operations (Biersteker 1987, p. 241). From the viewpoint of the community, the indigenization of the oil industry meant more repayment of the oil wealth to the community and more employment for the people, but there has always been an imbalance between their expectations and the government’s arrangements in the area. Salary increases for public servants in 1974 caused inflation and a boom in imports. In 1975, the federal government introduced a decree which raised its share of the oil proceeds from 50 percent to 80 percent. This meant that the fiscal position of state and local governments7 became much tighter. And, in contrast to urban population, the people in rural areas lived in misery with not enough policy-related or financial support from the federal government. The most serious legal change for the local communities, though, was that relating to land tenure. In 1978, the federal government proclaimed the Land Use Decree, which vested the ownership and control of all lands in the state governor as the representative of the federal government. Until then, land had been communally owned, and community leaders had substantial power to manage their land under customary law. With this new legal arrangement, not only the land but also the underground minerals, petroleum and natural gas came into the possession of the federal government. Moreover, the local communities were deprived of the opportunity to challenge this expropriation of their resources. Stagnation under the Military Regime The economy of the oil-producing area stagnated under the volatile policies of the federal government. In the 1980s, Nigeria experienced frequent changes in administrative rule, including the return of a military regime. First, a civilian administration, led by Shehu Shagari, collapsed

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after a military coup that stood for the reform of the Nigerian polity. The arbitrary policies of the civilian government were criticized by the military administration of Major General Mohammadu Buhari. Nigerians expected an economic recovery after the recession caused by the so-called oil glut in the international market. Buhari, however, introduced harsh economic reforms that gradually became unpopular even among members of his ruling council. One of the council’s members, Major General Ibrahim Babangida, carried out another military coup and toppled the Buhari regime in 1995. Under the Babangida administration, the Nigerian economy entered a structural adjustment phase. In 1986, the Structural Adjustment Programme was formally introduced with the support of international financial institutions. The SAP emphasized the recovery of the macroeconomy by way of harsh economic measures relating to fiscal expenditure and exchange rate controls. This program has been controversial. Supporters have appreciated its contribution to the recovery of gross domestic product (GDP), but opponents have heavily criticized the economic disparities that the SAP produced. Rural economies, including that of the oil-producing area, were completely left behind during this period of macroeconomic recovery. The military regime, however, did pay a certain amount of attention to oil production. As a former oil minister, Buhari fully realized the importance of the oil industry for Nigeria, and his administration continued to improve the fiscal terms for oil companies in order to allow them to secure their investments. The financial agreement between the government and the oil companies was further elaborated under the Babangida regime with the introduction of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)8 in 1986, but the NNPC was deprived of its regulatory power after the federal government established the Department of Petroleum Resources. The Babangida administration responded to the situation in the oil-producing area with a number of institutional arrangements. One conspicuous measure it took was to establish a new administrative unit (the Akwa Ibom State) in the area. This was intended to address the demands of the ethnic minorities in the former Cross River State. The other arrangement was the establishment of the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992. A government decree dictated an increase in the fiscal allocation to the oil-producing area. Oil proceeds for the area were increased from 1.5 percent to 3 percent. And the decree transferred the fund and its administration to the OMPADEC. This new commission became a development agency for the oil communities with the power to monitor problems connected with the oil companies. As a consequence, the 1990s saw the implementation of wide-ranging concessions to the people living in the oil-producing area.


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Community Action and the Changing Nature of the Youth The communities, though, continued their struggle against the government and the oil companies, even during the SAP era. In 1987, for example, a peaceful demonstration was organized by a community called the Iko in Akwa Ibom State. The Iko people protested against the environmental destruction caused by oil spillage from the local Shell facility, and demanded a stop to the damage. But the military government mobilized the riot police and suppressed the protest. The Iko community, however, did not abandon their struggle against Shell, and an environmental nongovernmental organization (NGO) came to its assistance to examine the nature and extent of the impact of the company’s operations on the community and its environment (Okonta and Douglas 2003, p. 84). This was a slight but important change. The appearance of the third party suggested a shift of initiative within the community. As the NGO was a brand-new agent in Nigerian society at that time, this kind of collaborative action reflected a power shift from the old generation to the new. The youth in the community had been formerly involved in both peaceful protest and direct action, but a preference for direct action became more pronounced under the SAP. Demonstrations against the military regime occurred frequently all over the country. Even junior secondaryschool students joined road blocks and other protests. They held up a leaf as a symbol of solidarity, and stopped any cars that attempted to pass by. An emotional drive or impetus to challenge the military government had been prevalent since the introduction of the SAP. Young people shared the general public’s uneasiness and uncertainty about the future, and they expressed their grievances quite directly. One of the reasons why young people might have thought that they had to commit themselves in this way was that their position or status within their families and society had become much more unstable. The youth were not free from the age structure of traditional society; their role and power were regulated by other parties such as the elders of their communities. Thus there appeared on the scene an ‘aged youth’ who were the same generation as the elders, but who owned less property and had no social title. In the prolonged economic recession, they were able to access fewer resources and had fewer opportunities to get jobs or money. In numerical terms, the youth population had increased all over the country, but their role and power in the community had shrunk in relative terms. The recognition of what was meant by ‘youth’ had completely changed. Popular protests in the oil-producing area seemed to enter a new phase after the introduction of the SAP. The increasing frequency of antiSAP demonstrations and anti-government actions suggested that social

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mobilization had grown stronger in Nigeria. With the tightening of the security situation under military rule, social mobility had become much higher than before. Though Nigerian youths were subject to many social constraints, their participation could change the direction of community action, as the above-mentioned Iko case suggests.

EVOLUTION AND TRANSITION OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS Protests in the Niger Delta The first incident in the Niger Delta to attract international attention occurred at the end of October 1990.9 A protest was organized against a facility of Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), a private venture operated by a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria. People from the local community, called the Umuechem, demanded compensation for damage, and also asked for the provision of rural infrastructure including electricity and roads. The SPDC divisional manager contacted the police commissioner of Rivers State, who overreacted to his request for security protection. Mobile (anti-riot) police were dispatched to restrain and deter the demonstrators, but this aggravated the situation. Direct clashes and violence followed the police intervention. Many people died, and people’s homes and property were badly damaged. Though an inquiry found no evidence of any threat from the protestors, there was no official compensation and no apology. This incident gave rise to suspicions on both sides of the conflict: the government and the community. In the same year, a different effort aimed at the oil companies was initiated by another minority group called the Ogoni. It was a well-organized protest against oil-production activities in the Niger Delta. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) appeared on the scene and became a vehicle for the protest. The Ogoni are supposedly divided into four dialect groups, but here they were united into a single entity. The emergence of MOSOP was accompanied by the Ogoni Bill of Rights, which addressed the realities and demands of the Ogoni people as a whole. The Bill of Rights was adopted by the movement and submitted to the federal government in August 1990. Its preamble stated: We, the people of Ogoni (Babbe, Gokana, Ken Khana, Nyo Khana and Tai),10 numbering about 500,000, being a separate and distinct ethnic nationality within the Federal Republic of Nigeria, wish to draw the attention of the Government and people of Nigeria to the under-mentioned facts.


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The history and grievances of the Ogoni people were then described, with an emphasis being put on the need for political autonomy and basic human rights, in accordance with which the Ogoni insisted on being recognized ‘as equal members of the Nigerian federation’. This implies that their demands did not deny the rights of any other ethnic group. The Bill of Rights was mainly directed at the Nigerian federal government, but the SPDC was directly referred to in two clauses that pointed out the facts concerning mining activities and underemployment by the company. In December 1992, MOSOP sent its demands to the oil companies operating in Ogoniland, together with an ultimatum that royalties be returned and compensation paid within 30 days. On 4 January 1993, MOSOP then proceeded to hold, for the first time in its history, a massive demonstration.11 It was a peaceful protest against the government’s continued denial of the movement’s demands and also marked a turning point in MOSOP’s campaign. MOSOP’s protests and campaigns went beyond the problem of Ogoniland. The movement criticized the general attitude of the oil companies and the international regime that allowed these firms to behave arrogantly in the living space of the local people. The movement centered on a local issue, but it was also situated in a wider context, which might be called the global frame of the Ogoni issue and which pushed to prominence the environmental and minority aspects of the problem. Incidentally, 1992 was a focal year for environment issues as it was the year in which the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED; generally called the Earth Summit) was held in Rio de Janeiro. The launching of the UN’s International Year of the World’s Indigenous Peoples followed, in January 1993. Local Attempts to Follow the MOSOP Model MOSOP’s success aroused local interest, and across the Niger Delta people mention the name of its leader, Ken Saro-Wiwa, with respect and admiration and ask how they can replicate the success of MOSOP in closing down oil production in the Ogoni area.12 Local communities continued to dispatch their representatives to the federal government and the oil companies, but in vain. Their demands for autonomy have long been neglected by the authorities, as have people’s demands for compensation and land tenure. While local people had raised their voices on these issues since independence, the political demands of the early 1990s were amplified by MOSOP’s Bill of Rights. No other group or movement, however, attained the level of cohesion and organization reached by MOSOP. The first attempts to emulate MOSOP were the movements organized by the Ijaw-speaking people (the Izon).13 In October 1992, they set up the Movement for the Survival of the Izon Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEND)

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in the Niger Delta. MOSIEND seemed to follow the example of MOSOP quite conscientiously. Apart from its use of an acronym-like name, MOSIEND proclaimed an ‘Izon People’s Charter’ directed at the government and people of Nigeria. The charter included an extensive discussion of the creation of a state since national independence and of the revenue allocation formulae applied to earnings from oil. It also demanded compensation for the oil revenues derived from the territory of the Ijawspeaking people, as well as ‘political autonomy as a distinct and separate entity’ outside the Nigerian state, with rights to the control and use of the oil, gas and other resources, based on agreements during the constitutional discussions leading up to independence as well as on pre-colonial agreements with the British (Human Rights Watch 1999, p. 129). A similar attempt was made by an Ijaw subgroup, the Ogbia. The traditional rulers of the communities concerned signed the ‘Charter of Demands of the Ogbia People’ in November 1992. Their demands included the repeal of the constitutional provisions giving ownership of mineral resources to the Nigerian federal government and a restoration of their rights to at least 50 percent of the oil revenues coming from their land. Moreover they demanded payment to the landlords of the area of all rents and royalties from the revenue from their crude oil since 1956 when the first Nigerian oil well started production on their land. A conservative estimate of the money due amounted to £226.5 billion. An extra payment of £35.5 billion was demanded as restitution for damage to their environment, and for any development and protection that might be required to ward off the future effects of oil exploitation. It is not difficult to discern similarities between these movements. Ethnically based organizations, the charters, and the demands directed at the federal government and the oil companies were common features among the movements that followed the Ogoni and MOSOP. They also seemed to share a historical legacy from the nationalist movement during the struggle for independence. The formation of each movement involved a set of objectives, together with the strategy required to attain them. It was obvious that MOSOP and its activities had become the frame of reference for these subsequent movements and that MOSOP had contributed to the formation of these movements’ organizational structure.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MOVEMENTS Protest and Repression in the Communities Conflicts in the Niger Delta have shown signs of activism since the early 1990s. Of epoch-making importance was the emergence of MOSOP, which


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in spite of its peaceful character exerted a substantial impact on other popular movements in the region. MOSOP’s leadership behaved tactically, and their campaigns and negotiation style seemed effective in attaining the organization’s objectives. After MOSOP, many similar movements emerged in various parts of the Niger Delta. These movements, along with their youth elements, have become more radical in their demands and methods of taking action. Women, also, have been active in these organizations. At the same time, old disputes and antagonisms among the communities have returned, bringing violence to the entire area. The basic nature of these conflicts has been a challenge to the status quo. Under the distressing economic conditions of the post-adjustment era, ordinary people wished to bypass the mechanism of resource distribution as sustained by governments and those in power. Local people, and especially the youth, have attempted to gain direct access to the source of wealth. In the Niger Delta, the main targets of their direct actions have been the oil companies. Activists have occupied production facilities and taken oil companies’ personnel as hostages. Both the federal and state governments have emphasized their commitment to the protection of the oil companies and their production facilities; if necessary by force. In addition to the regular security arrangements between the government and the companies, special security units were created by the government under the pretext of an initiative to protect oil facilities. A paramilitary force called the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force was organized to deal with MOSOP. It had the reputation of being brutal towards activists. Subsequent security outfits have labeled the youth as ‘economic saboteurs’ and have treated them harshly during demonstrations (Human Rights Watch 1999, p. 121). These security groups share the reputation of being some of the most abusive of Nigeria’s security organizations. Cases of violence can be grouped into two categories. The first consists of those incidents where members of the community have demanded compensation for the oil-production and related activities of the oil companies. In the second category are cases arising from the random harassment of community members and the latter’s response to that harassment. In many incidents, the oil companies describe protests by local people as being criminal, and allege that the youth taking part in the protests were hoping to extract from the companies benefits to which they were not entitled. However, these same incidents were described by the youth and community members involved as a struggle over the oil. In other words, both the youth and the oil companies describe the same incidents differently and denounce each other from different standpoints. Of course, different agents can frame the same event in different ways. Within the bounds of what we take for reality, our perceptions can frame an event in different ways, and

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this can cause us to interpret that event in diverse ways and attribute blame and responsibility differently, too (Crossley 2002, p. 134). Genesis and Strategy of the Youth Movements Nigerian youth challenge all socio-political authority. They have denounced both governments and the elders of their communities and have demanded a redistribution of the wealth produced in the areas where they live. The present social order cannot assure their rights; it is noteworthy that their opposition is therefore sometimes leveled even against other members of their own community. Even MOSOP experienced internal disputes after the death of its prominent leader, Kenule (Ken) Saro-Wiwa. Saro-Wiwa founded the youth wing of MOSOP in 1993. It was called the National Youth Council of the Ogoni People (NYCOP)14 and it brought a sense of urgency to MOSOP’s activism. NYCOP was mistrusted both by the Nigerian government and by the organization’s elders who regarded it as Saro-Wiwa’s private army or vigilante squad. However, Saro-Wiwa enjoyed wide support among MOSOP members. He wrote in his memoir that he had the support of at least 98 per cent of the Ogoni people (SaroWiwa 1995). But his followers were a mixed group, even within MOSOP,15 and intra-MOSOP wrangling and disputes undoubtedly existed over the leadership and management of the organization. In June 1993, Saro-Wiwa was elected president of MOSOP, and there was a change in the executive members of the organization. As some of them were even younger than Saro-Wiwa, who was 52 years old,16 it seemed that the younger generation had taken over MOSOP. This made the military government very suspicious of the organization. Saro-Wiwa encountered various kinds of harassment and was restricted from making foreign trips. As another sign of the government’s unease, a special task force of the army was dispatched to Ogoniland. What is most important here is the youth-driven transformation of these ethnic minority movements at a time of economic and political transition. Young people faced a grim future of continued unemployment and neglect by the oil companies in the Niger Delta. They insisted that they were the main victims of environmental degradation and of the bleak prospects in the region, so they confronted the government and the oil companies for access to resources, welfare services, and infrastructure, while demanding compensation. In many instances, the youth became not only victims but also victimizers, but in the context of the popular movements in the Niger Delta, they sought to resist further exploitation and the pollution of their land and water, while seeking compensation for the environmental disaster caused by the oil companies.


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In order to achieve their aims, the youth movements either mainstreamed themselves within an umbrella organization like NYCOP which played a central role in MOSOP’s protests,17 or operated as distinct entities, such as the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC),18 or as human rights organizations, such as Environmental Rights Action (ERA).19 These groups drew up agendas for change in the form of Bills of Rights, and Charters of Demands, or Declarations, which were endorsed at the grass-roots level or at mass rallies before being disseminated widely, then acted upon through mass action and international campaigns. The surge of youth activism was also linked to the perception that elders in the community were responsible for the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta. These elders were believed to be colluding with the oil companies and with the federal government in depriving their people of the oil wealth. This caused widespread anger and, as a result, youth leaders intentionally developed a more radical approach.

THE REALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF YOUTH FRAMING The External Appearance and Substance of the Youth Organizations From the foregoing discussion, it should be obvious that the youth have become a potent force in the popular movements of the oil-producing area of Nigeria. They have enhanced the effectiveness of the protests of the minority groups and of the demands made by those groups. In pursuit of their organization’s objectives, some have sought to build pan-ethnic organizational entities, while others have built popular alliances that cross ethnic and gender lines. Indeed, in giving more strength to their claims and grievances, they have transcended the local area and connected with global causes. The youth movements in the oil-producing area have often been described in a community context. A review of the Nigerian youth movement shows similarities and differences between the movements of the independence era and those in the 1990s. Experiences in the Niger Delta suggest that the present youth movements have a strong inclination to control resources at the community level. The youth could have demanded benefits at the national level through political representation at the centre, like those in the nationalist movement who redirected themselves toward national politics, but they felt that such a move might increase the risk of manipulation by elders closely connected to the government. The youth were not recognized as a critical social force after national independence. They were suppressed by elders in the community and by

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elderly politicians in national politics. However, the economic stagnation of Nigerian society accelerated the re-emergence of young people as active stakeholders in social struggles. Marginalized people used youth framing to justify their opposition and demands. As the case of the Niger Delta shows, the youth appeared to initiate the protests and opposition against the government and vested interests. They demanded a fair share of the area’s resources, and approached critical issues by securing political space both inside and outside their communities. Their common objective was to secure a sufficient share of the resources with which their land was endowed. Strategically, the youth have tended to skip national benefits and reach for universal values, using their international networks. This is one of the reasons why the MOSOP model was so popular among subsequent movements in the Niger Delta. Through this process, youth organizations could insist that they sought not only their own interests, but also the realization of such basic values as human rights and the protection of the environment for their community. The Effectiveness of Youth Framing Youth movements used to be regarded positively in Nigeria in spite of their elitist character. The educated youth took part in social reforms during the independence period, although this group did not include the majority of the youth who lived under the traditional age structure prevalent in rural Nigeria. The youth as a whole, then, were imagined to be a potential force for change rather than actually being such a force. It was the Nigerian Youth Movement and other youth-labeled entities which created the positive image of youth movements in Nigeria. The youth and their movements did not implement actual reforms, though, so much as impress on the people the need for such reforms. Youth movements in the Niger Delta used this socially constructed label to realize their demands. They tried to appeal to the appearance of reformism in their activities by using the word ‘youth’ in the names of their organizations. Their actions were a protest against the vested interests of their society, but they also opposed conservative elements in their own communities. MOSOP was appreciated not only because it elaborated an organization and strategy of protest, but also because its leaders, including Ken Saro-Wiwa, deliberately advocated youth-led action in the movement. MOSOP addressed the issues of the Niger Delta, attracted public interest, and involved various social agents in its protests. From an organizational point of view, its efforts and strategies were effective, but its success only occurred in the early stages of the opposition movement.


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The National Youth Council of the Ogoni People (NYCOP), a youth wing of MOSOP, was active, and many other youth organizations in the Niger Delta followed and duplicated its behavior, but NYCOP was not as successful as MOSOP in increasing support within local ethnic groups and communities. On the contrary, NYCOP was involved in intra- and inter-ethnic rivalries. The youth organizations were thus isolated even inside their own community, and this further radicalized them. The use of a ‘youth’ label has been impressive in effecting change. The name is a symbol of the movement or of its activism. This can be attributed to the character and tendencies of the youth themselves. However, it is not easy for a youth movement to accomplish its organizational aims, precisely because of the changeable nature of youth behavior. Once a problem occurs, the movement cannot easily sustain its original position. The loss of a leader can be fatal to the organization, as the case of MOSOP proved. A movement can change as the ‘youth’ label fades. In the Niger Delta, the movement’s use of the ‘youth’ frame as an active force was common in the early phase of protest and opposition, but the youth movements could neither sustain nor reproduce this power after that phase had passed.

CONCLUDING REMARKS Youth movements were remarkable during the independence era for being front-runners in social reform. They have contributed to preserving a positive image of youth in society, but this image has been completely transformed in recent years. The mass media now use the term ‘youth’ to describe violent and uncontrollable young people who engage in criminal and destructive activities. This contrast symbolizes the rise and fall of the youth movements in the Niger Delta. In Nigeria, the frame of youth action emerged through the history of the nationalist movement. After this movement declined in the ethnic politics of the post-independence era, youth movements had almost no chance to appear on the national scene. The protests and opposition activities of the Ogoni people reintroduced the youth to activism and gave them incentives. The so-called MOSOP model did work effectively early on. Following popular movements sought to replicate MOSOP’s youth framing and its institutional framework, although they failed to reproduce such a frame of action. Today in Nigeria, the youth are not just an age group or an angry young mob. They are not necessarily organized but they share socioeconomic grievances. They have the potential to become a social force, but they are marginalized inside their own communities, while at the same time they have to live within the various constraints of a formal society.

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The only thing they can do is to act outside these constraints. There is then a slight possibility that they can attain their goals through alternative methods to join an opposition movement or to take part in an organized protest such as that mounted by MOSOP. However, this strategy has been losing its momentum and effectiveness. The youth tend to be involved in the identity politics produced by election cycles under civilian rule. Youth framing, then, works under certain constraints that arise out of a society’s historical experience and its current situation.

NOTES 1.

2.

3.

4. 5.

6.

7. 8.

9.

The term ‘youth’ has special connotations in the Nigerian context. The ‘youth’ is not merely used to describe ‘young people’ but also the deprived in the community. The ‘youth’ has no job, property, social title and so on. This term symbolizes the ‘have nots’ of Nigerian society. The Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) was a political entity rather than a social movement. Secondary-level textbooks such as Crowder and Abdullahi (1979) and Omolewa (1986) describe the NYM in the context of the formation of political parties and associations. The regions were the second-tier administrative units of post-independence Nigeria. Their creation reflected the ethnic majority population, so that the Northern Region was created for the Hausa-Fulani, the Western Region for the Yoruba, and the Eastern Region for the Igbo. Another region called the Mid-Western was added to the federation as a region for the ethnic minorities of the Western Region. After Nigeria became a federal republic in 1963, the regions were reorganized as states. The NCNC was established as the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons in the 1940s. It was a pan-Africanist association that was organized by the major ethnic groups. The Igbo Union became one of its nuclei. The same thing was attempted by a small activist group from an ethnic minority group (the Ijaw) shortly before the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War. In February 1966, an armed group called the Niger Delta Volunteer Force attempted to secede from the Nigerian federation, and proclaimed the establishment of the Niger Delta Republic. It was the first protest from the Ijaw population over the control of oil by the federal government. In recent years, an armed youth group named themselves after this group and used the title of Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force. It was established as the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) in May 1971. The NNOC acquired the liabilities and interests of existing operators on behalf of the federal government. It was merged with the regulatory department of the government to form the NNPC in 1977. Nigeria has a three-tier administrative system: federal, state and local government. The MOU is a legal arrangement aimed at encouraging oil companies to continue their exploration and production in the country. In return, the Nigerian government guarantees these companies a stipulated profit margin, irrespective of market conditions. The first MOU was signed in 1986, and it guaranteed $2 per barrel after tax and royalty payments. The second one, in 1991, guaranteed $2.30 (Omorogbe 2001, p. 78). In 1987, another community called the Iko organized a peaceful demonstration to protest against the exploitation of their petroleum resources by Shell and the federal government. It was suppressed by the military government. The Iko have suffered from the effects of incidents caused by Shell, such as oil spillages, the blow-out of a flow station, and gas flaring (Okonta and Douglas 2003, pp. 83–6).

Opposition movements and the youth in Nigeria’s oil-producing area 10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17.

18.

19.

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The individual names of the five kingdoms in Ogoniland are designated in the preamble. As MOSOP was founded by the leaders of the Ogoni people collectively, the Ogoni Bill of Rights was adopted in the same manner. Traditional rulers and chiefs from the kingdoms all signed their names beneath the text of the bill. On the timing of MOSOP’s demonstration, the following observation may be apposite: ‘The demonstration was timed to coincide with the start of the United Nations Year of Indigenous Peoples’ (Okonta and Douglas 2003, p. 119). By May 1993, the SPDC, namely Shell, had declared the suspension of its operations in Ogoniland. It was rumored that the pumping of oil continued, but its nine oilfields and 96 production wells were formally abandoned in 1994. The Ijaw are the fourth-largest ethnic group in Nigeria. Their area extends over the Niger Delta where the major oil companies operate. The National Youth Council of the Ogoni People (NYCOP) was merely one of many entities among the Ogoni people. They were gradually organized under the umbrella of MOSOP. MOSOP served as an umbrella for the formation of such pan-Ogoni organizations as the Conference of Ogoni Traditional Rulers (COTRA), the Council of Ogoni Churches (COC), the Ogoni Teachers Union (OTU), the National Union of Ogoni Students (NUOS), the Ogoni Students Union (OSU), the Ogoni Central Union (OCU), the Council of Ogoni Professionals (COP), the Federation of Ogoni Women Associations (FOWA), and so on. Saro-Wiwa was born in Ogoniland on 10 October 1941. Saro-Wiwa wrote about his two-day tour of the Ogoni Kingdoms in November 1992: ‘On that tour, I found that there was a large number of youths angry with a society that had cheated them and who were therefore eager to hear us, to learn’ (Saro-Wiwa 1995, p. 102). He added that: ‘the term “youth” is used here to describe people who are below the age of forty’ (ibid.). He recruited a wide range of Ogoni ‘youth’ through this kind of activity. The Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) was formed in January 1999. At the end of the previous year, a gathering of Ijaw ‘youth’ from different communities adopted the ‘Kaiama Declaration’ (Kaiama is the name of the place where they gathered), which advocated the same demands as the preceding bill and charters. Environment Rights Action (ERA) was an affiliate of the Friends of the Earth International and one of the most outspoken groups to criticize oil-producing activities and the oil companies in the Niger Delta. It was not a community-based group, but its activism was similar in nature to that of the youth organizations.

REFERENCES Bierstecker, T.J. (1987), Multinationals, the State, and the Control of the Nigerian Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Coleman, James S. (1986), Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, Benincity: Broberg and Wiström. (Originally published by the University of California Press, Berkeley, CA in 1958). Crossley, Nick (2002), Making Sense of Social Movements, Buckingham: Open University Press. Crowder, Michael and Guda Abdullahi (1979), Nigeria: An Introduction to Its History, London: Longman Group. Human Rights Watch (1999), The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities, New York: Human Rights Watch.

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Jega, Attahiru (ed.) (2000), Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute. Khan, Sara Ahmad (1994), Nigeria: The Political Economy of Oil, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Obi, Cyril I. (2001), The Changing Forms of Identity Politics in Nigeria under Economic Adjustment: The Case of the Oil Minorities Movement of the Niger Delta, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Okonta, Ike and Oronto Douglas (2003), Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights and Oil, London: Verso. Omolewa, Michael (1986), Certificate History of Nigeria, Lagos: Longman Group. Omorogbe, Yinka (2001), Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria, Lagos: Malthouse Press. Saro-Wiwa, Ken (1995), A Month and a Day: A Detention Diary, London: Penguin Books.

PART IV

Conclusion

10.

Resources, organizations and institutions: intermediaries for social movements in the development context Kumiko Makino and Shinichi Shigetomi

PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT In this volume, we have explored the question of why social movements emerge in certain forms and with certain mechanisms in developing countries. One way to answer to this question would be to explain how the movement actors comprehend the situation and how they choose their behavior to achieve their goals. Indeed, modern theories of social movements have developed a methodology for such ‘purposive explanations’ (Tilly 1978, p. 6). However, this volume has attempted to explain the phenomena of social movements in the light of causes which are external to the movement actors. We assume that this causal approach is both necessary and valid since the social movements in the developing world are based on different circumstances to those in post-industrial Western democracies which the modern social movement theories take for granted. The differences in developing countries include the facts that: more constraints on economic resources limit the surplus which may possibly be mobilized for social movements; more direct authoritarian control on citizens’ political behavior limits the choices of collective action; and stricter control of the mass media and communication constrains the means of frame dissemination. Moreover, in the developing world there is a much smaller number of highly educated individuals who are free from their societal position and are expected, in the modern theories, to be the main actors of social movements. These conditions may affect the availability of movement resources, the size and shape of political opportunities, and the features and efficacy of identity and framing. Therefore, we have brought environmental factors back into the analytical framework. 227

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However, we have not limited ourselves to merely referring to structural problems which may cause grievances among ordinary people in developing countries. The structural elements are, by definition, consistent during any stage of historical development within which a social movement may change its appearance. Unlike social revolutions, social movements do not always make fundamental changes in the political and social structure, and structural elements do not sufficiently explain the wide variety of social movements happening in the developing world. Rather, an analysis of factors that are located in-between the structure and collective actions is required for a fuller understanding. Referring to the studies which place importance on specifying the context and institutional conditions of social movements, we have attempted to examine how these conditions determine the processes which have been identified by the modern theories. In other words, our concern is to find how resource mobilization, political opportunity recognition, collective identity formation and the framing processes of movement actors are conditioned by intermediary factors, which are objective and external to social movement actors but are distinguished from structural elements which are too broad and too deterministic.

SALIENT FEATURES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD The intermediary factors for social movements which the contributors to this volume have found can be broadly divided into three categories: resources, organizations and institutions. Resources for social movements comprise not only material and financial resources but also information and technical assistance. As was demonstrated in the case studies of Colombia (Chapter 2), Thailand (Chapter 3) and Argentina (Chapter 6), social movements in the developing world often depend on external financial resources for their existence. The availability of information can be also crucial, as it was in the case of the Chinese environmental protest movements. Regarding organizations, rather than the organizational structures of social movements per se, we have mainly focused on those which constitute historical and environmental conditions for social movements, such as indigenous organizations and networks which developed prior to the emergence of social movements, or organizations which exist in the surrounding society. These organizational conditions have a great influence on how social movement organizations develop, and shape the forms and directions of the movements. Institutions are not limited to substantive political and administrative

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institutions but also embrace values, cognitive systems and patterns of behavior which are widely shared and taken for granted in society. The case studies of South Africa (Chapter 5), Mexico (Chapter 7) and China (Chapter 4) demonstrate the importance of state institutions as determinants of political opportunities and constraints; on the other hand, the characteristics of the development forums in Thailand derived largely from those of social institutions. Moreover, the case studies of Mexico, India (Chapter 8) and Nigeria (Chapter 9) demonstrate the significance of institutionalized values and ideologies. For actors of social movements, resources are tools for achieving their goals, organizational conditions shape the form and direction of the movements, and institutions are the rules of the game in society. These three categories of intermediaries can therefore be regarded as objective conditions which have a direct influence on the behavior of the actors. These factors are suitable for objectively explaining social movements, as they take various forms and change over time according to the historical stages of development of particular societies. In these intermediary factors, we have found some highly salient features for explaining and understanding social movements in the developing world. Resource Mobilization The concept of resource mobilization was a major theoretical breakthrough in social movement analysis, as it pointed out that the mere existence of grievances could not explain the emergence of social movements, and demonstrated the importance of resources that enable collective actions to take place. Because of rampant poverty and violence, strong grievances, which are often life-threatening in nature, are omnipresent in the developing world. Therefore the motivation for social movements is potentially high, yet social movements do not always materialize in developing countries, as people there face severe resource constraints and restricted freedom of behavior compared to the developed world. Among our case studies, social movements in Colombia and China were subject to the most severe constraints. The main question which the case studies in these two countries explored was how social movements became possible in such extreme conditions. The chapters on Colombia and China emphasized the importance of the role of external, especially foreign, supporters which conferred financial assistance, useful information and legitimacy on the social movements. The activities of the Program for Development and Peace in Middle Magdalena (PDPMM) in Colombia have been supported by foreign donors such as the World Bank and the European Union (EU). In China, except for government-founded

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non-governmental organizations (NGOs), room for the mobilization of financial resources inside the country for NGOs and social movements is fairly limited, and many organizations cannot survive without the financial support of foreign foundations and international NGOs. However, in addition to foreign donors, the state also remains an important source of resources, since the degree of state control over resources is generally high in developing countries and since government permission is often required for social movements to receive financial assistance from foreign donors. Therefore, negotiation with the government to elicit resources constitutes an important strategy for social movements in the developing world. Such processes were typically observed for the piqueteros in Argentina and indigenous people’s movements in Mexico, yet they were also found in the case studies of Colombia, Thailand, China and South Africa. Having said that external resources are important for social movements, dependency on external resources also poses the risk of the movements being controlled or co-opted by the providers of the resources, whether they are foreign donors or the government. Social movements by Nigerian youth tend to appeal directly to international society and are not willing to interact with the state authorities because they do not want to be coopted by the elders who control the state. The negative framing of NGOs by social movements in India also reflects the dilemma between accepting useful external resources and the risk of losing autonomy. Organizations and Networks The significance of indigenous organizations and networks as an enabling factor for social movements has been pointed out in the existing social movement analysis, such as the political process theory of McAdam (1999). As we have seen above, resource mobilization from external supporters is key to overcoming resource constraints for social movements in the developing world; however, it is not easy for social movements to mobilize resources without being co-opted, and to use them effectively for achieving their goals. Thus, successful resource mobilization often depends on what kind of organizations and networks have existed in society prior to the social movements, and on whether the social movements have competent leaders with good knowledge and management skills on local problems. This point is well demonstrated in the case studies of Colombia and Thailand. In Colombia, the activities of the PDPMM would have been almost impossible if it were not for local NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) which existed even under the extremely violent situations. In the case study of Thailand, the development of various voluntary groups at the village level and the formation of a network of middle-class leaders across


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provinces are among the factors in achieving institutional readiness for the emergence of provincial development forums. Whether social movements without sufficient resources and experience can have a social impact also depends on the availability of the cooperation of external organizations and networks. In the cases of South Africa and Argentina, newly emergent social movements were able to enjoy significant negotiating power through collaboration with existing leftist organizations. Social movements often gain a sudden presence when the input occurs of significant amounts of resources by foreign donors, and subsequently foreign values tend to be more or less reflected in the movement discourses. However, the case studies of this volume suggest the importance of indigenous organizations and networks, even for social movements which are under the intense influence of foreign donors. It should be noted that such indigenous organizations do not always facilitate social movements, but may conversely suppress the grievances of vulnerable people in the community and deter mobilization of social movements. Thus, social movements of Nigerian youth are, in a sense, rebellions against the community order in which the youth are both marginalized and oppressed. Institutional Environments The influence of institutional environments on social movements has attracted attention in political process theory and political opportunity structure theory. Institutional environments in developing countries differ considerably from those in developed countries with mature democracies. With the exception of China, where the Communist Party continues its one-party rule, all the countries focused upon in this volume are democracies, at least in the procedural sense such as having regular multiparty elections. However, even if formal political institutions are well developed (newly introduced political institutions in developing countries are sometimes quite cutting-edge, as in the case of the Constitution of South Africa), the reality of their implementation is often far from democratic, and uneven governance, arbitrary implementation of laws, and resource distribution based on patron–client relations rather than the rule of law, are widely observed. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the malfunction of formal political institutions as the channel for powerless people to raise their voices is one of the important reasons why people organize themselves into social movements and resort to non-institutional measures. On the one hand, as in the case of rural mass protests in China, people are driven to non-institutional measures because there are no other ways for them to express their strong grievances. On the other hand, the fact that

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institutional politics are not well established can function as a political opportunity for social movements, because in such situations access to the polity is relatively flexible and there is much leeway for the negotiation of arbitrary arrangements. Otsuka pointed out the existence of ‘fragmentary opportunities’ for environmental protest movements in China, due to the unevenness and haphazard nature of social control by the state. Corporatism is also an important factor in the political opportunity structure, as was shown in the case studies of Argentina, Mexico and South Africa. In Argentina, the corporatist framework had excluded the constituency of piqueteros from access to the polity, yet once the conventional framework collapsed, political opportunities for social movements appeared. The corporatist state in Mexico was also of an exclusive nature, but the situation changed from the 1970s when the government was bound by necessity to involve a wider range of social groups to secure its legitimacy. This helped the indigenous people’s movement to succeed in having their demands heard by the government authorities. In South Africa, on the other hand, the corporatist institution of an inclusive nature which was introduced during the democratization process produced a breakthrough for social movements in allowing them to be seated at the negotiation table with the government, which had its origin in the apartheid liberation movement and the increasing tendency toward the centralization of power. In addition, several case studies have demonstrated that the ideologies and values of nationalist movements on which current nation states are built can serve as sources for the framing of social movements. When women’s movement organizations in India apply to other organizations labels of Western origin such as ‘feminism’ or ‘NGOs’, with negative connotations, this reflects the history of the women’s movement in India, whose development has been deeply connected to the nationalist movement. In Nigeria, the effectiveness of social movement framing with the concept of ‘youth’ is based not only on the current socio-economic conditions in which young people are marginalized, but also on the positive image of ‘youth’ formed during the nationalist movement during the era of independence. In the case of Mexico, indigenous people’s movements claim legitimacy of their demands on the grounds that ‘the indigenous’ was conferred with a special meaning analogous to ‘the national’ in the Mexican Revolution. These ideologies and values can be regarded as institutions in a wider sense, as they are widely shared by governing elites as well as by society at large throughout the historical process. Historical experiences unique to the developing world, such as nationalist movements for independence, political oppression in the post-independence era, and economic underdevelopment and dependency, are strongly reflected in and influence the institutional environments in which current social movements take place.


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EPILOGUE ‘[As it is] used to explain so much, it may ultimately explain nothing at all.’ This criticism of Gamson and Meyer (1996, p. 275) on political opportunity structure theory can also be applied to the other modern theories on social movements. This high degree of applicability is achieved since the modern theories place the contextual factors on the sidelines. In addition, theories that are too abstract do not provide useful information for actors involved in social movements in the real world with an abundance of contextual elements. This volume has attempted to shed some light on the relevant environmental factors in various case studies; we have examined how the objective conditions of resources, organizations and institutions influence the emergence and form of social movements; and have found some salient features of social movements in the development context. These contextual elements have been created through the historical accumulation of events in a certain area. In particular, the institutions are often path-dependent, and past experiences and repeated events affect the present behavior of actors through their cognitive and behavioral patterns. Indeed, present political institutions were the result of revolution (Mexico), the independence movement (India), and the struggle against discrimination (South Africa). The ‘youth’ image of Nigeria was formed in the process of the independence movement but was still shared by the members of society, so that the movement leaders use the ‘youth’ label for their movement. Considering the importance of resources, organizations and institutions as the explanatory variables, we should not neglect the context of history and the area in which a social movement happens. In an attempt to build a theoretical framework of analytic historical sociology, Skocpol (1984, p. 383) asserted that: ‘The unities of time and place must be broken for the purposes of drawing comparisons and testing hypotheses.’ We disagree with detaching events from the area context, and instead propose to find the typology of the relationship between the area context and events as we did when comparing the NGO phenomenum in Asian countries (Shigetomi 2002). Although we have not delved extensively enough to develop such a framework in this volume, we believe that it is one of the future challenges for social movement studies.

REFERENCES Gamson, William A. and David S. Meyer (1996), ‘Framing Political Opportunity’, in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds), Comparative

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Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 275–90. McAdam, Doug (1999), Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970, 2nd edn, Chicago, IL, USA and London, UK: University of Chicago Press. Shigetomi, Shinichi (ed.) (2002), The State and NGOs: Perspective from Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Skocpol, Theda (1984), ‘Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies in Historical Sociology’, in Theda Skocpol (ed.), Vision and Method of Historical Sociology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 356–91. Tilly, Charles (1978), From Mobilization to Revolution, Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing.

Index Abdullahi, Guda 222 ACF (All-China Federation) survey 89 Achmat, Zackie 115, 123 ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power) 116 actor-centered models 3–6 ACVC (Peasant Association of the River Cimitarra Valley) 29 Adler, Glenn 112 AEC (Anti-Eviction Campaign) 113 African National Congress (ANC) 112–13 aged youth 213 Agenda 21 86 Agnihotri, Indu 184, 189, 192 Ahumada, Consuelo 26 AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) 116 AIDS Law Project 115 AIDWA (All-India Democratic Women’s Association) 193, 199–200 AIWC (All India Women’s Conference) 187–8, 193 Akerkar, Supriya 184, 193 Akwa Ibom State 212 Alderete, Juan Carlos 146–7, 151–2 Alfonsín, Raúl 137 Alianza Nacional de Profesionales Indígenas A.C. (ANPIBAC) 163–4 All-China Federation (ACF) survey 89 Almeyra, Guillermo 148, 151, 152 Alther, Gretchen 47 Alvarez, Carlos 145 Alvarez, Sonia E. 19, 197, 203 Amako, Satoshi 81 Amenta, Edwin 8 Amin, Samir 6 Amnat Charoen Province Community Organization Network 53, 65

ANC (African National Congress) 112–13 Andréz 168 Angeloz, Eduardo 137 ANPIBAC (Alianza Nacional de Profesionales Indígenas A.C.) 163–4 Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC) 113 Anti Privatisation Forum (APF) 113 apertura policy 163–6 APF (Anti Privatisation Forum) 113 April 10 incident, see Huashui Town mass protest Archila Neira, Mauricio 19, 29 arenas 8 Argentina neoliberal policy and transformation of the welfare state 137–42 overview 134 socio-economic crisis 143–6 see also piquetero movement Argentine Communist Party 148–50, 152–3 Armstrong, Elisabeth 199 ASAM (Asamblea de Autoridades Mixes) 171 ATCC (Association of Peasant Workers of the Carare River) 29, 30 Atkinson, Doreen 119 AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) 22, 28, 30, 35, 43 Auyero, Javier 135, 142 Ayutla (village, Mexico) 168, 170 Ayuujk 174 Azikiwe, Nnamdi 209 Babangida, Ibrahim 212 Bachillerato Integral Comunitario Ayuujk Polivalente (BICAP) 174–6 Ballard, Richard 114

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Bangladesh 183 Barbados Declaration (1971) 162 Barbetta, Pablo 135 Barrancabermeja (city, Colombia) 27–9, 32, 33, 41, 46 Barrancabermeja, Catholic diocese of 30–32, 34–5, 46 Barrios de Pie 151 Basu, Aparna 188, 189, 195 BCM (Black Consciousness Movement) 112 Benford, Robert D. 4 Bergquist, Charles 21, 22 Berryman, Phillip 163 Bertely Busquets, María 164 Betancourt, Dario 21 BICAP (Bachillerato Integral Comunitario Ayuujk Polivalente) 174–6 Bidaseca, Karina 135 Bierstecker, T.J. 211 Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) 112 Bond, Patrick 113, 114 bourgeois feminists 195 BP (British Petroleum) 211 Bredell Consensus 123 Budlender, Geoff 120, 122 buffalo banks 57, 73 Buhari, Mohammadu 212 Butalia, Urvashi 191 Butler, Anthony 114, 129 Cai Shouqiu 84 Calderón, Fernando 19 Calman, Leslie J. 184, 190, 193 Campbell, John L. 8 Canel, Eduardo 4 Cárdenas, Lázaro 161, 176, 178 casiques 171 Castell, Raúl 148, 152 Catholic Church Colombia 29–30, 45 see also Barrancabermeja, Catholic diocese of see also Salesian Church causal explanation 5 Cavallo, Domingo 145 CBTA (Centro de Bachillerato Tecnológico Agropecuario) 173, 175

CCC (Classist and Combative Current) 146–7, 152 CCF (Concerned Citizens Forum) 113 CCP (Chinese Communist Party) 80 CDPMM (Corporation for Development and Peace in Middle Magdalena) 33, 35–7, 38, 39, 40, 42, 44, 46, 47 Ceballos, Jorge 151 CENRP (Committee on Environment and Natural Resource Protection) 86 Center for Ecological Environmental Science of Huai River System 94–5 Center for Investigation and Popular Education (CINEP) 32, 34–5, 45–6; see also SEAP–CINEP consortium Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (CLAPV) 89, 91–3, 100, 102 Center of Argentine Workers (CTA) 146–9, 151 Centre for Applied Legal Studies 121 Centro de Bachillerato Tecnológico Agropecuario (CBTA) 173, 175 Century Walk for Environmental Protection in China 86 CEPF (China Environmental Protection Foundation) 89 CGT (General Confederation of Labor) 140, 141, 146 Chaiwat Thiraphan 73 Chatri Chroensiri 73 Chatthip Nartsupha 58 Chaudhuri, Maitrayee 184, 186, 196, 202, 203 Chen Jinluo 81 Cheresky, Isidoro 153 China Environment News (Zhongguo Huanjing Bao) 85 China Environmental Protection Foundation (CEPF) 89 China, People’s Republic of (PRC) environmental policy development and information disclosure 84–7 fragmentary opportunities emergence 100–101

Index institutionalization of social control 80–84 NIMBY protests 96–8 overview 79–80, 103–5 rural mass protests 98–100, 103, 105 social foundations for environmental movements 87–91 strategies against limited resources 101–3 China University of Political Science and Law 89 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 80 Chipko movement 188 Chothia, Farouk 128 Chowdhary, Rekha 6 CINEP (Center for Investigation and Popular Education) 32, 34–5, 45–6; see also SEAP–CINEP consortium ‘civics’ 112 CLAPV (Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims) 89, 91–3, 100, 102 class relations 2, 6–7 Classist and Combative Current (CCC) 146–7, 152 Cloward, Richard A. 7 CODI (Community Organization Development Institute) 60, 64, 68 CODREMI (Comité Pro-Defensa de los Recursos Naturales y Culturales Mixes) 171–2 Coleman, James S. 208, 209 Coleman, Neil 121 collective identity, in NSM theory 4–5 Colombia Catholic Church 29–30 see also Barrancabermeja, Catholic diocese of economic development 22–4 national peace process 24–7 overview 19–20 political process 20–22 see also Barrancabermeja; Middle Magdalena Comacho, Daniel 6 Comisión de Apoyo y Relaciones 171 Comité Pro-Defensa de los Recursos Naturales 171

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Comité Pro-Defensa de los Recursos Naturales de la Zona Alta 171 Comité Pro-Defensa de los Recursos Naturales y Culturales Mixes (CODREMI) 171–2 Committee on Environment and Natural Resource Protection (CENRP) 86 Committee on Environmental Protection 86 Communist Party (Colombia) 20, 29; see also Argentine Communist Party; CCP; SACP Communist Party of India (CPI) 188 Communist Party of India (Marxist) 193 Communist Party of Thailand 55 communitarian ideal 52, 57, 58–9, 65 communitarian ideology 69 communitarian thought 59 community culture 58, 59, 66 Community Organization Development Institute (CODI) 60, 64, 68 Concerned Citizens Forum (CCF) 113 Confederation of Unionists of Colombia (CSC) 21 Confederation of Workers of Colombia (CTC) 21 Congreso Nacional de Pueblos Indígenas 163–4 Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 112–15, 117, 121, 123–6 Connors, Michael Kelly 54, 58 cooperative shop 57, 73 Corporation for Development and Peace in Middle Magdalena (CDPMM) 33, 35–7, 38, 39, 40, 42, 44, 46, 47 Cortés Márquez, Margarita M. 179 COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) 112–15, 117, 121, 123–6 CPI (Communist Party of India) 188 Crossley, Nick 2, 4, 8–9, 136, 161, 185, 218 Crowder, Michael 222 CSC (Confederation of Unionists of Colombia) 21

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CTA (Center of Argentine Workers) 146–9, 151 CTC (Confederation of Workers of Colombia) 21 Cutral-Co (city, Argentina) 142–3 danwei (‘work units’) 81 Davis, Diane E. 7 Davis, Gerald F. 8 De la Rúa, Fernando 143–5, 149, 153 De Roux, Francisco 31, 32, 36, 45–7 Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 189 Delanty, Gerard 5 delegative democracy 140 Delgado Jiménez 168, 169, 170, 171, 173, 174, 175, 179 D’Elía, Luis 146, 151 della Porta, Donatella 2 Deng Xiaoping 81 Depetri, Edgardo 151 Desai, Manisha 192 Development Activities of Citizens Forum of Prachin Buri 53 DGEI (Dirección General de Educación Indígena) 163 Diani, Mario 2 Díaz Montes, Fausto 178 Dietrich, Gabriele 202 Dirección General de Educación Indígena (DGEI) 163 distance, and social movements 7 Dlamini-Zuma, Nkosazana 116 Donato 168–70 Douglas, Oronto 207, 213, 222, 223 dowry-related murders 190 dual-line management system for NGOs 82 Duhalde, Eduardo 145, 150–51 Duque, Ubencel 47 Duquette, Michel 19 Durkheimian sociological approach 2 Eckstein, Susan 7, 19 Economic Society of Friends of the Country (SEAP) 32, 34 Economy, Elizabeth C. 79 Ecopetrol 32, 34 EDICOM (Educación Integral Comunitaria Mixe) 174, 175

Educación Integral Comunitaria Mixe (EDICOM) 174, 175 Egan, Anthony 113 EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) Law (China) 87 Ekkawit Na Thalang 58 ELN (National Liberation Army) 21–2, 23, 25, 26, 28–9, 30 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 87 Environmental Protection Law (China) 84–5 Environmental Rights Action (ERA) 219 Environmental Situations (Huanjing Qingkuang) 85 EPL (Popular Liberation Army) 21 ERA (Environmental Rights Action) 219 Escobar, Arturo 19 Escuelas Experimentales Normales 169 ETPs (Technical and Pedagogical Teams) 37, 38, 40, 43, 44 Fairbank, John King 80 Falun Gong incident 83 FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) 21–2, 23, 25, 26, 28, 30 Fassin, Didier 118 Fedeagromisbol (Farmers and Miners Federation of Southern Bolívar) 29, 39, 43 Federal Republic of Nigeria, see Nigeria Federation of Land, Housing and Habitat (FTV) 146–7, 151, 152 feminism, use of term in India 189 Fernández, Aníbal 147 Floriberto 168–71 Forbes, Geraldine 187, 188, 203 Forum Against Rape 194 forums, see provincial development forums FP (framing process) theory 2, 4–5 fragmentary opportunities in China 103 emergence 100–101 exploitation 101–3 framing 185, 200–202, 220–21

Index Frente Nacional de Liberación Zapatista 166 FREPASO (Front for a Country in Solidarity, Frente para un País Solidario) 144, 145 Friedman, Steven 114, 115 Friends of Nature 89, 96 Front for a Country in Solidarity (FREPASO, Frente para un País Solidario) 144, 145 FTV (Federation of Land, Housing and Habitat) 146–7, 151, 152 Gabriel, Franco 179 Gaitán, Jorge 21 Gamson, William A. 3, 4, 134, 135, 233 Gandhi, Nadita 184, 186, 187, 193, 194, 199 García, Martha L. 21 GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) program 113–14, 119 General Confederation of Labor (CGT) 140, 141, 146 General Mosconi (city, Argentina) 143 Gibson, Nigel C. 114 Giliomee, Hermann 128 Glaser, Daryl 112 Global March for Treatment 116, 123 Global Village of Beijing 89 Gómez 168 Gómez González, Gerardo 168 Goodwin, Jeff 1, 2, 3 Green Earth Volunteers 96 Green Watershed 96, 102 Grootboom case 119–20, 122 Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 113–14, 119 GSB (Government Savings Bank) 60 GSK (GlaxoSmithKline) 117 Gutiérrez Narváez, Raúl de Jesús 166, 167 Halcli, Abigail 5 Haynes, Jeff 7 He Daming 95 He, Jianyu 105 Health GAP (Health Global Access Project) 116

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Hernández Hernández, Natalio 164 Hernández, Ramón 179 Herring, Cedric 51 Heywood, Mark 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 129 hierarchical administrative management for NGOs 82 Ho, Peter 79, 89, 91, 100, 101, 102, 105, 106 Houtzager, Peter P. 8 HPL (Healthy Public Life) project 64 Hu Kanping 91, 95, 106 Huai River Protectors 93–5, 102 Huashui Town mass protest 98–9 Humanitarian Spaces project 35, 41, 42–5; see also Peace Laboratory project Ideas para una Educación Integral Mixe project 172–3 Igbo people 209 Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) 219 Iko community demonstration 213 India women’s movement early post-independence period 187–8 emergence of New Women’s Movement 188–90 frame alignment by SMOs against NGOs 196–200 frame alignment with ‘feminism’ 192–5 framing analysis 185 framing implications and consequences 200–202 literature 184–5 new challenges faced 190–92 overview 183–4 pre-independence period 186–7 indianismo (Indianism) 159, 162–3 indianista (Indianist) movements 159 indigenismo (indigenism) 162 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (Mexico) 165 Industrial Environmental Performance Disclosure Program 87 INI (Instituto Nacional Indigenista) 162

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institutional environments, social movements and 231–2 institutional opportunity 9 Instituto Nacional Indigenista (INI) 162 Instrumentación de la Educación Básica Mixe project 171–2 isomorphism 52, 72 Ito, Hideharu 22 IYC (Ijaw Youth Council) 219 Izon People’s Charter 216 Jacobs, Sean 128 Jad, Islah 196 Japan Environmental Council (JEC) 92 Jasper, James M. 1, 2, 3 JEC (Japan Environmental Council) 92 Jega, Attahiru 206 Jenkins, J. Craig 5 Jiang Zemin 85 John, Mary E. 184, 187, 189, 192, 193, 201 Johnston, Hank 4, 5 Julían Caballero, Juan 168 Kajita, Takamichi 6 Karat, Brinda 196 Katzenstein, Mary Fainsod 189 Khan, Sara Ahmad 211 Kirchner, Alicia 151 Kirchner, Cristina 153 Kirchner, Néstor 134, 150–54 Kishwar, Madhu 195 Kitschelt, Herbert 3, 8 Klandermans, Bert 112 Kline, Harvey 20 Kokubun, Ryousei 80 Kothari, Rajni 198 Krishnaraj, Maithreyi 184, 192, 196 Kudva, Neema 197 Kumar, Radha 184, 187, 190, 191, 193, 194, 203 Kuroda, Etsuko 168, 169, 171, 179 Kurtz, Marcus J. 8 ‘La Violencia’ 21, 29 Labor Emergency Program (Programa de Emergencia Laboral) 143 Labor Party (Partido Obrero, Argentina) 148–50, 153

Lacandon Declaration 166, 178 Lagos Youth Movement 209 Land Reform Law (Mexico) 165 Land Use Decree (Nigeria) 211 Landless People’s Movement (LPM) 113 Lanegran, Kimberly 112 Lassé, Rolando de 173–4, 174 Legal Resources Centre 121 LeGrand, Catherine 21 Lestage, François 165 Levitsky, Steven 141 Li Hangyun 88 Li Peng 85 Li Yong, 81, 83 Liebenberg, Sandra 119 Limón Rojas, Miguel 173–4 Lingam, Lakshmi 196 Liuli Dun, NIMBY protests 96–8 Livingstone, Grace 20, 26 Lo, Clarence Y.H. 51 Lodge, Tom 112 López Bárcenas, Francisco 164 López Murphy, Ricardo 145 Lorena, Irma 165 LPM (Landless People’s Movement) 113 Lü Zhi 79 Machado, Absalón 21 Machinea, José Luis 145 Madlala-Routledge, Nozizwe 127 Mahila Dakshata Samiti 190, 193 mahila mandals (women’s clubs) 186 mahila samities (women’s associations) 187 Maldonado Alvarado, Benjamín 179 Maloca 43–4 Manat Thanyakaset 67, 69, 73 Mandela, Nelson 117, 121–2 Manushi (magazine) 195 MAS (Muerte a Secuestradores) 22 mass protests China 89, 97, 103 environmental NGO aversion to 102 rural protests 98–100, 103, 105 Thailand 55 Massetti, Astor 147 Mathura 190

Index Matías Rossi, Federico 19 Matsushita, Kiyoshi 161 Mauro 168–9, 170, 172 Mazumdar, Vina 184, 189, 192 Mbali, Mandisa 114 Mbeki, Thabo 117–18 McAdam, Doug 2, 6, 8, 111, 134, 135, 136, 230 McCarthy, John D. 3, 8, 51, 103 Measures for Environmental Claim Management (China) 85 Medicines Act court case 116–17 Medina, Andrés 163, 164, 165, 179 Melucci, Alberto 4, 5 Menem, Carlos 137–41, 150 Mexican indigenous peoples’ movements overview 159–60 theoretical approach 160–61 see also Mexican Revolution; 1968 student movement; Tlahuitoltepec educational movement; Zapatista Rebellion Mexican Revolution 159–62 Mexico, revitalization of the ideals of the Revolution 163–6 Meyer, David S. 3, 134, 135, 233 middle-class 53, 62, 63, 145, 162, 196, 230 Middle Magdalena 20, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 39, 47 as an enclave economy 27–8 overview 27 as a region of conflicts 28–30 as a Targeted Region for the PDPMM 30–31 see also PDPMM MIJD (Independent Movement of the Retired and Unemployed) 148 Ministry of Civil Affairs (minzheng bu) 81 Minkoff, Debra C. 5, 9 Mlambo-Ngcuka, Phumzile 126–7 Molyneux, Maxine 193, 203 Monteváis, Carlos 161, 162 Morales-Gómez, Daniel A. 161 Mori, Kazuko 80 Morris, Aldon 51

241

MOSIEND (Movement for the Survival of the Izon Ethnic Nationality) 215–16 MOSOP (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People) 214–15, 216–17; see also Nigeria, attempts to follow the MOSOP model; Saro-Wiwa, Ken (Kenule) Motlante, Kgalema 127 Mottiar, Shauna 114, 115 movement entrepreneurs 8 MTD (Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados) 151 MTL (Movimiento Territorial de Liberación) 148, 153 MTR (Teresa Rodríguez Movement) 147–8, 152 muban 55 Mubangizi, John Cantius 120 Muerte a Secuestradores (MAS) 22 Múnera Ruiz, Leopoldo 21, 46 Muslim Women’s (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 190–91 Mussa, Michael 144 Nahmad Sittón, Salomón 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, 179 Nakazawa, Hideo 8 NAPWA (National Association of People Living with HIV/AIDS) 116 National Association of People Living with HIV/AIDS (NAPWA) 116 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 115 National Convention Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) 209 National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) 122–5 National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW) 188, 193–4 National Front (Colombia) 21, 47 National Inspection for Environmental Law Enforcement 86 National Liberation Army (ELN) 21–2, 23, 25, 26, 28–9, 30 National Piquetero Assembly 149 National Piquetero Bloc 148, 152–3 National Rural Development Program (NRDP) 60

242

Index

National Youth Council of the Ogoni People (NYCOP) 218–19, 221 Natividad Gutiérrez, Chong 166, 167 Nattrass, Nicoli 114, 118, 119, 126 NCNC (National Council of Nigerian Citizens) 209 NEDLAC (National Economic Development and Labour Council) 122–5 neo-institutional approaches 8–9 NEPA (National Environmental Protection Agency) 85 Neuquén Popular Movement (Movimiento Popular Neuqino) 142 NFIW (National Federation of Indian Women) 188, 193–4 NGO-ization 196–200 NGOs (non-governmental organizations) in China 79, 82–3, 89–91, 102, 103–5 and PDPMM 31, 34, 37, 40, 43–6 see also India, women’s movement, frame alignment by SMOs against NGOs Niger Delta, see Nigeria Nigeria attempts to follow the MOSOP model 215–16 community action 213–14 overview 206–7 protest and repression in the communities 216–18 protests 214–15 socio-economic context 210–13 youth movement effectiveness of youth framing 220–21 external appearance and substance 219–20 genesis and strategy 218–19 marginalization within ethnic politics 209–10 and nationalist movement 207–9 overview 221–2 Nigerian Civil War (Biafran War) 210 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 211–12

Nigerian Youth Charter 209 Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) 209, 220 NIMBY protests, China 96–8 1968 student movement (Mexico) 159–60, 162–3 Nkoli, Simon 115 NNPC (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation) 211–12 Nolen, Stephanie 118, 129 Nomiya, Daishiro 3 NRDP (National Rural Development Program) 60 NSM (new social movement) theory 2, 4, 6–7; see also South Africa, social movements, ‘old’ and ‘new’ Nu River dam project 95–6 núcleo de pobladores 34, 38 NYCOP (National Youth Council of the Ogoni People) 218–19, 221 NYM (Nigerian Youth Movement) 209, 220 Obi, Cyril I. 206 Observatory for Integral Peace (OPI) 43–4 O’Donnell, Guillermo 140 Offe, Claus 4, 5 OFP (Popular Women’s Organization) 29, 41 Ogoni Bill of Rights 214–15 people 206, 214–15 see also MOSOP Ogushi, Kazuo 6, 7 Oi, Jean C. 101 Okabe, Tatsumi 81 Okonta, Ike 207, 213, 222, 223 Olson, Mancur 3 Olympic Games, 2008 Beijing 83, 96 Omolewa, Michael 222 Omorogbe, Yinka 222 OMPADEC (Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission) 212 OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) 210–11 Operation Khanyisa 113

Index Orietta, Favaro y Mario Arias Bucciarelli 142 Otsuka, Kenji 79, 87, 105, 106 PAC (Pan-Africanist Congress) 112 Páez Segura, José Antonio 42 PAN (Partido Acción Nacional) 166 Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) 112 Pan Yue 94, 97 Parrilli, Oscar 151 Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) 166 Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) 162 Patel, Ebrahim 124 Patel, Vibhuti 203 PDPMM (Program for Development and Peace in Middle Magdalena) context 29–31 development process of 31–6 foreign support for 229, 231 organizational structure and financial management scheme 37–42 overview 19–20, 31, 45–6 principles and fields of activity 36–7 success factors 44–5 Peace and Development Project 36 Peace Laboratory project 35, 39–40; see also Humanitarian Spaces project Peasant Association of the River Cimitarra Valley (ACVC) 29 Pérez Castro, Tiburcio 165 Pérsico, Emilio 151 petitions 89 Pfeffer, Jeffrey 51, 71 Phadke, Shilpa 184, 187, 191, 196, 202, 203 Phang Nga Conservation Center 53, 65 Phatthana Thai Foundation 67 Phetchabun People’s Forum 65 piquetero movement conciliatory policy of Kirchner Government 150–52 context 137–42, 143–6 division and conflict 152–4 emergence 142–3

243

expansion 146–9 literature 135 overview 154 political opportunity structure 149–50 piqueteros 134, 140, 142–3, 147, 149–54 Pitrola, Néstor 148, 152 Piven, Frances Fox 7 Pizarro Leongómez, Eduardo 22 Plan Colombia 25–6 Plaza Huincul (city, Argentina) 142 PMTCT (prevention of mother-tochild transmission) campaign 115–16 court case 117–18 external support 120–22 use of constitutional provisions 118–20 political constraints 111 political opportunities 111 Polo Obrero 148–9 Popular Liberation Army (EPL) 21 Popular Women’s Organization (OFP) 29, 41 POS (political opportunity structure) theory 2, 3–4, 134–6, 154 criticisms of 135–6 see also piquetero movement poverty, and social movements 7 Power, Carla 129 Praphat Pintoktaeng 73 Prawase Wasi 58 Prem Tinsulanonda 60 PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) 162 provincial development forums 52 common features 52–3 formation of institutional readiness 56–7 institutional modification of public administration 59–61 legitimization of communitarian ideal 58–9 network formation by provincial activists 62 self-organizing activities at community level 57–8 literature 53–4 resource mobilization 62–6

244

Index

Provisional Registration Method of Social Associations 81 Provisional Regulation of Registration and Management of NonGovernmental and Non-Profit Institution Units 82 purposive explanation 5 Qu Geping 85 radical feminists 195 Raeburn, Nicole C. 8, 9 Rauber, Isabel 146 Ray, Bharati 188, 189, 195 RDF (Rural Development Fund) 60 RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme) 114 Regulations for Registration and Management of Social Associations 81, 82 resource dependence 51, 66; see also Surin Forum Reveles, Acosta 165 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 21–2, 25, 26, 28, 30 Reyes Gómez, Laureano 179 rice banks 58, 60 Riggs, Fred Warren 55 Rio Declaration 86 Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia 46 Rivers State Internal Security Task Force 217 RM (resource mobilization) theory 2, 3, 4, 11, 51, 229–30 road blockade protests, see piquetero movement Robins, Steven 114, 115, 121 Rodríguez Blanco, Marciel 149 Rodríguez, Darío 149 Rodríguez Saá, Adolfo 145, 150 Rojas Pinilla, Gustavo 21 Romero, Mauricio 47 Romero Medina, Amanda 27, 29 Roop Kanwar 191 Rucht, Dieter 5, 8 Rural Development Fund (RDF) 60 SACP (South African Communist Party) 114

Saich, Tony 79, 89, 101, 105 Salancik, Gerald R. 51, 71 Salesian Church 168–9 SANAC (South African National AIDS Council) 126 Sanco (South African National Civic Organisation) 112–13 Santamaría Salamanca, Ricardo 25 Sanz de Santamaría, Alejandro 47 Sarkar, Tanika 191 Saro-Wiwa, Ken (Kenule) 207, 215, 218, 220, 223 sati 190–91 Sato, Hiroshi 197, 198 savings groups 57, 60 Schuurman, Frans J. 7, 51 Scott, W. Richard 8, 51 SEAP (Economic Society of Friends of the Country) 32 SEAP–CINEP consortium 32, 34 SECC (Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee) 113 Secretariat of Public Education (SEP) 162 Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) 183, 188 SEP (Secretariat of Public Education) 162 SEPA (State Environmental Protection Agency, China) 86–9, 92, 94, 96–8; see also Pan Yue SER (Servicios del Pueblo Mixe) 171 Seri Phongphit 58 Servicios del Pueblo Mixe (SER) 171 SEWA (Self Employed Women’s Association) 183, 188 Shagari, Shehu 211 Shah, Bano 190 Shah, Nandita 184, 186, 187, 193, 194, 199 Shell (Royal Dutch Shell) 211 Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) 214 Shepard, Benjamin 116 Shi, Fayong 79, 106 Shigetomi, Shinichi 12, 51, 54, 57, 60, 63, 73, 202, 233 SIF (Social Investment Fund, Thailand) 54, 60, 62–6, 67, 68, 73

Index Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación (SNTE) 173 Singh, Rajendra 6 sit-downs 89 Skocpol, Theda 2, 8, 9, 51, 233 Slater, David 19 SMOs (social movement organizations) 3, 9, 11, 12 Snow, David A. 4, 160, 185 SNTE (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación) 173 social associations (China) 82–3 social movements 1 classical theories 2–3 institutional approaches 7–9 institutional environments 231–2 modern theories 3–6, 233 organizations and networks 230–31 problems and approaches in the development context 227–8 resource mobilization 229–30 salient features 228–9 theoretical aspects for developing world 6–7 Social Revolutionary Party, Colombia 29 Somchai Phatharathananunth 73 South Africa social movements literature on post-apartheid movements 113–15 ‘old’ and ‘new’ 112–13 see also TAC South African Communist Party (SACP) 114 South African National Civic Organisation (Sanco) 112–13 Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) 113 SPDC (Shell Petroleum Development Company) 214 state administration 7 Steinberg, Jonny 112 structural grievance models 2–3 student movement (Mexico, 1968) 159–60, 162–3 Surin Forum 53, 66–72 formation and institutionalization 66–9

245

resource dependency 70–72 vision, purpose and strategies 69–70 Svampa, Maristella 143 TAC (Treatment Action Campaign) emergence 113, 115–16 engagement in formal politics 126–7 literature 114–15 Medicines Act court case campaigns 116–17 National Treatment Plan negotiations 122–5 overview 110–11, 127–9 PMTCT campaign 115–16 court case 117–18 external support 120–22 use of constitutional provisions 118–20 Tacho 170 tambon 55, 56 TAO (Tambon Administrative Organization) 56 Tarrow, Sidney 3, 100, 111, 136, 145 Technical and Pedagogical Teams (ETPs) 37, 38, 40, 43, 44 ‘territorial community’ 37, 45 Thailand economic and political situation 54–6 see also Surin Forum Thaksin Shinawatra 55 Tiananmen Incident (Beijing, 4 June 1989) 81–2 Tilly, Charles 2, 3, 5, 160, 227 Tirado Mejía, Alvaro 22 Tlahuitoltepec educational movement Communal Secondary School and the Educational Projects 172–4 Community High School 174–6 Escuela Experimental Normal and Musical Training Center 169–71 Indigenous People’s Movement for Association of Villages 171–2 overview 176–8 refusal to allow construction of main road 167–9 Tlatelolco plaza, see 1968 student movement Tomada, Carlos 151, 152 Torres, Carlos Alberto 161

246

Index

Touraine, Alan 6 Towards Equality (Government of India 1974) 189–90 Townsend Movement 8 Treatment Literacy workshops 121 Tropical Oil Company (Troco) 28–9 Tshabalala-Msimang, Manto 117–18, 126 Tsunekawa, Keiichi 178 Turner, Jennifer L. 79, 106 UCDF (Urban Community Development Fund) 60 UCR (Unión Cívica Radical) 144–5, 153 UDF (United Democratic Front) 112 Umuechem protest 214 Unemployed Union (UTA, Unión de Trabajadores Desocupados) 143 UNHCR 43, 45 Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) 144–5, 153 Union of Young Nigerians 208–9 Unión Sindical Obrera (USO) 29, 32 United Democratic Front (UDF) 112 United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) 22, 30, 35 Urban Community Development Fund (UCDF) 60 Uribe Vélez, Álvaro 22, 26–7, 36 USO (Unión Sindical Obrera) 29, 32 Van der Vliet, Virginia 114, 116 Vargas, María Eugenia 179 Vargas Velásquez, Alejo 26, 27 Vasconcelos, José 161 Vázquez, Diego 162 Vázquez García, Sócrates 168 Velayudhan, Meera 203 Veltmeyer, Henry 6 Villalón, Roberta 135 Von Holdt, Karl 123 Von Lieres, Bettina 114, 115, 121

VOs (voluntary organizations), conflation with NGOs 197–8 Wafer, Alex 113 Wang Canfa 84, 85, 105, 106 Wang Ming 105 ‘War of a Thousand Days’ 20 ‘War on Drugs’, Colombia 25 Webster, Eddie 128 Wen Jiabao 96 Wesson, Murray 120 Weyland, Kurt 140 Wignaraja, Ponna 6 Wolff, Jonas 135 Wu Zhongze 81, 83 Wuhan, Hunan Province, environmental conflict 84 Xin Chunying 81 Xu Kezhu 92 Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF) 142–3 Yang, Guobin 79, 102 Yonemura, Akio 179 Yongshun Cai 79, 106 YPF (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales) 142–3 Yu Xiaogang 95, 106 Zabala Castañeda, Sonia Nadiesda 28 Zald, Mayer N. 3, 51, 103 Zapatista Rebellion 159–60, 166–7 Zhang Ye 81 Zhang Yulin 79, 89, 98, 103, 106 Zhao Yongkang 105 Zhaosishui Village, Dalian Town, Shahe County, Hebei Province, environmental conflict 84 Zhuxi industrial park, see Huashui Town mass protest Zibechi, Raúl 146 Zuma, Jacob 125–6 Zylan, Yvonne 8

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