Proportional Representation and the Constituency Role in Britain

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Proportional Representation and the Constituency Role in Britain Thomas Carl Lundberg

Proportional Representation and the Constituency Role in Britain

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Proportional Representation and the Constituency Role in Britain

Thomas Carl Lundberg SPIRE Keele University, UK

© Thomas Carl Lundberg 2007 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 13: 978–0–230–00652–2 hardback ISBN 10: 0–230–00652–3 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lundberg, Thomas Carl, 1967Proportional representation and the constituency role in Britain / Thomas Carl Lundberg. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–00652–2 ISBN-10: 0–230–00652–3 1. Proportional representation–Great Britain. 2. Representative government and representation–Great Britain. I. Title. JF1075.G7L86 2007 328.41′07347–dc22

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Contents List of Tables

vii

Preface and Acknowledgements

ix

1 Introduction: More Pluralism in Representation The context of this book New electoral systems Citizen disengagement Representatives and constituents Exploring the roles of elected representatives Questions asked in this book Outline of this book

1 4 7 9 11 15 17 19

2 Proportional Representation and Constituency Representation Why choose PR? PR elections in the United Kingdom Combining single-member constituencies with PR Mixed-member systems in comparative perspective A constituency role for list representatives? Shadowing

24 25 28 34 38 44 46

3 Representative Roles and Electoral Incentives The constituency role in Britain Questioning the link between MPs and constituents Weak legislatures and strong executives The British role in electoral engineering in Germany Conclusion

50 52 53 58 63 67

4 Evidence for the Electoral Incentive Methodological considerations Comparing British and German MMP elections Some evidence for the electoral incentive Constituency service: The ‘pork barrel’ and the personal vote Learning of electoral incentives? Conclusion

69 72 75 81

v

86 97 100

vi Contents

5 List Representatives and their Constituencies A constituency role for list representatives? New Zealand’s experience with list representatives British MEPs and list PR Conflict between constituency and partisan roles The constituency role of list representatives in Britain and Germany Spending time with constituents Learning electoral incentives? Conclusion

102 103 111 113 115 119 127 137 141

6 Competition Between Constituency and List Representatives Shadowing and constituency service in Scotland and Wales The constituency role of list representatives in Britain The dual candidacy debate German representatives’ attitudes towards each other Competition and conflict between German representatives The duties of list representatives in Germany Conclusion

143 144 150 158 166 169 170 175

7 Conclusion: Coming to Terms with Pluralism Conclusion Coming to terms with pluralism in British politics

177 178 182

Bibliography

184

Index

193

List of Tables 1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 5.1 5.2

The six electoral systems now in use in the United Kingdom Election results, Scottish and Welsh House of Commons seats, 1 May 1997 Election results, Northern Ireland Assembly, 25 June 1998 Election results, European Parliament members from Great Britain, 10 June 1999 Election results, Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, 6 May 1999 Election results, Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, 1 May 2003 Election results, Greater London Assembly, 4 May 2000 Global distribution of mixed-member systems for national legislative elections, 2004 Election results, Scotland and Wales, 1999 and 2003 Election results, Brandenburg and Hesse, 1999 UK survey response summary German survey response summary Constituency orientation: Re-election (UK) Constituency orientation: Re-election (Germany) Constituency service: Local promotion and the ‘pork barrel’ 1 (UK) Constituency service: Local promotion and the ‘pork barrel’ 2 (UK) Constituency service: Local promotion and the ‘pork barrel’ 1 (Germany) Constituency service: Local promotion and the ‘pork barrel’ 2 (Germany) Personal vote? (UK) Personal vote? (Germany) Constituency orientation (UK and Germany) Time spent on local promotion and ‘pork’ (UK and Germany) Helping constituents (UK and Germany) The role of list representatives (UK) The role of list representatives (Germany) vii

7 26 29 30 31 33 34 40 76 78 79 80 82 85 88 89 90 92 93 94 96 98 99 106 108

viii List of Tables

5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 6.1 6.2

Constituency and partisan role conflict (UK) Constituency and partisan role conflict (Germany) Constituency orientation: Links to voters and parties (UK) Constituency orientation: Links to voters and parties (Germany) Constituency orientation: Task importance (UK) Constituency orientation: Task importance (Germany) Contacts and meetings with voters and interest groups (UK) Contacts and meetings with voters and interest groups (Germany) Constituency orientation: How time is spent (UK) Constituency orientation: How time is spent (Germany) Contact with constituents (UK and Germany) Constituency and partisan role conflict (UK and Germany) Attitudes towards other representatives (UK, 2000 and 2003) Attitudes towards other representatives (Germany, 2000)

117 118 120 122 125 126 129 131 133 136 138 140 156 174

Preface and Acknowledgements This book critically examines the claim that those members of Britain’s devolved assemblies who are elected by party list proportional representation (PR) are somehow ‘second-class’ representatives. The Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly are elected by the mixed-member proportional (MMP) system, often referred to in Britain as the ‘additional member system’ (AMS), a rather unflattering term implying that the list-elected third of Welsh Assembly members – and almost half of the Scottish Parliament’s members – are ‘additional’ members, while their counterparts, elected in single-member constituencies, are more ‘genuine’ members. The term AMS, used by the Hansard Society in its 1976 recommendation of a West German-style reform of the singlemember plurality (SMP, colloquially known as ‘first-past-the-post’ in Britain) system of electing British members of Parliament, has become rather ingrained among not only the British media, but also among many scholars. This is unfortunate; aside from being somewhat inaccurate or unrefined (some mixed-member electoral systems are designed to produce a proportional outcome, while others, lacking the compensatory element of MMP, simply combine parallel elections of constituency and list representatives), AMS is actually quite a value-laden term, as noted above. While I, too, am guilty of using the term AMS in an early article on this topic, I have since switched to MMP, which is now the most commonly used term among the international group of scholars who study electoral systems (see Chapter 1). Furthermore, the Arbuthnott Commission, established to explore changes to the Scottish Parliament’s electoral system, strongly recommended abandonment of AMS, as well as other colloquial terms, like ‘top-up’ members to describe regional list members of the body. While it is perfectly legitimate to discuss the role of list-elected representatives, and even to be critical of what they do (or don’t do), using derogatory terms is simply unfair, and certainly not scholarly. As previously mentioned, MMP is an electoral system through which representatives are elected in single-member constituencies and from regional lists of candidates drawn up by party organisations, with list candidates winning seats in such a way that the overall election outcome, on a partisan basis, is more or less proportional in each ix

x Preface and Acknowledgements

electoral region. This combination of electoral methods, and the competition between the representatives elected in the two different ways, has generated controversy, and this controversy has much to do with the constituency role of elected representatives in Britain. People might wonder, not unjustifiably, what list-elected representatives are for – and in particular, what kind of constituency role they might play in the new political system. I use empirical evidence, gathered from surveys and interviews, to assess the constituency role of those elected from party lists, with a focus on members of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales. This investigation also compares British representatives to their MMP-elected counterparts in Germany (with empirical data from members of two Landtage, or state parliaments) and New Zealand. The comparative element of this study, guided by a theoretical approach, sets it apart from other studies as well. While British list-elected representatives do appear to have a different constituency role, often focusing more on organised interests, these representatives nevertheless add an important element of pluralism to Britain’s majoritarian politics. PR is simply impossible without multimember constituencies of some kind, so there is quite literally going to be more pluralism on the constituency level, whether people (particularly incumbents) like it or not. Indeed, I believe that most of the controversy associated with regional list representatives is a partisan reaction to the increased pluralism associated with the use of PR in geographical constituencies in places such as Scotland and Wales which are not known for political pluralism at the ‘ground’ level. One of the major aims of this book is to get around the biases and parochialism that so often characterise the literature on this topic, particularly in Britain. While I am critical of the Labour Party in these pages, I should point out that as an American citizen, I am not a member of any British political party, and do not mean to come down on Labour any harder than I would on the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats (or the nationalists in Scotland and Wales, for that matter). Labour should be given a huge amount of credit for implementing such far-reaching constitutional changes as devolution of power to Scotland and Wales, and for choosing PR to elect the new assemblies, as well as Britain’s members of the European Parliament. The Conservatives steadfastly opposed all these changes while they were in power, yet they benefit greatly from the use of PR for the assemblies they opposed. The Liberal Democrats, while long-standing supporters

Preface and Acknowledgements xi

of devolution and PR, are quite naïve to hold out for the single transferable vote as an electoral reform option at any level other than local government (which has been achieved in Scotland). My disappointment with Labour is that after having made these, and many other, radical constitutional reforms, they continue to govern as though these changes did not have consequences. They want to have their cake and eat it, as the saying goes, and their majoritarian – and often highly arrogant – approach is simply incompatible with the transformed, more pluralistic constitutional landscape that they themselves have brought into existence. This investigation has taken a long time, starting with my doctorate at the University of Notre Dame, in the USA, and continuing into my first academic job at Keele University, in England. I was very fortunate to have a great deal of support from the Political Science Department at Notre Dame, including Anthony Messina, Michael Coppedge, Frances Hagopian, and Andrew Gould. All were very helpful in different, yet complementary ways, with Michael also being instrumental in helping to get me a position at Notre Dame’s London Centre from 2000–2001, from where I could conduct the research necessary for this study. I would also like to thank the London Program Director, Stacie Gutting. This project would not have been possible without their help. I also appreciate assistance from the School of Politics, Philosophy, International Relations, and the Environment (SPIRE) at Keele University, allowing me to do a second survey of Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly members in late 2003. There are many individuals who also contributed helpful suggestions and much-needed encouragement along the way. These include Liz Barker, Elisabeth Carter, Stephen Church, Philip Cowley, Mark Duckenfield, Patrick Dunleavy, Jørgen Elklit, David Farrell, Robert Hazell, Markus Kreuzer, Robert Ladrech, Arend Lijphart, Richard Luther, Louis Massicotte, James Mitchell, Thomas Poguntke, Andrew Reynolds, and Matthew Shugart. Amir Abedi gets special thanks, not only for useful suggestions and friendly encouragement, but also for essential German translation assistance. Steve Kennedy and Alison Howson, of Palgrave Macmillan, were kind enough to listen to my ideas for constructing a book from all this research, and I appreciate the useful suggestions of an anonymous reader of my book proposal. Of course, I must also thank the politicians, British and German, who filled in questionnaires and granted interviews. Without their help, this book would not exist. Any errors, misinterpretations, or omissions are, of course, my own responsibility.

xii Preface and Acknowledgements

Some of the material presented here was previously published in journal articles. I would like to thank the McDougall Trust (and Paul Wilder) for permission to reproduce some material from my 2002 article ‘Putting a Human Face on Proportional Representation: Early Experiences in Scotland and Wales’ in the journal, Representation, volume 38, number 4 (Spring), pp. 271–83. There is also material from my 2006 article entitled ‘Second-Class Representatives? Mixed-Member Proportional Representation in Britain’, in Parliamentary Affairs, volume 59, number 1, pp. 60–77, and I thank Oxford University Press and the Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government for permission to reproduce that material here. Furthermore, material from my article ‘Competition between Members of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly: Problem or Virtue?’ in the Political Quarterly, volume 77, number 1 (January–March), pp. 107–16, appears here, courtesy of Blackwell Publishing and the Political Quarterly Publishing Company Ltd. Most of all, however, I would like to thank my parents. My mother, Sandra Hassel, and stepfather, Bert Hassel, as well as my father, Alan Lundberg, constantly provided support and encouragement throughout the long process of getting my doctorate and finding an academic job. Without their help, I would not be where I am today, so I dedicate this book to them. Chester

Tom Lundberg

1 Introduction: More Pluralism in Representation

In 1997, a Labour government was elected in Britain after 18 years of Conservative rule. The new government quickly embarked upon a radical constitutional reform agenda that included devolution, the delegation of power from Westminster to new assemblies to be elected in the ‘Celtic fringe’ of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Along with devolution came forms of proportional representation (PR). All forms of PR require some multimember constituency element – the basic principle is to reflect, usually on a partisan basis, the diverse voting preferences of as many people as possible. This multimember constituency component of PR differs significantly from the singlemember constituency nature of British parliamentary elections, in which only one candidate is elected by a plurality – the most – votes, regardless of whether this is an actual majority – over half the votes cast. The elected candidate, almost always nominated by a political party in the British case, then is expected to represent his or her entire geographical area, the constituency, despite the fact that he or she will usually vote the party line, and against the preferences of several (and in many cases, actually the majority) of his or her constituents. While the single-member plurality (SMP) or, as it is colloquially known in Britain, ‘first-past-the-post’, system remains for elections to Parliament at Westminster, various forms of PR were chosen for the elections to other representative bodies. Devolution created a new Northern Ireland Assembly, meant to be more inclusive and representative than its predecessor, by means of using the single transferable vote (STV). This preferential form of PR, in which voters rank individual candidates, has been used in the Irish Republic for many decades and in Northern Ireland, for local council elections, since 1973. Northern Ireland’s members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have been elected 1

2 Proportional Representation and the Constituency Role in Britain

by STV since 1979, and its various power-sharing assemblies have also used this PR system since the 1970s, with elections for a 108-member Northern Ireland Assembly held under STV in 1998 and 2003. In 1999, Britain (and not Northern Ireland) changed the way it elects its MEPs, from SMP to regional list PR. In the same year, yet another form of PR was introduced for elections to the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales. In the past, the system has been labelled ‘personalised PR’, particularly in Germany, its homeland (Kaase 1984). It is often called the additional member system (AMS) in Britain, but is known as the mixed-member proportional (MMP) system in most of the recent academic literature on electoral systems (Lijphart 1999; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001a; Farrell 2001; Reynolds et al. 2005). The Arbuthnott Commission, charged by (yet independent of) the British government with assessing Scotland’s use of different constituency boundaries and electoral systems, recommended that ‘mixed-member system’ replace the term AMS as well (Arbuthnott 2006: 73). Used again in a modified form, from 2000, to elect the Greater London Assembly (GLA), this British variant of the MMP electoral system is based largely on the (West) German model in use since the late 1940s. Compensatory mixed-member electoral systems allow voters to choose a representative in a single-member constituency while delivering a proportional overall outcome on a partisan basis because some representatives are elected from lists on a regional or national basis. The resulting legislature is composed of members elected in two different ways – hence the name mixed-member system (Massicotte and Blais 1999: 343). Scottish and Welsh voters elect one candidate in a single-member constituency, but they also choose a list (or independent candidate) with their regional vote in the MMP system. Representatives are elected from closed lists, unalterable by voters, in relatively large multimember electoral regions (eight in Scotland, and five in Wales). This means that constituents have several elected representatives in total – those in their electoral region (seven in Scotland and four in Wales), plus one in a relatively small single-member constituency. Greater London voters also elect constituency candidates in the same way, but use the other vote to elect ‘London members’ of the GLA on a closed list PR basis who will serve all of London – the single electoral region, electing eleven representatives, encompasses all of Greater London. The introduction of mixed-member electoral systems to Britain has created controversy. This is not only due to a distaste among some

Introduction: More Pluralism in Representation 3

people for the coalition or minority governments that are likely to arise when PR systems are used, due to the fact that one party is unlikely to win a majority of seats and govern alone, but also because of fears that mixed-member PR creates two ‘classes’ of elected representative. The same concerns have also arisen in New Zealand, where MMP has been used to elect this Commonwealth country’s parliament since 1996, and where the term MMP was coined by an independent commission. There, list members of Parliament (MPs), who comprise almost half the membership of the House of Representatives, ‘have been referred to as “second-class” by the media, parliamentary colleagues and the public alike’ in the early years of New Zealand’s use of MMP (Ward 1998: 127). References to list representatives as ‘second class’ could reflect a received wisdom among many Anglo-Saxon politicians, voters, and political scientists that multimember constituencies dilute the relationship between representatives and their constituents (Wheare 1963: 72). Behind this thinking is the expectation that representatives will act as non-partisan advocates for their constituents, regardless of whether a constituent voted for him or her at the last election, and British voters (as well as many elected representatives) value constituency service highly (Searing 1994; Norton and Wood 1993). This understanding of constituency service as a non-partisan activity was illustrated during a debate on office allowances by a member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP) who argued that single-member constituency MSPs deserve larger office allowances because ‘problems are not party political’ and voters would bring their problems to their single-member constituency MSP, not to MSPs from the regional list, meaning that list MSPs would need less of an allowance (Scottish Parliament 1999: col. 304). A related concern on the part of the constituency members of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly is that the list members of these bodies will spend time focusing on ‘sexy’ issues to publicise in their electoral regions, cherry-picking the most glamorous cases from their large electoral regions while their constituency-elected counterparts are stuck dealing with more mundane matters. Even worse for constituency representatives, list representatives may target individual constituencies for ‘extra’ attention because they plan to stand in that constituency against the incumbent, a practice called shadowing. The relationship between constituency and list representatives has been the subject of much controversy, despite attempts to prevent friction. In 2006, the British government actually banned dual candidacy, whereby candidates for MMP elections stand in both single-member con-


stituency and regional list contests, for Welsh Assembly elections. Those who lose constituency races can be elected via their respective party list if they are placed high enough on that list where dual candidacy is allowed, which includes almost all countries that use mixedmember electoral systems. While the Labour Government argued that dual candidacy was unfair, critics argued that Labour was trying to rig the system in a partisan way by reducing competition at the constituency level of election (Lundberg 2006). Many British critics of PR, however, are concerned that representatives elected from party lists will be more accountable to the political party that selects candidates, and ranks those lists, than to voters. In House of Commons debates on the establishment of the Scottish Parliament, Labour MP Ian Davidson argued that ‘First-class [constituency] Members will be accountable for their selection and election to real people, whereas there is some doubt about exactly to whom second-class [list] Members will be accountable’ (House of Commons 1998, vol. 304: col. 74). Constituency-elected representatives seem to fear that the ‘extra’ time list-elected representatives have (supposedly free from doing constituency service) will be spent currying favour in the party to assure the high list position needed in order to guarantee their re-election. Critics also raised voter choice and candidate accountability when the government controversially introduced closed list PR for European Parliament elections, rather than an open-list PR system.

The context of this book The above examples of problems arising from the introduction of new PR electoral systems illustrate how these institutional changes have shaken up the political establishment in Britain, thanks to the increase in pluralism associated with the changes. While devolution itself has been singled out by some commentators as the most significant of Labour’s constitutional reforms – with Vernon Bogdanor calling it the most ‘radical’ change since the Great Reform Act of 1832 (1999: 1) – arguably, the use of new electoral systems for these devolved assemblies is just as radical. Coalition and minority governments in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland since the late 1990s exemplify a departure from the single-party majority governments typical of Westminster. Yet Britain’s experiment with PR has important consequences, not only in terms of how many parties govern at a time, but also for the relationship between the various elected representatives themselves. Perhaps more importantly, the new PR electoral systems,


with their requirement for multimember constituencies, also have implications for the relationship between citizens and those who represent them. British citizens have at least one level of governance (regional or European) in which they are represented in an elected body by more than one person, allowing for a choice when they approach a representative to help with a problem. In contrast to the notion of non-partisan constituency service apparently held by British politicians, many British people may decide that they want to seek constituency service from representatives they voted for, albeit indirectly, through a party list. This increase in pluralism, among both how British people are represented and how many parties are involved in governing, shows that the United Kingdom has become less majoritarian in character since devolution was introduced by New Labour. Arend Lijphart distinguishes between the majoritarian (or Westminster) model of democracy, in which political institutions and their rules concentrate political power, and the consensus model, in which power is highly dispersed (Lijphart 1999: 2). In his framework for analysis, majoritarian democracies are characterised by a two-party system facilitated by a disproportional plurality or majority electoral system, meaning that one party normally wins a majority of legislative seats. Because majoritarian democracies are also, ideally, parliamentary systems in which the single-party cabinet can expect to pass its entire legislative agenda (rather than share power with a president), and are not limited by inflexible constitutions, majoritarian governments are extremely powerful. By Lijphart’s definition, majoritarian democracies are normally unitary states, however, so devolution of power from Westminster to Scotland, Northern Ireland, and in a more limited way, to Wales, constitutes a shift towards the consensus model, in which the state is decentralised. The use of PR, and the appearance of coalition and minority governments in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland are further examples of consensual characteristics (see Lijphart 1999, Chapter 3, for details on the consensus model). Whether these changes to the nature of British democracy are fundamental or merely cosmetic is the subject of academic debate. While some scholars consider the various constitutional changes to be quite radical, Matthew Flinders argues that only changes to the ‘federalunitary’ dimension, to use Lijphart’s terminology (1999: 3–4) of the British constitution are significant, concluding that there has ‘been no dramatic shift from a majoritarian to a consensual model of democracy at the national level’ (2005: 63). Flinders argues that despite the


appearance of devolution and new electoral systems, plus limited House of Lords reforms, the Freedom of Information Act and the Human Rights Act, ‘New Labour’s constitutional reform project cannot be interpreted as a fundamental paradigm shift’, noting that many other commentators agree with him (Flinders 2005: 87). Ultimately, the situation boils down to the fact that governments, once in office, are reluctant to reduce the huge amount of power available under the ‘flexible’ British constitution. This is particularly true for Labour, which in Flinders’s opinion ‘has always placed great weight on the capacity of the state to drive through and implement far-reaching social change’ (2005: 87). For Flinders and others who share this somewhat pessimistic view of recent constitutional changes, while devolution has introduced more pluralism into British politics, the centre resists any dilution of the concentrated power available under the majoritarian model of single-party domination. Some scholars challenge this view, however, arguing that there is much more pluralism in Britain’s political party system than many textbook accounts claim, and while this diversity is most evident in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, there are implications for Westminster (Dunleavy 2005: 504–5). Changes in British voting behaviour since the early 1970s, in the direction of less support for the Labour and Conservative parties, and more localised contests (in which ‘third’ parties or independent candidates pose serious challenges to the two largest British parties) are likely to be amplified in Westminster elections as they coexist with the PR elections for the European Parliament and the new assemblies, and these factors could possibly nudge a future British government to adopt PR for Westminster elections (Dunleavy 2005: 535). Patrick Dunleavy cites evidence from Josep Colomer, who found that multiparty systems pre-date the introduction of PR in his large-scale study of electoral system change across 87 democracies, thus contradicting Duverger’s Law, which claims that plurality electoral systems tend to maintain a two-party system (Colomer 2005: 12). The electoral diversity was already there, and the political elites feared that in such a fluid electoral environment, often caused by the new issue dimensions raised by the widening of the franchise, continued use of plurality or majority voting could be very dangerous, making PR more attractive in circumstances of ‘high uncertainty regarding the different groups’ relative strength’ or when ‘support is going to be widely distributed among several parties’ (Colomer 2005: 3). Dunleavy applies Colomer’s analysis to the British case, arguing


that the concession of PR to the new assemblies and the European Parliament by New Labour, plus the increasing diversity of party systems and voting behaviour UK-wide could ultimately bring about electoral reform at Westminster (Dunleavy 2005: 527).

New electoral systems The coexistence of multiple electoral systems that Dunleavy refers to means that British voters will be exposed to more parties than ever before, with constituency service across electoral regions raising their profile. Rather than just one MP claiming a monopoly on representation, whether a constituent likes it or not, the new reality of British political representation is quite pluralistic. Britain has made the transition from mainly plurality elections to a brave new world of six different electoral systems, both plurality/majority and proportional (Table 1.1). Plurality/majority electoral systems attempt to aggregate voting support so that a winner with the most support is elected, often in single-member constituencies, but not always, as in the block vote (multimember plurality) system. Majority systems require an absolute majority – more than half – of the vote for winning, but plurality systems only require the winner to have the most votes, even when this is less than a majority (often the case in British elections). Before 1997, Britain used the SMP system for elections to Parliament, as well as for the election of local councillors in single-member wards, or when one councillor’s term is up in a two- or three-member ward. In Table 1.1

The six electoral systems now in use in the United Kingdom

Plurality/Majority • Single-member plurality (SMP; ‘first-past-the-post’) – UK House of Commons, some local councils • Block vote (BV; multimember plurality, in which the voter has as many votes as there are candidates to be elected) – some local councils (including London boroughs) • Supplementary vote (SV) – directly elected city mayors (including London) Proportional • Mixed-member proportional (MMP; ‘additional member system’) – Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales, and Greater London Assembly • Single transferable vote (STV) – Northern Ireland’s Assembly, local councils, and European Parliament delegation; from 2007, Scottish local councils • Regional (closed) list proportional representation (PR) – European Parliament members from England, Scotland, and Wales


multimember wards in which all councillors are elected at the same time, the block vote system is used, giving voters as many votes as there are seats. The top vote winners – two in a two-member ward, for example – win the seats in this plurality system, used for most parliamentary constituencies before the 1885 Reform Act turned most Westminster constituencies into single-member ones. The final system, STV, was used in Northern Ireland both for local council elections and for electing the province’s three MEPs. Since 1997, the Labour Government has doubled the number of British electoral systems. One new majority system, the supplementary vote (SV), has been introduced, along with two new PR systems. SV, used for direct mayoral (including London) elections, gives voters two preferences. When all first preferences are tallied, if no candidate wins a majority (over half) of the valid votes, all candidates are eliminated except the top two first preference winners. Ballots of eliminated candidates are then scrutinised for any second preferences cast for the two remaining candidates, which are added to the existing vote totals, and the candidate with a majority of the vote wins. This system is similar to the alternative vote (AV) used for the Australian House of Representatives, but AV allows (and in Australia requires) voters to rank all candidates numerically. The two new PR systems (in addition to STV, now extended beyond Northern Ireland’s local councils to its Assembly in 1998) are regional list PR and MMP. Regional list PR was introduced for European Parliament elections from Britain (but not Northern Ireland, which uses STV for its three seats) in 1999. The closed-list form of PR, in which voters cannot alter the parties’ rankings of candidates, was chosen, despite the fact that open or flexible list PR systems do exist and are often used in other European countries. Such systems allow voters to change party list rankings, moving candidates up and down, which can sometimes change who wins seats. Closed list PR is controversial not only because it gives more control to party organisations, but also because it requires much larger regional constituencies than the single-member constituencies used in the past. MMP is the other PR system, again controversial in its use of closedlist PR in electoral regions. The system is mixed, however, in its use of single-member constituencies to elect most of the members of the bodies using MMP, the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly since 1999, and the Greater London Assembly since 2000. In total, this makes six electoral systems, with all British voters having the opportunity to vote in both plurality/majority and proportional elections.


Some voters have more opportunity to experiment with electoral systems than others – London voters can vote under five different electoral systems (all except STV), while many other English voters only use two (SMP and list PR).

Citizen disengagement This multitude of electoral systems presents more opportunities for the representation of citizens. Critics might argue that the new diversity of channels for citizen contact with elected representatives could confuse or overload people, but others see these new bodies, with new electoral systems, as good for improving citizen engagement with the political world. Voting is one of the most common political acts, yet voter turnout is declining in many democracies, and Britain is no exception. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, voter turnout in British parliamentary elections is at the lowest level since the introduction of mass suffrage. Turnout for the 2001 election was 59.4 per cent of those registered to vote, and only rose to 61.4 per cent for the 2005 election – yet average turnout for elections from 1945 through 1992 was 76.6 per cent, dropping to 71.5 per cent in 1997 (International IDEA 2006). While this decline in voter turnout could indicate that British people are turned off politics altogether (or, on the contrary, satisfied with the status quo), a major investigation into this apparent disengagement has concluded otherwise. The Power Inquiry, commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Reform and Charitable Trusts, found ‘a great deal of research evidence to show that very large numbers of citizens are engaged in community and charity work outside of politics’, calling apathy among the British a myth (Power Inquiry 2006: 16). This finding suggests that British people are disengaged from conventional politics, not political issues more generally. The British have diversified their forms of political participation to include joining pressure groups, social movements, and protest actions. Indeed, as membership of political parties drops to a fraction of what it was in the 1960s, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds claims over one million members – more than double the membership of all British political parties in 2005 combined (Kavanagh et al. 2006: 420). Advocates of PR might argue that this electoral reform could help to bring up British voter turnout levels, largely because voters are far less likely to ‘waste’ their votes in PR systems, while the large number of safe parliamentary seats (in which the incumbent has a very slim


chance of defeat) under SMP has reduced the incentive to vote. An investigation into the 2005 parliamentary election in Britain by the Electoral Reform Society also revealed that only 34 per cent of MPs were elected by the majority of the voters in their constituencies, the lowest in British history (Electoral Reform Society 2005: 10). The other 66 per cent of British MPs, elected on what the PR advocacy group labels ‘minority mandates’, were actually opposed by the majority of their constituents. Such a result is unlikely to enhance voter interest in the electoral process. While PR has been associated with higher voter turnout levels when several countries are aggregated, one study concludes that within individual countries that have increased electoral proportionality, there was no increase in turnout (Franklin 2002: 163). A report by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), a British left-wing think tank, claims that the electoral system is not a major factor in voter turnout, as turnout was far higher in elections before the 1990s under SMP in Britain, and countries using PR have also seen drops in their turnout levels in the late twentieth century (Keaney and Rogers 2006: 22). The IPPR recommends what it calls compulsory turnout, along the lines of the Australian law that forces citizens to show up at the polls (or cast a postal vote), even if they spoil their ballot paper in protest. Failure to cast a ballot in Australia can attract a fine of fifty dollars. This more authoritarian approach to getting the voters out to the polls – Australian turnout levels are usually about 95 per cent among registered voters – found favour with two Labour cabinet ministers, Peter Hain and Geoff Hoon (IPPR 2006). Critics might argue, however, that their support has as much to do with partisan selfinterest as with the desire to enhance citizenship. As the IPPR report notes (Keaney and Rogers 2006: 5), turnout has declined most rapidly among lower income people – those most likely to vote Labour. Rather than punishing citizens who are turned off from conventional politics, a better approach might be to convince them that voting is actually worthwhile. Franklin finds that electoral salience – whether elections matter to voters – is the most important factor in turnout (2002: 159). Unfortunately, the new set of elections available to British voters did not seem to inspire enough interest (turnout figures from BBC News Web site). Voter turnout for elections to the Scottish Parliament was 58.7 per cent in 1999 and 49.4 per cent in 2003, while turnout for Welsh Assembly elections was 46.0 per cent and 38.2 per cent. Even more alarming was turnout for the first European Parliament election held under list PR in 1999, which was only


24.0 per cent (UK-wide, including Northern Ireland, which used STV), although this rose to 38.2 per cent in 2004. Northern Ireland Assembly election voter turnout was higher, at 68.8 per cent in 1998 and 63.1 per cent in 2003. While these voter turnout levels appear low, these are second-order elections, which are not seen by voters as having the importance of central government elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980). A comparison to New Zealand parliamentary elections might be useful. In 1993, the last year for an SMP election, voter turnout was 85.2 per cent (turnout figures from International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). In 1996, the first MMP election saw voter turnout rise to 88.3 per cent, but then drop to 84.8 per cent in 1999. In 2002, New Zealand’s voter turnout dropped to 77.0 per cent, but then rose to 80.9 per cent in 2005.

Representatives and constituents While longer experience with new electoral systems might eventually increase voter turnout and interest in participation, opinion research showed that the first year of devolution in Scotland and Wales was disappointing to people there (Curtice 2000: 239). Many Scottish and Welsh people thought that devolution did not have a positive impact on their lives. Although some of the unpopularity of the new institutions might be attributed to hostile media coverage (Watson 2001a: 187–8), public disappointment could also be symptomatic of a desire for more powerful legislatures (Hazell et al. 2001: 192). Among politicians, examples of ‘role confusion’ illustrate how citizens are getting caught up in struggles between their elected representatives. In one case, a Labour constituency MSP complained about a Scottish National Party list member for trying to pass himself off as a ‘local’ MSP in his advertising, and the Scottish Parliament’s Standards Committee found him in breach of the members’ code of conduct (Grant 2001). A better understanding of how citizens and politicians are linked through these new institutions may be helpful in enhancing the legitimacy of devolution, particularly when the politicians do not appear to understand their place in the new institutional environment. The assumption, often made by British critics of list PR, that party list representatives are ‘second-class’ representatives is, at least to some extent, a manifestation of the electoral incentives approach to the study of political behaviour. From the rational choice perspective, the demands of electoral competition, particularly the size of the


constituency, are central in determining the strength of a representative’s constituency orientation (Jewell 1970: 482). The number of representatives elected from a constituency, called district magnitude, has the greatest impact on the strategic behaviour of both voters and candidates, according to electoral systems expert Gary Cox (1997: 228). If there is only one representative elected from a constituency, voters know exactly who is to be held responsible when they have grievances. If this representative wants to be re-elected, then he or she must, at least in theory, pay attention to the constituency. Multimember constituencies, on the other hand, offer politicians and voters different incentives. Candidates for legislative office must be high up on their party’s list in an electoral region in order to be elected, unless voters are allowed to express a candidate preference (or preferences), as is the case with open-list PR systems. A closed-list context presents an institutional incentive for list representatives to be heavily engaged in party activities and more oriented to the party leadership to ensure re-nomination to a high list position (Bowler and Farrell 1993: 53). While parties normally expect their list representatives to be active in the constituency and in the assembly, the service functions of list representatives are more likely to be oriented towards promoting the party in the electoral region than towards the more mundane local promotion and ombudsman functions performed by single-member constituency representatives. In other words, ‘it is relatively easier for legislators to shirk in satisfying voter demands under some electoral systems than others’, according to Bowler and Farrell (1993: 53). In closed-list PR systems, the constituency has not one, but several representatives, meaning that direct, personal accountability before the voters is not possible. Therefore, the value of a candidate’s personal reputation is low when the electoral system is based on closed-list PR with large district magnitudes (Carey and Shugart 1995: 431). Representatives elected in multimember constituencies may not be deliberately shirking their duties to their voters, however; they may not simply be able to focus on a large area, and therefore must choose a part of the constituency on which to concentrate their attention. Bernhard Wessels suggests that electoral competition is more personalised in small constituencies, where a manageable geographical area presents itself, while ‘large districts produce more uncertainty with respect to the question of whom to represent’ (1999: 222). In some countries, political parties have overcome this uncertainty problem by simply assigning smaller geographical subunits to their list representatives for the pur-


poses of carrying out constituency service functions. In New Zealand and Germany, the mixed-member system conveniently presents geographical subunits in the form of the existing single-member constituencies. The larger parties usually have enough list representatives to assign most to cover only one single-member constituency; in Germany, it is often the constituency that the list representative failed to win in the ‘direct’ part of the election (Burkett 1985: 129). Constituencies need not always be geographical; representatives could target identifiable groups in the community in the course of their re-election efforts. In Britain since the 1960s, Norton and Wood report that there has been a rise in ‘citizens gathering together to promote interests of common concern, many unrelated to the specific geographic confines of a parliamentary constituency’, and these groups lobby MPs (1993: 156). In New Zealand, the late Green list MP Rod Donald represented, in his words (1998: 48) ‘a number of nationwide constituencies’, referring to his party’s allocation of portfolios (his included employment, skills training, trade, tourism, and constitutional reform). He went on to say that part of his job was ‘to liaise with all the sector groups concerned with each portfolio’ which implies that interest groups – ‘nationwide constituencies of interest’ in his terminology – are acting as non-geographical constituencies. While different from Richard Fenno’s geographical constituency (1978: 1), these ‘constituencies of interest’ could be comparable to Fenno’s re-election constituency, differing only in the sense that they are not located within a small geographical area (1978: 8). Furthermore, it is possible that list representatives might be well positioned to campaign to these groups for electoral support. Whether geographical or otherwise, constituencies exist regardless of electoral system, and representatives who seek support from constituencies must serve them in some way. A rational choice assumption about a representative’s motivations anticipates that those elected in single-member constituencies under the SMP system will engage in enough constituency service to satisfy voters, especially if the constituency is marginal (where the incumbent had a close contest in the last election). According to the authors of The Personal Vote, ‘If representatives wish to remain representatives, their behavior will be calculated to please constituents’ (Cain et al. 1987: 3). The personal vote, based on a candidate’s ‘personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record’ is developed when representatives in single-member constituencies pursue a strategy to use non-controversial constituency service to appeal to voters in a non-partisan way (Cain et al. 1987: 9).


The authors of The Personal Vote found some evidence to suggest that while less pronounced than in the United States, the personal vote does exist in Britain, and seems to be of increasing electoral importance (1987: 170). Norton and Wood also argue that constituency service can help British MPs with their re-election goals, claiming that serving the constituency can only help because ‘constituents do not expect MPs to vote contrary to party policy and, in cases when constituents’ preferences are ignored by the choices their MPs make, they will blame the party, not the MP himself’ (1993: 146). However, other evidence suggests that the personal vote is of minimal electoral importance. Brian Gaines has tested the notion that constituency service should help elicit a personal vote that will assist in re-election purposes, assuming that incumbency should give an advantage to MPs (1998: 168). He finds, after an empirical test of British election results from 1950 to 1992, that ‘there is no sign of a large or growing incumbency advantage, as has been predicted by the personal vote school’ (1998: 187). Similarly, Pippa Norris found little evidence to indicate the existence of a personal vote in Britain (1997). Indeed, the best an MP can hope for is a personal vote of between 750 and 1000 votes, so if there is a significant swing against the incumbent’s party, the personal vote is useless (Curtice and Steed 1992: 340–1). In addition, an Australian study of representatives (elected in singlemember constituencies) found that ‘an MP catering to his or her local party will not be disadvantaged, but using constituency work to try to appeal more broadly to the electorate will result in a loss of votes’ (Studlar and McAllister 1996: 85). While there is some evidence to suggest that the personal vote may not be crucial, the important point from a rational choice standpoint is whether representatives themselves believe the personal vote matters to their re-election prospects. The extraordinary amount of time and resources invested by British MPs into constituency service implies that powerful personal motivations are at work. It is possible that representatives are motivated by factors other than an electoral incentive, as has been suggested by scholars like Searing, who claims that serving the constituency has been ‘part of the job’ for British MPs for centuries; such service is not necessarily done out of pure self-interest, but rather out of a sense of duty (1985: 377). Furthermore, these MPs know that British voters are aware of the fact that it is part of an MP’s job to serve the constituency. There is recent UK panel study evidence revealing that while voters may not know who their MP is, they nevertheless expect that their MP will be attentive to their needs when they require


assistance (Farrell and Gallagher 1999: 312). Party organisations that select parliamentary candidates also expect MPs to maintain a profile in the constituency and respond to constituents’ needs. While the MPconstituent link in Britain may not actually be sacred, there does appear to be a strong culture of constituency service that influences the expectations of both MPs and voters, regardless of whether such service pays significant electoral dividends.

Exploring the roles of elected representatives Recent studies by Donald Searing (1985; 1994) indicate that there are many roles assumed by British MPs, while Philip Norton and David Wood (1993) narrow these roles down to two broad categories or ‘faces’ of MPs: local non-partisan constituency service and national party policy advocacy. The introduction of mixed-member electoral systems, requiring the introduction of list PR representatives, in addition to representatives elected by plurality voting, presents the opportunity for these roles to be formally split, thus allowing a study of how elected representatives develop their roles along constituency and partisan lines. This is also an opportunity to investigate the broader issue of which influence – that of cultural norms or institutional rules – has a larger impact upon the assumption and formation of elected representatives’ roles. As noted above, British political culture places a great deal of value on the non-partisan constituency service role of elected representatives. It is possible that these representatives simply derive psychological benefits from performing what they consider to be an important duty (Searing 1985; Norris 1997). List members of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, for example, might focus heavily on nonpartisan constituency service to their regions, even if these activities detract from functions more characteristic of their partisan role (such as working on parliamentary committees) that are not very visible to the average voter. In addition, the ‘shadowing’ of constituency representatives by those elected from party lists could be justified in light of the cultural expectation that constituency service is ‘part of the job’ for all representatives, even those who were not elected from a small geographical area. However, many political scientists make the rational choice argument that institutional rules have a strong impact on how politicians behave. Rational choice logic assumes that people make cost-benefit analyses when making decisions – an economic approach that often focuses on


the institutional constraints, such as electoral rules, faced by political actors (Downs 1957). Applied to this electoral context, institutional reasoning holds that because constituency representatives are directly elected by voters, they should be expected to focus on constituency service more than representatives elected from regional lists ranked by the party hierarchy (Bowler and Farrell 1993; Cain et al. 1987). In other words, there is an electoral incentive for constituency representatives to serve their constituents well; they will not waste time performing tasks that are not instrumental to their own re-election. One way to examine the relative impact of cultural and institutional factors on the behaviour of politicians is to look at an example of MMP in a different (in this case non-British) cultural setting. Germany, the model for most mixed-member systems, has used MMP since the late 1940s for its federal and most state elections. If institutional rules are significant in determining how politicians behave, then they should work the same way in many different cultural contexts. The widely held perception of political scientists and commentators is that German voters and politicians do not distinguish between constituency and list representatives; there is no ‘caste’ system in which one type of representative is seen as more legitimate than the other (Burkett 1985: 130). However, role studies of German legislators that distinguish between constituency and list representatives have revealed interesting differences between representatives elected in the two different ways, suggesting that the electoral incentive does exist in Germany (Lancaster and Patterson 1990; Klingemann and Wessels 2001). Chapters 4 and 5 contribute further evidence to support these findings. To address the impact of the electoral incentive upon representational roles, parts of this book analyse the results of a postal survey of both German and British representatives in order to compare the role orientations of legislators elected in single-member constituencies and from party lists, as well as in different political cultures. Two German state parliaments (Landtage) are compared to their British counterparts, the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales. Surveys of the German representatives were undertaken in 2000, while the British representatives were surveyed in 2000 and again, after new elections, in 2003. Therefore, the surveys allow both a comparison of different political cultures, and a comparison of two different points in time to assess whether British representatives changed the way they behaved after ‘learning’ from the institutional incentives brought about by the MMP electoral system.


In order to assess the extent of their constituency roles, the questionnaires asked about the importance, frequency, and type of constituency service performed by the representatives, particularly as far as re-election is concerned. The party role was investigated by asking about time spent participating in party activities on the national or regional level and the type of activities undertaken (such as time on committees, which does not tend to be visible to constituents). Furthermore, questions to assess representatives’ attitudes about their jobs were included, and interviews investigate all of these issues in greater depth. Therefore, this investigation into the roles of elected representatives expands this academic field by connecting the role orientations of these representatives to institutional and cultural factors in a comparative context. As the following chapters will show, the electoral incentive does appear to influence how legislators behave in both Britain and Germany, but that the influence must be viewed in the proper cultural context. Furthermore, the conclusions from this study can only be suggestive, due to the limitations of the data and the research design.

Questions asked in this book Most of the book will focus on MMP because the mixed nature of the electoral system allows a comparison of constituency and partisan influences on the behaviour of politicians, who are elected in two different ways under this system. MMP allows for naturally controlled experiments on the behaviour of Germany’s elected representatives (Cain et al. 1987: 219). The literature reviewed above shows, however, that while many assumptions are made about German representatives, few are actually tested. British academic attention to the different roles played by list and constituency representatives in Scotland and Wales has also been surprisingly sparse, in spite of the concerns about how these roles might be affected by the introduction of regional list PR. An article published shortly after the introduction of MMP notes that ‘almost no attention’ has been paid to how legislators elected in two different ways might behave differently (Cowley and Lochore 2000: 181). A panel study of 13 MSPs has concluded after its preliminary interviews that ‘a degree of confusion about the appropriate roles of constituency and list MSPs’ exists; more research is planned (McCabe and McCormick 2000: 47). In a more general vein, John Carey has noted in a review of the institutional literature that mixed-member systems constitute a ‘boon


to electoral systems research by allowing comparisons of different electoral rules operating simultaneously in the same country for the same office and analysis of how these rules interact to influence behavior’ (2000: 741). In this era of rising dissatisfaction with politicians and lower voter turnout worldwide, it is important to determine whether electoral engineering can help improve the connection between voters and their representatives, particularly since MMP is becoming more and more common around the world. Some evidence is promising; Pippa Norris found that the highest levels of representative-constituent contact were in countries with mixed-member electoral systems (2001: 892). Clearly there is a need for more investigation into the roles assumed by the representatives of the newly elected assemblies in Scotland and Wales, and if the different ways in which they are elected has any effect on their roles. Comparisons with other mixed-member systems are likely to be helpful in this regard. Of particular value is New Zealand, where MMP was introduced into a British political culture, and Germany, where a different political culture exists. There are many questions about the new electoral system that need to be addressed. Does MMP really create two classes of representatives? More specifically, and expressing the question in a less value-laden way, does the mixed electoral system create incentives for those elected from lists to shirk their constituency role, assuming that there is such a role for list representatives? If MMP does promote shirking of constituency duties by list representatives, is this a fatal flaw in the electoral system, or is it simply a case of the need for a new division of labour among representatives, with some focusing more on constituency service than others? Are party list representatives actually more beholden to their parties than representatives elected in singlemember constituencies, as is claimed by critics of PR? MMP in Scotland and Wales has created, for the first time on the British mainland, competition between elected representatives arising from multimember constituencies and the resulting service given by different representatives to constituents in the same geographical areas. How do MMP-elected representatives handle this competition, something so new in Britain? Some list representatives shadow their constituency counterparts, while others do not. Do list representatives really have a constituency role, and if so, how does it differ from that of constituency representatives? What exactly is their constituency? Do interest groups count as constituencies? Ultimately, is this pluralism in constituency representation good for representative democracy?


More broadly, the new electoral systems and changes to the constituency role of British representatives have had political consequences. As Patrick Dunleavy notes (2005), the British party system is more complex than before, revealing a greater pluralism in British politics that, arguably, these new institutional rules are just coming to terms with. How will the British political establishment, particularly the governing Labour Party, respond to this pluralism? Indications are that almost ten years after its election, the Labour Government is uncomfortable with the greater pluralism its constitutional changes have helped to unleash. Labour’s plan to ban dual candidacy for Welsh Assembly elections, which could be seen as an alteration of its original MMP rules triggered by the electoral challenge to the party’s Welsh hegemony, suggests that Labour is uneasy with greater political pluralism. As Matthew Flinders argues (2005), Labour, at least at the Westminster level, still governs in a highly majoritarian way. The problem for Labour, however, is that once you open the proverbial Pandora’s Box, you cannot contain the pluralism that you have released short of abolishing the constitutional changes (including devolution) altogether, which would have significant political repercussions. Therefore, while this book focuses on the changes to the constituency role of representatives brought about by new PR electoral systems, it also speaks to the larger issue of how the political establishment is handling the increased political pluralism facilitated by these new electoral systems.

Outline of this book Research for this book spans over five years, allowing for the examination of survey data after the first two Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly elections, in addition to survey data from British MEPs and German Landtag members. Important developments, such as the official commissions headed by Lord Richard and Sir John Arbuthnott into possible reform of the Welsh Assembly and the Scottish Parliament, respectively, are also analysed. The book also makes use of debates at Westminster and at Holyrood, as well as secondary literature sources. While there is some disagreement in the relevant literature, this study assumes that rational representatives will anticipate that the constituency service demands of representatives elected under list PR systems will be lower than those of single-member constituency representatives because the former are better able to ‘shirk’ constituency demands, according to the terminology of Shaun Bowler and David


Farrell (1993: 54–5). This assumption does not accept the ‘secondclass’ label for list-elected representatives, however, but simply applies the rational choice framework in an attempt to explain the behaviour of politicians. Therefore, representatives elected from single-member constituencies should assume more of an ombudsman’s role, providing more frequent constituency service than list representatives, and the former should view this service as more important to their careers than their list counterparts. Single-member constituency representatives should spend more time dealing with the problems of constituents than list representatives, and should place a higher degree of importance on responding to such demands. List representatives, on the other hand, should spend less time on the needs of constituents and more time on enhancing the strength of the party and working on party activities in the elected assemblies (tasks not as visible to voters as constituency service). If list representatives seek to serve constituents, it is more likely that such constituents will be the non-geographical variety, in the form of interest groups. However, if list representatives are seen to serve constituents as actively as representatives from single-member constituencies, even though they derive little direct electoral benefit, then it is likely that they plan to stand against incumbent constituency representatives at the next election. Alternatively, it is possible that such list representatives are motivated by the cultural desire to perform such duties because they are ‘part of the job’, as British tradition demands. This is where it becomes important to examine the behaviour of German representatives as a means of comparison. The German part of this investigation also allows for a critical assessment of the received wisdom that German representatives, elected in two different ways for many years, view each other as equals. Mixed-member systems have spread far beyond their German homeland, and are now found in most regions of the world. The reasons why these electoral systems have become so popular in recent years, as well as why MMP was chosen for Scotland and Wales, are explored in greater detail in Chapter 2. This chapter describes and analyses mixed-member electoral systems in detail. The system’s advantages and disadvantages, a subject of academic and political debate in many countries, are also evaluated. Examples from around the world are discussed, including New Zealand, which is of particular interest because of its constitutional and cultural similarity to the United Kingdom. The choice of the MMP system for the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales raised important questions about the constituency role of list represen-


tatives in the British context, and these are recounted here. The issues discussed in this chapter guided the construction of the questionnaire sent to members of the new legislatures in Scotland and Wales, as well as members of two German state parliaments. Chapter 3 expands on the discussion earlier in this introductory chapter about the importance of the constituency role of representatives and how the electoral incentive affects this role. The argument in the academic literature pits the ‘culturalists’, who claim that constituency service is primarily an integral ‘part of the job’ (and even enjoyable) for British representatives against the ‘institutionalists’, who believe that constituency service is instrumental to re-election, being prompted by electoral rules, and not a sense of duty. The latter rudimentary rational choice approach guides the investigation here. Therefore, this book addresses a complaint raised by Peter Kerr and Steven Kettell, who argue that the study of British politics is too often atheoretical and descriptive (2006). This study uses theory and empirical evidence to answer important questions about the constituency role of elected representatives in Britain. Chapters 4 and 5 present empirical data from surveys of Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, and two German Landtag members conducted in 2000. There are also answers to open-ended questions, as well as comments from interviews with these politicians, and with British MEPs. These chapters focus on the constituency role of representatives, looking at contact between representatives and constituents, and constituency service in general. Some results show more contact between British constituency representatives and voters, and between list representatives and interest groups, as was expected. Party list representatives also appear to be more concerned, when it comes to re-election, about the national strength of their party and having the support of the party leadership. While most of the book focuses on British representatives, there are many important comparisons made to representatives in the two German state parliaments under investigation, the Landtag of Brandenburg and the Landtag of Hesse, and much of the empirical data from these comparisons can be found in Chapters 4 and 5. The received wisdom is that Germans do not distinguish between representatives elected in the two different ways, and that citizens in Germany do not view their representatives as constituency servants. This research joins a growing list of other studies in casting doubt upon these beliefs (such as Klingemann and Wessels 2001), and focuses on seldom-studied Landtag members. Survey results here


reveal that list representatives are somewhat more oriented towards their parties than constituency representatives, while constituency representatives are more focused on constituents. In particular, constituency representatives are more eager to promote their constituencies and seek projects for them than their list counterparts, as previous Bundestag research has shown (Lancaster and Patterson 1990). Competition between constituency and list representatives of the British and German assemblies is the subject of Chapter 6. Representatives elected in the two different ways in Britain came into conflict almost right away, particularly in Scotland. Problems arose as listelected representatives began to carry out constituency service functions not welcomed by constituency-elected representatives from different parties who regarded the practice as ‘shadowing’. In the process of their self-promotion, list representatives in Britain are stepping on the toes of constituency representatives, many of whom resent what they consider to be an intrusion. In Germany, however, this kind of conflict is not the case. German constituency representatives accept the presence of list representatives in their constituencies far more readily than is the case in Britain, although many believe that they have closer ties to their constituency and serve constituents better than their list-elected counterparts. Comments from both constituency and list representatives indicate that there is a large degree of mutual respect, however, which is clearly lacking among many representatives in Scotland and to a lesser extent in Wales. If there is any overt ‘class division’ between German legislators, it is that between the major and minor parties over constituency service, and has to do mainly with the number of deputies available to cover geographical constituencies (where major party members have the advantage because of the size of their parliamentary parties). The book’s conclusion, Chapter 7, argues that in many respects, legislators in Scotland and Wales behave in ways similar to their counterparts in the two German Landtage under study. Representatives, regardless of how they were elected, maintain close contact with their voters and with interest groups, as well as perform their various functions in strongly partisan ways. There are, however, some differences in the constituency roles held by constituency and list representatives, and the differences become more profound in the second survey, which was undertaken after the second Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly elections in 2003. These results suggest that while it took time (and an intervening election) for British representatives to ‘learn’


their electoral incentives, they responded accordingly, along the lines of what was seen in Germany, where MMP had been in place for longer. Excerpts from interviews illuminate the relevant issues further. In Scotland and Wales, a major area of difference lies in the attitudes held by the two types of representatives towards the electoral system, and the reaction by constituency representatives to shadowing by their list colleagues. The sometimes hostile reaction by constituency representatives to competition from list representatives is also the main way in which British representatives differ from their German counterparts. However, it is this competition that actually enhances the constituency role of representatives elected through the MMP system, potentially to the benefit of voters. The rational choice expectations are, to some extent, confirmed, but this does not mean that list-elected members of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly are ‘secondclass’ representatives. Instead, this book argues that list representatives play an essential role in increasing pluralism in British politics. Without them, the tentative steps away from the Westminster model now underway would not be possible. Rather than trying to suppress this pluralism in the political system, the Labour Government should have taken pride in its achievement and embraced it.

2 Proportional Representation and Constituency Representation

The new bodies introduced by New Labour’s devolution plans since 1997, plus Great Britain’s European Parliament (EP) seats since 1999, are elected by three different systems of proportional representation (PR): the single transferable vote (STV) for the Northern Ireland Assembly, closed-list PR for the EP seats representing nine English regions, Scotland, and Wales, and mixed-member proportional (MMP) representation for the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, and the Greater London Assembly (plus any future elected assemblies that might be established in the other English regions). MMP was the most controversial choice, and much of this controversy reflects a concern about how MMP affects the constituency role of elected representatives. As Chapter 1 pointed out, many British politicians, accustomed to the single-member plurality (SMP, colloquially known as ‘first-past-the-post’ in Britain) system, do not like the idea of sharing ‘their patch’ with anyone else. This belief, along with the ‘winner-take-all’ mentality that comes with it, caused problems in the early years of British MMP. Therefore, this chapter will focus on MMP as the most significant electoral model among the greatly increased diversity of British electoral systems, and its significant implications for the constituency role of elected representatives. Along with the consequences for constituency representation caused by PR’s multimember constituencies, there are also consequences for the representation of political parties, in the direction of more pluralism. Why would Labour allow this extra pluralism, when it stood to lose its dominance in Scotland and Wales? Many in the Labour Party disapproved of these electoral system choices (not to mention devolution in the first place), and there was much debate within the party about the wisdom of PR long after the first elections were held under 24

Proportional Representation and Constituency Representation 25

these systems. Critics outside the party argued that Labour should have foreseen the consequences of its electoral engineering, especially because comparative international evidence was available (particularly from Germany and New Zealand). This chapter will describe these electoral system choices in a historical and comparative context, investigating why Labour took its chances with PR, and evaluating the early consequences of its decisions. Later chapters will analyse the impact of PR on the constituency role of representatives elected by list PR and MMP, with relevant international comparisons.

Why choose PR? It seems quite remarkable that Labour, by opting for PR systems so often associated with coalition or minority governments, would choose to rule itself out of the chance of governing alone in the new assemblies it planned to establish – the party was looking very strong after a catastrophic Conservative election result in 1997. Labour was particularly strong in both Scotland and Wales. Yet it was precisely this electoral strength, when translated into seats via SMP, which precluded the use of that system to elect the new bodies. Assemblies elected purely on an SMP basis would most likely have resembled the existing Scottish and Welsh members of Parliament (MPs) at Westminster, with huge Labour majorities ‘manufactured’, to use electoral systems researcher Douglas Rae’s term (1967: 74), by the electoral system. By the late twentieth century, Labour had become the dominant party in both Scotland and Wales. In the 1997 parliamentary election, Labour won 56 (or 78 per cent) of Scotland’s 72 seats at Westminster, while the Liberal Democrats won ten, the Scottish National Party won the remaining six, and the Conservatives won none (Table 2.1). Results in this table show even greater support for Labour in Wales, which has been described as ‘the most loyal electoral heartland of British Labourism’ (Morgan and Mungham 2000: 69). There, the party won an outright majority of the popular vote, and 34 (or 85 per cent) of the principality’s 40 Westminster seats. Plaid Cymru won four seats, the Liberal Democrats two, and the Conservatives none, despite the fact that the Tories won almost 20 per cent of the vote, putting it into second place on vote share. Because a referendum establishing the proposed institutions had to pass in both Scotland and Wales, new legislatures that simply reproduced what already existed at Westminster would have been a tough sell to anyone apart from committed Labour voters. Even among the

26 Proportional Representation and the Constituency Role in Britain Table 2.1 Election results, Scottish and Welsh House of Commons seats, 1 May 1997 Party Scotland Labour Scottish National Conservative Liberal Democrat Other

% Vote

Seats

% Seats

45.6 22.1 17.5 13.0 1.8

56 6 0 10 0

77.8 8.3 0 13.9 0

Total Wales Labour Conservative Liberal Democrat Plaid Cymru Other

72 54.7 19.6 12.4 9.9 3.5

Total

34 0 2 4 0

85.0 0 5.0 10.0 0

40

Single-member plurality (SMP; ‘first-past-the-post’) system Source: BBC

Labour faithful in Wales, support for the assembly was weak, so support from the nationalist Plaid Cymru (the Party of Wales) and the Liberal Democrats was viewed by Labour as crucial to the passage of the referendum. Labour had initially planned to use a plurality system for the new assembly, but went along with PR in 1996 at the insistence of the then shadow Welsh Secretary Ron Davies and party leader Tony Blair (Bogdanor 1999: 221). It was in Labour’s interests to raise as much support as possible for devolution, given the divisions within the party itself, by reaching out to supporters of the other parties which would benefit from PR elections to the proposed assembly. Therefore, PR was recommended in order for ‘devolution to be seen as legitimate and to be widely accepted by the Welsh electorate’ (Laffin and Thomas 2000: 559). In Scotland, a determined effort was made by Labour to portray the new institutions of devolution as representative, open, accessible, and accountable (Brown 2000: 547–8). However, critics have questioned the ‘inclusive’ aura invoked here. Labour feared the potential for a future victory of the separatist Scottish National Party (SNP) under a plurality electoral system, so a form of PR was required to prevent the possibility that the SNP might use such a victory as a mandate for


Scottish independence (Mitchell 2000: 608). The Scottish case differed from the Welsh not only in the choice of PR as a means of preventing an outright victory by nationalists, but also in that there was a longstanding agreement on PR between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, thanks to previous negotiations on the subject during the Scottish Constitutional Convention during the early 1990s, when both parties were in opposition to the Conservatives at Westminster. Labour would not agree to the STV form of PR favoured by the Liberal Democrats, however, since STV, which allows voters to rank candidates in order of preference, ‘would publicly expose divisions within the party’, according to Vernon Bogdanor (1999: 220). The Liberal Democrats would not accept Labour’s proposal of the nonproportional (and potentially highly majoritarian) alternative vote, but in 1991 both parties did manage to agree on the Greens’ preference of MMP as the PR model they could live with (Jones 1992: 77). Therefore, MMP emerged as the ‘least bad’ PR model for both Labour and the Liberal Democrats, not as the favoured electoral system for either party. British MMP was the product of a political compromise. The main advantage of MMP for the Scottish Parliament, in the view of Scottish journalist Joyce McMillan, lies in the way it combines the ‘benefits of proportionality in the overall outcome of an election, with the retention of a clear link – a familiar and powerful one in British parliamentary democracy – between individual constituency MSPs [Members of the Scottish Parliament] and the area they represent’ (2005: 1). McMillan was co-chair of the Scottish Constitutional Commission, charged in 1993 with dealing with contentious issues the Constitutional Convention could not resolve. She also notes that STV would require the creation of very large multimember constituencies that would be ‘unfeasibly vast to provide a remotely comparable degree of proportionality’ in the more sparsely populated parts of Scotland (McMillan 2005: 1). Ultimately, Labour came to accept the independent Constitutional Commission’s recommendation of an electoral system that was not the party’s ideal choice, but one that would prevent an outright SNP seat majority in a future Scottish Parliament. Aside from electoral considerations, there were other reasons why the choice of PR was not an irrational one for Labour. While the government claimed that it wanted to make devolution a meaningful exercise in the transfer of power from the centre to the periphery, critics feared that Westminster would not hesitate to micro-manage devolution when it saw fit to do so. Although the Scottish Parliament would have primary legislative powers in its areas of jurisdiction, the Welsh


Assembly would only have secondary legislative powers. The Greater London Assembly would only have the power to oversee the Mayor of London. The European Parliament is far weaker than the Council of Ministers (which represents the member state governments) as a legislative body in the European Union, and PR was used to elect all its other members (even those from Northern Ireland), with Britain facing pressure to conform. The precedent of PR, in the form of STV, had been granted to Northern Irish local councils in the 1970s in the hope that a more inclusive electoral system would convince the Catholic minority that it was being included in the governing process, and was now an essential part of the Good Friday Agreement. STV is also used to elect the lower house of parliament in the Irish Republic, the Dáil. Although Labour only introduced PR reluctantly, and avoided it for Westminster, other British political parties have different views on PR systems. While Labour and the Conservatives oppose PR in general, preferring SMP, the Scottish Conservatives did accept MMP for Scottish Parliament elections when responding to the Arbuthnott Commission’s consultation on the Scottish Parliament’s electoral system (Arbuthnott 2006). MMP is also supported by the Scottish Greens and the Scottish Socialist Party. The SNP and Liberal Democrats prefer STV, as does Plaid Cymru, claiming that proportionality, more choice for voters, and a single method of electing all Assembly Members (not the case with MMP) were advantages of this preferential system of PR (Plaid Cymru 2005).

PR elections in the United Kingdom Elections went ahead, using the different electoral systems, from 1998. In Northern Ireland, the new assembly was elected using STV in eighteen constituencies, each electing six MLAs (Members of the Legislative Assembly). Voters are allowed to rank candidates in order of their preference 1, 2, 3 and so on. This means that while parties nominate candidates, voters have the final say over who is actually elected from among each party’s nominees. With closed-list PR, used for the election of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from Great Britain (not Northern Ireland, whose three MEPs are elected by STV), as well as the regional party list members of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, voters are not able to express any candidate preference (although independent candidates can stand on their own ‘lists’). Voters only select a party label, with regional party organisations ranking their lists of candidates.


In the case of Northern Ireland, four parties, two for each community on either side of the national identity question, won over 80 per cent of the votes and seats (Table 2.2). The Ulster Unionists, long the dominant (and pro-British) party of Northern Ireland, won the most seats despite winning fewer first preference votes than its nationalist (and largely Catholic) rival, the Social Democratic and Labour Party. Both ‘main’ parties, however, won vote percentages in the low twenties. The more extremist Democratic Unionist and Sinn Fein parties both came in below 20 per cent of the votes and seats, while several other parties also won seats. Table 2.2

Election results, Northern Ireland Assembly, 25 June 1998

Party* Social Democratic and Labour Ulster Unionist Democratic Unionist Sinn Fein Alliance UK Unionist Independent ‘No’ Unionists Progressive Unionist Women’s Coalition Ulster Democratic Total

% 1st preference vote

Seats won % Seats won

22.0 21.3 18.0 17.7 6.5 4.5 3.0 2.6 1.6 1.1

24 28 20 18 6 5 3 2 2 0

22.2 25.9 18.5 16.7 5.6 4.6 2.8 1.9 1.9 0

108

Single transferable vote system (STV) *All parties winning at least 1 per cent of the vote are listed here. Source: Nicholas Whyte (http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fa98.htm)

While STV produced a very proportional outcome in Northern Ireland, with a Gallagher index (G) of disproportionality (Lijphart 1999: 158) of only 3.5 per cent, regional list PR for Britain’s European Parliament seats was more disproportional, with a G of 7.8 per cent. Aside from the main three British parties (Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Democrat) and the Scottish and Welsh nationalists, the Greens won seats, as well as (perhaps ironically) the United Kingdom Independence Party, whose main policy objective is to pull the UK out of the European Union (Table 2.3). In 1999 there were also elections held for the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. The final electoral model for the Scottish Parliament was a single house composed of 129 members (MSPs), 73 of

30 Proportional Representation and the Constituency Role in Britain Table 2.3 Election results, European Parliament members from Great Britain, 10 June 1999 Party* Conservative Labour Liberal Democrat UK Independence Green Scottish National Plaid Cymru Pro-Euro Conservative British National Total

% Vote

Seats

% Seats

35.8 28.0 12.7 7.0 6.3 2.7 1.9 1.4 1.1

36 29 10 3 2 2 2 0 0

42.9 34.5 11.9 3.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 0 0

84

Regional closed party list proportional representation (PR) system *All parties winning at least 1 per cent of the vote are listed here. Source: BBC

whom were elected on a plurality basis from the existing Westminster single-member constituencies (with the Westminster constituency for the Shetland and Orkney Islands being split into two) and 56 from party lists in eight regional constituencies, using the pre-1999 European Parliament constituencies as boundaries. Seven regional party list MSPs are elected in a way that produces an overall outcome, taking both constituency and list seats together, that is proportional to the list vote in each region. This is a compensatory, not a parallel system: if Labour constituency candidates perform well (which has been the case so far), these results are taken into consideration when regional party list seats are awarded, so that Labour will not win many seats this way. In Wales, the unicameral National Assembly has 60 members (AMs), with 40 elected from the single-member Westminster constituencies and 20 elected from party lists in the five electoral regions formed from the former European Parliament constituencies. Only four party list AMs per region are elected here, using the same proportional method as in Scotland. Each voter has two votes: one for a candidate in a single-member constituency and another for a political party or independent candidate in the electoral region in which their constituency is situated. Votes for candidates were counted on a plurality basis, while regional seats were awarded in a way that took into account the single-member constituency seats already won on a partisan basis when allocating these party list seats, using the d’Hondt formula. Second ballot vote


totals for party lists (or independent candidates) were divided by the number one plus the number of seats (if any) won by that party’s candidates in the electoral region’s single-member constituencies. For example, in the Glasgow region, Labour swept all ten single-member constituencies in 1999, so its second ballot vote total was divided by eleven, reducing its quota to a number so small that the party picked up no party list seats, allowing the other parties representation among the seven seats available to them. Results for the 1999 elections, summarised in Table 2.4, reveal that Labour won most constituency seats in both Scotland and Wales, with the Liberal Democrats taking most of its Scottish Parliament seats in

Total National Assembly for Wales Labour Plaid Cymru Conservative Liberal Democrat Greens Socialist Labour Other/independent Total

38.8 28.7 15.6 14.2

56 35.4 30.5 16.5 12.5 2.5 1.1 1.5

1 8 8 3 0 0 0 20

37.6 28.4 15.9 13.4

% Seats

3 28 18 5 1 0 1 0

Total seats

33.6 27.3 15.4 12.4 3.6 2.4 2.0 3.3

Constituency seats

Scottish Parliament Labour Scottish National Conservative Liberal Democrat Greens Socialist Labour Scottish Socialist Other/independent

% Constituency vote*

Party

List seats

Election results, Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, 6 May

% Party vote

Table 2.4 1999

53 7 0 12 0 0 0 1

56 35 18 17 1 0 1 1

43.4 27.1 14.0 13.2 0.8 0 0.8 0.8

73

129

27 9 1 3 0 0 0

28 17 9 6 0 0 0

40

60

46.7 28.3 15.0 10.0 0 0 0

Mixed-member proportional (MMP) system * All other Scottish parties’ candidates together received 2.7 per cent of the total constituency vote. All other Welsh parties’ candidates together received 4.7 per cent of the total constituency vote. Source: BBC


constituency form. Party list seats comprised most of those won by the SNP, however, and all of those for the Scottish Conservatives. Disproportionality, as measured by G, was 7.5 per cent. In Wales, the nationalist Plaid Cymru delegation was composed of roughly equal proportions of list and constituency members, as was the case for the Liberal Democrats, while the Conservatives won only one constituency seat. The G in Wales was higher than in Scotland, at 8.6 per cent. Soon after the Scottish election, a coalition cabinet was formed with the participation of the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties. In Wales, Labour was surprised by the strength of Plaid Cymru (which won over 30 per cent of the party vote, triple its 1997 Westminster showing) and its own failure to win a majority of seats under an electoral system designed to be less proportional, thanks to the presence of only four list seats per region, than its Scottish counterpart. Welsh Labour formed a minority government, which was replaced by a coalition with the Liberal Democrats in October 2000. Elections in 2003 brought about a slight increase in the Labour vote in the Welsh Assembly, enough to allow for a bare majority Labour Government there, as Table 2.5 shows. There was a reduction of Labour seats in the Scottish Parliament, however, but the coalition with the Liberal Democrats, coming in on the same number of seats, continued. Nationalists in both Scotland and Wales were in for a shock, with both the SNP and Plaid Cymru losing about a third of the electoral support they had in 1999. Disproportionality was 7.2 per cent in Scotland and 10.3 per cent in Wales. The big winners in Scotland were the Scottish Socialist Party, with an increase from one to six seats, and the Greens, going from one to seven. All of these MSPs were elected from their party lists, not constituencies,1 and most Conservatives continued to be elected from lists as well in both bodies. With most nationalists also coming from the party lists, the 2003 elections once again showed that most of the opposition was made up of socalled ‘additional members’, the non-complimentary term used by the British media for regional list-elected representatives, while governing party members tended to be elected from single-member constituencies. This outcome did nothing to promote the notion that all members were equal. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that media attention in the early years of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly focused

1 Scottish Greens do not contest single-member constituencies so far.


Scottish Parliament Labour Scottish National Conservative Liberal Democrat Greens Socialist Labour Scottish Socialist Senior Citizens Other/independent Total National Assembly for Wales Labour Plaid Cymru Conservative Liberal Democrat Greens UK Independence Socialist Labour Other/independent Total

34.6 23.8 16.6 15.4 0 0 6.2 0.1

56 36.6 19.7 19.2 12.7 3.5 3.5 1.2 3.6

0 7 10 3 0 0 0 0 20

40.0 21.2 19.9 14.2 0

46 9 3 13 0 0 0 0 2

50 27 18 17 7 0 6 1 3

73

129

30 5 1 3 0 0 0 1

30 12 11 6 0 0 0 1

40

60

% Seats

Total seats

4 18 15 4 7 0 6 1 1

Constituency seats

29.3 20.9 15.5 11.8 6.9 1.1 6.7 1.5 7.5

% Constituency vote*

Party

List seats

Election results, Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, 1 May

% Party vote

Table 2.5 2003

38.8 20.9 14.0 13.2 5.4 0 4.7 0.8 2.3

50.0 20.0 18.3 10.0 0 0 0 1.7

Mixed-member proportional (MMP) system *All other Scottish parties’ candidates together received 3.3 per cent of the total constituency vote. All other Welsh parties’ candidates together received 4.7 per cent of the total constituency vote. Source: BBC

upon, among other things, the two types of representative created by the mixed-member systems used to elect these new bodies. Shortly after the May 1999 election, the Scottish press focused on the battle over office allowances for MSPs. Labour wanted list MSPs to get only 60 per cent of the allowance granted to constituency MSPs. Because the vast majority of Labour and Liberal Democrat MSPs are constituency MSPs, while most opposition MSPs are list MSPs, critics charged that partisan motivations were at work (Mitchell 2000: 609). The allowances situation in Wales is different. All AMs receive the same

34 Proportional Representation and the Constituency Role in Britain Table 2.6

Election results, Greater London Assembly, 4 May 2000

Party* Labour Conservative Liberal Democrat Green Christian Peoples’ Alliance British National UK Independence London Socialist Alliance Peter Thatchell (independent) Campaign Against Tube Privatisation

% Party vote

% Seats

Seats (constituency/list)

28.8 27.5 14.1 10.5 3.2 2.7 2.0 1.6 1.3 1.0

36 36 16 12 0 0 0 0 0 0

6/3 8/1 0/4 0/3 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total

25 (14/11)

Mixed-member proportional (MMP) system *All parties winning at least 1 per cent of the party vote are listed here. Source: BBC

allowances; it has been pointed out by SNP members that Alun Michael, the First Minister until Rhodri Morgan took over, was himself a Labour list AM (Hardie 1999). Another example of the use of MMP is found in the Greater London Assembly election of 2000. As Table 2.6 indicates, the three main British parties (Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Democrat) won most of the votes and seats, but the Greens managed to win over 10 per cent of the vote and three (12 per cent) of the 25 seats, all from the regional (London-wide) list.2 The disproportionality was 7.5 per cent.

Combining single-member constituencies with PR The election results from 1998 to 2003 all reveal a multiparty makeup of the bodies elected by these new proportional electoral systems, as one might expect. All involve the use of multimember constituencies, since PR is not possible without them. Only MMP, however, combines single-member and multimember constituencies to give a proportional outcome. With closed-list PR, all MEPs from Great Britain are elected

2 Unlike their Scottish counterparts, London Greens do contest single-member constituencies, as well as the regional list vote.


the same way, from large regional constituencies, while all members of the Northern Ireland Assembly are elected in relatively small-sized six-member constituencies by the preferential STV form of PR. While the choice of closed-list PR, as opposed to a more flexible or open variety that would allow voters a say over individual candidates on their preferred party list was unpopular among many (Butler and Westlake 2000), the fact remains that all MEPs from Great Britain are elected the same way. Thus, Northern Irish MLAs and British MEPs cannot claim that some of them are more legitimate than any others by virtue of how they are elected. The same cannot be said for members of the MMP-elected bodies. Some members of the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, and Greater London Assembly are elected by regional closed-list PR, but most are elected by plurality in single-member constituencies. There was always a danger that the mixed-member electoral system would lead to competition for greater legitimacy by the two types of representatives elected by it. This is one of the main reasons why Britain’s oldest and best-known pressure group for PR, the Electoral Reform Society (ERS), strongly supports STV over MMP (Electoral Reform Society 2006). The ERS likes not only the fact that STV is proportional on a partisan basis (to first preferences), but also the fact that there are no party lists – voters choose from among candidates nominated by all the parties, ranking candidates according to preference. Voters may stick with the candidates of one party, or mix them up. The voter is empowered under STV, not the party organisations, in the view of the system’s supporters. Yet this challenge to the power of party organisations is part of the potential problem with STV, in the view of some political scientists. A reduction in party cohesion could result when successful candidates owe their election to more than just their party labels, since STV forces candidates of the same party to compete against each other, just as they must compete against the candidates of other parties. Michael Gallagher, however, argues that there is no reduction in the cohesion of parties in the Irish Republic, stating that in the Dáil, ‘it is very rare for party representatives to break ranks from the party line on any issue’ (1997: 86). More relevant to the constituency role of elected representatives is the association of STV with a large constituency caseload for these representatives and the potential for parochialism and distraction away from other duties (such as national policy formulation and parliamentary committee work) that entails.


Gallagher points out that Irish politicians complain that they must ‘spend too much time responding to individual and community grievances from their constituents, which is necessary for electoral survival’ (1997: 87), and an Irish government minister has been campaigning for years to replace STV with MMP partially for this reason (Dempsey 2002). David Farrell, however, argues that the electoral system should not get all the blame for Ireland’s arguably too successful constituency service incentive, writing that Irish political culture has much to do with this localism, and that ‘it would be disingenuous to suppose that somehow this would dissipate if the electoral system were changed’ (2001: 146). Although STV remains popular with experts on electoral systems, MMP is now more popular, according to a recent survey (Bowler et al. 2005). While STV was recommended by an electoral reform conference convened by the British House of Commons speaker in 1916 for a portion of seats in that house, the proposal was rejected (Carstairs 1980: 195–6). The Liberals had been split over PR, while the Conservatives were opposed and Labour’s prior support had turned in the 1920s to opposition, once the party saw that it could replace the Liberals under SMP. Later, with the resurgence of the Liberals and the rise of the nationalists in Scotland and Wales in the early 1970s, the party system became less of a two-party affair, with high levels of disproportionality. This time, the Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government in 1976 recommended a variant of the West German electoral system, the Additional Member System (AMS), where voters only use one vote instead of the two used in the German version. Allowing only one vote would mean that voters would not be able to split their ballot between a candidate from one party (or an independent) and the list of another party, and is based upon the original German electoral system for the first Bundestag election in 1949. The ‘additional seats’ to be elected by PR would be allocated on a regional basis to parties in a compensatory way, taking into account the constituency seats already won by the parties’ candidates (Hansard Society 1976: 52). For the Hansard Society’s Commission, chaired by Lord Blake, the system to be recommended had to maintain the tradition of ‘a personal relationship between an MP and a clearly defined geographical area – in other words his constituency’ (Hansard Society 1976: 25). The Blake Commission was concerned about the geographical size of constituencies under STV, especially in light of the need for constituencies to elect three to five MPs if a reasonable level of proportionality is to exist – this would make some sparsely populated constituencies huge,


reducing the supposed link between MPs and constituents (Hansard Society 1976: 36–7). Aside from one member, the Blake Commission preferred to ‘combine the advantages of the single-member constituency with an acceptable degree of overall proportionality’, believing that ‘the smaller the constituency the closer the link between MP and his electorate’ (Hansard Society 1976: 37). To avoid the controversy of closed party lists, the Blake Commission recommended that seats be allocated to the ‘best losers’: those who had won the highest percentage of the vote in their constituency races, but failed to be elected (Hansard Society 1976: 40). This ‘best loser’ approach to dealing with the issue of closed party lists, used for Landtag (state parliament) elections in Baden-Württemberg, is not without its problems, however; critics have pointed out that voters will not know in advance who is on each party’s list, or in what order (Butler 1993: 78). Parties then lose the ability to increase the number of women elected, for example, via list quotas, or increase the representation of minorities. More recently, the Independent Commission on the Voting System, chaired by Roy Jenkins, recommended yet another mixedmember system called ‘Alternative Vote Top-up’ or ‘Alternative Plus’ (AV+) in late 1998 when it reported back to the Labour Government of Tony Blair. In its report, the Jenkins Commission stated that it sought to reduce the high levels of disproportionality between votes and seats on a partisan basis, while retaining as many single-member constituencies as possible (Jenkins 1998: para. 109). List MPs would be added sparingly; they would comprise only 15 to 20 per cent of the total, and only one or two would be added to small ‘clusters’ of single-member constituencies. Single-member constituencies would elect members by means of the alternative vote (AV), a highly majoritarian preferential system used for the Australian House of Representatives.3 Electoral systems scholars critical of the Jenkins Commission have argued that it ‘took a perfectly reasonable electoral system [MMP] and mangled it in such a way as to compromise its proportional credentials, expose its operation to manipulation, and introduce the possibility of highly unpredictable outcomes’ (Dyer 1999: 156) and that AV+ is ‘an unnecessarily complex and only marginally proportional variant’ (Shugart 1999: 144). Indeed, AV+ could more realistically be called a diluted majoritarian electoral system,

3 AV is also used to elect the parliaments of Fiji and Papua New Guinea.


rather than a form of proportional representation, despite the presence of compensatory list seats. The Jenkins Commission’s reluctance to recommend Germany or New Zealand’s roughly 50:50 ratio of constituency to list MPs, with national-level compensation, may reflect Prime Minister Blair’s misgivings about genuine PR – as journalist Andrew Rawnsley put it, the use of the word ‘independent’ in the commission’s title was ‘a joke to be enjoyed by those who knew the truth’ (2000: 203). It was also, however, symptomatic of the British bias against list-elected representatives. Concerns about the introduction of ‘second-class’ list MPs arose in the House of Commons debate on the electoral system to be used for the new assemblies in Scotland and Wales. Both Labour and Conservative MPs argued that the list MPs would be loyal primarily to their party leadership so that they could secure safe list positions (Judge 1999: 186). Even the commonly used British term for a mixedmember electoral system, the ‘additional member system’, is valueladen, implying that constituency-elected members of bodies elected by this system are normal or ‘default’ members and the ‘additional’ list members are added in just to ‘top up’ the party numbers. The Arbuthnott Commission in Scotland rejected the term AMS in favour of ‘mixed-member system’ to describe the Scottish Parliament’s electoral system (Arbuthnott 2006: 73). While Jenkins did not want the list MPs to be seen as ‘second grade’, as he calls it (1998: para. 135), his preoccupation with retaining a primarily single-member constituency system could be seen as enhancing, rather than reducing, the legitimacy problem for list MPs. Indeed, Jenkins’s counterparts on New Zealand’s Royal Commission on the Electoral System insisted that about half of all MPs be elected from lists, primarily to avoid a ‘second-class MP’ status for list MPs (Wallace 1986: 66). In contrast to the recent British approach of ‘managed’ inquiry into the merits of electoral reform, with an outcome crafted to suit the government, New Zealand’s more genuinely independent Royal Commission’s unexpectedly radical proposal found no immediate favour with politicians.

Mixed-member systems in comparative perspective New Zealand’s abandonment of SMP serves as an example of the operation of a genuinely proportional mixed-member electoral system in a country with a strong British cultural heritage. After a 1993 referendum, New Zealand’s voters chose the German-style alternative


recommended by the Royal Commission. Called Mixed Member Proportional (not AMS), it follows the German format of two votes on the ballot, one for a constituency member and one for a party list, so that splitting the vote between two parties would be allowed. MMP was implemented in time for the next general election in 1996, and was used again in 1999 and 2002. Despite the intentions of the Royal Commission, MMP in its early years still elicited the public perception that party list MPs are somehow ‘second class’ and less legitimate than constituency MPs (Ward 1998: 125). ‘Given New Zealand’s traditional attachment to single-member constituencies, it has proven very difficult for a new political culture to evolve that is understood and accepted by citizens and elites alike’, according to Leigh Ward (1998: 142). In defence of list MPs, co-leader of the Greens and list MP himself Rod Donald claims that list MPs perform, in addition to national policy advocacy, many local service functions, as they are assigned to locations where parties do not have constituency MPs (Donald 1998). Donald’s actions live up to the expectations of the Royal Commission, which anticipated that list MPs would ‘attach themselves’ to geographical constituencies or regions they way German list MPs do (Wallace 1986: 66). The Commission, echoing its British counterpart from 1976, hoped to retain the MP-constituent link, which it considered a ‘healthy feature of our system which protects the rights of citizens and enhances the historic role of Parliament in attending to grievances’ (Wallace 1986: 20). The New Zealand approach of using roughly a 50:50 ratio of constituency to list MPs, while not without its own controversy, attempts to embrace list MPs, rather than consign them to a marginal role in the political system, as the Jenkins Commission envisaged. New Zealand was not the only country to consider MMP or a related electoral system. Mixed-member systems became ‘fashionable’ around the world in the 1990s, having been adopted by 30 countries as of 2004, including Italy, Hungary, Russia, Japan, and Mexico (Reynolds et al. 2005: 23). Table 2.7 illustrates the diversity of the world of mixedmember systems. According to Louis Massicotte and André Blais, ‘mixed systems are not confined to countries of little size or importance’, since they include members of the G8 group of industrialised countries (Massicotte and Blais 1999: 345–6). While list PR is the most popular single family of electoral systems, constituting 35.2 per cent of the 199 countries and territories studied by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) in 2004, mixed-member systems (MMP and parallel, according to its terminology) account for

40 Proportional Representation and the Constituency Role in Britain Table 2.7 Global distribution of mixed-member systems for national legislative elections, 2004 Africa

Asia

Europe

Former USSR

Latin America

Oceania

Guinea

East Timor

Albania

Armenia

Bolivia

New Zealand

Lesotho

Japan

Andorra

Azerbaijan

Mexico Venezuela

Senegal

South Korea

Germany

Georgia

Seychelles

Pakistan

Hungary

Kazakhstan

Tunisia

Philippines

Italy*

Lithuania

Taiwan

Monaco

Russia

Thailand

Tajikistan Ukraine*

Source: Reynolds et al. 2005. Note: Lower (or only) house elections *Italy and Ukraine had switched to list PR for elections in 2006

15.1 per cent of the world’s countries and territories (Reynolds et al. 2005: 30). The authors note that since the mid-1990s, the most common change in electoral systems has been from majoritarian (plurality/majority) to mixed, as part of what they call a ‘rather clear’ trend towards more proportionality (Reynolds et al. 2005: 23). Mixed-member electoral systems are based on the model of elections to the German Bundestag since 1949, although imperial Germany and Denmark briefly used mixed-member systems before 1920, and the Bundestag’s model was the result of learning from Landtag elections in Allied occupation zones of the late 1940s (Massicotte and Blais 1999: 343). The defining characteristic of mixed-member systems, according to Massicotte and Blais, is the use of two contradictory electoral formulas – a majoritarian system and party list PR – for the same body (1999: 343). According to Matthew Shugart and Martin Wattenberg, however, mixed-member systems are multiple-tier electoral systems in which ‘one tier must entail allocation of seats nominally whereas the other must entail allocation of seats by lists’ (2001a: 10; emphasis in original). In other words, in each geographic area, voters elect representatives by name as well as by party label. This is usually accomplished, as Massicotte and Blais indicate, by using the British-style single-member plurality or the French-style two-round system for the nominal tier,


and closed party list PR for the list tier, in which voters cannot indicate a preference for individual candidates but must accept the party’s list as ranked. In some countries the overall outcome of mixed-member system elections is proportional on a partisan basis because the party list deputies are allocated in a way that compensates for disproportionality arising from the majoritarian component of the electoral system, while in other countries there is no compensatory element. For example, Germany’s mixed system allows voters to choose a representative in a single-member constituency by plurality while delivering a proportional overall outcome on a partisan basis (MMP), while other mixedmember systems are only semi-proportional due to the fact that the overall composition of the legislatures elected is not proportional to the party vote, as is the case in Japan and Russia. Called ‘parallel’ systems by some authors (Reynolds et al. 2005: 29), and mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) by others (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001a: 13), here the single-member constituency and multimember constituency portions of the elections are not linked, so the party list seats do not compensate for any disproportional results in the single-member constituency component of the election. The mixed-member electoral system used for the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales is compensatory on a regional basis (there are eight electoral regions in Scotland and five in Wales) and for the Greater London Assembly it is MMP London-wide, while in the German states of Brandenburg and Hesse, party list seats compensate for disproportionality on the state-wide level. The German electoral system fascinates political experts in many countries (Jesse 1988: 121). Most of these experts seem to admire the system, perhaps because of Germany’s recovery and prosperity after the Second World War, not to mention the stability of the country’s party and political system. On a more specific level, the German mixedmember system’s retention of single-member constituencies is particularly appealing to supporters of PR in Britain and countries with a British colonial heritage. Germany’s electoral system is sometimes described as a hybrid of first-past-the-post (plurality) and PR, giving the mistaken impression that the results are not proportional overall. The reality is that the German electoral system is very much a form of PR, and has been called ‘personalised PR’ by some authors (Kaase 1984). German voters have two votes on their ballot papers (Inter Nationes 1986: 6–7). The first vote (Erststimme) is for a constituency representative; the candidate with the most votes (a plurality) wins the seat.


However, only half of the Bundestag seats represent single-member constituencies. The second vote (Zweitstimme), for a party list, is the vote that determines the overall partisan composition of the entire Bundestag. A party is entitled to a proportion of Bundestag seats equal to the percentage of nationwide second votes it receives. The previously mentioned constituency seats are simply subtracted from a party’s entitlement, leaving the remainder to be filled from party lists within the federal states. One important condition, however, is that parties must win at least 5 per cent of the nationwide second vote, or three constituency seats, in order to obtain list seats. New Zealand also applies a 5 per cent, or one constituency seat, threshold to its 120-seat House of Representatives elections. Those who advocate mixed-member systems point to the advantage of retaining the single-member constituency, with its potential for personal representation and accountability, combined with proportional representation on a partisan basis, to reflect more accurately how voters cast their votes. Matthew Shugart and Martin Wattenberg, in their edited volume Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds? state that ‘the best of both worlds could be summarized as disciplined national parties whose individual legislators can be held accountable for their articulation of local interests’ (2001b: 582). In other words, these authors argue that PR is associated with cohesive, national parties with coherent policy programmes, while plurality voting in single-member constituencies should encourage representatives to focus on their geographical area through the mechanism of personal accountability. Therefore, MMP is seen as the ideal way to ‘put a human face’ on proportional representation by some political scientists and commentators, particularly in countries with a strong tradition of constituency representation. Among this community are British political scientists Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts, who argue that mixed-member systems will give ‘the accountability strengths of plurality rule in single-member constituencies with the offsetting proportional qualities of regional or national lists’ (1995: 26). Despite the claims of their ability to personalise PR and enhance accountability, however, most of these mixed-member systems do not allow voters to choose between candidates of the same party. This means that party organisations, either at the constituency, regional, or national level, are in charge of nominations to single-member constituency contests and the rankings of candidate lists that are closed to voter alteration (although Bavarian Landtag elections use open lists). Therefore, the personal element in mixed-member systems is some-


what superficial compared to other ‘personalised’ electoral systems, such as STV or open-list PR systems. The latter electoral systems appear to be more genuinely personalised on account of allowing voters to select from among several candidates of their chosen party, rather than simply accepting the one candidate nominated, or a closed list of candidates. Unfortunately, a number of scholars have concluded that electoral systems that have high levels of intraparty preference voting often reduce party cohesion and increase parochialism and even corruption, since candidates must seek out personal preference votes (Ames 2001; Katz 1986). On the other hand, mixed-member systems are likely to be favoured by those political actors who are in the position to bring about electoral reform since these systems are inherently flexible in structure and proportionality, and the variants allow the parties to retain a prominent role in the determination of candidates for legislative office. This role for parties in mixed-member systems may be a concern to those who believe that party organisations are already too strong, however. Venezuela adopted a form of MMP in the late 1980s, with reformers hoping that the single-member constituency element of the system would reduce the power of established interests that had penetrated the party system and society, described as ‘partyarchy’ (Coppedge 1994). Researchers were surprised to find that Venezuelan deputies elected in single-member constituencies ‘built ties with the established interests that have been integrated into party machineries’ anyway (Kulishek and Crisp 2001: 430). Therefore, mixed-member systems, in themselves, may not reduce the grip of strong parties. Results could be different in other contexts, particularly when sub-groups of parties at the constituency level (‘selectorates’) choose constituency candidates with minimal interference from national party headquarters, like the situation in Germany. Yet while minimal interference in candidate selection used to be the case in Britain, the trend in the late 1990s was for more of a role by central party headquarters in this process, especially in the case of the Labour Party. Although an effort was made to increase the involvement of party members in the selection of candidates, Labour was committed to increasing the number of female candidates in winnable seats, with the use of ‘twinned’ constituencies each selecting a male and female candidate in Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly elections (Hopkin and Bradbury 2006: 140). Furthermore, John Hopkin and Jonathan Bradbury argue that the apparent ‘“democratization” of the selection process was in part offset by the institution of a central


approved list of prospective candidates, which allowed the party leadership to “vet” applicants and exclude those they considered to be troublemakers’ (2006: 140). Troublemakers could also be eliminated by the central party headquarters using the list PR system to push undesirable candidates down the party lists to unelectable positions. The opportunity to deal with awkward or ‘off-message’ MEP candidates this way presented itself with the change to closed-list PR for European Parliament elections in 1999. The list PR portion of the MMP system for Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly elections also provided an opportunity for eliminating troublemakers.

A constituency role for list representatives? The 1999 row over MSP allowances in Scotland was an early indication not only of political expediency, however, but also of how little thought had been given to the constituency role that might be assumed by regional list MSPs. In one of its first debates, the Scottish Parliament tackled the contentious matter of Labour’s proposal that list MSPs receive a substantially lower office allowance, arguing that the SNP proposal of equal allowances for list MSPs was a waste of taxpayers’ money. The Labour MSP who introduced her party’s office allowance plan, Karen Whitefield, spoke at length about her commitment to serving the needs and interests of her constituency. She claimed not only that ‘the nationalists and Tories are lining up to enter what appears to be a cosy alliance to call for better resources for themselves’ in the form of equal office allowances for list MSPs, but also that the ‘people of Airdrie and Shotts gave me a clear mandate to represent them, and them alone. It is my constituency office that they will visit and my surgeries that they will attend. I alone am accountable to the people of Airdrie and Shotts’ (Scottish Parliament 1999: col. 297). Another Labour constituency MSP, Mary Mulligan, argued in the same vein that ‘most people will come to the constituency MSP first…I will represent all Linlithgow constituents, whether they voted for me or not. I am sure that other constituency MSPs feel the same way’ (Scottish Parliament 1999: col. 304). These constituency MSPs’ assumptions about which representatives voters would seek out for addressing their problems were not shared by list MSPs. Based on the speeches of list MSPs during the allowances debate, it is clear that list MSPs expected that they, too, would assume a constituency role, as SNP list MSP Michael Russell argued. ‘It is fair to say that every member will work as a constituency member. Indeed,


members from lists will work over much larger constituencies…There might well be a need to provide more resources for those people’ Russell claimed, referring to the Scotland Act 1998 which created the Scottish Parliament (Scottish Parliament 1999: col. 283–4). List MSPs, only recently elected, saw Labour’s allowance proposal as a threat to their assumption of a constituency role. Conservative list MSP Bill Aitken claimed that Labour ‘is seeking to deny resources to the opposition parties to prevent their operating effectively in areas that it regards as its own baronial fiefdom’ (Scottish Parliament 1999: col. 302). In a rare display of agreement between the Tories and the SNP, nationalist MSP Kay Ullrich stated that Labour was trying ‘to stifle all opposition and to deny the people of Scotland the right of access to the MSP of their choice’ (Scottish Parliament 1999: col. 303). The heart of the matter was summarised by Conservative list MSP John Young during the debate: ‘There is a problem. The idea of list MSPs was introduced and approved at Westminster. The problem is that nobody specified what the duties of a list MSP would be. We know the constituency MSPs’ duties, as we know what Westminster MPs do, but what are the list MSPs supposed to do?’ (Scottish Parliament 1999: col. 313–14). This question, perhaps the most important in the debate, was only partially addressed by constituency MSPs. For her part, Mary Mulligan mentioned scrutiny of the Executive and the drafting of legislation, implying that list MSPs might have a more prominent part to play in those activities: ‘There is a role for constituency and list MSPs – but the role is slightly different. There is no question of there being two classes of MSP, which has been suggested’ (Scottish Parliament 1999: col. 305). Yet most constituency MSPs simply reiterated their assumption that while Scots would have eight MSPs (one for their constituency and seven for their region), most citizens would avoid the list variety when it came to getting their grievances redressed. ‘Anyone can see that I will be the first port of call, the first person to whom people will come – I am not saying that I am the only person – and that there will be a clear difference between my responsibilities and those of the seven list members’ said Johann Lamont, a Labour constituency MSP who failed to elaborate on what this ‘clear difference’ would be (Scottish Parliament 1999: col. 319). ‘List members were brought here to provide political balance’, stated Mike Watson, a Labour constituency MSP who mentioned what was probably on the minds of many in the chamber (Scottish Parliament 1999: col. 322). In a less subtle way, Labour constituency MSP Andy Kerr revealed a similar answer to the question of the list MSPs’ main


function. ‘List MSPs were elected to achieve proportionality. They are equal in the job, but in a different job…List MSPs and constituency MSPs play different roles in the community’ (Scottish Parliament 1999: col. 324). Kerr does not, however, elaborate upon what he believes actually is the proper role for list MSPs beyond ‘topping up’ the numbers in the Scottish Parliament; he simply states that his role is ‘to look after the interests of the people of East Kilbride’, and ‘we do not need another MSP simply shadowing that role at the taxpayers’ expense’ (Scottish Parliament 1999: col. 323; emphasis added).

Shadowing The term ‘shadowing’ is sometimes used to describe the performance of constituency service functions by party list representatives, who may be assigned by their parties to one or more constituencies not represented by their party, and/or who plan to stand for election as a constituency representative there in the future. In New Zealand after the introduction of MMP in 1996, the term ‘shadow MPs’ was applied to those list MPs who were assigned by their parties to geographical constituencies (called ‘electorates’ in that country) where they often ‘encountered some resistance from the electorate MPs’ (Ward 1998: 137). Some constituency members may question the ability of a list member to have the same level of commitment to serving a geographical constituency, or they may simply feel territorial about their particular ‘patch.’ Others may resent seeing the person they defeated in the constituency element of the election sitting across from them in parliament, rather than disappearing ‘until the next election campaign’ (Watson 2001a: 113). Even worse, many in the Labour Party feared that opposition ‘SNP list members would establish their own office in the individual constituency which they intended to contest at the 2003 election, and would then, free from constituency casework, wage a full-time political campaign over the ensuing four years against the Labour incumbents’ (Watson 2001a: 21). Therefore, the potential for the shadowing of Labour constituency MSPs may have been the crucial factor in the desire of the Labour Party in Scotland to reduce the office allowance for list MSPs. While Karen Whitefield’s proposal that list MSPs get 60 per cent of the constituency MSP office allowance failed, a Liberal Democrat compromise amendment passed. The logic behind this proposal was to encourage list MSPs from the same party to share a regional office when a party has more than one list MSP in an electoral region. Only in cases where a party


has just one list MSP in a region does he or she receive an allowance comparable to that of a constituency MSP; if there are two or more list MSPs from one party, the allowance for each MSP is calculated by adding one full allowance and the sum of 30 per cent of the full office allowance for each additional MSP, and dividing it by the total number of regional list MSPs (Scottish Parliament 1999: col. 301). According to the successful amendment’s sponsor, Margaret Smith, one regional constituency office for a party’s regional members ‘maintains the link with the constituency the MSP was elected to serve and reduces the amount of public money that is spent on what might prove an unnecessary, and possibly confusing, plethora of political offices’ (Scottish Parliament 1999: col. 300). The potential for problems to arise from conflicts between list and constituency MSPs was also dealt with in an annex to the Code of Conduct for Members of the Scottish Parliament: called ‘Relationships between MSPs: Guidance from the Presiding Officer’, in which it is emphasised that ‘regional Members have responsibility to all those in the region for which they were elected’; to facilitate this goal, list MSPs are ‘expected to work in more than 2 constituencies within their region’ (Scottish Parliament 2000: 96). Furthermore, ‘Regional Members must not describe themselves as a “local” Member for (or having a particular interest in) only part of the region for which they were elected’ (2000: 95; emphasis in original). While the Scottish Parliament is clearly trying to prevent the conflicts with constituency MSPs that might arise from shadowing by list MSPs, it does appear to recognise that list MSPs have a right to serve constituents residing in their electoral regions. However, there is some question about voters who failed to elect a member from their party of choice, in either their constituency or electoral region. The Greens and the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) only won a single seat each in 1999, in two separate regions. The leader of the SSP, Tommy Sheridan, was brought before the Scottish Parliament’s standards committee by a constituency MSP who alleged that Sheridan improperly took up the case of a woman in her constituency, which lies outside his Glasgow electoral region (Horsburgh 2001). Sheridan claimed that the woman, a member of the SSP, asked for his intervention in the housing dispute with a local authority because her constituency MSP was not doing enough to help her. In most instances, however, voters will have someone they voted for among the eight MSPs who represent them, since there is at least one MSP from each of the four main parties in most of Scotland’s electoral


regions (but not all, which could lead to more cases of MSPs assisting people outside their constituencies or regions). Some observers have predicted that in time, constituents who are strongly partisan will approach MSPs from the party they support, going to list MSPs when the constituency MSP is someone they voted against. ‘Constituency MSPs need not see this in any sense as a threat, since they cannot lose votes from people who did not originally vote for them. The floating or non-voter has a wide choice and will more often approach their directly elected constituency MSP, who is likely to have built a local profile through general activity and holding surgeries in the constituency’, according to Mike Watson, formerly a Glasgow constituency MSP, who also notes that German voters tend to approach representatives from parties they voted for (2001a: 116–17). In Germany, parties assign list deputies to geographical constituencies where they failed to win seats, even to the point of sending candidates who lost in the constituency element of the election to open offices in those exact constituencies where they lost (Klingemann and Wessels 2001: 291). The entire concept of constituency could also evolve as a consequence of the new party list representatives. While British tradition views a constituency as a small geographical location, it is possible that party list representatives, elected from regions about eight times the size of typical Westminster constituencies, could break down these regions by focusing on organised interests within their regions. In New Zealand, the late Green list MP Rod Donald represented what he called ‘a number of constituencies of interest’ referring to his party’s allocation of portfolios (1998: 48). His account of how MMP was beginning to operate in his country’s political system goes on to say that part of his job was ‘to liaise with all the sector groups concerned with each portfolio’ (his included employment, skills training, trade, tourism, and constitutional reform), which implies that interest groups are acting as non-geographical constituencies (Donald 1998: 48). The evolution of the notion of constituency, the result of competition between constituency and list representatives, and the resolution of the controversy over having a system in which members of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly are elected in two different way are worthy of study, and not only because they are interesting for students of British politics. These matters also allow for a test of how important rational choice considerations are to politicians – do those elected from single-member constituencies work harder than their listelected counterparts for personal votes from constituents? Do those elected from party lists perform a similar level of constituency service


out of a culturally based sense of duty, or do they focus on other tasks, lacking an electoral incentive to cultivate strong ties to a constituency? Can shadowing be considered a rational activity, or is it more rational to be a strong partisan and maintain a safe list position? Later chapters will address these questions with empirical evidence gathered from surveys of British and German representatives, but Chapter 3 will analyse the electoral incentives of these representatives in greater detail.

3 Representative Roles and Electoral Incentives

This chapter explains the importance of the constituency role for elected representatives in Britain and how this role, plus the role as party representative, evolved over time in the context of a reactive legislature. It also examines the scholarly arguments surrounding constituency service that will be tested in later chapters of this book. Some scholars argue that it is the very weakness of Parliament as a policyinfluencing body that encourages so many of its members to perform large amounts of constituency service. The link between British Members of Parliament (MPs) and their constituents, while considered almost sacred by many British pundits and politicians, turns out to be far weaker than is commonly believed when subjected to critical analysis, yet the myth of constituency service plays a major role in the country’s debate over electoral reform. Furthermore, the performance of constituency service cannot be solely attributed to some intrinsic ‘cultural’ value to the elected representative. Closer analysis of the assumption that the MP-constituent link is important implies a rudimentary rational choice argument: the way in which representatives are elected affects how those representatives will behave. Therefore, ‘good constituency MPs’ should reap electoral rewards at the next election, while bad ones can be held personally accountable. Critics of proportional representation (PR) almost invariably invoke this logic when they claim that the multimember constituencies required by PR systems remove the electoral incentive for representatives to be directly accountable to their constituents, thus diminishing their constituency role. Aside from this role as servants of their constituents, however, British MPs also play a role as representatives of their parties. Arguably, this is the far more important role politically – MPs usually vote the 50

Representative Roles and Electoral Incentives 51

party line on parliamentary bills and back this position in public. In a parliamentary system of government, as in Britain, the executive depends on at the least the toleration of a majority of MPs in order to retain office. Party discipline ensures that MPs remain loyal most of the time, but loyalty can sometimes be a problem, as Tony Blair came to discover during his time as Prime Minister, when Labour backbench rebellions became commonplace. Usually, British MPs are quite partisan, but there are times when party loyalty might conflict with an MP’s constituency role – the MP might feel that voting the party line is bad for his or her constituents. Enhanced constituency service, however, could help MPs deal with the tension between the two roles, and perhaps even cultivate a personal vote – electoral appeal independent of partisan considerations – that could help in a close re-election contest. In reality, however, British voters tend to pass judgement on MPs not as constituency servants, but as party representatives. This practice, of using the vote to influence who will govern, has been the habit of British voters since the development of the modern party system in the late nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the role of British elected representatives as constituency servants is often highlighted by politicians and journalists in the debate over electoral reform, and the link between representatives and constituents could possibly be useful in integrating an increasingly disengaged public back into conventional politics. Furthermore, the use of PR, with its multimember constituencies, could actually enhance constituency service by forcing representatives to compete over the activity, giving constituents more choice in the process. This could mean that, contrary to the objections of PR’s opponents, multimember constituencies used in a British context might actually improve the quality of British democracy. The perceived need for some kind of constituency link explains the choice by most British advocates of PR of the single transferable vote (STV) or mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral systems. STV allows voters to rank candidates, standing in multimember constituencies, in order of their preference, while MMP normally allows voters to choose both a candidate in a single-member constituency and a party list for a region or the nation as a whole. The MMP system allows politicians to stand as constituency candidates and/or on party lists. This dual-track route for entry into a legislature has interesting implications for potentially splitting the constituency and partisan roles of representatives elected via this system. The experience of Germany in attempting to create a constituency role, in addition to the partisan role, for


elected representatives with the introduction of an MMP system after the Second World War shows that such electoral engineering is possible, and that British fears of multimember constituencies and ‘second-class’ elected representatives might be exaggerated.

The constituency role in Britain The constituency role for British MPs has evolved over the centuries. Historically, monarchs had full executive and legislative powers over the realm, but consultation with Parliament gradually developed. In England, counties sent two knights of the shire, and boroughs sent two burgesses, to the House of Commons (Pulzer 1967: 14). By the second half of the thirteenth century, MPs were ‘empowered both to speak for the whole county and to make promises which would be regarded as binding on the whole county’ (Birch 1971: 27). In addition to this parliamentary role of agent, MPs gradually assumed the role of constituency advocate as Parliament became more and more successful in obtaining ‘redress of grievances before supply’, or the granting of revenue to the Crown (Birch 1971: 28). ‘For hundreds of years, high policy was addressed elsewhere, while the Commons concentrated on representing local matters arising from unsatisfactory administrative, fiscal, or social circumstances’ explains Donald Searing, noting that only in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did the role of constituency advocate become less salient, to be rediscovered in the twentieth (1994: 122–3). The growth of the welfare state in the twentieth century, particularly since the 1960s, was accompanied by a big increase in constituency service, thanks to the demands of voters and political parties (Norton 1994: 714–18). ‘The modern role of the Constituency Member is, in fact, a new version of a very old role that had been neglected for some time’, and was, Searing claims, ‘revived by the demands of the Welfare State and refurbished by the backbenchers who set out most enthusiastically to meet those demands’ (Searing 1994: 123). According to Philip Norton and David Wood, the demands of constituency service almost overwhelm MPs (1993: 156). Constituency servants today can be broken down into two main categories, which Searing labels ‘welfare officers’ and ‘local promoters’ (1994: 124). Welfare officers are MPs ‘whose primary focus falls on individual constituents and their difficulties with housing, pensions, or whatever problems they may bring to the surgery’, the British term for an MP’s consultations with residents of the constituency, while local promoters are those who ‘concentrate primarily on collective concerns of the constituency as a whole, or of sectors within it,


on matters such as industrial development, unemployment, or securing a road bypass’ (Searing 1994: 124). Anecdotal accounts by Cain et al. (1987), Searing (1994), and other researchers reveal that despite the demanding nature of the work, many British MPs actually like to do constituency service and take it seriously. In this view, MPs see themselves as advocates for their constituencies, acting on behalf of their residents’ needs and seeking redress of their grievances. The link between MP and constituents is seen by most MPs as something akin to sacred, according to Ivor Crewe, who notes that ‘Hard-boiled politicians become almost dewyeyed about the “sacred trust” and “indissoluble bond” between Members and their local constituents’ (1985: 45). Norton and Wood even warn that ‘To sever that link would serve to undermine the legitimacy of the House of Commons’ (1993: 155). These views suggest that British representatives perform constituency service out of a sense of duty, and not primarily for electoral gain. Furthermore, the most direct link is that between the single-member constituency MP and his or her constituents, according to much of the British and Commonwealth commentary on this topic. As British politics scholar K.C. Wheare puts it, it is possible that a member who drew much of his support from a particular part of a multi-member constituency might be able to maintain contact with that part. Generally speaking, however, the system of multi-member constituencies, which proportional representation requires, renders more difficult any close contact between the member and his constituents (1963: 72). This way of thinking has been questioned, however, by critics looking at the historical record and at the attitudes of British people today.

Questioning the link between MPs and constituents While the single-member constituency appears, on the surface, to have some advantage in terms of personal accountability, the ‘sacred link’ between representatives and constituents in this system is dubious, according to a critical historical analysis. Although there is a tradition of small constituencies, the single-member constituency did not become predominant in British elections until after the 1885 Reform Act. From the time of Simon de Montfort’s Parliament of 1265 to the eve of the Great Reform Act in 1832, almost all constituencies in


England returned two MPs to the House of Commons (Carstairs 1980: 190). The representation of ‘natural’ communities, regardless of the number of electors therein, was the goal (Steed 1985: 272). The Great Reform Act did not equalise the number of electors in each constituency, but instead redistributed the constituencies so that the over-represented south of England had fewer of them, and the underrepresented north had more (Pulzer 1967: 16–17). The electoral system used with the multimember constituencies of this period (and still used in some English and Welsh council elections) is called the block vote, a plurality system in which each voter has as many votes as there are seats to be elected, and the successful candidates are the top vote winners (the top two in a two-member constituency, for example). Franchise extension, being implemented very gradually in nineteenth-century Britain, would bring political consequences, however, and the politicians were aware of them. The problem for the Conservatives was that the block vote system tends to exaggerate the disproportionality between seats and votes on a partisan basis, because most voters vote for candidates of the same party when there is strong party loyalty among the electorate (Reynolds et al. 2005: 44). By the late nineteenth century, a mass party system was evolving in Britain. According to Gary Cox, voters were becoming more partisan, as indicated by his analysis of split voting (votes cast for candidates of different parties in two-member constituencies), particularly by the late 1860s (Cox 1987: 103–5). Cox argues that this partisanship within the electorate coincided with the rise of a party-controlled Cabinet as the originator of legislation: ‘The private MP had become insignificant in the determination of policy – whether of a general or a local nature – by the 1860s, and voters responded to this by using their votes to determine what did matter: party control of the executive’ (Cox 1987: 136). A candidate’s party label was what mattered, not his personal characteristics, which had mattered when Britain had a more elitist party system based on a limited electoral franchise. This party-oriented electorate, and the potential for expanding it into the working class, posed a significant challenge to the Conservatives. Because single-member constituencies were seen as more beneficial to the representation of minority opinion, and the wealthy would, with franchise extensions, become a minority of the electorate, ‘the best safeguard appeared to the Tories at the time to be the adoption of numerous single-member constituencies’ to protect them from the potentially devastating effects that could have resulted from the


block vote in multimember constituencies full of newly enfranchised working-class men (Carstairs 1980: 192). The 1885 Reform Act introduced a largely single-member constituency system for parliamentary elections, eliminating most two-member constituencies, so that only twenty-four remained (Cox 1987: 95). Therefore, the Conservative preference for single-member constituencies appeared to arise more from the desire to protect the party from electoral oblivion than from any need to enhance personal accountability among MPs, as defenders of single-member plurality (SMP) might argue today. Furthermore, single-member constituencies were not universally supported by those who sought electoral reform in late nineteenth-century Britain. John Stuart Mill, among others, instead advocated STV, which would have retained natural communities and multimember constituencies, with varying numbers of MPs that would be based upon the size of each local electorate. Rather than giving voters as many votes as there were candidates in each constituency, however, voters would have one vote that could be transferred in case they failed to elect their first choice of candidate. STV is a preferential system in which voters rank candidates 1, 2, 3 and so on, with a quota used to determine which candidates win the seats. Votes are transferred, both from failed candidates, as well as from winning candidates with a ‘surplus’. Because most voters are partisan and give their first few preferences to candidates from the same party, STV provides for results that are proportional to the party label of the first preferences of the voters (Carstairs 1980: 39). PR on a partisan basis was not the attribute that reformers like Mill cared about, however; he supported STV because voters are able to choose from among candidates on a personal, rather than a partisan, basis (Carstairs 1980: 194). Parties will usually nominate as many candidates as there are seats in a constituency, and independent candidates may stand. This extension of voter choice reduces the power of party organisations to get their preferred candidates elected; while parties still nominate candidates, the final selection is done by the voters, based upon the quotas received by candidates, and independent candidates are not at a major disadvantage. Despite being the preferred option for many British electoral reform advocates to this day, partially because of the greater choice (among candidates of the same party) available to voters, as well as proportionality on a partisan basis, STV failed to become the system for electing British MPs. Instead, single-member constituencies emerged as part of a political compromise over franchise extension, redistribution (boundary


changes), and electoral system between Liberal and Conservative leaders (Steed 1985: 274–6). The chosen electoral reform, SMP, was quite unusual in the wider European context. While other European political elites, under pressure from demands to expand the franchise, chose PR systems around the beginning of the twentieth century, the British simply modified their existing medieval plurality system. It was rational for the Conservatives to support an SMP system if they believed they would remain one of the largest parties after future franchise extensions; as Josep Colomer puts it, ‘the large will prefer the small and the small will prefer the large’, referring to assembly size, district magnitude (number of representatives elected per constituency), and vote quotas for seat allocation (Colomer 2005: 2; emphasis in original). With the later appearance of the Labour Party, with its potential to split the ‘progressive’ vote with the Liberals, the Conservatives made the correct decision (Rustin 1985: 133–4). The Liberals, however, miscalculated badly, being divided over the question of PR until it was too late. As Labour overtook the Liberals, it changed its policy on the electoral system from support for PR to opposition, while the Liberals came to support PR. Unsurprisingly to those who believe that rational choice considerations motivate politicians, from the middle of the twentieth century, British political parties came to support the electoral system they thought best served their interests, regardless of how ‘sacred’ the constituency role of representatives was. Many in the Labour Party, however, do claim that the single-member constituency is crucial. Summarising Labour Party deliberations over the question of electoral reform in the 1990s, Raymond Plant argues that the party would oppose STV with its multimember constituencies because of the ‘vast geographical size’ that could overshadow the ‘natural geographical community which has been important historically in the British view of representation’; he also claims that the constituency link would become diluted in such constituencies because with competing MPs from different parties (or even from different factions of the same party), ‘the idea that an MP can speak on behalf of his or her constituents would become very controversial’ (Plant 1999: 74). Another Labour Party member, Peter Hain, argues for the importance of the single-member constituency in maintaining ‘local accountability to the community and to party members’ in his advocacy of the alternative vote (AV), a highly majoritarian and disproportional electoral system (1986: 94–5). AV is a preferential system, like STV, but it is not proportional because there can only be one winner.


Yet despite all the importance attached to it, not all British MPs actually enjoy constituency service. Before his retirement from Parliament in 2005, the late Labour MP Tony Banks referred to serving his constituents as ‘tedious’, saying: It’s 22 years of the same cases, but just the faces and the people changing. I found it intellectually numbing, tedious in the extreme. It might sound a little disparaging to say this about people’s lives and their problems and we did deal with them…but I got no satisfaction from this at all. I really didn’t. And all you were was a sort of high-powered social worker and perhaps not even a good one. So I won’t miss that (BBC News web site 2004). Banks was not alone in his feelings about constituency service. Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina report in The Personal Vote that some MPs in their study also questioned its value, believing that ‘they are being drawn away from the traditional debating and voting functions of Parliament’ (Cain et al. 1987: 92). Critics of the ‘sacred’ notion of the single-member constituency make other points as well. The modern-day requirement that singlemember constituencies be uniform in population size entails frequent boundary changes today in an era in which electoral equality matters, making any notion of ‘community’ somewhat artificial and fleeting, according to John Curtice (1992: 201–2). He also claims that strong traditions of constituency service exist in some multimember systems, such as Ireland. Indeed, one of the main criticisms of STV is that this system’s electoral incentives force candidates to become too beholden to their constituents, and that the resulting parochialism distracts MPs from national policy matters (Gallagher 1997: 87). Curtice also argues that personal accountability is questionable in Britain when one considers that most voters make their decisions on the basis of party labels, with most seats being safe on that basis (1992: 201–2). Other sceptical assessments of the value of the single-member constituency include that of Crewe, who claims that the ‘sacred link’ argument is based ‘on sentiment rather than evidence’ (1985: 45). He reports the results of surveys revealing that, at least in the early 1970s, most voters were unable to name anything their MP had done for the constituency or in Parliament, and almost half did not even know their MP’s name (1985: 54). Stuart Weir and David Beetham report evidence from later years showing that contact between MPs and constituents was still not very high; only 9.7 per cent of voters surveyed in the late


1980s had contact with their MP in the previous five years (1999: 70). Research for the Electoral Commission in the first decade of the twenty-first century shows a continuation of this pattern. Only 15 per cent of the people surveyed had contacted a local councillor or MP in the preceding two or three years to ‘present their views’ (Electoral Commission and the Hansard Society 2006: 34), although 24 per cent had contacted their councillor or MP at some point in the past (Electoral Commission and the Hansard Society 2006: 38). The same survey, conducted in 2005, also showed that only 44 per cent could correctly name their MP (Electoral Commission and the Hansard Society 2006: 37).

Weak legislatures and strong executives In spite of the arguments to the contrary, however, many British people believe that they can take a complaint to their local MP for redress, and there is a very good reason why Parliament is historically a place for the redress of grievances – it is a weak legislature. Many scholars have pointed out the legislative weakness of the British Parliament and the strength of the executive, the Cabinet. As Searing asserts, ‘The House of Commons is not a legislature. It does not make laws. It does, however, redress grievances’ (1985: 378). While Searing’s statement may be somewhat exaggerated, it does echo the classic description of the British system of government by Walter Bagehot: ‘The efficient secret of the English Constitution may be described as the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers’ [1867] (1966: 65). Gary Cox argues that this ‘efficient secret’, the development of Cabinet responsibility to Parliament, brought about a high level of party discipline among MPs (1987: 170). A similar trend took place across most of Europe during the rest of the nineteenth century. According to Gerhard Loewenberg and Samuel Patterson, ‘The typical European legislator no longer accepted explicit instructions from his constituents; he conceived of himself as acting in the national interest, yet his views of the national interest were formed in the context of partisan loyalty’ (1979: 179). R.H.S. Crossman notes in his introduction to a modern reprinting of Bagehot’s classic The English Constitution that while a nineteenth-century MP was ‘genuinely responsible to his own conscience and his own constituents’, today ‘the prime responsibility of the member is no longer to his conscience or to the elector, but to his party’ (Crossman 1966: 42–3). More


recently, Dunleavy and his colleagues argue that ‘loyalty by MPs to their party, in government or opposition, is the keystone of their political role and determines all or most of their conduct’ (Dunleavy et al. 1998:16). In Britain, the Cabinet is stronger than in most European democracies, making the legislative role of House of Commons members even weaker than that of its counterparts elsewhere. In fact, Cabinet dominance of Parliament is the main defining characteristic of Arend Lijphart’s majoritarian (or Westminster) model of democracy (1999: 10–12). Cabinet dominance of the legislature must be maintained through party discipline, which invokes the partisan role of MPs – ‘supporting the party under whose label he or she was elected, particularly as a supporter of the government or the official opposition’ (Rush 2001: 21–2). Sometimes, however, the demands of the partisan role conflict with an MP’s constituency role, since ‘an MP could not simultaneously be a delegate of his constituents and a party loyalist’ (Norton and Wood 1993: 26). In such instances the party whip may invoke the notion of the mandate because, as Birch notes, ‘it is not at first sight easy to justify a system in which the elected representative may be forced by his party managers to vote for a policy which is contrary to the apparent interests of his constituents, contrary to the prevailing opinion in his constituency, and contrary to his own personal judgement about what is best for the country’ (Birch 1971: 97). In these circumstances, MPs appear to be nothing more than delegates for their parties, although to be fair, party discipline is strong in most European parliamentary systems (Norton 1990), and rebellions have been on the increase in the British case, especially within the Labour Party since 1997 (Cowley and Stuart 2004). Some leeway may be allowed, as long as MPs vote the party line, according to Richard Katz: A British parliamentary candidate is selected primarily as a spokesman for his national party. So long as he is prepared to defend his party and its platform before the electorate and to support the party’s leaders on divisions in the House of Commons, the candidate personally may oppose them on some issues (1980: 100). Furthermore, many British MPs may not see any conflict between their constituency and partisan roles ‘because they perceive their constituency in terms of its local party organization’, overlooking the full diversity of opinion that exists, according to Loewenberg and Patterson (1979: 173).


Because of the level of party discipline in European democracies, almost all of which are parliamentary systems operating under a responsible party model, elected representatives behave not as trustees, but as delegates of their parties, according to Jacques Thomassen (1994: 248). Since political parties, not MPs, are the ‘key actors in the system of political representation’, as Thomassen puts it (1994: 249–50), the many prior investigations of the roles of legislators simply are not comparable to the British situation. Role studies of elected representatives go back to 1960s America, with The Legislative System by John Wahlke and colleagues (1962). They are perhaps best known for their typology of representational roles (Wahlke et al. 1962: 16) that uses the terms delegate (one who acts on the instructions of a group), trustee (one who acts freely, according to what the representative judges is best), and politico (a hybrid of delegate and trustee). Unlike in America, the strength of the British executive has forced MP roles to evolve from constituency delegate to modern party delegate; the short era of the Burkean trustee is long gone. However, the rediscovery of the constituency service role could actually be seen as a way for MPs, claiming to be non-partisan constituency servants, to conceal their partisan role. In an American congressional context, Richard Fenno argues that when Members of Congress ‘cultivate their constituencies’ in an attempt to gather and consolidate support in their electoral districts, they are showing their own ‘home style’ which consists of the representative’s allocation of resources, presentation skills, and explanation of Washington activities (1978: 32–3). Norton and Wood extend Fenno’s argument to the British context, where MPs may develop their own ‘home style’ in the form of enhanced constituency service ‘in an effort to sublimate constituents’ displeasure over their policy stances’ (1993: 147). Whether British MPs are succeeding in concealing their partisan roles with an effective constituency role – a ‘home style’ – is questionable. Recent research for the Electoral Commission shows that 41 per cent of people surveyed are satisfied with their own MP, with only 13 per cent dissatisfied, but 47 per cent did not give an opinion (Electoral Commission and the Hansard Society 2004: 2). When questioned about what constituents want from MPs, partisanship was not high on the list. Asked to choose from a list of ‘important qualities for an MP to have’, only 39 per cent of people surveyed chose party loyalty, while 54 per cent wanted their MP to have been brought up in the area he or she represents, and 58 per cent wanted their MP to be ‘independent-minded’, up 21 per cent from the response given to the


same question in 1983 (Electoral Commission and the Hansard Society 2006: 26). A desire for an independent-minded MP suggests that MPs are failing to conceal their partisan role from their constituents, who also appear to be getting more demanding about constituency service. Healey et al. found in their study of MPs that since 1997, the vast majority of MPs take constituency service seriously, noting that constituents are far less deferential (2005: 29). Modern constituency service, with its heavy constituent demands, strengthens party organisations ‘by removing national policy and parliamentary votes from the responsibility – and influence – of the individual MP’ (Anagnoson 1983: 172). Since 1997, British parties are emphasising constituency service even more, according to Oonagh Gay, who claims that these efforts at constituency contact are ‘part of the development of the permanent election campaign’ (2005: 63). Gay reports that while the House of Commons received about 10,000 letters per week in 1964, such correspondence had risen to 40,000 by 1997 (2005: 58). Dunleavy et al. suggest that overworked backbenchers ‘turn to “constituency work” as a tangible satisfaction in a badly defined and often frustrating career’, noting accusations that ‘whips, ministers and civil servants encourage MPs to act as local advocates because they know that constituency overload can drive out persistent scrutiny’ of government (1998: 16). Therefore, pressures from the party, as well as constituents, force many MPs into maintaining an active profile in their constituencies. Furthermore, MPs might aim to cultivate a personal vote, attracting voters for reasons not related to partisan considerations. While the personal vote is well known in countries like the United States, where there is less partisanship in voting for members of Congress than is the case in countries with parliamentary systems, British MPs have generally discounted the value of the personal vote (Cain et al. 1987). A study by Brian Gaines (1998) showed that the personal vote did not seem to matter much in British elections held between 1950 and 1992, and research by others cited in Chapter 1 of this book was also not supportive of the personal vote offering a strong electoral incentive to MPs seeking re-election (Curtice and Steed 1992; Norris 1997). On the other hand, the change in voting patterns since the early 1970s, with partisan de-alignment (Denver 2003: Chapter 4) and possibly new voting patterns altogether among the multitude of new elected bodies and electoral systems in the United Kingdom (Dunleavy 2005), added to the aforementioned decline of deference among voters might cause MPs to reconsider the utility of constituency service in cultivating a


personal vote. The ability of the Liberal Democrats to retain seats in recent years reflects the possibility of an ‘incumbency effect’, which even some Labour MPs appear to believe has helped them, according to Gay (2005: 63). While the electoral arena for Westminster elections has become more uncertain for participants in recent years, contests for seats in the devolved assemblies, bodies elected by new electoral systems, were even more unpredictable for candidates. In the regional list PR systems, as well as MMP, representatives might find ways to carve out constituencies to serve, and an electoral incentive might operate, but perhaps in a more complex way. Because voters can split their constituency and regional list votes in MMP elections, they can reward good constituency service without betraying party loyalty (Banducci and Karp 1998: 151–2). As Susan Banducci and Jeffrey Karp have pointed out in the New Zealand case, MMP has altered electoral incentives so that list-elected MPs might try to cultivate non-geographical constituencies, or they could prefer to target geographical singlemember constituencies to stand in at the next election because MPs elected there receive higher office allowances, as is also the case in Scotland (1998: 152). Therefore, while it might be rational for list-elected representatives simply to curry favour with the party organisation that ranks the list, in order to secure a high list position, a closer inspection reveals that a rational incentive – greater state-provided resources – exists in these cases that could be used for electioneering purposes. While this use of office allowances could be seen as an abuse of public funds, as Gay observes in the case of Westminster, the line between ‘non-partisan’ constituency work and campaigning is becoming increasingly blurred (2005: 64). Perhaps it is naïve to believe that there ever was such a line in the first place, or to believe that in this era of apparently disengaged voters and more unpredictable electoral outcomes, the use of constituency service would not become overtly party political. In any event, constituency service continues to play an important role in British politics, and this importance might be increasing. British politicians elected in single-member constituencies have an electoral incentive to provide constituency service, particularly if their constituency is marginal. In MMP elections, which combine SMP and list PR, the electoral incentive is more complex. Representatives can contest single-member constituency elections, list PR elections, or both in almost all the countries that use mixed-member systems. If contesting both elections (‘dual candidacy’), representatives seeking re-


election have electoral incentives both to serve geographical constituents in the single-member constituency being contested, and to please the party organisation that ranks the list, to obtain a high ranking. This incentive to serve constituents, grafted onto a PR system, was deliberately introduced in Germany (thanks to British influence) in an attempt to improve PR there after the Second World War.

The British role in electoral engineering in Germany A strong constituency role for elected representatives was seen by admirers of the British system, both at home and abroad, as a virtue. While PR itself was the subject of many attacks in the academic literature (Hermens 1941), other critics of the country’s previous party list PR electoral law believed that Germany, which had little tradition of constituency service, needed a ‘system [that] would build and strengthen the ties between the members of parliament and the citizens’ (Kaase 1984: 162). However, many political scientists argue that Germany’s MMP electoral system, now over 50 years old, has not accomplished the desired goal of ‘personalising proportional representation’, although there has been some dissent from the assumption that German constituency and party list representatives behave the same way. Recent evidence, to be reviewed below, suggests that those who introduced MMP to Germany were largely successful in their efforts to put a ‘human face’ on PR. Germany’s Reichstag did use single-member constituencies for the election of its deputies from 1871 to 1918, with universal manhood suffrage, but under a two-round runoff system that penalised the Social Democrats, who faced the leading candidate of the fragmented anti-socialist right in the second round of elections (Jesse 2000: 125). When universal suffrage was granted to both men and women with the introduction of the Weimar Republic, a large constituency, closed-list PR system was deliberately chosen by Social Democratic and leftist Liberal leaders to undermine the grip of conservative local bourgeois elites so that ‘There was no possible way for a deputy to be connected with a district’ and interfere with class consciousness (Suval 1985: 249). Consequently, there were complaints about the impersonal and remote nature of the relationship between Reichstag deputies and their constituents, and attempts were made to reform the system in the direction of greater personalisation before the rise of the National Socialists and the demise of Weimar (Jesse 2000: 126).


After Germany’s defeat in the Second World War, British occupation zone administrators insisted on reversing what they considered to be an impersonal representative tradition by requiring that municipal elections held in 1946 be predominantly candidate-based, but conceding a party list PR element at the request of the parties (Ebsworth 1960: 53–5). While there is a precedent for the mixed system in some German states (as well as in Denmark) prior to the Second World War, the British role in re-introducing a ‘human face’ to elections was crucial to its resurrection after the war. The mixed-member system was later applied to all state parliament (Landtag) elections in the British occupation zone, while military governments in the American and French zones allowed ‘pure’ list PR (Ebsworth 1960: 61–2). However, the British-inspired compromise model caught on with German authorities, so that in 1949 the first Bundestag election used an electoral system based on that of the Landtag of Lower Saxony, in the British zone (Ebsworth 1960: 65; 75). Whether the mixed system of constituency and party list representatives actually does enhance the relationship voters have with those they elect is the subject of some dispute in the literature. Max Kaase, a German critic, argues that ‘the initial expectations in designing the personalized PR system with respect to citizen deputy ties have certainly not materialized’ (1984: 163). Charlie Jeffery argues that ‘Germany does not provide a positive model of constituency representation’, claiming that ‘a continuous link between voters and MPs in a particular area does not have the significance attached to constituency representation in the UK’ (Jeffery 1998: 246). In addition, while many observers argue that German citizens generally do not distinguish between directly elected and party list representatives, little attention is paid to whether the two types of German representatives themselves behave differently. The received wisdom as far as the German public’s view of their elected representatives holds that there is no ‘caste’ system in which one type of member is seen as more legitimate than the other (Burkett 1985: 130). In fact, dual candidacy (constituency candidates being on party lists as well to ensure election) is the norm, with the ‘losing’ candidate in the direct constituency elections often winning a Bundestag seat from that constituency’s Land (federal state) party list. Louis Massicotte illustrates this electoral reality in Germany, where the vast majority (84.9 per cent) of Bundestag members elected in 2002 had stood both in constituencies and on party lists, and 97.0 per cent of Social Democrat and 83.5 per cent of Christian Democrat constituency candidates were also on their parties’ lists (2004: 73). This phenome-


non is one reason why Eckhard Jesse states that the voter ‘does not perceive the difference at all’ between the two different types of representatives (Jesse 1988: 120). Jesse is very critical of the two-vote system in Germany, claiming that it ‘does not lead…to a “personalizing” of the polling act’, and that ‘political participation is not promoted through the possibility of casting both votes differently. For it is really only the second vote which is decisive’, he argues, referring to the ballot’s party vote that determines each party’s overall seat entitlement (Jesse 1988: 120). Supporting Jesse’s claim, research indicates that most Germans vote for parties, not personalities (Roberts 1988: 115). According to Tony Burkett, ‘incumbent constituency members gain little advantage and, like their British counterparts, rarely hold on against national or regional trends. Evidence of a personal vote achieved by a conscientious concern for constituents’ problems is notable by its virtual absence’ (1985: 121). Some scholars also suggest that a personal relationship between German MPs and their constituents is weak or lacking because there are places other than the Bundestag for citizens to take their grievances, using the Land governments or Landtag deputies, or various legal channels and civic initiatives (Burkett 1985: 124–7). In this view, German and other continental European parliamentary deputies are not perceived as advocates for their constituents the way they are in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. For example, in Scandinavia, grievances are redressed through ‘legally-regulated appeal procedures’ (Särlvik 1983: 125–6). As Bo Särlvik explains, ‘there is simply not much room for a member of parliament to act as a “middle man” who assists his constituents in their private dealings with authorities’, dealings which would be seen in the Nordic countries as ‘attempts to exercise improper political influence on the due process of administrative law’ (1983: 126). However, it would be mistaken to assume that there is no link between German representatives and their constituents. British constitutional scholar Vernon Bogdanor may be exaggerating when he asserts that ‘Members of the Bundestag, unlike elected representatives in Britain, are not expected to involve themselves in constituency work’ (1999: 225). The evidence is very much to the contrary, even if the constituency role for German representatives is less important than it is for their British counterparts. German political scientist Werner Patzelt reports that in Germany, ‘it is obvious that for an MP the constituency work is a critical part of holding his office.


Consequently, the representatives devote about one-third of their working hours to constituency work’ (Patzelt 1997: 60). Indeed, Patzelt’s research reveals that constituent demands are so great that Bundestag members ‘are expected to act as ombudsmen with far more rigour than they feel should be expected of them’ (Patzelt 1997: 72). Not having a close connection to their constituency or region ‘may have implications for a member’s chances for re-selection as a parliamentary candidate in a constituency or his or her ranking on the state list’ (Saalfeld 2002: 47). Furthermore, Germans approach both party list and constituency representatives, with both types receiving similar amounts of correspondence (Burkett 1985: 129). Which representative is contacted by citizens seems to depend on party identification: ‘If “their” party lost in the constituency they may prefer to approach the List deputy of that party, especially if he or she was the unsuccessful candidate of the party in that constituency’ (Burkett 1985: 129). ‘Losing’ constituency candidates who end up being elected via the party list often shadow the candidate who defeated them, setting up shop in the same constituency. This ‘shadowing’ might explain why most Germans do not distinguish between list and constituency representatives, as Jesse suggests (1988: 120). While most accounts of the German electoral system state that there is no difference in the public status of party list and constituency representatives, some scholars say there is a difference between the role orientations and behaviour of representatives. Evidence from Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Bernhard Wessels shows that party list and constituency members of the Bundestag differ with respect to both the style and focus of representation, causing the authors to conclude that ‘type of mandate makes a difference for role orientation’ (Klingemann and Wessels 2001: 292). In fact, these scholars conclude that German voters do evaluate the performance of constituency candidates, in contrast to the received wisdom. They claim that the electoral system ‘contributes to a personal vote at the grass roots. This was exactly what the authors of the German electoral law had tried to engineer’ (Klingemann and Wessels 2001: 296; emphasis in original). These results complement those of an earlier study by Thomas Lancaster and David Patterson, who found that ‘[legislative] district type affects representatives’ perceptions of pork barrel allocations as a special type of constituency service’ (1990: 458). They hypothesised that constituency members of the Bundestag would try harder than their list-elected counterparts to seek government projects in order to claim personal credit and gain votes.


In other research, Werner Patzelt writes that Bundestag members elected in single-member constituencies ‘regard themselves more as successful representatives of the citizens, clearly invest more time in constituency work, and engage much more in case work and constituency service’ than their list-elected colleagues (1999: 37). However, Patzelt goes on to say that those major party members who were defeated in single-member constituency races but enter the Bundestag or a Landtag as list members behave like directly elected constituency members of these bodies (1999: 38–9). The main behavioural differences appear to exist between the deputies of major (Social Democrat and Christian Democrat) and minor parties (including the Greens, the Free Democrats, and eastern Germany’s Party of Democratic Socialism); the latter are more focused on interest groups and policy making than on geographical constituencies, largely due to the simple fact that they have fewer elected representatives (Patzelt 1999: 39). It is, consequently, more difficult for minor party members to cover geographical constituencies – each one would need to take on several. For major party members, however, existing in larger numbers allows them to shadow geographical constituencies where they might have a realistic chance of winning at the next election. Often this is the constituency they lost in the single-member constituency portion of the last election. For the major party members, then, there appears to be an electoral incentive to compete for constituency business, and this competition may bring about the close representative-constituent linkages that were lacking in Germany prior to the establishment of the Federal Republic.

Conclusion The use of MMP in the Federal Republic of Germany after the Second World War was an electoral engineering experiment into creating a constituency role for elected representatives where one did not exist before. This experiment was influenced by the British understanding of the importance of the constituency role of representatives. Evidence from the 1990s has called into question the received wisdom that the German experiment was a failure. Chapters 4 and 5 of this book will challenge the older viewpoint further, adding more empirical evidence in support of the conclusions of Patzelt, Klingemann and Wessels, and Lancaster and Patterson. If the Germans did succeed in making the constituency role important for politicians and citizens, then, it can be


argued, institutional rules can make a difference, even where cultural norms or past practices (or lack thereof) might appear to be an obstacle. In the British case, the link between representatives and constituents may be a bit sentimental, or even a distraction from scrutiny of government, as the critics cited above have argued. The partisan role of British representatives does appear to be more important than the constituency role in determining how they behave, according to most of the literature; a personal vote derived from a prominent constituency role does not seem to be of much electoral significance for MPs at Westminster. For members of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales, however, the MMP electoral system might create some new challenges for constituency service, as Chapter 2 explained – the two-vote electoral system allows voters to split their votes between a constituency candidate and a political party. This aspect of MMP might allow for a clearer separation of the constituency and partisan roles, and could provide a stronger electoral incentive for constituency representatives to serve the constituency well. Results from the first two MMP elections in New Zealand reveal that voters there ‘embraced’ the idea of ballot splitting, as over a third of them did this (Church 2001: 14). Whether members of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly act upon an electoral incentive is the subject of Chapters 4 and 5. With a rational choice approach – assuming that the way a representative is elected affects his or her behaviour – one would expect that those elected in single-member constituencies will be closer to their geographical constituents, having at least a somewhat stronger constituency role orientation than their counterparts elected from closed party lists. For the latter, the partisan role should be more important, so one would expect to see a stronger focus on the party organisation that ranked the candidates high enough to secure election in that way. Perhaps due to the long British tradition of constituency service, however, list representatives might seek out some kind of surrogate constituency role, possibly as ‘shadow’ representatives in geographical constituencies, although this behaviour could be seen as a rational one, rather than a cultural artefact, since constituency representatives in Scotland received higher office allowances from the beginning. List-elected representatives might also focus more on interest groups as they seek out new ‘constituencies’ to serve, expanding the boundaries of what we know of the constituency role in the process.

4 Evidence for the Electoral Incentive

This chapter focuses on the constituency role of representatives in the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales. For the purposes of comparison, this chapter also investigates the roles of representatives in the two German state parliaments under investigation, the Landtag of Brandenburg and the Landtag of Hesse. Germany is important in this study as the archetypal example of the mixedmember proportional (MMP) electoral system. Along with contact between representatives and constituents, and constituency service in general, the partisan role of these legislators is examined. The electoral incentives hypothesis (that representatives will do what enhances their chances for re-election) is tested, along with the hypothesis that representatives from major parties behave like constituency representatives, regardless of how they were elected. Empirical data in this chapter come from postal surveys conducted in late 2000, after members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) and Welsh Assembly Members (AMs) had been in office for well over one year, and German representatives were in office for about the same amount of time, having been elected in 1999 as well. These results are examined in detail here, as well as in Chapter 5, which extends the analysis to focus upon how list representatives cultivate constituencies, comparing their actions and attitudes to their counterparts. A second survey was conducted of MSPs and AMs in 2003 in order to assess whether attitudes and behaviour had changed over time. These results will be compared to the key findings from the 2000 British survey and the German survey at the end of Chapters 4 and 5, and Chapter 6 will explore the tensions between constituency- and list-elected representatives. The research design employed in this study involves comparing the members of legislatures that are similar in many respects. They are 69


members of assemblies below the level of central government who are elected in single-member constituencies or in larger multimember electoral regions. The process by which their parties select them, and even their party systems, are roughly similar. However, the countries to which they belong differ in political culture and experience. Members of the Scottish Parliament (129 members) and the National Assembly for Wales (60 members) are studied and compared to the members of two Bundesland (federal state) assemblies in Germany, the Landtag of Hesse (110 members) and the Landtag of Brandenburg (88 members). These British and German assemblies operate in parliamentary systems, in which a cabinet government is formed with the support, or at least tolerance, of a majority of assembly members. The Scottish Parliament differs from the Welsh Assembly in having primary legislative competence, while its Welsh counterpart has secondary legislative powers – it can only alter legislation from Westminster to suit Welsh purposes. Nevertheless, Wales has been quite active in making the most of devolution, with few objections from the British government, a cooperative process undoubtedly aided by the fact that Labour has been in charge both at Westminster and at Cardiff Bay (with a brief coalition with the Liberal Democrats during part of the Assembly’s first term) during this period. In the words of one expert on devolution, ‘the tendency is for the National Assembly to use its powers with growing discretion and declining Westminster regulation’ (Jeffery 2006: 155). Furthermore, the aim of this research is not to compare legislative powers, but to understand the constituency role of elected representatives. Therefore, survey results from Scottish and Welsh representatives are combined to increase the sample size of respondents in the study. German legislatures were chosen for comparison primarily because Germany was the model for the MMP electoral system in Britain, and Landtage (plural of Landtag) are the counterparts of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. The Scottish and Welsh assemblies are elected by a system that gives voters two votes (one for a constituency representative, and one for a party). This means that two German state assemblies elected by the two-vote system, which is not used for all German Landtage (Massicotte 2003), had to be chosen. The electoral systems used for all four legislatures involve compensatory PR (‘mixed-member proportional’), and are not ‘parallel’ mixed systems, as described in Chapter 2. Furthermore, all of these assemblies are substate legislatures with responsibility for various tasks as provided for in British devolution legislation or in the German federal constitution, the Basic Law (Gunlicks 1999).

Evidence for the Electoral Incentive 71

Similarities also exist as far as the candidate selection process is concerned. The literature shows that in both Britain and Germany, local constituency or electoral region parties are able to select their own candidates, and outside interference from national party headquarters has been strongly resisted (Denver 1988; Roberts 1988). In Germany, local branches of each political party hold meetings in which delegates select constituency candidates, while party list candidates are chosen at statewide selection conferences attended by delegates from local constituency parties (Roberts 1988: 99–101). British and German candidates were allowed to stand for election both in constituencies and on party lists, a practice called dual candidacy. In Britain, there is a long tradition of candidate selection by members of local constituency parties, and while central party organisations sometimes tried to influence the selection of candidates, such attempts were usually unsuccessful (Denver 1988: 57). With the introduction of devolution and new legislative bodies, however, there were some changes in Scottish and Welsh candidate selection. The Labour Party, in an attempt to increase the number of female candidates, introduced the process of ‘twinning’ neighbouring constituencies in such a way that one would nominate a woman, while the other would nominate a man. Twinning was controversial, as was a change to Labour’s selection process involving the screening of potential candidates by panels (Morgan and Mungham 2000: 150). This level of central intervention resulted in the high-profile expulsion of Scottish Parliament candidate Dennis Canavan, who won election as an independent constituency representative anyway (Wring et al. 2000: 237). While Labour’s approach has the potential to reduce the power of the local parties in the future, it was not a major factor at these elections in 1999 and 2003. Most candidates for the British and German assemblies under investigation here were selected by local party activists without undue interference by their national organisations. Party systems are also somewhat similar in Britain and Germany, with both having two large parties at the central government level and smaller parties, particularly in different nations or regions of the country. The nations and regions under study contain variations of their national party systems. Large centrist parties of the left and right are present (Labour and the Conservatives in Britain, Social Democrats and Christian Democrats in Germany), as well as smaller liberal and Green parties. In three of the four nations and regions, parties expressing discontent with the central government are also present. The Scottish National Party (SNP) demands independence for Scotland,


while Plaid Cymru (the Party of Wales) seeks more autonomy for Wales within the United Kingdom. In the eastern part of Germany, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) is the successor to the Socialist Unity Party (SED), the communist party that had a monopoly on the government of the former German Democratic Republic. Now the PDS expresses the discontent of many eastern Germans, including those in Brandenburg, with reunification.

Methodological considerations Postal surveys allow for a major savings in time and expense over large-scale interviewing (Mangione 1995: 6). Due to time and financial constraints, a postal survey was the best method for gathering information from the representatives under investigation. Postal surveys have been used successfully by many social science researchers. While most data were gathered by using a postal survey of the members of the assemblies under study, some interviewing of representatives, via telephone or e-mail, as well as in person, was also undertaken. Interviews allowed for more in-depth questioning not possible with the postal questionnaire. All members of the assemblies who had been in office for at least one year, with the exception of the presiding officers (parliamentary speakers) and heads of government, from whom responses were considered highly unlikely, were sent the four-page questionnaires and selfaddressed stamped return envelopes. The questionnaire contained four pages of questions in two columns on each side of two sheets of paper. Almost all questions were closed-ended, meaning that the respondents simply had to tick boxes to complete most of the questionnaire. Questions were arranged to flow in a way that was logical for the respondent (Mangione 1995: 36–7), as well as to fit in the space provided. Many questions asked the representatives to select from responses on Likert scales, which provide a range of agreement or disagreement, as well as ‘no opinion’ (Mangione 1995: 12). Before the final draft of the questionnaire was completed, a pre-test of the first draft was undertaken, as recommended by survey experts (Mangione 1995: 24–6). A German Landtag and that state’s Bundestag delegation not under study were selected and the questionnaire was administered. While the results from this state, Saxony-Anhalt, are not included in the final study, they were helpful in determining the appropriateness of the questions and their format, as well as what kind of response rate could be expected from subsequent administrations.


After revisions, the final draft of the questionnaire was administered to members of the legislatures under study. Interviews with members of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly were arranged after the questionnaire administration with those who had not responded in an attempt to boost response rates by leaving another questionnaire with the interviewees and encouraging them to return them later. Finally, a second survey of members of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly was sent out in late 2003, several months after the elections were held for these bodies, in order to assess whether there had been any ‘learning’ of electoral incentives by representatives. The data gathered here allow for a comparison across time. In order to see how the type of election affects representative role orientations in the legislative bodies under study, the basic distinction between constituency service and party policy advocacy, devised by Norton and Wood (1993), was used to guide the construction of the questionnaire. While different questionnaire forms were designed for members of the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, the German Landtage, and for constituency and party list representatives, the questions were essentially the same. The differences were mainly in some terms to make the questionnaires suitable for their recipients (for example, ‘your constituency’ is generally used for constituency representatives and ‘your electoral region’ for party list representatives). The German questionnaires were translated from the British versions as closely as possible, with the help of a native German speaker familiar with German politics from a political science perspective. In the surveys, the primary goal was to assess the British and German representatives’ focus of representation, as other similar studies have done using questionnaires (Judge and Ilonszki 1995; Damgaard 1997; Kreuzer and Pettai 1999). A number of questions asked about the importance, frequency, and type of constituency service provided by the legislators. For example, representatives were asked about how often they hold meetings (called ‘surgeries’ in Britain) in their constituencies or electoral regions; how much time they spend on service to the constituents’ needs; and what type of functions they perform for constituents. Furthermore, it was important to distinguish between non-partisan constituency service activities (dealing with constituents’ problems; attending local community functions; speaking at public meetings) and local party activities (attending party meetings; party fundraising) in the constituency, as Studlar and McAllister have shown (1996:


78–82). More fundamental questions along these lines asked about the representatives’ own assessments of how important constituency service is to the goal of re-election. In addition, the questionnaire’s instructions referred to interest groups, defined them and gave examples, since some questions asked about such groups in the sense of non-geographical constituencies. The party role was investigated by asking about representatives’ time spent participating in party activities on the national or regional level and the type of activities undertaken (such as time on parliamentary and party committees, which does not tend to be visible to constituents), as well as their support for their party leaders and policies, even when such support may not be in the interests of constituents. Questions were also asked to assess the attitudes the representatives held about their roles and the roles of other representatives. While most questions were closed-ended in format, to encourage recipients to fill in and return the questionnaires, one open-ended question was used at the end to encourage comments. The questions can be clustered into groups that deal with the main areas under investigation: the importance of constituency and partisan roles; role conflicts; and contact with constituents. Related to the last area is how the representatives conceive of their constituencies and whether personal attention to them, through the procurement of public spending projects or the ‘shadowing’ of single-member constituency representatives by those elected from party lists, helps to cultivate a personal vote that might be useful for the purposes of re-election. Some general questions about representatives’ attitudes towards the electoral system were also included. For determining the importance of the constituency and partisan roles, questions were asked about the legislators’ representative activities, as well as some more general ‘parliamentary’ work and any distinction they might see between the two different types of representatives. Further questioning about how important various activities were to the representatives’ goal of re-election acted as another measurement of role importance. Using the time representatives actually spend on their various activities was a different way of exploring the importance of their roles. Potential conflict between roles was investigated by asking one very straightforward question on the matter, as well as a question about what was the prime motivator for the representative to seek office. Contact with constituents was examined by asking respondents to fill in approximately how often they had media appearances, sent out


mailings, and held surgeries, as well as by asking for a breakdown of the volume of correspondence by voters and by interest group. Such a breakdown was important for discovering any difference in how constituencies might be cultivated. Which particular ‘constituencies’ representatives were involved with, among interest groups, was the subject of another question that asked respondents to choose from a list (or fill in additional groups). Constituency contact, with the purpose of cultivating a personal vote, was investigated by asking whether, how frequently, and with what measure of success, representatives attempted to procure public spending projects (commonly called ‘pork barrel’ spending in the United States) for their constituencies or electoral regions. The questions were asked as part of the questions on how representatives spend their work time, as well as in separate questions, with Likert scales. Because the shadowing of constituency representatives by those elected from party lists could also be seen as an attempt to gain a personal vote, particularly when those party list representatives intend to contest a single-member constituency seat, all representatives were simply asked whether they were shadowing or being shadowed. As a follow up, constituency representatives were asked how they felt about the phenomenon, when it was happening to them, and party list representatives were asked how they might be building ties with non-geographical constituencies. The personal vote was also investigated by asking whether representatives felt that their own personal qualities were important to their re-election prospects, as well as whether their seats were vulnerable. The questionnaire also included some questions directed at the representatives’ attitudes about the electoral system. Representatives were asked about their agreement or disagreement with a number of statements about them and their differently elected counterparts. The full text of each question is included in subsequent chapters where results are presented.

Comparing British and German MMP elections The multiparty nature of politics in Scotland and in Wales is evident from the results of the 1999 and 2003 elections to the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales, as shown in Table 4.1. The Labour Party, traditionally strong in both Scotland and Wales, faced tough competition in 1999 from its nationalist rivals, the SNP and Plaid Cymru. Both nationalist parties won about 30 per cent of the


Election results, Scotland and Wales, 1999 and 2003

Party Scottish Parliament, 6 May 1999 Labour Scottish National Conservative Liberal Democrat Green Socialist Labour Scottish Socialist Other/independent

% Party % vote Seats 33.6 27.3 15.4 12.4 3.6 2.4 2.0 3.3

43.4 27.1 14.0 13.2 0.8 0 0.8 0.8

Total Welsh Assembly, 6 May 1999 Labour Plaid Cymru Conservative Liberal Democrat Green Socialist Labour Other/independent

35.4 30.5 16.5 12.5 2.5 1.1 1.5

46.7 28.3 15.0 10.0 0 0 0

Total Scottish Parliament, 1 May 2003 Labour Scottish National Conservative Liberal Democrat Green Socialist Labour Scottish Socialist Senior Citizens Unity Other/independent

29.3 20.9 15.5 11.8 6.9 1.1 6.7 1.5 7.5

38.8 20.9 14.0 13.2 5.4 0 4.7 0.8 2.3

Total Welsh Assembly, 1 May 2003 Labour Plaid Cymru Conservative Liberal Democrat Green UK Independence Socialist Labour Other/independent Total Source: BBC

36.6 19.7 19.2 12.7 3.5 3.5 1.2 3.6

50.0 20.0 18.3 10.0 0 0 0 1.7

Total seats

Constituency List seats seats

56 35 18 17 1 0 1 1

53 7 0 12 0 0 0 1

3 28 18 5 1 0 1 0

129

73

56

28 17 9 6 0 0 0

27 9 1 3 0 0 0

1 8 8 3 0 0 0

60

40

20

50 27 18 17 7 0 6 1 3

46 9 3 13 0 0 0 0 2

4 18 15 4 7 0 6 1 1

129

73

56

30 12 11 6 0 0 0 1

30 5 1 3 0 0 0 1

0 7 10 3 0 0 0 0

60

40

20


party list vote, while Labour won roughly 35 per cent. In 2003, however, the nationalists did poorly in both nations, losing about onethird of their electoral support. Labour just barely managed to win half of the Welsh Assembly seats in 2003, while the party actually lost seats in the Scottish Parliament. In both nations at both election years, Labour won most of the constituency seats available, which would have given the party overwhelming domination of each devolved assembly, had there not been a system of proportional representation operating for these elections. Counting only constituency seats in the Scottish Parliament, the Liberal Democrats would have come in second place, but when party list seats are added in, the party comes in fourth, behind both the SNP and the Conservatives (who won no constituency seats in 1999, and only three in 2003). For the SNP, list seats comprise the vast majority of its total. In the Welsh Assembly, the nationalists, Plaid Cymru, have a more balanced delegation of constituency to list representatives, while the Liberal Democrats have an even split of three to three. As in Scotland, however, the Conservatives in the Welsh Assembly are almost entirely list representatives. Therefore, the new governments emerging from both nations’ legislatures are composed almost entirely of constituency representatives, while most opposition representatives were elected from party lists. Results from the 1999 elections to the two German Landtage under study, shown in Table 4.2, display multiparty politics as well. Two large parties exist throughout the Federal Republic, the centre-left Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), and the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and both are the top two parties in Brandenburg and Hesse. In Brandenburg, however, a strong challenger to the two national parties exists. The PDS, successor to the communist Socialist Unity Party that governed the German Democratic Republic during the era of Germany’s partition has become a major force in the eastern federal states that used to make up the former East Germany. The PDS appeals to resentment of western Germany, as well as to other anti-establishment sentiments, and won 23.3 per cent of the party vote, close to the 26.5 per cent won by the CDU. Neither party won very many constituency seats (only five for the PDS and two for the CDU), because the SPD took 37 constituencies, as well as 39.3 per cent of the party vote. This performance meant that the SPD was not entitled to any party list seats. The remaining party list seats in Brandenburg went to the extreme right-wing populist German People’s Union (DVU), which barely managed to surpass the 5 per cent threshold required for


Constituency seats

List seats

Landtag Brandenburg, 5 September 1999 Social Democratic Party Christian Democratic Union Party of Democratic Socialism German People’s Union Free Democratic Party Alliance ’90/The Greens Other

Total seats

Party

% Seats

Election results, Brandenburg and Hesse, 1999 % Party vote

Table 4.2

39.3 26.5 23.3 5.3 1.9 1.9 1.7

41.6 28.1 24.7 5.6 0 0 0

37 25 22 5 0 0 0

37 2 5 0 0 0 0

0 23 17 5 0 0 0

Total Hessischer Landtag, 7 February 1999 Christian Democratic Union Social Democratic Party Alliance ’90/The Greens Free Democratic Party Republicans Other Total

43.4 39.4 7.2 5.1 2.7 2.2

45.5 41.8 7.3 5.5 0 0

89

44

45

50 46 8 6 0 0

34 21 0 0 0 0

16 25 8 6 0 0

110

55

55

Source: Federal Statistical Office, Germany

entering the Landtag. The resulting government of Brandenburg was a grand coalition of the SPD and the CDU. In Hesse, the CDU is the largest party and it chose to govern in a coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP). The CDU and the SPD in Hesse both have a less lopsided share of constituency and list seats compared to their counterparts in Brandenburg, as Table 4.2 shows. The FDP, a liberal centre-right wing party, and the left-wing Alliance ‘90/The Greens both have much smaller parliamentary parties than the CDU and the SPD, and have only party list seats. No other parties crossed the 5 per cent threshold in Hesse. The overall survey response rate for the two British assemblies, taken together, was 39.8 per cent in 2000 and 39.7 per cent in 2003, with a similar response rate in both Scotland and Wales (Table 4.3). There was a difference between the response rate for constituency and list representatives, however, and Labour Party representatives (mainly elected from single-member constituencies) are somewhat underrepresented at 26.6 per cent in 2000 and 30.0 per cent in 2003. The lower response


rate for Labour is probably the main factor in the lower response rate for constituency representatives as well (30.8 per cent compared to 52.7 per cent for list representatives in 2000, and a similar result in 2003). Nevertheless, this result is respectable considering that these groups of legislators have been so heavily surveyed, thanks to the novelty of their assemblies. Results from both Scotland and Wales, which have similar party systems and a common British political heritage, are analysed together below so that the number of respondents is high enough for meaningful comparisons. As Table 4.3 shows, the total number of respondents in 2000 was 72, and in 2003, 75, so appropriate caution must be used

Table 4.3

UK survey response summary Questionnaires sent out

Responses received

% response

2000 Scottish Parliament Welsh Assembly Constituency representatives List representatives Labour Nationalist (SNP and Plaid Cymru) Conservative Liberal Democrat Other party1

124 57 107 74 79 51 29 23 2

49 23 33 39 21 24 15 9 1

39.5 40.4 30.8 52.7 26.6 47.1 55.6 40.9 50.0

Total2

181

72

39.8

2003 Scottish Parliament Welsh Assembly Constituency representatives List representatives Labour Nationalist (SNP and Plaid Cymru) Conservative Liberal Democrat Scottish Green Scottish Socialist Other party3

129 60 113 76 80 39 27 22 7 6 3

49 26 37 38 24 18 17 8 4 3 1

38.0 43.3 32.7 50.0 30.0 46.2 63.0 36.4 57.1 50.0 33.3

Total

189

75

39.8

1 2 3

Scottish Green, Scottish Socialist Two questionnaires had an ‘unknown’ party affiliation due to missing coding Senior Citizens’ Unity, Independents


when assessing these results. Responses are analysed comparing constituency to list representatives, as well as major party (Labour and nationalist – SNP or Plaid Cymru) to minor party (Conservative, Liberal Democrat, and Green) representatives. The independent t-test is used with one-tailed probability to test for significant differences between constituency and list representatives, and between major and minor party representatives, in the British and German results. The overall German survey response rate (Table 4.4) was 46.6 per cent, with a slightly higher response from Hesse (49.1 per cent, compared to 43.5 per cent for Brandenburg), and from party list representatives (53.1 per cent, compared to 41.9 per cent for constituency representatives). This response rate is higher than that of other scholarly investigations of German elected officials. For example, Lancaster and Patterson (1990) had a response rate of 37.1 per cent, from the German Bundestag members they surveyed by mail in a similar project, and Downs (1998) had a 35.2 per cent response rate from a postal survey of members of German Landtage. On a partisan basis, however, the PDS stands out with a response rate of only 27.3 per cent. Results from both Landtage are analysed together below, comparing constituency to list representatives, and major (Social Democrat and Christian Democrat) to minor (Party of Democratic Socialism, Greens, Free Democrats, and German People’s Union) party representatives. The small number of respondents, at 89, must be taken into consideration when assessing these results.

Table 4.4

German survey response summary Questionnaires sent out

Responses received

% response

Landtag Brandenburg Hessischer Landtag Constituency representatives List representatives Social Democratic Party Christian Democratic Union Party of Democratic Socialism Alliance ’90/The Greens Free Democratic Party German People’s Union

85 106 93 98 78 72 22 8 6 5

37 52 39 52 37 38 6 5 3 2

43.5 49.1 41.9 53.1 47.4 52.8 27.3 62.5 50.0 40.0

Total

191

89

46.6


Some evidence for the electoral incentive The electoral incentives approach to the understanding of why elected representatives do what they do to be re-elected assumes that constituency representatives will perform the constituency service necessary to retain their seats at subsequent elections, while party list representatives will concentrate on their parties, normally at the expense of constituency service. One set of survey questions sought to investigate the electoral incentive by asking representatives how important various activities were to their re-election prospects. These activities, and the British representatives’ responses, grouped as constituency or list representative, and major (Labour and nationalist) or minor (Conservative, Liberal Democrat, or Green) party representative, are reported in Table 4.5. The electoral incentives hypothesis anticipates that constituency representatives will focus on voters residing in their single-member constituencies, performing the service functions that will help get them re-elected, while list representatives will focus more on party activities. On the other hand, major party representatives might focus on voters residing in geographical constituencies, even when such representatives are not actually elected in those constituencies, while minor party representatives could be expected to focus on nongeographical constituencies, such as interest groups. Werner Patzelt (1999) argues that in Germany, major party (Christian Democrat and Social Democrat) representatives behave like constituency representatives largely because they have the numbers to do so, unlike their counterparts in the minor parties, who simply do not have enough deputies in the Bundestag or the Landtage to carry out typical constituency service functions. Asked about the importance of various factors in their re-election, 63.6 per cent of constituency representatives said it was very important helping people who had problems with government agencies, compared to only 46.2 per cent of list representatives (Statement A, Table 4.5). This difference is significant at the 0.05 level, and is consistent with the expectation that constituency representatives should be more oriented towards their constituencies than list representatives. There is less of a difference between major and minor party representatives, 57.8 per cent and 48.1 per cent respectively, which is only weakly significant at the 0.10 level. On the other hand, 71.8 per cent of list representatives said it was very important to be visible in their electoral regions (Statement B), compared to 63.6 per cent of


Constituency orientation: Re-election (UK)

Question: How important are the following to your re-election prospects? % response to each level of importance:

Very

Somewhat

No opinion

Not very

Not at all

No response

(A) Helping people in your constituency/electoral region who have problems with government agencies All representatives 54.2 30.6 0 2.8 0 • Constituency** 63.6 21.2 0 0 0 • List** 46.2 38.5 0 5.1 0 • Major parties* 57.8 28.9 0 0 0 • Minor parties* 48.1 33.3 0 7.4 0

12.5 15.2 10.3 13.3 11.1

(B) Being visible in your constituency/electoral region through the media or public appearances All representatives 68.1 19.4 0 1.4 0 • Constituency 63.6 21.2 0 0 0 • List 71.8 17.9 0 2.6 0 • Major parties 64.4 22.2 0 0 0 • Minor parties 74.1 14.8 0 3.7 0

11.1 15.2 7.7 13.3 7.4

(C) Voting with your parliamentary party on legislation All representatives 9.7 48.6 9.7 • Constituency** 3.0 48.5 9.1 • List** 15.4 48.7 10.3 • Major parties 6.7 53.3 11.1 • Minor parties 14.8 40.7 7.4

13.9 15.2 12.8 8.9 22.2

2.8 6.1 0 4.4 0

15.3 18.2 12.8 15.6 14.8

(D) The support of your party leader All representatives 11.1 • Constituency*** 9.1 • List*** 12.8 • Major parties 11.1 • Minor parties 11.1

15.3 24.2 7.7 15.6 14.8

4.2 9.1 0 6.7 0

13.9 15.2 12.8 13.3 14.8

0 0 0 0 0

11.1 15.2 7.7 13.3 7.4

1.4 3.0 0 2.2 0

12.5 15.2 10.3 13.3 11.1

41.7 27.3 53.8 37.8 48.1

13.9 15.2 12.8 15.6 11.1

(E) Your party’s national strength during the election campaign All representatives 59.7 27.8 0 • Constituency*** 39.4 42.4 0 • List*** 76.9 15.4 0 • Major parties* 64.4 22.2 0 • Minor parties* 51.9 37.0 0

1.4 3.0 0 0 3.7

(F) Getting your party’s election manifesto commitments enacted into law All representatives 33.3 37.5 9.7 5.6 • Constituency 30.3 36.4 3.0 12.1 • List 35.9 38.5 15.4 0 • Major parties 31.1 37.8 6.7 8.9 • Minor parties 37.0 37.0 14.8 0

N = 72 Major parties = Labour, SNP, and Plaid Cymru; minor parties = Conservative, Liberal Democrat, and Green *Difference is significant at the 0.10 level **Difference is significant at the 0.05 level ***Difference is significant at the 0.01 level


constituency representatives. While there is not a significant difference between list and constituency representatives, this result, going in the opposite direction of what would be expected, suggests that list representatives need to get their names out to the public, who may not be familiar with who they are. Other questions in Table 4.5 asked representatives about the importance of party ties to their re-election prospects. The responses from list representatives suggest that party ties are more important to them than to constituency representatives, perhaps lending some support to the criticism levelled at list-elected representatives of being too close to their parties. Voting with the parliamentary party on legislative proposals (Statement C) was more important to list representatives, with 15.4 per cent of them saying it was very important, compared to only 3.0 per cent for their constituency-elected counterparts, with the difference significant at the 0.05 level. Having the support of their party leader (Statement D) was very important to 12.8 per cent of list representatives, compared to 9.1 per cent of constituency representatives, and somewhat important to 53.8 per cent of list representatives, compared to 27.3 per cent of constituency representatives. The difference between the two types of representatives is significant at the 0.01 level, and the same is true for the responses to the importance of a representative’s party’s national strength during the election campaign. On this factor (Statement E) in reelection, 76.9 per cent of list representatives said it was very important, while only 39.4 per cent of constituency representatives thought so. Getting the party’s manifesto commitments enacted into law (Statement F) was very important to 35.9 per cent of list representatives, compared to 30.3 per cent of constituency representatives, but this difference is not significant. While most differences between constituency and list representatives in Table 4.5 are statistically significant, showing list representatives to be more oriented towards their parties, the same is not the case when comparing representatives as members of major or minor parties. The only significant differences between major and minor party representatives are found in Statements A and E (at the 0.10 level). This suggests that the differences between constituency and list representatives have something to do with the way the representatives are elected, rather than to the relative size of their parliamentary parties, as has been suggested in the German case. German Landtag members also live up to electoral incentives expectations explored by the same set of questions, as Table 4.6 illustrates.


As expected, constituency representatives show a closer relationship to their geographical constituencies. When asked about the importance of various factors in their re-election, 40.0 per cent of constituency representatives said it was very important helping people who had problems with government agencies, compared to only 32.7 per cent of list representatives (Statement A, Table 4.6). This difference is significant at the 0.05 level, and is consistent with the expectation that constituency representatives should be more oriented towards their constituencies than list representatives. As far as media and public appearances are concerned (Statement B), 30.0 per cent of constituency representatives said it was very important to be visible in their electoral regions, compared to 20.4 per cent of list representatives. Adding in those who say it is somewhat important to be visible yields 77.5 per cent of constituency and 81.6 per cent of list representatives. While not a significant difference, this result suggests that both types of representative – even list representatives – need to get their names out to the public. Statements C–F in Table 4.6 are related to the partisan role of representatives, and here, list representatives display stronger partisan ties than constituency representatives. List representatives agreed more strongly than constituency representatives that voting with the party on legislation, that the party’s national strength during the election campaign, and that getting the party’s manifesto commitments enacted are important to their re-election efforts. In Statement C, 17.5 per cent of constituency representatives said it was very or somewhat important to vote with their parliamentary party, compared to 36.8 per cent of their list-elected counterparts, while the result for Statement D revealed only 15 per cent of constituency representatives, but a staggering 49 per cent of list representatives believed that it was very or somewhat important to have the support of their party leader (with a difference in the latter case significant at the 0.01 level). In Statement E, 22.5 per cent of constituency representatives said their party’s national strength during the election campaign was very important to re-election, while 40.8 per cent of list representatives felt the same way. Enacting the party’s manifesto commitments was very important to over 12 per cent of both constituency and list representatives, but was somewhat important to twice as many list (51.0 per cent) as constituency (25.0 per cent) representatives. All of the differences between German constituency and list representatives in this section are significant (although Statements B and F only weakly so, at the 0.10 level). Significant differences between major

Evidence for the Electoral Incentive 85 Table 4.6

Constituency orientation: Re-election (Germany)


Very

Somewhat

Not very

Not at all

No response

(A) Voting with your parliamentary party on legislation All representatives 5.6 22.5 16.9 • Constituency** 2.5 15.0 20.0 • List** 8.2 28.6 14.3 • Major parties 5.4 23.0 17.6 • Minor parties 6.7 20.0 13.3

33.7 35.0 32.7 31.1 46.7

10.1 15.0 6.1 9.5 13.3

11.2 12.5 10.2 13.5 0

(B) The support of your party leader All representatives 10.1 • Constituency*** 5.0 • List*** 14.3 • Major parties 9.5 • Minor parties 13.3

29.2 42.5 18.4 31.1 20.0

9.0 15.0 4.1 9.5 6.7

12.4 15.0 10.2 14.9 0

3.4 5.0 2.0 4.1 0

2.2 2.5 2.0 1.4 6.7

10.1 12.5 8.2 12.2 0

2.2 5.0 0 2.7 0

11.2 15.0 8.2 12.2 6.7

23.6 10.0 34.7 21.6 33.3

No opinion

15.7 12.5 18.4 13.5 26.7

(C) Your party’s national strength during the election campaign All representatives 32.6 44.9 6.7 • Constituency** 22.5 47.5 10.0 • List** 40.8 42.9 4.1 • Major parties 29.7 45.9 6.8 • Minor parties 46.7 40.0 6.7

(D) Getting your party’s election manifesto commitments enacted into law All representatives 12.4 39.3 11.2 23.6 • Constituency* 12.5 25.0 17.5 25.0 • List* 12.2 51.0 6.1 22.4 • Major parties 10.8 39.2 10.8 24.3 • Minor parties 20.0 40.0 13.3 20.0

(E) Helping people in your constituency/Land who have problems with government agencies All representatives 36.0 37.1 3.4 14.6 0 8.9 • Constituency** 40.0 42.5 2.5 5.0 0 10.0 • List** 32.7 32.7 4.1 22.4 0 8.2 • Major parties* 40.5 33.8 2.7 13.5 0 9.5 • Minor parties* 13.3 53.3 6.7 20.0 0 6.7 (F) Being visible in your constituency/Land through the media or public appearances All representatives 24.7 55.1 3.4 7.9 0 9.0 • Constituency* 30.0 47.5 7.5 2.5 0 12.5 • List* 20.4 61.2 0 12.2 0 6.1 • Major parties 24.3 54.1 4.1 6.8 0 10.8 • Minor parties 26.7 60.0 0 13.3 0 0 N = 89 Major parties = SPD and CDU; minor parties = PDS, Greens, FDP, and DVU *Difference is significant at the 0.10 level **Difference is significant at the 0.05 level ***Difference is significant at the 0.01 level


and minor party representatives are not present in Statements C–F, suggesting that these factors are different because of how the representatives were elected. Furthermore, the German pattern of results, with constituency-elected representatives appearing to be closer to their constituencies and list-elected representatives being closer to their parties is similar to the British case as shown in Table 4.5. This pattern is also evident in New Zealand research conducted in the 1999 Candidate Study, in which candidates for election, via the singlemember constituency and/or party list route that MMP there allows, were asked how important various representative activities were. While 52 per cent of constituency candidates said that helping with individual problems was ‘very’ important, only 21 per cent of list candidates agreed, as did 43 per cent of those candidates standing in both a constituency and on the list (Karp 2002: 140). Back in Scotland, a 2004 survey of MSPs found that 96.6 per cent of constituency MSPs believed it was ‘very’ important to help solve constituents’ problems, while 77.4 per cent of list MSPs felt the same way (Bradbury and Russell 2005b: 32).

Constituency service: The ‘pork barrel’ and the personal vote One important constituency-oriented function involves promoting the constituency as a place to do business, as well as a place for government spending (‘pork barrel’, in American terminology). Success here could help representatives in their re-election campaigns, allowing constituency representatives to claim credit and win personal votes. This process could be more difficult for representatives elected in larger regions, which could make things more difficult logistically – the region might simply be too large to allow voters to focus on the impact of a few examples of business relocations or public spending projects, and a particular list-elected representative’s connection to those successful cases. Credit for such successes would also be difficult to reward, due to the use of closed-list PR, which requires voters to choose a party, and not an individual candidate by name, when voting. Therefore, an electoral incentives approach would anticipate that representatives elected in small constituencies are more likely to promote the constituency as a place for new businesses, and seek government spending projects, in order to claim credit and enhance their electoral chances via a personal vote, which is, by definition, independent of party considerations.


A study of German Bundestag members in the late 1980s found that constituency representatives were more likely to seek public spending projects for their constituencies than list representatives (Lancaster and Patterson 1990). Another, more recent, study of Bundestag members also concluded that those elected in constituencies were more likely to seek out places on parliamentary committees that would enable them to allocate ‘pork’ to those geographical constituencies (Stratmann and Baur 2002). This book also investigates project-seeking by German, as well as British, elected representatives, asking how much work time was spent seeking projects and promoting the constituency or region as a place to do business. Representatives were asked to select a category giving a range roughly corresponding to the percentage of their total work time spent on these tasks. Weighted averages were then calculated by taking the midpoint of each range and multiplying it by the percentage of representatives who responded in each range (excluding ‘no response’). These midpoints were also used in the t-tests of statistical significance. In the British part of this investigation into local promotion and ‘pork-seeking’ behaviour, Table 4.7 reveals only very slight differences between list and constituency representative time spent promoting the region as a place for business (Statement A, with 7.6 per cent compared to 5.3 per cent respectively), and an even smaller difference when it comes to time spent seeking public projects (Statement B, with 6.6 per cent for list representatives and 6.1 per cent for constituency representatives). This finding is the opposite of what the electoral incentives hypothesis expects, in that list representatives spent more time on these activities, but the differences were not statistically significant. When analysing representatives’ responses as major or minor party representatives, however, it appears that more time is spent by the former, as would be expected, with a significant difference between the two as far as project-seeking is concerned. This British finding could be evidence for what Werner Patzelt has detected in Germany, where he claims major party (Christian Democrat and Social Democrat) representatives, whether elected in singlemember constituencies or via party lists, tend to focus on geographical constituencies because they have the numbers, thanks to large parliamentary parties, to do so (1999: 38–9). On the other hand, list representatives in Scotland and Wales might not differ much from constituency representatives in their ‘local promotion’ efforts because they represent relatively small regions compared to their counterparts in Germany, who are elected from lists covering entire federal states.


Constituency service: Local promotion and the ‘pork barrel’ 1 (UK)

No response

Weighted average

51–100 %

26–50 %

16–25 %

6–10 %

0–5 %

Portion of work time:

11–15 %

Question: Approximately what percentage of your total work time is spent performing the following tasks?

(A) Promoting your constituency/electoral region as a place to do business All representatives 54.2 27.8 4.2 4.2 4.2 0 6.6 • Constituency 51.5 27.3 9.1 3.0 0 0 5.3 • List 56.4 28.2 0 5.1 7.7 0 7.6 • Major parties 48.9 26.7 4.4 6.7 4.4 0 7.0 • Minor parties 63.0 29.6 3.7 0 3.7 0 5.8 • Government 56.7 20.0 6.7 3.3 3.3 0 5.8 • Opposition 52.5 32.5 2.5 5.0 5.0 0 7.2

5.6 9.1 2.6 8.9 0 10.0 2.5

(B) Seeking public spending projects for your constituency/electoral region All representatives 44.4 33.3 6.9 8.3 0 0 6.4 • Constituency 39.4 36.4 12.1 3.0 0 0 6.1 • List 48.7 30.8 2.6 12.8 0 0 6.6 • Major parties** 33.3 35.6 8.9 11.1 0 0 7.1 • Minor parties** 63.0 29.6 3.7 3.7 0 0 5.2 • Government 40.0 36.7 16.7 0 0 0 6.1 • Opposition 47.5 30.0 0 15.0 0 0 6.7

6.9 9.1 5.1 11.1 0 6.7 7.5

N = 72 Major parties = Labour, SNP, and Plaid Cymru; minor parties = Conservative, Liberal Democrat, and Green **Difference is significant at the 0.05 level

Scotland is broken up into eight electoral regions, while Wales is divided into five. Another question investigated the pork barrel issue in a different way, asking about how often representatives attempted to get public spending projects for their constituencies or regions (Question 1, Table 4.8). Constituency representatives appear to be more frequent seekers of pork than list representatives, with the former citing ‘daily’ or ‘weekly’ 33.3 per cent of the time, as opposed to 18.0 per cent for list representatives, but the difference is only weakly significant (at the 0.10 level). However, major differences appear when representatives are asked about how successful they are when they seek spending projects (Question 2, Table 4.8). Only 5.1 per cent of list representatives report that they are usually successful, compared to 15.2 per cent of con-


stituency representatives, and only 3.0 per cent of constituency representatives say they are seldom or almost never successful, compared to 25.7 per cent of list representatives. These differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level, but so are the differences between government and opposition representatives. It is difficult to tell whether constituency representatives work harder to seek out such projects for their constituents, or whether they are more successful simply because they tend to be Labour or Liberal Democrat representatives, the parties of government in Scotland and in Wales. What is more noteworthy is the finding from Table 4.7 indicating that list representatives spend more time promoting their regions and seeking pork for them. Table 4.8

Constituency service: Local promotion and the ‘pork barrel’ 2 (UK)

Question 1: How often do you attempt to provide for public spending projects in your constituency/electoral region? % responding:

All representatives • Constituency* • List* • Major parties • Minor parties • Government • Opposition

Daily

Weekly

Once or twice a month

A few times a year

2.8 3.0 2.6 4.4 0 3.3 2.5

22.2 30.3 15.4 22.2 22.2 30.0 17.5

25.0 21.2 28.2 28.9 18.5 13.3 32.5

23.6 21.2 25.6 24.4 22.2 20.0 25.0

Never

2.8 0 5.1 0 7.4 0 5.0

No response 23.6 24.2 23.1 20.0 29.6 33.3 17.5

Question 2: How often are you successful in gaining public spending projects for your constituency/electoral region when you seek them out? % responding: All representatives • Constituency*** • List*** • Major parties** • Minor parties** • Government*** • Opposition***

Almost always

Usually

Sometimes

Seldom

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

9.7 15.2 5.1 13.3 3.7 13.3 5.0

58.3 60.6 56.4 60.0 55.6 63.3 55.0

9.7 3.0 15.4 8.9 11.1 3.3 15.0

Almost No Never response 5.6 0 10.3 2.2 11.1 0 10.0

16.7 21.2 12.8 15.6 18.5 20.0 15.0



The German cases, unlike those in Britain, do reveal results expected by the electoral incentives hypothesis, however. Table 4.9 shows significant differences (at the 0.05 level) between constituency and list representative work time spent promoting the constituency or region as a place for business (a weighted average of 12.4 per cent and 6.1 per cent, respectively). There was a difference, significant at the 0.01 level, between constituency and list representatives when it comes to the time they spend seeking public projects (9.7 per cent for constituency representatives and 5.0 per cent for list representatives). In both cases, the work time spent by major and minor party representatives is almost the same, although the difference between governing party (9.3 per cent) and opposition (5.0 per cent) representatives’ work time on local promotion suggests that governTable 4.9 Constituency service: Local promotion and the ‘pork barrel’ 1 (Germany) Question: Approximately what percentage of your total work time is spent performing the following tasks? Weighted average

No response

(B) Seeking public spending projects for your constituency/Land All representatives 49.4 23.6 10.1 3.4 3.4 • Constituency*** 25.0 42.5 10.0 7.5 5.0 • List*** 69.4 8.2 10.2 0 2.0 • Major parties 45.9 25.7 10.8 4.1 2.7 • Minor parties 66.7 13.3 6.7 0 6.7 • Government* 43.6 23.6 12.7 5.5 3.6 • Opposition* 58.8 23.5 5.9 0 2.9

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

7.2 9.7 5.0 6.5 6.1 7.1 5.2

10.1 10.0 10.2 10.8 6.7 10.9 8.8

26–50 %

14.6 12.5 16.3 14.9 13.3 12.7 17.6

16–25 %

9.0 12.4 6.1 7.8 7.2 9.3 5.0

11–15 %

1.1 2.5 0 1.4 0 1.8 0

6–10 %

(A) Promoting your constituency/Land as a place to do business All representatives 42.7 21.3 9.0 7.9 3.4 • Constituency** 27.5 27.5 12.5 12.5 5.0 • List** 55.1 16.3 6.1 4.1 2.0 • Major parties 40.5 23.0 9.5 8.1 2.7 • Minor parties 53.3 13.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 • Government** 36.4 23.6 9.1 12.7 3.6 • Opposition** 52.9 17.6 8.8 0 2.9

0–5 %

51–100 %

Portion of work time:

N = 89 Major parties = SPD and CDU; minor parties = PDS, Greens, FDP, and DVU *Difference is significant at the 0.10 level **Difference is significant at the 0.05 level ***Difference is significant at the 0.01 level


ing party representatives might spend more time simply because they know they are more likely than their opponents to appeal to business people who want government connections. On the other hand, there is very little difference (only weakly significant at the 0.10 level) between government and opposition representatives as far as their efforts to obtain spending projects are concerned, and a nonsignificant difference between major and minor party representatives. This suggests that the way in which representatives are elected has an impact on their pork-seeking efforts. As with the British case, another question investigated the pork barrel issue in a different way, asking about how often German representatives attempted to get public spending projects for their constituencies or regions (Question 1, Table 4.10). Contrary to expectations, list representatives are more frequent seekers of pork than their constituency counterparts, with the former citing ‘daily’ or ‘weekly’ 24.4 per cent of the time, as opposed to 10.0 per cent for list representatives, and the difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. On the other hand, major party representatives spend more time (20.3 per cent daily or weekly) than minor party representatives (6.7 per cent daily and none weekly) seeking pork, but the difference is not statistically significant. These results do not support the electoral incentives hypothesis, nor do they support Patzelt’s (1999) argument that major party representatives behave like constituency representatives regardless of how they were elected. However, there are no surprises when representatives are asked about how successful they are when they seek public spending projects. Only 16.3 per cent of list representatives report that they are almost always or usually successful, compared to 32.5 per cent of constituency representatives, as shown in Question 2 of Table 4.10. There is a statistically significant difference (at the 0.05 level), however, between major and minor party representatives, with 25.7 per cent of major party representatives saying they were almost always or usually successful, compared to 13.3 per cent of minor party representatives. However, the fact that governing party representatives are more successful than opposition representatives at obtaining pork strongly suggests that a representative’s status is most important in determining who is allocated spending projects. Whether seeking out and obtaining public spending projects is helpful to the development of a personal vote that can improve a representative’s re-election chances is the subject of Table 4.11. When asked how important their success in obtaining government projects

92 Proportional Representation and the Constituency Role in Britain Table 4.10 (Germany)

Constituency service: Local promotion and the ‘pork barrel’ 2

Question 1: How often do you attempt to provide for public spending projects in your constituency/Land? % responding:

Daily

Weekly

Once or twice a month

A few times a year

Never

No response

All representatives • Constituency*** • List*** • Major parties • Minor parties • Government • Opposition

6.7 0 12.2 6.8 6.7 9.1 2.9

11.2 10.0 12.2 13.5 0 9.1 14.7

19.1 17.5 20.4 16.2 33.3 16.4 23.5

40.4 37.5 42.9 39.2 46.7 34.5 50.0

11.2 22.5 2.0 12.2 6.7 16.4 2.9

11.2 12.5 10.2 12.2 6.7 14.5 5.9

Question 2: How often are you successful in gaining public spending projects for your constituency when you seek them out? % responding: All representatives • Constituency** • List** • Major parties** • Minor parties** • Government*** • Opposition***

Almost always 3.4 7.5 0 4.1 0 5.5 0

Usually

Sometimes

Seldom

Almost never

No response

20.2 25.0 16.3 21.6 13.3 23.6 14.7

39.3 30.0 46.9 40.5 33.3 40.0 38.2

11.2 2.5 18.4 8.1 26.7 0 29.4

9.0 10.0 8.2 6.8 20.0 7.3 11.8

16.9 25.0 10.2 18.9 6.7 23.6 5.9

N = 89 Major parties = SPD and CDU; minor parties = PDS, Greens, FDP, and DVU **Difference is significant at the 0.05 level ***Difference is significant at the 0.01 level

for their constituencies or electoral regions was to their re-election prospects (Statement A), 15.2 per cent of British constituency representatives said it was very important, while 10.3 per cent of list representatives gave the same response. The difference is not statistically significant, however; 21.2 per cent of constituency representatives actually said getting projects was not very important, compared to 15.4 per cent of list representatives. There is a significant difference, at the 0.05 level, between major and minor party representatives, however. As in the case of Table 4.7 (Statement B), more major party representatives (17.8 per cent) thought it was very important to obtain projects than minor party representatives (3.7 per cent).

Evidence for the Electoral Incentive 93 Table 4.11

Personal vote? (UK)


Very

Somewhat

No opinion

Not very

Not No at all response

(A) Your success in obtaining government-sponsored projects in your constituency/ electoral region All representatives 12.5 45.8 8.3 18.1 1.4 13.9 • Constituency 15.2 48.5 0 21.2 0 15.2 • List 10.3 43.6 15.4 15.4 2.6 12.8 • Major parties** 17.8 48.9 4.4 15.6 0 13.3 • Minor parties** 3.7 40.7 14.8 22.2 3.7 14.8 (B) Your own personal qualities All representatives 45.8 • Constituency 39.4 • List 51.3 • Major parties 42.2 • Minor parties 51.9

33.3 36.4 30.8 33.3 33.3

4.2 6.1 2.6 4.4 3.7

4.2 0 7.7 6.7 0

(C) Your overall voting record All representatives 5.6 • Constituency** 3.0 • List** 7.7 • Major parties*** 0 • Minor parties*** 14.8

44.4 36.4 51.3 40.0 51.9

5.6 3.0 7.7 6.7 3.7

30.6 39.4 23.1 37.8 18.5

0 0 0 0 0

12.5 18.2 7.7 13.3 11.1

1.4 3.0 0 2.2 0

12.5 15.2 10.3 13.3 11.1

N = 72 Major parties = Labour, SNP, and Plaid Cymru; minor parties = Conservative, Liberal Democrat, and Green **Difference is significant at the 0.05 level ***Difference is significant at the 0.01 level

The remaining evidence for a personal vote in the British case is not overwhelming, but present to some extent in that list and minor party representatives are concerned about their own voting records, as well as the prominence of other list representatives. When asked if their own personal qualities were important in their re-election effort (Statement B, Table 4.11), 51.3 per cent of list representatives said they were very important, compared to 39.4 per cent of constituency representatives, although the difference is not significant. On whether their overall voting record mattered (Statement C), 59.0 per cent of list representatives said their record was very or somewhat important, while 39.4 per cent of constituency representatives replied the same way; and the difference is significant at the 0.05 level. This difference is the


opposite of what would be expected by the personal vote school, and is even more prominent when comparing major and minor party representatives. Among German representatives, the question of whether seeking out and obtaining public spending projects is helpful to the development of a personal vote is summarised in Table 4.12. When asked how important their success in obtaining projects for their constituencies or electoral regions was to their re-election prospects, 30.0 per cent of constituency representatives said it was very important, while only 12.2 per cent of list representatives gave the same response. The difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, as is the difference between major and minor party representatives. Taking together those who responded ‘very important’ or ‘somewhat important’, 60.8 per

Table 4.12

Personal vote? (Germany)


Very

Somewhat

No opinion

Not very

Not at all

No response

(A) Your success in obtaining government-sponsored projects in your constituency/ Land All representatives 20.2 34.8 11.2 18.0 2.2 13.5 • Constituency*** 30.0 40.0 5.0 10.0 0 15.0 • List*** 12.2 30.6 16.3 24.5 4.1 12.2 • Major parties*** 21.6 39.2 8.1 12.2 2.7 16.2 • Minor parties*** 13.3 13.3 26.7 46.7 0 0 (B) Your own personal qualities All representatives 39.3 • Constituency 45.0 • List 34.7 • Major parties 39.2 • Minor parties 40.0

44.9 32.5 55.1 41.9 60.0

2.2 5.0 0 2.7 0

4.5 5.0 4.1 5.4 0

0 0 0 0 0

9.0 12.5 6.1 10.8 0

(C) Your overall voting record All representatives 3.4 • Constituency* 5.0 • List* 2.0 • Major parties 2.7 • Minor parties 6.7

34.8 35.0 34.7 32.4 46.7

14.6 22.5 8.2 17.6 0

36.0 25.0 44.9 33.8 46.7

0 0 0 0 0

11.2 12.5 10.2 13.5 0

N = 89 Major parties = SPD and CDU; minor parties = PDS, Greens, FDP, and DVU *Difference is significant at the 0.10 level ***Difference is significant at the 0.01 level


cent of major party representatives said their success in obtaining projects was important, while only 26.6 per cent of minor party representatives responded the same way. These results support both the electoral incentives hypothesis and the argument that major party representatives, regardless of how they are elected, behave like constituency representatives. These German results are similar to the results for this question in Scotland and Wales, but stronger. German evidence in the rest of Table 4.12 in support of the above hypotheses is weaker, however. When asked if their own personal qualities mattered (Statement B), 45.0 per cent of constituency representatives said they were very important, compared to 34.7 per cent of list representatives, although the difference is not significant. The vast majority of representatives (84.2 per cent), however, said that their personal qualities were very or somewhat important. On whether their overall voting record mattered to their re-election effort (Statement C), there was very little difference (significant at the 0.10 level) between constituency and list representatives, and a non-significant difference between major and minor party representatives. The differences that are there, however, do go in the hypothesised directions. Therefore, while most results in Table 4.12 support the expectation that constituency and major party representatives are more likely to cultivate a personal vote for re-election purposes, not all of this German evidence is strong. The comments from one Hesse MdL (Mitglied des Landtages, Member of the Landtag) are useful on the topic of whether German Landtag members would bother to cultivate a personal vote: The possibilities of a constituency MdL achieving election results that clearly differentiate themselves from the election results for the party are very small. In practice a good or bad constituency MdL can gain a result of plus or minus 5 per cent in comparison to the party. Much more is not possible. The practice in Hesse shows that the deviations are rather small. Admittedly, however, the [voters’] decisions are also sometimes very tight. In my constituency, for example, I won my first election with only an 823-vote majority. It is clear that one must also take advantage of a small difference, with 150,000 inhabitants in the constituency (Gotthardt 2001). The above comments imply that a personal vote is only rarely of electoral importance, but it should not be taken for granted. Nevertheless, a stronger constituency orientation among British representatives is indicated by the results in Table 4.13. The majority of


British representatives disagreed or disagreed strongly with Statement A, ‘MSPs/AMs/MdLs are elected primarily to serve the interests of Scotland/Wales/Brandenburg/Hesse, not to look after the problems of individual voters’, while 38.8 per cent agreed or agreed strongly. Roughly the reverse is true for the German representatives, and the difference between German and British responses is significant at the 0.05 level. An even greater difference (0.01 level) between the responses of British and German representatives exists in Statement B, ‘Helping individual voters with their problems is one of the most worthwhile parts of the job’. Among British representatives, 51.4 per cent agreed strongly with the statement, while only 18.0 per cent of

Table 4.13

Constituency orientation (UK and Germany)

No response

Strongly disagree

Disagree

No opinion

Agree

% response:

Strongly agree

Question: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about Members of the Scottish Parliament/National Assembly for Wales/Members of the Landtag?

(A) MSPs/AMs/MdLs are elected primarily to serve the interests of Scotland/Wales/Brandenburg/Hesse, not to look after the problems of individual voters All representatives 11.8 35.4 5.0 39.8 6.2 1.9 British representatives* • Constituency • List German representatives* • Constituency • List

6.9 6.1 7.7

31.9 30.3 33.3

6.9 6.1 7.7

43.1 51.5 35.9

8.3 3.0 12.8

2.8 3.0 2.6

15.7 12.5 18.4

38.2 37.5 38.8

3.4 5.0 2.0

37.1 40.0 34.7

4.5 5.0 4.1

1.1 0 2.0

(B) Helping individual voters with their problems is one of the most worthwhile parts of the job All representatives 32.9 49.1 8.1 9.3 0 0.6 British representatives** • Constituency • List

51.4 45.5 56.4

44.4 48.5 41.0

2.8 3.0 2.6

1.4 3.0 0

0 0 0

0 0 0

German representatives** • Constituency* • List*

18.0 30.0 8.2

52.8 47.5 57.1

12.4 10.0 14.3

15.7 12.5 18.4

0 0 0

1.1 0 2.0

N (UK) = 72; N (Germany) = 89 * Difference is significant at the 0.05 level ** Difference is significant at the 0.01 level


German representatives expressed the same level of agreement. Clearly, more satisfaction is derived from constituency service for British representatives than for their German counterparts. Furthermore, there are no significant differences between the responses of constituency and list representatives in Table 4.13 except for German representatives in Statement B.

Learning of electoral incentives? Survey data presented so far in this chapter were obtained in late 2000, when MMP-elected British representatives had only been in office just over one year, with the first elections to the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly held in May 1999. A second survey was undertaken in late 2003, after the second Scottish and Welsh elections were held in May of that year, to see if any ‘learning’ of electoral incentives had taken place. The results from the most important questions are presented below, and suggest that British representatives may have learned from the rational incentives in the electoral system, following the German pattern. The 2000 and 2003 surveys asked German and British representatives how much of their work time was spent on local promotion and ‘bringing home the bacon’, and Table 4.14 shows the results with the 2003 data compared to the 2000 data from Tables 4.7 and 4.9. German representatives spent an average of 9 per cent of their work time promoting their areas as places to do business, but this average again covers up the fact that constituency representatives spent 12.4 per cent of their work time as local promoters, while their constituency counterparts spent only 6.1 per cent of their time this way, less than half as much (Table 4.14, Statement A). The difference is significant at the 0.05 level. The same sort of difference, but significant at the 0.01 level, between the two types of representative is seen among the British representatives in 2003. Here, constituency representatives spent 9.3 per cent of their time promoting the constituency as a business place, while their list counterparts spent only 4.7 per cent of their time promoting their electoral regions. Again, the difference between the two types of member is in the hypothesised direction, as with the German representatives, but the result from the 2000 survey of Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly members was the opposite. British constituency representatives in 2000 spent only 5.3 per cent of their time promoting their constituencies, while list representatives spent 7.6 per cent of their time on this activity.


Time spent on local promotion and ‘pork’ (UK and Germany)

Portion of work time spent:

Weighted average (%)

(A) Promoting your constituency/electoral region/Land as a place to do business British representatives, 2000 6.6 • Constituency 5.3 • List 7.6 German representatives, 2000 • Constituency* • List* British representatives, 2003 • Constituency** • List**

9.0 12.4 6.1 7.0 9.3 4.7

(B) Seeking public spending projects for your constituency/electoral region/Land British representatives, 2000 6.4 • Constituency 6.1 • List 6.6 German representatives, 2000 • Constituency* • List*

7.2 9.7 5.0

British representatives, 2003 • Constituency* • List*

7.4 9.8 5.2

N (UK 2000) = 72; N (Germany) = 89; N (UK 2003) = 75 * Difference is significant at the 0.05 level ** Difference is significant at the 0.01 level

Seeking out pork barrel spending takes up about 7 per cent of the average British or German representative’s time, but this average conceals some major differences between constituency and list representatives. For members of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly surveyed in 2000, the differences between constituency and list representatives are slight, statistically insignificant, and not in the hypothesised direction: constituency representatives spent 6.1 per cent of their time seeking public spending projects for their constituents, while their list counterparts spent 6.6 per cent of their time on this activity (Table 4.14, Statement B). In 2003, however, the question, asked again, came up with entirely different results, this time in the expected direction. The more recent survey found that British constituency representatives spent 9.8 per cent of their work time seeking pork, while their list counterparts spent only 5.2 per cent of their time on this activity. The difference is significant at the 0.05 level. This result is nearly iden-


tical to the finding among German Landtag members, where constituency representatives spend 9.7 per cent of their time seeking pork, while their list counterparts spent only 5.0 per cent of their time this way. The difference here is also significant at the 0.05 level. The German Landtag and British 2003 results are similar to those of Lancaster and Patterson (1990) in their Bundestag member research, and are consistent with the electoral incentives hypothesis. Perhaps as a result of the intervening election, and simply having more time to ‘learn’ their electoral incentives, British representatives in 2003 responded to the survey in a very similar way to their German counterparts, departing from their answers in 2000 on questions about securing public funding for their geographical areas and promoting these places to businesses. The evidence presented so far suggests that constituency representatives believe that an emphasis on constituency service is important to their re-election effort; otherwise, it seems unlikely that they would spend the time on it. When asked more directly whether they believe that helping people who have problems with government agencies is important to their re-election, constituency representatives are, indeed, more likely to say that this effort is ‘very’ important (Table 4.15). In the British case, there was an increase from 2000 to 2003 in the percentage of both types of representative saying that constituency service was

Table 4.15

Helping constituents (UK and Germany)

Question: How important is helping people in your constituency/electoral region/ Land who have problems with government agencies to your re-election prospects? % response to each level of importance:

Very

SomeNo Not Not No what opinion very at all response

British representatives, 2000** • Constituency* • List*

54.2 63.6 46.2

30.6 21.2 38.5

0 0 0

German representatives, 2000** • Constituency* • List*

36.0 40.0 32.7

37.1 42.5 32.7

British representatives, 2003 • Constituency** • List**

61.3 73.0 50.0

26.7 13.5 39.5


2.8 0 5.1

0 0 0

12.5 15.2 10.3

3.4 2.5 4.1

14.6 5.0 22.4

0 0 0

8.9 10.0 8.2

2.7 2.7 2.6

1.3 0 2.6

0 0 0

8.0 10.8 5.3


‘very’ important, but in each survey, the percentage of constituency representatives is higher. In 2000, the difference is significant at the 0.05 level, while in 2003, the difference is significant at the 0.01 level. Constituency members of the Landtage in Germany are also more likely to say that constituency service is helpful to their re-election efforts, but there is one area that differs from the British results. While 5 per cent of constituency representatives in the German case replied that constituency service was ‘not very’ important to their re-election prospects, a far greater portion of list representatives (22.4 per cent) responded this way. In the two British surveys, only 5.1 per cent of list representatives in 2000, and 2.6 per cent in 2003, said that constituency service was ‘not very’ important, while none of their constituency counterparts responded this way. These results are in the hypothesised direction, but the difference between German and British responses is quite large, suggesting that constituency service has a greater importance in Britain than in Germany, as some of the relevant literature claims. On the other hand, constituency service is ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ important to the vast majority of German representatives, both constituency- and list-elected, as Table 4.15 indicates.

Conclusion Evidence presented in this chapter reveals that, to some extent, there is a stronger electoral incentive for representatives directly elected in single-member constituencies than for their list-elected counterparts. Both British and German representatives were more likely to consider helping people who have problems with government agencies as very important to their re-election prospects if they were elected in singlemember constituencies. This result is consistent with the electoral incentives hypothesis that how representatives are elected influences their behaviour, which is a stronger orientation towards their geographical constituents, in this context. Other electoral incentives evidence presented in this chapter, however, applies more to the German representatives than to their British counterparts, and many comparisons between constituencyand list-elected representatives reveal no significant differences. Yet the seeking of public spending (pork barrel) projects and the promotion of local areas as a place for business by German representatives took up more of the constituency-elected representatives’ work time, and these representatives were much more likely to say that success in obtaining pork is very helpful to their re-election effort. This finding confirms


that of Lancaster and Patterson (1990), who discovered the same pattern in their research into Bundestag members in the late 1980s. In the 1990s, other researchers investigating differences between constituency- and list-elected members of the Bundestag found that those elected in single-member constituencies ‘are predominantly on committees where they have influence over the allocation of benefits to their geographic reelection constituency’, while list-elected members ‘select committees that have control over funds that benefit party reelection constituencies’ (Stratmann and Baur 2002: 507). In Scotland and Wales, there is very little difference between the constituency and list representatives’ responses to the questions on local promotion and the seeking of government spending projects, apart from the fact that constituency representatives claimed to be more successful in obtaining them. The differences between British and German responses on these questions, suggesting a stronger electoral incentive among German representatives, could indicate simply that the Germans have had more time to become familiar with the rational incentives present in the electoral system. Chapter 5 will analyse how list-elected representatives have attempted to build constituencies, and Chapter 6 will illustrate how constituency and list representatives in Scotland and Wales have sometimes come into conflict over the constituency role.

5 List Representatives and their Constituencies

Chapter 4 examined the relationship between elected representatives and their constituents, assessing the electoral incentives hypothesis and comparing British representatives, in the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly, with their German counterparts. This chapter will continue these comparisons, but will focus upon constituency building, with a particular interest in how list-elected representatives, lacking small, well-defined geographical constituencies, develop ‘alternative’ constituencies of their own. The electoral incentives hypothesis expects that the way in which representatives are elected influences the behaviour of these representatives, so that those elected in singlemember constituencies should be ‘closer’ to their constituents than list representatives, who might focus on interest groups, or even their own regional party organisations, as ‘surrogate’ constituencies. While the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly do elect party list representatives from regional constituencies, these are much larger than traditional Westminster constituencies – each Scottish Parliament electoral region contains, on average, nine single-member constituencies and Welsh Assembly electoral regions have an average of eight single-member constituencies. Regions used for electing British members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are also much larger than the single-member constituencies used prior to the change to regional list proportional representation (PR) introduced in 1999. For example, the South West England electoral region (of some five million people) includes Bath and North East Somerset, Bournemouth, Bristol, Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Gloucestershire, North Somerset, Plymouth, Poole, South Gloucestershire, Swindon, Torbay, Wiltshire, the Isles of Scilly, and even Gibraltar, all represented by seven MEPs (UK Office of the European Parliament 2006). Therefore, it is important to see how 102

List Representatives and their Constituencies 103

list-elected representatives respond to this major change in the size of their constituencies. This chapter examines some responses from British MEPs surveyed in 2002, illustrating how they came to terms with the change from single-member plurality elections to list PR, exploring how they got used to sharing their (now much larger) electoral regions with other representatives. Most of this chapter, however, analyses data from the 2000 survey of members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) and Welsh Assembly members (AMs), along with data from a survey of members of two German Landtage, or state parliaments, in the same year. Some data from the 2003 survey of MSPs and AMs are compared to the data from 2000 at the end of this chapter as well. The Landtag of Brandenburg and the Landtag of Hesse were chosen, with members’ responses combined and reported as data from ‘German representatives’, as was the case for MSPs and AMs (taken together as ‘British representatives’), with comparisons made between the two, in Chapter 4. These British and German representatives are elected by the mixed-member proportional (MMP) system. In order to establish the linkages between elected representatives and their constituents, a series of questions asked British and German representatives about which people or groups they listened to, the importance of their duties, the contacts they had with constituents and interest groups and how they spent their work time. Other questions asked representatives about what happened when there was a conflict between what was good for their constituents and what was good for their parties, as well as some other questions about their roles. This chapter analyses these survey results and considers comparisons not only with the German experience, but also the MMP experience in New Zealand, as reported in the literature on that country’s transition from a British-style system of political representation.

A constituency role for list representatives? While representatives elected in geographical areas have a clearly defined constituency upon which to focus, those elected from party lists have a less defined focus of representation. There is a geographical element to representation for list MSPs, AMs, and MEPs in Britain, but these electoral regions, as described above, are quite large. Therefore, a regional representative might break down his or her electoral region into smaller parts, perhaps using existing single-member constituencies as geographical units, especially if he or she plans to


shadow constituency MSPs or AMs, in the Scottish and Welsh MMP cases. Alternatively, list representatives could focus on interest (‘pressure’) groups, particularly those important to the party, or simply those that are of personal interest to the representative. Finally, a list representative might see his or her party itself as a constituency, since the regional party organisation is ultimately responsible for determining the rank order of the party list for the next election, and because Britain uses closed-list PR for the PR portion of MMP, and for electing all MEPs, individual voters cannot alter these lists and choose candidates they prefer. This means that the electoral incentive for list representatives is to behave in a way that pleases the party organisation, although this could include raising the party’s profile in the electoral region, perhaps through aggressive constituency service. As previous chapters have pointed out, list representatives are a controversial addition to the British political system, partially because they did not begin their existence in the bodies that elect them with a clearly defined role. In the process of defining that role, however, list representatives in Britain have been annoying constituency representatives, to various degrees, as some of them go about shadowing their counterparts elected in single-member constituencies. Furthermore, list representatives have been seen by their critics as having an easier time, free from the heavy constituency caseload burden of their constituency-elected brethren. While list representatives might counter that argument, saying that serving their far larger electoral regions is actually a bigger burden, comments in the media from these critics indicate that list representatives have a mountain to climb if they want to gain respect from other politicians, not to mention much of the British press. Over four years after the first Scottish Parliament election, a Scottish Labour Member of Parliament (MP), Brian Wilson, labelled list MSPs an ‘under-employed waste of space’, implying that they do not work as much as their constituency counterparts (BBC News Web site 2003). Two years later, in an opinion piece for the newspaper Scotland on Sunday, he claimed that ‘there is barely the pretence of list MSPs’ allowances being used for anything other than to run the local party machine….Neither is there anything democratic about the list system’ (Wilson 2005). Hostility towards list MSPs is also seen in newspaper editorials. ‘Natural justice is also offended when a candidate directly rejected by the voters in the constituency section still contrives to get elected by dint of being placed high on the regional list by his or her party machine’, The Scotsman argued in an editorial against the practice of dual candidacy (2005).


Coverage of list MSPs in The Scotsman could be somewhat unflattering, indicating a bias against them, ignorance of the electoral system, or a bit of both. A 2006 article headlined ‘Storm over Euro MP appointment by “list” system’ appears to exemplify both: the author writes that if the Labour candidate for a Westminster by-election for a Scottish constituency won, she would resign as an MEP and be replaced in that post by another Labour Party candidate on its list, ‘who failed to win election to Brussels in 2004’, yet ‘will be appointed as one of Scotland’s seven MEP’s without having to face the electorate’ (MacDonnell 2006). The assumption that the candidate ‘failed’ reflects a winner-takes-all notion that is not compatible with the reality of list PR, and saying that the candidate could become an MEP ‘without having to face the electorate’ flies in the face of the fact that all the candidates on the party list did, collectively, face the electorate (indeed, all their names were printed on the ballot papers!) at the European Parliament election. Press coverage like this, apparently stuck in the Westminster mindset, does not help advance the understanding of PR, forms of which have been used for some years now across the UK. Because the relevant press coverage is sometimes biased and/or mistaken, and because at the time of the 2000 survey, PR was still quite new, this investigation’s survey asked MSPs and AMs whether, from their perspective, Scottish and Welsh people understand where to go with their questions or grievances. Results, in Table 5.1 (Statement A), show that there is some disagreement between the two types of MSPs and AMs over whether voters are confused about whether to approach a constituency or list representative with questions or problems, with only 21.2 per cent of the former agreeing (and none strongly) that there is confusion and 69.7 per cent disagreeing or disagreeing strongly. List MSPs and AMs seem to think there is confusion, however, with 46.2 per cent agreeing or agreeing strongly with the statement, and the difference between list and constituency representatives is significant at the 0.01 level. Major party representatives as a group also express disagreement with the statement, with 26.7 per cent of them agreeing (and none strongly) with Statement A, but 48.1 of minor party representatives agree or agree strongly. The difference between them and minor party representatives is significant at the 0.05 level. As far as constituency service functions are concerned, there is again disagreement between the representatives. Statement B in Table 5.1 shows that only 33.3 per cent of constituency MSPs and AMs agree or


The role of list representatives (UK)

Question: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about Members of the Scottish Parliament/National Assembly for Wales? % responding:

Strongly agree

Agree

No opinion

Disagree

Strongly disagree

No response

(A) Voters appear to be confused about which type of MSP/AM (single-member constituency or party list) to approach with questions or problems All representatives 5.6 29.2 15.3 44.4 5.6 • Constituency*** 0 21.2 9.1 60.6 9.1 • List*** 10.3 35.9 20.5 30.8 2.6 • Major parties** 0 26.7 15.6 48.9 8.9 • Minor parties** 14.8 33.3 14.8 37.0 0

0 0 0 0 0

(B) Party list MSPs/AMs carry out the constituency service functions associated with MSPs/AMs elected from single-member constituencies All representatives 19.4 38.9 11.1 20.8 8.3 1.4 • Constituency*** 3.0 30.3 6.1 39.4 18.2 3.0 • List*** 33.3 46.2 15.4 5.1 0 0 • Major parties* 17.8 37.8 6.7 26.7 11.1 0 • Minor parties* 22.2 40.7 18.5 11.1 3.7 0 (C) Party list MSPs/AMs are developing more expertise on policy matters than MSPs/ AMs elected from single-member constituencies All representatives 12.5 6.9 38.9 29.2 12.5 0 • Constituency*** 0 9.1 27.3 42.4 21.2 0 • List*** 23.1 5.1 48.7 17.9 5.1 0 • Major parties 6.7 8.9 42.2 28.9 13.3 0 • Minor parties 22.2 3.7 33.3 29.6 11.1 0 N = 72 Major parties = Labour, SNP, and Plaid Cymru; minor parties = Conservative, Liberal Democrat, and Green *Difference is significant at the 0.10 level **Difference is significant at the 0.05 level ***Difference is significant at the 0.01 level

agree strongly that their party list counterparts carry out the constituency service functions associated with constituency representatives, while 79.5 per cent of list representatives agree or agree strongly that they are indeed performing constituency service functions. The difference between list and constituency representatives is significant at the 0.01 level. This result suggests that the two types of representatives have different ideas about what constitutes constituency service – constituency MSPs and AMs might believe that what their list counterparts are doing is partisan electioneering and not comparable to the daily grind of taking all cases, no matter how mundane. Major party


representatives express stronger disagreement than representatives of minor parties, and while this difference is weakly significant at the 0.10 level, it is less significant than the difference between constituency and list representatives above. When asked whether list representatives are developing more policy expertise than constituency representatives, there is again disagreement between these groups of representatives, with only 9.1 per cent of constituency MSPs and AMs agreeing (and none strongly) and 63.6 per cent disagreeing or disagreeing strongly (Statement C in Table 5.1). Of the list representatives, 28.2 per cent agree or agree strongly that they are developing more policy expertise than constituency representatives, but the large number giving no opinion (48.7 per cent) indicates some uncertainty. Differences between constituency and list representatives are significant at the 0.01 level, but the difference between major and minor party representatives is not significant. While there are quite different opinions among politicians about the MMP electoral system in Scotland and Wales and voter confusion over the representatives’ roles, German survey results indicate that politicians there believe the German public has no problem understanding where to go with their problems or questions. Table 5.2 reveals only a slight disagreement between the two types of representatives about whether voters are confused about whether to approach a constituency or list MdL (Mitglied des Landtages – member of the Landtag) with questions or problems (Statement A). Only 15.0 per cent of the constituency MdLs agree or agree strongly that there is confusion, while 22.5 per cent of list MdLs feel the same way. The difference between list and constituency representatives is not statistically significant, however, and the vast majority of both types of representatives say there is no confusion. There is no significant difference between major and minor party representatives’ responses either. The results here are probably due to the fact that MMP has been in place for years in Germany – even in Brandenburg, where the system was introduced after German reunification in 1990. As far as constituency service functions are concerned, though, there is significant disagreement between the different types of representatives (Statement B in Table 5.2). Only 15.0 per cent of constituency MdLs agree strongly that party list MdLs carry out the constituency service functions associated with their constituency counterparts, while 51.0 per cent of list MdLs agree strongly that they are indeed performing constituency service functions. The difference between list


The role of list representatives (Germany)

Question: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about Members of the Landtag (MdLs)? % responding:

Strongly agree

Agree

No opinion

Disagree

Strongly disagree

(A) Voters appear to be confused about which type of MdL (single-member constituency or party list) to approach with questions or problems All representatives 3.4 15.7 7.9 46.1 25.8 • Constituency 2.5 12.5 10.0 52.5 22.5 • List 4.1 18.4 6.1 40.8 28.6 • Major parties 4.1 13.5 8.1 47.3 25.7 • Minor parties 0 26.7 6.7 40.0 26.7

No response

1.1 0 2.0 1.4 0

(B) Party list MdLs carry out the constituency service functions associated with MdLs elected from single-member constituencies All representatives 34.8 33.7 6.7 21.3 2.2 1.1 • Constituency** 15.0 32.5 12.5 35.0 5.0 0 • List** 51.0 34.7 2.0 10.2 0 2.0 • Major parties** 31.1 33.8 8.1 23.0 2.7 1.4 • Minor parties** 53.3 33.3 0 13.3 0 0 (C) Party list MdLs are developing more expertise on policy matters than MdLs elected from single-member constituencies All representatives 10.1 19.1 10.1 41.6 18.0 1.1 • Constituency 2.5 25.0 12.5 40.0 20.0 0 • List 16.3 14.3 8.2 42.9 16.3 2.0 • Major parties*** 6.8 16.2 10.8 45.9 18.9 1.4 • Minor parties*** 26.7 33.3 6.7 20.0 13.3 0 N = 89 Major parties = SPD and CDU; minor parties = PDS, Greens, FDP, and DVU **Difference is significant at the 0.05 level ***Difference is significant at the 0.01 level

and constituency representatives is significant at the 0.05 level, as is the difference between major (31.1 per cent) and minor (53.3 per cent) party representatives. This result shows that either these representatives have different ideas about what constitutes constituency service, or that perhaps constituency and major party representatives feel that what the list and minor party representatives are doing is of less value, or perhaps a form of partisan electioneering. When asked whether list MdLs are developing more policy expertise than constituency MdLs (Statement C), there is only a minor and statistically insignificant disagreement between constituency and list representatives, with 27.5 per cent of constituency representatives


agreeing or agreeing strongly and 30.6 per cent of list representatives agreeing or agreeing strongly. While the strength of the agreement is higher with the list representatives, it is interesting to note that the majority of both constituency and list representatives actually disagree that the list representatives are developing more policy expertise than constituency representatives. The disagreement between major and minor party representatives, however, is greater and significant at the 0.01 level. Only 6.8 per cent of major party representatives agree strongly that party list MdLs are developing more policy expertise, while 26.7 per cent of minor party representatives agree strongly with Statement C. Comments from MdLs on this issue, reviewed in Chapter 4, reveal that while many list representatives do focus on policy matters, this does not necessarily arise simply from the way they were elected, but rather from special skills or interests that they have. However, it is possible that minor party representatives, who are often elected from their party lists, tend to focus on policy matters more because they know they are not likely to be elected in single-member constituencies, and therefore gravitate towards policy. In Britain, the received wisdom is that constituency service is simply ‘part of the job’ for elected representatives, who often enjoy performing these duties. While some do not like to focus on their constituency role, it is generally understood that they must take it seriously. Interviews with representatives suggest that constituency service is simply expected by the Scots and the Welsh, and while a personal vote is not normally decisive in most contests at the constituency level, representatives ignore constituents at their peril. Kirsty Williams, Liberal Democrat constituency AM for Brecon and Radnorshire in 2001, says that while it is not possible to beat a large national swing against a party, Welsh Assembly members must be good constituency representatives because voters have ‘certain levels of expectations which have to be fulfilled’ (Williams 2001). In close contests, however, the personal vote could matter. Christine Chapman, Labour AM for Cynon Valley in 2001, expects that the personal vote will really matter at the next Welsh Assembly election because she is facing a strong Plaid Cymru challenger (Chapman 2001). Constituency service is important to Chapman, she says, because she is identified with the constituency – she makes sure that people get to know her by name. As far as duties are concerned, however, constituency representatives seem to have a clear preference for being what they are, and not list representatives. ‘Constituency members are much more readily identifiable in the eyes of the public as being their representative’,


argues Williams (2001). She notes that constituency representatives are more often sought after for casework, and are more frequently invited to local public functions than list representatives, who are not as well known by the public at large. While trying not to disparage her list colleagues, Williams says that constituency representatives simply expect to maintain a stronger local presence. She explains the failure of regional list AMs to attend a recent event in her constituency this way: I feel a particular responsibility to get out and about in my constituency. I think it’s probably a lot more difficult for people who have to represent a region because you could be pulled in so many different directions, and I don’t think they weren’t at that particular event because they were skiving, or that they couldn’t be bothered. They were probably not at that event because they were doing other events in different parts of their region (Williams 2001). The focus on just the local constituency’s needs, for which constituency representatives are known, can almost be a disadvantage at times. Williams recalls ‘I’ve actually been in a meeting where regional Assembly members said don’t write to me, write to Kirsty – she’s your member!’ (Williams 2001). For many constituency representatives like Williams, however, a strong local presence is not a burden, but rather an enjoyable part of the job. Brian Gibbons, another Welsh constituency AM, only stood for election in his constituency, and not on the Labour list in his electoral region because he did not want to have a political career ‘at any cost’, in his words. ‘I was only interested in really representing the area that I live in and trying to make a difference for that area’, he says (Gibbons 2001). This close constituency contact, according to Mike Watson, formerly a Glasgow Labour constituency MSP, makes his job preferable to that of a list representative: I like the fact that on a fortnightly basis I hold surgeries in various parts of my constituency and individuals bring problems to me which I then take up. These vary from housing to education to health to individual campaigning issues such as fox hunting to the crisis in Palestine, and International Development Aid to AntiMotorway Campaigners. This variation I find particularly challenging and it is, needless to say, satisfying when I am able to achieve a move of house or an improvement to a family’s living conditions as a result of taking up their case. These sort of issues rarely come the


way of a list MSP, as I understand it, and for that reason dealing simply with general issues to my mind would be much less satisfying. This would be a clear disadvantage of a list member (Watson 2001b). While preferring their own jobs, some British constituency representatives did point out that list representatives might have an advantage in being able to form a more strategic view of their region’s needs, particularly when there is only one representative of a party elected from the list, rather than a few. In the latter case, list representatives tend to divide the region into components for ‘shadowing’ the sitting constituency representatives, rather than focusing on policy matters with broad implications for the region as a whole.

New Zealand’s experience with list representatives Another example is particularly relevant to the question of the role of list representatives. The case of MMP in New Zealand is useful as an illustration of what happened when a Westminster-style democracy made the transition to PR elections. While critics of PR in that country often focused on the possible fragmentation of Parliament among many parties, and the likely need for coalition or minority government, much was also made of the presence of list-elected MPs under the MMP system, who were considered to be ‘second-class’ MPs (Ward 1998). In the first MMP-elected Parliament, many list MPs established constituency offices in geographical electorates, as New Zealanders call their single-member constituencies (Barker and Levine 2000: 113). Green MP Rod Donald noted that his party (in 1996, the Alliance) would divide up these constituencies among its small band of representatives, meaning that each had responsibility for four, yet received a much smaller office budget than a constituency MP did for one constituency (Donald 1998: 47). In spite of this financial constraint, Donald aimed to spend at least one day per month in the ‘away from home electorates’, as he called them, noting that while ‘list MPs are not in the business of competing with constituency MPs’, he hoped that the constituency MP elected where he had his main office ‘now accepts that he benefits from the service I offer, not only to those people who voted for the Alliance, but also to anyone else who seeks my advice, assistance, advocacy or representation’ (Donald 1998: 48). List MPs in New Zealand also support constituency MPs from the same


party as ‘buddy MPs’ who provide extra help for overloaded MPs representing large areas, such as the huge Maori electorates,1 one of which includes the entire South Island and part of the North Island (Church 2001: 10). Aside from the geographical constituency functions, Donald enumerates what he calls ‘a number of constituencies of interest’, claiming that all parties do this sort of allocation of portfolios, which in his case included employment, skills training, overseas trade, tourism, and electoral and parliamentary reform (1998: 48). Other research, by Stephen Church, has shown that list MPs can become identified with particular issues of interest, such as the decriminalisation of cannabis; Green list MP Nandor Tanczos, ‘a dreadlocked Rastafarian who personifies the campaign’ to legalise the drug, attracts a segment of the youth vote, saying that ‘community is no longer simply geographical’ (Church 2001: 11). Another role Church discovered in his study of New Zealand MPs is that of the party representative, arguing that the ‘electoral basis for list MPs makes it appropriate for them to articulate their party’s perspective, and increasingly, more list MPs are seeing this as their primary role in the electorate [constituency]’, with examples of list MPs who promote their parties locally (Church 2001: 12). While some MPs were concerned about where the accountability was – to a geographical constituency or to a party organisation – other MPs liked the freedom list MPs had in developing representational roles for themselves, with some constituency MPs even envying their list counterparts’ freedom from the mundane ‘social work’ expected of constituency MPs (Church 2001: 14). One list MP and ACT (Association of Consumers and Taxpayers) party leader, Richard Prebble, writes that the constraints of being a list MP in a small party have forced his MPs to take the lead in what he calls ‘e-politics’, using ‘quality, interactive websites’ to overcome their lack of a major presence in physical constituency offices (Prebble 2003). It is more likely that voters will communicate with ACT and MPs from other small parties regarding partisan matters (policy issues) rather than on more traditional constituency matters, but this practice could indicate the development of a ‘new’ type of constituency.

1 Single-member constituencies in New Zealand include some reserved for Maori voters (who can choose to enrol on the Maori, or the general, roll). These Maori constituencies overlap the general constituencies.


New Zealand’s experience with list representatives shows that these politicians have more flexibility in how they develop a constituency role, which may resemble that of a constituency-elected MP in having a geographical presence and helping people with grievances, or it could instead be more focused upon specific policy matters and issues important to the list MP. The latter is more likely in the case of minor party MPs, as appears to be true in Germany, as well as in Britain. Contact with constituents, a major challenge in New Zealand’s political system, has evolved with MMP, as well as with technological advances.

British MEPs and list PR As in New Zealand, contact between British representatives and their constituents faced a challenge after the introduction of PR. List PR was introduced for Great Britain’s 1999 elections to the European Parliament, replacing the single-member plurality system that had been used since the first elections in 1979. In order to examine the reaction of British MEPs elected under the new list PR system in 1999, this author asked MEPs in a 2002 survey the question ‘How has list PR changed how you represent your voters?’. Some responses were quite direct, and negative, including ‘For the worse’, and ‘Lost contact with voters’. Others were more positive, pointing to the increased competition among representatives and how this is good for voters: It keeps you ‘on your toes’ vis-à-vis constituents, who can always turn to another member in your constituency if they are getting bad service (including members of other parties)! It provides a wider scope and better balance in who you represent – there are no purely ‘urban’ or ‘rural’ or ‘mining’ or ‘steel’ or whatever seats anymore, but regions with multiple interests. The reference to interests above was also noted by this MEP, regarding how representation has changed under list PR: It has affected more how businesses and public authorities approach MEPs. Under the single-member system they had only one option, and now they can pick and choose either by political sympathy or by specialised interests of MEP (in particular committee membership).


Other MEPs noted that the major increase in the size of their constituencies posed some practical problems for representation, as this MEP states: It [list PR] hasn’t changed how I represent them since there is no collective South West view on anything and no sense of regional identity. It simply means I have more communities and people to represent and keep in contact with. Another MEP, however, notes that the new system does have its advantages, perhaps referring to the party faithful as a constituency: It’s harder [to represent voters under PR]. You cannot be as vivid a presence for 4–5 million voters as you are for 500,000 in a handful of Westminster constituencies. This I regret, although there are gains in collective action for the region, which can reach all voters and supporters. The increased importance of the party was mentioned by several MEPs, which is consistent with the electoral incentives hypothesis. One says that list PR has caused ‘diminished contact with voters; increased importance of party’, while another states ‘Before I represented the whole constituency; now I represent my party’s voters’. Another states, in detail: The party and its policies are now more significant. Previously once selected one normally built up individual loyalty that is more or less impossible with six million voters and 100,000 party members. Now I have to keep my ‘nose clean’ with the party hierarchy. Previously I had to keep local supporters happy. Other MEPs pointed out the competition within party organisations engendered by the list PR system, with the ranking of lists carried out on a regional basis. The political problem with the system is that you are in greater competition with other MEPs in your region with your political persuasion than you are with the opposition members. The party list system is confusing to the electorate. It weakens the link between voters and their representative, puts party before


people, and endures competition within the party organisation rather than against the political enemy in other parties. This competition within regional party organisations over the candidate selection process could harm the prospects for MEPs from the same party working together on constituency service, as other researchers have pointed out (Farrell and Scully 2003). Indications are, however, that MEPs from the larger parties (which often have more than one MEP per region) are splitting up constituency service within their regions. For example, Dr Caroline Jackson identifies herself on her Web site as ‘Conservative MEP for the South West of England’, but names her fellow Conservative MEPs elected in 2004, Giles Chichester and Neil Parish, giving their Web site addresses and dividing up constituency responsibilities: Caroline has primary responsibility for Wiltshire and Gloucestershire; Neil has primary responsibility for Dorset and Somerset; Giles has primary responsibility for Devon and Cornwall; Caroline and Neil share Bristol; Neil and Giles share Gibraltar (Jackson 2006). Other parties’ MEPs elsewhere have also divided up constituency duties geographically, breaking down the large electoral regions into more manageable constituencies.

Conflict between constituency and partisan roles Many of the MEPs above pointed to what they considered to be an elevation of the party role, which seemed to be coming up against the constituency role. To probe this issue further, the 2000 survey of British and German representatives investigated what happens when the constituency and partisan roles of these elected representatives come into conflict. This survey also distinguishes between representatives elected in single-member constituencies and those elected from regional lists, while the previous survey of MEPs was restricted to listelected representatives as the only type elected from Great Britain. Asking questions to force a choice between constituency and partisan roles was another way to obtain British representatives’ views on this topic, although some had problems answering, as Question 1 in Table 5.3 shows. When asked if they had to choose between helping to get their parties’ policy preferences enacted or serving their constituents as the primary motivation for their choice to stand for office,


over 10 per cent of the MSPs and AMs either refused to answer or chose both, which was not an option on the questionnaire. Some claimed that party policy was instrumental to serving their voters’ needs, so there was seldom a conflict. The majority, with almost no difference between constituency (54.5 per cent) and list (56.4 per cent) representatives, indicated that they stood for election in order to serve their constituents or voters. There is also very little difference between major and minor party representatives, or between government and opposition representatives. This result seems to confirm the received wisdom about British representatives and the high importance of their constituency role, deflecting criticism of list representatives as partisan hacks who care more about their parties than their constituents. Question 2 in Table 5.3 asked how British representatives would vote when there is a conflict between what the party wants and what they think is best for their constituents. Despite the received wisdom about how attached they are to their constituents, this result suggests that both types of MSPs and AMs regard the party’s instructions as more important. Partisanship is high in Scotland and Wales, regardless of how representatives are elected, although this should be expected in parliamentary systems of government relying upon strong party discipline. Roughly 60 per cent of both types of representatives always or usually vote with the party in such circumstances. Since there is not much of a difference between constituency (63.7 per cent) and list (59.0 per cent) representatives in this question, or in Question 1, there is no evidence in this table to indicate that list MSPs and AMs are ‘second-class’ representatives. Indeed, it would be difficult to claim that list representatives are overly accountable to their parties when there is a conflict between party and constituent needs. Both the constituency and the party appear to be highly important to British representatives in this 2000 survey, but party discipline means that the party will supersede constituency interests when it comes to voting on legislation. The party could, arguably, constitute a constituency in itself. As in Britain, representatives in Germany were asked if they had to choose between helping to get their parties’ policy preferences enacted or serving their voters as the primary motivation for their choice to stand for office (Question 1 in Table 5.4). As was the case among Scottish and Welsh representatives, some German MdLs (over 10 per cent) chose both, which was not an option on their questionnaire, either. Some claimed that party policy was instrumental to serving their voters’ needs, so there was seldom a conflict, echoing their British

List Representatives and their Constituencies 117 Table 5.3

Constituency and partisan role conflict (UK)

Question 1: If you had to choose only one or the other, which of the following was more instrumental in your decision to stand as an AM/MSP? • Helping to get the policy preferences of your party enacted into law • Serving the needs of your constituents/voters % responding: All representatives • Constituency • List • Major parties • Minor parties • Government • Opposition

Party policy

Constituents

(Both)

No response

34.7 33.3 35.9 35.6 33.3 26.7 37.5

55.6 54.5 56.4 53.3 59.3 60.0 55.0

6.9 6.1 7.7 8.9 3.7 6.7 7.5

2.8 6.1 0 2.2 3.7 6.7 0

Question 2: Sometimes in the legislative process there is a conflict between what your parliamentary party wants and what you believe is best for your constituents. In such cases, how do you vote on the proposed legislation? % responding:

With the party:

About equally with party and constituents

Always Usually All representatives • Constituency • List • Major parties • Minor parties • Government** • Opposition**

27.8 27.3 28.2 24.4 33.3 20.0 32.5

33.3 36.4 30.8 40.0 22.2 33.3 32.5

With the constituents:

No response

Usually Always 19.4 15.2 23.1 22.2 14.8 20.0 20.0

6.9 12.1 2.6 4.4 11.1 13.3 2.5

4.2 6.1 2.6 2.2 7.4 6.7 2.5

8.3 3.0 12.8 6.7 11.1 6.7 10.0

N = 72 Major parties = Labour, SNP, and Plaid Cymru; minor parties = Conservative, Liberal Democrat, and Green **Difference is significant at the 0.05 level

counterparts. The majority of German constituency representatives (50.0 per cent), however, indicated that they stood for election in order to serve their voters, while 55.1 per cent of list representatives said they stood primarily so that they could help get the policies of their parties enacted. The difference between the two types of representative is significant at the 0.05 level, and is what would be expected if one assumes that list representatives are more partisan – more interested in advancing the party’s agenda than performing constituency service.


Constituency and partisan role conflict (Germany)

Question 1: If you had to choose only one or the other, which of the following was more instrumental in your decision to stand as an MdL? • Helping to get the policy preferences of your party enacted into law • Serving the needs of your constituents/voters % responding:

Party policy

Constituents

(Both)

No response

44.9 32.5 55.1 43.2 53.3 36.4 58.8

40.4 50.0 32.7 45.9 13.3 52.7 20.6

10.1 10.0 10.2 6.8 26.7 7.3 14.7

4.5 7.5 2.0 4.1 6.7 3.6 5.9

All representatives • Constituency** • List** • Major parties** • Minor parties** • Government*** • Opposition***

Question 2: Sometimes in the legislative process there is a conflict between what your parliamentary party wants and what you believe is best for your constituents. In such cases, how do you vote on the proposed legislation? % responding:

With the party: About equally With the with party and constituents: constituents Always Usually

All representatives • Constituency • List • Major parties** • Minor parties** • Government • Opposition

37.1 32.5 40.8 40.5 20.0 32.7 44.1

38.2 40.0 36.7 37.8 40.0 36.4 41.2

No response

Usually Always 12.4 15.0 10.2 12.2 13.3 16.4 5.9

1.1 0 10.2 2.7 20.0 5.5 5.9

5.6 2.5 0 0 6.7 0 2.9

5.6 10.0 2.0 6.8 0 9.1 0


The second question in Table 5.4 asked how representatives would vote when there is a conflict between what the party wants and what they think is best for their voters. Here the main finding is that partisanship is high, regardless of how representatives are elected, as was the case in Scotland and Wales. Over 70 per cent of both types of representative always or usually vote with the party in such circumstances. Since there is not much of a difference between constituency (72.5 per cent) and list (77.5 per cent) representatives in this question, it is difficult to claim that list representatives are overly accountable to


their parties when there might be a conflict between party and constituent needs. There is a difference, significant at the 0.05 level, however, between major and minor party representatives’ responses, but not in the expected direction. Only 2.7 per cent of major party representatives would vote with the constituents in the scenario described in the question, while 26.7 per cent of minor party representatives said they would vote with their constituents. The result from Question 1, however, does support the idea that constituency-elected representatives are closer to their constituents, holding true in Germany but not in Britain, where both constituency and list representatives were about equal in their claims to be close to their constituents. This finding could be simply a product of the fact that PR is new in Britain, while Germany has had its MMP system for some time and role differentiation has had longer to take place. While results from a second British survey, done in 2003, will be compared to these later in the chapter, more survey questions explore the constituency role of British and German representatives below.

The constituency role of list representatives in Britain and Germany Some differences between British constituency and party list representatives exist in the responses to the question that asked how important it was for elected representatives to listen to various people or groups when they were deciding how to vote on proposed legislation (Table 5.5). There was no significant difference in how representatives responded to the question of listening to ‘all voters’ within the constituency or electoral region (Statement A). Despite the expectation that list representatives would focus more upon those who voted for them, rather than the electoral region as a whole, 56.4 per cent of them found it very important to listen to all voters, as opposed to 48.5 per cent of constituency representatives. The difference is slight, but the opposite of what would be expected. Narrowing down just to ‘those who voted for you’ (Statement B) from the wider constituency or electoral region is a way to focus on partisan voters, a natural constituency for party list representatives. The result shows that 38.5 per cent of list representatives thought it is very important to listen to the people who voted for them, as opposed to 24.2 per cent of constituency representatives, but the difference is only weakly significant at the 0.10 level. There is a more significant difference (at the 0.01 level) between constituency and list representatives


Constituency orientation: Links to voters and parties (UK)

Question: How important is it for representatives to listen to the following people when they decide how to vote on proposed legislation? % response to each level of importance:

Very

Somewhat

No opinion

Not very

Not at all

No response

(A) All voters within your constituency/electoral region All representatives 52.8 30.6 0 • Constituency 48.5 30.3 0 • List 56.4 30.8 0 • Major parties 55.6 26.7 0 • Minor parties 48.1 37.0 0

0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0

16.7 21.2 12.8 17.8 14.8

(B) The people who voted for you All representatives 31.9 • Constituency* 24.2 • List* 38.5 • Major parties 33.3 • Minor parties 29.6

44.4 42.4 46.2 42.2 48.1

2.8 3.0 2.6 4.4 0

2.8 6.1 0 2.2 3.7

0 0 0 0 0

18.1 24.2 12.8 17.8 18.5

(C) Interest groups All representatives • Constituency*** • List*** • Major parties • Minor parties

16.7 3.0 28.2 15.6 18.5

52.8 54.5 51.3 51.1 55.6

5.6 6.1 5.1 6.7 3.7

9.7 15.2 5.1 8.9 11.1

0 0 0 0 0

15.3 21.2 10.3 17.8 11.1

(D) Your parliamentary party All representatives • Constituency** • List** • Major parties • Minor parties

44.4 30.3 56.4 46.7 40.7

38.9 45.5 33.3 33.3 48.1

1.4 3.0 0 2.2 0

0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0

15.3 21.2 10.3 17.8 11.1

(E) Your own conscience All representatives • Constituency • List • Major parties • Minor parties

61.1 51.5 69.2 60.0 63.0

19.4 24.2 15.4 20.0 18.5

1.4 0 2.6 0 3.7

1.4 3.0 0 2.2 0

0 0 0 0 0

16.7 21.2 12.8 17.8 14.8



when it comes to listening to interest groups, however (Statement C). Perhaps seeing such groups as constituents, 28.2 per cent of list representatives said it is very important to listen to them, while only 3.0 per cent of constituency representatives agreed. The difference here is significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting that list MSPs and AMs are cultivating interest groups as constituencies, perhaps as surrogate geographical ones. While the above findings show some evidence that list representatives are no less focused on geographical and non-geographical constituencies than their counterparts elected in smaller single-member constituencies, list representatives do appear to take listening to the parliamentary party more seriously. Among list representatives, 56.4 per cent said it is very important to listen to the party, compared to 30.3 per cent of constituency representatives (Statement D). The difference between the two types of representatives is significant at the 0.05 level, while there is no significant difference when comparing representatives by major or minor party. This finding suggests that listelected representatives might be more beholden to their parties, as the electoral incentives hypothesis would expect, and as British critics of PR often claim. No significant difference exists between the two types of representative when it comes to listening to their conscience (Statement E), however, with 51.5 per cent of constituency representatives and 69.2 per cent of their list counterparts responding ‘very important’. Furthermore, there were no significant differences between members of major and minor parties, which were grouped in order to assess whether major party members (Labour, the Scottish National Party, and Plaid Cymru) behave like constituency representatives by virtue of the size of their parliamentary parties, which are larger than those of the minor parties (Conservative, Liberal Democrat, and Green). As noted in previous chapters, Werner Patzelt (1999) argues that German major party representatives behave like they were elected in constituencies, even if they were not, because the size of their parliamentary parties allows those elected via party lists to shadow geographical constituencies, which minor party representatives are not able to do on account of their smaller numbers. The same question (Table 5.6) asked German Landtag members how important it was for elected representatives to listen to the previously listed people and groups when they were deciding how to vote. Despite the expectation that list MdLs would focus more strictly upon those who voted for them, rather than their federal state’s voters as a whole (‘all voters’, Statement A), 10.2 per cent of them found it very


Constituency orientation: Links to voters and parties (Germany)

Question: How important is it for representatives to listen to the following people when they decide how to vote on proposed legislation? % response to each level of importance:

Very

Somewhat

No opinion

Not very

Not at all

No response

(A) All voters within your constituency/Land All representatives 6.7 33.7 • Constituency 2.5 50.0 • List 10.2 20.4 • Major parties 6.8 33.8 • Minor parties 6.7 33.3

18.0 15.0 20.4 16.2 26.7

15.7 12.5 18.4 16.2 13.3

10.1 7.5 12.2 9.5 13.3

15.7 12.5 18.4 17.6 6.7

(B) The people who voted for you All representatives 10.1 • Constituency*** 7.5 • List*** 12.2 • Major parties*** 6.8 • Minor parties*** 26.7

48.3 35.0 59.2 45.9 60.0

12.4 20.0 6.1 14.9 0

10.1 15.0 6.1 10.8 6.7

4.5 7.5 2.0 5.4 0

14.6 15.0 14.3 16.2 6.7

(C) Interest groups All representatives • Constituency • List • Major parties* • Minor parties*

15.7 12.5 18.4 16.2 13.3

58.4 67.5 51.0 55.4 73.3

2.2 2.5 2.0 1.4 6.7

12.4 7.5 16.3 14.9 0

1.1 0 2.0 1.4 0

10.1 10.0 10.2 10.8 6.7

(D) Your parliamentary party All representatives • Constituency • List • Major parties • Minor parties

9.0 5.0 12.2 8.1 13.3

41.6 40.0 42.9 41.9 40.0

9.0 10.0 8.2 5.4 26.7

24.7 25.0 24.5 25.7 20.0

3.4 5.0 2.0 4.1 0

12.4 15.0 10.2 14.9 0

(E) Your own conscience All representatives • Constituency • List • Major parties*** • Minor parties***

73.0 67.5 77.6 68.9 93.3

15.7 22.5 10.2 18.9 0

0 0 0 0 0

1.1 0 2.0 1.4 0

0 0 0 0 0

10.1 10.0 10.2 10.8 6.7


important to listen to all voters, as opposed to 2.5 per cent of constituency MdLs. However, 52.5 per cent of constituency MdLs said it was very or somewhat important to listen to all voters, as opposed to


30.6 per cent of list MdLs in this combined category. The difference between how constituency and list representatives responded is not significant, as is the case for major and minor party voters. A different result is found when narrowing down just to ‘those who voted for you’ from the wider constituency or electoral region, a way to focus on partisan voters who might form a non-geographical constituency for party list representatives. Responses to Statement B show that 71.4 per cent of list MdLs thought it is very or somewhat important to listen to the people who voted for them, as opposed to 42.5 per cent of constituency MdLs. The difference between constituency and list MdLs is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, as is the case for the difference between major and minor party MdLs. Of major party MdLs, 52.7 per cent fell into the ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ important categories, compared to 86.7 per cent of minor party MdLs. These results are in line with the electoral incentives expectation that list representatives should have stronger partisan links than constituency representatives, and that list representatives might try to find non-geographical constituencies within their federal states. Since many list representatives (particularly those from minor parties) are not likely to be elected in geographical constituencies, they should be focused more specifically on those who voted for them, rather than the wider public in single-member constituencies, where representatives might be able to pick up personal votes from less partisan voters. This German result, however, shows a much stronger difference between constituency and list representatives than is the case for the British result for this statement in Table 5.5. List representatives in Germany seem to take listening to organised interests more seriously than their constituency counterparts (Statement C), but the difference in responses is not statistically significant, while it was highly significant in the British case. Results from major and minor party representatives show that interest groups are very or somewhat important to 86.6 per cent of minor party representatives, compared to 71.6 per cent of major party representatives, and the difference is slightly significant at the 0.10 level. On listening to the parliamentary party (Statement D), more list MdLs (12.2 per cent) than constituency MdLs (5 per cent) said this was very important when voting, but the difference is not significant. A highly significant difference, however, between major and minor party representatives is seen in their response to whether they listen to their own consciences when voting on proposed legislation (Statement E). All minor party representatives who responded


(93.3 per cent of the total) said it was very important, compared to 68.9 per cent of major party representatives. Further questions about the tasks of elected representatives fail to show significant differences between British constituency and list representatives’ attitudes towards traditional constituency service. The importance that representatives place upon the various tasks of legislators was used as a way to investigate constituency and party orientation, and the British responses are summarised in Table 5.7. Responses range from ‘very important’ to ‘not at all important’. Among constituency MSPs and AMs, 81.8 per cent said it was very important to represent the collective views of their constituents, compared to 74.4 per cent of list MSPs and AMs (Statement A). As far as responding to individual voters’ grievances or requests, at the core of constituency service in Britain, 81.8 per cent of constituency representatives said it was very important, while 69.2 per cent of their list counterparts agreed (Statement B). Although more constituency representatives than list representatives said that these constituency service tasks were very important, which is consistent with the electoral incentives hypothesis, the difference is not statistically significant. The same questions on task importance also examined party orientation, with the hypothesis that the party itself could function as a constituency, especially for list representatives, who are ranked by regional party organisations. MSPs and AMs were asked about how they felt about enacting the election manifesto commitments of their parties into law (Statement C). Here, a high number of constituency representatives (60.6 per cent) stated that it was very important to enact these commitments, while only 48.7 per cent of list representatives ticked ‘very important’, which is the opposite of what would be expected from representatives who are seen by critics of PR as party hacks. The difference between the responses is not statistically significant, however. Looking at major and minor party representatives, 62.2 per cent of those from the major parties said manifesto enactment was very important, compared to 40.7 per cent of minor party representatives, but the difference is only weakly significant at the 0.10 level. Furthermore, a look at government (Labour and Liberal Democrat) versus opposition (nationalist, Conservative, and Green) representatives reveals a more significant difference (at the 0.05 level), which suggests that simply being part of the governing coalition means a representative will most likely get manifesto commitments enacted into law. When asked about enhancing the party’s strength (Statement D), more list representatives


Constituency orientation: Task importance (UK)

Question: How important is each of the following tasks of a Member of the Scottish Parliament/National Assembly for Wales? % response to each level of importance:

Very

Somewhat

Not at all

No response

(A) Representing the collective views of your constituents/voters All representatives 77.8 15.3 2.8 0 • Constituency 81.8 12.1 3.0 0 • List 74.4 17.9 2.6 0 • Major parties 77.8 15.6 2.2 0 • Minor parties 77.8 14.8 3.7 0

0 0 0 0 0

4.2 3.0 5.1 4.4 3.7

(B) Responding to individual voters’ grievances or requests All representatives 75.0 18.1 0 • Constituency 81.8 12.1 0 • List 69.2 23.1 0 • Major parties 73.3 20.0 0 • Minor parties 77.8 14.8 0

0 0 0 0 0

6.9 6.1 7.7 6.7 7.4

(C) Enacting your party’s election manifesto commitments into law All representatives 54.2 38.9 1.4 1.4 • Constituency 60.6 33.3 0 3.0 • List 48.7 43.6 2.6 0 • Major parties* 62.2 31.1 0 2.2 • Minor parties* 40.7 51.9 3.7 0 • Government** 66.7 30.0 0 0 • Opposition** 47.5 42.5 2.5 2.5

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

4.2 3.0 5.1 4.4 3.7 3.3 5.0

(D) Enhancing your party’s strength All representatives 55.6 • Constituency* 45.5 • List* 64.1 • Major parties 51.1 • Minor parties 63.0

0 0 0 0 0

5.6 6.1 5.1 4.4 7.4

36.1 45.5 28.2 40.0 29.6

No opinion

1.4 0 2.6 2.2 0

Not very

0 0 0 0 0

1.4 3.0 0 2.2 0


than their constituency counterparts indicated that this was very important (64.1 per cent to 45.5 per cent), a difference significant at the 0.10 level. This difference is what the electoral incentives hypothesis would anticipate, as list representatives’ chances of successful election increase as a direct result of support for the party label, while


constituency representatives are more able to cultivate a personal vote independent of party. Task importance was also used as a means of investigating constituency and party orientation among German MdLs (Table 5.8). List representatives were somewhat more likely to say that it was very important representing the collective views of their voters (53.1 per cent, compared to 42.5 per cent for constituency representatives).

Table 5.8

Constituency orientation: Task importance (Germany)

Question: How important is each of the following tasks of a Member of the Landtag? % response to each level of importance:

Very

Somewhat

Not at all

No response

1.1 2.5 0 1.4 0

0 0 0 0 0

1.1 2.5 0 1.4 0

4.5 2.5 6.1 4.1 6.7

0 0 0 0 0

2.2 2.5 2.0 2.7 0

(C) Enacting your party’s election manifesto commitments into law All representatives 11.2 56.2 6.7 23.6 • Constituency** 7.5 47.5 7.5 32.5 • List** 14.3 63.3 6.1 16.3 • Major parties** 6.8 58.1 5.4 27.0 • Minor parties** 33.3 46.7 13.3 6.7 • Government 9.1 56.4 7.3 25.5 • Opposition 14.7 55.9 5.9 20.6

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2.2 5.0 0 2.7 0 1.8 2.9

(D) Enhancing your party’s strength All representatives 30.3 • Constituency*** 20.0 • List*** 38.8 • Major parties 29.7 • Minor parties 33.3

0 0 0 0 0

2.2 5.0 0 2.7 0

(A) Representing the collective views of your voters All representatives 48.3 49.4 • Constituency 42.5 52.5 • List 53.1 46.9 • Major parties** 43.2 54.1 • Minor parties** 73.3 26.7

No opinion 0 0 0 0 0

(B) Responding to individual voters’ grievances or requests All representatives 38.2 52.8 2.2 • Constituency 37.5 55.0 2.5 • List 38.8 51.0 2.0 • Major parties 39.2 51.4 2.7 • Minor parties 33.3 60.0 0

56.2 57.5 55.1 56.8 53.3

5.6 7.5 4.1 4.1 13.3

Not very

5.6 10.0 2.0 6.8 0



While this result (Statement A) is contrary to what the electoral incentives hypothesis would expect, the difference is not statistically significant. There is a significant difference (at the 0.05 level) between major and minor party representatives, though, with 73.3 per cent of minor party representatives saying that it is very important to represent the collective views of their voters. Here is an unexpected constituency-oriented result from representatives elected primarily from party lists. As in some previous results, it is possible that list representatives see their smaller base of voters as a non-geographical constituency, in the way that some representatives view interest groups. On responding to voters’ grievances or requests (Statement B), both constituency and list MdLs attached nearly equal importance to this task, with about 38 per cent saying it was very important. There was only a small, and statistically insignificant difference between major and minor MdLs on this result as well. German representatives were also asked how they felt about enacting the election manifesto commitments of their parties into law (Statement C). Here, a higher number of list representatives (14.3 per cent) stated that it was very important to enact these commitments, while only 7.5 per cent of constituency representatives ticked ‘very important’, and a bigger difference exists between major and minor parties (6.8 per cent and 33.3 per cent respectively said ‘very important’). The differences between constituency and list representatives, as well as between the representatives of major and minor parties, are statistically significant at the 0.05 level, while the difference between governing party and opposition party representatives is not significant. This suggests that list representatives, and representatives of minor parties, are more strongly party-oriented than their counterparts, which is what the electoral incentives hypothesis would anticipate. When asked about enhancing their party’s strength (Statement D), more list MdLs than constituency MdLs indicated that this was very important (38.8 per cent to 20.0 per cent, respectively), and the difference between constituency and list representatives is significant at the 0.05 level. This result is consistent with the expectation that list representatives will have a stronger orientation towards their parties, benefiting directly from voter support for the party label.

Spending time with constituents How representatives spend their time with their constituents, as voters or interest groups, was investigated further. Contact with voters and


interest groups was broken down into correspondence (letters, phone calls, and e-mails) and meetings (including surgeries) over a typical month. Representatives were asked to report contacts with voters and interest groups separately, selecting the frequency of each type of contact from a given range. Table 5.9 reports the weighted average of these meetings in Scotland and Wales, again determined by multiplying the midpoint of each range by the percentage of representatives responding in each range (excluding ‘no response’), as in Chapter 4. The weighted average in this context gives a rough illustration of the contacts representatives have with voters and interest groups. Constituency MSPs and AMs have more contacts per month with voters (Part A: a weighted average of 224.1, compared to 174.4 for list representatives), which is what the electoral incentives hypothesis would predict, although the difference between the two is not statistically significant. List representatives, however, have more contact with interest groups (Part B: a weighted average of 203.7, compared to 110.4 for constituency representatives), and here the difference is significant at the 0.05 level. Both constituency and list representatives meet roughly the same number of interest group representatives (Part D: about 14), but constituency representatives meet more voters (Part C: a weighted average of 38.9 per month, compared to 24.3 for list representatives), a difference that is significant at the 0.01 level. Similar results were obtained by Philip Cowley and Stephen Lochore when they analysed the constituency contact of MSPs (2000: 183). When British representatives were asked to estimate the extent of their public contact, constituency representatives reported an average of 110.8 media appearances per year, while list representatives reported 190.0 (Part E of Table 5.9). There are statistically significant differences between representatives – at the 0.05 level for constituency and list representatives, and at the 0.10 level for representatives of major and minor parties. One reason for the greater number of media appearances reported by list representatives could simply be self-promotion; representatives of the public may not be as familiar with list representatives as they are with constituency representatives. There was a significant difference in the expected direction (and at the 0.01 level) in how many surgeries (‘open house’ meetings with voters) were held, however, with constituency representatives holding an average of 57.3 per year, compared to the 35.1 held by their list counterparts. A difference, significant at the 0.01 level, is also present when looking at major and minor party representatives’ surgeries held. The difference in the number of general information mailings sent out to voters (8.3 per year


Contacts and meetings with voters and interest groups (UK)

A–D: In a typical month, roughly how many contacts do you have with individual voters and interest group representatives via letters, phone calls, e-mails, or personal meetings at your office or at a public event (including surgeries)? Contacts per month:

Weighted average

(A) Contacts with voters All representatives • Constituency • List • Major parties • Minor parties

197.0 224.1 174.4 204.4 182.7

(B) Contacts with interest groups All representatives • Constituency** • List** • Major parties • Minor parties

160.9 110.4 203.7 153.1 172.5

(C) Meetings with voters All representatives • Constituency*** • List*** • Major parties • Minor parties

31.0 38.9 24.3 32.8 27.8

(D) Meetings with interest groups All representatives • Constituency • List • Major parties • Minor parties

14.3 13.7 14.8 14.4 14.1

(E) Average number of contacts/events per year Media appearances1 All representatives • Constituency • List • Major parties • Minor parties

154.8 110.8 190.9 131.3 193.1

Mailings sent to voters 7.6 8.3 7.0 8.3 6.5

Surgeries held2 45.6 57.3 35.1 53.2 31.8

N = 72 Major parties = Labour, SNP, and Plaid Cymru; minor parties = Conservative, Liberal Democrat, and Green **Difference is significant at the 0.05 level ***Difference is significant at the 0.01 level 1 Difference between constituency and list representatives is significant at the 0.05 level; difference between major and minor party representatives is significant at the 0.10 level 2 Differences between constituency and list representatives, and between major and minor party representatives, are significant at the 0.01 level


for constituency representatives, compared to 7.0 for list representatives) is not, however, statistically significant. In Scotland and Wales, these results indicate more contact between constituency representatives and voters, and between list representatives and interest groups, but not every difference between the two types of representative is significant. These differences are to be expected because the constituency representative is regarded as the first point of contact for constituents when they have a problem. Thanks to the Westminster tradition, this is where most people will go unless they have a stronger identity with a list representative, or perhaps with the representative’s party. The greater linkages between list representatives and interest groups, however, could represent an attempt to cultivate new ‘constituencies’. Other researchers have also noted that British list representatives had more contacts with interest groups than with individual constituents, as Jonathan Bradbury and Meg Russell found in their interviews with MSPs (2005b: 36). The contact German MdLs have with voters and interest groups is reported in Table 5.10. Contact between representatives and voters and interest groups is assessed the same way as for British representatives. In Germany, constituency representatives appear to have more contacts per month with voters (Part A: a weighted average of 127.6, compared to 96.8 for list representatives), while list representatives have more contact with interest groups (Part B: a weighted average of 58.8, compared to 53.3 for constituency representatives). Both constituency and list MdLs meet roughly the same number of interest group representatives (Part D: roughly 28), but constituency MdLs meet more voters (Part C: a weighted average of 83.6 per month, compared to 69.5 for list representatives). While some differences between constituency and list representatives are evident, these are not statistically significant. Furthermore, there is no significant difference between constituency and list MdLs in Part E of Table 5.10, although list representatives made a weighted average of 106.8 media appearances in the last year, compared to 99.1 for constituency representatives, echoing the British pattern. List representatives also sent out slightly more mailings to voters, but both types of representative held almost the same number of surgeries (about 20). These measures of representative-citizen contact in Germany reveal only a slight (and usually statistically insignificant) difference between constituency and list representatives. There appears to be more contact between constituency representatives and voters, and between list representatives and interest groups, but the only significant difference in


Contacts and meetings with voters and interest groups (Germany)

A–D: In a typical month, roughly how many contacts do you have with individual voters and interest group representatives via letters, phone calls, e-mails, or personal meetings at your office or at a public event (including surgeries)? Contacts per month:

Weighted average

(A) Contacts with voters All representatives • Constituency • List • Major parties • Minor parties

110.4 127.6 96.8 109.1 119.5

(B) Contacts with interest groups All representatives • Constituency • List • Major parties • Minor parties

56.2 53.3 58.8 58.9 46.2

(C) Meetings with voters All representatives • Constituency • List • Major parties • Minor parties

75.9 83.6 69.5 76.7 71.5

(D) Meetings with interest groups All representatives • Constituency • List • Major parties*** • Minor parties***

28.8 27.8 29.6 31.4 15.9

(E) Average number of contacts/events per year Media Mailings sent appearances to voters All representatives • Constituency • List • Major parties • Minor parties

103.4 99.1 106.8 101.9 110.7

21.1 17.9 23.6 19.5 27.9

Surgeries held 20.7 21.3 20.3 20.9 20.1

N = 89 Major parties = SPD and CDU; minor parties = PDS, Greens, FDP, and DVU ***Difference is significant at the 0.01 level


Table 5.10 exists between major and minor party representatives over meetings with interest groups (Part D), showing that major party MdLs have an average of 31.4 meetings per month with interest groups, while minor party MdLs have only 15.9 meetings. This result suggests that interest groups are more of a natural constituency to German constituency representatives than was the case for their Scottish and Welsh counterparts. In order to get a better idea of the representatives’ constituency and party orientations, the survey also asked how British and German representatives spent their work time. First, representatives were asked to select a category giving a range roughly corresponding to the percentage of their total work time spent on various tasks (0–5 per cent, 6–10 per cent, and so on). Weighted averages were again calculated as in the previous table, taking the midpoint of each range and multiplying times the percentage of representatives who responded in each range (excluding ‘no response’). These midpoints were also used in the t-tests of statistical significance. The results give an illustration of the time allocated to the tasks of these representatives, although this table is not exhaustive. In addition, the time allocations do not add up to 100 per cent because representatives were asked only to provide an approximation of how much time they spend on the tasks listed; requiring perfect time accounting would most likely have reduced the response rate in this section. Table 5.11 lists constituency-related activities for Scottish and Welsh representatives (such as helping voters with problems and attending non-partisan meetings and events), as well as other tasks that could be viewed as party-oriented activities (such as attending party functions and serving on parliamentary committees). While the parliamentary work cited here might appear to be independent of party, it is considered partisan because representatives are working under their party labels in ways not very visible to constituents, doing what their parties expect of them. Those activities involving parliamentary work, such as attending debates or serving on committees can be seen as more relevant to a representative’s partisan role, as they usually include working (and indeed voting) with the party. Time spent this way is greater for list MSPs and AMs, who spend a weighted average of 22.1 per cent of their work time attending debates and/or speaking in the chamber (Statement A), as well as 19.8 per cent of their work time serving on committees (Statement B), compared to 15.5 per cent and 12.6 per cent respectively for constituency representatives. These differences are significant at the 0.05 level. Such differences might indicate that list


Constituency orientation: How time is spent (UK)

Question: Approximately what percentage of your total work time is spent performing the following tasks? Portion of work time:


(A) Attending debates and/or speaking in Parliament/the Assembly All representatives • Constituency** • List** • Major parties • Minor parties

19.1 15.5 22.1 18.6 19.8

(B) Serving on parliamentary committees All representatives • Constituency** • List** • Major parties* • Minor parties*

16.5 12.6 19.8 17.6 14.8

(C) Helping voters who have problems with government agencies All representatives • Constituency • List • Major parties • Minor parties

16.3 17.5 15.4 15.5 17.8

(D) Contacts with interest groups (through meetings, letters, and phone calls) All representatives 13.5 • Constituency*** 9.2 • List*** 17.2 • Major parties 14.0 • Minor parties 12.8 (E) Attending local meetings or events sponsored by community or civic groups and not organised by your party All representatives 14.0 • Constituency** 11.2 • List** 16.3 • Major parties 13.8 • Minor parties 14.2 (F) Attending local meetings or events organised by your party) All representatives • Constituency* • List* • Major parties • Minor parties

8.5 6.4 10.3 9.0 7.6



representatives are less focused on serving constituents, as the electoral incentives hypothesis would expect, although another study of Scottish representatives found little or no difference between constituency and list MSPs in how much time was spent on similar activities (Cowley and Lochore 2000: 183). There is a small difference between major and minor party members, significant at the 0.10 level, in the amount of time spent serving on committees, with major party MSPs and AMs spending more time (17.6 per cent, compared to 14.8 per cent for minor party representatives, in Statement B). Otherwise, however, there are no significant differences between major and minor party representatives as shown in Table 5.11. In this study, constituency MSPs and AMs appear to spend slightly more time helping voters who have problems with government agencies (Statement C), with a weighted average of 17.5 per cent of a constituency representative’s work time as opposed to 15.4 per cent for a list representative, but this difference is not significant. However, list representatives spend more time with interest groups than constituency representatives (Statement D: 17.2 per cent for a list representative, compared to 9.2 per cent of a constituency representative’s time), and this difference is significant at the 0.01 level. This finding is consistent with the expectation that constituency representatives will focus on serving voters residing in their constituencies, while list representatives may see organised interests as potential ‘nongeographical’ constituencies. However, the previous result shows that list representatives spend almost as much time helping voters with their problems, which is not what the electoral incentives hypothesis would anticipate. Furthermore, list MSPs and AMs appear to spend more time attending non-partisan meetings than constituency representatives (Statement E: a weighted average of 16.3 per cent of a list representative’s time, compared to 11.2 per cent for a constituency representative). A possible explanation for this result is that list representatives need to make themselves known to people in the electoral region from which they have been elected, so they will attend even non-partisan functions if it will help get them noticed. However, list representatives spend more time than constituency representatives attending meetings organised by their parties (Statement F: a weighted average of 10.3 per cent of a list representative’s time, compared to 6.4 per cent for constituency representatives). The difference is only significant at the 0.10 level, but is consistent with the expectation that list representatives should be more oriented towards their parties.


The same work time questions were asked of German Landtag members in 2000, with results summarised in Table 5.12. Those activities involving assembly work, and therefore more appropriate to a representative’s partisan role, include attending Landtag debates and serving on committees. Time spent on these activities is actually greater for constituency MdLs, who spend a weighted average of 20.4 per cent of their work time attending debates and/or speaking in the chamber (Statement A), as well as 20.5 per cent of their work time serving on committees (Statement B), compared to 15.1 per cent and 15.7 per cent respectively for list MdLs. While these differences are only slightly statistically significant (at the 0.10 level), it is surprising that constituency representatives would spend more of their work time on these activities, since the electoral incentives hypothesis would expect them to devote more time to their constituency work. Differences also exist between the work time of major (18.0 per cent) and minor (12.3 per cent) party representatives spent attending debates and/or speaking in the chamber, as well as serving on committees (17.9 per cent for major party representatives and 15.2 per cent for those from minor parties). However, only the former difference is significant, and at the 0.10 level. More support for the electoral incentives hypothesis exists in Statement C, but not much. Constituency MdLs appear to spend more time helping voters who have problems with government agencies (although this difference is very slight, with a weighted average of 11.4 per cent of a constituency MdL’s work time as opposed to 9.7 per cent for a list MdL). While this is consistent with the expectation that constituency representatives will focus on serving voters residing in their constituencies, the difference is not statistically significant. There is, however, a significant difference (at the 0.01 level) between how much time major party representatives spend helping voters and the time spent by representatives of the minor parties performing the same activity. Major party representatives spend 11.4 per cent of their work time helping voters with their problems, compared to the 5.7 per cent of a minor party representative’s time. This finding supports the expectation that minor party representatives have a stronger policy focus and less time for (or less interest in) constituency work, while major party representatives, regardless of how they were elected, focus on constituencies. On contacts with interest groups (Statement D), list MdLs spend slightly less time than their constituency counterparts on this activity (13.8 per cent of their time, compared to 14.7 per cent for constituency


Constituency orientation: How time is spent (Germany)

Question: Approximately what percentage of your total work time is spent performing the following tasks? Portion of work time:


(A) Attending debates and/or speaking in the Landtag All representatives • Constituency* • List* • Major parties* • Minor parties*

17.4 20.4 15.1 18.0 12.3

(B) Serving on parliamentary committees All representatives • Constituency* • List* • Major parties • Minor parties

17.8 20.5 15.7 17.9 15.2

(C) Helping voters who have problems with government agencies All representatives • Constituency • List • Major parties*** • Minor parties***

10.4 11.4 9.7 11.4 5.7

(D) Contacts with interest groups (through meetings, letters, and phone calls) All representatives 14.2 • Constituency 14.7 • List 13.8 • Major parties 13.8 • Minor parties 15.5 (E) Attending local meetings or events sponsored by community or civic groups and not organised by your party All representatives 12.3 • Constituency 13.5 • List 11.4 • Major parties 11.8 • Minor parties 13.4 (F) Attending local meetings or events organised by your party) All representatives • Constituency* • List* • Major parties • Minor parties

12.1 14.2 10.4 11.6 11.6



MdLs). The expectation that list representatives may see organised interests as potential ‘non-geographical’ constituencies is not borne out in this German result, while the British result, in Table 5.7, reveals a major difference between constituency and list representatives, in the hypothesised direction. Constituency contact through local meetings or events not organised by the party would be more likely to attract constituency MdLs, who have an electoral incentive to spend time this way, and results (Statement E) show that constituency representatives spend 13.5 per cent of their work time at such meetings or events, compared to 11.4 per cent for list representatives. The difference between these weighted averages is not, however, significant. As for meetings or events organised by the party (Statement F), however, a difference significant at the 0.10 level does exist between the constituency (14.2 per cent) and list (10.4 per cent) representatives’ work time, but the result is not what the electoral incentives hypothesis would anticipate. In general, these German results shown in Table 5.12 are not highly supportive of this hypothesis, while British answers to these work time questions are.

Learning electoral incentives? Surveys of MSPs and AMs in Britain, and of German MdLs were conducted in 2000, and in 2003 the same questionnaire was sent to MSPs and AMs again. The electoral incentives hypothesis expects that constituency representatives are more oriented towards the constituents that re-elect them, while list representatives will be more focused on the party organisation that ranks the list, perhaps seeing the party as a constituency in itself. List representatives might also see interest groups as constituencies they should cultivate. Electoral incentives expectations appear to apply (weakly) to the behaviour of German representatives, as shown in Table 5.13, Statement A. As some scholars have pointed out (Jeffery 1998), Germans spend less time on these matters than their British counterparts, yet 10.4 per cent of their work time is still significant. British representatives, however, spent over 16 per cent of their work time on constituency service in 2000, and over 17 per cent in 2003. In Germany, constituency representatives spend more of their work time helping constituents with their problems than list-elected representatives (11.4 per cent, as opposed to 9.7 per cent), but the difference is small and not statistically significant. British constituency representatives surveyed in 2000 also spend slightly more of their work time helping voters (17.5 per cent) than


Contact with constituents (UK and Germany)

Portion of work time spent:


(A) Helping voters who have problems with government agencies British representatives, 2000** • Constituency • List

16.3 17.5 15.4

German representatives, 2000** • Constituency • List

10.4 11.4 9.7


17.3 21.1 13.7

(B) Contacts with interest groups (through meetings, letters, and phone calls) British representatives, 2000 13.5 • Constituency** 9.2 • List** 17.2 German representatives, 2000 • Constituency • List

14.2 14.7 13.8


12.9 9.1 16.9

N (UK 2000) = 72; N (Germany) = 89; N (UK 2003) = 75 ** Difference is significant at the 0.01 level

list-elected representatives (15.4 per cent), but results from the 2003 survey reveal a much bigger difference, and in the hypothesised direction. In 2003, British constituency representatives spent 21.1 per cent of their work time helping voters, while list-elected representatives spent a mere 13.7 per cent of their work time on constituency service. The large difference, significant at the 0.01 level, between British constituency and list representatives over time spent helping voters in 2003 lends support to the hypothesis that constituency representatives have learned (perhaps from the 2003 election) that constituency service can make a difference to one’s re-election prospects. The difference in time spent on constituency service between British and German representatives is also significant, at the 0.01 level, showing that this service is a bigger part of the job for elected representatives in Britain. While dealing with constituents usually takes the form of holding surgeries (open-house meetings with the public) or answering letters, e-mails, or phone calls from regular citizens, representatives may also


deal with interest groups. It is possible that list representatives, lacking small geographical constituencies, might seek out a different kind of constituency altogether. In New Zealand, Green party list MP Rod Donald (1998) focused not only upon geographical areas (allocated by the party), but also upon what he called ‘a number of nationwide constituencies’ or ‘constituencies of interest’, which included employment, training, trade, tourism, and constitutional reform. Therefore, while parties may assign geographical constituencies held by constituency representatives from other parties to their list representatives, it appears that interest groups might be easier for list representatives to deal with. The time spent dealing with interest groups is reported in Table 5.13, Statement B. Both British and German representatives report spending an average of 13 to 14 per cent of their work time in contact with interest groups via meetings, letters, and phone calls. For German representatives, the difference in time spent on such contacts between constituency and list Landtag members is minor and statistically insignificant, 14.7 per cent and 13.8 per cent respectively, but the difference is not in the hypothesised direction. The opposite is true, however, with the British representatives. In 2000, constituency members of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales spent 9.2 per cent of their time dealing with interest groups, while list representatives spent 17.2 per cent of their time on interest group contacts. Almost the same result appears in the 2003 survey, with constituency representatives spending 9.2 per cent of their time on interest group contacts, while their list-elected counterparts spent 16.9 per cent of their time on this activity. The differences are both significant at the 0.01 level, and suggest that MMP has promoted a new type of constituency service for list members of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. Looking into constituency service more closely, another survey question asked whether serving constituents or enacting party policy was more instrumental to their decision to stand for office (Table 5.14). Here, half of the German constituency representatives said serving the needs of their constituents was more instrumental in their decision to stand, while only 32.7 per cent of list representatives chose this response. Helping to get party policy preferences enacted into law was cited as the motivation to seek office by 55.1 per cent of list representatives. The difference in responses between constituency and list members of the Landtage is significant at the 0.05 level. This result suggests that German list representatives prefer an emphasis on policy


Constituency and partisan role conflict (UK and Germany)

Question: If you had to choose only one or the other, which of the following was more instrumental in your decision to stand as a Member of Parliament/the Assembly/the Landtag? • Helping to get the policy preferences of your party enacted into law • Serving the needs of your constituents/voters % responding:

Party policy

Constituents

No response

British representatives, 2000* • Constituency • List

34.7 33.3 35.9

55.6 54.5 56.4

9.7 12.2 7.7

German representatives, 2000* • Constituency* • List*

44.9 32.5 55.1

40.4 50.0 32.7

14.6 17.5 12.2


40.0 27.0 52.6

52.0 62.2 42.1

8.0 10.8 5.3


matters to constituency service, and that perhaps some role differentiation has been brought about by the mixed electoral system. British results in Table 5.14 show a dramatic shift to the German pattern when comparing role orientation in 2000 and 2003. The German pattern of role preference was not found in the 2000 UK survey, in which almost no difference was seen between constituency and list representative responses. Over half of both constituency and list representatives in Scotland and Wales claimed they stood for election in order to serve their constituents’ needs, perhaps illustrating the pervasiveness of constituency service in Britain. This is also seen in the fact that only about 40 per cent of German representatives (taking both constituency- and list-elected together) went into politics primarily to serve constituents, while over half of British representatives, both in 2000 and 2003, said they were primarily motivated to serve constituents. The difference between German and British responses in Table 5.14 is significant at the 0.05 level. The strong constituency orientation among British representatives appears to be somewhat diluted among list-elected representatives in the 2003 results, however. Among constituency representatives, 62.2 per cent cited serving voters as their motivation for standing, while only 42.1 per cent of list representatives cited this. Helping to


enact party policy motivated 52.6 per cent of list representatives, but only 27 per cent of their constituency counterparts. The 2003 difference between the responses of British constituency and list representatives is significant at the 0.01 level, while the difference in 2000 was not statistically significant. This change among list representatives in the hypothesised direction could indicate that more interest in policy than in traditional constituency service follows a learning process – it may have become clear that list representatives, especially those from the smaller parties, will have more policy work to do than their counterparts in the larger parties. Furthermore, the Scottish Greens, who increased their presence in the Scottish Parliament from one to seven members after the 2003 election, did not stand in constituency contests at all. These results suggest that MMP is promoting role differentiation.

Conclusion Clearly there is some evidence that representatives disagree about the constituency role list representatives may be playing in the new assemblies in Scotland and Wales. Survey results do reveal more contact between constituency representatives and voters, and between list representatives and interest groups, perhaps because list representatives see interest groups as non-geographical constituencies. Party list representatives also appear to be more concerned, when it comes to re-election, about the national strength of their parties and having their leaders’ support. Therefore, there is some evidence among British representatives for the electoral incentives hypothesis. On the other hand, both constituency and list representatives are highly partisan, and both are assuming active constituency roles. List representatives spend almost as much of their work time helping voters with their problems as constituency representatives do, and they also promote themselves heavily in their regions, making media appearances and attending meetings. While this self-promotion could be viewed as culturally inspired – British voters expect constituency service, and British elected representatives have traditionally provided it, particularly in the last few decades – it is also possible that list representatives are maintaining high constituency profiles due to an electoral incentive. If these active list representatives plan to stand against incumbents in single-member constituencies at the next election, the ‘shadowing’ of incumbent constituency representatives can provide useful name recognition that might help the campaign efforts of list representatives. In the process


of their self-promotion, however, list representatives in Scotland and Wales are stepping on the toes of constituency representatives, many of whom seem to resent what they consider to be an unwarranted intrusion at best, and an electoral threat at worst. The next chapter will compare how British and German representatives come to terms with the competition brought about by MMP. Many of the German survey results confirm the hypothesised expectation that Landtag members elected in single-member constituencies will be closer to their constituents than party list representatives. In particular, constituency representatives are more eager to promote their constituencies and seek projects for them than their list counterparts, as previous Bundestag research has shown (Lancaster and Patterson 1990). Constituency representatives are also more successful in gaining public spending projects when they seek them, and view this success, as well as helping constituents in general, as important to their re-election effort. German list representatives seem more concerned than their constituency counterparts about the party’s strength, getting manifesto pledges enacted, and maintaining the party leader’s support. List representatives also appear more motivated to enter politics out of a desire to get their parties’ policies enacted than constituency representatives. As recent literature suggests (Patzelt 1999), there are also significant differences between members of the major Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and minor parties Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), Alliance ’90/The Greens, Free Democratic Party (FDP), and German People’s Union (DVU) as far as constituency orientation is concerned. In some instances, results overlap with those of constituency and list representatives. This finding suggests that major party representatives, whether elected in constituencies or from lists, sometimes behave like constituency representatives because they look after geographical constituencies. Parties with many elected representatives are able to assign list representatives to constituencies where they did not win the local races, while minor parties simply do not have enough elected representatives to follow the same practice. Therefore, the observed differences between representatives may not simply be a product of how they are elected, but whether they are from major parties that expect their representatives to have a strong constituency presence regardless of whether they were directly elected or not. Chapter 6 will assess this issue more using open-ended comments from German representatives, in addition to survey data suggesting that constituency and list representatives do not see themselves as equals.

6 Competition Between Constituency and List Representatives

The elections to the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales were conducted using the mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system new to Britain, and some members of these bodies, elected in the two different ways, came into conflict almost right away. Problems arose as list-elected representatives began to ‘shadow’ their constituency-elected counterparts by performing constituency service functions. In Scotland, a panel study of 13 members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) noted the presence of friction between constituency and list members early on, often over who was entitled to casework (McCabe and McCormick 2000). Initially there was less of a problem in Wales, but after the second Welsh Assembly election in 2003, more attention was paid to the practice of shadowing performed by list Assembly Members (AMs). In 2005 the British government began the process of introducing a ban on dual candidacy, where candidates are allowed to stand in both constituency and regional list contests at the same time, for Welsh Assembly elections. While competition between constituency and list members of German assemblies, most of which are elected by MMP systems, has led to shadowing as well, the practice is considered normal and does not result in the kind of problems seen in Britain. Survey data in Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that differences between Landtag members do exist, however – between how constituency and party list representatives perceive each other, as well as how they carry out their constituency roles. Tensions between German constituency and list representatives are less severe than those between their British counterparts, however, and dual candidacy is the established German practice, and is allowed almost everywhere else where mixed-member electoral systems are used. 143


This chapter analyses the comments of MSPs and AMs in an attempt to learn more about the shadowing phenomenon and the competition between constituency and party list representatives more generally. The activities of Scottish and Welsh list representatives are investigated to discover how they come into conflict with their constituency counterparts. MSP and AM comments, as well as some survey data, will assess the attitudes held by British politicians towards the new competition facilitated by the MMP electoral system. The dual candidacy debate over Welsh Assembly elections will show how the Labour Party, creator of the increased pluralism in Welsh politics, tried to constrain this pluralism by pursuing an electoral system change that would harm the party’s opponents. How shadowing operates in Germany and why the practice appears not to elicit the negative reaction seen in Britain is then explored, along with a more general examination of the activities of party list representatives there. Comments and survey data are used to assess how German legislators view their electoral system and each other, and comparisons to another international experience, that of New Zealand, are also made. Finally, the German experience will be compared to what is happening in Scotland and Wales.

Shadowing and constituency service in Scotland and Wales Taking Scotland and Wales together, 48.5 per cent of constituency representatives responding to the survey in 2000 claimed they were being shadowed, while 33.3 per cent of list representatives admitted to the practice that year. List representatives often target constituency representatives they plan to stand against in the constituency part of the next election by establishing a local presence – acting like a shadow constituency representative. Christine Chapman, Welsh Assembly constituency AM, notes that a regional list AM who planned to stand against her at the next election from the nationalist party Plaid Cymru had a rival ‘constituency office’ in her constituency (Chapman 2001). Chapman’s reaction was not to take anything for granted; the competition makes politicians less complacent, which she believes could be good for voters, although perhaps a bit confusing. ‘If I were a list member, I would work across the region’, and not just concentrate on one constituency, Chapman says (2001). Relations between other constituency representatives and their list counterparts could be more cordial, however. For Margaret Smith MSP, a degree of shadowing (if it can even be called that) came from Lord James Douglas Hamilton, who was the Conservative Member of Parliament (MP) for her constituency at Westminster before a fellow

Competition Between Constituency and List Representatives 145

Liberal Democrat took the seat in 1997 (Smith 2001). Many constituents remember Lord James, so they would go to him if they were Tory voters. He would still be invited to public functions and meetings because of his strong links to the Edinburgh constituency. Smith had no complaints about Lord James’s activities; he would advertise as a ‘Lothians MSP’ and not try to pass himself off as the constituency MSP. Lord James would notify Smith of cases he had taken up from people residing in her constituency, as the parliament’s code of conduct calls for. Some representatives are simply not being shadowed, usually because the constituency is very safe for the incumbent’s party. Brian Gibbons, a Labour constituency AM in south Wales, states that his constituency ‘wouldn’t be a target for anybody….by the time they got to my constituency they really would be on the way to changing the political face of Wales!’ (Gibbons 2001). Because Gibbons believed himself to be very active in his constituency, he argued that shadowing him would be a fruitless endeavour for list representatives. ‘For example, in the last week I will have been to eight locations in my constituency, providing surgeries and so forth, and I think it would be very difficult for regional list members to provide that level of service. I can do that because this is my patch; if they were trying to compete it would be impossible for them. There’s no point putting a lot of investment in my constituency’ (Gibbons 2001). Other constituency representatives commented that shadowing from their list counterparts did not have a great effect on them, or that they simply took it in their stride (comments are attributed to MSPs or AMs, from the 2000 or 2003 survey, as indicated): No problem (MSP 2000). If they had [shadowed me] I would not be concerned as they have the right to do so (AM 2000). Has no effect on my constituency workload. Constituents come to my office for assistance (MSP 2000). Just have to grin and bear it (MSP 2000)! It is her right to do so, and up to me to fight her off (AM 2000)!! None has an office (to the best of my knowledge) but one does occasionally turn up to meetings/lobbies etc. I always welcome him (he


is from another party) and publicly acknowledge his presence and any help he can give me in doing my work. He then usually looks embarrassed (AM 2000)! I am quite relaxed about it. They have to cover much wider areas in terms of their representation, so I am confident that they will not be able to give the attention to detail which I can, with an office in the constituency. In time, I believe voters will gravitate to a representative of the party which they voted, when seeking to have a complaint dealt with (MSP 2000). While many constituency representatives do not have a problem with their list counterparts, others clearly do. Some of the more negative comments suggested that there were electoral motivations involved in shadowing, as the electoral incentives hypothesis would expect: In my neighbouring constituency the Labour list MSPs have set up an office with a view to challenging him [the incumbent] at the next election (MSP 2000). Shadowing happens and it is an abuse of office. Not only is it a duplication of effort and resources, but it encourages partisan attitudes among MSPs (MSP 2003). The Tory MSP in question is not particularly active so he is not a problem. However, the SNP list members divide up the individual constituencies amongst themselves and shadow 2 or 3 each. This has the effect of ‘politicising’ constituency work. Instead of representing all constituents equally, you are portrayed as representing only those who support you. This is unnecessary and divisive (MSP 2000). [I feel] Very angry. List MSPs are able to cherry-pick issues without having to deal with anything like the whole of constituency work. Time is much less ‘free’ for constituency MSPs (MSP 2000). I support their right to work wherever they like. I do not support their tendency to advertise themselves as a constituency rep. when they are list members (AM 2000). They should represent their whole constituency equally and not just one small part (MSP 2000).


Unnecessary and against the intention of proportionality. Surrogate constituency MSPs were not the intention of the AMS [Additional Member System]. Furthermore, the target seats are the ones shadowed. It also suggests a list MSP is not as worthwhile as a constituency one (MSP 2000). One theme that emerges from the above comments is the partisan electoral threat felt by some constituency representatives, as has been noted by other researchers (McCabe and McCormick 2000: 45; Bradbury and Russell 2005b: 50). Some list representatives, particularly the nationalists, who make up the second largest party in each body, are aiming to take many (mainly Labour) constituency seats at the next election. Because of the multimember electoral regions (each containing several single-member constituencies within them) created by the mixed-member electoral system, Scottish and Welsh politicians are facing their opponents constantly, even after defeating them in singlemember constituency races. In this sense, the shadowing of constituency representatives could be seen as a rational behaviour for list representatives who wish to be re-elected by the more traditional, and perhaps prestigious, method in Britain, single-member plurality (colloquially known as ‘first-past-the-post’). A target constituency is all the more desirable if it is a safe seat. Furthermore, because constituency MSPs get more of an office allowance than regional list MSPs, as is the case in New Zealand, there is another rational incentive to target single-member constituencies (Banducci and Karp 1998: 151–2). The constituency service performed by list representatives, in this view, is being performed primarily for electoral gain, not out of a desire borne of cultural norms to deal with the sometimes mundane grievances of constituents. The comments above also show that some constituency representatives feel that list representatives are abusing constituency service, intruding upon casework that ‘rightfully’ belongs to representatives elected in single-member constituencies and exploiting the cases promising the most political gain for the party. Constituency representatives seem (or claim) to believe that the services provided to constituents should somehow be above partisanship, and not used as part of a battle between competing politicians. This perspective is perhaps reflected in the survey findings in Chapter 5, in which most constituency representatives deny that list representatives are providing constituency service. While this finding seems absurd, in light of the evidence that list representatives are serving constituents, constituency


representatives seem to believe that what their list counterparts are doing is not comparable to the ‘non-partisan’ service they believe they provide. In a comment above, one MSP objects to how list representatives shadowing constituency representatives are ‘politicising’ constituency work, as if this is a bad thing, or something that was never the case before. Furthermore, this MSP finds it ‘unnecessary and divisive’ that members might be ‘portrayed as representing only those who support’ them. In other words, voters who failed to elect a constituency candidate should accept this defeat, because the constituency representative will serve everyone, even those who voted against her or him. The idea that constituency service itself can be used as a way to advance the party and enhance one’s own personal electoral prospects has been noted in Chapter 3. Oonagh Gay writes that at Westminster it is becoming more difficult to distinguish between what is genuinely non-partisan service to constituents, and what is useful for campaigning purposes (2005: 64). This issue made news in Wales in the summer of 2005 when it emerged that a Plaid Cymru regional list AM, Leanne Wood, had suggested in an internal party discussion paper entitled ‘What should be the role of a regional AM?’ that her party’s AMs, most of whom are elected from regional lists, should concentrate less on constituency casework and more on, in her words, ‘how we better use staff budgets for furthering the aims of the party’ (BBC News Web site 2005). The list AM’s comments in the ‘leaked’ paper were seized upon by Welsh Secretary Peter Hain who, claiming Wood had been ‘caught red-handed abusing the system’, used her comments as extra ammunition in his battle against regional list AMs – the government had proposed a ban on dual candidacy in a White Paper a month before (BBC News Web site 2005). Wood defended herself from Hain’s somewhat sensational parliamentary attack, arguing that it was entirely appropriate to ask what the role of a list AM should be, particularly in light of the large size of their electoral regions, and the fact that they receive the same level of office allowance as their constituency-elected counterparts. She said that her paper asked bold questions such as should regional AMs behave like constituency AMs. My region, South Wales Central, covers eight constituencies and more than half a million people. We cannot offer the same service as a constituency AM without larger staff budgets. Rather than spread ourselves too thinly, I asked if we should focus


less on casework and more on wider campaigning and political issues. There are legitimate questions to ask and I make no apology for asking them (Wood 2005). Her defence of raising this issue highlights the question of where to draw the line between non-partisan constituency service and partisan campaigning, a question that is made more explicit by the MMP electoral system, with its representatives elected in two different ways. Some list members of the Welsh Assembly and the Scottish Parliament mention that the problems between constituency and list members of these bodies have much to do with reasons other than with the electoral system itself. One says the friction encountered is ‘party political, not as a result of the system’ (AM 2003). Other examples are below: No direct friction from AMs elected from my region’s single-member constituencies – but lots from the Labour ‘spin’ machine misrepresenting both the legal and constitutional facts and the reality of events in the Assembly (AM 2003). ‘Friction’ from MSPs representing single-member constituencies is largely confined to Labour Party HQ. Individual MSPs have no problem with my efforts. Labour with so many constituency reps see list MSPs as a danger (MSP 2003). Other constituency representatives are less hostile towards the list representatives who shadow them. Instead of resenting it, they see this competition, at least grudgingly, as good for the voters: I think it is unfortunate that we have two types of MSP. Politically, obviously I would rather it hadn’t happened. However it may be good for representative democracy (MSP 2000). It can be irritating-to-threatening, but is an inevitable consequence of the system, so has to be accepted. The answer is to work harder and better for the constituency and constituents (MSP 2000). It makes my day-to-day work much more demanding and pressurised. However, it also makes me work harder and improves the working of democracy in my constituency. Good for the people, bad for the politicians (MSP 2000).


Welsh Assembly constituency member Kirsty Williams comments that because list AMs target constituencies they plan to contest at the next election, they can be a ‘real pain in the neck’ and even ‘infuriating’, making constituency AMs feel like they are in a ‘constant state of competition and electioneering’ (Williams 2001). This competition between representatives benefits voters, who now have more choice, argues Peter Black, a Liberal Democrat list AM. He cites cases of people actually approaching their local councillor, MP, constituency AM, and list AMs, and comparing their ‘performance’ with regard to the concerns brought to their attention (Black 2001). A list MSP also notes that the MMP system ‘gives each elector a range of part parliamentarians to approach. I have been impressed by the significant number of people who have told me “this is the first time I have ever voted for someone who got in”’ (2003). Another list MSP says the following: I do not frequently encounter friction and I find that there is often scope for cross-party consensus in my region on a number of issues. Obviously this is balanced by the need to remain politically distinctive. Being a list MSP allows me to represent areas where my party has no constituency MSP, yet members seek access to the party itself (2003). Williams agrees that enhanced choice is good for constituents because ‘you can’t be lazy’, and for the most partisan voters who will never approach a constituency AM they voted against, there is the opportunity to deal with ‘their own’ list AM: There may be Conservatives out there who would never come to me in a million years, and why should they be disenfranchised because of a weird electoral system [first-past-the-post]? At least now they’ve got someone they feel comfortable going to, and I think that’s fine (Williams 2001).

The constituency role of list representatives in Britain Party list representatives are new elements of the British political system, appearing for the first time in the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, the Greater London Assembly, and the British (but not Northern Irish) delegation to the European Parliament. Because they are so new, there appears to be some ques-


tion as to what exactly they should do, particularly regarding constituency representation. Indeed, one list MSP stated ‘The duties and functions of list MSPs were not thought out by the founders of the Scottish Parliament or the CSG [Consultative Steering Group on the Scottish Parliament]’ (MSP 2000). The lack of guidelines for list representatives may account for some of the problems encountered with shadowing, and a protocol on how list representatives should deal with constituents has been added to the Scottish Parliament code of conduct, but nothing similar was in place for the Welsh Assembly in its early years. This addition to the code of conduct for MSPs, Guidance on the Relationships between MSPs, has been summarised in the Scottish Parliament’s Public Information Service leaflet, ‘You and Your MSPs’. The leaflet tells citizens that they ‘are free to approach any of the eight MSPs who represent’ them, and their wishes are the ‘principal concern’ as far as which member they would like to approach (Scottish Parliament 2001). However, the leaflet goes on to say that the Guidance ‘envisages that in most circumstances, individual constituents will approach the relevant constituency MSP’, and if a regional list MSP is approached instead, ‘he or she must inform the relevant constituency MSP at the outset’, although the citizen can request that this should not happen (Scottish Parliament 2001). Regardless of what the Guidance envisages, many list representatives perform traditional constituency service activities, often catering to voters who prefer to deal with someone they voted for (when they failed to elect the constituency representative of their choice), as the comments above and survey data from Chapter 5 show. Because of the large size of their electoral regions, list representatives often focus on a smaller geographical part of the region, even if they are not strictly shadowing constituency representatives for the purpose of improving their chances in the constituency portion of the next election. In cases where an electoral region has both list and constituency representatives from the same party, these representatives may choose to co-ordinate their activities. Liberal Democrat constituency MSP Iain Smith said he worked with the only list representative from his party in the electoral region, Keith Raffan, on issues that cross constituency boundaries and affect their entire Mid Scotland and Fife region (Smith 2001). List representatives are somewhat more likely than their constituency counterparts to work with organised interests, often in areas that match their own expertise or interests.


The following comments from list members of the Scottish Parliament provide some idea of how they represent constituents, geographical and otherwise: I work primarily in 3 constituencies, though I tend to concentrate on the one in which I live. My regional office is in the neighbouring constituency (2000). I travel extensively in Scotland to meet with and encourage all kinds of non-political organisations on a non-political basis (2000). I feel I represent the remote rural way of life and that angle in many of my contributions in the parliament (2000). As a Green, I think I tend to be approached on particular categories of problems (environmental ones) across the area, rather than the full range of constituency problems (2003). Because of the diversity of list MSPs’ constituents, civic organisations and lobby groups tend to approach the MSP whom they think will best represent their interests. The management at Prestwick Airport will have links with the Tory MSPs; groups fighting hospital closures will contact the SSP; there is flexibility (2003). When asked how list representatives go about representing interest groups as non-geographical constituencies, one countered by saying ‘working “with”, not representing’ (MSP 2000). Several others listed groups that they work with or represent, including the countryside, fisheries, older people, youth, the environment, ethnic/linguistic groups, overseas development, ship-building, and victims of abuse. The activities of list representatives are limited by the size of their office allowances, however. In Scotland these are smaller than those of a constituency member if a party has more than one list member in a given region. One list MSP argues that list representatives ‘are disadvantaged because of lower allowances and being forced to share offices with other list members. Allowances are far too low to allow us to employ enough staff to do the job properly’ (2003). Scottish National Party (SNP) list MSP from 1999 to 2003, Andrew Wilson, argued that the matter of allowances is highly significant, because Labour tries to maintain its ‘one party state’ in Scotland by reducing the visibility of SNP members (most of whom are elected


from party lists) with its imposition of smaller office allowances (Wilson 2001). He believed that the Labour Party’s leadership was concerned about losing some not-so-safe constituencies to the SNP at the next Scottish Parliament election, and that this explains why Labour fought so hard to limit allowances to list representatives. In spite of the smaller office allowance, Wilson set up a telephone hotline for constituents in his Central Scotland electoral region to use for problems or questions, and he said that he received calls from voters of all party (or non-party) backgrounds (2001). While Wilson saw the competition between MSPs brought about by the electoral system as good for the voters, the Labour MSP in a single-member constituency he was shadowing, Cathie Craigie, complained about Wilson’s use of the term ‘your local MSP’ on signs and promotional materials in 2001. Craigie took the case to the Scottish Parliament’s Standards Committee, where Wilson agreed to remove the offending word (‘local’) found to be in breach of the parliament’s guidelines (Scottish Parliament 2001). No sanctions were imposed, however, but the BBC News Web site reported that such tensions between constituency and list MSPs had led the British government to decide to abolish the eight electoral regions and elect all list representatives from the 2003 election onwards on a panScotland basis, expecting that ‘the change would stop list MSPs acting like surrogate constituency MSPs’ (2001). The government had apparently hoped that with no electoral regions, list MSPs would have no regional identity and would therefore be more likely to focus on policy matters, rather than shadow targeted Labour constituency MSPs. The proposed national list system was condemned by the SNP immediately, and all MSPs interviewed for this book believed that the BBC report, which was also cited in Scottish newspapers, was simply a ‘kite’ being flown by Westminster to assess the public response in Scotland. The electoral regions were seen by MSPs as an important way to maintain a regional dimension in the parliament and political system. Margaret Smith, Liberal Democrat constituency MSP, argued that regional lists are good for list member accountability and urban-rural balance, and that national lists might increase party centralisation (Smith 2001). Furthermore, the use of national lists in New Zealand does nothing to prevent the shadowing of constituency MPs by their list colleagues. A small party that would gain seats under a national list allocation is the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP), which in 1999 won only a single


seat (in Glasgow). The then leader of the SSP, Tommy Sheridan, made news in 2001 when he was brought before the Scottish Parliament’s standards committee by a constituency MSP who alleged that Sheridan improperly took up the case of a woman in her constituency, which lies outside his electoral region (Horsburgh 2001). The case raises interesting questions because Sheridan claimed that the woman, a member of the SSP, asked for his intervention in a housing dispute with a local authority because her constituency MSP was not doing enough to help her. In this instance, because the woman lived in the ‘wrong’ place, she was unable to seek redress of her grievance from an MSP of her choice. Electing list MSPs on a nationwide basis would prevent this sort of problem from happening again, as well as help small parties like the SSP and the Greens win more seats because there would be more list seats to be allocated than under the current regional system (only seven are available per region). A national list system in Wales would help small parties overcome the bigger electoral bias there against them, where only four are elected per region, as well. Despite the potential for more seats and fewer troubles with constituency members, the SSP actually supports the retention of the regional list system. According to Sheridan’s press and policy officer, Hugh Kerr, while ‘the idea of a national list has some attraction for us (we would win more seats), we would be opposed to it as we value the links to the region, particularly Glasgow’ (2001). Kerr was also optimistic that the members of the standards committee will be ‘more flexible in their application’ of the rules governing casework outside an MSP’s constituency or region (2001). In fact, the Guidance on the Relationships between MSPs does say that dealing with a case or issue outside an MSP’s constituency or region is permitted ‘by prior arrangement’ (Scottish Parliament 2000: 93). However, the SSP would be relying upon the good graces of constituency MSPs who are sometimes hostile to list representatives who they believe should not act as ‘surrogate constituency MSPs’, while a national list system would simply eliminate the problem. Indeed, Sheridan’s attachment to a region could be seen as irrational, in a rational choice sense, if he values the constituency link more than the potential for electoral gain. The ‘rational actor’ would prefer a system that is more proportional, giving more seats to small parties, even at the expense of constituency ties. The link between representatives and their constituents in Britain is highly valued by both politicians and citizens, as the literature


reviewed earlier indicated. Many of the comments from MSPs and AMs above reflect the sentiment of this constituency representative: I feel there is a lack of clarity between the two types of AM – which is both unhelpful and confusing for electors. The link developed between a constituent and their representative as in the case of an MP is more difficult to establish (AM 2000). Because proportional representation (PR) by definition requires the introduction of multimember constituencies, the inevitable competition between and even within parties (when the time comes for nominations to regional party lists) may trouble those who see a partisan intrusion into what they view as non-partisan constituency service. Other criticisms of PR often raised in Britain focus on a perceived lack of personal accountability on the part of elected representatives. As one constituency MSP stated, ‘I think list MSPs pursue causes, not constituents’ concerns and are much less accountable’ (2003). Therefore, one of the survey questions asked MSPs and AMs how accountable they are. When asked in 2000 whether constituency representatives are more accountable to voters than list representatives, a not surprising 90.9 per cent of the former agreed or strongly agreed, while only 28.2 per cent of list representatives felt the same way (Table 6.1, Statement A). The difference is significant at the 0.01 level. Labour representatives, as a group, agreed quite strongly, while the nationalists disagreed strongly. The differences between these parties are significant at the 0.01 level. The accountability question was asked again three years later. In 2003, 94.6 per cent of constituency representatives agreed or agreed strongly once again, while 23.7 per cent of list representatives responded the same way (Table 6.1, Statement A), showing a slight polarisation from the 2000 result. Among Labour representatives, 50.0 per cent agreed or agreed strongly, down from the 85.7 per cent of 2000 due to 41.7 per cent responding ‘no opinion’. Nationalist opinion has also changed, with 66.6 per cent agreeing or agreeing strongly, up from the 37.5 per cent in 2000. Despite this surprising result, the difference between the nationalists and Labour is significant at the 0.01 level. However, there was initially some agreement on whether both constituency and list representatives are equally representative of the people of Scotland and Wales. Even most constituency representatives (69.7 per cent) agreed or strongly agreed that both types of


Attitudes towards other representatives (UK, 2000 and 2003)

Question: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs)/National Assembly for Wales (AMs)? % responding:

Strongly agree

Agree

No opinion

Disagree

Strongly disagree

No response

(A) MSPs/AMs elected from single-member constituencies are more accountable to voters than party list MSPs/AMs 2000 All representatives 25.0 31.9 16.7 19.4 6.9 0 • Constituency** 42.4 48.5 3.0 6.1 0 0 • List** 10.3 17.9 28.2 30.8 12.8 0 • Labour** 52.4 33.3 9.5 4.8 0 0 • Nationalist** 8.3 29.2 25.0 25.0 12.5 0 • Conservative 26.7 20.0 20.0 26.7 6.7 0 • Lib Democrat 11.1 55.6 0 22.2 11.1 0 2003 All representatives • Constituency** • List** • Labour** • Nationalist** • Conservative • Lib Democrat

34.7 67.6 2.6 45.8 22.2 23.5 50.0

24.0 27.0 21.1 4.2 44.4 29.4 12.5

4.0 0 7.9 41.7 5.6 5.9 0

20.0 5.4 34.2 0 16.7 0 12.5

17.3 0 34.2 8.3 11.1 41.2 25.0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(B) Both types of MSPs/AMs (party list and single-member constituency) are equally representative of the people of Scotland/Wales 2000 All representatives 45.8 37.5 2.8 8.3 5.6 0 • Constituency** 18.2 51.5 6.1 15.2 9.1 0 • List** 69.2 25.6 0 2.6 2.6 0 • Labour** 19.0 33.3 9.5 23.8 14.3 0 • Nationalist** 70.8 25.0 0 4.2 0 0 • Conservative 40.0 53.3 0 0 6.7 0 • Lib Democrat 33.3 66.7 0 0 0 0 2003 All representatives • Constituency** • List** • Labour** • Nationalist** • Conservative • Lib Democrat

44.0 5.4 81.6 4.2 72.2 58.8 37.5

22.7 29.7 15.8 12.5 27.8 35.3 12.5

N (2000) = 72; N (2003) = 75 ** Difference is significant at the 0.01 level

4.0 5.4 2.6 8.3 0 5.9 0

13.3 27.0 0 37.5 0 0 12.5

14.7 29.7 0 37.5 0 0 25.0

1.3 2.7 0 0 0 0 12.5


representatives are equally representative of the people when asked in 2000 (Table 6.1, Statement B). Agreement from constituency representatives was more grudging than from list representatives, though, with only 18.2 per cent of the former agreeing strongly. Furthermore, 24.3 per cent of constituency representatives actually disagreed or disagreed strongly, so the difference between list and constituency representatives is significant at the 0.01 level. Another finding is the existence of strong partisan differences, some of which are also significant at the 0.01 level. Among Labour representatives, 38.1 per cent disagree or strongly disagree that both types of elected representatives are equally representative, while 95.8 per cent of nationalist representatives agree or agree strongly. Such a high level of disagreement should be of great concern, as it deals directly with the issue of how legitimate list representatives are as representatives of the people. Results from the 2003 survey heighten the issue of how list representatives are perceived by their constituency counterparts. Among the latter, only 35.1 per cent agree or agree strongly that both types of representatives are equally representative of the people of Scotland and Wales, down to about half the 2000 level of 69.7 per cent (Table 6.1, Statement B). More than twice as many constituency representatives as in 2000, 56.7 per cent, disagree or disagree strongly that the two types of representatives are equally representative of the people. This dramatic change over a three-year period should worry those who hope the problems with MMP, particularly those involving the presence of two different types of representative, will subside over time. Labour’s attitude on the mixed-member electoral system is of crucial importance, because the government at Westminster could change how Scottish and Welsh devolved assembly members are elected, since constitutional matters are reserved for Westminster. Many in the party are not happy with PR, blaming the electoral system, rather than Labour’s electoral performance, for their failure to win an outright majority of seats in the Welsh Assembly in particular, where victory was expected in 1999. Only a bare majority was achieved there in 2003 because the speaker, who does not normally vote, came from the opposition, reducing its numbers to 29 and giving Labour a de facto majority with its 30 seats. While some members of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly would prefer to abolish PR altogether, this option is politically unlikely, due to the fact that Labour would probably win a huge majority of the seats if the single-member plurality system were used to


elect these bodies. Such an outcome would be unacceptable to the other parties, and most likely, to the majority of the population in Scotland and Wales – the majority of Scottish and Welsh voters in both 1999 and 2003 voted against Labour. Although some have called for two-member constituencies, serious proposals for change have focused on modifying the existing MMP system, or replacing MMP with another PR system, the single transferable vote (STV). Within the Labour Party, there have been mixed feelings about the mixed-member form of PR in particular, as the above survey data and comments reveal. Some appear to have reconciled themselves to the system, while others oppose it. Many complaints from Labour representatives about the electoral system have focused on how candidates defeated in single-member constituencies can win regional list seats. Labour member of the Welsh Assembly, Brian Gibbons said that many in his party feel that the mixed-member system ‘gives undue prominence to people who have failed at the ballot box’ but turn up in the assembly anyway, thanks to their positions on party lists (Gibbons 2001). On the other hand, another Labour representative, Mike Watson, was more optimistic about the ability of Scottish Parliament constituency and list members to co-exist: I believe the matter of MSPs from individual constituencies and list constituencies being in ‘conflict’ will also peter out. At the end of the day, the important thing is to ensure that the individual raising a complaint has his or her issue dealt with effectively, and there really is not a great extent to which list and constituency MSPs are in competition. Certainly that should not be the case and I believe that once the Parliament is fully bedded in (which should be by the end of its first four-year term) such problems should be minimised and ultimately will, to any extent, cease to exist (2001b). If Watson’s comments turn out to be accurate, then the future of Britain’s mixed-member electoral experiment looks brighter. However, problems between list and constituency members appeared to persist well into the second term of both the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly.

The dual candidacy debate In Wales, tensions between constituency and list AMs increased after the 2003 election. All of Labour’s AMs now were constituency members,


unlike before when the 1999 election returned one list member who happened to be Labour’s leader, Alun Michael. This allowed Labour AMs to feel less inhibited about condemning list AMs as ‘second class’, along with a 2003 election result in which three candidates who lost the constituency of Clwyd West to Labour entered the Assembly via their respective party lists (Bradbury and Russell 2005a: 3). Later, a government commission chaired by Lord Richard dealt with the question of electoral reform along with other issues associated with Welsh devolution, including the powers of the Assembly. The Richard Commission, reporting in 2004, recommended the introduction of STV as a replacement for MMP for the Assembly. It cited ‘two types of AM with overlapping responsibilities’ and the ‘freedom for candidates to stand for both constituency and party regional seats’ as disadvantages of MMP (Richard 2004: 230), and recommended that STV replace MMP if the size of the Assembly is increased beyond the present 60 members, fearing that more list AMs would exacerbate the ‘problem’ of shadowing (Richard 2004: 239). This conclusion was criticised by Charlie Jeffery, who argued that the ‘perceived problem’ with MMP in Wales might have less to do with the electoral system and more to do with what was, for the Labour Party, a ‘difficult process of adaptation to the idea of multi-party politics which should ease over time’ (2004: 5). Rather than try to reconcile itself to the competition it faces from list members of the Assembly, however, the Labour Party, via the British government, attempted to reduce the competition. In a White Paper, the British government proposed a change to the MMP system that would forbid dual candidacy in Welsh Assembly elections, so that candidates could stand only in constituencies or on regional lists. Citing what it called ‘considerable dissatisfaction that candidates who are rejected by a particular constituency can still become Assembly Members through the regional list and so be able to claim to represent the constituency that rejected them’, the White Paper says this situation of competition ‘can have done little to enhance the credibility of the electoral process or the voters’ level of engagement with it’ (Wales Office 2005: 10). Peter Hain, the Welsh Secretary, even goes so far as to argue that ‘providing a backdoor route for election for those who have been defeated at constituency level can be a disincentive for voters’ in the forward to the White Paper (Wales Office 2005: 3). The government’s claims about dual candidacy were promptly criticised in a response by the Electoral Commission, an independent, nonpartisan body established in 2000 by Parliament. It pointed out that


there was no public opinion evidence publicly available at the time of the White Paper’s publication in June 2005 supporting the government’s assertion that the Welsh people disapproved of dual candidacy. Indeed, the Commission asks for any such evidence to be made public, reporting that the issue of dual candidacy did not emerge in any of its own studies on Welsh voter attitudes (Electoral Commission 2005: 5). The Commission goes on to reject the government’s case for abolishing dual candidacy, arguing that constituency incumbents (Labour AMs) will be the likely beneficiaries of a situation in which opposition parties would be reluctant to run their strongest candidates in constituency races with no regional list ‘safety net’, with sacrificial lambs standing there instead. The resulting reduction in competitiveness of constituency races could exacerbate the perceived class division between the two types of AMs and reinforce the notion held by critics of MMP that list representatives are rootless party hacks whose main role is just ‘to top up the numbers’ rather than to represent actual voters. Citing its main consideration as the voter’s perspective, the Commission cautioned ‘against any change that is perceived to be partisan and could add to a prevailing distrust of politicians’, particularly in this era of low voter turnout (2005: 6). The Commission’s response paper also makes comparisons to other countries using mixed-member electoral systems, almost all of which permit dual candidacy. The only mixed-member system case that forbids dual candidacy is Ukraine, according to academic researchers assisting the Commission, though Thailand and the Palestinian Legislative Council also ban the practice. Another researcher, Louis Massicotte, notes that Mexico limits to 60 the number of dual candidacies per party running for Congress, but does not forbid dual candidacy in its mixed-member electoral system (2004: 71). Otherwise, dual candidacy is a permitted feature of mixed-member systems. In Germany, dual candidacy has been the norm for decades, and many of those who are defeated in constituencies enter the Bundestag or Landtage (parliaments of the federal states) via their party lists, setting up offices in the constituencies where they were defeated with no public outcry. Massicotte points out that in Germany, the vast majority (84.9 per cent) of Bundestag members elected in 2002 had stood both in constituencies and on party lists, and that 97.0 per cent of Social Democrat and 83.5 per cent of Christian Democrat constituency candidates were also on their parties’ lists (2004: 73). Dual candidacy allows parties to cultivate a local presence across a country or territory without the risk of losing their most experienced,


high-ranking members. Over time, as parties’ fortunes shift, many politicians will have entered legislatures elected by mixed-member systems via both routes. In Germany, Massicotte found that over the period from 1949 to 2002, 19.0 per cent of individual Bundestag members had been elected both from constituencies and from lists, and that among long-serving members (over 10,000 days), this level rose to 50 per cent (2004: 76–7). Therefore, there is no stigma attached to losing in a single-member constituency, but winning via the party list in Germany, the longer a politician is around, the more likely this situation will happen, even to senior politicians like former Chancellor Helmut Kohl. In another country that uses MMP, New Zealand, the issue of dual candidacy was investigated by a government-appointed committee a few years after the new electoral system was introduced in 1996. The MMP Review Committee received 21 public submissions calling for the abolition of dual candidacy, so it took the matter seriously. The committee recognised that, given the country’s legacy of single-member plurality elections and the belief held by many voters that they directly convey a mandate upon successful candidates in single-member constituencies with their votes, adapting to indirectly elected list MPs would be difficult. Nevertheless, the committee unanimously recommended the continuation of dual candidacy, citing among its reasons the need for parties to be able to ‘protect valuable candidates in marginal seats and reward superior candidates in unwinnable seats’ and stating this regarding list MPs: The committee considered that list members are accountable, and that they do have a popular mandate. They get this from the nationwide support their party receives through the party vote and thus voters will always have the ultimate sanction. If a party persists in putting unpopular electorate [constituency] candidates on the list to ensure they are elected, voters can respond by not giving that party their party vote. Voters can similarly indicate to a party what they think of the performance of its list-only candidates through the exercise of the party vote (Hunt 2001: 51). There is no reason why this advice should not equally apply to the British cases of MMP, where voters have two votes – one for a party list and one for a constituency candidate – allowing voters to reward ‘good’ constituency representatives and punish parties that put ‘hacks’ high on their regional lists.


Critics of MMP who want to keep a system of PR for the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly often recommend STV, used to elect local councils in Scotland from 2007, as an alternative. STV is seen as preferable to MMP by some critics, such as the Electoral Reform Society, because all representatives would be elected in the same way; there would be no ‘second-class’ representative problem for list-elected MSPs and AMs. STV is also popular because it allows voters to rank candidates (often from the same party) in order of preference, thus reducing the power of the party organisations in determining list order in systems of closed-list PR (which includes MMP as used in Britain). While it might sound more democratic to allow voters to have this kind of influence, there are potential problems with STV, as discussed in Chapter 2. Representatives elected this way can become overly beholden to constituents. At a minimum, parochialism can become a problem as representatives focus more on local issues and less on national policies. In the Republic of Ireland, the local government minister advocated, unsuccessfully, the introduction of MMP as a replacement for STV (‘a slave to local issues’, in his words) in order to avoid this kind of distraction from major national and international policy matters (Dempsey 2002). Potentially worse than parochialism is the effect STV can have on party cohesion, particularly for large parties that might have significant factions. Therefore, while MMP promotes competition between different parties’ candidates, STV would promote competition within parties and possibly undermine party unity. In any event, the Labour Party rejected calls for STV (including one issued by the Richard Commission) to replace MMP for the Welsh Assembly, choosing instead to pursue the abolition of dual candidacy in MMP. The debate over dual candidacy in Britain shows, on one level, crude and sensational language reminiscent of the ‘playground politics’ that Westminster is famous (or infamous) for. Westminster MPs, including Welsh Secretary Peter Hain himself, used rather bombastic terms, regardless of which side of the debate they were on – and this debate was very partisan. During a parliamentary debate over dual candidacy, Conservative MP David Jones asked Hain ‘Does it not operate to the advantage of those Labour constituency Members that a softer candidate will be standing against them on a first-past-the-post basis? The more able candidates will stand on the regional list rather than on first-past-thepost. Is not that precisely what the Secretary of State is hoping for? (HC 9 Jan 2006: col. 33). In response, Hain said the following: There we have it in its full glory – the real Conservative faces of Wales exposed. Why have the hon. Gentlemen and other Welsh Conservatives


joined an unholy coalition on the issue with Plaid Cymru and the Liberal Democrats? Why are they so afraid of taking their choice to the people? Are they afraid that they will lose the constituency elections and therefore opt for the lifebelt of the list? (HC 9 Jan 2006: col. 34). This exchange clearly shows how partisan the issue had become. In another debate, Shadow Welsh Secretary Cheryl Gillan stated that she and her Conservative colleagues had argued that the proposed ban was ‘a partisan attempt by the Labour party to rig the electoral system to its own advantage’ (HC, 27 Feb 2006, col. 29). Expanding upon the issue of how partisan Labour was being in its attempt to ban dual candidacy, Gillan stated the following: Labour Members also displayed a lot of partisanship when they said that one of their problems was with list Members setting up rival camps. I am not sure how this change in the system will stop that because there will still be list members, who will still be able to set up rival camps. The evidence session … provided an interesting insight into the psychology of the Labour party. I heard the Committee Chairman, the hon. Member for Glasgow, Central (Mr. Sarwar), utter the immortal words that are on page 22 of the draft manuscript: ‘I represent Glasgow Central. I have 11 MSPs interfering in my constituency.’ That is the Labour party’s attitude to Members of the Scottish Parliament and, I presume, to Assembly Members. That is appalling. We have touched on the real reason for the proposals in the Bill to change the electoral system (HC, 27 Feb 2006: col. 35). On another level, however, the dual candidacy debate revealed that there is a very different understanding of democratic representation among many British politicians than there is among politicians in countries that have long used PR electoral systems, as the German comparison demonstrates. Many Labour MPs responded to the White Paper’s consultation call invoking the so-called ‘Clwyd West question’, as Ann Jones did in her submission: I am extremely pleased to see proposals in the White Paper to end the disgrace of defeated constituency candidates getting elected via party lists. This nonsense was explicitly illustrated at the last Assembly election in the Clwyd West constituency where Labour’s Alan Pugh won, but three rejected Tory, Nationalist and Lib Dem candidates still got elected through the top-up [regional] list (Wales Office Consultation Web site 2005).


Jones uses the term ‘rejected’ candidate to describe those who lost in the single-member constituency Clwyd West, reflecting the winnertake-all perspective associated with the ‘first-past-the-post’ in British politics. This zero-sum approach is not, however, compatible with the logic of proportional representation, in which there can be several winners per constituency. Jones continues to reveal her understanding of representation as she defends her preference for ‘first-past-the-post’ elections, invoking the argument that the winning politician is ‘clearly accountable’ to constituents (Wales Office Consultation Web site 2005). While it is possible (and perhaps likely) that Jones is simply ‘helping her team’ by attacking regional list AMs in her support for the government’s proposal to ban dual candidacy, her attack on PR could also reflect a genuinely different understanding of representative democracy, one that has come into collision with the realities of PR. This majoritarian understanding of democracy, to use Arend Lijphart’s terminology (1999), is even more strongly evident in Welsh Secretary Peter Hain’s reaction to the Conservative amendment of the Government of Wales Bill, by the House of Lords, to reinstate dual candidacy. As was the case with his forward to the White Paper, discussed above, Hain made very dismissive comments about list-elected AMs in comments to the BBC: There is widespread abuse where candidates are elected on lists – often the majority of them having lost in the constituencies which they also stood for. So the voters rejected them in those constituencies, but they end up winning on lists. I think it’s an abuse – if you’re defeated and end up winning and setting up in the very same constituency where the voters kicked you out that is an abuse. We had a manifesto commitment to implement this ban on dual candidature – to put the voters in charge rather than the parties or the candidates having an each-way bet. Defeated candidates set up constituency offices as regional list members and try to undermine the elected member (BBC News Web site 2006). While some of the belligerent tone here probably reflects the partisan frustration at being defeated by the opposition parties on the proposed legislation, Hain’s comments, like those of his Labour colleague Ann Jones above, illustrate a view of democracy that is not pluralistic, but highly majoritarian. Hain argues that there was a manifesto commitment to the ban, invoking a notion peculiar to the Westminster model of democracy that the winning party has a mandate to enact everything


in its election manifesto, even though it is unlikely that voters actually base their decision on party manifesto promises, or endorse all of them (Kavanagh et al. 2006: 413). Furthermore, because Labour won the 2005 Westminster election with just over 35 per cent of the popular vote, the government has been heavily criticised in the British media when it has invoked its electoral ‘mandate’ on other controversial issues, such as identity cards. As was the case with Jones’s comments, Hain also displays a winnertake-all understanding of representation (‘voters rejected them in those constituencies, but they end up winning on lists’) quite at odds with the logic of PR, which requires multimember constituencies. Shadowing of constituency-elected AMs by those elected from regional lists is called an ‘abuse’ because Hain sees this practice as a way to ‘undermine’ constituency AMs. Those who are accustomed to multimember constituencies and greater political pluralism in general (not something normally associated with Wales), however, might simply see shadowing as a product of the electoral competition one would expect in a multiparty system, multiparty politics facilitated by Labour’s choice of a PR electoral system for the Welsh Assembly. The issue of political pluralism and the question of dual candidacy also arose in the context of the Scottish Parliament, where an independent commission, headed by Professor Sir John Arbuthnott, rejected the idea of banning dual candidacy, going so far as to call such a ban ‘undemocratic’ (Arbuthnott 2006: 44). The Arbuthnott Commission dismissed the government’s assertion in the White Paper that citizens were somehow put off by dual candidacy, noting the lack of survey evidence and pointing out that the matter did not figure prominently in its own consultation or in focus groups (2006: 44). The following statement sums up the reaction of the commission to the dual candidacy debate: We suggest that dual candidacy only seems problematic to some people here because of the legacy of constituency representation within British political culture and the hegemony which this has secured for some parties. Candidates coming in second or third place who are then elected through the regional list are only ‘losers’ in the context of a first past the post, ‘winner takes all’, electoral system. This logic does not sit well within a proportional system and introducing it devalues and undermines the concept of proportionality. The criticism, and the pejorative terms in which it is sometimes put, does little to enhance the legitimacy of regional MSPs (Arbuthnott 2006: 44).


Critics might wonder why Labour would choose PR, well known to political scientists to promote multiparty politics, and a specific electoral system, MMP, long associated with the practice of shadowing in Germany, and then complain about these issues, as some opposition MPs cited above have pointed out. The German case, discussed below, reveals that Labour should have foreseen, at least to some extent, how MMP would operate in practice in Britain, although the Germans seem to have avoided the worst of the problems associated with British MMP simply due to historical circumstances.

German representatives’ attitudes towards each other Relations between constituency and list representatives in Germany differ from the British case, according to the received wisdom. Literature reviewed earlier suggested that there is no difference in the status of German constituency and list representatives in the eyes of most German citizens. Most list members of German assemblies establish some kind of presence, usually by means of an office, in the constituency of a directly elected representative. Exactly half of the constituency representatives who responded to the survey of Brandenburg and Hesse Landtag members (Mitglied des Landtages, MdL) in 2000 said they were being shadowed, while 89.9 per cent of the list MdLs admitted to the practice. The positive comments from constituency MdLs about the activities of list MdLs in their constituencies imply that nothing abnormal or unexpected is going on: An entirely normal occurrence. It’s customary! All deputies have a constituency office! They are doing their job. It is a necessity for the deputy to maintain an office. At a subsequent election the list deputy is again a constituency candidate, and especially demanded in public. The last time, the list MdLs were also represented with offices, which was very good. These comments are in line with the literature suggesting that shadowing is a common occurrence in Germany; the conventional view is that


constituency representatives do not feel threatened by list representatives who set up shop in their ‘patch’, having been assigned by their parties to constituencies won by opposition members. The result is that most voters have a member of a party they support looking after their geographical areas, as this Hesse MdL describes: Every MdL has his own constituency office and looks after his region. The region in which a party has no constituency MdLs, as a rule will be looked after either by a list MdL or by a neighbouring constituency MdL, so that all citizens have an MdL of their party as a contact person (Gotthardt 2001). In other words, constituency representation in Germany is not an exclusive right, as is so often the view among British elected representatives, but rather a responsibility shared among members of different parties. Many Landtag members, both directly- and list-elected, politely repeated the same line about both types of MdL being treated as equals, as exemplified by these Hesse constituency MdLs: The parliamentary work of a directly elected MdL does not differentiate itself from that of a list MdL. Merely a directly elected MdL is somewhat more bound to ‘his’ constituency. Most list MdLs also have a constituency assigned to them, however, which they have not won directly themselves (Wintermeyer 2001). The differences between constituency and list MdLs are not very big. In practice everyone works co-operatively together and there are only small differences. It may, for that reason, be repeated yet again that it comes to no kind of tensions between deputies, and they work productively together for the good of the citizens (Gotthardt 2001). Other comments from directly elected MdLs, while maintaining that there are no major differences between the two types of members, reveal upon closer inspection that perhaps being directly elected makes an MdL a bit more equal, however. The main advantage in being a constituency MdL, as cited by a number of them, was the degree of independence from the state party organisation that comes with direct election. One directly elected Hesse MdL puts it this way: There are, in my opinion, no great differences between a directly elected MdL and a list-elected MdL. The commitment to the


constituency is equal in that both types of MdL are selected by party members in the respective constituency. One difference I could suggest is that a directly elected MdL brings in the interests of the constituency without consideration of statewide political concerns. A directly elected MdL can confine himself to the representation of his constituency. The commitment to statewide subjects he could set aside, although so far in practice I have not yet seen it (Brückmann 2001). Any independence from the party, however, is not likely to be significant, as the above comment suggests, and of course the representative’s commitment to the constituency party must be strong in order to secure re-nomination. Whatever degree of freedom is achieved for a representative by direct election depends on constituency service for its continuation. Directly elected MdLs take pride in serving their constituents, believing that this service distinguishes them, at least to some extent, from their list counterparts, as well as giving them a bit more freedom. A constituency member of the Saxony-Anhalt Landtag says that those ‘who want to be directly elected have to work very hard with the people, and they are independent from any party leaders. That’s very important for me’ (Stier 2000). Another constituency MdL, from the Hesse Landtag, writes: The work of a constituency MdL differs from that of a list MdL as far as constituency care naturally playing a greater role. A constituency MdL tries to be re-elected in the constituency at the next election. That is to say, the workload for a constituency MdL favours the constituency. Beyond that, a constituency MdL is at least a bit freer in his work. In the end he can refer to the fact that he was elected in his constituency and the citizens stand behind him. He has, therefore, as a rule a certain weight and also a somewhat greater independence vis-à-vis the wishes of his party (Gotthardt 2001). Gotthardt’s comment here links the directly elected MdL to his or her constituency, arguing that this linkage does actually help the voters, whose electoral support helps the MdL act more independently than a list MdL. Such a difference might also confer a higher degree of status upon constituency MdLs, an advantage noted by Hesse MdL Axel Wintermeyer (2001).


Competition and conflict between German representatives The above comments suggest that there is at least some difference in how German constituency representatives perceive their list counterparts. Therefore, competition for ‘business’ from voters should come as no surprise. Some MdLs view this competition in a positive way, while others are not so pleased with it. Many directly elected MdLs had quite positive comments about the constituency activities of their list counterparts: Competition enlivens business. In the same party (or coalition partner), it can mean a division of labour and thereby an enhancement. With opposition colleagues, it increases the awareness and is a motivation. A very involved, working colleague, even though he belongs to another party. Commitment [to the constituency] is positive because it helps the citizens. [The list member/s is/are] also putting effort into the constituency. These comments see benefits for constituents resulting from the representatives’ competition over service. This contrasts with the more negative tone displayed in the comments of constituency MdLs below regarding list MdLs: His constituency work is worse than mine. Office of an opposition party member – work is not known to me; so far not effective in public appearances. The PDS deputy in question has not taken up an office in my constituency, but was born and brought up there. He jumps over every populist ‘stick’ [issue]. It is not crucial whether one is elected directly or through the list. But it is crucial if the constituency deputy lives there. When the deputy is only ‘visiting’, the effectiveness is small.


No continuous operation; no identification with the region; exclusively party work. Less effective! The direct candidate is and remains better known. Party list members will become too close to their parties and interest groups; it’s very easy. They all want to be elected again so they need a very good place in front of this list. And the place on the list depends on the party leaders, not the citizens. It may be noteworthy that strong local ties are valued by the MdLs who made the above comments. In any case, there is at least a small amount of displeasure with the activities of list MdLs on the part of directly elected constituency MdLs in Germany.

The duties of list representatives in Germany Representatives elected from party lists were asked whether they focus their attention upon a geographical region or organised interests. Many mentioned that they concentrate on both a region and a set of interest groups, while others selected one or the other, or claimed that everyone was treated equally. The most frequent response from list representatives was that they tried to focus on both a region and interest groups, which were sometimes enumerated: I concentrate on both the representation of the residents of my constituency and on a specific interest group. A. General interest representation; B. Constituency interest representation; C. Narrow interest representation. I am directly reachable by everyone and I try to do my constituency work without prejudice, with interest groups and in parliament. I look after both my constituency and its residents, as well as the education sector lobbyists. Of course I deal with and represent problems of the constituency. Beyond that, I see myself as part of the environmental movement.


Particular concentration on constituency work, especially the rural population, youth, businesses, and the unemployed. Strengthening of businesses and the infrastructure. Budgetary issues concern the entire state. It is about setting priorities for the development of the good of all citizens. In the context of the discussion with deputies of my party in cities and municipalities, I am interested in all regions. Concrete problems of citizens I give my particular and specific support. As a person who deals with legal affairs, I represent those who work in and with the justice system, as well as of course citizens who are affected by the actions of the justice system. Even though I was not directly elected, I represent in particular the voters of my constituency. Many of the list representatives above refer to geographical constituencies as ‘theirs’. The last comment is particularly revealing in that the list MdL claims to represent the voters of a constituency in which she was (admittedly) not directly elected. Other list MdLs, from various parties, used similar references to ‘their’ constituencies: I concentrate on the region in which I was elected!! Representation of my region. Neither [region] nor [interest group]; I follow my basic convictions. I put the emphasis of my work on my constituency. My county consists of 4 constituencies. I have started first in one constituency – it was uncovered – I have my constituency office there. I am active in the other 3 constituencies. The above comments reflect the high degree of attachment list representatives in Germany have towards the single-member constituencies in which they perform constituency service. Their shadowing of directly elected constituency representatives is so commonplace and normal that list members do not hesitate to claim geographical areas as their own. Party list representatives also focus on interest groups with which they have an affinity, either due to the prominence of the group in the community, or because of some personal interest or attribute (occupation or


some other qualification) of the deputy. Many of those who commented mentioned that interest groups were more often the focus of a list deputy’s attention. Some comments, from the representatives of several parties, are listed below: The regional interests are very important, but groups are also…the difference between directly elected and list-elected deputies is not publicly noticed. Local questions stand behind the general subjects. I represent, logically, environmental interests more, close to my party’s ideas and convictions. Primarily the ‘troubled and burdened’ [downtrodden]. Employees, families, youth. I represent mainly a specific interest group, namely those who have decided to be against a multicultural Germany. Mainly agricultural policy and thereby the rural areas. I represent the farmers!!! Public events of the party; information booths; supporting citizen initiatives. Parliamentary: to use public hearings of Landtag committees for interest groups. The representation of specific interest groups follows from responsibilities in the parliamentary party: High schools and their status groups in the state; Prisons and the relevant groups and their social environment. For many list representatives, working with organised interests gives the politicians an opportunity to make a difference. One list member of the Hesse Landtag prefers her work to that of a constituency MdL, finding it more satisfying to focus on special projects (and have time to find solutions for them) than spend a lot of time ‘shaking hands’ in the area, as she puts it. For list members from the smallest parties, which generally have few or no directly elected seats, geographical representation must come


second to interest group and policy promotion, thanks simply to the small number of deputies they have. As some MdLs commented: Here one must differentiate between the representatives of the big and small parties. Deputies from the big parties – regardless of whether they won the constituency or not – look after the citizens considerably more than deputies of the small parties. Only small parties are not represented in the area. Small parties’ deputies must represent more regions and fields. The above comments are consistent with the expectations in recent literature (Patzelt 1999) about how major and minor party members are likely to differ in the way they relate to constituents. The survey data, cited in Chapters 4 and 5, also showed statistically significant differences between Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and Christian Democratic Union (CDU) members on the one hand, and Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), Alliance ’90/The Greens, Free Democratic Party (FDP), and German People’s Union (DVU) members on the other, in a number of questions related to constituency service. Landtag members were asked in the 2000 survey to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with statements on how accountable and representative they are. Results are shown in Table 6.2. When asked if they agreed that MdLs elected in single-member constituencies are more accountable to voters than party list MdLs (Statement A), 67.5 per cent of constituency MdLs agreed or agreed strongly, while 26.6 per cent of list MdLs felt the same way. The difference between the two types of MdLs is significant at the 0.01 level. The same statistical significance exists in the difference between constituency and list MdL responses to the second statement (B) in Table 6.2, which asks if both types of MdL are equally representative of the people of their federal state. While the vast majority of both types of representative agree or agree strongly, the response from constituency MdLs (62.5 per cent agree or agree strongly) is significantly different from that of list MdLs (93.9 per cent). Furthermore, there are significant (at the 0.01 level) differences between major (SPD and CDU) and minor (PDS, Green, FDP, and DVU) party members in their responses. These differences in how the two different types of German representatives view those elected from party lists are surprising in light of the many literature assumptions that there is no lesser status for list


Attitudes towards other representatives (Germany, 2000)

Question: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about Members of the Landtag (MdLs)? % responding:

Strongly agree

Agree

No opinion

Disagree

Strongly disagree

No response

(A) MdLs elected from single-member constituencies are more accountable to voters than party list MdLs All representatives 14.6 30.3 5.6 27.0 21.3 1.1 • Constituency** 22.5 45.0 5.0 15.0 12.5 0 • List** 8.2 18.4 6.1 36.7 28.6 2.0 • Major parties 14.9 31.1 5.4 27.0 20.3 1.4 • Minor parties 13.3 26.7 6.7 26.7 26.7 0 (B) Both types of MdL (party list and single-member constituency) are equally representative of the people of Brandenburg/Hesse All representatives 46.1 33.7 6.7 11.2 0 • Constituency** 22.5 40.0 12.5 22.5 0 • List** 65.3 28.6 2.0 2.0 0 • Major parties ** 40.5 35.1 8.1 13.5 0 • Minor parties ** 73.3 26.7 0 0 0

2.2 2.5 2.0 2.7 0

N = 89 Major parties = SPD and CDU; minor parties = PDS, Greens, FDP, and DVU ** Difference is significant at the 0.01 level

representatives in that country. While constituency MdLs might see their list colleagues as equals in most other respects, a significant number of them do not view list MdLs as being equally accountable to voters, or as representative. Aside from the above findings, there are few, if any, public indications that German constituency representatives view their list-elected colleagues as less worthy. Summing up his sentiments on the electoral system, Hesse constituency MdL Frank Gotthardt says this: To the advantage of a constituency MdL belongs the greater freedom, a greater independence, of a more direct contact with the citizens and a greater popularity with them. To the disadvantage belong, accordingly, that he must spend more time in his constituency due to electoral uncertainty that, as a rule, was not the case with list MdLs, and he cannot frequently occupy himself as intensively with the inner workings of parliament as list colleagues. In practice the differences are not very great, but partly according to how the MdL sees his task, recognisable. The division into con-


stituency and list MdLs makes sense, in my view, in so far as constituency MdLs, as a rule, see to it that regional problems will be discussed in parliament. List MdLs, on the other hand, see to it that broader questions also find an adequate importance in the discussion. The blend of local problems and statewide perspectives is, in my view, a good practice (Gotthardt 2001). Gotthardt’s comments reflect the more positive (and frequently cited) outlook on how the two different types of German representatives function within the political system, and do not really deal with the issues of accountability and direct representation raised by critics.

Conclusion Conflicts have arisen between constituency and list representatives in Scotland and Wales when list representatives shadow their constituency counterparts. In Germany, however, conflict to the extent seen in Britain is not the case. German constituency representatives accept the presence of list representatives in their constituencies far more readily than is the case in Britain, although many of them believe that they have closer ties to their constituency and serve constituents better than their list-elected counterparts. Comments from both constituency and list representatives indicate that there is a large degree of mutual respect, however, which is less prevalent among representatives in Scotland and Wales. While the German survey data indicate some statistically significant differences between constituency and list representatives in attitudes towards how accountable and representative they are, there is no indication of a ‘second class’ status for German list representatives. If there is any ‘class division’ between German representatives, it is between the major and minor parties over constituency service, and has to do mainly with the number of representatives available to cover geographical constituencies (where SPD and CDU members have the advantage because of the size of their parliamentary parties). The way that constituency representatives in Scotland and Wales, perceive their listelected counterparts appears to be a significant problem for MMP, at least for the time being. In Germany, dual candidacy has been the norm for decades, and many of those who are defeated in constituencies enter the Bundestag or Landtage via their party lists, setting up offices in the constituencies where they were defeated with no public outcry. In Britain, however,


the use of language like ‘the constituency that rejected them’ implies a zero-sum view of representation that is incompatible with PR in general; it is difficult to see how another form of PR, such as STV, would be any more suitable. Not surprisingly, the Labour Party rejected the Richard Commission’s recommendation of STV in 2004 (Bradbury and Russell 2005a: 4). As a large party, Labour would stand to lose cohesion and discipline as the preferential electoral system exposed divisions within it. It could also be argued that Labour, in abolishing dual candidacy in MMP, would rather have list AMs seen by the public as nothing more than opposition party ambassadors, rather than recognisable competitors with roots in the local community. Such a perception would reinforce the notion that list AMs are second-class representatives in Wales, a place where Labour is very strong ‘on the ground’ and where its candidates are more likely to win single-member constituency contests. Even if it were to be adopted, STV would be unlikely to reduce the problems that, arguably, have less to do with list-elected MSPs and AMs being seen as ‘second-class’ representatives and more to do with the fact that constituencies are now multimember in nature. This major change is a significant shift from the monopoly on constituency representation that British politicians (particularly Labour politicians in Scotland and Wales) are accustomed to. Much of the conflict between constituency and list representatives appears to be the product of partisan, not electoral, differences. Furthermore, this competition can bring benefits to the people of Scotland and Wales who should get better constituency service as single-member constituencies become more competitive. This advantage was actually pointed out by some constituency representatives themselves. Banning dual candidacy, meaning that candidates could only stand on the regional party list or in constituency races, could eliminate the benefits of better constituency service by reducing the competition that facilitates it.

7 Conclusion: Coming to Terms with Pluralism

This concluding chapter will review some of the most important empirical findings of the surveys of representatives elected by the mixed-member proportional (MMP) system in Scotland, Wales, and Germany. Addressing the rational choice-inspired critique that listelected members of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly are ‘second-class’ representatives, as critics of list proportional representation (PR) in Britain maintain because such representatives are not directly elected in single-member constituencies, is an important part of this study, and some of the findings suggest that list representatives do have less of a focus on traditional constituency service. This does not mean, however, that list representatives are less important; on the contrary, they have broadened out the definition of constituency representation in Britain, as well as having contributed greatly to the partisan diversity of Britain’s new PR-elected bodies. Furthermore, because some list representatives have chosen to shadow their constituency counterparts, MMP has the potential to enhance constituency service by promoting competition between representatives. In Scotland and Wales, there are major differences in the attitude held by the two types of representative towards the electoral system and the reaction by constituency representatives to ‘shadowing’ by their list colleagues. The sometimes hostile reaction by constituency representatives to competition from list representatives is also an important way in which British representatives differ from their German counterparts. However, it is this competition that arguably enhances the constituency role of representatives elected through the MMP system, to the benefit of voters. If voters can gain from MMP, it is hard to sustain the claim that list representatives are second-class representatives. 177


Conclusion This book has attempted to analyse the question of whether list-elected representatives, now present in British devolved bodies and comprising its European Parliament members, are ‘second-class’ representatives. While many British politicians, journalists, and commentators appear to believe the answer is ‘yes’, the evidence for such a response is not clear-cut. Re-phrased in a more academic way, the main concern of this study has been to examine the constituency role of list representatives, asking whether rational choice considerations, implicitly assumed in the ‘second-class’ argument, apply. Do list representatives shirk the constituency role played by constituency-elected representatives, or do they instead re-invent it, perhaps finding new, non-geographical constituencies? Do list representatives have any function other than ‘to top-up the numbers’ on a partisan basis, as their critics might claim? Evidence from this research is not conclusive in the scientific sense, due to the limitations arising from the relatively small sample size and roughly 40 per cent response rate, but it is highly suggestive of an electoral incentive influencing at least some of the behaviour of elected representatives. As the previous chapters have shown, postal surveys of British and German elected representatives found that, in some important respects, politicians behaved as the electoral incentives hypothesis expected. Those elected in single-member constituencies tended to spend more time on constituency service activities (such as holding surgeries and meeting individual constituents, and helping them with their problems or questions) that should help the re-election effort of those in geographical constituencies. This pattern holds, in many instances, for both British and German representatives. List-elected representatives, in Britain at least, spent more time dealing with interest groups, perhaps seeing such groups as non-geographical constituencies, as is the case in the New Zealand experience with MMP (Donald 1998). The changes in Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSP) and Assembly Members (AM) survey results from 2000 to 2003 indicate that some role differentiation, perhaps facilitated by the MMP electoral system, has taken place. Those representatives who are more interested in constituency service are, perhaps, better at performing it, and this may help them succeed at being re-elected. Another similarity lies in a type of constituency service that seeks public spending projects, which may not be an efficient way of spending public money, or promoting the constituency as a location for businesses. This type of activity among German Bundestag members

Conclusion: Coming to Terms with Pluralism 179

has been studied by Lancaster and Patterson (1990) using survey research. Obtaining ‘pork barrel’ spending or new jobs for the area can give elected representatives an extra edge over their challengers at the next election. Here, German constituency representatives, as Lancaster and Patterson found, spend more time on these activities than their list-elected counterparts. British representatives did not follow the German pattern when surveyed in 2000, but did in 2003 – constituency MSPs and AMs spent about twice as much time seeking ‘pork’ as their list-elected counterparts, as the electoral incentives hypothesis anticipates. This change from 2000 to 2003 among British representatives could indicate a learning curve, a response to rational electoral incentives in the MMP system. When asked directly whether constituency service matters for reelection, representatives elected in single-member constituencies in both Britain and Germany are more likely to say ‘yes’. Exploring the motivations of these politicians further, it was revealed that those elected from party lists are more likely to prefer getting party policies enacted than serving constituents. There was a major shift in the British responses to this position when comparing data from 2000 to 2003, with British representatives behaving more like their German counterparts. The reason for this, and other, findings could be attributed to rational electoral incentives, although critics of the rational choice approach might argue that personal values explain the results. It could simply be that those representatives who enjoy constituency service the most put more effort into being elected in single-member constituencies, avoiding the party list altogether or seeing it as a less desirable mode of election (for cultural reasons), while list-elected representatives focus more on partisan matters, which could be simply due to a personal preference for this type of work, rather than the rational response of pleasing the party organisation that ranks the lists. Evidence from this study is unlikely to settle the controversy over what motivates the behaviour of politicians, particularly among those who are the most strongly opposed to the rational choice approach. On the other hand, evidence from the comments of representatives arguably points to an electoral incentive behind the shadowing of constituency representatives by their list counterparts (especially those from major parties) in both Germany and Britain. List representatives use constituency service to improve their visibility and to build up support in constituencies they are planning to contest at the next election. This is most likely why Labour and Liberal Democrat members of the Scottish Parliament, most of whom were elected in constituencies,


tried (successfully) to reduce office allowances for list representatives – they correctly anticipated that shadowing would occur. Furthermore, the Scottish Parliament’s Guidance for MSPs, in the body’s code of conduct (2000), arguably puts an unfair burden on list MSPs, requiring them to contact constituency MSPs when they take up constituents’ cases. This policy is at odds with advice from the parliament that tells voters they may approach any or all of their eight MSPs (Scottish Parliament 2001). While some constituency representatives encounter very little, if any, shadowing, others do. In the process of their self-promotion, some list representatives in Scotland and Wales are stepping on the toes of their constituency-elected counterparts. Many of the latter resent what they consider to be an intrusion into ‘their patch’, reflecting a winner-takes-all attitude towards constituency representation. The fact that most constituency representatives are from the Labour Party, historically dominant in Scotland and Wales and in power in the devolved governments after the 1999 and 2003 elections, only serves to enhance the perceived class distinction between these constituency-elected, government party representatives and the listelected, opposition party representatives. The lack of public awareness of the presence of list-elected regional representatives, and the difficulty these representatives face in covering large electoral regions, have made competition in the form of shadowing by some list representatives quite common, although other list representatives (particularly those from the smaller parties that lack sufficient numbers to carry out shadowing, and are unlikely to pose a threat in constituency contests anyway) are likely to focus more strongly on region-wide policies and deal extensively with interest groups. The Scottish Greens, for example, did not stand in single-member constituency contests. The competition between constituency- and list-elected representatives has the potential to enhance constituency service and possibly bring citizens closer to the governance process. So far, however, there is a distinct lack of public opinion data investigating the link between the people and those who represent them in British PR-elected bodies. More research here is clearly necessary. In the case of MMP, most electoral competition fostered occurs between representatives of different parties, not among members of the same parties. This advantage of MMP would likely please critics of electoral systems that allow intraparty preference voting, like the single transferable vote and open-list proportional representation. Critics of these more ‘open’ electoral systems claim that electoral systems with high levels of intraparty


preference voting often reduce party cohesion and increase parochialism and even corruption, since candidates must seek out personal preference votes (Ames 2001; Carey and Shugart 1995; Katz 1986). Therefore, it is entirely possible that MMP may actually live up to Shugart and Wattenberg’s ‘best of both worlds’ description (2001b), if given a chance. Unfortunately for those representatives elected by list PR, however, opinion among British politicians and media commentators is rather hostile towards what are often still thought of as ‘second-class’ representatives. Britain might do well to follow the example of New Zealand, where the committee that investigated MMP ultimately decided that the country would have to adjust to the electoral system’s implications for constituency representation. Another lesson that New Zealand might offer Britain is to use a more neutral name for the electoral system, rather than one that is quite value laden. Instead of ‘additional member system’ (AMS), which implies that list-elected representatives are somehow incidental by-products of the electoral system, the term MMP, first devised by the Royal Commission which recommended the system for New Zealand, and now the term used internationally by most political scientists, should be adopted in Britain. MMP is not only neutral, but also more accurate, as the electoral outcome is proportional on a partisan basis when list seat allocation is linked to results in single-member constituency races, while other mixed electoral systems do not feature this link and are therefore not PR systems (these are now called ‘parallel’ or ‘mixed-member majoritarian’ systems and are exemplified by systems used in Japan and Russia, among many others). The term ‘top-up members’, often used to describe list representatives, is even more pejorative than ‘AMS’ and should also be avoided; ‘regional member’ should be used instead, as the Arbuthnott Commission recommended (2006: 41). In summary, these results suggest that the electoral system can influence how politicians behave, as rational choice theorists have argued. While representatives elected via party lists may have less of a traditional geographical constituency role, they appear to create a different constituency role by working more closely with interest groups than their constituency-elected counterparts. It is also important to point out that list representatives play an important role in the political system as the preferred representatives of those who voted for them, via their party lists, and not for those who won in their single-member constituencies. For many voters in Scotland and Wales, it is the first time they have actually elected anyone, and now


they can approach someone they voted for when they seek constituency service. For less partisan voters, there is now a choice in where to go for constituency service. Results from the 2000 and 2003 surveys in Britain suggest that representatives ‘learned’ about the importance of constituency service to their re-election, as German representatives seem to have done long ago, with German politicians taking their constituency role seriously (Patzelt 1997; Klingemann and Wessels 2001). As one member of the Scottish Parliament put it, MMP ‘makes me work harder and improves the working of democracy in my constituency. Good for the people, bad for the politicians’. This statement summarises the potential impact of MMP upon the constituency role of elected representatives in Britain – an effect that could improve the relationship between citizens and their representatives, helping to re-engage citizens with conventional politics at a time when disengagement is so high (Power Inquiry 2006).

Coming to terms with pluralism in British politics This book has examined one small, yet important, aspect of British politics – the constituency role of elected representatives. The introduction of PR, with the multimember constituencies that are essential to this type of electoral system, not only facilitates the increase in the number of political parties that are likely to win seats. PR also increases pluralism literally by increasing the number of representatives elected in constituencies to more than one. This shift from a winner-take-all type of constituency representation to a pluralistic model has created shockwaves in Scotland and Wales, places not previously known for having much of that type of pluralism. For many in the Labour Party, there appears to be a sense of entitlement to constituency representation here, particularly in Wales. Unfortunately, yet not surprisingly, Labour politicians have tried to rein in the political pluralism that they themselves have helped to unleash. The ban on dual candidacy for Welsh Assembly elections, passed in 2006, plus the lower level of office allowances for list members of the Scottish Parliament (also supported by the Liberal Democrats, most of whom are elected in constituencies there), implemented at the beginning of that body’s existence, reveal discontent with the new pluralism. Critics argue that Labour wants to have its proverbial cake and eat it – the governing party wants to enact major constitutional changes, but on its own terms.


There are significant problems with Labour’s approach to constitutional reform in Britain. When a government tinkers with one aspect of the constitution, especially that which increases political pluralism, other aspects are also likely to be affected. As critics (such as those in the Constitution Unit at University College London) have pointed out, there appears to be no overall plan to Labour’s constitutional reform agenda. Changes seem to be made on an ad hoc basis, and this approach is likely to intensify as the government tries to put out multiple ‘fires’ ignited by its previous poorly conceived actions. For example, Labour’s attempts to constrain the pluralism at the constituency level noted above are inconsistent with the logic of PR. On dual candidacy, there is absolutely no excuse for being unaware of the consequences that MMP systems have for constituency representation, such as shadowing. Germany has used MMP since the late 1940s (thanks, ironically, to the postwar British influence), and New Zealand – a country with a long Westminster political tradition – implemented MMP in 1996, just a few years before the system was introduced in Scotland and Wales. Banning dual candidacy in Wales after two sets of MMP elections appears, in these circumstances, to be nothing more than a partisan attempt to rig the electoral system to Labour’s advantage. Labour’s attempts to ‘manage’ aspects of its constitutional reform agenda, particularly when conducted in such a self-serving manner, could also have grave consequences for the possibility of getting the disillusioned British public to re-engage with the institutions of government and conventional political process. As Matthew Flinders suggests, the unwillingness of New Labour to embrace genuine movement away from the Westminster model, coupled with its reformist pretensions, ‘actually increased public expectations and then made the contrariety between rhetoric and reality more stark, leading to even greater disillusionment’ (2005: 90). Rather than trying to force a favourable outcome for itself in these constitutional matters, the government should allow the constituency role of PR-elected politicians to evolve as these representatives and their voters interact.

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Index accountability, 4, 12, 42, 53, 55–7, 112, 153, 155, 175 additional members, 32 additional member system (AMS), 2, 7, 36, 38, 147, 181 see also mixed-member proportional Aitken, Bill, 45 Alliance ’90, see Greens (Germany) allowances, see office allowances alternative vote (AV), 8, 27, 37, 56 alternative vote plus, 37 see also Jenkins Commission alternative vote top-up, see alternative vote plus Ames, Barry, 43, 181 Anagnoson, J. Theodore, 61 Arbuthnott Commission, 2, 19, 28, 38, 165, 181 Australia, 8, 10, 37 Baden-Württemberg, 37 Bagehot, Walter, 58 Banducci, Susan, 62, 147 Banks, Tony, 57 Barker, Fiona, 111 Bauer, Martin, 87, 101 Beetham, David, 57 behaviour political, 11–12, 16–17, 20, 66–8, 69, 87, 100, 102, 137, 147, 178–9 voting, 6–7 best losers, 37 Birch, Anthony, 52, 59 Black, Peter, 150 Blair, Tony, 26, 37–8, 51 Blais, André, 2, 39–40 Blake Commission, 36–7 see also Hansard Society block vote, 7–8, 54–5 Bogdanor, Vernon, 4, 26–7, 65 Bowler, Shaun, 12, 16, 19, 36 Bradbury, Jonathan, 43, 86, 130, 147, 159, 176

Brandenburg, see Germany British Broadcasting Corporation, 153, 164 Brown, Alice, 26 Brückmann, Uwe, 168 buddy MP, 112 Butler, David, 35, 37 Burkett, Tony, 13, 16, 64–6 Cain, Bruce, 13, 16–17, 53, 57, 61 Canavan, Dennis, 71 candidate selection, 43, 71, 115 Carey, John, 12, 17, 181 Carstairs, Andrew, 36, 54–5 Chapman, Christine, 109, 144 Chichester, Giles, 115 Christian Democrats (Germany), 64, 67, 71, 77–8, 80–1, 87, 142, 160, 173 Church, Stephen, 68, 112 citizen disengagement, 9, 182 class distinction between representatives, 3–4, 11, 18, 20, 22–3, 38–9, 45, 52, 111, 116, 159–60, 162, 175–6, 177–8, 180–1 Clwyd West, 159, 163–4 coalition, 4–5, 25, 32, 70, 78, 111, 124, 163, 169 Code of Conduct (Scottish Parliament), 11, 47, 145, 151, 180 Colomer, Josep, 6, 56 committees, 15, 17, 35, 74, 87, 101, 113, 132–6, 172 see also Standards Committee (Scottish Parliament) and MMP Review Committee (New Zealand) Commons, House of (UK), 4, 7, 26, 36, 38, 52–4, 58–9, 61 compulsory voting, 10 conflict between representatives, 22, 47, 143–4, 158, 169, 175–6 roles, 51, 59, 74, 103, 115–19, 140

193

194 Index consensus democracy, 5 Conservative Party (UK), 1, 6, 25–8, 30–4, 36, 38, 45, 54–6, 71, 76–7, 79, 115, 144, 150, 156, 162–4 constituency geographical, 1, 12–13, 18, 36–7, 39, 42–6, 48, 56, 62–3, 67–8, 81, 84, 87, 99–100, 102–3, 111–13, 115, 121, 138, 142, 151–2, 167, 170–2, 175, 178, 181 marginal, 13, 62, 161 multimember, 1–3, 5, 7–8, 12, 18, 24, 27, 34, 41, 50–2, 54–7, 70, 147, 155, 165, 176, 182 non-geographical, 20, 62, 74–5, 81, 121, 123, 127, 134, 137, 141, 152, 178 of interest, 13, 48, 112, 139 orientation, 12, 81–6, 95–7, 119–42 role, 17–23, 24–5, 35, 44–5, 50–2, 56, 59–60, 63, 65, 67–8, 69–70, 103, 109, 113, 115–16, 141–2, 143, 150–5, 170–3, 177–83 service, 3–5, 7, 13–22, 36, 46, 48, 50–3, 57, 60–3, 66–8, 69, 73–4, 81, 86–92, 96–7, 99–101, 104–9, 115–19, 124–42, 143–4, 147–52, 155, 168–76, 177–80, 182 single-member, 2–3, 12–13, 19–20, 30, 37–8, 41–3, 51, 53, 55–7, 62–3, 67, 74–5, 105–8, 153, 155–7, 161, 164, 173–6, 180–1 constituency-representative relationship, 3, 5, 36, 63–5, 84, 151, 154, 182 Constitution Unit (University College London), 183 constitutional change, 5–6, 19, 182 Coppedge, Michael, 43 Cowley, Philip, 17, 59, 128, 134 Cox, Gary, 12, 54–5, 58 Craigie, Cathie, 153 Crewe, Ivor, 53, 57 Crisp, Brian, 43 Crossman, R.H.S., 58 culture, role of, 15–16, 18, 36, 39, 70, 165 Curtice, John, 11, 14, 57, 161

Damgaard, Erik, 73 Davidson, Ian, 4 Davies, Ron, 26 delegate role, 59–60 democracy, 5, 18, 27, 51, 59, 111, 149, 164, 182 Democratic Unionist Party (Northern Ireland), 29 Dempsey, Noel, 36, 162 Denver, David, 61, 71 devolution, 1, 4–6, 11, 19, 24, 26–7, 70–1, 159 d’Hondt formula, 30 disproportionality, 5, 29, 32, 34, 36–7, 41, 54, 55 district, see constituency district magnitude, 12, 56 Donald, Rod, 13, 39, 48, 111, 139, 178 Douglas-Hamilton, James, 144 Downs, Anthony, 16 Downs, William, 80 dual candidacy, 3–4, 19, 62, 64, 71, 104, 143–4, 148, 158–65, 175–6, 182–3 Dunleavy, Patrick, 6–7, 19, 42, 59, 61 Duverger’s Law, 6 Dyer, Michael, 37 Ebsworth, Raymond, 64 Electoral Commission (UK), 58, 60–1, 159–60 electoral incentives, 11, 14, 16–17, 21, 23, 50, 57, 61–3, 67–8, 69, 73, 81, 83, 86–91, 95, 97, 99–101, 102, 104, 114, 121–8, 134–7, 141, 146, 178–9 electoral reform, 7, 9–10, 36, 38, 43, 50–1, 55–6, 159 Electoral Reform Society (UK), 10, 35, 162 electoral regions, 2–3, 7–8, 30, 41, 47, 70, 73, 75, 81, 84, 88, 92, 94, 97, 102–4, 115, 147–8, 151, 153, 180 electoral system choice, 6–8, 24–8, 36–9, 54–6, 63–4 electoral systems, see alternative vote, block vote, closed-list proportional representation,

Index 195 first-past-the-post, Germany, mixed-member majoritarian, mixed-member proportional, open-list proportional representation, regional list proportional representation, Scotland, single transferable vote, single-member plurality, supplementary vote, Wales electorate, see constituency Erststimme (First Vote), 41 European Parliament, 1, 4, 6–8, 10, 24, 28–30, 44, 102, 105, 113, 150, 178 Farrell, David, 2, 12, 15–16, 20, 36, 115 Federal Statistical Office (Germany), 78 Fenno, Richard, 13, 60 first-past-the-post, 1, 7, 24, 26, 38, 41, 147, 150, 162, 164–5 see also single-member plurality Flinders, Matthew, 5–6, 19, 183 Franklin, Mark, 10 Free Democrats (Germany), 67, 78, 80, 142, 173 Freedom of Information Act (UK), 6 Gaines, Brian, 14, 61 Gallagher, Michael, 15, 35–6, 57 Gallagher index, 29, 32, 34 Gay, Oonagh, 61–2, 148 geographical constituency, see constituency German People’s Union, 77–8, 80, 142, 173 Germany Bavaria, 42 Bundestag, 22, 36, 40, 42, 64–7, 72, 80–1, 87, 99, 101, 142, 160–1, 175, 178 electoral system, 2, 13, 16–23, 25, 36–43, 48, 51–2, 63–7, 69–72, 77–8, 81, 87, 90–2, 94–101, 107–9, 113, 116–19, 121–3, 126–7, 130–2, 135–40, 142, 143–4, 160–1, 166–7, 170–5, 177, 179, 183

Landtag (Brandenburg and Hesse), 21, 41, 69, 70, 77–8, 80, 83–6, 95–6, 103, 107, 166–8, 172, 174 Gibbons, Brian, 110, 145, 158 Good Friday Agreement, 28 Gotthardt, Frank, 95, 167–8, 174–5 Grant, Claire, 11 Greater London Assembly, 2, 7–8, 24, 28, 34–5, 41, 150 Greens Germany, 67, 71, 78, 80, 121, 142, 173 London, 34 New Zealand, 13, 39, 48, 111–12, 139 Scotland, 27–8, 31–3, 47, 76, 79, 81, 124, 141, 152, 154, 180 UK, 29–30 grievances, 12, 36, 39, 45, 52–3, 58, 65, 105, 113, 124–7, 147, 154 Guidance on the Relationships between MSPs, 47, 151, 154, 180 Gunlicks, Arthur, 70 Hain, Peter, 10, 56, 148, 159, 162, 164–5 Hansard Society, 36–7, 58, 60–1 Hardie, Alison, 34 Hazell, Robert, 11 Healey, John, 61 Hermens, Ferdinand, 63 Hesse, see Germany home style, 60 Hoon, Geoff, 10 Hopkin, Jonathan, 43 Horsburgh, Frances, 47, 154 Human Rights Act (UK), 6 Hunt, Jonathan, 161 Ilonszki, Gabriella, 73 independent candidates, 2, 6, 28, 30–1, 36, 55, 71 Independent Commission on the Voting System, see Jenkins Commission Institute for Public Policy Research, 10 institutional rules, 15–16, 19, 68 Inter Nationes, 41

196 Index interest groups, 13, 18, 20–2, 48, 67–8, 74–5, 81, 102–3, 120–3, 127–41, 152, 170–3, 178, 180–1 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 11, 39 intraparty preference voting, 43, 180 Ireland Northern, see Northern Ireland Assembly Republic of, 28, 35–6, 57, 162 Jackson, Caroline, 115 Japan, 39–41 Jeffery, Charlie, 64, 70, 137, 159 Jenkins Commission, 37–9 Jesse, Eckhard, 41, 63–6 Jewell, Malcolm, 12 Jones, Ann, 163–5 Jones, David, 162 Jones, Peter, 27 journalists, 27, 38, 51, 178 Judge, David, 38, 73 Kaase, Max, 2, 41, 63–4 Karp, Jeffrey, 62, 86, 147 Katz, Richard, 43, 59, 181 Kavanagh, Dennis, 9, 165 Keaney, Emily, 10 Kerr, Andy, 45–6 Kerr, Hugh, 154 Kerr, Peter, 21 Kettell, Steven, 21 Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, 16, 21, 48, 66–7, 182 Kohl, Helmut, 161 Kreuzer, Marcus, 73 Kulishek, Michael, 43 Labour Party (UK), 1, 4–8, 10–11, 19, 23, 24–34, 36–8, 43–6, 51, 56–7, 59, 62, 70–1, 75–81, 89, 104–5, 109–10, 144–7, 149, 152–3, 155–60, 162–6, 176, 179–80, 182–3 Laffin, Martin, 26 Lamont, Johann, 45 Lancaster, Thomas, 16, 22, 66–7, 80, 87, 99, 101, 142, 179 Landtag, see Germany legitimacy, 11, 35, 38, 53, 165

Levine, Stephen, 111 Liberal Democrats (UK), 22–34, 46, 62, 70, 76–7, 79–81, 89, 109, 121, 124, 145, 150–1, 153, 163, 179, 182 Lijphart, Arend, 2, 5, 29, 59, 164 list proportional representation (PR) closed-list, 2, 4, 7–8, 12, 24, 28, 34–5, 43–4, 63, 86, 104, 162 open-list, 4, 12, 42–3, 180 regional list, 2–4, 8, 16–17, 29, 32, 44, 47, 62, 102, 104, 110, 115, 143–5, 147–8, 151, 153–4, 158–65 local elections, 1, 7–8, 28 local promotion, 12, 52, 87–92, 97–8, 101 Lochore, Stephen, 17, 128, 134 Loewenberg, Gerhard, 58–9 London, see Greater London Assembly Lords, House of (UK), 6, 164 Lundberg, Thomas, 4 MacDonnell, Hamish, 105 majoritarian democracy, 5–6, 19, 59, 164, 181 majority electoral systems, see alternative vote and supplementary vote Mangione, Thomas, 72 Margetts, Helen, 42 marginal constituencies, see constituency Massicotte, Louis, 2, 39–40, 64, 70, 160–1 mayoral elections, 7–8 McAllister, Ian, 14, 73 McCabe, Angela, 17, 143, 147 McCormick, James, 17, 143, 147 McMillan, Joyce, 27 media appearances, 74, 82, 84–5, 128–31, 141 coverage, 3, 11, 32, 104, 165, 181 methodology, 72–5 Mexico, 39–40, 160 Michael, Alun, 34, 159 Mill, John Stuart, 55 minority government, 3–5, 32, 111

Index 197 Mitchell, James, 27, 33 mixed-member majoritarian (MMM), 39–41, 70, 181 mixed-member proportional (MMP), 2–3, 7–8, 11, 13, 15–23, 24–5, 27–8, 31, 33–51, 62–4, 67–8, 69–70, 75, 86, 103–4, 107, 111–13, 119, 139, 141–2, 143–4, 147–50, 157–62, 166, 175–6, 177–81 MMP Review Committee (New Zealand), 161, 181 Morgan, Kevin, 25, 71 Morgan, Rhodri, 34 multimember constituency, see constituency multimember plurality, see block vote Mulligan, Mary, 44–5 Mungham, Geoff, 25, 71 National Assembly for Wales, see Wales New Zealand, 3, 11, 13, 18, 20, 25, 38–40, 42, 46, 48, 62, 68, 86, 103, 111–13, 139, 144, 147, 153, 161, 178, 181, 183 non-geographical constituency, see constituency Northern Ireland Assembly, 1–2, 4–8, 11, 24, 28–9, 35 Norris, Pippa, 14–15, 18, 61 Norton, Philip, 3, 13–15, 52–3, 59–60, 73 office allowances, 3, 33, 44, 46–7, 62, 68, 147–8, 152–3, 180, 182 ombudsman, 12, 20, 66 open-list proportional representation (PR), see list proportional representation Palestinian Legislative Council, 160 parallel electoral system, see mixed-member majoritarian Parish, Neil, 115 party cohesion, 35, 43, 162, 176, 181 discipline, 42, 51, 58–60, 116, 176 leadership, 12, 21, 38, 44, 59, 74, 82–5, 141–2, 153, 168, 170

organisation, 8, 15, 28, 35, 42–3, 55, 61–3, 68, 71, 102, 104, 112, 114–15, 124, 137, 162, 167, 179 role, 15, 17, 51, 59–61, 68, 69, 74, 84, 115–18, 132–40 Party of Democratic Socialism (Germany), 67, 72, 78, 80, 142, 173, 182 partisan role, see party Patzelt, Werner, 65–7, 81, 87, 91, 121, 142, 173, 182 personal vote, 13–14, 48, 51, 57, 61–2, 65–6, 68, 74–5, 86, 91–5, 109, 123, 126 personalised proportional representation (PR), 2, 12, 41–3, 63–5 see also mixed-member proportional Pettai, Vello, 73 Patterson, David, 16, 22, 66–7, 80, 87, 99, 101, 142, 179 Patterson, Samuel, 58–9 Plaid Cymru (UK), 25–6, 28, 30–3, 72, 75–7, 79–80, 109, 144, 148, 163 Plant, Raymond, 56 pluralism, 4–6, 18–19, 23, 24, 144, 165, 182–3 plurality/majority systems, 7–8, 40 policy, 14–15, 29, 35, 39, 42, 50, 52, 54, 57, 60–1, 67, 73, 106–13, 115–18, 135, 139–41, 153, 162, 172 political culture, see culture, role of politico role, 60 pork barrel, 66, 75, 86–92, 98–100, 179 Power Inquiry, 9, 182 Prebble, Richard, 112 preferential electoral systems, see alternative vote, single transferable vote, supplementary vote pressure groups, see interest groups proportional representation (PR), see list proportional representation, mixed-member proportional, single transferable vote public spending projects, see pork barrel Pulzer, Peter, 52, 54

198 Index questionnaire construction, 72–5 Rae, Douglas, 25 rational choice, 11–16, 20–3, 48, 50, 56, 68, 154, 177–81 Rawnsley, Andrew, 38 Reform Acts (UK), 4, 8, 53–5 regional lists, see list proportional representation Reichstag (Germany), 63 Reif, Karlheinz, 11 relationship between constituents and representatives, see constituency-representative relationship Reynolds, Andrew, 2, 39–41, 54 Richard Commission, 19, 159, 162, 176 Roberts, Geoffrey, 65, 71 Rogers, Ben, 10 Royal Commission on the Electoral System (New Zealand), 38–9, 181 Rush, Michael, 59 Russell, Meg, 86, 130, 147, 159, 176 Russell, Michael, 44–5 Russia, 39–41 Rustin, Michael, 56 Saalfeld, Thomas, 66 Särlvik, Bo, 65 Sarwar, Mohammed, 163 Saxony-Anhalt, 72, 168 Schmitt, Hermann, 11 Scotland electoral system, 1–7, 17–23, 24–6, 30–3, 38, 41, 43–4, 68, 69, 71, 75–7, 105–6, 143–5, 155–8, 162, 175–6, 177, 180–3 Scottish Parliament, 3, 11, 16, 25–30, 44–8, 70, 150–4, 179–80 Scotland Act 1998, 45 Scotsman, The, 104–5 Scottish Constitutional Convention, 27 Scottish National Party (UK), 11, 25–8, 30–4, 44–6, 71, 75–7, 79–80, 146, 152–3 Scottish Parliament, see Scotland Scottish Socialist Party, 28, 31–3, 47, 76, 79, 152–4

Scully, Roger, 115 Searing, Donald, 3, 14–15, 52–3, 58 ‘second-class’ representatives, see class distinction between representatives second-order elections, 11 selection of candidates, 43, 71, 115 shadowing, 3, 15, 18, 22–3, 46–7, 49, 66–8, 74–5, 104, 111, 121, 141, 143–51, 153, 159, 163, 165–7, 171, 175, 177, 179–80, 183 Sheridan, Tommy, 47, 154 shirking, 12, 18 Shugart, Matthew, 2, 12, 37, 40–2, 181 single-member constituency, see constituency single-member plurality (SMP), 1, 7, 24, 26, 40, 55, 103, 113, 147, 157, 161 see also first-past-the-post single transferable vote (STV), 1, 7, 24, 29, 51, 158, 180 Sinn Fein (UK), 29 Smith, Iain, 151, 153 Smith, Margaret, 47, 111, 144–5 Social Democratic and Labour Party (UK), 29 Social Democrats (Germany), 63–4, 67, 71, 77–8, 80–1, 87, 142, 160, 173 South West England electoral region, 102, 114–15 Standards Committee (Scottish Parliament), 11, 47, 153–4 Steed, Michael, 14, 54–6, 61 Stier, Michael, 168 Stratmann, Thomas, 87, 101 Stuart, Mark, 59 Studlar, Donley, 14, 73 supplementary vote (SV), 7–8 surgeries, 44, 48, 52, 73, 75, 110, 128–31, 138, 145, 178 survey design, see questionnaire construction Suval, Stanley, 63 Tanczos, Nandor, 112 Thailand, 40, 160

Index 199 Thomas, Alys, 26 Thomassen, Jacques, 60 trustee role, 60 twinning, 71 Ukraine, 40, 160 Ullrich, Kay, 45 Ulster Unionist Party (UK), 29 United Kingdom Independence Party, 29 Venezuela, 40, 43 voter choice, 4, 55 voter turnout, 9–11, 18, 160 Wahlke, John, 60 Wales electoral system, 1–7, 17–23, 24–6, 30–3, 38, 41, 43–4, 68, 69, 71, 75–7, 105–6, 143–5, 148, 154–60, 162–5, 175–6, 177, 180–3 National Assembly for Wales, 11, 16, 25–8, 30, 70 Wales Office, 159, 163–4 Wallace, John, see Royal Commission on the Electoral System (New Zealand) Ward, Leigh, 3, 39, 46, 111

Watson, Mike, 11, 45–6, 48, 110–11, 158 Wattenberg, Martin, 2, 40–2, 181 Weir, Stuart, 57 Welsh Assembly, see Wales Wessels, Bernhard, 12, 16, 21, 48, 66–7, 182 Westlake, Martin, 35 Westminster model of democracy, 5, 23, 59, 164, 183 see also majoritarian democracy Wheare, K.C., 3, 53 Whitefield, Karen, 44, 46 Whyte, Nicholas, 29 Williams, Kirsty, 109–10, 150 Wilson, Andrew, 152–3 Wilson, Brian, 104 Wintermeyer, Axel, 167–8 women, representation of, 37, 63 Wood, David, 3, 13–15, 52–3, 59–60, 73, 148 Wood, Leanne, 149 work time, 75, 87–91, 97–101, 103, 132–41, 146 Wring, Dominic, 71 Young, John, 45 Zweitstimme (Second Vote), 42

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