Peace-Building and Development in Guatemala and Northern Ireland

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Peace-Building and Development in Guatemala and Northern Ireland

Also by Charles A. Reilly New Paths to Democratic Development in Latin America (editor) Inquiry at the Grassroots (co-edited with William Glade) Religión y política en méxico (co-edited with Martín de la Rosa) In Partnership with People (with Eugene Meehan and Tom Ramey) Development, Public Policy and Local Politics in Authoritarian Brazil

Peace-Building and Development in Guatemala and Northern Ireland Charles A. Reilly

PEACE-BUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT IN GUATEMALA AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Copyright © Charles A. Reilly, 2009. All rights reserved. First published in 2009 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–61157–3 ISBN-10: 0–230–61157–5 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Reilly, Charles A. Peace-building and development in Guatemala and Northern Ireland / Charles A. Reilly. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–230–61157–5 1. Peace-building—Guatemala. 2. Peace-building—Northern Ireland. 3. Community development—Guatemala. 4. Community development— Northern Ireland. 5. Civil society—Guatemala. 6. Civil society— Northern Ireland. 7. Guatemala—History—Civil War, 1960–1996—Peace. 8. Northern Ireland—Politics and government—1994– I. Title. JZ5584.G9R45 2008 303.6⬘609416—dc22

2008031897

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: January 2009 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

For my wife Marta, and daughters Mari and Leni

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Contents

List of Tables

ix

Acknowledgments

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List of Abbreviations

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Introduction: “Easier Signed Than Done” 1 Peace and Its Delayed Dividends 2 Fatigue, Not Fraternity in Guatemala 3 Development from Below? 4 Elusive Equity and Security in Northern Ireland 5 Getting to Yes in Northern Ireland 6 Conclusion: Synergies for Peace

1 9 17 41 67 91 117

Appendices Appendix 1 Guatemala: Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace (December 29, 1996) Appendix 2 The Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation (May 6, 1996) Appendix 3 The Good Friday Agreement (Belfast Agreement), April 10, 1998 Appendix 4 The Agreement at St Andrews (October 13, 2006)

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Bibliography

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Index

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127 133 161 191


Tables

1.1 1.2 2.1 4.1 5.1 6.1

Guatemala and Northern Ireland: Selected Comparisons Peace Agreements Compared Guatemalan Poverty The Belfast or Good Friday Agreement “If the Majority of People Voted for a United Ireland, I . . .” Policy Arenas and Agents

13 15 24 85 98 119


Acknowledgments

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he author and publisher are grateful for permission to reproduce copyright materials from the sources listed below. Every effort has been made to contact all copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently omitted, the publishers will be pleased to make arrangements at the earliest opportunity. We are grateful ●

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to Robert Bly, Humberto Akabal, and Nineties Press for permission to quote English translations of Humberto’s poems “Distance,” “Freedom,” “The Last Thread,” and “Theft” from the volume Poems I Brought Down From the Mountain, Nineties Press, Minneapolis, MN, copyright 1999; as well as to Elena M. Reilly for permission to print her poem “Postconflict”; and to A.P. Watt Ltd for permission on behalf of Grainne Yeats to quote excerpts from W.B. Yeats’ poems “The Lake Isle of Innisfree” (1 verse), the “Second Coming” (4 verses), and “Easter 1916 (2 verses), from W.B. Yeats Poems selected by Seamus Heaney, London, Faber and Faber, 2000; to Scribner for U.S. English print rights for 1 line from Yeats’ “The Lake Isle of Inisfree,” reprinted with the permission of Scribner, an imprint of Simon and Schuster Adult Publishing Group, from The Complete Works of W.B.Yeats, Volume I: The Poems, Revised, edited by Richard J. Finneran. New York: Scribner, 1997. All rights reserved, and for 4 lines from “The Second Coming,” and 2 lines from “Easter 1916,” reprinted with the permission of Scribner, an imprint of Simon and Schuster Adult Publishing Group, from the Complete Works of W.B. Yeats, Volume I: The Poems Revised, edited by Richard J. Finneran. Copyright © 1924 by the MacMillan Company. Copyright renewed © 1952 by Bertha Georgie Yeats. All rights reserved.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ●

We acknowledge the Nobel Foundation as source of my citations from Seamus Heaney’s Nobel lecture (December 7, 1995); and the anonymous nineteenth century author of the limerick “Theory and Practice.”

I appreciated the constructive comments of an anonymous reviewer of this manuscript. It results from much good fortune and fine friends, including eleven years in Guatemala with Maryknoll and then Peace Corps, a fellowship at Notre Dame University’s Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies in 2003, a Fulbright Senior Specialist fellowship to the University of Ireland in Galway and INCORE in Belfast, Northern Ireland in 2004, followed by a research fellowship at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice at the University of San Diego with inputs from four classes of IPJ masters’ students while I “taught” this book. Among many who have shared their insights, special thanks to John Darby, Alan Smith, Niall O’Dochartaigh, Chris Curtin, Eamon Deane, Martin Melaugh, and Dennis Bradley from Ireland, North and South. Over many years, I have learned much from Guatemalans Carlos Escobar Armas, Ricardo Stein, Frank LaRue, Helen Mack, Rene Poitevin, Otilia Luz de Coti, Jose Miguel Gaitan, Rigoberta Menchu, Hermano Santiago Otero, Gustavo Porras, and Rodolfo Gomez, and especially from Bishop Juan Gerardi and many cohorts of Maryknoll priests, sisters, and brothers. Finally, my thanks to citizens of the world such as professors Angeliki Kanavou, Jim O’Brien, John Paul Lederach, Scott Appleby, Paulo Frieire and the many poets mentioned in this book whose imagination makes this world a better place. The volume is dedicated to my wife Marta and daughters Mari and Leni.

Abbreviations

ANAM AOH ARK ASC ASIES CACIF CAIN CAJ CBI CDC CEH CIEN CNPRE CONAVIGUA CRC CSO DUP ECLA EMP EU FEMICA FLACSO FRG GAM GANA GDP GFA GIS GNP GTZ HTA

National Association of Mayors (G) Ancient Order of Hibernians NI Social and Political Archive Civil Society Assembly (G) Association of Research and Social Studies (G) Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations (G) NI Web Service (Conflict Archive on the Internet) Committee on the Administration of Justice Confederation of British Industry Community Development Center (NI) Historical Clarification Commission (G) Center of National Economic Research (G) Permanent Commission for Educational Reform (G) National Coalition of Guatemalan Widows Community Relations Council (NI) Civil Society Organization Democratic Unionist Party (NI) Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL) Presidential Military Staff (G) European Union Federation of Central American Municipalities Latin-American Faculty of Social Sciences Guatemalan Republican Front Mutual Support Group or GAM (G) Grand National Alliance (G) Gross Domestic Product Good Friday Agreement Geographic Information System Gross National Product German Aid Program Home Town Association

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ABBREVIATIONS

IDB IFIs IMF INFOM INFORPRESS IPJ IRA IULA MINUGUA NGO NI NICVA NIO NILT NISRA OAS PAC PAN El Periodico PNC Prensa Libre PRONADE PSNI Quetzal REMHI RUC SDLP SF UDA UK UNDP UNE UNHCR UNICEF URNG USAID UUP UVF

Inter-American Development Bank (BID) International Financial Institutions International Monetary Fund Institute for Municipal Advancement (G) Central American News Agency Institute for Peace and Justice, School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego Irish Republican Army International Union of Local Authorities Mission of Verification of the United Nations in Guatemala Non-governmental organization Northern Ireland NI Council of Voluntary Agencies NI Office (UK Administration) NI Life and Times Surveys Northern Ireland Statistical Research Organization of American States Guatemalan Civil Defense Patrols National Advance Party (G) Guatemala City Newspaper National Civil Police (G) Guatemala City Newspaper National Program for Education (G) Police Service of Northern Ireland Guatemalan Currency Recovery of Historical Memory Project, “Guatemala Never Again” Royal Ulster Constabulary Social Democratic and Labour Party (NI) Sinn Fein Party (NI) Ulster Defense Association (NI) United Kingdom United Nations Development Program National Union of Hope Party (G) United Nations High Commission for Refugees United Nations Children and Education Fund Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity United States Agency for International Development Ulster Unionist Party (NI) Ulster Volunteer Force (NI)

Introduction

“Easier Signed Than Done”

And I shall have some peace there For peace comes dropping slow (William Butler Yeats, “The Isle of Innisfree”)

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uatemala and Northern Ireland (NI) signed historic peace accords in 1996 and 1998 respectively. This book compares and contrasts lessons learned from their implementation, making some middle-range peace/and development policy recommendations for both countries’ governments and civil society organizations (CSOs). Despite very different economic development levels, both places are divided, find peace implementation difficult, and are heavily influenced by outside actors— including their own diaspora. Guatemala is deeply divided internally along class, race, and ethnic lines, with more than 15% of its population in the United States (and with affinity to Mayan peoples who live across the Mexican border). Ireland too is divided along religious and ethnic lines, with a border that crosses the island since 1921. The North is a province linked politically to the United Kingdom, with ties to its emigrants there, in the Irish Republic, and in the United States. Guatemala, like its Central American neighbor El Salvador, embarked on peace-building with UN oversight, while the Northern Irish felt UK and Irish Republic pressure for making peace. When compared to NI, Guatemalan religious differences are minor, and religious leaders, Catholic, Protestant, and Mayan, played key roles in the peace process as did some in NI. Both places endured centuries of colonial occupation. Both have struggled with post-accord violence that has reached alarming levels in Guatemala. Peace and development go together—hence I emphasize growth with equity issues that are cause and consequence of both conflicts. The UNDP Human Development Report for 2006 placed Guatemala in the 118th place. Great Britain ranked #18, the Irish Republic ranked #4,

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PEACE-BUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT

and NI (which is subsumed within Great Britain) would fit just above #18. NI, industrial, wealthy, and educated, contrasts with Guatemala’s majority indigenous, poor rural population. The extraordinary concentration of wealth and conspicuous consumption evident in zones of the Guatemalan capital makes it hard to believe it would rank so low. There are other indicators. Per capita ownership of helicopters is the highest in the world. News reports of starvation in drought-affected communities of eastern Guatemala during recent years and the exodus of migrants northward should have caused greater awareness. The concentration of wealth in this country is matched only by Brazil in the Americas. Migration provides an escape valve from poverty in Guatemala and remittances generate foreign exchange that has exceeded all foreign aid and direct private investment for the past several years ($3.6 billion in 2006). But remittances do not equal development. This book examines a decade of halting implementation of these two peace agreements through June 2007. “Power-sharing,” centerpiece of the Belfast Agreement, has eluded the Northern Irish until now, just as “integral, equitable development” evades Guatemalans. The book digs beneath the elite pacts that produced these peace agreements to observe the dynamics of putting them into practice at the mid-level and grassroots. It examines the ways civil society or voluntary organizations have furthered or delayed the process. I will argue that peace-building and development are inseparable. Whether in very poor or relatively wealthy postconflict settings, initiatives that reduce insecurity and inequity are fundamental to building a better future. I emphasize markets, government, and civil society rather than any one leg on the development and governance tripod. I look at CSOs and democratization in this and previous work, with focus on their functions. Religions, education, local government, policing and business organizations are key institutional arenas for rendering society more or less civil. They connect state, market, and citizenry. Their positive or negative influence in the streets, neighborhoods, borders, and everyday life of both places determine citizen support for their peace process. In Guatemala, the national Civil Society Assembly played a powerful role preventing a civilian president from taking dictatorial power much as a string of military presidents had done before him, but the Assembly was much criticized for not leading the peace process. Similarly, Jonathan Tonge argues that there has been little civil society role in shaping the political process in NI. He finds “that a depoliticization of society has occurred, as the stress on identity and culture have been at the expense of the old contesting politics of national

INTRODUCTION

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sovereignty, self-determination and independence” (Tonge, 2005, 7). Third party–led, elite, rather than “public peace processes” characterized both places (Saunders, 2001). Rather than reify civil society, or presume to transform it into a political actor, I prefer to deconstruct it into diverse levels and actors. Hence, for example, I highlight the helping or hindering role of religion in making these postconflict societies more civil, as well as the equity issues and violence that have complicated their path to peace. My comparison of peacebuilding in a relatively wealthy and an extremely poor, divided Christian society yields lessons useful elsewhere—perhaps even for the “intractable conflicts” of the Middle East and elsewhere. While academically grounded, I write to reach popular and professional readers who might become constituents for better-informed public opinion and policy. I write as well to persuade my own government and international actors to invest more in peace than war. The former UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali distinguished peace-making, peace-keeping, and peace-building (BoutrosGhali, 1992). These two peace agreements struggled to ensure the first two, with peace-building couched in exhortations. Has negotiated peacemaking gone out of style? Cycles of violence continue to multiply and perpetuate themselves throughout the world. During the 1990s, there was optimism that many conflicts could be successfully negotiated (Darby, 2006). Such assurance diminished as many peace agreements broke down from internal causes, from grievance and creed and arms trade greed that lay hidden from view. Besides feuding adversaries, other factors changed the trend. Perhaps a small part of the fault lies with researchers. In academic and professional literature, there has been much work on the run-up to peace agreements with too little study of their implementation, the disruptions of postconflict violence, and the complications of poverty. With some exceptions, research focused primarily on political elites and their pacts, but elite pacts, like icebergs, cover lots more beneath the surface. Ideologues too are at fault, especially those of my own government. Declaration of “war against terrorism” (despite failures of its many martial predecessors—“war against poverty,” “war against drugs,” “war against crime,” etc.) and manipulation through fear since the attacks of September 11, 2001 have yielded a changed global security context characterized by heavy-handed, rigidified approaches. Diplomacy slipped far down the list of peace-making tools. Now first response to conflict precludes dialogue, multiplies preconditions, and opts for military responses over negotiated settlements. Adversaries may not be addressed. Preventive war is in, prevention for peace, including effective economic and social development, is not.

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But Why Compare These Two? NI and Guatemala, different but parallel settings, are striking examples of the complexity and stop-and-go process of implementing peace. Each teaches compelling lessons, both positive and negative, on how to build or not build peace, work with third parties, include adversaries, sustain dialogue, meld leaders and followers, reduce inequities, share wealth, and multiply opportunities. Both cases offer contrasting public and private responses to policing and postconflict violence. Both show that “getting to yes” required negotiation by adversaries, while successful implementation (or “sticking with yes”) requires persistence, moral imagination, human security, job creation, and fairness. Economics matters, and third party involvement usually does as well (Walter, 2002). The similarities are many: ●

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both places have colonial origins, their conflicts trace back for centuries; both ended the twentieth century with more than three decades of violent conflict; both societies are deeply divided, with profound inequities, real and perceived; both societies had to create jobs for ex-combatants or hardcore unemployed; insecurity is widespread (and security forces make things worse, often themselves becoming the problem); both countries created new civilian police forces after agreements; mutual distrust is fortified by powerful narratives, symbols, identity markers; both countries compete in a global marketplace, constrained by structural adjustment or requirements to seek market niches and enhanced productivity; both have a hegemon (Great Britain and the United States); and belong to associations of nations (United Kingdom, European Union, United States, and Central America); both seek to expand economies by marketing their picturesque tourist sites—if only they were less violent.

The Guatemalan and NI differences are significant, including: ●

size: Guatemala’s 15 million population is nearly 10 times that of NI (the NI population almost equals the Guatemalans in the United States);

INTRODUCTION ●

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a huge gap in UNDP’s human development indices—the countries rank numbers 118 and 18 respectively; Guatemalan poverty requires basic humanitarian aid and spans a continuum from relief to sustained development; there is a dramatically different physical and human capital base for grappling with peace, poverty, and power issues; internal differentiation (Mayan/mestizo, class) is more stark in Guatemala than in NI; Guatemala’s absolute and relative poverty levels are utterly unlike NI’s relative deprivation or “imparity of esteem”; border and sovereignty issues are no longer salient in Guatemala; and the NI industrial capacity far outweighs Guatemala, where 60% are still subsistence rural agricultural producers and most urban poor work in the informal sector.

A Social Inquiry Several years ago, I participated in an event convened by the Soros Foundation of Guatemala that assembled activists and analysts from many postconflict settings, including South Africa, Kosovo, NI, El Salvador, and Guatemala, to brainstorm together on lessons learned during peace processes. I was impressed by the practicality and ripple effect of lessons shared and caveats expressed by the participants. Every case was unique. Every case had lessons to share. That event led me to begin a paired comparison of the two peace processes I knew best, and to conduct a series of courses, interviews, and workshops on development, civil society, and peace-building in Guatemala, Ireland, and the United States, incorporating their insights. It evolved into a normative social inquiry seeking knowledge of more effective (and feasible) ways to reduce conflict, build peace, and improve life conditions, equality, and security, especially for poorer populations in Guatemala and NI. An inductive approach, it drew on my past experience and study of local level political, economic, and cultural development. The inquiry sought to be critical or evaluative, contrasting what is, with what could be, and offered grounded suggestions for improvement (Meehan, 1994). In this book, I analyze and share lessons learned from this inquiry into the first decade of peace implementation in these two illustrative cases. I sought to identify synergies for peace, especially at the mid-level of these societies that might prove to be alternatives to more prevalent, repetitive conflict cycles. I started with the assumption that integral development and peace-building will require combined state, market, and civil society activities embedded in changing global and local cultures. Through extended

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residence and multiple visits (as researcher, NGO practitioner, electoral observer, foundation representative, etc.) dating from 1959 in NI and 1965 in Guatemala (before and since the onset of “the troubles” and “civil war”), I had long-term perspective. It was enriched by participant observation and interviews with elites and leaders at many levels of both societies, including principle actors and negotiators of the agreements such as Gerry Adams and Paul Arthur of NI, former Irish prime minister Garrett Fitzgerald of NI and Gustavo Porras, Ricardo Stein, and Rigoberta Menchu in Guatemala. NI and Guatemala are striking examples of the complexity of crafting, then implementing peace in different, but surprisingly similar settings. The appendices include copies of both final agreements with key accompanying texts (the Guatemalan Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation, May 6, 1996 [appendix 2], and the Agreement at St. Andrews, October 13, 2006 regarding the restoration of the NI Assembly [appendix 4]). Adversaries and third party elites labored hard and well to craft the two peace agreements included in the appendices. Implementation fell to political leaders and their followers, reminding us that peace agreements, like politics and democracy, must affect intermediate and grassroots levels. Building peace, like politics and democracy, is ultimately local. If NI took decades to reach an agreement and now the restoration of power-sharing, the task of building trust and “parity of esteem” across its divided communities is still pending. Its leading political parties, the Democratic Union Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein (SF) edged away from extreme hard-line toward more centrist postures. If Guatemala had a relatively easy negotiation for peace after a stalled civil conflict and rapid decommissioning of weapons by the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) rebels, its implementation has been hamstrung by extreme postconflict violence, dramatic inequity in the distribution of economic growth and peace dividends, and inept policing of powerful drug cartels. Its political parties are personalist and short-lived. Few survive one or two electoral cycles. Both cases offer contrasting public and private responses to postconflict violence. Both show that the key to “getting to yes” was dialogue and negotiation and key to implementation is patience, ensuring some certainty and human security, and a measure of fairness. Both had to grapple far more with grievance and greed than with creed. But reconciliation is still pending.

Chapter Overviews The first chapter explores the ties between peace-building and integral human development in postconflict settings. Guatemala and NI illustrate

INTRODUCTION

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well how, in very poor as in relatively rich countries, peace and development issues converge. Whether framed as development or peace-building, the perennial political questions of “who gets what, when, and how?” confront the architects and artisans of both peace processes. The two countries have similarities in their divisions and dramatic differences in their wealth. The peace agreements are similar—at least in part because of the strong influence of external actors. Halting economic growth and distribution issues plague both, as did disappointments with anticipated peace dividends. Ongoing violence after the agreement has been far greater in Guatemala, though it was violence and the threat of same that prolonged the suspension of the power-sharing government that was centerpiece of the NI accords. Ian Paisley, after decades of refusal to even talk to Gerry Adams of SF, surprised everyone by agreeing to reinstate the Stormont government in 2007. What else has happened since the accords? Let’s take a closer look at the background and actual implementation in both countries. Chapter 2 reviews recent Guatemalan history, its stalemated civil war, prolonged negotiations, and inflated peace agreement under a global development model that excludes the vast majority of the population. Divided for centuries along various fault lines: ethnic (Maya/Ladino); rural/urban; wealthy/poor, and religious (Catholic, Evangelical, Maya), the thirtysix-year civil conflict was fueled by cold war ideological division. If, the guerrilla leadership made a relatively smooth transition to political competition, the military continued to resist a subordinated role in society. Economic elites consistently resisted measures to strengthen government. Chapter 3 examines the role of mid-level actors and organizations of Guatemalan civil society in the peace process, poverty alleviation and sustainable development efforts. Violence continued, in some places even intensified, and policing has been ineffective since peace agreements were signed. Religious pluralism is relatively new to Guatemala, but I found considerable civility between the Catholic majority, the fast growing Protestant Evangelicals and a deeply rooted, newly visible Mayan religious and secular leadership. Education is key to Guatemala’s future development, and state and market actors too must begin to invest in human and social capital. Immigration and dependency on remittances cannot solve poverty, neither can a weak state, fragile local government, and inept police install rule of law. The emergence of an articulate indigenous leadership throughout the country is encouraging. Chapter 4 looks at NI, “the troubles” and the pressures that led to ceasefire and a political agreement welcomed by most, but not all Northern Irish. I examine the early stages of the peace process, noting economic challenges and civil society efforts—complicated by hard-line political leadership, centralized institutions, inequitable policing, and imported

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consociational schemes for power-sharing. Violence by paramilitary “spoilers,” realities and perceptions of inequity and insecurity placed huge obstacles before peace-builders. Refusal of adversaries to talk to one another had set back the peace process for most of the decade. Chapter 5 traces the implementation of the NI agreement through mid-2007, focused on the work of voluntary or civil society organizations and religious and business associations. Peace-building has moved forward at many levels of civil society despite prolonged stalemate at the top. Integrated, community-based policing is working. An improving economy has increased opportunity and reduced conflict. Face-to-face, cross-community relationships and friendships continue to spring from religious efforts, although segregated housing patterns persist and integrated education remains an unrealized ideal for 95% of Northern Irish children who study in separate schools. Resumption of power-sharing now challenges politicians to learn the nitty-gritty of government and how to partner with citizens in governance. Resolution of the question of “sovereignty,” that prize province of politicians, will be deferred to citizens and their evolving demographics. District government will be the proving ground of power-sharing. My final chapter summarizes lessons learned and makes public and private policy suggestions for sustainable peace-building and development. Among them: outsiders can’t make a peace process work; willingness to coexist is a good starting place for peace-building; attitudinal change trumps institutional experiments; churches can orient but can’t control citizen attitudes; citizen security and effective community policing are key; and moral imagination can help steer political and economic actors in more socially useful directions. Positive leaders from civil society, religions, and business have helped bridge the divides in both settings—and hope persists since even “negative” leaders can and have reversed course—witness Ian Paisley. Unlike peace agreements, the longterm sustainability of peace implementation resides mostly at the middle and grassroots of any society. I offer examples and suggestions for managing conflict in these and other contexts, wealthy or poor, through combined “public/private” peace and equity policies. Lessons can be learned from other settings, but creativity and moral imagination must be homegrown (Lederach, 2005). Peace-building, like development and politics, is ultimately local. Fortunately, today, like in the past, both these countries have more than their share of poets, whether Nobel winners or popular favorites who energize politics and north-star aspirations for a better future. I will include a sampling of reflections by some of these Northern Irish and Guatemalan political bards, protagonists of moral imagination.

1

Peace and Its Delayed Dividends

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere The ceremony of innocence is drowned. The best lack all conviction, while the worst Are full of passionate intensity. (William Butler Yeats, “The Second Coming”)

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uatemala and Northern Ireland (NI) signed peace agreements about the same time over a decade ago. Transition to democracy from military domination has framed Guatemalan political discourse while emergence from colonial occupation and consociational solutions for divided societies preoccupied Northern Irish analysts. My focus will underline development challenges to peace-building, given the root causes and postconflict violence of the Guatemalan “civil conflict” and Northern Irish “troubles.” Development, “the new name for peace,” includes economic, political, social, and cultural dimensions. Especially in Guatemala, but to a degree in NI as well, centuries of discrimination, scars from conflict, then uneven economic growth during the ten years since peace accords were signed have resulted in societies still marked by poverty, exclusion, distrust, and stubborn resistance to change. Hence, the need for economic growth and social reconstruction to reweave social fabrics (a metaphor well suited to countries with marvelous weavers). Development means institutional as well as attitudinal change, and both take time. It requires economic growth as well as distribution, and the latter breeds resistance and conflict. Structural adjustment schemes have failed the majority. Inequity and religion fueled conflict in NI, despite relative

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affluence, while ideology and discrimination compounded Guatemalan poverty. Political development after conflict requires gutsy leadership and institutions capable of channeling demands, grievances, and social conflict through negotiation, give and take, compromise, and collaboration—habits and skills that don’t come easy to Guatemalan or Irish politicians, certainly not to those who prefer confrontation or cling to violence to get their way. Following Jean Paul Lederach’s emphasis on “middle range political actors” who link political and economic elites with the people, I will analyze several arenas and institutions where intermediate level actors from civil society organizations (CSOs) have accelerated post-accord implementation, social healing, and progress (Lederach (1997, 81)). The first such policy arena is that of education and human capital formation where the Irish can teach the Guatemalans a great deal. The second is municipal government, a level where initiatives to improve accountability and responsiveness of local government leaders has begun to mesh with citizen demands for access and participation, an arena where both Irish and Guatemalans can improve. Policing in both settings has caused, and hopefully, can become an effective tool to help manage, conflict. Religious tolerance and pluralism have grown in the Central American country and organizations of civil society have created a groundswell for long-term educational and municipal reform. Catholics are learning that their declining market share has not brought the world to an apocalyptic end despite evangelical growth. The Northern Irish religious/ethnic mix is still far from reconciled at the local level, but cross-community organizations are many and dialogue builds bridges. Migration and diaspora, less significant in the Irish case, loom large in Guatemala where remittances of migrant workers redistribute income across a couple of borders. Their remittances now exceed the sum of direct private investment, plus loans and grants of all foreign aid programs and have become the key income stream for the poor, helping support 25% of the population. Migrants do indeed build peace. The Guatemalan peace process was shepherded by the United Nations (UN), while the British and Irish governments played key roles on the island, with crucial support occasionally from outsiders such as Senator George Mitchell and President Bill Clinton. The European Community figured prominently in Irish Republic infrastructural development, and with a number of other donor countries, contributed to Guatemalan finance. Donors and the Guatemalan government funded physical infrastructure more than human capital, while the Irish on the other hand had invested in universal free education and human resource development before and during the crisis. The two countries sit on opposite shores of the Atlantic, suspended from different sides of economic scales. Guatemala’s income distribution

PEACE AND ITS DELAYED DIVIDENDS

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is among the worst in Latin America (the region with the least equitable distribution in the world). Commitment to investment for social and economic development was central to the Guatemalan peace accords. Two billion dollars were requested from the international community, while the government made an as yet unfulfilled commitment to increase taxation to 12% of GDP for social spending purposes. For many of the poorest, migration is the sole economic option and their remittances amount to a vital “structural adjustment” program of, by, and for the poor (and a safety valve for the government). Guatemala’s legacy of violence, surfeit of weapons, inept security forces, and most of all its geographical location, have resulted in a burgeoning drug transshipment trade from South American suppliers to North American markets. Powerful and wealthy gangs have multiplied since the accords, easily buying off police, military, and allegedly, politicians. Development, of course, requires physical security and human security, including some reduction in inequity. Despite NI’s relative wealth, equity issues (“parity of esteem” is the Belfast Agreement catchword) and physical security complicate its peace process too. Hopes were high for not just an end to violence but for a handsome “peace dividend” as well. Paramilitary groups, both republican and loyalist, shifted their political activities to lucrative smuggling operations challenging law enforcement and justice. Newly created police forces in both places had to prove themselves to skeptical publics in both settings—the NI Police Service rather successfully, Guatemala’s National Civil Police, not. While NI has begun to piggyback on the economic success of the Celtic Tiger across its border, hardcore unemployed still strain the welfare system, feed resentment, and prompt many people to blame past adversaries rather than engage collaborators for the future. Northern Irish Protestants focused on security, insisting on decommissioning of IRA paramilitary weapons, while Catholics focused more on equal justice and opportunity. But in fact, both communities grapple with security and social justice issues—developmental to the core—that will chafe as long as growth is slow, its benefits skewed, and “parity of esteem” an illusion. Absolute or relative poverty and abuse of power permeate memories of and rationales for violence in both countries (Ho Won Jeong, 2005).

Peace Agreements Compared The Guatemalan peace accords and Belfast or Good Friday agreement approached development with different priorities and procedures. The Guatemalan accords came together during months of final negotiations

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that dealt successively with an omnibus but vague agreement on “socioeconomic and agrarian issues,” human and indigenous rights, resettlement of international and internal refugees, and clarification of the roles of the military and civil authority. The broad economic and social development wish list (see appendix 2) preceded agreement on more concrete political development sequels of a definitive cease-fire, constitutional reforms, legal incorporation of the rebel forces as a political party, and scheduling and verification procedures. The Belfast or Good Friday Agreement, building on previous pacts, was a package deal that began with “majority choice” for union with Great Britain or with Ireland. It created new political structures—a legislative Assembly for powersharing, a North/South Ministerial Council and a British/Irish Council. It then dealt with human rights, civil and religious liberties, equality of opportunity, and social economic and cultural issues, concluding with decommissioning and security. The agreement contained some economic development language, exhortations to equity and the goal of “parity of esteem.” It framed a complex consociational scheme for power-sharing that grappled with ensuring minority rights. Like Guatemala, the Belfast Agreement’s mechanics honed in on the narrow political arena, leaving open questions of how human security, equitable development, social justice, religious and human rights would fare in their implementation. What has happened since? Let’s take a closer look at the background and actual implementation in both countries. Guatemala and NI are half a world apart and sometimes surprisingly similar. I will neither explore the history of Ireland, the British attempts over eight centuries to control the island, nor detail the Easter Uprising of 1916 or the partition of Ireland that took place in 1921 here. NI’s Unionist majority, most of them Protestant, want to stay within the United Kingdom and many of its Catholics want to belong to the Republic of Ireland, considering British troops there as an “occupation force.” Neither will I elaborate on Guatemala’s colonial history under Spain, its nineteenth-century struggles for independence along with other Central American republics that have been followed by de facto dependence on the United States during much of the twentieth century. Both histories and their narratives continue to impact contemporary conflicts and peace-building. But for now, let’s compare some contemporary information on both countries. NI, despite a much higher level of economic development, is, like Guatemala, burdened by inequity, employment deficits, a host of political, social, and cultural problems—development issues of another sort. In 1995, John Darby summarized the “Northern Irish problem” as a “tangle of inter-related problems,” including: a constitutional problem (integration with Great Britain? A united Ireland? Independence?); inequalities,


13

Table 1.1 Guatemala and Northern Ireland: Selected Comparisons

UNDP Human Development Index GDP per capita Life Expectancy Population Languages Religion: Protestant Catholic Migration Conflict began: Killed Disappeared Peace Accords Police Force

Guatemala

Northern Ireland

118 $3281 65.3 years 11.6 million 24

18* $21,000 75M / 80F 1.68 million 2

30–35% 55% 1.5 million 1960 200,000 50,000 1996 20,000

52% 42% 1,875 (2002) 1968 3,600 — 1998 8,765

Note: * NI is subsumed under Great Britain. Sources: UNDP, MINUGUA, NISRA 2000, Prensa Libre.

especially in employment, cultural identity, security; religious difference; “and a problem of day to day relationships between the people who live in Northern Ireland” (Darby, 1995). With the exception of the first, the same problems are found in Guatemala. Among the bright spots, Darby noted less discrimination in housing, some integrated schooling (though only 5% are in integrated schools currently), cultural diversity introduced in all school curricula, and nearly half of twenty-six local government councils had introduced power-sharing or community relations initiatives. Guatemala shares at least one of the bright spots (improved local governance), religious differences are less problematic (to be treated later), and the legal framework of the peace accords was incorporated into the Guatemalan Constitution in 2006. Violence plagues both sides, but the scale of violence in Guatemala far exceeds that of NI. NI’s rate of economic growth declined from 5.5% in the late 1990s to 2.2% in 2003, recovering by 2005 to 3.2% (“Economic Briefing,” NI Executive, January 25, 2006, retrieved June 17, 2006). Jobs had disappeared, private sector investment declined and the public sector dominated economic activity. The elections of November 2003 seemed to undermine prospects for power-sharing (Irish Times, November 29, 2003). The hardline Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) led by Ian Paisley gained a victory on the Protestant, loyalist side over the more moderate Ulster Unionist Party led by David Trimble, while republican Sinn Fein (SF) triumphed over the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) among Catholic

14


republicans. The two defeated parties had led the way to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement to build peace through power-sharing, a formula which broke down in 2002, leaving the British government to run the province. Paisley insisted he would never negotiate with Gerry Adams of SF, since full decommissioning of weapons by the IRA was still pending and his DUP party had refused to endorse the original Belfast Agreement. Gerry Adams had argued for peaceful talks and collaboration beginning in 1982, but in May 2007 Ian Paisley surprised everyone, especially his most hard-line supporters, by agreeing to reinitiate power-sharing and restore the Stormont government with SF’s Martin McGuinness as his deputy prime minister. Their unexpected duet has begun well. As Gerry Adams told us recently “the peace process is a journey, not a destination, it took many twists and turns, then the breakthrough in May 2007 when we got to Ian Paisley. I do think he has come to this point with a good heart” (University of San Diego, July 10, 2007). Despite unfavorable economic performance, the initial stages of the Guatemalan peace process were relatively uncomplicated: guerrilla weapons were decommissioned; their leaders created a political party; UN monitors (MINUGUA) were positioned throughout the country; and the military reluctantly returned to their barracks. Although the peace agreement terms were ambitious, peace was generally welcomed. Politicians however, did not lead down the road to peace. Congress needlessly cluttered a proposed referendum and legislative reforms for its implementation with complex and contradictory propositions, leading a confused population to abstain from voting. Peace was welcomed, its political camouflage was not. The outgoing Arzu administration that had signed the agreement was soon succeeded in 1998 by the FRG (Guatemalan Republican Front) party headed by the notorious General Efrain Rios Montt and its presidential candidate Alfonso Portillo, the former closely linked to the military, the latter linked to corruption and opportunism. During four years marked by controversy and corruption scandals, hopes grew for a new and more effective administration. The 2003 electoral victory of Oscar Berger, a respected businessman, appeared to set the scene for accelerated implementation of the peace agreements, but the 2007 elections were contested over the same issues of security and development. The Irish peace accord (“Belfast” or “Good Friday” Agreement) appears tidier than the rambling Guatemalan equivalent. The former focused on complex constitutional questions, new governmental structures, and power-sharing, while Guatemala’s introduced a broad range of development and democratization issues, scratched scars of race discrimination, but did not specify benchmarks for improvement in government structure or performance. Both Northern Irish sides had made considerable


15

concessions—especially by conceding that the population would itself decide on union with Great Britain or with Ireland. The Irish process began tenuously, with dissident groups such as the “Continuity IRA” and the “Real IRA” in the shadowy background, complicating the SF party’s role in negotiations, while in Guatemala peace began and still grapples with violence at many levels—narcotrafficking, organized crime, common crime, and a very weak police and justice system. The Irish process had been hobbled on the surface over the calendar and quantity of weapons decommissioned by the Irish Republican Army (IRA), but the division runs much deeper, and Protestant paramilitary groups had committed more murders in recent years than the IRA. Guatemalan guerrillas turned over most of their weapons long since, yet the country continues to be awash in weapons and violence by political, criminal, and shadowy “parallel powers.” The negotiations leading to the Belfast (or Good Friday) Agreement were concluded with endorsement by most political parties, except Paisley’s DUP, and 71% of the population. The Belfast Agreement required significant constitutional and potential territorial changes—recalling the often-quoted prophecy “Ireland, Britain’s first colony, will be its last.” Popular referenda endorsed the agreement on both sides of the Irish border. The main point of the agreement was to recognize the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of NI with

Table 1.2

Peace Agreements Compared

Guatemalan Peace Accords

Belfast or Good Friday Agreement

Human rights

Majority choice for union with Great Britain or with Ireland Democratically elected assembly in Northern Ireland North/South Ireland Ministerial Council British/Irish Council Human rights, civil and religious liberties Rights, safeguards, and equality of opportunity—social, economic, and cultural issues Decommissioning of arms Security, policing, and justice — —

Resettlement Historical Clarification Rights of indigenous peoples Socioeconomic and agrarian issues Civil authority/role of military

Definitive cease-fire Constitutional and electoral reform Legal incorporation of the URNG Scheduling and verification of accords for a firm and lasting peace

Sources: For Guatemalan Peace Accords see appendices 1 and 2. For Belfast or Good Friday Agreement and follow-up see appendices 3 and 4.

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regard to its status, whether union with Great Britain, a sovereign united Ireland, or some other compromise arrangement. The agreement listed areas of shared commitment of the parties and institutions to see to their implementation: ● ●

●

● ●

human rights, including civil rights and religious liberties; other rights, safeguards, and equality of opportunity (economic, social, and cultural issues); decommissioning—the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations within two years under supervision of an International Commission; security, the normalization of security arrangements and practices; policing and justice, with a new police service to be set up, capable of attracting support from the entire community, with a fair, impartial, and effective justice system.

The NI agenda was significant, its political and administrative structures well considered, but many of the root causes of conflict were by-passed in the push for agreement. Senator George Mitchell, who mediated the negotiations, reflected exceptional skill and empathy (Mitchell, 1999). The Guatemalan agreement, on the other hand, was a sweeping catalogue of future development needs and political desiderata given that the violent conflict itself had already passed into history. Both societies were deeply, but differently divided. Security and equity were shared themes in both agreements. Displacing paramilitary groups and creating an effective new civilian police force was central to both. The agreements were signed, celebrated, and sealed, their delivery was pending. To begin our examination of the implementation of these accords, let’s go across the sea to Guatemala.

2

Fatigue, Not Fraternity in Guatemala

In this small country Everything is far away: food, education, clothes. (Humberto Ak’abal, “Distance”)

G

uatemala, one of the world’s loveliest countries, is replete with biodiversity, a multicultural mosaic, ribbed by volcanoes, washed by two oceans, and threatened by natural disasters. It is also plagued by history, trapped in vicious circles of inequity and racism that threaten to permanently exclude most of its people from some decent measure of democracy and development. Guatemala is deeply divided, its fault-lines stemming from ethnic, class, and power asymmetries. Income distribution ranks among the hemisphere’s worst. Educational opportunity is limited for the vast majority. The economy and social structure reflect the worst of the past and little of the hoped-for future. Guatemalan society, especially its elites, has proven extraordinarily resistant to change. Nearly four decades of war followed by one decade of peace have left many of its citizens disappointed—so frustrated with their failed political and economic elites that they may overlook how rapidly much of the world is leaving them behind. I’ll examine the conflict, the peace accords, and their implementation, honing in on some encouraging arenas at regional and local levels. Then I’ll offer some mid-range propositions and policy suggestions for Guatemalans, who in November 2007 elected a new president, and for international actors who would respond to the middle and longer-term challenges of peace-building. Eleven years after its accords were signed, Guatemala demonstrates that cease-fires and signed agreements are just a preface, and are often the

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easier part of building peace. In most recent Latin American peace processes, negotiations ending guerrilla wars were carried out in a context of political, economic, and social transition: ●

●

●

from authoritarian or military regimes toward civilian control and democratization; from closed markets and primary production to opening economies and fierce competition in regional and global markets; and an exodus from rural village life to urban centers and migrating across borders.

The root causes of these conflicts are found in dramatic poverty, gross inequality, ethnic discrimination, and a prolonged failure of dominant local elites and international development models to effectively improve life conditions of the majority of local populations. State, market, and civil society mark the parameters of the discussion. The Guatemalan state has been weak, its economy fragile, and “civil society” hardly civil, beset by a growing culture of violence. Nearly four decades of sporadic civil war, “internal conflict” is the phrase usually used by Guatemalans, left the military strong, consistently well-financed, often overriding the executive branch of government. One tragic legacy of its counterinsurgency was the decimation of rural leadership and organization. Congress has proven inept and the judicial system ineffective. Private sector economic elites, accustomed to getting their way in most economic policy decisions, adopted the rhetoric of economic liberalization and readily accused government officials of corruption. Legacies of racial discrimination, enmity from the “internal conflict,” fragmentation, and atomization meant that organized civil society, represented by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), church leaders, Mayan organizations, and sometimes by a national civil society assembly, has been unable to coalesce consistently so as to effectively influence government or market actors. As a result, in the eleven years since the peace accords were signed, few have collected any “peace dividend” or enjoyed tranquility. Inequitable development, leftist ideology, exclusionary society, military domination, and oligarchic economic interests were underlying causes of the conflict, and they pose huge obstacles for proponents of peace. Peace-building in this context raises issues of democracy and development—including the prospects for commitment to human and social capital formation as well as a more enlightened approach to economic growth and social spending. What of the economic development models for the country? First came centuries of agro-export from a plantation economy that shipped sugar, coffee, cotton, bananas, and then cattle overseas. Next was a weak effort

FATIGUE, NOT FRATERNITY IN GUATEMALA

19

at import substitution through protected, often monopolistic industries, followed by a market-driven “free trade” credo combined with austerity and state-shrinking. This recipe (Joseph Stiglitz, a former World Bank economist calls it “economic fundamentalism”) prevailed as the peace accords were signed, resulting in “dysfunctional development” in the words of Susanne Jonas. This structural adjustment model has been unable to ensure growth, reduce poverty, or reverse uneven patterns of income distribution. Worsening terms of trade, a regional economic downturn, global competition, dead-ended primary commodity exports, a stagnant economy have meant fewer jobs. The IMF estimates Guatemala’s rate of growth will be 4.8% in 2007 and 4.3% in 2008, CEPAL predicts 5% and 4.3% respectively, while the Guatemalan central bank projects a more optimistic 5.6% and 5.5% for each year. Inflation has averaged 7% in recent years, reaching a high of 9.23% in 2004. According to the UNDP, which in its 2006 human development index ranked Guatemala 118th among the countries of the world, the share of income accruing to the richest 20% was 59.5%, while the poorest 20% received 2.9%, a Gini index of 55.1% (UNDP, 2006). According to the ENCOVI household surveys of 2006, 51%, or more than 6 million people live in poverty. Between 2000 and 2006, poverty declined from 56% to 51% and extreme poverty declined only slightly, from 15.7% to 15.2%. In rural settings in 2006, 72% were poor and 31% live in extreme poverty (ENCOVI, 2006). Reactivating an economy, increasing productivity and savings, and achieving a more balanced distribution of wealth have all yet to begin. And social development? Guatemalan society is deeply divided—the fault-lines of race, class, income, and education continue to widen. The indigenous majority, scattered on subsistence micro-plots in the highlands has long suffered discrimination, unfair labor legislation, and frequent oppression at the hands of ladino or mestizo minority. Educational opportunity is limited, its quality poor. The technical skills required for competition in this global economy are lacking—especially when many still struggle with basic literacy and numeracy. Job opportunities are limited or low-paying, so Guatemala’s lead export is now its people, emigrants whose remittances bring new capital to the grassroots. These Guatemalans seek the same mobility given to technology and capital, risking their lives on the migrant trail. A temporary survival strategy for the poor and safety valve for the government, migration is an unreliable long-term solution for the more than 50% of the country below the poverty line. Social reconstruction after war and continued violence will require much time. The tourist industry, the second largest dollar earner in the Guatemalan economy celebrates its diverse cultures, the weavings, marimbas, villages clinging to magnificent volcanoes and lovely lakes, or ancient

20


temples built centuries before the pilgrims hit Plymouth Rock. For most Guatemalans however, the cultural cleavages of their society are viewed as a liability. Diversity within Mayan culture, presence of Xinka and Garifuna Caribbean cultures, plus European settlers and intermarriage makes for a rich, if lumpy stew within a hitherto segmented melting pot. And political development? No matter the many exogenous causes of regional economic downturn, disenchantment with democracy is widespread. Citizenship is a novelty. “People today vote more as consumers than as citizens,” observed Soros Guatemala Foundation director Ricardo Stein. They are driven more by market interests than political motives. The economic crisis is also a political one. Democratic consolidation after decades of military authoritarian rule was difficult. Challenges to the prevailing economic paradigm and disappointment in the early experience of democracy provoked populist political reactions. In the mid-twentieth century, when Guatemalans tried their own version of electoral democracy from 1944 to 1954, the United States helped undermine the experiment, ushering in once again the cycle of military governments, coups, and “strong-men.” During the thirty-six-year conflict, civilian democratic leadership was decimated, since most organizational efforts associated with change, whether by centrist politicians, cooperative members, catechists, or Mayans were assumed to be subversive. Democracy and its promoters came late to Guatemala. Negotiation skills, compromise, give and take are not part of everyday behavior. Political violence has escalated dramatically since the accords. John Courtney Murray once summarized American democracy, writing, “We hold these truths, therefore, we can disagree” (Murray, 1960). I recall a Central American friend calling for a “cofradia de los en desacuerdo”—“a brotherhood of those who disagree.” Not yet, because those elusive truths are still not shared in much of the isthmus. If past ideologies and development models led to civil war and current ones are helpless before poverty and new forms of violence, what would peace-friendly development approaches look like? Pope Paul VI was right in calling “development the new name for peace.” I’ve already hinted at some of its economic, social, and political dimensions. A stronger state, more inclusive market and consumers, and more civilized society set the agenda for peace-building just as they do for development.

Peace, Equality, and Democracy? In December 1996, peace accords were signed that finalized a Guatemalan shooting war pretty much concluded several years before. The accords set a four-year timetable for resolving a list of issues that reached back


21

centuries, generating expectations that rapid external investment of $2 billion would quickly glue the country together. North American sponsors seemed to forget the still pending agenda of our Civil War. Europeans abstracted from decades, even centuries it has required for them to work through continental enmities that have yielded a peaceful, post-nationalist community. Something must be said for the wisdom of the Maya who know that building peace is a long-haul proposition, perhaps because their calendar has twenty months! Tocqueville’s Democracy in America and the Mayan foundational holy book Popol Vuh have something in common—respect for equality. Alexis put it this way: Among the laws that rule human societies there is one that seems more precise and clear than all the others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased. (Tocqueville, 1969)

The Mayans summarized it crisply: “let no-one be left behind.” Alexis admired the simultaneous growth of equality and association among New England yeomen. Despite Guatemala’s inequality and scant opportunity for those at the bottom, I’ll argue that there are solid chances for democracy to develop, and development to be democratized, at the mesoand micro-levels in Guatemala. One important Northern Irish response to inequality and grievance we will examine was greater localized social investment in human capital—a lesson instructive for Guatemalans. Peace will have to be built, not just on the accords that now serve more as north star than road map, but on the hard lessons learned during implementation. Inflated hopes, poor performance vis-à-vis the accords by three post-accord administrations, and the bedrock traditionalism of Guatemalan culture brought dashed expectations. Absolute and relative poverty linger on. Violence and corruption have increased, quite overwhelming police and justice institutions. Land ownership issues dominate the history of the country—they still do, even as information technology, competition, job creation, environmental degradation, and water scarcity add contemporary challenges. To build peace, Guatemalans will have to develop consensus on mechanisms of redistribution to reduce inequity in the country, and they will have to build political institutions to process conflicts and channel social demands. Lessons learned from the Irish can also help the process. There are huge gaps separating state and society, public and private spheres in Guatemala. Responsibilities as well as rights of citizenship are

22


still a long way from taking hold. The “anti-fiscal” pathology of Guatemalan middle and upper classes, trapped in a private world that views the state as terminally corrupt, may not respond to antibiotics administered by a new administration. Post-accord violence has reached fearsome levels. But there are islands of hope. Educational reform, municipal vitalization, religious and ethnic tolerance, and the phenomenon of migrant remittances represent mid-level spaces where peace and reconciliation can be built, either from a development or a democratizing civil society perspective.

Historical Sketch of Guatemala Here I can only briefly review Guatemalan history. Ever since the conquest, Guatemala has suffered alternating disputes between liberals and conservatives, then military and civilians, and then became a cold war pawn. Poorly served by its political and economic elites, torn by thirtysix years of fratricidal war, plagued by inequitable distribution of wealth, its populace is still quite undecided on the relative benefits of democracy or authoritarian rule. Two democratically elected presidents launched a peaceful “Revolution of October,” but Jacobo Arbenz’ land reform, expropriating and reimbursing unused plantation land of the United Fruit Company, provoked a U.S. CIA-supported invasion and imposition of a string of military presidents (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982). Neither state terrorism nor democratic elections were a U.S. priority during the cold war. Nonviolent motors of change antedated the conflict in the 1950s and 1960s (the cooperative movement and community development initiatives), some paralleled the war (mobilization for reconstruction after the 1976 earthquake, emergence of indigenous leadership on both sides the conflict), and some followed (migration, remittances, emergence of Mayan intellectuals, and increased female leadership). The Catholic Church hierarchy changed dramatically during the war as clergy and bishops became targets of repression along with their faithful. Evangelical churches multiplied, part of a Latin America–wide trend, accelerating during the worst of the war since survival (if not salvation) was perceived as more likely through conversion. University students became acquainted with campesino life through obligatory social service and voluntary literacy training. Guatemala’s thirty-six-year “internal conflict” can be traced to political and economic ideologies, to a traditional society, and to persistent poverty within a development model yielding huge rewards for the very few and scant drops trickling-down for the many. The U.S. commitment to support Latin American militaries sometimes backfired, as in the early 1960s when a number of U.S. trained junior officers of the Guatemalan army launched


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a guerrilla uprising in the eastern part of their country. Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, this sporadic armed conflict, including urban guerrilla attacks, moved from the east where they were rapidly defeated, into the north and northwestern regions of the country. By the late 1970s, two of the four guerrilla factions had won some support from the indigenous population, and between 1980 and 1983, the army adopted a counterinsurgency strategy with a scorched earth policy that included vicious massacres of civilian populations in the north and northwest. Generals Romeo Lucas Garcia (1978–1982) and Efrain Rios Montt (1982–1983) led the country during that period, both having carried out internal coups to take power. The U.S. Congress under President Jimmy Carter, embarrassed by the gross human rights abuses of the Guatemalan Army, had suspended military aid to Guatemala in 1978, and U.S. economic aid was suspended in 1983. (Israelis then sold weapons to the Guatemalan Army). More recent revelations of U.S. complicity in tolerating, even training torturers, elicited an apology from President Clinton during his visit to Guatemala when he said that support for military forces that “engaged in violent and widespread repression was wrong” (Washington Post, March 12, 1999, 25). During the thirty-six years of armed conflict, more than 200,000 Guatemalans were killed, nearly a million were displaced internally (many of them forced into camps or “development pole” villages by the military), and thousands more fled into southern Mexico. As the 1980s ended, it was increasingly clear that the Guatemalan military would not definitively root out the guerrillas, neither did the isolated guerrillas stand any chance of themselves taking power. Scattered military actions and persistent sabotage of the physical infrastructure led economic elites (some who financed paramilitaries, others acquiescent toward the military) to welcome a cease-fire and search for peace. The road to a peace agreement was initiated after dialogues between military, guerrillas, and politicians with international government interlocutors as well as the Catholic Saint Egidio peace-building community. It was sustained by local mediators such as Bishop Quezada Toruño and international observers, who helped build trust or confianza among the military and guerrilla leadership. It required time, spanning the administration of four democratically elected Guatemalan presidents. The United Nations (UN) was incorporated into the process and would figure significantly in the implementation phase. In 1994, under the auspices of the UN and a group of countries called “Friends of the Peace Process” (Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, United States, and Venezuela), the government and guerrilla leadership began official negotiations. The first hurdle was to achieve a framework acceptable to both parts, incorporating essential elements such as issues of

24


human rights, amnesty, laying down of arms, and an effective cease-fire. Then a global agreement on human rights was signed that emphasized strengthening institutions of the judicial system, followed by others on resettlement of the displaced, the rights of indigenous peoples, and a year later an ambitious accord on socioeconomic and agrarian problems with goals for dealing with poverty. A radical change was proposed in the accord to strengthen civil authority and redefine the function of the army in a democratic society. In 1995, the army generals and the guerrilla leadership of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), agreed to a definitive cease-fire, with the guerrillas turning over their arms to the UN, to be followed by proposed constitutional reforms and a popular referendum. After agreement on legal incorporation of the URNG as a political party, on December 29, 1996, President Alvaro Arzu and the URNG agreed to a schedule for compliance, implementation, and verification of the accords. With a short tenure, extended to 2005, the UN Mission (MINUGUA) was charged with overseeing weapons decommissioning and verification of the entire package. Peace-making and peace-keeping were easy—peace-building would require deeper and more dramatic change. Peace-Building Without Wealth Distribution? Inequitable distribution of land, water, power, and wealth fueled a conflict sparked by ideology. What to make of widening inequalities after peace? Is it possible for a country such as Guatemala to effectively include only 30% of its population in the benefits of growth, leaving 15% to 20% Table 2.1 Guatemalan Poverty

% living in poverty % in absolute poverty. Share of national income Poorest 20% Middle 60% Richest 20% Adult literacy Chronic malnutrition of children Formal sector jobs

2000

2002

2006*

56.1% 15.7%

57% 21.5%

51% 15.2%

2.8% 36% 61.8% 68.2% 46.4% 32.5%

1.7% 34.3% 64% 72.5% 48.7% 28.7%

2.4% — 62.1% — — —

Note: * ENCOVI, 2006. Source: UNDP Agenda for Human Development, September 4, 2003.


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in extreme poverty and more than 50% in a precarious financial setting? If development requires sustained economic growth and productivity increases, whence support for building human and social capital to bring them about? Redistribution through taxation and social spending was a key proposal of the peace accords and the international mentors who agreed to finance nearly two-thirds of the costs of peace. Guatemalan counterpart contributions via tax payments or social spending have not been forthcoming. International donors began to suffer “development fatigue” given Guatemalan reluctance to pay their share. In 2000, four years after the accords were signed, 56.1% of the population lived in poverty and 15.7% in absolute poverty. By 2002, the poverty level has risen to 57% while people in absolute poverty totaled 21.5% of the population. Other indicators in 2002 were bleak—chronic malnutrition of children rose from 46.4% to 48.7% and formal sector employment declined from 32.5% to 28.7%. Rural Guatemalans fared worse, with 72% below the poverty line and 31% in extreme poverty (UNDP, 2003). The richest 20% saw their share of national income rise from 61.8% to 64%, while the share of the poorest declined from 2.8% to 1.7%, and the middle 60% dropped from 36 to 34.3% of national income (UNDP, September 4, 2003). By 2006, the ENCOVI household survey found that poverty had declined to 51% and extreme poverty declined but slightly between 2005 and 2006, from 15.7% to 15.2%. The peace dividend for the poor has been modest indeed. The Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA/CEPAL) predicts 5% growth in the Guatemalan economy for 2007—but development economists posit at least 6% growth as the goal for effective poverty alleviation, and of course, growth doesn’t translate into distribution. Income maldistribution and power concentration go together. According to former Costa Rican president and Noble Prize winner Oscar Arias, “Guatemala is one of the worst countries in Latin America in so far as concentration of economic power” (Oscar Arias, Prensa Libre, October 6, 2003). Given the negative impact of cyclical world coffee crises, drought, and a stagnant economy, can there be specific steps taken to make the country safe and respectful of human rights, working toward growth with equity and social development? Must poverty prevail? In a survey by London’s Economist magazine, Guatemala City recently achieved the dubious honor of being the city with the highest cost of living in Latin America, replacing Mexico City (Inforpress #1697, March 23, 2007). According to Hugo Maul, director of research at the National Center for Economic Research (CIEN), the spike is caused by the appreciation of the quetzal against the dollar (Prensa Libre, June 3, 2007). Were it not for remittances, which reached US$ 3,609 billion in 2006 and are expected to

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top US$ 4 billion in 2007, poverty would be overwhelming. Inflation for 2007 is estimated at 5% after several years hovering between 6% and 7%. If the state is impotent or incompetent in grappling with poverty, what then, is the role of markets and business elites? Rachel McCleary argues that, in the early 1990s, “an unusual elite pact occurred between the organized private sector, the military, and some leaders of popular organizations” who agreed “to maintain constitutional order and democratic government,” that is, reject coup attempts by military and civilians. This set the stage for several administrations to hold conversations with guerrilla leaders and eventually, the peace accords (McCleary, 1999, 6–7). The Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations (CACIF) has maintained up to the present its powerful position in representation of business elites from all sectors. Besides recognizing that peace is good for business, it has endeavored to keep government in its place, and has kept distant from organized civil society. Meetings were recently held between business leaders and representatives of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, and CACIF, which resulted in the formation of the Guatemalan Council of Private Charitable Foundations (CFPG). Since 1996, the CFPG has included some of Guatemala’s most powerful business families, including: Carlos F. Novella (Cementos Progreso), Juan Bautista Gutiérrez (MultiInversiones), Julio Herrera Ibárgüen (Pantaleón sugar mill), María Luisa Monge de Castillo (Corporación Mariposa) and Ramiro Castillo Love (Cervecería Centroamericana, Banco Industrial) (Inforpress, February 2, 2007). During the Portillo administration, as relations between business elites and the president deteriorated, a “corporate social responsibility” theme was advanced by some business leaders, though without changed position toward tax payments. Philanthropy was in vogue, yet philanthropy is not yet development (See Mayra Palencia and Elisabeth Oglesby, cited in Inforpress, February 2, 2007). One encouraging event in which I participated in 2002 that illustrated growing concern by business elites for development and not just charitable activity was when the Castillo Córdova Foundation (funded by the Central American Brewery) celebrated the service of Peace Corps volunteers who “did not wait for peace, but stepped forward to make it happen through development projects to improve the quality of life of poor Guatemalans.”

Implementing Peace Accords and Doing Development The list of accords was extraordinarily ambitious, ranging from items clearly linked to the cessation of hostilities (cease-fire, demobilization,


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repatriation), others linked to the causes of the conflict (e.g., land distribution, racism, civil and military relations), and still others addressing concrete public and private policy questions (such as multilingual education, decentralization, etc.). These were huge issues, unaddressed or eluding well-intentioned governments and the country for centuries. Far more than a peace agreement, the accords represented a listing of economic, political, and cultural development requirements of the country—all desirable, but few attainable in the short or middle term. Expectations were high that, with peace, all other good things would follow, not just for the elites but for the population as a whole. Social patience was in short supply. The international community agreed to contribute to the estimated $2.6 billion cost, and the opportunistic Guatemalan government committed itself to raise about 30% of that figure, based on highly optimistic assumptions of a 6% growth rate of the economy. The Friends of the Peace Process, later called a “Consultative Group” coordinated by the IDB, included a stipulation that the Guatemalan government increase its levels of taxation to 12% of GDP by the year 2000, as well as increase its social spending to support the agenda included in the Accords (Guatemala’s social spending of 2.5% of GDP was the lowest in the hemisphere, except for Haiti). The government made commitments, but lacked cash as well as competent, committed, and incorrupt people equipped to make peace and development projects work. Throughout the society, human capital, like social capital, is in short supply. The peace accords, signed in December 1996, represented a significant achievement of Alvaro Arzu’s Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN) administration. Much as in the United States where “only Nixon could go to China,” a businessman with Arzu’s stature could cut the deal with guerrillas. Unfortunately, the President took personal credit for the event, resulting in little “ownership” by other sectors of the population who really did welcome cessation of thirty-six years of hostilities. Militarycivilian relationships would continue problematic. The Arzu administration began to follow through its commitments, but was generally lukewarm. It prematurely tried to get victims to pardon their victimizers even before they had been named. More than twenty follow-up commissions were appointed to guide implementation—most proved ineffective due to overlapping mandates and little clout to enforce compliance. Early in the implementation phase of the peace process, when I asked a panel of Guatemalans who had participated in the peace negotiations what they had learned that might be shared with other countries, they agreed that building “relationships of trust is the key” to negotiations and “it is very difficult to contain high expectations of peace” and immediate peace dividends. They described a tense moment in negotiations when

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they took a break, and a general and a guerrilla leader spent the break playing a marimba. Both were very good musicians and afterward, the negotiations too began to resonate. The panel’s major self-criticisms were two: “We tried to do far too much too soon—simultaneity may lead to (an agreement’s) downfall,” and “ownership of the process was not shared with the people but belonged to a narrow elite group on both sides of the conflict” (Guatemala City Peace Corps panel, March 1999). The citizens had been left out. The FRG (Frente Republicano Guatemalteco, Guatemalan Republican Front) party, led by former General Efrain Rios Montt with its candidate Alfonso Portillo campaigned on citizen security during 1999 and with strong support in the countryside, won easily. Oscar Berger, the PAN candidate and former Guatemala City mayor proved a lackluster campaigner. General Rios Montt was elected president of the Congress showing that he too had clout—either from fear to vote against him, his image as an authoritarian “strongman,” support from rural paramilitary “civil patrols” (PACS) that he had helped create, or backing from his fellow evangelicals. The Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH), a product of the 1994 Oslo Agreement, was set up under the leadership of Otilia Luz de Coti, an indigenous educator reelected to Congress in 2007, and two lawyers, Christian Tomaschat from Germany and Guatemalan Alfredo Balsells Tojo. Its mandate was constrained by the law of National Reconciliation passed prior to the accords, which exempted military and guerrillas from prosecution for most wartime crimes. The commission sought “to clarify the violations of human rights and acts of violence to the population (in) the armed conflict. The Commission was not set up to judge, since that should be done by the tribunals of justice, but rather to clarify the history of what happened during the fratricidal war.” They asked: “What explains the unbridled violence committed during the armed conflict? Why did these barbarous acts not respect the most elementary rules of human rights, Christian ethics and Mayan spirituality?” And “what were the causes of the armed confrontation?” On February 25, 1999, the CEH issued its report, with findings consistent with those of the Catholic Church’s REMHI study “Guatemala, Never Again,” published the previous year. The main causes of the conflict, they concluded were “the concentration of economic and political power, the racist and discriminatory character of society towards the majority of the population that is indigenous, and the social and economic exclusion of huge impoverished sectors—Mayan and ladino.” The CEH report listed a total of 626 massacres, as part of a plan “by government forces for complete extermination of Mayan communities, with the destruction of


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their homes, cattle and other forms of subsistence” (Siglo XXI, April 27, 1999, 5). Christian Tomaschat who presided over the commission, called the military’s actions “genocide . . . government forces blindly pursued the anti-communist fight, without respecting any legal principle, or even the most elemental ethical or religious values” (AP, cited in News Notes, March/April 1999, 11). The report concluded that 93% of the 42,000 deaths investigated were attributed to the army and its affiliated civil action patrols (El Periodico, September 24, 2002). The early years of the peace accords coincided with economic downturn throughout Latin America. The local economy is challenged by global competition and technical innovation, by propensity for domestic capital flight, by declining value of traditional exports, and low levels of education and technical skills in the labor force. Close to half of Guatemala’s rural population is still engaged in subsistence farming. GDP according to the Ministry of Finance reached a 3.6% growth rate in 1999, 3.3% in 2000,and 2.3% in 2001 (though international financial analysts reported just 1.5% growth in 2001 and 2002. The world glut in coffee, sugar, and bananas, traditional pillars of the export economy, might prove a blessing in disguise if Guatemalans were to diversify. The country’s mountains and jungles are far better suited to agro-forestry than agriculture. Inflation has stayed beneath 10% and the quetzal has remained relatively solid vis-à-vis other currencies. The Portillo government ran an annual fiscal deficit of about 2%. Its commitment to raise tax revenues to 12% of GDP by 2000, fell well short of that goal, reaching 8.7% in 1998, 9.4% in 1999, 9.6% in 2000, 9.9% 2001, and 10.5% in 2002 (according to CIEN and the Ministry of Finance as reported in El Periodico on September 24, 2002). (The Berger administration in 2006 struggled to reach 10%.) The economy and violence are important “spoilers” of the accords, but politics didn’t help.

Peace Process and Politics under Portillo and Rios Montt The Portillo administration (2000–2003) had a short-lived honeymoon in 2000 despite its two to one margin of victory. The President heartily endorsed the accords in his acceptance speech. But the FRG lacked depth—senior and middle-rung administration appointments ranged from a very few technically competent to many poorly equipped people and some outright thieves. Corruption rapidly became an issue. The newspapers uncovered scandals involving major campaign donors, bank bailouts, police and customs scandals, narcotrafficking, mass prison escapes, and so forth. Natural disasters such as Hurricane Mitch and drought hurt the economy, exceeding local disaster management capacity.

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In 2001, the national business association (CACIF), representing agriculture, trade, industry, and finance organizations, protested with a national level shutdown of businesses, including transportation. President Portillo grew more aggressive, at times sounding paranoid. His populist rhetoric and promises he couldn’t keep deepened tensions and fanned flames of resentment, especially among the rural poor. The accords called for a “Popular Consultation” or referendum to ratify agreements preliminary to constitutional reforms, but Congress unnecessarily complicated the package with extraneous issues, a confused public mostly abstained and it was voted down on May 16, 1999. The result was discouraging to domestic peace builders and international advocates including the UN Mission for Verification, MINUGUA. Clearly, the Guatemalan people welcomed peace, but their aspirations were not helped by this congressional exercise in obfuscation. President Arzu had failed to share credit and swiftly jump-start peace accord implementation. Alfonso Portillo accomplished much less. The military meanwhile continued to take a large share of the budget, plus frequent increases over budgeted levels—most of which is spent in secret under the cover of “national security.” Transparency International reported that Guatemala had slipped backward to number 80 of 102 countries in its annual assessment of government transparency. Shadowy figures from the military leadership of the past continued with influence and impunity. The Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP), a branch of the army assigned to presidential security and intelligence, continued well financed until November 2003, despite repeated commitments to close it down by both presidents. The 1998 murder of Bishop Juan Gerardi two days after he presented the church’s REMHI study of wartime atrocities was traced to two officials and one soldier affiliated with the EMP who were eventually found guilty and imprisoned. The Bishop Gerardi and Myrna Mack murders (the latter an anthropologist affiliated with Georgetown University who had been documenting the situation of refugees) were the only attempts to prosecute military officers after the war. Social spending especially in health and education has lagged well behind commitments of the Portillo administration, while military spending continued at wartime levels. Whether you start from Hegel, or Toqueville, or the UN’s BoutrosGhali, making societies more civil is fundamental to peace-building. Central American countries began this trajectory after fierce wars that inhibited if not decimated civic organizations and leadership. Given the absence of political parties and party systems capable of channeling interests and grievances, plus indifference of the organized private sector to address social concerns beyond their immediate economic and political


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interests, expectations were high that civil society organizations (CSOs) might play a major role in social and political development. CSOs were enormously important in delivering education, health, rural development, and other services that citizens elsewhere expect, and receive, primarily from government. Human rights NGOs courageously advocated justice and suffered frequent harassment, break-ins, even murders. Civil society performance echoes the Irish experience analyzed by John Darby: “[T]he strong civil society in Northern Ireland allowed reforms in the allocation of housing, employment and education to be implemented during the years of violence, prevented a bad situation from becoming worse, and reduced the roster of problems to be tackled during the peace process” (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2000, 240). During the four years under Portillo, creating alternative spaces for dialogue was the task of CSOs that provided constructive alternatives to the constant confrontation between the president and the private sector. Groups such as the FORO GUATEMALA and BAROMETRO emerged and, through frequent public dialogues, maintained a climate of civility and search for solutions that had nearly disappeared from the media and government. CSOs are fragmented but networked, often depend on external funding, and increasingly seek policy influence. Transnational environmental, human rights, and development CSOs backed up their Guatemalan counterparts. Many CSOs have gracefully shifted from traditional stances opposed to government to a more positive set of proposals. They continuously deliver social services and sometimes adopt “quasi-party roles,” since most political parties tend to be personalist, poorly organized, and short-lived. They multiply like rabbits but disappear after the electoral hunting season.

2003 Elections The Guatemalan national elections of 2003 resuscitated hope and returned the peace accords to public discourse. There were huge lines of voters at the first electoral round on November 9. Then voters had to select from among ten presidential and vice-presidential candidates, hundreds of congressional candidates, hopefuls for 331 mayoral and town council positions, and candidates for a Central American parliament. Most positions were decided the first time around. But since neither presidential nor vice-presidential candidate got an absolute majority, the second-round runoff was between Oscar Berger, running with a coalition of three parties nick-named GANA (Gran Alianza Nacional), against Alvaro Colom who leads the UNE (Unión Nacional) party. General Efrain Rios Montt

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did not make the cut and his political career seems over, to the relief of 88% of the Guatemalans who voted (and most of the international community). Although head of the Congress and FRG party, the General once occupied the presidency through a military coup and earned notoriety for his role as head of the army during flagrant human rights abuses and massacres twenty-five years before. The two finalist candidates had solid, if not spectacular careers in both public service and private enterprise. They repudiated the violent past, promised action on the violence of the present while endorsing the peace accords signed in 1996. I served as an electoral observer for the Organization of American States (OAS) for the second round on December 28, 2003. It yielded a national level outcome of 56% for Berger, 48% for Colom. Departments (equivalent to states) with indigenous majorities went with Colom, as did younger voters in our polling place. A large Guatemala City majority put Berger on top. If historically, Guatemalan citizens suffer low electoral self-esteem, outsiders haven’t always helped. The CIA undermined a democratically elected government in 1954 and military generals helped themselves to the presidency throughout much of the twentieth century. But this election was different. Civil rights leaders had reassured voters that the secret ballot really was a secret. (A rumor circulated widely that satellites could take pictures of voters and their choices.) In the words of Mayan Quiché poet Humberto Ak’abal, “fear still walked in the land.” But the serious, polite, happy demeanor of voters this time was upbeat, full of hope. Valentin Paniagua, chief of the OAS’ international observers stated that “this Guatemalan election is an example for all Latin America.” Guatemalan architect and intellectual Adrian Recinos left the polling place and said, “We’re doing better than the ancient Greeks, given the climate of tranquility, respect and joy prevailing in this election” (Reilly, 2004, 16). Guatemalan political self-esteem was climbing. The next day, after concession and commitment to a “loyal opposition” role by Alvaro Colom, president-elect Oscar Berger met with civil society leaders from across the political spectrum who “assigned” him to revive work toward the goals of the peace accords. Cardinal Archbishop Quezada Toruño, who had initiated dialogues between guerrillas and army nearly a dozen years before and the UN’s MINUGUA director Thom Koenig presided over the event. Berger accepted the task, going a step further by suggesting Nobel Prize winner Rigoberta Menchu might serve as special ambassador for indigenous affairs, inviting human rights lawyer Helen Mack to oversee justice programs, and Gustavo Porras to run the Peace Secretariat. Frank La Rue, a leading human rights activist was asked to join the government as a human rights ombudsman. Civil society leaders were no longer “the opposition.”


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A Salvadoran friend once reminded me that “elections are but one movement in the symphony of democracy.” Learning to negotiate, dialogue, trust, organize—there is still much to do. Parties and party systems must be built. Taxes must be paid and social investment made. That electoral “movement” was splendid, but, like Beethoven’s Ninth, still needs a mighty chorus of citizens to complete the work. Impressed by the training, efficiency, organization, mechanics, but especially by the upbeat attitudes of a mostly youthful electoral team, I asked if they might be willing to help us North Americans iron out electoral messes next time in Florida and California. They all said yes! The scars of war were still deep, criminal violence considerable, but in the 2003 election (and again in 2007), Guatemalans resisted fear tactics designed to prolong government by generals and their allies. Respect for political institutions, always low, had plummeted during Portillo’s FRG administration and polarization was accentuated. Guatemalans enjoyed a moment of hope in that election, hope reinforced by frequent ecumenical marches in favor of peace and against violence such as the one held on August 13, 2004. But there was a long road ahead.

The Berger Administration (2004–2008) The Berger administration shows a mixed record. The structural problems of the economy remain daunting for domestic and international reasons. In an address to the UN General Assembly, President Berger made an “appeal to the international community to eliminate measures that distort the market. . . . Our efforts to overcome poverty and achieve socio-economic development for the population are conditioned by the progress of multilateral trade negotiations” (Prensa Libre, September 23, 2004). Financial commitments to paramilitary “civil patrols” by the preceding government were pending. Land invasions continued. Some notorious criminals were indicted by the justice system—including ministerial level members of the preceding administration. The new civil police were ill-trained, little trusted, and sometimes engaged in criminal activity. Some small-scale tax reform laws were passed and increments to social spending have occurred, especially for education, though they fall far below the levels suggested by CSOs, teachers unions, and academic researchers. Education in the 2004 budget represents 1.4% of GDP, raised to 2% in 2005, while the rest of Latin America averages 4%, according to researcher Saenz de Tejada (Prensa Libre, August 19, 2004). Despite a continuing legacy of labor dispute with teachers, Berger can point to a number of limited successes in education. The rate of illiteracy,

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for example, has been reduced each year—from 26.3% in 2004 to 25.2 in 2005, reaching 24% in 2006 (Inforpress, February 2, 2007). GDP increased from 3.2% to 4.6% between 2005 and 2006. Transparency International through its Guatemalan affiliate, Acción Ciudadana (AC), gives the Berger administration improved marks for each year. Infant mortality rates continue to improve (though they remain the highest in Latin America). On the once key indicator of fiscal effectiveness, Berger only slightly exceeded 10% of GDP in tax collection during 2006, and there are fears that the level may drop to 9% in 2007—far short of the 12% target envisioned in the peace agreement ten years ago (Ibid.). Berger has followed through on his campaign claims to be a “municipalist,” despite resistance from Congress for his decentralization initiatives. Transfers from the federal government have grown each year of his tenure. Legislative initiatives from the executive branch celebrated 2006 as the “year of decentralization.” While financial transfers to municipalities grew, there were frequent tensions between the priorities and projects of mayors and those of the federal social investment funds, FONAPAZ and FIS. (Ibid.).

Policing and Justice Systems Murders during the first three years of the Berger administration totaled 15,728, exceeding those of both the Arzu and Portillo administration during a similar period (Ibid.). “President Berger advises his successor to concentrate on the administration of justice,” read headlines of a recent Prensa Libre article (August 30, 2007). “The main thing will be to strengthen the Public Prosecutor Ministry so that its investigations will be more effective,” he said, adding that the budget will have to be increased considerably to improve the administration of justice and the rule of law. During October 2004, there had been 455 cases of police abuses submitted to the Public Prosecutor’s office, while the director of the Human Rights Office, Sergio Morales, reported an average of two formal complaints per day by citizens against National Civil Police (PNC) officers (Prensa Libre, October 18, 2004). Carlos Vielman, minister of government, said that he “took over the PNC with a great deal of corruption, but that 200 (1%) of the force had been dismissed and another 240 officers would soon be dismissed.” Unlike Northern Ireland’s improving postconflict civil police force, Guatemala’s has continued to deteriorate. President Berger presided over retirement ceremonies for 11,663 military as part of the reduction in the size of the military agreed to in the peace accords, yet its budget went up through retirement payments and equipment


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purchases (Prensa Libre, 2004). The goal for 2005 was to reduce the army to 15,500 troops. The task of modernizing the army will continue through 2010, including military educational reform, transparency of the military budget, restructured career patterns (reducing the top-heavy officer corps), and being more open toward civil society, according to Colonel Francisco Bermudez, president of the Commission for Modernization of the Army. The proposal to create a new International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was overwhelmingly approved by 110 of the 115 deputies present in congress on August 1, 2007. The initiative dates back to December 2006, when the Berger administration and the UN agreed to establish a commission of international experts to investigate paramilitary security forces believed to be operating alongside, or infiltrating, state institutions, and to make recommendations to dismantle them. With an initial two-year mandate, the law stipulates that CICIG will be an independent body based in Guatemala City, with its commissioner to be appointed by—and report periodically to—UN secretary-general Ban Ki-Moon. The commission will investigate crimes committed by “criminal structures and clandestine security organizations that threaten civil and political rights and undermine the rule of law in Guatemala.” The vote was applauded by human rights organizations, the government, and the international community as a key development in the battle against organized crime. With financial support from the United States, Sweden, Norway, and Spain, CICIG is expected to start work in November 2007. There are questions about its effective autonomy as well as disappointment that its scope will not extend to crimes committed during the civil conflict, although disappearances might be investigated.

Electoral Campaign 2007 Incumbency meant little in the 2007 election. Political analyst Edgar Guttierez notes that “we are witnessing the worst defeat of a party in (Guatemalan) democracy. . . . No party has fallen so low in voter preference as today’s GANA party. It once enjoyed support of entrepreneurs, the international community and the press” (El Periodico, August 30, 2007). In the campaign, violence trumped GDP growth. The GDP reached 4.6% in 2006 (Inforpress, February 2, 2007) thanks to steady financial policy, high world prices for coffee, and generalized growth in Latin American economies, but economic improvement was overshadowed by greater growth in violence. Berger could celebrate growth in literacy. He could claim improved statistics on school enrollment. But the overall assessment of three-and-a-half

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years in office was disappointing, especially when measured against two previous low performing governments and high hopes for accelerating equitable development. GANA had failed to build party machinery, suffered internal divisions after the 2003 elections, and lacked a congressional majority. “Its failure lay in bad management of security and little conviction in implementing social policy” (Alberto Grosetti in Intellibriefs blog, August 28, 2007). There had been encouraging efforts to improve the transparency of the electoral process. For example, the NGO Acción Ciudadana reported that for the first time in Guatemalan history, the supreme electoral court (TSE) received and published on August 13, 2007, a partial list of the political parties’ funding sources. Local analysts admit that some contribution amounts are open to question, but publishing names of donors is a big step in strengthening the democratic process. Indigenous organizations registered complaints with the Electoral Tribunal about the lack of electoral information in their languages, and their voices were heard. In sum, Berger’s administration was lackluster, business-friendly, moderately attentive to accord implementation, and certainly avoided the notoriety of his predecessor.

Elections 2007 The 2007 presidential electoral campaign included twelve parties who presented “plans of government” to the electorate while two more offered only slogans. The platforms, with several exceptions, did not focus on the peace accords. Many of the parties are personalist, most did not exist five years ago. Nobel Prize winner Rigoberta Menchu led a new party, Encuentro Guatemala, drawn from the indigenous social movement Winaq. With little chance for victory, it did have considerable symbolic value for nominating the first indigenous woman candidate for the presidency. Her party did win four congressional seats. The leading candidates, Manuel Colom Argueta of the National Union for Hope (UNE) and Otto Perez Molina of the Patriotic Party (PP), represented, in the words of political analyst Edgar Guttierez, a “center-left” and a “center-right” option—the former emphasizing solidarity and reduction of poverty as key to security and sustainable development, the latter focused on security lest there be no investment, no jobs, and more poverty. Disappointment in peace process’ implementation, security concerns, and calculated pre-electoral violence translated into low voter turnout in the first round of 2007 elections. Forty political figures or human rights advocates were killed during 2007 (eighteen of them from Colom’s UNE


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party). Neither candidate won an absolute majority so runoff elections were held on November 4, 2007. Guttierez anticipated a very close race that would likely be decided by voters “in the metropolitan area where insecurity is seen as creating greater anguish” (Edgar Guttierez, El Periodico, August 30, 2007). The campaign offered a familiar choice between a former general offering hard line physical security promises and a center-left businessman pushing development as a path to human security. Would postconflict violence decide yet another election in Guatemala? The growing influence of drug cartels on Guatemalan politicians and institutions alarms many observers. Hence, there was little surprise that the electoral campaign was dominated by discussion of security and out of control drug cartels even more than poverty. To the surprise of many pollsters and pundits, Manuel Colom Argueta did win the runoff election on November 4, 2007, capturing 52.82% of total votes cast, with a solid majority of electors in twenty of the twentytwo departments. As expected, Perez Molina won decisively in the capitol (436,551 votes to Colom’s 297,114), but this time, the capitol did not determine the national outcome. Security, the “single issue” of the capitol was outweighed by the “social development” preference of the rest of the country—especially the rural areas. The election reflected clearly the divisions between rural and urban Guatemala. As Alberto Fuentes Knight of the Central American Institute for Fiscal Studies observed, “there is a powerful thrust for equity, many people voted for urban and rural equality, seeking to reduce poverty and improve conditions for rural development.” Enrique Bolaños of the Institute for Democracy and Development concurred. “Citizens of the interior showed that their vote was decisive, and these elections showed that the country has considerable differences in so far as unsatisfied demands” (Prensa Libre, November 6, 2007). Colom Argueta, at his first press conference, announced that “I intend to convert Guatemala into a social democratic country—one with a Mayan face that smells of corn tamale, and for this I hope to count on support of the opposition” (Prensa Libre, November 6, 2007). Despite his entrepreneurial background, Colom got no free pass from the organized business sector. The president of CACIF, Carlos Enrique Zuñiga Fumigalli, for example, congratulated Colom Argueta on his election, pledged cooperation, and in the next breath rejected “on principle” Colom’s intent to try and persuade Congress to renew the special peace accord tax due to expire at the end of December 2007. Colon had argued that the tax revenue would be required to cover a shortfall of 1.7 million quetzales for many programs not included in the 2008 budget. Congress did vote on November 27 to extend the tax for one more year.

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Postconflict Violence and the Peace Process The 1998 and 2003 Guatemalan campaign slogans about citizen safety were empty. Crime levels skyrocketed, ranging from highly organized gangs robbing banks and vehicles, to drug mafias moving South American drugs northward by land, sea, and air, to the multiplication of urban youth gangs, some of them linked to gangs in the United States. Kidnapping for political and ransom purposes continued. Sporadic lynchings revealed an unraveled rural social fabric and lack of trust in police and justice systems. Human rights organizations suffered break-ins and theft of their information, resulting in special visits during 2003 by UN and OAS officials who recognized that rights continue fragile. Gruesome murders of women multiplied, leading to discussions of “femicide.” The rule of law, as well as good governance is still pending. Like Northern Ireland, “violence and its effects work their way into the very fabric of society and become part of normal life” (Darby, 2001a, 126). Darby analyzed how types of violence change and diffuse during peace processes. He distinguishes “strategic” violence (to influence negotiations), “spoiler” violence (to derail the process), and “horizontal” violence, including sectarian street confrontations, mobs, deliberate woundings, and so forth. Violence in Guatemala is neither so much a bargaining chip for negotiations nor a “spoiler” of the accords, although political motivation does underlie some assassinations and mob violence during electoral years. But if violence is not so much aimed at toppling the accords (they don’t matter that much to thugs nor even to average citizens), some of it was orchestrated to create an electoral climate favorable to a “strongman” promising citizen security. But, unlike 1999, in the 2003 and 2007 elections, the electorate proved more discriminating. Besides political crime, organized and not-so-organized crime has multiplied exponentially. Much of the violence comes from increasing poverty, from lack of formal employment, from decreased opportunity even in the “informal economy,” from an overabundance of weapons and excess numbers of people whose sole skill lies in using them. Multinational bands of car thieves spirit vehicles out of the country or to “chop-shops” in the city. Bank and armored car robberies abound—many of them using armor-piercing shells that are only manufactured by the army! Today’s violence is no summons to restart the failed revolution of the 1960s, but it provides a huge challenge to building the peace. The military institution struggles to redefine its role and reels from its loss of prestige and status. Many Guatemalans still instinctively turn to the military as order breaks down—providing incentives for segments of the military to create conditions that perpetuate their domestic security role. Some voices within the military adjusted rapidly to


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the accords civilian control message, perhaps to forestall more radical calls for the army’s abolition, like Costa Rica did many years ago. Latin America has the highest murder rates in the world, Guatemala’s among the highest in the region. (Murders under successive administrations keep climbing—during Arzu’s presidency over 13,000, Portillo over 14,000, and under Berger murders had reached 15,728 by January of 2007 [Inforpress, February 2, 2007].) Violence, especially against women has grown considerably since the peace accords were signed. A lexicon of adjectives modifying violence drawn from Guatemalan discourse includes “state-sponsored,” institutional, structural, ethnic, organized (whether by paramilitary, narcotraffickers, car thieves, bank robbers, or kidnappers), as well as those associated with “common” criminals, youth gangs, lynchings, and so on. “State-sponsored” violence or “state terrorism” refers to activities by secret and not-so-secret groups associated with government (abductions, massacres, and “disappearances” are the mechanisms), which became routine under “counterinsurgency governments.” “Structural” violence usage ranges widely, embracing political, economic, and social dimensions, including oppression, exclusion, discrimination, unemployment, land scarcity, and worsening income distribution. State violence has consistently been directed against indigenous populations, impelled by fear of as well as disdain for the indigenous majority. Cold war architects routinely ignored “state terrorists” of the 1960s to 1980s only to resuscitate the term for non-state actors after September 11, 2001. The CIA role behind the Chilean military’s violent attack on the government and life of President Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973 escaped infamy. Not all 9/11s are created equal. Fresh varieties of violence followed peace within Guatemala’s overarmed society. Unemployed ex-combatants were prepared to work as criminals, police, or security guards—professions that proved frequently interchangeable. The newly created “National Civil Police” force (PNC) of 20,000 has proven far from effective, though they are now physically present throughout the country. Underequipped and undertrained, they lack effective back-up from public prosecutors and justice system. (The Northern Irish police force has been far more effective, better financed, and provides a useful model for community-based policing.) Guatemala is a transit point for highly organized, well-financed drug smugglers shipping products from South America to the United States. More than half of South American cocaine gets shipped through Guatemala and U.S. government officials estimate that up to 10% of the drugs stay in the country as payment for transshipment costs and to develop local markets for the drugs. Some national and local government officials are rumored to have drug cartel financing.

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Unlike Northern Ireland, where paramilitaries come from both sides in the conflict, in Guatemala, they are usually identified with the right. Paramilitary and hit squads have been active since the 1960s, when clandestine groups such as the “mano blanca” (white hand) took credit for numerous assassinations and threatened countless more. “Shadowy” or “parallel forces,” often identified with serving and retired military, especially the presidential security and intelligence apparatus, the EMP, stand accused of attacks on human rights leaders, church people, and recently, opposition politicians. “Civilian self-defense patrols” or PACs, conscripted local defense forces created by the army in 1981, were supposedly demobilized with the peace accords, but reappeared in 2002. Some of the PACs have been accused of atrocities during the war, others were used as cannon fodder by the military in encounters with the guerrillas. After President Portillo promised them recompense and didn’t deliver, they protested. A firestorm of opposition greeted the government’s efforts to make payment through new taxes and an ultimately successful international bond issue. That debt and the many claims for reimbursement haunted the Berger administration, but it did succeed in facilitating the creation of the Commission (CICIG) to investigate the activities and impunity of paramilitary groups within and outside of the army and police (Prensa Libre, September 20, 2004). In Guatemala, perceptions that institutions such as police and judiciary are impotent against (or participants in) antisocial behavior lead to what has been called a “public insecurity syndrome” that effects life patterns considerably. The middle and upper classes in the capital rarely go out at night, avoid public places, socialize only with family and peers, and distrust most everyone outside their extended family and friendship circles. Gated communities and apartment houses and condominiums multiply. Security guards, personal weapons, theft insurance, alarm systems, and razor wire become necessities. And poor folk are seen as likely criminals. If post-accord violence fuels authoritarian practices undercutting democracy, its negative impact on economic and social development is far greater. The one growth industry is security. The ongoing social casualty is trust. The peace process is cramped by fiscal austerity and physical violence. Equity and security were catchwords of the 2007 campaign and Colom Argueta invited all parties to contribute to the agenda of his government. Yet political collaboration between the president, a fragmented Congress, and pugnacious national business elites has proven problematic. What are the prospects at other levels? In the next chapter, we’ll examine some of the local and mid-level movements and actors of civil society. Might they be platforms for effecting enduring change?

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Development from Below?

They have robbed our lands, trees, water What they could not take away is the Nahual (spirit). Nor will they be able to. (Humberto Ak’abal, “Theft”)

M

ost assessments of ten years of peace accord implementation centered on performance of the state, with relatively little review of the roles of civil society or of the private sector, especially its highly organized uppermost levels and international members. Market actors outmuscle the state and even migrant remittances very nearly exceed the national budget. In this chapter, we will first review some evaluations of the peace process from the perspective of international donors and civil society organizations (CSOs), and then shift our lens to examine intermediate and local level initiatives seeking to make peace work. In December 2006, the tenth anniversary of the signing of the peace accords, the Collective of Social Organizations, a Guatemalan civil society consortium, criticized the peace process, noting that “The root causes of armed conflict are still present, with many worsened; the de facto powers (oligarchy, military and mafias) are mainly responsible for the fact that . . . we lost an unrepeatable opportunity. . . . For the past ten years, we’ve lived in a context influenced by a neoliberal agenda that collides constantly with the peace agenda” (Collectivo, 2006, 4 and 6). The United Nations (UN), through MINUGUA, a major player in obtaining agreement and monitoring its early implementation, diplomatically insisted on coupling peace implementation and development. On the anniversary, it welcomed the “finalization of a bloody armed conflict” and that “the themes of peace have entered into the awareness and discourse of the authorities, political and social organizations and the collective imagination.” It endorsed congressional approval of “Framework

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Legislation of the Peace Accords” as “commitments of the State” and the newly created “National Council” set up to promote the reforms required to fulfill commitments for peace. “The Peace Accords are the framework for the entire UN system’s activities in Guatemala, and along with the Millennium Development Goals, represent the agenda and the historic opportunity to advance welfare and human security. . . . Peace is a work of daily construction for everyone. The commitment to peace should be expressed in concrete programmatic tasks of the government and political and social organizations to achieve a firm and lasting peace” (United Nations System, 2006). The UN Development Program (UNDP) proposed a proactive framework for Guatemalan peace-building and development in its 2005 Human Development Report. “The report underlines that it is possible to break the vicious association between ethnic diversity and inequality and create a virtuous circle of human development that benefits all.” It indicated the following priorities: 1. increasing productive capacity of the population through economic reform; 2. scaling up political participation from the local to national level; 3. developing human capacity through educational reforms; and 4. eliminating racism and discrimination from Guatemalan culture and institutions. The key challenge to promote human development in the country is to make Guatemala an inclusive and pluralistic state. (UNDP, 2005)

European Union (EU) donors and international and Guatemalan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) met to review the peace accord implementation on May 2 and 3, 2007 in Brussels and concluded: “Ten years after their signing, advances in fulfilling the accords have been minimal.” The participants faulted “the lack of political will of successive governments and the elites who run the country who are mainly responsible for this situation.” The report was particularly critical of the lack of “a fiscal pact and tax reform that gives the State the necessary resources to fulfill its obligations flowing from the accords.” It found the agreement on identity and rights of indigenous peoples “has had a very low level of implementation.” With regard to “access to justice, impunity, police reform and combating parallel powers, despite some institutional changes and considerable international aid, the situation has not improved.” The authors strongly endorsed the creation of the International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG), approved by the Guatemalan Congress in mid-2007. Finally, European donors criticized the lack of implementation of the

DEVELOPMENT FROM BELOW?

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social and economic agreement. “Because there is no coherent governmental policy for rural development,” European agencies have withdrawn their support for agricultural development. In a study for the Guatemalan Pro-Peace Foundation, its authors concluded that “Vast political power has long been held by an elite that continues to use the state apparatus almost exclusively to defend its own interests.” “While many sources say that little or no progress has been made in resolving the issues that led to war, we find that the Peace Accords did at least open a dialogue on political participation by historically marginalized groups,” citing the creation of Community Development Councils (COCODES) as one positive institutional example (Carlos Sarti and Isabel Aguilar, Inforpress, February 2, 2007). These criticisms of state, market, and civil society elites are compelling. But neither peace agreements nor their implementation should be assessed solely at the macro level. Mid-level and grassroots expressions of coexistence, cooperation, and grounded implementation of the peace agreements must also be examined. During this decade, leaders of CSOs have had to grapple with their transition from opposition to sometimes reluctant participation in the compromises of governance. Some human rights leaders (Frank La Rue, Helen Mack) and indigenous leaders (Rigoberta Menchu) for example, did play roles in the Berger administration. Private sector organizations, especially CACIF, have had different relationships with successive administrations—from overt antagonism toward Portillo to quite comfortable (if not preponderant) influence on the outgoing Berger administration. The private sector has taken some initiatives to grapple with poverty through foundations and philanthropy, but steadfastly resists measures to strengthen government or increase its tax contributions. Market actors are dubious about the state. What of civil society? Let’s next examine how religions, local government, education, and migrant remittances help, or hinder, the process of development and peace-building.

Religions, Civility, and Peace-Building The violence before, during and since the accords shows how far Guatemalan society is from civility. Yet in certain key moments, the earthquake of 1976, the attempted coup by Serrano, the devastation from Hurricane Mitch, citizens have come together and carried out extraordinary reconstruction initiatives. The national Civil Society Association (CSA) played an important role in the formulation of the accords but was relatively absent or ineffective in ensuring its application. (See the excellent study by Hilda Salveson [2002].) Analytically and programmatically, “civil

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society” deserves deconstruction. Especially in Latin America, the emergence of civil society was largely through the churches. Unlike many other conflict and postconflict settings, religions were mostly peace makers. Despite tensions between them, a principal source of increasing civility may be found in Guatemala’s religious groups. Church leaders helped start peace-making, have reduced polarization, and are building “brother[and sister-] hoods of those who disagree.” They also challenge government on public policy. For example, the Catholic bishops criticized the Berger administration for not taking into account environmental damage from mining concessions and hydroelectric plants and have questioned the labor impact of a Central American trade agreement (Prensa Libre, September 20, 2004). Cardinal Rodolfo Quezada Toruño of Guatemala City criticized the administration during demonstrations against the free trade agreement. “I think the agreement was negotiated behind the backs of the people and the government didn’t explain it.” “We want a government that doesn’t serve as a lawyer for business but rather an advocate for the common good, one that seeks the welfare of the nation, not just of entrepreneurs who are indeed decisive for the future of the country, but so too are the popular sectors” (Prensa Libre, March 14, 2005). Christian churches and Mayan believers have traveled from Catholic hegemony through uncomfortable coexistence to more frequent collaboration seeking equitable development during the past decade. Liberal government measures in the nineteenth century denied Catholicism the exceptional privilege it enjoyed in many Latin countries. The Catholic Church does play a huge role in providing social services, education, and health care that, especially in rural regions, would be otherwise lacking. Evangelical churches grew rapidly over several recent decades, especially in the cities, forging close community cohesion, increasing their social services and, sometimes, political involvement. At the “high church” level of Catholic hierarchy, ecumenical and Evangelical confederation, collaboration is frequent. True, at the village level, deafening decibels of competing religious microphones may prevail on Sunday morning, but on balance, both at the national and local level, the churches have helped build peace. Especially among Mayans, religious practice has positively reinforced the identity of a people who had only experienced discrimination. The top three presidential candidates in the 2003 election included a Catholic, Oscar Berger, an Evangelical pastor and retired general, Efrain Rios Montt, and Alvaro Colom Argueta, probably the only Guatemalan ladino who has been inducted into the Mayan shaman priesthood by an association of Mayan priests. The candidates’ religious affiliation was not a determining factor for voters. Catholics, Evangelicals, and Mayan religious were all affected by the conflict and played differing roles in building peace.


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Catholics with Competition: Some Background Catholicism in Guatemala has zigzagged from identification with the Spanish crown in conquest and colony, disputes with liberal governments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, strong anticommunism, and initial support for the military in the mid-twentieth century. Then, prompted by liberation theology and the “preferential option for the poor,” there followed significant shifts in its theology, worldview, and social practice during the war. For the military and many Guatemalan economic elites, Catholicism was identified with the left. Repression targeted the church, high and low, hierarchy and laity, to a degree seldom before seen in the region, or in Guatemala’s own conflictive history. Thirteen priests, two bishops, a number of religious women and hundreds of lay catechists were assassinated. (A number of Evangelical pastors were also killed during the 1980s.) Yet Catholicism, despite its martyrs, is far from monolithic. Catholic charismatics are less prompted by a social gospel and conservative religious and lay organizations such as Opus Dei and the Legionnaires of Christ are more tied to the wealthy than opting for the poor. Religious social activism dating from the 1950s and 60s was followed by repression during the civil conflict, most especially in Guatemala’s “holocaust” period (1978–1983) when nearly 200,00 were killed under generals Lucas Garcia and Rios Montt. Among the high visibility “symbolic victims” was Bishop Juan Gerardi, murdered in April 1998, two days after presenting the findings of the Catholic Church’s study of wartime atrocities. He had helped the Catholic hierarchy find its voice. The civil conflict began in 1960 in the eastern portion of Guatemala, with occasional urban guerrilla forays in the capital. As repression increased under General Arana, the Guatemalan bishops in 1967 expressed the first of many lamentations, without accusing either side in particular. We can’t be indifferent when entire populations in the country are being decimated, especially in the Northeast, while every day the number of orphans and innocent victims of mysterious battles and vengeance, or when many men are violently taken from their homes by unknown kidnappers, detained in unknown places or vilely assassinated, their cadavers appearing afterwards horribly destroyed and profaned. (Verbum, Guatemala, August 6, 1967, 1).

The archbishop of Guatemala City in the 1960s, Cardinal Mario Casariego sought to mute any such collegial protest. For some time, in the words of Ricardo Bendaña, “The Bishop’s Conference was inhibited and didn’t

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make any important statement” (Bendaña, 1996, 147). That changed after the mid-1980s, when the Conference, provoked by assassinations of catechists and clergy, published strong pastoral letters and grew deeply involved in supporting refugees and scattered “resistance communities” in jungles near the border with Mexico. The next archbishop of Guatemala City, Prospero Penados set up an Office of Human Rights that became a persistent lobby in support of rights, gave a pastoral response to victims, and tracked atrocities that led to the “Guatemala Never Again” (REMHI) study. In August 2002, Pope John Paul made his third visit to Guatemala to recognize Brother Pedro de San Jose de Betancur’s work among the poor in the seventeenth century. More than a million turned out to welcome the Pope, and for two days, Guatemala celebrated a “fiesta.” The Pope spoke of his special concern for the indigenous peoples and for the poor, and reminded them of his affection for the martyred Bishop Juan Gerardi. As social problems multiplied since the conflict, the Catholic hierarchy has opted to maintain its firm commitment to social justice. The 2006 election of Alvaro Ramazzini, bishop of San Marcos, to head the Episcopal conference underlines this commitment. The bishop has been critical of violence, mining investments, immigration policies sought greater justice in the distribution of land, and also questioned the free trade agreement. The hierarchy retains some of the socially assertive leadership previously exercised by murdered Bishop Juan Gerardi. (Marta San Roman, Inforpress #1647, October 3, 2007).

Evangelical Growth Besides dealing with repression of its pastoral agents, the Guatemalan Catholic Church was confronted with another major challenge between 1960 and 1990—how to deal with growing numbers of evangelical church adherents. Catholic bishops had been accustomed to small “historic” Protestant churches (Presbyterian, Methodist, Episcopal) invited into the country by Justo Ruffino Barrios in the 1890s, with whom ecumenical exchanges were nonthreatening. But evangelical or Pentecostal converts, in what Archbishop Prospero Penados labeled the “invasion of the sects,” were more recent and less welcome. For nationalist intellectuals of left and center, as well as some bishops, evangelicals were rejected as “Yankee (that is, Protestant) imperialists” bearing cold war ideology from the United States. The three visits of Pope John Paul II sought to check this evangelical church growth as well as plead for serving the poor, repudiating repression, and reinforcing his notion of centralized hierarchy in Rome. While evangelical churches grew in numbers, the Catholic


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Church adapted to their stimulus with its own expressions of reform such as church base communities and charismatic revival. Religious competition has been good for Guatemalan Catholicism. Evangelical growth in Guatemala was rapid, controversial, at first socially and politically quiescent, and while precise numbers are still debated, probably reached one of the highest proportions in Latin America. Scholars now estimate Evangelicals at between one-fourth and one-third of the adult population, although some earlier estimates ran higher. (See works by Virginia Garrard Burnett and David Smilde.) For some evangelicals, conversion from Catholicism represented a survival strategy to avoid repression, and “reconversion” has occurred. For others, evangelical congregations offered a more effective moral message, a more affective community experience, encouraging greater male involvement in the family and less alcoholism. Recent research exploring values and beliefs, yields surprising parallels between Pentecostal and charismatic Catholics—the “Pentecostalization” of both religions, according to Timothy Steigenga (2001). Evangelical Church leaders have played a supporting role in the peace process, broadening their social and political involvement since the accords were signed. An early 1990s example was the National Reconciliation Commission that included Catholic and evangelical representatives who helped initiate the peace dialogue. The Evangelical Alliance assembled thousands of faithful from over 500 churches in the main Guatemala City square to call for a reduction in violence (Prensa Libre, April 23, 2006). The peace accords led to a Consultative Commission for Educational reform that included Catholic bishops and Evangelical Alliance delegates. During the past three years, both entities collaborated in recommending revisions to the government’s proposed new Code for Children and Youth. Both organizations belong to the “Guatemalan Forum” that with other civil society organizations has, in public and private meetings, pushed an anticorruption agenda on the government. And both play prominent roles in the National Campaign for Educational Reform. Collaborative ventures at town and regional levels vary according to local leadership. Many local pastors sponsor peace-building ecumenical activities together and religious polarization has generally declined. Vitalino Similox, one of the leading spokespersons of the Conference of Evangelical churches of Guatemala, expressed his view of the Catholic Church as follows: “We need the Catholic church, with its convoking power and moral authority, to promote real reconciliation in our country. We need its leadership to seek reparation for the damage caused by the armed conflict. It needs to impose its moral authority and seek unity of all Christians and the whole society” (El Periodico, June 6, 2002, 16). Mario Ovalle of the Evangelical

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Alliance insists “we, as church, will not join a party. . . . We should think of Guatemalans, not of indigenous and ladino, civilians and military, reds and creams (colors of the top soccer teams), evangelicals and Catholics” (Prensa Libre, April 20, 1999). Mayan Spirituality Besides the emergence of evangelical churches during the final decades of the twentieth century, long invisible Mayan religious practices have surfaced in the public square. A radical departure in Guatemala, many public, including state events now begin with Mayan priests celebrating rituals, lighting multicolored candles at the four cardinal points, and chanting invocations to “Ajau,” the Creator manifest in nature. Mayan religion links its practitioners to their ancestors whose spirits are always present and accessible through prayer. Long relegated to tourist sites, Mayan religious expression and holy places are legitimated in the peace accords as well in literature. The Mayan cosmos-vision identifies each persons’ gifts and destiny, or nahual (a spirit or angel, represented by an animal) through their birth dates in the Mayan calendar. Maya Quiché poet Humberto Ak’abal has achieved national and international recognition and projects the spirit of Mayan religiosity through his lyrics (Ak’abal, 1999; 1998). Mayan shrines and the deep inter-penetration of Mayan-Christian beliefs have been recognized and respected. A sometimes romanticized interpretation of Mayan respect for nature is contrasted with consumerism and destruction of the environment. In a divided society, with overt and covert discrimination against indigenous the norm, discussing rights of indigenous peoples during peace negotiations indeed represented a radical breakthrough. Identity issues remain on the implementation agenda. The day after his 2007 election, Colom Argueta announced he would seek advice from a Council of Mayan Elders. As a leading Guatemalan social scientist had written earlier, “The increasing participation, organization and consciousness of the Mayan population throughout this period has been one of the greatest contributions of the peace process to democratization in Guatemala” (Azpuru, 1999, 111). Religious Coexistence and Collaborative Peace-Building Churches played a low key but important dual role in the early steps toward negotiations. In the words of Luis Pásara, the Catholic Church was both “an interpreter of Guatemalan problems in relation to the armed conflict, and an active mediator” (Pásara, 2001, 60). In early 1989,


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following the lead of Oscar Arias and the Central American Peace Plan, the Guatemalan government set up a National Reconciliation Committee, led by Bishop Rodolfo Quezada Toruño of Zacapa (in September 2003, he was named cardinal archbishop of Guatemala City). The committee began a “national dialogue” in support of negotiations to end the conflict. Since 1988, an ecumenical group had supported the peace process, celebrating well-publicized liturgies for national reconciliation and justice. Evangelical, mainline Protestant churches and Catholics belonged to the group. A Permanent Assembly of Christian Groups focused discussions on the war, human rights, land tenure, ethnic rights, social justice, mass poverty, freedom of expression, and the unwelcome militarization of the country (Berryman, 1994, 137). This ecumenical movement led by Bishop Quezada set the stage for negotiations and for the Bishop himself to become a key mediator. Like South Africa’s Archbishop Tutu, the role of Bishop Quezada Toruño was key to starting the peace process. In March 1990, the Norwegian Lutheran Church sponsored a meeting in Oslo with the National Reconciliation Committee headed by Bishop Quezada and the URNG guerrilla leadership. Both parties invited the UN to be involved as it had in El Salvador. Two months later, Quezada again mediated a session with the URNG and Guatemalan political party leaders in El Escorial, Spain, followed by subsequent meetings in Mexico and Colombia, usually with Bishop Quezada or Bishop Juan Gerardi as brokers. The United States, relaxing its cold war defensiveness, supported the dialogue. Once the UN was invited into the peace process, Quezada stepped back and let the UN appointed mediators take over. Bishop Gerardi emphasized “pastoral work and reconstruction of the social fabric, building peace from below and from within” (Edwardo Guttierez, cited in Pásara, 2001, 62). An editorial in Prensa Libre (September 29, 2003) wrote that “Quezada Toruño was the conciliator in the long peace process . . . [and] has managed excellent institutional relations with politicians of every stripe and with representatives of the evangelical churches, so that he has become a symbol of conciliation between these different interpreters of the Christian message.” In name of the Ecumenical Forum for Peace, which includes the Catholic, Anglican, Lutheran and Presbyterian as well as the Conference of Evangelical churches, Anglican Bishop Armando Guerra said, “we recognize his huge contribution to the peace process as well as his constant efforts for reconciliation and human rights” (Prensa Libre, September 30, 2003). The church focus in the 1990s had shifted to human rights and pastoral support that led to the REMHI study. The Archdiocesan Human Rights Office embarked on a massive effort to document the “historical memory”

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of repression. Nearly 600 interviewers went to the field to gather testimonies from over 55,000 survivors of massacres. On April 24, 1998, Bishop Gerardi presented the findings of the “Recovery of Historic Memory Project” (REMHI), entitled Guatemala: Nunca Mas (Never Again). The victims of the war included 150,000 dead, 50,000 disappeared, and nearly a million refugees. The study reported 422 massacres, 70% of them committed during 1981 and 1982. It found the army directly responsible for 60% of the victims, 6% by civil patrols and military commissioners, and 19% by a combination of army and paramilitary forces. The guerrillas were found responsible for 9.3% of the victims. (REMHI Summary in “Challenge,” EPICA, 1998). Influenced by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission led by Archbishop Tutu in South Africa, but more limited in scope due to the amnesty provisions of the Guatemalan cease-fire and accords, both the REMHI and the UN supported Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) reports sought to clarify responsibilities, permit victims to tell their stories, seek healing by airing brutal facts, in hopes that such atrocities would occur “never again.” Both reports gained international attention, though not all Guatemalans wanted to revisit their history. When simplified versions of the reports were published for use in schools, there were objections that “informing children about the war risked prolonging it.” Much more than peaceful coexistence, the Guatemalan churches have jointly created space for dialogue and for building a more civil society—more than in many countries, they embarked on peace-building. Religions have helped expand notions of civic responsibility. Many CSOs had their origins in Christian as well as Mayan religions. I believe that the high-profile Civil Society Association (CSA) role before the accords has given way to a deeper-rooted and more extensive network of CSOs, ranging from grassroots community organizations to national level associations. Cooperatives, schools, clinics, and hospitals originating in the churches carry a great deal of the social service burden of society (Reilly, 1998, 169–208). Besides religious organizations’ involvement with human rights and the peace process, the “civic” side of civil society is adopting more political dimensions. For the past fifteen months, representatives (usually the secretary-general) of all but one of twenty-two Guatemalan political parties have been meeting in a “Permanent Forum of Political Parties,” a very novel “space” for learning and discussion. Using the peace accords as a starting point, the forum discussed what should be the ongoing role of the Guatemalan state, and agreed on a “shared national agenda” to: increase internal democracy of civil society organizations and political parties; to restore the fiscal pact agreed upon in 2000; to find ways to


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institutionalize the peace accords; and to strengthen congressional and executive branch human rights offices. The groundswell from civil society for significant change in public education led the Forum to endorse civil society’s “National Campaign for Educational Reform.” It agreed to lobby for increases in the education budget to 4% of GDP immediately, with a middle term goal of 7% (Prensa Libre, October 14, 2003). The peace accords brought high hopes, then disappointment. There have been positive accomplishments in the first ten years of peace accord implementation, especially at the local level, many originating from CSOs and the churches. Like in Northern Ireland, organizations of women multiplied seeking to build peace. New participatory spaces were opened. One legacy of the violence of the war in Guatemala was the multiplication of indigenous women’s organizations such as Mama Maquin, formed by indigenous women refugees from the war who fled to Mexico. They assisted the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to identify needs and aspirations of women in camps scattered across the border. Named after one of the first indigenous women killed by the army during the war, after their repatriation, they have continued involved in education, health, job training and human rights issues. The Mutual Support Group or GAM, founded in 1984, has continued a persistent critic of human rights abuses, as has the National Coalition of Guatemalan Widows (CONAVIGUA). Such organizations spawned during the conflict have joined more recent initiatives to ensure human rights and build peace. Like volcanic islands in the middle of the sea, they offer a place to land. I will examine other policy arenas, “islands of hope,” with recommendations to solidify the peace process under the new government. Colom Argueta emphasized his commitment to dialogue and collaboration rather than confrontation. He heartily endorsed the commitments of the Accords and the peace process. And he argued that development and peace-building go together. Education is a key middle range arena for long term development and peace-building in Guatemala. Let’s explore it in greater depth. “Education—An Act of Hope in Personal and Social Perfectibility” Peace is not simply the absence of war, nor mere coexistence between matched adversaries. It is neither “tranquility of order” nor the “silence of the tomb.” Peace is a dynamic process—no ready-made package but a work-in-progress requiring constant communication. It means education, an act of hope in personal and social perfectibility. . . . The peace accords gave us new paradigms, including those grounded in tolerance,

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pluralism and equity which lead to mutual respect with no exclusions. Education makes it possible that such values be realized in our country among our people. (Escobar Armas, 2000, 11)

Three of the peace accords of 1996 directly addressed education. They emphasized its indispensable role in creating a multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual society, an instrument for building equity and ending social exclusion. The business sector too claims to value education for increased productivity, employment and income. How can a new government and its successors ensure the quantity and quality of education? If there’s one point of agreement in the international development assistance business, it is that education, especially of girls, gives the greatest return to an aid dollar. Research findings confirm a direct positive correlation between investment in education and advances in human and social capital formation (See Birdsall et al., 1995). Human capital is the cornerstone of sustained development, but it is also key to recovering the social capital, trust, and confianza obliterated by thirty-six years of civil conflict and threatened by criminal and political violence following the peace accords. Yet, there is a growing gap in education, income, and technology between countries. South Korea had educational levels similar to Guatemala in 1960, but invested in education to prepare the skilled labor that today ships sleek cars and SUVs to Central America and the world. Chile upped its educational investment from 2% of GDP to 4% and 5% levels for the past four decades. The Irish, both North and South, refocused on universal education four decades ago and with a labor force attuned to rapidly changing conditions and high tech opportunities, earned the “Celtic Tiger” label. Can Guatemala compete? Not now. In the past decade, of every ten students who entered Guatemalan schools, 42% failed the first grade and fewer than three reached the sixth grade. Only one in ten completes secondary, and one in hundred graduates from university. Huge leaps in productivity elsewhere during the past fifty years drive home the necessity of a much better educated labor force. Let’s begin at the beginning. In 2002, pre-primary and primary public education in Guatemala had 20,339 rural and urban primary schools, led by 80,000 teachers, teaching 2,339,953 students. The National Teachers’ Assembly estimates that another 100,000 children receive no primary schooling for lack of schools and a shortage of approximately 7000 teachers. A recent initiative called the National Program for Education (PRONADE) sent 10,000 teachers to teach 300,000 children in remote communities where they seek to involve parents in local


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school management. The promising experiment limps along, the teachers often unpaid. Scattered rural populations are difficult to reach, and urban schools must deal with security problems like gang violence and theft. Given the inadequacies of public schools, middle and upper classes opt for private education at all levels, and thus remain indifferent to public education and reluctant to add tax payments to their already heavy investment in private schooling. Deficits appear too on the qualitative side of education. Overcrowded classrooms and poorly prepared, undermotivated, underpaid teachers lead to unproductive classes and ill-instructed children. The Northern Irish teacher/student ratio of sixteen to one is awesome compared to Guatemala’s where a primary school teacher with huge classes begins with a salary of less that $200 per month, and might double that salary after thirty years. (No wonder that most teachers take a second job, work morning and afternoon sessions, and prepare classes well for neither.) Passive pedagogy, authoritarian lectures, memorized answers, lack of books and teaching materials, absence of reinforcement at home or alternative places for reading and studying outside of the classroom yield at best, low quality students, more frequently, early dropouts. Guatemala is one of two countries in Latin America where teacher training does not require university level content. The budget amount destined for education increased since the peace accords, but by 2002 still represented only 2.5% of the gross national product (GNP) (Costa Rica and Panama allocate 5.4% to education, Honduras and Nicaragua 4%), putting Guatemala’s financial commitment to education almost as low as Haiti (Educación en Retroceso, Siglo XXI, October 21, 2002, 2). Successive administrations talk education, reject predecessor’s projects, invent new ones, and then reduce the budget. That might well change, given growing pressure. In 2002, seventy-four CSOs launched a national campaign for education, lobbying for an increase to the Education Ministry’s budget. An educational reform initiative was launched in 2001 based on proposals of the peace accords and the Commission for Educational Reform in 1998. There has been slow improvement in literacy levels in the country. Later than the rest of Latin America, this reform effort will tackle curriculum and teacher training or “professionalization.” Granted, the task is a long-term challenge. Growing engagement of CSOs, thinktanks, business associations, and the media might help change priorities. Teachers’ grievances with the establishment must also be dealt with. Their organizations focus heavily on contract, salary, and benefit issues. They went on strike and shut down schools for seven weeks during 2003. Solid technical education proposals are persistently swamped in the high tides of political battles and fiscal deficits. The organizations of civil society

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have grown more proactive and have enlisted media coverage to influence public opinion for investing in and improving Guatemalan education. With twenty-three recognized languages and dialects, the challenge of multilingual education is enormous. Although nearly half of Guatemala’s population is indigenous, bilingual teachers total only 18,000 of the nearly 80,000 teachers in the country. In predominantly indigenous departments including Huehuetenango, El Quiché, and Alta Vera Paz, there are 923,666 children between six and twelve, of whom 81% have received no bilingual education. While isolated experiments exist, given the lack of bilingual teachers, there has been little systematic work incorporating castellanization and indigenous languages into literacy and numeric training (Siglo XXI, October 21, 2002, 4). Long-standing agendas of racial bias must be addressed through combined economic, legal, moral, and educational policy approaches that can make educational opportunity for all a reality—not a rhetorical flourish. Pressures for educational reform come from outside as well as domestic sources. The World Educational Summit in Dakar in 2000 proposed standards and time lines for education, and Guatemalan NGO participants there criticized government neglect. UNICEF has introduced educational innovations from other countries. The Peace Corps’ Healthy Schools pilot project, teaming Volunteers with Guatemalan teachers, teach health and hygiene in primary schools using modern pedagogy. The experiment has been adopted and expanded to the national level by the ministry of education. During 2002 a European Community spokesman, showing signs of “peace process funding fatigue,” suggested that foreign subsidies might dry up if Guatemalan counterpart commitments to education were not met. If elites and middle-class citizens are unwilling to support the government to meet basic human and educational needs of the poor majority, “why should we?” If you drive through highland communities where school after school has been built by foreign donors, then glance at the skyscrapers, restaurants, and night clubs of the Zona Viva of Guatemala City, you know whose money goes where. Such conspicuous consumption for the few discourages external contributions for the many. The Center for National Economic Research (CIEN), one of the country’s leading private research organizations evaluated Guatemalan educational progress in 2002. On the basis of a ranking of variables including finance, efficiency, quality, and coverage, the authors concluded that “education is totally mediocre.” Since the peace accords, financing of education has increased somewhat, literacy levels and national coverage have improved said Maria del Carmen Acena, then director of CIEN. “There have been improvements but they are terribly slow . . . and we are falling behind in comparison with other countries like Panama and Costa Rica.”


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(Acena was later named Minister of Education in the Berger administration.) Among suggestions for improving the educational system, the CIEN study proposes the following steps: ●

● ● ●

jointly with civil society, establish a twenty year educational strategy; develop a more modern educational framework; develop measurable standards of educational performance; and consolidate the program of professional development of the teachers. (Prensa Libre, August 8, 2002, 10)

Political analyst Gustavo Porras noted: “Despite the political clouds that cyclically darken the horizon, at the base of society tendencies for positive change multiply in the country. Among them, there is social demand for education and training, growth of a competitive economy at the grassroots, a tendency toward organization, growing participation of women in society and politics, increased protagonism and qualitative impact of the indigenous population.” (Siglo XXI, September 29, 2007). Citing statistics from the National Household Survey (ENCOVI, 2006) he wrote that “Primary grade coverage is now up to 95%, 100% for 10 year olds. Illiteracy is at 24%.” The Permanent Commission for Educational Reform (CNPRE), issued a less sanguine report in November 7, 2006 entitled “A Portrait of Injustices: the Education System in a Racist and Discriminatory Society.” It noted that less than a third of Guatemalans go to middle school and less than a fifth to high school, those numbers much lower for indigenous who in primary schools represent 35.8%, at pre-primary 31.5%; at middle school 18.7%; and 12.9% in high school (Inforpress, February 2, 2007). Besides national educational policy commitments and financing, a major shift in attitudes will have to occur at the local level, school by school and district by district. PRONADE might prove a valuable experiment, since it represents very isolated and needy schools. Increased local involvement in education, with mixed financing from foreign aid, the government, and perhaps, perhaps, remittances might accelerate educational reform. Remittances from migrant laborers might inject fresh capital for rural education—but its’ advocates must first overcome the “legitimate paranoia” of those who don’t trust government. Without investment in human capital, there’s no prospect for social capital formation. And without better education at all levels, there can be little hope for a skilled labor force or an enlightened electorate. Youth need to appreciate tolerance and to recognize the futility of cycles of violence. The Northern Irish are

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capitalizing on long-term investment in human capital. Pressure from below may help to sustain educational reform initiatives in Guatemala. Now, let’s look at local government.

Municipal Governance—Nucleus of Peace-Building Although the peace accords represent a pact of elites, and international attention has focused on central state reform of executive, legislative, and especially judiciary branches, the efficacy of peace accords will have to be proven ultimately at the local level. Guatemala has twenty-two departments with appointed governors and 331 municipalities (similar to U.S. counties with an urban core surrounded by rural villages) that elect their officials. The Constitution of 1985 recognized municipal autonomy and designated a fixed portion (first 8%, then 10%) of national income to the municipalities for improving core support and local service delivery. Subsequent legislative proposals and spin-offs of the Peace Accords bogged down during the Portillo administration, including a major overhaul of the municipal code, decentralization law, participatory “urban and rural development councils” and efforts to straighten out the confusing legacy of corporatist, authoritarian and democratic legal codes. This presented both challenge and opportunity for the government entering in 2004. President Berger had clearly stated his “municipalist” convictions and did manage to significantly increase transfers of federal funds to local governments and advocated many revisions to Guatemalan law required to reduce centralization and concentration of authority. Decentralization legislation was passed in 2005 after a year of congressional debate (Inforpress, October 6, 2005). Enthusiasm of mayors and their councils for decentralization exceeds their capacity to manage the new responsibilities. The policy lines were clear: begin to de-concentrate some services to departmental capitals and then transfer responsibilities to the municipalities while attempting to strengthen local government, modernize public administration, and increase citizen participation. The 2007 budget projections continued to increase funds destined for decentralization, although the bulk of these funds come from the European Union (EU) to support decentralization and municipal strengthening (100 million quetzales), with a second donation of 43.6 million for strengthening civil society. Central government social investment funds (FONADES and FONAPAZ), always competitors with municipalities for government funding, were reduced in the current budget. (Inforpress #1647, September 22, 2006). Prior to the signing of peace accords, the country had taken steps toward decentralization of governance, with some recognition of the


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need to respect autonomy, encourage services and enhance authority at the local level. While financial transfers from central government to local governments date back to 1985, the latter still depend heavily on the center. Major changes in attitudes, competencies and legislation are required if local governments are to play a more effective role in democratization and development. Capacity must be built and corruption reduced if there is to be greater efficiency and transparency in managing municipal resources. The peace accords sought reforms to the municipal code and changes in legislation inconsistent with greater municipal autonomy. The Accord on Indigenous Rights raised the issue of adapting to parallel structures of traditional indigenous organization such as the cargo system, cofradias or brotherhoods, elders, and so on. To help finance the accords, government, the business sector, and CSOs agreed to a “fiscal pact” to increase revenues while better targeting social spending. The Fiscal Pact proposed further decentralization of government and the authorization of local property taxes as a municipal revenue source. Besides funding issues, the limited human resources and technical skills of local governments have received some support and technical assistance from bilateral agencies (GTZ of Germany and USAID in particular). The Institute for Municipal Advancement (INFOM) has often helped strengthen the technical capacity of local governments. Peace Corps volunteers began work in some thirty municipalities seeking to improve municipal planning, service delivery, and citizen participation. They brought information management, technical and simple organizational skills like encouraging weekly staff meetings (to bring financial decision-making out in the open), low-tech innovation like hanging pictures of completed public works projects in the mayor’s waiting room to demonstrate performance or bringing high-tech geographic information system (GIS) skills to help resolve festering boundary disputes or map natural resource deterioration. A number of former guerrillas, elected mayors in some of the most war-devastated communities, requested Peace Corps Volunteers and became their champions, to the great surprise of capital city based ideologues of left and right who assumed they could not work well together. An Association of Mayors (ANAM) has served as an occasionally effective, sometimes co-opted instrument for lobbying in favor of local government. At the Central American level, linked to the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) and based in Guatemala is the Federation for Central American Municipalities, (FEMICA). It provides valuable technical information and analysis on municipal governance in Guatemala and elsewhere. Capacity-building, plus the transfer of information and

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lessons learned by subnational governments elsewhere should be encouraged, and I believe, merits more support than the traditional flow of finance and technical assistance to the national level. Citizen involvement and control has been enhanced now that they can organize and elect municipal officials through local “civic committees.” These have offered rural towns, especially indigenous communities, the opportunity to enter local politics without affiliating with national parties. Legislative changes in 2005/2006 have weakened the civic committee, however, by increasing the minimum number of signatures required and reducing from three to two months the inscription period to write in candidates. These measures, designed by congressional political parties, have been labeled “unfair competition”; an “unnecessary limitation” (of) “political participation” and will likely “result in electoral abstention” argued a Prensa Libre editorial (September 5, 2006). This civic innovation had indeed encouraged more direct political participation unencumbered by unresponsive or flimsy national political parties. It has been particularly effective in indigenous communities. Quetzaltenango, the country’s second largest city had been governed well for two terms by an indigenous mayor and civic committee and there were more than thirty mayors serving in 2003 after election through civic committees. There is great promise in building Guatemalan democracy from the ground up. Key to the process are those in the middle of the social and institutional pyramid, especially local governments. The municipality is a weak institution still, just like citizenship. The exercise of rights and responsibilities is novel and tentative. Municipalities reach down to citizens as well as upward to national authorities. Municipalities in Guatemala can become hinges capable of supporting democratization as well as development. Tocqueville recognized this potential in 1835 when he visited both the United States and Ireland—the latter then resembled today’s Guatemala in many ways—especially the coexistence of considerable wealth with extreme poverty (Tocqueville, 1969 and Reilly, forthcoming, 2009). As I have argued elsewhere: Institutions set the rules of the game—the formal and informal channels for decision-making, the frameworks that make citizenship operative and confirm it as preferable. The range of such institutions and organizations vary from society to society and, within any specific society, change over time. . . . Qualitative factors like participation, access, responsiveness, accountability and competition give life to the institutional fabric. . . . Local-level politics can be both a starting point and a lifelong school for citizen-ruler interaction. This is not an idealized, rose-colored notion of citizenship but the everyday negotiating, pact making, compromise and disenchantment that is the stuff of politics. (Reilly, 1995, 262)


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Some Guatemalan office-holders have demonstrated growing openness to accountability and responsiveness toward their citizens, and citizens in turn have always sought access to officials, though they are not always ready to participate in local affairs. There is demand for water, sanitation, roads and schools. There is need for transparency and conflict management, as well as technical inputs from mayors, whether former guerrillas or representatives of the right. Ideological labels lose their edge in the boondocks, where local level politicians know they have to deliver on a daily basis, and they are learning that all deliveries should be public. Whether Tocqueville, Popol Vuh, Boss Daley, Tip O’Neill, or Rigoberto Quemé (twice the indigenous mayor of Quetzaltenango), they would agree, that all politics, like development, democracy, and peace-building, is ultimately local. Guatemalan municipalities enjoy a political and legislative framework that may have even greater potential for promoting peace and development than the highly centralized Northern Irish local governments. The editorial board of Guatemala’s leading newspaper celebrated local level democratization like this: With adequate resources and decision-making capacity, affording them independence and liberty from the bonds of presidential and party politics, the municipalities would be equipped with un-imagined possibilities not only for meeting the need for public works and community services, but also for promoting job creation. The possibilities of municipalism are unlimited. (Prensa Libre, March 8, 2003)

The UNDP welcomed indigenous participation. “One of the most important advances observed during the past 20 years since formal democracy was installed in Guatemala, is the increasing role of indigenous people in local politics. One-third (133/331) of all municipalities in the country are now led by Mayan people” (UNDP HDR, 2005). With such endorsements of local problem-solving and democracy, let’s turn to one more arena for development and peace-building. Migration, diasporas, and remittances have played a significant role in Ireland, less so in Northern Ireland. They are already far more important in Guatemala. Financing Peace: Grants, Loans, and Migrant Remittances To finance the peace accords, the Guatemalan government was to increase social spending by increasing taxes to 12% of GDP by 2000. Congress and taxpayers resisted and the international community grew “fatigued.” An unlikely financial source has partially filled the poverty gap: migrant remittances—a grassroots response to ineffective development and no jobs.

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From Southern California to northern New Jersey, there are many towns where few lawns get cut, ditches dug, or strawberries picked without Latin American labor. Restaurants often have Guatemalan dishwashers, and many families have a Guatemalan maid or nanny. The latest official Guatemalan and International Office of Migration (OIM) statistics say 1.2 million Guatemalans are in the United States, other estimates range closer to 1.5 million, and President Portillo told President Bush that the number was closer to 2 million. The point here is the high volume of dollars the migrants and their networks send to their extended families in Guatemala. In 2002, Guatemalan remittances reached at least $1.689 billion, an amount surpassing tourism that had replaced coffee as the main dollar earner. As donor commitments wane and international finance recedes, remittance income keeps climbing and first surpassed $2 billion dollars in 2003, reaching $3.61 billion in 2006 and the Guatemalan Central Bank estimates they will exceed $4.2 billion in 2007. Since 2001, according to Donald Terry of the IDB, remittances to Guatemala eclipsed the combined transfers of aid to the country by the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and exceeded direct private foreign investment (interview, 2003). Terry estimates that one out of every four Guatemalan adults now depend on remittances. Money talks, and of a sudden, first Western Union, then the Bank of Guatemala, then local financial institutions such as Bancafe and Banrural began to seriously monitor remittance transfers and explore ways to lessen transaction costs while attracting new customers. (Mexican migrant remittances exceeded $10.5 billion in 2002, $14 billion in 2003, and $20 billion in 2006.) Financial resources for building peace through development in Guatemala have moved from the negotiating table of government, guerrillas, multilateral banks, and donor nations to the grassroots decisions of individual migrants risking a dangerous journey north. International banks and scholars have been surprised by the volume of these flows and now monitor them more carefully. If international peace/development assistance dries up, grassroots actors will have to carry the load for improving life conditions of the majority. Remittances have proven far more effective than most development aid programs in reaching poor households for improving living standards and consumption needs. Researchers are now exploring the development impact of these funds. Will remittances have to carry the burden of peace-building as well? If so, for how long? And what of the dependence remittances create? What of increased controls on immigrant flows, walls, high-tech detection, and the U.S. National Guard? The migrant worker/remittance phenomenon is worldwide, yet migrant workers have not figured much in debates about globalization. Capital and technology may go wherever, not so labor. According to Donald Terry,


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over 100 million migrant workers around the world send more than $100 billion home. This awkwardly integrated labor market represents a nettlesome but indispensable reality within the globalizing market economy. In 2003, remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean exceeded $38 billion, averaging transactions of $200–$300.

Migration Patterns Migration of Guatemalans to the United States was accelerated by the conflict. Early migrant flows of the 1970s and 1980s included many political refugees, then people seeking economic opportunity or survival. Many followed North American agricultural cycles and came for short periods each year, while a very few came on guest worker programs for temporary legalized contract labor in U.S. agriculture. For the Guatemalan government, with little rural presence (except the army), international migration was passively welcomed as an escape valve for population pressure and scarce opportunity. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that of the 1.2 million Guatemalan immigrants living abroad, 90% of them are in the United States of whom 60% are undocumented (LA Reports, August 23, 2007). As migrant families and communities consolidated in the States, they became both magnet and anchor for new arrivals that followed agricultural jobs throughout the country, or became “settlers” and put down roots. California has the largest concentration—probably more than 50% of Guatemalans in the United States—with Florida, Illinois, New York, and the Washington, DC, area well represented. Labor market opportunity as well as immigration policy influence both the numbers and the types of immigrants. Recent U.S. border policy has raised the stakes, forcing migrants to abandon relatively easy urbanized border-crossing corridors in Southern California and Texas for the hostile environment of the Sonora Desert with dangers from nature, organized crime, drug and people smugglers. Tragedies multiply. Over 400 Latin migrants are known to have perished from dehydration, exposure, and murder in the Sonora Desert entering Arizona from Mexico between 1999 and 2003 (NPR, “All Things Considered,” September 23, 2003). The rise of U.S. vigilante attacks on migrants in various border-states illustrates how uncivil U.S. society can be. Seeking to avoid the violent Mexican border crossing, some twenty-one indigenous people from San Rafael La Independencia, Huehuetenango drowned in October 2003 after their small boat swamped in the Pacific off Oaxaca. Authorities are still finding bodies of immigrant victims caught in the September 2007 Southern California wildfires.

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Gradually, communities of migrants, settlers, second-generation residents and citizens have taken root, followed by the formation of “home town associations” (HTAs) seeking ways to support their Guatemalan communities. National networks such as GUATENET aim to influence North American public opinion and legislation on migration, and to influence Guatemalan government policies. Positive civic experience in the United States can trickle down to Central America. Transnational civil society is a reality. “Guatemalans here [in the United States] care more about Guatemala than the Guatemalans back home” said one immigrant. A relatively new phenomenon, these immigrant associations reflect earlier migrant settlement patterns and have caught the attention of the IDB, NGOs, churches, even the Guatemalan government. And Guatemalan politicians wouldn’t be left out. On September 30, 2003, a month and a half before their national elections, four leading presidential candidates interrupted their campaign to speak at a forum of migrants in Los Angeles. Soon afterward, Zury Rios Montt, then vice president of the Guatemalan Congress and Finance Minister Weymann met in Washington with Guatenet. Whether or not hustling votes in Los Angeles or Washington, DC, benefits Guatemalan politicians, there is no doubt of the value of remittances to migrant families. President Berger met with over 100 representatives of Guatemalan immigrant organizations on the eve of his address to the UN in 2004. He agreed to seek legislative changes to permit absentee ballots and acknowledged that “today more than ever we’re aware of the importance of migrants and their contribution to the national economy” (Prensa Libre, September 20, 2004). Community and collective remittances are growing, but individuals account for most of the volume. Telephone cards and cell phones simplify communication back home, while competition for financial transfer services has driven down exploitative costs. Now the commercial banking industry sees it can make money by structuring electronic transfer opportunities, and multiplying ATM sites where remittances can be cashed in rural Guatemala. Identification cards issued by Mexican consulates in the United States have facilitated Mexicans’ access to bank accounts, electronic transfers and debit cards. Guatemalan banks may follow that example. Second stories added to rural houses, TV antennas and dishes, and thousands of used school buses and pickup trucks (“pikops” in local parlance) are obvious signs of migrant remittances that improve transport and communications in many rural settings. The International Office on Migrations in 2002 studied twenty-two municipalities that “export” significant numbers of migrants to the United States. Of the estimated $93 million sent in remittances to some 63,000 families, the study found nearly 32% went to maintain the household, 11% to cancel debts, 9% to


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education, 9% to household improvements, 9% to savings, 6% to health, 4% to business investments, and 2% to agricultural inputs (Prensa Libre, September 22, 2003). Household survival and better living conditions still outranks productive investment of this money. Growth in remittance income offers new windows of opportunity for local services, small business investment, and peace-building. NGOs working in microfinance have begun to partner with development banks to channel a portion of remittances to investment as well as consumption. So too do more general purpose development NGOs. Former Guatemalan ambassador to the United States William Stixrud used to meet with Guatemalan groups resident in the United States to explore mechanisms for community development investment and social service delivery through collective remittances (interview with author, February 9, 2003). Transforming private capital flows into public investments and services is difficult, though some very encouraging cases have been documented such as the Los Angeles Kanjobal Mayan community, which has contributed to construction and maintenance of classrooms and a church as well as payments toward campesino medical costs in the hospital in Santa Eulalia, Huehuetenango (UN/CEPAL, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c). The IDB recently held a conference in Guatemala to encourage greater investment use of these funds and the University of San Diego’s Joan Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice as well as the University of California in San Diego (UCSD) and Santa Barbara (UCSB), and the New Americans’ Museum in San Diego have been tracking the phenomenon. Middle term prospects for both migration and financial transfers will depend on jobs in the U.S. economy, on the effectiveness of border controls, and on the political clout of those in the United States who regard immigrants as assets, or as liabilities. Most telling will be the securityrelated attitudes and measures emanating from the September 11, 2001 benchmark—when more than 3,000 American victims of terror died, not unlike 200,000 innocent Guatemalan victims of state terrorism during that civil conflict—with American governmental complicity. Regardless of futile walls and costly surveillance instruments, in the long run, remittance income will begin to decline as new generations “disconnect.” An excessive dependency on such transfers could harm the poor in Central America, and dissuade struggling migrants in the United States from investing in their own human and social capital, and that of their children. Peace in Guatemala and elsewhere requires integral development and opportunity much more than remittances, at least until the vision of a long-exiled Guatemalan writer be finally realized. Always troubled by the divisions of his society, Luis Cardozo y Aragón imagined a hope horizon beckoning Guatemalans, the Northern Irish, all of us. He wrote that

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“We are Indians, we’re mestizos, we’re Creoles and later we’ll be nothing else than Guatemalans. Much later, now without borders, without countries, we’ll be citizens of the milky way. . . . Not with nostalgia for the past, but with nostalgia for the future, our return to the future” (1986). In the meantime, thousands of immigrants gathered in Los Angeles a few years ago to watch the Cardinal Archbishop peace-builder Quezada Toruño of Guatemala bless a statue of the Christ of Esquipulas that had been carried across the border by several migrants from the Guatemalan community in Los Angeles. “We tried to bring it through customs, but they wouldn’t let us. They said we needed Lord knows how many papers and that they couldn’t let it into the United States (Prensa Libre, September 8, 2003). So the immigrants smuggled the statue through a tunnel under the fence and the cardinal came to bless it. The “wetback Christ” became a Guatemalan religious remittance to the United States. Propositions Guatemala and Northern Ireland, one poor and the other relatively rich continue to build elusive peace. Implementation has been slow, difficult and often appeared to move in reverse gear. Postconflict violence escalated continually in Guatemala while it receded in Northern Ireland although historical narratives and prejudice continue to fuel distrust. A shared future appeared elusive in both settings. They can learn from each other, and both can teach lessons on locally controlled peace-building to people and countries throughout the world—including my own—as it stumbles through clouds of rhetoric to unsuccessfully impose unworkable “peace” in Iraq, Afghanistan, or unconditional support for one side in the Israel—Palestine impasse. Let me conclude with some propositions (none revolutionary but all often ignored) to summarize the argument of this section and introduce the next. 1. Peace-building transcends borders but requires roots at home. Guatemala’s future is immersed in the Central American context and United States orbit (just as Northern Ireland is influenced by the United Kingdom, the Republic, and the European Community). However important third parties were for “getting to peace,” as the past decade in Northern Ireland and Guatemala demonstrates, external actors are usually secondary during implementation and can at best reinforce a process that ultimately must be ratified and practiced locally in day-to-day living. 2. Peace-building requires profound attitudinal and institutional change. Tocqueville celebrated both “equality of condition” and


3.

4.

5.

6.

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“art of association.” Grassroots democracy, equitable development, and power-sharing across ethnic divides and religious identities requires new narratives, trust, and social patience. As a Guatemalan analyst observed, “[d]emocracy is a consensual form of conflict resolution. Its goal is to open space for building consensus, but its dynamics work neither rapidly nor by decree” (Osvaldo LaPuente, Prensa Libre, June 7, 2004). Neither “invisible hands” nor structural adjustment have yielded equity, justice, or peace. Markets, seldom truly “free” and infrequently fettered, should not be allowed to dwarf states, international organizations, and civil society. Peace-building is in tension with austerity and can be swamped or reversed by poverty, even by perceptions of unequal treatment. Development models and social policy must combine the strengths of state, market, and civil society actors and not be subservient to any one of them. Peace-builders should remember that ethnic conflict is usually over something else (land, resources, territory, dogma, ideology, narratives, attitudes, religion, economic opportunity, etc.). The Guatemalans, despite deep ethnic division, show the Northern Irish and the world that religious competition can become cooperation. Peace-building in Guatemala requires more citizen security, better policing, and control of criminal violence. Postconflict violence has plagued both settings, but Northern Ireland is creating a type of effective, all-community policing model that could greatly benefit Guatemala as well. Guatemala requires more social investment that implies a strong state collecting more taxes from the elite and middle class. It requires change in U.S. and European policies to make “fair trade” fair and to level the proverbial “playing field” for competition with subsidized farmers in North America and Europe. Guatemalan citizens and CSOs create synergies for building peace through middle range activities and programs in arenas such as religion, education, local governance, and investment of migrant remittances. They also require and deserve an economy that creates jobs, that distributes as well as produces wealth, a government that protects citizens and regulates markets so as to improve its policies—the “who gets what, when, and how?” questions that should have as their purpose the common good, not particular.

Now let’s look at Northern Ireland and its peace process to date.


4

Elusive Equity and Security in Northern Ireland

“. . . . We are hunters and gatherers of values . . . .” (Seamus Heaney, Nobel Lecture, December 7, 1995)

I

n 1998, after a long period of ethnic conflict known as “the troubles,” the people of Northern Ireland (NI) made some tough compromises and set out on the road to peace with the signing of the Belfast, or Good Friday Agreement. “The troubles, like all complex historical events, have produced rival explanations: they have been seen as the aftermath of colonization; as the clash of religions; as class warfare; as ethnic disputes; or, in their degenerate forms, as the thuggery of rival gangs. No one living in Northern Ireland went unscathed by them; eventually, everyone on both sides knew a friend or family member whose life had been changed (or ended) by them” (Vendler, 1998, 40). In these chapters, I examine the implementation of the peace process, concentrating on economic reality, shifting values and civil society efforts—all of them until now overshadowed by hard-line politics and fragile political structures. Can markets and civil society trump politics in NI? Violence has diminished and trust, though still scarce, is growing. Elite pacts do not erase sectarian differences. Until May 2007, the political institutions set up by the agreement for “devolution” of power-sharing government within NI had been suspended for almost four years due in part to disagreements about the fact and form of “decommissioning” arms by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Despite some criminal activity, paramilitaries have confined violence to disciplining their own members. There is relative peace in NI, but political ferment overshadowed and distracted from economic recovery and social equanimity. Building peace after deep-rooted conflict is a prolonged and often painful process.

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On May 8, 2007, NI initiated a hopeful new phase of peaceful politics. The 108 members of the Northern Irish Assembly designated a twelvemember administration to be led by Ian Paisley of the Democratic Union Party (DUP) as first minister and Sinn Fein’s (SF’s) Martin McGuinness as deputy first minister. Once again, a Northern Irish government is attempting to share power following the terms of the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement of 1998. The first such initiative collapsed in 2002. Only after considerable pressure from British and Irish governments did Ian Paisley and Gerry Adams, now the major party leaders, finally meet face to face to fulfill commitments made in 2006 to again share power. The long-time adversaries amazed press, politicians, and diplomats as they accommodated to the present reality—suspending the underlying constitutional dispute over the long-term future of the province—and affirmed a shared value in peace. Ian Paisley’s turnabout from firebrand to affability was a dramatic departure from his public position and persona—leading some long-time Unionist collaborators to resign from his party, while Adams, who had long expressed a readiness for peaceful collaboration, seems to have retained credibility among nationalists in the North. The decision on continued union with Great Britain or eventual (re-)unification with the Republic of Ireland will be decided some time in the future through peaceful elections. The “clash of sovereignties” is postponed, remanded to the flow of time, demographics, and economics. Both men expressed hope for the future, and recognized the tragic violence from sectarian struggle that had cost thousands of lives. The leaders saw their differences trumped by the “peace dividend” of economic and political opportunity, by international pressures, and by fatigue at the violence. Yet sectarian differences remain, “peace lines” (walls) still separate neighborhoods and mistrust if not hostility prevails among many of their followers. The same leaders who now embrace peace were instigators of hostility and now must tackle very different issues in the Assembly. Resumption of power-sharing challenges these politicians to learn the nitty-gritty of government. Their leadership had been practiced through grandstanding for constituents rather than negotiation with opponents. Before grappling with coexistence and reconciliation, the restored power-sharing Assembly’s priority attention must be to impose unpopular charges for water consumption and revise equally controversial educational testing. Are the politicians prepared for the sticky issues of peace? They have begun well.

What About Citizens? As Paul Arthur (2000) and Harold Saunders (2001) remind us, forging peace agreements and achieving their implementation requires at least

ELUSIVE EQUITY AND SECURITY IN NI

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dual tracks. If there is clearly a primacy to the elite, political, diplomatic track, there is also a complementary, informal, trust-building civil society side that is indispensable—especially for getting beyond “yes.” A practitioner like Quintin Oliver agrees on: “the role of civil society in shifting mood and opinion over recent year to encourage the peace process. Not run it, manage it nor direct it note. But mood and atmosphere can be critical backgrounds against which politicians and community leaders can feel able to make moves. That is classic conflict resolution” (Oliver cited by Guelke in Crotty and Schmitt, 2002). Adrian Guelke (2003) suggests that civil society was more engaged in the run-up to the peace agreements than in its implementation, attributing the decline to a sense of relief that, with the Agreement, their “the job was done.” He emphasizes the consociational, elitist nature of the Agreement that is hardly inclusive, as well as the reluctance of civil society actors to enter directly into policy formulation or its implementation (As in other parts of the world, civil society organizations (CSOs) originated outside, usually against the government, and prefer to be critics and sometimes loyal opposition). We’ll return to this discussion later after exploring the context of “the troubles.” Religious division is part of the problem. The population totals 1,685,267 according to the 2001 census. The Catholic minority is catching up to the Protestant majority. According to the Second Report of the 2001 census, Catholics represented 43.76% of the population and Protestants 53.13% (who are subdivided into Presbyterians 20.69%, Church of Ireland 15.3%, Methodist 3.51%, “other Christian” 6.07%). Economics complicates the peace. NI is becoming a service economy. Its industrial strength ebbed while globalization advanced, the European Community expanded, and investors sought calmer climates (especially in the Republic). Despite relative abundance and recovery, building peace in this rust-belt setting encounters many of the challenges facing poorer “postconflict” countries. Relative deprivation fuels discontents that tunnel beneath the ethnic divide and surface as political rigidity. Hardcore unemployment and the lack of status respect on both sides reinforce centuries-old divisions. “It was social and economic inequality that had fueled nationalist protest at the start of the troubles and many nationalists could be assuaged by the promise of equality within existing territorial boundaries,” writes Jonathan Tonge. “For true republicans, however, it was the denial of the political right to national sovereignty that needed to be addressed” (Tonge, 2005, 53). The “true republican” position was placed on hold by the Agreement. Until mid-2006, political breakthroughs seemed unlikely. Many republican and loyalist political leaders have been deeply mired in the past. Do they reflect or lead public opinion? Popular attitudes as measured by Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT) surveys through 2003 indicated growing polarization, though not at all equaling some

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politicians’ intransigence. Elections of November 2003 and 2005 tilted toward the hard line, the extremes. Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) outpolled the moderate Ulster Unionist party (UUP) on the loyalist side of the divide, and SF gained more seats than the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) among republicans, the net result a threat to power-sharing given the relatively rigid position of both victors (Irish Times, November 29, 2003). Roger Mac Ginty notes that until the 2003 election, 80% of Protestants said that power-sharing must play a role in any NI government. “The emphasis on either/or constitutional choices by NI politicians (and journalists) misreads the public mood. More than any other option, the people of NI want effective devolution” argues Mac Ginty (ARK Research No. 18, April 2003). Gillian Robinson agrees. “People in NI seem to be reflecting the starkly drawn identities and incompatible constitutional demands being presented by their political leaders. . . . While institutions to promote cultural, religious and political pluralism are having some positive impact at grassroots levels, there are worrying indicators that NI is in some respects becoming more divided again” (Gillian Robinson, March 4, 2003). Do NI’s political leaders listen only to the extremes? Would dissidents and hardliners use recent electoral victories to decrease polarization? Would the IRA’s long delayed decision to put its weapons “out of use” make a difference? Who would be prepared to work on a challenged economy? NI politics has bogged down, but if the economy can recover, politics might matter less. Despite relative peace in NI, it seems clear that the awesome power of symbols, permanence of grievance, shortfalls of leadership, absence of trust, and impact of ethnic antagonism have combined to maintain the status quo until now. Outsiders, even prime ministers, cannot themselves make peace work. That has to come from internal leaders who can respond to and or channel grassroots demands, hear the less strident, and open alternative routes to the future. Civil society and political society must both grapple with how to move two alienated communities beyond violence and division. Might civil society leaders lead political leaders from extreme to more centrist positions? The Agreement reflected a considerable gap between popular aspirations of the majority for peace and political institutions that might manage and meld that divided society. The architects of peace were not sufficiently in touch with the women, the bricklayers, carpenters, and masons who had to design and build a lasting edifice—and few mid-level construction foremen and brokers were involved. I believe the future requires more low profile, slow work at coexistence, imagining other options, building trust, and rethinking identity. It means grappling with poverty and deprivation, with real and perceived inequity, with insecurity. Some Northern Irish voters in 2003 and 2005


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shifted their votes from the moderate center parties that had delivered the first phase of the peace process. Was this a tactical maneuver? An expression of frustration? Or did they perceive that hard-line political leaders were smart enough to know they needed to include the center as well as the extremes? Events of 2007 seem to support the latter. The dispute can best be framed in terms of relationships marked by distrust, and economics complicated by inequity, not just ethnicity and dogma.

The Inquiry I have been a frequent visitor to Ireland, North and South since the 1960s, and enjoyed a Fulbright fellowship there during 2004. I focused on the implementation of its peace accord through a normatively driven social inquiry that seeks to improve the conditions of life of Northern Irish people, is inductively grounded in their real world problems, and is critical and evaluative (Meehan, 1994). Like Tocqueville when he visited Ireland in 1835, my contemporary questions addressed religion, governance, schooling, and especially poverty (Reilly, forthcoming 2009). My development experience led me to concentrate less on government and diplomacy, more on civil society and its organizations, since I expected to find greater potential for sustainability there. The Irish peace agreement was driven by political elites, but I sensed its implementation would depend on lower levels of society—on those who must live with the consequences of elite pacts on a daily basis. Given the sectarian dimension so prominent in NI, the first question I pursued was the role of churches in peace-building, or rather, how have the churches helped and hindered the process of change. A second related inquiry had to do with the efficacy of voluntary sector or CSOs at elite, grassroots, but especially middle levels, to advance civility and peace in the long run. The third set of questions addressed the contributions of local government and my implicit hypothesis (and hope) that good governance, effective policing, direct access to political leaders, and meaningful citizen participation should occur there so that accountable local politicians can deepen democracy and craft responsive social policy for the local majority and minorities. Peace-building is a prime example of public/private policy since, to be effective, it must engage private actors from markets and civil society as well as government. Public policy, if it is democratic, needs “platforms” where policy-makers and “policy-takers” of civil society can meet, agree, and disagree. Building peace, like supporting development, can be most effectively and efficiently done by focusing on the middle level leaders in the social pyramid (Reilly, 1995, 22; Lederach, 1997, 41). They are linked

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to elite leadership at the top, and to the local level or base communities at the bottom. My field focus was on people and organizations working in these mid-level “issue arenas” or “policy platforms”—in churches, local government, voluntary organizations, schools, and the arts. How do midlevel leaders build positive relationships, advance problem-solving, and, sometimes, effect reconciliation?

Peace, Economy, and Equity This and the following chapter analyzes the run-up and implementation of the NI peace process to date, highlights lessons learned, and recommends policies for those seeking to end violence, manage conflict, improve equality, and let the future rather than the past be their guide—in NI and elsewhere. My first observation is the close connection between building peace and achieving equitable development. Despite its relative wealth, equity issues have greatly complicated NI’s peace process. Some say the Northern Irish Protestants focus on security, while Catholics focus on equality—but in fact, each community grapples with both issues—developmental to the core—that will chafe as long as threats of violence continue, police are not trusted, poverty affects one or both sides, and the distribution of wealth and power is very uneven. Issues of fairness, relative poverty, and abuse of power permeate rationales for and memories of the conflict. As two U.S. brokers of the NI peace process wrote, “People want and expect to see improvement in their lives. Peace processes cannot thrive in a vacuum. They do best when associated with increased prosperity” (Mitchell and Haass, 2007). “It was social and economic inequality that had fueled nationalist protest at the start of the troubles and many nationalists could be assuaged by the promise of equality within existing territorial boundaries,” writes Jonathan Tonge. “For true republicans, however, it was the denial of the political right to national sovereignty that needed to be addressed” (Tonge, 2005, 53). Contemporary joblessness does fuel frustration. As the millennium began, according to the Northern Ireland Civic Forum’s antipoverty working group, “More than 100,000 working age households—one in five—have no one in work. One quarter of all adults in the region are at the lowest level of literacy and a similar proportion have no formal qualifications” (Civic Forum and Democratic Dialogue, 2002). Unemployment is highest among Catholic and nationalist men. Nearly one-fourth of all housing is rented from the NI Housing Executive, a social program to deal with low-income housing shortages and housing segregation, but also an indicator of dependency on the state. GDP per head stays steadily around


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80% of the UK level (Morrissey, 2000, 136), and yet “Per capita public expenditure is about a third higher than the U.K. as a whole” (European Union, 1999, 3). Economic growth may be one remedy for such imbalance. Northern Ireland’s economy sustained a growth rate of 6% between 1996 and 1998, 5.2% for 1999 and 2000, but fell to 2.5% in 2003 (Price Waterhouse, 2004). There were encouraging forecasts of economic recovery—3% growth in 2004 and 3.5% for 2005 (INVESTNI, 2004). Aggregate statistics tell one part of the story but distribution and deprivation tell another, since GDP varies considerably within subregions. For example, GDP in Belfast averaged 128% of the United Kingdom but elsewhere in NI it ranged between 66% and 75%. Just after the Agreement, “Average GDP was lowest in the West and South. . . . The highest relative deprivation is in Belfast, the West, South and Northeast of NI” (European Union, 1999, 3). Some economists point to slow but steady growth in comparative income levels during the past several years. If incomes still lag behind the United Kingdom, they are rising. The private sector is creating more jobs. Overall unemployment numbers have declined (though hardcore, long-term unemployment continues). Businesses still rely heavily on state contracts. Public sector employment has reached 42%. The voluntary and community sector provides at least 5% of employment, and is growing. Overseas investment is higher than the United Kingdom. Housing prices are rising and tourism is increasing at 4 and 5% per year, surpassing 2 million visitors in 2004. NI’s unsteady economy is not simply a result of “the troubles,” but stems from a decline in manufacturing and global economic trends (petroleum costs, research and development requirements, product cycles, new markets, etc.). It is adjusting to becoming a service economy and its private sector is learning how to compete under new global rules. Ironically, much of NI’s recent recovery is thanks to increased cross-border commerce with the Irish Republic. The overall economy is improving. Experts agree on what must be done to accelerate recovery, but not on to how to distribute the benefits of growth. Most admit the economy still relies far too much on state investment, too little on markets and entrepreneurs. To increase the private sector share of the market and to increase GDP per capita incomes, the Economic Development Forum (a consortium of government, labor, researchers, and business leaders), argues for greatly increased productivity and more “high value-added jobs.” To increase productivity, the Forum calls for more innovation, entrepreneurship, skills training and infrastructure. It insists on much closer links between education and business to produce a labor force better equipped for changing technologies and markets. The Northern Irish government too recognizes its economic challenges. “Productivity for example, is below the UK level. More people are

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unemployed for longer periods. . . . these deep-seated problems requires a fundamental shift from the current over-dependence on the public sector to a modern economy driven by business and focused on higher value-added and innovative products and services. Strengthening the private sector is an economic imperative” (NI Economic Vision, 2005, 1). Protestants in NI traditionally looked down on the Irish Republic for its poverty and took pride in their own industriousness. The recent economic performance of the Celtic Tiger to the South no longer permits such condescension. The market sector has not been indifferent to the peace process. The violence of marching seasons in the 1990s certainly discouraged tourism, but that industry was not the sole “loser.” Political instability correlates with economic stagnation argued the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in NI in a document published in 1994. In “Peace—A Challenging New Era,” more popularly known as “The Peace Dividend Paper,” the business think-tank and lobbying group underlined that “loss of life, property destruction and high security costs” led to disinvestment and economic decay (van Tongeren, 2005, 327). The CBI, along with other trade and business organizations in an association called G7, articulated business interests in peace-building. They invited U.S. business leaders to NI. Perhaps even more significantly, at least from the ground-level perspective, CBI with the Community Relations Council published antisectarian guidelines for employers. Like many CSOs, however, CBI has not continued proactively on the peace and reconciliation front, except for a 2003 background paper that stressed the role of business in trying to improve community relations, promoting social inclusion and the “benefits of a diverse workforce” (CBI, 2003, 3).

The “Northern Irish Problem” NI’s peace process is burdened by long memories, insufficient jobs, and a host of economic, political, social, and cultural problems—development challenges at many different levels. John Darby summarized the “Northern Irish problem” as a “tangle of inter-related problems,” including: a constitutional problem (integration with Great Britain? A united Ireland? Independence?); inequalities, especially in employment; cultural identity; security; religious difference; “and a problem of day to day relationships between the people who live in Northern Ireland” (Darby, 1995, 7). Today, the tangle of problems persists, but as he noted then, there continues to be less discrimination in housing, some integrated schooling, some power-sharing in local government councils and for the moment, at the top,


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examples of successful community relations initiatives and most religious leaders are persistently “pro-peace.” The British and Irish governments played key roles in the NI negotiations, with crucial support occasionally from outsiders such as Senator George Mitchell and President Bill Clinton. The European Community figured prominently in Irish Republic infrastructural development, and has financed many peace-building activities in the North and cross-border communities. The Irish peace accords (“Belfast” or “Good Friday” Agreement) focused on complex constitutional questions and governmental structure, leaving many of the issues that divided Protestant and Catholic communities to be worked out later. Elections of 2003 and 2005 indicated a hardening of positions. The Northern Irish process was hobbled on the surface over IRA decommissioning of weapons, but the division runs much deeper. The institutions were suspended, a review of the content of the agreement was rejected, with hardliners on both sides refusing to talk face to face until May 2007. Neither strong pressure from external actors, nor ratification by a majority of people in North Ireland and the Republic, nor fatigue from many decades of “the troubles” were sufficient to make the peace process work quickly and well. The Belfast Agreement was hammered out from above with external actors taking the lead. While Prime Minister Tony Blair could understandably want to offload the United Kingdom’s “Northern Irish problem,” Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Bertie Ahearn and the Irish Republic were little inclined to absorb the financial and political costs of the Northern population, its subsidies, and its quarrels. Yet both leaders moved forward decisively, setting the terms and the framework for the process. They were fully agreed on two points—paramilitary activity on both sides of the ethnic-religious divide must cease, and the Northern Irish people themselves must decide their future. But the external actors who helped broker the agreement were unable to generate momentum nor manufacture trust among Northern Irish whose lives, stories, murals, music, and memories all reinforced mistrust. The complexity of implementing Northern Ireland’s peace process stems from the unavoidable, daunting task of changing relationships, encouraging empathy and generating trust, especially at the local level.

Peace-Building and Development—Via State, Market, or Civil Society? More than forty violent conflicts dot the globe in a recent count. Most, but not all of them, are found in very poor settings. Peace-building today must

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grapple with development, identities, and structural inequality between and within countries. There are structural constraints on peaceful dispute resolution that range from interests of the lucrative arms business, competition for natural resources, the hubris of a hegemonic power, and the very framework of international trade skewed in favor of the wealthy. But development, like peace-building must tackle people’s attitudes, build trust, and change relationships, if they are to succeed in reducing poverty and ending cycles of violence. Even in relatively affluent, industrialized settings like NI, development is necessary if there is to be peace. Poverty, inequity, and relative deprivation helped fuel violence in NI that might continue without economic recovery. The concepts and practice of building peace and promoting development have overlapped in recent decades. Most twentieth century development models first centered on the state, then locked in on trade and markets, but have now begun to pay attention to civil society. Macroeconomic models prevailed initially in development policy and aid programs, to be slowly complemented by meso- and micro-initiatives such as credit for the informal economic sector. Peace-building in postconflict settings, like human development everywhere, takes time. Markets, civil society, and state must be engaged—at macro-, meso-, and micro-levels. Of course, NI enjoys substantial advantages over most contemporary peace processes. “It is a small region within a rich nation state, itself part of a prosperous economic union” (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2000, 91). That said, in 2000 nearly 46% of employment was in the public sector, with British subsidies of 4 billion pounds that amounted to almost one-third of GDP (ibid.). That is not a healthy ratio—certainly NI would not qualify for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan! An NI economy with hardcore unemployed strains the welfare system, feeds resentment, and prompts many people to place blame for the past rather than find hope for the future. Darby and Mac Ginty note that in most peace processes, “socio-economic development, if it features at all, is usually cast in a secondary role” and yet “a background of economic depression is a serious obstacle to peace processes” (ibid., 4). They note the “asymmetrical nature of many peace processes and the difficulty of improving structural inequities” (ibid., 238). There are often high expectations of a “peace dividend,” whether spurred by donors offering financial incentives, investors bringing fresh capital, or tourists arriving with the end of conflict. While it may not “make or break” a peace process, economic development often exacerbates inequality, a root cause of conflict (ibid.). Although absolute poverty in NI can’t be compared with underdeveloped countries, it is relative poverty, deprivation, and inequity there that feed resentment, undermine trust, and provide some spoilers with a


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“rationale” for violence. As the peace process unfolded, some paramilitary groups on both sides converted their skills into criminal gang activity. For centuries in NI, perceptions of inequality and unfairness loomed huge among blue-collar Catholics, who regard compensatory or affirmative action by government as rights long denied. Blue-collar Protestants now feel the pinch of sectors of the economy in decline, shipyards stilled, investment and technologies passing them by. Many are bewildered if not angered at their loss of status—a painful experience for Protestants who had looked down on Catholics from a Calvinist perch of superiority based on predestination and industriousness. Like development aid, “peace dividend” funds have sometimes escalated internal divisions as groups compete for resources, with the Protestants convinced they usually receive the short end. Cease-fires brought a “peace deficit” when security-related jobs and industries began to decline. While a more civil society might mediate public/private policy responses to poverty and inequity, there have to be jobs as well as subsidies. Markets must recover and businesses multiply to employ the majority of its people. What to make of “the state” in NI? Despite the Belfast Agreement and the on-and-off efforts toward self-government at NI’s Stormont Castle, for a large minority “the state” enjoys little legitimacy, its police represent “the enemy,” and government power-sharing is problematic at best. For the majority, their loyalty lies with a Great Britain that appears to have spurned them, leaving resentment but at least some readiness to try power-sharing. Local government, the most grounded setting for state and civil society relationships, is extremely weak, its powers limited by central, external authority (Great Britain). Policing and the exercise of power are fundamental to citizen security. Its one-sided abuse has contributed to mistrust and led to the consolidation of paramilitary organizations. Certainly, government social investment in education, welfare, and housing prevented a bad situation from growing worse. The social infrastructure is relatively sound, but the flow of subsidies appears unsustainable. What programs and safety nets will be provided by state and civil society to reduce violent responses to exclusion and injustice?

Civil (and Not So Civil) Society Civil society can be defined as broadly as Hegel’s “everything between the family and the state” or as narrowly as “those who agree with my point of view.” In NI for many, “voluntary sector” is a functional equivalent, while in the United States “nonprofits” might suffice. Some definitions stress “society,” others emphasize a normative “civility.” (For the latter, the

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“Orange Order” would be excluded, while for the former, the order represents a pure example of citizen mobilization and mutual support.) Some counter pose “consociational” political elite leadership to civil society leadership in political change and peace processes. For others, civil society refers primarily to those organizations engaged in cross-community dialogue, human and civil rights advocacy, and peace-building—necessarily embracing both sides of the divide. For still others, it refers to think-tanks, “talk shops,” research organizations, and the like. Business and labor organizations are sometimes included under the rubric but not always. I prefer to think in terms of distinct but overlapping (and often contentious) spheres and actors of “state, market, and civil society.” To avoid reification of the concept, I emphasize civil society organizations (CSOs) understood inclusively as “formal, private, voluntary, self-governing, non-profit organizations, (including some religious, labour and business organizations) that function at community, regional, national or international levels.” CSOs often serve as critics, a collective counterbalance to both states and markets, much as the role of transnational civil society can be both agent and critic of globalization (see Goulet, 1985; Howell and Pierce, 2001; Kaldor, 2003; Salamon and Anheier, 1994). Like in underdeveloped and developed countries, NI has generous and seamy sides to its society. Besides historical enmities, the decline in economic growth and uneven distribution of wealth drive discontents in richer as well as poor settings. Relative as well as absolute deprivation matter a great deal. Status and identity affect readiness to share power. How civil is the NI society? There has been a decline in violent crime and fewer incidents of political violence, although not always during the “marching season” or Saint Patrick’s Day parades. Certainly, the presence of paramilitary organizations on both sides of the ethnic divide attests to ongoing incivility. The IRA with its various dissident branches is mirrored on the Protestant side by the Ulster Defence Association, the Ulster Volunteer Force, and lesser gangs. The Orange Order among Unionists and the Ancient Order of Hibernians among republicans fit within a broad definition and play important social roles, but even scholars hesitate to call them “civil society.” Paramilitary or quasi-political organizations’ notoriety and media attention can obscure organizations at every level seeking to bring about positive change, deliver social services, education, and health, organize workers, sponsor sports, or build peace. At neighborhood, community, cross-community and NI levels, CSOs abound, estimated to exceed 5,000. The inputs of civil society to the early stages of the NI peace process were substantial, some of them internationally recognized. Nobel Prizes have been awarded to grassroots activist women as well as to courageous


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politicians who signed the agreement. Politicians John Hume and David Trimble were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1998 for their efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict within and across their communities, about twenty-two years after Mairead Corrigan and Betty Williams received the same honor in 1978. These two women, one Protestant, one Catholic, responded to the accidental killing of two girls by organizing marches in what came to be called the “peace people” movement of community level peace-building. While political analysis and media coverage during the years leading up to agreement featured international actors and NI political party leaders and their followers, the voluntary sector did play a fundamental role in influencing people to build trusting relationships, question tragic but unproductive cycles of violence, and offer alternatives indicating that peace might indeed be possible. Human rights organizations added normative depth to the voluntary sector while opening pragmatic avenues for peace advocates dead-ended in seemingly intractable sovereignty questions. “The troubles” had begun with demand by the nationalists for civil rights, especially equality in jobs, voting and housing. They encountered increasingly repressive police and military response. The Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) in Belfast, a human rights NGO combined critique of policing and emergency laws with policy alternatives for better administration of justice in the province. After cease-fires by paramilitaries in the 1990s and movement toward a peace agreement, CAJ’s strong advocacy of accountable policing translated human rights principles into concrete confidence builders for political activists, opening some to the possibility of decommissioning of arms. SF and the PUP parties adopted these human rights and equality positions in the peace talks. Eventually “many of the human rights measures proposed by CAJ found their way into the Belfast agreement, which had substantial provision for human right protections (Bell, 2006, 365). Bell argues further that human rights discourse helped “reframe absolutist clashes over power and sovereignty,” an important early input, and she recognized that “the real work often begins at the point of an agreement’s implementation” (370). While doubting its cumulative impact on attitudes in NI society at large, Adrian Guelke recognizes the important influence of many civil society initiatives prior to the agreement, including the Opsahl Commission that helped structure political discourse prior to the December 1993 public start of the peace process; the creation of the NI Women’s Coalition that facilitated negotiations; the work of citizens in the nonparty “Yes” campaign during the referendum on the Agreement, and finally “support given by civil society to the Agreement at times of difficulty over implementation” (Guelke, 2003, 67). In this, he echoes Paul Arthur who told

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me in another context, “when track one was in trouble, track two helped sustain momentum of the peace process.” When cease-fires broke down, or parties withdrew from talks, individuals often kept lines of communication open in settings sponsored by CSOs in NI and abroad. Initiative 92 and the independent citizen’s group known as the Opsahl Commission produced a series of recommendations on politics, law, justice and security, religious and cultural issues. But it was a single phrase within these recommendations, “parity of esteem” that in Guelke’s opinion resonated deeply, expressing republican aspirations in a way that loyalists could find acceptable. Not a magical formula, it was an evocative image, a synergy for peace empowering people on both sides to think that a political settlement was indeed possible. The Belfast Agreement did eventually incorporate the equality agenda drawn from the Opsahl recommendations. In 1998, the nonparty “Yes” campaign mobilized Northern Irish voters for a referendum on the Belfast Agreement even as the Irish Republic voted a referendum on dropping its territorial claims to the North enshrined in Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution. Well-known persons from civil society, the voluntary sector, and business community helped “sell” the case for the Agreement to majorities in both communities. The campaign received a bump from Bono’s U2 concert in Belfast with appearances by John Hume and David Trimble. The vote in support of the Agreement exceeded expectations. “It may be concluded that the independent “Yes” campaign was the result of a healthy civil society, and that the eventual vote of 71% in favor of the Good Friday Agreement in the May 1998 referendum would have been significantly lower had it not been for its contribution to the political process” (Cochrane and Dunn cited in Guelke, 2003, 74). The NI Women’s Coalition emerged from activist women involved in the community and voluntary sector, including Unionists, nationalists, and independents. The Coalition builds peace, with emphasis on inclusion, human rights, and equality. Its members played key roles in negotiations leading up to the Belfast Agreement, and since then, have promoted its full implementation. Their delegates were the only female signers of the Agreement and originated the idea of the Civic Forum to engage all viewpoints in public discussion. Senator George Mitchell noted that “The Women’s Coalition are professional, prepared, and I think they have made an enormous contribution to the process.” Besides their uncommon, cross-community membership, the Coalition’s advocacy has introduced well-grounded, common sense solutions for protecting the rights of children, achieving integrated education and housing, reducing domestic violence, and introducing Family Trauma Centers (Fearon, 2000, 163). To counter the absence of women in


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politics, Coalition members opted to compete as a political party, winning two seats in the 1998 NI Assembly elections, and another in 2001 local elections. However, the Coalition failed to win any seats in the 2003 election, but continued its support for peace implementation, cross-community cooperation, and reconciliation. The time was not yet ripe for transition from civil society, cross-community activism to partisan politics. A truly remarkable example of civil society conflict management at the grassroots developed during heightened tension and riots over parades in 1996. Rumors, panic, and a lack of reliable information compounded the situation. Riots were particularly violent in working-class, interface neighborhoods of North Belfast. Many people moved away due to the violence. Staff at the Community Development Centre (CDC) there came up with the idea of using mobile telephones—at that time a novelty—that would permit lines of communication between neighbors, within communities, across communities, and with police, housing, and other relevant agencies. The CDC became the hub of the network and phones were made available to reliable community members on both sides of the sectarian divide to report day and night on local events, dispel or confirm rumors, warn of gatherings, potential riots, and the like. Initially, the communicators were “emergency firemen” but with time, relatively stable, and reliable twenty-four-hour networks were operating. Direct, accurate communication replaced mistrust, suspicion, and rumors. The Community Relations Council funded the initiative and it was replicated in other neighborhoods of Belfast and elsewhere in NI. “. . . The notion of using low-cost technology to react to potentially dangerous confrontations in divided communities such as those in NI has proven its value” (interview with Neil Jarman, USC, May 4, 2007). The North Belfast mobile phone communications experience exemplified informal civil society problem-solving and an expanding impact of citizen networks. 1. Step one was reactive fire-fighting to manage violence through inexpensive technology; 2. The next stage expanded networks, building on trust and personal relationships, then moved into organizational training, capacitybuilding, planning, and prevention; 3. Then came the challenge of “embedding the peace”—not just stopping the violence. That meant building trust, creating space for dialogue, and building institutions to make peace work (Interview, USC, May 4, 2007, see also Neil Jarman, in van Tongeren, 2005, 440). Despite “Catholic versus Protestant” ethnic labels, many church leaders have consistently condemned violence from the pulpits and pushed for peace. Ecumenical organizations, research think-tanks, and universities,

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women’s organizations, the Civic Forum and neighborhood groups have created platforms for dialogue and prepared position papers that informed the peace agreement. “In Northern Ireland, the peace process has been built from the bottom up as well as from the top down, from the centre out as well as from the polarities in” wrote Colin Irwin, whose polls have diligently tracked public opinion on the peace process (Irwin, 2002 and www.peacepolls.org). We’ll further examine the role of some religious, voluntary, or civil society organizations in the next chapter. The seamy side of NI society and history means that trusting relationships are scarce. Hostility stems from small minorities on both sides of the divide, with large majorities tired of violence yet fearful of change. It will be up to the Northern Irish people, not social scientists nor British and Irish prime ministers, nor backward looking political leaders to make change happen. More jobs in profitable businesses, novel power-sharing by long-term antagonists, and far more attention to meso- and grassroots relationships must be concerns of peace. John Paul Lederach insists that “peace-building is more than post-accord reconstruction . . . [it] encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict towards more sustainable, peaceful relationships” (Lederach, 1997, 20). He advocates “moral imagination, the capacity to imagine and generate constructive responses and initiatives that, while rooted in the day-to-day challenges of violent settings, transcend and ultimately break the grips of those destructive patterns and cycles” (Lederach, 2005, 183). Like sustainable development, peace-building starts and ends with changing relationships. It entails the creation or restoration of social capital, those networks and linkages between antagonists that might lead to trust, reciprocity and interdependence. Like other types of capital formation, amassing social capital takes time. Some countries, like NI, have taken giant steps toward peace—initially by cease-fire, then negotiations, then on paper. Now let’s look at how it happened.

The NI Peace Process—Looking Back A peace process extends backward and forward from negotiations to end a conflict and sets the framework and principles of an agreement. “Their implementation may prolong the cycle for many years, during which time institutions must be established and reforms carried through” (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2000, 11). The NI peace agreement has been celebrated for its eclectic, top-down institutional approach, while local level obstinacy


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often bears the blame for delays in its application. Many crucial points were tabled during negotiations for subsequent attention. As is the custom in the United States, intractable issues were remanded to commissions. The lead actors in the agreement were the British and Irish prime ministers. If the external political elites were in full accord, why the hesitance? Was it a lack of leadership among domestic political elites? If so, can a new generation of politicians step in and make a fresh start, or will the intergenerational transfer of distrust prolong stalemate? Is it a question of structure, form, constitutional engineering? Many institutional initiatives have been proposed and foundered. Is it a problem of imagination—the “imagined communities” on both sides with identities rigid to the point of fragility? Does it have to do with space and turf (the territorial dimension of conflict)? Or of time (an exclusive focus on the past with little attention to the future)? Leadership, institutions, imagination, space, and time—all are entwined in the conflict and in its resolution. They combine to create vicious circles and defeatist dynamics that preclude smooth implementation of the peace accords. There are deep roots to this conflict. “Building peace takes as long as did the conflict itself,” is a daunting thought when one thinks of NI. I will not here explore Irish history, the British attempts to control it for eight centuries, the imposition of English rule on the Northern Province of Ulster under Queen Elizabeth I as the sixteenth century ended and King James oversaw the subsequent land redistribution to English, Scotch, and Welsh settlers who came to be known as the “Planters.” The lines between Catholic and Protestant, the religious and cultural as well as territorial divisions were drawn by 1700 and have remained to this day. Subsequent benchmarks include the failed Easter Uprising of 1916 against British rule in which the IRA’s leadership was executed, but SF, its political wing, won the election of 1918 and set up its own parliament. The tense situation in 1921 led to draconian emergency powers assumed by the mostly Protestant Northern Irish police force. The partition of Ireland that took place in 1921 recognized home rule for the twenty-six counties of the South. The six Northern counties of Ulster received a subordinate government based in Stormont Castle, Belfast, and got “devolved” powers from Great Britain for administering local government, policing, education, and social services. Ultimate authority remained in London. NI’s Unionist majority, the majority Protestant, have continued loyal to and united to (hence “loyalist,” “Unionist”) the United Kingdom and many Catholics want to belong to the Republic of Ireland. But other issues were festering. The Civil Rights campaign begun in the late-1960s showed that many Northern Irish Catholics were prepared to focus on equality in the North

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as much as seek incorporation with the South. The movement focused on employment, housing and jobs, using marches, media events, and sit-ins mirroring civil rights protests elsewhere. Derry exemplifies the dynamics of the NI conflict (see O’Dochartaigh, Civil Rights, 1997). A majority Catholic community, systematically excluded from political influence since partition, it began in 1968 to channel awareness of injustice into public protest. “Routine” fairness issues like housing and job discrimination gave way to a new focal point for grievances by Catholics—policing. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was an entirely Protestant police force rejected in Catholic neighborhoods because of its unfair application of law and arbitrary imposition of order. Gangs of young people on both sides of the ethnic divide began to fight, and riots followed. In 1969, the British government sent British troops—many remained through 2006. Initially welcomed even by the Catholics, their increasingly repressive actions, especially on January 30, 1972 or “Bloody Sunday,” when paratroopers shot and killed thirteen people at a civil rights march, provoked the birth of the Provisional IRA and a violent campaign initially targeting British soldiers. British tactics included roundups, internment without trial of over 1,500 people in the first year, and harsh treatment of detainees, leading to support of the IRA by some local Catholics (and the Irish diaspora). In 1971, the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) was set up by Northern Protestants, giving that side its first paramilitary organization to be followed by the Ulster Volunteer Force. Violence multiplied, 468 people were killed in 1972—the highest annual total of the troubles. As the 1980s began, IRA prisoners began a hunger strike that resulted in ten deaths and drew national and international attention to the prolonged stalemate of NI. IRA bombing campaigns in NI and in England multiplied innocent victims.

The Belfast or Good Friday Agreement The Downing Street Declaration of 1993 by Great Britain and Ireland’s prime ministers set the stage for the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement of 1998. The Agreement required significant institutional changes, that is, the Republic agreed to drop its territorial claim to the North, a hard pill for Republicans to swallow, just as Northern Protestants, if consoled by the “principle of consent by the majority,” were dismayed at their “gradual abandonment” by Great Britain. The agreement set up an East-West Council to link lawmakers from the Irish Republic and the British Parliament, and a NI Assembly that would operate based on proportional power-sharing, not majority rule (see appendices 3 and 4).


Table 4.1

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The Belfast or Good Friday Agreement

Majority choice for union with Great Britain or with Ireland Democratically elected Assembly in Northern Ireland North/South Ministerial Council British/Irish Council

The release of political prisoners began. Most parties endorsed the agreement during negotiations (except for Paisley’s DUP). Popular referenda were held and 71% voted in favor of the agreement on both sides of the border. Almost a year later, the assembly of nationalist and union politicians uneasily opened for business, its devolved powers depending on appropriate behavior of the politicians and their constituencies. It has been an off and on process. The power-sharing adventure of devolution based at Stormont Castle near Belfast has been suspended more than it has functioned, interrupted by broken ceasefires, paramilitary violence, the recurring issue of decommissioning IRA arms, spying, and withdrawal of parties for various reasons. The impasse continued until May 2007. Liz O’Donnell, who represented the Irish government at the multiparty Stormont talks that led to the Good Friday Agreement, recently reflected on the “aspects of the Agreement itself, or the way it had been negotiated, that encouraged or led to current difficulties (of implementation).” She underlined “the central role of the two governments.” “It fell to the two governments by proxy to drive discussions forward; we urged the parties to engage in discussion with us and with each other, framed the terms of reference, came up with discussion papers, and in the end drafted the bulk of the Agreement itself. But there was absolutely no engagement between Sinn Fein and the Unionists, and frankly little enough between the others.” “This meant that the parties had little sense of one another, as individuals and politicians, than might have been suspected, particularly in so small a society. They had not talked through the issues as human beings. They did not understand, much less trust each other. . . . The parties became dependent on the governments and seemed incapable of taking the initiative themselves.” “Related to this was the lack of public engagement with, or ownership of, the talk’s progress. It was almost exclusively a top-down process, much of which took place in private. . . . The Good Friday Agreement has been famously described by Seamus Mallon as ‘Sunningdale for slow learners’—meaning the UUP and Sinn Fein. But looking back, it is at least arguable that the agreement was actually reached too quickly for the parties, and even more so for the

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people they represent. Possibly a slower and less dramatic process would have given the Agreement deeper roots” (O’Donnell, 2006, 138–144). As a participant in the negotiations, her 2006 assessment of the Agreement’s outcomes and lessons is well grounded. Her reflections on the implementation phase are sometimes harsh, wise yet realistic about the limitations of politics. “Thirty years of tribal conflict has left a legacy of political dysfunction. . . . Politicians are one-dimensional.” She worries that “the relationship between the two communities in NI often seems to be no better than in the darkest days of the Troubles . . . Sectarianism seems to thrive. There is a limit to what politics can achieve in human relations. Time may well be a more potent force in that regard. One cannot legislate for forgiveness and reconciliation.” She regrets the “marginalisation of the political parties that were key to its negotiation and early functioning—the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)—the so-called middle ground” (as well as the erosion of the Alliance Party, the Women’s Coalition, the Progressive unionist Party and the United Democratic Party). “It appears that only those parties which build up their strength from the extremes inward— the DUP and Sinn Fein—have the political security and authority in their own communities to reach a lasting compromise” (O’Donnell, 2006, 140). It appears these two parties have finally done so. Two major U.S. players in the NI negotiations were Richard Haass and Senator George Mitchell. They offered some thoughtful observations as their efforts a decade earlier seemed to finally bear fruit. “People want and expect to see improvement in their lives. Peace processes cannot thrive in a vacuum. They do best when associated with increased prosperity . . . [For leaders], making sure that violence will not succeed is not enough. They must also come to believe that a true political path exists, one that will allow them to realize enough of their agenda to persuade their followers to turn away from violence. . . . [It is]important that a context is created so that leaders can survive their compromises. This requires reaching out to civil society and preparing the public for what can and cannot be achieved so that it comes to accept even partial success as preferable to continued armed struggle” (Mitchell and Haass, 2007).

Consociationalists, Integrationists, and Everybody Else Interpretations of the internal dynamics of the Northern Irish peace process reflect contrasting views on the directionality of change and the role of different actors. Some emphasize “top-down” or “consociationalist” vertical explanations, focusing on political and economic leaders.


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Yet the consociational solution, drawn from other contexts, seems to perpetuate sectarianism rather than transcend it. Others reverse direction and focus on “bottom-up” “integrationist,” civil society or voluntary sector leaders. Still others prefer horizontal explanations, focusing on lateral dynamics—whether pushing from center toward the extremes of the political spectrum or an opposite movement pulling extremes back toward the center. Both approaches grapple with leader—follower relationships. Neither approach responds to complex reality and no emphasis—top-down or bottom-up—inside out or outside in—captures all the dynamics at play. I confess to prefer an analytical and pragmatic focus on “those in-between,” the mid-section of society, those actors who look up at leadership and down at followers. Admittedly, this may stem from the old story of the Irishman’s choice. When asked by a bartender whether he wanted whiskey or beer, the Irishman quickly responded “both.” But I stand by it. The Northern Irish peace process was certainly heavily influenced by outsiders—the British and Irish prime ministers, the Americans, the EU, and so on from its earliest stages even to the restoration of power-sharing. The salience of the Northern Irish themselves, their political leaders and followers is debated among pundits and researchers. Undoubtedly, the burdens of a “shared future” henceforth will fall on the NI people. The response of civil society or the voluntary sector to date has been on balance more positive than political leaders (who, as some analysts have recalled, might have done this agreement forty years ago!). Here are two examples of the debate. Adrian Hamilton writes from Great Britain about Northern Ireland changes: “. . . it has not been the centre or the cross-community parties that have triumphed in the ballot box. If only they had. It has been the extremes that have come out on top, and the success of the peace process has been in getting the leaders of these polar opposites to see it in their own interest to pursue a political path. If anything, the communities they represent seem to be as divided as ever. The majority of the population certainly wanted peace, but they do not appear to have sought reconciliation. Their demand for an end to civil strife played its part in propelling events. But in essence, the restoration of power-sharing has been a triumph of top-down politics, not bottom-up social change” (The Independent, Sunday, May 10, 2007). Breidge Gadd, a prominent voluntary sector leader and former chief NI probation officer disagrees. She writes “The only surprise about the Paisley/ Adams settlement was the number of people, especially supposedly wellinformed journalists, who expressed surprise that it could possibly happen. Anyone who has been around those communities that suffered most during the conflict, and indeed, it could be argued that in some ways contributed

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to the conflict, knew that sooner or later government by the ‘extremes’ was on the cards. In fact, astute observers of the attitudes and activity of key leaders in those communities would have noticed that the people who used to lead the street protests for some time now have been leading the peace process.” “. . . . Major, Reynolds, Mitchell, Hume, Clinton, Blair and Ahearn played an important role. Their work would have been in vain however if the communities in which conflict festered had not already been on the journey to peace . . . Policymakers this time around . . . have been well aware of the powerful role this civil society, and especially grassroots community organizations have played in bringing about stability” (Irish News, June 1, 2007). Relationships at all levels had to change. Whether the interpretations of journalists such as Hamilton or Gadd, or academic discussions of consociationalism versus integrationism, a full explanation of the dynamics at work and the levels of causality and credit will require more time to sort out. Confronted with such “either—or” choices, perhaps the Irishman’s is the best choice. Complex peace processes do not lend themselves to unidirectional causality, operate on only one level, nor obey teleological narratives. Like democracy and development, peace agreements too are reversible. How significant were civil society peace-building efforts before and since the Agreement? Responses vary greatly among researchers, journalists, activists, and politicians, some of them noted above. Some celebrate the leadership of politicians, others the civil society initiatives. Activists and engaged observers such as Paul Arthur and Dwight Morrow emphasize dual tracks and complementarity of approaches. Without underestimating very real contributions by specific CSOs and individuals in the run-up to the Agreement, I find that CSOs have played a far more significant role in building peace since the agreement. They accommodate more readily to the process of “peace process.” As one of the lead negotiators in the Guatemalan peace agreement told me, “simultaneity can be the downfall of a peace agreement—not everything can be done at the same time.” In his analysis of the agreement itself, Adrian Guelke emphasizes its consociational structure and faults it for the tension created between a top-down, elitist framework that prevents an “integrationist” bottom-up civil society dynamic. But he goes further, in a provocative article that question’s civil society’s contribution to the peace process by focusing on the goals of political actors. He argues that republicans, at least since the early 1990s sought “a negotiated end of British rule in Ireland”; Unionists “sought to achieve legitimation of partition through the peace process”; while the British government for many years “promoted political accommodation between the two communities in Northern Ireland. Its goal has been and remains the stabilization of NI as a political entity.” On the basis


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of these goals, he argues that civil society did little for either republican or loyalist cause, but that it is “easiest to make the case that that civil society has made a significant contribution to aiding the process (from) . . . what may be labeled the British or metropolitan liberal perspective,” (Guelke, 2003, 67). He “invites debate over whether consociational and civil society approaches to the resolution of conflict are compatible?”—a debate that I leave to others who are at ease with such polarities. NI has changed after decades, even centuries of contention. Violence is down, job discrimination has declined, social fraternization across sectarian lines has increased, and, according to annual “Life and Times Surveys,” civility seemed to be generally improving among the population at large. At first glance, it seemed that it was the politicians who remained obdurate, and perhaps disconnected from their social bases. However, in the 2003 and 2005 elections there was increased voter support on both sides for more inflexible parties. Ian Paisley, leader of the DUP continued his rigid approach to negotiations, and won the largest number of seats (thirty seats) in Assembly elections held in November 2003. SF, with historical ties to the IRA, won more seats than the centrist Social Democratic and Labour Party on the republican side. In the 2005 elections, hardliners on both sides continued to gain strength. The political center seemed to grow silent, the extremes were in ascendance. Or were they? After the agreement, what was happening in the arenas, spaces and platforms inhabited by civil society or the voluntary sector? How great was the tension between consociational, top-down agreements and “integrationist,” grassroots involvement? Whose vision of peace would energize implementation of the agreements—external third parties, obdurate politicians, grassroots activists, and passive citizens? Would civil society figure large in implementation? What obstacles had to be overcome?


5

Getting to Yes in Northern Ireland

Too long a sacrifice Can make a stone of the heart. Oh when may it suffice? (William Butler Yeats, “Easter 1916”)

Obstacles to Implementation My emphasis is on the implementation of the peace agreement, the downstream after a peace agreement has been negotiated and signed, the output and outcome side of what is now commonly called the “peace process.” Peace agreements are to peace processes what policies are to implementation. Political scientists warn that “implementation changes policy,” an insight expressed crisply in the 1800s by an anonymous limerick author: We all place a great deal of reliance On the theory and practice of science But the hopeful intentions Of so many inventions Can be quite buggered up in appliance. (Parrott, 1983, 65)

To list but a few explanations of the peace process, the agreement is “buggered” by excessively high expectations, by the Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) refusal to decommission weapons, by inadequate, one-sided policing, by enforced residential segregation, by ingrained habits of violence, by disconnected policy ideas, by neglect of root causes, by sectarian rigidity, by lack of a truth commission, and so on. Voter frustration in

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Northern Ireland (NI) is expressed through electoral shifts and has tilted toward unreconciled hardliners. Impatience and indifference alternate in the Republic too. As former prime minister Garrett Fitzgerald recently observed: “most Southerners became alienated by the prolonged violence, and are frankly bored by the long drawn-out peace process. Honesty requires that we admit that Southern attitudes towards Northern Ireland are a good deal more negative than public proclamations of solidarity and of commitment to Irish political unity might seem to suggest” (Belfast Telegraph, July 19, 2004). Clearly, the legacies of conflict and the struggle for power by each community within any new government arrangement were underestimated by the architects. NI seems a classic case of zero-sum negotiations. Niall O’Dochartaigh emphasized how the NI “experience of conflict” during the Troubles has structured and set conditions for protracted conflict for decades. “Many of the key relationships which sustain violent conflict are substantially unchanged since the early 1970s” (O’Dochartaigh, 1997, 325). Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd focus on the contents of the agreement itself that, they argue, has not adequately dealt with the struggle for power between the two communities, leaving “each community in NI with the conviction that it has vital interests to defend and that it must defend them with all the resources available to it. In such circumstances, power, rather than reconciliation—is the immediate and overriding concern.” (Ruane and Todd, 1996, 324). Future options for the territory have usually been dichotomized—full integration with Great Britain or full integration with the Republic. With the Agreement, they have been lightly refined to include: 1. prolong dependence on Great Britain (perhaps with increased autonomy like Scotland); 2. merge into and depend on the Republic; 3. set up an independent NI government with institutional arrangements falling somewhere in between (regional government, devolved power-sharing, or joint government). Ruane and Todd proposed an autonomous regional framework like the Catalan region of Spain that might free the NI peace process from “outmoded concepts of sovereignty and nationalism” (Ruane and Todd, 1996, 303). As of 2007, surprising almost everyone, devolved power-sharing is again under way, the unlikely fulfilment of Northern Irish poet Seamus Heaney’s radical stand on the possibility of change. “ ‘Whatever is given,’ I wrote in one of my own poems, ‘can always be re-imagined . . . .’ And I have been greatly reinforced in that belief” (Heaney, 1995, 200). Heaney had long

GETTING TO YES IN NI

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struggled to reconcile political and imaginative partition through what he called a “commonwealth of art.” Must Identity and Community Be Immutable?—How Does Imagination Help or Hinder? “Imagined community” is a concept related to identity and to the realm of political change invented by Benedict Anderson (1983). Though originally applied to “nations,” it is applicable to peoples at different levels, particularly in divided settings. If we are to believe Heaney, the fertile Irish imagination so evident in literature, drama, poetry, and ballads is surely up to reimagining its politics. The Irish recycle their history, their myths, as well as recent memories through rituals, parades and processions. How to imagine a different community—one that shares a future rather than wallows in the past? It seems to me that literature and the arts are and can become still more engaged in the building of peace, the “problematization” of stereotypes, the reinterpretation of identity, and refashioning of the “imagined community.” Certainly, the interplay of poetry and politics, like peace and its absence, have been a constant in NI and the Republic. Although the Belfast Agreement, like most peace accords, was an elite pact, a large majority of the total population endorsed the original package—71% in the North and 96% in the Republic. The current political arrangement offered generous financial salaries to members of the Northern Irish Assembly, whether in session or not. Political elites do take care of themselves. Implementing the Agreement at Meso- and Grassroots Levels Implementation of peace accords, like development, depends heavily on middle level actors who bridge the gap between political elites and grassroots citizens. In the following section, I will examine how religion, education, local government, and civil society or the “voluntary sector” have weighed in to the peace process and policy implementation in NI. The first question I wanted to pursue was the role of churches in peace-building, or rather, how have the churches helped, and how have they hindered the process of change at “high,” middle, and grassroots levels? To what degree have they ameliorated or exacerbated the growth or decline of civility? Another question has to do with education and its contribution to sustainable peace. How significant and efficacious are organizations of civil society, again at elite, middle and grassroots

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levels? And what of small and mid-sized business entrepreneurs who straddle the market and civil society—where do they stand regarding the pace and priorities of the peace process? My final set of questions looks at local government from my Tocquevillian hypothesis (and hope) that good governance, effective policing, direct access to political leaders, and meaningful citizen participation should result in accountable local politicians crafting responsive social policy for local majority and minorities. Subnational government, closer to civil society than to “the state,” could counterpoint the centralizing thrust of government, large corporations, and media, while teaching the techniques and tradeoffs of negotiation and power-sharing. Here are my observations.

Religion The conflict in NI is most frequently portrayed as an ethnic conflict, with the identities of two antagonistic communities defined (or labeled) by religious affiliation. Religion has indeed reinforced sectarian identities historically, and people still call themselves “Catholic” or “Protestant” regardless of levels of religious practice—although 13.88% did not state their religion or said they have none in the 2001 census (www.nicensus2001.gov. uk.nica). In a study of churches and community relationships, Duncan Morrow and colleagues observed that “In many ways, the experience of violence has affected the churches more profoundly than the churches have affected violence” (Morrow et al., 1991, 4). The authors recognize the significance of churches within NI society—they are the largest nongovernmental institutions, the largest voluntary organizations, major players in the economy, nuclei of lasting networks of relationships, crucial markers of identity, deposits of historical memory, and they reflect all strands of Ulster politics. The influence of churches in causing or overcoming “the troubles” is debated. “The main churches, with a few individual clerical exceptions, set their face against paramilitary violence, and tried to foster better inter-community relations with varying degrees of success” writes Martin Mansergh (2000, 13). Catholic cardinal Sean Brady claims that “. . . on balance, religious faith and the churches have contributed positively to the resolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland” (Brady, 2004). Dr. Robin Eames (Church of Ireland archbishop) helped draft key paragraphs of the Downing Street Declaration that were essentially about “creating greater trust between North and South” (Mansergh, 2000, 19). But Catholic bishops, Church of Ireland, and Presbyterian church leadership have not played high profile, political leadership roles to match Free Presbyterian pastor Ian Paisley’s long-term centrality in Unionist politics.


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His position underlines one extreme of political-religious discourse in the region. “Paisleyism is characterized by the belief that Protestantism and Britishness are under constant threat” (Brewer, 1994). More than two centuries ago, Episcopalian Wolfe Tone in 1798 sought to unite “Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter” in a single Irish Republic, and later denounced the Catholic clergy for having caused that project to fail (Kearney, 1997). That initiative is still pending. Ian Paisley, until recently, directed his dissent as vigorously against Church of Ireland and Presbyterian pastors as against Roman Catholics. Catholics represent the largest single religion, totaling about 45% of the population. In the Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT) survey (2002) nearly two-thirds of the Catholics in NI favored a united Ireland, 75% supported the Good Friday Agreement, but only 33% thought community relations had improved. Over 60% said they go to Mass weekly, down from 86% in 1989 (Brian Lennon, 2004, ARK #22). In 2002, 16% of respondents to the NILT survey identified themselves as members of the Church of Ireland, of whom 30% attended church weekly. About 71% identified themselves as “Unionist,” and 76% identified themselves also as “British.” In 1998, 22% of respondents said they were Presbyterian, rising to 26% in 1999 and falling to 18% in 2001 (Morrow, 2004b). The other politically significant church is Reverend Ian Paisley’s Free Presbyterian Church. A small minority among Protestants, (with less than a tenth of the Presbyterians and a quarter of the Methodists), yet “the Free Presbyterians personify the political face of Ulster Protestants” (Morrow et al., 1991, 4). “Dissenters” still target Catholics and some Protestants as well, witness a recent set of “Resolutions” by Ulster Orangemen, who “deplore the way in which the teachings of our Protestant reformed Faith are being denied, eroded and undermined by those Protestant Ministers who have aligned themselves with the Church of Rome” (Belfast Telegraph, July 10, 2004). The Catholic Bishops of Northern Ireland gave a guarded endorsement of police reforms recommended by the Patten Commission, issued a statement supporting the peace process and expressed concern at delays in its implementation on June 11, 2003. However, John Brewer states that “the Catholic Church had lost control of politics in the Catholic community from the 1950’s onwards” (Brewer, 1994). And Morrow argues that “. . . the churches are integral to the division unless they can separate themselves and their faith from an identity with a political goal, i.e., United Kingdom or United Ireland” (Morrow, 2004a, 14). Catholic Bishops have recently had to deal with notorious cover-ups of priests and religious involved in sexual exploitation of children and young people that has further undermined their church’s influence.

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The Protestant identity is threatened. Protestants make frequent appeals for security based on perceptions that Great Britain has become too responsive to the other side. “. . . There exists among Protestants in NI a genuine and widespread feeling of unease and uncertainty which is described in public as ‘Protestant alienation’ . . . a perception that, within NI, the social and constitutional bulwarks and defenses for Protestants are being steadily and persistently eroded” (Dunn and Morgan, 1994, 15). The Catholic sense of alienation has been softened by a greater sense of entitlement, with governmental and international sources supporting affirmative action initiatives to compensate for inequality of opportunity and discrimination.

Ecumenical Initiatives Ecumenical efforts were relatively frequent during the early 1960s, encouraged by Pope John XXIII and the Vatican Council that elicited reciprocal gestures among Protestant churches. They tapered off during the civil rights campaign of the late 1960s and subsequent violence, but have increased recently. On June 8, 2004, Belfast’s then Archbishop Sean Brady became the first ever Roman Catholic bishop invited (along with Church of Ireland primate and the Methodist president, to the Presbyterian General Assembly in Belfast). Not surprisingly, outside the meeting, Free Presbyterian and DUP party leader Ian Paisley led sixty followers protesting the presence of the Catholic leader in the Presbyterian Assembly. In 1976, Catholic Church representatives signed a joint declaration with other churches (except Paisley’s Free Presbyterians) that said that Christians have a moral obligation to support the authorities against paramilitary forces in Ireland, North and South (Brewer, 1994). At the upper levels, bishops and clergy spoke of justice and fair treatment, as well as forgiveness and reconciliation. At intermediate and local levels, many local churches sought to make dialogue routine and reconciliation a fact. As the troubles worsened, funerals and pastoral care were laced with pleas for reconciliation despite sorrow and rage. Interreligious dialogues shaped commitments eventually clothed in the secular language of the Good Friday Agreement. Corrymeela, the Glencree Centre for Reconciliation, and the Irish School of Ecumenism’s “Partners in Transformation” program are influential examples of ecumenical midlevel organizations involved in peace-building. All such endeavors aimed, as Brady put it, at “going beyond identities of exclusion to create identities based on mutual recognition and need.” Protestant and Catholic leaders supported the creation of an office for Northern Ireland within the


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European Union (EU), leading one observer to comment that such collaboration works better outside than at home! (Meehan, 2000, 207). The hierarchy is not the church. Local clergy, in daily contact with their congregations and neighborhoods, translate religious messages into pastoral and political reality. Catholic priests in Derry and Belfast played a key role at the grassroots in supporting and sometimes leading their people in protest and in peace-building. The dynamics of church involvement and disengagement responded to changes on the ground. Niall O’Dochartaigh’s case study of the troubles in Derry, for example, documents the changing positions taken by Catholic clergy and laity as the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) repression intensified and internments without charges multiplied between 1968 and 1971. Many “conservative” Catholics became “moderates,” and some moderates became “extremists” or at least more tolerant of IRA violence between mid-1970 and 1971 in response to “indefensible” repressive actions of the RUC and the British Army. While only a year before, Catholic conservative and moderate groups called for patience, repression increased recruitment into the IRA and its splinter groups (O’Dochartaigh, 1997). “There was a general politicization of the lower clergy in the first years of civil unrest.” While “some lower clergy were disgruntled at the moderate stance taken by the bishops” (Brewer, 1998), greater numbers denounced violence and called upon Catholics “to support the security forces.” “The lower clergy began to be depoliticized . . . in 1972 [by] the . . . no-warning civilian attacks by both sets of paramilitaries . . . The violence ended any romantic notions priests had about the IRA.” Later in 1972, groups of clergy in Belfast and Derry called on the IRA to stop the violence (Brewer, 1998, citing Rafferty, 1994, 271). Protestant clergy too were involved with pastoral concerns and funerals, though their responses were less coordinated than the Catholics, given the decentralized structure of Protestant denominations. Paisley’s inflated rhetoric did not discourage loyalist paramilitary organizations. Survey data shows little homogeneity among lay people within each religious community and opinions varied in the wake of particular incidents, such as the outbreak of violence against Catholic children at Belfast’s Holy Cross School. The range of opinions has increased since the peace agreement and devolution. The annual NILT in an October 2002 survey asked how members of different religious groups would vote should there be a “constitutional referendum tomorrow” on the future of NI. Only 3% of Protestants said they would vote for unification with the Republic, while 58% of the Catholics voted in the affirmative. Yet 80% of Protestants replied at that time that they would vote in favor of powersharing with Catholics in NI. The simple dichotomy for union with Great

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Table 5.1

“If the Majority of People Voted for a United Ireland, I . . . ”

Find it almost impossible to accept Could live with it Would happily accept majority wishes Don’t know

Protestant

Catholic

No Religion

28 41 27 4

1 25 66 8

8 28 59 6

Source: NILT, Political Attitudes, 2002 in ARK.

Britain or with the Republic had been diffused through the brief recent experience of self-government. Not surprisingly, community relations has become a major component of the peace process, and has received considerable domestic and international funding support. The Morrow “Churches and Community Relations” study cautioned government donors to recognize the limitations of church leadership in community relations, given most churches’ tendency to be reactive more than proactive, to reflect rather than transcend community divisions. Despite evidence for positive grassroots impact of community work, one author sees growing polarization in NI indicated by electoral data and growing alienation by Protestants who argue that affirmative action for Catholics is leaving Protestants behind, or as some say, “rewards the IRA” (Hughes, 2003b, 1). Brendan Murtagh looks at NILT surveys through the lens of Putnam’s distinction between bonding social capital that aims to build in-group solidarity and capacity, and bridging social capital that looks outward and seeks to produce trust, reciprocity and mutual understanding. He questions those activists who give priority to “single identity” work, arguing for community relations efforts that build cross-cutting networks and trust in areas, and among groups, where the stock of social capital is weak (Murtagh, 2002). Especially at “interface” neighborhoods where Protestant and Catholics meet constantly, more effort is required for coexistence or cooperation to take hold. Conflict management in these settings is extremely complicated, triggering initiatives such as the Peace and Reconciliation Group in Derry and the Interface program in Belfast where there are at least twenty-five such potential neighbourhood flashpoints. Families speak of fear for the safety of their children and report that “outsiders” often come to the interface to create trouble, leaving problems for the locals to clean-up. Neighbourhood leaders distinguish between youth violence and paramilitary violence, the former attributed to restless youth rather than politics. These leaders strongly refute paramilitary claims to speak “for the people.” The churches, even the loyalist Order of Orangemen,


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“utterly condemn the paramilitaries, loyalist and republican, for crimes by which they dominate and destroy the lives of people and their communities” (Belfast Telegraph, “Twelfth Resolutions,” July 10, 2004). Religious groups and community organizations have received generous funding from the European Community, international donors, the diaspora, and the government of Great Britain since the early stages of the peace process. But secular forces alone do not seem sufficient to induce greater civility and acceptance of diversity—certainly not while insecurity and inequality provoke or provide excuses for troublemakers. Declining church attendance may lead to less religious-fuelled antagonism, but might also weaken moral sanction on those prone to violence. Religious collaboration in peace-building can be undercut by fundamentalist rhetoric. In sum, religion plays an important, though declining role in forming attitudes and influencing behaviour in NI. Church leaders have been enveloped in the conflict, at times some have exacerbated it, but others have taken lead roles to build peace. Some have helped write key documents of the peace process, while other leaders stood outside the melee. At the intermediate level, church-related organizations and community initiatives with religious motivation have figured prominently in building coexistence and seeking reconciliation. At the neighbourhood or local level, churches, like schools, represent key institutions for overcoming segregation and building a more civil society. But they too often reflected community attitudes rather than transcend them.

Education NI’s educational system can be another builder of peace. The enlightened policy of universal, free schooling at all levels is extremely important. Educational quality in NI is good, consistently outranking schools in England and Wales. Nearly 11% of the population claims some knowledge of the Irish language, and eight integrated schools teach Irish. While segregated schools are the norm, they result from segregated housing patterns as well as parent choice and only 5% of schools are integrated. Religious segregation in education has deep roots. Until the late eighteenth century, the Penal Laws excluded the Catholic population from formal education and clandestine “hedge schools” provided “illegal” education for Catholic children until religious orders were allowed to set up schools in the early 1800s. Free higher education for the past fifty years has benefited middleclass Catholics and some, such as Seamus Heaney and many Northern Irish Catholic poets and social scientists, have excelled. Education for

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citizenship is clearly the foundation of a long-term strategy for building peace, notes Alan Smith of the University of Ulster. University level education can often be the first experience of interchange among Catholics and Protestants stemming from segregated neighborhoods and schools. Higher education, research institutes, and policy-oriented think-tanks such as INCORE, the Democratic Dialogue, or the Civic Forum have multiplied and improved the quality of information, debate and policy options available to citizens and politicians. Education is still closely tied to the religious question (Smith, 2001). Data showing greater numbers of Catholics in the school systems of the North underscore Protestant nervousness about their own treatment when they become the minority. Catholic bishops defend their publicly funded parochial school system against accusations that it encourages divisiveness or separate identities, arguing that many public schools have Protestant ministers on their boards and a curriculum suffused with equally confessional Protestant interpretation. In fact, publicly funded schools are both Catholic and Protestant in orientation, a norm dictated as much by custom and by neighborhood segregation, as by religion. Thus schooling, like residence, reinforces Catholic and Protestant identities. Education, especially at lower levels needs qualitative improvements. Teachers must be better prepared to meet challenges that go beyond transfer of knowledge to more effectively transfer skills and values. They need revised texts, improved teacher training and curriculum reform. One unfortunate residue of the “troubles” are antagonistic myths, requiring, as one Irish Protestant put it, the “creation of new myths.” If not myths, teachers need to teach history drawing from multiple sources that can elicit and explore critically the inherited and the alternative “narratives” of the violence. They need to grapple with the emotional if not traumatic burdens resulting from sectarian strife. Given that all schools are publicly funded, but 95% of them are still segregated along religious lines, the challenges to educators are many. Training in new skills for the hardcore unemployed and retooling workers for a more knowledge-based economy is an arena where educators and businesses should be working more closely together.

Local Government Conflicts, like politics and governance, are ultimately local. While civil society or the voluntary sector are indeed central actors in the peace process, local government is little connected to peace implementation in the North of Ireland. The consociational framework, originally devised for


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very different settings, was top-down and centralized. The architects of the Belfast Agreement and its early implementers did little to directly buttress local government or fold it into the peace process. Professor Alan Smith put his finger on another reason, noting that Northern Ireland has for too long been an “administered region with an insular mind-set,” illattuned to an era of globalization or the autonomous political management of local affairs. “The republic has a government—we don’t!” (Smith, 2004). There is local administration rather than local government on both sides of the Irish border. As in the Republic, local governments tend to be administrative extensions of central government, with relatively little control over resources or programs. Local government structures in NI date from the fall of the Stormont government in 1972, when twenty-six local councils were created for the provision of minor services. Currently, there are proposals to reduce the number of councils from twenty-six to as few as five or six regional councils. Under the present structure, major services (education, housing, health, roads, and water) are administered directly through British government departments working through the Northern Ireland Office (NIO). Local councils are responsible for technical services (garbage collection and disposal, minor public works, leisure services, building control, and environmental health). Some NI councils have played a successful entrepreneurial role in economic development and job creation. Local government once had a greater role in certain areas of social policy—that is, housing was once controlled locally but taken back by the center, allegedly because of sectarian abuses. But as Knox and Haslem point out, “The paradox of the Northern Ireland system is that the administrative body with least functions—local government—is most accountable to the electorate and indeed represents the only democratic forum since the demise of the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1986” (Knox and Haslem, 1994). Since 1989, and increasingly during the peace process, community relations and cross border relationships have become a major local activity. “Community participation” and “partnership” initiatives are often financed in the North by Great Britain and the EU. (Cox et al., 2000, 205). The Community Support Framework of the NI government for 2000–2006 received 870 million pounds from the EU. It set up two programs—“Building Sustainable Prosperity” (for development purposes), and “Peace and Reconciliation,” better known as “Peace II,” to address the legacy of the “troubles” through social cooperation and cross-border cooperation. The funding is channelled through local councils (NICVA, 2005). Given the legacy of weak local government, gerrymandering that has skewed representation in favour of Protestants, and the limited access to budgets by local politicians, local government potential

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for peace-building seems slim. One can hope that these experiments will demonstrate their potential—buttressing the peace process, facilitating coexistence, encouraging democracy, and promoting better community relations. These are positive developments—though they cannot be financed long from outside sources. A sustained peace process will require more and better local government, citizen interaction that transcends sectarian borders and majority/minority relationships worked out—down there. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the voluntary sector have been relatively effective. Thus far, leadership in building peace has come from civil society. Organizations bridging the public and private sector have multiplied. Community relations initiatives, such as community police boards, help government projects “land” in formerly conflictive settings. Police reform may offer a new opportunity for community level governance.

Policing Policing in NI represents far more than a government security function. It is viewed by both sides through the lens of human rights—whether by Catholics’ who resent police “repression” or by Protestants, who build memorials for some 300 RUC officers murdered by the IRA. It also represents a key node in state—civil society relationships. The relationship between communities and policing, so negative throughout “the troubles,” is improving thanks to community police boards and efforts to hire Catholics in proportion to their demographics. Police reforms represent one example of effective government decentralization. Negotiators of the Good Friday Agreement agreed that an independent commission be set up to reform policing in NI. To help build a more accountable and representative police force, this Patten Commission recommended that policing should be more localized through District Command Units that would cover the same area as district councils. Police and community relations were to be facilitated through District Policing Partnership Boards. Sinn Fein had refused to work on community police boards until 2006, but Unionists have participated and consistently demand increased security. Gerry Adams has recently encouraged republicans to join the force. The restructured Northern Ireland Police Service numbers nearly 7,000 plus 1,765 reservists. While ethnic, religious, and class dimensions underlie the conflict known as “the troubles,” the durability and dynamism of that conflict traces back to policing in urban settings, first by the RUC, then by the British Army, followed by community vigilantes that evolved into paramilitary organizations. In the first six years after the Belfast Agreement


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was signed, according to the NIO as reported in the Belfast Telegraph of March 28, 2004, loyalist paramilitaries were responsible for 55 deaths, 942 shootings, and 718 bombings—many of them using small but deadly pipe bombs. The IRA had killed twenty-two as well as the twenty-nine victims of the Omagh bomb in August of 1998. Punishment beatings and shootings by paramilitaries from both sides have been aimed primarily at keeping their own people in line rather than targeting the opposite community. Some paramilitaries have shifted to organized criminal activity. Levels of violence in NI have been relatively low compared to Guatemala and many long-standing conflicts. During the decades since 1968 when violent conflict or “the troubles” began, there were about 3,600 political killings in NI and over 30,000 injured. While trust is still in short supply among Catholics and Protestants, the new Police Service’s performance has been generally found acceptable to both sides, except for its inability to control paramilitary activities. Paramilitary organizations in both Catholic and Protestant neighbourhoods claim a police role, allegedly controlling drugs and gangs (if not themselves managing criminal activities), intimidating community members, and (on the Catholic side) sometimes threatening those who participate in police boards or consider joining the force. “Punishment beatings” are administered to those who do not follow the paramilitary line. Some unionist and nationalist neighborhoods have proposed “restorative justice community police” which have been declared unacceptable if not subject to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). High hopes compete with equally high suspicion regarding this re-created PSNI. The legacy of distrust caused by years of abuse by both RUC and the British Army continues to keep Catholics wary of armed authority, although a recent survey showed that the number of Catholics who believed the new police force treated both communities equally had increased from 33% to just over 50%. Yet in September 2005, shortly after the IRA decommissioned arms, Protestant gangs rioted against police for several days after a traditional parade was rerouted from Catholic areas. “The perception among Unionists is that the peace process has worked against them; that they’ve been the losers. The Catholics don’t see themselves as the winners, but the way the loyalists are reacting to the peace process is starting to make them believe that they may actually have won” (Adrian Guelke, Christian Science Monitor, September 20, 2005). These old discontents begin to compete with new problems arising from immigration. Incidents involving racial and ethnic intolerance toward African and Middle Eastern immigrants have multiplied in the North, and the expanded EU will likely bring more Central and Eastern Europeans into Ireland, so the police must deal with these new human rights challenges. Ironically, many of the Catholic applicants to the police are recent immigrants from Poland.

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Civil Society, Equity, and Peace-Building The reallocation of responsibilities between public and private sectors perplexes all societies. The debate whether social service and welfare provision should stem mostly from state, market, or voluntary organizations has been joined throughout Europe, as elsewhere in the world. Decentralization models currently blend “voluntarist” (civil society) with “welfarist” (state) and “post-welfarist” (mixed approaches). Rethinking social service delivery and welfare is complicated in NI by the postconflict tasks of community relations and reconciliation. NGOs or civil society organizations (CSOs) are most commonly referred to as the “voluntary sector” in Northern Ireland, and constitute a broad universe estimated by the NI Council of Voluntary Action (NICVA) to exceed 5,000 organizations with annual budgets of over 400 million pounds. In a 1995 study, Seamus Dunn and Fairgal Cochrane categorized their functions as “service delivery, advocacy, dialogue and consciousness-raising.” The organizations range from neighborhoods and town levels to efforts extending throughout the province and across the border. Besides government programs, some social services, health care, and education are delivered by local community organizations, regional, and even international networks and organizations. A large cluster of peace/conflict resolution organizations has evolved—NGOs advocating reconciliation and/or coexistence between feuding groups while teaching negotiating skills and conflict management. Besides the EU and British government funding mentioned above, many of these organizations have been funded by other international sources (Atlantic Philanthropies has been a major donor) and local philanthropic organizations and churches. Increasingly, NGOs “seek to more effectively impact the policymaking and program development in conflicts throughout the world” (Fitzduff and Church, 2004). While for some voluntary organizations, peace-building and conflict resolution are a sideline, for others, it is their primary activity. Some deal with people from just one side of the sectarian divide, others deliberately cross boundaries of class, religion or territory. Many have roots in particular religious denominations, based in specific parishes or congregations. John Brewer offers an excellent mapping of peace-building organizations, especially at the local level. He finds that “Civil society has survived the conflict and functions to enhance grassroots peacemaking efforts, permitting an impressive peacemaking industry to develop” (Brewer, 2003). “With a history that divides Catholics and Protestants and with victim experiences that make remembrance equally divisive, NI needs an agreed future in the absence of an agreed past” (ibid.).


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Intermediate and Local Organizations One example of a purposive, unafraid ecumenical organization is Corrymeela, which describes itself as “people of all ages and Christian traditions, who, individually and together, are committed to the healing of social, religious and political divisions that exist in Northern Ireland and throughout the world.” With several centers in and around Belfast, Corrymeela offers a variety of religious, artistic, and cultural activities to bring people from different traditions together. Duncan Morrow, CEO of the NI Community Relations Council, and a long term member of the Corrymeela Community, recently summarized the challenge of working through conflict in order to build peace as follows: “Better relations mean a capacity to address conflicts, not avoid them” (Morrow, 2004a). In Derry, a voluntary organization called Holywell Trust was set up by Aemon Deane in 1988 to create opportunities for personal growth and community development within the North West of Ireland. It has over forty employees and volunteers, and serves as a “conflict resolution group incubator,” helping new organizations into existence, maturity and independence. It initiates community projects, provides a setting for discussion and plans for action, offers training and seminars, builds networks and partnerships. Rob Arbuckle and Terry Doherty belong to Holywell and described for me the complexity of youth work at the community level and then across sectarian and border divides. Terry is a Catholic social worker, Rob a Protestant musician. They underlined how peace-building in Derry requires an intergenerational, long-term effort, starting with the young. Music and the arts have proven particularly effective. They described bringing together feuding groups of Catholic and Protestant teenagers to form bands and percussion groups that resulted in a program called “Different Drummer” that has successfully performed locally and toured as far as South Africa and San Francisco. Arbuckle noted that the poverty/prejudice relationship is profound among the poor. They need to develop their self-esteem. “They need new ‘enabling mythologies’ to replace the old ones that have hobbled them for too long—I remind them that it was Scots Irish, our people, who went to America two centuries ago and devised what has become the strongest nation and most creative democracy in the world.” In Sligo, under the sponsorship of the National University of Ireland at Galway, is another example of peace-building through a one-year, part-time training program designed for community activists on both sides of the border. The university awards a diploma in Peace-building and Community Development Practice to border residents who study the

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theory and practice of peace-building, community development, and conflict transformation focussed on the border communities. Participants learn communications and group work skills and get down to the nittygritty of planning or enhancing specific community level projects. The project is supported by the EU’s Peace II Programme and the National Development Plan of the Irish government. Besides mid-level voluntary organizations (in Latin America they are called grassroots support organizations, or GSOs), many neighbourhood initiatives have sprung up, often in settings where violence was greatest. For example, in October of 2003, relatives and friends of victims of the Shankill bombing in Belfast ten years earlier met to commemorate the victims and set up “the One Small Step” Campaign. The people of NI have to realize how far they have already come, said Shankill community worker Baroness May Blood. “Too many people live in the past. We need to take one small step. We want to remember the past but not live in it.” The “One Small Step Campaign is encouraging everyone to do something, be that reading a newspaper from ‘the other side,’ going on a community relations course or simply learning a bit about another culture” (Belfast Telegraph, January 24, 2003). Incident-related local organizations may fade with time, but they illustrate the urge for peace constantly emerging from the grassroots. The voluntary sector grapples with issues side-stepped or handed off to commissions for subsequent resolution, while at intergovernmental levels, efforts are made to cobble institutions that might permanently ensure the peace. Violence has diminished, but still affects communities where paramilitaries are self-appointed community “enforcers.” The work of community development, community services, and building cross-community dialogue—especially at the interface between Protestant and Catholic communities, will continue to fall to these organizations of civil society. Health, education, and other social services will continue to rely heavily on churches and voluntary organizations. Women’s organizations will continue to gain purchase on the uphill climb to equality and peace. Whether you prefer to call upon the “voluntary sector,” “civil society organizations,” or “social capital,” the bottom line must be worked out at the local level. There, patience for the long haul, rather than quick-fixes, must prevail.

Bridging Markets and Civil Society: Economic and Social Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs from small and medium businesses express frustration with the pace of the peace process and doubts about the narrowly political management of peace-building. Economic recovery requires acceleration


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and new priorities. Lord Rana, the president of the NI Chamber of Commerce and Industry argues that faster economic growth should become the engine that drives political progress. . . . we can accelerate the pace of change by focusing even greater attention on the economy, making it the priority. I am not suggesting that the pursuit of an agreed political solution should be sidelined or shelved altogether. What I urge is a change of emphasis. There is now a much greater opportunity—and an urgent need—to engage all local parties in united action on economic issues. The best way to move NI forward on all fronts is to increase the level of investment in economic development. (Business First, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2005: 5)

The Federation of Small Businesses in NI, which represents nearly 5,000 micro and small business owners, asked its members to communicate with (i.e., lobby) the 2005 electoral candidates for the following priorities: free business from red tape; combat crime against businesses; invest in skill-building to increase productivity; create a better business environment; ensure that employment policies are business- and family-friendly; and finally, make taxes fairer and simpler (NI Policy Unit News, April 22, 2005). In a decidedly peremptory tone, the Federation went on to say: “Real and practical steps must be taken by the new government to moving our economy from public sector-led to private sector led. We don’t need any more strategies or consultation documents on this subject—we need action if our future economy is to be led by wealth creators rather than wealth spenders. Small businesses are the future of our economy, creating wealth and contributing much needed taxes to pay for vital services such as education and health” (ibid., 1). While business leaders at various levels criticize excessive and unsustainable state involvement in the economy, they are ready to enter innovative joint ventures and public/private partnerships such as the Economic Development Forum. The Confederation of British Industry in Northern Ireland (CBI) effort to develop standards for equitable hiring offers a lowkey but valuable contribution to easing tensions at the employment office door. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry, like the NI Small Business Federation, advocates changing how to do business, including learning how to partner with government and/or the voluntary sector. This can yield negative results. University of Ulster economist Mike Smyth warns of “an entrepreneurial group that is subsidized by the public sector.” The private sector must be weaned from state dependence. There are saints and sinners in markets as in state and society, probably in similar proportion. However, the private sector knows the borders between state and economy are permeable. Business experience should help them relativize

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ethnic borders, nationalist/republican borders, Northern and Southern borders as well. From a sole focus on political paths, economics-driven approaches to peace and prosperity make sense. Creativity surfaces at the margins between civil society, business, and government. More than 30,000 people are employed in the “social economy sector” that includes cooperatives, housing associations, foundations, trusts and employee-owned businesses. (Pearson, 2004). The West Belfast Taxi Association is an example of such community-based businesses, many of which provide transitional and long-term employment. They have been called “key to the social and economic regeneration of disadvantaged areas” by the West Belfast Economic Forum (Comments on “Developing a Social Economy,” April 20, 2004). The private and social economy sectors can play an ever-greater role at the peace and growth table by creating jobs, increasing productivity, and training labor for future jobs. Financial investment plus social capital investment can yield profits and social returns—what some call the “double bottom line.” Lessons Learned and Policy Recommendations NI has gone through protracted conflict—several decades profiled against the backdrop of contentious centuries. The peace process for most Northern Irish has been a journey from conflict toward coexistence, while some others have already progressed to advanced stages of cooperation and even reconciliation. The process began with ceasefires, then negotiations, and in 1998 reached one benchmark—the Good Friday or Belfast Agreement. Peace-building has been slow and painful. Let me list some lessons I have learned and recommend policy approaches that I believe will accelerate implementation of the Belfast Agreement in light of postconflict experiences elsewhere. In brief: Lessons 1. Outsiders can’t make a peace process work. 2. Attitudinal change is every bit as important as institutional change. 3. “Settle for less”—the will to coexist is a good start to implementing a peace process. 4. Moral imagination can push politics and economics in more socially useful directions. 5. The churches (like politicians) may orient but don’t control NI citizen attitudes and behaviour. More integrated education at all levels can help reduce tribal outlooks.


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Policy Recommendations and Agents 1. Provide full and fair physical security to Catholics as to Protestants (State and civil society). 2. Support business development geared to the double bottom line of profits and equity, offering greater access to jobs, goods, and services to both communities (Market actors and state). 3. Transform District Councils by enhancing their autonomy and financial capacity so that, combined with citizen stakeholders, they can learn to share power, build social capital and peace (Local state and civil society). 4. Peace-building, like equitable development, requires combined, multilevel initiatives by the private sector and civil society, not just politicians. 1. Outsiders can’t make a peace process work. They may jump-start, but cannot sustain, a peace process—outsiders are like car batteries, but not alternators. Commitment to change by a significant cross-section of domestic actors must be obtained for the process to take hold in the long run. Many of the Northern Irish seemed to prefer having no power at all, rather than to let “the other side” have any power. Thus “devolution,” or power-sharing, was often on hold. If majority choice continues to prevail, and demographics continue to change, then today’s majority will be tomorrow’s minority—so both sides must take minority rights very seriously. The Belfast Agreement and steps leading up to it were pushed by the two “sponsoring governments,” Great Britain and Ireland, with encouragement from the U.S. government, the European Community, Canada, and to a degree, the Irish diaspora. They all influenced the process, but it is the Northern Irish alone who can make it stick. John Brewer’s earlier critique of NI political elites was telling. “There is virtually no integration of the activities at the grassroots with high level negotiations, and the spirit and commitment at the bottom does not animate the top. . . . Top-level politicians offer no vision of peace” (Brewer, 2003). But change is possible! 2. Attitudinal change is every bit as important as institutional change—trusting relationships are key, and the exercise of power needs to be relativized. The NI peace agreement was top-heavy on institutional forms. The architects sought to ensure power-sharing with minority and majority participation, but they could not invent mechanisms to overcome the legacies of mistrust that undercut power-sharing. Hence the devolved political institutions had been suspended more than not. There has been positive impact from mid-level and local-level initiatives that grappled with communications, dialogue, and helping people channel

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energies away from violence. Educators in public and private schools play a pivotal role in the process and the multiplication of research institutions and think tanks has helped. “The peace process proposed new institutions and constitutional forms as a basis for peace and reconciliation. But the proposals would also change the balance of power. Many nationalists supported them for that reason. Unionists opposed them for that reason. . . . As the search for reconciliation gave way to a struggle for and about power, hopes for a settlement receded. The struggle for power undermines the search for a settlement based on agreement” (Ruane and Todd, 1996). Both sides’ leaders have made long overdue commitments to peaceful resolution of differences and the joint exercise of power. Their constituents and the world wait to see how they will do. 3. “Settle for less”—the will to coexist is a good start to implementing a peace process after prolonged conflict. Cooperation and harmony are idyllic aspirations in settings where almost everybody considers themselves victims, where funerals ignite sparks of rage easily stoked by those who live for violence—or lack skills beyond handling guns and bombs. Settling for less helps set rebuilding in motion. Donald Horowitz offers a caveat to scholars and pundits: “a bloody phenomenon cannot be explained by a bloodless theory” (Horowitz, 2002, 193). Rather than deny or downplay conflict, leaders and followers must learn how to manage it. Robert Bellah (Bellah et al., 1985) defines community as “a group of people with a history and with hope for the future.” The Northern Irish have too much history, too little regard for the present and future. 4. Moral imagination can push politics and economics in more socially useful directions. Until there are new narratives to substitute for the ballads, poems, memories, and reiterated tales of wrongs done, change will come slowly. The arts help create a new future-oriented imaginative repertoire that can outdo the ritual of parades celebrating the long gone triumphs of Orangemen and miracles of St. Patrick. “Whatever is given / can always be re-imagined, however four-square / . . . it happens to be,” wrote Seamus Heaney. Identity can be reimagined, just as the imagined community of “Catholic,” “Protestant,” “Irish,” or “Northern Irish,” no matter how foursquare, can be revisited. The arts help imagine things as other, and other people as the same. More objective histories can be taught in schools and at home. Religion can reemphasize peace and justice. Empathy, thinking how life can be different, was for Daniel Lerner the starting point of development for “traditional” societies whose people assumed they had no choice but to repeat their fathers’ trade or their mother’s life-style. Given NI’s weighty cultural legacy, beyond stalemated politics, change can be spurred through the arts, history, poetry, and narrative. The sounds of different drummers can be heard, new narratives written, empathy can spread.


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5. The churches (like politicians) may orient but don’t control NI behavior. With more integrated education at all levels, they can help reduce tribal attitudes. The churches still exert a major influence on Northern Irish attitudes and behavior, despite declining influence resulting from secularization, scandal, or changed urban life styles. Most religious people have long since rejected violence and accept peaceful politics as the sole route to the future. The churches must lead by themselves demonstrating conversion, readiness to surrender power, and courageous commitment to pluralism in public life. Churches provide the backbone of the voluntary sector and deliver social services that help reduce poverty and improve education. The churches can encourage religious identity that reinforces civility rather than buttresses siege mentalities. And churchmen and women can encourage autonomous, pluralist politics rather than pursue clerical domination. The churches can take a risk for peace by supporting more integrated education in the 95% of schools that remain “sectarian.”

Policy Recommendations and Agents 1. Ensure full and fair physical security to Catholics as to Protestants, since the right to public safety belongs to all citizens (state and civil society). Violence does not end with ceasefires. Paramilitary organizations and their splinter groups use it as a political bargaining chip, to punish their own members, for vigilante purposes, to spoil peace-building—or to commit crimes. Decommissioning of weapons was a red button for both sides, with British “occupation” troops a major irritant for nationalists. “Terrorist” is a code word, reinforced worldwide after September 11, 2001. Prisoner releases were painful but effective gestures for confidence-building, still more the long postponed IRA move to put its arsenal “out of use.” “Policing became the civil rights issue of Northern Ireland” wrote Niall O’Dochartaigh in 1997, and until now, Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods are “policed” by paramilitary organizations. Security should flow from legitimate sources—not self-appointed paramilitaries. Local institutions, especially the NI police force, need proportionate membership drawn from the entire community and to continue deepening their neighborhood ties through police boards. British Army presence, an expression and symbol of occupation, is counterproductive. 2. Support business development geared to the double bottom line of profits and equity, offering greater access to jobs, goods, and services to both communities (market actors and state). The long-term Catholic quest for jobs is now shared by Protestants. The private sector seeks an ever-greater

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role at the peace and growth table by advocating more economics and less politics. Business leaders want a smaller public sector and greater space for entrepreneurship. The small social economy sector deserves celebration. All agree that NI must recover economic growth by finding its niche in the twenty-first century global economy. But equity (seldom central to economic development models) must be part of the package if grievances are to be met and reconstruction accelerated. NI must stimulate business development that can provide more jobs and standards for more equal access to jobs in both communities. Attention to small and mid-size business and increased cross-border commerce are obvious steps, along with training and preparation of labor for a “knowledge-based economy.” Inequality, perceived and actual, stems from uneven distribution of jobs, resources and power. Albert Hirschman used the metaphor of the tunnel with two lanes of traffic and relatively patient drivers in each, until one lane begins to move forward leaving the other behind. Then, patience evaporates and the social peace is broken by protest. If economic development through markets is key to reconstruction, equal opportunity is key to reconciliation. 3. Transform District Councils by enhancing their autonomy and financial capacity so that, combined with citizen stakeholders, they can learn together to share power, build social capital and peace (local state and civil society). District councils depend excessively on central government and lack proactive capacity. They could become settings for conflict management, power-sharing, and schools for pluralist democracy. Yes, many NI urban neighborhoods are divided—sometimes down the middle of a street. Murals, barriers, and walls have been markers of its divisions. Segregated housing, schools, and neighborhoods still exist, but integrated job opportunities and mixed marriages have begun to disrupt patterns of separation. Some murals celebrating violence have been painted over, others have been touched up for busloads of tourists as relics of bygone days. Some councils, even in large cities such as Belfast and Derry, have effectively shared power already. The Community Support Framework offers a whole range of useful social capital experiments illustrating what can be done, but may soon lose its EU funding. Rate and tax structures need revision so that revenues and expenditures may be better aligned, and with more local control. Rather than await the resolution of constitutional questions, civility and governance and peace-building are already being wrestled with at the local level. NI demonstrates the benefits from strengthening mid-level leadership for conflict management and for exercising real local power through both public and private intermediate institutions. Empowered local government working with churches, business and neighborhood organizations could teach creativity and flexibility to the politicians at the top. Linking district


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councils and community oversight boards to local police jurisdictions has been a useful first step at negotiation and compromise. 4. Peace-building, like equitable development, requires combined, multilevel initiatives by the private sector and civil society, not just politicians. Peace-building and equitable development have much in common, since both must constantly grapple with generating and distributing goods, power, and status. Development means many things, but boils down to reducing vulnerability and increasing capacity. It means facilitating more human lives for more people in ways congruent with their changing cultures. Constructing peace means interrupting cycles of violence, managing conflict and reconstructing institutions and the economy. In underdeveloped as well as wealthier settings like the United States, Ireland, and NI, a permanent stratum of very poor people remains, and may be growing. State, market, and civil society must somehow respond. In NI, poverty and inequity that once affected but one side of the divide, now cross sectarian boundaries. NI cannot afford permanent division nor can its economy maintain close to a third of its population on the dole. The Celtic Tiger across the border offers markets and one model of change, but its poverty levels are also a disgrace. A more secure peace can attract investment and carve new niches in the global economy, starting with neighbors to the South, and eastwards to the EU as well as Great Britain. Relationships must change. Economic development, human development and peace-building do indeed go together.

Postscript Northern Ireland’s future will increasingly be tied to Europe. The politics of the peace process was driven by Great Britain and the Irish Republic, but their influence and credibility have waned. The impact of European Union membership on the Irish Republic is huge, and it has contributed financially to the NI peace process at macro, meso- and micro-levels. If EU funding feels impositional to beneficiaries, much like international financial institutions in poor countries, one tradeoff is that the EU offers NI working political models of coexistence in divided societies. EU planners lean toward strong institutions at the supra-national level, but they also value subsidiarity that favors strong government and collaborative governance at subnational levels. The Northern Irish welcome unaccustomed peace and devolution. Their economic recovery can’t tolerate much violence. Rumours of trouble, mere fumes can fuel negative “unfavourable investment climate” decisions. Imagining alternative political models makes sense, but only when

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economic actors and citizens are included in the exercise. Small businesses worry about dependence on state contracts and middle and large businesses chafe at investors driven away by tax levels nearly three times those of the Republic. Protestants initially had serious reservations about the Belfast Agreement. Only 43% of them considered it basically sound, as opposed to 77% of Catholics (Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 2003), but threats about “revisiting” its content by one side, “but keeping its substance” by the other, have finally receded. The good news is that “there is cross-community support for common destiny, in the form of a recognition that Northern Ireland’s future lies in power-sharing” (Mac Ginty, 2004). IRA and UDA weapons, the last big “confidence-building” obstacles are no longer at issue, but trust still is. The vast majority of NI people are tired of violence. Neither do they want insecurity nor inequity to continue. In the final analysis, it’s up to them to change their relationships. They have already travelled a long way. The Belfast or Good Friday Agreement was a key milestone. The failure of negotiations in December 2004 was disappointing. Remarkable concessions and compromises have been made by both sides. The long overdue destruction of weapons by the IRA in 2005 was another milestone, one that has finally been matched by loyalist paramilitaries. But paramilitary are not the core of this peace process. Leadership on both sides have finally stepped up. More decided support should come from inside and below for a settlement initiated outside and above, or the peace process will be incomplete. For two antagonistic sides to really share power (as well as neighborhoods, jobs, and schools), a huge leap of faith and trust is required, since power has usually meant abuse or violence by the side that controls the state. Many grassroots and intermediate organizations of civil society, most churches, educators, and some local governments have weighed in strongly on the side of peaceful coexistence. Social entrepreneurship has flourished. Business leaders now call for economic growth and greater space for private sector entrepreneurial initiative. It is likely that, as in the republic, out-migration will shift to return migration as the economy recovers, reducing the brain drain to Great Britain. But given deep division, the peace process will continue a work in progress. The people of NI, majority and minority, elite and grassroots, must deal with their fear of change and lack of trust. They must insist on leaders who are fixed on the future, skilled in negotiation and dialogue, ready to manage constituencies and conflict. Those leaders must be prepared for economic as well as political and civic challenges at all levels. Market, state, and civil society actors must be fully engaged in the work of peace. Confidence-building measures were required to reach a peace agreement. And successful implementation itself builds confidence, even


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counsel for others. Gerry Adams was recently asked what he had learned that might be applied to the Middle Eastern conflict, especially Israel and Palestine, and he replied: “We learned a great deal from Mandela and the South African experience and others might learn from us. In the Middle East, they’ll have to decide what suits them—but I’m sure many of the core principles of Northern Ireland will fit there as well—the centrality of dialogue, putting yourself in the other’s shoes, avoiding preconditions, putting all the issues on the table, keeping ‘back channels’ open; inviting all the actors, including the international community and especially the enemies—since it’s your enemies you make peace with, not your friends.” He had recently visited the Middle East, where an Israeli told him “ ‘ninety percent of the Palestinian and Israeli people, if given a piece of paper, can write down for you the several points required for a settlement.’ The South Africans did it, the Northern Irish have done it, it’s a disgrace that it hasn’t yet been solved” (University of San Diego interview, July 10, 2007). Some used to say that of the Northern Irish!


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Conclusion: Synergies for Peace

Postconflict If this world is dedicated to producing charcoal and ashes then we must be sculptors who comb the beaches after bonfires, transforming burnt wood into compasses or pelicans, strange structures that remind us of something we can’t name, the suggestion of wings, or a thin arrow pointing North, towards the graceful arc of a suspension bridge that we will drive across, tomorrow. Elena M. Reilly

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oems, argued Seamus Heaney and many Irish poets before him, have power to persuade, to affirm values, to sometimes “act like their society’s immune systems, going to attack whatever unhealthy or debilitating forces are at work in the body politic” (Heaney, 1995, 114). He advocated a “commonwealth of art” for both Irelands, suggesting that identities can change and imagination can enhance policy. Think of Alexis de Tocqueville, who strongly indicted the poverty he witnessed in Ireland in 1835 (as he would in Guatemala today). He celebrated both the “equality of condition” and “art of association” he saw in America that same year. Grassroots democracy, equitable development, and power-sharing nearly two centuries later still requires equality and artful association,

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more justice, improved relationships, even poems. Trust grows slowly, especially after conflict. We have explored the first decade implementing peace agreements by two deeply divided societies. Ethnicity, wealth, religion, land tenure, educational levels, jobs, opportunity—many fault-lines criss-cross in both places. Their social bases of power differ, yet asymmetries of wealth and power are similar. Postconflict violence has been nasty and persistent in both settings—extremely disruptive in Guatemala. Former conflict cycles were replaced by new ones, feeding on narratives of the past and profound distrust in NI, on international drug trade corruption, and fear in Guatemala. I have argued that building peace requires replacing negative energies of conflict cycles with positive synergies for peace. With Lederach and others, I am convinced that sustainable peace-building, like development, is best cemented at the middle and local levels of a society. Granted, these levels are neither paragons of virtue nor of efficacy—they share the defects of the rest of humanity and its institutions. But their actual and potential contributions have too long been ignored—especially when it comes to implementation. Peace-building and development cannot be separated—at least if development is understood to mean not just economic growth but integral human development and opportunity for the many, not just for the few. Equity and security are aspirations shared by a majority in both settings. We have examined some mid-level “synergies for peace,” intermediate arenas where the nitty-gritty of conflict management, trust-building, reconciliation, and increased human opportunity are operative. Religious settings, educational initiatives, micro and small business entrepreneurs, local government, models of policing that engage the community while effectively protecting people and their human and civic rights—these are keys to improving relationships, implementing positive change, and making nonviolent conflict management routine. From very different starting points, both Guatemala and Northern Ireland (NI) have recently enjoyed modest economic growth, with greater wealth more broadly distributed in the latter than in the former. Political leadership has been uneven in both, especially when leaders feared to lead, or let divisive narratives of the past obscure future opportunities. Successful peace processes must indeed ensure human security—starting, not with draconian counterproductive measures and military occupation, but with fair and competent policing, reducing fear and uncertainty, and moving toward opportunity for more complete human lives. Attitudes and institutions must change, even if only a little at a time. Economic growth needs to occur and its benefits be shared. The process requires creating spaces for dialogue and shifting time horizons forward so that trust can grow,

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more civil societies can emerge and shared futures evolve. The cultural foundations of conflicts must be engaged if they are to be resolved and transformed, since coexistence and reconciliation have to bridge divergent versions of identities and history. “Peace comes dropping slow,” said Yeats. Ron, a young Israeli soldier photographed with his weapon in a recent volume wrote, “I think Hebrew and Arabic are the only languages in the world where the greeting is the word ‘peace.’ All that’s left is to implement it.” (Haaretz, 2007). My chapters highlight lessons learned and offer suggestions for sustainable peace-building and development. Among them are the following: outsiders can’t make a peace process work; willingness to coexist is a good starting place for peace-building; attitudinal change must accompany institutional experiments; churches can orient, but not control citizen attitudes; ensuring citizen security through effective community policing is key to containing residual violence and securing human rights; and moral imagination can help steer political and economic actors in more socially useful directions. Positive leaders from civil society, religions, and business have helped bridge the divides in both settings—and hope persists since even “negative” leaders can and have reversed course—witness Ian Paisley’s unexpected “conversion.” Unlike elite-negotiated peace agreements, sustainable peace implementation resides mostly at the middle and grassroots of any society. Managing conflict in contexts wealthy or poor requires inventing “public and private” policies. Peace-building, like development, requires combined, multisector and multilevel initiatives by the private sector and civil society as well as government to determine who gets what, when and how? Some specific policy recommendations for each country were suggested in my chapter analysis. Some may be relevant for other settings, especially if they include local level policy arenas and agents. In the November 4, 2007 election, the Guatemalan majority voted for a candidate who emphasized pursuit of more equitable development—a core principle of their peace agreement—rejecting the alternative program Table 6.1

Policy Arenas and Agents

Grounded Policy Arenas

Agents

Physical security Equality Decentralization Poverty—Austerity Education Social services Advocacy

state and civil society state, market, and civil society state and civil society state, civil society, and markets state, civil society, and business state, civil society, and philanthropy civil society or voluntary sector and parties

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of yet more strong-armed security promised by a former general. In May 2007, Northern Irish politicians chose to resume power-sharing government and have worked very well together thus far. As George Mitchell, key mediator in the NI dispute remarked “Conflicts are created and sustained by human beings. They can be ended by human beings” (Medal of Freedom speech, 2002). In both these cases, conflicts have been managed and routine political dialogue has begun. Guatemala and Northern Ireland, one poor and the other relatively rich continue to build elusive peace. Implementation has been slow, difficult, and often appeared to move in reverse gear. Both offer useful lessons on how to build (and not) build peace, to work with international third parties, sustain tense dialogues, meld leaders and followers, reduce inequities, share wealth, and multiply opportunity. Postconflict violence escalated continually in Guatemala while it receded in NI—although historical narratives and prejudice there continue to fuel distrust. Yet they can (and have) learned from each other, and both can teach lessons on locally controlled peace-building to people throughout the world—including the Middle East and my own country—as it seeks to impose unworkable “peace” in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan and gives uncritical support to the Israeli occupation. South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Guatemala were once labelled “intractable conflicts.” Third parties, Palestinian and Israeli peacebuilders and hardliners can learn from the former “intractables.” Both sides want and deserve security, both should renounce violence, both have rights to institutions, equity and opportunity, and both need to talk to one another. Israel’s security concerns, are no more legitimate than those of Palestinians. Their conflict cycles can also be interrupted. Third parties can help. Security and equity go together. Positive change must occur on the ground. Although most peace agreements emphasize elite pacts (often neglecting popular endorsement and security), and while multilateral financial institutions (IFIs) bank on growth strategies (with scant regard for distribution), my argument has been that sustainable peace-building and democratic development both depend on mid- and local-level activities to make them work over the long run. Well-crafted peace agreements and thoughtfully designed economic development plans go nowhere without resonance, commitment, and capacity throughout the society (especially when the rules of the game are stacked against those who don’t write them!). Hence, my focus on the actors and institutions at the middle and grassroots level—including religious organizations, local governments, community-based policing, civil society or voluntary organizations, plus a bottom line emphasis on education—that can make or break implementation of agreements and long-term development.

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Clearly, even-handed national and international actors are crucial— especially for helping adversaries arrive at, craft, guarantee, finance, and even monitor agreements, but their policy designs and formulae must be ratified and more importantly, be experienced as beneficial, by the people on the ground. Without decent job opportunities, those who have lived by violence will continue to do so. Trade agreements should not suppress, but multiply new jobs. Without opportunities stemming from development at home, international migration flows will continue to grow, no matter the walls constructed and sensors planted. Remittances may assuage extreme poverty and provide seed capital for some micro-businesses, but they can’t replace government social policy and socially responsible business involvement. Peace-building, like politics and development, is ultimately local and must engage state, market, and civil society actors at home and across borders. Two key U.S. players in the NI peace process, Richard Haass and Senator George Mitchell expressed their satisfaction at the resumption of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in 2007. Reviewing lessons they had learned in the NI process—some pertinent for many hot spots in the world, including Guatemala, and especially the Middle East—they wrote: “Negotiations are essential. Peace never just happens; it is made issue by issue, point by point. In order to get negotiations launched, preconditions must be kept to an absolute minimum.” “Frontloading a negotiation with demanding conditions all but assures that negotiations will not get under way, much less succeed.” “Parties should be allowed to hold on to their dreams. No one demanded of NI’s Catholics that they let go of their hope for a united Ireland; no one required of NI Protestants that they let go of their insistence that they remain part of the UK. They still have those goals, but they have agreed to pursue them exclusively through peaceful and democratic means. That is what matters.” “Leaders take time to accept that they must give up armed struggle and to sign on and compromise. It also takes time for their supporters to follow. The good news is that enduring peace is worth the wait” (Haass and Mitchell, 2007). It is indeed.

Poets and Hope We’ve looked at several islands of hope and drawn some lessons from Guatemalan and Irish peace-building to date. We have focused on midlevel institutions and actors who can deal upward with the elites who made pacts for peace and development, and downward to the people who suffered most from war and poverty and have reason to be skeptical. Migrants with their remittances offer finance that does get to the

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grassroots, though it could be made more productive. Municipalities are the school of democracy and the level of government that can both provide services and respond to citizens, though their capacity must be built. Police can treat all citizens fairly and firmly. Religions can move from competition to collaboration, temper exclusionary tendencies, and help civilize society. Education can prepare human capital and successive generations to grapple with and move beyond unexamined legacies of the past towards knowledge-based economies. Civil society’s reform proposals can help successive political administrations make positive differences that can be sustained over the long run. Guatemala and Ireland are both lovely tourist destinations, as colorful in their weaving as they are in their languages. But they have both been violent. Beyond diplomatic negotiation and social science analysis, there is the realm of poets and essayists bridging popular oral cultures and conflictive politics in the quest for ending violence and imaging peace. Both countries boast Nobel laureates, Ireland with Yeats and Heaney, Guatemala’s Asturias, Menchu, or a worthy candidate like Ak’abal. Poets, weavers of words, can depict hopeful narratives in settings that have for too long been dominated by cultures of violence. Seamus Heaney called Northern Irish poet Louis MacNeice “the sponsor” of a NI “struggling to be born.” “The admission of MacNeice within the symbolic ordering of Ireland also admits a hope for the evolution of a political order, one tolerant of difference and capable of metamorphoses within all the multivalent possibilities of Irishness, Britishness, Europeanness, planetariness, creatureliness, whatever” (Heaney, 1995, 200). Can you not hear in these Northern Irish poetic and political reflections an echo of Guatemalan Luis Cardozo y Aragón: “We are Indians, we’re mestizos, we’re Creoles and later we’ll be nothing else than Guatemalans. Much later, now without borders, without countries, we’ll be citizens of the milky way?” (Cardozo y Aragón, 1986). Humberto Ak’abal is a Maya Quiché poet whose verse Robert Bly brought to English speakers and who captures Mayan legacies of respect for nature, reverence for ancestors, healing from war, photographic imagery, and a sparkling sense of humor. He writes of a small country, of deadweight burdens suspended from head straps, and of freedom. Perhaps Heaney had it right when he wrote of such poets “. . . . they manifest poetry’s high potential, its function as an agent of possible transformation, of evolution towards that more radiant and generous life which the imagination desires” (Heaney, 1995, 114). Implementing peace agreements may follow a long, often hilly, and winding path, or in Gerry Adam’s earlier imagery, means sailing toward “a farther shore.” I have often referred to moral imagination. If homegrown,

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it can reach deeper down and further forward than political craft and economic formulas hatched far away—whether “Washington consensus,” “road map,” or well-meant designs of third party brokers. Let me encourage readers then to seek insights, imagination, and social energy, not just from pundits but from poets of such places who have themselves grappled with hard human choices for peace or violence, justice or inequity, despair or hope. Again, listen to Ak’abal.

The Last Thread The last thread of daylight bends under the weight of night and doesn’t break, it seems like hope. Humberto Ak’abal


Appendices


Appendix 1 Guatemala: Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace (December 29, 1996)

Whereas: The signing of this Agreement puts an end to more than three decades of armed conflict in Guatemala and thus to a painful era in our history, In recent years, the search for a political solution to the armed conflict has created new opportunities for dialogue and understanding within Guatemalan society, The country now faces the task, in which all Guatemalans must share, of preserving and consolidating peace, To this end, the Peace Agreements provide the country with a comprehensive agenda for overcoming the root causes of the conflict and laying the foundations for a new kind of development, Compliance with these Agreements is an historic, unavoidable commitment, Present and future generations must be made aware of the full implications of the peace commitments, The Government of the Republic of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) have agreed as follows:

I. CONCEPTS 1. The Peace Agreements reflect a national consensus. They have been endorsed by the various sectors represented in the Assembly of Civil Society and outside it. Their progressive implementation must fulfill the legitimate aspirations of Guatemalans and, at the same time, unite the efforts of all behind these common objectives. 2. The Government of the Republic reaffirms its adherence to the principles and norms aimed at guaranteeing and protecting full respect for human rights, and its political determination to enforce them. 3. Population groups uprooted by the armed conflict have the right to reside and live freely in Guatemalan territory. The Government of the Republic undertakes to ensure their return and resettlement in conditions of dignity and security.

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4. The Guatemalan people are entitled to know the full truth about the human rights violations and acts of violence that occurred in the context of the internal armed conflict. Shedding light objectively and impartially on what happened will contribute to the process of national reconciliation and democratization in the country. 5. Recognition of the identity and rights of indigenous peoples is essential for building a multi-ethnic, multicultural and multilingual country of national unity. Respect for and the exercise of the political, cultural, economic and spiritual rights of all Guatemalans is the foundation for a new coexistence reflecting the diversity of their nation. 6. Firm and lasting peace must be based on participatory socio-economic development that is geared to the common good and to the needs of the entire population. Such development requires social justice, as one of the cornerstones of national unity and solidarity, and sustainable economic growth as a prerequisite for meeting the population’s social demands. 7. The genuine participation of citizens—both men and women—from all sectors of society is essential for achieving social justice and economic growth. The State must broaden these opportunities for participation and strengthen its own role as guiding force of national development, lawmaker, source of public investment, provider of basic services and promoter of social consensus and settlement of disputes. To that end, it must raise fiscal revenues and, as a matter of priority, channel public spending towards social investment. 8. In the search for growth, economic policy must be directed towards preventing processes of economic exclusion, such as unemployment and impoverishment, and towards optimizing the benefits of economic growth for all Guatemalans. Raising the standard of living and ensuring health care, education, social security and training for Guatemalans are preconditions for achieving sustainable development in Guatemala. 9. The State and organized sectors of society must join forces to find a solution to agrarian problems and promote rural development, both of which are the key to improving the situation of the majority of the population living in rural areas— the population group most seriously affected by poverty, inequity and the weakness of State institutions. 10. The strengthening of civilian power is an essential prerequisite for the existence of a democratic regime. The ending of the armed conflict affords an historic opportunity to renew the country’s institutions so that, working in coordination, they can guarantee Guatemalans the rights to life, liberty, justice, security, peace and the full development of the individual. The Guatemalan armed forces must adjust their functions to the new era of peace and democracy. 11. The legal integration of URNG, in conditions of security and dignity, is in the national interest and is directly related to the objective of reconciliation and the consolidation of a democratic system open to all. 12. The constitutional reforms set out in the Peace Agreements provide the fundamental substantive basis for the reconciliation of Guatemalan society within

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the framework of the rule of law, democratic coexistence and the full observance of and strict respect for human rights. 13. Elections are essential for Guatemala’s current transition to a functional, participatory democracy. Improving the electoral regime will help to strengthen the legitimacy of public authority and facilitate the country’s democratic transformation. 14. The implementation of the national agenda arising out of the Peace Agreements is a complex, long-term undertaking requiring the determination to fulfil the commitments made and the involvement of State bodies and of the country’s various social and political forces. This undertaking calls for a strategy that sets realistic priorities for the gradual fulfillment of commitments, thereby ushering in a new chapter in Guatemala’s history—one of development and democratic coexistence.

II. ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE PEACE AGREEMENTS 15. All agreements signed on the basis of the Framework Agreement on Democratization in the Search for Peace by Political Means, signed at Querétaro, Mexico, on 25 July 1991, and those concluded since the Framework Agreement for the Resumption of the Negotiating Process, signed at Mexico City on 10 January 1994, are hereby incorporated into this Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace. Those agreements are: (a) The Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, signed at Mexico City on 19 March 1994; (b) The Agreement on Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict, signed at Oslo on 17 June 1994; (c) The Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer, signed at Oslo on 23 June 1994; (d) The Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples, signed at Mexico City on 31 March 1995; (e) The Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation, signed at Mexico City on 6 May 1996; (f) The Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society, signed at Mexico City on 19 September 1996; (g) The Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire, signed at Oslo on 4 December 1996; (h) The Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime, signed at Stockholm on 7 December 1996; (i) The Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of URNG, signed at Madrid on 12 December 1996;

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(j) The Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements, signed at Guatemala City on 29 December 1996. 16. With the exception of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, which has been in force since it was signed, all the agreements incorporated into the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace shall enter into force formally and in full when the present Agreement is signed.

III. EXPRESSION OF GRATITUDE 17. Upon completion of the historic negotiating process in the search for peace by political means, the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca wish to place on record their gratitude for the national and international efforts that have contributed to the conclusion of the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace. They emphasize the role played by the National Reconciliation Commission, the Conciliation, the Assembly of Civil Society and United Nations Moderation. They also express appreciation for the support provided by the Group of Friends of the Guatemalan Peace Process, consisting of the Republic of Colombia, the United Mexican States, the Kingdom of Norway, the Kingdom of Spain, the United States of America and the Republic of Venezuela.

IV. FINAL PROVISIONS First. The Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace shall enter into force when it is signed. Second. This Agreement shall be widely publicized, especially through formal education programs. Guatemala City, 29 December 1996. For the Government of Guatemala: (Signed) Gustavo PORRAS CASTEJÓN (Signed) Otto PÉREZ-MOLINA Brigadier-General (Signed) Raquel ZELAYA ROSALES (Signed) Richard AITKENHEAD CASTILLO For the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca: (Signed) Ricardo RAMÍREZ DE LEÓN (Commander Rolando MORÁN) (Signed) Jorge Ismael SOTO GARCÍA (Commander Pablo MONSANTO) (Signed) Ricardo ROSALES ROMÁN

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(Carlos GONZÁLES) (Signed) Jorge Edilberto ROSAL MELÉNDEZ For the United Nations: (Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI Source: Posted by USIP Library on: November 20, 1998 Source Name: MINUGUA, United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights in Guatemala Source URL: http://www.un.org/Depts/minugua/afinal.htm Date Downloaded: July 7, 1998


Appendix 2 The Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation (May 6, 1996)

Agreement on Social And Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation concluded on 6 May 1996 between the Presidential Peace Commission of the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca Whereas: A firm and lasting peace must be consolidated on the basis of social and economic development directed towards the common good, meeting the needs of the whole population, This is necessary in order to overcome the poverty, extreme poverty, discrimination and social and political marginalization which have impeded and distorted the country’s social, economic, cultural and political development and have represented a source of conflict and instability, Socio-economic development requires social justice, as one of the building blocks of unity and national solidarity, together with sustainable economic growth as a condition for meeting the people’s social needs, Rural areas require an integral strategy that facilitates access by small farmers to land and other production resources, offers juridical security and promotes conflict resolution, It is essential, both for the realization of the production potential of Guatemalan society and for the achievement of greater social justice, that all sectors of society participate effectively in finding a way to meet their needs, particularly in setting public policies that concern them, The State should pursue democratization in order to expand those possibilities for participation and strengthen its role as a leader of national development, as a legislator, as a source of public investment and a provider of services and as a promoter of consensus-building and conflict resolution, This Agreement seeks to create or strengthen mechanisms and conditions to guarantee the effective participation of the people and contains the priority objectives for Government action to lay the foundations of this participatory development,

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The implementation of this Agreement should enable all the country’s social and political forces to face together, in a cooperative and responsible way, the immediate tasks of combating poverty, discrimination and privilege, thus building a united, prosperous and just Guatemala that will afford a dignified way of life to its people as a whole, The Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (hereinafter referred to as “the Parties”) have agreed as follows:

I. DEMOCRATIZATION AND PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT A. Participation and consensus-building 1. In order to pursue a true, functional and participatory democracy, the process of social and economic development should be democratic and participatory and include: (a) consensus-building and dialogue among agents of socio-economic development; (b) consensus-building between these agents and State bodies in the formulation and implementation of development strategies; and (c) effective citizen participation in identifying, prioritizing and meeting their needs. 2. Expanded social participation is a bulwark against corruption, privilege, distortions of development and the abuse of economic and political power to the detriment of society. Therefore, it is an instrument for the eradication of economic, social and political polarization in society. 3. In addition to representing a factor in democratization, citizen participation in economic and social development is essential in order to promote productivity and economic growth, achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth and train human resources. It ensures transparency in public policies and their orientation towards the common good rather than special interests, the effective protection of the interests of the most vulnerable groups, efficiency in providing services and, consequently, the integral development of the individual. 4. In this spirit, and in line with the agreements already concluded on the resettlement of the population groups uprooted by the armed conflict and on identity and rights of indigenous peoples, the Parties agree on the importance of establishing or strengthening mechanisms allowing the citizens and different social groups to exercise their rights effectively and participate fully in decision-making on the various matters affecting or involving them, with full awareness of both their individual and collective obligations to society, which they will fulfil responsibly. 5. Strengthening social participation means that greater opportunities in social and economic decision-making should be offered to organized groups. This assumes that all kinds of grass-roots organizations representing different interests will be recognized and encouraged. It requires, in particular, the guarantee of full and effective rights for rural and urban workers and small farmers to participate, as organized entities, in the process of building consensus with the

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business sector or at the national level. For this purpose, flexible laws and administrative regulations must be passed to grant legal personality or other forms of legal recognition to those organizations requesting it. 6. This also assumes a major effort to promote a culture of consensus and capacity-building in business, labour and other types of organizations in order to increase their ability to plan and negotiate and effectively to assume the rights and duties inherent in democratic participation.

Consensus-building 7. Building consensus at the national, departmental and communal levels and among rural and urban units of production is essential in order to stimulate and stabilize economic and social growth. State structures must be adapted to fulfil this role of building consensus and reconciling interests, in order to be able to work effectively and efficiently to modernize the production sector, enhance competitiveness, promote economic growth and provide basic social services efficiently and universally.

Participation at the local level 8. Bearing in mind that the people who live in a department or municipality, whether business owners, workers, members of cooperatives or community representatives, are the ones who can best define the measures that benefit or affect them, a package of instruments must be adopted for institutionalizing the decentralization of social and economic decision-making, involving a real transfer of government funds and of the authority to discuss and decide locally on the allocation of resources, how projects will be executed and the priorities and characteristics of government programmes or activities. In this way, government bodies will be able to base their actions on proposals arising from the reconciliation of interests among the various segments of society. 9. Through this Agreement, the Government commits itself to take a series of steps designed to increase the people’s participation in the various aspects of public life, including social and rural development policies. This series of reforms must enable structures that generate social conflict to be replaced by new relationships that ensure the consolidation of peace, as an expression of harmonious life together, and the strengthening of democracy, as a dynamic and perfectible process from which advances can be achieved through the participation of various segments of society in shaping the country’s political, social and economic choices. 10. In order to reinforce the people’s ability to participate and, at the same time, the State’s management capacity, the Government agrees to:

Communities (a) Promote a reform of the Municipal Code so that deputy mayors are appointed by the municipal mayor, taking into account the recommendations of local residents in an open town council meeting;

Municipalities (b) Foster social participation in the context of municipal autonomy, pursuing the process of decentralization to give more authority to municipal governments,

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and consequently, strengthening their technical, administrative and financial resources; (c) Establish and implement as soon as possible, in cooperation with the National Association of Municipalities, a municipal training programme that will serve as a framework for national efforts and international cooperation in this field. The programme will stress the training of municipal staff who will specialize in executing the new duties that will be the responsibility of the municipality as a result of decentralization, with an emphasis on land use planning, a land register, urban planning, financial management, project management and training of local organizations so that they can participate effectively in meeting their own needs;

Departments (d) Promote in the Congress a reform of the Act concerning the governance of the departments of the Republic, to the effect that the governor of the department would be appointed by the President of the Republic, taking into consideration the candidates nominated by the non-governmental representatives of the departmental development councils;

Regions (e) Regionalize health care, education and cultural services for indigenous people and ensure the full participation of indigenous organizations in the design and implementation of this process;

System of urban and rural development councils (f) Take the following steps, bearing in mind the fundamental role of urban and rural development councils in ensuring, promoting and guaranteeing the people’s participation in the identification of local priorities, the definition of public projects and programmes and the integration of national policy into urban and rural development: (i) Re-establish local development councils; (ii) Promote a reform of the Urban and Rural Development Councils Act to broaden the range of sectors participating in departmental and regional development councils; (iii) Provide adequate funding for the council system.

B. Participation of women in economic and social development 11. The active participation of women is essential for Guatemala’s economic and social development, and the State has a duty to promote the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. 12. Recognizing women’s undervalued contributions in all spheres of economic and social activity, and particularly their efforts towards community

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improvement, the Parties agree that there is a need to strengthen women’s participation in economic and social development on equal terms. 13. To this end, the Government undertakes to take the specific economic and social situation of women into account in its development strategies, plans and programmes, and to train civil servants in analysis and planning based on this approach. This undertaking includes the following: (a) Recognizing the equal rights of women and men in the home, in the workplace, in the production sector and in social and political life, and ensuring that women have the same opportunities as men, particularly with regard to access to credit, land ownership and other productive and technological resources;

Education and training (b) Ensuring that women have equal opportunities for education and training in the same conditions as men, and that any form of discrimination against women that may be found in school curricula is eliminated;

Housing (c) Ensuring that women have equal access to housing of their own by eliminating the obstacles and impediments that affect women in relation to rental property, credit and construction;

Health (d) Implementing nationwide comprehensive health programmes for women, which involves giving women access to appropriate information, prevention and health care services;

Labour (e) Guaranteeing women’s right to work, which requires: (i) Using various means to encourage vocational training for women; (ii) Revising labour legislation to guarantee equality of rights and opportunities between men and women; (iii) In rural areas, recognizing women as agricultural workers to ensure that their work is valued and remunerated; (iv) Enacting laws to protect the rights of women who work as household employees, especially in relation to fair wages, working hours, social security and respect for their dignity;

Organization and participation (f) Guaranteeing women’s right to organize and their participation, on the same terms as men, at the senior decision-making levels of local, regional and national institutions; (g) Promoting women’s participation in public administration, especially in the formulation, execution and supervision of government plans and policies;

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Legislation (h) Revising national legislation and regulations to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women in terms of economic, social, cultural and political participation, and to give effect to the government commitments deriving from the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

II. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 14. The State is responsible for promoting, guiding and regulating the country’s socioeconomic development so as to ensure economic efficiency, increased social services and social justice in an integrated manner and through the efforts of society as a whole. In the quest for growth, economic policy should be aimed at preventing processes of socioeconomic exclusion, such as unemployment and impoverishment, and maximizing the benefits of economic growth for all Guatemalans. In seeking to ensure the well-being of all Guatemalans, social policy should foster economic development through its impact on production and efficiency. 15. Guatemala requires speedy economic growth in order to create jobs and enhance social development. The country’s social development, in turn, is essential for its economic growth and for better integration into the world economy. In this regard, better living standards, health, education and training are the pillars of sustainable development in Guatemala.

State responsibilities 16. The State has inescapable obligations in the task of correcting social inequities and deficiencies, both by steering the course of development and by making public investments and providing universal social services. Likewise, the State has the specific obligations, imposed by constitutional mandate, of ensuring the effective enjoyment, without discrimination of any kind, of the right to work, health, education and housing, as well as other social rights. The historical social imbalances experienced in Guatemala must be corrected, and peace must be consolidated, through decisive policies which are implemented by both the State and society as a whole.

Productive investments 17. The country’s socio-economic development cannot depend exclusively on public finances or on international cooperation. Rather, it requires an increase in productive investments that create adequately paid jobs. The Parties urge national and foreign entrepreneurs to invest in the country, considering that the signing and implementation of an agreement on a firm and lasting peace are essential components of the stability and transparency required for investment and economic expansion.

Gross domestic product 18. For its part, the Government undertakes to adopt economic policies designed to achieve steady growth in the gross domestic product of not less than 6 per cent

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per annum, which would enable it to implement a progressive social policy. At the same time, it undertakes to implement a social policy aimed at ensuring the well-being of all Guatemalans, with emphasis on health, nutrition, education and training, housing, environmental sanitation and access to productive employment and to decent pay.

The State’s leadership role 19. To meet this objective and to enable the State to play its leadership role in social policy, the Government undertakes to: (a) Apply and develop the regulatory framework to guarantee the exercise of social rights and provide social services through public entities and, where necessary, through semi-public or private entities, and supervise the adequate provision of such services; (b) Promote and ensure the participation, in accordance with the regulatory framework, of all social and economic sectors that can cooperate in social development, particularly in providing full access to basic services; (c) Ensure that the public sector provides services efficiently, considering that the State has a duty to give the population access to quality services. 20. In response to the population’s urgent demands, the Government undertakes to: (a) Increase social investment significantly, especially in the areas of health, education and employment; (b) Restructure the budget so as to increase social expenditure; (c) Give priority to the neediest sectors of society and the most disadvantaged areas of the country, without short-changing other sectors of society; (d) Improve the administration of government resources and investments by decentralizing them and making them less concentrated and bureaucratic, reforming budget performance mechanisms by giving them autonomy in decision-making and financial management to guarantee their efficiency and transparency, and strengthening supervisory and auditing mechanisms.

A. Education and training 21. Education and training have a fundamental role in the country’s economic, cultural, social and political development. They are central to the strategy of equity and national unity, and vital for economic modernization and international competitiveness. Reform of the educational system and of its administration is therefore necessary, as is the implementation of coherent and forceful State policies in the field of education, in order to achieve the following objectives: (a) To affirm and disseminate the moral and cultural values and the concepts and behaviour patterns which are the foundations of democratic coexistence, including respect for human rights, for the cultural diversity of Guatemala, for the productive work of its people and the protection of the environment and for

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the values and mechanisms of power-sharing and social and political consensusbuilding which constitute the basis of a culture of peace; (b) To avoid the perpetuation of poverty and of social, ethnic, sexual and geographical forms of discrimination, particularly those which arise from the divide between urban and rural society; (c) To contribute to the application of technical and scientific progress and, consequently, to the achievement of higher productivity, the creation of more jobs and increased income for the population, and beneficial integration into the world economy. 22. In response to the country’s needs in the field of education, the Government undertakes to:

Spending on education (a) Implement significant increases in the resources allocated to education. By the year 2000, the Government proposes to step up public spending on education as a proportion of gross domestic product by at least 50 per cent over its 1995 level. These targets will be revised upwards in the light of future developments in State finances;

Adjustment of educational curricula (b) Adjust educational curricula in accordance with the objectives set out in paragraph 21. These adjustments will take into account the conclusions of the Education Reform Commission established by the Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples;

Coverage (c) Expand, as a matter of urgency, the coverage of education services at all levels, and in particular the provision of bilingual education in rural communities, by means of: (i) The integration of children of school age into the educational system, ensuring that they complete the pre-primary and primary levels and the first level of secondary school; in particular, by the year 2000, the Government undertakes to provide access, for all those between ages 7 and 12, to at least three years of schooling; (ii) Literacy programmes in as many languages as is technically feasible, with the participation of suitably qualified indigenous organizations; the Government undertakes to raise the literacy rate to 70 per cent by the year 2000; and (iii) Education, training and technical courses for adults;

Occupational training (d) Develop, with appropriate and efficient methodology, training programmes in communities and enterprises for the retraining and technical updating of workers, with emphasis on the inhabitants of isolated areas and rural communities, with support from those sectors which are able to collaborate in this undertaking;

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Training for participation (e) Provide training to enable social organizations at the municipal, regional and national levels to take part in socio-economic development, including the fields of public administration, fiscal responsibility and consensus-building;

Civic education programme (f) Design and implement a national civic education programme for democracy and peace, promoting the protection of human rights, the renewal of political culture and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The mass media will be invited to participate in this programme;

Community-school interaction and community participation (g) In order to encourage the enrolment of children in the educational system and to lower the school drop-out rate, the Government undertakes to encourage effective community and parental participation in the various aspects of the education and training services (curricula, appointment of teachers, school calendar, etc.);

Financial support (h) Develop scholarship and student grant programmes, economic support and other incentives, to enable needy students to continue their education;

Training of school administrators (i) Develop continuing education programmes for teachers and school administrators;

Advisory commission (j) For the purpose of designing and implementing the educational reform to be carried out by the Ministry of Education, an advisory commission attached to the Ministry will be set up, consisting of participants in the educational process, including representatives of the Education Reform Commission set up pursuant to the Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples;

Higher education and research (k) State-run higher education, the management, organization and development of which is the sole responsibility of the Guatemalan University of San Carlos, is a key factor in achieving economic growth, social equity, the dissemination of culture and a greater pool of technological know-how. The Government of the Republic undertakes to provide to the University of San Carlos, in a timely manner, the funding which is its prerogative under a constitutional mandate. With all due respect to the autonomy of the University, the parties urge the authorities of that distinguished institution to give favourable consideration to all initiatives which increase its contribution to the country’s development and help to consolidate peace. The Government undertakes to heed such contributions and initiatives and to respond appropriately. Particular importance is attached to the development of the University’s regional centres and of its internship programmes, especially in the poorest sectors. The Parties also urge the business sector to devote increased

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efforts to applied technological research and to human resources development, forging closer exchange links with the University of San Carlos;

Educational outreach workers (l) Pursuant to the Agreement on Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict and the Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples, community educational outreach workers shall be incorporated into the national education system, and due regard shall be given to suitable curricula for indigenous communities and uprooted population groups.

B. Health 23. The Parties agree on the need to promote a reform of the national health sector. This reform should be aimed at ensuring effective exercise of the fundamental right to health, without any discrimination whatsoever, and the effective performance by the State, which would be provided with the necessary resources, of its obligation with regard to health and social welfare. Some of the main points of this reform are as follows:

Concept (a) It would be based on an integrated concept of health (including prevention, promotion, recovery and rehabilitation) and on humanitarian and communitybased practice emphasizing the spirit of service, and it would be applied at all levels of the country’s public health sector;

National coordinated health system (b) One of the responsibilities of the Ministry of Health is to formulate policies to provide the entire Guatemalan population with integrated health services. Under the coordination of the Ministry of Health, the health system would combine the work of public agencies (including the Guatemalan Social Security Institute) and private and non-governmental organizations involved in this sector to implement actions designed to enable the whole Guatemalan population to have access to integrated health services;

Low-income population (c) The system would create the conditions for ensuring that the low-income population has effective access to quality health services. The Government undertakes to increase the resources it allocates to health. By the year 2000, the Government proposes to step up public spending on health as a proportion of gross domestic product by at least 50 per cent over its 1995 level. This target will be revised upwards in the light of future developments in State finances;

Priority care (d) The system would give priority to efforts to fight malnutrition and to promote environmental sanitation, preventive health care and primary health care,

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especially maternal and child care. The Government undertakes to allocate at least 50 per cent of public health expenditure to preventive care and undertakes to cut the 1995 infant and maternal mortality rate in half by the year 2000. In addition, the Government undertakes to maintain the certification of eradication of poliomyelitis, and to eradicate measles by the year 2000;

Medicine, equipment and inputs (e) The Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare will revise current rules and practices with regard to the manufacture and marketing of drugs, equipment and inputs and will promote measures to ensure that these are in sufficient supply and that they are affordable and of high quality. In the case of popular basic or generic drugs, ways of purchasing them will be studied and applied in order to ensure transparency in their marketing, quality and pricing to ensure that services are provided efficiently;

Indigenous and traditional medicine (f) The system would enhance the importance of indigenous and traditional medicine, promoting its study and renewing its concepts, methods and practices;

Social participation (g) The system would encourage active participation of municipalities, communities and social organizations (including groups of women, indigenous people, trade unions and civic and humanitarian associations) in the planning, execution and monitoring of the administration of health services and programmes, through local health systems and urban and rural development councils;

Administrative decentralization and enhancement of local autonomy (h) The decentralized organization of the various levels of health care should ensure that health programmes and services are offered at the community, regional and national levels, which are the basis of the national coordinated health system.

C. Social security 24. Social security is a mechanism for expressing human solidarity and promoting the common good, laying the foundations for stability, economic development, national unity and peace. Under the Political Constitution of the Republic, the Guatemalan Social Security Institute, an autonomous body, administers the social security system. The Parties consider that appropriate measures should be taken to expand its coverage and increase its benefits and the quality and efficiency of its services. To that end, the following should be taken into account: (a) The administration of the Guatemalan Social Security Institute should be completely autonomous, in accordance with the constitutional principle of coordination with health agencies under the national coordinated health system;

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(b) Under the International Labour Organization convention ratified by Guatemala, social security should include programmes for medical care and benefits in the areas of sickness, maternity, disability, old age, survival, job-related accidents and illnesses, employment and family welfare; (c) The application of the principles of efficiency, universality, unity and compulsoriness to the operation of the Guatemalan Social Security Institute should be reinforced and guaranteed; (d) The financial soundness of the Institute should be strengthened through a system of tripartite control of contributions; (e) New ways of managing the Institute with the participation of its constituent sectors should be promoted; (f) The Institute should be effectively incorporated into the coordinated health system; (g) Conditions should be created that will facilitate the universal coverage of all workers by the social security system.

D. Housing 25. It has been recognized that there is a need to institute a policy, in accordance with the constitutional mandate, to give priority to the building of lowcost housing, through appropriate financial arrangements, in order to enable as many Guatemalan families as possible to own their own homes. To this end, the Government undertakes to:

Planning (a) Closely monitor land management policies, especially urban planning and environmental protection policies, to enable the poor to have access to housing and related services in hygienic and environmentally sustainable conditions;

Standards (b) Update health and safety regulations applicable to the construction industry and monitor compliance with them; coordinate with municipalities to ensure that construction and supervision standards are homogeneous, clear and simple, in an effort to provide high quality, safe housing;

Housing stock (c) Promote a policy to increase the stock of housing in Guatemala, in an effort to enable more people from low-income sectors to rent or own their own homes; (d) Increase the supply of housing-related services, housing options and highquality, low-cost building materials; in this context, apply anti-trust regulations to the production and marketing of building materials and housing-related services in accordance with Article 130 of the Constitution;

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Finance and credit (e) Implement monetary policies designed to reduce the cost of credit significantly; (f) Strengthen the securities market and make it more available as a source of funds to purchase housing, by offering first and second mortgages and facilitating the selling of securities issued for housing operations, such as common and preferred stocks in construction companies, mortgage bonds and debentures, real estate participation certificates, supplemental letters, promissory notes and other documents related to rental with an option to buy; (g) Design a direct subsidy mechanism and apply it to the demand for lowcost housing, to benefit the most needy sectors. To this end, strengthen the Guatemalan Housing Fund to improve its capacity to grant funds to assist those living in poverty and extreme poverty;

Participation (h) Stimulate the establishment and strengthening of participatory arrangements, such as cooperatives and self-managed and family businesses, to ensure that the beneficiaries are able to participate in the planning and construction of housing and related services;

Regularization of the land situation (i) Promote the legalization, access to and registry of land, not only in the vicinity of Guatemala City but also for urban development in the province capitals and municipalities, together with the implementation of building projects in villages and on farms, especially rural housing;

National commitment (j) In view of the size and urgency of the housing problem, national efforts should be mobilized to solve it. The Government undertakes to allocate to the housing promotion policy no less than 1.5 per cent of the tax revenue budget, beginning in 1997, giving priority to the subsidy for low-cost housing options.

E. Work 26. Work is essential for the integral development of the individual, the well-being of the family and the social and economic development of Guatemala. Labour relations are an essential element of social participation in socio-economic development and of economic efficiency. In this respect, the State’s policy with regard to work is critical for a strategy of growth with social justice. In order to carry out this policy, the Government undertakes to:

Economic policy (a) Through an economic policy designed to increase the use of the labour force, create conditions for the attainment of rising and sustained levels of employment,

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while sharply reducing structural underemployment and making possible a progressive increase in real wages; (b) Encourage measures in coordination with the various social sectors to increase investment and productivity within the framework of an overall strategy of growth with social stability and equity; Protective labour legislation (c) Promote, in the course of 1996, legal and regulatory changes to enforce the labour laws and severely penalize violations, including violations in respect of the minimum wage, non-payment, withholding and delays in wages, occupational hygiene and safety and the work environment; (d) Decentralize and expand labour inspection services, strengthening the capacity to monitor compliance with the labour norms of domestic law and those derived from the international labour agreements ratified by Guatemala, paying particular attention to monitoring compliance with the labour rights of women, migrant and temporary agricultural workers, household workers, minors, the elderly, the disabled and other workers who are in a more vulnerable and unprotected situation;

Occupational training (e) Establish a permanent, modern vocational instruction and training programme to ensure training at all levels and a corresponding increase in productivity through a draft law regulating vocational training at the national level; (f) Promote coverage by the national vocational instruction and training programmes of at least 200,000 workers by the year 2000, with an emphasis on those who are joining the workforce and those who need special training to adapt to new conditions in the labour market;

Ministry of Labour (g) Strengthen and modernize the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, ensuring its leading role in Government policies related to the labour sector and its effective deployment in the promotion of employment and in labour cooperation. To that end, it undertakes to:

Participation, coordination and negotiations (i) Promote the restructuring of labour relations in enterprises by encouraging labour management cooperation and coordination with a view to the development of the enterprise for the common good, including possible profit-sharing arrangements; (ii) Facilitate the procedures for the recognition of the legal personality of labour organizations; (iii) In the case of agricultural workers who are still hired through contractors, propose reforms for the speedy and flexible legal recognition of forms of association for the negotiation of such hiring; and (iv) Promote a culture of negotiation and, in particular, train persons to settle disputes and coordinate action for the benefit of the parties involved.

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III. AGRARIAN SITUATION AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT 27. It is essential and unavoidable to solve the problems of agrarian reform and rural development in order to address the situation of the majority population, which live in rural areas and is most affected by poverty, extreme poverty, injustice and the weakness of State institutions. The transformation of the structure of land use and ownership must have as its objective the incorporation of the rural population into economic, social and political development so that the land constitutes, for those who work it, the basis of their economic stability, the foundation of their progressive social well-being and the guarantee of their freedom and dignity. 28. Land is central to the problems of rural development. From the conquest to the present, historic events, often tragic, have left deep traces in ethnic, social and economic relations concerning property and land use. These have led to a situation of concentration of resources which contrasts with the poverty of the majority and hinders the development of Guatemala as a whole. It is essential to redress and overcome this legacy and promote more efficient and more equitable farming, strengthening the potential of all those involved, not only in terms of productive capacity but also in enhancing the cultures and value systems which coexist and intermingle in the rural areas of Guatemala. 29. These changes will enable Guatemala to take full advantage of the capacities of its inhabitants and, in particular, the richness of the traditions and cultures of its indigenous peoples. It should also take advantage of the high potential for agricultural, industrial, commercial and tourist development of those resources deriving from its wealth of natural resources. 30. Solving the agrarian problem is a complex process covering many aspects of rural life, from modernization of production and cultivation methods to environmental protection, as well as security of property, adequate use of the land and of the labour force, labour protection and a more equitable distribution of resources and the benefits of development. This is also a social process whose success depends not only on the State, but also on a combination of efforts on the part of the organized sectors of society, in the awareness that the common good requires breaking with the patterns and prejudices of the past and seeking new and democratic forms of coexistence. 31. The State has a fundamental and vital role in this process. As the guide for national development, as a legislator, as a source of public investment and provider of services and as a promoter of social cooperation and conflict resolution, it is essential for the State to increase and refocus its efforts and its resources towards the rural areas, and to promote agrarian modernization, in a sustained manner, in the direction of greater justice and greater efficiency. 32. The agreements already signed on human rights, on the resettlement of populations uprooted by armed confrontation and on the identity and rights of indigenous peoples contain commitments which constitute essential elements of a global strategy for rural development. It is in line with these provisions that the

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Government undertakes, through this Agreement, to promote an integral strategy covering the multiple elements which make up agrarian structure, including land ownership and the use of natural resources; credit systems and mechanisms; manufacturing and marketing; agrarian legislation and legal security; labour relations; technical assistance and training; the sustainability of natural resources and the organization of the rural population. This strategy includes the aspects described below.

A. Participation 33. The capacity of all actors involved in the agricultural sector must be mobilized to make proposals and to take action, including indigenous peoples’ organizations, producers’ associations, business associations, rural workers’ trade unions, rural and women’s organizations or universities and research centres in Guatemala. To that end, in addition to the provisions of other chapters of this Agreement, the Government undertakes to: (a) Strengthen the capacity of rural organizations such as associative rural enterprises, cooperatives, small farmers’ associations, mixed enterprises and selfmanaged and family businesses to participate fully in decisions on all matters concerning them and to establish or strengthen State institutions, especially those of the State agricultural sector, involved in rural development so that they can promote such participation, particularly the full participation of women in the decision-making process. That will strengthen the effectiveness of State action and ensure that it responds to the needs of rural areas. In particular, participation in development councils will be promoted as a framework for the joint formulation of development and land use plans; (b) Strengthen and expand the participation of tenant farmers’ organizations, rural women, indigenous organizations, cooperatives, producers’ trade unions and nongovernmental organizations in the National Agricultural Development Council as the main mechanism for consultation, coordination and social participation in the decision-making process for rural development, and in particular for the implementation of this chapter.

B. Access to land and productive resources 34. Promote the access of tenant farmers to land ownership and the sustainable use of land resources. To that end, the Government will take the following actions: Access to land ownership: land trust fund (a) Establish a land trust fund within a broad-based banking institution to provide credit and to promote savings, preferably among micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises. The land trust fund will have prime responsibility for the acquisition of land through Government funding, will promote the establishment of a transparent land market and will facilitate the updating of land development plans.

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The fund will give priority to the allocation of land to rural men and women who are organized for that purpose, taking into account economic and environmental sustainability requirements; (b) In order to ensure that the neediest sectors benefit from its services, the fund will set up a special advisory and management unit to serve rural communities and organizations; (c) Initially, the fund will limit its activities to the following types of land: (i) Uncultivated State land and State-owned farms; (ii) Illegally settled public land, especially in Peten and the Franja Transversal del Norte, which the Government has pledged to recover through legal action; (iii) Land acquired with the resources allocated by the Government to the National Land Fund and the National Peace Fund for that purpose; (iv) Land purchased with grants from friendly Governments and international nongovernmental organizations; (v) Land purchased with loans secured from international financing agencies; (vi) Undeveloped land expropriated under Article 40 of the Constitution; (vii) Land acquired from the proceeds of the sale of excess land, as determined by comparing the actual dimensions of private property with the dimensions recorded at the land register department, which has become the property of the State; (viii) Land which the State may purchase pursuant to Decree No. 1551, Article 40, on agricultural development areas; (ix) Land which the State may purchase for any purpose; and (x) Miscellaneous grants; (d) The Government will promote and enact legislation to regulate all the activities of the land trust fund. Such legislation will establish, inter alia, the fund’s aims, functions and financing and acquisition mechanisms, and the allocation, origin and destination of land. In 1999, the extent to which the allocation targets have been met will be assessed and, if need be, the functioning of the land allocation programme will be adjusted;

Access to land ownership: funding mechanisms (e) Promote, through all means possible, the development of a dynamic land market that would enable tenant farmers who either do not have land or have insufficient land to acquire land through long-term transactions at commercial or favourable interest rates with little or no down payment. In particular, promote the issuance of mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by the State whose yield is attractive to private investors, especially financial institutions;

Access to the use of natural resources (f) By 1999, allocate to small and medium-sized farmers’ groups legally incorporated as natural resources management ventures, 100,000 hectares within

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multi-use areas for sustainable forest management, the management of protected areas, eco-tourism, conservation of water sources and other activities compatible with the sustainable potential use of the natural resources of such areas; (g) Promote and support the participation of the private sector and grass-roots community organizations in projects for the management and conservation of renewable natural resources through incentives, targeted direct subsidies or funding mechanisms on soft terms, in view of the non-monetary benefits that the national community derives from such projects. Given the benefit that the international community receives from the sustainable management and conservation of the country’s forest and biogenetic resources, the Government will actively promote international cooperation in this venture;

Access to other productive projects (h) Develop sustainable productive projects especially geared towards boosting productivity and the processing of agricultural, forestry and fishery products in the poorest areas of the country. In particular, for the period 1997–2000, guarantee the implementation, in the poorest areas, of a Government agricultural sector investment programme in the amount of 200 million quetzales in the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors; (i) Promote a renewable natural resources management programme which fosters sustainable forestry and agro-forestry production, as well as handicrafts and smalland medium-scale industry projects that give added value to forest products; (j) Promote productive ventures related, inter alia, to agro-processing industries, marketing, services, handicrafts and tourism with a view to creating jobs and securing fair incomes for all; (k) Promote an eco-tourism programme with the broad participation of communities which have received appropriate training.

C. Support structure 35. Prerequisites for a more efficient and just agricultural structure include not only more equitable access to productive resources but also a support structure that will enhance farmers’ access to information, technology, training, credit and marketing facilities. Over and above its commitment to social investment as set forth in the chapter on social development, including in particular investment in health, education, housing and employment, the Government also undertakes to:

Basic infrastructure (a) Engage in judicious public investment and foster a climate conducive to private investment with a view to upgrading the infrastructure available for sustainable production and marketing, especially in areas of poverty and extreme poverty; (b) Develop a rural development investment programme with emphasis on basic infrastructure (highways, rural roads, electricity, telecommunications, water and

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environmental sanitation) and productive projects, for a total amount of 300 million quetzales annually during the period 1997–1999;

Credit and financial services (c) Activate the land fund not later than 1997, while simultaneously promoting conditions that will enable small and medium-scale farmers to have access to credit, individually or in groups, on a financially sustainable basis. In particular, with the support of the private sector and non-governmental development organizations, the Government proposes to strengthen local savings and credit agencies, including associations, cooperatives and the like, with a view to enhancing their function as sources of credit providing small and medium-scale farmers with financial services efficiently and in accordance with local needs and conditions;

Training and technical assistance (d) Strengthen, decentralize and broaden the coverage of training programmes, especially programmes designed to enhance rural people’s managerial skills at various levels. The private sector and non-governmental organizations will be enlisted in the implementation of this action; (e) Develop technical assistance and job training programmes that will upgrade the skills, versatility and productivity of the labour force in rural areas;

Information (f) Develop an information collection, compilation and distribution system for the agriculture, forestry, food processing and fisheries sectors, one that will provide small producers with reliable information on which to base their decisions relating to seeds, inputs, crops, costs and marketing;

Marketing (g) Develop a system of storage centres and duty-free zones with a view to facilitating the processing and marketing of agricultural products and fostering rural employment.

D. Organization of the rural population for production 36. Organizing the rural population is a decisive factor in transforming the inhabitants of the countryside into genuine protagonists of their own development. In view of the vital role of small and medium-scale enterprises in combating poverty, creating rural jobs and promoting more efficient land use, there is a need to promote a more efficient form of organization of small producers so that they can, in particular, take advantage of the support structure described in paragraph 35. To this end, the Government undertakes to: (a) Support micro-, small and medium-scale agricultural and rural enterprises by strengthening the various ways of organizing them, such as associative rural

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enterprises, cooperatives, small farmers’ associations, mixed enterprises and selfmanaged and family businesses; (b) Tackle the problem of smallholdings through: (i) A firm and sustained policy of support for smallholders so that they can become small-scale agricultural businessmen through access to training, technology, credit and other inputs; (ii) Promoting, if the smallholders so desire, amalgamation of holdings in those cases where conversion into small businesses is not possible owing to the dispersal and size of the properties.

E. Legal framework and juridical security 37. Guatemala is in need of reform of the juridical framework of agriculture and institutional development in the rural sector so that an end can be put to the lack of protection and dispossession from which small farmers, and in particular indigenous peoples, have suffered, so as to permit full integration of the rural population into the national economy and regulate land use in an efficient and environmentally sustainable manner in accordance with development needs. To this end, and taking into account in all cases the provisions of the Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Government undertakes to:

Legal reform (a) Promote a legal reform which will establish a juridical framework governing land ownership that is secure, simple and accessible to the entire population. This reform will need to simplify the procedures for awarding title and registering ownership and other real estate rights, as well as to simplify administrative and judicial formalities and procedures; (b) Promote the establishment of an agrarian and environmental jurisdiction within the judiciary through the enactment of the relevant legislation by the Congress; (c) Promote the revision and adjustment of the legislation on undeveloped land so that it conforms to the provisions of the Constitution, and regulate, inter alia through incentives and penalties, the underutilization of land and its use in ways incompatible with sustainable natural resource utilization and preservation of the environment; (d) Protect common and municipal land, in particular by limiting to the strict minimum the cases in which it can be transferred or handed over in whatever form to private individuals; (e) With respect to community-owned land, to regulate participation by communities in order to ensure that it is they who take the decisions relating to their land;

Prompt settlement of land conflicts (f) To establish and apply flexible judicial or non-judicial procedures for the settlement of disputes relating to land and other natural resources (in particular,

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direct settlement and conciliation), taking into account the provisions of the Agreement on Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict and the Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous People. In addition, to establish procedures that will make it possible: (i) To define formulas for compensation in the case of land disputes and claims in which farmers, small farmers and communities in a situation of extreme poverty have been or may be dispossessed for reasons not attributable to them; (ii) To reinstate or compensate, as appropriate, the State, municipalities, communities or individuals when their land has been usurped or has been allocated in an irregular or unjustified manner involving abuse of authority; (g) Regulate the award of title to the lands of indigenous communities and beneficiaries of the Guatemalan Institute for Agrarian Reform who are in lawful possession of the land assigned to them;

Institutional mechanisms (h) By 1997, to have started the operations of a Presidential office for legal assistance and conflict resolution in relation to land, with nationwide coverage and the task of providing advice and legal assistance to small farmers and agricultural workers with a view to the full exercise of their rights, and in particular of: (i) Advising and providing legal assistance to small farmers and agricultural workers and/or their organizations upon request; (ii) Intervening in land disputes at the request of a party with a view to arriving at a just and expeditious solution; (iii) In the case of judicial disputes, providing advice and legal assistance free of charge to small farmers and/or their organizations when they so request; (iv) Receiving complaints of abuses committed against communities, rural organizations and individual small farmers and bringing them to the attention of the Office of the Counsel for Human Rights and/or of any other national or international verification mechanism.

G. Land register 38. On the basis of the provisions of paragraph 37, the Government undertakes to promote legislative changes that would make it possible to establish an efficient decentralized multi-user land registry system that is financially sustainable, subject to compulsory updating and easy to update. Likewise, the Government undertakes to initiate, by January 1997 at the latest, the process of land surveying and systematizing the land register information, starting with priority zones, in particular with a view to the implementation of paragraph 34 on access to land and other production resources.

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H. Labour protection 39. The Government undertakes to promote better participation of rural workers in the benefits of agriculture and a reorientation of labour relations in rural areas. It will place particular emphasis on applying to rural workers the labour policy outlined in the relevant section of the present agreement. An energetic labour protection policy, combined with a vocational training policy, is in line with the requirements of social justice. It is also needed in order to attack rural poverty and promote an agrarian reform aimed at more efficient use of natural and human resources. Accordingly, the Government undertakes to: (a) Ensure that the labour legislation is effectively applied in rural areas; (b) Pay urgent attention to the abuses to which rural migrant workers, young tenant farmers and day labourers are subjected in the context of hiring through middlemen, sharecropping, payment in kind and the use of weights and measures. The Government undertakes to adopt administrative and/or penal sanctions against offenders; (c) Promote reform of the procedures for recognition of the legal personality of small farmers’ organizations with a view to simplifying such recognition and making it more flexible through the application of the 1975 International Labour Organization Convention 141 on organization of rural workers.

I. Environmental protection 40. Guatemala’s natural wealth is a valuable asset of the country and mankind, in addition to being an essential part of the cultural and spiritual heritage of the indigenous peoples. The irrational exploitation of Guatemala’s biogenetic and forest resource diversity endangers a human environment that facilitates sustainable development. Sustainable development is understood as being a process of change in the life of the human being through economic growth with social equity, involving production methods and consumption patterns that maintain the ecological balance. This process implies respecting ethnic and cultural diversity and guaranteeing the quality of life of future generations. 41. In this sense, and in line with the principles of the Central American Alliance for Sustainable Development, the Government reiterates the following commitments: (a) To adjust educational curricula and training and technical assistance programmes to the requirements of environmental sustainability; (b) To give priority to environmental sanitation in its health policy; (c) To link physical planning policies, particularly urban planning, with environmental protection; (d) To promote sustainable natural resource management programmes that will create jobs.

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J. Resources 42. In order to finance the measures mentioned above, and in view of the priority assigned to modernizing the agriculture sector and rural development, the Government undertakes to increase the State resources allocated to this area by, inter alia:

Land tax (a) Promoting, by 1997, the legislation and mechanisms for the application, in consultation with municipalities, of a land tax in the rural areas from which it is easy for the municipalities to collect revenues. The tax, from which small properties will be exempt, will help to discourage ownership of undeveloped land and underutilization of land. Taken as a whole, these mechanisms ought not to encourage deforestation of land use for forestry;

Tax on undeveloped land (b) Establishing a new tax schedule for the annual tax on undeveloped land which imposes significantly higher taxes on privately owned unutilized and/or underutilized land.

IV. MODERNIZATION OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES AND FISCAL POLICY A. Modernization of government services 43. Government services should become an efficient tool of development policies. To this end, the Government undertakes to:

Decentralization and redistribution (a) Deepen the decentralization and redistribution of the powers, responsibilities and resources concentrated in the central Government in order to modernize, render effective and streamline government services. Decentralization should ensure the transfer of decision-making power and sufficient resources to the appropriate levels (local, municipal, departmental and regional) so as to meet the needs of socio-economic development in an efficient way and promote close cooperation between government bodies and the population. This implies: (i) Promoting an amendment to the Executive Authority Act and the Departmental Control and Administration Act and, in particular, to Decree No. 586 of 1956, which will make it possible to simplify, decentralize and redistribute government services; (ii) Promoting the decentralization of support systems, including the purchasing and procurement system, the human resources system, the informationgathering and statistical system and the financial management system.

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National auditing (b) Reform, strengthen and modernize the Comptroller’s Office. Professionalization and advancement of public servants 44. The State should have a skilled labour force which can ensure the honest and efficient management of public funds. To this end, it is necessary to: (a) Establish a career civil service; (b) Adopt legal and administrative measures to ensure real compliance with the Integrity and Accountability Act; (c) Promote criminal sanctions for acts of corruption and misappropriation of public funds.

B. Fiscal policy 45. Fiscal policy (revenue and expenditure) is the key tool enabling the State to comply with its constitutional commitments, particularly those relating to social development, which is essential to the quest for the common good. Fiscal policy is also essential to Guatemalan sustainable development, which has been impaired by low levels of education, health care and public security, a lack of infrastructure and other factors which militate against increasing the productivity of labour and the competitiveness of the Guatemalan economy.

Budgetary policy 46. Budgetary policy should respond to the need for socio-economic development in a stable context, which requires a public spending policy consistent with the following basic principles: (a) Giving priority to social spending, the provision of public services and the basic infrastructure needed to support production and marketing; (b) Giving priority to social investment in health care, education and housing; rural development; job creation; and compliance with the commitments entered into under the peace agreements. The budget should include sufficient resources for strengthening the organizations and institutions responsible for ensuring the rule of law and respect for human rights; (c) Efficient budget performance, with an emphasis on decentralization, redistribution and auditing of budgetary resources.

Tax policy 47. Tax policy should be designed to enable the collection of the resources needed for the performance of the State’s functions, including the funds required for the consolidation of peace, within the framework of a tax system consistent with the following basic principles: (a) The system is fair, equitable and, on the whole, progressive, in keeping with the constitutional principle of ability to pay;

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(b) The system is universal and compulsory; (c) The system stimulates saving and investment. 48. The State should also ensure efficiency and transparency in tax collection and fiscal management so as to promote taxpayer confidence in government policy and eliminate tax evasion and fraud.

Tax collection target 49. Bearing in mind the need to increase State revenues in order to cope with the urgent tasks of economic growth, social development and building peace, the Government undertakes to ensure that by the year 2000, the tax burden, measured as a ratio of gross domestic product, increases by at least 50 per cent as compared with the 1995 tax burden.

Fiscal commitment 50. As a step towards a fair and equitable tax system, the Government undertakes to address the most serious issue relating to tax injustice and inequity, namely, evasion and fraud, especially on the part of those who should be the largest contributors. In order to eradicate privileges and abuses, eliminate tax evasion and fraud and implement a tax system which is, on the whole, progressive, the Government undertakes to:

Legislation (a) Promote an amendment to the Tax Code establishing harsher penalties for tax evasion, avoidance and fraud, both for taxpayers and for tax administration officials; (b) Promote an amendment to the tax laws designed to eliminate loopholes; (c) Evaluate and regulate tax exemptions strictly so as to eliminate abuses;

Strengthening of tax administration (d) Strengthen the existing auditing and collection mechanisms, such as crosschecking, tax identification numbers and tax credits for withholding of income tax and value-added tax; (e) Simplify and automate tax administration procedures; (f) Ensure the correct and prompt application or reimbursement of tax credit and punish severely those who do not return withheld value-added tax to the tax authorities; (g) Create a special programme for large contributors in order to ensure that they comply fully with their tax obligations; (h) Implement administrative structures specifically geared to the revenue collection and auditing programmes and to the application of the relevant tax laws; (i) Strengthen the capacity of municipalities to exercise their authority to collect taxes;

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Participation (j) Ensure that the urban and rural development councils contribute to the definition and monitoring of tax policy within the framework of their mandate to formulate development policies;

Civic education (k) Within academic curricula, continue to promote knowledge of, respect for and compliance with tax obligations as part of coexistence in a democratic society.

Enforcement of tax policy 51. The failure to fulfil tax obligations deprives the country of the resources needed in order to address the backlog of social needs affecting Guatemalan society. The Government undertakes to impose exemplary penalties on those who engage in various types of tax fraud, to modernize and strengthen tax administration and to give priority to spending on social needs.

V. FINAL PROVISIONS 1. This Agreement shall form part of the agreement on a firm and lasting peace and shall enter into force at the time of the signing of the latter agreement. 2. In order to ensure that this Agreement serves the interests of Guatemalans, the Government shall initiate immediately the programming and planning activities which will enable it to comply with the investment commitments contained herein. 3. In accordance with the Framework Agreement, the Secretary-General of the United Nations is requested to verify compliance with this Agreement. 4. This Agreement shall be disseminated as widely as possible; to this end, the cooperation of the mass media and of teaching and educational institutions is requested. Mexico City, 6 May 1996. (signed) For the Government of the Republic of Guatemala Gustavo PORRAS CASTEJÓN Raquel ZELAYA ROSALES Brigadier General Otto PÉREZ MOLINA Richard AITKENHEAD CASTILLO For the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca General Command Commander Pablo MONSANTO Commander Rolando MORÁN Commander Gaspar ILÓM Carlos GONZALES

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For the United Nations Marrack GOULDING Under-Secretary-General Jean ARNAULT Source: Posted by United States Institute for Peace USIP Library on: November 20, 1998 Source Name: MINUGUA, United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights in Guatemala Source URL: http://www.un.org/Depts/minugua/paz8.htm Date Downloaded: July 7, 1998


Appendix 3 The Good Friday Agreement (Belfast Agreement), April 10, 1998

The Agreement reached in the multi-party negotiations

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Declaration of Support 2. Constitutional Issues Annex A: Draft Clauses/Schedules for Incorporation in British Legislation Annex B: Irish Government Draft Legislation 3. Strand One: Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland 4. Strand Two: North/South Ministerial Council 5. Strand Three: British—Irish Council British—Irish Intergovernmental Conference 6. Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity Human Rights United Kingdom Legislation New Institutions in Northern Ireland Comparable Steps by the Irish Government A Joint Committee Reconciliation and Victims of Violence Economic, Social and Cultural Issues 7. Decommissioning 8. Security 9. Policing and Justice Annex A: Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland Annex B: Review of the Criminal Justice System 10. Prisoners

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11. Validation, Implementation and Review Validation and Implementation Review Procedures Following Implementation Annex: Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland.

1. DECLARATION OF SUPPORT 1. We, the participants in the multi-party negotiations, believe that the agreement we have negotiated offers a truly historic opportunity for a new beginning. 2. The tragedies of the past have left a deep and profoundly regrettable legacy of suffering. We must never forget those who have died or been injured, and their families. But we can best honour them through a fresh start, in which we firmly dedicate ourselves to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the protection and vindication of the human rights of all. 3. We are committed to partnership, equality and mutual respect as the basis of relationships within Northern Ireland, between North and South, and between these islands. 4. We reaffirm our total and absolute commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful means of resolving differences on political issues, and our opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any political purpose, whether in regard to this agreement or otherwise. 5. We acknowledge the substantial differences between our continuing, and equally legitimate, political aspirations. However, we will endeavour to strive in every practical way towards reconciliation and rapprochement within the framework of democratic and agreed arrangements. We pledge that we will, in good faith, work to ensure the success of each and every one of the arrangements to be established under this agreement. It is accepted that all of the institutional and constitutional arrangements—an Assembly in Northern Ireland, a North/South Ministerial Council, implementation bodies, a British-Irish Council and a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference and any amendments to British Acts of Parliament and the Constitution of Ireland—are interlocking and interdependent and that in particular the functioning of the Assembly and the North/South Council are so closely inter-related that the success of each depends on that of the other. 6. Accordingly, in a spirit of concord, we strongly commend this agreement to the people, North and South, for their approval.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 1. The participants endorse the commitment made by the British and Irish Governments that, in a new British-Irish Agreement replacing the Anglo-Irish Agreement, they will: (i) recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer

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to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland; (ii) recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland; (iii) acknowledge that while a substantial section of the people in Northern Ireland share the legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the island of Ireland for a united Ireland, the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union and, accordingly, that Northern Ireland’s status as part of the United Kingdom reflects and relies upon that wish; and that it would be wrong to make any change in the status of Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people; (iv) affirm that if, in the future, the people of the island of Ireland exercise their right of self-determination on the basis set out in sections (i) and (ii) above to bring about a united Ireland, it will be a binding obligation on both Governments to introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish; (v) affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of both communities; (vi) recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland. 2. The participants also note that the two Governments have accordingly undertaken in the context of this comprehensive political agreement, to propose and support changes in, respectively, the Constitution of Ireland and in British legislation relating to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland.

ANNEX A DRAFT CLAUSES/SCHEDULES FOR INCORPORATION IN BRITISH LEGISLATION 1. (1) It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of

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the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll held for the purposes of this section in accordance with Schedule 1. (2) But if the wish expressed by a majority in such a poll is that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland, the Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament such proposals to give effect to that wish as may be agreed between Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Ireland. 2. The Government of Ireland Act 1920 is repealed; and this Act shall have effect notwithstanding any other previous enactment.

SCHEDULE 1 POLLS FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 1 1. The Secretary of State may by order direct the holding of a poll for the purposes of section 1 on a date specified in the order. 2. Subject to paragraph 3, the Secretary of State shall exercise the power under paragraph 1 if at any time it appears likely to him that a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland. 3. The Secretary of State shall not make an order under paragraph 1 earlier than seven years after the holding of a previous poll under this Schedule. 4. (Remaining paragraphs along the lines of paragraphs 2 and 3 of existing Schedule 1 to 1973 Act.)

ANNEX B IRISH GOVERNMENT DRAFT LEGISLATION TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION Add to Article 29 the following sections: 7. 1. The State may consent to be bound by the British-Irish Agreement done at Belfast on the day of 1998, hereinafter called the Agreement. 1. Any institution established by or under the Agreement may exercise the powers and functions thereby conferred on it in respect of all or any part of the island of Ireland notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution conferring a like power or function on any person or any organ of State appointed under or created or established by or under this Constitution. Any power or function conferred on such an institution in relation to the settlement or resolution of disputes or controversies may be in addition to or in substitution for any like power or function conferred by this Constitution on any such person or organ of State as aforesaid. 1. If the Government declare that the State has become obliged, pursuant to the Agreement, to give effect to the amendment of this Constitution referred

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to therein, then, notwithstanding Article 46 hereof, this Constitution shall be amended as follows: i. the following Articles shall be substituted for Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish text: “2. [Irish text to be inserted here] 3. [Irish text to be inserted here]” ii. the following Articles shall be substituted for Articles 2 and 3 of the English text: “Article 2 It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish nation. That is also the entitlement of all persons otherwise qualified in accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish nation cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage. Article 3 1. It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite all the people who share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the diversity of their identities and traditions, recognising that a united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions in the island. Until then, the laws enacted by the Parliament established by this Constitution shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws enacted by the Parliament that existed immediately before the coming into operation of this Constitution. 2. Institutions with executive powers and functions that are shared between those jurisdictions may be established by their respective responsible authorities for stated purposes and may exercise powers and functions in respect of all or any part of the island.” iii. the following section shall be added to the Irish text of this Article: “8. [Irish text to be inserted here]” and iv. the following section shall be added to the English text of this Article: “8. The State may exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction in accordance with the generally recognised principles of international law.” 4. If a declaration under this section is made, this subsection and subsection 3, other than the amendment of this Constitution effected thereby, and subsection 5 of this section shall be omitted from every official text of this Constitution published thereafter, but notwithstanding such omission this section shall continue to have the force of law. 5. If such a declaration is not made within twelve months of this section being added to this Constitution or such longer period as may be provided for by law, this section shall cease to have effect and shall be omitted from every official text of this Constitution published thereafter.

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3. STRAND ONE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1. This agreement provides for a democratically elected Assembly in Northern Ireland which is inclusive in its membership, capable of exercising executive and legislative authority, and subject to safeguards to protect the rights and interests of all sides of the community.

The Assembly 2. A 108-member Assembly will be elected by PR(STV) from existing Westminster constituencies. 3. The Assembly will exercise full legislative and executive authority in respect of those matters currently within the responsibility of the six Northern Ireland Government Departments, with the possibility of taking on responsibility for other matters as detailed elsewhere in this agreement. 4. The Assembly—operating where appropriate on a cross-community basis— will be the prime source of authority in respect of all devolved responsibilities.

Safeguards 5. There will be safeguards to ensure that all sections of the community can participate and work together successfully in the operation of these institutions and that all sections of the community are protected, including: (a) allocations of Committee Chairs, Ministers and Committee membership in proportion to party strengths; (b) the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it, which neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe, together with a Human Rights Commission; (c) arrangements to provide that key decisions and legislation are proofed to ensure that they do not infringe the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland; (d) arrangements to ensure key decisions are taken on a cross-community basis; (i) either parallel consent, i.e. a majority of those members present and voting, including a majority of the unionist and nationalist designations present and voting; (ii) or a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, including at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist designations present and voting. Key decisions requiring cross-community support will be designated in advance, including election of the Chair of the Assembly, the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, standing orders and budget allocations. In other cases such decisions could be triggered by a petition of concern brought by a significant minority of Assembly members (30/108). (e) an Equality Commission to monitor a statutory obligation to promote equality of opportunity in specified areas and parity of esteem between the two main communities, and to investigate individual complaints against public bodies.

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Operation of the Assembly 6. At their first meeting, members of the Assembly will register a designation of identity—nationalist, unionist or other—for the purposes of measuring crosscommunity support in Assembly votes under the relevant provisions above. 7. The Chair and Deputy Chair of the Assembly will be elected on a crosscommunity basis, as set out in paragraph 5(d) above. 8. There will be a Committee for each of the main executive functions of the Northern Ireland Administration. The Chairs and Deputy Chairs of the Assembly Committees will be allocated proportionally, using the d’Hondt system. Membership of the Committees will be in broad proportion to party strengths in the Assembly to ensure that the opportunity of Committee places is available to all members. 9. The Committees will have a scrutiny, policy development and consultation role with respect to the Department with which each is associated, and will have a role in initiation of legislation. They will have the power to: ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

consider and advise on Departmental budgets and Annual Plans in the context of the overall budget allocation; approve relevant secondary legislation and take the Committee stage of relevant primary legislation; call for persons and papers; initiate enquiries and make reports; consider and advise on matters brought to the Committee by its Minister.

10. Standing Committees other than Departmental Committees may be established as may be required from time to time. 11. The Assembly may appoint a special Committee to examine and report on whether a measure or proposal for legislation is in conformity with equality requirements, including the ECHR/Bill of Rights. The Committee shall have the power to call people and papers to assist in its consideration of the matter. The Assembly shall then consider the report of the Committee and can determine the matter in accordance with the cross-community consent procedure. 12. The above special procedure shall be followed when requested by the Executive Committee, or by the relevant Departmental Committee, voting on a cross-community basis. 13. When there is a petition of concern as in 5(d) above, the Assembly shall vote to determine whether the measure may proceed without reference to this special procedure. If this fails to achieve support on a cross-community basis, as in 5(d) (i) above, the special procedure shall be followed.

Executive Authority 14. Executive authority to be discharged on behalf of the Assembly by a First Minister and Deputy First Minister and up to ten Ministers with Departmental responsibilities. 15. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister shall be jointly elected into office by the Assembly voting on a cross-community basis, according to 5(d)(i) above.

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16. Following the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, the posts of Ministers will be allocated to parties on the basis of the d’Hondt system by reference to the number of seats each party has in the Assembly. 17. The Ministers will constitute an Executive Committee, which will be convened, and presided over, by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. 18. The duties of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister will include, inter alia, dealing with and co-ordinating the work of the Executive Committee and the response of the Northern Ireland administration to external relationships. 19. The Executive Committee will provide a forum for the discussion of, and agreement on, issues which cut across the responsibilities of two or more Ministers, for prioritising executive and legislative proposals and for recommending a common position where necessary (e.g. in dealing with external relationships). 20. The Executive Committee will seek to agree each year, and review as necessary, a programme incorporating an agreed budget linked to policies and programmes, subject to approval by the Assembly, after scrutiny in Assembly Committees, on a cross- community basis. 21. A party may decline the opportunity to nominate a person to serve as a Minister or may subsequently change its nominee. 22. All the Northern Ireland Departments will be headed by a Minister. All Ministers will liaise regularly with their respective Committee. 23. As a condition of appointment, Ministers, including the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, will affirm the terms of a Pledge of Office (Annex A) undertaking to discharge effectively and in good faith all the responsibilities attaching to their office. 24. Ministers will have full executive authority in their respective areas of responsibility, within any broad programme agreed by the Executive Committee and endorsed by the Assembly as a whole. 25. An individual may be removed from office following a decision of the Assembly taken on a cross-community basis, if (s)he loses the confidence of the Assembly, voting on a cross-community basis, for failure to meet his or her responsibilities including, inter alia, those set out in the Pledge of Office. Those who hold office should use only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be excluded or removed from office under these provisions.

Legislation 26. The Assembly will have authority to pass primary legislation for Northern Ireland in devolved areas, subject to: (a) the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it which, if the courts found to be breached, would render the relevant legislation null and void; (b) decisions by simple majority of members voting, except when decision on a cross-community basis is required; (c) detailed scrutiny and approval in the relevant Departmental Committee;

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(d) mechanisms, based on arrangements proposed for the Scottish Parliament, to ensure suitable co-ordination, and avoid disputes, between the Assembly and the Westminster Parliament; (e) option of the Assembly seeking to include Northern Ireland provisions in United Kingdom-wide legislation in the Westminster Parliament, especially on devolved issues where parity is normally maintained (e.g. social security, company law). 27. The Assembly will have authority to legislate in reserved areas with the approval of the Secretary of State and subject to Parliamentary control. 28. Disputes over legislative competence will be decided by the Courts. 29. Legislation could be initiated by an individual, a Committee or a Minister.

Relations with other institutions 30. Arrangements to represent the Assembly as a whole, at Summit level and in dealings with other institutions, will be in accordance with paragraph 18, and will be such as to ensure cross-community involvement. 31. Terms will be agreed between appropriate Assembly representatives and the Government of the United Kingdom to ensure effective coordination and input by Ministers to national policy-making, including on EU issues. 32. Role of Secretary of State: (a) to remain responsible for NIO matters not devolved to the Assembly, subject to regular consultation with the Assembly and Ministers; (b) to approve and lay before the Westminster Parliament any Assembly legislation on reserved matters; (c) to represent Northern Ireland interests in the United Kingdom Cabinet; (d) to have the right to attend the Assembly at their invitation. 33. The Westminster Parliament (whose power to make legislation for Northern Ireland would remain unaffected) will: (a) legislate for non-devolved issues, other than where the Assembly legislates with the approval of the Secretary of State and subject to the control of Parliament; (b) to legislate as necessary to ensure the United Kingdom’s international obligations are met in respect of Northern Ireland; (c) scrutinise, including through the Northern Ireland Grand and Select Committees, the responsibilities of the Secretary of State. 34. A consultative Civic Forum will be established. It will comprise representatives of the business, trade union and voluntary sectors, and such other sectors as agreed by the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. It will act as a consultative mechanism on social, economic and cultural issues. The First Minister and the Deputy First Minister will by agreement provide administrative support for the Civic Forum and establish guidelines for the selection of representatives to the Civic Forum.

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Transitional Arrangements 35. The Assembly will meet first for the purpose of organisation, without legislative or executive powers, to resolve its standing orders and working practices and make preparations for the effective functioning of the Assembly, the British-Irish Council and the North/South Ministerial Council and associated implementation bodies. In this transitional period, those members of the Assembly serving as shadow Ministers shall affirm their commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means and their opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any political purpose; to work in good faith to bring the new arrangements into being; and to observe the spirit of the Pledge of Office applying to appointed Ministers.

Review 36. After a specified period there will be a review of these arrangements, including the details of electoral arrangements and of the Assembly’s procedures, with a view to agreeing any adjustments necessary in the interests of efficiency and fairness.

ANNEX A PLEDGE OF OFFICE To pledge: (a) to discharge in good faith all the duties of office; (b) commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means; (c) to serve all the people of Northern Ireland equally, and to act in accordance with the general obligations on government to promote equality and prevent discrimination; (d) to participate with colleagues in the preparation of a programme for government; (e) to operate within the framework of that programme when agreed within the Executive Committee and endorsed by the Assembly; (f) to support, and to act in accordance with, all decisions of the Executive Committee and Assembly; (g) to comply with the Ministerial Code of Conduct.

CODE OF CONDUCT Ministers must at all times: ●

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observe the highest standards of propriety and regularity involving impartiality, integrity and objectivity in relationship to the stewardship of public funds; be accountable to users of services, the community and, through the Assembly, for the activities within their responsibilities, their stewardship of public funds and the extent to which key performance targets and objectives have been met;

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ensure all reasonable requests for information from the Assembly, users of services and individual citizens are complied with; and that Departments and their staff conduct their dealings with the public in an open and responsible way; follow the seven principles of public life set out by the Committee on Standards in Public Life; comply with this code and with rules relating to the use of public funds; operate in a way conducive to promoting good community relations and equality of treatment; not use information gained in the course of their service for personal gain; nor seek to use the opportunity of public service to promote their private interests; ensure they comply with any rules on the acceptance of gifts and hospitality that might be offered; declare any personal or business interests which may conflict with their responsibilities. The Assembly will retain a Register of Interests. Individuals must ensure that any direct or indirect pecuniary interests which members of the public might reasonably think could influence their judgement are listed in the Register of Interests;

4. STRAND TWO NORTH/SOUTH MINISTERIAL COUNCIL 1. Under a new British/Irish Agreement dealing with the totality of relationships, and related legislation at Westminster and in the Oireachtas, a North/ South Ministerial Council to be established to bring together those with executive responsibilities in Northern Ireland and the Irish Government, to develop consultation, co-operation and action within the island of Ireland—including through implementation on an all-island and cross-border basis—on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the Administrations, North and South. 2. All Council decisions to be by agreement between the two sides. Northern Ireland to be represented by the First Minister, Deputy First Minister and any relevant Ministers, the Irish Government by the Taoiseach and relevant Ministers, all operating in accordance with the rules for democratic authority and accountability in force in the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Oireachtas respectively. Participation in the Council to be one of the essential responsibilities attaching to relevant posts in the two Administrations. If a holder of a relevant post will not participate normally in the Council, the Taoiseach in the case of the Irish Government and the First and Deputy First Minister in the case of the Northern Ireland Administration to be able to make alternative arrangements. 3. The Council to meet in different formats: (i) in plenary format twice a year, with Northern Ireland representation led by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister and the Irish Government led by the Taoiseach;

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(ii) in specific sectoral formats on a regular and frequent basis with each side represented by the appropriate Minister; (iii) in an appropriate format to consider institutional or cross-sectoral matters (including in relation to the EU) and to resolve disagreement. 4. Agendas for all meetings to be settled by prior agreement between the two sides, but it will be open to either to propose any matter for consideration or action. 5. The Council: (i) to exchange information, discuss and consult with a view to cooperating on matters of mutual interest within the competence of both Administrations, North and South; (ii) to use best endeavours to reach agreement on the adoption of common policies, in areas where there is a mutual cross-border and all island benefit, and which are within the competence of both Administrations, North and South, making determined efforts to overcome any disagreements; (iii) to take decisions by agreement on policies for implementation separately in each jurisdiction, in relevant meaningful areas within the competence of both Administrations, North and South; (iv) to take decisions by agreement on policies and action at an all-island and cross-border level to be implemented by the bodies to be established as set out in paragraphs 8 and 9 below. 6. Each side to be in a position to take decisions in the Council within the defined authority of those attending, through the arrangements in place for co-ordination of executive functions within each jurisdiction. Each side to remain accountable to the Assembly and Oireachtas respectively, whose approval, through the arrangements in place on either side, would be required for decisions beyond the defined authority of those attending. 7. As soon as practically possible after elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, inaugural meetings will take place of the Assembly, the British/Irish Council and the North/South Ministerial Council in their transitional forms. All three institutions will meet regularly and frequently on this basis during the period between the elections to the Assembly, and the transfer of powers to the Assembly, in order to establish their modus operandi. 8. During the transitional period between the elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly and the transfer of power to it, representatives of the Northern Ireland transitional Administration and the Irish Government operating in the North/South Ministerial Council will undertake a work programme, in consultation with the British Government, covering at least 12 subject areas, with a view to identifying and agreeing by 31 October 1998 areas where co-operation and implementation for mutual benefit will take place. Such areas may include matters in the list set out in the Annex. 9. As part of the work programme, the Council will identify and agree at least 6 matters for co-operation and implementation in each of the following categories: (i) Matters where existing bodies will be the appropriate mechanisms for cooperation in each separate jurisdiction;

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(ii) Matters where the co-operation will take place through agreed implementation bodies on a cross-border or all-island level. 10. The two Governments will make necessary legislative and other enabling preparations to ensure, as an absolute commitment, that these bodies, which have been agreed as a result of the work programme, function at the time of the inception of the British-Irish Agreement and the transfer of powers, with legislative authority for these bodies transferred to the Assembly as soon as possible thereafter. Other arrangements for the agreed co-operation will also commence contemporaneously with the transfer of powers to the Assembly. 11. The implementation bodies will have a clear operational remit. They will implement on an all-island and cross-border basis policies agreed in the Council. 12. Any further development of these arrangements to be by agreement in the Council and with the specific endorsement of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Oireachtas, subject to the extent of the competences and responsibility of the two Administrations. 13. It is understood that the North/South Ministerial Council and the Northern Ireland Assembly are mutually inter-dependent, and that one cannot successfully function without the other. 14. Disagreements within the Council to be addressed in the format described at paragraph 3 (iii) above or in the plenary format. By agreement between the two sides, experts could be appointed to consider a particular matter and report. 15. Funding to be provided by the two Administrations on the basis that the Council and the implementation bodies constitute a necessary public function. 16. The Council to be supported by a standing joint Secretariat, staffed by members of the Northern Ireland Civil Service and the Irish Civil Service. 17. The Council to consider the European Union dimension of relevant matters, including the implementation of EU policies and programmes and proposals under consideration in the EU framework. Arrangements to be made to ensure that the views of the Council are taken into account and represented appropriately at relevant EU meetings. 18. The Northern Ireland Assembly and the Oireachtas to consider developing a joint parliamentary forum, bringing together equal numbers from both institutions for discussion of matters of mutual interest and concern. 19. Consideration to be given to the establishment of an independent consultative forum appointed by the two Administrations, representative of civil society, comprising the social partners and other members with expertise in social, cultural, economic and other issues.

ANNEX Areas for North-South co-operation and implementation may include the following: 1. Agriculture—animal and plant health.

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2. Education—teacher qualifications and exchanges. 3. Transport—strategic transport planning. 4. Environment—environmental protection, pollution, water quality, and waste management. 5. Waterways—inland waterways. 6. Social Security/Social Welfare—entitlements of cross-border workers and fraud control. 7. Tourism—promotion, marketing, research, and product development. 8. Relevant EU Programmes such as SPPR, INTERREG, Leader II and their successors. 9. Inland Fisheries. 10. Aquaculture and marine matters 11. Health: accident and emergency services and other related cross-border issues. 12. Urban and rural development. Others to be considered by the shadow North/South Council.

5. STRAND THREE BRITISH-IRISH COUNCIL 1. A British-Irish Council (BIC) will be established under a new British-Irish Agreement to promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial development of the totality of relationships among the peoples of these islands. 2. Membership of the BIC will comprise representatives of the British and Irish Governments, devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, when established, and, if appropriate, elsewhere in the United Kingdom, together with representatives of the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. 3. The BIC will meet in different formats: at summit level, twice per year; in specific sectoral formats on a regular basis, with each side represented by the appropriate Minister; in an appropriate format to consider cross-sectoral matters. 4. Representatives of members will operate in accordance with whatever procedures for democratic authority and accountability are in force in their respective elected institutions. 5. The BIC will exchange information, discuss, consult and use best endeavours to reach agreement on co-operation on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the relevant Administrations. Suitable issues for early discussion in the BIC could include transport links, agricultural issues, environmental issues, cultural issues, health issues, education issues and approaches to EU issues. Suitable arrangements to be made for practical co-operation on agreed policies. 6. It will be open to the BIC to agree common policies or common actions. Individual members may opt not to participate in such common policies and common action.

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7. The BIC normally will operate by consensus. In relation to decisions on common policies or common actions, including their means of implementation, it will operate by agreement of all members participating in such policies or actions. 8. The members of the BIC, on a basis to be agreed between them, will provide such financial support as it may require. 9. A secretariat for the BIC will be provided by the British and Irish Governments in co-ordination with officials of each of the other members. 10. In addition to the structures provided for under this agreement, it will be open to two or more members to develop bilateral or multilateral arrangements between them. Such arrangements could include, subject to the agreement of the members concerned, mechanisms to enable consultation, co-operation and joint decision-making on matters of mutual interest; and mechanisms to implement any joint decisions they may reach. These arrangements will not require the prior approval of the BIC as a whole and will operate independently of it. 11. The elected institutions of the members will be encouraged to develop interparliamentary links, perhaps building on the British-Irish Interparliamentary Body. 12. The full membership of the BIC will keep under review the workings of the Council, including a formal published review at an appropriate time after the Agreement comes into effect, and will contribute as appropriate to any review of the overall political agreement arising from the multiparty negotiations.

BRITISHIRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 1. There will be a new British-Irish Agreement dealing with the totality of relationships. It will establish a standing British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, which will subsume both the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council and the Intergovernmental Conference established under the 1985 Agreement. 2. The Conference will bring together the British and Irish Governments to promote bilateral co-operation at all levels on all matters of mutual interest within the competence of both Governments. 3. The Conference will meet as required at Summit level (Prime Minister and Taoiseach). Otherwise, Governments will be represented by appropriate Ministers. Advisers, including police and security advisers, will attend as appropriate. 4. All decisions will be by agreement between both Governments. The Governments will make determined efforts to resolve disagreements between them. There will be no derogation from the sovereignty of either Government. 5. In recognition of the Irish Government’s special interest in Northern Ireland and of the extent to which issues of mutual concern arise in relation to Northern Ireland, there will be regular and frequent meetings of the Conference concerned with non-devolved Northern Ireland matters, on which the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals. These meetings, to be co-chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, would also deal with all-island and cross-border co-operation on non-devolved issues.

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6. Co-operation within the framework of the Conference will include facilitation of co-operation in security matters. The Conference also will address, in particular, the areas of rights, justice, prisons and policing in Northern Ireland (unless and until responsibility is devolved to a Northern Ireland administration) and will intensify co-operation between the two Governments on the all-island or cross-border aspects of these matters. 7. Relevant executive members of the Northern Ireland Administration will be involved in meetings of the Conference, and in the reviews referred to in paragraph 9 below to discuss non-devolved Northern Ireland matters. 8. The Conference will be supported by officials of the British and Irish Governments, including by a standing joint Secretariat of officials dealing with non-devolved Northern Ireland matters. 9. The Conference will keep under review the workings of the new British-Irish Agreement and the machinery and institutions established under it, including a formal published review three years after the Agreement comes into effect. Representatives of the Northern Ireland Administration will be invited to express views to the Conference in this context. The Conference will contribute as appropriate to any review of the overall political agreement arising from the multi-party negotiations but will have no power to override the democratic arrangements set up by this Agreement.

6. RIGHTS, SAFEGUARDS AND EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY Human Rights 1. The parties affirm their commitment to the mutual respect, the civil rights and the religious liberties of everyone in the community. Against the background of the recent history of communal conflict, the parties affirm in particular: ● the right of free political thought; ● the right to freedom and expression of religion; ● the right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations; ● the right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate means; ● the right to freely choose one’s place of residence; ● the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity; ● the right to freedom from sectarian harassment; and ● the right of women to full and equal political participation.

United Kingdom Legislation 2. The British Government will complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with direct access to the courts, and remedies for breach of the Convention, including power for the courts to overrule Assembly legislation on grounds of inconsistency.

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3. Subject to the outcome of public consultation underway, the British Government intends, as a particular priority, to create a statutory obligation on public authorities in Northern Ireland to carry out all their functions with due regard to the need to promote equality of opportunity in relation to religion and political opinion; gender; race; disability; age; marital status; dependants; and sexual orientation. Public bodies would be required to draw up statutory schemes showing how they would implement this obligation. Such schemes would cover arrangements for policy appraisal, including an assessment of impact on relevant categories, public consultation, public access to information and services, monitoring and timetables. 4. The new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (see paragraph 5 below) will be invited to consult and to advise on the scope for defining, in Westminster legislation, rights supplementary to those in the European Convention on Human Rights, to reflect the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland, drawing as appropriate on international instruments and experience. These additional rights to reflect the principles of mutual respect for the identity and ethos of both communities and parity of esteem, and—taken together with the ECHR—to constitute a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. Among the issues for consideration by the Commission will be: ●

●

the formulation of a general obligation on government and public bodies fully to respect, on the basis of equality of treatment, the identity and ethos of both communities in Northern Ireland; and a clear formulation of the rights not to be discriminated against and to equality of opportunity in both the public and private sectors.

New Institutions in Northern Ireland 5. A new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, with membership from Northern Ireland reflecting the community balance, will be established by Westminster legislation, independent of Government, with an extended and enhanced role beyond that currently exercised by the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, to include keeping under review the adequacy and effectiveness of laws and practices, making recommendations to Government as necessary; providing information and promoting awareness of human rights; considering draft legislation referred to them by the new Assembly; and, in appropriate cases, bringing court proceedings or providing assistance to individuals doing so. 6. Subject to the outcome of public consultation currently underway, the British Government intends a new statutory Equality Commission to replace the Fair Employment Commission, the Equal Opportunities Commission (NI), the Commission for Racial Equality (NI) and the Disability Council. Such a unified Commission will advise on, validate and monitor the statutory obligation and will investigate complaints of default. 7. It would be open to a new Northern Ireland Assembly to consider bringing together its responsibilities for these matters into a dedicated Department of Equality.

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8. These improvements will build on existing protections in Westminster legislation in respect of the judiciary, the system of justice and policing.

Comparable Steps by the Irish Government 9. The Irish Government will also take steps to further strengthen the protection of human rights in its jurisdiction. The Government will, taking account of the work of the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution and the Report of the Constitution Review Group, bring forward measures to strengthen and underpin the constitutional protection of human rights. These proposals will draw on the European Convention on Human Rights and other international legal instruments in the field of human rights and the question of the incorporation of the ECHR will be further examined in this context. The measures brought forward would ensure at least an equivalent level of protection of human rights as will pertain in Northern Ireland. In addition, the Irish Government will: ●

●

● ● ●

establish a Human Rights Commission with a mandate and remit equivalent to that within Northern Ireland; proceed with arrangements as quickly as possible to ratify the Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities (already ratified by the UK); implement enhanced employment equality legislation; introduce equal status legislation; and continue to take further active steps to demonstrate its respect for the different traditions in the island of Ireland.

A Joint Committee 10. It is envisaged that there would be a joint committee of representatives of the two Human Rights Commissions, North and South, as a forum for consideration of human rights issues in the island of Ireland. The joint committee will consider, among other matters, the possibility of establishing a charter, open to signature by all democratic political parties, reflecting and endorsing agreed measures for the protection of the fundamental rights of everyone living in the island of Ireland.

Reconciliation and Victims of Violence 11. The participants believe that it is essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of the victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation. They look forward to the results of the work of the Northern Ireland Victims Commission. 12. It is recognised that victims have a right to remember as well as to contribute to a changed society. The achievement of a peaceful and just society would be the true memorial to the victims of violence. The participants particularly recognise that young people from areas affected by the troubles face particular difficulties and will

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support the development of special community-based initiatives based on international best practice. The provision of services that are supportive and sensitive to the needs of victims will also be a critical element and that support will need to be channelled through both statutory and community-based voluntary organisations facilitating locally-based self-help and support networks. This will require the allocation of sufficient resources, including statutory funding as necessary, to meet the needs of victims and to provide for community-based support programmes. 13. The participants recognise and value the work being done by many organisations to develop reconciliation and mutual understanding and respect between and within communities and traditions, in Northern Ireland and between North and South, and they see such work as having a vital role in consolidating peace and political agreement. Accordingly, they pledge their continuing support to such organisations and will positively examine the case for enhanced financial assistance for the work of reconciliation. An essential aspect of the reconciliation process is the promotion of a culture of tolerance at every level of society, including initiatives to facilitate and encourage integrated education and mixed housing.

Economic, Social and Cultural Issues 1. Pending the devolution of powers to a new Northern Ireland Assembly, the British Government will pursue broad policies for sustained economic growth and stability in Northern Ireland and for promoting social inclusion, including in particular community development and the advancement of women in public life. 2. Subject to the public consultation currently under way, the British Government will make rapid progress with: (i) a new regional development strategy for Northern Ireland, for consideration in due course by a the Assembly, tackling the problems of a divided society and social cohesion in urban, rural and border areas, protecting and enhancing the environment, producing new approaches to transport issues, strengthening the physical infrastructure of the region, developing the advantages and resources of rural areas and rejuvenating major urban centres; (ii) a new economic development strategy for Northern Ireland, for consideration in due course by a the Assembly, which would provide for short and medium term economic planning linked as appropriate to the regional development strategy; and (iii) measures on employment equality included in the recent White Paper (“Partnership for Equality”) and covering the extension and strengthening of anti-discrimination legislation, a review of the national security aspects of the present fair employment legislation at the earliest possible time, a new more focused Targeting Social Need initiative and a range of measures aimed at combating unemployment and progressively eliminating the differential in unemployment rates between the two communities by targeting objective need. 3. All participants recognise the importance of respect, understanding and tolerance in relation to linguistic diversity, including in Northern Ireland, the Irish

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language, Ulster-Scots and the languages of the various ethnic communities, all of which are part of the cultural wealth of the island of Ireland. 4. In the context of active consideration currently being given to the UK signing the Council of Europe Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the British Government will in particular in relation to the Irish language, where appropriate and where people so desire it: ● ●

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take resolute action to promote the language; facilitate and encourage the use of the language in speech and writing in public and private life where there is appropriate demand; seek to remove, where possible, restrictions which would discourage or work against the maintenance or development of the language; make provision for liaising with the Irish language community, representing their views to public authorities and investigating complaints; place a statutory duty on the Department of Education to encourage and facilitate Irish medium education in line with current provision for integrated education; explore urgently with the relevant British authorities, and in co-operation with the Irish broadcasting authorities, the scope for achieving more widespread availability of Teilifis na Gaeilige in Northern Ireland; seek more effective ways to encourage and provide financial support for Irish language film and television production in Northern Ireland; and encourage the parties to secure agreement that this commitment will be sustained by a new Assembly in a way which takes account of the desires and sensitivities of the community.

5. All participants acknowledge the sensitivity of the use of symbols and emblems for public purposes, and the need in particular in creating the new institutions to ensure that such symbols and emblems are used in a manner which promotes mutual respect rather than division. Arrangements will be made to monitor this issue and consider what action might be required.

7. DECOMMISSIONING 1. Participants recall their agreement in the Procedural Motion adopted on 24 September 1997 “that the resolution of the decommissioning issue is an indispensable part of the process of negotiation”, and also recall the provisions of paragraph 25 of Strand 1 above. 2. They note the progress made by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning and the Governments in developing schemes which can represent a workable basis for achieving the decommissioning of illegally-held arms in the possession of paramilitary groups. 3. All participants accordingly reaffirm their commitment to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. They also confirm their intention to continue to work constructively and in good faith with the Independent Commission, and to use any influence they may have, to achieve the decommissioning of all

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paramilitary arms within two years following endorsement in referendums North and South of the agreement and in the context of the implementation of the overall settlement. 4. The Independent Commission will monitor, review and verify progress on decommissioning of illegal arms, and will report to both Governments at regular intervals. 5. Both Governments will take all necessary steps to facilitate the decommissioning process to include bringing the relevant schemes into force by the end of June.

8. SECURITY 1. The participants note that the development of a peaceful environment on the basis of this agreement can and should mean a normalisation of security arrangements and practices. 2. The British Government will make progress towards the objective of as early a return as possible to normal security arrangements in Northern Ireland, consistent with the level of threat and with a published overall strategy, dealing with: (i) the reduction of the numbers and role of the Armed Forces deployed in Northern Ireland to levels compatible with a normal peaceful society; (ii) the removal of security installations; (iii) the removal of emergency powers in Northern Ireland; and (iv) other measures appropriate to and compatible with a normal peaceful society. 3. The Secretary of State will consult regularly on progress, and the response to any continuing paramilitary activity, with the Irish Government and the political parties, as appropriate. 4. The British Government will continue its consultation on firearms regulation and control on the basis of the document published on 2 April 1998. 5. The Irish Government will initiate a wide-ranging review of the Offences Against the State Acts 1939–85 with a view to both reform and dispensing with those elements no longer required as circumstances permit.

9. POLICING AND JUSTICE 1. The participants recognise that policing is a central issue in any society. They equally recognise that Northern Ireland’s history of deep divisions has made it highly emotive, with great hurt suffered and sacrifices made by many individuals and their families, including those in the RUC and other public servants. They believe that the agreement provides the opportunity for a new beginning to policing in Northern Ireland with a police service capable of attracting and sustaining support from the community as a whole. They also believe that this agreement offers a unique opportunity to bring about a new political

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dispensation which will recognise the full and equal legitimacy and worth of the identities, senses of allegiance and ethos of all sections of the community in Northern Ireland. They consider that this opportunity should inform and underpin the development of a police service representative in terms of the make-up of the community as a whole and which, in a peaceful environment, should be routinely unarmed. 2. The participants believe it essential that policing structures and arrangements are such that the police service is professional, effective and efficient, fair and impartial, free from partisan political control; accountable, both under the law for its actions and to the community it serves; representative of the society it polices, and operates within a coherent and co-operative criminal justice system, which conforms with human rights norms. The participants also believe that those structures and arrangements must be capable of maintaining law and order including responding effectively to crime and to any terrorist threat and to public order problems. A police service which cannot do so will fail to win public confidence and acceptance. They believe that any such structures and arrangements should be capable of delivering a policing service, in constructive and inclusive partnerships with the community at all levels, and with the maximum delegation of authority and responsibility, consistent with the foregoing principles. These arrangements should be based on principles of protection of human rights and professional integrity and should be unambiguously accepted and actively supported by the entire community. 3. An independent Commission will be established to make recommendations for future policing arrangements in Northern Ireland including means of encouraging widespread community support for these arrangements within the agreed framework of principles reflected in the paragraphs above and in accordance with the terms of reference at Annex A. The Commission will be broadly representative with expert and international representation among its membership and will be asked to consult widely and to report no later than Summer 1999. 4. The participants believe that the aims of the criminal justice system are to: ● ●

● ●

deliver a fair and impartial system of justice to the community; be responsive to the community’s concerns, and encouraging community involvement where appropriate; have the confidence of all parts of the community; and deliver justice efficiently and effectively.

5. There will be a parallel wide-ranging review of criminal justice (other than policing and those aspects of the system relating to the emergency legislation) to be carried out by the British Government through a mechanism with an independent element, in consultation with the political parties and others. The review will commence as soon as possible, will include wide consultation, and a report will be made to the Secretary of State no later than Autumn 1999. Terms of Reference are attached at Annex B. 6. Implementation of the recommendations arising from both reviews will be discussed with the political parties and with the Irish Government.

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7. The participants also note that the British Government remains ready in principle, with the broad support of the political parties, and after consultation, as appropriate, with the Irish Government, in the context of ongoing implementation of the relevant recommendations, to devolve responsibility for policing and justice issues.

ANNEX A COMMISSION ON POLICING FOR NORTHERN IRELAND Terms of Reference Taking account of the principles on policing as set out in the agreement, the Commission will inquire into policing in Northern Ireland and, on the basis of its findings, bring forward proposals for future policing structures and arrangements, including means of encouraging widespread community support for those arrangements. Its proposals on policing should be designed to ensure that policing arrangements, including composition, recruitment, training, culture, ethos and symbols, are such that in a new approach Northern Ireland has a police service that can enjoy widespread support from, and is seen as an integral part of, the community as a whole. Its proposals should include recommendations covering any issues such as re-training, job placement and educational and professional development required in the transition to policing in a peaceful society. Its proposals should also be designed to ensure that: ●

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the police service is structured, managed and resourced so that it can be effective in discharging its full range of functions (including proposals on any necessary arrangements for the transition to policing in a normal peaceful society); the police service is delivered in constructive and inclusive partnerships with the community at all levels with the maximum delegation of authority and responsibility; the legislative and constitutional framework requires the impartial discharge of policing functions and conforms with internationally accepted norms in relation to policing standards; the police operate within a clear framework of accountability to the law and the community they serve, so: they are constrained by, accountable to and act only within the law; their powers and procedures, like the law they enforce, are clearly established and publicly available; there are open, accessible and independent means of investigating and adjudicating upon complaints against the police; there are clearly established arrangements enabling local people, and their political representatives, to articulate their views and concerns about policing and to establish publicly policing priorities and influence policing policies, subject to safeguards to ensure police impartiality and freedom from partisan political control;

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there are arrangements for accountability and for the effective, efficient and economic use of resources in achieving policing objectives; there are means to ensure independent professional scrutiny and inspection of the police service to ensure that proper professional standards are maintained; the scope for structured co-operation with the Garda Siochana and other police forces is addressed; and the management of public order events which can impose exceptional demands on policing resources is also addressed. The Commission should focus on policing issues, but if it identifies other aspects of the criminal justice system relevant to its work on policing, including the role of the police in prosecution, then it should draw the attention of the Government to those matters. The Commission should consult widely, including with nongovernmental expert organisations, and through such focus groups as they consider it appropriate to establish. The Government proposes to establish the Commission as soon as possible, with the aim of it starting work as soon as possible and publishing its final report by Summer 1999.

ANNEX B REVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM Terms of Reference Taking account of the aims of the criminal justice system as set out in the Agreement, the review will address the structure, management and resourcing of publicly funded elements of the criminal justice system and will bring forward proposals for future criminal justice arrangements (other than policing and those aspects of the system relating to emergency legislation, which the Government is considering separately) covering such issues as: ●

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the arrangements for making appointments to the judiciary and magistracy, and safeguards for protecting their independence; the arrangements for the organisation and supervision of the prosecution process, and for safeguarding its independence; measures to improve the responsiveness and accountability of, and any lay participation in the criminal justice system; mechanisms for addressing law reform; the scope for structured co-operation between the criminal justice agencies on both parts of the island; and the structure and organisation of criminal justice functions that might be devolved to an Assembly, including the possibility of establishing a Department of Justice, while safeguarding the essential independence of many of the key functions in this area. The Government proposes to commence the review as soon as possible, consulting with the political parties and others, including nongovernmental expert organisations. The review will be completed by Autumn 1999.

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10. PRISONERS 1. Both Governments will put in place mechanisms to provide for an accelerated programme for the release of prisoners, including transferred prisoners, convicted of scheduled offences in Northern Ireland or, in the case of those sentenced outside Northern Ireland, similar offences (referred to hereafter as qualifying prisoners). Any such arrangements will protect the rights of individual prisoners under national and international law. 2. Prisoners affiliated to organisations which have not established or are not maintaining a complete and unequivocal ceasefire will not benefit from the arrangements. The situation in this regard will be kept under review. 3. Both Governments will complete a review process within a fixed time frame and set prospective release dates for all qualifying prisoners. The review process would provide for the advance of the release dates of qualifying prisoners while allowing account to be taken of the seriousness of the offences for which the person was convicted and the need to protect the community. In addition, the intention would be that should the circumstances allow it, any qualifying prisoners who remained in custody two years after the commencement of the scheme would be released at that point. 4. The Governments will seek to enact the appropriate legislation to give effect to these arrangements by the end of June 1998. 5. The Governments continue to recognise the importance of measures to facilitate the reintegration of prisoners into the community by providing support both prior to and after release, including assistance directed towards availing of employment opportunities, re-training and/or re-skilling, and further education.

11. VALIDATION, IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW Validation and Implementation 1. The two Governments will as soon as possible sign a new British-Irish Agreement replacing the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, embodying understandings on constitutional issues and affirming their solemn commitment to support and, where appropriate, implement the agreement reached by the participants in the negotiations which shall be annexed to the British-Irish Agreement. 2. Each Government will organise a referendum on 22 May 1998. Subject to Parliamentary approval, a consultative referendum in Northern Ireland, organised under the terms of the Northern Ireland (Entry to Negotiations, etc.) Act 1996, will address the question: “Do you support the agreement reached in the multi-party talks on Northern Ireland and set out in Command Paper 3883?”. The Irish Government will introduce and support in the Oireachtas

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a Bill to amend the Constitution as described in paragraph 2 of the section “Constitutional Issues” and in Annex B, as follows: (a) to amend Articles 2 and 3 as described in paragraph 8.1 in Annex B above and (b) to amend Article 29 to permit the Government to ratify the new British-Irish Agreement. On passage by the Oireachtas, the Bill will be put to referendum. 3. If majorities of those voting in each of the referendums support this agreement, the Governments will then introduce and support, in their respective Parliaments, such legislation as may be necessary to give effect to all aspects of this agreement, and will take whatever ancillary steps as may be required including the holding of elections on 25 June, subject to parliamentary approval, to the Assembly, which would meet initially in a “shadow” mode. The establishment of the North-South Ministerial Council, implementation bodies, the British-Irish Council and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference and the assumption by the Assembly of its legislative and executive powers will take place at the same time on the entry into force of the British-Irish Agreement. 4. In the interim, aspects of the implementation of the multi-party agreement will be reviewed at meetings of those parties relevant in the particular case (taking into account, once Assembly elections have been held, the results of those elections), under the chairmanship of the British Government or the two Governments, as may be appropriate; and representatives of the two Governments and all relevant parties may meet under independent chairmanship to review implementation of the agreement as a whole.

Review procedures following implementation 5. Each institution may, at any time, review any problems that may arise in its operation and, where no other institution is affected, take remedial action in consultation as necessary with the relevant Government or Governments. It will be for each institution to determine its own procedures for review. 6. If there are difficulties in the operation of a particular institution, which have implications for another institution, they may review their operations separately and jointly and agree on remedial action to be taken under their respective authorities. 7. If difficulties arise which require remedial action across the range of institutions, or otherwise require amendment of the British-Irish Agreement or relevant legislation, the process of review will fall to the two Governments in consultation with the parties in the Assembly. Each Government will be responsible for action in its own jurisdiction. 8. Notwithstanding the above, each institution will publish an annual report on its operations. In addition, the two Governments and the parties in the Assembly will convene a conference 4 years after the agreement comes into effect, to review and report on its operation.

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ANNEX AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND The British and Irish Governments: Welcoming the strong commitment to the Agreement reached on 10th April 1998 by themselves and other participants in the multi-party talks and set out in Annex 1 to this Agreement (hereinafter “the Multi-Party Agreement”); Considering that the Multi-Party Agreement offers an opportunity for a new beginning in relationships within Northern Ireland, within the island of Ireland and between the peoples of these islands; Wishing to develop still further the unique relationship between their peoples and the close co-operation between their countries as friendly neighbours and as partners in the European Union; Reaffirming their total commitment to the principles of democracy and nonviolence which have been fundamental to the multi-party talks; Reaffirming their commitment to the principles of partnership, equality and mutual respect and to the protection of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights in their respective jurisdictions; Have agreed as follows: ARTICLE 1 The two Governments: (i) recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland; (ii) recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland; (iii) acknowledge that while a substantial section of the people in Northern Ireland share the legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the island of Ireland for a united Ireland, the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union and accordingly, that Northern Ireland’s status as part of the United Kingdom reflects and relies upon that wish; and that it would be wrong to make any change in the status of Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people; (iv) affirm that, if in the future, the people of the island of Ireland exercise their right of self-determination on the basis set out in sections (i) and (ii) above to bring about a united Ireland, it will be a binding obligation on both Governments to introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish;

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(v) affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspirations of both communities; (vi) recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland. ARTICLE 2 The two Governments affirm their solemn commitment to support, and where appropriate implement, the provisions of the Multi-Party Agreement. In particular there shall be established in accordance with the provisions of the Multi-Party Agreement immediately on the entry into force of this Agreement, the following institutions: (i) a North/South Ministerial Council; (ii) the implementation bodies referred to in paragraph 9 (ii) of the section entitled “Strand Two” of the Multi-Party Agreement; (iii) a British-Irish Council; (iv) a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference. ARTICLE 3 (1) This Agreement shall replace the Agreement between the British and Irish Governments done at Hillsborough on 15th November 1985 which shall cease to have effect on entry into force of this Agreement. (2) The Intergovernmental Conference established by Article 2 of the aforementioned Agreement done on 15th November 1985 shall cease to exist on entry into force of this Agreement. ARTICLE 4 (1) It shall be a requirement for entry into force of this Agreement that: (a) British legislation shall have been enacted for the purpose of implementing the provisions of Annex A to the section entitled “Constitutional Issues” of the Multi-Party Agreement; (b) the amendments to the Constitution of Ireland set out in Annex B to the section entitled “Constitutional Issues” of the Multi-Party Agreement shall have been approved by Referendum; (c) such legislation shall have been enacted as may be required to establish the institutions referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement. (2) Each Government shall notify the other in writing of the completion, so far as it is concerned, of the requirements for entry into force of this Agreement.

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This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the receipt of the later of the two notifications. (3) Immediately on entry into force of this Agreement, the Irish Government shall ensure that the amendments to the Constitution of Ireland set out in Annex B to the section entitled “Constitutional Issues” of the Multi-Party Agreement take effect. In witness thereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by the respective Governments, have signed this Agreement. Done in two originals at Belfast on the 10th day of April 1998. For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland For the Government of Ireland

ANNEX 1 The Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Talks

ANNEX 2 Declaration on the Provisions of Paragraph (vi) of Article 1 In Relationship to Citizenship The British and Irish Governments declare that it is their joint understanding that the term “the people of Northern Ireland” in paragraph (vi) of Article 1 of this Agreement means, for the purposes of giving effect to this provision, all persons born in Northern Ireland and having, at the time of their birth, at least one parent who is a British citizen, an Irish citizen or is otherwise entitled to reside in Northern Ireland without any restriction on their period of residence. Posted by Northern Ireland Office. Source: URL: http://Northern Ireland Office.gov.uk/agreement.pdf. Date downloaded April 28, 2008. Converted to Word. Posted by USIP Library on: July 9, 1998 Source Name: Department of the Taoiseach, Irish Government Source URL: http://www.irlgov.ie/taoiseach/publication/niagreement/annex.htm Date Downloaded: July 2, 1998


Appendix 4 The Agreement at St Andrews (October 13, 2006)

(On Friday 13th October 2006, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern announced that a way forward had been agreed with the leaders of the Democratic Unionist Party, the Revd Ian Paisley, and the leader of Sinn Fein, Gerry Adams. The St Andrews’ Agreement provides for a timetabled series of steps leading towards the eventual restoration of the Northern Ireland Assembly). Over the past three days in St Andrews we have engaged intensively with the Northern Ireland political parties with a view to achieving the goal we set in Armagh in April, which is shared by all the parties and the overwhelming majority of people in Northern Ireland: the restoration of the political institutions. We believe that the transformation brought about by the ending of the IRA’s campaign provides the basis for a political settlement. 2. Our discussions have been focused on achieving full and effective operation of the political institutions. When we arrived in Scotland a limited number of outstanding issues remained to be resolved, including support for and devolution of policing and the criminal justice system, changes to the operation of the Agreement institutions, and certain other matters raised by the parties or flowing from the Preparation for Government Committee. The two Governments now believe that the agreement we are publishing today clears the way to restoration.

POWER SHARING AND THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 3. Both Governments remain fully committed to the fundamental principles of the Agreement: consent for constitutional change, commitment to exclusively peaceful and democratic means, stable inclusive partnership government, a balanced institutional accommodation of the key relationships within Northern Ireland, between North and South and within these islands, and for equality and human rights at the heart of the new dispensation in Northern Ireland. All parties to this agreement need to be wholeheartedly and publicly committed, in good faith and in a spirit of genuine partnership, to the full operation of stable powersharing Government and the North-South and East-West arrangements.

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4. Following discussion with all the parties, we have made an assessment of practical changes to the operation of the institutions and we are publishing today a clear outline of these. The British Government will introduce legislation in Parliament before the statutory November deadline to enact these changes, once parties have endorsed the agreement and agreed definitively to restore the power sharing institutions. Details of these changes are set out in Annex A.

POLICING AND THE RULE OF LAW 5. We have consistently said that support for policing and the rule of law should be extended to every part of the community. We believe that all the parties share this objective. Notwithstanding the right of every political party to hold the police to account, we believe that there are fundamental principles of support for the police and the courts which underpin any democratic society. 6. We believe that the essential elements of support for law and order include endorsing fully the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the criminal justice system, actively encouraging everyone in the community to co-operate fully with the PSNI in tackling crime in all areas and actively supporting all the policing and criminal justice institutions, including the Policing Board. 7. Discussions on the devolution of policing and justice have progressed well in the Preparation for Government Committee. The Governments have requested the parties to continue these discussions so as to agree the necessary administrative arrangements to create a new policing and justice department. It is our view that implementation of the agreement published today should be sufficient to build the community confidence necessary for the Assembly to request the devolution of criminal justice and policing from the British Government by May 2008.

HUMAN RIGHTS, EQUALITY, VICTIMS AND OTHER ISSUES 8. Both Governments have also discussed other matters raised by the parties. Some of these relate to the final implementation of the Agreement and others have been raised in the context of the Preparation for Government Committee. The British Government has also agreed to take forward a number of measures to build confidence in both communities and to pursue a shared future for Northern Ireland in which the culture, rights and aspirations of all are respected and valued, free from sectarianism, racism and intolerance. Details of all these issues are set out in Annex B.

FINANCIAL PACKAGE FOR THE NEWLY RESTORED EXECUTIVE 9. The Governments are also committed to working with the parties to establish the most favourable possible financial climate for a newly restored Executive.

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The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister for Finance will meet delegations from the First and Deputy First Minister to take this forward. Details of how this might be achieved are set out in Annex C.

CONCLUSION 10. We believe that all parties should be able to endorse this agreement and to implement it in good faith, building the trust and confidence necessary for a stable and lasting settlement. We have set out a fixed timetable for the implementation of this agreement in Annex D and have asked parties, having consulted their members, to confirm their acceptance by 10 November. Following endorsement of the St Andrews agreement by the parties the Assembly will meet to nominate the First and Deputy First Minister on 24 November. Between that date and restoration of the Executive on 26 March the new Programme for Government Committee will agree all the necessary arrangements relating to ministerial responsibilities, ensuring that d’Hondt can be run and the Executive can operate immediately. 11. Verification and compliance mechanisms relating to the Assembly already exist, as set out in the agreement between the Governments published in May 2003 and in the Belfast Agreement. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach are determined that default by any one of the parties following restoration of the Executive should not be allowed to delay or hinder political progress in Northern Ireland. 12. The Governments have made clear that in the event of failure to reach agreement by the 24 November we will proceed on the basis of the new British Irish partnership arrangements to implement the Belfast Agreement. 13. It is clear to us that all the parties wish to see devolution restored. It is also clear to us that all parties wish to support policing and the rule of law. We hope they will seize this opportunity for bringing the political process in Northern Ireland to completion and establishing power-sharing government for the benefit of the whole community.

ANNEX A PRACTICAL CHANGES TO THE OPERATION OF THE INSTITUTIONS 1. Following discussion with all the parties in the Preparation for Government Committee and here at St Andrews, we are proposing practical changes to the operation of the institutions of the Agreement in the interests of efficiency and fairness, as envisaged by the Agreement itself. We believe the changes will enable all the institutions to operate in an effective and stable manner, with all parties engaging in good faith and in a spirit of genuine partnership.

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STRAND 1 ISSUES 2. A statutory ministerial Code. An amendment to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 would provide for a statutory ministerial Code, and place a duty upon Ministers (including junior Ministers), notwithstanding their executive authority in their areas of responsibility as defined in the Agreement, to act in accordance with the provisions on ministerial accountability of the Code. The Code would reflect a requirement for safeguards to ensure that all sections of the community could participate and work together successfully in the operation of these institutions and that all sections of the community were protected. There would be arrangements to ensure that, where a decision of the Executive could not be achieved by consensus and a vote was required, any three members of the Executive could require it to be taken on a cross-community basis. 3. The 1998 Act would be amended to require inclusion in the Code of agreed provisions in relation to ministerial accountability. Consistent with paragraphs 19 and 20 of the Agreement, this would provide for the Executive to be the forum for: (i) the discussion of, and agreement on, issues which cut across the responsibilities of two or more Ministers, including in particular those that are the responsibility of the Minister of Finance and Personnel. (ii) prioritising executive proposals; (iii) prioritising legislative proposals; (iv) recommending a common position where necessary—for instance, on matters which concern the response of the Northern Ireland administration to external relationships; (v) agreement each year on (and review as necessary of) a programme incorporating an agreed budget linked to policies and programmes (Programme for Government). 4. The Code will also provide for the discussion of and agreement on any issue which is significant or controversial and: (a) clearly outside the scope of the agreed Programme for Government or (b) which the First Minister and Deputy First Minister agree should be brought to the Executive. 5. The new Code would be discussed by the parties and agreed by the Executive when formed. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister would propose the Code to the Assembly. It would have effect once endorsed by cross-community support there. Any amendments to the Code would require cross-community support in the Assembly. 6. Assembly referrals for Executive review. An amendment to the 1998 Act would provide for referrals from the Assembly to the Executive of important ministerial decisions. Thirty members of the Assembly might initiate such a referral, within seven days of a ministerial decision or notification of the decision where appropriate. Before he could pass the referral to the Executive, the Presiding Officer,

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following consultation with the parties in the Assembly, would be required to certify that it concerned an issue of public importance. The Executive would consider the issue within seven days. A second referral could not be made by the Assembly in respect of the same matter. Only matters covered by the Ministerial Code, as set out above, would require a collective decision by the Executive. 7. Reflecting the Pledge of Office, Ministers would be required to act in accordance with any relevant decisions of the Executive and/or Assembly. 8. Amendments to the Pledge of Office. The Pledge of Office would require that Ministers would participate fully in the Executive and NSMC/BIC, and would observe the joint nature of the office of First Minister and Deputy First Minister. Before the Government legislates on the pledge of office it will consider the outcome of further Preparation for Government Committee discussions on policing and the rule of law. 9. Appointment of Ministers in the Executive. An amendment would be made to the 1998 Act on appointment of Ministers in the Executive. The Nominating Officer of the largest party in the largest designation in the Assembly shall make a nomination to the Assembly Presiding Officer for the post of First Minister. The Nominating Officer of the largest party in the second largest designation in the Assembly shall similarly nominate for the post of Deputy First Minister. The d’Hondt procedure will then run, as already set out in the 1998 Act, to fill the Ministerial posts in the Executive. Where a vacancy arose later in the office of the FM or DFM, the nominating officer(s) of the party(ies) entitled to nominate as above for the office(s) would do so and the nominee would take up office once he had taken the pledge of office. Where a vacancy arose in another ministerial office, it would be filled as at present. It will be a matter for the standing Institutional Review Committee referred to in paragraph 12 to consider whether the new procedures should continue beyond the life of the present Assembly. 10. Functions of Office of First Minister and Deputy First Minister. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister would reach agreement as to whether any functions of the current OFMDFM should be transferred to other departments, and would put proposals to the Executive and Assembly accordingly. 11. Committee of the Centre. An amendment to the 1998 Act would provide for the existing Assembly Committee of the Centre to be placed on a statutory footing like that of other departmental scrutiny committees. 12. Reviews. An amendment to the 1998 Act would provide for the Assembly to appoint a standing Institutional Review Committee, to examine the operational aspects of the Strand One institutions. Matters to be reviewed in this way would be agreed among the parties. The Committee’s reports would be considered by the Executive and Assembly, and, where agreed changes required legislative steps outside the scope of the devolved institutions, by the British Government in consultation as appropriate with the Irish Government. 13. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister would appoint an Efficiency Review Panel, to examine efficiency and value for money of aspects of the Strand One institutions. The FM/DFM would put to the Assembly for approval

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proposals for the panel’s remit, which might include the size of the Assembly and the departmental structure. The Panel would take into account as appropriate the work of the Review of Public Administration. The Panel’s report would be considered by the Executive and Assembly, and, where agreed changes required legislative steps outside the scope of the devolved institutions, by the British Government in consultation as appropriate with the Irish Government. 14. Repeal of the Northern Ireland Act 2000. The Northern Ireland Act 2006 provides for the automatic repeal of the Northern Ireland Act 2000 if the Assembly is restored by the date set out in that Act. The Government remains committed to the repeal of the Northern Ireland Act 2000 on the restoration of devolved government in Northern Ireland. 15. Community designation. An amendment to the 1998 Act would provide that an Assembly Member would not be able to change community designation for the whole of an Assembly term except in the case of a change of membership of political party.

STRANDS TWO AND THREE ISSUES 16. Executive role in preparation for NSMC and BIC meetings. The amendment to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 on a ministerial Code, described in the British Government’s Strand One proposals, would bear on Executive proceedings relating to the North-South Ministerial Council and British-Irish Council. 17. The Code would provide that draft NSMC and BIC decision papers would be circulated to all Executive members within a period (to be decided by the Executive) in advance of a scheduled NSMC or BIC meeting. Any member of the Executive would have the right to seek an Executive discussion on such a paper. Notwithstanding the lead Minister’s executive authority in his/her area of responsibility as defined in the Agreement, where the Code provided that certain matters should be considered/agreed in the Executive Committee (see paragraphs 3 to 5 of the British Government’s Strand One proposals), this would apply to any draft NSMC/BIC decision papers falling within those agreed provisions. 18. Attendance at NSMC and BIC. Amendments to the 1998 Act would provide for a minister with lead departmental interest in an issue under consideration at an NSMC/BIC meeting to be entitled to attend (with a power for a minister so entitled, by consent, to arrange for another minister attending to discharge his/her responsibilities), and a power for the FM/DFM to adjudicate where a Minister’s lead departmental interest was disputed. In the circumstances where a lead Minister was not proposing to attend the meeting in question, and had not arranged for a replacement Minister to discharge his/her responsibilities, there would also be a statutory obligation on FM/DFM to nominate a replacement for a lead Minister to attend the NSMC/BIC and discharge his/her responsibilities. There would be a statutory power for the FM/DFM to require such relevant information from the lead department as would be necessary for the NSMC/BIC meeting in question. Finally, reflecting the existing requirement for representation of

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the Executive on a cross-community basis at meetings of the NSMC/BIC, there would be a statutory obligation on the FM/DFM to nominate the other Minister whose presence is necessary to fulfil that requirement. 19. Review. The Northern Ireland Executive and Irish Government, under the auspices of the NSMC, would appoint a Review Group to examine objectively (1) the efficiency and value for money of existing implementation bodies and (2) the case for additional bodies and areas of co-operation within the NSMC where mutual benefit would be derived. The Group would also input into the work commissioned by the NSMC in June 2002 on the identification of a suitable substitute for the proposed Lights Agency of the Foyle, Carlingford and Irish Lights Commission. The Group would report with recommendations to the NSMC. Any changes to the existing arrangements would require the specific endorsement of the Assembly and Oireachtas. In the meantime, the NSMC would continue to oversee the ongoing work of the Implementation Bodies and work in the areas of co-operation. 20. Assembly/Oireachtas scrutiny of implementation bodies. Chairs and Chief Executives of North/South bodies, when called upon and at least yearly, would appear before relevant Assembly Committees. There is provision in the South for similar arrangements in relation to the Oireachtas. 21. North-South Parliamentary Forum. The Northern Ireland Executive would encourage the parties in the Assembly to establish a North-South parliamentary forum bringing together equal numbers from the Oireachtas and the Assembly, and operating on an inclusive basis. 22. Independent Consultative Forum. The Northern Ireland Executive would support the establishment of an independent North/South consultative forum appointed by the two Administrations and representative of civil society. 23. Secretariat of British-Irish Council. Following consultation with its other members, and with a view to giving further impetus to its work, the two Governments would facilitate the establishment of a standing secretariat for the British-Irish Council, if members agree. 24. East-West Inter-parliamentary Framework. Following appropriate consultation with the British-Irish Inter-parliamentary Body, the two Governments would encourage the Oireachtas, the British Parliament and the relevant elected institutions to approve an East-West Inter-parliamentary Framework which would embrace all their interests. The framework would operate on an inclusive basis. 25. If the Preparation for Government Committee wishes to reconvene to discuss further changes and reaches agreement by 31 October, the Governments stand ready to implement any such agreed changes.

ANNEX B HUMAN RIGHTS, EQUALITY, VICTIMS AND OTHER ISSUES The Government will continue to actively promote the advancement of human rights, equality and mutual respect. In the pursuit of which we commit to

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the following: ●

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In early November, we will publish an Anti-Poverty and Social Exclusion strategy to tackle deprivation in both rural and urban communities based on objective need and to remedy patterns of deprivation. The strategy will build on the good work of the ‘Neighbourhood Renewal’ and ‘Renewing Communities’ initiatives. This can be taken forward by an incoming Executive. The Government will introduce legislation this autumn to establish a Victims’ Commissioner for Northern Ireland. We will establish a forum on a Bill of Rights and convene its inaugural meeting in December 2006. The Government believes in a Single Equality Bill and will work rapidly to make the necessary preparations so that legislation can be taken forward by an incoming Executive at an early date. The Government will introduce an Irish Language Act reflecting on the experience of Wales and Ireland and work with the incoming Executive to enhance and protect the development of the Irish language. The Government firmly believes in the need to enhance and develop the Ulster Scots language, heritage and culture and will support the incoming Executive in taking this forward. We have begun consulting with the Parties on terms of reference for a review which will examine all the issues around parading in Northern Ireland with a view to developing an agreed long term strategy. The Government will work with business, trade unions and ex-prisoner groups to produce guidance for employers which will reduce barriers to employment and enhance re-integration of former prisoners. The 50/50 recruitment arrangements to the PSNI will lapse when the Patten target for Catholic officers has been achieved. We will bring forward in the next parliamentary session legislation to give the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission additional powers. These will include the power to compel evidence, access places of detention and rely on the Human Rights Act when bringing judicial proceedings in its own name. We will publish the Government’s response to the consultation carried out on these matters last year, before 24 November. We will bring forward separate legislation before the end of 2006 to reform entry requirements to ensure access for EU nationals to posts in the Civil Service. During the autumn we will facilitate a meeting of the Northern Ireland Grand Committee in Northern Ireland.

ANNEX C FINANCIAL PACKAGE FOR THE NEWLY RESTORED EXECUTIVE All of the parties have raised the question of the future economic progress of Northern Ireland. The Governments are committed to working with all the

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parties to establish a platform for long-term economic stability and reform necessary for a newly restored Executive. In the context of restoration of the institutions, the Governments remain committed to ensuring the Executive has the capacity to provide quality public services, to continue the process of necessary reform, to plan for the future, to make the long-term capital investments to underpin the economic transformation of Northern Ireland, as well as bringing long-term benefits for the island as a whole. In the context of the forthcoming Comprehensive Spending Review, the Chancellor agrees to meet all parties to consider proposals—including those from the Assembly subgroup on economic challenges facing Northern Ireland— that make the most of new opportunities arising from greater peace and stability. We will also consider the potential for further North/South economic cooperation including proposals for joint investment initiatives. In the context of preparations for restoration, both Governments will work with the parties on these issues. In response to the strongly expressed views of many in the NI community, the British Government will introduce a cap on domestic rates under the new capital values system and will examine the possibility of further rate reliefs for pensioners on lower incomes.

ANNEX D TIMETABLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ST ANDREWS AGREEMENT 13 October: Governments publish St Andrews agreement. Parties consult, including through the DUP Assembly group, the Sinn Fein Ard Comhairle and other appropriate party bodies, on the St Andrews agreement, and respond by 10 November. 17 October: New Programme for Government Committee begins regular meetings to agree priorities for new Executive, with parties represented at leadership level. 20/21 November: Legislation at Westminster to give effect to the St Andrews agreement, including practical changes to the institutions (Annex A). 24 November: Assembly meets to nominate FM/DFM. January: IMC Report. March: Endorsement by the electorate of the St Andrews agreement. 14 March: Members of the Executive nominated by party leaders. 26 March: Power devolved and d’Hondt run. Failure to agree to establish the Executive will lead to immediate dissolution of the Assembly, as will failure to agree at any stage, and the Governments will take forward new partnership arrangements on the basis previously announced.

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ANNEX E FUTURE NATIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND: PAPER BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT Building on the useful discussions that have already taken place with the parties on the issue, this paper outlines the arrangements that are being put in place for the handling of national security intelligence in Northern Ireland and the accountability measures that will be in place, once lead responsibility passes to the Security Service in late 2007. The change will bring Northern Ireland into line with the rest of the UK, to provide a consistent and co-ordinated response to the threat from terrorism, including from international terrorist groups such as Al Quaeda. It also, since national security is an excepted matter, prepares the way for devolution. The British Government is confident the new arrangements will bring real benefits to both the Security Service and the PSNI. A key driver behind the practical arrangements currently being devised and tested is the unique interface in NI between national security and serious/organised crime. The new arrangements preserve and build upon the Patten reforms: that is a fundamental principle of these changes. New integrated working arrangements—the first such approach in the UK—will strengthen the PSNI’s criminal intelligence capability. This is because PSNI officers will be co-located with Security Service personnel and will work in a variety of roles including as intelligence analysts/advisors and for the purpose of translating intelligence into executive action. These arrangements are designed precisely for the purpose of ensuring that intelligence is shared and properly directed within the PSNI. Integration of personnel in this way is an essential protection against concerns that some intelligence would not be visible to the PSNI. The Security Service has no executive policing responsibilities, even in countering threats to national security. While the Security Service will provide the strategic direction, the PSNI’s contribution to countering terrorism will remain absolutely central. In all circumstances, including where the interest is national security related it will be the role of the PSNI to mount executive policing operations, make arrests and take forward prosecutions under the direction of the Public Prosecution Service. There will be no diminution in police accountability. The role and responsibilities of the Policing Board and the Police Ombudsman vis a vis the Police will not change. Police officers working with the Security Service in whatever capacity will remain accountable to the Chief Constable and under the oversight of the Police Ombudsman. The Security Service and the Ombudsman’s office have been working together to agree arrangements for the Ombudsman’s access to sensitive information held by the Service, where this becomes necessary for the discharge of the Ombudsman’s statutory duties. The Service has already disclosed sensitive information to the Ombudsman’s office in a number of cases. It is important to ensure that comprehensive accountability mechanisms are in place for all aspects of policing in Northern Ireland, and we will continue to discuss these matters with the parties.

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The Government will publish in due course high level versions of the MoUs currently being developed between the Security Service and the PSNI and others, as appropriate. The great majority of national security agents will be run by the PSNI, under the strategic direction of the Service, mirroring the arrangements the Service has with the police in GB. This makes sense in NI in particular because of the interface between serious crime and national security; the police also have the advantage of local knowledge. The Security Service will continue to run directly a small number of agents who are authorised to obtain information in the interests of national security as distinct from countering criminality, where the circumstances make that appropriate. The principles observed by the PSNI and the Security Service in running agents are the same, and are enshrined in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. The Policing Board will, as now, have the power to require the Chief Constable to report on any issue pertaining to his functions or those of the police service. All aspects of policing will continue to be subject to the same scrutiny as now. To ensure the Chief Constable can be fully accountable for the PSNI’s policing operations, the Security Service will participate in briefings to closed sessions of the Policing Board to provide appropriate intelligence background about national security related policing operations. On policing that touches on national security the Chief Constable’s main accountability will be to the Secretary of State, as it is now. The Security Service is fully accountable through existing statutory arrangements and the due processes of Parliament. In addition, three separate Commissioners oversee different elements of covert work in NI: the Intelligence Services Commissioner; the Interception of Communications Commissioner; and the Surveillance Commissioner. Relevant complaints relating to the actions of the intelligence agencies are investigated by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, a panel comprising senior members of the legal profession. There is also the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee whose remit is to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the security and intelligence agencies and whose reports are placed before Parliament; the Government has already indicated that it is prepared to consider how the Northern Ireland focus of the Committee might be strengthened. In summary, a whole range of safeguards will continue in place: the Policing Board’s continuing role in ensuring efficient policing; the safeguards embodied in RIPA; the Ombudsman’s role in investigating complaints against police officers; Parliament’s scrutiny of intelligence matters through the Intelligence and Security Committee; the various Commissioners’ oversight of particular types of covert operations; and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal’s remit to deal with complaints. Not only are these arrangements comprehensive, they are as transparent as the sensitivity of the issues allows. Further to reinforce this comprehensive set of safeguards, the Government confirms that it accepts and will ensure that effect is given to the five key principles which the Chief Constable has identified as crucial to the effective operation of the new arrangements, viz: a. All Security Service intelligence relating to terrorism in Northern Ireland will be visible to the PSNI.

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b. PSNI will be informed of all Security Service counter terrorist investigations and operations relating to Northern Ireland. c. Security Service intelligence will be disseminated within PSNI according to the current PSNI dissemination policy, and using police procedures. d. The great majority of national security CHISs in Northern Ireland will continue to be run by PSNI officers under existing police handling protocols. e. There will be no diminution of the PSNI’s ability to comply with the HRA or the Policing Board’s ability to monitor said compliance. In that connection, the Government believes that the Policing Board’s Human Rights advisers should have a role in human rights proofing the relevant protocols that will underpin the Chief Constable’s five key principles, and also in confirming that satisfactory arrangements are in place to implement the principles. The detailed operation of this safeguard will require further consideration. As far as the employment of former police officers by the Security Service under these new arrangements is concerned, there will be no bar on former officers serving in the new organisation, but for operational reasons there will be a need for such individuals to have working experience of the arrangements under which the PSNI currently operate. The same rigorous vetting procedures will apply to them as they do to all new staff joining the service. Source: Full Text of the Agreement at St. Andrews, October 13, 2006 http://www.nio.gov.uk/st_andrews_agreement.pdf . . . NIO.gov.uk/st_Andrews_Agreement. (Copied to WORD, May 10, 2008).

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Index

Adams, Gerry, 6–7, 14, 68, 102, 115, 191 advocacy, 78–80, 104 agro-forestry, 29, 150 Ahern, Bertie, 191 Ak’abal, Humberto, 17, 41, 122–123 Alliance Party, 86 Anglo-Irish Agreement, 162, 185 Arbenz’, Jacobo, 22 Arias, Oscar, 25, 49 Armas, Carlos Escobar, 52 Arthur, Paul, 6, 68, 79, 88 Arzu, Alvaro, 24, 27 back channel, 115 Balsells Tojo, Alfredo, 28 Belfast Agreement, 2, 11, 14, 75, 77, 80, 93, 101–102, 108–109, 114, 161, 193 Berger, Oscar, 14, 28, 31, 32, 44 Blair, Tony, 75, 191 Bloody Sunday, 84 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 3 British Army, 102–103, 111 CACIF (G), 26, 30, 37, 43 Chamber of Commerce and Industry (NI), 107 Church of Ireland, 69, 94–95 CICIG, 35, 40, 42 civil rights, 16, 78–79, 83–84, 96, 111, 176 civil service, 156 civil society, 1–8, 10, 18, 22, 31, 35, 40–44, 47, 50–53, 56, 62, 65, 67–70, 71, 76–82, 86–89, 93–94,

99, 102, 104, 106, 108–109, 111, 113–114, 119–121, 173, 197 Civil Society Assembly (G), 2 civil society organizations, 50, 78, 106 civil war, 6–7, 20 civilian police, 4, 16 Clinton, Bill, 10, 75 cold war, 7, 22, 46 Collective of Social Organizations, 41 Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH)-G, 28 Community Development Centre (NI), 81 Community Relations Council (NI), 74, 81, 105 CONAVIGUA, 51 confidence-building, 111, 114 consociational, 8–9, 12, 78, 87–89, 100 Constitutional Issues, 161, 186, 188–189 Continuity IRA, 15 corruption, 14, 18, 21, 34, 118, 134, 156 Corrymeela, 96, 105 credit and financial services, 151 creed, 3, 6, 176 crime, 3, 15, 35, 38, 61, 78, 107, 182, 192, 200–201 criminal, 15, 33, 35, 52, 65–67, 77, 103, 156, 182–184, 191, 192, 200 Criminal Justice, 161 cycles of violence, 3 Darby, John, 12, 31, 74 decentralization, 27, 34, 56, 102, 135–136, 143, 155–156

216

INDEX

decommissioning, 6, 11–12, 14–16, 24, 67, 75, 79, 85, 180–181 democracy, 6, 9, 17, 18, 20–22, 33, 35, 50, 59, 65, 71, 88, 102, 105, 112, 117, 122, 128–129, 134–135, 141, 187 Democratic Unionist Party, 6, 13, 70, 191 Derry (or Londonderry), 84, 97, 98, 105, 112 d’Hondt, 167, 168, 193, 195, 199 dialogue, 3–4, 6, 10, 31, 43, 47, 49, 51, 82, 96, 104, 106, 109, 114–115, 118, 120, 127, 134 diaspora, 1, 10, 84, 99, 109 diplomacy, 3, 71 discrimination, 9, 14, 18–19, 39, 140 discrimination against women, 136–137 Dissenters, 95 district government, 8 drug cartels, 6, 37, 39 economic elites, 7 ecumenical, 33, 44, 47, 49, 96, 105 El Salvador, 1, 5, 49 elite pacts, 2, 3, 71, 120 employment, 12–13, 25, 31, 38, 52, 73–76, 84, 107–108, 139, 144–146, 150–151, 178–179, 185, 198, 202 ENCOVI, 19, 24–25, 55 enterprise, 32, 146 environmental protection, 154 equality, 5, 12, 15–16, 21, 37, 64, 69, 72, 79–80, 83, 106, 117, 137, 162–163, 167, 170–171, 177–179, 187–188, 191, 197 equality of opportunity, 96 equity, 1, 3, 8, 11–12, 16, 25, 37, 52, 65, 72, 109, 111–112, 120, 139, 141, 146, 154

European Convention on Human Rights, 166, 176–178 European Union, 42, 56, 73, 97, 173, 187 Evangelicals, 7, 44, 47 exclusion, 9, 39, 52, 77, 96, 128, 138 ex-combatants, 4, 39 Executive Authority (NI), 155, 167 fear, 3, 28, 32–33, 39, 98, 114, 118 Federation of Small Business (NI), 8, 53, 107, 148 female leadership, 22 first minister (NI), 68 fiscal policy, 155 Fitzgerald, Garrett, 6, 92 foreign aid, 2, 10, 55 Free Presbyterian Church, 95 GANA, 31, 35–36 Garcia, General Romeo Lucas, 45 Garifuna, 20 Gerardi, Bishop Juan, 45–46, 49 Good Friday, 12 Good Friday Agreement. See Belfast Agreement grassroots, 6, 8, 19, 43, 59–60, 70–71, 78, 81–82, 88–89, 93, 97–98, 104, 106, 109, 114, 119–120, 122 Great Britain. 83–87, 92, 96, 99, 101, 109, 113–14, 162–63, 187, 189. See also United Kingdom greed, 3, 6 grievance, 3, 6, 21, 70 Guatemala, 1–2, 4–17, 19–30, 32–65, 103, 117–148, 152, 154, 158–159 Guatemalan peace process, 10, 14 Haass, Richard, 72, 121 health, 30–31, 44, 51, 54, 63, 78, 101, 104, 107, 128, 136–144, 150, 154, 156, 173–174 Heaney, Seamus, 67, 92, 99, 117, 122

INDEX

hierarchy, 44–46, 97 Ho Won Jeong, 11 Holywell Trust, 105 housing, 8, 13, 31, 72, 74, 77–81, 84, 99, 101, 108, 112, 137–139, 144–145, 150, 156, 179 HTAs home town associations, 62 human capital, 5, 10, 21, 27, 55–56, 122 Human Development Report, 1 human rights, 12, 16, 23–25, 28, 31–32, 35–36, 40, 43, 49–51, 79, 102–103, 119, 127, 129, 139, 141, 147, 156, 162, 177–178, 182, 191, 202 human security, 4, 6, 11–12, 37, 42, 118 Hume, John, 79–80 IDB (InterAmerican Development Bank), 26 identity, 2, 4, 13, 44, 70, 74, 78, 93–98, 128, 134, 147, 163, 165, 167, 177, 188 ideologues, 3 imagined community, 93, 110 implementation, 1–14, 16–17, 21, 23–24, 27, 36, 41–43, 48, 51, 64, 67–71, 79–82, 86–95, 100, 108, 114, 118–119, 127, 129, 134, 136–139, 145, 148, 150–153, 162, 171–175, 181, 186, 188, 192, 197 inclusion, 74, 80, 179, 194 income distribution, 10, 19, 39 indigenous, 2, 28, 54 indigenous leadership, 22 indigenous rights, 12 insecurity, 2, 4, 8, 40, 70, 99, 114 interface, 81, 98, 106, 200–201 Irish language, 99, 180, 198 Irish Republic, 1, 10, 73–75, 80, 84, 95, 113 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 15, 67, 91 John Paul (Pope), 46 Justice Systems, 34

217

Kinzer, S., 22 Kosovo, 5 labour relations, 146, 154 ladino, 7, 20, 29, 44 land conflicts, 152 land ownership, 21 land tax, 155 land tenure, 49, 118 land trust fund, 148–149 leadership, 7, 10, 18, 20, 23–24, 28, 30, 46–47, 68, 70–72, 78, 83, 87–88, 98, 102, 118, 139, 199 Lederach, John Paul, 8, 10, 71, 82, 118 legal reform, 152 lessons, 1, 3–5, 8, 21, 58, 64, 72, 86, 108, 119–121 literacy, 19, 22, 24, 35, 53–54, 72, 140 local government, 2, 7, 10, 13, 39, 43, 56, 71–74, 83, 93–94, 100–102, 112, 118 Londonderry. See Derry loyalist, 11, 13, 69, 83, 89, 97–99, 103, 114 Mac Ginty, Roger, 31, 70, 76, 82 malnutrition, 24, 142 Mama Maquin, 51 market, 2–5, 7, 10, 18–20, 33, 43, 61, 65, 73–74, 78, 94, 104, 111, 113, 119, 121, 145–149 Maya, 7, 21, 48, 122 Mayan spirituality, 28 McCleary, Rachel, 26 McGuinness, Martin, 14, 68 Meehan, Eugene, 5, 71, 97 Menchu, Rigoberta, 6, 32, 36, 43 mestizo, 5, 19 Methodist, 46, 69, 96 Middle East, 3, 115, 121 mid-level leadership, 112

218

INDEX

migration, 2, 10, 13, 59–61 military, 2–3, 7, 11–15, 18, 20, 22–23, 26–35, 38–41, 45, 48, 50, 79, 102–103, 118 MINUGUA, 13–14, 24, 30, 32, 41, 131, 159 Mitchell, George, 10, 16, 75, 80, 86, 120–121 moral imagination, 4, 8, 82, 119, 122 municipal, 10, 22, 56–58, 135–136, 141, 152, 155 Myrna Mack, 30 narratives, 4, 12, 64–65, 88, 100, 110, 118, 122 National Association of Municipalities (G), 136 National University of Ireland, Galway, 105 natural resources, 76, 147–150, 152 negotiated settlements, 3 NI Assembly, 6, 81, 84 NILT Surveys, 69, 95, 97–98 NISRA, 13 non-governmental organizations, 102, 142, 151 normative social inquiry, 5 Northern Ireland Assembly, 101, 121, 171–173, 177, 179 Northern Ireland Executive, 197 obligations, 42, 134, 138, 157–158, 169–170 occupation, 1, 9, 12, 111, 118, 120 O’Dochartaigh, Niall, 111 opportunities for education, 137 Opsahl Commission, 79 Orange Order, 78 outsiders, 8, 10, 32, 75, 87, 98, 109, 119 Paisley, Ian, 7–8, 13–14, 68, 89, 94–96, 119, 191 paramilitary, 8, 11, 15–16, 28, 33, 35, 39–40, 50, 75, 77–78, 84–85, 94, 96–98, 103, 111, 114, 180–181

parity of esteem, 6, 11, 80, 163, 166, 177, 188 partition, 12, 83–84, 88, 93 Patten Commission, 95 peace accords, 1, 9, 11, 13, 18, 19–20, 25–27, 29, 31–32, 36, 39–40, 47–48, 50–59, 75, 83, 93, 127–131, 133–159, 161–189, 191–202 Peace Corps, 26, 28, 54, 57 peace dividend, 6, 27 peace people, 79 peace process, 1–2, 7–8, 14, 27, 36, 40–41, 48–51, 54, 65–69, 71–72, 74–82, 87–88, 91–99, 101–103, 106–114, 119, 121 peace-building, 1–12, 17, 20, 23–24, 30, 42–47, 50–51, 59–64, 71, 74–79, 82, 88, 93, 96–99, 102, 104–106, 111–113, 118–121 peaceful means, 162, 165 peace-keeping, 3, 24 peace-making, 3, 44 physical security, 11, 37, 109, 111 PNC (National Civil Police, G), 34, 39 poems and lines, 1, 9, 17, 41, 91–92, 110, 117–118, 123 poet, 8, 99, 117, 122, 123 police and justice, 15, 21, 38 police and security, 175 Police Ombudsman, 200 police reform, 42 policing, 2, 4, 6–8, 15–16, 39, 65, 71, 79, 83–84, 94, 102, 118–120, 176–178, 181–184, 191–195, 200–201 policy arenas, 51, 119 policy platforms, 72 policy recommendations, 1, 119 political leadership, 94 Popol Vuh, 21, 59 Porras, Gustavo, 6, 32, 55 Portillo, Alfonso, 14, 28, 30 poverty, 2–5, 7, 9–11, 18–26, 33, 36–38, 49, 58–59, 65, 70–77, 105, 111– 113, 117, 121, 128, 133–134, 140, 145–147, 150–154

INDEX

power-sharing, 2, 12–14, 65–68, 70, 77, 82–87, 92–94, 109, 112, 114, 116, 120, 140, 193 principle of consent, 84 prisoner releases, 111 prisoners, 84–85, 185, 198 productivity, 4, 19, 25, 52, 73, 107–108, 134, 140, 146, 150–151, 156 propositions, 14, 64 Protestant, 1, 7, 12–15, 46, 49, 69, 75, 78–84, 94–98, 100, 103, 105–106, 110–111 PSNI (Police Service of NI), 103, 192, 198, 200–202 public policy, 44 public/private policy, 71, 77 punishment beatings, 103 Quezada Toruño (Bishop), 23, 32, 44, 49 race, 1, 14, 19, 37, 177 Ramazzini, Alvaro, 46 Real IRA, 15 reconciliation, 6, 22, 47–49, 68, 72, 74, 81, 86–87, 92, 96, 99, 104, 108, 110, 112, 118–119, 128, 135, 162, 178–179 reconstruction, 9, 22, 43, 49, 82, 112 referendum, 14, 30, 79–80, 97, 185–186 relative deprivation, 5, 73, 76 religion, 2, 43, 50, 122 religious leaders, 1, 75 remittances, 2, 7, 10–11, 19, 22, 25, 41–43, 55, 59, 60–65, 121 republican, 13, 69, 80, 89, 99, 108 resettlement, 15, 129, 142, 153 Revolution of October, 22 rights of women, 137, 146 Rios Montt, General Efrain, 23, 28–29, 31, 44–45, 62 Robinson, Gillian, 70 Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), 84, 97 Ruane, Joseph, 92

219

rule of law, 7, 34–35, 38, 129, 156, 192–193, 195 Saint Egidio, 23 Saunders, Harold, 68 Schlesinger, Stephen, 22 Security Service, 200–202 self-determination, 3, 163, 187 shared future, 64, 87 Sinn Fein, 6, 13, 68, 85–86, 102, 191, 199 small business, 63, 107, 118 Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP), 13 social investment, 33–34, 56, 65, 77, 128, 139, 150, 156 social justice, 11, 46, 49, 128, 133, 138, 145, 154 social security, 137, 143–144, 169 social services, 31, 44, 78, 83, 104, 106, 111, 135, 138–139 socio-economic and agrarian issues, 12 socio-economic development, 33, 76, 128, 138, 141, 145, 155–156 South Africa, 5, 49–50, 105, 120 sovereignty, 3, 5, 8, 69, 72, 79, 92, 175 Stein, Ricardo, 6, 20 Stormont, 7, 14, 77, 83, 85, 101 Strand One, 161, 195–196 Strand Three, 161 Strand Two, 161, 188 structural adjustment, 4, 11, 19, 65 Sunningdale, 85 symbols, 4, 70, 180, 183 synergies, 5, 65, 118 tax policy, 156 taxes, 33 terror by the state, 39 terrorism, 3, 22, 63, 200–201 third party, 3 Tocqueville, 21, 58–59, 64, 71, 117

220

INDEX

Todd, Jennifer, 92 Tonge, Jonathan, 2, 69, 72 Trimble, David, 13, 80 troubles, 6–7, 9, 67–69, 72–75, 79, 84, 94–97, 100–103, 178 trust, 6, 23, 27, 33, 38, 40, 52, 55, 65, 67, 69–70, 75–76, 81–82, 85, 94, 98, 103, 114, 118, 144, 148–49, 162, 193 Ulster Defense Association, 84 Ulster Scots, 198 Ulster Unionist, 13, 70, 86 Ulster Volunteer Force, 84 UNDP, 1, 5, 13, 19, 24–5, 42, 59 unemployed, 4, 11, 73–76, 100 unemployment, 39, 69, 73, 128, 138, 179 United Kingdom, 1, 12, 64, 73, 75, 83, 95, 161–164, 169, 174, 176, 187–189

United States, 1, 4, 5, 12, 20, 27, 35, 38–39, 46, 49, 58, 60–64, 77, 83, 130, 159 URNG, 6, 15, 24, 49, 127–129 victims, 27, 45–46, 50, 61, 63, 84, 103, 106, 110, 178–179 violence, 1–11, 13, 15, 18–22, 28, 31–40, 43, 46–47, 51–55, 64–67, 70, 72, 74, 76–82, 85–86, 91–94, 96–100, 103, 106, 110–114, 118–123, 128, 170, 178, 187 voluntary organizations, 2, 72, 94, 104, 106, 120 voluntary sector, 71, 77, 79–80, 87, 89, 100, 106–107, 111, 119 war against drugs, 3 wealth distribution, 24 Women’s Coalition (NI), 79–80, 86 women’s participation, 137 Xinka, 20

Peace-Building and Development in Guatemala and Northern Ireland

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