Organized Crime: From Trafficking to Terrorism

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Organized Crime

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Organized Crime From Trafficking to Terrorism Volume One

Frank G. Shanty, Editor Patit Paban Mishra, Contributing Editor

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Copyright © 2008 by ABC-CLIO, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Organized crime : from trafficking to terrorism / Frank G. Shanty, editor, Patit Paban Mishra, contributing editor. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-1-57607-337-7 (hard copy : alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-1-59884-102-2 (ebook) 1. Organized crime. 2. Terrorism. I. Shanty, Frank, 1950– II. Mishra, Patit Paban. HV6441.O745 2007 364.1'06—dc22 2007017471 07

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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit http://www.abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, Inc. 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper. Manufactured in the United States of America

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Contents Acknowledgments ix Preface xi Introduction xiii Organized Crime: From Trafficking to Terrorism Section I Organized Crime, Criminal Groups, and National and Regional Threats 1 A. Historical Antecedents of Organized Crime Organized Crime throughout History: Renaissance and Early Modern Period 4 The History and Evolution of Organized Crime: United States 10 American Mafia 14 Ethnic Group Involvement in Organized Crime: Historical Perspectives and Emerging Trends 18 The Historical Impact of Organized Crime on American Society 20 Film and Television Portrayals of Organized Crime 25 B. Organized Crime: Definitions, Theories, Concepts, Structure, and Function The Activities of Transnational Organized Crime 30 Causation Theories and Concepts of Organized Criminal Behavior 35 Characteristics and Operational Tactics of Organized Crime 39 Concept of Transnational Organized Crime 42

Defining Organized Crime: Economic, Legal, and Social Factors 43 Difficulties in Applying Generic Conceptualizations of Organized Crime to Specific National Circumstances 47 Structure and Functional Organization of Criminal Groups 51 Traditional and Nontraditional Organized Crime Groups 53 C. Global, Regional, and National National and International Threats: Regional Profiles 56 Organized Crime in Africa 60 Organized Crime in Asia 66 Triads and Tongs: Asian Organized Crime in America 71 Organized Crime in Australia: Drug Trafficking and Human Smuggling 74 Organized Crime in the Balkans and Implications for Regional Security 78 Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Political-Criminal Nexus 84 The Jogo do Bicho: Brazil’s Illicit Lottery 88 Transnational Crime in the Caribbean Region 93 Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean 96 v

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The Central Asian Republics 102 Child Sex Trafficking in Cambodia 107 Organized Crime in Eastern Europe 110 Europe: Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the Baltic States, and the European Union 113 Gang Crimes: Latino Gangs in America 120 International Organized Crime and Its Impact on U.S. National Security 125 Crime and Corruption in Japan: The Yakuza 128 The Relationship between Politics and Organized Crime in Latin America 132 North America 136 Arms and Drug Trafficking: The Case of North Korea 142 Drug Trafficking in Northern Ireland 145 The International Arm of Russian Organized Crime: Russian Mafiya 148 Organized Crime in South America 152 Organized Criminal Activity in South America’s Tri-Border Region 159 Turkish Organized Crime: Heroin Trafficking and Money Laundering Operations 162 Child Trafficking in West Africa 165

Section II Criminal Enterprises and Sources of Financing 169 A. Criminal Enterprises: Trafficking and Other Illegal Business Activities of Organized Crime Bribery and Corruption of Police Officials 171 Consumer-Driven Crimes: Drugs, Gambling, and Prostitution 173 Criminal Copyright Infringement: Pirating of Electronics, Music, and Computer Software 177 Criminal Motor Vehicle Theft and Trafficking 180 Criminal Trafficking and Trade in Counterfeit Consumer Products 181 Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime: The Rise and Evolution of International Drug Cartels 184

Fuel Racketeering, Motor-Fuel Tax Fraud, and Illegal Export Smuggling 190 Gambling: Numbers and Bookmaking 192 The Global Sex Trade: Commercial Sex, Pornography, and International Sex Tourism, a Multibillion-Dollar Industry 194 The Historical Involvement of Organized Crime in Labor Racketeering 197 Illegal Gambling and Loan-Sharking 202 Illegal Trading in Diamonds, Gems, and Precious Metals 204 International Trafficking of Men, Women, and Children 206 Murder for Hire: Assassination and Contract Killings 210 Nontraditional Organized Crime: Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs 211 The Relationship between Legitimate and Illegal Markets 214 The RICO Statute: An Overview 216 Trafficking in Persons and Human Organs 219 Trafficking in Stolen Art, Antiques, and Cultural Property 223 B. Financial Crimes, Fraud, and Money Laundering Computer Intrusions and Intellectual Property Theft 226 Credit, Insurance, and Securities Fraud and Fraudulent Bankruptcies 228 Foreign Economic Espionage: Theft of Trade and High-Tech Secrets 229 Global Efforts to Combat Money Laundering: The Egmont Group and the Financial Action Task Force 233 Health Care Fraud: An Emerging Criminal Enterprise 237 Identity Theft, Fraud, and Criminal Activity 240 International Money Laundering Control: Law Enforcement Issues 243 Money Laundering and the Global Financial System 246 Offshore Financial Services: Bank Secrecy Jurisdictions and Offshore Banking 249

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The Process of Money Laundering: Placement, Layering, and Integration 251 Money Laundering, Tax Evasion, and Financial Havens 253 Money Laundering: Typologies, Methods, and Current Trends 256 Organized Theft Rings: Interstate Theft and Transportation of Stolen Property 260 Product Counterfeiting Operations of Organized Criminal Groups 263 Securities Fraud and Stock Manipulation Schemes 266 Tax Evasion and Trust Schemes 269 Trade, Banking, and Financial Institution Fraud 270

Section III The Global Impact of Organized Crime 275 A. The Globalization of Crime Criminal Infiltration in Legitimate Businesses and Industries 277 Economic, Political, and Social Impact of Transnational Organized Crime 280 Environmental Crime: The Illegal Storage and Disposal of Hazardous and Toxic Waste 284 Global Crime Victimization: Impact on Social Order and Democracy 286 Internet Extortion and Information Security 289 Strategic Alliances between Organized Crime Groups 292 Transnational Crime and Its Impact on International Security 294 B. Transporter Crime and Smuggling Networks and Piracy Attacks on Commercial Vessels: Piracy in the Malacca Strait and South China Sea 299 Drugs, Guns, and Armed Conflict 303 Human Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants and Illegal Aliens: A Global Overview 305 Maritime Smuggling of Migrants 309 Organized Crime, the Russian Military, and Nuclear Smuggling 313

Snakeheads and Human Migrant Smuggling: China’s Fujian Province 314 C. Illegal Drugs, Trade, and Trafficking Drug Production and Trafficking in the Western Hemisphere: The Andean Region of South America 318 The Global Cocaine Trade: Coca Cultivation, Cocaine Production, and Distribution 322 The Global Opium Trade: Cultivation, Production, and Distribution 327 Mexican Organized Crime: Drug Cartels 332 Social and Economic Impact of the Drug Trade: A Global Perspective 335 Violence, Drugs, and Organized Crime 338 D. Non-State Actors: International Criminals and Terrorists Drug Trafficking, Transnational Crime, and International Terrorist Groups 342 Financial Networks of Global Terrorism 345 Has Al-Qaeda Acquired Nuclear Weapons? The State of Existing Knowledge 350 Organized Crime, Nonstate Actors, and Weak or Failed States 357 Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime in Comparative Perspective 363 Underground Commerce: Black Markets 371 E. International Measures to Combat Organized Crime and Corruption Combating Transnational Organized Crime: Technical and Legal Issues 375 The Concept and Role of International Financial Intelligence Units 377 The Criminal Intelligence Process and Organized Crime 379 Current International Efforts to Combat Organized Crime 381 Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 385 Human Smuggling and Trafficking: The Limitations of Official Statistics 387 International Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking 391 International Initiatives Dealing with the Abuse and Trafficking of Illegal Drugs 394

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The 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) 398 F. National and International Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies Australian Crime Commission 404 Canadian Security Intelligence Service 406 Caribbean Financial Action Task Force 408 Central Intelligence Agency 409 Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada 411 Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, Italy 413 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 414 Europol 416 Federal Bureau of Investigation 418 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 420 International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC) 422 International Atomic Energy Agency 423 International Criminal Court 424 International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) 427 International Law Enforcement Academies 428 National Crime Authority 430 National Criminal Intelligence Service (United Kingdom) 431 Serious Organised Crime Agency (United Kingdom) 433 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 435 Task Force to Fight Illicit Trafficking in Cultural Property Stolen in Iraq 436 U.S. Customs and Border Protection 438 G. Future Direction of Global Organized Crime and Its Control Organized Crime Control: The Merger of International Law Enforcement and Intelligence Operations 441 Organized Crime Studies: An Agenda for Future Research 443

Appendix: Directory of Major Organized Criminal Groups Aboriginal-Based Criminal Groups, Canada 449 Albanian Mafia 449 Alperon Crime Organization (Israel) 450 Asian Gangs 451

Azerbaijani Groups 451 Balkan Crime Groups 452 Big Circle Boys 452 Black Gangster Disciples 453 Born to Kill 453 Cambodian Crime Groups 453 Chechen Criminal Gangs 454 Chinatown Gangs 454 Chinese Triads 455 Colombian Drug Cartels 455 La Cosa Nostra (Sicilian Mafia) Italy 456 Dragon Syndicates 456 East European-Based Criminal Groups 457 Fuk Ching 457 Gang Crime (International Street and Prison Gangs) 458 Georgian Mafiya 458 Great Circle Triad 458 Jamaican Criminal Organizations: Shower Posse 459 Khalil Kharfan Organization 459 Kuratong Balaleng (Philippines) 459 Latino Gangs 460 Malina Organizatsia 460 Marielito Gangs 461 Mexican Federation 461 ’Ndrangheta: The Calabrian Mafia (Italy) 462 Neapolitan Camorra (Italy) 462 Nigerian Criminal Organizations 463 Odessa Mafiya 463 Pentagon 463 Russian Mafiya 464 Sacra Corona Unita 464 South African Crime Groups 465 Sun Yee On 465 Taiwan’s Triads 466 14K (Hong Kong) 466 Tiendaomeng Crime Syndicate 466 Turkish/Kurdish Gangs 467 Turkish Mafia 467 Ukrainian Mafia 467 Wah Ching Crime Syndicate 468 West African Gangs 468 Wo Group 468 Yakuza 469 Index I-1

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Acknowledgments This project required the combined efforts of many dedicated individuals. Most notably, the major credit and the utmost gratitude go to those who have taken time from their busy schedules to contribute their knowledge and expertise. Without their commitment and untiring effort, this publication could not have been completed. Any encyclopedia entails a lot of effort and often requires some sacrifice of those involved in its conception, production, and completion. Certainly this present effort, Organized Crime: From Trafficking to Terrorism, was no exception. An undertaking of this magnitude often involves delays, changes, additions, a search for qualified people, and sometimes last-minute problems requiring the replacement of qualified writers. Again, this present effort was no exception. I would like to extend a debt of gratitude to my longtime friend Ralph Carrick, who passed away during the course of this effort. Ralph was a unique individual. He is one of the few people I have known who spent more time listening than he did talking. What a rare quality. I valued his friendship very much. I thank him for all the support he gave me on this project and for always being there. I would also like to thank my father, Dr. Frank Shanty, who has always provided support and encouragement to me. He is a special person, and I consider myself a better man for having had the benefit of his counsel and wisdom over the years. I would like to extend my utmost gratitude to several people who went above and beyond the call of

duty to ensure that major topics were assigned and completed. Oftentimes these individuals personally took responsibility for writing an entry that contributed significantly to the overall depth and comprehensiveness of this two-volume work. Dr. Robert Hanser assisted this effort by writing several entries and served as coauthor on several others. He also helped solicit qualified contributors, and on most of these entries he provided his insights and knowledge to ensure the integrity of the final product. A special debt of gratitude is also extended to Daniel Mabry and Joseph Serio. Both individuals have personally contributed entries to this work and have also provided assistance on locating qualified contributors. Other individuals also deserve special recognition for assuming more responsibility than was expected: Nathan Moran, Laura Ferola, Georgios Antonopoulos, Edgar Tijhuis, Kelly Hignett, Don Liddick, Mark Galeotti, Sean Griffin, Marilyn Peterson, and Hua-Lun Huang. Without their invaluable assistance, this project would have been much more difficult to complete. On the technical side, I would like to thank my coeditor, Dr. Patit Mishra, for his invaluable assistance on the documents (Volume 2) and for his friendship and kind words. A special note of gratitude is extended to Dr. James Ciment for his ongoing methodological guidance and technical support and for bringing this publication to fruition. The ABC-CLIO staff deserves special recognition. First, I would like to thank Dr. Alex Mikaberidze, submissions editor for ABC-CLIO, for his

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understanding, patience, guidance, and technical support throughout this entire project. Alex is a true professional, and ABC-CLIO is fortunate to have him. Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank my wife, Melanie, for accepting long hours, missed dinners, and weekends spent on the keyboard or with pen in hand. She has provided encouragement and understanding throughout this project as well as my ongoing PhD dissertation.

Finally, this two-volume encyclopedia is dedicated to my son Jason, a U.S. Marine, and to other Marines serving with him and other sons and daughters who are serving our country in various branches of the U.S. military during this critical period in this country’s history and indeed in the history of the entire global community. May God bless all of these brave men and women. Frank Shanty General Editor

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Preface Organized crime is an international phenomena and a major twenty-first-century security threat. This two-volume edition addresses issues that are critical to our understanding of this problem. Volume one begins with several articles that serve as a background and an introduction to this timely topic. Historical antecedents, causation theories, and group dynamics are discussed by scholars with an intimate knowledge of these issues. While organized crime is not a new problem, it has taken on new significance since the events of September 11, 2001. Volume one addresses the crime problem from a global perspective. Key issues such as the globalization of crime, the criminal infiltration of the legitimate business sector, and the operational characteristics of various organized criminal groups and enterprises are a few of the topics discussed in detail in volume one. Also covered in detail are financial crimes—including fraud and money laundering, transporter and smuggling networks, piracy, and the international illicit drug problem—and current measures used to combat global organized crime and corruption both nationally and internationally. A major issue for governments as well as law enforcement is the involvement of terrorist organizations in criminal activity to finance their operations. With this in mind, two leading authorities knowledgeable in this area have contributed entries that discuss the controversy surrounding the criminal-terrorist nexus. While the objective of this project was to present the relevant issues from a global perspective, we believe that this can best be accomplished with a thor-

ough discussion of organized crime as it impacts the nation-state. Therefore, several entries tackle this problem from a national and regional perspective. Other key issues addressed are the trafficking in persons, with an emphasis on the trafficking of women, children, and migrants. The manufacture and trafficking of arms, munitions, and explosives is also discussed. Given the diversity of the global crime problem, we have included entries that address the trading or transfer of a wide range of illegal contraband. One of the defining characteristics of twentyfirst-century criminal activity is its global reach. Therefore, we have included topics of special concern such as environmental crime, the impact of transnational crime on international security, and the future of global organized crime control. Additionally, since organized crime affects the entire international community, a profile of various national and international law enforcement and intelligence agencies charged with combating this problem is provided. Also included is a directory of some of the major organized criminal groups presently operating throughout the world. Finally, volume two provides key multilateral and international documents such as treaties, conventions, protocols, and other legal instruments designed to combat national, regional, and international criminal activity and regulate the activities of individuals as well as the responses given to this problem by nation-states and the international community as a whole.

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Throughout this two-volume set, we have attempted to address those aspects of global crime that presently challenge the capabilities of law enforcement and other international agencies and governing bodies. Comprehensive in scope and written by top scholars in the field, Organized Crime: From Trafficking to Terrorism is suitable for use by stu-

dents, researchers, scholars, those charged with combating this problem, and others interested in learning more about this continually evolving international problem that threatens nation-state survival as well as public safety. Frank Shanty General Editor

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Introduction Organized Crime 2006: A Global Overview of Current Events, Recent Trends, and Emerging Patterns Don Liddick Transnational organized crime is a virulent breed of criminality that transcends national boundaries and permeates the globe. Although certain forms of transnational crime such as slave trading have existed for many centuries, the phenomenon expanded rapidly in the second half of the twentieth century. Facilitated by technological advances that vastly improved communications and transportation and integrated world markets, transnational organized crime now thrives in a broad array of economic and political situations and virtually any place where regulation of industry, government, and the administration of justice are inadequate. The proscription of goods and services creates huge global black markets supplied by networks of illegal entrepreneurs who are enabled by corrupt government officials, intelligence and military personnel, corporate businesspeople, and the international banking community. The profits generated from transnational crime are so great that they create what criminologists have called a political-criminal nexus, whereby political and criminal power are fused and criminal interests shape the course of international affairs. Transnational crime consists of a staggering range of infractions but is most notably manifested in the production and smuggling of narcotics; arms trafficking; cargo theft from trucks and shipping terminals; automobile theft; piracy on the high seas; art and antiquities theft; software piracy; the smuggling of illegal migrants; sexual slavery and transnational

prostitution; pornography; traffic in human organs; smuggling toxic wastes; traffic in exotic life forms and endangered species; money laundering; the violation of intellectual property rights; product counterfeiting; currency counterfeiting; industrial theft and economic espionage; various financial frauds and high-tech computer crimes; terrorism; the traffic in nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons; cyberterrorism; kidnapping; the pirating of music compact discs and digital video discs; sports bribery; securities fraud; the smuggling of gems and gold; poaching of fish and other wildlife; the illegal dumping of toxic wastes; capital flight from developing nations; and bankruptcy and insurance fraud. The terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 were a form of transnational crime and represent a good example of the impact of this global problem. Political-Criminal Nexus The damage from transnational crime is exacerbated by the fact that the most important criminals are typically political and societal elites: informal power brokers, powerful politicians, and businesspeople. The nexus between organized crime groups and state authorities is driven by the motives of profit and power and is exemplified by countless mutually beneficial exchange relationships. Acquiring access to state power allows crime groups to gain immunity for their illegal enterprises and exploit the social, xiii

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A UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter flies past one of Saddam Hussein’s former palaces in Tikrit, Iraq. Hussein used Oil-ForFood funds to finance lavish personal projects like this one. (Department of Defense)

economic, and political apparatus of the state, while for their part government officials pursue cooperative arrangements with organized criminals to fatten their wallets, secure votes, and control political enemies. Classifying heads of state and other national and international leaders as transnational organized criminals is appropriate. For example, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein pilfered oil wealth and United Nations (UN) Oil-for-Food money intended for Iraqi civilians to build palaces. The impact of transnational crime is immeasurable. Transnational criminals have become so powerful that their activities destabilize new democracies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and undermine the sovereignty of weak nations in Latin America, Africa, and the Caribbean. Transnational organized crime is responsible for overpriced goods

and services; the poisoning of men, women, and children with harmful drugs; the exacerbation of regional conflicts and wars; the funding of terrorist organizations; the usurpation of legitimate governments and the siphoning of public resources; and the physical suffering of millions of people worldwide. Through the restraint of trade and other debilitating effects, transnational crime delivers a terrible blow to the legitimate economy of all nations. The Rise of Transnational Criminal Organizations The growth of transnational crime in the last half of the twentieth century arose from several factors, including economic liberalization and globalization, high profits driven by prohibition laws, the increasing global demand for illicit goods and services, and state

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failures and civil wars. Economic liberalization and the opening of borders, while beneficial in many ways, have also facilitated illegal sectors of the global economy. For example, financial liberalization has made the movement and laundering of illicit funds much easier. Similarly, tax amnesties on repatriated capital attracts legal money but is also an encouragement to money launderers. Free trade measures may be good for the global economy, but the subsequent growth in cross-border traffic has made it simpler for smugglers to hide contraband among legal goods. Another example is the economic reforms in Mexico that produced social disruptions and spurred increased opium and marijuana cultivation. Transnational crime also flourishes because of the lack of political will to stop it. If issues over sovereignty, jurisdiction, and the incompatibility of the laws of different nations were not problematic enough, the profits from crime are so great that public officials and other powerful elites choose to participate in crime and reap the benefits, as opposed to developing national and international strategies for attacking the problem. Entire nation-states have been and remain the sponsors of terrorism and transnational organized crime. Transnational crime groups have grown more sophisticated, coordinating their ventures and sharing information, resources, and market access. By forming global criminal alliances, the world’s most prolific criminal organizations have managed to reduce risks and expand the breadth of their operations. For example, the leaders of South American drug cartels coordinate with criminal organizations in France and Italy, who develop arrangements with criminals in Poland and Russia, who complete the circuit by establishing relations with organized criminals back in Latin America. Additional examples include German pornographers who work with Chinese Triads to produce child pornography in Southeast Asia, Jamaican Yardies who enforce drug rule in England with automatic weapons provided by the Russian Mafiya, a deal between the Sicilian Mafia and Russian crime gangs to traffic in stolen nuclear materials, and Mexican drug cartels that partner with outlaw motorcycle gangs to distribute methamphetamine in the United States and Canada. The incidence of criminal partnerships on such a global scale has created new

difficulties for law enforcement in terms of jurisdiction, resources, and the corruption of public officials. Some transnational crime organizations are highly diversified and operate a large number of legal as well as illegal enterprises. Many groups have businesslike structures and use technological advances and specialists to improve efficiency. Criminals use financial experts and banking officials to launder money, manage investments, and establish front companies, while some drug smuggling organizations use transportation specialists and legal experts to research commercial flows, learn about tariff laws, and master administrative procedures in commercial ports. Corrupt lawyers manipulate the law and the judicial system to thwart investigations and shape legislation. The criminals also use information and communication technologies that allow them to obtain, process, and protect information in order to evade law enforcement. The capacity of modern computers and telecommunication systems allows transnational criminals to create decoys and false trails for investigators, plot market strategies for the distribution of illicit goods, and identify the most efficient smuggling and money laundering routes. The vast proceeds from crime are used to purchase the most recent surveillance technologies to keep track of law enforcement personnel and develop counterintelligence. Another ominous development is the movement of terrorists and extremist groups into organized crime activities. For example, Marxist insurgents in Colombia, unable to rely on Soviet or Cuban aid since the late 1980s, have turned to the drug trade for financing. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) tax and protect the cocaine trade in that country. Similarly, in Angola and Sierra Leone terrorists pay for the costs of insurgency by mining and illegally exporting diamonds. A Hezbollah cell in North Carolina was prosecuted for trafficking in cigarettes, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has been known to engage in extortion rackets. In those cases where terrorists don’t operate illegal enterprises independently, they foster relationships with organized criminals to gain contacts with immigration officials, corrupt law enforcers, develop relationships with money launderers, and acquire weapons, encryption software, and global positioning equipment. xv

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The Global Reach of Transnational Crime The principal threat from Western Europe is Italian criminal organizations, which maintain an active presence in the United States and are involved in extortion, gambling, counterfeiting, money laundering, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and financial frauds. While the Neopolitan Camorra and the N’drangheta are significant Italian-based crime groups, the Sicilian Mafia remains one of the most prolific global crime organizations, with a significant presence in some forty countries. Comprised of perhaps 180 families, or clans, the group has acquired most of its wealth and power through heroin trafficking. In 1997 thirty-one Sicilian Mafia members, including the reputed boss of bosses, Salvatore Riina, were convicted in association with the 1992 slaying of Italy’s top crime prosecutor. Authorities estimate that $20 billion per year is repatriated to Palermo, Sicily, the base of the Sicilian Mafia. The growth of transnational organized crime is especially prominent in Asia and Eastern Europe. Ethnic conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s precipitated lasting networks of terrorists and organized criminals who traffic in weapons, contraband, stolen art, and people. Transnational crime in the former Soviet Republics is especially serious. More than one hundred major Russian Mafiya gangs are believed to operate in forty-four countries around the world. Authorities believe that 70–80 percent of private banks in Russia are controlled by organized crime. In 1999 several people and two companies were charged with laundering some $7–10 billion in illicit and legitimate revenue through the Bank of New York on behalf of Russian criminals. Russian Mafiya groups also maintain a heroin pipeline that runs from Myanmar to the Balkans, through Germany and Nigeria, and on to distributors throughout Europe and the United States. Southeast Asia is also a major growth region for transnational crime. More than half of the heroin produced in Myanmar is trafficked through Yunnan Province in China on its way to drug markets in North America and Australia. Factories in Guandong Province are significant producers of counterfeit and pirated goods. The six major Chinese Triad societies, along with many smaller satellite groups, comprise the world’s largest criminal associ-

ation, with more than 100,000 members. The largest group, the Sun Yee On, is based in Hong Kong, has direct ties to the Beijing government, and engages in heroin trafficking, alien smuggling, and extortion in Canada, Thailand, Australia, and Central America. In 2001, mafia-style crimes increased by 530% in China, and 2,600 Chinese officials were implicated as being in collusion with organized crime. Chinese Triads in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, along with other crime groups in Mainland China, have extended their criminal activities and developed relationships with ethnic Chinese crime groups in the United States. The Chinese syndicates engage in a broad array of crimes, including drug trafficking, alien smuggling, weapons trafficking, money laundering, credit card fraud, and software piracy. The Yakuza, considered to be among the world’s largest and most powerful criminal confederations, are thought to generate about $13 billion in annual revenue. Yakuza gangs control casinos and brothels, own real estate and sports and entertainment companies, and engage in methamphetamine trafficking, extortion, and loan-sharking. The gangs are involved in every aspect of the Japanese economy and extort huge sums of money from corporations and banks. Perhaps $1 trillion of Japan’s bad debts are owed to banks by Yakuza-related real estate speculators. Yakuza gangs can be found in Australia, Costa Rica, Hawaii, Brazil, South Korea, and on the West Coast of the United States. U.S. law enforcement has noted that Yakuza groups have laundered money through the U.S. stock market and invested heavily in real estate, including golf courses and hotels. A Yakuza affiliate is believed to have purchased shares in Dow Chemical, Chase Manhattan, IBM, General Motors, Atlantic Ritchfield, and Bank of America. Latin America is a major source of transnational crime. Colombian traffickers are responsible for supplying most of the world’s refined cocaine, with the majority going to the United States. The Andean countries of Peru and Bolivia are the primary sources of coca, while Venezuela is a major transshipment corridor for drugs trafficked through the Caribbean and destined for the United States. However, drug trafficking is not the only transnational criminal enterprise emanating from Latin America. Colombia is

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also the leader in manufacturing counterfeit U.S. currency. Bolivia is a staging area for the movement of illegal migrants from China and the Middle East to the United States. Authorities estimate that patent and trademark infringements in Argentina and Brazil cost U.S. firms $500 million in lost sales every year. In addition, the Caribbean is a major transshipment route for the passage of arms, drugs, illegal migrants, and contraband. Jamaica is the largest exporter of marijuana in the Caribbean and has well-established crime gangs with contacts in Colombia and the United States. Puerto Rico sits at the middle of three trans-Caribbean smuggling routes, while Dominican traffickers control the shipment of cocaine and marijuana from Puerto Rico to the United States. Caribbean nations also serve as offshore banking centers used for money laundering and income tax evasion. Money laundered through the Colon Free Zone is estimated to be $1 billion to $4 billion annually. Countries in Central America are conduits for the shipment of drugs and other contraband, from points south up through Mexico and into the United States. Mexico and the countries of Central America are by far the largest source of illegal migrants to the United States. Many of the migrants are from the region, primarily Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico, but tens of thousands of others come from China, India, and other Asian, African, and Middle Eastern countries. The U.S. government estimates that alien smuggling networks in Central America generate about $1 billion a year in gross annual revenue. In Mexico, drug traffickers corrupt public officials and exploit the huge amount of legitimate traffic along the porous U.S.-Mexican border. Mexican traffickers dominate the U.S. methamphetamine market, while approximately half of the cocaine smuggled into the United States crosses the southwestern border. The smuggling of stolen vehicles, firearms, tobacco, alcohol, pirated goods, and illegal migrants are also common along the U.S.-Mexican border. With the world’s largest and most diversified economy, the United States is an excellent breeding ground for transnational organized crime. The United States is a leading source of contraband luxury goods, especially automobiles, firearms, tobacco products, and alcohol. While the United States re-

mains the world’s largest consumer of illicit drugs, it is also a leading producer and exporter of marijuana, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine. The United States is a major transshipment point for contraband shipped from one foreign nation to another and is a significant source of precursor chemicals used in the global drug traffic. The principal crime groups originating in the United States that have transnational dimensions are outlaw motorcycle gangs and the American La Cosa Nostra. The response to the transnational crime problem has been tardy and ineffective. Attempts to strike at transnational criminal networks are hindered by the global dimensions of the problem and its diffuse and expansive nature as well as widespread corruption of public officials and the challenges of international cooperation. Increasing global demand for drugs and other black market commodities drive the transnational crime engine, while religious zealotry, ethnic rivalries, and ideological radicals fuel international terrorism. While strong legislation and technological innovations give government and private-sector personnel tools to fight criminals, the tools themselves give rise to serious questions regarding privacy rights and the scope of government power. Money Laundering Among all transnational crimes, the outlook on fighting money laundering is especially grim. Methods and characteristics of money laundering are limited only by the imagination of the given criminal. For example, with real estate fraud, developers acquire large loans, wire the money to bank accounts outside the United States, and then declare bankruptcy. With terrorism and the illegal trade in arms and nuclear materials, methods can vary because criminals typically intend to conceal the destination as well as the origin of funds. In the fight against money laundering, banks and other depository institutions remain the first line of defense. In the United States, the government has largely succeeded in stopping money launderers from gaining direct access to U.S. banks. However, money launderers now look increasingly to international mechanisms and nonbank money transmitters. Major factors that confound law enforcement include the full-scale automation of

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wire transfer services with increased on-line access and less human intervention or monitoring, the exponential growth of international and multinational business transactions, the use of underground or informal banking systems such as the chit and hawala systems, the global interdependence of financial institutions and clearing mechanisms, the increase in correspondent relationships among foreign banks, specialized bank accounts that cater to foreign clients, the development of money management services, foreign exchange trading, swaps and derivative trading, and new trends in banking such as direct-access banking and cybercurrency. International Efforts to Combat Global Crime Some promising trends in fighting transnational crime have emerged. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) are bilateral accords among nations intended to facilitate the prosecution of crimes with international dimensions. MLATs and executive agreements are especially productive in regularizing international asset forfeiture cooperation among treaty partners. MLATs strengthen procedures for international cooperation and create obligations and channels of communication for exchange of information and evidence in criminal investigations and proceedings. The UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, also called the Palermo Convention, was ratified in December 2000. The treaty has two primary goals: to bridge the gap between international legal systems and to establish standards for domestic laws to effectively combat organized crime. Signatory governments pledge to criminalize activities committed by organized crime groups, expedite extradition proceedings, enhance anti–money laundering efforts, and generally improve international cooperation. The Palermo Convention also established a series of protocols aimed at combating specific crimes, including trafficking in women and children, the smuggling of migrants, and the traffic in illegal firearms. Interpol has undergone dramatic changes since the mid-1990s in response to the growing threat of transnational crime. With 177 member nations, its principal challenge has been to develop a system that allows for the sharing and dissemination of information among the member states. Interpol also continues to explore initiatives to standardize

how law enforcement agencies in different countries collect, analyze, store, and utilize evidence of criminal acts. The long-range goal of the organization is to create a global database of organized criminals and criminal organizations. While efforts to combat transnational organized crime are extensive, aggressive legislation such as the U.S. Patriot Act and the recommendations of international bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force are not enough to counter the threat of transnational organized crime. Making significant inroads will require transnational political will and cooperation, elements of international crime control that remain noticeably absent. Stemming from the war and subsequent atrocities in the Balkans in the early to mid-1990s, the UN General Assembly decided to convene a diplomatic conference on the establishment of an International Criminal Court. The conference, held in Rome during June–July 1998, precipitated the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Ratification remains incomplete and is opposed by the United States. Issues related to national sovereignty, criminal definitions, and the incompatibility of the laws of different nations make it unlikely that an International Criminal Court will soon be an effective tool in combating transnational organized crime. Conclusion An International Crime Threat Assessment developed by the U.S. government in 2000 predicted that the process of globalization and the erosion of state authority would precipitate further diversification of transnational crimes. The report also suggested that large criminal syndicates such as the Sicilian Mafia, the Chinese Triad societies, and the Russian Mafiya will continue to pose a major threat to U.S. interests and would probably grow to become even more self-sufficient. Cooperation among large criminal syndicates could be replaced by fully integrated transnational crime groups, or perhaps large interactive networks of smaller crime groups will cooperate and specialize in criminal ventures. On the other hand, law enforcement will be challenged by individuals and small groups of criminals who utilize hightech computer skills and telecommunications. Electronic theft and the manipulation of financial

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markets were cited in the threat assessment as continuing problems. Transnational criminals are also likely to take advantage of scientific and manufacturing advances to produce new synthetic drugs and high-quality counterfeit products. Illegal enterprises such as drug trafficking, alien smuggling, and the traffic in women and children will continue, but perhaps an even greater threat will be the role that transnational crime is expected to play in the undermining of national security and the destabilization of regions in conflict. Transnational criminals will continue to broker deals for illicit arms and weapons of mass destruction to foreign armies, militias, and terrorists, while crime groups and individuals are expected to become proficient at exploiting computer networks that control vital information infrastructures. References Abadinsky, Howard. Organized Crime. 6th ed. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 2000. Berdal, Mats, and Monica Serrano. Transnational Organized Crime and International Security:

Business As Usual? Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002. Finckenauer, James O., and Yuri Voronin. The Threat of Russian Organized Crime. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2001. Godson, Roy. “Special Focus: The International Fight Against Money Laundering.” Trends in Organized Crime 4(4) (1999): 1–7. Godson, Roy, ed. “International Crime Threat Assessment.” Trends in Organized Crime 5(4) (2000): 32–144. Lupsha, Peter. “Transnational Organized Crime versus the Nation State.” Transnational Organized Crime 2(1) (1966): 21–48. United States Congress, House Committee on International Relations. Global Organized Crime. 104th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996. Viano, Emilio C. Global Organized Crime and International Security. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1999. Williams, Phil, and Dimitri Vlassis, eds. “Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities, and Responses.” Transnational Organized Crime 4(3–4) (1998): 57–87.

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Section I Organized Crime, Criminal Groups, and National and Regional Threats Don Liddick

Transnational crime can be found in practically every region around the globe. The nexus between organized crime groups and state authorities is driven by the motives of profit and power, a pattern of corruption that is evident regardless of differing economic and political systems. Transnational crime has a tremendous impact on all nations and is so pervasive that it destabilizes countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa, as well as new democracies in Eastern Europe. Through the restraint of trade, capital flight, various black markets, tax evasion, and the traffic in armaments, people, and drugs, transnational crime weakens the function of governments and severely damages legitimate commerce on a global scale. Western Europe Transnational crime poses a significant threat to legitimate government and commercial structures throughout Western Europe. The most visible criminal organizations in this region are Italian in origin and include the Sicilian Mafia, the ’Ndrangheta, and the Camorra. All three groups possess global reach: the Sicilian Mafia maintains a significant presence in forty countries around the world, while the Camorra and the ’Ndrangheta maintain operations in several U.S. East Coast cities. Although the Italian criminal organizations are involved in numerous illegal endeavors, historically their most significant illicit enterprise has been the global trade in heroin. Of course, the problem of transnational crime is in no way limited to Italian-based groups or, for that matter, organizations indigenous to

Western Europe. Jamiacan Yardies enforce the drug trade in England with automatic weapons supplied by the Russian Mafiya, and various crime gangs from Eastern Europe traffic women and children into the region to staff the thriving illicit sex trade. Operated by criminal gangs in Eastern Europe and Russia, nuclear materials are smuggled into Germany, known as the hub of nuclear terrorism. Eastern Europe Ethnic-driven wars in the Balkans in the 1990s facilitated the rise of durable networks of terrorists and organized criminals who specialize in weapons trafficking, human smuggling, and the traffic in stolen art. Transnational crime in the former Soviet Republics is quite pronounced. For example, more than 100 Russian Mafiya gangs are believed to operate in forty-four countries around the world. In just the period 1990–1996, the number of documented Mafiya groups grew from 785 to more than 8,000. The more sophisticated groups, numbering perhaps 300, include the Solntsevskaya, the Odessa Mafiya, and various Armenian groups. Capital flight from Russia involves a siphoning of state wealth and natural resources to the tune of $1.5 billion to $3 billion per month, while the Ukrainian shadow economy is thought to comprise 60 percent of the gross domestic product. Asia Transnational crime is a rapidly expanding problem in Asia. Heroin produced in Myanmar, much of it trafficked through Yunnan Province in China, 1

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supplies drug markets in Australia, Europe, and North America. Factories in Guandong Province are infamous for producing pirated and counterfeit goods. China’s Triad societies make up the world’s largest criminal network, with more than 100,000 members. The most significant group, the Sun Yee On, is based in Hong Kong and has direct links to the Beijing government. The Chinese syndicates are involved in a broad range of criminal activities including weapons trafficking, money laundering, credit card fraud, drug trafficking, alien smuggling, and software piracy. Based in Japan, the Yakuza remains one of the world’s largest crime organizations. Yakuza gangs engage in methamphetamine trafficking, extortion, and loan-sharking and own real estate, casinos, brothels, and sports and entertainment companies. The gangs extort huge sums from corporations and banks and have a tremendous negative impact on the Japanese economy. Yakuza gangs can be found throughout the world, from Brazil to Australia to Hawaii. Latin America Transnational crime in Latin America is quite pervasive. Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador are the primary staging areas for drugs exported to the United States. In fact, Colombian traffickers supply most of the world’s refined cocaine. Bolivia is a staging area for the movement of illegal migrants from China and the Middle East to the United States, while Peru and Ecuador contain the principal coca-growing regions. The Caribbean is a major transshipment route for the passage of contraband, arms, drugs, and illegal migrants. Caribbean nations and Panama are major offshore banking centers used for money laundering and tax evasion. Central America is a major conduit for the shipment of drugs, migrants, and other contraband from points south, and U.S. officials estimate that alien smuggling networks in the region generate about $1 billion a year for organized criminals. In Mexico, drug traffickers have completely corrupted public officials and the military. Mexican traffickers largely control the U.S. methamphetamine market, while perhaps half of the cocaine smuggled into the United States crosses the northern border of Mexico. Criminals take further advantage of the porous U.S.-Mexican border

by smuggling firearms, tobacco, stolen vehicles, alcohol, pirated goods, and, most significantly, illegal migrants. North America In North America, the United States is a significant source of transnational organized crime. The United States is a major supplier of contraband luxury goods, tobacco, automobiles, firearms, and alcohol. The world’s largest consumer of illicit drugs, the United States is simultaneously a major supplier of marijuana and methamphetamine. The principal transnational criminal organizations based in the United States are outlaw motorcycle gangs and the American La Cosa Nostra. Transnational organized crime in Canada is a growing threat as well. Drug trafficking, money laundering, securities fraud, telemarketing scams, migrant smuggling, and the smuggling of tobacco products, jewelry, and alcohol are just a few of the more significant rackets. Among the transnational crime groups operating in Canada are the Sicilian Mafia; various Asian gangs, including Chinese Triads; aboriginal organized crime groups; transnational crime groups from Eastern Europe; and outlaw motorcycle gangs. Africa Transnational organized crime is burgeoning in Africa. Perhaps the most significant source is Nigeria. As much as 40 percent of the heroin smuggled into the United States is imported by Nigerian criminal gangs who work as subcontractors for other transnational crime groups. Nigerian organized criminals are also involved in bank fraud, insurance fraud, ivory smuggling, the manufacture and use of false identifications, advance-fee frauds, cocaine trafficking, and credit card scams. Elsewhere, the ethnic conflicts and civil wars endemic in Africa facilitate international arms trafficking and the smuggling of precious gems used to finance wars. Drugs and firearms are smuggled over land and through ports to South Africa and then on to Europe and the United States. Organized crime is a significant and growing problem in South Africa. The FBI notes that some criminal groups operating in North America are based in nations such as Liberia and Ghana.

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Conclusion Transnational organized crime also thrives in Australia and is emerging in New Zealand. Australia’s strong economy and modern shipping have overcome any geographical impediments to drug trafficking on a wide scale. Even New Zealand, isolated in the South Pacific, has become the home of organized crime groups, including ethnic Maori and Polynesian gangs, Chinese Triad societies, and the Hells Angels motorcycle club.

References Godson, Roy, ed. “International Crime Threat Assessment.” Trends in Organized Crime 5(4) (2000): 32–144. Newbold, Greg. “The Emergence of Organized Crime in New Zealand.” Trends in Organized Crime 3(3) (1997): 73–94. Potter, Gary, and Bankole Thompson. “Emerging Influences and Trends in African Organized Crime.” Criminal Organizations 11(1–2) 1997: 4–9. Williams, Phil, and Dimitri Vlassis, eds. “Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities, and Responses.” Transnational Organized Crime 4 (1998): 3–4.

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A. Historical Antecedents of Organized Crime

Organized Crime throughout History: Renaissance and Early Modern Period Concepcion Saenz-Cambra Organized crime, understood in a literal sense as a systematic illegal activity with the purpose of increasing wealth or power, is as old as the first systems of government and law. Piracy, smuggling, banditry, kidnapping, and extortion are all ancient and transnational occupations, but the Renaissance and early modern periods were, undeniably, a golden age for the history of organized crime. Organized crime, as characterized by a few basic qualities such as durability, hierarchical structure, access to political protection, being capital orientated, and use of violence happened across all classes of society. While the upper classes and the bourgeois were highly involved in the smuggling business of illegal goods and trafficking in human beings, the lower classes suffered an increase in criminality and delinquency in relation to the growth of urban society and a deep social dislocation. Organized groups of robbers, bandits, and burglars represented the majority of prisoners sentenced for criminal activities up to the end of the eighteenth century. Even though society despised them, some of these outlaws, such as Rob Roy MacGregor, a Scottish freebooter, became folk heroes. Organized crime rose rapidly over the last two decades of the sixteenth century and reached particularly soaring levels during the second half of the 1590s, when widespread piracy and privateering throughout the Caribbean led to constant smuggling

of illegal and stolen goods and the slave trade. This period also saw the birth of some of the most notable secret criminal societies in history: the Mafia, the Garduna, the Camorra, the ’Ndrangheta, and the Yakuza. The increase in criminal activities led to changes in criminal law and methods of law enforcement. The first result of this development of jurisprudence was the creation of the first professional police force in the modern sense, in this case by the government of King Louis XIV in 1667 to police the city of Paris. Subsequently, new prisons were established such as the Bastille in France, a medieval defensive structure that was converted into a state prison in the early seventeenth century by Cardinal Richelieu (1585–1642). In addition to the ordinary criminal courts, the Inquisition acted as a criminal tribunal charged with the detection, prosecution, and punishment of heresy, apostasy, and other deviations and crimes against the Catholic faith. Religious courts are a clear illustration of the ever-evolving nature and definition of crime and subsequently of the understanding of organized crime. Even though the Inquisition found in Islamism, Judaism, and Protestantism a kind of organized religious criminal activity, the tribunal’s actions tell us more about a society unable to cope with diversity than about factual organized criminality. An additional complication to the changing description of crime lies in the survival of sources. In general, the farther back in time we go, the fewer records that survive. It is from these records that we

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Legendary Scottish outlaw and folk hero Robert Roy MacGregor, also known as “Rob Roy” or “Red MacGregor,” during a sword fight ca. 1700. (Getty Images)

can gain an understanding of the form and extent of criminal activity of the time. Thus, special attention will be drawn to these three subjects: piracy and privateering, the slave trade, and the emergence of secret criminal societies. Piracy and Privateering In practice, piracy is as old as the history of sailing itself. An indication of its antiquity is the fact that the word “pirate” derives from the Greek verb peiraw, meaning “to make an effort” or “to adventure one’s self.” The earliest documented pirates were the Phoenicians in the second millennium B.C. During Antiquity and the Middle Ages, piracy was practiced in all known seas, being particularly important in the Red Sea, the Mediterranean, and the China Sea. But the discovery of America marked a radical break with the immediate past. The enormous increase in

the traffic of goods by sea was accompanied by the appearance of highly organized criminal naval enterprises in the hands of new types of pirates: corsairs, buccaneers, and filibusters. The most popular synonym to describe pirates was the term “corsairs,” but they were also often referred to as buccaneers and filibusters. The term “corsair,” which etymologically originates from Italian corso, meaning “to chase,” referred to pirates who had an official sanction by a government to sail. Those pirates who did not have it became known as buccaneers, from the French word boucaner, meaning “to cure meat,” and filibusters, from the Dutch word vrijbuiter, meaning a “free booter” or “plunderer.” The Corsairs Corsairs were captains of private ships, and their crew members specialized in maritime robbery and 5

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pillaging of port cities, operating with an official sanction of their government to attack the vessels and ports of an enemy nation during wartime. In England, piracy became a legal business with Henry VIII, and later, under Queen Elizabeth I, it became a maritime enterprise granting the licenses in exchange for part of the booty. After the license expired or the war was over, some corsairs returned to private activities as rich bourgeois recognized by their monarchs with awards. The most famous corsair was Francis Drake, appointed admiral and knighted by Queen Elizabeth. Others continued with their criminal activities, and some, such as Captain John Hawkins, became slave dealers. Not all corsairs, however, targeted the Caribbean. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Mediterranean Sea suffered the incursions of the Turkish and North African corsairs, who attacked the European vessels in an atmosphere of conflict between Christianity and Islam. The most famous of these Barbary corsairs was Aruch Barbarossa. Buccaneers Those pirates based in the Caribbean who lacked an authorization by a country’s government and kept the entire booty for themselves were referred to as buccaneers. They also acted as slave dealers and smugglers. They formed an association called the brotherhood of the coast that admitted outlaws, fugitives, and criminals. They terrorized mainly the towns and villages on the Gulf of Mexico and in the Caribbean. The most famous buccaneer was Henry Morgan, who sacked the city of Puerto Bello in 1668. Filibusters Another type of early modern pirate was the filibuster. Like all other pirates, their main goal was to assault the Spanish fleet, but they also smuggled illegal goods, especially into the ports of Cuba and the surrounding islands from their base in Belize. Their distinguishing feature was their motto: “We live for today, because we will probably all hang tomorrow.” Their maxim was supported by their custom of selling the booties extremely quickly and expending the gains in bacchanals.

Captain William Kidd, a privateer convicted of piracy, was hanged on May 23, 1701. His body was displayed at Tilbury Point at the mouth of the Thames River in England as an example to sailors tempted to engage in piracy. (Library of Congress)

Punishment The punishment for piracy was death. Trials for piracy were usually held in admiralty courts. If found guilty, the pirate could be hanged immediately after the trial. The bodies of the most notorious captains were often hung from a gibbet in a conspicuous place by the water’s edge as a frightening example to those leaning toward the temptation of piracy. Such was the end for Captain William Kidd, who was hanged on 23 May 1701.

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Slave Trade As a practice, slavery has flourished from the earliest recorded history until the early twentieth century, but the discovery of America and the subsequent escalation of piracy had an enormous impact in the development of international slave trade organizations. In the early fifteenth century, Europeans carried out their first slave raids along the coast of Africa. Black African slaves’ skill as agricultural laborers and their adaptability to tropical climates made them sorely needed in the agricultural economy of the European colonies, an economy based on the plantation system. Because in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries much of the slave trade was done illegally, with many operating without license and others disregarding quotas, the records are scarce. However, the estimated export of slaves from Africa to the Americas was as much as 3 million in the period between 1450 and 1600. It is estimated that about 25 percent of the slaves died during the journey. While practiced by most European countries, slavery was an accepted social institution, and the slave trade became one of the most profitable legal activities that a merchant could exercise. Secret Criminal Societies Not all organized crime was state supported or trade related. In fact, the most notable secret criminal societies in history—the Mafia, the Garduna, the Camorra, the ’Ndrangheta, and the Yakuza—had their origins in the early modern period. These powerful criminal organizations were not the only secret societies to appear at this time. The reasons for the appearance of secret criminal societies at this precise moment in time are innumerable, but the most prominent is the social dislocation produced by the transition between two clashing periods, from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance in Europe, and from its somehow parallel movement in Japan, from the Late Tokugawa Shogunate to the Meiji period. Curiously, in both cases the state had been a coercive enterprise that was based on the concept of protection as business. Social realities and the ne-

cessities of statecraft had overridden the exiguous egalitarian principles of early communities. Even though by the fourth century A.D. the dominant form of government was the hereditary monarchy, the end of both eras saw several fierce contests for the Crown by powerful regional noble families who ruled over the surrounding populace. The peasantry needed the nobility—or, to be more exact, their army—for protection against local violence and external invasion. These armies were not professional armies in the modern sense but rather consisted of local warriors related by kinship or ethnicity to the nobleman. In return for being protected by these military forces, the peasantry paid taxes—assessed in money, goods, or labor—that supported the nobility and its army and bestowed legitimacy upon them. The Renaissance and the Meiji period sparked a centralization of power by monarchies, which created a disruption in the established order that led to social struggles and, in most cases, violence. One feature shared in common among all secret societies was that of a membership structure consisting of graded or hierarchical degrees. Most of the characteristics of these groups can be almost entirely explained by family structure itself, but the roots of early modern secret societies can be traced back to medieval society. Some formal characteristics can be found in the medieval guilds, which emerged as a way to train personnel and trade goods but also served as a kind of judicial system. In many cases, the guilds took care of judicial problems internally, which created an incipient step toward the creation of secretive organizations, but unlike the guilds and other secret organizations, members of these criminal societies commanded respect and control through their use of violence, trepidation, thievery, and murder. Like in the modern criminal societies, the most remarkable characteristics were their common use of violence, the loyalty of its members regardless of the menace, and the strict code of silence they followed. Moreover, almost all criminal societies’ members had at least one common characteristic: they came from poor backgrounds and were outcasts of society. The organization supplemented or replaced their family network and offered unconditional

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friends, financial support, and safety, giving meaning and purpose to their lives. The Mafia The Mafia is the most famous, and infamous, of the Western criminal societies. The Mafia in present times is synonymous with violence and illegal acts, but it began as an administrative system implemented by landowners to keep control of their estates in their absence. The origin of the word “mafia” is debated. Historically, it was first used in the 1863 theatrical play I mafiusi de la Vivaria, written by Giuseppe Rizzotto, that describes the behavior and the activities of a group of Mafiosi. The word itself, however, made its first official appearance in a report about illegal activities by the chief prosecutor in Palermo, Filippo Gualtiero, in 1865. The most likely source is from the Sicilian dialect meaning “boldness” or “bravado,” possibly from the Arabic mahjas, meaning “aggressive boasting” or “bragging.” Eventually, it was linked with the secret society. Further possibilities are the slogan “Morte alla Francia Italia anela!” (Death to the French is Italy’s cry!). Another possibility, yet highly improbable, is “Mazzini autorizza furti, incendi, avvelenamenti” (Mazzini authorizes theft, arson, poisoning). The Mafia was born in Sicily after the conquest of the island by Spain in the fifteenth century. The Spanish domination had important repercussions on Sicilian society. The implementation of the Spanish centralization system and the transition from the Middle Ages into the Renaissance, which carried a sharp growth in urban life, provoked an exodus of the Sicilian upper class to the vibrant capital of the island of Palermo, but they still owned large estates in the countryside. Subsequently, they employed supervisors, called gabelloti, to take care of the lands and workers. The gabelloti also hired assistants and tax collectors—uomo di fiducia (loyal men) and campieri (mercenaries)—to help them maintain order by using fear and intimidation. The vertical structure of this new administrative system is a direct basis for the modern Mafia, almost paralleling its organization. However, the modern Mafia members provide a more heroic and dramatic origin, one of subversion and resistance against the tyrannical invaders. When

the Spaniards invaded Sicily, they carried with them the Holy Inquisition, which they used to further subordinate the local population. Using fear and intimidation, the Spanish held subdued groups by force and violence. Many Sicilians ran away to the mountains, where they formed an armed society of peasants who, according to popular folklore, enjoyed the respect of the community since they represented defiance and protection against the implacable Spaniards. The Garduna The Garduna was a Spanish secret criminal brotherhood that appeared in the late Middle Ages. According to tradition, a hermit named Apollinario from Andalucia started a sacred army to drive the Moors out of the Iberian Peninsula after an apparition of the Virgin Mary. With God’s blessing to destroy, kill, and loot, those who joined him would be absolved of all wrongdoing. The Garduna soon became a weapon of terror against all heretics and acted with the approval of the Spanish Inquisition until 1670, when the Church withdrew its support for the organization. After this date, the Garduna expanded its scope, and its victims now included Christians as well as Muslims and Jews. With branches allegedly in Spain, Portugal, and Latin America, the Garduna gave evidence of its survival as a secret criminal organization throughout the twentieth century. The Camorra Most historians agree that the Garduna was the precursor to the Neapolitan Camorra, which was most likely transplanted when Spain took Naples in the sixteenth century. The term camorra is a Spanish word meaning “quarrel.” The Camorra’s most distinguishing feature was its recruitment process, since its members were accepted provisionally and could not become official full members until they had committed a murder for the organization. Even though during its long existence it has always been a secret criminal organization associated with robbery and murder, reputedly the Spanish rulers of Naples used the Camorra as mercenary forces to subvert any resistance. After centuries of criminal

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activities, the Camorra was finally suppressed after Benito Mussolini’s takeover in 1922. The ’Ndrangheta The ’Ndrangheta is a Calabrian secret criminal organization. Even though the first factual evidence of its existence as such under this name dates from the late nineteenth century during the Italian unification, its origins are most probably in the Spanish Garduna through the Neapolitan Camorra. Its name derives from the Greek word andragathía, meaning “heroism” and “virtue.” Instead of the pyramid structure of bosses used by other Mafia-type organizations, the ’Ndrangheta uses families based on blood relationships and intermarriages. As in most other criminal societies, all members go through an initiation ceremony, in this case called ’Ndrangheta, a series of questions and answers on loyalty and valor in Calabrian dialect. The ’Ndrangheta is still one of the richest and most powerful criminal organizations. The Yakuza The Yakuza is a Japanese organized crime society that originated during the Tokugawa era in the early seventeenth century. The word yakuza means “8-9-3.” The word ya means “8,” ku means “9,” and za means “3.” The name derives from Oicho-kabu, an old Japanese gambling game. The goal of the game is to get, or come closest to, a score of 9. A player’s score in this game is decided by adding the scores on several cards and using only the smallest digit. Because 8 + 9 + 3 = 20 = 0 points and this combination of cards equates to a losing hand, the term became an expression for useless hands in society. As in the case of the Mafia, the origin of the Yakuza is a controversial subject. Modern Yakuza see machiyakko (servants of the town) as their origin. These men were artisans and craftsmen who took to weapons and defended the villages and the cities against the wayward kabuki-mono (crazy ones). Stories about the people’s champions saturate Japanese folklore. Contrary to this belief, most historians refute this theory and affirm that its members are descendants of the kabuki-mono. They were samurai, distinctive for their extravagant clothes and hair styles, who carried unusually long swords in their belts. During the

Tokugawa era, an extended period of peace in Japan, the services of these samurai were no longer needed, which forced them into unemployment. They became wandering samurai, also know as ronin, who turned to theft and mayhem, plundering villages and small cities. Effects and Repercussions The Renaissance and early modern period were the transitional movements in Europe between medieval and industrial times. Organized crime wanted to penetrate and overturn the internal course of the struggle resulting from these disruptions of social life. At the time, organized crime was able to form legal businesses as the result of the merger between criminal capital and the state power structures, as it happened in the cases of piracy and privateering and the slave trade. The overlap between organized crime and business practices was a reaction to the failures in social consciousness and in legislation, which, in this case, was not amended until the modern era. Related to these social inadequacies was the creation of secret criminal societies in which both crime and victimization served as a sort of noninstitutionalized protest against existing social relationships. Their emergence and the victimization of individuals, but especially businesses, were not only an indicator but also a product of organized crime. Such was the success in seizing control that secret criminal societies have learned to adapt to new realities, and they are still a force in the modern world. References Daraul, Arkon. A History of Secret Societies. New York: Pocket Books, 1969. Duggan, Christopher. The Sicilian Origins of the Mafia. London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 1987. Gatrell, V. A. C., et al., eds. Crime and the Law: The Social History of Crime in Western Europe since 1500. London: Europa, 1980. Hess, Henner. Mafia & Mafiosi: Origin, Power, & Myth. New York: New York University Press, 1998. Konstam, Angus. The History of Pirates. London: Mercury Books, 2005. Lunde, Paul. Organized Crime: An Inside Guide to the World’s Most Successful Industry. London and New York: Dorling Kindersley, 2004. 9

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Thomas, Hugh. The Slave Trade: The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1440–1870. London: Picador, 1997. Weisser, Michael. Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Europe. Hassocks: Harvester, 1979.

The History and Evolution of Organized Crime: United States Robert Hanser, Kaine Jones, and Walonda Wallace There are a multitude of definitions for organized crime. One simple definition, according to Larry J. Siegel, might be that organized crime is “the ongoing criminal enterprise groups whose ultimate purpose is personal economic gain through illegitimate means.” Alan Block and William Chambliss define organized crime as “those illegal activities connected with the management and coordination of racketeering and the vices, particularly illegal drugs, illegal gambling, usury, and prostitution.” The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) states that organized crime consists of “any group having some manner of a formalized structure and whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Such groups maintain their position through the use of actual or threatened violence, corrupt public officials, graft, or extortion, and generally have a significant impact on the people in their locales, region, or the country as a whole.” Any one of these definitions categorizes several groups as organized criminal syndicates. On the basis of these definitions, certain groups such as motorcycle gangs, street gangs, and, most importantly, the Mafia, or La Cosa Nostra, can be categorized as organized crime. Nonetheless, for the sake of simplicity and to ensure that adequate focus and clarity is maintained, this essay will primarily provide a history and evolutionary analysis of the Mafia in the United States, as it is the most recognized organized crime group in the United States. The Mafia As a Prototype for Organized Crime Development The Mafia originated in Sicily, and while it was not originally called the Mafia or La Cosa Nostra it

eventually evolved and took on that name. It all began in Sicily when certain Sicilians formed a secret society to combat outside Arabic, Spanish, and Norman invaders who occupied the country throughout various points in history. The term “mafia” is thought to have origins with the Sicilian Arabic dialects and is derived from terms meaning to protect and act as a guardian. The Mafia in Sicily mainly acted as a protection service in the sense that it would require a certain amount of money in return for protection. Those who did not pay would suffer violent acts of kidnappings, bombings, and murder. In the 1900s, organized crime experienced a surge that strongly affected American society. In the early 1900s members of the Mafia fled to the United States. This was largely due to the efforts of Benito Mussolini, who attempted to rid Italy and Sicily of the Mafiosi through political and military action. It was at this time when the American Mafia grew dramatically in size. While the majority of the Mafiosi were located in New York City, there was quite naturally a strong presence in Chicago as well. In Chicago, such wellknown figures as Al Capone emerged during Prohibition. The Mafiosi in Chicago had specialized in the manufacture of low-cost, high-proof, untaxed alcohol during this time, and this made them ideally suited for illicit sales in this type of commodity. Italian and Sicilian organized crime members would eventually become known as the outfit and would have some unique characteristics. The main distinction centered on the outfit’s willingness to work in cooperation with other groups. Likewise, the managerial aspects of this group tend to be much more centralized than those of other groups that would develop around the nation. Prior to prohibition, organized crime was typically restricted to its own local community. This was true for Italian and Sicilian organized crime groups as well as others such as Jewish and Irish groups. However, Prohibition enabled the Mafia to break out of its own small enclaves in Chicago, New York, and other urban areas and thus allowed for the rapid and lucrative spread of illicit activities and the accumulation of profits. This is also important for another reason: victims of the Mafia now began to

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include persons who were not from the Italian American community. Prior to this, the Mafia did tend to primarily victimize its own communities consisting of fellow immigrants. But from this point on in their evolution, they would intermix their activities to include the broader American population. In most of urban America, the Mafia maintained the dominant influence over organized criminal activity. During the 1930s and 1940s, the Mafia would exert control over important labor unions, illegal gambling operations, and even wholesale drug trafficking. During this time the Mafia also channeled its funds into legitimate businesses as a means of investment and also as a front for illegitimately obtained cash. Lastly, it was also during this time that the term “Cosa Nostra”—meaning “our thing” among its members—emerged. This era of Mafiosi had a distinctly American flavor that served to separate these gangsters from their true Sicilian counterparts. As with most immigrant populations that arrived in America during the late 1880s and early 1900s, many Italian immigrants (both Mafia and nonMafia) found themselves in New York City. During the 1920s in the United States, Mafia groups vied for power during what was referred to as the Castellammarese war. From this point on numerous Mafia crime families emerged, with the New York City faction eventually splitting into five families: the Gambino family, the Genovese family, the Colombo family, the Bonanno family, and the Luchese family. Each of these families is essentially controlled by one boss who in turn is under the main boss, or boss of bosses. The Rise of Mafia Families in the United States The Gambino family was originally led by Salvatore D’Aquila, who was the boss of bosses until he was murdered in Brooklyn in 1928. A series of individuals succeeded D’Aquila. Among them were Frank Scalise, who took over until 1931, and Vincent Mangano, who represented the family from 1931 to 1951. Albert Anastasia then became head of the family and is well known for putting together a hit squad called Murder, Inc. This group of assassins killed an estimated 400 people during the time of

his leadership. Unfortunately for him, his murderous ways made members of the family question his sanity. Ultimately, he was murdered by Larry and Joe Gallo, otherwise known as the Gallo brothers. After the demise of Anastasia, Carlo Gambino took over in 1957 and reigned for almost twenty years. He always tried to stay in the shadows and out of the spot light. This was beneficial for the profits of the family, and because of his behind-the-scenes demeanor he is known as the best boss of the Gambino family. Before his death, he appointed his cousin Paul Castellano to be head of the Gambino family. The soldiers and captains of the Gambino family did not identify with Castellano and thought of him as more of a businessman than a gangster. Before long Castellano lost any sense of respect that he could command from his soldiers and captains. This led to an eventual assassination that was orchestrated by John Gotti, and it was Gotti who took control of the Gambino family in 1985. However, in 1992 Gotti was convicted of murder and racketeering and is serving a life sentence in a federal prison. Presently, Gotti’s son, John Gotti Jr., is acting boss of the Gambino family. Giuseppe “Joe the Boss” Masseria was the first boss of the Genovese family. However, in 1931 the famous gangster Charlie “Lucky” Luciano preceded Masseria and became head of the Genovese family. Luciano got his nickname after being severely beaten by a rival gang; the beating was so severe he was considered lucky to have survived. Luciano remained in power until 1936, when he was forced to go to Sicily due to criminal charges brought against him in New York City. Frank Costello, a close friend of Luciano, took over the Genovese family soon afterward. Costello was murdered by Vincent “Chin” Gigante under orders of Vito Genovese. Genovese held the position of boss of the family for four years, until 1959, when the family went under the rule of a three-man ruling council. Tommy Eboli, Jerry Catena, and Mike Miranda comprised the ruling council that controlled the Genovese family until 1972, when Frank “Funzi” Tieri took over. Vincent “Chin” Gigante replaced Anthony “Fat Tony” Salerno, who resided as the boss of the Genovese family from 1981 until his imprisonment on racketeering charges in 1987. However, Gigante was also 11

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convicted of several racketeering charges in July 1997. Liborio “Barney” Bellomo, who was the acting boss of the family while Fat Tony was incarcerated, entered a guilty plea in 1997 to charges of extortion and was sent to prison for ten years. Currently, the street boss of the Genovese family until Gigante is released from prison is Dominick “Quiet Dom” Cirillo, and many members of the family feel they will continue to be prosperous under him. The initial boss of the Luchese family was Gaetano Reina, who was boss until 1930 when Gaetano Gagliano took over. Gagliono was on the original National Commission of La Cosa Nostra and remained boss of the Luchese Family until 1953. Gaetano “Thomas” Luchese headed the family after Gagliano. Luchese used the garment industry as his primary racket, working closely with Carlo Gambino and the Gambino family. After Luchese’s death in 1967, his son-in-law Carmine Tramunti became boss of the Luchese family until he was incarcerated for murder. In 1974 Anthony “Tony Ducks” Corallo became head of the Luchese family. He reportedly stabilized the family while being boss but was incarcerated in 1986 and subsequently died in 2000. After Tony Ducks there was Vittorio Amuso, who served as boss until 1992 when he received a life sentence due to infractions against the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. Alfonse “Little Al” D’Arco was the initial street boss while Amuso was incarcerated and later turned state’s witness. Presently, the acting boss of the Luchese family is Joe DeFede. It is believed that DeFede is headed for rough times in his attempt to rebuild the family, which has essentially gone from 125 members to less than 100. The Luchese family has been troubled with their own members snitching on the family. In the 1990s alone three major members of the Luchese family have snitched on the family. Joe Profaci was the first boss of the Colombo family, from 1930 to 1962. He was an attention-getter who was frequently in the newspapers. During his time of leadership a lieutenant within the family, “Crazy” Joey Gallo, led a full-fledged war against Profaci in hopes of gaining control of the family. Gallo apparently lacked the support needed to defeat Profaci, and consequently Profaci’s faction of

Vito Genovese (1897–1969) rose through the mafia ranks from hit man for Lucky Luciano to “godfather” of the Genovese crime family. (Library of Congress)

the family defeated Gallo. When Profaci died, Joseph Magliocco took over for a brief period until his death in 1963. Joe Colombo succeeded Magliocco and became a well-known boss in New York City. Consequently, in 1971 he was shot at an Italian American Day rally by a black gunman named Jerome Johnson. It was believed that he acted alone and killed Colombo without reason. Nevertheless, Gambino, who was upset at all the press that Colombo was attracting, was actually the man behind the murder. Colombo remained in a coma for seven years after being shot and finally died in 1978. Joseph Yacovelli became boss of the Colombo family after Colombo was shot and was in control for two years. Then Joseph Brancato took over for five months in 1973 until he was incarcerated for murder. The family then came under the control of Thomas DiBella, who is responsible for creating a period of peace with members of the family headed by Crazy Joey Gallo. Despite his efforts in

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1978, Carmine “Junior” Persico killed DiBella. Persico was eventually convicted on racketeering charges that led to a 100-year sentence. Sometime during the mid-1980s, the Colombo family split into two factions. Persico was head of one faction, while Vic Orena, the acting boss of the Colombo family, had control of the other faction. However, in 1992 Orena was convicted on charges of racketeering, and this began the Colombo war. Members in each faction of the family were killing each other. Persico won the Colombo war once he was able to appoint his nephew, Andrew Russo, as the acting boss. Russo took control of the family, and in a few months he became the permanent boss of the Colombo family. In 1996 Russo was indicted on racketeering charges. The Bono family was first led by Cola Schiro until 1930. Salvatore Maranzano became the boss of the family after Schiro and was also the boss of bosses until other mobsters, mainly Charlie Luciano, conspired and murdered Maranzano in 1931. After the death of Maranzano, Luciano created the National Commission of La Cosa Nostra. Joe Bonanno took the place of Maranzano as the boss of the Bonanno family and held control until 1964. Bonanno is known for being the first boss to break the omerta, or code of silence. Frank LaBruzzo became the boss of the family for the next two years and was then followed by Gaspare DiGregorio, who also took control for two years. Paul Sciacca was the boss for less than a year. Then Phillip “Rusty” Rastelli, Joseph Zicarelli, Joseph DiFillippi, and Natale Evola formed a ruling council that maintained the family for three years. After the three-year rule of council, Evola became the sole boss for one year and was followed by Rastelli, who became the boss in late 1973 until his incarceration in 1974 for racketeering. Carmine Galante succeeded Rastelli but was murdered in 1979. Rastelli was eventually released from prison and regained control of the family. Rastelli had two main members who helped him run the family: Dominick “Sonny Black” Napolitano and Benjamin “Lefty Guns” Ruggiero. These two members also had close dealings with undercover FBI agent Joseph D. Pistone, otherwise known as Donnie Brasco. Nevertheless, after it was discovered that Brasco was an FBI agent, Napolitano disappeared. Ruggiero was put in jail and died of lung

cancer two years after his release. Rastelli was incarcerated yet again in 1985, and in 1989 he turned over control of the family to Joey Massino, who is still in control today. Conclusion Organized crime maintains a hierarchical structure. Those involved conduct their business and make their profits by means of fear, intimidation, violence or threat thereof, corruption of public officials, and extortion with the sole motivation of turning a profit. Organized crime has broadened its operations to include drug smuggling and other commodities as well as made endeavors in industrial and technological espionage, financial market manipulation, and the corruption and control of groups within the legal state system. La Cosa Nostra has become so colossal that other Italian criminal organizations have begun to associate themselves with the group. Currently, there are four Italian organized crime groups in the United States: the Sicilian Mafia, the Camorra, the ’Ndrangheta, and the Sacra Corona Unita. These criminal organizations have continued to immigrate to the United States since the 1960s. They mainly deal in the heroin trade and have grown to an extent that they now have attained control of certain criminal operations that were at one time solely operated by La Cosa Nostra. These Italian organized crime groups have become yet another substantial threat to the American society due to their drug trafficking and money laundering operations. Through the use of sophisticated electronic surveillance and undercover operations, the FBI has begun to make a noteworthy impact on La Cosa Nostra. Due to technological advances as well as covert operations, FBI investigations have resulted in several successful federal prosecutions of members of La Cosa Nostra who are in substantial positions in the hierarchy. While it is doubtful that the FBI will be successful in ridding the United States of La Cosa Nostra altogether, it has made steps toward suppressing this group’s continued prominence. While it is unlikely that the Mafia will ever return to its previous grandeur, it is also unlikely that we will see the total demise of this illicit organization anytime in the near future. 13

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References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003. ———. “Organized Crime: Italian-American Mafia.” P. 1096 in Encyclopedia of Criminology, edited by R. A. Wright and J. M. Miller. New York: Routledge, 2005. ———. “Organized Crime: Sicilian Mafia.” P. 1106 in Encyclopedia of Criminology, edited by R. A. Wright and J. M. Miller. New York: Routledge, 2005. Albanese, J. Organized Crime in America. 3rd ed. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson, 1995. Block, Alan A., and William J. Chambliss. Organizing Crime. New York: Oxford, 1981. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Investigative Programs: Organized Crime. Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice, 2005, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/glossary.htm. Finckenauer, J. O. A Cosa Nostra in the United States. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2000, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ nij/international/lcn_text.html. Paoli, L. Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003. Siegel, Larry J. Criminology: The Core. 2nd ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2004.

American Mafia Don Liddick As opposed to a highly bureaucratic and rigidly structured organization founded on the island of Sicily and transplanted whole into the United States, the Mafia was in fact a system of patron-client relations that bridged legitimate and illegitimate segments of Sicilian society. Arising out of moral, social, economic, and geographic conditions unique to western Sicily, mafioso (meaning “men of honor”) emerged in the early nineteenth century after the feudal system was abolished and a need arose for someone to mediate and enforce contracts and other relationships. Typically peasants, mafioso used violence to entrench themselves in a patronage system whereby they entered the service of both the landed gentry and other peasants. In the service of landowners, mafioso arranged for adequate rents and the suppression of workers. For peasants,

mafioso provided work and the continuation of contracts. Originally, then, the Mafia was not a crime organization but rather a system of patronage unique to the western part of Sicily. In recent years the term “mafia” has been applied to virtually any criminal organization, network, or informal association that falls within the realm of organized crime. Crime groups have been labeled the Dixie Mafia, the Russian Mafia, the Black Mafia, and so on. However, if the term “mafia” is to be applied to certain criminal groups, then it appropriately belongs to the Sicilian Mafia and the American La Cosa Nostra. The American Mafia In the United States, the phenomenon known as the Mafia has its genesis in events beginning with the emigration of millions of Italians in the period 1880– 1920. Almost from the start, Italian American organized crime was characterized by sensationalism and misconceptions. While gangs of Italian Americans did roam in many American cities by the turn of the twentieth century, it was sensational journalism and anti-immigrant sentiment that fueled the idea that a monolithic and corporate-like crime organization comprised of Italian Americans was preying on the United States. (In reality, nothing so formal or organized has ever existed.) Later, throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the idea that a secretive national crime organization was operating in the United States developed further. Crime fighters such as Thomas Dewey and Harry J. Anslinger fostered the notion of an Italian conspiracy, and the idea of a national crime cartel consisting of Italian Americans was further bolstered when a former associate of the infamous racketeer Dutch Schultz published a series of high-profile articles in Collier’s magazine. As the story goes, under the direction of Lucky Luciano a group of younger Italians assassinated as many as one hundred old-style mafioso leaders across the nation in 1931, a great purge that according to legend gave rise to a national crime organization called the Mafia. While research shows that only four persons were actually murdered, the monolithic and national implications of the event were emphasized by government and the media. The mafia legend grew when Brooklyn District Attorney William O’Dwyer obtained testimony from gangsters

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associated with the notorious Murder, Inc., crowd of assassins. In this context, the congressional Kefauver Committee held televised hearings in the early 1950s investigating the world of organized crime. The committee concluded that a sinister criminal organization known as the Mafia operated throughout the United States. Not long after the committee dramatized the idea of Italian American organized crime, a gathering of sixty-five Italians at the home of Joseph Barbara in Appalachin, New York, on 19 November 1957 was interpreted by the law enforcement community as undisputed proof that a national organization called the Mafia existed. The belief that organized crime in America consisted of an Italian-run superorganization was perpetuated in 1963 when criminal-turnedinformant Joseph Valachi testified before the McClellan Committee. It was Valachi who revealed the new name for the Mafia: La Cosa Nostra, or “our thing.” A few years later in his famous book Theft of the Nation, Donald Cressey stated that Cosa Nostra

Johnny Torrio (1882–1957) was a Chicago mobster considered to be one of the founders of organized crime in America. (Library of Congress)

accounted for almost all of organized crime in America. In reality, Italian American organized criminals, commonly referred to as the Mafia, have operated crime enterprises in the United States since the 1880s. Early rackets included the extortion of legitimate Italian American businessmen. Typically, a shopkeeper would receive a note demanding money or else face a bombing or kidnapping. Around the turn of the twentieth century, New York City’s Ignazio Saietta ran a successful counterfeiting operation. Perhaps the most important New York criminal in that time was Paolo Vaccarelli, also known as Paul Kelly. Kelly organized hundreds of street thugs in the multiethnic Five Points neighborhood of Manhattan and carried on a legendary street war with his Jewish rival, Monk Eastman. Other young Italian street thugs were muscle for hire, coercing the electorate or otherwise intimidating opponents on behalf of municipal authorities. By the 1920s, young Italian hoodlums matured and helped organize the illegal liquor trade during the Prohibition era. Italian gangster John Torrio was largely responsible for organizing the East Coast liquor trade, while former Five-Pointer Alphonse Capone eventually consolidated control of organized crime in Chicago. This tendency toward centralization created the impetus whereby alreadysignificant Italian American criminal enterprises evolved in the direction of what later came to be called the American La Cosa Nostra. Profits from bootlegging and the desire to transcend old-style Sicilian management led infamous gangsters such as Charles “Lucky” Luciano and Meyer Lansky to consolidate Italian and some non-Italian criminal operations into a loose confederacy of some two dozen crime families. Regulated to some extent by a small body of the most powerful crime bosses known as the Commission, La Cosa Nostra has never been a monolithic or formal organization but was clearly the most significant form of organized crime in the United States from the 1930s to the end of the century. Organizational Structure While government and the media have stressed the singular and corporate-like features of Italian American crime families, La Cosa Nostra is in reality less formal than a legitimate organization. 15

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Nevertheless, the national confederacy of Italian American criminal enterprises has been quite durable in the face of tremendous law enforcement pressure. This longevity is largely the function of the Mafia’s ability to create fear, corrupt government officials, and maintain an effective management and authority structure. Structurally, each Mafia family possesses a leadership hierarchy in the shape of a pyramid. The boss is at the top and is the absolute final authority in all major decisions affecting the family. An underboss is second in command and acts as a buffer between the boss and lower-level personnel. A consigliere, or counselor, mediates disputes and advises the boss. The consigliere may in effect have as much power and influence as the underboss. Below these leadership positions are the several capos, or captains, each of whom manages his own unit of soldati (street soldiers). Street soldiers are the lowest rank in the official family membership. As made members of Mafia families, the persons filling the above positions are in for life and owe allegiance to the crime group above all other loyalties upon pain of death. Although street soldiers comprise the lowest level of made members, each runs his own crew of nonmember associates who operate the day-today criminal activities of the organization. Although the law enforcement community and the U.S. government stress the bureaucratic and hierarchical authority structure of the American Mafia, academics have suggested that structurally, the organization is far less formal. Mark Haller, for example, argues that the relationship between Mafia bosses and their subordinates is like the Chamber of Commerce or Rotary Club. Just as legal businessmen join the aforementioned groups to advance their interests, members of the Mafia see the crime family as an association that can further their illicit business affairs. Much additional research in cities throughout the United States indicates that rather than a formal organization, the Mafia is characterized by numerous informal associations of individuals who typically form temporary partnerships to perpetrate organized crimes. Criminal Activities Criminal enterprises operated by the Mafia are prodigious and are intertwined with legitimate com-

merce. The legacy of racketeering in business and labor unions involves the systematic restraint of trade and extensive money laundering through legitimate business and financial institutions. Italian American gangsters have preyed on organized labor from the early years of the twentieth century, most notoriously infiltrating the Teamsters Union and the International Longshoreman’s Association. La Cosa Nostra members and associates have looted millions from union health and welfare funds through fraudulent health care plans and phony loans. Modern racketeers and corrupt government officials have infiltrated numerous industrial sectors and overwhelmed the regulatory role of the government, especially in the areas of environmental protection, waste management, construction projects, and the shipment of goods. The racketeer’s reach is limited only by opportunity, as a partial list of industries controlled by organized crime demonstrates: garments, construction, flower shops, funeral parlors, fish markets, master barbers, musicals, live poultry sellers, newsstands, taxi cab drivers, and window cleaners, among others, have all been subjected to Mafia coercion. The breadth of the Mafia’s influence in the legitimate economy is exemplified by construction in New York City, where for many years major projects were subject to a 2 percent “tax” by Mafia families. Industrial racketeering is of course only one segment of the Mafia’s operations in the United States. Prohibition and tight regulation of businesses that cater to human pleasures has created large-scale black markets and thus organized crimes, including gambling services, pornography, prostitution, and the distribution of illicit drugs. La Cosa Nostra groups have generated huge profits through their hidden ownership of legal casinos in Las Vegas and Atlantic City, while numbers gambling and sports betting remain multibillion dollar operations. In conjunction with their bookmaking interests, La Cosa Nostra figures also have a long history of infiltrating and corrupting professional and amateur athletics, including point-shaving scams, fixed horse and dog races, and the control of some professional boxers. The sex trade has always been a major Mafia money-maker. In New York City by the 1930s, Mafia families set up the prostitution industry as a factory system where women were booked in brothels. In

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later years, Cosa Nostra members would develop their own pornography production and distribution companies. Always keen on providing for human pleasures, La Cosa Nostra historically has maintained hidden ownership in nightclubs and is known to be heavily involved in the music and movie industries. Of course, the illicit production and distribution of drugs continues to be a significant enterprise for the American Mafia, especially the heroin trade and the smuggling of cigarettes from low-tax to high-tax states. But perhaps the most common criminal endeavor engaged in by Mafia members is organized theft, especially from trucking, air, water, and freight terminals. In recent years, Mafia families have extended their activities into the realm of so-called whitecollar crimes. In New York City, La Cosa Nostra has infiltrated Wall Street, running up stock prices and extorting money from brokers and traders. Perhaps as many as two dozen brokerage firms are controlled by organized crime. Similarly, at least twenty-two failed savings and loan institutions have been linked to money laundering operations by organized crime figures. How to distribute money stolen from savings and loans was even the subject of sit-downs among some of New York City’s Mafia families. Government and Law Enforcement Efforts Despite the endurance of the American Mafia, the U.S. government has mounted an impressive attack. Robert Kennedy’s Justice Department placed pressure on the corrupt Teamsters Union in the early 1960s, and by the end of that decade legislation provided for judicially approved electronic surveillance and hefty prison terms for those involved in organized crime. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute has been a particularly effective tool, making it a crime to participate in or conduct the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. RICO provided heavy penalties and removed the constraints on prosecutors, allowing them to try in a single case multiple criminal defendants as a group. The threat of lifetime prison terms coupled with a way out provided by the Witness Protection Program eventually broke down La Cosa Nostra’s infamous code of silence (omerta), and by the 1980s dozens of mob

bosses, underbosses, and capos had been convicted. In the famous Commission case, four of five New York City Mafia bosses were convicted. The transnational dimensions of the American Mafia were highlighted in the Pizza Connection case in which an international law enforcement effort dismantled a network of American Cosa Nostra and Sicilian Mafia groups that had been using U.S. pizzerias as fronts for a $1.6 billion heroin and money laundering operation. The U.S. government has also had considerable success in driving organized crime out of the Teamsters through civil RICO suits and in limiting organized crime on the docks by targeting the International Longshoremen’s Association. Prosecutions of Cosa Nostra members have continued throughout the 1990s and into the twenty-first century and have included the conviction of crime bosses Vincent “The Chin” Gigante, John Gotti, and John Gotti Jr. Conclusion Significant law enforcement successes may have weakened the American Mafia, but it is also clear that new criminal groups indigenous to the United States as well as those originating in Europe, Africa, Asia, and South America have filled the vacuum. Moreover, the demise of La Cosa Nostra predicted by many in law enforcement and academia has not occurred. As of this writing, Italian American criminal organizations remain active in many American cities, and all five families from New York City remain intact. References Albini, Joseph. The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend. New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1971. Block, Alan A. East-Side West-Side: Organizing Crime in New York, 1930–1950. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1983. Fox, Stephen. Blood and Power. New York: William Morrow, 1989. Jacobs, James B., Christopher Panarella, and Jay Worthington. Busting the Mob: U.S. v. Cosa Nostra. New York: New York University Press, 1994. Liddick, Don. An Empirical, Theoretical, and Historical Overview of Organized Crime. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1999. 17

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Lyman, Michael D., and Gary W. Potter. Organized Crime. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997.

Ethnic Group Involvement in Organized Crime: Historical Perspectives and Emerging Trends Sean Patrick Griffin Much of the academic and popular literature on organized crime—not to mention the news and entertainment media—is preoccupied with Italian American and Sicilian American groups. Indeed, a casual observer may conclude that organized crime in the United States is or has been the exclusive province of those of Italian and Sicilian descent. Such an observation, although understandable given all the attention to such groups, is patently false. What, then, accounts for this state of affairs, and what merits does the claim that non-Italian and nonSicilian groups are recently emerging hold? The discussion of organized crime in academic literature exhibits remarkable variation. One common hypothesis argues that organized crime committed by groups other than Sicilian Americans and Italian Americans is emerging. However, a competing hypothesis argues that many supposedly emerging groups have long been involved in organized crime and that it is the research in this area that is emerging. Emergence of Non-Sicilian and Non-Italian Organized Crime Several authors have adopted this theme, either explicitly or by implication. For instance, John Conklin explicitly states that “in recent years, ethnic and national groups other than Italian-Americans have developed organizations to pursue profits through illegal means.” There is another manner in which this discussion is presented. Often, authors do not address this debate specifically but instead implicitly adopt the emerging group paradigm by omitting any reference to groups other than Sicilian Americans and Italian Americans. This subset of literature casts doubt on the emerging organized crime hypothesis and, either explicitly

or by inference, argues that it is the research on organized crime committed by groups not of Italian or Sicilian origin that is emerging. Concerning the broad concept of emerging organized crime, James Inciardi notes that “historically, discussions of organized crime have focused almost exclusively on . . . groups like the Mafia and La Cosa Nostra,” while “more recent analyses, however, have extended their interest to other criminal groups.” Ronald Berger and colleagues have explicitly and implicitly addressed the notion of supposedly emerging organized crime groups: “It is important to keep in mind that members of organized crime networks in the United States are by no means exclusively of Italian descent, nor were they ever.” Similarly, Larry Gaines and Roger Miller have stated that “thanks in large part to popular culture and the media, organized crime is often associated with the Italian Mafia. Indeed, to many, organized crime and the Mafia are synonymous, and the myth has become more powerful than reality.” They conclude that “in fact, organized crime is an equal opportunity field of criminal activity, with nearly every ethnic group . . . represented.” Importantly, the logic that organized crime is emerging is not only incorrect but is also damaging to criminological study. That is, emphasizing Sicilian/Italian American groups not only ignores the long history of organized crime before Italian immigration but also overlooks the involvement of many other ethnic and racial groups. As Steve Barkan states, “It also diverts attention away from organized crime’s roots in poverty, in the readiness of citizens to pay for the goods and services it provides, and in the willingness of politicians, law enforcement agents, and legitimate businesses to take bribes and otherwise cooperate with organized crime.” There are two related reasons for the competing emerging organized crime paradigms. The first concerns how authors define organized crime, and the second revolves around the utter lack of quality data regarding non-Sicilian/Italian organized crime (although data is lacking for these groups as well). The lack of data directly affects the ability to operationally define organized crime. The Definition of Organized Crime If mere participation in the vices, racketeering, and/or political graft alone is the operational thresh-

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old, there should be no debate about the existence of extra-Sicilian/Italian American organized crime dating back to the 1800s if not before. Conversely, one could adopt a more stringent threshold, such as mandating that groups exhibit division of labor, corruption, or use of violence to maintain networks and thus group continuity. If this latter approach is adopted, the issue regarding whether such ethnic organized crime has a long history is less settled since there are few substantive studies, and perhaps even less data, on the matter. The Relative Lack of Non-Sicilian/Italian American Organized Crime Data One glaring reason regarding the absence of data in this area concerns the government’s absolute preoccupation with Sicilian/Italian American organized crime. The U.S. government has convened a number of panels and committees over the years to address the issue of criminal syndicates and to create related policies. Most notable are the following: Senator Estes Kefauver’s committee (1951), Senator John L. McClellan’s committee (1963), President Lyndon B. Johnson’s task force (1967), the National Advisory Committee’s task force (1976), and, most recently, President Ronald Reagan’s Commission on Organized Crime (1983). The clear preoccupation of these panels has been the so-called National Crime Syndicate and La Cosa Nostra. Although President Reagan’s commission did, somewhat tentatively, expand the boundaries of organized crime beyond Italian Americans, certainly they were the major emphasis. On a state level, the situation is much the same. Pennsylvania’s commissions and task forces, for instance, have also consistently focused on Italian American groups rather than others. As Philip Jenkins and Gary Potter noted in 1987, “The [Pennsylvania Crime Commission] itself has mentioned in passing that black-run numbers banks were dealing in annual sums several times greater than Italian-run organizations. But it is Italian criminality that is discussed at length.” Scholars may have thus confined their studies of organized crime to Sicilian/Italian American groups partly because of the attention being paid them. Furthermore, the government’s focus necessarily af-

fects other components in the criminal justice system, many of which produce the data of criminological studies. For example, law enforcement agencies and prosecutors, of course, adopted the focus on Sicilian/Italian American groups, and thus researchers who used this data exclusively arrived at narrow, and biased, conclusions. Donald Cressey’s Theft of the Nation (1969) is perhaps the embodiment, and certainly among the most significant examples, of the literature promoting this paradigm. He wrote that “an Italian organization in fact controls all but an insignificant proportion of the organized-crime activities in the United States,” and “if one understands Cosa Nostra he understands organized crime in the United States.” Perhaps such conclusions prompted renowned organized crime scholar Frank Bovenkerk to sarcastically note in his 1998 essay that while discussion of Prohibition has centered around smugglers who were Italians, Irish, and Jewish in Chicago and northeastern cities, “thirsty people must also have lived outside these cities; but who was distilling and selling bootleg liquor in the American South and in the rural areas where there were few if any recent immigrants?” Frank Hagan recently stated that “while the last fifty years in the United States have witnessed the period of Sicilian-Italian domination of syndicate crime, this was preceded by Jewish . . . and Irish domination.” He added, “Prior to these groups, WASPS (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants) controlled organized crime. During these periods, many other ethnic groups—for example, Germans, Lebanese, Greeks, blacks—also participated in organized crime.” In sum, non-Italian/Sicilian American groups have existed for generations, although their structure and significance have been the subject of considerable debate. Another problem with the emerging organized crime hypotheses concerns the operational definition of the term “recent.” Authors who loosely state that organized crime among certain ethnic groups has recently emerged leave open a host of possible interpretations. If “recent” refers to activities within the past five or ten years, these characterizations are quite likely flawed. Several authors have documented that a variety of ethnic syndicates, fitting the more restrictive characterization of organized crime, were present in numerous U.S. cities as 19

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early as the 1800s. For example, Jeffrey Scott McIllwain’s historical work on New York City around 1900 found that Chinese organized crime “predates, in structure and sophistication, organizations of other ethnic origins later recognized as ‘modern’ organized crime by academics, the media and the government.” He thus concluded that the common, trendy discussion of Chinese organized crime as emerging is ahistorical. Historical analyses by Sean Patrick Griffin and Robert Lombardo have concluded that much of the current academic literature on African American organized crime in Philadelphia and Chicago is equally unsophisticated and suspect. Thus, as more studies are conducted, the social system accounting for the multifarious phenomenon of organized crime is commonly exhibited. By definition, these studies will conclude that organized crime is, and has been, an equal opportunity employer. References Barkan, Steve E. Criminology: A Sociological Understanding. 2nd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001. Berger, Ronald J., Marvin Free, and Patricia Searles. Crime, Justice and Society: Criminology and the Sociological Imagination. New York: McGrawHill, 2001. Bovenkerk, Frank. “Organized Crime and Ethnic Minorities: Is There a Link?” Transnational Organized Crime 4 (1998): 109–126. Conklin, John E. Criminology. 5th ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1995. Cressey, Donald R. Theft of the Nation: The Structure and Operation of Organized Crime. New York: Harper and Row, 1969. Gaines, Larry K., and Roger Leroy Miller. Criminal Justice in Action. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003. Griffin, Sean Patrick. Black Brothers, Inc.: The Violent Rise and Fall of Philadelphia’s Black Mafia. Leicester, UK: Milo, 2005. ———. “‘Emerging’ Organized Crime Hypotheses in Criminology Textbooks: The Case of AfricanAmerican Organized Crime.” Journal of Criminal Justice Education 14 (2003): 287–301. Hagan, Frank E. Introduction to Criminology: Theories, Methods, and Criminal Behavior. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002. Inciardi, James A. Criminal Justice. 7th ed. Orlando: Harcourt Brace, 2002. Jenkins, Philip, and Gary W. Potter. “The Politics and Mythology of Organized Crime: A

Philadelphia Case Study.” Journal of Criminal Justice 15 (1987): 473–484. Kleinknecht, William. The New Ethnic Mobs: The Changing Face of Organized Crime. New York: Free Press, 1996. Lombardo, Robert M. “The Black Mafia: AfricanAmerican Organized Crime in Chicago, 1890– 1960.” Crime, Law and Social Change 38 (2002): 33–65. McIllwain, Jeffrey Scott. Organizing Crime in Chinatown: Race and Racketeering in New York City, 1890–1910. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2004.

The Historical Impact of Organized Crime on American Society Mark Jones The study of organized crime is seldom divorced from the dimensions of ethnicity and politics. Two areas in which organized crime has impacted American society are ethnic stereotyping, especially of Italian Americans, and the ascension of prominent political figures. Ethnic Stereotyping Contrary to a common perception, organized crime did not originate with Prohibition, and it did not originate with Sicilian immigrants. D. J. Kenney and J. O. Finckenauer suggest that the first forays into organized crime in the American colonies originated with colonial pirates who operated off the East Coast and in the Caribbean. The pirates supplied colonists with cheap and tax-free goods and received protection from corrupt politicians in the colonies, especially in the Carolinas and Virginia. Most pirates were of Anglo extraction, but many Americans associate organized crime with Italian Americans or, more specifically, Sicilian Americans. Six historical events contributed to or created this perception. One event was the tremendous influx of immigrants to the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. More than 12 million people entered the United States via New York’s Ellis Island during the early twentieth century alone. Although most of these immigrants were basically law-abiding, others were not, and their criminal lifestyle came with them. Many immigrants came

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from countries where respect for the government and the criminal justice system was nonexistent in economically disadvantaged subcultures. Sicilians came from a small, rural, impoverished Mediterranean island whose capital, Palermo, has been called the most conquered city in history, enduring oppression at the hands of the Romans, the Carthaginians, the Arabs, the Turks, the Spanish, and mainland Italians. Along with Eastern European Jews and the Irish, Sicilians comprised a disproportionate number of organized criminals during the early twentieth century. Of those three groups, Italians made the biggest impact on organized crime. The second event occurred in New Orleans, another major U.S. city. New Orleans experienced problems with small-time organized criminal activity perpetrated by Italian immigrants. In 1890 a dispute between two groups of Italian dockworkers, the Provenzanos and the Matrangas, beset the New Orleans shipping docks. The dispute came to a head in October of that year when David Hennessey, the New Orleans police chief, was shot to death outside his home. Rumor spread that Hennessey’s last words were “the Dagoes did it.” Nineteen Italian immigrants were arrested, and nine were put on trial for Hennessey’s murder. Hennessey was rumored to be in cahoots with one of the groups of dockworkers, but the news media reported that an honest, incorruptible police chief had been murdered by members of a secret society of foreign criminals intent on thwarting his impending arrest of the mobsters. When the trial ended in mistrials and acquittals, New Orleans residents were outraged. A mob stormed the jail that held the Italian prisoners, and the men were publicly lynched. The lynching created a short-term strain in relations between Italy and the United States and, even more importantly, served as the unofficial beginning of associating organized crime activity with Italian Americans. The third event that exacerbated the association between Italians and organized crime was Prohibition. Prohibition, which came into effect with the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1919 and was revoked by the Twentyfirst Amendment of 1933, turned many small-time street gangs and bootleggers into multimillionaire businessmen. Although practically all ethnic groups

Al Capone, the son of Neapolitan emigrants, is America’s most legendary gangster and for many personifies the phenomenon of “organized crime.” (Library of Congress)

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were involved in Prohibition-era bootlegging, the period witnessed the crystallization of Italian association with big-time organized crime activity. Chicago, in particular, suffered the ill effects of violent crime that sprang from competition among bootleggers. The Chicago gangster Al Capone, an Italian American, is still America’s most infamous criminal godfather. From the 1890s through the 1950s, the perception existed that organized crime in the United States was largely the product of an alien conspiracy of Italian immigrants who were determined to undermine the American way of life and government. This Black Hand was supposedly a secret society of Italians that functioned as a shadow government and co-opted politicians and other public officials, possessing power far beyond that of any other criminal organization. The fourth event that cemented this perception occurred in 1957 near a small town in New York. Some Americans scoffed at the idea that organized crime was sophisticated or that it even existed to a great degree at all. However, when police officers in Appalachin happened upon a meeting of fifty-eight Italian American crime bosses from across the country, proponents of the alien conspiracy idea used the Appalachin conference as proof of their point of view. The fifth event involved television, another emerging innovation in America in the early 1950s. During the 1950s when television was in its infancy and often in desperate straits to find entertainment for its audience, organized crime and the U.S. Senate obliged. The Kefauver Committee hearings, broadcast on national television, were great theater. Senator Estes Kefauver, a Democrat from Tennessee, achieved lasting fame as chairman of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate Crime in Interstate Commerce in the early 1950s. Many of the committee hearings, which took place in fourteen cities, were televised, giving Americans their first view of Mafia figures, and the new and novel medium of television served to promote Kefauver’s reputation. He used the notoriety gained from his mobster hearings to launch an unsuccessful vice presidential campaign in 1956, when he and Adlai Stevenson were defeated by Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon. Another U.S. senator, John McClellan of Arkansas, used organized crime and television to promote his

career as well. One notable piece of testimony came in 1963 and featured Joseph Valachi. The McClellan Committee hearings, which were televised intermittently during the 1950s and 1960s, also attracted a large television audience. Valachi’s 1963 testimony about his life as a low-level soldier in the Genovese crime family marked the first time that the operations of the Italian Mafia, or La Cosa Nostra, were laid bare before the American public. Although some of Valachi’s testimony was later discredited, his unrefuted testimony placed an official government imprimatur on the alien conspiracy idea of a secret group of Italian criminals determined to undermine American government and institutions. The sixth event was the publication of Mario Puzo’s 1969 novel The Godfather. The fascination generated by real-life exposés of mafia life paved the way for sensationalized fictional accounts of the mafia. The Godfather, a runaway best-seller, told the saga of an Italian American crime family, headed by a Sicilian immigrant, and reinforced alreadyexisting perceptions and myths about organized crime and Italian Americans. The novel spawned two films in the early 1970s, both of which enjoyed tremendous critical and popular acclaim, and a third film in 1990. More than any other media event, The Godfather created the American perception of organized crime that persists to this day. The Godfather movies left viewers with the idea that mafia figures were men of honor, misunderstood by a hypocritical mainstream society, corrupt politicians, and public officials. Good mafia bosses, like the movies’ lead characters Vito and Michael Corleone, were honest men simply trying to do what was in the best interest of their family, both their immediate family and the extended family—namely, their criminal enterprises—in a society that would provide no alternative to organized crime. The Godfather movies spawned other popular and critically acclaimed books and movies, most notable among them Casino and Goodfellas. It also led to instances of life imitating art. Some organized criminals imitated behaviors from these films. Ascension of Political Figures Fighting organized crime has been a means of attaining prominence for many American politicians at mu-

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The Historical Impact of Organized Crime on American Society

The cast of the film The Godfather pose for a family portrait during a wedding scene in a still from the 1972 film, directed by Francis Ford Coppola and based on the novel by Mario Puzo. (Getty Images)

nicipal, state, and national levels. In addition to Kefauver, four other men, more so than any other nationally known politicians, can attribute a great deal of their success to their efforts to combat organized crime, and their names are inextricably linked to the history of organized crime in the United States. They are Thomas Dewey (1902–1971), John F. Kennedy (1917–1963), Robert F. Kennedy (1925–1968), and Rudolph Giuliani (1944–). From 1933 to 1937, Dewey served as U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, which included Manhattan. While a federal prosecutor, he pursued some of New York’s most prominent organized crime figures, including Dutch Shultz and Lepke Buchalter, the latter bearing the ignominious distinction as the only major American organized crime figure to be executed by the government. Dewey used his fame as a federal prosecutor to get

himself elected as the New York County district attorney in 1937 and as governor of New York in 1942 (for three terms). Dewey is primarily remembered as a footnote to one of the most famous political photographs in American history. He was the Republican nominee for President in 1944, when he was handily defeated by Franklin Roosevelt, and again in 1948, when, despite being heavily favored, he was again defeated, this time by Harry Truman. A Chicago newspaper prematurely declared Dewey the winner, and in a Pulitzer Prize-winning photograph, a beaming Truman is shown holding the newspaper with the headline “Dewey Defeats Truman,” sealing Dewey’s place in history as America’s most famous presidential also-ran. Dewey would not have risen to national prominence had it not been for his successful organized crime prosecutions in the 1930s. 23

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John F. Kennedy belonged to the most prominent Irish American family of the twentieth century. His father, Joseph P. Kennedy, became a millionaire through banking and investment ventures, but the elder Kennedy also had ties to gangsters, especially during Prohibition, when he participated in largescale bootlegging. When the younger Kennedy, upon being elected to the U.S. Senate, was asked to serve on Senator John McClellan’s committee investigating organized crime in labor and business, his father reportedly cautioned against his acceptance. Kennedy served on the McClellan Committee, and his work increased his already-considerable fame and aided his successful 1960 presidential bid. Robert F. Kennedy served as chief counsel for the McClellan Committee and, like his older brother, increased his national visibility by taking on corrupt labor leaders and mobsters. When he was appointed attorney general in his brother’s presidential administration, he made organized crime his top priority. For the first time, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, whose mercurial leader J. Edgar Hoover had for decades ignored organized crime, undertook the battle as well. Kennedy’s crusade against organized crime would aid his political career, but it was to prove fateful as well. In the opinion of many, the Kennedy battle against organized crime resulted in the president’s assassination. The assassination of President Kennedy on 22 November 1963 was one of America’s most horrendous crimes of the twentieth century. Despite intense scrutiny, few crimes are as shrouded in mystery or have been subject to as many wild conspiratorial claims. No one was ever convicted of President Kennedy’s murder. The accused assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, was murdered in front of a national television audience while in police custody. Oswald’s killer, Jack Ruby, was widely believed to be a mob hit man charged with silencing Oswald. Except for one showboat trial conducted by a discredited New Orleans prosecutor named Jim Garrison, no one was ever tried for Kennedy’s murder. According to G. R. Blakely and R. N. Billings, two Kennedy assassination researchers, a likely explanation for that trial was that the prosecutor, who himself had mob ties, may have been trying to divert suspicion away from Carlos Marcello, a New

Orleans mob boss with a long-standing rivalry toward the Kennedy brothers. Using organized crime prosecution as a means of political advancement is far from dead. One such example is found in Rudolph Giuliani. Giuliani is known for his work as New York City mayor and especially for his courageous leadership after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The last chapter in his career has not been written. At this writing he is a Republican candidate for the U.S. presidency. Like others mentioned previously, Giuliani owes his rise to prominence in large measure to his work prosecuting mobsters (and white-collar criminals) in the 1980s. Like Dewey several decades earlier, Giuliani served as U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, a hotbed of organized crime activity. One of the first prosecutors to use the federal RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization) statute to its fullest extent, Giuliani, himself an Italian American, is credited, perhaps too much, with bringing the Italian mob in New York City to its knees. The New York City mob still has not recovered from the Giuliani-led prosecutions of the 1980s. Conclusion Neither of the two phenomena discussed here— ethnic stereotyping and using organized crime as a means of political ascent—will fade away. While Italian American mobsters have been joined and in some respects supplanted by other ethnic groups’ forays into organized crime, the traditional Sicilian mob is far from extinct. In the years to come, other ethnic groups will also bear the brunt of ethnic stereotyping as organized criminals. In addition, public officials will continue to use these criminal organizations as a means of advancement. To illustrate, one of Giuliani’s assistant prosecutors, Michael Chertoff, used the political capital gained from his work with Giuliani’s mobster prosecutions to his own political advantage. After his work as prosecutor under Giuliani, Chertoff held a number of positions, including judge for the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals. In 2005 he was nominated by President George W. Bush to serve as secretary of the Department of Homeland Security.

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References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime. 7th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002. Albini, J. The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend. New York: Irvington, 1971. Beschloss, M., ed. American Heritage Illustrated History of the Presidents. New York: Crown, 2000. Blakey, G. R., and R. N. Billings. The Plot to Kill the President: Organized Crime Assassinated J.F.K. New York: Times Books, 1981. Blok, A. The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860–1960: A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 1974. Cressey, D. R. Theft of the Nation: The Structure and Operations of Organized Crime in America. New York: Harper and Row, 1969. Ellis Island Immigration Museum, www.ellisisland .com. Fox, S. R. Blood and Power: Organized Crime in Twentieth Century America. New York: Morrow, 1989. Kenney, D. J., and J. O. Finckenauer. Organized Crime in America. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994. Maas, P. The Valachi Papers. New York: Putnam, 1968. McCullough, D. Truman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992. Persico, Joseph E. “Vendetta in New Orleans.” http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/ magazine/ah/1973/4/1973_4_65.shtml. Puzo, Mario. The Godfather. New York: Putnam, 1969.

Film and Television Portrayals of Organized Crime Brian Cogan Since the early days of film, when D. W. Griffith’s The Musketeers of Pig Alley dramatized a brutal gang war, film and, later, television have both popularized and in some ways romanticized organized crime. Films that involve organized crime, which are usually referred to under the genre of gangster film (although there are numerous subgenres, and not all critics use the same terms) have in many ways captured the American imagination. In the American Film Industry’s (AFI) list of the top one hundred films of all time, numerous films about organized

crime are featured in many of the top spots, and some films such as The Godfather DVDs have been perennial best-sellers in terms of sales since their release. Most notably, films such as The Godfather trilogy, the films of Martin Scorsese (particularly Goodfellas and Casino), and other films such as The Untouchables and even Analyze This have proved to be popular with the general public. Also, the recent success of The Sopranos and other programs such as The Wire, WiseGuy, and even the original Untouchables television series all dealt with organized crime in a manner that has held a particular fascination for the general public. To analyze why these versions, some more romanticized than others, have had such enduring popularity, we must first look at the history of organized crime in mass media portrayals such as films and television shows. The enduring popularity of films that deal with organized crime is thought by many to be a uniquely American phenomenon, but there is also a long tradition of films from other countries that deal with organized crime. In particular, there are numerous examples of how the genre developed in Western countries, such as England and France, as well as films that show the Japanese Yakuza and the Hong Kong Triads, which demonstrates that the fascination with media portrayals of organized crime is a worldwide phenomenon. Origin of Organized Crime Films The first gangster film is considered by many to be D. W. Griffith’s The Musketeers of Pig Alley, a silent film from 1914 that involves the unwitting involvement of a musician and his wife in a large-scale gang war. The film ends with the musician and his wife aiding in the escape of the lead gangster from the police, demonstrating that even at the start of films about organized crime, there was also a tendency to romanticize the gangster as a tragic hero. Although numerous other films about organized crime were made during Hollywood’s early years, the Hays Code (a precursor to the current MPAA ratings system) was adopted in 1930 in order to lessen the glamorization of sex and violence and ensure that criminals had to be punished at the end of the film. (Although many gangster films were allowed more liberties than other films, they also had to dramatically scale 25

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back the level of violence after the introduction of the Hays Code.) Even 1931’s Little Caesar, a film loosely based on the rise of Al Capone and starring Edward G. Robinson as the doomed Rico Bandello, shows a remarkable sympathy to the main character and his meteoric rise and eventual downfall and can almost be interpreted not as an allegory that crime does not pay but that Bandello was not tough enough to lead the gangs of Chicago. The gangster film, as noted by film historian Bernard Dick, was a way in which the American public could look to gangsters as heroes, symbolically doing what the powerless and poverty-stricken American public could not. As Dick noted, gangsters “achieved an emancipation that moviegoers might envy, but could never experience because the price was too high.” Numerous actors such as Robinson, Humphrey Bogart, George Raft, and James Cagney became associated with the genre. While most of the American films about organized crime romanticized the gangster figure, they were also bound by the restrictions of the Hays Code to demonstrate that crime did not pay. In this way, the life and presumed freedom of the members of a gang could be celebrated for the first two reels, until the eventual triumph of the police and the death or capture of the lead gangster and the dissolution of his enterprise. This was more or less the case until the restrictions of the code were largely lifted in the 1950s and 1960s and a new wave of films, more realistic and more modernistic, reinvented the genre of the organized crime film. The Modern American Organized Crime Film from The Godfather to the Present The father of the modern American organized crime film and the template for most media representations of organized crime are the first two Godfather films (the third is generally considered inferior by most critics and writers on organized crime films) by director Francis Ford Coppola. The Godfather films were homages to the traditional romanticized idea of the noble gangster as a man of honor, acting outside the law, but with an exemplary devotion to both the biological family as well as the crime family that he runs with a firm but fair hand and were also a way of criticizing exactly what it was supposedly celebrating. The modern organized crime film (and

television shows, especially in the case of The Sopranos) also relies heavily on a sense of nostalgia for a time long past, when gangsters operated with a distinct set of ethics and a moral code. But as films such as The Godfather make clear, this sense of nostalgia was for an imaginary time, one that never really existed. As film historian James Cawleti has noted, this use of nostalgia was used “as a means of demythologization.” The Godfather films did not evoke the past merely to be nostalgic. Rather, the films sought to demolish the traditional notion of the glamorous and larger-than-life gangster figure. The first film in the series, The Godfather (1972), involved the larger-than-life Shakespearian characters of the Corleone crime family, represented by the Don, Vito Corleone (Marlon Brando), and his sons, most notably Michael (Al Pacino), who was supposed to be the one member of the family insulated from the grim necessities of the Mafia lifestyle. In the course of the film, Michael is corrupted and joins the crime family to avenge the shooting of his father. And although the film romanticized the role of the noble gangster, it also served as an indication that the life of a criminal was not necessarily one of honor and rigorous codes but rather one of revenge and petty murders done sheerly out of necessity. The second Godfather film further demonstrated the parallels made between regular business and organized crime, if only to indicate that both are inherently corrupt and eventually lead to the destruction of the soul. The Godfather films were also ripe with religious imagery as well as gruesome depictions of violence, and both of these themes were later adapted by Martin Scorsese, the foremost American filmmaker in the organized crime genre. The films of Scorsese that deal with organized crime, including Mean Streets (1973), Goodfellas (1990), and Casino (1995)—all of them featuring frequent Scorsese star Robert DeNiro—also demystify the nature of organized crime. In Mean Streets, Scorsese’s earliest major film on the subject, the criminals involved are mostly petty, damaged street thugs who work together out of necessity but are doomed to failure as their plans outstrip their ambitions. As in The Godfather and in early gangster films, the characters are doomed because of their actions and their involvement in crime, and inevitable failure is all but

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assured from the start of the film. While Scorsese films have always involved a strong sense of the symbolic and heavily feature religion, crime is simply a way of life, and the characters have no other choice. As Ian Christie and David Thompson note, Scorsese himself admits that he was “trying to make a sort of homage to the Warner Brothers gangster films.” In his later and better-known organized crime films, Goodfellas and Casino, the characters (such as Henry Hill as played by Ray Liotta in Goodfellas and Joe Pesci in both films) are minor players in a major enterprise. The world they inhabit has a certain logic in terms of moral codes, but it also is a world where violence follows no apparent logic and where anyone not part of the inner circle can die at any time because of provocations real or imagined. The dichotomy of the good earner, the epitome of a good person who kicks up their tribute to the boss, is also contrasted with the cowboy (such as the character of Tommy, as played by Pesci in Goodfellas) who will be tolerated while useful. The characters in Casino and Goodfellas do not live in a world of codes and underground ethics but instead live in a cavalier world in which death can come quickly and without warning. The business, which comes first and foremost, does not rely on personal achievement but rather is a highly organized hierarchy in which proper respect must be paid and money must be kicked up the corporate ladder to the big boss. This type of organized crime portrayal can also be seen in numerous other films, such as Oliver Stone’s Scarface (1983) that glamorized the violent cocaine-addled Tony Montana, who dies violently in a hail of bullets. Scarface has become a favorite of numerous rappers, who use the images and iconography of the film in order to show their perceived realness and authenticity as real gangsters. (Despite the fact that many of them have never been involved in gang activity or organized crime on any level, the mythology is powerful.) Numerous modern organized crime films are also inspired by the work of Scorsese and Coppola. Films such as New Jack City (1991), which deals with the innercity crack trade and how larger gangs soon organized the drug trade into a corporate-like enterprise, and the works of Quentin Tarantino portray a violent but glamorized version of organized crime, where

wealth can be acquired quickly through violent assaults or the drug trade and where a violent death is considered the normal and inevitable conclusion to the life. Other recent films such as Spike Lee’s Clockers (1995) and Antoine Fuqua’s acclaimed Training Day (2001) show a shadowy world where corrupt policemen such as Alonzo Harris (portrayed by Denzel Washington in his Oscar-winning role) form uneasy alliances with local gang-bangers while trying to stave off the vicious Russian mobs who are trying to control the drug trade. Organized Crime in Foreign Films America certainly is not the only country to have glamorized the activities of organized crime. Numerous British films such as Layer Cake (1994), Sexy Beast (2000), and (albeit by an American director, Steven Soderbergh) The Limey (1999) have glamorized the tough-as-nails British gangster. Modern British organized crime films are largely gloomy affairs where betrayal is common and the easiest way in which to climb the rungs of power is through well-thought-out ultraviolent acts. Modern British films about organized crime follow some aspects of the traditional template but locate the modern British organized criminal in a world where wealth, power, and violence are associated with a total lack of conventional morality. French gangster films also have a unique take on the existentialist gangster, doomed to smoke endless cigarettes while watching his perfect plan untangle. In such films as Touchez pas Au Grisbi (Hands Off the Loot) (1954), Le Samuorai (1967), Du Riffifi Chez les Hommes (1955), and Bob le Flambeur (1955), a sense of nostalgia exists, as it is clearly inevitable that the criminal will be caught and his organization dismantled no matter how carefully planned and well-thought-out his crimes are. As Robin Buss noted in his book on film noir in French organized crime dramas, “men . . . confront questions of freedom, loyalty, courage, escape, money, desire and the ironies of fate.” French organized crime films usually do not involve large numbers of gangsters but instead portray smaller and more mobile groups engaged in usually nonviolent enterprises that inevitably end in murder and eventually the downfall and demise of the group. In particular, 27

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the films of Jean-Pierre Melville such as Le Samouri and Le Cercle Rouge (1970) demonstrate a distinct sense of fatalism, not because crime does not pay but because fate is unrelenting and all men are doomed to failure. Two reoccurring Asian genres involve the unique nature of organized crime in Japanese and Chinese culture in the films that chronicle the adventures of the Japanese Yakuza and the Chinese Triads. These films have many similarities with American organized crime films but with a slightly different emphasis. The Yakuza films, such as the films of Fukasaku Kinji, early on dealt with highly stylized samurai-era gangs, the precursors of the modern Yakuza gangs today. These films that enjoyed their greatest popularity during 1963–1973 embodied, according to Japanese film historian Donald Richie, the concept of “giri-ninjo” or the “sacrifice of individuality for the sake of the group” and virtues such as “loyalty, dedication and subservience.” The traditional older Yakuza films featured heroes more concerned with honor than personal gain. As a new Japanese audience started to seek more sophisticated fare, new modern Yakuza films began to rise in popularity, as epitomized in the films of modern Japanese Renaissance man and writer/director/actor “Beat” Takeshi Kitano, who revolutionized the modern Yakuza film into a vibrant genre in which cool killers ruthlessly deal with rival gangs in films such as Hana-Bi (Fireworks) (1997) and Sonatine (1993). Hong Kong–made films about the Triads are usually concerned with questions of honor and a perceived nostalgia for a lost time when the codes of the Triads were followed more faithfully. According to author Bey Logan, the Triads were not always criminal organizations but rather were “originally from the Hung Societies which developed to oppose the Ching rulers of ancient China,” and “today gambling, extortion and drugs have taken the place of more patriotic concerns.” There have been numerous Triad films made, mostly from the Hong Kong region, and the Triads are usually represented by a benevolent older boss and a younger power-hungry boss eager to modernize the gang into the contemporary pursuits of organized crime. There are numerous examples of this, such as The Incorruptible, the Hong Kong version of the Untouchables set in 1950s with popular stars Ray

Lui, Carrie Ng, and Simon Lam. The best-known filmmaker who has done many Triad-based films is the acclaimed John Woo, who now mostly makes films in Hollywood. Woo’s early Hong Kong films such as the two-part A Better Tomorrow (1986 and 1988) as well as his masterpieces The Killer (1989) and Hard Boiled (1992) feature conflicted and honorable contract killers working for gang leaders who do not appreciate their seemingly old-fashioned devotion to honor and loyalty. The main themes of these films romanticize the gangster, as in American films, but also reinforce the Asian sense of mutual dependency and loyalty. The Yakuza films and the Triad films were, and are, very similar in common themes of loyalty and interdependence. Even if it is sometimes unclear exactly which illegal organized crime activities the Triads and Yakuza are engaging in, the overall message is essentially the same. As Italy has also been the home of the original Sicilian Mafia, there have been numerous Italian films made about the Mafia. However, in postwar Italy the influence of the Mafia was so strong that even a director as respected as Lucino Visconti was not able to successfully fund an ambitious trilogy of movies about the Italian gangs because of intimidation from politicians with ties to organized crime. Later, due to popular outcry, the pressure eased, and many films were made demonstrating the hold that the Sicilian Mafia had on certain parts of the country, most notably Fransesco Rosi’s Salvatore Giuliano (1961) and Il CaseoMattei (1972). The Representation of Organized Crime on Television While there have been representations of organized crime on television almost since its inception, the genre has evolved over the years. While early shows such as The Untouchables dealt with fairly straightforward representations of good versus evil, where virtuous treasury agents pursued the brutal gangsters led by Capone, modern television representations are more nuanced. Praised by critics for its dramatic quality as well as its fairly detailed and well-researched portrayal of the modern Mafia, The Sopranos is different in the way in which it revolves around the concept of omerta, or the oath that Mafia members take never to reveal secrets to outsiders.

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Official credentials of U.S. Treasury agent Eliot Ness (1903–1957). Ness authored The Untouchables, an autobiographical novel which inspired a television show and a 1987 film of the same name. (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms)

As the main character, the fairly sympathetic but occasionally murderous Tony Soprano, spends much of every episode revealing secrets to one degree or another to his psychiatrist, Dr. Melfi, it is clear that the show is both a more emotionally nuanced take on the modern organized crime member than in the past and a social commentary on the loss of mythical traditions involving the romanticization of the virtuous criminal. Many critics have praised The Sopranos for its unflinching realism, and psychologist Glen Gabbard likens the program to holding a mirror “up to human nature.” The enormous popularity of The Sopranos is due in part to its portrayal of gangster characters—engaged in clearly illegal activities such as gambling, prostitution, protection rackets, and sometimes larceny and murder—as normal humans with human problems.

culture but who also has a sense of loyalty, honor, and hierarchy that is notably lacking in organized crime in the real world.

Summary Organized crime has been represented in film and television since the inception of each medium, and although the portrayal is different in degree from culture to culture, overall the representation has portrayed the character of the gangster as a romantic figure who belongs to an organization with parallels to contemporary government and corporate

References Buss, Robin. French Film Noir. London: Marion Boyars, 2001. Cawelti, John G. “Chinatown and Generic Transformation in Recent American Films.” Pp. 559–579 in Film Theory and Criticism, 2nd ed., edited by Marshall Cohen and Gerald Mast. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979. Christie, Ian, and David Thompson, eds. Scorsese on Scorsese. London: Faber and Faber, 1989. Dick, Bernard. Anatomy of Film. New York: Bedford-St. Martin’s, 2002. Gabbard, Glen. The Psychology of the Sopranos: Love, Desire and Betrayal in America’s Favorite Gangster Family. New York: Basic Books, 2002. Hammond, Stefan, and Wilkins, Mike. Sex and Zen and a Bullet in the Head. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. Logan, Bey. Hong Kong Action Cinema. New York: Overlook Press, 1995. Mes, Tom, and Jasper Sharp. The Midnight Eye Guide to New Japanese Film. Berkeley: Stone Bridge, 2005. Richie, Donald. A Hundred Years of Japanese Film. Tokyo: Kodansha, 2005. 29

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B. Organized Crime: Definitions, Theories, Concepts, Structure, and Function

The Activities of Transnational Organized Crime Nathan Moran The Activities of International Organized Crime: A Taxonomy of Crime Of all the crimes perpetrated by international crime organizations, seven are of current interest in the literature: drug trafficking, arms trafficking, smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, trafficking in persons and human body parts, money laundering, computer crime, and infiltration into legal businesses. Drug Trafficking Estimates are that trafficking in narcotics is a $500 billion a year business that has doubled in size since 1987. The connection between international organized crime and drug trafficking is clear. According to Gerhard Mueller, “The illicit traffic in narcotic drugs is entirely controlled by organized crime networks, loosely related with each other geographically, as well as at the various levels of production and marketing, and by type of narcotics. . . . No other form of international and organized crime is as costly in terms of human and national financial suffering as the illicit trade in narcotic drugs.” The Colombian cartels are some of the wealthiest international organizations in existence. The Andes drug organizations in Bolivia and Peru act as subcontractors to the Colombian cartels. They perform the first stages in the drug manufacturing process of refining the raw coca into a cocaine paste or base. The Colombians then provide the

transportation to move the products to the final processing labs, bringing with them large sums of cash to pay for the raw narcotics. According to R. Godson and W. J. Olson, “until recently the Colombians generally did not involve themselves directly in these regional efforts, but with increased law enforcement successes, particularly in Bolivia, that have rolled up whole local organizations, the Colombians have begun to take more control.” To move cocaine to the United States, the Colombians have established vast networks with Mexican cartels, which represent only arrangements of convenience. Indeed, according to Godson and Olson, the Colombians reportedly complain of incompetence on behalf of the Mexicans, “but they need the Mexicans to run the network of local landing strips, safe houses, and logisticalsupport systems—including the network of corrupt officials that the Mexican organizations had developed over the years—necessary to sustain huge long-range drug-trafficking operations.” Similarly, as the Colombians develop ties with the Mexicans, they are also developing ties with the Sicilian Mafia and other organized crime and international crime groups in Europe. They are also establishing contacts in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States to launder money. The Colombians are colluding with Asian (primarily Chinese) heroin traffickers, occasionally exchanging heroin for cocaine, and are studying the potential to grow poppies in the Andes Mountains, studies that have relied largely on the importation of technicians and agricultural experts from Asia.

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The major heroin trafficking networks of Asia, such as the Golden Triangle, both have and are establishing ties with Nigerian groups for assistance in the international trafficking of heroin. The Nigerians are essentially contracted out as mules to smuggle heroin into the United States in their stomachs and intestines by swallowing condoms filled with the drug. These mules are recruited and trained by Nigerian contractors who operate under a three-cornered network. First, the mules travel from Nigeria to Thailand with money on their persons. The mules then exchange the money for heroin in Thailand. Finally, travel arrangements are made for them to enter the United States and Europe with the drugs in their stomachs, intestines, or body cavities. Recently, U.S. law enforcement has become attuned to fighting this type of smuggling via long detentions and x-rays of suspected smugglers, which has led to variations in the three-cornered smuggling scheme. The Nigerians now travel to many different countries, often with forged or stolen identities and passports, prior to entering their port of choice. This leads to more difficult detection and a clouded travel log, which in turn makes it more difficult for inspection personnel to justify the searches on the basis of countries recently visited. The main drug markets include opium, heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine. The groups that are involved in the trafficking of each of these drugs differ. Opium and heroin are primarily being produced and transported by Asian international crime groups. Those drugs are also being cultivated in Colombia, Venezuela, Vietnam, and post-Soviet Central Asia but on a smaller scale. T. Farer asserts that Colombia now supplies most of the heroin to the United States. Cocaine is produced and shipped primarily by Latin American drug cartels. Methamphetamine is produced and transported by more nontraditional organized crime groups such as outlaw motorcycle clubs. Rising producers and shippers of methamphetamine include groups in North Korea, Poland, China, Russia, Azerbaijan, Mexico, and the Baltic States. There are various methods for controlling the international drug markets, such as the laws and rules promulgated by the Single Convention on Nar-

cotic Drugs (1961), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971), and the United Nations (UN) Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988). However, there are severe shortcomings to this theoretical web of international drug smuggling: 1. Underfunding of the specified programs, such as the UN International Drug Programme. 2. Underfunding at the local, regional, and national levels. 3. The emphasis on fighting drug trafficking differs greatly from one country to the next. 4. High levels of corruption in countries that produce and export most of the illegal drugs. 5. The serious issue that developing and nascent democracies lack the legal infrastructure to implement effective programs.

Arms Trafficking Trafficking in arms is related to the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Weapons trafficking is heavily influenced by international crime organizations. According to J. Martin and A. Romano, this activity requires “the clandestine cooperation of various organizations, both public and private, on an international level” and is characterized well in Peter Maas’s 1986 book Manhunt. According to A. Sampson, trading in arms dates back to the time of the Crusades (1095–1254). This trade did not become global, however, until the mid-nineteenth century, or shortly after the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Since the 1960s, arms sales on the global level have increased exponentially and are principally driven by political movements such as terrorism. Also since the 1960s, China’s various organized crime groups, mainly the Triads, have emerged as one of the Big Four nations for trafficking weapons, behind Russia, the United States, and France in terms of sales. J. H. Cushman has reported the value of arms sales with developing nations at $30 billion, with the United States agreeing to sell $5.6 billion worth of arms each year. Commenting on China’s role in this illicit trade, Martin and Romano have noted that a 1989 special report of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration tracks the illegal trafficking of 31

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Organized Crime: Definitions, Theories, Concepts, Structure, and Function

Chinese-made AK-47s to gun dealers in California, who in turn were selling the guns to drug traffickers in Colombia and Mexico. The report further notes that drugs were occasionally used rather than cash to pay the smugglers for the weapons. According to Martin and Romano, “This case illustrates one type of cooperative relationship between private arms-traffickers and drug-traffickers. The former supply the latter with illegal arms; the latter pay for the arms with illegal drugs, and presumably the arms-traffickers then sell the drugs for cash with a suitable markup in the value of the drugs involved.” Industrial nations such as the United States have long engaged in both legal and illegal arms transfers to their allies. Such nation-states have also engaged in covert actions with other countries, ranging from propaganda campaigns to paramilitary operations against other governments. The most publicized of all nation-state weapons transfers was the Iran-Contra affair. The exposure of these weapons sales and transfers began with a single shooting on 5 October 1986, when a C-123 American cargo plane was flying ammunition into Nicaragua in support of the Contra rebels against the government of Nicaragua and was shot down. An American ex-Marine parachuted from the plane shortly before the crash and was immediately apprehended by the Nicaraguan military. The exMarine was put on trial, found guilty, and sentenced to thirty years in prison. Shortly thereafter it was publicly revealed that President Ronald Reagan was attempting to free the hostages in Iran by selling weapons to that country and simultaneously selling weapons to the Contra forces in Nicaragua even though Congress had prohibited the supply of weapons to the country. In the ensuing investigation, the only person convicted of illegal weapons transactions was the ex-Marine crew member of the downed C-123 cargo plane, and that was in a Nicaraguan court. Smuggling of Weapons of Mass Destruction The great number of armed conflicts around the world would not be possible without the concerted effort by organized crime groups to network with producers and suppliers in the trafficking of

weapons. The most dangerous of all weapons transactions are in the form of WMDs, which include chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. According to G. O. W. Mueller, “It is now clear that since 1992, on at least five occasions, several relatively small quantities of nuclear material, including pure plutonium, have been diverted from nuclear facilities in former Soviet republics and offered for sale in Germany and other countries west of Russia.” Mueller further asserts that this is a sign that controls in the region are inadequate to ensure that no fissile material becomes available for the international black market. The evidence suggests that known nuclear smuggling is being perpetrated by small groups of individuals rather than large international organizations. The motives of these individuals are usually for individual gain in the criminal underworld. The greatest danger is, of course, that these weapons are sold to the highest bidder, with that person or group being of terrorist ideology. Most of the known fissile material smuggling cases to date were the result of sting operations, with the material never being delivered to a viable buyer. In many of these cases, however, the public has been exposed to radiation. The bulk of the activity in the trafficking of nuclear and fissile material is taking place in Russia, where there is an extreme lack of government controls. Russia currently has more than 10,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and 700 tons of fissile uranium and plutonium stored outside of delivery systems (e.g., missiles, suitcase nukes, etc.). According to R. W. Lee, Russia “has about the same GNP as the Netherlands with ten times the population.” The faltering government of Russia and the past communist dictatorships have left a power vacuum, which can hinder Russia’s ability to control its WMDs. Lee asserts that an example of Russia’s ability to control its nuclear arsenal is seen in the “soaring illegal traffic in radioactive isotopes and other nuclear material that originates principally in nuclear complexes in former Soviet states.” The possibility that completed nuclear weapons are available on the black market should not be ignored. This possibility is due in large measure to the current state of decay in the Russian nuclear

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The Activities of Transnational Organized Crime

The French navy frigate FS Commandant Ducuing (right) prepares to board a British ship as part of visit, board, search, and seizure training in the Persian Gulf on October 30, 2006, as part of exercise Leading Edge 2007, a multi-nation security initiative to stop the trafficking of WMDs. (Department of Defense)

establishment, which can be attributed to the privatization of the Russian nuclear complex and has resulted in wide-scale corruption, insider threats, and criminal conspiracies. The active trafficking in fissile material on a global scale would, no doubt, require the collaboration between nuclear plant managers, corrupt government officials, and international crime groups. Thus, although there is evidence that only small groups are trafficking in fissile material, there is also logical evidence that this cannot be the case in all circumstances. Trafficking in Persons and Human Body Parts Humans have been trafficked as far back as recorded history. The original use of the term “slave trade” includes the white slave trade, or women being transported for the purpose of forced prostitution. The Mann Act of 1910 was one of the earliest laws promulgated for the sole purpose of preventing the trafficking of women for prostitution.

There are several areas of trafficking in persons that are on the rise: 1. The transport of illegal immigrants with resulting involuntary servitude. 2. The transport of women for the purposes of prostitution. 3. The transport of household workers. 4. The transport of children for the purpose of illegal adoption.

Ko-Lin Chin asserts that international crime organizations, and Chinese organizations in particular, conduct much of the illegal transportation in persons. The people being trafficked illegally today are those who have few skills and no political clout, and they are forming a new class of illegal aliens in the United States. Their movement into the United States and other countries, however, has not proven to be problematic for law enforcement, given the lax enforcement standards. 33

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Mueller asserts that “a number of States have dealt unsuccessfully with the influx of illegal immigrants, turning them from an economic liability to an asset, with little if any impact on the crime rate.” Thus, although there is a plethora of local, national, and international laws in place to prevent the trafficking of persons, the enforcement of these laws has been shown to be relatively lax. The demand for various body parts is much greater than the number of body parts available for transplant. The number of donors in the United States is estimated at 12,000, with 35,000 people currently on waiting lists. According to C. Moors, there is evidence of illicit organ transplanting occurring in the United States, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Turkey, India, England, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, China, and South Africa. The seriousness of this elusive and relatively unresearched phenomenon is highlighted by the fact that several commissions have been created to investigate the illicit trade in human body parts on the international level. Some of these commissions have passed regulations of various sorts, but the enforcement of these regulations is questionable. Sea Piracy Although sea piracy still receives little empirical attention, it is resurfacing as an increasingly sophisticated activity perpetrated by organized criminals. An example of this activity is occurring with the drug cartels of Latin America that, in the past, relied heavily on confiscated vessels, but only after their passengers and crews were killed. According to Mueller, “Several thousand vessels were victimized. As the drug trade became prosperous, it could rely on purchased or (illegally) chartered vessels.” Shipping companies today contract out private security forces or mercenaries for their vessels traveling in pirate waters. According to Mueller, although this is a worldwide phenomenon, the “appearance of piracy in so many parts of the world cannot be attributed to a single organization; it remains a criminological challenge. Obviously, the pirates of the various affected maritime sites do operate as criminal gangs.”

Money Laundering Money laundering is the act of making illicit funds appear to be legitimate sources of revenue. The following is a story from S. Einstein and M. Amir of how and why money laundering is a common practice in the operational reality of international crime organizations: Consider that, in a little village, a poor householder has been struggling for years to patch his roof and feed his cow. All of a sudden, he orders the roofer to put a new roof on his cottage. He also buys a car and sends his kids to summer camp. The villagers ask the question: “Where does the sudden wealth come from?” And so it is nationally and internationally, but the villagers’ curiosity is augmented by laws requiring the divulgence of bank deposits of $10,000.00 or more, and by many other legislative devices. Consider now that a considerable part of the financial gain of the world’s citizens is ill-gotten, for example by bribery, corruption, black market activities and transactions outside the tax laws, and especially by dealing in contraband—weapons, stolen goods, art and cultural heritage, and particularly drugs.

This same concept can be applied to the massive global drug markets. Drug cartels are making hundreds of billions of dollars annually. How can these groups possibly show all of this money to be legitimate revenue? There are many methods and schemes for laundering money. Three of the most famous are bogus real estate investments, purchases of bars of “gold” that are actually painted bars of lead, and real and fictitious sales of art. What each of these methods has in common is an investment that appears to be legitimate. This appearance of a legitimate investment is what accounts for the large amount of money that is made. It is as though these groups simply make wise investments on an ongoing basis. Probably the most widely used method of money laundering is the transfer of money out of the country in which the money was made (by air, sea, land, or the Internet). This cash is then deposited abroad. Next there are a series of international money transfers until it is virtually impossible to track the trail of money. There is a great deal of disagreement between scholars as to the true extent of

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money laundering. What is generally agreed upon is that money laundering activities have an effect on the international economy, the ramifications of which were discussed earlier.

Cushman, J. H. “U.S. Study Sees China As a Top Arms Dealer.” New York Times, 12 May 1988. Einstein, S., and M. Amir. Organized Crime: Uncertainties and Dilemmas. Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, 1999. Farer, T., ed. Transnational Crime in the Americas. New York: Routledge, 1999. Godson, R., and W. J. Olson. International Organized Crime. Washington, DC: Society, 1995. Hess, D., K. Meyers, M. Gideon, S. Gomez, and J. Daly. “Italian Organized Crime and Money Laundering.” Pp. 345–406 in Organized Crime: Uncertainties and Dilemmas, edited by S. Einstein and M. Amir. Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, 1999. Jamieson, A. “Transnational Italian Organized Crime.” Transnational Organized Crime 1(2) (1996): 151–165. Lee, R. W., III. “Transnational Organized Crime: An Overview.” Pp. 1–38 in Transnational Crime in the Americas, edited by T. Farer. New York: Routledge, 1999. Martin, J. M., and A. T. Romano. Multinational Crime: Terrorism, Espionage, Drug and Arms Trafficking. London: Sage Publications, 1992. Moors, C. “Body Brokers in Organ Trafficking.” Crime and Justice International: Worldwide News and Trends 15(52) (2001): 5–6, 22–25. Mueller, G. O. W. “Transnational Crime: An Experience in Uncertainties.” Pp. 3–18 in Organized Crime: Uncertainties and Dilemmas, edited by S. Einstein and M. Amir. Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, 1999. Sampson, A. The Arms Bazaar: From Lebanon to Lockheed. New York: Viking, 1977.

Computer Crime One of the prerequisites for laundering money is the use (or abuse) of computer technology. Computers are used widely by both legitimate and illegitimate markets and are just as accessible to crime organizations as they are to the legitimate world. Although the common perception is that organized crime groups operate via word of mouth and the telephone, computers greatly enhance the ability of international crime groups to communicate worldwide via encrypted technologies and nonencrypted communications. G. Mueller estimated in 1995 that the amount of money lost via illicit computer transactions was up to $8 billion annually, with Australia alone losing an estimated $700 million annually. Although this estimate is dated, the amount of money lost annually to illicit computer transactions can only increase as the Internet becomes more available to the world’s population. Infiltration into Legal Businesses This is the last activity addressed in the taxonomy of organized crime activity because it is the foundation of a highly complex international crime organization. When an organized crime group infiltrates legitimate businesses and economies, it moves from being a purely illicit organization to appearing to be a legitimate organization, which often occurs when organized crime groups utilize front companies. Although there is no evidence, either quantitatively or qualitatively, as to the severity of this infiltration, the amount of money being made in the illicit drug markets ($500 billion annually) is a sign that there most certainly is money to be invested in legitimate businesses and economies. References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime. 7th ed. New York: Nelson-Hall, 2002. Chin, Ko-Lin. Chinese Subculture and Criminality: Non-traditional Crime Groups in America. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1990.

Causation Theories and Concepts of Organized Criminal Behavior Vincenzo Ruggiero If we accept a common distinction, we can identify three types of organized crime: predatory, parasitic, and symbiotic. Causation theories, inevitably, will vary according to the type under consideration. Organized crime that is mainly predatory in character might be explained through causation theories revolving around notions of strain, subculture, or relative deprivation. Even when the purely predatory element evolves into some form of illicit business, such as the distribution of prohibited goods and services, such theories may still claim a degree 35

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of validity. See, for example, R. Merton’s formulation, whereby individuals and groups who share institutionally acceptable goals (money and success) but do not posses the legitimate means to pursue them will resort to illegitimate means as a form of deviant adaptation. In this way, they innovate, or reinvent, the possible manners to achieve wealth and reputation. When applying this formula to Al Capone, Merton describes the notorious gangster as an example of the triumph of amorality over morally prescribed failure. In its parasitic form, organized crime is equated to a mere service-providing organization. Among the goods provided, trust and protection are singled out as paramount. These, which should be supplied by the state, may under certain circumstances become the preserve of private, if unlawful, entrepreneurs. Organized crime, in this perspective, is an industry for the supply of private protection and the distribution of trust to economic actors who would otherwise be unable to interact safely. Organized crime, in brief, is regarded as a counterpower replacing the authority gap left by an ineffective state. Finally, when faced with symbiotic forms of organized crime, namely with criminal entrepreneurs gaining access to the legitimate economy and the official political arena, causation theories may experience serious difficulties. Eclecticism in such cases may prevail because this type of organized crime may be explained through a combination of subculture, differential association, strain, and, as stressed above, the inadequacy of the state or the lack of a proper entrepreneurial culture. But let us now summarize, in more general terms, the contribution of criminological theory to the analysis of organized crime. An Overview of Etiology When early positivist criminologists discussed organized crime, the emphasis was placed on tradition, which supposedly plays a crucial role in its perpetuation. As Cesare Lombroso argued, “It seems to me that the high persistence of some wicked associations such as the Mafia, the Camorra and brigandage depends first of all on their longterm existence, in that the continuous repetition of

Cesare Lombroso (1835–1909), Italian criminologist and founder of the Italian School of Positivist Criminology. (Library of Congress)

our acts transforms these acts into a custom and therefore into a norm.” Lombroso’s argument sounds very familiar, as it echoes some contemporary analysis that explains the persistence of organized crime by resorting to variables such as backwardness or archaism. Other comments made by Lombroso on the subject matter sound even more familiar: for example, that the perpetuation of organized crime is also due to the lack of stigma attached to the very concept of mafioso. The author notes that the mafiosi are not regarded as individuals belonging to a distant and censurable social universe: in the local popular culture “they are not associated with immorality, nor do they elicit contempt.” Moreover, it is noteworthy that Lombroso, when trying to explain the extraordinary longevity of organized crime in Italy, indicates a strong causality in what he terms the “inadequate governments, which do not rule according to justice, and in a sense make it necessary and useful that people exercise and implement their own justice.” Here, we are in the domain of some theories mentioned above, according to

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which organized crime thrives where the state is absent or is characterized by an authority deficit. Related to these are control theories, which posit that deviant acts are the result of weak individual bonds to society. This causation, however, would imply that organized crime is unable to establish any meaningful relationship with the official society. On the contrary, Merton’s deviant adaptations of the innovative type, as we have seen, suggest that organized criminals are far from displaying weak bonds to the official world, as they share societal values and goals despite pursuing them through illicit means. The dominant culture, Merton argues, makes incompatible demands on those who occupy the lower strata in society: “On the one hand, they are asked to orient their conduct toward the prospect of large wealth, and on the other, they are largely denied effective opportunities to do so institutionally.” Chicago School theorists formulate the notion of social disorganization, which crucially attributes the emergence of organized crime to the decline of informal social control on the one hand and the emergence of homogenous social and cultural enclaves on the other. According to this theory, the degree of organization of illegal structures (be they youth gangs, groups of pimps, gambling syndicates, or others) is dependent on the degree of disorganization of society. In other words, their organization is a function of the distance separating them from other social groups. Sociological studies conducted in Chicago’s delinquent areas unveiled microsocieties of immigrants that were perfectly organized. Deviance, in this perspective, endorses a surrogate social order, a vicarious system that is nevertheless a social system in its own right. In this system, it is perfectly logical that a gangster is not met with disapproval. He is a product of his surroundings in the same way in which good citizens are the product of their environment. Therefore, the problem is not the lack of organization within those particular microsocieties but rather the lack of meaningful communication between these enclaves and society as a whole. Finally, among the analyses offered by sociocriminological literature, subcultural theories should be mentioned. Derived from Merton’s

structural anomic theories and in debt to Edwin H. Sutherland for their emphasis on the learning dimension of criminal conduct, these theories seem to constitute an inexhaustible explanatory source for students of organized crime. Criminal groups are said to adopt criminal solutions to resolve their status problems. They adhere to a delinquent subculture that can provide them with accessible opportunities. Moreover, criminal behavior is learned in a communicative process in which both the techniques and the rationalizations for one’s illegality are slowly acquired. It should be noted that most explanations mentioned so far revolve around notions of deficit, deficiency, and inadequacy. These notions tend to associate all antisocial conducts with a condition of disadvantage, be it economic, cultural, or psychological. In this respect, during the course of an entire century, the etiology of organized crime only moved a few steps forward, as some early positivist tenets, when updated with new linguistic expressions, seem to survive intact in our time. Categories such as low self-control also fall within this paradigm and are applied to all sorts of criminal conduct. As noted by prominent criminologists Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi, “We do believe that there is no need for theories designed specifically to account for gang crime, organized crime, or professional criminals. The theory of crime and self-control is capable of accounting for the facts about ‘organized’ crime.” In brief, according to this causation theory, all criminal conduct is to be imputed to lack of selfcontrol, which characterizes individuals who are prone to physicality, and therefore are unable to postpone gratification, and tend to blame other people first and themselves last. These psychological traits are said to denote not only organized crime but also criminal conduct in general. Criminal Enterprise Authors who are dissatisfied with these explanations argue that theories based on deficit can hardly explain the type of organized crime that develops in affluent societies. In such societies, organized illegal activities seem less the result of poverty, underdevelopment, or lack of self-control than of their 37

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opposites: affluence, development, and the control of resources. The paradigm of deficit, therefore, is said to remain prevalent only in that it provides an irreplaceable ideological device. Social disadvantage, lack of socialization, control deficit, and so on are suitable analytical tools only when one tries to depict organized crime as a distinctive form of social pathology. On the other hand, these tools are ineffective when this type of crime is explained with reference to the ordinary relationships among people and within the normal conditions of the economy. Conventional commentators focus their analysis on the internal relationships within organized groups, hence the emphasis on entities such as crime families, clans, and similar close-knit units. They neglect the fact that in order to reproduce itself, organized crime is bound to establish some external relationships with society at large. The nature and strength of these external relationships may better explain the social and institutional power of organized groups along with their longevity. In this perspective, organized crime can be interpreted as a coalition, as in the research conducted by W. Chambliss, consisting of “politicians, law enforcement people, businessmen, union leaders, and (in some ways least important of all) racketeers.” Subcultural theorists were aware of this aspect of organized crime, although they perhaps failed to draw a logical conclusion from it. Apprentice criminals, some have argued, pass from one status to another in the illegitimate opportunity system, and as they do so they develop a set of relationships with members of the legitimate world. Unless they can form these relationships, the possibility of a stable, protected criminal style of life is effectively precluded. In other words, organized crime can reproduce itself less because crime families maintain their close-knit structures and distinctive subcultures than because they dissolve within the dominant social structure and culture. In fact, the more they do so, the more their criminal opportunities may increase. New skills may be acquired as licit and illicit activities mutually enhance each other. This aspect was highlighted in a 1993 report by the Pennsylvania Crime Commission in which concerns were aired about the

“benign attitudes” displayed by local communities toward racketeering groups. These attitudes were chastised not so much for fostering distrust in the legitimate governmental processes as for permitting racketeers to grow powerful enough to enter into the official economy. “Infiltration of legitimate business” was feared as a synonym for more possibilities to engage in crime. Many of the controversial issues outlined so far stem from the difficulties often met by students of organized crime. As A. Block puts it, the study of organized crime has been fascinated by conspiracy theory, a fascination that leads to the depiction of monolithic, impenetrable, culturally hermetic groups of criminals. He also suggests that the term “organized crime” should be abandoned altogether in favor of the term “illegal enterprises.” This approach is implicitly adopted by scholars analyzing organized crime, and crime in general, as economic activity. Some economists such as R. Andreano and J. Siegfried note that the basic premise of sociological work on crime is that criminals are somehow different from noncriminals, and the major research consists of the ways in which criminals differ. Assuming a rationality to human behavior, such economists argue that criminals should also be acknowledged as being endowed with principles guiding the rationality of their action. In other words, all actors involved in the crime sector of the economy “are consciously or subconsciously weighing the costs and benefits of their actions and making explicit choices among alternatives.” Criminologists and sociologists who have adopted economic variables for the explanation of organized crime include P. Arlacchi, who indicates that “mafia business” develops thanks to partnerships established with corrupt politicians and businesspeople. Many other authors focus on the environment surrounding organized crime to pinpoint the entrepreneurial and political culture conducive to the development of organized forms of criminal enterprise. What most such authors appear to have in common is a perception of the official economy and the official political arena as overworlds that are unable to clearly identify acceptable and unacceptable practices, hence the possibility for organized crime to create remunerative links between

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such fuzzy overworlds and their own criminal underworld. References Arlacchi, P. La mafia imprenditrice. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1983. Andreano, R., and J. Siegfried, eds. The Economics of Crime. New York: Wiley, 1980. Block, A. Perspectives on Organizing Crime. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991. Chambliss, W. On the Take: From Petty Crooks to Presidents. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978. Gambetta, D. La mafia siciliana: Un’industria della protezione privata, Turin: Einaudi, 1992. Gottfredson, Michael R., and Travis Hirschi. A General Theory of Crime. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990. Lombroso, C. L’uomo delinquente. 1876. Reprint, Turin: Bocca, 1971. Merton, R. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press, 1968. Pennsylvania Crime Commission. 1992 Report. Conshohocken: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1993. Ruggiero, V. Crime and Markets. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. ———. Organized and Corporate Crime in Europe. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996. Sutherland, Edwin H. Criminology. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1974.

Characteristics and Operational Tactics of Organized Crime Hua-Lun Huang Defining Organized Crime Seems to Have Become a Sisyphean Job Organized crime has been a hot and fascinating topic in criminology and criminal justice since the late 1920s, when tong fights, piracy, gang wars, and many other organized crime activities were examined by Asbury Herbert. Because of this heavyweight status, numerous books and articles on structured gangs in general and organized crime in particular have been published in the past seven decades. Although many scholars have addressed the subject of organized crime, the definition of the concept of organized crime seems to still be highly controversial among diverse scholars and law

enforcement officials. For example, Maximilian Edelbacher in his paper on organized crime in Austria indicated that “there is no definition that is accepted by all Europeans.” With this in mind, a less controversial way to describe the notion of organized crime is to identify its fundamental features instead of formulating a unanimous definition, which appears to be an endless, if not hopeless, job. Based on this quality-centered approach, previous studies on organized crime will supplement each other. The central problem of the concept of meaning variance, as described by Thomas S. Kuhn, that is often associated with the idea of organized crime may also be minimized. The Cardinal Characteristics of Organized Crime Organized crime is not new to many parts of Asia, Europe, Africa, and America. For instance, as early as the Warring States (481–221 B.C.), organized bandit groups had already appeared in China. During the Dark and Middle Ages, numerous people of Europe and North Africa witnessed plunder and destruction caused by bandits, the Vikings, and countless desperados. Buccaneers, pirates, and privateers played a very important politico-economic role in North Africa, South Europe, and North America in the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries. In the twentieth century, drug rings, human smuggling gangs, underground sex industries, armed pirates, swindle blocs, and many other organized crime groups, to a varying extent, were still active in America and many other countries. All of these underground or illegitimate elements, of course, have been heterogeneous regarding activities, power, leadership styles, initiation ceremonies, and life span. However, such historical and modern organized outlaws, in terms of cultural and socioeconomic factors, have shared certain cardinal qualities. These qualities can be summarized as follows. First, in terms of gender roles (one of the most important factors shaped by culture), the great majority of historical and modern organized crime figures are males. This phenomenon may be due to the situation that androcracy and patriarchy, after 39

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years of being criticized or even challenged, still serve as the rules that dominate gender relationships. Because of these rules, males tend to enjoy dominant statuses and are expected to play the roles of adventurer, supplier, protector, and decision maker. These statuses and roles, in turn, allow males to control more material and symbolic resources (particularly money and power) and to explore new businesses, including illegal ones. Besides androcracy and patriarchy, the formation of organized crime enterprises or companies is related more often than not to three socioeconomic factors, namely the availability of suitable targets, the appearance of criminal opportunities, and the absence of capable guardians. The first of these three factors refers to those people and practices that will allow underground elements to gain and take advantage of economic profits. For example, in terms of people, some undocumented Chinese of coastal provinces want to go America, Japan, or Taiwan to better their lives. To “help” these illegal Chinese immigrants to go overseas, some loosely structured human smuggling rings in America, China, Japan, and Taiwan have established legitimate employment agencies, travel agencies, or manpower companies. Most of these agencies or companies run by outlaws and gang members soon evolve into organized crime strongholds. In terms of practices, a number of routinized industrial and commercial rackets permit gangsters to obtain colossal benefits, as can be exemplified by the waterfront corruption on the Gulf Coast. Such gangsters, under the patronage of some corrupt law enforcement agents, almost immediately became organized crime figures as well. In addition to suitable targets, some countries and areas in the modern world provide outlaws abundant opportunities to develop their businesses. These countries (e.g., Russia and the former Soviet Republics) or regions (e.g., the border areas between America and Mexico or the coastal provinces of China) usually become havens for organized crime groups, particularly for transnational organized crime syndicates, because of widespread corruption, underdeveloped legal systems, characteristics of the natural environment, guerrilla and terrorist movements, civil wars, and so forth.

Ineffective police forces and legal loopholes (i.e., absence of capable guardians), in turn, pave the way for organized crime to survive, expand, or even become institutionalized. Operational Tactics of Organized Crime Groups From the perspective of origin, there are some required cultural and socioeconomic conditions necessary for organized crime groups to form and survive. On the other hand, organized crime associations need to devise and follow certain tactics of operation to safeguard their continuation. In this regard, at least two operational tactics are especially noteworthy. First, as the Mafia families of America were disintegrated, if not eradicated, by the authorities after the 1980s, modern organized crime bosses tended to lead in an absentee fashion. That is, based on the decline of the American Mafia, many organized crime bosses seem to have learned the lesson that it is not safe to establish headquarters and run businesses on the soil of highly industrialized countries, particularly America. Because of this awareness, many big brothers of modern organized crime groups have chosen to reside in developing or economically backward countries such as Mexico, Cambodia, Colombia, China, and Morocco, where laws against organized crime seem to be incomplete or lacking. From these developing countries, organized crime figures will direct their little brothers in the developed and economically advanced nations. With this division of labor, numerous core members of organized crime are able to keep their mob identities low-profile and avoid getting into any legal troubles. Closely related to the operational strategy of absentee leadership is the crime of identity theft. As just mentioned, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for organized crime syndicates to operate in highly industrialized countries such as America. Such a barrier motivates many organized gangs to use con games, electric fraud, or mail theft to steal social security numbers, credit card numbers, and other private information. The confidential data obtained from phishing or similar techniques will then be used by organized crime blocs to acquire

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Organized crime boss John Joseph Gotti Jr., aka “The Dapper Don,” poses for a mugshot in New York City. Gotti’s conspicuous leadership of the Gambino crime family in the 1980s coincided with the increased prosecution and steady decline of the Mafia in the United States; he died in prison on June 10, 2002. (Getty Images)

luxury goods, launder money, smuggle people, and commit usury and many other financial crimes. References Billingsley, Phil. Bandits in Republican China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988. Chin, Ko-Lin. Smuggled Chinese: Clandestine Immigration to the United States. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999. Cohat, Yves. The Vikings: Lords of the Seas. Translated by Ruth Daniel. New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1992. Edelbacher, Maximilian. “Organized Crime: An Austrian Perspective.” Pp. 249–269 in Organized Crime: Uncertainties and Dilemmas, edited by Stanley Einstein and Menachem Amir. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999. Einstein, Stanley, and Menachem Amir, ed. Organized Crime: Uncertainties and Dilemmas.

Chicago: University of Illinois Chicago Press, 1999. Herbert, Asbury. The French Quarter: An Informal History of the New Orleans Underworld. 1936. Reprint, New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2003. ———. The Gangs of New York: An Informal History of the Underworld. 1928. Reprint, New York: Paragon House, 1990. ———. The Gangs of Chicago: An Informal History of the Chicago Underworld. New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2002. Kuhn, Thomas S. The Road since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970–1993, with an Autobiographical Interview. Edited by James Conant and John Haugeland. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. McCall, Andrew. The Medieval Underworld. New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1993. Pennell, C. R. Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader. New York: New York University Press, 2001. 41

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Woodiwiss, Michael. Organized Crime and American Power: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001.

Concept of Transnational Organized Crime Nathan Moran Introduction to the Concept of Transnational Organized Crime The concept of transnational organized crime was first introduced in a 1975 professional conference in Geneva at the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders. Agenda Item 5 of the congress addressed “Changes in Forms and Dimensions of Criminality International and National.” This congress similarly addressed the topic of “Violence of International and Comparative International Significance.” The concept of international organized crime has become of increased concern and debate in the international, national, regional, and local communities and by practitioners and scholars alike. M. Cherif Bassiouni and Eduardo Vetere provide evidence of this growing concern in a compilation of all the documents promulgated by the United Nations (UN) between 1975 and 1998. In this book the authors identify more than seventy UN congresses held to specifically address the issue of international organized crime. There are many reasons that international organized crime has become such a global hot-button issue. One of the primary reasons comes from transformations in the global economy that are changing the world in a manner conducive to the development of international organized crime. These transformations have spawned various threats to world order and specifically to nations and states. International crime organizations have complicated relationships both between and within countries. For instance, Colombian drug cartels are drastically changing the political process both inside and outside of Colombia. This in turn debilitates the viability of political representation and ultimately undermines the rule of law. Transformations in the global economy are also making the

trafficking in weapons, drugs, humans, and other illicit and licit commodities a very lucrative business. Indeed, the consequences of the illicit global economy are already being felt, and the impact can only increase as time progresses. International organized crime merits an important position on the agenda of international crime and globalization issues. According to T. Farer, it is the “juxtaposition of powerful crime organizations and weak states [that] poses subtle threats to government authority and legitimacy, and to the operation of free markets in these countries.” It is an accurate statement to assert that international organized crime is a chameleon. You see it when you do not know it, and it can appear to be something else (e.g., licit rather than illicit). The activities perpetrated by international crime groups vary widely and include drug trafficking, weapons trafficking, human trafficking, sea piracy, trade in human body parts, money laundering, computer crime, and infiltrating legal businesses. Background and Trends in International Organized Crime: The Players There are a plethora of international crime groups in existence today. Some include the Colombian drug cartels (Medellin and Cali), Chinese organized crime (Triads, Tongs, and criminal street gangs), Russian organized crime (Russian Mafiya), Japanese organized crime (Yamaguchi-gumi and the Sumiyoshi-rengo Boryokudans), and Mexican cartels (Juarez, Tijuana, Guadalajara, and Gulf ). Global organized crime groups exist in many countries that are not as well known for organized crime activity, including Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Burma (Myanmar), Pakistan, Israel, Albania, Nigeria, and Jamaica. Organized crime and international crime organizations are operating in almost every industrialized country. The major and minor players differ in terms of size, wealth, cohesion, licit and illicit activities, their international links, and the threat they pose. Threats Posed by International Organized Crime International organized crime poses many threats to the domestic United States as well as the inter-

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national community. They include challenges to institutional order, political pressure, economic coercion, and the outputs corresponding with these threats. Each of these has destructive potential that can disturb the international order. References Bassiouni, M. Cherif, and Eduardo Vetere. Organized Crime: A Compilation of U.N. Documents, 1975– 1998. Ardsley, NY: Transnational, 1993. Chin, Ko-Lin. Chinese Subculture and Criminality: Non-traditional Crime Groups in America. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1990. Farer, T., ed. Transnational Crime in the Americas. New York: Routledge, 1999. Frieman, H. R. “Obstructing Markets: Organized Crime Networks and Drug Control in Japan.” Pp. 173–198 in The Illicit Global Economy and State Power, edited by H. R. Friman and P. Andreas. Boston: Rowan and Littlefield, 1999. Friman, H. R., and P. Andreas, eds. The Illicit Global Economy and State Power. Boston: Rowan and Littlefield, 1999. Helleiner, E. “State Power and the Regulation of Illicit Activity in Global Finance.” Pp. 53–90 in The Illicit Global Economy and State Power, edited by H. R. Friman and P. Andreas. Boston: Rowan and Littlefield, 1999. Mueller, G. O. W. “Transnational Crime: An Experience in Uncertainties.” Pp. 3–18 in Organized Crime: Uncertainties and Dilemmas, edited by S. Einstein and M. Amir. Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, 1999. Richards, J. R. Transnational Criminals Organizations, Cyber Crime, and Moneylaundering. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1999. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. Report prepared by the secretariat, A/CONF.56/10, 1976. Viano, E. Global Organized Crime and International Security. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999. Ward, R. H. “The Internationalization of Criminal Justice.” Pp. 267–322 in Boundary Changes in Criminal Justice Organizations, vol. 2, edited by C. M. Friel. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2000. Williams, Phil. “Getting Rich and Getting Even: Transnational Threats in the Twenty-first Century.” Pp. 19–63 in, Organized Crime: Uncertainties and Dilemmas, edited by S. Einstein and M. Amir. Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, 1999.

Defining Organized Crime: Economic, Legal, and Social Factors Nathan Moran Research on organized crime has been complicated by a myriad of definitions on the subject. Definitions vary in form and include societal definitions, which are largely driven by the media, governmental definitions, and criminological definitions. However, there has not yet been a definition developed that is adequate for empirical research. The use of anecdotal observations as scientific evidence is contrary to the scientific principles of objective, rigorous research that is premised upon both the philosophy of science and the scientific process. Definitions of organized crime are fluid, vary from researcher to researcher, and are contingent upon whether the research target is local, national, global, or a mix of the three. Organized crime has historically been described in terms of the traditional or familial crime syndicates, which have been broadly labeled La Cosa Nostra, the mob, and the Mafia. Largely because of drug, arms, and human trafficking, this perspective has changed somewhat in the last twenty years to include characteristics such as South American cartels (e.g., the Medellin or Cali cartels) and Asian organized crime groups (e.g., the Triads, Yakuza, and Tongs). Definitional Issues The primary organizational definitions fall into two categories: governmental and academic. Governmental Definitions Governmental entities that have attempted to define organized crime include the 1976 Organized Crime Task Force, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Interpol, the German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), the Centrale Recherche Informatiedienst (Central Police Investigation Information Service or Dutch Central Investigation Agency Service, CRI), and entities in many other countries, states, and institutions that are having to define organized crime in an attempt to police, investigate, or otherwise deal with organized crime. Governmental definitions of organized crime differ from academic or criminological definitions in that 43

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Mafia leaders under house arrest on the island of Linosa, near Sicily, in 1971: (left to right) Mosario Mancino, Salvatore Sanfilippo, Calogero Migliore, Giuseppe Sirchia, Rosario Riccobono, and Vincenzo Parlapiano. With the rise of Latin American, Russian, and Asian crime groups in recent decades, the traditional perception of organized crime as a familial, largely Italian, phenomena is changing. (Getty Images)

they tend to be specific to organizational goals and lack conceptual operationalization. These goals tend to be driven by politicians, the media, and society. Many of these definitions take the form of a listing approach, as do many academic definitions, in which the characteristics of the organized crime groups or individuals are simply numerically or alphabetically listed. This listing procedure, however, has been criticized as being overly simplistic considering the extreme complexity of transnational organized crime. The 1976 Organized Crime Task Force The 1976 Organized Crime Task Force adopted the listing approach when it defined organized crime as consisting of “two or more persons, who with conti-

nuity of purpose, engage in one or more of the following activities: (1) the supplying of illegal goods and services, i.e., vice, loan-sharking, etc.; (2) predatory crime, i.e., theft, assault, etc. Several distinct types of criminal activity fall within this definition of organized crime. The types may be grouped into five general categories: racketeering, vice-operations, theft/fence rings, gangs, and terrorists.” This definition of organized crime incorporates a list of attributes in paragraph form. Furthermore, this definition is outdated by a full generation and by new forms of organized criminal activity. The definition cannot account for the changing nature of the Italian Mafia, the rise of drug lords, the movement of the drug lords toward transnational-

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ity, and the full-scale globalization of organized crime. The task force’s definition lacks a comprehensive focus that accounts for changes in organized crime activities. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation According to H. Abadinsky, the FBI adopts a different approach in its definition of organized crime: “Any group having some manner of formalized structure and whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Such groups maintain their position through the use of violence or threats of violence, corrupt public officials, graft, or extortions, and generally have a significant impact on the people in their locales or regions of the country.” The FBI’s definition focuses on the traditional activities of organized criminals to maintain the group and further its goal: to make money. However, the focus on traditional activities is noninclusive of more advanced forms of organized crime that utilize activities other than those listed in furtherance of their organizational goals. This is a disadvantage that is insufficient for an empirical study of transnational organized crime, although it may be operationally sufficient for the FBI as an investigative agency. Interpol According to P. J. Ryan and G. E. Rush, Interpol maintains a similar approach to that of the FBI in defining organized crime: “Any enterprise or group of persons engaged in a continuing illegal activity which has as its primary purpose the generation of profits and continuance of the enterprise regardless of national boundaries.” The Interpol definition focuses on the structure of the group but not on the acts that are used to further the goals of the group. The Interpol definition does, however, incorporate a critical concept in the study of transnational organized crime: the continuance of the organization regardless of national boundaries. The German Bundeskriminalamt The BKA, which is the German national police force, defines organized crime as “the planned

commission of criminal offenses, determined by the pursuit of profit and power, involving more than two persons over a prolonged or indefinite period of time, using a commercial or business license scheme, violence, and/or intimidation.” In this definition the BKA focuses on one aspect of the group (“more than two persons over a prolonged or indefinite period of time”), two goals (profit and power), and three methods to achieve those goals (a commercial business license scheme, violence, or intimidation). The BKA’s definition is limiting in the sense that for any organized crime organization there is more than one aspect of the group, there are more than two organizational goals, and there are more than three methods of achieving those goals. Thus, there exist many organized crime groups that do not fit this very narrow definition of organized crime. The Dutch Centrale Recherche Informatienest The CRI utilizes a unique approach in defining organized crime that is useful not only for the investigation of organized crime but also for empirical studies. The CRI utilizes a Likert scaling procedure that consists of eight progressive elements focusing on both the group and the group’s activities: 1 = any hierarchical structure 2 = internal support 3 = money laundering 4 = corruption and bribery of legal system officials 5 = involvement in more than one illegal activity 6 = organizations that hide behind front companies 7 = criminal activities which take place over a long period of time 8 = members who act violently against competitors

Using these eight elements, the CRI has created a scale as to the intensity or degree of organized criminal activities and organizational structure. Thus, organized criminal activity on the scale of 1 and 2 represent a low-level organized crime group, 3–5 represents a moderately sophisticated group, and 6–8 represents a highly organized, highly sophisticated organized crime organization. This approach, however, is lacking conceptual clarity and operationalization and in the strictest sense is not a definition of organized crime. 45

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Academic Definitions Definitions of organized crime that are academic or criminological tend to be developed via empirical studies and results and differ dramatically from governmental definitions of organized crime, which tend to be driven by political concerns, the media, and society. Donald Cressey Donald Cressey, in his 1969 book Theft of the Nation: The Structure and Operation of Organized Crime in America, defined organized crime as “any crime committed by a person occupying, in an established division of labor, a position designed for the commission of crime providing that such division of labor also includes at least one position for a corruptor, one position for the corruptee, and one position for an enforcer.” Cressey’s definition was developed from a perspective that is less concerned with the criminal activities themselves than with the perpetrators of the crime. In doing so, he contributed a great deal to the empirical study of organized crime, but he does not include the criminal activities themselves. Michael Maltz In 1976 Michael Maltz published an article specifically addressing issues and difficulties in defining the term “organized crime.” He focused on issues of semantics (e.g., the incongruities in how a specific organized criminal act is referred to as organized crime, but when general organized crime issues are being discussed they are referred to as entities or groups). Maltz addresses the organizational aspects more than the committed behaviors and is specifically concerned with the dynamics of the organized crime group by way of its means (e.g., violence, theft, corruption, economic coercion, deception, and victim participation) and ends (e.g., economic and political objectives). He defined organized crime as “a transaction proscribed by criminal law between offender(s) and victim(s). It is not necessary for the victim to be a complainant or to consider himself victimized for a crime to be committed. An organized crime is a crime in which there is more than one offender, and the offenders are and intend to remain associ-

ated with one another for the purpose of committing crimes. The means of executing the crime include violence, theft, corruption, economic power, deception, and victim participation. These are not mutually exclusive categories; any organized crime may employ a number of these means.” The objective of most organized crimes is power, either political or economic. These two types of objectives are also not mutually exclusive and may coexist in any organized crime. Maltz created one of the first criminological definitions that is applicable to the empirical study of organized crime. However, Abadinsky criticized Maltz’s definition as being “quite broad—it fails to provide a basis for distinguishing between the James Gang (of ‘Wild West’ fame) and the Capone organization (of Prohibition fame).” Abadinsky notes that when Jesse James was killed his organization ended, but when Capone was imprisoned his organization continued for fifty years after the end of Prohibition. Thus, although Maltz provides a model for a definition of organized crime that can be used in empirical research, it is still lacking. Howard Abadinsky Howard Abadinsky attempted to define organized crime on the basis of the strengths of past definitions while reducing the weaknesses. He defines organized crime as: a nonideological enterprise involving a number of persons in close social interaction, organized on a hierarchical basis with at least three levels/ranks, for the purpose of securing profit and power by engaging in illegal and legal activities. Positions in the hierarchy and positions involving functional specialization may be assigned on the basis of kinship or friendship, or rationally assigned according to skill. The positions are not dependent on the individuals occupying them at any particular time. Permanency is assumed by the members who strive to keep the enterprise integral and active in pursuit of its goals. Organized crime eschews competition and strives for monopoly on an industry or territorial basis. Organized crime is willing to use violence and/or bribery to achieve ends or to maintain discipline. Membership is restricted, although nonmembers may be involved on a contin-

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gency basis. There are explicit rules, oral or written, particularly involving the need for secrecy, which are enforced by sanctions that include murder.

Cressey, D. R. Theft of the Nation: The Structure and Operation of Organized Crime in America. New York: Harper and Row, 1969. Hagan, F. Research Methods in Criminal Justice and Criminology. 5th ed. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2002. Maltz, M. D. “On Defining Organized Crime.” Crime and Delinquency 22 (1976): 338–346. Maltz, M. D. “Toward Defining Organized Crime.” Pp. 21–35 in The Politics and Economics of Organized Crime, edited by H. E. Alexander and G. E. Caiden. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985. Moran, N. An Examination of Russian, Colombian, and Chinese Organized Crime from 1991–2001: A Time Series Analysis. PhD dissertation. Huntsville, TX: Sam Houston State University Press, 2002. Reuter, P., and C. Petrie. Transnational Organized Crime: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999. Ryan, P. J., G. E. Rush. Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspective: A Reader. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997.

Abadinsky includes the goals of the group, the structure of the group, and activities of the group and operationalizes much of what is included in this definition. Although this is the most advanced definition of organized crime to date, it is lacking insofar as the definition is specific to groups that are not operating on a transnational level. Rather, it is referring to groups that are local or national. From the perspective of this research, Abadinsky’s addition of “crossing of one or more national borders, physically or by other means,” forms a key variable. A Working Definition of Transnational Organized Crime The definition developed by Nathan Moran builds upon the previous definitions addressed above. This definition is not a new definition but rather a refinement and amalgamation of previous definitions that has been operationalized for the empirical study of transnational organized crime. The operationalized definition reads as follows: “Transnational organized crime is a crime or series of crimes that are conducted by a group of two or more people that crosses at least one national border. A transnational organized crime group is self-perpetuating and characterized by a hierarchical structure, a willingness to use force or the fear of force, and the use of bribery and/or corruption in the pursuit of illicit profit and/or power.” This working definition encompasses all of the critical components needed to conduct an empirical study of transnational organized crime. In addition, with slight modification this definition would be appropriate for national organized crime groups as well. References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime. 7th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002. Carter, D. L. “International Organized Crime: Emerging Trends in Entrepreneurial Crime.” Pp. 131–148 in Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspective: A Reader, edited by P. J. Ryan and G. E. Rush. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997.

Difficulties in Applying Generic Conceptualizations of Organized Crime to Specific National Circumstances Sappho Xenakis The twentieth century witnessed the development of the legal concept of organized crime. Stemming first from a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements and then becoming the subject of international conventions, organized crime has developed into a significant theme for international cooperation. Nevertheless, considerable ambiguity and division have remained apparent with regard to the term’s meaning and, consequently, to the implementation of approaches to combat it. “Organized crime” has continued to be used as an overwhelmingly political, all-inclusive term for a variety of criminal activities. In seeking to simplify and generalize the lessons to be learned from organized criminal activity in specific times and places, approaches to organized crime have been developed internationally that aim for universal applicability but still reflect the specificity of their origins. Several problems have arisen 47

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in the international attempt to distinguish generic conceptualizations of the nature and threat posed by organized crime and then apply these to different national settings. Defining Organized Crime: The Impact of History, Locality, and Structure International political discourse on organized crime has shifted from focusing primarily on the structure of the criminal group (a prevalent approach during the 1950s–1980s) to being concerned more with the commodities traded and their market power (since the 1990s). While the ethnicities of groups are still noted in police records internationally, an increasing concern about illicit trading has led to an effort to map broader networks of cooperation in criminal enterprise. In the mid-twentieth century, international cooperation against organized crime—in the collective sense, distinct from various crimes commonly associated with it such as drug trafficking and arms smuggling—emerged alongside the struggle to combat Mafia activity in Italy and the United States. The basis of international action against organized crime was thereby drawn from a conceptualization of a hierarchical organization of individuals engaged in monopolistic management (primarily the provision of protection) for criminal trade as well as for legitimate businesses. Organized crime was to be distinguished from crime that is organized by its specific, durable, and monopolizing intentions, characteristics that lent to it an extra level of menace than posed by less sophisticated criminal activity. There have been numerous critics of such structural interpretations of organized crime who have argued that organized crime groups may also be based around loose networks and patterns of relations rather than more rigid hierarchical groups. Recent international agreements have promoted a conceptualization of organized crime that is broader than simply Mafia-type groups and focuses more on illicit transnational commercial groups. In 1994 the World Ministerial Conference on Organised Transnational Crime drew up a series of identifying characteristics that included inter alia that the group used violence, intimidation, or corrup-

tion to earn profits, control territories or markets, and launder illicit proceeds; involved hierarchical links or personal relationships that permitted leaders to control the group; and cooperated with other transnational criminal groups. This exceedingly broad set of characteristics included all possible formulations of the notion of organized crime. The 2000 United Nations (UN) Convention against Transnational Organised Crime that replaced the World Ministerial Conference on Organised Transnational Crime was scarcely more acute. This definitional disagreement concerning the nature of organized crime and the activities that characterize it is a primary weakness of the attempt to secure a unified position against organized crime internationally. Efforts to combat the diverse phenomena included in the term do not appear to be comparably differentiated, at least at the international level. Groups that are engaging in organized criminal trade and have a weak communal or geographical basis and scant interest in the provision of protection or monopolization bear little resemblance to organized crime as Mafia-type organization and far more resemblance to gangs. Some scholars argue that in order to successfully tackle the problem of organized crime, the definition of organized crime needs to be tighter and also needs to avoid incorporating everything from gang and white-collar crime to corporate crime and corruption (not to mention terrorism and political and environmental civil disobedience). Universalizing the Threat Assessment of Organized Crime Apart from the reality of localism, which means that organized crime is interpreted as referring to different activities according to each place and time, postulations about the generic nature of the threat posed by organized crime are also problematically applied universally. Many theorists of organized crime diagnose the principal threat as its challenge to the state rather than its multifarious dangers to the security of individuals. Yet while some theorists such as P. Williams have characterized organized crime as a serious threat to both national and international security, particularly in its undermining of state sovereignty, others such as

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L. Shelley argue against this theory-driven analysis, claiming that while such crime may undermine the integrity of certain states, it does not yet pose a real threat to the international community of states. Numerous authors identify the pervasiveness of organized crime as the main reason that states should not expect to be able to counter its threat alone and should instead embark upon more rigorous cooperation with other states to combat it. This emphasis on international cooperation is nevertheless criticized by some observers who argue that the interpretation of organized criminal activity on which such a presumption is based exaggerates the significance of the international dimension of organized crime as opposed to giving more recognition to its more tangible form at the local level. Ironically, however, while it is the very proponents of greater interstate cooperation against organized crime who most strongly characterize its threat to states and state sovereignty as alarming, it is those same people who urge states to relinquish oldfashioned notions of sovereignty and independence that prove hindrances to the establishment of strong policing and juridical links between states. In a 1992 report of a UN General Assembly debate on the strengthening of international cooperation to combat organized crime, the conclusion was that “a too restrictive interpretation of sovereignty and jurisdiction, more applicable to the world of half a century ago, often constitutes a serious obstacle to co-operation.” The condemnation of concepts of sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction as antiquated hindrances to a desirable increase in international cooperation against organized crime has also been made in other UN bodies as well as by some specialists on the subject. Those calling for greater international cooperation against organized crime have championed a collective security approach to understanding the nature of the threat of organized crime. It is assumed that organized crime seeks to maximize its operational opportunities and minimize the risks posed by law enforcement, and therefore international harmonization of law and enforcement procedures is necessary to end the existence of safe havens for criminal activity. The balloon effect—

whereby a route for organized criminal activity has been blocked and the traffic simply moves around the law enforcement obstacle through another country—has been a continual bane to law enforcement efforts to crush organized crime internationally. Thus, there needs to be an effective equal distribution of the risk of organized crime among different states. This can be created by policy and policing harmonization on the issue to reduce the temptation of organized crime groups to relocate to countries where law enforcement is more lax. The collective security approach to organized crime does not support a detailed assessment of the threat posed by any particular facet of organized crime to any particular state. For example, the first point made by the International Association of Penal Law in its conclusions and recommendations presented to the 8th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime in 1990 was that “organized crime and terrorism are the main threat and danger to democratic institutions and peaceful co-existence in every State.” Indeed, more focused reports, such as that by Europol, on the threat of organized crime in particular regions necessarily acknowledge its differing level of seriousness to states both within and outside the area in question. Maintaining the ambiguity of the threat should also therefore be recognized as an important part of the argument to persuade individual states that the threat is overwhelming and universal and that consequently so too should be the international response. The irony is that the desire for increased international policy and enforcement that is willing to forgo a tight analysis of the nature of the threat of organized crime lays the foundation for the unverifiable nature of the effectiveness of such efforts. Without an effective evaluation procedure, goals cannot be prioritized, and ends and means cannot be satisfactorily distinguished. The Example of Economic Harm The economic harm posed by organized crime is often presented as one of the most serious and general negative effects of the phenomenon internationally. Even with this most apparent case, however, the effects of organized crime are far more varied than is commonly perceived. Indeed, it is 49

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perhaps only in acknowledging the significant extent of such variation that the demand and success of organized criminal activity can realistically be assessed. There are many different ways in which organized crime and related patterns of corruption are regarded as harmful to the legitimate economy of states. Whether or not the crimes are committed by organized groups of criminal entrepreneurs, tax evasion undermines the state’s authority and its power. The wealth accumulated by organized crime provides it with the capital to corrupt state officials, which can be particularly destabilizing in weak or developing countries. The perceived prevalence of organized criminal and corrupt practices also discourages foreign direct investment. Policies of macroeconomic stabilization have created situations in which a demand exists for criminal finances to be invested in markets and meet credit needs since legitimate financiers have refused to become involved. This may cause high inflation to persist and the intended gains of efficiency from economic reforms to be minimized. The suggestion is that criminal finance carries negative potential for developing economies as well as for wealthier and more stable countries. Moreover, the unfair advantage of the authoritarian monopolistic practices of organized crime in the business world makes competition harder for legitimate enterprises, whatever the level of economic development, and may encourage them to adopt similar unethical or illegal practices. There are those, however, who dispute the assumption that organized criminal activity is necessarily harmful to developing economies, especially where alternative forms of market competition are severely limited. Thus, for certain countries, a particular form of illicit trade may provide the economy with an international market niche, enabling that country to exploit a comparative advantage for the production of that good in the world economy, whether the commodity is illegal drugs or illegally exported low-wage workers. Additionally, in the 1970s some theorists suggested that in cases where policies are hampering the efficient mechanism of market activities, corruption could even enhance the welfare of the society.

Trickle-down economic theories imply that profits from organized crime can boost the overall economy of a country and that the notion of a crime of money laundering is little more than a needless criminalization of what are themselves a series of harmless or even positive financial acts. The existence of corruption in developing countries may even be viewed as a positive, though informal, form of taxing the proceeds of the illicit economy. Such arguments are generally met with the observation that the larger profits made by organized crime are unlikely to be reinvested in poor economies and instead will probably be sent to safety in foreign bank accounts in the West. While the former views may be considered extreme, it is often more generally pointed out that for some developing states corruption and crime remain necessary methods of survival. Where economic reforms have reduced the power of the government to provide stability and social safety nets and instead produced socially polarizing and politically disintegrating austerity, black markets and crime are likely to thrive. Moreover, when economic and political transformations coincide, the normative fabric of law and the labeling of criminality are destabilized. From this perspective, economic systems do not function automatically but instead require effort to be created, perpetuated, and legitimized, and they therefore rely on appropriate forms of political and ideological scaffolding. Conclusion The draw of profits and success offered by involvement with organized criminal activity is of course not restricted to individuals and groups in places where the legitimate economy is extremely weak. From illegal immigration to money laundering, to prostitution and the use of drugs, such activities are also supplied to and engaged within developed countries. Yet the threat is not calculated in the same way by all developed states, regardless of the existence of international agreement on the broader assumption of the threat of organized crime and the imperative to act against it in concert. Even among more developed countries, perceptions of the consequences and dangers posed by all these activities as well as their possible benefits vary significantly.

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References Andreas, P. “Smuggling Wars: Law Enforcement and Law Evasion in a Changing World.” Transnational Organized Crime 4(2) (Summer 1998): 75–90. Beare, M., and R. T. Naylor. “Major Issues Relating to Organized Crime: Within the Context of Economic Relationships.” Submission to the Law Commission of Canada, 14 April 1999, Nathanson Centre for the Study of Organized Crime and Corruption, www.ncjrs.gov/nathanson/ organized.html. Europol. European Union Organised Crime Situation Report 2002, http://www.europol.eu .int/index.asp?page=EUOrganisedCrimeSit Rep2002. Fijnaut, C. “Transnational Organized Crime and Institutional Reform in the European Union: The Case of Juridical Co-operation.” Transnational Organized Crime 3/4 (Autumn/Winter 1998): 276–302. Hobbs, D., and C. Dunnighan. “Global Organised Crime: Context and Pretext.” Pp. 289–300 in The New European Criminology: Crime and Social Order in Europe, edited by V. Ruggiero, N. South, and I. Taylor. London: Routledge, 1998. International Association of Penal Law. “Effective National and International Action against a. Organized Crime, b. Terrorist Criminal Activities.” Contribution to the 8th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August–7 September 1990. Naylor, R. T. Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy. New York: Cornell University Press, 2002. Report of the UN Secretary-General. The Strengthening of International Co-operation in Combatting Organized Crime. United Nations General Assembly, 47th Session Agenda Item 93 (b), Social Development: Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Doc. A/47/381, 28 September 1992. Reuter, P. Disorganised Crime: The Economics of the Visible Hand. London: MIT Press, 1983. Savona, E. “Harmonising Policies for Reducing the Transnational Organised Crime Risk.” Paper prepared for the international workshop Discontinuous Institutional Change and the Economic System: Theory and Evidence, 8–13 July 1995. Schelling, T. “What Is the Business of Organised Crime?” Journal of Public Law 20 (1971): 71–84. Shelley, L. “Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism.” Pp. 25–51 in The Illicit Global Economy and State Power, edited by H. R.

Friman and P. Andreas. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 2000, www.unodc.org/palermo/ convmain.html. United Nations Economic and Social Research Council. “Most Effective Forms of International Co-operation for the Prevention and Control of Organised Transnational Crime at the Investigative, Prosecutorial and Judicial Levels.” Background Document, World Ministerial Conference on Organised Transnational Crime, Naples, 21–23 November 1994, E/CONF.884/4, 1 September 1994. Williams, P. “Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security.” Survival 36(1) (Spring 1994): 96–113. World Ministerial Conference on Organised Crime. “Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime.” UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Newsletter, Vienna, 26–27 November 1995.

Structure and Functional Organization of Criminal Groups Hua-Lun Huang Two Different Approaches to the Study of Social Groups In the past four decades, the subject of social groups has been examined by numerous scholars. Based on diverse research areas, these scholars can be roughly divided into two groups. The first group includes those organization and management writers searching for ways to maximize the economic benefits or production capacity of legitimate organizations, especially transnational corporations and medium-sized enterprises (as can be exemplified by the faculty of the Sloan School of Management of Massachusetts Institute of Technology). With such an aim to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of commercial or industrial associations, researchers of this group generally focus on issues such as leadership, power, cultures of organization, managerial ideologies, and decision-making processes. Unlike those specialists on legitimate organizations who try to maximize the economic benefits of private or public enterprises, the second group of researchers includes those criminologists and criminal 51

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justice professionals who make great efforts at understanding the configuration and operation of illegitimate organizations, particularly street gangs (as can be exemplified by the faculty of the Department of Criminology at the University of Pennsylvania). With such a goal of preventing the proliferation and development of unlawful or delinquent associations, researchers of this group typically concentrate on topics such as poverty, antisocial subcultures, gang features, crime profiles, sociospatial analysis, and so forth. Of these different topics, the issue about the structure and the functional organization of criminal organizations is usually viewed as one of the most complicated questions within criminology, criminal justice, and gangology. Typologies of Criminal Groups’ Structure In criminology and sociology, the concept of structure usually refers to demographic, politicoeconomic, and sociocultural factors that will cause a society, community, or group to exhibit certain stable or distinguishable qualities (some of the typical factors are racial composition, political system, and religious beliefs). In terms of structure, criminal groups, just like legitimate organizations, display a number of identifiable or established features. These structural features, based on the different manifestations of the three demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural factors—racial homogeneity, level of organizational sophistication, and ideology—can be summarized in the following eight categories: ITS type: identical racial background + tiered organizational arrangements + salient ideology, as can be exemplified by belligerent white supremacy prison gangs in America ITN type: identical racial background + tiered organizational arrangements + negligible ideology, as can be exemplified by the Yamaguchi-gumi, the largest gang in Japan IES type: identical racial background + egalitarian organizational arrangements + salient ideology, as can be exemplified by the skinhead gangs in America and Europe IEN type: identical racial background + egalitarian organizational arrangements + negligible ideology, as can be exemplified by those amateur piratical

groups, organized by some Indonesian, Filipino, and Vietnamese fishermen, in the Strait of Malacca DTS type: divergent racial background + tiered organizational arrangements + salient ideology, as can be exemplified by extremist militia groups in America DTN type: divergent racial background + tiered organizational arrangements + negligible ideology, as can be exemplified by transnational human smuggling rings in North Africa, East Asia, North America, and Europe DES type: divergent racial background + egalitarian organizational arrangements + salient ideology, as can be exemplified by loosely structured occult gangs in America DEN type: divergent racial background + egalitarian organizational arrangements + negligible ideology,

A former member of the Aryan Brotherhood in Calipatria State Prison, Calipatria, California, poses on June 17, 2004. The Aryan Brotherhood’s identifiable features are its racial background, tiered organizational arrangement, and salient ideology. (Mark Allen Johnson/ZUMA/Corbis)

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as can be exemplified by auto theft rings in America and Europe

References Anderson, Elijah. Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City. New York: Norton, 1999. Austin, Joe, and Michael Nevin Willard, eds. Generations of Youth: Youth Cultures and History in Twentieth-Century America. New York: New York University Press, 1998. Chin, Ko-Lin. Smuggled Chinese: Clandestine Immigration to the United States. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999. Handy, Charles. Understanding Organizations. 4th ed. New York: Penguin Books, 1999. Hinton, William. Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village. New York: Vintage Books, 1966. Miethe, Terance D., Richard C. McCorkle, and Shelley J. Listwan. Crime Profiles: The Anatomy of Dangerous Persons, Places, and Situations. Los Angeles: Roxbury, 2005. Perrow, Charles. Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986. Steffensmeier, Darrell J., and Jeffery T. Ulmer. Confessions of a Dying Thief: Understanding Criminal Careers and Illegal Enterprise. New Brunswick, NJ: AldineTransaction, 2005. Steinberg, Steven J., and Sheila L. Steinberg. Geographic Information System for the Social Sciences: Investigating Space and Place. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2006. Valdez, Al. Gangs: A Guide to Understanding Street Gangs. 3rd ed. San Clemente, CA: Law Tech Publishing, 2000.

According to these different features of structure, some criminal groups can be categorized as expressive or ideology-directed gangs (e.g., gangs of ITS, IES, DTS, and DES types). On the other hand, some criminal groups should be classified as instrumental gangs (such as gangs of ITN, IEN, DTN, and DEN types) because they are dominated by the goal of pursuing economic benefits. Typologies of Criminal Groups’ Functional Establishment Although criminal groups exhibit different structural characteristics, no criminal groups can survive without the logistical support of certain legitimate or semilegitimate organizations (i.e., certain lawful or semilegal organizations serve as the functional establishment for criminal groups). In this regard, at least two types of functional establishment can be identified. The first type (which includes corrupt custom officials and police) provides legal documents or statuses to criminal groups. This service has been examined by some sociologists specializing in dealings among human smuggling rings and some lawful companies and agencies in China. For example, in his study of Chinese illegal immigrants who wanted to go to America and other high-income countries to fanshen (improve socioeconomic status), Ko-Lin Chin argues that “without the support of [legal] organizations and networks, the movement of tens of thousands of Chinese peasants and laborers to the United States would not be possible.” The second type of functional establishment provides fencing channels for criminal groups, specifically for rings of auto thieves, burglars, and professional pickpockets. Darrell Steffensmeier and Jeffery Ulmer’s field study clearly shows that career burglars must incorporate elements such as auction houses, antique dealers, secondhand dealers, private collectors, Salvation Army workers, and truckers into their “spider webs.” Without such fencing networks, it would be almost certain that career burglars as well as other professional offenders would have to quit their jobs.

Traditional and Nontraditional Organized Crime Groups Hua-Lun Huang What Are Organized Crime Groups? In 1951, based on the information collected by the Kefauver Committee, chaired by U.S. Senator Estes Kefauver, the American government, according to Jay Albanese, claimed that there is a “sinister criminal organization known as the Mafia operating throughout the country with ties in other nations.” Since then, Mafia organizations and crime families in America have become hot subjects for law enforcement agents, criminologists, investigative reporters, freelance writers, and film producers. Under the influence of this extensive fervor to 53

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examine the centralized Mafia organization in America, numerous authors also use the title of “Mafia” to describe non-Italian gangs, such as the Black Mafia, the Chinese Mafia, the Japanese Mafia, and the Russian Mafia. Although the issue of whether a centralized Mafia group exists in America remains a highly controversial topic for criminologists and law enforcement officials, there is one certain point about the Mafias, namely that Mafias in the modern world (including those in North America, East and Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and Russia) are structured gangs. These structured gangs, without exception, will exhibit five characteristics. Because of these features, the Mafias or structured gangs are classified as organized crime groups in criminology or the sociology of crime literature. These defining features are: Masquerade. Continuous involvement in legitimate businesses (such as in construction, transportation, and entertainment industries) by the Mafias. These involvements are the main channels for gang members to “bleach” their “black” or criminal backgrounds. Authority. Command and obey (or superior and subordinate) relationships between or among Mafia members. Fetters. Regulation of Mafia members through behavioral rules or conduct codes. Iniquity. Persistent involvement in illegitimate activities (e.g., murder, intimidation, and extortion) by the Mafias. Association. Behind-closed-door connections between Mafia groups and some corrupt law enforcement agents or other government officials.

Economic Benefits and Traditional Organized Crime Groups From the perspective of criminology, traditional organized crime groups are firms, corporations, companies, or associations. This means that leaders of traditional organized crime groups (e.g., the St. Petersburg Mafias of Russia, the drug cartels of Colombia, the Yamaguchi-gumi of Japan, the Triad societies of Hong Kong, and the Bamboo Union gang of Taiwan) will spend most of their money,

energy, time, and other resources on businesses that can generate enormous profits (some typical examples of such businesses are human smuggling, printing fake bank notes, loan-sharking, debt collection, kidnappings for high ransoms, con games, identity theft, and intellectual property theft). Since traditional organized crime figures concentrate on the accumulation of wealth, it is not unusual for such mobsters to live in luxurious buildings and behave like successful businessmen or even philanthropists. Typologies of Nontraditional Organized Crime Groups In sharp contrast to traditional organized crime syndicates, some modern organized crime groups do not pursue instrumental goals such as economic interests. Instead, these groups focus on certain expressive goals such as racial or spiritual purity. In this regard, four different types of nontraditional organized crime groups can be identified. The first type is exemplified by the skinheads or neo-Nazi groups of Western and Northern Europe and North America. These radical-racist groups are generally supporters of the doctrines of Christian identity, which advocates the idea that the white race is God’s chosen race. Under the influence of Christian identity, elements of radical racist groups usually believe that the white race (except for the Jews) is the best in the world, while other races are burdens for white people. This racist mind-set then paves the way for various hate crimes. The second category of nontraditional organized crime groups is typified by the Satanic churches or similar churches. These churches, as their titles indicate, teach followers doctrines not found in the teachings of mainstream churches. Such deviant churches may also encourage followers (especially adults) to get involved in nudist rituals or pursue worldly pleasures. Because of these teachings, practices, and philosophies, the Satanic churches seem to be places where child molestations, incest, sexual harassments and assaults, promiscuous sex, or even spouse exchanges are recurrent. Besides aggressive racist groups and the Satanic churches, some nontraditional organized crime groups, both domestic and international, are terror-

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Finally, under some circumstances such as civil war and racial cleansing, organized crimes may be perpetrated by state managers or the military. This phenomenon was evident in the Holocaust against the Jews during World War II and in the massacres and systematic rapes in Indonesia, East Timor, Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and other places during the second half of the twentieth century.

German riot police arrest ultra right-wing skinheads after the confiscation of guns and banned Nazi symbols at the entrance of the Bavarian town of Freilassing near the Austrian border on August 5, 2000. The skinheads were on their way to a meeting of the far right-wing NPD (National Democratic Party) in Freilassing. (Reuters/Corbis)

ist in nature. The concept of terrorism has more than one hundred definitions. No matter which definitions are concentrated upon, all domestic and international terrorists seem to have one thing in common in their worldview: the American government is crooked and is the main source of all evil things in the world. Based on this perception, some people attempted to destroy the American government by joining the Patriot movement of America or international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda.

References Albanese, Jay S. Organized Crime in America. 3rd ed. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson, 1996. Barton, Blanche. The Secret Life of a Satanist: The Authorized Biography of Anton LaVey. Los Angeles: Federal House, 1992. Bresler, Fenton. The Chinese Mafia. New York: Stein and Day, 1981. Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Berkley, 2003. Hill, Peter B. The Japanese Mafia: Yakuza, Law, and the State. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. Ianni, Francis A. Black Mafia: Ethnic Succession in Organized Crime. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974. Levin, Brian. “The Patriot Movement: Past, Present, and Future.” Pp. 97–131 in The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium, edited by Harvey W. Kushner. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998. Perry, Barbara. In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes. New York: Routledge, 2001. Totten, Samuel, Williams S. Parsons, and Israel Charny, eds. Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2004. Varese, Federico. The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

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C. Global, Regional and National

National and International Threats: Regional Profiles Rob Hanser Introduction Improvements in communication and travel technologies have created a global community in which distance no longer precludes potential business ventures between parties that are not within the same proximity. Indeed, this same development within the business, cultural, and sociological arenas has also impacted the nature of organized crime around the world. Organized criminal syndicates that once were restricted to their own immediate locale have now found that it is both convenient and lucrative to establish networks throughout various regions of the world. Thus, organized criminal activity is both interregional and intraregional in nature and has become more complicated and difficult to track. This concise and general overview of the state of affairs in each continent, along with some quick notes on the interrelationships that these regional syndicates may have with other organizations in other areas of the world, lays the groundwork for subsequent entries that address regional organized criminal activities in a more in-depth and comprehensive manner. Africa The continent of Africa is currently in a state of turmoil. Several countries throughout this continent are either in a state of civil war or are at war with a neighboring nation. Likewise, the graft and corruption within many of these governments (such as

Nigeria and the Congo) hampers the ability of ethical law enforcement personnel to adequately combat activities instigated by organized criminals, particularly when those groups have essentially bought off many of the top government officials. Thus, the continent of Africa is particularly vulnerable to infiltration of organized criminal activities and is likewise hard-pressed to provide any true deterrent to such activities. Lastly, Africa is very rich in natural resources (such as diamonds, indigenous wildlife, precious stones, and valuable metals), and this tends to attract organized criminal syndicates to the region. Africa acts as a stopover point within the international drug trafficking industry. Drug runners en route to Europe from South America, Southeast Asia (the Golden Crescent), and Southeast Asia (the Golden Triangle) will often use various regions of this continent as a layover point during the long and arduous journey to their destinations in Europe. Likewise, it is at this point that Nigerian organized criminal syndicates often enter the picture in the international drug smuggling arena, acting as transporters who provide assistance in trafficking the drugs into Europe and further distributing them to sellers on European soil. Thus, definite interconnections between Nigerian criminal syndicates and other syndicates in South America and Southeast Asia have been found to clearly exist. Asia and the Middle East The continent of Asia is vast and includes a number of regions that could each entail an entire entry

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Melanie, 28, a former Yakuza prostitute who was tricked into traveling to the Far East, shields her face as she talks during an interview in Risaralda province, Colombia, on October 28, 2003. Japanese crime gangs enslave women by flying them to Japan under false pretenses, then forcing them into prostitution to pay off travel (John Jairo Bonilla/Reuters/Corbis)

(and indeed, independent entries do follow that provide the in-depth coverage needed for each region of this continent). However, it is perhaps best to note that there are basically three broad areas of Asia that have proven particularly noteworthy when studying organized crime: East Asia (including China, Japan, and the region of Southeast Asia), Southeast Asia (primarily including the region known as the Golden Crescent in and around Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan), and Russia (including the Ukraine and areas adjacent to East European countries).

In the area of East Asia, two primary groups immediately come to mind as being particularly influential: the Yakuza of Japan and the Snakeheads and Triads associated with China. Both groups have been actively involved in crimes involving human smuggling and drug trafficking. While business ventures may include a number of other crimes (fire arms trafficking, illicit sex industry and pornography activities, extortion, etc.) their international notoriety tends to revolve around human smuggling and trafficking, drug running, and the illicit sex industry. Furthermore, both groups have 57

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worked in tandem on occasion, while the Yakuza in particular have established operations in the United States and in Colombia. The Yakuza have established relationships with some of the Colombian drug lords and have likewise found the practice of smuggling Colombian women to Japan for use in the illegal sex industry to be a very lucrative activity. In the Golden Triangle region of Asia, opium has been in continuous production and has even been used to finance military operations among guerrilla and extremist groups in the region. In Southeast Asia, the Golden Crescent region has been notorious for producing opium and for being responsible for a substantial amount of the heroin that is smuggled into Europe. Likewise, this same drug trade has also generated funds which finance extremist groups such as Hezbollah and allegedly al-Qaeda. This underscores recent trends in orga-nized crime literature and research that have shown the continued collaboration between organized crime groups and extremist groups. Indeed, in some cases they may be one and the same. Further still, some extremist groups in these regions (such as Hezbollah) have been reported to engage in organized smuggling of rare or precious items or materials to generate funds (as with diamond smuggling schemes in the Congo that have been led by members of Hezbollah as a means of income to finance their terrorist operations). Lastly, Russian organized crime has had a history of operation that has spanned several centuries. In modern times, the protection and extortion rackets common to these groups have been extended to the United States. These groups have been very successful in perpetrating a variety of white-collar crimes (particularly in the banking, insurance, and investment industries) in Russia, the United States, and Europe. Russian organized crime groups are occasionally involved in the human smuggling enterprise in Eastern and Western Europe that is frequently linked to the illicit sex industry in Europe and abroad. Australia In Australia, organized crime syndicates have been found to be most active within the areas of drug trafficking and human smuggling. The human

smuggling issue often revolves around the illicit sex industry (a common theme among organized crime syndicates in each region of the world), particularly with Asian girls and women. However, the Australian government has taken this issue very seriously and has even gone so far as to criminalize illegal immigration into the country. Likewise, the trafficking of heroin has emerged as a problem on this continent, leading to several governmental initiatives to halt the trade in this drug. Europe The impact of organized crime throughout Europe has been both profound and debilitating. Numerous groups both internal and external to Europe engage in a diverse array of activities. One of the more recent trends has been the increase in gun trafficking as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc politico-military structure. Human smuggling seems to again emerge as a threat, with illegal and migrant workers (and sex industry participants) seeking entry into Western Europe. Likewise, drug smuggling into Portugal (particularly along the coast) and in Spain and France (particularly from Africa) continues to occur despite the more relaxed and tolerant laws associated with these crimes (when compared to the United States). The recent emergence of the European Union has been effective in coordinating continental responses to organized crime. Such organizations as Europol and various arrangements such as the Schengen Agreement demonstrate how the various nations of Europe have found it beneficial and necessary to coordinate and collaborate their efforts in combating organized criminal activity. North America North American organized crime entails that which occurs both in Canada and the United States as well as that which occurs in Mexico and Central America. The Mexican drug cartels are seemingly on the rise even though Mexico and the United States have made coordinated efforts to combat their active trafficking of cocaine (from South America) and heroin (from Mexico) into the United States (the major demand center for these drugs).

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Likewise, it has been found that numerous Latino gangs have spread throughout various areas of the United States, and many of these gangs (particularly those from Central American countries) have proven to have a strong penchant for violence. Finally, as with many organized crime groups, human smuggling problems also exist along the border between Mexico and the United States. In Canada and the United States, there has been a noticeable increase in Asian organized crime, including Chinese Triads and the Japanese Yakuza, in western sections of both nations. Other immigrants (such as those of Laotian and Vietnamese descent) have also emerged as organized crime and petty gang threats throughout Canada and the United States. Both countries have likewise seen activity among motorcycle gangs that act as couriers for organized crime syndicates and likewise are involved in numerous rackets spanning much of North America. Lastly, traditional groups such as the American Italian Mafia, while not as influential as was the case decades ago, still ply their trade throughout the United States. In total, it would appear that the United States is a virtual magnet for organized crime syndicates due to its strong demand for illicit drugs and other goods and services as well as the fairly open borders that exist despite recent improvements in internal and external security. South America Organized criminal activity in South America is fairly rampant, particularly that associated with the illicit cocaine trade. The instability of some South American governments and the heavy jungle regions throughout the continent provide an ideal environment for organized crime syndicates. The cocaine trade has continued to flourish despite efforts to counter this activity. The United States as well as Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru have worked to destabilize this activity, and while there have been noticeable results from these efforts, these criminals continue to generate substantial profits. Furthermore, these groups have been found to have networks with other organized crime syndicates from other regions of the world such as the Japanese Yakuza, Nigerian organized crime syndicates

that transport cocaine to Europe, Mexican organized crime syndicates, and traditional syndicates in the United States. Likewise, the cocaine trade in Colombia has proven to be a source of revenue for rebel militant groups that contribute to the continued governmental instability of the region. Conclusion It is clear that where there is a demand for illegal goods and services, there will be those willing to provide such services with the expectation of generating profit. This is the underlying characteristic of most organized crime activity. What is interesting is that this same common denominator seems to exist in each continent across a variety of cultural and demographic groups. Further still, many of the same demands (i.e., drugs, sex industry services, and gun trafficking) seem to exist in each region of the world. Other trends, such as the increased collaboration between organized crime and extremist group activity, have been noted to be on the increase around the world. Thus, it is clear that organized crime is likely to remain a global phenomenon that will become ever more entrenched in their local regions of origin due to local demands for services, while at the same time these groups are likely to experience growth from increased demands abroad, which leads to interconnections between regional groups spanning the globe and further serves to fuel demands for services in new markets that have typically been unavailable to many localized syndicates in the past. References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime. 7th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003. Abadinsky, H. “Organized Crime: Italian American Mafia.” Pp. 1096 in Encyclopedia of Criminology, vol. 2, edited by R. A. Wright and J. M. Miller. New York: Routledge, 2005. Abadinsky, H. “Organized Crime: Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs.” Pp. 1102–1103 in Encyclopedia of Criminology, vol. 2, edited by R. A. Wright and J. M. Miller. New York: Routledge, 2005. Committee on International Relations. “Combating International Crime in Africa,” 1998, http:// commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa50884 .000/hfa50884_0.HTM. 59

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David, F. Human Smuggling and Trafficking: An Overview of the Response at the Federal Level. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2000. Finckenauer, J. “Organized Crime: Russian Mafia.” Pp. 1103–1106 in Encyclopedia of Criminology, vol. 2, edited by R. A. Wright and J. M. Miller. New York: Routledge, 2005. Gentleman, J. A. The Regional Security Crisis in the Andes: Patterns of State Response. Washington, DC: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2001. Hanser, R. “Immigration and Crime in Europe.” Criminal Justice International 18(62) (2002): 7–12. Mabrey, John. “Human Smuggling from China.” Crime and Justice International 19(17) (2003): 5–10. Molina, F. P. “Japan, the Mecca for Trafficking in Colombian Women.” Global Alliance against Traffic in Women, 1999, http://www.december18 .net/web/general/paper30ColombiaJapan.pdf. Sutton, A., and S. James. Evaluation of Australian Drug Anti-Trafficking Law Enforcement. Melbourne: Australian Centre for Police Research, 1995. Takemura, N. “Organized Crime: Japanese Mobsters.” Pp. 44–67 in Encyclopedia of Criminology, vol. 2, edited by R. A. Wright and J. M. Miller. New York: Routledge, 2005. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Trend in Reduction in Colombia Continues, but New Statistics in Bolivia and Peru Warrant Close Monitoring.” Vienna, Austria, 2005, http://www .unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2005/unisnar904. html.

Organized Crime in Africa Rob Hanser The continent of Africa has provided a political climate that is ideal for organized crime syndicates to operate with virtual impunity. Indeed, much of the continent is in a virtual state of crisis, with numerous nations mired in civil wars that have continued for years and even decades. Likewise, the draught, famine, and disease (particularly the spread of HIV and AIDS) has created a state of emergency and desperation among the populations of many nations within this continent. Furthermore, there is

an abundance of extremist groups and rebel factions throughout this continent, and this ensures both the continued instability (politically, militarily, and economically) of various regions of the continent and the continued need for martial law in nations that might otherwise be amenable to more democratic approaches. Reform groups, particularly those affiliated with the United Nations (UN), are optimistic that the future of this resource-laden continent will ultimately improve, but numerous challenges have been noted among many groups. One primary challenge that impedes the possibility of reform throughout this vast continent is the continual strife that is caused by the activity of organized criminal syndicates. There exists in Africa a multitude of complex interrelationships among organized criminal syndicates, extremist groups, and various military operations. Certain types of activities may be pertinent to multiple regions or may simply be rampant throughout the entire continent. East Africa: Organized Crime and Relief Efforts Due to the problems associated with famine in East Africa, the UN has coordinated numerous forms of relief projects. However, it appears that these efforts have been undermined by warlords in Somalia who extract fees from relief providers. The warring factions within this country are a source of chaos that helps to ensure the country’s state of lawlessness. However, this form of organized criminal extortion does not parallel the internal corruption that has infiltrated the UN process itself. Indeed, it has been found that in both Kenya and Somalia, many UN officials and employees involved in these efforts were themselves members of organized crime syndicates and were responsible for siphoning off large amounts of monetary aid and supplies. An array of corrupt practices has been reported to occur in East Africa. The process of dividing aid, determining which refugees are given better resettlement options, and even the assignment of various UN officials have all been tainted by the methodical and systematic efforts of organized criminals. For the most part, complaints made by

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local citizenry have been stifled by either organized crime members or the government in Somalia. In other cases, it seems that victim complaints are simply ignored and lost in the chaos and haste of the relief program. Despite the efforts of the UN, the devastation of the area has taken its toll on the population and those working in the region. Indeed, Media Watch has likened the structure of the UN service system in the region to “an organized crime network” that “fulfill[s] the political agenda of the connected few” who have “roots with the past repressive Marxist dictatorship of Somalia and the ruling elite” of certain highly corrupted neighboring city-states in the region. These political interest groups have reportedly confiscated money from the UN and have stored substantial amounts in secret Swiss bank accounts, lining their pockets for their own future political interests in the region. Furthermore, these same criminal syndicates have been noted to print counterfeit money and have used various UN banking programs as a means of laundering the money into worldwide circulation. The generation of these funds has served to further destabilize the overall economy in the region and provides more immediate and short-term benefits to various warring factions. This also provides a source of ready revenue for the purchase of illegal firearms that are routinely trafficked into Somalia. Thus, it is clear that many of these interest groups are directly responsible for much of the civil war and unrest that has plagued Somalia in years past. East Africa: Child Smuggling, Trafficking, and Kidnapping in Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia Due to the desperation of the region, other forms of exploitation have also been noted to take place. One such activity that has been noted is the act of child smuggling from areas of East Africa, particularly Somalia. The combination of international criminal networks, the continuing international isolation of the region, and the general absence of law and order have made this activity a nearly no-risk type of crime that does not generate concern. Due to death and pestilence, the high mortality rate of children, and the frequent kidnappings of children by various extremist groups such as the Lord’s

Resistance Army, which operates in northern Uganda but makes incursions into neighboring Kenya and the Sudan, problems with missing children are essentially a normalized part of the region. Since 1987, the Lord’s Resistance Army has abducted more than 20,000 children who are used as soldiers and human fodder within the guerrilla group that continues its campaign against the Ugandan government. Of the female children who are abducted, the most attractive are forced to be wives and consorts for the upper-ranking persons of this guerrilla extremist group. As has been demonstrated in various other entries, there is an everincreasing link between organized crime activity and extremist or rebel groups in various areas of the world. Much of the smuggling of children out of Africa has been to a variety of destinations in Europe. Cases have been noted in which families in Somalia have paid to have their children smuggled out of the country, believing that they are providing them with a better life. Unfortunately, it appears that many end up in prostitution rings or are simply warehoused by persons receiving government subsidies associated with raising immigrant children. Despite this risk, parents continue to send their children because, according to L. Hannan, the smuggling of “a child abroad accrues no social shame in a society where the future is so bleak and circumstances so extreme.” Because of the lack of education and health care, many parents struggle to get their children out of the country, and smuggling is the quickest way for this to occur. In the meantime, organized criminals specializing in smuggling and trafficking procedures are constantly willing to provide the service for the right price. West Africa: Nigerian Organized Crime Of all the organized crime activities in West Africa, it is perhaps the activity of Nigerian organized crime syndicates that has drawn the most international attention. These syndicates are generally known for their involvement in various forms of fraud and their drug trafficking activities. Of all the African organized crime groups, it is the Nigerian organized crime groups that have impacted the 61

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Global, Regional and National

United States and Europe the most. These criminal enterprises are involved in a wide range of criminal endeavors including financial crimes such as credit card fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting, and the alteration of official documents. These syndicates typically operate in both Africa and the United States, utilizing small interrelated cells that consist of a small cadre of members. Unlike many traditional organized crime groups, Nigerian criminal enterprises tend to be loosely structured, fluid, and dynamic. The organizational structure of syndicates is often founded along family, tribal, or village bonds and relationships. Beyond these loose structures for smaller groups, the larger syndicates do tend to have a more structured organization. The specific type of organizational structure utilized may be open to debate, but three common types of organizational structure have been observed among Nigerian organized crime syndicates. The first of these is referred to as the traditional pyramid or hierarchy. These hierarchies consist of top-rung organizers, many of whom reside in Lagos, and it is these individuals who are most closely linked with other criminal operations elsewhere in the world. Indeed, these organizers have been likened to crime barons and are often members of the elite or of the Nigerian governmental system, or both. Obviously, these individuals maximize their activities through their connections to or positions within the government, staying in Lagos to ensure that they have the most influence possible when protecting their illicit endeavors. These elite organized crime members are also among the beneficiaries of the proceeds from criminal activities abroad that pour profits back into Nigeria. The second form of organization is more of a flexible network. As noted previously, many Nigerian crime groups are fairly small, being based upon common bonds of family, tribal membership, or personal familiarity. These members will often work with larger organizations, at least on a caseby-case basis, but their work tends to be much more freelance in nature. They tend to have a high degree of autonomy due to both their smaller size (making it much easier to settle on common interests) and their lack of allegiance to more hierarchi-

cal forms of criminal organizations. The third type of organized crime group consists of the selfcontained cell in which only a handful of members work in tandem with one another. Each of these members will tend to have very specific agreedupon responsibilities, and the division of labor within the group will frequently be established in a clear and direct manner. These cells may operate as completely independent identities, or they may occasionally unite themselves with other larger organizations when such a union seems particularly lucrative. Among the activities that these groups are known for, it is the proliferation of various fraud scams that tend to be highly lucrative and easy to manage. These fraud scams are often conducted by e-mail but may include any number of mechanisms. These types of crime are often referred to as 4-1-9 or 419 frauds in reference to the section of the Nigerian penal code that addressed fraudulent schemes. Victims are targeted in roughly sixty countries around the world. It would also appear that many of the victims are elderly, particularly those in the United States. These schemes are very successful because they do not actually require the victim to transmit a bank account number or provide other access to personal accounts when solicited to do so. Rather, if the victim merely provides a letterhead, signature, and other such useful imagery, these organized criminals may use it to forge letters of recommendation to the American embassy for travel visas, to con other prospective victims, or to perpetrate identity fraud. With respect to the drug trade, the continent of Africa has emerged as a convenient intermediate transit point for drug traffickers ultimately en route to Europe or the United States. The Nigerian crime syndicates have emerged as primary organizers of the shipments that go through many areas of Africa. Nigerian drug trafficking criminal groups are likewise interlinked with the global community of organized criminals, having extensive networks in numerous foreign countries. For instance, alliances have been created between some Colombian cartels and these Nigerian criminal organizations. Within the borders of Colombia, authorities have reported increasing

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arrests of Nigerian nationals who are involved in cocaine trafficking. Furthermore, law enforcement officials in other South American nations such as Ecuador and Brazil report that Nigerian drug trafficking enterprises in those countries is highly active in the shipment of cocaine to the European drug markets. Indeed, Nigerian organized crime groups have been reported to employ more than 1,500 people in the nation of Brazil alone to assist in their drug trafficking schemes. These groups export well over ten tons of cocaine a year and continually engage in the transportation and sale of cocaine and heroin in European markets. These criminals are also active in trafficking heroin bound for Europe from Mexico, Central America, South America and Asia. In addition, the prices for cocaine in European markets are purportedly higher, and profit margins are greater than in the United States. Thus, Nigerian drug traffickers tend to make more profit for their efforts than do other traffickers who service U.S. drug consumers. Lastly, these groups tend to be very effective in making the necessary border crossings due to their prevalent use of fraudulent documents by couriers, which makes the identification and apprehension of these individuals extremely problematic. As further indication of the transnational nature of Nigerian drug trafficking, Nigerian criminal groups have also had long-standing business dealings with heroin growers in Southeast and Southwest Asia. This is particularly true in Thailand and Pakistan, where Nigerian criminal groups have established and maintained contacts with opium growers and distributors to obtain heroin for distribution in their markets in the United States and Europe. This activity has become so profitable that Nigerian crime syndicates have even been known to operate in the United States itself. Drug enforcement investigations have shown that the trafficking and selling of heroin to users in major cities such as Chicago is largely controlled by Nigerian organized crime groups. Central and South Africa In Zambia, the unique crime of emerald smuggling has been found to be particularly problematic. Zambia loses roughly US$200 million due to this

specific type of smuggling. Indeed, Zambia produces the second-highest quality of emeralds (being bested only by those coming out of Brazil). Given that the Zambian economy is so challenged and also since the emerald mining industry is so crucial to the Zambian economy, the emerald smuggling activity of organized criminal groups in that area has been devastating. Furthermore, these organized criminal groups have been found to likewise operate diamond smuggling operations in South Africa. This demonstrates that the nature of the smuggling and sale of illicit natural resources— in this case precious stones—utilizes similar (if not identical) methods and types of infrastructure, allowing these criminals to ply their illicit activities throughout numerous nations in the area. Neighbor to Angola, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, and Congo, Zambia is a heavily populated country with an estimated 9 million people. It is saturated with diverse racial and lingual groups. Because of Zambia’s extensive border, people are able to travel back and forth freely within and outside of the country. A part of the copper belt in the Southern African region, much of the organized crime in Zambia is centered around international demand for natural resources of various types. However, the activities of organized criminal groups in this country include a number of activities. Indeed, as Jay Albanese and colleagues indicate, “Organized crime in Zambia manifests itself in motor vehicle theft, drug trafficking, firearms, smuggling, commercial poaching, bank fraud, and money laundering.” As is often the case throughout many nations of Africa, there is an implicit link between organized criminal groups and the local law enforcement officials of the area. In Zambia, law enforcement officials reportedly often act as accomplices out of fear since many officials have been murdered by organized crime syndicates in that country. Thus, law enforcement officials simply act as an extension of the organized crime problem, providing documents such as registrations and driver’s licenses to syndicates in exchange for money and illicit services. Numerous vehicles are stolen from Zambia and are retrieved in adjoining countries, while other vehicles are found in Zambia that have 63

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been illegally stolen from neighboring countries. These vehicles are often used by the syndicates themselves or are sold or discarded for profit through extensive auto theft rings. In the nation of South Africa, organized crime syndicates have emerged throughout many of the major cities. New forms of organized crime, drug trafficking, and even the financing of extremist groups have placed the issue of money laundering as a priority for officials tasked with addressing crime problems in this nation and surrounding nations of the region. The small nations of Lesotha and Swaziland as well as Namibia and Mozambique have likewise been riddled with organized crime syndicates that are active in a variety of criminal activities. The recent relaxation of border checks into South Africa has made the country a regional hub for heroin dealers, and there are an estimated 238 small-time criminal syndicates that operate in the country. Furthermore, the laundering of drug proceeds through the international banking system has been accomplished with relative ease, as the law enforcement agencies in this country and surrounding nations are fairly inexperienced with such well-orchestrated and well-hidden types of criminal activity. Indeed, it would appear that drug cartels are providing criminals with extensive expertise, and here again (as with other areas of the continent), Nigerian organized crime groups have played a major role in the drug trafficking industry in South Africa. Indeed, Nigerian criminal groups have basically invaded Johannesburg, with roughly 60,000 Nigerian immigrants residing in the city. Neighbor to South Africa, the nation of Mozambique is the region’s second-largest drug trafficking market. As with South African drug traffickers, foreign dealers are often Nigerian (as well as others from abroad, namely South America and Southeast Asia) and tend to work independently or with local gangs in the region. The drug money in both South Africa and Mozambique is then being laundered into legitimate business enterprises such as real estate investment and construction activities. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there has been increasingly serious concern with respect to diamond smuggling from within that nation’s resource-rich mines. This nation has been wracked

with civil war and unrest for a number of years, and conditions there are completely chaotic. This has led to some very threatening developments for the international community. Due to the nation’s instability, Islamic extremist groups have utilized this smuggling industry as a source of primary revenue to fund their worldwide acts of terrorism. One of these groups, the Lebanese-based Hezbollah, has been particularly fond of this industry. As has been mentioned previously, this again underscores the frequent overlap between organized crime activities and various extremist or guerrilla groups. D. Farah indicates that “in some cases, the militant groups have worked in [the] Congo with Lebanese diamond dealers who also conducted business in Sierra Leone with men identified by the United States as key operatives for Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda network.” Likewise, these terrorist organizations may be intertwined in other forms of resource smuggling, such as the Congo’s gold and uranium trade and the semiprecious stone tanzanite in neighboring Tanzania. Firearms Trafficking throughout Africa According to M. Brunwasser, “there is a growing industry involving firearms trafficking which has also served to exacerbate the emergence of a series of bloody civil wars in countries such as Rwanda, the Congo, and Liberia.” Many of the arms that are trafficked are provided by East European firearms traffickers, with small arms and ammunition being provided at wholesale levels to factions in Angola, Rwanda, Somalia, and the Congo. Heavy cargo planes fly large shipments of these firearms into these countries in direct violation of international embargos. As Brunwasser notes, this entails the activity of “an internationally organized network of individuals that are well funded, well connected and well versed in brokering and logistics, with the ability to move illicit cargo around the world without raising the suspicions of the law or with the ability to deal with obstacles.” Many of the civil conflicts in Central and South African nations center around control of the diamond mining territory of those countries, and as was noted previously, this has also attracted the criminal interests of various extremist groups and

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firearms have been termed blood diamonds by many locals in Africa. Because this exchange is so lucrative and due to the availability of a large surplus of firearms from the previous Soviet Eastern bloc region of Europe and to the ease with which diamonds and other precious gems are smuggled from the region, coupled with the intense demand for firearms from nations throughout the entire continent of Africa, it is likely that this particular form of organized criminal activity will only continue for years to come.

Bodies of refugees line the roadside in Rwanda, victims of cholera and the strife instigated by civil war, October 1994. The chaos created by civil wars in Africa provides fertile ground for smuggling and black markets. (Department of Defense)

organized crime syndicates. These syndicates ply their trade of smuggling the diamond resources out of the country while simultaneously providing arms (often in exchange for the diamonds that they in turn sell for huge profits) to warring factions that further induce instability in this region of the continent. This then further adds to the chaotic political climate of the region, making the area all the more ideal for further activities by organized crime syndicates, creating a cycle of activities that economically feed one another. Because of this trade in firearms and because of the extensive human misery caused by the internal strife and conflict exacerbated by the widespread availability of these firearms, the diamonds used as exchange for

Wildlife Poaching throughout Africa One crime that seems to be common in Africa is the poaching of rare and exotic animal resources. At first glance, such an activity might not seem to be nearly as serious or economically damaging as many of the other activities noted throughout the continent. However, a close examination of the economic costs associated with this organized criminal activity demonstrates otherwise. For instance, in 2000–2001, the Bubiana Conservancy of southern Zimbabwe lost approximately 300,000 animals that were worth US$28.5 billion, all due to the illegal enterprise of poaching. Other countries have also experienced severe losses of their unique and rare animal species. Consider also that in Zambia, Kenya, and Niger, populations of black rhinos, elephants, and giraffes have been decimated, while millions of dollars have lined the pockets of smugglers who sell horns, tusks, and skins in various underground markets throughout the world. Such losses and the international concern over the possible extinction of some of these species has caused multiple law enforcement agencies throughout Africa to join together in order to save wildlife resources from further destruction. One example of this unified effort would be the Lusaka Agreement Task Force (LATF), which has collaborated with the United Nations Environmental Program. Together, these organizations have established a common ground between law enforcement agencies that aid in protecting the animal resources of Africa that were once so abundant but now are a rare commodity that is trafficked within illicit organized criminal networks. 65

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Conclusion The continent of Africa is currently plagued with civil strife, economic instability, famine, and disease. Although Africa is rich in mineral and animal resources, much of these resources seem to serve as a magnet that attracts organized crime ventures due to the inability of many African governments to provide counterresponses to such activities. The weak border security common to most African nations together with the sense of chaos that forebodes much of the continent serves to make such activities fairly easy to pursue. Given the high profits that can be generated and the sense of desperation among much of the populace in many regions of Africa, it is likely that organized crime will continue to be a scourge that further plagues the continent and serves to further perpetuate the instability there, the very instability that makes the efforts of these criminal syndicates possible in the first place.

References Albanese, Jay S., Dilip K. Das, and Arvind Verma. World Perspectives: Organized Crime. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003. Brunwasser, M. “The Embargo Buster: Fueling Bloody Civil Wars.” Frontline World, 2002, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/ sierraleone/bout.html. Committee on International Relations. “Combating International Crime in Africa,” 1998, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/ hfa50884.000/hfa50884_0.HTM. “Drug Crime Wracks Southern Africa.” BBC News, 20 August 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ africa/3167125.stm. Farah, D. “Digging Up Congo’s Dirty Gems.” Global Policy Forum, 30 December 2001, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/ diamond/2001/1230hezbol.htm. Hannan, L. “Somali’s Smuggling Children Overseas.” BBC News, 17 January 2003, http://news.bbc.co .uk/1/hi/world/africa/2667495.stm. Hanser, Robert. “Poaching Problem Growing.” Crime & Justice International 18 (2002): 7–15. Somali Historical Society of North America. “Corruption and Extortion in High Places,” 23 February 2001, http://www.somaliawatch.org/ archivefeb01/010223202.htm.

Plautt, M. “Profile: Uganda’s LRA Rebels.” BBC News, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ africa/3462901.stm. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. IRIN Web Special on Separated Somali Children. 2003, http://www.irinnews.info/ webspecials/Somalichildren/default.asp.

Organized Crime in Asia Richard H. Ward and Daniel J. Mabrey Since the end of the Cold War, crime has been a troubling issue for most of the developing economies of Asia. Many of these states have been characterized by corruption, unstable or weak governments, and, in many cases, criminal justice systems that have neither the funding nor the technology necessary to cope with increasingly sophisticated criminal activity. In many countries throughout Asia, organized criminal groups have long histories, in some cases dating back hundreds of years. In virtually all cases, these groups have been evolutionary, adapting to changing political conditions, to warfare (both domestically and internationally), and, perhaps most important, to the development of technology, communications, travel, and the emergence of a global economy. There are four major types of transnational organized criminality prevalent in Asia: arms trafficking, human trafficking, narcotics trafficking, and corruption. The ten Asian countries discussed here were chosen based on the uniqueness of the organized crime groups, their interrelationships with other groups, and the availability of data and information on organized crime activities within the countries. China The People’s Republic of China (PRC), with a population of more than 1 billion, is the largest country in the world and has evolved since 1949 from a relatively isolated country to a burgeoning superpower. The criminal justice system has undergone numerous changes from the time when the country opened up to the West in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although crime in China is relatively low by

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A member of Guangzhou’s largest criminal gang looks around during a trial at Guangzhou Municipal Intermediate People’s Court on August 5, 2005, in Guangdon Province, China. Thirty-five members of the gang are accused of crimes ranging from extortion to drug trafficking, kidnapping, and murder. (Getty Images)

Western standards, China has experienced an increasing crime problem since the early 1990s, due in no small measure to a growing economy and the ability of organized crime to move more freely throughout the country. Organized crime in China is somewhat amorphous but generally takes two similar forms. The first involves criminal activity by gangs such as the Triads, frequently in cooperative ventures involving black market activities, large burglaries, thefts, and hijackings. These gangs are also involved in extortion of small businesses. Criminal syndicates make up the second form of Chinese organized crime and are involved in more sophisticated crimes such as prostitution, illegal immigration, slavery, and other organized forms of vice. Historically, Chinese law enforcement officials maintained that organized crime was virtually eliminated under the leadership of Mao Zedong, but it is doubtful that organized crime ever left the coun-

try. Rather, the Triad societies, which moved to Hong Kong following the fall of the Guomindang (Nationalist) government, still maintained a clandestine presence on the mainland. Although data relative to the increase of Triad activity in China is scarce, public security officials are now acknowledging the increasing presence of Triad groups from Hong Kong. There have also been reports of Triads forming drug trafficking networks with the Bamboo Union gangs in Taiwan, the Yakuza in Japan, and even drug cartels from Colombia. The U.S. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs reported that China is a major transit point for illegal narcotics produced in the Golden Triangle, and the largest number of seizures of Southeast Asian heroin now occurs within the country. The southern areas of China will also continue to be major transit routes for Southeast Asian heroin. Heroin in particular is pouring in to China from

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Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos. China is also a major source country for precursor chemicals such as ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and acetic anhydride and is a major producer of crystal methamphetamine. Unemployment and what is commonly referred to as the floating population have created widespread migration to the cities and contribute to increases in organized criminal activities. A significant number of these migrants turn to drug trafficking as a means of supporting themselves, especially when a low-level drug dealer in China can make more money in a day than a farmer would make in a year. The exploitation of women and children for sex and human trafficking by organized criminal groups represents another major problem for China. Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guizhou Provinces are the principal areas from which many women are kidnapped or sold into slavery. Within the country, prostitution has become a major source of revenue for the poor, and as drug addiction has increased, the problem has become more widespread. In the larger cities, organized crime has taken over much of the sex trade, and corruption of police and civilians, such as hotel employees and cab drivers, has contributed to the problem. The custom of bride-selling has returned, and women and girls from North Korea and Vietnam are commonly trafficked into China as wives. Illegal immigration has also become a lucrative business for organized crime, and the smuggling of individuals to all parts of the world has become commonplace. Chinese organized crime groups, especially the Triads, are deeply involved in the human trade business. Traffickers, known as Snakeheads, are part of a global network wherein an individual might pay $30,000 or more to enter the United States. Within the United States, a well-organized criminal network has been developed to foster illegal immigration. Many if not most of the illegal immigrants must work for years to pay off their debt, and many women are destined to be forced into prostitution. Chinese Triads have assumed control of the smuggling of illegal immigrants from smaller familyoperated organizations as an increasingly attractive alternative to drug trafficking because it promises

multibillion-dollar profits without the same severe penalties if caught. Beyond the Triads and sophisticated criminal syndicates, thousands of minor gangs exist throughout the country and are involved in a wide range of illegal thefts and commerce violations. As they become more sophisticated and as travel becomes easier, it is likely that they will broaden their activities and begin to cooperate with other criminal groups. Hong Kong It is interesting that Hong Kong, one of the most successful communities in Asia, has one of the most advanced criminal justice systems in the world yet continues to be the center of Triad activity in Asia. One police estimate calculated as many as fifty Triad societies in Hong Kong, the largest being the Wo Sing Wo and the 14K. Unlike in many of the other countries in Asia, illegal drug trafficking is not viewed as a major problem in Hong Kong, and police place a high priority on drug suppression and the control of precursor chemicals. Drugs smuggled in are primarily for local consumption. Hong Kong is solely a destination point for trafficking women for the purposes of sexual exploitation, with a majority of the women coming from Mainland China, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. Organized crime groups in Hong Kong are heavily involved in counterfeit goods operations and the resale of stolen consumer goods in Hong Kong. This network feeds a massive money laundering operation in Hong Kong that is used to fund other criminal activities and legitimate front businesses. Corruption in Hong Kong is significantly lower than in the other Asian countries in large part because of the anticorruption police units, which are some of most powerful in the world. Japan In recent years, a sluggish economy and revelations about the influence of organized crime, particularly the Yakuza or Boryokudan, in Japanese government and businesses has cast a cloud over Japan’s national crime control efforts. This Yakuza should be considered among the vanguard of organized crime groups

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for the way they have infiltrated Japanese society and government, including the police. The Yakuza influence has infiltrated banks, real estate agencies, corporations, and government, prompting major scandals. The Yakuza are reported to make millions of dollars per year through corporate extortion. Their senior membership is known to buy a small number of shares in a company so that they can attend shareholders’ meetings and spot corporate targets for extortion. There are an estimated 110,000 active members who are part of as many as 2,500 crime families. In 2001, the Japanese National Police arrested 9,893 Yakuza members for possession of stimulants, 1,949 for extortion, and 1,398 for gambling. The exploitation of women by the Yakuza has been an ongoing problem, largely as a result of the large number of foreigners trafficked or smuggled from the Philippines and Thailand who are involved in prostitution. Many of these women turn to Yakuza members to arrange travel to Japan and the United States for work, but when they arrive they are often forced into the Japanese sex trade. Cambodia The major transnational criminal activities in Cambodia are controlled largely by Chinese and Myanmarese organized crime groups and are closely tied to drug and human trafficking. Cambodia has been cited by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as a source country for the growth of marijuana, which is trafficked largely in Europe, and as a transit country on the international drug market for the distribution of Southeast Asian heroin. Heroin is moved from Laos and Thailand through Phnom Penh as part of the global drug trade. Within the country there has been a significant increase in the use of methamphetamine by young people, prompting the government to take an active role in working with international agencies in antidrug activities. In spite of these improved international relationships, the existence of widespread corruption hampers enforcement efforts. Gambling, prostitution, and money laundering have also fostered the existence of global organized crime networks in the country.

Cambodia, like many nations in Southeast Asia, has a serious problem with human smuggling and trafficking. It is estimated that the number of victims of trafficking in the sex industry ranges from 2,000 to more than 3,000 annually, approximately 80 percent of whom are Vietnamese women and girls. Human traffickers in Cambodia use a variety of methods to acquire victims. In many cases, victims are lured by the promises of legitimate employment. It is not uncommon for a victim’s acquaintances, friends, or even family members to sell the victim outright or receive payment for helping to deceive them. Young children, the majority of them girls, are commonly pledged to brokers or middlemen as collateral for loans by desperately poor parents. The children are then held responsible for repaying the loan and the accumulating interest. Republic of Korea Organized crime in Korea has a unique history when compared to that of other Asian nations. As Korea began to modernize in the 1800s, groups of young men, called Keondal, were formed in and around the places they worked, such as bars, gambling houses, and construction sites. The Keondal were not considered criminal groups, even though they engaged in criminal activities and violence between each other, because they honored loyalty and faithfulness and would sometimes help the weak and the poor. This changed as Korea began to modernize after the Korean War. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Korean organized crime groups developed into nationwide organizations, with some groups even extending their activities to foreign countries through associations with the Yakuza and other organized crime groups in the United States. As of January 2000, the prosecutors in the Violent Crime Department (the agency charged with combating organized crime) estimated that there were more than 11,500 members in 404 organized crime families or groups in Korea, with the average criminal organization having 35 members (Park, 2001). Drug trafficking is the main criminal enterprise for Korean organized crime, with most shipments originating in drug factories in China and Japan 69

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before being smuggled into countries throughout Asia and into the United States. This is interesting because unlike most countries in Asia, drug use is not common among people in Korean society. Prostitution and the exploitation of women is a common problem, due in no small measure to the presence of the large American military presence in the country. However, the U.S. military in Korea now maintains a zero-tolerance policy regarding trafficking and is working with the Korean government to ensure that trafficking is eliminated from establishments that surround U.S. military bases. Russian and Korean-Chinese criminal organizations are involved in trafficking women and migrant workers. The Russian Mafiya provides job opportunities as entertainers to young Russian women and assists them in obtaining Korean tourist visas. The women who apply are sent to Korea to work in entertainment businesses as dancers or barmaids, although they often eventually end up as prostitutes. Myanmar Myanmar, formerly Burma, is a major opiumproducing country with a government and criminal justice system that is rife with corruption. Both of these factors make Myanmar an attractive environment for organized crime and its activities. Drug production and trafficking in Myanmar are controlled by several so-called armies that in effect are the largest organized crime groups in the world. Armed ethnic groups such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kokang Chinese, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) control the cultivation areas, refine opium into heroin, and also produce methamphetamine. In areas controlled by the UWSA, the government has virtually no control and has not attempted to eliminate opium production, claiming that cracking down on the organization jeopardizes Myanmar’s national security. Myanmar is a major source country for persons trafficked for labor and sexual exploitation. Many Burmese women can be found in the sex industries of Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Hong Kong, and even Japan. The military is often directly involved

in trafficking for forced labor, and there are reports that some children have been forcibly enlisted into the Myanmar Army. The Myanmar government has been repeatedly censured by international human rights organizations for its forced labor practices. Other Asian Countries In Taiwan, organized crime is controlled largely by the Bamboo Union Gangs. These gangs have close relationships with Triad groups in China and Hong Kong and are primarily involved in drug trafficking (methamphetamine and heroin) from Mainland China. Prostitution, controlled largely by organized crime, was outlawed in 1997, giving rise to floating brothels off the coast of Taiwan. According to one estimate, there were still 60,000 female child prostitutes (ages twelve to seventeen) in Taiwan in 1999, most of whom were sold by their parents to criminal syndicates. The Philippines has long been a haven for the sex industry, both within the country and as part of the human export trade. Organized crime groups control virtually every aspect of the commerce in women and children. Thousands of women are sent to Japan, Thailand, and other countries, and the Philippines is also a major provider of young children for pedophiles who travel from countries throughout the world, including the United States, on so-called sex tours. There are approximately 7.4 million overseas Filipino workers living and working all over the world. It is estimated that 1.62 million of them are irregular migrants, although many are suspected to be victims of trafficking. Thailand’s multibillion-dollar sex industry is one of the most notorious in the world. Organized crime groups have imported an estimated 1 million women from China, Laos, and Vietnam to Thailand. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund, the number of children engaged in prostitution varies from 60,000 to 200,000, with 5 percent of those being boys. Global criminal networks involved in Thailand’s drug trafficking, money laundering, and prostitution operate from China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore. Most of the transnational organized crime groups operating in Vietnam are from bases in other Asian countries, but there are a growing

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number of Vietnamese organized gangs (namely affiliates of the Nam Cam Gang), many of which display characteristics of the more sophisticated groups in Hong Kong and China. The U.S. Department of State has identified Vietnam as a major transit point and production entity for heroin. Heroin from Laos, Myanmar, China, and Thailand and marijuana from Cambodia are frequently moved through Vietnam by organized crime groups. The Future of Asian Organized Crime Organized crime in Asia will continue to grow well into the early twenty-first century. Within the individual countries that have spawned organized criminal activity, many groups have expanded their operations because of weak criminal justice systems and high levels of police corruption. Many of these groups have histories that span several hundred years, and they enjoy tightly knit memberships strengthened by the bonds of familial ties and communal values of honor and loyalty found in Asian societies. Since the late 1980s, one of the most important changes has been the introduction of new forms, or at least more sophisticated forms, of organized crime. Human smuggling, corruption, and the changing nature of the drug trade extensively involve criminal groups. There is evidence that many of the traditional groups in the area of human smuggling have been replaced with small individual cells that operate independently and are motivated by financial gain rather than honor. This changing trend toward the subcontracting of criminal activities to street gangs and loosely tied affiliates poses a new dilemma for law enforcement in its efforts to develop intelligence and clear legal cases. These challenges are compounded in countries where there is no effective mechanism to conduct sophisticated criminal investigations into organized crime. References Bremner, B. “How the Mob Burned the Banks.” Business Week 3460(29) (January 1996): 42–47. Bruno, A. “Unique Gang Organizations—The Yakuza.” Court TV Crime Library, 2003,

http://www.crimelibrary.com/gangsters_outlaws/ gang/. Drug Enforcement Administration. Drug Intelligence Briefs: Cambodia, China, Myanmar. Washington, DC: DEA Publications, 2004. Juvida, S. F. “Philippines—Children: Scourge of Child Prostitution.” IPS-Third World News, October 12 1997, http://www.ips.fi/koulut/ 199742/6.htm. National Police Agency, Criminal Investigation Bureau. “Criminal Trends.” Japan Information Network, 10 October 2002. Park, Y. K. Transnational Organized Crime and the Countermeasures in Korea. Resource Material Series No. 58 of the 116th International Training Course. UNAFEI. Harumi-cho, Fuchu, Tokyo, Japan, 2001, http://www.unafei.or.jp/ english/pdf/PDF_rms/no58/58-06.pdf. United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. March 2004, http://www.state.gov/p/ inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/.

Triads and Tongs: Asian Organized Crime in America Hua-Lun Huang Historical Background Creating secret societies to fulfill certain socioeconomic, religious, or political functions by lowerclass people has a long history in China. For instance, during the final years of the Han dynasty (202 B.C.–A.D. 220), bankrupt peasants, drifters, urban outcasts, peddlers, and other lowborn individuals founded various clandestine sectarian organizations to acquire economic resources necessary for livelihood, to be possessed by supernatural beings, to share information about the preordained fate of imperial government, or even to initiate antigovernment revolutionary movements. During the Song (A.D. 960–1267), Yuan (A.D. 1280–1368), and Ming (A.D. 1368–1644) dynasties, people from the bottom layer of society continued the practice of creating secret associations (such as the White Lotus Sect, the Society of Brothers and Elders, and the Green Gang) to obtain economic support or spiritual comforts or to challenge the 71

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authority of imperial governments. Within the context of this long history of establishing and utilizing secret associations to perform miscellaneous social functions, the first Triad society (Sanhehui, also known as Tiandihui, the Society of Heaven and Earth) was founded by Wan Ti Xi, a roaming Fujianese monk, in the 1760s (i.e., during the midQing dynasty, A.D. 1644–1911). Since one of the aliases of monk Wan Ti Xi is Hong Er (both Wan and Hong are last names, as given names are always preceded by family names in Chinese names), some modern Triad societies are also called Hong Men (i.e., the Hong League; in Chinese, the literal meanings of “Hong” are sonorous, grand, enormous, or immense), as some tongs (literally, a grandiose room where the judge can adjudicate cases, festival-related rituals will be performed, or important family/clan decisions will be made) in Chicago, New York, San Francisco, Toronto, Vancouver, and the other big cities in North America bear the title. What should be noted is that in addition to Hong Men or tongs, Triad societies can also bear the overarching title of shan (mountain). This is because Triad societies are acephalous or highly decentralized groups. Any Triad society can name itself as so-and-so shan or tong. At any rate, present-day Triad societies in North America and Europe usually label themselves as so-and-so tong, while those in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the other Asian countries usually choose the blanket titles of shan. Typologies of the Triad Societies Compared to a number of modern Triad societies in Asia, Europe, and North America that have become either violent street gangs or organized crime syndicates, the first Triad society set up by monk Hong Er was not a criminal assembly. On the contrary, the original purpose for Hong Er was to form a mutual aid group that would allow lowincome and unemployed people to help each other financially and emotionally in order to survive in a highly disadvantaged social and geographic environment. Despite its original intention to provide reciprocal assistance, the activities of the Triads, after more than two hundred years of evolution, can be summarized into four categories: mutual

help-oriented triads, revolution-involved triads, ideology-directed triads, and criminal triads. Mutual Help-Oriented Triads Some of the modern Triad societies or tongs still focus their activities on the provision of economic, financial, or social services to members, as did their predecessors in eighteenth-century China. Because of that, such Triads can be viewed as the Chinese equivalents of the Salvation Army or other Western philanthropic organizations. This characteristic can be clearly seen from those tongs (e.g., the Chinese Six Companies of New York City that in 1883 was renamed the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association) founded in America (particularly in San Francisco, New York City, and Washington, D.C.) and Canada (especially Vancouver) during the 1850s to 1890s when numerous Chinese immigrants experienced white hostility, anti-Asian racism, or even anti-Chinese violence. Revolution-Involved Triads The second category of contemporary Triad societies is that of Republican revolution participation. In the 1890s and 1900s, Sun Yat-Sen and his associates came to America and Canada to raise funds hoping that overseas Chinese would assist their efforts to overthrow the Qing government. A few tongs (such as Zhi Gong Tong) in Chicago, Honolulu, New York City, San Francisco, and Vancouver became Sun’s supporters. This participation in the Republican movement of China (1880s–1911) deeply influenced the political stance of modern tongs because after the Republican government was established in 1911, tongs generally considered the Guomindang (Nationalist) government to be the sole legitimate government of China. With such a firm identification, the Nationalist government in China (1911–1949) and in Taiwan (1950–2000) has enjoyed several decades of support from tongs (of course, the Nationalist government has provided decades of financial support to tongs in return) despite the fact that the communists took over China in late 1949. The Nationalist government lost to the independence-advocated and anti-China Democratic Progressive Party government in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections in Taiwan.

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Because of this great political transformation, there has been a tendency that after 2000, some tongs started to change their political attitude and attempted to establish a patron-client relationship with the Chinese communist government. This implies that if any tongs, which usually look like legitimate nonprofit organizations, get involved in illegal businesses such as gambling, prostitution, or human smuggling and trafficking, they might use the special funds received from the communist government to cover up or even to perpetuate those illegitimate businesses, as they did during the Nationalist government era. Ideology-Directed Triads As previously mentioned, following the 2000 presidential election in Taiwan, parts of modern tongs have become supporters of the Chinese communist government. On the other hand, there are tongs that still consider the Nationalist party as the only legitimate government of China and Taiwan. Such jingoistic tongs manifest the third attribute of modern Triad societies, namely extremist nationalism. Extreme nationalist tongs may have something to do with the underground economy or illegal behaviors, just like some nonideological tongs. But what really makes them notorious among liberal Americans, Chinese, and Taiwanese Americans who are pro-Taiwanese independence is that under the auspices of the Nationalist government, these ideology-directed tongs became involved in political murder, intimidation, interethnic assault, and other political crimes of the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. These connections with Nationalist statesponsored crimes faded away gradually after the mid-1990s. However, there is no evidence that radical nationalist tongs have lost their power or influences in Chinatowns. Criminal Triads The fourth and final category of modern Triad societies or tongs is that compared to the tongs that are involved in organized criminal activity simply on a case-by-case basis, some Triad tongs have become stable elements of the so-called black society (i.e., criminal world). Triad societies or tongs engaging in crime or vice are not new to law enforcement

authorities in America. As early as 1882 when the Chinese Exclusion Act was implemented, some Triad members and tongs were already deeply involved with tong wars, gambling, prostitution, and opium use. This phenomenon seems to be closely related to the emergence of American Chinatowns. American Chinatowns and Criminal Triads According to Iris Chang, Jeffrey Scott McIllwain, and John Kuo Wei Tchen, the formation of Chinatowns is an epitome of social injustice of American society. That is, the appearance of Chinatowns is a manifestation of anti-Chinese racism because American media of the nineteenth century generally portrayed Chinese immigrants as weird, corrupt, uncivilized, or even wicked people with unique customs and behavioral styles. With such a

Police examine the body of a Hip Sing Tong member in Chinatown, New York, in 1924. The shooting death was, allegedly, the result of a gang war among rival Tongs. (Corbis) 73

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stereotypical image, numerous Chinese immigrants in the 1800s were isolated from Caucasian Americans and could not be Americanized (for single Chinese males, one of the leading obstacles of Americanization was the difficulty in marrying white women). Without the opportunity to be assimilated into the host society, most nineteenthcentury Chinese immigrants could not move and instead stayed in given districts of certain cities. Chinese enclaves within large cities in turn became environments of Chinese criminality because social isolation, to a considerable extent, turned Chinatowns into de facto self-governed communities where Chinese affairs seldom, if ever, were arbitrated by white law enforcement agents. On the other hand, self-governance offered some tongs and related Chinese underground elements chances to perpetuate criminal behaviors (such as con games, murder, extortion, loan-sharking, etc.). During and after World War II, the media began describing Chinese Americans as a model minority because of the prominent wartime performance of many Chinese Americans. Nevertheless, Chinatowns to a varying extent are still marginalized places in American society. Such nonmainstream and closed statuses pave the way for criminal Triad societies, street gang-connected tongs, or Chinese street gangs to victimize Chinatown residents on a regular basis. References Chang, Iris. The Chinese in America: A Narrative History. New York: Penguin, 2003. Chin, Ko-Lin. Chinatown Gangs: Extortion, Enterprise, and Ethnicity. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Dai, Xuan-Zhi. Zhong Guo Mi Mi Zong Jiao Yu Mi Mi Hui She (Chinese Secret Religions and Societies). 2 vols. Taipei, Taiwan: Commercial Press, 1990. Dillon, Richard H. The Hatchet Men: The Story of the Tong Wars in San Francisco’s Chinatown. New York: Coward-McCann, 1962. Kaplan, David E. Fires of Dragon: Politics, Murder, and the Kuomintang. New York: Atheneum, 1992. Ma, L. Eve Armentrout. Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns: Chinese Politics in the Americas and the 1911 Revolution. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990.

McIllwain, Jeffrey Scott. Organizing Crime in Chinatown: Race and Racketeering in New York City, 1890–1910. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2004. Miller, Stuart Creighton. The Unwelcome Immigrant: The American Image of the Chinese, 1785–1882. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969. Miscevic, Dusanka, and Pete Kwong. Chinese Americans: The Immigrant Experience. Westport, CT: Hugh Lauter Levin Associates, 2000. Murray, Dian H. The Origins of the Tiandihui: The Chinese Triads in Legend and History. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994. Tchen, John Kuo Wei. New York before Chinatown: Orientalism and the Shaping of American Culture, 1776–1882. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. Tong, Benson. Unsubmissive Women: Chinese Prostitutes in Nineteenth-Century San Francisco. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994.

Organized Crime in Australia: Drug Trafficking and Human Smuggling Robert Hanser and Nathan Moran Drug Trafficking Drug problems in Australia revolve more around the demand for what are typically referred to as soft drugs within the variety of illicit drugs that are trafficked. Consumer demand for these soft drugs (i.e., marijuana and amphetamines) continues to increase, and these drugs are mostly grown or manufactured in Australia. However, the use of harder drugs (such as heroin and cocaine) does not seem to be the major drug concern in Australia, and these drugs are seldom produced within the borders of the country. Despite this, Australia does serve as a transit point for certain drugs leaving one country and destined for another. Indeed, heroin from the Golden Triangle (Southeast Asian manufacturers) bound for the U.S. drug market may first make a brief stop in Australia while in transit. Likewise, Australia has been known to serve as a transshipment point for cocaine from South America (notably Colombia) that is destined for arrival in Southeast Asia. This is particularly true in areas of Southeast Asia that cater to licit and illicit tourist demands for fun and pleasure.

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Therefore, it is due to the strategic geographical location of Australia that many drugs tend to pass through these borders. Thus, illicit drug use has been noted as a growing problem among the Australian population. From the available arrest and conviction records and from various forms of survey research, it is clear that the most frequent drugs of choice in Australia are marijuana and amphetamines. Likewise, these two drugs tend to be grown or produced by the native population of this country, although on occasion some may be trafficked from neighboring New Zealand. Anecdotal evidence coupled with arrest data points to the likelihood that cocaine, smuggled in from South America and the United States, is a growing concern. However, the use of cocaine and arrests for cocaine continue to remain low in comparison with other illicit drugs in Australia. Seizures of cocaine in Australia remain low in comparison to seizures of the drug on an international basis. Lastly, problems with heroin consumption are noted as a problem in Tasmania, but this is largely confined to this area and is not seen as a major problem throughout the remainder of the continent of Australia due to effective controls to prevent growth in trafficking of the licit opium crop. Cultivation and Production Cannabis is the only illicit drug known to actually be cultivated in Australia. Crop yields have not decreased despite the increased eradication efforts of Australian law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, Australian law enforcement officials continue to report increased sophistication among growers who use indoor and hydroponic methods of growing marijuana. The manufacturing of amphetamines has also been noted to be on the increase, although this actually pales in comparison to the production of marijuana. While heroin is not a primary drug problem in Australia, the trafficking of the drug through Australia has increased among Asian-based criminal groups. This trend is expected to continue as demand for these types of drugs increases in other areas of the world. The primary source for heroin trafficked through Australia continues to be the Golden Triangle area

of Laos, Burma, and Thailand. Ecstasy consumed in Australia is primarily imported from Europe, with some shipments transiting Asia prior to arrival in Australia. South American cocaine trafficking organizations are utilizing the improved transportation and commercial links between Australia and South America to facilitate the smuggling of cocaine. From Australian arrest records, it is clear that couriers from South America are intercepted at international airports on a routine basis. Cannabis It has been estimated that approximately 226,000 Australians use cannabis at least weekly and that on average these users consume roughly 10 grams per week, with a total annual consumption of about 120,000 kilograms. Furthermore, at a price of $450 per ounce (the typical street price), this amounts to an annual business of approximately $1.905 billion in revenue. Further still, it has been estimated that roughly 90 percent of the total cannabis market (108,000 kilograms) can be attributed to the local production of the drug within the borders of Australia itself). Thus, the trafficking of cannabis from other origins consists of only a small portion of the total marijuana drug trade. To this day, cannabis remains the most popular illicit drug in the country, and the vast majority of all drug-related arrests are concerned with cannabis offenses. This is course not at all surprising, because of the popularity of the drug in Australia and since the vast majority of this drug is grown within the borders of Australia. Although most of this drug is grown internally, Australian officials still remain vigilant in attempting to thwart potential importation of cannabis. Heroin There are approximately 3,360 frequent users of heroin in Australia. When considering calculations based on average weekly consumption rates for different frequency levels of user, it has been estimated that an annual consumption figure of 350 kilograms at 80 percent purity is trafficked in Australia, mainly in and around the area of Tasmania. At street prices of $500 a gram, this adds up to roughly $699 million that is circulated around this 75

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A crew member from the North Korean ship Pong Su is escorted to a plane in Sydney on April 23, 2003, as he is extradited to the state of Victoria to face charges of drug smuggling. The ship was boarded by armed forces off the coast of New South Wales and escorted to Sydney harbor after allegedly unloading heroin in Victoria. (Reuters/Corbis)

aspect of the illicit drug trade. From this figure, it can be seen that the amount of money generated from the heroin industry amounts to well less than half of that generated from the marijuana trade. It is generally thought that most heroin entering the country arrives by courier via commercial airline flights. Likewise, crews on commercial shipping and oceangoing yachts have been found to be involved in the importation of heroin. This distribution process is thought to resemble a pyramidshaped organizational scheme in which importers sell kilograms to wholesalers who cut the purity of the drug by 50 percent prior to selling the product to dealers as ounce measurements. From this point, these dealers cut the heroin to street purity and sell it in 5 and 10-gram bags to small-time deal-

ers who often are also users of the drug. These lower-end dealers then sell to users in half grams, grams, and smaller single-use dosages. Most of the heroin consumed in Australia is produced, in rank order, in the Golden Triangle (the intersection region of Burma, Laos, and Thailand), the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran) and the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. Hong Kong is a major transshipment port for Australian heroin imports from Southeast Asia, as are Malaysia and Singapore. Vietnam is also emerging as a transit country. Cocaine Data on cocaine use is very unreliable from within Australia. It is estimated that roughly 6,600 persons are cocaine users who consume more than once a

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month. It is generally thought that the cocaine trade is much less organized in Australia than the heroin trade. Trafficking of this drug typically occurs through small amounts arriving via the mail or carried on commercial flights for personal use. Otherwise, the trafficking of this drug is virtually nonexistent in Australia, at least according to official government and other research-based sources. Amphetamines Data-based research is currently not sufficient to provide estimates of the number of amphetamine users in Australia. Generally, many law enforcement officials and researchers in Australia contend that the trade in amphetamines has been most closely associated with biker groups. Furthermore, the majority of amphetamines are largely produced in Australia in illegal and covert laboratories as opposed to being imported into the country. Law Enforcement Efforts Australian law enforcement agencies continue aggressive counternarcotics efforts. The responsibility for such efforts is divided among several agencies including the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the Australian Customs Service (ACS), and the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) as well as various state and territorial police services throughout the country. The AFP and other Australian law enforcement agencies continue to have close working relationships with U.S. agencies including the DEA and the FBI. During the past decade, the AFP has seen an increase in liaison activities in an effort to focus on transnational crime including drug trafficking, terrorist activities, and people smuggling.

involvement of organized crime groups. The involvement of these groups is of concern not only from a criminal justice perspective but also from a human rights perspective. There is the concern that the involvement of organized crime groups may increase the likelihood that situations of human smuggling will be elevated to situations more correctly described as human trafficking. Most undocumented workers in the Australian sex industry have entered that industry voluntarily. In other words, these women are willing contenders who have identified the sex industry as a lucrative option. Indeed, official reports and survey-based research indicate that there are very few cases of women having been deceived about the nature of the work they will undertake in the Australian sex industry. Rather, the issues of deception and coercion are more likely to arise in relation to the terms and conditions of their employment. Law Enforcement Efforts In 2003, the Australian government announced a $20 million initiative to combat both the smuggling and the trafficking in persons. Most officials in Australia contend that while there is a distinct difference between smuggling and trafficking of persons into Australia, the actors engaged in both activities tend to be one and the same. Because of this, some of the initiatives developed are designed to handle both sets of illegal immigration issues with the thought that many of those targeted will fall into both areas of criminal activity. Indeed, Australia is one of the few countries that has actually criminalized illegal immigration, and the government there has pursued many aggressive measures pertaining to both human smuggling and trafficking. Some of these initiatives include the following:

Human Smuggling From the available information on people smuggling and trafficking to Australia, it appears that overstaying is by far the most common method of entering and working in the country illegally. Human smuggling is a far less common practice, with unlawful entry by air being the most frequently practiced method, followed by unlawful entry by sea. Human smuggling to Australia appears to be increasingly sophisticated in nature, suggesting the

1. A twenty-three-member AFP mobile strike team to investigate trafficking and sexual servitude was established in 2003. 2. Immigration officials have been assigned to the Australian embassy in Bangkok to investigate human smuggling and trafficking in Southeast Asia. 3. There has been an effort to increase cooperation among countries in the regions of Southeast Asia 77

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and Oceania to combat human smuggling and trafficking. 4. There is collaboration between the numerous agencies (such as the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs) to provide better oversight and detection of human immigration and consequent smuggling. 5. Reintegration assistance measures have been instituted for smuggled and trafficked victims who are returned to source countries in Southeast Asia. 6. A policing program specifically designed to address the smuggling and trafficking of women for sexual servitude has been developed.

Conclusion Drug trafficking is a growing business in Australia, but it would appear that this is mainly true with softer drugs rather than more addictive and problematic drugs such as cocaine or heroin. Furthermore, most of the drug problems in Australia are associated with marijuana that is grown within the borders of the country. Thus, any true trafficking problem that might exist in Australia is either restricted to that within the borders of the country or is largely restricted to the heroin trade in the vicinity of Tasmania. With respect to human smuggling, it has been found that this is seldom an occurrence that is unwilling on the part of the person smuggled. The typical stereotype of victimized women and children being brought into the country against their will, particularly for the sex trade, is less a smuggling issue and more a trafficking issue. Both of these occurrences are considered to be rare in Australia. Nevertheless, the Australian government does take the matter seriously, particularly when involving the sex trade industry, and numerous initiatives have been established to combat the problems related to human smuggling.

Criminology, 2001, http://www.aic.gov.au/ research/drugs/. Brockett, L., and A. Murray. “Thai Sex Workers in Sydney.” Pp. 191–202 in Sex Work and Sex Workers in Australia, edited by R. Perkins, G. Prestage, R. Sharp, and F. Lovejoy. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1994. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2005. David, F. Human Smuggling and Trafficking: An Overview of the Response at the Federal Level. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2000. Human Trafficking.org. Australian Government Commits AUS$20 million to Anti-Trafficking Initiatives. Washington, DC: Academy for Educational Development, 2004. McCusker, Rob. The Worldwide Fight against Transnational Organized Crime: Australia. Technical and Background Paper Series, No. 9. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2004, http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/tbp/ tbp009/. Schloenhardt, A. Organized Crime and Migrant Smuggling: Australia and the Asia-Pacific. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2002. Sutton, A., and S. James. Evaluation of Australian Drug Anti-Trafficking Law Enforcement. Melbourne: Australian Centre for Police Research, 1995.

Organized Crime in the Balkans and Implications for Regional Security Daniela Irrera Introduction and Overview A new curtain is falling across eastern Europe, dividing north from south, west from east, rich from poor and the future from the past. As Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic sprint into the future of democracy and market economics, Romania and Bulgaria slide into

References Australian Institute of Criminology. Drug Seizures by Australian Customs Service, 1984/85–2002/03. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2001, http://www.aic.gov.au/research/drugs/. ———. Illicit Drugs and Alcohol: Drug Use Statistics. Canberra: Australian Institute of

Balkan backwardness and second-class citizenship in the new Europe. R. C. Longworth, Chicago Tribune, October 1994

The above quotation describes what happened in parts of Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Since

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then, the Balkans have been characterized worldwide as a region of backwardness, poverty, mystery, and illegality. Since the 1500s, domination and submission have conspired to make these people ethnically and religiously fragmented, obligating them to live together in a state system that was periodically altered but without allowing them selfdetermination. An interminable period of oppressive totalitarian regimes and state-run economies condemned these countries to suffer political, economic, and social disruption. Yet within Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkan region represents a strategic area, dividing West from East and Occidental Christian and Protestant societies from Orthodox, Slavic, and Muslim communities. The Balkans has always been at the center of international politics: regarding the Versailles accord in World War I, the Yalta division in World War II; the Iron Curtain during the communist period; and its subsequent period of political and economic transition. For this reason, and in order to assure peace and stability in the region, European states along with the United States have tried, with little success, to establish several long-standing political administrations. In the 1990s, weakness and disintegration of state institutions affected all postcommunist societies around the region, but the Balkans also suffered from ethnic fragmentation and instability, making the situation there even more problematic. Civil wars between Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians led to brutal and bloody conflicts calmed only slightly by the Dayton Agreement of 1995. Subsequently, the Kosovo War (1999) and the Macedonian Crisis (2001) reconfirmed that this area urgently needed a political, economic, and social assist beginning at the local level and addressing the most critical problems. The difficult transition process, the economic crisis, and above all the sanctions against Yugoslavia because of its part in Kosovo War instigated alternative activities: the trafficking in drugs and prostitution and the smuggling of weapons, people, and stolen cars along what is known as the Balkan Route. Organized crime groups, first based in Serbia, Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia, effected these profitable transfers. In order to remain in power, local politicians and administrators tolerated these groups.

Organized crime has now become the most treacherous blight in the Balkans, afflicting every aspect of the state system. The most pernicious result is that crime had permeated the whole society, making democracy, stability, the rule of law, and economic progress impossible to achieve. The response to this problem, of course, should be global, not individual, and should aim to provide regional security. But in order to achieve this, any international consortium or agreement set to combat organized crime must take into account the historical context of the region or else it is destined to fail. Clearly, these countries are not homogeneous. Throughout history, they have presented peculiar characteristics that in various ways had contributed to the rise of organized crime many years earlier. To resolve the problem, both the heterogeneity and the individual structural factors of these states must be taken into consideration. Such an approach appears to be the only possible means to ensure peace and stability in the Balkans and, as a consequence, in all of Europe. Organized Crime in the Balkans The strategic geographical position of the Balkans and its long and troubled history have condemned the region and its people to become a sort of causeway between two different parts of the world. They have always been considered as a crucial piece in a controversial puzzle. Several times, they have had to adapt their civilizations, languages, and religions for a greater good in order to conserve longstanding peace and stability. In order to understand why this region has fallen into such a troubled state—that of an organized crime hegemony—it is necessary to review its history and political development. Historically, the building of the Balkans into nation-states was always externally driven without allowing its people to achieve self-determination. Because of the many different dominations throughout history, its ethnic constituents became fragmented: Serbs are orthodox and Slavic; Slovenians and Croats are Catholic and more open to the influences of Europe; the people living in Montenegro have their own identity and have always suffered from Serbian domination; Bosnians are Muslims, and their identity is linked to the former 79

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Ottoman system; Albanians are partly Muslims, partly Catholics; Kosovo has an Albanian majority and a Serbian minority; and Macedonians are mostly Muslims, with an Albanian majority and a Greek minority. The disparities are not only religious but are also found in language, custom, mentality, and political perceptions. In 1918, the Versailles Peace Agreement focused on the most numerous ethnic groups and gave birth to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Slovenians, and Croats (SHS) that included Serbia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina, and Kosovo. It was an odd arrangement that according to French and British aims was supposed to ensure a formal guarantee of political stability. The product was a multiethnic state ruled by the Karadjodjevic monarchy (Serbs) but supposedly made up of representative bodies. In practice, however, the Serbian national model was a hegemony, and although Slovenia and Croatia were the wealthiest and most productive members, everything was directly controlled by the central power in Belgrade. There was no chance for either minority or ethnic groups to be represented or to respond. With the help of foreign investments from Western countries and a strong police and intelligence system, Serbian leaders succeeded in enforcing order and containing ethnic tensions until World War II. During the Cold War, the Balkan region fell on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain. Although communist regimes were ideologically identical in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the new East Germany, Yugoslavia, which replaced the SHS, continued to remain the principal and crucial member in international policymaking. It was a communist regime, ruled by the Communist Party and by a strong leader, Josip Broz, known in the West as Marshal Tito. At any rate, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall nothing changed in practice. The state was a Federal Republic, and the provinces continued to exist and were given formal autonomy, but political and economic power was still centered in Belgrade. Tito was the voice. Although he was a communist, he was not loyal to the Soviet establishment and wanted to create his own politics, a Yugoslav communist state not tied to one of the two blocs, West-

ern or Eastern. For these reasons, France, England, and even the United States considered him to be a perfect choice as Balkans leader. Under him, in fact, Yugoslavia became a nonaligned country, maintaining stability and unity in the area while remaining independent of Soviet influence, and again ethnic differences were brought under control. Already during this difficult period, rudimentary illegal activities existed. Because of great poverty, people were buying basic goods and food on the black market, thus assisting in the formation of criminal networks. Criminal groups were tolerated by institutions already affected by corruption. The intelligence service, the Kontraobavesajna Sluzba (KOS), was aware of the existence of illicit activities and was in fact directly involved in them. The effectiveness of the system was, of course, due to Tito’s ability to rule the state, but when he died in 1980, everything changed. The new party leaders and, in particular, Secretary Slobodan Milosevic assumed a more aggressive stance toward minorities, promoting a brutal Serbian nationalism. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall some years later, existing internal tensions and violence escalated. When the international context changed, the United States and Europe altered their perception of the Balkan problem: with communism removed, it was no longer necessary to maintain and nourish a strong Yugoslavia. The Republic exploded with ethnic revivals and nationalism, restrained for too many years. In 1992, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared their independence, causing a bloodthirsty war spattered with old terms such as “genocide” and new ones such as “ethnic cleansing.” With the Dayton Agreement, signed in 1995, President Bill Clinton’s administration and the newborn European Union (EU) established a new state system in the Balkans: many small, independent, ethnically homogeneous countries. Among these were Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia, which should have been aided in developing democracy and the rule of law, and BosniaHerzegovina, which should have been assisted by an international peacekeeping unit to monitor the local situation. This choice of state system proved to be totally ineffective and inadequate to face new as well as old problems. Milosevic remained president

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Organized Crime in the Balkanss and Implications for Regional Security

Nikica Jelavic, an alleged organized crime boss, sits between guards during a trial in Zagreb, Croatia, on October 17, 2000. Coatia put 17 alleged gangsters on trial in October of 2000 for a multitude of charges including racketeering, murder, drug trafficking, and abduction. (Reuters/Corbis)

of a smaller state, including only Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina, but the state was excluded from participation in international organizations, and its economy was seriously damaged by United Nations (UN) sanctions. An area weakened by the transition process, privatization, and civil wars, the Balkans represented a free zone for every kind of illegal activity by old criminals with new sophistication. Drugs, weapons, prostitution, people, cigarettes, nuclear material, and stolen cars were easily run along the so-called Balkan Route, going from East to West European countries and passing through Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia. Corrupt bureaucracies, institutions, and intelligence systems helped to expedite illicit activities along these networks. Belgrade and Milosevic’s establishment was at the core of this entanglement, yet he did not act alone. In Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania—everywhere in the area—local criminals, who grew stronger with

the black market during the communist regimes, exploited wars and sanctions to increase their activities and routes. They used their old links with politicians and intelligence agencies to infiltrate the state system, criminalizing every institution. Serbia remained as the crucial zone of power. The subsequent civil wars in Kosovo and Macedonia and the consequent political crises show how organized crime was ruling the region, while the corresponding peace agreements mindlessly replayed the peacekeeping intervention model, failing to take into account the structural problems of the region at the time. This failure is why it is possible to affirm that organized crime in the Balkans is an outcome not of globalization but rather of internal elements, structurally and historically linked to the process of building nation-states and abetted by contemporary inclinations. Any attempt to bring peace and stability to the region should start from the knowledge 81

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that to fight organized crime requires addressing not only the legal and judiciary systems but, first of all, institutional reform and political transparency and issues of the rule of law, economic development, and social and ethnic identity. Regional security will not be accomplished without serious scrutiny and a modification of the entire system. Implications for Regional Security The need to find a long-standing settlement in the Balkan region was always of crucial importance on the European agenda and, although the United States was involved several times, Europe continues to be the favorite and more appropriate political agent to entrust with the task of bringing stability to the area. With the Dayton Agreement, the Balkan States began their difficult dialogue with the EU. Even before that time, they benefited from Association Agreements and Partnerships, but the transition process, ethnic struggles, and civil wars contributed to worsen the situation and to undermine the existence of mutual confidence. Thus, dialogue became characterized by numerous conflicting local interests and attitudes. Slovenia, which was always the most European province of the Federal Republic, initiated negotiations with the EU very early and applied for and was granted membership, while the Westernized Balkan regions of Albania, Croatia, Kosovo, Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro as well as Macedonia responded differently. Croatia was the most developed, Bosnia was under UN administration, Albania was living out its difficult transition process to democracy, and Serbia and Montenegro continued to be ruled by the old leadership. Thus, they presented several kinds of developmentally different local situations. Nevertheless, organized crime as well as political corruption and illegal economies had become a common problem. The EU adopted a regional approach that, considering ethnic dimensions and political responsibilities (above all, in the case of Milosevic), could offer financial support and assistance. Following the war in Kosovo, this approach needed to be more fully implemented. In 1999 the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe was launched to establish an effective comprehensive strategy to tackle regional problems. The

pact had the task of amplifying outcomes from the previous period by underlining the role of local politics and actors assisted by Western financial backing. Now involved in supporting local governments are many actors, including international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; civil society (such as nongovernmental organizations); civil rights associations; media; students; and the EU member states. They are working on three major concerns: human rights and democratization, economic development, and security. Yet from the beginning, the pact did not include all Westernized Balkan countries. Some of them, such as Serbia and Montenegro, did not meet the prerequisite social and political conditions for inclusion. Nevertheless, Albania and Macedonia, which were benefiting from financial aid, were also affected by corruption and organized crime. The following step in the EU strategy, the establishment of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), may be considered as a preferred means to assimilation into the EU. It is backed up by the assistance program CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization) that replaced earlier initiatives, and it aims to strengthen institutions and the rule of law in order for countries to prepare for application for EU membership. In November 2002 during an international conference on organized crime in London, the involved actors stressed the need to implement this process and outlined how it might be enacted at the regional level. During that time, the EU identified vital goals and instruments for ensuring regional security in the near future: • To strengthen legal systems with financial support for training judges and prosecutors. • To upgrade police capacity by enhancing management, recruitment, and career development. • To improve border management by increasing the border control capacity of police and other customs services. • To promote asylum and migration policies by respecting EU and international standards.

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Organized Crime in the Balkanss and Implications for Regional Security

It is clear that the recent cruel past suffered by the Balkan countries has taught their European donors that they must face a sort of perverse Chinese-boxes game. In other words, when they find a solution to a problem, another even more dangerous problem is uncovered. And when they think they have found and tested a successful resolution to that problem, they realize that the solution is satisfactory for some countries but not for others. And on and on it goes. Even though organized crime has become a transnational issue acting in a global dimension, in the Balkans it continues to present some peculiar aspects not found elsewhere. Therefore, it is not possible to apply a standard anticrime plan or policy model, even the most effective one. In order to attract European support, some countries such as Serbia and Albania have developed democratic systems only as a formality while maintaining an illegal underworld. For this reason, it seems more appropriate to act on a caseby-case basis, remembering that in order to achieve regional security, it is necessary to have a totality of peaceful, transparent, and democratic states. Creating these many peaceful states in the Balkan region is an arduous international challenge.

entire state system, contaminating political parties, institutions, economic players, intelligence operations, and the police force. The EU, the agent of greatest potential responsibility in this situation and the Balkans’ natural speaker, can now determine, this time definitively, in which direction the Balkans should change. Enacting programs of anticorruption and police training under local governments, which are themselves criminal and corrupt, will never achieve state security. These important measures should be part of a comprehensive strategy that begins, first of all, with institution building and establishing the rule of law at the national level. But constructing political and economic entities should go beyond using outside countries as models and should be designed with a full awareness and understanding of the structural systems in the Balkan countries. Stabilizing the Balkans is a long and arduous task but one that appears to be the only way to win a lasting peace for this area. Serbia, the crucial link in every historical period, is an effective place to begin.

Conclusions The Balkans, especially the Western part, is usually designated as one of most illegal and criminal parts of the world. The fact that it contributes greatly to transnational drugs, weapons, and people smuggling is well established. Yet most of the problems from which it suffers are directly linked to the process of building modern nation-states and to the roles and functions imposed on the region by the international community since 1918. This difficult heritage of exploitation combined with a people of ethnic diversity and disparate political and economic visions has caused an explosive mixture. Thus, it would be a great mistake to argue that current challenges and disruptions to state sovereignty only come from illegal groups external to the main body of the society. Traditions of organized crime have provided a continuing threat to the development of state sovereignty in this region. Because of weakened conditions in the area over the years, organized crime has been able to infiltrate the

References Banac, I. The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988. Barkey, K. Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to Centralization. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994. Braun, A. Small-State Security in the Balkans. London: Macmillan, 1983. Coleman, C., and J. Moynihan. Understanding Crime Data. Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1996. Heyman, J. M. C, ed. States and Illegal Practices. Oxford: Berg, 1999. Hobsbawm, E. Bandits. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969. Holsti, K. The State, War, and the State of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Komlenovic, U. “Crime and Corruption after Communism: State and Mafia in Yugoslavia.” East European Constitutional Review 6(4) (Fall 1997), http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol6num4/feature/ index.html. Lendval, P. Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans. London: Macdonald, 1969. 83

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Longworth, R. C. “Bulgaria, Romania Resist the Pull of the West.” Chicago Tribune, 10 October 1994. Miletitch, N. Trafics et crimes dans les Balkans. Paris: PUF, 1998. Serbia after Djindjic, International Crisis Group Balkans Report No. 141, 18 March 2003. Panebianco, S., and R. Rossi. EU Attempts to Export Norms of Good Governance to the Mediterranean and Western Balkan Countries. Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 53, October 2004. Todorova, M. Imagining the Balkans. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Vickers, M. The Albanians: A Modern History. London: Tauris, 1999. Vukovic, S. “Corruption in Serbia.” South East Europe Review 1 (2002): 135–146. Xhudo, G. “Men of Purpose: The Growth of Albanian Criminal Activity.” Transnational Organized Crime 2(1) (1996): 1–20.

Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Political-Criminal Nexus James Scaminaci III Genocide, other war crimes, nonvoluntary population movements, and the partitioning of BosniaHerzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) are a product of political-criminal power structures utilizing ethnonationalism to legitimize their political and economic power, exploit public revenues and enterprises for political party or personal enrichment, camouflage their impoverishment of Bosnia’s citizens, and maintain their electoral support. The attempted wartime partitioning of Bosnia by Slobodan Milosevic’s Yugoslavia and President Franjo Tudjman’s Croatia plus varying postwar efforts by Bosnia’s nationalist parties to prevent the establishment of a functioning and legitimate central government—governing institutions working according to the rule of law, accountability, and transparency— and the return of around 2 million displaced persons and refugees to their prewar homes represent a continuing effort to deny Bosnia’s existence as a multiethnic, multicultural society. The war in Bosnia, which lasted from April 1992 to December 1995, was a combination of external aggression from Serbia and Croatia and a civil war, with extensive external military, intelligence, finan-

cial, and ideological assistance instrumental in initiating, prolonging, and intensifying the conflict. The three dominant nationalist parties in Bosnia—the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ-BH), and the Bosnian Party of Democratic Action (SDA)—partitioned the country into competing ethnic power structures, each complete with its own military, intelligence service, police, paramilitary groups, judiciary, payment bureaus, pension systems, and public enterprises. All elements of the power structure contributed to the financial and political sustainability of the nationalist parties as well as facilitated electoral and social control over the citizens. The development of these power structures began during Josip Broz Tito’s rule, when Yugoslavia’s State Security Service (SDB) and the Yugoslav People’s Army’s (JNA) Counter-Intelligence Service (KOS) used criminals to liquidate the regime’s opponents overseas and carry out drug smuggling for state profit. Efforts to circumvent the United Nations (UN) arms embargo against Yugoslavia further solidified this relationship. During the war, there were considerable illegal oil and other smuggling operations between Croatia and Yugoslavia as well as collaborative smuggling operations by criminal and military networks controlled by the three nationalist parties. In the postwar era, ethnic-based paramilitary units transformed into organized criminal gangs, maintained their pattern of interethnic and international cooperation, and continued to provide financial support to the nationalist parties in exchange for political protection. According to the European Union’s (EU) November 2003 Stabilization and Association Agreement assessment of Bosnia, organized crime now poses a “major obstacle” to EU integration. The U.S. State Department’s 2003 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report stated that Bosnia had emerged as a regional transshipment and storage center and was increasingly involved in the production of synthetic drugs. Bosnian drug traffickers were linked to organized crime in Albania, Russia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Italy, and Germany, and drug trafficking funded corrupt government officials, ethnic hardliners, and organized crime groups. The State

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Department’s 2001 narcotics report cited “substantiated links between the narcotics trade and the parallel institutions that undermine the rule of law in Bosnia.” The war ended in December 1995 with the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, also known as the Dayton Agreement. The agreement established a very weak state-level central government, and two entities—a unitary Republika Srpska (RS) and a Federation—further decentralized into ten essentially ethnically partitioned cantons and an autonomous Brcko District belonging to neither entity. The central government had very few characteristics of a modern state, lacking, for example, control over the three militaries, and was dependent upon the entities for financial support. In 2002, the central government accounted for just 2 percent of all government expenditures, while the Federation accounted for 75 percent. Bosnia is characterized by political fragmentation; lack of uniform laws, regulations, and standards; weak controls on all public spending; actual or attempted political interference in all aspects of the judicial system; an extensive socialist bureaucracy with wide discretionary authority; very high tax rates; and porous borders. These factors have fostered endemic corruption, widespread customs, and tax evasion; the growth of a gray economy; high unemployment and poverty; lack of funds for salaries, pensions, and infrastructure; and significant obstacles to foreign investment. In the postwar era, each of the nationalist parties has opposed the rule of law and efforts to control organized crime and corruption. The nationalist parties, but especially those in the RS, have sought to prevent the establishment or weaken the competency of state-level institutions such as the State Border Service, the State Information and Protection Agency, an Indirect Tax Administration for a Value Added Tax, an Intelligence and Security Agency, and the partially internationally staffed Court of Bosnia and Prosecutors Office. After the establishment of these institutions, suspicion exists that the nationalist parties have sought to hinder their effectiveness by staffing key positions with party loyalists. Throughout the postwar era, the nationalist parties have resisted professionalizing

and training police, prosecutors, and judges as well as removing political control over the entire law enforcement and judicial systems that would enable investigations and court cases to proceed against politically sanctioned murders, organized crime, high-level corruption, war crimes, and terrorism. Only after a series of intelligence scandals did the nationalist parties agree to merge the three intelligence agencies (secret police) that had collected intelligence on intraethnic and interethnic opponents as well as the international community. For the nationalist parties, the rule of law as well as accountability and transparency in all public revenues threatened their never-ending cash flows, opaque expenditures, and endemic corruption. International law enforcement officials in late 2002 estimated that Bosnia loses between 300 million and 600 million konvertible marks (KM) annually in customs revenue due to fraud and bad management, while Dani magazine, citing sources from the state prosecutor’s office in late 2004, reported that Bosnia lost 1 billion KM in customs revenue. An estimated 3 billion KM are laundered through fictitious firms. The Office of the High Representative’s (OHR) Special Audit of Republika Srpska and Federation governments in 2001 revealed systemic problems related to the inability of control systems to prevent fraud and corruption, including illegal or vague government decisions, government decisions not published in the Official Gazette, and missing or fraudulent documentation. OHR’s Special Audit of the three public electric utilities for the year 2001 revealed lost revenue due to mismanagement, conflicts of interest, theft, or neglect of 266 million KM. The World Bank’s 2002 Public Expenditure and Institution Review found very weak controls on all government expenditures. The World Bank could not estimate the true size and scope of subentity expenditures and payment arrears, could not estimate the functional allocation of municipal spending, and found a complete lack of internal audit mechanisms and virtually no control over public procurement, an estimated 7 percent of gross domestic product. Tax-free zones were virtually unregulated, and military veterans were exempt from paying customs duties on imports. A 2004 audit of the country’s tripresidency revealed 85

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overspending for dubious expenditures amounting to 25 million KM, a poor role model for all government agencies. Transparency International’s (TI) 2004 National Integrity Systems Study concluded that while significant OHR-driven or -imposed reforms had been enacted, parliamentary oversight committees, Supreme Audit, and other regulatory or investigative agencies were understaffed, underequipped, still subject to political influence, or illprepared to combat endemic corruption. TI’s 2004 Corruption Perception Study found that corruption is the second most important problem facing Bosnia, that political parties are the most corrupt institution in Bosnia, and that the nationalist SDA, SDS, and HDZ-BH are by far the most corrupt political parties, in that order. Milosevic’s project to commit genocide against the Bosnians and to partition Bosnia utilized the Serbian Orthodox Church, scientific and cultural organizations, print, television and radio media, and the JNA, the SDB, the KOS, and organized crime gangs. The Serb Democratic Party, founded and headed by Radovan Karadzic, was created, guided, financed, and armed by the SDB prior to the war. The JNA also armed the SDS and Bosnian Serb paramilitary groups. Similarly, the Republika Srpska Army (VRS), police, and intelligence service were an extension of their counterparts in Milosevic’s Yugoslavia. Indictments at The Hague against Milosevic, Karadzic, and their subordinates clearly demonstrate the institutional linkages between the two political-criminal power structures. In the postwar era, SDS efforts to protect Karadzic, General Ratko Mladic, and other Hague indictees from being captured cost Bosnia participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Partnership for Peace Program in 2004. Press reports suggest that military intelligence, the civilian intelligence service (OBS), and the police are key components of Karadzic’s protection. In March 2003, the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) discovered that a VRS intelligence unit, in conjunction with the OBS, was spying on the international community, political opponents, and the Federation. In April 2004 OHR blocked the SDS from receiving public funding, and in July 2004 OHR made public an audit of the SDS that

German protesters from the Society for Threatened Peoples International take part in a vigil with survivors of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre during a demonstration in front of the War Crimes Tribunal September 26, 2002, in The Hague, Netherlands. (Getty Images)

revealed widespread fraud and violations of the election law. High Representative Paddy Ashdown suggested that there could be little confidence that the SDS was not financing Karadzic’s physical protection. In a related effort to reduce Karadzic’s protection, in June 2004 Ashdown dismissed fifty-nine RS officials including members of the SDS Main Board, SDS mayors and other municipal-level officials, and officials from public enterprises, the police, and military intelligence. Karadzic’s financial support is believed to come from customs and tax evasion schemes conducted by the RS Customs Administration and by public enterprises and private companies involved in oil, timber, cigarettes, and alcohol imports as well as from sweetheart privatization deals. Tudjman sought to partition Bosnia using his own military forces and the subordinate HDZ-BH and Croat Defense Council (HVO) forces. The Hague indictee Mladen Naletilic Tuta’s Convict Battalion operating in Mostar and the larger

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Herzegovina area was the most notorious. The close relationship among political party, government, and private business is exemplified by the case of the Hercegovacka Bank, founded in 1998. More than 60 percent of the bank’s initial capital came from Croatian government funds intended to pay HVO salaries. All of the main officials involved in creating the bank came from the HDZ-BH, including the Bosnian Croat member of the tripresidency and the Federation minister of defense. Several of these high-level officials also sat on the board of directors of companies that were shareholders in the bank and that had received the largest amount of loans from it. Additionally, eleven of the top fifteen suppliers to the HVO, accounting for 55 percent of the HVO’s expenditures in 2000, had shares in or were controlled by the bank. In late 2000 the HDZ-BH undertook an unsuccessful effort to create a third entity using the Hercegovacka Bank as the financial backbone. The bank was seized by the OHR in April 2001, numerous financial irregularities were discovered, and as of 2004 court cases against several former high-level HDZ and HVO officials are pending. In March 1999 Jozo Leutar, the Bosnian Croat deputy interior minister of the Federation, was assassinated by a car bomb in Sarajevo. Six perpetrators were charged with murder, including General Ivan Andabak, a high-level member of Tuta’s Convict Battalion. Andabak had previously been arrested (but not tried) in Rijeka, Croatia, for importing several hundred kilograms of cocaine. Andabak and the others were acquitted despite the testimony of two protected witnesses. The acquittal prompted press speculation that justice had been subverted either through bribes, intimidation, a faulty investigation, or a fraudulent indictment. More importantly, Leutar’s murder, like those of high-ranking RS police inspectors investigating Karadzic’s corruption, signaled that organized crime and ethnic hard-liners were above the law. In October 1999, the SFOR conducted an unannounced inspection of the Bosnian Croats’ National Security Service (SNS) and uncovered evidence that the SNS was prepared to conduct illegal intelligence collection operations against the international community, including International

Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) investigators, and had the ability to engage telephone and credit card fraud. The origins of the SDA are rooted in the intellectual movement of Young Muslims founded in 1941, a pan-Islamist group influenced by the Cairo-based Muslim Brotherhood. Eight of the SDA’s founders were drawn from the Young Muslims, but the party was ideologically and culturally heterogeneous with regard to the role and practice of Islam and the question of a Bosnian or Muslim identity, while the vast majority of Bosnians are secular in outlook and eagerly consume Western culture. Several of Alija Izetbegovic’s inner circle convicted with him in 1983 for endangering socialist Yugoslavia were on the board of directors of the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA) or otherwise supported TWRA’s fund-raising and arms smuggling efforts. TWRA, a Sudan-based Islamic nongovernmental organization (NGO) headed by Fatih al Hassanein, a friend of Izetbegovic since 1970, was linked to Sudan’s National Islamic Front (NIF)—another name for the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan—led by Hasan al Turabi, a longtime friend of Hassanein. In 1991 Turabi gave refuge to Osama bin Laden, while Sudan received considerable financial and terrorist training support from Iran. Bin Laden and al-Qaeda are believed to have contributed millions of dollars to TWRA, and TWRA is believed to have been instrumental in bringing the mujahideen into Bosnia. Unrecognized at the time, the Bosnian model of al-Qaeda’s jihad was developed using mujahideen (as trainers and shock troops), Islamic NGOs, front companies, banks, logisticians, and moneymen. The TWRA and the group of Bosnians associated with it reportedly received up to $2.5 billion between 1992 and 1995 from Islamic sources, and the money was spent in unaccountable ways due to inadequate record keeping, according to Dani and Slobodna Bosna investigative reports in November 2002 and September 2003, respectively. More importantly, the TWRA provided the postwar (1996) funding (4.7 million German marks) to the Foundation to Aid Muslims in Bosnia that, in turn, formed the Bosnian Investment Organization (BIO), a company representing the top inner leadership of the SDA. BIO owned or 87

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was a joint owner of several other companies involved in air transport, trucking, tourism to Saudi Arabia, oil, import and export, and weapons and explosives manufacture. The key Bosnian participant in the TWRA, the Foundation to Aid Muslims in Bosnia, and BIO was Hasan Cengic, convicted in 1983 along with four others for visiting Iran for the fifth anniversary of the Iranian Revolution and charged in 2004 with abuse of office while serving as the Federation’s deputy defense minister in 1996. At that time, he reportedly authorized his company, BIO, to produce explosives, ammunition, and weapons. In October 2004, the state prosecutor seized TWRA documents in Una Sana Canton as part of an investigation into the links between the TWRA, members of the SDA, and bin Laden. Iran was a major provider of weapons, ammunition, humanitarian assistance, and financial support as well as military and intelligence personnel. In February 1996, the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) raided an Iranian terrorist training camp at Pogorelica in central Bosnia. Explosive devices hidden in childrens’ toys as well as other terrorist-related items were seized. The Iranians reportedly trained 1,400 Bosnian operatives at Pogorelica and other camps during the war, 5 of whom were arrested in April 1996 for the attempted assassination of Fikret Abdic. The Pogorelica camp was linked to the SDA-controlled intelligence service, the Agency for Investigation and Documentation (AID). Post 9-11 investigations of Islamic charities possibly linked to al-Qaeda, the Pogorelica terrorist training court case, the continuing controversy over the unsolved September 1996 murder of AID’s Deputy Director Nedzad Ugljen, the revelation of the existence of AID’s Seve assassination unit, continuing investigations into the fraudulent provision of postwar Bosnian citizenship and passports to more than 700 mujahideen, the conviction of an SDA-linked general for smuggling weapons to Kosovo, the discovery of a huge covert SDA-linked weapons cache in Mostar, and the suspected SDA use of the Federation Intelligence and Security Service (FOSS) to wiretap the former FOSS director Munir Alibabic and prominent members of the political opposition Social Democratic Party have

been major SDA embarrassments and called into serious question the SDA’s support for the rule of law. References Andreas, Peter. “The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia.” International Studies Quarterly (2004): 29–51. Hajdinjak, Marko. Smuggling in Southeast Europe: The Yugoslav Wars and the Development of Regional Criminal Networks in the Balkans. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2002. Kovac, Janez. “NATO Westar Operation Reveals Bosnian Croat Spy Net.” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkans Crisis Report 104, 21 December 1999. Magas, Branka, and Ivo Zanic, eds. The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1991–1995. London: Frank Cass, 2001. Popov, Nebojsa, ed. The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000. Rausche, Adrian. “International Direct Intervention Responses to Clandestine Political Economies: The Hercegovacka Banka Case Study.” Paper presented at the Conference on the Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace, Thomas J. Watson Center for International Studies, Brown University, 6 May 2003. U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute. “SFOR Lessons Learned in Creating a Secure Environment with Respect for the Rule of Law.” Carlisle, PA, May 2000, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ army-usawc/sfor_rule_of_law.doc. U.S. Institute for Peace. “Lawless Rule versus Rule of Law in the Balkans.” December 2002, http://www.usip.org.

The Jogo do Bicho: Brazil’s Illicit Lottery Amy Chazkel In the early 1890s, the Brazilian government gave permission to the privately owned Rio de Janeiro zoo to operate a raffle that was designed to supplement the zoo’s insufficient income. Each entry ticket to the zoo had a randomly selected animal printed on it and gave the patron a chance to win a cash prize. Each day, the zoo’s owner, the wealthy land developer, entrepreneur, and former baron João Baptista Vianna Drummond, personally

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selected the lucky animal. Soon, though, booking agents in the city center began to sell tickets to win the raffle at the zoo. Thus, the clandestine lottery called the animal game—or, in Portuguese, the jogo do bicho—was born in Brazil’s capital city. State law enforcement soon lost control of the raffle at the zoo. Within a decade, the game had become a cultural phenomenon that pervaded Brazil, with thriving networks of booking agents, dealers, and players. Surges of political and criminal repression throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century failed to prevent Rio’s residents from playing, discussing, and writing songs and stories about the game. Certain aspects of the jogo do bicho that characterized the illicit lottery in its earliest years remain virtually unchanged today. Players of the jogo do bicho still exchange a small amount of money—a quantity of their own choosing—for a chance to play one of the several varieties of the game. The lottery is still based on a list of twenty-five animals, each corresponding to a number or set of numbers. The roughly alphabetical list of animals associated with each number remains unchanged from the end of the nineteenth century: 1 = avestrúz (ostrich), 2 = águia (eagle), 3 = burro (donkey), 4 = borboleta (butterfly), 5 = cachorro (dog), 6 = cabra (goat), 7 = carneiro (sheep), 8 = camelo (camel), 9 = cobra (snake), 10 = coelho (rabbit), 11 = cavalo (horse), 12 = elefante (elephant), 13 = galo (rooster), 14 = gato (cat), 15 = jacaré (alligator), 16 = leão (lion), 17 = macaco (monkey), 18 = porco (pig), 19 = pavão (peacock), 20 = peru (turkey), 21 = touro (bull), 22 = tigre (tiger), 23 = urso (bear), 24 = veado (deer), and 25 = vaca (cow). The manner of selecting these numbers, however, has undergone several changes. Although it began as a raffle at the zoo, in the clandestine form that it then took the jogo do bicho became a side bet on the legal lottery by the mid-1890s. In its most common form, the player selects either an animal or a number; each animal corresponds with four sets of twodigit numbers (dezenas). The last two digits of the winning number of the (licit) federal lottery would determine the day’s winner. From the late twentieth century when the game ceased to be linked to the legal lottery up to the present day, those who

run and fund the jogo do bicho (bankers, or banqueiros) operate a clandestine drawing to select the winning number each day. Whatever the means of determining them, the numbers and animals that form the basis for the jogo do bicho have long fed a rich folk tradition aimed at divining the outcome of the game by looking for signs in the experiences, sights, and chance occurrences of daily life, such as the license plate on a passing car, the death of a famous person, or the appearance of a stray dog at one’s doorstep. An elaborate system of dream interpretation and translating hunches into winning animals and numbers provides many Brazilians with a widely shared source of fun and sociability as well as an aspiration of acquiring wealth. Criminalization From its inception in the early 1890s to the present day, the jogo do bicho has been one of Brazil’s most ubiquitous cultural practices. It has also been, nearly from the beginning, against the law. Although thousands in all of Brazil’s cities ended up in jail for playing and especially dealing in the jogo do bicho, its legal status was always ambiguous in its early decades. Officials at the national and municipal levels never agreed on whether to criminalize or simply to regulate this lottery. The Brazilian Penal Code of 1890, which was in effect when the jogo do bicho was invented, had several articles that banned all games of chance not specifically permitted by the government. Yet as a misdemeanor that in many ways was indistinguishable from its legal counterpart, the licensed and permitted lotteries both public and private that flourished at that time, the jogo do bicho fell into a category of crime that was difficult both to define and to prosecute. Despite this legal ambiguity, throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries those who played, dealt, and banked this illicit lottery were routinely arrested and processed through the Brazilian judicial system. Repression was usually arbitrary and sporadic, as police campaigns to stamp out the jogo do bicho every few years resulted in waves of arrests. Police crackdowns occurred in 1907, 1913, 1917, 1926, and 1933. The supplement to the new Penal Code passed in 1940 89

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that enumerated misdemeanor infractions mentioned the jogo do bicho by name and definitively criminalized it. Law Number 6259, passed on 10 February 1944, reinforced the new Penal Code’s ban on this clandestine lottery. In keeping with the tradition of seeking signs of the outcome of the daily jogo do bicho number in noteworthy daily events, folklorist Hugo Pedro Carradore reports that for an entire week after the passing of this legislation, the most frequently played combination of jogo do bicho numbers in Brazil was 6259, the number that corresponds with the law. Despite the definitive national-level ban on playing and selling the jogo do bicho in the early 1940s, local governments legalized the animal game from time to time, both de facto and de jure. For example, according to Carradore, the São Paulo state government, under Ademar de Barros (1941– 1945), decided to regulate instead of expressly prohibit the game. Those who banked the game were obliged to pay a certain amount of their proceeds to the state government. One lottery shop could only be established one hundred meters from another. Under this arrangement, anyone over eighteen years of age could legally play the jogo do bicho. Changing Structure and Meanings of the Animal Game Brazilian conventional wisdom about the origins of the jogo do bicho—reinforced and spread by folklorists, scholars, and everyday people—emphasizes the lottery’s origin as a clever financial scheme to keep the Rio de Janeiro zoo afloat, which then became a criminal practice because of the avarice of both the urban masses and corrupt police. While this popular conception of the jogo do bicho’s origin does contain some truth, additional contextual knowledge provides a more complete picture of how it developed into the enormously popular but illicit practice that it remains to the present day. The jogo do bicho was not just an innocent moneymaking scheme gone awry but rather was part of a truly revolutionary moment in the cultural and social history of the Brazilian city in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The jogo do bicho was a part of the early development of the urban entertainment industry. Significantly, the

game’s first financiers were also instrumental in organizing and funding the movie, popular theater, and popular entertainment industries. In addition, the many shopkeepers and street vendors who then sold tickets for the game were also part of the changing structure of the Brazilian city. The jogo do bicho developed as part of the growth of the urban petty commerce and, relatedly, the illicit and semi-illicit markets for goods and services now known as the informal sector. Those who study the history of the jogo do bicho have observed that this illicit lottery underwent a process of transformation beginning around the 1920s. First, the jogo do bicho increasingly came to be associated with the urban poor and working classes. Second, the jogo do bicho went from being sold by small, independent sellers who banked the game themselves to being sold by more centralized, specialized, and modern vendors and financed more centrally by entrepreneurs. Finally, in the middle of the twentieth century, the jogo do bicho fell increasingly under more systematic and effective police persecution. These changes gradually but dramatically altered the way the game had worked during the first two decades of its existence. In 1893 when Drummond effectively lost his monopoly on betting on the outcome of the animal raffle, the jogo do bicho had begun to decentralize in both spatial and organizational terms. In other words, it fanned out geographically and, as described above, was played at innumerable, varied sites throughout the city. For the most part, those who sold tickets to the jogo do bicho were not specialists in this trade. Rather, they were primarily shopkeepers, retail clerks, and artisans and workers in a variety of trades who sold these illicit lottery tickets as a means of supplementing their income. In the Brazilian capital city where the game originated, the jogo do bicho grew to conform to the city’s patterns of industrial growth and urbanization, spreading throughout the city and especially into the working-class suburbs. Toward the middle of the twentieth century, however, the jogo do bicho continued to disperse throughout the city but also began to centralize in terms of its organizational structure. Gradually, dry goods sellers who sold jogo do bicho tickets on the side and banked

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their own lottery businesses gave way to sellers who exclusively dealt in jogo do bicho tickets and, increasingly, were banked by someone else (a banqueiro) who also financed other vendors. Historian Felipe Santos Magalhães’s research reveals that by the 1940s, the tendency of successful vendors (bicheiros) and banqueiros to expand their businesses and competition between different bankers led to the concentration of jogo do bicho capital in the hands of ever fewer bankers and the division of certain small but growing sections of the city into individual banqueiros’ turf. As the sale of jogo do bicho tickets centralized, the general consumption of these tickets as well as their cultural meanings became increasingly restricted to the popular classes and the urban underworld. When the Rio de Janeiro police carried out a census in 1913 of the jogo do bicho vendors, they did not report any places to purchase the illicit lottery in the better-off South Zone of the city. As the research of sociologist Marcelo Pereira de Mello demonstrates, Rio’s middle sectors had already distanced themselves from the sellers of the jogo do bicho by that decade. Despite the jogo do bicho’s uncertain legal position and its consistent popularity across all socioeconomic classes, those who dealt in the clandestine lottery had already accumulated the stigma of criminality by the 1920s because of nearly three decades of police harassment. The increasing pace of criminalization of the jogo do bicho after the mid-1910s can also be traced to such changes in the urban landscape as the growth of suburbs and the increased spatial differentiation of classes in the city. Probably above all, the development of the jogo do bicho was the result of the unofficial partnership between those who banked and sold tickets to this lottery and the police. Although police corruption is notoriously difficult to document, the occasional official denunciations and police investigations into the involvement of renegade police officers in the jogo do bicho in accepting protection money demonstrate what appears to have been pervasive police involvement in the jogo do bicho from the earliest years of the twentieth century to the present day.

The Jogo do Bicho in Contemporary Brazil The contemporary jogo do bicho is famously characterized by its absorption in and involvement with the culturally and financially important business of Rio de Janeiro’s Carnival celebrations. The relationship between the jogo do bicho and Rio’s carnival samba organizations (samba schools, or escolas de samba) developed gradually but was finally consolidated in the late 1980s. As the samba schools increasingly turned into large business enterprises in the last quarter of the twentieth century, they came into the embrace of the jogo do bicho. Although not all of Rio de Janeiro’s samba schools are affiliated with the jogo do bicho, many came to be financed by the illicit lottery’s banqueiros and managed under the same administrative hierarchy. The relationship between samba schools and jogo do bicho sellers and bankers was initially based on the interests of individual patrons, people from within the jogo do bicho organization with an interest in the samba music played at Carnival. This relationship eventually became more depersonalized and institutional. During the period from the 1960s to the late 1980s, samba schools and the jogo do bicho organization came into close contact with each other as institutions, rather than just acting together through ad hoc contact, because of their proximity and shared public. The contemporary jogo do bicho organization is also commonly understood to be involved with the urban drug traffic in Brazil. The level and degree to which this connection exists is not known and has not been formally studied. The jogo do bicho’s lasting importance in Brazilian (especially urban) daily life has long fascinated not only foreign commentators but also Brazilians. Popular depictions of the animal game comment on not only its underworld of urban gangsters but also its persistence despite constant persecution, its general acceptance despite the stigma of its illegality, and the consistently smooth functioning of the game and legendary honesty of its bicheiros. Such classic films as Amei um Bicheiro (1952) and plays such as Boca de Ouro (1960), adapted to the screen by illustrious filmmaker Nelson Pereira dos Santos in 1963, and O Rei de Ramos (1979) as well as short stories and chronicles authored by both famous and 91

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The alleged leader of clandestine gambling activities in Brazil, Carlos Ramos, also known as Charlie Waterfall, talks with the press as he arrives at the Federal Police building on March 1, 2004, in Brasilia, Brazil, to testify regarding his involvement in a bribery scandal of Rio and Brasilia governors. Ramos is reputed to be a major figure in jogo do bicho (game of the animal) numbers game. (AFP/Getty Images)

unknown writers depict jogo do bicho players, vendors, and bankers and the world of which they are a part. Today, players can still make bets on thousands of street corners throughout Brazil as well as on the telephone and the Internet. Although public suggestions to legalize the jogo do bicho occasionally arise, both buying and selling remains a misdemeanor crime that is punishable by fines and/or a prison term. References Bretas, Marcos Luiz. A guerra das ruas: Povo e polícia na cidade do Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério da Justiça, Arquivo Nacional, 1997.

Carradore, Hugo Pedro. Folclore do jogo do bicho. São Paulo: Tribuna Piracicabana, 1979. Chazkel, Amy. Laws of Chance: The Jogo do Bicho and the Making of Urban Public Life in Brazil, 1880–1968. Durham: Duke University Press, forthcoming. DaMatta, Roberto, and Elena Soárez. Eagles, Donkeys and Butterflies: An Anthropological Study of Brazil’s “Animal Game.” Translated by Clifford E. Landers. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006. Herschmann, Micael, and Kátia Lerner. Lance de sorte: Futebol e o jogo do bicho na belle epoque carioca. Rio de Janeiro: Diadorim, 1993. Magalhães, Felipe Santos. “Ganhou leva . . . do vale o impresso ao vale o escrito: Uma histório social do jogo do bicho no Rio de Janeiro (1890–1960).”

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Unpublished PhD diss., Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2005. Mello, Marcelo Pereira de. “A história social dos jogos de azar no Rio de Janeiro, 1808–1946.” Unpublished MA thesis, Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro, 1989. Salvatore, Ricardo D., Carlos Aguirre, and Gilbert M. Joseph, eds. Crime and Punishment in Latin America: Law and Society since Late Colonial Times. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001.

Transnational Crime in the Caribbean Region Virginia Wilson The Caribbean is made up of twenty-five countries that encompass hundreds of islands stretching from the southern point of Florida to the northwest of Venezuela. Due to the islands’ location between the United States and South America, the Caribbean has a significant amount of transnational crime, particularly in drug trafficking and money laundering. Trafficking and Money Laundering In terms of drug trafficking, the Caribbean generally acts as a transshipment zone from the originating country to the consuming country. South America, a major producer of illicit drugs, and the United States, a major consumer of illicit drugs, are both close to the Caribbean islands. Transnational organized crime groups employ several common criminal methods throughout the region. Airdropping involves an airplane dropping bales of drugs to the water or land below. The drugs are then retrieved by traffickers, who use high-speed boats if the shipment lands in water. Traffickers also use legal and illegal airstrips, which are made on roads or in remote fields. Loaders are used to unload the airplanes while the plane is still moving on the runway to protect the pilots from arrest. Many items such as car interiors, suitcases, live and dead animals, and people have been used to smuggle drugs. Many of the islands are also used as staging areas for different drug trafficking operations. Because of the geography of the islands, all of

the countries use maritime vessels, particularly high-speed boats, to smuggle drugs into the area. Cocaine and marijuana are the major illicit drugs smuggled into and out of the Caribbean. The U.S. State Department’s 2004 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report identified the Bahamas, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic as major transit points for the shipment of South American narcotics to the United States and other markets. Cocaine is by far the most profitable drug trafficked in the Caribbean. The primary route for cocaine trafficking is through Jamaica and Haiti, followed by routes through Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, and the Dominican Republic. Secondary movement of cocaine is through Puerto Rico and into the United States or to the United States and Europe via the eastern islands of the Caribbean. Colombian heroin has limited movement and is generally not consumed in the Caribbean. Jamaica is a significant source for marijuana, although Colombia has recently become a major competitor in the marijuana trade. The Caribbean provides an alternate route for synthetic drugs, or club drugs, such as MDMA (ecstasy) into the United States from Europe. The Caribbean is considered a tax haven for many companies and money launderers. The area endorses itself as an offshore center, requires little or no tax burden, has very strict bank secrecy laws that provide customer confidentiality, has a large financial and banking center, offers low incorporation fees, offers free movement of currency into and out of country, and has few laws that criminalize money laundering and other financial crimes. Proceeds from drug trafficking are routinely laundered through many Caribbean countries. Some of the countries in the Caribbean have free-zone areas in which goods can be held and then shipped without an additional import or duty tax. Offshore banking is significant in Aruba, the Bahamas, Curacao, and most British independencies. The technology revolution has greatly increased the offshore financial activities, especially in the areas of communications and telecommunications. Many nonbanking institutions such as jewelry stores, casinos, and travel agencies are also used in money laundering. 93

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An armored van waits at the airport to unload a shipment of money on August 21, 2000, in Nassau, Bahamas. The Bahamas’ financial district rivals the country’s tourist industry for its contribution to the national economy. (Getty Images)

Arms trafficking is growing rapidly in the region and is both interregional and intraregional, with many of the firearms coming from South America. The arms are usually traded for drugs as payment and are kept in the country or region. Most of the arms involved are AK-47s, and gun running is directly involved with the drug trade. Of all the countries in the Caribbean, Haiti is the most heavily involved in the arms trade. Human trafficking is the third most lucrative business in the world, behind arms and drug trafficking. Many people are lured by the promise of a career or marriage, and many end up being abused, exploited, or forced into labor. Many governments in the Caribbean currently claim that the problem is small, although a large increase may be seen due to the developing tourism industry and labor markets. According to the International Organization for Migration, the Dominican Republic has lost more than 50,000 women in the past fifteen years

to human trafficking, and between 20,000 and 50,000 Haitians are illegally living abroad. Crime in the Caribbean: An Overview The twenty-five countries in the Caribbean have various problems in regard to organized crime. Anguilla. A British territory located in the northeastern part of the Caribbean, Anguilla is known as a minor drug transshipment point and an offshore banking center that is vulnerable to money laundering. Antigua and Barbuda. Located in the eastern part of the Caribbean, Antigua and Barbuda are known as a drug transshipment point and a major offshore financial center. There are about eighty Internet gambling sites and twenty-six offshore banks in the country. Aruba. Located in the southern part of the Caribbean close to Venezuela, Aruba is a territory of the Netherlands. It is known as a drug transship-

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ment point (especially for cocaine) and a major offshore financial center with accompanying money laundering. Bahamas. Located in the northernmost part of the Caribbean close to Florida, the Bahamas acts as a major drug transshipment point (cocaine, marijuana, ecstasy) and offshore financial center with money laundering. There are about 400 offshore banks and 100,000 international business companies. Barbados. Located in the southeastern part of the Caribbean, Barbados is known as a drug transshipment point (cocaine) and major offshore financial center with money laundering. British Virgin Islands. Located in the northern part of the Caribbean, the British Virgin Islands is a British territory that is known as a drug transshipment point (cocaine) and offshore financial center. Drug trafficking is prevalent between the British Virgin Islands and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Cayman Islands. Located in the western part of the Caribbean, the Cayman Islands are British territories that are known as a minor drug transshipment point (cocaine and marijuana) and as a major offshore financial center notorious for tolerating money laundering. Cuba. Located in the northwestern part of the Caribbean close to Florida, Cuba is a minor drug transshipment point (cocaine). Dominica. Located in the eastern part of the Caribbean, Dominica is known as a drug transshipment point and a growing offshore financial center and money laundering area. Dominican Republic. Located in the central part of the Caribbean next to Haiti, the Dominican Republic is known as a drug transshipment point (cocaine, heroin, ecstasy) and as a money laundering area. Human trafficking is also a major concern for the country. Grenada. Located in the southern part of the Caribbean, Grenada is a drug transshipment point (cocaine and marijuana) and growing offshore financial center and money laundering area. Guadeloupe. Located in the eastern part of the Caribbean, Guadeloupe is a French territory known as a drug transshipment point (cocaine, ecstasy) and offshore financial center and money laundering area.

Haiti. Located in the central part of the Caribbean next to the Dominican Republic, Haiti is known as a major drug transshipment point (marijuana, cocaine, heroin) and money laundering area. Arms trafficking is also a concern for the country. Many Haitians flee their country to the Dominican Republic and other islands. Jamaica. Located in the western part of the Caribbean, Jamaica is known as a drug transshipment point (marijuana, cocaine, heroin) and money laundering area due to a flourishing drug trade. Martinique. Located in the eastern part of the Caribbean, Martinique is a French territory known as a drug transshipment point (cocaine and marijuana). Montserrat. Located in the eastern part of the Caribbean, Montserrat is a British territory and is known as a drug transshipment point (marijuana and cocaine) and offshore financial center that is vulnerable to money laundering. Navassa Island. Located in the western part of the Caribbean between Jamaica and Haiti, Navassa Island is an uninhabited U.S. territory. No major transnational crimes occur on the island. Netherlands Antilles. Located in the southern part of the Caribbean close to Venezuela, the Netherlands Antilles is a Dutch territory that is known as a drug transshipment point (cocaine and heroin) and major offshore financial center with money laundering. The country also has large free-zone areas. Puerto Rico. Located in the north-central part of the Caribbean, Puerto Rico is a U.S. territory that is known as a drug transshipment center (marijuana, cocaine, heroin, ecstasy) and a major money laundering area. Saint Kitts and Nevis. Located in the eastern part of the Caribbean, Saint Kitts and Nevis is known as a drug transshipment point (cocaine) and an offshore banking center that is vulnerable to money laundering. Most financial crime is concentrated on Nevis, which has more than 19,000 offshore companies. Saint Lucia. Located in the southeastern part of the Caribbean, Saint Lucia is known as a drug transshipment center (marijuana, cocaine, heroin) and a growing offshore financial center that is vulnerable to money laundering. 95

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Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Located in the southern part of the Caribbean, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is known as a drug transshipment point (marijuana, cocaine) and a growing offshore financial center that is vulnerable to money laundering. Trinidad and Tobago. Located in the southeastern part of the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago is known as a drug transshipment point (cocaine, heroin) and as a money laundering area due to the drug trade. Turks and Caicos. Located in the northern part of the Caribbean, Turks and Caicos is known as a drug transshipment point (marijuana, cocaine) and money laundering area due to the drug trade. U.S. Virgin Islands. Located in the northern part of the Caribbean, the U.S. Virgin Islands is a U.S. territory that is known as a drug transshipment point (marijuana, cocaine). References Bordenave, S., and D. Davis. “Small Arms Demand and Violence in the Caribbean: Focus on Haiti.” Draft paper presented at the Regionalism, Regional Security and Civil Society of the Greater Caribbean in the New Global Environment Seminar, 25–27 February 2004, http://www.afsc .org/latinamerica/PDF/smarmeng.pdf. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook, 2005, http://www.cia.gov. Griffith, I. L. Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Seige. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1997. ———. The Political Economy of Drugs in the Caribbean. New York: St. Martin’s, 2000. International Organization for Migration. “IOM in the Caribbean,” October 2002, http://www .iom.int/documents/publication/en/caribbean3 .pdf. Klein, A., M. Day, and A. Harriot. Caribbean Drugs. New York: Zed, 2004. Smellie, A. “The Illegal Trade in Firearms and Its Impact on the Drug Trade and Money Laundering in the Region,” n.d., http://www.cfatf .org/eng/typoexe/illtrad/index.pdf. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. September 2003. Drug Enforcement Administration. Drug Intelligence Brief: The Drug Trade in the Caribbean; A Threat Assessment, September 2003, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/ 03014/03014.pdf.

Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean Robert D. Hanser, Nick Wakeley, Meghan K. Smith, and Walonda Wallace Introduction Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean are all fairly well known for their share of political instability and continued warfare. These characteristics have created a region of the world that is witness to innumerable acts of desperation among the poor and downtrodden on the one hand and overt acts of exploitation from victimizers on the other. This means that it often may be difficult to discern between the victim and the perpetrator in these cases, and this is particularly true when organized criminal activities such as human smuggling (as with the illicit sex industry) or drug trafficking (for more affluent consumers in the United States) are concerned. Moreover, the activities of organized crime groups in this area of the world are becoming more diversified and now simultaneously resemble the acts of drug-running outfits, orga-nized paramilitary guerrilla rebels, and primary terrorist factions all at the same time. Thus, these groups are no longer onedimensional in their mode of operation, and they are less amenable to any simplistic single form of analysis. There are three primary areas of criminal activity now common to organized crime groups in Latin America: drug trafficking, human smuggling (including the illicit trade), and terrorism. The drug trafficking industry is fairly common knowledge among scholars, practitioners, and laypersons alike. Human smuggling, including the illicit sex trade, is common to many underdeveloped areas of the world and thus may not be a surprising development (although its proximity to the United States may be somewhat surprising). However, the third activity consists of a blending between the incomegenerating activities of these criminal groups and their nefarious links to groups that perpetrate acts of terrorism. Drug Trafficking in Latin America Organized crime is typically most involved with generating profits by providing illicit goods and services to meet the demands of a given consumer

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population. Because the United States is an avid consumer of illicit drugs, it is only natural that many of the less-developed countries in Latin America have experienced a strong tendency among its criminal entrepreneurs to fulfill this demand. Indeed, the drug trade is one of the most lucrative operations for criminal syndicates in the regions of Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. According to J. Farrar, “Central America, Mexico and the Western Caribbean have become the principal corridor through which transnational drug trafficking groups move some 92 percent of the South American cocaine shipments that enter the United States.” Central America is one region that is heavily affected by the drug trade because of its easily penetrated borders, lack of adequate law enforcement, and lack of well-trained law enforcement officials. Due to the low risk of detection by enforcement officials, the graft and corruption of those officials, and the political instability of many countries in Central America, this region has been found to be ideally suited as a primary corridor by which the trade can be conducted. In fact, seizure data indicate that Central American countries are increasingly being used by international drug traffickers as transit points for transporting illicit drugs, especially heroin and cocaine, from South America throughout the United States and Canada, with much of this trafficking occurring along the Atlantic Coast. Oftentimes the organized crime groups establish bases of operation in Central America that act as way stations for further drug product transportation. From the large seizures of drugs and the testimony of apprehended offenders, it is becoming increasingly clear that traffickers use the Central American region as a major transit point for further drug transportation. Likewise, Caribbean countries are increasingly being exploited by illicit drug traffickers as transit points as well, and this is particularly true with many of the island nations throughout the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. Interdiction efforts continuously encounter a steady flow of illicit drugs being trafficked by air and sea in the Caribbean. Not only has the drug trade brought illicit products into this region, but it has also brought

increased levels of violence. Violence related to drug trafficking has been a continual problem in this region, and law enforcement must continuously contend with these dangers both on land and at sea. Within the Caribbean region, certain points may serve as drop-off points for sale, particularly when the drugs are carried via air. Much of the drug trade through the Caribbean is conducted by aerial transportation using personal aircraft that is contracted by the drug trafficking organization (which is typically interlinked with cartels and such organizations in South America and Mexico). Frequently, dead bodies from conflicts between drug traffickers are encountered in various island nations of the Caribbean, their origins being rooted in squabbles over the conditions of the trade that occur when parties meet at obscure landing sites of small personal aircraft. The Mexican drug cartels are major suppliers of illicit drugs and receive substantial profits from the drug trade. D. L. Bender estimates that “Mexican drug rings smuggle between $10 billion and $30 billion worth of narcotics annually.” In other words, these Mexican organized crime groups, or cartels, clear more than $10 billion a year from transporting drugs into the United States. Indeed, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration estimates that approximately 92 percent of the cocaine sold in the United States in 2001 came through the U.S.Mexican border, compared with 77 percent in 2003. One key reason for this rampant trafficking is the well-known corruption that exists within the Mexican system of law enforcement. Human Smuggling and Trafficking and the Illicit Sex Trade in Latin America It is important to distinguish between smuggling and trafficking. In a general sense, smuggling refers to instances when the victim is an accomplice to one degree or another. Typically there is no force used to encourage the victim to make the illegal transit across national borders. This does not mean that crimes are not perpetrated against these victims, but it simply denotes the fact that the victims often give initial consent to their illegal passage across international borders. Trafficking, on the other hand, implies that no consent is given on the 97

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Policemen unload over 2,000 kilograms of cocaine at Juan Santamaria airport in Alajuela, Costa Rica, on April 24, 2005. The drugs came into the country by boat from Colombia and were seized in Playon de Camay, near the border with Nicaragua. (AFP/Getty Images)

part of the victim and often entails some degree of force that transports the victim against her or his will. Each of these activities has been reported to occur in Latin America, particularly with respect to entry into the United States. However, the issue of trafficking has been noted to be most problematic when pertaining to children who are victims of the illicit sex trade. Indeed, it has been reported that hundreds of young girls are taken to virtual slave markets in the vicinity of Mexico City for use as child prostitutes who service a demand generated by foreign visitors of the city. These children are systematically raped and intimidated into compliance and then are bought by pimps, who then transport them across the border into the United States. As a result, Mexico has been noted to be routinely frequented by pedophiles due to the despera-

tion of many of the street children in impoverished areas of the country and the lax federal, state, and municipal laws and enforcement. Currently, attention has been given to this concern, and authorities and advocacy groups are working to stem this illicit industry. But the demand continues to intensify from foreign visitors, and this in turn provides a lucrative criminal venture for human traffickers in this region of the world. On the other hand, the issue of human smuggling into the United States through the U.S.Mexican border region has also been noted to be an active organized criminal trade. The criminal actors are frequently referred to as coyotes and often smuggle desperate individuals from Central America into the southwestern United States. Most frequently, those escorted and smuggled by coyotes

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are young women, particularly women from Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. These women are frequently charged $10,000 to $20,000 for their entry, and they are then forced to work in bars and nightclubs as exotic dancers or prostitutes until this fee is paid in full. Naturally, many abuses (often beatings and rapes) often happen to these women, and threats of deportation or harm to their families in their own country of origin typically will keep them compliant. The smugglers are often fairly rough on their human cargo and have been notorious for their violence and willingness to kill noncompliant women. On some occasions, women are left for dead in the desert regions of the U.S. Southwest. Likewise, women who become pregnant due to their victimization through rape or forced sexual servitude have often been made to submit to unwanted abortions, sometimes under barbaric conditions. Investigations by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement divisions have uncovered numerous smuggling rings in the U.S. Southwest and in the state of New York. Often, the perpetrators are from the nations of El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mexico, and their range of operations can be quite extensive so as to include routes of operation that cover numerous countries throughout the region. These networks will tend to include ringleaders who often own many of the domiciles where the women are hidden and imprisoned as well as the bars and nightclubs where they are forced to ply their trade. Recruiters are specialized members of these networks who locate young and attractive females in war-torn or povertyridden locations of Central America, lying to the women about their job prospects in the United States so as to entice them as willing (albeit naive) accomplices into the smuggling activity. The smugglers or coyotes conduct the actual work of transporting their human victims through the Mexican desert into the United States and also work within the United States to smuggle these women from state to state. Enforcers are responsible for imposing the rules and working conditions upon the victims as well as collecting the smuggling fees. It should be pointed out that the members of these networks are frequently female, meaning that the

perpetrators do not represent a gendered type of grouping. Many of the criminals arrested, convicted, and sentenced among these organized crime operations are female and may even be spouses of the male criminal actors involved in the smuggling operation. The coyotes are likewise responsible for the smuggling of male victims as well. Many of the men seeking to enter the United States do so under the hope of securing employment (although it is illegal employment) that is superior to what they could obtain in their own country of origin. Many desire to save the money for their families in their native countries and are employed in the migrant farming industry in various areas of the United States. These men may seek the aid of a smuggler since security has become increased along the U.S.Mexican border. However, many are given deceptive accounts of the conditions that surround their smuggling experience. As a result, many die of suffocation, starvation, and other abuses that occur in the process of the smuggling activity. One organized human smuggling ring operated out of El Paso, Texas, and often solicited U.S. truck drivers (paying them handsomely and providing other incentives) to illegally smuggle people inside their interstate eighteen-wheeled rigs. This organized crime ring is thought to have processed as many as 500 undocumented immigrants a week from El Paso to northern Texas and beyond. Aside from the human smuggling that seems to be inherent among many organized crime syndicates around the world, there is some evidence that the syndicates operating in Central America and Mexico may have connections to extremist groups from the Arabic Middle Eastern area of the world. Indeed, Senator John Cornyn, chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship, has noted that Arabic literature and materials have been discovered in areas of Texas near the Mexican border where many human smuggling rings have been known to operate. This has led to a call for improved border security within the United States and has heightened concerns that such smuggling operations may become fully enmeshed with extremist group efforts from abroad on a recurring basis. Given the 99

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The bodies of nine people line the Tuxtla Gutierrez road where a cargo truck carrying more than seventy Central American illegal immigrants collided with a trailer in Chiapas, Mexico, on April 26, 2006. (Pablo Virgen/Corbis))

recent discovery of Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) operatives in various areas of Central America, this concern may not only be understandable but also a bit past due. Extremist Group Interconnections The ETA, otherwise known as the Basque Separatists or Fatherland and Liberty group, has been around since the 1960s and 1970s with, according to Graham Turbeville, “a long history of involvement in drug trafficking to generate operational funds or money for weapons purchases in both Latin America and Spain.” Indeed, it was found that the ETA has used legitimate business fronts for its organized trafficking of drugs and weapons in the Santa Rosa region of Managua, Nicaragua. One such facility in Managua was dubbed the “Taller

Santa Rosa Arsenal.” Inside the facility were a number of illicit goods including hundreds of passports from various countries. The trafficking of these passports provided a lucrative exchange and also gave ETA members the ability to infiltrate nearly any nation. Furthermore, it has been reported that the ETA has been responsible for widespread kidnapping rings that run throughout Latin America. According to Turbeville, the ETA uses “ransom money to finance its operations” in order to further finance their terrorist acts that are routinely carried out in Spain and their own Basque country. The ETA is likewise involved with weapons trafficking, and this business thrives considering the warfare that has occurred in El Salvador and other surrounding countries. Among the weapons trafficked, various guns, grenades, C-4

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explosives, and even varieties of surface-to-air missiles have been reported. Evidence found from this and other such raids on ETA operations in Latin America indicate that this group has been active in this region for twenty years or more. In the 1980s, many of the ETA members fled to Spain, while some members decided to take multiple trips back and forth between Spain, France, and Latin America. In 2001, Spanish law enforcement estimated that roughly 500 members of the ETA fled to various locations in Latin America. Most of these members sought a temporary vacation from their active membership but were considered to still be on reserve should the need for aid to their fellow members again present itself. According to Turbeville, “More recent 2004 estimates suggest that some 130 ETA members are located in Latin America, specifically, though precise numbers are clearly lacking and change with comings and goings.” Turbeville further notes that “in addition to Nicaragua, they have been particularly associated with Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, Uruguay, the Dominican Republic, and several other states in the regions.” As Turbeville notes, Mexico is considered to be the “ETA’s country of choice in regard to establishing it’s major financial and logistical networks.” Spanish law enforcement officials estimate that there are eighty members in Mexico and believe that the majority of these are involved in the clan’s financial and logistical networks. The Mexican government insists on capturing these members who are residing in their country. A successful seizure in Oaxaca that was handled by the Mexican government during the summer of 2003 resulted in lots of ETA material including some twenty-five ETA activity-related videos, ETA operational and chemical weapons manufacturing manuals, documents related to the organization, and bank receipts. Also found were weapons, explosives with detonators, false documents, and illegal banking operations such as money laundering. Currently, the Mexican government is continuing to track down the remaining ETA members who are residing in Mexico. According to Turbeville, “They have also recruited Mexican citizens to help in their work.”

Venezuela was once home to as many as thirty Basque ETA criminals, and the Spanish government is attempting to exile these members from the country. However, due to help given to the ETA from the administration of Caesar Chavez, it is more difficult for the Spanish government to move forward. After the Santa Rosa arsenal explosion, the ETA’s logistics head-in-charge “Paticorto” retreated to several places such as Costa Rica and Colombia. He was assumed to have established contact with one of Colombia’s biggest insurgencies, the National Liberation Army (ELN). The ELN helped Paticorto in order to acquire weapons and training. According to Turbeville, “It is asserted in a number of sources that the association with the ELN served as the basis for establishing collaboration with the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia), a move linked to planned growth in FARC’s urban operations requirements.” Present ETA members in Colombia are easily compared alongside the Real Irish Republican Army (Real IRA) and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provisional IRA). The ETA has made close ties with the IRA, several politicians, associates from Lebanese and Libyan training camps, and some right-hand men in the weapons and arms market. In regard to the ETA’s future, it would appear that newer recruits are entering at a younger age and with less initial experience. This can be a boon or a bane for many such organizations. On the one hand, the lack of prior organized socialization makes the recruit more malleable to intensive indoctrination of group norms and activities. On the other hand, this means that ETA will have to invest more time and energy in developing new recruits for success as warriors of terror. Furthermore, this ensures that older members will continue to be of vital importance to the logistical and managerial aspects of this paramilitary group. The ETA remains a highly militarized, disciplined, and determined group, but the changing nature of new recruits and the new operational environment— centered around organized criminal activity—may have unanticipated consequences. Given the organized and militarized nature of this extremist group, it is likely that continued influence will 101

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extend throughout the region, further connecting the interrelationships among organized crime syndicates and extremist group activities). This development has been noted in other areas of the world (i.e., Southeast Asia and the Middle East) and is also very similar to the connections of FARC and the organized drug trade operating in Colombia. Thus, it may well be that the ETA is a likely candidate for further law enforcement attention when combating organized crime activity and is likely to warrant military intervention since it presents an added threat to the national security of the United States and other nations in the region. Conclusion Organized crime is an area of crime that is growing. Perpetrators need funds and groups to help them with their illegal activities. Many organized crime groups attract followers and extremists who want to be heard and want to fight for what they may believe in. Thus, gangs and extremist groups are formed. These groups are greatly linked to crime, especially organized crime, while they fight for their beliefs and commit crimes for their groups. However, they need funds for their acts, and the illicit sex and illicit drug industries are ideal for these organizations to truly benefit from and make huge profits. Although this problem is worldwide, the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central America are being transformed into a regional haven for a variety of organized crime syndicates, guerrilla military factions, terrorist groups, drug cartels, and human trafficking outfits. It is likely that this area of the world will continue to provide more than its fair share of crime and human misery to the global scene for several decades to come. References Bender, D. L. The War on Drugs: Opposing Viewpoint. San Diego: Greenhaven, 1998. Davis, Joyce M., and Nomi Morris. “World Governments Take Steps to Stop Sale of Women into Sex Industry,” 6 January 2001, http://groups .yahoo.com/group/hlf/message/1506. Farrar, J. State Dept. Official Discusses Central American Drug Trafficking. Washington, DC:

Office of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2004, www.usinfo.state.gov. Gilot, L. “Human Smuggling Was Big Business for El Paso Brothers.” El Paso Times, 16 June 2003. Hanser, R. D. “Immigration and Crime in Europe.” Criminal Justice International 18(62) (2002): 7–8, 25. ———. “The Prison System of Spain.” Criminal Justice International 18(60) (2002): 11, 28–31. Human Events Online. “Tex. Senator Shown Evidence of Arab Personal Effects at Mexican Border,” 22 November 2005, http://www .humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=10427. Inciardi, J. A. The War on Drugs: Heroin, Cocaine, Crime, and Public Policy. Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield, 1986. Moran, N., and R. Hanser. “Terror for Profit: The IRA-FARC Connection.” INTERSEC 14(2) (2004): 44–47. Rosales, Jose Nahun. “Second Human Smuggling ‘Enforcer’ Pleads Guilty; Admits Young Honduran Women Forced to Work in N.J. Bars,” 22 November 2005, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ nj/press/files/ros1122_r.htm. Schaffer Library of Drug Policy. America’s Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime. President’s Commission on Organized Crime, 1986, http://www.druglibrary.org/ schaffer/govpubs/amhab/ahmenu.htm. Turbeville, G. H. “ETA Terrorism, the Americas, and International Linkages.” Criminal Justice International 20(81) (2004): 4–10. Willamette World News. “Mexico Deputies Seek Crackdown on Child Sex Tourism,” http://blog .willamette.edu/centers/llc/worldnews/mexico/.

The Central Asian Republics Mark Galeotti Introduction The Central Asian Republics (CARs)—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—created by the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 understandably resent the outside world’s assumption that the so-called ’stans are essentially identical. In Soviet times, after all, the region was known as Central Asia and Kazakhstan because the latter, with its greater level or urbanization and sizable Russian population, was consid-

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ered very different from the others. However, their organized crime problems do share striking similarities, not least in the extent to which they are shaped by three common issues: political instability or illegitimacy, endemic corruption, and trafficking of various illegal commodities, especially drugs. Organized crime in the region as a whole does not fit the same pattern as in Russia or the West. Instead, what passes for organized crime is dominated by so-called clans. In some cases, these are essentially kin groups. In others, they are clans in a more figurative sense, political cliques that tend to cohere around a particular individual, family, or local elite. These are often relatively crude in their structures and even their operation. They depend for their success and security not so much on high levels of tradecraft as on their effective autonomy or connections. They are often heavily involved in racketeering and embezzlement, but this typically takes place behind an official facade. For example, businesses are encouraged to support specific charities, political groups, and other front organizations to avoid harassment from police and tax authorities. The main overtly criminal activities undertaken by these gangs relate to smuggling, primarily but not exclusively of drugs. Common Problems All five CARs are essentially artificial states, their borders drawn during the Soviet era. It is not enough to say that the borders do not reflect the ethnic and geographical realities on the ground. They were deliberately drawn to create divided and unruly states in order to deter hopes of independence. When independence was essentially thrust upon them, they were left with Soviet-era leadership struggling to adapt to a new political environment and a host of unresolved ethnic, political, and socioeconomic dilemmas. Furthermore, these states were all impoverished, their economies having been planned to operate as part of a wider Soviet Union and unprepared for the loss of central subsidies and protected markets. The existing political elites moved quickly to create new bases for power, and the result has been a partial and distorted transition away from the Soviet model. While all the CARs are nominally

democracies, in practice most are heavily dominated by small cliques of officials and their families and allies, generally known as clans. Likewise, the shift from the planned to the market economy has been used as an opportunity to enrich the old elites, who were allowed to snap up lucrative businesses at artificially low prices. Some are more corrupt and some less so, but the result has generally been that the CARs are dominated by narrow elites, often with little real political legitimacy, at least outside their own home regions. Combined with extreme poverty (as of 2005, the average monthly income in the region was $10–15) and resurgent interethnic and religious tensions, this has also created instability throughout the region. In some cases, this has taken purely political form. In others, this has meant outright civil war, such as the one that wracked Tajikistan during 1992–1997. In the twenty-first century, though, terrorism associated with Islamic extremism is an increasing problem and one that both contributes to and is worsened by the strength of organized and transnational crime in the region. Although the region is no stranger to political and religious extremism, there is evidence of growing links between local militant groups and such global networks as al-Qaeda, including the rise of trademark tactics such as suicide bombings (the first being made in Uzbekistan in March 2004). Some groups seek political change, while others seek regional secession. There are also growing calls for the formation of a single Moslem Caliphate of Greater Turkestan, uniting the Turkic peoples of the region including those of China’s Xinjiang Province. Whatever their aims or inspirations, most of these insurgent and terrorist groups are turning to the narcotics business for funds, whether charging criminals tolls for moving drugs through areas they control or involving themselves directly. After all, Afghanistan’s emergence as the world’s main source of opiates has had a dramatic effect on the regional underworld. Furthermore, narcotics are produced in the Chu and Fergana Valleys (the first of which cuts from Kazakhstan into Kyrgyzstan, the second from Uzbekistan into Kyrgyzstan), the mountainous regions of Leninabad and Gornyi Badakhshan (both in Tajikistan), and Surkhandarya 103

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One of the alleged Tashkent bombers speaks at his trial in June of 1999. On February 16, 1999, six bombs were detonated in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, targeting government buildings and killing sixteen people. The Uzbek government charged 22 men in the attack and sentenced six to death. It is widely speculated that the men’s confessions were extracted by torture. (Corbis)

(in Uzbekistan). Thus, drug production and trafficking is explicitly transnational and rooted in regions already hard to control where ethnic identities run against artificial national borders. Furthermore, the huge profits generated by drugs have created extensive and secure networks for moving and laundering money, which the terrorists are also able to use. This is certainly true of the bestknown terrorist organization in the region, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which, despite its title, operates throughout the CARs. The destruction of its base of operations in Afghanistan has simply forced it to operate increasingly covertly rather than relying on open force of arms, including buying, refining, and trafficking heroin. The Opium Trade Opium has been grown and trafficked across the region for centuries, but with the rise of heroin use,

this became an increasingly important trade. Afghanistan is the world’s main source of opiates. In 2004, for example, opium was grown in 206,000 hectares, producing 4,000 tons of opium, most of which was converted inside the country into 400 tons of illegal morphine and heroin. Traditional trafficking routes through Iran and Pakistan came under pressure beginning in the late 1990s, and as a result Central Asia became an increasingly important route into Russia and Western Europe. Despite improving cooperation within the region and also an increasingly serious approach on the part of most of their governments, the CARs will be unable in the foreseeable future to prevent drug trafficking. A kilogram of heroin costs around $1,000 on the Afghan border, $10,000 on the Kazakh-Russian border, $25,000 when packaged for retail sale in Moscow, $30,000 as a bulk wholesale item in Western Europe, or fully $130,000–

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The Central Asian Republics

150,000 when sold on the streets of Europe. As long as there are such lucrative markets, the traffickers will have the incentives and resources to ensure that they continue to exploit them, even if that means paying ever-greater bribes, finding new routes, or even arming terrorist and separatist movements. A raid launched by the IMU in Kygyzstan’s Batken region in 1999, for example, appears to have been made not for political reasons but at the behest of drug smugglers eager to clear government forces away from profitable routes. Seizure rates are no more than 5–10 percent of the opiates flowing from Afghanistan, and despite extensive international pressure and assistance, rising quantities of intercepted drugs appear to reflect growing levels of trafficking rather than greater successes by the authorities. Furthermore, the trade is strengthening and galvanizing local organized crime gangs, contributing to a culture of endemic corruption among law enforcers and creating illegal routes that can then be expanded to carry other commodities. All five CARs are source countries of both illegal migrants and victims of human trafficking. Kazakhstan in particular is also a transit country, and weapons appear to flow freely to insurgent groups within the region. Kazakhstan Kazakhstan has been one of the most stable of the CARs and also managed the transition from the Soviet era relatively smoothly. Northern Kazakhstan, which still has a significant ethnic Russian population, is the only substantial part of Central Asia in which organized crime demonstrates a modern network-style structure, although most local gangs are actually linked into larger combines in Russia itself. Other than this, its underworld is dominated by clans based in particular communities and regions, protected by their political leaders in central and local government. It also has a relatively low crime rate, albeit one that has increased steadily, especially in and around the capital city of Astana. Kazakhstan is a drug-producing and trafficking state. Marijuana and ephedra grow wild on more than 1.2 million hectares of southern Kazakhstan, especially in the Chu Valley, which is arguably only

partially under central government control. Thus, almost all marijuana in Central Asia comes from Kazakhstan. However, its main role is as a drugtransit country. Since 2000, the proportion of Afghan heroin passing through Central Asia grew to around a third, of which almost three-quarters moves through Kazakhstan at least at some point. Despite adopting a major antinarcotic program in 2000, President Nursultan Nazarbayev has admitted that it might take twenty years for Kazakhstan to control the problem. Smuggling of every kind appears rife and organized. As well as locals, Kazakh gangs traffic Uzbeks and other Central Asians to Russia, Turkey, and beyond for both sexual exploitation and forced agricultural and construction labor. Likewise, when Uzbekistan increased its customs dues and partially closed its border with Kazakhstan in 2003, Kazakh gangs swiftly exploited this, smuggling relatively cheap goods across the border. Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan weathered the storm of the 1990s better than most of the CARs, as crime levels remained relatively low and open discontent was avoided. However, it is also one of the poorest postSoviet states, and over time its situation worsened steadily as the inherited infrastructure crumbled and prices of imported oil and gas rose. This contributed to a growing organized crime problem dominated by drug trafficking, both for domestic purposes and, above all, through trade of Afghan opiates. After all, it borders onto China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan and is characterized by the kind of rugged terrain and poor roads that make detection of drug traffickers problematic. The isolated mountain passes on the Chinese and Tajik borders have become especially heavily used by traffickers, as they are snow covered for up to four months of the year, and what border posts exist are often without electricity and are staffed by underpaid and demoralized officers eager to be bribed. Thus, the southern and southwestern regions of Osh and Batken have become thoroughly penetrated by traffickers. The city of Osh has become one of the key turntables for drug shipments brought in 105

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by road and then sent by road and air on to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan for through-shipment to Russia and beyond. By 2005, dealing, moving, growing, or processing raw opium had become the main livelihood for perhaps half the population of the city and its environs, and despite periodic purges (in 1995, the city’s police chief had to transfer or dismiss his entire drug squad and replace them with only those men he felt he could trust, a mere twenty-nine officers), corruption remains endemic within local law enforcement. The result has been a growing crisis in law enforcement. In 2005, staff at the central Criminal Investigation Department formally petitioned parliamentary assistance, claiming that they could not cope with the challenge of fighting organized crime. For the foreseeable future, this challenge seems set only to grow. Tajikistan Tajikistan was torn by civil war during 1992–1997, leading to a near collapse of law and order. The crime rate doubled in the first quarter of 1993 alone, with the number of murders increasing ninefold and the number of armed robberies tenfold. After the formal end of the fighting between the government and the Unified Tajik Opposition, the country was left with a weak economy (even by 2004, 80 percent of the population was living below the poverty line), and the central government’s grip on the much of the country remains limited. The civil war was essentially clan-based, fought among the northern-based Khodzhent (Leninabad) clan, the southern-based Kulyab clan, and the easternbased Badakhshanis. During the fighting, warlords and militias turned to crime—and drugs in particular—to finance their wars. Even though the war is over, many gangs continue to smuggle Afghan opiates across their hard-to-secure common border. The country’s cotton crop is also heavily criminalized, with cotton smuggling second only to the drug trade in Tajikistan’s criminal economy and with a largely northern-based cotton mafiya maintaining links with its much more powerful counterparts in Uzbekistan. In a vicious circle, this has also deprived the state of tax revenue it needs both for economic reconstruction—Tajikistan is one of the poorest countries in the world—and law enforcement.

Although for at least its first decade of existence the Tajik government was unable or unwilling to tackle organized crime seriously, by 2004 there was evidence of a growing political will to deal with the problem. That year, Tajikistan joined Interpol, and Interior Minister Humdin Sharipov admitted for the first time the failings of the police, especially in analyzing and combating organized crime. And in one of the highest-profile cases of its kind, Ghaffor Mirzoyev, former head of Tajikistan’s Drug Control Agency, was arrested and charged with murder, corruption, and involvement in drug trafficking. However, a lack of resources will severely limit the government’s efforts for the foreseeable future. Turkmenistan By 1999, Turkmenistan had become a virtual dictatorship under its colorful and self-aggrandizing President Saparmurat Niyazov, and a combination of extreme poverty and high levels of immunity enjoyed by corrupt officials have helped to encourage organized crime, so long as the gangs are linked with members of the ruling elite. It is unclear whether Niyazov turns a blind eye to high-level corruption or is simply unaware of it. In December 2003 he claimed that there was no crime in his country, three months after criticizing his minister of interior for being excessively cautious in fighting crime. Turkmenistan shares borders with Afghanistan and Iran and must therefore contend with flows of processed heroin or raw opium from Afghanistan as well as routes leading into and out of Iran. This has also fueled a growing domestic drug problem, albeit one underreported by the authorities. In 2004, the Ministry of Health claimed that 15 percent of the population used illegal drugs, but other estimates put the figure as high as 25 percent. In part this may represent a culture of suppressing bad news, or it may be due to links between senior figures within the Turkmen government and the heroin trade. Uzbekistan Like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan has an essentially authoritarian political system, dominated by President Islam Karimov and his allies, something that

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Child Sex Trafficking in Cambodia

has facilitated corruption. This has invigorated domestic gangs, although they tend to be relatively small organizations, controlled by or beholden to corrupt officials and local grandees. They are involved in a wide range of activities, from racketeering to cotton and oil smuggling. However, the most lucrative single activity is drug trafficking. Uzbekistan was once an opium-producing country, but a sustained government campaign as well as the difficulties in competing with Afghan growers largely eliminated domestic producers. Instead, it has become a major transit country, with traffickers moving opiates across Uzbekistan’s southern borders, especially in the Kashkadarya and Surkhandarya provinces (touching on both Tajikistan and Afghanistan), then to Kazakhstan for shipment to Russia and Europe. Karimov’s intransigent position has contributed to the rise of terrorism, motivated both by political frustration and Islamic militancy. The IMU has posed a challenge to the state since the late 1990s, especially after U.S. troops were stationed in the country in 2002, and has been joined by other political Islamic groups. As in Tajikistan, insurgency, terrorism, and organized crime became quickly intertwined, with underground movements turning to drug smuggling to raise funds and engaging the services of criminals to procure weapons, documents, and intelligence. Given that the main gangs all have links with the regime, this has meant that smaller groups previously locked out of the most lucrative criminal businesses have begun to gain a foothold thanks to their terrorist links, raising the prospect of an underworld struggle between those supportive of the regime and those opposed and mirroring the wider political struggle. References Galeotti, Mark. “Cross-Border Crime and the Former Soviet Union.” IBRU Boundary & Territory Briefing 1(5) (1995): 1–25. Gleason, Gregory. Markets and Politics in Central Asia. Londoon: Routledge, 2002. Makarenko, Tamara. “Crime, Terror and the Central Asian Drug Trade.” Harvard Asia Quarterly 6(3) (2002), http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/academic/ intrel/research/cstpv/pdffiles/HAQMakarenko3.doc.pdf.

Olcott, Martha Brill. Drug Trafficking on the Great Silk Road: The Security Environment in Central Asia. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2000. Redo, Slawomir. Organized Crime and Its Control in Central Asia. Huntsville, TX: Office of International Criminal Justice, 2004.

Child Sex Trafficking in Cambodia Roe A. Roberts and Chris Bain Introduction Child sex slave trafficking is a lucrative industry. The United Nations (UN) estimates that human trafficking is the world’s third-largest criminal enterprise. U.S. intelligence agencies state that trafficking puts $US9.5 billion into the coffers of organized crime each year. As a result, about 1.2 million children worldwide are forced into a life of sexual slavery each year, and this problem is particularly acute in Cambodia, which is a source, a destination, and a transit point for child sex slaves. One-third of Cambodia’s sex workers are under age eighteen. and many are smuggled in from Vietnam. In 1996, the Cambodian Interior Ministry stated that 5,000–6,000 children were enslaved in brothels in and around Phnom Penh. By 2005, the government estimated that there were 30,000 sex workers in the country, with an average age of fifteen. Local charities suggest that the average age is closer to twelve, as brokers are buying nine-yearold girls, having them cook and clean in brothels until they get a few years older, then offering them to clients as so-called cherry girls. In 2003, Svay Pak, a shanty town located on the fringe of Phnom Penh, had twenty brothels lining its main street. Pimps freely offered girls or boys depending on the customer’s preference, and $500 would buy a sixyear-old for a week. Historical Background Cambodia’s child sex trafficking grew out of the chaos created by the long civil war in the 1970s and 1980s. Millions died, families broke apart, poverty abounded, and criminal predators exploited the resulting chaos. The UN’s entry into the country 107

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helped end the war but not the sex trade. In fact, it expanded to serve the needs of UN troops stationed in Cambodia. After the UN left, the growing tourism industry fueled the trade. The widespread availability of child sex slaves made Cambodia a favorite tourist destination for pedophiles from around the world. In 2004, ECPAT-USA estimated that American tourists accounted for 38 percent of Cambodia’s child sex trade. Thus, the growth in Cambodia’s child sex trade is due in large part to the lucrative tourist industry. However, another factor—the HIV/AIDS epidemic—has also spurred its growth. Children orphaned or abandoned by parents with AIDS are left to the mercies of sex traffickers. Also, men who once hired adult workers for sex now hire children, who’ve had few or no sex partners, due to their fear of contracting HIV from the adult workers, and the younger the child the better. As a result of the epidemic, 70 percent of young girls rescued from Cambodian brothels have HIV. If not rescued, these children become too ill to work and are abandoned by the brothel owners. A Growing International Problem Children become sex slaves in a number of ways. Some parent’s sign work contracts with brokers who travel from village to village. These parents sign the contracts thinking that their children are being hired for legitimate work only to condemn them to a life of sexual slavery. Once the contracts are signed, it is almost impossible for the children to escape due to debts created by the contract and the shame of returning to a society that rejects them. In some instances, parents or other relatives knowingly sign these contracts for their own financial benefit. As demand has increased for child sex slaves, there has also been an increase in kidnappings. Hagar, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) in Cambodia, blames the increase in kidnappings on the Thai government’s efforts to curb prostitution. Pierre Tami, a Hagar director, says that when forced from Thailand, organized crime sought out another place in which to operate, and that place was Cambodia. Many times, these abducted children are sold in the West as prostitutes or mail-order brides. The U.S. Central Intel-

ligence Agency (CIA) estimates that 50,000 young Asian women and girls are illegally smuggled into the United States each year. Cambodia passed stricter laws in 2000, but the threat of conviction and penalties didn’t deter traffickers, as authorities were either unwilling or unable to effectively curb this escalating crisis. Officials openly admitted to having lost control of a situation in which senior police and military officers control the sex trade and successful prosecutions are rare. Police openly accept bribes, evidence is allegedly misplaced before trials, brothels are tipped off before raids, and pimps slip out of their handcuffs on the way to court. Although an occasional case draws international attention and a harsh sentence, in the majority of cases prosecution rarely occurs, and when it does offenders are given light sentences. The situation has become so extreme that in 2004, armed assailants kidnapped eighty-four children and women from a shelter run by Agir pour les Femmes En Situation Précaire (AFESIP, Acting for Women in Distressing Situations), a Cambodia NGO for victims of the sex trade. The Cambodian government committee investigating the attack did such a poor job that U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher publicly questioned Cambodia’s commitment to sincerely address human trafficking crimes. International Cooperation There are glimmers of hope. While Cambodia had done little to stop the trafficking, recently more arrests are being made, and Svay Pak’s brothels have been shut down. Internationally, most East Asian countries have signed a treaty, the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The UN’s Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) included articles setting out the responsibilities of governments to protect children from the abuses of the child sex trade. UNICEF is working with local governments to review legislation and is supporting rescue efforts aimed at reuniting children with their families. The United States, NGOs, and the UN have been working to curb those parts of the multibillion-dollar sex tourism industry that promote child sex traffick-

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Young Vietnamese prostitutes are detained by Cambodian police during a brothel raid in Phnom Penh on October 11, 1997. (AFP/Getty Images)

ing. In the United States, the 2003 Protection Act’s child sex tourism provision was used to convict Michael Clark, who paid young boys $2 for sex in Cambodia. Since then, more Americans have been charged under the act. A 2004 report stated that the synergy created by the cooperation between these groups is starting to produce positive results. References Anon. “Cambodia: Child Sex Trade Booming.” Women’s International Network News 22(3) (1996): P48. Boucher, Richard. “U.S. Criticizes Cambodian Inaction in Shelter Attack.” U.S. State Department News, 19 February 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p =washfile-english&y=2005&m=February&x= 20050219142924SAikceinawZ0.7409021&t=xarchi ves/xarchitem.html. Central Intelligence Agency. “Trafficking in Persons Report.” Released by the U.S. Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2004, http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2004/ 33191.htm.

Crawford, Emily. “Therapist Travels to Cambodia to Fight Effects of Sex Slavery.” Albuquerque Journal, 16 April 2005. Farrell, Michael. “Global Campaign to Police Child Sex Tourism.” Christian Science Monitor, 22 April 2004. Hansen, Chris. “Children for Sale.” Dateline NBC News, 5 January 2005, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/ 4038249/. Marks, Kathy. “British Sex Tourists Turn Killing Fields of Cambodia into Paedophiles’ Playground.” The Independent, 5 January 2003, http://www.vachss.com/help_text/a2/british_ sex.html. McClelland, Susan. “Sad Little Girls.” MacLean’s 116(47) (2003), http://www.macleans.ca/world/ global/article.jsp?content=20031124_70039 _70039. Munthit, Ker. “Tide Turns against Foreign Sex Offenders in Cambodia.” Associated Press, 29 March 2004, http://www.cambodia.oggham .com/?p=375. Pettifer, Jennifer. “Cambodia’s Child Sex Shame.” BBC Radio 4’s Crossing Continents, 3 November 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/ crossing_continents/3975965.stm. 109

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Silverman, Victoria. “Hagar, an NGO, Helps Human Trafficking Victims in Cambodia,” 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2004/Jun/17448703.html. UNICEF. “Children on the Edge, Protecting Children from Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking in East Asia and the Pacific,” 2002, http://www.unicef.org/vietnam/childse.pdf.

Organized Crime in Eastern Europe Kelly Hignett The term “Eastern Europe” has always been more than purely a geographical term, also often containing economic, cultural, and political meanings. After World War II, the term was most commonly used to refer to those European countries that fell under the control of the Soviet Union and established communist regimes. Today, as many of the former Eastern bloc countries are reintegrated with Western Europe through their inclusion in organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the term “Eastern Europe” has become less clearly defined and subject to interpretation. However, the term remains commonly used, in its broadest sense, to refer to the grouping of European countries that were part of the Sovietdominated socialist bloc until 1989: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and the former Yugoslavia. One of the major developments in organized crime in recent years has been the increasing use of East European countries as an operating base for both indigenous and nonindigenous criminal organizations. Recent EU documentation classes organized crime in East European states as being “on the frontline” of the fight against organized crime, despite a second report admitting that “significant intelligence gaps still exist” in knowledge about organized crime in the East European region. The Evolution of Organized Crime in Eastern Europe During the Cold War, the geopolitical East-West divide across Europe meant that the countries of Eastern Europe were largely isolated from their

Western neighbors. As a result, organized crime in Eastern Europe is often considered to be a recently emergent problem, with the first international concerns voiced in the early 1990s. However, the roots of organized crime in most East European countries can be traced back to the socialist era with the development of a criminal subculture in society, concealed in the criminal-political nexus that existed under socialism. The first recorded examples of organized crime in most East European states date from the 1970s. By the late 1970s, all East European countries had a flourishing black market that provided the ideal environment for criminals to make large profits through the supply of illegal goods and services on an extensive scale. By the 1980s, many gangs were also involved in small-scale smuggling operations, organized burglary, and the illegal production of drugs and alcohol. These early criminal groups were certainly primitive compared to modern organized crime. However, they did display many characteristics commonly associated with organized crime in terms of their structure and operations. Police reports suggest that by the late 1980s, a number of gangs with Mafia-style structures had emerged in most East European countries. In addition, despite the strict border controls in place, there is evidence of rudimentary small-scale, cross-border connections by the late 1980s, particularly between East European and Russian criminal organizations. However, it was the collapse of socialism across East Europe in 1989 and the subsequent postsocialist transition that provided the opportunities for organized crime to modernize and expand operations. During the transition period the potential benefits of participation in organized crime increased, while the risks were negligible in comparison. The early 1990s saw a veritable explosion in organized crime across the East European region due to political transition, social upheaval, chaotic economic conditions, weak law enforcement, a permissive legal framework, unprotected borders, and porous financial systems. Extensive privatization programs in most East European states presented criminals with an opportunity to invest proceeds from their illicit activities in the

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legal economy. This combination of circumstances influenced the dynamics and structure of organized crime in the region, and the result was that organized criminal operations in East Europe became more complex and professional and, as a result, were perceived as a serious threat. The postsocialist transition also gave criminals the opportunity to expand their operations. The rapidly changing economic climate presented many opportunities for criminal activity, and many gangs became involved in tax evasion, import-export scams, and large-scale money laundering. The relaxation of border controls after 1989 also made it easier for trade and travel across state borders, which enabled East European organizations to establish working relationships with criminal gangs based outside the region. The states of Eastern Europe were ideally situated for incorporation into European smuggling routes, acting as a natural channel between Western Europe and Asia. The central East European states (such as Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) provided numerous routes into Western Europe, while the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) provided easier access to the Scandinavian countries. This made the countries of Eastern Europe attractive to numerous gangs from outside the region. By the mid-1990s, intelligence reports suggested that criminal organizations from Arabic countries, Africa, Asia (especially China), Colombia, China, Turkey, the former Soviet Union, and various West European countries (including the Italian Mafia) were all operating either directly on East European territory or in conjunction with domestic gangs. Today, according to Interpol, most of the well-known criminal organizations have established operations in Eastern Europe. In addition, various East European criminal groups are known to be active in numerous countries, with operations spanning three continents. East European Organized Crime Today East European organized crime has proven to be both flexible and adaptable, and by the close of the 1990s many criminal networks operating in Eastern Europe had developed a sophisticated and profes-

sional approach to their activities. In many cases, East European organized criminal groups have graduated from acting as service providers to actually controlling operations. Intelligence received from law enforcement agencies in many East European countries indicate that until recently, criminal organizations were largely structured along the traditional Mafia paradigm, with a centralized, hierarchical structure and clear levels of membership. However, recent reports indicate a shift toward looser criminal networks and cellular organizations, which allows for greater flexibility particularly in terms of international operations. Data concerning the composition of criminal organizations seems to support this trend. Whereas in the early 1990s most groups detected in East European countries were overwhelmingly composed of domestic criminals, today an increasing number of organizations are known to have mixed ethnic membership, while some are composed almost solely of nonindigenous members. Many East European criminal organizations have a reputation for violence, and throughout the 1990s criminal turf wars were reported in almost all East European countries as rival gangs fought for influence. Today, the underworld in most East European countries appears to be more stable, although score settling does still occur. Most gangs have retained their capacity for violence, especially those from the former Yugoslavia, who are particularly associated with violent conduct and intergang warfare. A further defining characteristic of East European organized crime today is the diversity of markets in which the criminals are involved. The most popular criminal activity for East European organized crime today is drug trafficking. In the 1990s, many East European states were incorporated into the Balkan Route used to smuggle heroin from Afghanistan into Western Europe and Scandinavia. Today it is believed that Turkish and Albanian groups are the primary suppliers of heroin to Western Europe, but the inclusion of so many East European countries as smuggling routes means that the suppliers often work in conjunction with ethnic East European criminals to organize transit. Meanwhile, the illegal production of drugs is 111

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Bulgarian anti-terrorist police secure containers with 2,058 kg of drugs before incineration in a furnace at the Aleksandrovska Hospital in Sofia on December 14, 2004. Bulgaria is one of the countries on the so-called Balkan route for smuggling drugs from Asia to Western Europe. (AFP/Getty Images)

increasing, with laboratories discovered in many East European states, and Poland was recently named as the second-largest supplier of amphetamines to the European market. Increased drug seizures in East European states suggest that those states are becoming increasingly attractive as markets for drug traffickers rather than simply as smuggling routes. In a similar vein, many East European criminal organizations are also involved in human trafficking and illegal immigration. East European countries play a dual role as both source and transit countries in the transportation of human cargo to the West. Again, this is an activity that generally requires cooperation between criminal gangs from Eastern Europe and from outside the region. Other popular activities for East European organized crime include the smuggling of alcohol, cigarettes, and oil; extortion; and prostitution. Vehicle smuggling

and arms smuggling were popular activities in the early 1990s, particularly during the wars in the former Yugoslavia. However, these activities have decreased in recent years due to more effective border controls and lower profitability, although a significant number of cases are still uncovered every year. All East European criminal organizations are also involved in money laundering to some extent, and there have been a number of high-profile financial investigations involving East European banks in recent years. Fighting Organized Crime in East Europe East European authorities were largely unprepared for the explosion of organized crime after 1989. However, significant progress in combating organized crime has been made in recent years. Most East European countries have launched programs aimed at reducing and preventing organized crime.

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Europe: Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the Baltic States, and the European Union

Changes in domestic law have recognized the existence of new forms of criminality, and specific measures have been adopted in the fields of illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and serious economic crime. Specialized law enforcement units trained to combat organized crime have also been formed, and border controls have been strengthened across the region. Many East European states have also been required to strengthen their legislation and take action against organized crime as a prerequisite for membership in the EU. In recent years, there have been many positive developments in fighting organized crime in the East European region, and a number of high-profile Mafia trials have taken place in some East European countries (notably Poland and Hungary). The countries of Eastern Europe have also made bilateral and multilateral agreements on fighting organized crime and sharing information with a variety of countries outside the region. Given the international nature of organized crime in the region and the scope of criminal activities in terms of type and territory, there is a need for increased international cooperation if attempts to prevent East European organized crime are to succeed. As the states of Eastern Europe become more integrated with the West, organized crime in these states is increasingly viewed as a European rather than a regional problem. References Council of Europe. Organised Crime Situation Reports (1996–2004), http://www.coe.int/ defaultEN.asp. Europol. European Union Situation Report on East European Organised Crime. The Hague, Netherlands: Europol, 2001, http://www.europol .europa.eu/index.asp?page=publar2001. ———. Europol Annual Report, 2000. The Hague, Netherlands: Europol, 2001. ———. Europol Annual Report, 2003. The Hague, Netherlands: Europol, 2004. ———. Threat Assessment: The Impact of East European Crime on the EU. The Hague, Netherlands: Europol, 2000. Hignett, K. “Organised Crime in East Central Europe: The Czech Rebublic, Hungary and Poland.” Pp. 70–83 in Global Crime Today: The Changing Face of Organised Crime, edited by

Mark Galeotti. Abingdon, Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2005. Holyst, Brunon. “Organized Crime in Eastern Europe and Its Implications for the Security of the Western World.” Pp. 67–93 in Organized Crime—Uncertainties and Dilemmas, edited by Stanley Einstein and Menachem Amir. Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, 1999. Savona, E., and S. Adamoli. “The Impact of Organised Crime in Central and Eastern Europe.” Transcrime, Working Paper No. 7, September 1996.

Europe: Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the Baltic States, and the European Union Kelly Hignett The Evolution of Organized Crime in Europe Organized crime is by no means a new phenomenon in Europe. The clandestine nature of organized crime, a lack of reliable data, and gaps in intelligence make it difficult to accurately assess the full scope of organized crime in Europe today. Analysis of the evidence that is available, however, suggests that European organized crime has become increasingly widespread and sophisticated, with European states used as both transit routes and target markets for organized gangs operating in their territory. As such, the issue of organized crime and its impact on security and stability has become increasingly politicized in many European states in recent years. Today, transnational organized crime is considered to pose a clear problem for most European countries, with intelligence reports stating that organized crime should be considered a significant threat to European security. Two key developments influenced the rise of organized crime in twentieth-century Europe. The first development was the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, an event that led to the removal of the geopolitical East–West divide across the European continent that had been in existence since the aftermath of World War II, and, similarly, the independence 113

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of the Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—and their return to Europe following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, events that led to the redefinition of Europe both geographically and politically. The second development was the closer integration of European states through the evolution of the European Union (EU). The emergence of new opportunities as a result of these changes was realized by criminal groups based both inside and outside of the new Europe. Therefore, contemporary criminal development in Europe has clearly been shaped by the increasing influence of nonindigenous criminal networks, and as a result, organized crime in Europe today demonstrates immense variance in terms of numerical and ethnic composition, organizational structure, operational methodology, and the scope and scale of operations. While some gangs concentrate their efforts solely on involvement in a particular market or territory, most have shown signs of increasing diversification. In addition, the development of strategic alliances among criminal networks in a variety of European countries and with organizations operating outside of Europe has led to the further dissemination of organized crime across the European region. European Integration: Opportunities for Organized Crime The EU is a treaty-based institutional framework that defines and manages economic and political cooperation among its member states. Today, twenty-five European countries have full membership status in the EU: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. A further five countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, and Turkey) are currently candidates for future accession to the EU and are at various stages of preaccession negotiations. The process of European integration leading to the EU began in the 1950s. The Treaty on European Union was signed in 1993 and aimed to facil-

itate even closer political and economic relations among member states. The full impact of transnational organized crime in the EU remains unclear, as significant intelligence gaps still exist. However, the latest figures identify that more than 4,000 criminal groups, consisting of an estimated 40,000 total members, are known to operate on EU territory. It is clear that both indigenous and nonindigenous criminal organizations are increasing operations throughout EU member states and also establishing strong links with other groups operating outside of the EU area. The importance of the recent enlargement of the EU into East-Central Europe and the Baltic States (the largest single round of enlargement to date, increasing membership of the EU from fifteen to twenty-five member states) in May 2004 has also impacted upon the development of organized crime in Europe by increasing the opportunities available to gangs seeking new criminal markets, as new members have been targeted as source, transit, and destination countries for gangs operating in the EU. This internationalization of European organized crime has clearly been influenced by the strengthening of the EU. In recent years, there have been further moves toward the pooling of sovereignty and lowering of internal borders between EU member states. The creation of the Single European Market in 1993 aimed to further European economic integration by enabling the freer movement of goods, services, people, and capital between EU member states, thus creating a single space of mobility for EU citizens to live, travel, and work in Europe. In addition, fifteen of the twenty-five members of the EU are currently signatories of the Schengen Acquis (1985), which allows for the freer movement of peoples between EU member states through the abolition of internal border controls. These same policies, designed to allow greater European integration by encouraging the freer movement of goods and peoples across European borders, have also been utilized by criminals to forge cross-border links and expand their operations in terms of both markets and territory (for example, the introduction of the Single European Market in 1993 led to a dramatic increase in commodity smug-

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gling), thus providing opportunities for the development of closer working relations among criminal organizations operating within Europe. Many established criminal networks seized on the development of closer relations between West and East European states (and the Baltic States) after 1989 as an opportunity to set up shop and gain freer access to the EU trading zone, while the eastward enlargement of the EU provided a wealth of opportunities for the criminal gangs established in the accession states. Since the revolutions of 1989, many East European criminal networks have established themselves as a serious force in the international criminal hierarchy, and according to Interpol, by the mid-1990s “every gang making big money in drugs, guns, prostitution and extortion” had established a base of operations in Eastern Europe. This freer movement of people within the European area has also increased migration flows between EU member states, which have created opportunities for criminal gangs to establish links with communities based outside of their home territory. Europe Today: A Criminal Melting Pot Most European countries can trace the historical development of domestic criminal organizations. Today, however, it is evident that both indigenous and nonindigenous crime networks increasingly span the whole of Europe with their operations. For example, Arabic, Colombian, Nigerian, Russian, Turkish, and Vietnamese groups operate throughout Europe while retaining strong links with their countries of origin. While some organizations with an operating base in Europe conform to the more traditional model of organized crime (strongly hierarchical, centrally controlled, and ethnically closed) such as Italian Mafia groupings or Albanian clans, other organizations increasingly operate as looser interconnected criminal networks. Thus, organized crime in Europe today encompasses a broad variety of individual groups, including Jamaican Yardie gangs in the United Kingdom, Chinese Triads extorting money from businessmen in Chinese communities across Europe, Belgian white-collar criminals involved in

organized fraud against EU legislation, Dutch gangs controlling amphetamine production, German groups involved in illegal immigration, Polish gangsters transporting stolen cars from Germany to Russia, and Latvian gangsters smuggling cigarettes from Ukraine into the Baltic and Nordic states, to name but a few examples. All of these groups show some variance in terms of size, organizational structure, mode of operations, and activities undertaken. The influx of nonindigenous criminal organizations into European territories has had a clear impact on the European underworld. Some gangs, such as Chinese organizations, used the traditional method of criminal expansion into European territories, that of using émigré communities to establish operations outside of their country of origin. Other organizations, however, most notably those from the former Soviet Union and the Balkan states (principally Albania), attempted to move in and take over markets or territories in other European states by force. This led to upheaval in the previously established status quo in many areas. The East European states in particular were rocked by a series of violent turf wars between criminal gangs in the mid-1990s, while virtually all European states have recorded an increase in assassinations and violent incidents connected with organized crime since the early 1990s as a result of struggles for influence between rival gangs. While the influx of nonindigenous criminal organizations may lead to conflict in the shorter term, the longer-term result has been that of increasing cooperation between many criminal groups. An examination of the composition of organized crime networks currently known to be active in Europe highlights the increasingly international nature of organized crime. This trend is reflective of the evolution of organized crime on a global scale. In recent years, European states have been fully utilized as a crossroads by numerous criminal groups. For example, Turkish and Chinese networks are now known to operate in the majority of EU member states. Russian-based criminal networks were quick to expand their operations into Eastern Europe and the Baltic States in the early 115

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1990s and have also established themselves in many West European countries. In many cases, however, foreign-based criminal organizations subcontract operations to local criminal groups in European territories. For example, Chinese Triads overseeing the illegal immigration of Chinese nationals from Beijing to London may use contacts in Chinese émigré communities in European states to organize stages of transit. However, they may also establish a working arrangement with domestic European criminal networks in their chosen transit countries, as subcontracting part of the operation to local groups will decrease the risk of detection and prove mutually profitable. Criminal Activities Organized crime groups based or operating in European countries are currently engaged in a broad variety of criminal activities and markets, including drug smuggling; arms trafficking; illegal immigration and people trafficking; cross-border smuggling in commodities such as antiques, alcohol, cigarettes, cars, oil, and even nuclear materials; extortion; bribery; fraud; counterfeiting; and money laundering. Although the trafficking and supply of drugs currently remains the largest illegal market in Europe, organized crime involvement in illegal immigration and human trafficking is rapidly increasing, and this trend looks set to continue. Despite this diversity, however, some common traits can be identified, and the increasing interlinkage between criminal networks operating in Europe means that from a general perspective, organized crime is viewed as a common threat to all European states. Intelligence suggests that today criminal networks often view the EU as a single target market for their activities, and this requires EU members to cooperate closely if they are to ensure their own security, and that of their neighbors, against organized crime. Drugs Europe acts as a transit region, destination market, and producer of illicit drugs. Drug trafficking remains one of the most profitable markets for organized crime to develop operations in Europe, particularly since the opening up of Eastern

Europe and the Baltic States as transit points for drugs en route to Western Europe and the United States. Source countries for drugs transported into Europe include Afghanistan, Colombia, Jamaica, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, and South Africa. Colombian cartels supply the majority of cocaine to Europe, working with local European-based groups in countries such as Italy, Poland, and Spain, to ensure transport and distribution across Europe. Turkish and Pakistani groups control the trafficking of heroin from the Middle East and Central Asia through Eastern Europe and the Balkans, again working with local criminal networks. According to Interpol reports, as much as 80 percent of the heroin on Western European markets today is believed to enter Europe via one of these Balkan Routes from the East. Cannabis from Morocco is primarily trafficked to European markets via Spanish ports. Since the early 1990s, there has also been an increase in synthetic drugs smuggled out of Western Europe as a result of operations between criminal networks in countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and Britain. There is largescale manufacture of synthetic drugs in European states such as the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Britain, and Poland. (Today, Polish-produced amphetamines account for more than 25 percent of the European market, second only to the Netherlands in terms of production.) Because of its central geographical location, Germany serves as a major transit point for criminal organizations involved in smuggling operations, particularly in the trafficking of drugs and illegal immigrants from East to West and the smuggling of cars and synthetic drugs from West to East. There is also a large European market in the smuggling of cigarettes, dominated largely by Italian and Albanian gangs often working with Russian or Ukrainian networks, with numerous known trafficking routes extending across Europe. Vehicle Theft and Smuggling Since the early 1990s there has been substantial development in the trafficking of stolen vehicles by European criminal organizations. It is currently estimated that around 80 percent of cars illegally

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smuggled through the East European region are stolen from West European states and are en route to Serbia, Russia, Ukraine, and Central Asia. Criminal networks involved in this market demonstrate considerable levels of organization, professionalism, and specialization, with alterations to vehicle license plates and supporting documentation often occurring en route and the majority of stolen vehicles having already been transported out of the country before their theft is even registered. Recent statistics suggest that the European market for stolen vehicles is now in decline. However, it is worth noting that in cases where organized vehicle theft does occur, criminals are resorting to more violent methods, with the practice of carjacking on the increase across Europe. Arms Smuggling Europe has also increased in significance as a center for arms smuggling in recent years. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact treaty organization after 1989 provided European criminals with a ready market in weaponry, explosives, and ammunition. In addition, the breakup of Yugoslavia and the subsequent Balkan wars of the early 1990s increased the demand for illegal weapons in the region. The increase in criminal gangs in many European countries has led to increased competition between organizations, leading to the outbreak of fighting over markets and territories in recent years, and this has led many criminal gangs operating in Europe to seek to arm themselves at a higher level. In addition, many weapons trafficked through the European market are transported on to other continents, either to countries under UN arms embargos or countries such as Colombia, where rebel groups seek a steady supply of arms, which they often exchange for cocaine that can then be sold on the European market. Money Laundering Most European criminal organizations are involved in money laundering to a greater or lesser degree. Traditional European centers for money laundering include Luxembourg, Switzerland (due to its tradition of bank secrecy), and the United King-

dom. However, developments in many East European states after 1989 have also led to increased criminal interest in Eastern Europe as a base for investment and money laundering. A variety of criminal organizations, both domestic and foreignbased, were able to invest in businesses during the privatization programs taking place across Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. In addition, a lack of financial regulations to protect the East European banking system led to a number of suspicious transactions, and by the mid-1990s Hungary was considered to have become the third-largest money launderer in Europe. Organized criminal involvement in large-scale fraud against EU regulations has been documented in a number of states, such as the reportedly widespread involvement of criminal organizations in defrauding EU agricultural policy. In addition, the introduction of a new European currency, the euro, as the principal currency for twelve EU member states in 2002 also raised concerns that this would provide new and easier opportunities for counterfeiting, fraud, and money laundering, particularly in the transitional stage of currency changeover. Illegal Immigration and People Smuggling Illegal immigration is currently one of the most worrisome aspects of organized crime in Europe. Human smuggling was the fastest-growing criminal market at the beginning of the twenty-first century, second only to drug trafficking in terms of profit. Hundreds of thousands of immigrants enter the EU states illegally every year, with current estimates suggesting that as many as 75 percent of migrants entering European states illegally are aided and abetted by criminal organizations, and this figure is believed to be increasing. The main illegal migration flows in Europe run from East to West, with the countries of the EU constituting a major destination for many migrants. Organized illegal immigration in Europe is often controlled by gangs based outside of the region, with Chinese, Russian, and Turkish gangs believed to dominate the market. As outlined above, however, illegal immigration often involves alliances between different criminal groups, and many of the organizers subcontract transit of their cargo to local European 117

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groups at various stages along the way. The trade in illegal immigration can generate large profits for the criminals, but several human tragedies have served to politicize this issue in European states. In one case, the bodies of eighteen illegal immigrants were discovered hidden in a Hungarian lorry that had been abandoned across the border in Austria. In another recent tragedy, fifty-eight illegal Chinese migrants suffocated to death in the back of a container lorry in the English port of Dover. In a related market, some European criminal organizations are involved in the trafficking of human beings. The trafficking of women within Europe has increased considerably since the early 1990s, and many victims are forced into the sex trade, often also controlled by organized crime. Many women from East European countries are discovered each year working as prostitutes in Western Europe, with the Netherlands and Germany being popular destinations. Networks uncovered include the trafficking of women from Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania into Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands. The European gangs involved in illegal immigration and human trafficking often employ professional methods to gain entry to European countries, and the use of forged passports and documentation is increasing. The recent expansion of the EU to include several East-Central European countries and the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania raised concerns about the consistency of border security across Europe. Since the political changes of the early 1990s, there has been a marked increase in the level of illicit traffic through both Eastern Europe and the Baltic corridor. Despite measures taken to improve border controls across Europe, several areas remain a cause for concern. The borders between the Czech Republic and Germany, Hungary and Ukraine, and Poland and the Former Soviet Union remain problematic, and there continues to be a high level of illegal traffic through the Baltic States and into the Nordic countries. Significant advances in border security have been made in recent years, but with several new EU members now protecting the external borders of Europe, concerns over border security remain.

Fighting Organized Crime in Europe The increasingly international nature of organized crime across Europe means that Europeans are beginning to recognize the necessity of working together to actively fight crime, and the recent politicization of many issues linked to organized crime (such as illegal immigration, gun control, and value added tax fraud) in many European states have pushed organized crime to the forefront of the political agenda. The EU is developing an institutional framework for fighting organized crime in member states and encourages the cross-border exchange of information and policing to fight organized crime, both within the EU itself and with neighboring countries. For example, there is a significant Russian Mafiya presence in the EU, so the engagement of Russia in the fight against organized crime in the EU is essential if measures are to prove effective. A joint EU–Russian Action Plan on combating organized crime was signed in 2000. The EU is taking a serious approach to combating organized crime in the territories of its member states. The third pillar of the EU treaty allows for cooperation in justice and home affairs (including cooperation in judicial matters, law enforcement, and border control), and this incorporates the fight against organized crime. EU policy documents state that a cooperative and proactive fight against organized crime at both the national and European levels is a priority in ensuring the security of its member states. Significant advances in legal harmonization between EU member states have already been made, although loopholes still exist, making further developments desirable. In addition, accession candidates are required to meet a number of criteria (including criteria relating to policing, border control, and the fight against organized crime and corruption) before they become eligible for membership in the EU. High levels of organized crime have recently been outlined as causing particular concern in relation to Bulgaria’s application to become a member of the EU. In 1993, the European Union Ad Hoc Group on Organized Crime adopted a working definition of what constitutes organized crime, although this has not been formally adopted by EU members on a

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European Union justice and interior ministers in the Redouten room of the Hofburg castle during an informal meeting in Vienna on January 14, 2006. The ministers examined whether to give more operational independence to Europol amid concerns that the policing body’s work is unfocused and may overlap with other agencies. (AFP/Getty Images)

national level, and thus European states currently hold a variety of nationally accepted definitions of what exactly constitutes organized crime, with several states lacking any precise legal definition. In 1996 an EU action plan on organized crime was officially adopted. The Amsterdam Treaty on the European Union, which came into force in 1999, provides a legal framework for accelerating efforts made at the EU level to strengthen law enforcement and judicial cooperation. In October 1999, the Tampere European Council adopted an all-embracing approach to reinforce the fight against serious crime that included a number of new initiatives designed to foster closer police cooperation between member states. In March 2000, the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted a millennium strategy in the field of prevention and control of organized crime that contains thirty-nine detailed recommendations in various fields and set

target dates to implement them. All EU member states have also signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The EU has also set up an institutional framework designed to assist with the fight against organized crime in all member states. The establishment of Europol in 1995 was the first real attempt at creating a European police organization and aimed to improve the effectiveness of cross-border cooperation between domestic law enforcement bodies in EU member states. Europol facilitates the crossborder exchange of information; provides expertise, technical support and operational analysis; and produces strategic reports and crime analysis on the basis of information collated from member states. Europol remains understaffed and has no executive powers, however, the effectiveness of Europol depends largely on the extent of operational cooperation between the law enforcement 119

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agencies of member states, which is not always forthcoming. The European Police College, established in 2002, aims to provide training in combating organized crime to law enforcement officers across EU states and increase levels of cross-border cooperation within Europe. This is a welcome development if the member states of the EU are to implement a truly effective program against organized crime. The majority of European countries have signed the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, adopted in 2000. In addition, many European countries have signed additional bilateral or multilateral regional agreements to work together in fighting crime. Other organizations have also been established, such as the Task Force on Organised Crime in the Baltic Sea Region, established in 1996, that includes representatives from Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, and the EU. Cooperation across state borders is often problematic, however, and in many cases the authorities find that they are playing catch-up with the criminals, who remain one step ahead. Recent reports all highlight the need for further research in order to identify and understand organized crime in Europe. Additionally, greater coordination between governments and law enforcement agencies in the exchange of information, legislative reform, training, and restructuring of personnel is needed if European states are to mount a serious and united challenge to organized crime.

References Adamoli, S., et al. Organised Crime around The World. Helsinki: HEUNI, 1998. Gateway to the European Union, Informational Website.“Organized Crime,” http://europa.eu/ scadplus/leg/en/s22008.htm. Europol. EU Organised Crime Situation Report (2000). The Hague, Netherlands: Europol, 2001, http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page =publications. Europol. Europol Annual Report (2000). The Hague, Netherlands: Europol, 2001, http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page =publications. Organised Crime Situation Reports. Strasbourg:

Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/T/E/ GENERAL/portailEN_indexA-Z.asp?charac=O. Europol. Threat Assessment: The Impact of East European Crime on the EU. The Hague, Netherlands: Europol, 2000. Heijden, T. van der. “Measuring Organized Crime in Western Europe,” 1996, http://www.ncjrs.org/ policing/mea313.htm. Hignett, K. “Organised Crime in East Central Europe: The Czech Rebublic, Hungary and Poland.” Pp. 70–83 in Global Crime Today: The Changing Face of Organised Crime, edited by Mark Galeotti. Abingdon, Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2005. Sands, J. Europe in the Age of Globalization: A Hotbed of Transnational Organized Crime? ECPR SG Organised Crime, September 2002, http://members.lycos.co.uk/ocnewsletter/SGOC09 02/sands.html. Task Force on Organized Crime in the Baltic Sea Region informational website: http://www .balticseataskforce.ee/.

Gang Crimes: Latino Gangs in America Robert Hanser and Nathan Moran Street Gangs Latino gangs have spread to various areas of the United States including Chicago and cities in the Southwest, Florida, and New York. In fact, the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) estimates that roughly 47 percent of all gang members are Latino in cultural or racial orientation. Furthermore, in states such as Arizona, it is reported that fully 62 percent of all gang members are Latino in demographic orientation. Other areas of the Southwest report similar levels of Latino gang involvement. In trying to understand the development of Latino gangs, it is important to keep in mind the unique cultural demographics involved with the Latino American population. The acculturation process for many Latino American immigrants has been shaped by the economic deprivation that many early Latino American immigrants endured when first coming to the United States. This is particularly true among those Latino Americans who immigrate illegally into the United States. Indeed, it has been found that many first-generation Latino

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American immigrants are not fluent in English. This creates a schism between this generation and their children, who quickly learn English from within the school systems. For these youths, much of the socialization process then occurs among peers rather than within the family, and this has created a social identity for these youths that provides them with alternative values unique to their own demographic group. J. D. Vigil refers to the notion of cholo culture, which is derived from Mexican Spanish to refer to persons of lowly or marginal social status. With Anglo and Latino American characteristics being intermixed, this cholo orientation becomes internalized in the streets. Specifically, Vigil notes that many Mexican American youths find a sense of belonging within this subculture since their experience as fluently bilingual biculturals is essentially normalized. Thus, the cholo culture reflects a poverty-ridden, unguided process of street socialization and identity that is intertwined with much of the Latino American gang subculture. Indeed, it is this cholo culture that is purportedly the groundwork of the Latino subculture. It is for this reason that many adolescent Latino males join gangs during their progression into manhood. The gang provides a set of guidelines for these youths to follow as they search for meaning and belonging amid a world of deprivation, misunderstanding, and alien culture. These youths from the cholo culture are already socialized to the street and are thus perfectly socialized for later membership within a street gang. This is particularly the case for young males raised in female-dominated households. These youths lack a stable male role model and therefore purportedly turn to those models available within the gang family. As in other cultures that face this gender dilemma, the street gang has formalized a gang initiation ritual to help newcomers take on a new “tough male” identity. As Vigil notes, the effects of gang association produce a range of corollary behaviors that immerse the youths into criminal activity that is reinforced by the subculture. The use of any variety of drugs, the ownership of firearms, and the development of a mind-set referred to as locura (quasi-controlled craziness) all coalesce to produce a volatile and

explosive youth who must provide public displays affirming this mind-set and attitude to gain and maintain respect among the gang family. The gang subculture itself has values and norms that guide and direct gang members. The protection of barrio territory and family honor is crucial to the youthful male gang member’s standing in the subculture. This sense of machismo is central to the gang member’s sense of integrity and self-worth within this value system and will be defended against slight or dishonor with little regard for the consequences that can ensue. Various forms of dishonor and disrespect are the primary sources for many gang conflicts, drive-by shootings, and sexual assault of females related to the target of the insult within a Latino gang. Among Latino gangs, various hand gestures, signs, and symbols are common. Graffiti use and the tattooing of symbols of gang identity are common and are acts that affirm the members’ loyalty, and they also can be used to denigrate the reputation of a rival gang. Indeed, the very attire, as well as style of talking and walking are all strongly influenced by gang membership. Young members frequently display differing cultural norms from older members, which can also be reflective of the differing levels of acculturation within the broader society. Naturally, these differences in norms are also simply a product of the natural life-cycle aging process. Many Latino gangs target local schools as a recruiting platform for new members, and these gangs may hold parties where new members go through a variety of initiation rites into the gang. These entry rituals are likely to be quite violent. Prospective members may have to undergo beatings, while potential female gang members may be gang-raped as part of their initiation. Regardless of the age of the gang member, nicknames are given to all new members, and they are expected to apply those nicknames (along with the barrio gang name) in graffiti on walls. Furthermore, these members will frequently tattoo their given name on themselves to increase identity and solidarity with the membership. Among gangs in general, including Latino gangs, there has been a emergence of so-called gang nations. This is actually just an informal term used to 121

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“Cholo,” a US-born citizen of Salvadoran heritage, shows off his Mara Salvatrucha-13 (MS-13) tattoos and hand signs on January 23, 2006, in Durham, North Carolina. MS-13 is a street gang formed by refugees of El Salvador who fled the country’s civil war during the 1980s and 1990s. (Getty Images)

describe gangs that are large enough to have multiple subgroups with a variety of related members, sometimes stretching across multiple areas of the United States. Over the past few years, law enforcement officials have referred to gangs such as the Surenos and Nortenos, both from California, and the Mexican Mafia of California, Texas, and Florida as genuine gang nations. These officials note that both of these Latino gang nations consist of several smaller sets that share common symbols and loyalties. Because of this, it may well be that members of different sets may not even recognize one another even though they are both members of the same gang nation. It is thus through the use of signs and insignia that are common to members throughout the gang nation that they may be able to positively identify their common loyalties in gangland affiliation. These same Latino gang nations have also been found within Texas prison populations.

Among these gang members, it is most common that members will circulate back and forth between prison terms and periods of release when they are back on the streets. In metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles, Miami, and San Antonio, this is very common. Furthermore, the prison culture and the existing Latino prison gangs tend to further import the street gang values, with prison gang mentality and allegiances being transmitted back into society through members who are released. This creates a constant recycling of Latino gang members who alternate their criminal careers from the street to the prison and back to the street. Because of this, no discussion on Latino gangs in America would be complete if it did not provide a discussion on Latino prison gangs. Inmates are expected to remain members for life, maintaining their prison gang contacts after their release. A released inmate who has joined a

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prison gang can be a negative influence if he reestablishes contact with his former street gang members. In Texas, law enforcement officials report that certain prison gangs recruit young members directly off the streets. Some law enforcement officials report that prison gangs are taking over street gangs as a means of expanding their drug trade. For example, among prison gangs such as the Mexican Mafia, dues are collected from each member with the intention that this money is to be sent to fellow gang members who are confined in prison to ensure that their incarceration is as comfortable as possible. In fact, released and paroled prison gang members have been known to be involved in a wide array of crimes that either supplement potential drug addictions or serve utilitarian purposes dictated by gang leaders. Some of these crimes might include home invasions, assaults, burglaries, robberies, murder, murder for hire, and witness intimidation. Prison Gangs While there are numerous Latino prison gangs, perhaps the most influential gang (particularly in relation to street gangs) is the Mexican Mafia. Similarly, prison gangs are gaining prominence as organized criminal groups, and the most notable among these is the Mexican Mafia. This prison gang has been found in at least ten different prison systems throughout the United States and has members outside of prison confines that carry out the orders of ranking leaders still incarcerated. A number of sources confirm that the origin of the Mexican Mafia started during the 1950s at the Duel Vocational Center in California. During this time, a group of youths from an urban Los Angeles street gang were incarcerated within this juvenile institution. These youthful street gang members joined for protection within the institutional setting to emerge into the prison gang that they are today. The Mexican Mafia is now largely made up of convicts and ex-convicts who by the 1960s had obtained control over prison heroin trafficking and other illicit inmate activities such as homosexual prostitution, gambling, and protection rackets. The Mexican Mafia has had a long and influential relationship with outside street gangs and oper-

ations. In 1966 the Mexican Mafia began to move its operations outside of the prison environment and had organized Latino gangs in East Los Angeles to confront the various African American gangs (such as the Bloods and the Crips) that had gained notoriety in that city. The Mexican Mafia is influential with other street gangs and may often exert control and dominance over these smaller gangs. However, it often works out that these members simply become subsumed within the larger organization. The existence of direct members and affiliates of the Mexican Mafia being in the community and in the prison has resulted in the crosspollination of the Mexican Mafia. This crosspollination is said to occur when the gang has developed such power and influence as to be equally effective regardless of whether its leadership is inside or outside of the prison walls. In fact, some cases in Texas have involved members who have directed terror campaigns from their prison cells as a means of controlling the drug trade by Latino street gangs. Furthermore, the wives, girlfriends, and relatives of the Mexican Mafia are held in high regard because of their support in drug transactions, financial activities, and mail-forwarding operations. These networks with extended family are likewise enmeshed with street gang members outside of the prison walls. In fact, the street gang members may be an added source of protection for the extended family inside the prison walls, and as noted earlier, these same members may eventually be incarcerated, only to be replaced by new street gang members and older members who are paroled. Thus, there is a strong interrelationship between many community family members and both the street gang member and the prison gang member, making membership in both nearly seamless for the hardened Latino gang member. Central American Latino Gangs Immigrating into the United States One fairly recent development among Latino gangs in the United States is the increased representation of gangs and gang members from nations in Central America. During the past decade, gangs have migrated across Central America into Mexico to 123

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ultimately settle within the United States. This migration has occurred due to military targeting of these gangs in their native nations of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Their arrival in the United States has generated a new wave of crime in many Latino neighborhoods in Los Angeles and other areas of California. It is estimated that roughly 70,000 to 100,000 members exist within the boundaries of Central America and Mexico. Due to this, top officials in Honduras and El Salvador have called the gangs as serious a threat to national security as terrorism is to the United States. Military and police personnel in these two countries have incorporated numerous aggressive strategies to combat these gangs. As a result, thousands of gang members are fleeing north, moving with and preying on the waves of illegal migrants who travel to the United States, which is likewise taking aggressive measures of its own to deport thousands of gang members on immigration violations. Since its exodus from members’ native countries of origin, the Mara Salvatrucha has expanded into Alaska, Oregon, Texas, Nevada, Utah, Oklahoma, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Virginia, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, and even Canada. Due to the social problems that plagued their Central American homelands, Central Americans began to immigrate to the United States and flocked to the Los Angeles area. Many of these immigrants were members of violent gangs that had terrorized citizens of El Salvador during the chaos that had ensued in that country. However, when Salvadorans migrated into predominantly Mexican American communities located in and around Los Angeles, they found that they were not readily accepted and were also frequently targeted by Mexican gangs. Thus, the Mara Salvatrucha formed as a means of protection and quickly gained a reputation for being well organized and extremely violent. The two largest Central American gangs in the United States are the Mara Salvatrucha and the Mara 18, and both of these gangs originated on the streets of Los Angeles. Recently, the United States has bolstered immigration enforcement, and this has resulted in the deporting of tens of thousands of Central American

gang members back to their countries of origin. During the mid-1990s it was reported that roughly 40,000 criminal and illegal immigrants were deported annually. This has only resulted in further expansion of criminal enterprises in countries such as Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico. It has also resulted in an increased and diverse membership among these gangs as the Mara Salvatrucha increasingly recruit new members from within countries other than El Salvador. Another result is that gang members now range in age from roughly eleven years old to forty years old. One development that generates increased concern is the fact that these gangs have formed alliances with several drug cartels and human smugglers. Their connection with human smuggling has drawn the attention of border security officials in the United States who fear a possible alliance between these gangs and extremist groups seeking access into the United States. As these gangs become more diversified and as they form stronger footholds within the various nations south of the United States, this could easily be an eventual likelihood. Given the sheer number of illegal immigrants who enter the United States along the southern border, prevention of gang immigrants seems to be virtually impossible. As a result, the Mara Salvatruchas and the 18th Street gang (Mara 18) have become two of the fastest-growing Latino gangs in the United States and are forming into a growing security threat to the United States, Mexico, and Central America with a presence that is likely to become more prevalent in years to come. Conclusion Latino gangs in the United States are spreading in influence and represent a large proportion of overall gang activity throughout the nation. Many of these gang members have gravitated toward gang membership due to acculturation difficulties and economic challenges presented in the United States. As part of the evolution of Latino gangs, operations have extended from the streets to networks with organized crime syndicates while likewise infiltrating many of the prison systems of the nation. Indeed, the membership between Latino prison gangs and street-based Latino gangs may be

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quite blurred, as they are frequently one and the same. Lastly, an increase in immigration from numerous Central American countries has led to an influx of immigrant gangs from these countries. These gang members are more ruthless than ever and bring with them seasoned experience from their tenure as guerrilla fighters during periods of revolutionary instability within these nations. In total, it would appear that the presence and influence of Latino gangs in America is likely to be permanent and that this influence is likely to grow in years to come.

References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime. 7th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003. Attorney General of Texas. Gangs in Texas 2001: An Overview. Austin, TX: Office of the Attorney General, 2002, http://www.oag.state.tx.us/ AG_Publications/pdfs/2001gangrept.pdf. Buentello, S. Personal Interview at TDCJ-ID Administrative Annex. Huntsville, TX: Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division, 2001. Garcia-Preto, Nydia. “Latino Families: An Overview.” Pp. 141–154 in Ethnicity and Family Therapy, 2nd ed., edited by M. McGoldrick, J. Giordano, and J. Pearce. New York: Guilford, 1996. Horowitz, R. Honor and the American Dream: Culture and Identity in a Chicano Community. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983. Huff, C. R., ed. Gangs in America. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996. National Criminal Justice Reference Service. “Gangs—Facts and Figures,” 2005, http://www.ncjrs.org/spotlight/gangs/facts.html. Shusta, M., D. R. Levine, P. R. Harris, and H. Z. Wong. Multicultural Law Enforcement: Strategies for Peacekeeping in a Diverse Society. 3rd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2005. Thompson, G. “Shuttling between Nations, Latino Gangs Confound the Law.” New York Times, 26 September 2004, http://www.sawers.com/ deb/nytimes%20gang%20article.htm. Vaquera, T., and D. W. Bailey. “Latin Gangs in the Americas: Los Mara Salvatrucha.” Crime and Justice International 20(83) (November/December 2004): 4–10.

Vigil, J. D. “Learning from Gangs: The Mexican American Experience.” ERIC Digest, No. EDORC-97-1 (1997): 1–6.

International Organized Crime and Its Impact on U.S. National Security Ron Hanser, Jeffrey P. Rush, Deborah L. Pace, Joel M. Keyes Introduction The reach of organized criminal activity extends well beyond the domain of any one city, state, or nation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines organized crime as a continuing criminal enterprise involving conspiracy, an organized structure fed by fear and corruption and motivated by greed. While the most well-known example of organized crime is that of the Italian Mafia, organized crime as defined by the FBI is significant and is fueled by not only the corruption of government officials but also by society itself. Society must either accept (or at least tolerate) or ignore organized crime for it to continue. Indeed, it is various members of society who allow organized crime to exist through their demand for the goods and services provided by organized crime. The Transnational Nature of Organized Crime Since 9/11, the transnational nature of organized crime has taken on new importance as we begin to assess and investigate the extent to which organized crime might be related to terrorist groups. Indeed, Illir Gjoni suggests that organized crime constitutes a threat to democracy, in particular a serious threat to new democracies and subsequently to the national security of the country. While Gjoni is writing specifically about Albania, it is not unreasonable to suggest that organized crime is a threat to all democracies (including the United States). Furthermore, organized crime is an even greater threat to countries that are in transition to more democratic practices. Indeed, these countries are at a heightened risk of security compromise due to the fact that many common forms of protective infrastructure may not be entirely in place. This has 125

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been found to be true in many East European countries and even more so among many African nations that have attempted to incorporate democratic reforms. The global nature of this concern becomes clearer when one considers that there is a current international shift toward the democratization of many nations. Advocates for this shift toward democracy claim that a democratic state will ultimately overcome tyranny and terror that are instigated at the hands of the government. Ironically, however, a country seeking to overcome the tyranny and terror of the state by becoming democratic might be more susceptible to the terror and tyranny of organized crime. If this tyranny and terror are denied and ignored and a response thereto is delayed (the DID syndrome), the new democratic state could find itself being undermined by its own citizens, and the security of other countries could be compromised by this significant criminal and security threat. Some of the criminal activities associated with organized crime include money laundering, drugs, weapons trading, human trafficking, murder, and bribery. While these crimes clearly have a significant effect on the nation in which the criminals live, in a post-9/ll world all of these crimes have a transnational effect that could compromise the security of other countries. As organized criminals gain a foothold in a country, their quest for money, power, and influence could move them into any number of alliances, schemes, or other associations, each of which is designed to make the organized crime group more money. Might some of these groups have the national security fervor of Tony Soprano, the lead character of HBO’s The Sopranos? Absolutely. There have been reports of many incarcerated Italian Mafia types here in the United States ratting out other inmates with ties to the Muslim faith. Furthermore, many gangsters would not knowingly become involved in terrorism against the United States. The problem, of course, is twofold: (1) many gangsters (i.e., organized crime groups) are simply ignorant as to the groups they are associating with or where the money is ultimately going, and (2) some of these groups are simply unconcerned with the ultimate affiliations that their actions may support.

Within the United States, one emerging transnational organized crime threat is that of Mara Salvatrucha 13, or MS-13. Shelly Feuer Domash tells us that “this plague that came to Long Island from El Salvador by way of the streets of Los Angeles follows the same migratory patterns as the Salvadoran immigrant community that it preys upon, fanning out across the United States from ethnic enclaves in California.” MS-13 has been identified in the California, Alaska, Oregon, Utah, Texas, Nevada, Oklahoma, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, Florida, and Washington, D.C. Additionally, there is really no question that MS-13 members move relatively freely from Central and South America and Mexico to the United States and back. Furthermore, there are unconfirmed reports that MS-13 has been recruited by al-Qaeda to transport al-Qaeda members across the southern border. Apparently al-Qaeda has reached out to MS-13 due to its expertise in human trafficking and in getting people across the border. It is not too much of a reach to think that if people can be easily smuggled, so too can weapons, bombs, and the like. Transnational Response In a post-9/11 world, there is no question that how we do policing must change. This change must occur at every level: local, state, and federal. We must also realize that some groups are so ingrained in ideology and individuals that simply arresting or killing the leader will not cripple the organization as it might have once done. We must think outside of the box and imagine things that perhaps have never before been thought of. We must use all of the resources available to us in the fight against organized crime, especially its transnational nature. The FBI lays out four criteria in its battle against organized crime: • We must employ a methodology that yields maximum impact with our limited counter-organized crime resources; • We must pursue targets which have direct ties to significant national and international criminal enterprises and systematically dismantle those enterprises;

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• We must remain flexible enough to pursue regional organized crime groups conducting significant racketeering activity; and • We must ensure that our targets are permanently dismantled or significantly disrupted.

The FBI identifies the agency mission as being tasked to “eliminate criminal enterprises which pose the greatest threat to the American society.” State and local law enforcement should establish similar criteria for their part in the fight against transnational organized crime and its relationship to issues of national security. Federal law enforcement must also realize that this is a fight that they cannot engage in on their own but rather one that will require partnering with local, state, and private law enforcement. Law enforcement at any level is not necessarily known for the ability to be innovative in the various fights against the criminal element. In many cases, attempts at innovation have brought scorn and ridicule to the agency, thus ending any attempt at innovative policing strategies. Again, in a post-9/11 world innovation must be the watchword for policing. It is imperative that policing eternally evolve to maintain the level of safety necessary for the changing levels of criminality.

final deliberations: “the grand strategy of preventive war, the grand strategy of active deterrence and containment, and the grand strategy of cooperative multilateralism.” These same strategies can be thought of in the context of law enforcement and its role in battling the transnational threat of organized crime: How can law enforcement go about preventing transnational organized crime, what can be done to prevent and/or contain the transnational organized crime threat, and what strategies can be developed to increase national and transnational cooperation in the battle? Conclusion The Stanley Foundation report suggests eight strategies. Of the eight strategies proposed, it is the eighth one, “to transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century,” that is most relevant here. Clearly, all levels of public and private law enforcement must transform to meet the challenges of the transnational organized crime threat. Agencies must work hand in hand utilizing technology, intelligence, and communication to successfully combat transnational organized crime individually and its connection to global terrorism.

The Stanley Foundation Report A report provided by the Stanley Foundation Independent Task Force on strategies for U.S. national security determined that there were three basic questions that must be addressed on the matter of national security. These questions are: • What should the U.S. do with its historically unprecedented global power? • What is the likely future position in the world 10 to 15 years from now and how should the United States go about influencing that position? • How can the United States ensure its own national security while at the same time create a stable, just, and sustainable global system in the 21st century?

Chairman Larry Korb proposed three broad grand strategies or strategic viewpoints that brought the contending arguments together under three conceptual areas and focused the group’s

References Domash, Shelly Feuer. “America’s Most Dangerous Gang.” Police, February 2005, http://www .policemag.com/Articles/2005/02/America-sMost-Dangerous-Gang.aspx. Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Organized Crime,” http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/ocshome.htm. Gjoni, Illir. “Organized Crime and National Security: The Albanian Case.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004, http://www .stormingmedia.us/79/7922/A792224.html. Korb, Larry. Strategies for U.S. National Security: Winning the Peace in the 21st Century. Muscatine, IA: Stanley Foundation, 2003, http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/03stanleyfound .pdf. Sharansky, Natan, Ron Dermer, and Anagoly Shchransky. The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror. New York: Public Affairs, 2004. 127

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Crime and Corruption in Japan: The Yakuza Robert Hanser and Nathan Moran Much of the growth of Japanese organized crime, typically referred to as the Yakuza or Boryokudan, has occurred during the years that followed World War II, when the number of Yakuza grew to large proportions, with members divided among numerous splinter gangs throughout the nation of Japan. With the growth in membership and the splintering of that membership, it was simply inevitable that interrivalry and gang warfare would ultimately emerge. Since the end of World War II, five specific periods of development occurred that have led to the contemporary Yakuza organization of today. The traditional sense of public mystique surrounding this criminal organization is being replaced with a sense of public disdain within mainstream Japanese culture. This has led to increased friction between the Yakuza and the Japanese society and more intensive efforts from police. Almost in reaction to this increased resistance at home, the Yakuza have expanded their operations beyond the Japanese homeland to the global market, although they are still definitely active in Japan and still provide illicit goods and services to Japanese citizens. Confusion Period: 1945–1950 The immediate post–World War II period is marked in history as a time of lawlessness and anarchy coupled with a great deal of economic deprivation. During this period, not only was the upperworld of mainstream Japanese society in a state of social disarray, but so was the underworld. Immediately following World War II, the street gangs (known as gurentai or street hoodlums) began to struggle with the older, more established gangs over gambling profits, territory, and monopolies. It was also during this time that the number of organized crime groups began to rise, in terms of both the size and number of groups. According to M. T. Shikita and Shinichi Tsuchiya, the Boryokudan began to develop “various rackets such as street hawking, black markets, gambling, group robberies, and strong-arm protection.” During this period, the police countermeasures to the Japanese underworld’s struggle for survival was minimal

because of allied occupation in Japan and budgetary issues that severely limited the funds available to police agencies to perform their job effectively and efficiently. This struggle was for gambling, prostitution, and drug profits. Conflict Period: 1951–1963 Out of the confusion period rose the conflict period, a full eight years longer than the confusion period. The conflict period was a time in which the Boryokudans began to rise to power and prosper in Japan. (In terms of organized crime, the term “prospering” means that the group is earning money and is gaining insulation from the government via political corruption.) It is estimated that by the end of this period, there were 5,216 organized gangs in existence with more than 184,000 members throughout Japan. Shikita and Tsuchiya have indicated that membership in the Boryokudan during this period reached a postwar high. The rise in the potential to make significant monetary gains during the conflict period created and enhanced existing tensions between Boryokudan organizations. This time of conflict is analogous to the confusion period fighting between the gurentai and the older established gangs. It was during this time that the gurentai gained control of the streets and targeted businesses to establish networks of criminal enterprises. Emerging gangs during this period had to help develop protective institutions to limit competition in gambling and prostitution while continuing to fight centuries-old turf battles. It was the forming of alliances and the growth of Boryokudans that led to the police period. The Police Period: 1964–1970 In response to the gang wars of the conflict period, the police were pressured from a number of sources into quelling the illicit activities of the seven largest Boryokudan organizations. During 1964–1970, public opinion in Japan of the Boryokudan dropped to the point that there was a great deal of pressure placed on politicians who, in turn, placed pressure on the police to ameliorate the wars between the various gangs that were causing the most social disruption.

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A Japanese gangster, or Yakuza, shows off his tattoos at the beach in 1955. Large, elaborate tattoos are a Yakuza tradition that survives today. (Getty Images)

The police attempted to intercept the various Boryokudans gaining power through the suppression of illegal gambling and prostitution. The police also began to use public relations techniques to stigmatize Boryokudan activities as being inherently antithetical to the Japanese value system, a value system that is deeply ingrained in the people of Japan. During this public campaign against the Boryokudan, three groups dissolved completely: the Sumiyoshi-kai, the Kanto-kai, and the Kinsei-kai. As will be seen in the discussion of the reorganization

period, the members of these groups did not absolve themselves from a life of crime. Rather, they joined other larger and more established groups that were more resistant to police and societal pressure. The Reorganization Period: 1971–1980 Between 1971 and 1980, the Boryokudans began to reorganize and rise to power yet again. This reorganization is largely marked by the pact in 1972 between the Yamaguchi-gumi and the Inagawa-kai. This pact had been engineered by Yoshio Kodama, 129

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who was originally the godfather of Tokyo’s powerful Inagawa-kai, and was made with Kazuo Taoka, the godfather of the Yamaguchi-gumi. This deal was sealed in Taoka’s home through a traditional sakazuki ceremony that included a blood brotherhood sworn over the consumption of Japanese saki. This Yamaguchi-Inagawa alliance created a Yakuza conglomerate that controlled all but four of Japan’s prefectures. The Reformation Period: 1981–1988 Two noteworthy points should be mentioned regarding the development of the Yakuza during this period. The first was the death of Masahisa Takenaka, the head of the Yamaguchi-gumi, who was gunned down by rival Yakuza. The second was the death of Yoshio Kodama of the Inagawa-kai who died of a stroke in 1984. These developments ultimately resulted in a general peace agreement that led to the Inigawa-kai joining with the Yamaguchi-gumi but only with the added clause that the Inigawa-kai’s members must be accepted into the Yamaguchi-gumi and must also be allowed in all decision-making processes. Once these two groups had successfully merged, the Yakuza became a highly structured and well-managed organized crime faction. Thus, after the reformation period, the Yamaguchi-gumi became, and remain today, the largest and most sophisticated Koiki Boryokudan in Japan (that is, sophisticated in terms of hierarchal stability as well as its ability to withstand pressures from the public, law enforcement, and gang warfare). International Cooperation: 1988–Present Japanese police have had to adopt a strategy of international cooperation to fight this burgeoning global threat. Indeed, it has been noted that the Yamaguchi-gumi have expanded their operations, causing much concern to other countries and forcing Japanese policymakers to consider a new paradigm on crime: transnationality. Boryokudan assets have now been traced to gambling casinos, the pornography trade, real estate businesses, night clubs, restaurants, souvenir shops, and travel agencies. These assets have likewise been extended to locations throughout the world rather than being

restricted to the confines of Japanese society. In addition, there have been several attempts among the Yakuza to establish legitimate businesses as well (using proceeds obtained illicitly). However, these attempts have had mixed success at best due to numerous police crackdowns on the Yakuza. Major Criminal Enterprises of the Yakuza Of all the criminal industries that the Yakuza are involved in, perhaps the most notorious and lucrative are the sex-related businesses that are designed to accommodate the Japanese working male. The Yakuza control prostitution rings throughout Japan, commonly holding young women from other Asian countries captive to serve as indentured servants and comfort workers. The Yakuza have been known to work closely with the Chinese Snakeheads and have been involved in the smuggling of women from the People’s Republic of China into Japan to work in the sex industry. According to A. Bruno, the Japanese euphemistically refer to prostitution as “selling spring,” and Japanese customers are noted for having a taste for very young women and adolescent girls. One of the methods by which the Yakuza cater to this demand is through the purchase of unwanted female children from Snakeheads in China. The law in China restricts couples to only one child, and many couples prefer to have a male child. The Yakuza work in close cooperation with Chinese Snakeheads to smuggle Chinese immigrants into Japan. Often these immigrants are young girls and/or women who are forced work in various bars, restaurants, and nightclubs until they are old enough to be employed as prostitutes. Many of these young girls working in this industry come from rural towns in the Philippines. They may be told that there are respectable forms of employment in Japan, only to find that they have been misled once they arrive in Japan. With no family and no protective oversight, these girls and women are typically forced to work in strip clubs and to engage in prostitution under the watchful guard of their Yakuza pimps. Over time, it is often the case that these women do succumb to the demands of their captors, particularly since the money is far superior to what they could earn in their home country.

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The Yakuza have also been instrumental in arranging the infamous sex tours frequented by Japanese business travelers. These sex tours are popular in East Asia, and the Yakuza organize vacation tours to cities such as Bangkok, Manila, Seoul, and Taipei, where Japanese and Western businessmen can be seen with prostitutes of differing nationalities. Likewise, the Yakuza at least partially control a large pornography market in Japan that includes a substantial amount of child pornography, and this has resulted in serious governmental sanction with respect to this type of crime largely due to international pressure on Japan. In recent years, a growing drug problem has emerged in Japan, with the primary drugs of choice being amphetamines and methamphetamine. The Yakuza produce these drugs in hidden laboratories throughout Japan, the Philippines, and Korea. The Yakuza have likewise extended their drug trafficking operations to Hawaii and Australia, although the markets have not been reported to be as lucrative in Australia as they are in other areas of the Pacific region. The Yakuza are often the source of media attention in Hawaii because of their involvement in methamphetamine trafficking, gambling, and prostitution throughout the Hawaiian islands. In addition, the Yakuza have been reported to be involved in cocaine transportation to Japan, as the demand for this drug has seen an increase in the Yakuza’s nation of origin. During the past two decades, the Yakuza have sought to generate illicit income by intervening in private disputes with violence. During the years of rapid expansion in Japan when urban land prices continued to increase, some Yakuza intervened in real estate deals as a means of making money through the modification of these transactions. Once the economic boom in Japan ended, these Yakuza threatened corporate executives with violence as a means of cutting any potential losses that might ensue. Eventually, many Yakuza were implicated in unlawful lending practices and the unlawful disposal of worthless bonds. These tactics also extended to various forms of corporate extortion and blackmail. Over time, the money-making ventures and forms of corporate crime associated with the Yakuza have grown quite complex and sophisticated.

Anti-Yakuza Public Climate It would appear that Japanese organized crime is following a trend that is somewhat similar to that found in the United States. Many of the traditions of the Yakuza seem to not have control of members as they once did. Indeed, it has been noted that in many police prefectures throughout Japan, calls are made much more frequently from Yakuza gangsters and family members who wish to leave their life of organized crime. Furthermore, there have been complaints from some Yakuza that traditional rules are no longer obeyed, and it is likewise reported that more Yakuza are willing to break rank and even disclose information against their brethren. To further add incentive, more than sixty Japanese companies have created opportunities for reform of prior Yakuza members by offering them career-track jobs. This and other developments have resulted in an erosion of many of the old-time obligations and sense of strict loyalty. It would also appear that the older rituals and customs of the Yakuza are occasionally sacrificed if a member can make more money in the process of committing disloyal acts that provide shortcuts to financial gain. Reported in-fighting and double-crossing have led to frequent intragang warfare among members. This has also resulted in the unintentional killing of innocent bystanders in the process. The killing of ordinary citizens is typically considered taboo among the Yakuza gangster subculture. With recent occurrences being shown in the media, there has been much greater public consensus against the Yakuza, and it is reported that this public consensus has had a serious negative impact on the organization. What was typically considered unthinkable is increasingly becoming more commonplace given this public consensus. Community members now provide phone information to police, who successfully raid dice and gambling dens. Indeed, the Ichiri Ikka suffered a blow to their public face when common citizens of Hamamatsu staked out the gang’s main building. This building was taped by CCTV, and the tapes were provide to police. This and other evidence resulted in the expulsion of the Ichiri Ikka from the community, which resulted in public humiliation and embarrassment 131

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for the gang. The Ichiri Ikka responded with violence to the community, and this simply served to further entrench the community against the Yakuza. Conclusion The Yakuza have had a long and far-reaching history in Japan. This organized crime syndicate has developed throughout several historical stages that have reflected the slow consolidation of these criminals into an organization similar to today’s modern corporation. In the process, the Yakuza have maintained a distant rapport with law enforcement and political figures within the Japanese government. Currently, the Yakuza seem to be losing popularity with the Japanese mainstream public, and the once famed rapport with the police and the community is open to question. As a result, the Yakuza have found incentive to turn toward the global scene and markets that stretch beyond Japan. This has proven profitable but has also drawn attention from a number of nations. By all accounts, it would appear that the Japanese Yakuza have become one of the most effective and efficient organized crime syndicates to emerge on the global scene, and it is highly likely that this syndicate will continue to thrive in the transnational sector for many more years to come.

References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime. 7th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003. Albanese, J. Organized Crime in America. 3rd ed. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson, 1995. Bruno, A. “Criminal Enterprises.” Courtroom Television Network, 2005, http://www.crimelibrary .com/gangsters_outlaws/gang/yakuza/4.html ?sect=25. David, F., and P. Monzini. Human Smuggling and Trafficking: A Desk Review on the Trafficking in Women from the Philippines. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2000. Huang, F. Y., and M. S. Vaughn. “A Descriptive Analysis of Japanese Organized Crime: The Boryokudan from 1945 to 1988.” International Criminal Justice Review 2 (1992): 19–57. Kaplan, D. E., and A. Dubro. Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal Underworld, expanded ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

Moran, N. R., and R. D. Hanser. “Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs and the Japanese Yakuza: An Historical Analysis and Theoretical Application.” Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology 7(1 & 2) (2002): 150–178. Poulin, R. “Globalization and the Sex Trade: Trafficking and the Commodification of Women and Children.” Canadian Women Studies 22(3–4) (2003): 38–43. Reischauer, E. O. The Japanese Society: Change and Continuity. Cambridge: Belknop Press of Harvard University Press, 1988. Shikita, M. T., and Shinichi Tsuchiya. Crime and Criminal Policy in Japan from 1926 to 1988. Tokyo: Japan Criminal Policy Council, 1990. Takemura, N. “Organized Crime: Japanese Mobsters.” Pp. 44–67 in Encyclopedia of Criminology, edited by R. A. Wright and J. M. Miller. New York: Routledge, 2005.

The Relationship between Politics and Organized Crime in Latin America André Moysés Gaio It is easier to buy a Member of Congress than to elect one. —Marcos Camacho, Leader of the Primeiro Comando da Capital, São Paulo, Brazil

The establishment of the military dictatorships beginning in the 1960s was certainly the most important stimulus to the onset and development of organized crime in Latin America, for it generated the institutional conditions criminals needed to operate freely. Inspired by the principles of the Cold War, the military and civilians who composed the ruling authority of the dictatorial political regimes concentrated on political repression of various strata of the populations of the countries they perceived as subversive. Therefore, the scattered criminality—or incipient microcriminality— received little attention. The absence of the rule of law encouraged the springing up of criminal organizations. The lack of accountability mechanisms also allowed the leaders of the new dictatorships to start plundering state resources and transferring them to banks in other countries, especially in Switzerland.

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Since the only means of legitimation in the search for popular support found by the dictatorships was economic growth, the welfare policies, the search for standards of quality for the social policies, the provision of security for people, as well as the increase of individual income were completely ignored. Only the growth of the gross domestic product mattered. Such growth, when it did happen, was financed by illegally incurred unpayable foreign debts. This mechanism of financing economic growth ran out when the socalled debt crisis took place in the beginning of the 1980s, which brought about two basic conditions for the proliferation of organized crime: poverty and the nearly complete disorganization of the institutional structure of the state, highlighting the fact that some had not yet completed the necessary tasks for the creation of a modern state, configuring what we may call quasi-states. Since some dictatorships lasted until the late 1980s, the results of twenty years of such practices were dramatic. Being specialized in political repression, the police forces had not yet developed investigative skills or an intelligence agency, whereas the judiciary branch, when it was not suppressed by the generals, became politically aware. The inspection capacity was negligible, and there were no special laws concerning the practice of organized crime. Following the fall of the dictatorships were periods of complete social disorganization, income concentration, and unstable governments, conditions that favor the development of organized crime. In countries such as Bolivia, frequent accusations that drug trafficking was under the control of the presidency by generals such as Hugo Banzer and Garcia Meza demonstrate that organized crime was already institutionalized. However, in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, and Peru, poverty, the widespread practice of corruption, and institutional conditions that were completely adverse to crime control were enough to propel the articulation of organized criminality. The case of Mexico is different from the ones mentioned above, especially due to the fact that it did not have the experience of a military dictator-

ship or a critical institutional rupture. But it received a powerful stimulus to the practice of corruption due to the monopoly of power in the hands of the Institutional Republican Party (PRI), which in the 1980s did not have any significant adversaries who questioned its power. The literature on corruption in Mexico during the rule of the PRI is extensive, and the growth of criminal organizations there certainly received strong stimuli from the Mexican political authorities. Colombia has played a distinctive role in the process of development of organized crime, more specifically of mafia-type organizations. Such distinction is important precisely because mafia-type organizations are those in which the politicalcriminal nexus is established. The Italian Penal Code, Article 416 bis, draws a precise concept of mafia or gangster association: “The illegal association is of mafia-type when the participants take advantage of the intimidating power of the association and of the resulting conditions of submission and silence (omertà), to commit criminal offenses, to manage or control, either directly or indirectly, economic activities, concessions, authorisations, public contracts and services, or to obtain unlawful profits or advantages for themselves or for others, or with a view to prevent or limit the freedom to vote, or to get votes for themselves or for others on the occasion of an election.” Any definition of organized crime shall take into account some characteristics of the groups: durability, continuity, hierarchical, complex, violence (or the threat of it), corruption, number of people, etc. The relationship between organized crime and politics is tenuous, and therefore the distinction between the former and mafia associations must be made. For more than six decades, Colombia’s economy has been based on the dependence on the production of the coca leaf and its transformation into cocaine (sold in the international market) and a political life marked by the resolution of conflicts through the systematic use of violence, by killing its opposers, by high homicide rates, and by the constitution of paramilitary groups that have been fighting a civil war for decades. As a result, Colombia was and still is a strong stimulus to the establishment 133

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and strengthening of criminal organizations in Latin America and other regions. The formation of the Cali and Medellin cartels favored the emergence of unprecedented relationships between cocaine dealers and politicians. The financing of presidential and parliamentary campaigns, besides the dealers themselves appearing as candidates, has altered the structure of the groups, changing their status from criminal organizations to mafia-type organizations. Organized Crime and Democracy In 1984, the same year that the military dictatorship in Brazil came to an end, there was a sign that something new was happening. It “snowed” in Rio de Janeiro. This expression, which gained popularity, meant that a combination of Brazilian and Colombian drug dealers spread a great deal of cocaine in that city—and at very low prices—in a country that consumed little of that drug. The strategy, in the medium run, resulted in an explosion of demand from Brazilians and the development of groups such as the Comando Vermelho (Red Command)—associated with Colombian and Paraguayan groups—and the jogo do bicho (Brazilian version of the numbers racket), which has become involved in the traffic of drugs. Both had considerable influence in the politics of the state of Rio de Janeiro. Corruption and Politics Corruption in the higher levels of public offices was a scene that was many times repeated. Several presidents—Alberto Fujimore (Peru), Carlos Salinas (Mexico), Fernando Collor (Brazil), Carlos Andrés Perez (Venezuela), and Carlos Menem (Argentina)—were removed from office due to serious accusations of corruption or were sued after the termination of their mandates. The accusations of illicit enrichment of such politicians usually reduced investigations to mere individual or small-group misappropriations. Few investigations, with the exception of the Brazilian and Mexican cases, made connections between the former presidents and the mafia or other criminal organizations. In the case of former Brazilian president Collor, the investigation was able to bring to light the involvement of Paulo César Farias (trea-

surer of the presidential campaign and an influential personality during his mandate) with the trafficking of cocaine and with money laundering in association with the Italian Mafia (’Ndrangheta) and the Colombian cartels. Globalization and National States It is true that globalization has provided organized crime and mafia associations with new opportunities to operate. The many operations performed disclosed—and still do—a concentrated operation involving Colombian, Brazilian, Paraguayan, and Argentine drug dealers. The presence of the Russian and Italian Mafias conducting business in association with the Latin American groups is widely known and has expanded into several operations: drug trafficking (cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and smart drugs), purchasing of government companies, illegal slot machines, arms trafficking, and kidnappings. The precariousness of the sovereignty of the countries of this region also becomes clear by the establishment of tax havens, especially in Paraguay and Uruguay, accountable for the laundering of money from criminal organizations. Brazil and Argentina also demonstrate certain fragility in the control of dirty money. Globalization, however, becomes more dramatic when we analyze it as an internalization process of global trends. The adjustment that each country makes of impulses produced in other regions is what we perceive as the decisive dimension of the globalization process. In different degrees and dynamics, the countries of the region started assimilating processes of social disintegration (a consequence of the employment crisis), reduction of the social policies of welfare, loss of the efficiency of the structure of the state, crisis of the classical schemes of political representation, etc., that originated from other contexts. In all Latin American countries, the growth of the informal economy is already a serious problem. In this sector, low wages, absence of social protection, and a feeling of not belonging to society have become powerful stimuli to participation in crime. In Brazil, where such a trend has its most worrying configuration (almost 50 percent of the workforce has informal jobs), the figures show that in Rio de

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Jaime Paz Zamora (left), Carlos Menem (middle), and Fernando Collor de Mello; presidents of Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil respectively, at a summit in Argentina in 1992. Menem was arrested in 2001 for arms trafficking, Zamora was accused of sheltering a drug trafficker, and Collor de Mello was impeached amid a bribery scandal since this photo was taken. (Reuters/Corbis)

Janeiro alone the drug trade employs about 200,000 people. The problem replicates in Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia. When an institutional recovery of the theme of criminality was noticed by many countries of the region with the creation of laws and institutions to combat both microcrime and macrocrime, the ineffectiveness to enforce new laws and the absence of resources for the operation of the new institutions became evident. The feeling that the classical mechanisms of political representation are ruined favors a social dynamic that stimulates the legislative branch’s controlling attempt to satisfy the interests of specific groups, including organized crime. The institutional recovery of the fight against crime, how-

ever, fructified and forced a change in the operational strategy of criminal organizations. In Colombia, the end of the cartels promoted the formation of small groups that trade smaller quantities of cocaine to avoid being apprehended by law enforcement agencies. In Brazil, the trafficking of drugs is also linked to smaller organizations, although a new gang, Primeiro Comando da Capital (First Command of the Capital), started off inside the penitentiary system and has attained some success in its operations. It is a larger group based in São Paulo and has thousands of members. Presently, the nexus between crime and politics has a peculiar dynamic: it is deprived of any ideology or long-term project; operates both at the local and regional levels (towns and states); has amassed 135

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the police, the judiciary, the executive branch, private companies, and criminals in the same illegal schemes; and searches less for the protection of groups (although this still is of some importance) than the attainment of benefits through rigged public bidding and distribution of benefits. Eventually, the state itself becomes criminal. The concepts of corruption and white-collar crime are inadequate to describe and explain the dynamics of a state whose components—of various spheres—occupy themselves with the plundering of public assets and the sale of judicial sentences on an unprecedented scale, while the members of parliament negotiate their positions and police forces ally with drug dealers and criminals. Today, there is no mafia-type group operating to control the executive branch of the states of the region. Politics has turned into the demise of ideology, and delinquency has become a routine. References Camacho, Marcos. Statement before the House of Representatives of Brazil. Parliamentary Inquiry Commission, 6 August 2006. Peralva, Angelina. Violência e Democracia. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2000. Ryan, Patrick J. Organized Crime: A Reference Handbook. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1996. Soares, Luiz Eduardo. Violência e política no Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro: ISER, 1996. Thoumi, Francisco E. Illegal Drugs, Economy and Society in the Andes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. Zaluar, Alba. Integração perversa: Pobreza e tráfico de drogas. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2004.

North America Don Liddick Transnational organized crime is a significant threat to the economic and political security of the United States and Canada. Some groups, such as the American Cosa Nostra and outlaw motorcycle gangs, are indigenous to the United States but have become so expansive that they are transnational in scope. Other criminal gangs, such as the Russian Mafiya, the Japanese Yakuza, and the South Amer-

ican drug cartels, are foreign-based but maintain a significant presence and influence in the United States and Canada. La Cosa Nostra The most significant indigenous transnational crime organization in the United States is the American Mafia, or La Cosa Nostra. Italian American organized criminals have operated in the United States since the 1880s, when the first significant wave of Italian immigration to America began. Italian American criminals in that era ran a variety of rackets, including extortion, labor racketeering, prostitution, and illegal gambling. The prohibition of alcohol in the 1920s greatly increased the illicit wealth and power of Italian American gangsters and resulted in a centralization of sorts that came to be called La Cosa Nostra, a network of crime families featured in some two dozen American cities. By the time of the televised congressional Kefauver Committee hearings in 1951, the government, the law enforcement community, the media, and the general public increasingly viewed organized crime as synonymous with Italian American organized crime families. The now infamous meeting of organized criminals in Appalachin, New York, in 1957 and the testimony of mob turncoat Joe Valachi in 1963 brought the Mafia into full public view and were the basis for the conclusions of President Lyndon Johnson’s Task Force Report on Organized Crime in 1967. The task force concluded that organized crime was virtually synonymous with La Cosa Nostra. While the corporatelike and monolithic features attributed to the Mafia are an exaggeration, the various crime families have nevertheless remained a significant source of organized crime in the United States. The criminal activities of the American Cosa Nostra have been quite diverse, including the provision of illicit goods and services and racketeering in business and industry. Industrial racketeering by La Cosa Nostra involves the systematic restraint of trade, the pillaging of union benefit funds, and the laundering of illicit revenue through otherwise legitimate business and financial institutions. Although a wide range of commercial activities are negatively impacted by organized crime, the prob-

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Joseph Valachi, former murderer and member of the Cosa Nostra crime organization, being sworn in before the Senate Rackets Committee in Washington to testify to his involvement with organized crime and narcotics in 1963. (Getty Images)

lem of industrial racketeering has been especially severe in those economic zones concerned with construction, waste management, the protection of the environment, and the shipment of goods. Tight regulation by the state has also provided the opportunity for La Cosa Nostra families to make huge profits in those businesses that cater to human pleasures: gambling, prostitution, pornography, and drugs. La Cosa Nostra’s control of air, rail, and water freight terminals provides additional billions of dollars in easily pilfered cargo. The extent of the Mafia’s theft, fraud, and extortion is far-ranging and has reached into the area of white-collar crime. Italian American organized crime families have infiltrated Wall Street, driving up stock prices, cashing out early, and extorting money from brokers and traders. Authorities estimate that La Cosa Nostra families control perhaps two dozen brokerage firms and influence many others. The principal

transnational dimensions of La Cosa Nostra have traditionally involved the importation and trafficking of heroin in the United States. Powerful legislative tools such as hefty penalties for drug trafficking and court-authorized electronic surveillance led to numerous prosecutions of Mafia figures in the 1980s and 1990s. Still, the predicted demise of La Cosa Nostra has failed to materialize. Moreover, transnational organized crime in the United States involves far more than the American Mafia. In the 1980s and 1990s, numerous transnational crime groups developed significant criminal operations in the United States, including African American, Latino, Chinese, Jamaican, Korean, Vietnamese, Japanese, Nigerian, Colombian, and Russian networks. Russian Mafiya gangs are particularly active, with some thirteen to fifteen gangs operating throughout the United States. Russian gangsters perpetrate a variety of crimes on U.S. soil, including telecommunications fraud, money laundering, insurance fraud, and fuel racketeering. Chinese Triad societies in Hawaii, Seattle, San Francisco, New York, and Boston traffic in heroin and smuggle cars, electronic equipment, and people. It seems obvious that the law enforcement attack against La Cosa Nostra, while impressive, has not seriously limited organized crime in the United States. Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs Outlaw motorcycle gangs are a continuing organized crime threat in North America. The number of gangs operating in the United States is unknown. The U.S. Marshal’s Service has estimated their number at 800, while the Pennsylvania Crime Commission has suggested that the number is more like 200–400. Most gangs are small, local, and unorganized, but a few have evolved into large criminal organizations that are international in scope. Outlaw motorcycle gangs participate in numerous organized crimes, including murder for hire, prostitution, the operation of massage parlors, international white slavery, kidnapping, burglary, gun running, insurance frauds, loan-sharking, motorcycle and automobile theft, gambling, truck hijacking, arson, forgery of government documents, extortion, the fencing of stolen goods, theft 137

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from U.S. military bases, assault, rape, and, most notably, narcotics trafficking (especially methamphetamine, cocaine, and steroids). In 1986 the President’s Commission on Organized Crime estimated that 40 percent of the entire U.S. methamphetamine supply was controlled by outlaw motorcycle gangs. Other sources have estimated that the larger well-organized groups earn up to $1 billion a year from their various criminal endeavors. The largest and most sophisticated groups operating today are the Hells Angels, the Outlaws, the Pagans, and the Bandidos. All but the Pagans have international memberships, while the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has estimated that the Hells Angels have more than sixty chapters in thirteen countries. Other noteworthy clubs operating in the United States include the Avengers (located primarily in Michigan, Ohio, and West Virginia), the Gypsy Jokers (Pacific Northwest), the Hessians (Las Vegas, Nevada), the Dirty Dozen (Arizona), the Vargos (California), the Sons of Silence (Colorado), and the Warlocks (Delaware, New Jersey, and southeastern Pennsylvania). Asian Gangs Organized crime originating in Asia has a significant impact on the North American continent. Japanese Yakuza gangs smuggle amphetamines and firearms from the United States to Japan. (Strict gun controls in Japan transform a $100 American handgun into a product worth $1,200 in Japan.) The principal impact of the Yakuza on the United States is their purchase of legitimate businesses to launder and repatriate their illegally earned revenues. A Yakuza affiliate, the Rondan Doyukai Company, is believed to have purchased shares in the Dow Chemical Company, Chase Manhattan, IBM, General Motors, Bank of America, and Atlantic Richfield. Japanese gangs have acquired interests in or purchased import-export, real estate, restaurant, and oil lease businesses in Hawaii and Los Angeles and have reportedly established themselves in such cities as Denver, Las Vegas, Vancouver, and San Francisco. Chinese Triad groups with a presence in the United States are the Sun Yee On, 14K, Wo Hop To, Wo On Lok, and Leun Kung Lok. These groups are especially prevalent in the

Pacific Rim, with a strong presence in Hawaii, Seattle, and San Francisco. Triads are also prevalent in the eastern cities of New York, Boston, and Toronto, where they control the eastern Asian heroin trade, with annual profits more than $200 billion. Other principal transnational criminal activities include the smuggling of weapons, cars, boats, electronic equipment, and people. The smuggling of illegal aliens into Europe and North America nets an additional $3.5 billion per year for Triads. Russian Mafiya The Russian Mafiya is active in most large American cities. Since the mid-1970s, Brighton Beach, New York, has been the traditional base of Russian organized crime in America, but the FBI has identified Russian crime groups in Boston, Chicago, Miami, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Seattle, Denver, Minneapolis, Dallas, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego. In 2001 some thirteen to fifteen crime groups with international ties to Russia or other former Soviet Republics operated in the United States, with perhaps 600 members. Russian crime groups in America are involved in telecommunications fraud, the cloning of cellular phones, money laundering, and medical and insurance fraud. Fuel racketeering is a prominent Russian organized crime scam that results in the loss of $2 billion annually in U.S. federal and state gasoline taxes. Russian gangs have also targeted U.S. banks and financial institutions. In 1999, two companies were charged with laundering $7–10 billion in criminal proceeds and legitimate funds through institutions such as the Bank of New York on behalf of Russian tax evaders. Russian criminals have been implicated in the white slave trade, the dumping of toxic wastes into tankers carrying gasoline to be burned in automobiles, and the attempted delivery of tactical nuclear weapons and surface-to-air missiles to U.S. buyers. In one case, investigators in South Florida discovered the intended sale of a Russian submarine to Colombian drug traffickers. Drug Cartels Some of the most significant transnational organized crime groups affecting North America are drug trafficking organizations centered in Colom-

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bia and Mexico. Some 300 Colombian trafficking organizations operate within the United States. The decimation of the infamous Medellin cocaine cartel merely led to the rise of Cali-based and Mexican trafficking organizations. During the 1990s, the Cali organization produced and distributed 80– 90 percent of the cocaine imported into the United States. If the Cali cartel, with revenues of $8 billion per year, were a legitimate corporation, it would be the top-grossing firm in the world, exceeding companies such as Exxon, General Electric, Philip Morris, and IBM. Law enforcement pressure has precipitated changes in the South American drug trade in recent years, including the rise of independent trafficking groups in Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay; a shift in supply routes to Mexico, Venezuela, and the eastern Caribbean; and a transition in production to other countries such as Brazil. In addition, Colombia has now become a major source of heroin entering the United States. The shift in cocaine trafficking routes through Mexico in the late 1980s also facilitated the growth of the Mexican Federation, a group of drug trafficking organizations consisting of the Gulf, Juarez, Sonora, and Tijuana cartels. The Mexican Federation controls almost all of the heroin, cocaine, and marijuana production, smuggling, and distribution in Mexico and the western United States. A fifth group, the Amezqua Organization, controls the growing methamphetamine trade. Sicilian Mafia The Sicilian Mafia is the most powerful of the Italian-based transnational crime groups and supplied the structural model adopted by Italian American/La Cosa Nostra crime groups in the United States. The Sicilian Mafia operates in more than forty countries, including the United States and Canada. The FBI concluded that the infiltration of the Sicilian Mafia into the United States occurred primarily from the late 1970s onward, with about 3,000 members operating primarily in northeastern and mid-Atlantic states by the early 1990s. Consisting of approximately 180 families or clans, the Sicilian Mafia has accumulated most of its political and economic power from the vast prof-

its generated through trafficking in heroin. After law enforcers broke up the infamous French Connection in 1972, forcing French Corsicans who controlled the U.S. heroin market out of business, the Sicilian Mafia stepped in to fill the void. By 1981 the group was smuggling six tons of heroin into the United States annually. At present, the Sicilian Mafia is thought to be responsible for $750 million worth of Southeast Asian heroin entering New York City each year and remains one of the principal heroin suppliers to U.S. consumers. African-based Groups African criminal enterprises impacting the United States are predominantly Nigerian. However, the FBI notes that some criminal groups operating in North America are based in nations such as Liberia and Ghana. The FBI has identified a transnational African organized crime presence in cities from coast to coast but concludes that they are most prevalent in Atlanta; Baltimore; Washington, D.C.; Chicago; Milwaukee; Dallas; Houston; New York; and Newark. The U.S. State Department estimates that as much as 40 percent of the heroin smuggled into the United States is imported by Nigerian criminal gangs working as subcontractors for the Russian Mafiya, the Chinese Triads, Colombian cartels, or the various Italian criminal groups. Nigerian gangs use U.S. dollars to buy heroin from source countries such as Myanmar, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Then, both drugs and firearms are smuggled over land and through ports to South Africa and on to New York City and various European cities. Sales revenues are used to buy luxury products such as cars, electronics, and watches that are shipped to Nigeria for resale in the lucrative black market. Nigerian organized criminals are also involved in cocaine trafficking, credit card scams, bank fraud, insurance fraud, ivory smuggling, the manufacture and use of false identifications, and advance-fee frauds. A common fraud, called 4-1-9 schemes after the section of the Nigerian penal code implicated, involves a deluge of letters, e-mails, and faxes proposing fictitious business opportunities in exchange for an advance fee. Scams such as these are estimated to cost Americans some $250 million every year. 139

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Jamaican Gangs Beginning in the mid-1980s, groups of Jamaican nationals established a presence in the United States and formed criminal gangs called posses. There may be as many as forty posses in at least eighteen different American cities. The Jamaicans are vertically integrated in the United States as importers, wholesalers, distributors, and retailers of both cocaine and marijuana. The posses are particularly violent, and some groups such as the Dog, Jungle, and Okra Slime train in guerrilla warfare. Eight hundred drug-related murders were attributed to Jamaican gangs in the period 1984–1987 alone. The Shower Posse is the largest of the Jamaican gangs, with a significant presence in Miami and New York City. Posses are also involved in money laundering and the smuggling of illegal firearms. Organized Crime in Canada The impact of transnational organized crime is no less in Canada. A 1998 Organized Crime Impact Study commissioned by the solicitor general of Canada found that the Canadian illicit drug market is between $7 billion and $10 billion each year, securities fraud and telemarketing scams cost Canadians at least $5 billion each year, between $5 billion and $17 billion is laundered each year, as many as 16,000 people are smuggled into Canada each year, the counterfeiting of clothes and pharmaceuticals may cost Canadians more than $1 billion each year, and the illegal smuggling of tobacco, alcohol, and jewelry may result in the loss of up to $1.5 billion in government tax revenues. Canadian officials and researchers agree that the last decades of the twentieth century witnessed the proliferation and increasing sophistication of organized crime in Canada. Organized crime groups have infiltrated and use Canada’s marine ports as conduits for illicit drugs, tobacco, alcohol, gems, firearms, cigars, jewelry, animal parts, and illegal migrants. The illicit tobacco and alcohol market in Canada is supplied by cross-border smugglers as well as domestic criminals. Drug trafficking in Canada involves Asians, Italians, outlaw motorcycle gangs, and, to a lesser extent, Iranians, Romanians, Lebanese, and

Jamaicans. Colombian-based cocaine trafficking groups are well established in Canada as well. By the late 1990s, the hydroponic cultivation of marijuana had reached unprecedented levels. Much of this marijuana is exported from British Colombia to the United States. Outlaw motorcycle gangs are the principal actors in a thriving illicit chemical trade (mostly PCP, methamphetamine, and LSD), while Asian syndicates with ties to Hong Kong, Taiwan, China, and Vietnam control the heroin market. Asian-based organized crime groups are very active in Canada and are involved in narcotics trafficking, the smuggling of illegal immigrants, and the theft of computers, computer components, electronic goods, and luxury automobiles. Home invasions, prostitution, gambling, shoplifting rings, kidnapping, extortion, commodity smuggling, the traffic in cigarettes and liquor, insurance fraud, contract murders, and the production and distribution of counterfeit currency, software, pirated videos, manufactured goods, and credit cards are also common activities. The Asian groups are based in Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Toronto, and Montreal but are expanding into smaller cities and rural areas. Much of the increase in violence associated with Asian-based criminal activity can be attributed to Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian street gangs. In addition, several Chinese Triads are active, including the Luen Kung Lok and 14K, as well as Dai Huen Jai, or the Big Circle Boys, centered in Toronto and British Columbia. The Lotus Gang, comprised of Canadian-born Chinese, operates in Vancouver, has ties to the Hells Angels, and is involved in cocaine and heroin trafficking, credit card fraud, extortion, and the cloning of cellular telephones. Fukienese crime groups emerging in Toronto are involved in the smuggling of migrants from Fuchow in China into Canada and the United States. In Quebec, more than 350 Asian-based criminals are divided into thirty-five gangs, most of which are national or international in scope. Asian organized crime activity in Montreal is controlled by Vietnamese or ethnic Chinese born in Vietnam. East European-based organized crime groups first appeared in Toronto in the mid-1990s. Since that time, Canada has experienced a proliferation of criminal gangs originating from the former

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Soviet Union and the former communist states in Eastern Europe. Russian gangs are present in every part of Canada. The East European-based organized crime groups have forged alliances with other major organized crime groups in Canada, are transnational in nature, and are most active in Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, and Halifax. Toronto in particular seems to be an integral center for criminal gangs from the former Soviet Union. East European-based organized crime groups are most prominently involved in prostitution, tobacco and weapons smuggling, immigration fraud, the importation of illegal drugs, the theft of vehicles for export, gas tax fraud, and money laundering. Internet scams such as credit card skimming, e-commerce site hacking, and fraudulent credit card purchases are also common. The presence of Russian-based organized crime in Canada has produced significant damage in the country’s financial sector. The establishment of shell companies and money laundering in order to move capital out of Eastern Europe increased significantly in 1998. Italian organized criminals in Canada are associated with one of three organizations: the Sicilian Mafia, the ’Ndrangheta, or the American Cosa Nostra. The Sicilian Mafia is considered to be the most powerful of the three and maintains ties to other Sicilian clans in Canada, the United States, Venezuela, and Italy. The main Sicilian organization is the Caruana/Cuntrera family. The three major Italian-based organized crime groups participate in joint ventures with all the major criminal entities in Canada, including Asian and East European-based gangs, outlaw motorcycle gangs, South American groups, and domestic criminal organizations. The Italian-based crime gangs are most prominently involved in drug trafficking, illegal gaming (sport betting, video lottery terminals, and backroom casinos), extortion, loan-sharking, and money laundering. Criminal organizations flourish in certain Canadian aboriginal communities, especially on the U.S.-Canadian border where the smuggling of liquor, tobacco, and firearms is prevalent. In September 1997 the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples seized machine guns and semiautomatic

weapons from a reservation that was part of a black market operation that sold firearms, explosives, drugs, cigarettes, and alcohol. Violence and political unrest on the reservations is an ongoing problem. Aboriginal street gangs in the provinces of western Canada are growing and are developing alliances with other organized crime groups. The most powerful aboriginal street gang, the Manitoba Warriors, is involved in drug trafficking and prostitution. Canadian authorities believe that aboriginal groups will continue to consolidate their control of prostitution and illicit drugs in urban centers such as Winnipeg. Since 1996, when Canadian authorities estimated that the country hosted thirty-six outlaw motorcycle gangs with some 1,200 members, the number of chapters has increased dramatically. Outlaw motorcycle gangs are involved in money laundering, murder, theft, counterfeiting, loansharking, extortion, prostitution, strip clubs, the illegal sale of alcohol, and the traffic in illegal firearms, stolen goods, alcohol, and cigarettes. The Hells Angels is the largest and most powerful of the motorcycle clubs. The expansion of Hells Angels chapters throughout Canada has been significant. The 2001 Annual Report from the Organized Crime Agency of British Columbia observed that Canada had a total of thirty Hells Angels chapters (up from just eleven in 1996) with some 500 members. Canadian law enforcement officials and intelligence gatherers have noted that outlaw motorcycle gangs commonly forge alliances with other biker gangs and organized crime groups, especially Asian and Italian-based syndicates. A biker war between the Hells Angels and the Rock Machine that began in 1994 has resulted in more than 100 homicides, 124 murder attempts, 9 missing persons, 84 bombings, and 130 incidents of arson. Despite some law enforcement successes, outlaw motorcycle gangs in Canada are expected to continue their expansion. References Albanese, Jay. Organized Crime in America. 3rd ed. Cincinnati: Anderson, 1996. Beare, M. E. Criminal Conspiracies: Organized Crime in America. Toronto: Nelson, 1996. 141

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Criminal Intelligence Service Canada. “2003 Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada,” http:// www.cisc.gc.ca/. ———. “2004 Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada,” http://www.cisc.gc.ca/. ———. “2005 Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada,” http://www.cisc.gc.ca/. Godson, Roy, ed. “International Crime Threat Assessment.” Trends in Organized Crime 5(4) (2000): 32–144. Lyman, Michael D., and Gary W. Potter. Organized Crime. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997. Organized Crime/Drug Branch, Criminal Investigative Division. An Introduction to Organized Crime in the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.

Arms and Drug Trafficking: The Case of North Korea MiRang Park It is not a new issue that North Korea has been involved in international drug dealing. In the 1990s, North Korea’s economic output fell by more than 50 percent, and in 1999 the country had one of the lowest gross domestic products in the world. In a country that is economically and politically isolated from the rest of the world, drug dealing seems to be more dangerous because of the possibility that statesponsored drug trafficking by North Korean officials may serve as a desperate attempt to pursue financial gain as well as international political power vis-à-vis state support. In addition, the fact that key governmental officials, including a diplomatic officer and an army officer, have been implicated in drug dealing has drawn international attention. Historical View of Drug Dealing Historically, because drugs threaten people’s mental and physical health through narcotics addiction, drugs have been used as a means of economic expansion and a war weapon against an adversarial country. Also, narcotics addiction has led to economic distress and corruption in society. Examples such as the Opium Wars between China and England in the 1700s can be found throughout history.

Historical View of Drug Dealing in North Korea In the early 1970s, North Korea purchased opium from Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, and Lebanon. North Korea tried to promote the merchant trade that smuggled drugs into third world countries. From the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, North Korea began opium poppy cultivation in the northern province of Hamkyong-do and in the mountainous regions, producing and smuggling the cultivated opium in a state-sponsored operation. As a result of the collapse of the East European bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the exportation of arms began to decline, and financial difficulties became much more of a burden. North Korea has subsequently selected to enlarge its international drug smuggling operations by increasing the area of cultivation with the blessing of its government. In the early 1990s, Jong-Il Kim christened the project of cultivating the poppy as White-Bellflower and started concentrating a national effort to cultivate drugs and export opium mainly to bring in foreign currency. White-Bellflower is directed by Kim and accomplished with Division 39, a largely unpublicized trading network and slush fund that was set up during the mid-1970s to fund Kim’s political career. In recent years, North Korea has strengthened its smuggling apparatus by associating with the Yakuza in Japan, the Triad in China, and the Mafia in Russia. According to William Bach, director of the Office of Asia, Africa, and Europe, “Since 1976 there have been at least 50 arrests and drug seizures involving North Koreans in more than 20 countries around the world.” Drug Market in North Korea North Korea has produced and sold many types of drugs, including opium, cocaine, and Philopon (methamphetamine), although the output of opium is especially huge. According to the U.S. Department of State, it is presumed that North Korea cultivates the poppy on 4,200–7,000 hectares and produces 30–40 tons of raw opium per year. Also, the Department of State believes that North Korea has expanded the cultivation area and increased opium production. The total area was expanded to 7,000 hectares in 1995, and opium productivity has

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Arms and Drug Trafficking: The Case of North Korea

Policemen stand guard at a check point in Niigata port, Japan, on August 24, 2003, one day before the arrival of the North Korean ship Man Gyong Bong-92. Some 1,500 police officers were mobilized to greet the ship amid protests as the ship is suspected of smuggling drugs and missile parts. (AFP/Getty Images)

increased from three tons in 1992 to thirty tons in 1993, forty tons in 1995, and more than fifty tons in 1998. In recent times, Philopon production, which is easy to produce and has a high profit margin, has decreased. Also, we could infer the market size of North Korea through a comparison with the total official amount of export and the amount by international drug smuggling. N. Green argues that the amount of export by international drug smuggling in 2001 exceeded the official total amount of exports of North Korea in that same year. North Korea has carried out on a national scale the production and illicit sales of drugs through governmental officials such as diplomats and businessmen stationed overseas in order to address the

country’s severe food shortage since the latter 1970s. The suspicion that North Korea has been involved in drug dealing under government direction has been exemplified in the following cases. During 2003, there was one major heroin trafficking incident linked to North Korea. The 4,000-ton trader Pong Su, a vessel owned by a North Korean enterprise, was seized by Australian Federal Police (AFP) and other Australian security forces in midApril after apparently delivering 125 kilograms of heroin to criminals at an isolated beach near Lorne, Australia. Another incident with a North Korean connection occurred in June 2003 in Pusan, South Korea, where customs authorities seized 50 kilograms of methamphetamine from a Chinese vessel 143

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that had stopped at the port of Najin, North Korea, before arriving in Pusan. According to a 2004 report by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the Pong Su seizure and numerous drug smuggling incidents linked to North Korea over the past several decades may “reflect official involvement in the trafficking of illicit narcotics for profit, and make it highly likely, but not certain, that Pyongyang is trading narcotic drugs for profit as state policy.” In another instance, which occurred in July 2002, Taiwanese police seized and searched a Taiwanese ship and found 79 kilograms of heroin. It was soon revealed that the ship transported heroin to the sea area of North Korea. Among those who dealt secretly in drugs was a naval officer, ranked as a brigade commander. In this case the North Korean military’s complicity in drug smuggling was exposed. Also, in February of the previous year, two North Korean diplomats were caught entering Russia with 70 kilograms of cocaine, and an official of the North Korean Consulate General in China was arrested by Chinese security police for attempting to sell 9 kilograms of opium with the help of certain Korean Chinese residents. In February 2000, Japanese police arrested a North Korean trader because he smuggled methamphetamine, the source of Philopon, into the country. The amount of methamphetamine seized was 250 kilograms. It was the largest amount confiscated since Japan has supervised international drug crime. There are numerous additional cases of North Korean government officials’ involvement in drug dealing, including diplomatic as well as military officials. In October 1998, a councilor of an embassy of North Korea was arrested in Berlin, Germany, for carrying heroin produced in North Korea. In July of the same year, two North Korean diplomatic officials were arrested for carrying Rohypnol, a benzodiazepine, in Egypt. Also in January 1998, seven councilors of an embassy of North Korea conspired and tried to smuggle 35 kilograms of cocaine into Russia. As seen in the above drug smuggling cases, key governmental officials residing in foreign countries served as middlemen by providing a link between the production and sale of illicit drugs, tempted easily toward individual and national profit.

As stated previously, because the only means to lift North Korea’s economic circumstances are weapons exportation and drug trafficking, it is natural that a symbiotic relationship between the military and drugs would exist. However, it is hard to quantify the nature of this relationship. The only clue to understanding the military’s role is assumptions set forth as a result of investigations conducted by the U.S. government. A Use of Expenditure North Korea began with a small-scale drug market that gnawed at the previously established drug market in the Golden Triangle area (i.e., the borderland of Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand). As a means to earn foreign currency by the government in the late 1970s and as a means to overcome financial difficulties and the severe difficulties of obtaining food due to the collapse of East European socialism in the late 1980s, the North Korean government rushed into the drug business in earnest. Also, because the government failed to find alternatives to solve its financial difficulties in the middle of the 1990s, abandoning the temptation of the highly profitable drug market became increasingly difficult. Moreover, from the late 1990s, it is alleged that Kim has used drug money for operating expenses for the Labor Party, clandestine operations against South Korea, operating expenses for weapons and technology, expenses of diplomatic officers in foreign countries, and terror support. Given North Korea’s dire economic circumstances, it is difficult to determine if drug dealing and arms smuggling can be reduced or eliminated in the immediate future. References Akers, Ronald. Drugs, Alcohol, and Society: Social Structure, Process and Policy. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1991. Abadinsky, Howard. Drugs: An Introduction. 4th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Thomson, 1997. Anon. “Australia Links Heroin Triad to North Korea.” Criminal Justice Periodicals 10(11) (2004): 3. Green, N. “Asia-Pacific: Dealing Drugs.” Harvard International Review 26(1) (2004): 3. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law

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Drug Trafficking in Northern Ireland

Enforcement Affairs. “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2003,” 1 March 2004, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/. Kwon, J. H., and D. J. Kwak. “Tens of Thousands of Drug Addicts in Pyongyang.” Daily NK, 19 August 2005, http://www.dailynk.com/english/ read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=255. Lee, Jaeseung. Production of Drugs in North Korea. Naegok-dong, Seoul: National Intelligence Service, Republic of Korea, 2000. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. Testimony of William Bach, Director, Office of Asia, Africa, and Europe, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, before the Financial Management, Budget, and International Security Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 20 May 2003, Washington, D.C. Solomon, Jay. “In North Korea, Secret Cash Hoard Props up Regime.” Wall Street Journal, 14 July 2003. Spaeth, Anthony. “Kim’s Rackets.” Time, 2 June 2003, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,455850,00.html.

Drug Trafficking in Northern Ireland Matthew H. Callahan Introduction Unlike the rest of Great Britain, Northern Ireland did not suffer from a discernable drug problem or harbor a thriving drug culture until the arrival of ecstasy in large quantities in the 1990s. Since that time, the frequency of drug use in Northern Ireland has increased, forcing legislation concerning the classification of drugs as well as increased penalties for possession and distribution. Northern Ireland’s unique political climate and static social norms created by a conservative Catholic Church have spared the citizens much of the more dangerous Class A drug abuse seen in other parts of the United Kingdom. The sectarian politics that shaped Northern Ireland’s culture also created the paramilitary terrorist organizations that until recently waged a constant war of differing political ideologies against one another. With the peace process bringing the disarming of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) as well as cease-fires by its Unionist counterparts—

the Ulster Defense Association, the Ulster Volunteer Force, and the more radical splinter group the Loyalist Volunteer Force—the threat of terrorist violence in Northern Ireland exists to a lesser degree than in years past. These terrorist organizations, however, are amorphous entities, and the fund-raising and political rallies that had sustained their budgets in the past are now being replaced with organized criminal activities. Truly, all the paramilitary organizations are involved in organized crime to differing degrees, but according to the investigations of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), all are involved in some form of organized criminality not related to their politically motivated terrorism. A 2001 study of organized criminal threats in Northern Ireland notes that of the seventy-eight individual criminal gangs known to operate in Northern Ireland, forty-three have links to either Republican or Loyalist paramilitary organizations. Of that number, more than twothirds of these gangs are involved in dealing narcotics. Given this degree of interconnection, a study of drug trafficking and narcotics sales in Northern Ireland invariably deals with the expansion of paramilitary groups into organized crime. With more than half of the known gangs operating in Northern Ireland maintaining some sort of ties to the paramilitary terrorist organizations, it is not surprising that the PSNI has focused a large amount of its antidrug policing on the larger terrorist groups. While all the paramilitary organizations publicly support an antidrug message, they all supplement their incomes through the sale of narcotics on some level. The PSNI has found that of the two overarching groups, it is the Loyalist terrorist groups that have more ties with the drug trade than do their Republican counterparts. From these investigative findings, it seems that both groups are not involved in large-scale international drug trafficking and sales. PSNI interviews on the street level confirm this and show that a local distributor may in fact be Irish and working for or through one of the paramilitary organizations and that his supply of drugs came from a criminal organization not specifically tied to either Ireland or their native terrorist groups. These Irish terrorist groups, both Loyalist and Republican, are involved in the street145

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level sale of drugs such as cocaine, heroin, ecstasy, and cannabis. The paramilitary organizations are using their arms and revolutionary political connections to import drugs from other criminal organizations, mainly in Eastern Europe, via Spain and the Netherlands. Drugs are also smuggled through Great Britain and over the common border with the Republic of Ireland, which has more than 300 crossing points. Republican Paramilitary Organizations and Drug Trafficking The PIRA, founded in 1969, is the largest and bestfunded Republican paramilitary terrorist organization and operates in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The PIRA has been involved in and has loosely observed a cease-fire since the mid-1990s and recently has put its arms beyond use. Publicly, it is staunchly antidrug, leading and funding community-based initiatives. In addition to this public message, several known drug offenders, both users and dealers, have been targeted over the years by PIRA punishment squads and as a result have been severely injured or killed for dealing drugs and exhibiting other antisocial behavior in neighborhoods that the PIRA claims to protect. The criminal aspects of the PIRA are mainly involved in robberies (the PIRA was responsible for the £26 million bank robbery in Belfast in 2006) as well as cigarette and fuel smuggling across the Republic of Ireland border. In an effort to both observe the cease-fire and still police the neighborhoods it wished to control, the PIRA created the cover group Direct Action Against Drugs (DAAD) in 1995. While not involved in the sale of drugs, DAAD did have an impact on the drug trade in Northern Ireland in the mid-1990s. After Easter 1995, the cover group killed drug dealer Micky Mooney in Belfast, and in September of that year another alleged drug dealer was killed. Between December 1995 and January 1996, DAAD killed five more drug dealers. Because most of the drug dealers killed by this group were considered small time by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC, precursor to the PSNI) and because PIRA involvement in narcotic sales was not unheard of, most of those in Northern Ire-

land law enforcement were led to believe that these killings of drug dealers around Belfast were not acts of vigilante justice but rather of the PIRA removing small-time dealers who either opposed the group or refused to pay their protections fees. The Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), founded in 1986, and the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), founded in 1997, are both splinter groups of the PIRA. Neither observe the ceasefires of their progenitor or engage meaningfully in the peace process. Because of both groups’ dissatisfaction with PIRA leadership and direction, the CIRA and the RIRA are extremely political minded, preferring to remain active terrorists. Because of their smaller sizes, these two groups are involved in organized crime and drug trafficking to a much lesser extent than other Republican paramilitary groups. There is some evidence to link the RIRA with overseas drug trafficking, although this is limited. Still, both groups maintain small protection rackets that do include franchising urban areas to drug dealers in order for them to operate. The Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), founded in 1975, and the Irish Peoples’ Liberation Organization (IPLO), founded in 1986, represent the most heavily involved Republican paramilitary groups in organized crime, specifically drug trafficking. The IPLO was a splinter group of the INLA and was founded after an internal feud. The IPLO immediately began attacking the INLA membership. Belying its organized crime connections, the IPLO was at one time led by Gerald Steenson, a Belfast underworld figure. In 1992, the PIRA attacked and effectively eliminated the IPLO in a series of punishment shootings, reportedly because of drug trafficking, killing one member and wounding dozens of others. The INLA is still active in criminal enterprises and is heavily involved in the drug trade in Northern Ireland. Loyalist Paramilitary Organizations and Drug Trafficking The Ulster Defense Association (UDA), founded in 1971, is the oldest and largest of the Loyalist paramilitary organizations. The UDA controls much of the organized crime in the Loyalist areas of Ulster.

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An Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) color guard flanks the coffin of slain leader Gino Gallagher at Belfast, Northern Ireland on February 1, 1996. The INLA has been rife with internal violence and is reputed to be deeply involved in the drug trade. (Bian Little/AP/Wide World)

Its protection rackets have existed nearly as long as the organization itself. It is deeply involved in drug trafficking from the street level to wholesale purchase, and its leadership (notably Johnny “Mad Dog” Adair and Jim “Doris Day” Gray), called Brigadiers, live lavish criminal lifestyles off these illegal profits. The UDA has been involved in a series of feuds with the other Loyalist paramilitary organizations in addition to its terrorist activities against the Republicans. The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), whose present incarnation was founded in 1966, and the Red Hand Commandos (RHC), founded in 1972, have fewer members than the UDA (particularly in the case of the RHC, which only has perhaps a dozen members). The UVF and the ultramilitant RHC splinter faction still make a considerable impact on crime in Northern Ireland. Both of these organizations are heavily involved in crime, and most of their criminal income comes from the trafficking of narcotics in the Ulster region. An event illustrating the divisiveness of this organization occurred in early 2005. Mark Haddock, a leading UVF figure, was shot by members of his own organization in an

attempt to silence him. Haddock had recently been named as a participant in the 1997 murder of Raymond McCord. McCord was allegedly a drug courier for Haddock and the UVF and was murdered to prevent knowledge of the drug trafficking from surfacing. The Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), founded in 1996, is a Loyalist paramilitary groups and is perhaps the most heavily involved in organized crime and drug trafficking. It has been linked to two large drug seizures. In 2003 one of the largest seizures of drugs in Northern Ireland captured £2–3.5 million of LVF ecstasy and cannabis ready for distribution. The second seizure occurred in 2005, also of ecstasy and cannabis, where £125,000 was taken in Holywood. The LVF had a long-standing feud with its parent organization, the UVF. Among the reasons for this were conflicting interests in the Ulster drug trade and a number of attacks and murders that took place during 2004–2005, with the LVF getting the worst of it. In response to this, the LVF publicly abandoned its political goals and now devotes its resources wholly in the drug trade and other aspects of organized crime. 147

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Conclusions Aside from the feuding paramilitary organizations, other smaller criminal units do operate within Northern Ireland. Of these organizations, some do traffic narcotics, although none disburse them on the level of the larger paramilitary groups or the organizations directly under their protection. This level of cooperation presents difficulties for law enforcement, as even supposed enemy organizations have been known to put aside political differences when profits can be made. Catholic, and supposedly Republican, drug dealers make protection payments to Loyalist organizations in order to operate. In at least one case, the Independent Monitoring Commission found that a Loyalist group was paying another Loyalist organization £250 per week in order to trade drugs in its territory. This type of cooperation presents difficulties not only for local law enforcement but also for international law enforcement agencies. In 2002, three PIRA members were arrested in Colombia on weapons charges. The subsequent investigation turned up trade links between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the PIRA. The PIRA would train members of FARC in certain types of weapons (notably mortars) and in exchange was paid in cash or narcotics (the main income of FARC is from narcotic sales). In continental Europe, other trade links between the PIRA and the Spanish Basque Fatherland and Liberty Association (ETA) were identified in turn. There, narcotics were used again as currency, with the PIRA not necessarily distributing them. Instead, the PIRA traded expertise and training to the ETA for narcotics and in turn traded narcotics to criminal groups in the Balkan region for arms. Corrupt Croatian military figures in particular facilitate this Balkan link of narcotics and weapons trades. While investigators point out that narcotics and arms sales can occur separate from each other, the climates and conditions that allow one promote the other. Although Ireland’s drug culture may be a more recent phenomenon than the existing cultures in the United States or Great Britain, the involvement of highly motivated and organized paramilitary groups makes the trafficking, sale, and use of narcotics an exponentially more complicated issue.

The Independent Monitoring Commission notes that organized crime in Northern Ireland is a serious issue given the extent of paramilitary involvement, and the number of task forces and organizations in the region designed to combat drug trafficking and organized crime shows that the respective governments of the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom understand this. The Organized Crime Task Force and agencies such as the Asset Recovery Agency and Criminal Assets Board combine efforts to locate and seize the paramilitary organizations’ illegal wealth. References Curtis, Glenn E., and Tara Karacan. “The Nexus among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapon Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe.” Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, December 2002. Coogan, Tim Pat. The IRA. New York: Palgrave, 2002. English, Richard. Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. “The Illegal Drugs Trade and Drug Culture in Northern Ireland: Interim Report on Cannabis.” House of Commons, Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, 6th Report of Session 2002–2003, Vol. 1. “Independent Monitoring Commission Reports,” Nos. 1–7, April 2004–October 2005. “Irish Terrorists Not Linked to International Drug Trafficking.” United States General Accounting Office, Office of Special Investigations, GAO/05100-18R, September 2000. Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ireland.

The International Arm of Russian Organized Crime: Russian Mafiya Kelly Hignett Introduction The emergence of the Russian Mafiya has been recognized as the major development in transnational organized crime in recent years and has added a new dimension to global crime in the last decade. Since establishing themselves as a major force in the international criminal hierarchy, the

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Russian Mafiya has shown a particular ability and willingness to operate outside its home territory. The phrase “Russian organized crime” is generally used to refer to criminal groups from all territories of the former Soviet Union, encompassing criminal gangs originating from territories such as Armenia, Belarus, Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine in addition to Russia itself. International Reach Current evidence suggests that Russian criminal organizations have formed extensive links with criminal organizations based outside of Russia in Europe, North and South America, the Middle and Far East, and North Africa. Russian-based criminal organizations are known to be involved in criminal activities with many of the major international crime groups, including Chinese Triads, Colombian drug cartels, the Sicilian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza, and Turkish drug traffickers. According to intelligence sources, these alliances have become a major feature in the development of transnational organized crime in the past few years. Latest intelligence suggests that 200–300 Russian Mafiya groupings, of varying size, are actively operating in almost seventy countries across both the Western and Eastern Hemispheres, and many Russian godfathers are known to have established a permanent base abroad. Russian organized crime groups are involved in a broad range of activities across the full criminal spectrum. With a clear involvement in traditional criminal activities (e.g., drug smuggling, extortion, and prostitution), they are also actively engaged in a wide range of legal or semi-legal businesses that often act as a cover to launder the proceeds from their illicit activities. The increasingly transnational nature of Russian-based organized crime means that many Russian criminals have now invested in businesses and properties outside of Russia, and this has provided further opportunities for these criminals to expand their influence outside of their home territories. After the collapse of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russianbased criminal organizations were quick to expand their operations outside of the domestic market. In

some cases Russian criminals used the traditionally favored method of territorial expansion, that of targeting and infiltrating Russian émigré communities, and this provided a secure base to establish connections. However, much of the initial Mafiya expansion also focused around those countries or regions where Russian criminals had previously established contacts (for example, in Eastern Europe, where the Red Army had been stationed during the Cold War, providing a preliminary contact base). In other cases where this was not possible, Russian gangs took over markets by force, leading to violent turf wars between rival criminal gangs. Russian organized gangs are still known for their ability to use violence to establish control today. However, since their initial expansion in the mid1990s, evidence suggests that in many cases Russian gangs have moved away from using violence as a first resort in favor of establishing cooperative alliances with rival gangs on a strategic basis. The result of this change in tactics was a further expansion in Russian Mafiya influence as transnational links strengthened and new markets opened up, providing Russian organized crime with new opportunities on a global scale. As Russian criminals have been able to buy into foreign properties and businesses in recent years, this has encouraged the further building of networks with criminal gangs in these states and has enabled the Russian Mafiya to cast its net even farther afield. Russian Mafiya expansion into the states of Central Asia opened up the possibility of extending networks into the Asian market, through the Caucasus, and into the extensive drug markets in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey. From the early 1990s, Russian Mafiya groups began establishing alliances with Chinese Triads, although many Chinese gangs were wary of forming close working relations with Russian criminals. Russian Mafiya influence in Eastern Europe provided these gangs with a gateway into Western Europe and the European Union (EU) member states, and there has been evidence of Russian criminal activity on some level in almost all European countries since the mid-1990s. Russian gangs have also established a clear presence in the 149

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United States and Canada, and evidence suggests that in recent years the Russian Mafiya influence in Latin America and the Caribbean has increased. The extensive international reach of Russian organized crime today can be clearly illustrated by the wealth and influence of the Solntsevskaya group. Originally based in the Moscow suburb of Solntsevo, the Solntsevskaya network is today believed to incorporate more than 5,000 members who are engaged in worldwide operations spanning four continents, and the network is widely regarded as the most powerful criminal organization originating in the former Soviet Union in terms of its wealth and influence. Principal activities of gang members include working in drug production, smuggling, and distribution; the illegal trafficking of antiques, arms, and cars; illegal trading in oil; prostitution; extortion; fraud; economic crime; and money laundering. The Solntsevskaya gang is known to be involved in the transit of South American cocaine into Europe and North America and is believed to have established strong links with drug cartels in Latin America and with a variety of criminal organizations operating across Europe. Russian Mafiya Groups in the United States The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) believes that there are 5,000–6,000 criminals from the former Soviet Union active in the United States today, and clear evidence of Russian crime operations has been uncovered in fourteen U.S. states. Recent FBI reports have identified almost twenty Russian crime groups operating in the United States, the activities of which are believed to center primarily around such major U.S. cities as San Francisco, Los Angeles, Miami, Chicago, and New York City. The Brighton Beach area of New York has long been a focus point for U.S. law enforcement efforts against organized crime, as the district contains one of the oldest and most prominent Russian émigré communities in the United States. The extent and activities of Russian crime in this area has been well documented, and in 1992 the Tri-State Joint Soviet Émigré Organised Crime Project was founded to identify the extent of Russian organized crime in the regions of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The best-known organization operating in

the Brighton Beach area was the Odessa group under the leadership of Evsei Agron, a Soviet émigré who extorted tens of thousands of dollars from the Russian communities of Brighton Beach before being shot outside his apartment. U.S. law enforcement officials have also uncovered a clear working relationship between Russian and Italian criminals in the United States, and Russian Mafiya groups based in the United States have formed alliances with Colombian drug cartels since the early 1990s. Many Russian gangs involved in the drug trade have an operating base in Miami, which provides a convenient gateway between Mexico and the United States. The FBI has even uncovered plans by Russian groups operating in America to use a Russian submarine to smuggle cocaine from Colombia to the United States. As criminals from the former Soviet Union become more assimilated into American society, they are investing in legitimate businesses, but in many cases these businesses act as a front for money laundering operations. U.S. banking and financial institutions have also been infiltrated by Russian organized crime, as illustrated by the financial scandal in 1998–1999 that involved connections between Russian criminals and $10 billion laundered through the Bank of New York. The United States considers the expansion of Russian organized crime to be a direct threat, and in recent years the U.S. government and law enforcement have offered international assistance to other states in preventing and controlling the influence held by Russian gangs. In recent years, several high-profile Russians suspected of leading and participating in criminal organizations have been arrested in the United States or barred entry into America altogether. Strategic Alliances in Europe Russian and European Organized crime groups have also created a variety of strategic alliances and transnational networks. There has been evidence of Russian criminal activity on some level in almost all European countries since the mid-1990s. Russian gangs are known to have established particularly close working relations with criminal organizations in the Balkan region (particularly Albania), Greece,

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Germany, Italy, and Poland. It has been estimated that Russian criminals are responsible for up to one-third of the total crime committed in Germany. Both Cyprus and Switzerland are popular destinations for illicit cash and money laundering. More than 2,000 Russian companies are operating in Cyprus, and it is estimated that Russian criminals have now replaced Colombian cartels as the major criminal users of Swiss bank accounts. London is also a popular destination for Russian criminals to launder money and purchase property. Many Russian gangs are keen to establish a presence in the EU and have been targeting member states and states seeking EU membership with this end in sight. Recently, much attention has been devoted to Russian Mafiya activities in Central and Eastern Europe. Law enforcement and intelligence have recorded a Russian criminal presence in the region from the early 1990s, immediately following the collapse of communism in the region in 1989. By the late 1990s, even Russian officials were publicly accepting that many Central and Eastern European states were acting as a headquarters for Russian organized crime. Following extensive gang warfare in Russia in the 1990s, many criminals fled to Eastern Europe, where their Soviet-era contacts made it easy for them to establish bases in cities such as Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw. The establishment of a Russian presence in Eastern Europe also provided these criminals with a gateway to Western Europe and the European Union. Russian gangs involved in drug smuggling have forged alliances with their Turkish counterparts, and the popular Balkan Routes for drug trafficking through Eastern Europe, into Western Europe, and on to the United States. Conversely, Russian gangs are also involved in smuggling stolen cars from Western Europe that are then transported eastward. Many are bought and sold in Russia itself, while others travel on into Central Asia. Operations in Asia In recent years, Russia has also increased in importance as a channel for illicit drugs from Central Asia and the East, and this is another significant element of Russian participation in international

organized crime. Drugs are trafficked from the Golden Crescent (Iran, Pakistan, and particularly Afghanistan) and the Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, and Thailand). The latest available intelligence suggests that more than 1,500 drug trafficking gangs are working inside and outside Russia, with Russian groups acting actively as buyers and providers in the drug market both inside and outside Russian territory. Trade routes pass through Russia and continue on into Europe and even to North America. There is further evidence of Russian organized crime extending the scope of its activities into Asia to include large-scale fraud, gambling, and prostitution. There are at least 5,000 Russian prostitutes operating in Thailand alone, many of whom arrive through networks controlled by Russian gangs, and evidence suggests that some Russian gangs have established a presence in Vietnam and Sri Lanka. Many Russian gangs also operate in alliance with Chinese criminals, with people trafficking and illegal immigration as popular collaborative activities. Many Russian criminals have also targeted Israel, with Russian crime estimated to have invested around $4 billion in the Israeli economy and more than thirty suspected Russian criminals under surveillance by the Israeli police. The Caribbean and Latin America More recent evidence suggests the increased establishment of Russian criminal groups in the Caribbean, often working in cooperation with drug cartels based in Central and South America. Interpol reports suggest that Russian criminals in Latin America and the Caribbean have become involved in drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and money laundering, often forming working alliances with indigenous gangs. According to the FBI, the Russian Mafiya has opened a number of front companies and set up an increasing number of banks in Caribbean offshore centers in order to launder the proceeds from these illegal activities, which amounts to millions of dollars. The lack of transparency and inefficient monitoring of the banking systems of many Latin American and Caribbean states has left them particularly vulnerable to penetration by Russian money launderers, and the 151

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dubious practice of a number of the smaller states in the region of selling citizenship has further enabled Russian crime groups to establish themselves in the region. In addition, weak political infrastructure and a culture of corruption in many Latin American states provided a comfortable environment in which to establish operations for criminals who had flourished during similar conditions in the Soviet Union. A variety of reports since the mid-1990s have been concerned with growing Russian organized crime involvement in other Latin American states such as Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Chile. Russian criminals also have an active presence in Mexico that enables them to directly control the smuggling of drugs across the border into the United States. A variety of Russian gangs are involved in a wide range of illegal activities in Mexico, including trafficking in drugs, arms, and people; prostitution; kidnapping; fraud; and money laundering. In addition, many Russian criminals are operating to provide domestic criminal and guerrilla groups with illegal arms, which threatens economic growth and regional stability. Conclusion Today, the threat posed by the increasing reach of Russian organized crime is recognized by the international community, and many states today are taking this threat very seriously. Although Russian organized crime has clearly established a presence outside of the Russian borders, its international contacts and strategic alliances do not signal the emergence of a vast, centrally directed Russian criminal empire. Many Russian international criminal networks appear to be alliances of convenience operating on a short-term cooperative basis, although this does not lessen the potential threat they pose. The increasing internationalization of Russian organized crime is reflective of the general increase in transnational alliances between criminal gangs and the globalization of criminal markets. References Finkenauer, James. “Russian Organized Crime in the United States.” American-Russian Law Institute, http://russianlaw.org/roc_us.htm.

Finckenauer, James, and Elin Waring. Russian Mafia in America. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998. Galeotti, M. “The Russian ‘Mafiya’: Consolidation and Globalisation.” Global Crime 6(1) (February 2004): 54–69. ———, ed. Russian and Post-Soviet Organized Crime. Aldershot, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2002. “The Rise and Rise of the Russian Mafia.” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special _report/1998/03/98/russian_mafia/70095.stm. Rosner, Lydia S. “The Sexy Russian Mafiya.” Pp. 28– 32 in Russian and Post-Soviet Organized Crime, edited by M. Galeotti. Aldershot, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2002.

Organized Crime in South America Robert Hanser and Debra R. Robinson The structure of organized crime in South America functions along a transnational framework. This transnational aspect permits those countries engaging in various forms of criminal enterprise to transcend national borders and elude government control. Enabled by governmental and socioeconomic instability, organized criminal activity continues to proliferate and infiltrate other nations in the surrounding locale at a disturbing rate. Corruption and violence are common occurrences and serve as significant impediments to legalistic and judicial intervention in South American countries such as Venezuela, Colombia, and Chile. The complex networks integral to present-day organized criminal enterprises facilitate global access for their rapidly expanding illicit activities. As B. Stanislawski and M. Hermann note, these criminal organizations have evolved from past hierarchal structures with “a small cadre of leaders at the top” to more diverse network based groups “whose functions and activities are more dispersed.” The criminal activities cover a wide range of activities including arms trading, drug trafficking, money laundering, fraud, extortion, smuggling, multinational auto theft, bank fraud, counterfeiting, murder, bribery, and corruption. These activities allow organizations to amass enormous wealth and international power. South American orga-

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nized crime groups also engage in collaborative partnerships (such as that observed between Colombian cartels and Russian criminal organizations) to facilitate the fluidity and continuity of their respective illegal enterprises. The Institute for National Strategic Studies cited in its 1999 report that due to the enormous wealth and influence of some of these groups, such as those in Colombia, they are considered “a state within a state.” A highly lucrative global drug trade presents a significant contributing factor to the wealth and international influence exercised by crime cartels in these countries. Although a number of the prominent leaders have been removed by imprisonment, extradition to the United States, or death, their absence has failed to significantly impact the global drug market. The vast and expansive nature of the international crime network ensures the continued production, trafficking, and selling of illegal narcotics. Colombia Those countries having the highest levels of organized criminal activity in South America are Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, and Argentina. Control of the cocaine industry has historically been dominated by drug cartels in Colombia. Organized criminal groups operating out of Colombia have access to the most high-level communications technology and are also outfitted with radarequipped aircrafts, munitions, and numerous workers who oversee the entire trafficking process from the cultivation to the international transporting of the contraband. According to a report in the Schaffer Library of Drug Policy, they are the “largest, wealthiest, most sophisticated organizations” engaged in cocaine trafficking. Since the 1970s, Colombia has served as the home base for some of the most notoriously violent and intricately organized criminal enterprises in the world. What began as small indiscriminate cocaine smuggling operations grew into an international drug trafficking empire. Because of the astounding profits, the mid-1970s saw the formation and rise of the Medellin cartel. The Ochoa brothers (Fabio, Jorge Luis, and Juan David), Jose Gacha, and Pablo Escobar were the masterminds

behind the criminal enterprise and led the Medellin cartel to become the premier drug trafficking outfit to originate out of Colombia. Escobar was an extremely violent and power-hungry individual and, according to a PBS Frontline report, is reputed to be culpable in the murders of “hundreds of government officials, police, prosecutors, judges, journalists and innocent bystanders.” Fierce power struggles between the Colombian government and the Medellin cartel resulted in the subsequent dismantling of the group. Gacha fell prey to the Colombian police, and the Ochoa brothers surrendered in the 1990s in exchange for lenient sentences. Escobar was eventually slain by Colombian police after many lengthy clashes. Following the dismantling of the Medellin cartel, the Cali cartel rose to prominence and power. Covert machinations by the Cali cartel are reputed to have contributed to the eventual downfall of the Medellin cartel. The Cali group drew its sights on Escobar, secretly providing the Colombian police and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) with information concerning his whereabouts and criminal activities. The cartel also formed People Against Pablo Escobar (PEPES) and beleaguered his homes, businesses, and lieutenants in his organization. During this time, the Cali cartel was also gaining a more secure foothold in the cocaine smuggling business. They employed terrorist techniques utilizing cells in the hiring of employees, made use of sophisticated communications equipment, and engaged the services of internationally recognized lawyers to monitor the movements of the DEA and U.S. prosecutors. This group also exercised significant political clout secured through the bribing and campaign financing of top Colombian government officials. However, during the mid-1990s, leaders of the Cali cartel were arrested and sentenced to prison terms ranging from ten to fifteen years. It is thought that they may have received sentencing deals similar to that of the Ochoa brothers. Also, the DEA believes that these members continue to engage in criminal enterprises from their prison cells. The dismantling of these two major crime alliances has resulted in the formation of smaller 153

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Hermilda de Escobar (second from right), mother of Medellin drug cartel kingpin Pablo Escobar (portrait) walks with friends and relatives to Escobar’s tomb on December 2, 1994, to celebrate the first anniversary of his death. Escobar was killed in a shootout with Colombian police in Medellin. (AFP/Getty Images)

and more fragmented criminal groups, allowing for greater control and networking potential. According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, these organizations frequently employ the services of guerrilla groups such as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) that aid the drug smuggling process by “supplanting themselves as the middlemen between the farmers and the cocaine processing labs owned by the cartel bosses.” FARC also exercises a significant amount of territorial control in Colombia. This territory was initially obtained under the guise of utilizing it for the formation of a demilitarized zone, but it has instead been used for cultivating narcotics and staging assaults against the Colombian military. Of equal concern for the government is the ongoing collaborative alliance between FARC and the Russian Mafiya. The Russian Mafiya has used

this relationship to create an arms pipeline to Colombia, equipping FARC with weapon caches and other supplies to aid in its war against the Colombian government. The weapons range from assault weapons to military helicopters to surfaceto-air missiles. The U.S. government has also uncovered evidence supporting the suspicion that this alliance is an arms-for-drugs trade, with cocaine shipments smuggled back to the Russian Mafiya for distribution and sale. In addition to working relationships with the Russian Mafiya, FARC has been noted to have also developed an extensive working relationship with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) that involves both weapons trafficking and military training. Military training camps that utilize IRA technical consultants have been noted to exist deep within the jungles of Colombia. The training that FARC receives provides the organization with a level of military

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expertise and weapons knowledge that tends to exceed that of the common soldier in much of Colombia’s current national military. There is also mounting evidence that FARC’s reach has extended to the U.S. borders. The arrest of a FARC member in Mexico has convinced the Mexican and U.S. governments of a Colombian link to the Tijuana cartel. This collaboration is also believed to be an arms-for-drugs trade agreement. The U.S. government acknowledges that the “defeat of FARC” will not result in the obliteration of drug trafficking out of South America but rather the proliferation of other groups waiting to assume their position. One such group might be the Carlos Castano organization, a paramilitary group that funds its operations by way of extortion and the provision of protective services to drug-processing facilities in northern and central Colombia. Moreover, the DEA reports that this group is also suspected of having direct involvement in cocaine production for exportation out of Colombia. Peru The country of Peru is located in the western portion of South America and is bordered by Ecuador and Colombia to the north, Brazil and Bolivia to the east, and Chile to the south. The bulk of illegal narcotics supplied to the United States are smuggled from Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Colombia. The coca plant is cultivated in these countries, and the majority of the raw product is processed and converted to cocaine in laboratories based in Colombia. This factor allows Colombian drug cartels to retain domination of the cocaine trafficking market. However, intensified enforcement efforts by Colombian police have resulted in some drugprocessing operations being relocated to other South American countries such as Bolivia and Peru. According to a report by the DEA, cocaine production in Peru decreased by an estimated 68 percent from 1995 to 2000. This can be attributed in part to Peru’s air-interdiction program, which resulted in the closure of the cocaine airbridge between Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. Subsequently, the price of coca decreased, taking the profit out of cultivation. However, replanting

efforts detected in previously abandoned fields prompted speculation that coca leaf cultivation is resuming. The Republic of Peru is also a source country for the trafficking of women and children for sexual exploitation and forced domestic labor. A U.S. State Department report on trafficking in persons in Peru noted that most victims are transported internally from rural to urban areas and are forced to work as prostitutes in bars, nightclubs, and brothels. Those trafficked outside of the country for sexual exploitation are typically transported to Western Europe, primarily Spain and Japan. Those victims designated for forced labor are transported to neighboring countries such as Ecuador. It is also noted in the report that drug smugglers and terrorist groups often hold captive entire families residing in rural areas for the purpose of forced “agricultural labor” in remote areas of the country. The Peruvian government does not currently have a comprehensive law against trafficking, but according to the U.S. State Department report, its penal codes encompasses “trafficking-related crimes such as slavery, pimping, sexual exploitation of children, and forced labor.” The government continues to thwart sexual exploitation of minors but is hampered by the laggardly legal system, resulting in low prosecution and conviction rates. Moreover, the report states that while there is no evidentiary support for the allegations of government involvement in trafficking, some individual officials have fallen under suspicion for “tolerating” sexual exploitation of minors through prostitution, unregulated brothels, and migrant smuggling. Brazil Organized criminal activity in this country has extended beyond that of narcotic trafficking, with only a few groups engaging in its practice. The DEA reports that with the exception of some cannabis grown in the northeastern region that is typically for domestic consumption, there is minimal evidence of illegal drug cultivation in Brazil. The Brazilian government has most recently been forced to contend with more sophisticated crimes such as credit card fraud, intellectual property theft and smuggling, and automobile trafficking. At the 155

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116th International Training Course (ITC) on Transnational Crime, it was noted that credit card fraud has become a significant problem in Brazil. The fraud is carried out through the cloning of credit cards, which is mostly accomplished overseas due to ready availability of the required equipment. The sale of such equipment is banned in Brazil. Money laundering is also cited as a growing activity utilized by organized criminal enterprises in Brazil. ITC researchers note the difficulty in ascertaining the extent of the money laundering due to its illegality and the lack of available statistics. However, they supply a rough approximation of 2–5 percent of the global gross domestic product as being composed of “dirty money.” The International Mafia, based in Brazil, is reputed to have utilized “ghost beneficiaries, front and fictitious companies” for their money laundering operations. The piracy and smuggling of intellectual property has become a growing concern. According to an article by V. Rodrigues in Brazzil magazine, Luiz Correa, the national secretary of public security, states that piracy is no longer viewed as a social issue by the government but rather is a “product of organized crime.” He further adds that it is not indigent to Latin American countries but instead is a global concern. The primary items pirated in Brazil are CDs, cigarettes, and watches. According to data secured from the Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property (Adepi), “phony” products account for approximately 45 percent of videotapes and DVDs sold, and an estimated 70 percent of computer components are either pirated or smuggled contraband. An estimated 40 percent of cigarettes consumed in Brazil arise from the black market. In addition, approximately one-fifth of the drugs sold in Brazilian pharmacies are produced illegally. A survey conducted by the British consulting firm mi2g and cited in a 2002 report indicates that Brazil has become the world’s premier exporter of Internet crimes such as identity theft, credit card fraud, and piracy violations. Intellectual property crimes are speculated to cost the Brazilian government an estimated US$67 billion in uncollected taxes and significantly impacts economic development through a loss of 1.5 million jobs as a result of

piracy and smuggling. Government officials report that organized crime and international terrorist groups are responsible for black market goods circulated in the country. A 2005 report by Interpol states that due to the expansive geographic area and complex “operating environment,” policing is difficult. Subsequently, these difficulties facilitate the involvement of organized and transnational crime groups in a wide spectrum of intellectual property crimes. Another lucrative smuggling operation is the transporting of stolen automobiles. According to a report by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, automobile trafficking has become a “booming business,” and Iguacu Falls in Brazil is cited as one of two principal centers for transshipments of stolen vehicles, with the other being Ciudad del Este. They are also transit points for the smuggling of narcotics and arsenals. Argentina According to the 2005 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Argentina is not considered a significant drug-producing country but instead is a transit country through which much of the cocaine flows from neighboring Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia destined for Europe. Argentina is also designated as a transit country for the smuggling of Colombian heroin to the U.S. East Coast, with New York the primary destination. While not a major drug-producing country due to its advanced chemical-processing facilities, Argentina is considered the premier manufacturer of precursors needed to produce cocaine and heroin. Argentine officials acknowledge that drug trafficking has become a growing concern. The majority of cocaine and marijuana enter Argentina through Bolivia by way of the remote and rugged border with Salta and Jujuy. These narcotics are also smuggled across the river bordering Paraguay and the provinces of Misiones and Corrientes. Commercial aircraft are utilized for the trafficking of heroin and some cocaine. The DEA cites that based on intelligence reports, the most substantial volumes of narcotics are smuggled from Argentina through the use of containers by way of Argentina’s maritime port system.

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The Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) uses x-ray technology to check the interiors of seaport containers. Container ships have been identified by the CBP as a serious weakness in securing U.S. borders against narcotics smuggling, human trafficking, and terrorism. (Department of Homeland Security/James Tourtellotte)

Due to membership in Mercosur (the Southern Common Market established by the 1991 Treaty of Ascuncion), Argentina is prohibited from opening and inspecting sealed containers from another member state that pass through the country without direct intelligence notification concerning a specific container. Those countries considered full members of Mercosur include Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela, while Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru maintain associate memberships. These South American countries comprise a significant number of those geographic locales purported as drug trafficking portals. Subsequently, those uninspected containers are considered by government officials to be high trafficking threats. Money laundering has also been cited as a growing problem among Mercosur member countries. According to a 2001 report by the Center for

Transnational Crime and Corruption, increased activity can be partly attributed to the need for Colombian and Mexican cartels to launder drug money. It is also noted to be due to a proliferation of offshore banking establishments in Latin America and the Caribbean. Money laundered through Mercosur countries is harder to detect due to it being filtered through legitimate enterprises such as banking institutions, shell companies, and brokerage exchanges. The government’s response was the establishment in 2000 of the South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD) whose primary function is the coordinating of operations to monitor and prevent money laundering in South American countries. Smuggling Methods Despite aggressive efforts by the U.S. and other governments toward the detection, monitoring, 157

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and halting of drug trafficking, smugglers continue to find new and innovative methods to transport the illegal drugs. According to a report by the U.S. National Narcotics Intelligence Consumer Committee, traffickers have hidden cocaine in the walls of cargo containers, concrete lamp posts, bulk cargo, live animals, and the stomach of human couriers, with these human mules known to ingest up to fifty “fingers” or cocaine-packed condoms. A 2000 report by the U.S. Customs states that they are being “challenged daily” due to the growing number of innovative mechanisms being devised to conceal and smuggle illegal contraband. Traffickers have concealed drugs in propane tanks, engines, food products, electronic games, and computer parts. Narcotics are also being sewn into clothing, wigs, and the lining of luggage and are hidden in the soles of shoes. U.S. Customs also reports that human carriers have been induced by drug smugglers to “endure painful surgical implants to conceal narcotics in their legs, abdomen, and stomach.” Law enforcement and intelligence agencies report that an estimated 65 percent of the cocaine shipped to the United States is transported across the Central America–Mexico corridor, with fishing vessels utilized for bulk shipments. The most significant amounts of drugs shipped from the coastal regions are produced in the south-central area of the country as well as other less-cultivated regions in the northern third of Colombia. Prominent smuggling groups based in Cali, Medellin, Bogotá, and other locales organize the majority of these drug shipments. Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti are the primary transshipment destinations for Colombian cocaine smuggled via the Caribbean. However, due to instability of the government and economy, Haiti has increasingly become the transshipment point of choice for cocaine destined for the U.S. East Coast. Challenges The rapid growth of organized and transnational crime in South America has significantly impacted the region’s development. In fact, there is no region of the world that has not evidenced the influence of organized crime. It has weakened economic devel-

opment potential, undermined the credibility and power of the government, and eroded social capital. It has spread globally, resulting in the corruption of political, social, and economic systems. A report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies states that a partial solution is the empowering of “domestic legal institutions” and vital social organizations in those countries burdened with the effects of organized criminal activities. The Institute for National Strategic Studies notes that better coordination, more resources, and comprehensive long-term planning would significantly improve law enforcement capabilities for fighting organized crime. It will also require proactive policies that identify anticrime initiatives, antidrug operations, and improved intelligence-gathering and reporting systems.

References Cilluffo, F. The Threat Posed from the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Terrorism. Center for Strategic & International Studies before the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, 2000, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/ congress/2000_h/001213-cilluffo.htm. DEA Congressional Report. “DEA Targets International Organized Crime,” 2 March 2001, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct030201 .htm. DEA Report. “Drug Trafficking in the United States,” 2001, http://www.policyalmanac.org/ crime/archive/drug_trafficking.shtml. Hudson, R. Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America. Library of Congress, 2003, 32–63. Institute for National Strategic Studies. Transnational Trends: New Threats? United States Department of State, 1999, 245–260. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. U.S. Department of State, 2005, http://www .state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/. International Training Course, 116th. Current Situation of Organized Crime in Trafficking Stolen Vehicles, Card Fraud, Money Laundering and Major Transnational Organized Crime Groups, 2000, 222–227. Interpol. “Interpol and Brazil Co-host AntiCounterfeiting Conference, Target Is Transnational Counterfeiters in South America.” Media Release,

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13 June 2005 http://www.interpol.int/Public/ ICPO/PressReleases/PR2005/PR200521.asp. Moran, N., and R. Hanser. “Terror for profit: The IRA-FARC Connection.” Journal of International Security 14(2) (2004): 44–47. PBS Frontline. “Drug Wars,” http://www.pbs.org/ wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/. Rodrigues, Valtemir. “In Brazil, Piracy Is Now Organized Crime and Not a Social Issue.” Brazzil, 26 June 2005, http://www.brazzilmag.com/ content/view/2964/2/. Schaffer Library of Drug Policy. “America’s Habit, Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime,” 1986, http://www.druglibrary.org/ schaffer/govpubs/amhab/ahmenu.htm. Shelley, L. Money Laundering, Organized Crime and Corruption. Center for Transnational Crime and Corruption, 2001, 1–12. Stanislawski, Bartosz, and Margaret Hermann. “Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and WMD.” CIDCM Conference, University of Maryland, 15 October 2004. U.S. Customs Today. “The Constant Change in Concealment Methods,” July 2000, http://www .customs.ustreas.gov/custoday/jul2000/conceal .htm. U.S. Trafficking in Persons Report. “Human Trafficking and Modern-day Slavery, Republic of Peru,” 2004, http://gvnet.com/humantrafficking/ Peru.htm.

Organized Criminal Activity in South America’s Tri-Border Region Adam Dulin The South American cities of Ciudad del Este (Paraguay), Puerto Iguazu (Argentina), and Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil) comprise a territory known as the Tri-Border Region (TBR). Although the cities are close in proximity, either the Paraná or the Iguaçu Rivers separate each city. The TBR is the largest free-trade zone in Latin America and serves as a bridge for three nations. This area also serves as a tourist attraction where travelers can see the Iguazu Falls. Prior to the 1940s, the TBR was sparsely populated land, home to indigenous people and wildlife. During the early period of exploration, when Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay sought to profit from the region’s vast natural resources, attention

was focused on the region’s timber supplies. By the mid-twentieth century, tourism was recognized as a new base of economic activity. During the latter part of the twentieth century, new jobs in the region served as a catalyst for internal migration of people seeking work. What followed was a drastic increase in the region’s population. For example, the population of Foz do Iguaçu more than tripled during the 1970s and 1980s. Accompanying the unexpected increase in inhabitants were many problems, including lack of basic amenities such as running water and electricity. Additionally, the omnipresent and multifaceted criminal economy flourished in the area. International migration also matched the increase in internal migrants. Of particular interest, many Lebanese and Chinese settlers started businesses in the TBR. The TBR gained infamy in 1994 when the bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, was linked to foreign militants operating in the region. However, organized crime has been a part of the region for much longer. Boosted by porous borders and lax security checks, people who wish to make money illegally can choose from a variety of activities that occur daily throughout the region. The TBR is a haven for easy money. Contraband Smuggling Small-time contraband smugglers, also known as sacoleiros, carry a wide variety of contraband, such as drugs and cigarettes, through the TBR. Drug trafficking accounts for a large proportion of the crimes committed by teenagers in Foz do Iguaçu. However, drug routes in Latin America can change quickly. Due to a concentrated effort to reduce the flow of drugs in the TBR, drug trafficking may have declined. Drug-related arrests on the border of Puerto Iguazú have decreased since 2000, indicating that enforcement efforts in the region may have displaced the criminal activities to other areas. A more chronic problem in the area is the influx of cigarettes. A pack of cigarettes that cost $1 in Paraguay will cost around $2.50 in Argentina due to higher tax rates. Cigarette smuggling in the TBR is very profitable. As reported by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) on 22 February 2004, during one month in 2004, more than 11,000 car159

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tons of cigarettes were intercepted in the TBR before reaching wayward points in Argentina. Many terrorist groups in Europe and North America have financed operations through the illegal importation of these items, including the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and Hezbollah (Party of God). The latter is believed to have a presence in the TBR. Money Laundering Even though Ciudad del Este only has a population of 300,000, the city has more than fifty-five different banks and foreign exchange shops. Many of the banks serve as a conduit for money laundering operations. The United States estimates that $6 billion a year in illegal funds are laundered there, an amount equivalent to 50 percent of the gross domestic product of Paraguay. A 1996 study by the U.S. government estimated that $20 billion is laundered through Brazil annually. Many of the laundered proceeds come from the drug trafficking and contraband trade. Former Paraguayan General Lino César Oviedo is believed to be in control of a Paraguayan cartel that has amassed a fortune through money laundering in Ciudad del Este. Oviedo allegedly gained $1 billion through these operations. Part of the money may have been invested in properties he owned in the TBR. Product Piracy Latin America is the world’s third-largest market for illegal duplication of CDs, videos, and cassettes, according to the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition. Illegal production of these products is centered in Brazil and Argentina, whose governments have toughened their intellectual property laws but nonetheless need to make further improvements to combat the proliferation of illegal multimedia. Paraguay’s Ciudad del Este serves as a regional center for pirated goods. Large shipments of pirated products from Asia are routinely destined for the city, a point from which other markets, particularly Brazil, are easily reached. The flourishing economy of pirated goods in the TBR has a far-reaching and damaging impact on

other countries. For example, a 1998 estimate by the International Intellectual Property Alliance claims that lost revenue from patent and trademark infringements in Argentina and Brazil costs U.S. companies $500 million annually. Economic concerns have not gone unnoticed. The trade representative of the United States has routinely subjected Paraguay to special monitoring for unacceptably high levels of intellectual property theft. Despite persistent complaints, counterfeit and pirated products saturate the TBR. Extortion There is a fear of repercussion among TBR residents when it comes to discussing the crime problem that surrounds them. On more than one occasion, residents who openly discussed such issues have faced threats, including death threats. Even those who earn their livelihood illegally fear for their safety if they openly discuss criminal activities in their communities. It is common knowledge in the TBR that Chinese residents are forced to buy goods from other Chinese merchants who are part of organized crime groups attempting to create monopolies. Chinese organized crime members from Mainland China and Taiwan have also forced Chinese merchants to pay protection taxes, a forced revenue that earns some groups $30,000 each month. Lebanese individuals with possible ties to foreign terrorist groups have also used extortion. In 2001, the Paraguayan intelligence services, while collecting information on the activities of Lebanese citizens living in the TBR, reportedly found evidence implicating Assad Ahmad Barakat for fraud and death threats. The businessman was allegedly forcing Lebanese citizens to contribute to the Hezbollah terrorist group. Gunrunning Large consignments of military weaponry are routinely smuggled into Brazil from Paraguay and Argentina. Typically, weapons that are smuggled through the TBR’s Puerto Iguazu are of Belgian, German, local, and U.S. origin. At least 11,000 military weapons, including rifles, machine guns, handguns, and grenades, have been smuggled into

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Brazil since 2001. However, as with other estimates of criminal activity in Latin America, a more realistic estimate regarding the number of smuggled weapons may be much higher. In fact, weapons originating from domestic sources, including weapons stolen from military depots, may never be reported as stolen. Well-established terrorists and organized crime groups are known to participate in gunrunning schemes in the TBR. One organized crime group known as the Local Connection, purportedly composed of politicians and former soldiers, has prospered from smuggling weapons into Brazil. The Local Connection reportedly operates without fear of reprisal due to the public stature of its leading members and is organized like the traditional Italian Mafia, with small subgroups that answer to a regional boss. Weapons traffickers are able to command a high price for weapons in the TBR. One shipment of American-made weaponry such as the Colt M-16A, which is present in the region, may result in a net gain of $4,000 for a weapons smuggler. A shipment of local weapons, such as Bersa 9mm pistols (Argentinean), is worth around $1,300. Terrorism and Organized Crime in the TBR The TBR offers terrorist groups the ideal environment for financing activities abroad. Not only does the region have a sizable Lebanese and Palestinian diaspora, but it also has a reputation for lax security. The possible presence of terrorist groups has not passed unnoticed by domestic and foreign governments. According to the U.S. State Department’s 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism, various forms of organized crime such as drug trafficking and the sale of pirated goods have been a part of the region’s economy for many years. However, the presence of international terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas has also been noted in the region, particularly for the purposes of financing terrorist operations. Brazilian security agencies claimed that the financial aid offered in 2000 by groups in the TBR to Islamic and Middle Eastern terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad totaled $261 million. An investiga-

tion begun in September 2001 also determined that a group of forty-two Arabs in Ciudad del Este shipped approximately $50 million abroad, mostly to Lebanon, during the 1997–2001 period. It is believed that these funds were derived from arms trafficking and other illicit activities. Hezbollah has reportedly had a presence in the TBR for more than a decade. Besides using the TBR for financing of terrorist activities abroad, the Lebanese terrorist group has also reportedly staged terrorist attacks in South America from the region. Attacks that the group may have perpetrated include bombings that occurred in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1992 and 1994 against Jewish targets. Conclusion The TBR has been a scene of organized crime for many decades. What makes the region particularly interesting is the presence of numerous forms of crime and actors: a criminal mix influenced by people from different cultures, lured to the TBR for monetary reasons. From juvenile crimes such as drug and cigarette smuggling to large-scale weapons smuggling operations, the crimes committed in the region do not occur in a vacuum but rather have far-reaching ramifications. The problems in this region are further compounded by the possible presence of terrorist groups. References Coker, Dale. “Smoking May Not Only Be Hazardous to Your Health, but Also to World Political Stability: The European Union’s Fight against Cigarette Smuggling Rings That Benefit Terrorism.” European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law & Criminal Justice 11(2003): 350–377. Ferradás, Carmen Alicia. “Environment, Security, and Terrorism in the Trinational Frontier of the Southern Cone.” Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 11 (2004): 417–442. Godoy, Roberto. “Brazilian Daily Outlines Gunrunning Operations.” O Estado de Sao Paulo, 9 May 2004. Hudson, Rex. Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2003. International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition. International/Global Intellectual Property Theft: Links to Terrorism and Terrorist Organizations. 161

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Washington, DC: International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition, 2003. “International Crime Threat Assessment.” Trends in Organized Crime 5 (2000): 32–145, http://www.fas .org/irp/threat/pub45270index.html. Madani, Blanca. “Hezbollah’s Global Finance Network: The Triple Frontier.” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 4(1) (January 2002), http:// www.meib.org/articles/0201_l2.htm. Mendel, William W. “Paraquay’s Ciudad del Este and the New Centers of Gravity.” Military Review 82 (2002): 51–58. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001,” 21 May 2002, http://www .state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2001/. Wagner, C. “Brazil: Argentine Crime Group ‘Local Connection’ Said to Have Ties to Terrorists in TriBorder.” Zero Hora (Porto Alegre), 10 November 2002.

Turkish Organized Crime: Heroin Trafficking and Money Laundering Operations Mark Galeotti Introduction Turkish organized crime, for decades the dominant force in the wholesale supply of heroin and other opiates to Europe, is also a clear example of how business opportunity transcends political and ethnic division. After all, it embraces members of both the Turkish state and the Kurds rebelling against them, and while distinctive in its traditions, defined by close-knit clans or families, it is still able to evolve swiftly and also work closely with other gangs and communities, from Italians to Albanians. Origins and Organization Organized crime in Turkey has long and strong historical and cultural roots, especially in regard to the international drugs trade. Opium has been grown there since the eighth century, and Turkey became a key European supplier of the drug in the nineteenth century. In the 1970s, the Turkish government bowed to mounting international pressures and began a heavy-handed campaign to eliminate the domestic production of opiates. This was a substantial challenge: as of 1971, 40 percent of Turkish

farmers were cultivating poppies as their main or subsidiary crop, while whole regional economies were dependent upon opium production. To a large extent the campaign was successful, but the groups involved in the narcotics industry simply abandoned production and concentrated on the trafficking of opiates from the Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, and Thailand) and especially the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and, later, post-Soviet Central Asia). They have also made full use of the opportunities provided by the long-running Kurdish insurgency in eastern Turkey. Turkish organized crime is dominated by a handful of clans or extended families. Some sources suggest twelve and others put the figure as high as twenty, but the higher figures probably err in counting lesser branches of major groups as separate gangs. After all, these are often amorphous structures, especially at the edges, where semiautonomous gangs and individuals may even have links with more than one of the major clans. All are dominated by a senior baba (head of family) and his immediate allies and kin, but they are no longer organized strictly or even primarily by bloodline. Instead, they are increasingly inclusive and fluid in their structures, adopting useful new recruits regardless of kinship and abandoning pyramidal hierarchies for a compartmentalized network of semiautonomous cells. The Turkish gangs originally relied on ethnic and family links among immigrants and temporary laborers in other European countries (especially West Germany) for their distribution networks. Since the late 1980s, though, they have increasingly simply sold on to local groups or subcontracted distribution, concentrating on the wholesale trade. They have also turned increasingly toward recruiting or working with other ethnic communities (including Albanians) for their operations abroad. A further complication is the presence of overtly political factions for whom narcotics trafficking was originally adopted as a vital source of revenue, even if in many cases it soon became the end rather than the means. Behind their political rhetoric, many of these groups either came to resemble the genuinely criminal groupings or actually became incorporated within them. The Kurds, a

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people living in eastern Turkey, northern Syria and Iraq, and western Iran, have since 1984 been fighting an often bitter war for independence or autonomy. The Kurdish guerrillas of the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers’ Party) have traded in drugs to fuel their operations. In practice, the PKK has largely managed to avoid losing its political identity and is not so much directly involved in the trade as in charging rents to gangs for the use of PKK-held territory on which to grow opium, operate site-processing facilities, or transport drugs. Narcotics have reportedly also been trafficked by Turkish Marxist revolutionary groups as well as progovernment (or at least anti-PKK) elements. The main Kurdish narcotics traffickers appear to come not from the PKK but instead are Kurdish leaders and militias co-opted by the government as local auxiliaries and informants. Many took advantage of their new role to engage in extortion and drug trafficking. The right-wing Grey Wolves terrorist faction has also been implicated in the narcotics trade. Turkish organized crime thus works with and plays off a whole array of political factions and figures, from the PKK to the extreme Right. Narcotic Trafficking Turkish organized crime is an extremely active international force, especially in Europe. It was identified as working in twelve of the fifteen countries surveyed for the European Commission’s 1996 Europol 155 document and primarily trafficking heroin and other opiates with related activities such as money laundering. Turkish organized crime operates in alliance with both major organized crime syndicates and numerous street-level gangs. This too has evolved over time. Between the 1950s and 1970s, morphine base from Turkey and Lebanon was converted into heroin in and around Marseilles by Corsican groups. Some was trafficked in Europe, much (through the so-called French Connection) shipped to North America. In the 1970s Turkish domestic production declined, but its role as a transshipment point continued. Perhaps more importantly, the Turks developed closer links with the Sicilian Mafia, and processing moved to Palermo. Since then, there has been a diversifi-

cation of the European narcotics industry, and new players have entered the scene, including the Apulian Sacra Corona Unita and Calabrian ’Ndrangheta in Italy as well as Russian and other East European groups, but the Turks still dominate the wholesale heroin supply to the continent. At its peak in the early 1990s, up to 85 percent of the heroin in Europe had been processed in or had traveled through Turkey: some 4–6 metric tons each month. While new routes, especially through Russia, began to emerge in the 1990s, even by 2005 this figure was still around 70–75 percent. The drugs arrive from Asia either across the land border with Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria or by sea from or via Syria and Lebanon. Despite the increasing role of Russian routes, most heroin handled by the Turks still flows through the former Yugoslavia, moved either by land up into southeastern Europe or smuggled by fast boat across the Adriatic into Italy. While old routes were briefly disrupted by the civil wars that wracked the Balkans at the end of the twentieth century, these conflicts actually proved a blessing for the criminals. The ensuing anarchy created lawless areas for them to operate in, while impoverished police forces and political elites became especially vulnerable to corruption. It also unleashed Albanian gangs from both Albania itself (which exploded into civil wars in both 1990 and 1996) and the ethnically Albanian Serbian province of Kosovo. After all, while the Turks have strategic alliances with major European criminal cartels as well as their own distribution networks within the 2 million Turkish expatriates within the European Union, a key asset for the Turkish gangs since the 1990s has been its so-called Albanian Connection. The Albanians provide both couriers and distributors with a reputation for efficiency, discretion, and ruthlessness such that they have quickly become key agents, and by the turn of the millennium they may have handled 75 percent of Turkish heroin during at least some stage of its trafficking. Money Laundering and Reinvestment The global narcotics trade is lucrative, and organizations involved in it are faced with the need to launder substantial amounts of money. Turkish organized 163

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Istanbul Governor Muammer Guler (left) and the city’s police chief Celalettin Cerrah pose for photographers next to the one metric ton of heroin seized by police in the city in January of 2004. (AFP/Getty Images)

crime is heavily involved in this, especially given the lack of effective money laundering legislation in Turkey until 1996, which even then was only brought to international standards in 2005, as well as the existence of a virtually institutionalized money laundry operation in Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus. The criminals have invested heavily in the latter, especially in casinos and other gambling centers and in a banking system grossly disproportionate to the island’s needs. The territory has also become used by Italian, Russian, and other criminals not only for money laundering but also as a safe haven and as a neutral ground for meetings. Much of the revenue from heroin trafficking is reinvested in genuinely or overtly legal businesses. Germany has emerged as second only to Turkey as a magnet for Turkish criminal profits, much reinvested in government bonds, property, businesses, and the tourism and leisure industries. If anything, Germany’s appeal has only increased as Ankara

slowly begins to make progress in combating money laundering. However, as money laundering options began to become more limited, many Turkish gangs began to reinvest their profits in other criminal operations instead. By 2003, the Turks were playing a growing role in smuggling illegal migrants into Europe and in people trafficking. By the late 1990s, Turkey had also become second only to Italy in the level of kidnappings in Europe. Turkish organized crime is thus a powerful and ambitious force within the European underworld, primarily thanks to its key role as the continent’s wholesale supplier of heroin. It lacks the sophistication and breadth of operations of, for example, the Sicilian Mafia but has been helped by the considerable protection it has enjoyed within Turkey, especially with its vital money laundering haven in northern Cyprus, and is in the middle of a process of diversification fueled by heroin profits.

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References Galeotti, Mark. “Turkish Organized Crime: Where State, Crime and Rebellion Conspire.” Transnational Organized Crime 4(1) (Spring 1998): 25–41. Sariibrahimoglu, L. “The Crash That Shook Turkish Security to the Core.” Jane’s Intelligence Review 10(4) (April 1998): 8–11. Xhudo, Gus. “Men of Purpose: The Growth of Albanian Criminal Activity.” Transnational Organized Crime 2(1) (Spring 1996): 1–20. Zurcher, Erik. Turkey: A Modern History, rev. ed. London: Tauris, 2004.

Child Trafficking in West Africa Georgios A. Antonopoulos Introduction Although child trafficking has been a phenomenon with a long history in West Africa, it became the epicenter of a serious debate in the 1990s. According to Article 3(a) of the Protocol on the Trafficking of Human Beings supplementing the United Nations (UN) Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, trafficking is “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of persons, by the means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.” Contributing Factors It should be noted, however, that when it comes to children, an activity of exploitation is considered as trafficking even when there is consent by the child. There are estimates by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in West Africa that the number of trafficked children in the area each year is 200,000. However, the exact number is largely unknown due to the hidden nature of this trade, the lack of legislation about trafficking in a large number of West African countries, and practices and traditions in West Africa that reinforce trafficking itself and the underreporting of trafficking cases.

There is a constellation of factors that play an active role in the flourishing of trafficking of children in West Africa. The most important factor is poverty. It is striking that 78.5 percent of the population in Ghana, 85.8 percent of the population in Burkina Faso, and 90.6 percent of the population in Mali, three of the most important source countries for trafficked children, live on less than US$2 a day. In addition, there is a very strong colonial tradition of slavery in West Africa. Other factors involve the inadequate educational, vocational, and economic opportunities for children in rural (and urban) areas of West Africa, the demand for cheap labor, ignorance of the dangers associated with trafficking on the part of the parents, and the absence of legal, enforcement, and judicial frameworks against child trafficking. The truth is, however, that all of the above factors constitute a very complex nexus of child trafficking in the area. Major Trafficking Routes According to the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, in general terms there are two major trafficking routes in West Africa: (1) from Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mali to the Côte d’Ivoire and (2) from Togo and Benin to Nigeria, Cameroon, and Gabon. This does not necessarily mean that the destination countries cannot be source or transit countries. A child from Burkina Faso, for instance, can be trafficked to the Côte d’Ivoire and from there to Nigeria. Moreover, a child from Nigeria, which is largely considered a destination country, may be trafficked to neighboring countries. It is also common for a number of children primarily from Nigeria to be trafficked to a number of European countries (especially Italy) or the Middle East and introduced into prostitution. Moreover, there are a large but unknown number of trafficked children from rural areas to cities in the same country (internal trafficking). Basically, trafficking patterns follow the patterns of migration. The trafficked children are introduced into prostitution; begging on the streets of large cities; various petty crime activities; domestic servitude; and labor in factories, restaurants, agriculture (specifically cocoa, cotton, rubber, and rice plantations), fishing, and construction and mine sites. Some of the labor sectors in which children are 165

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Diarra Yacouba, 15, poses for a photo on June 28, 2001, in Logbogba, Côte d’lvoire. Yacouba, who is from Mali, was a victim of child labor trafficking and worked on the cocoa plantations for a year before a friend found him and helped him regain his freedom. (Getty Images)

introduced show how well this form of organized crime is linked to the licit economy and that each benefits from the goods and services provided the other. There are also a number of children sold as soldiers in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Methods of Recruitment and Control There are different methods of recruitment of trafficked children that are sometimes organized by groups associated with other illicit trades. These methods include: 1. Abduction. 2. Bonded placement or fostering. Networks and individuals who are involved in the trafficking of children in West Africa take advantage of the extreme poverty and the traditional practice of poor families sending children to more affluent individuals or families as a way to facilitate the upbringing and education of the sold children and

the children who stay with the family. After some time, the children are no longer cared for but are put into exploitative conditions, primarily domestic servitude. 3. Marriage proposition. This is a method of recruitment that is precipitated by a very important factor: the cultural context in relation to marriage in West Africa. Girls are eventually sold to tribal chiefs throughout the whole region to become their brides. 4. False promise of work prospects. The children are promised work in the city or country of destination, but instead of entering the promised sector of employment they are forced into hard labor, prostitution, or criminal activities. This is one of the most popular ways of recruiting children, who are later introduced into the commercial sex scene in Europe. Mamas, who are ex-prostitutes, many times facilitate the recruitment of girls for prostitution. 5. Exploitation by parents and relatives.

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Apart from the fact that when children are trafficked they do not have anyone else but the traffickers to “protect” them and that the children when trafficked to countries where they do not enjoy citizenship are in a state of illegality, there are other methods that the traffickers of children use to control their victims. These methods include beatings, deprivation of food and sleep, imprisonment in houses and other lodgings, threats, constant surveillance, and forced sex with a large number of clients when the children are introduced into the commercial sex scene. In addition, there is a very interesting way of control of the trafficked children that is also applied to trafficked adults from West Africa: the threat of witchcraft practices against the victims or their families. There are cases in which Nigerian children (as well as women) were made submissive under the threat of Voodoo practices enforced on them by sangomas. It is estimated that a trafficker can earn as much as US$30 a month for each child trafficked. Due to the fact that we are not in the position to know the exact number of trafficked children in West Africa, the exact number of trafficked children who are introduced in every labor sector, or the practices that are associated with a specific labor sector, especially prostitution, it is impossible for us to know the exact amount of money that the traffickers get. However, the estimated amounts, just as with the numbers of trafficked children in West Africa, are certainly an underestimate. The effects of child trafficking are enormous for the children. Initially, the children are not treated as such, something that negatively affects their upbringing. Their education prospects are severed, and they endure problems of health associated with hard labor, malnutrition, and maltreatment. Many children involved in prostitution suffer from HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases. Research by the UN in Benin in the late 1990s revealed that the children who escaped trafficking networks were likely to suffer from feelings of alienation by their families and native countries or cultures. The effects of child trafficking are also enormous for the children’s families and the countries of origin of the victims, who lose their most important asset: their youths.

Conclusion West Africa is a region in which there are relatively little developments in relation to trafficking. This is, as mentioned earlier, one of the reasons that this trade flourishes in that particular corner of the world. There are some clear steps that should be followed by the international community and, of course, by the countries affected by child trafficking. First, there is a great need for the rich countries to reduce the economic differences between the industrially advanced world and West Africa and to eradicate poverty. Second, the establishment of strong legal, judicial, and enforcement frameworks in relation to human trafficking in West Africa is an imperative. All countries in West Africa have signed the international conventions against trafficking. However, not all countries have passed national legislation on trafficking. Even when legislation exists, enforcement is weak and inadequate. Third, there is a huge need for more campaigns informing the public about the dangers of irregular migration, both internal and external. Organizations such as UNICEF, the International Labour Organization, and Anti-Slavery International have been organizing public awareness projects and establishing reception centers in the region, but a lot more can be done. Finally, given that we know relatively little about this trade, additional research on every aspect of child trafficking, and specifically of its social organization, should be conducted. References Agbu, O. “Corruption and Human Trafficking: The Nigerian Case.” West Africa Review 4(1) (2003): 1–13. Aronowitz, A. A., and M. Peruffo, “Trafficking in Human Beings and Related Crimes in West and Central Africa.” Pp. 394–414 in The Blackwell Companion to Criminology, edited by C. Summer. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004. Astill, J. “The Terrible Truth about the Ship of Slaves.” Guardian, 21 April 2001. International Organisation for Migration. “New International Organisation for Migration Figures on the Global Scale of Trafficking.” Trafficking in Migrants Quarterly Bulletin, Geneva, IOM No. 23, 1 April 2001, http://www.iom.int/jahia/ Jahia/pid/8/EN/tm_23.pdf. 167

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Olateru-Olagbesi, B. “Brief Overview of the Situational Analysis of Human Trafficking in West Africa.” Paper presented at the 7th African Regional Conference on Women, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 6–10 October 2004. Ruggiero, V. “Criminals and Service Providers: Cross-National Dirty Economies.” Crime, Law and Social Change 28 (1997): 27–38. Salah. R. “Child Trafficking in West and Central Africa: An Overview.” Paper presented at the 1st Pan African Conference on Human Trafficking, Abuja, Nigeria, 19–23 February 2001. UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre. Child Trafficking in West Africa: Policy Responses. Florence: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2002.

United Nations. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. Vienna, Austria: United Nations, 2000, http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dc atoc/final_documents_2/convention_%20traff_eng .pdf. United Nations Economic and Social Council. “Child Trafficking in West and Central Africa.” Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, 24th session, Geneva, 23 June–2 July 1999. World Resources Institute. “Economic Indicators— Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali,” 2003, http:// earthtrends.wri.org.

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Section II Criminal Enterprises and Sources of Financing Frank Shanty

Advances in communications and computer technology and the easy access to international markets in the post–Cold War world have provided the criminal entrepreneur with a wide range of lucrative and illegal financial opportunities. As the movement of money, goods, and people across national and international borders continues to expand, licit as well as illicit enterprises are reaping the benefits and the fruits of globalization. Organized crime is an evolving threat to state, regional, and international security. The activities of these organized criminal groups span legitimatesector enterprises as well as illegal activities such as the illicit production and distribution of narcotics and precursor chemicals, the trafficking of women and children, forced labor, consumer-driven crimes, and a host of illegal financial enterprises ranging from securities and health care fraud to product counterfeiting operations and tax evasion schemes. There are many definitions of organized crime and of what exactly constitutes a criminal enterprise. Basically, a criminal enterprise forms to generate revenue by engaging in illegal activities and providing goods and services in competition with its legal counterparts or in direct violation of existing statutes in the case of illegal commerce or services. Essentially, according to R. Thomas Naylor, “organized crime is associated more with market-based offenses—the production and distribution of illegal goods and services to willing consumers.” Twenty-first-century criminal activity often involves elected or appointed public officials as well

as private business establishments. The lure of huge profits or a one-time big payoff often entices those entrusted with the responsibilities of ensuring public safety and security to accept bribes, favors, or other forms of compensation to look the other way or to actively take part in the illegal venture. Law enforcement and other regulatory agencies are finding it extremely difficult to thwart the activities of these well-organized and well-connected criminal networks. Due to the transnational dimension and scope of the problem, many agencies are illequipped to launch a truly effective assault on some of the more sophisticated criminal operations. State legislative initiatives and bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements are designed to address some of the issues inherent in adopting a comprehensive approach to the global crime problem, but these attempts at achieving consensus often fall short at the implementation phase regardless of the initial good intentions of state participants. According to Michael Woodiwiss, “today’s illicit global economy involves trading in anything from hazardous waste to human body parts, and the Internet has multiplied opportunities for fraud. . . . The world now needs a comprehensive and objective inquiry into criminal problems associated with both legal and illegal markets.” Cooperation between national as well as international enforcement agencies is a prerequisite to effective and collective action. This is often difficult to achieve since domestic laws, priorities, and resources vary between states. To compound this problem, agencies within a specific country are often unable to 169

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Criminal Enterprises and Sources of Financing

coordinate and consolidate their resources or establish a protocol for effective intelligence sharing. The entries addressed in this section provide the range of activities currently engaged in by organized criminal groups. The variety of activities covered should impress upon the reader the truly global dimension of this problem and the need for a concerted and comprehensive international effort to combat it.

References Evans, John. “Criminal Networks, Criminal Enterprises.” International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, 1994, http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/ netwks94.pdf. Naylor, R. Thomas. Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002. Woodiwiss, Michael. “Transnational Organized Crime: The Global Reach of an American Concept.” Pp. 13–27 in Transnational Organized Crime: Perspectives on Global Security, edited by Adam Edwards and Peter Gill. New York: Routledge, 2003.

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A. Criminal Enterprises: Trafficking and Other Illegal Business Activities of Organized Crime

Bribery and Corruption of Police Officials Robert Hanser and Jessica I. Welch Recently, there has been much attention paid to the corruption of police and their deviant behavior. However, police corruption is not a new problem and dates back to the establishment of the first organized local police forces. While corruption has been a persistent problem for law enforcement, the nature of police corruption has varied over time. Historically, police corruption involved such lowlevel and passive activities as bribery schemes and nonenforcement of the law. Today, the prominent issues at hand are police brutality and drug-related police corruption. A sampling of recent episodes of corruption since 1990 in the police departments of three major cities—New York City, Los Angeles, and New Orleans, located in vastly different regions of the United States—demonstrates that corruption is alive and well in all corners of the nation. These cities, when taken together, provide a good cross section of the United States in terms of both police agencies and corruption sampling. Corruption in each of these cities has been known to consist of brutality, bribery, and extortion. New York City Throughout New York City’s history of policing, its department has repeatedly been rocked over the years by high-profile police corruption scandals. The Mollen Commission reported that the most prevalent form of police corruption in New York City is

police committing crimes in connection with the illegal drug trade. Between 1992 and 1996, federal and city investigations and prosecutions led to the convictions of thirty officers for primarily narcotics-related offenses. In 1993 during eleven days of corruption hearings, a parade of New York police officers testified before the Mollen Commission about dealing drugs, stealing confiscated drugs funds, stifling investigations, and beating innocent people. The New York City Law Department reported that police misconduct, described as assault/ excessive force, assault, and shootings by police, cost city taxpayers more than $44 million for fiscal years 1994 and 1995). The city paid approximately $70 million in settlement or jury awards involving claims alleging improper police actions between 1994 and 1996. Two of the largest amounts paid during this period were a 1994 verdict costing $7.5 million and a 1995 pretrial settlement, at the time the largest in its history, of $16.6 million. Unlike prosecutions of police for drug-related incidents, grand juries often decline to indict officers of brutality-related charges, choosing to believe officers accounts of events. Between 1992 and 1995, ninety-four cases were decided, with nineteen leading to prosecution. In 1996, five of twenty-two cases decided were prosecuted. Perhaps the most flagrant abuse of police power occurred during the period 1985–1990. During this time two New York City police detectives, Louis Eppolito and Stephen Caracappa, became involved with the Luchese crime family and were operating as Mafia hitmen. In March 2005 following the 171

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Criminal Enterprises: Trafficking and Other Illegal Business Activities of Organized Crime

retirement of both men and a lengthy investigation, the two former police officers were arrested and charged with various crimes under the RICO statute. In April 2006 they were convicted of racketeering, eight counts of murder, and obstruction of justice. Both men are currently serving life sentences. Los Angeles When speaking of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), one can hardly refrain from mentioning its entanglement in drug-related offenses and highly publicized incidents of police brutality. Between 1991 and 1996, the office of the city attorney reported that the city paid $79.2 million in civil lawsuit judgments and awards and pretrial settlements against police officers. Unfortunately, criminal prosecution of police for alleged brutality is extremely rare in Los Angeles. According to the Internal Affairs Group’s commander, at most one officer a year is prosecuted for an on-duty abuserelated incident. Between 1993 and 1995, besides the four officers involved in the Rodney King incident, there had been two other prosecutions of LAPD officers. However, in regard to drug-related corruption, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported that twenty-seven sheriff’s deputies and one police officer had been convicted by 1994 for skimming millions of dollars of drug money while members of an elite narcotics unit, and the department became embroiled in a far-reaching corruption scandal centered around the antigang unit of the department’s Rampart Subdivision. By 2003, more than one hundred falsely obtained convictions had been thrown out, twenty LAPD officers had left active duty, and three officers were convicted of conspiring to frame innocent people. The LAPD is now under a federal consent decree to implement reforms and changes. A federal judge ruled in May 2006 that the department has made progress in eliminating racial discrimination and corruption, and he extended the consent degree by three years. New Orleans The police department in New Orleans, Louisiana, has had more than its share of corruption and bru-

tality. The U.S. Justice Department reported in 1991 that New Orleans had the highest ranking of citizen complaints of police brutality in the country. In addition, at least 50 of the 1,400-member force has been arrested since 1993 for felonies including homicide, rape, and robberies. Likewise, prosecutions of police brutality are rare considering the number of complaints filed by citizens. Of the 819 cases of police brutality considered between 1992 and 1995, 9 were prosecuted. In 1996, of the 80 cases decided by federal prosecutors for federal districts containing New Orleans, none were prosecuted. In drug-related cases, 11 police officers were convicted of accepting nearly $100,000 from undercover agents to protect a cocaine-supply warehouse containing 286 pounds of cocaine. More recently, the New Orleans Police Department has received much media attention since the Hurricane Katrina incident, which may unveil more corruption and add to its already brutal track record. Conclusion Police corruption is still today a major concern and is not limited to one geographical region. Yet while police corruption is a major concern, it seems to be only a major concern of the residents of the abovecited cities. These three cities were consistent in both drug-related corruption and police brutality, but there is noticeably little prosecution for either. The future may look promising with the consent decrees in place and more training occurring now, but unless these departments and all others hire diverse ethical people and prosecute offenders, corruption will continue to be a major concern. References General Accounting Office. Report to the Honorable Charles B. Rangel, House of Representatives, Law Enforcement: Information on Drug-Related Police Corruption. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1998. Human Rights Watch. Shielded from Justice: Police Brutality and Accountability in the United States, 1998, http://www.hrw.org/reports98/police/. Los Angeles Police Department. Official website, http://www.lapdonline.org. “NY Police Were Mafia Hitmen.” RINF Alternative News, 7 April 2006, http://www.rinf.com/ columnists/news/ny-police-were-mafia-hitmen.

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An unidentified bone lies in a ravine in Tijuana, Mexico, on October 15, 2000, where Mexican federal agents have been searching for the remains of three bodies allegedly buried by two Los Angeles police officers from the city’s Rampart subdivision. The police corruption scandal is the most serious in LAPD history. (Getty Images)

Schmalleger, F. Criminal Justice Today. 8th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2005.

Consumer-Driven Crimes: Drugs, Gambling, and Prostitution Hua-Lun Huang Typologies of Crime Classifying crimes and applying the typologies to the comparisons and analyses of criminal behaviors have been research foci for criminologists, sociologists, and victimologists for more than one hundred years. For example, based upon the ideas of atavism and born criminals, Cesare Lombroso, the founder of criminal anthropology and modern criminology, argued in 1893 that criminal women can be categorized into “prostitutes,” “insane criminals,” “epileptic and morally insane offenders,” and “hysterical offenders.” In the 1980s and 1990s,

Marshall Clinard and colleagues contended that crimes should be divided into nine groups: interpersonal, property, public order, conventional, political, occupational, corporate, organized, and professional crimes. Like Lombroso, Clinard, and other criminologists who advanced typologies of criminal behavior, Dean Dabney identifies eight different patterns of offenses: homicide, assault, rape, robbery, burglary, property crimes, public order crimes, and crimes within corporations and other organizations. Consumer-Driven Crimes Are Victimless Crimes Drug addiction, illegal gambling, prostitution, and other consumer-driven misdemeanors (such as homosexuality and abortion) generally are classified by liberal sociologists as crimes without victims. Two reasons are frequently listed to justify this classification. First, under normal circumstances, criminal 173

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behaviors such as abusively using drugs, unlawfully gambling, and secretly buying sexual services from prostitutes do not directly involve interpersonal violence or crimes against personal property. Instead, such behaviors generally include voluntary transactions and mutual agreements between consumers (i.e., drug addicts, gamblers, and johns) and service providers (i.e., drug traffickers, owners of gambling industries, and prostitutes). Because of these two features, drug addiction, illegal gambling, and prostitution, from the perspective of victimology, do not fit into legal definitions of crime. As an alternative, they should be deemed as regular businesses. Second, besides implying regular businesses, voluntary transactions and mutual agreements also entail the idea that people who are involved in the activities of drugs, unauthorized gambling, and prostitution do not assume civil and criminal responsibilities. This is because people who are engaged in these three activities usually will not be attacked or murdered and will not experience financial losses. This characteristic, obviously, is different from what the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) called index offenses (murder, sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, auto vehicle theft, and arson) and from other less serious interpersonal and property crimes (identity theft, fraud, shoplifting, or embezzlement, to name just a few), which are always associated with identifiable victims and the issue of restorative justice. Given that drugs, gambling (without official permissions), and prostitution do not cause evident damages to a society, these acts apparently belong to the domains of personal freedom, free will, and rational choice. All of these private domains suggest that drugs, (underground) gambling, and prostitution are victimless crimes that should not be criminalized. Consumer-Driven Crimes Are Deviant Behaviors For Edwin Schur and sociologists such as Martin Weinbert and Rubington and Patricia and Peter Adler, drugs, (unregulated) gambling, and commercialized sexual behaviors should be considered as voluntary transactional behaviors. Based on this theoretical viewpoint, they examine these con-

sumer-driven activities in the context of deviant behaviors. According to these sociologists of deviance or symbolic interactionists, human behaviors usually can be given different (or even conflictual) meanings on the basis of interpersonal interactions and communications or specific conditions of external environment. This means that except for some behaviors that are commonly viewed by human societies as delinquent or antisocial acts (such as treason and incest), human behaviors (including drug addiction, prohibited gambling, and prostitution) basically do not assume any universally acceptable or valid meanings. For instance, in economically advanced countries, girl infanticides are defined by the law as crimes and, as a result, assume the negative meaning of felony. However, in certain extremely impoverished rural areas of Bangladesh, China, India, and Pakistan, the same practices might be regarded by destitute parents as necessary means for survival. (In other words, positive meanings are given to the behaviors of murdering baby girls.) This situation may lead those parents who have killed their baby girls to neutralize their homicidal behaviors and to transform girl infanticides into acceptable local customs or norms. From the angle of symbolic interactionism, what Schur and sociologists of deviance advocated is the idea that almost all deviant behaviors are products of social construction. This logic, among others, implies two things. First, the defining characteristics of drug addiction, illegal gambling, prostitution, and other consumer-propelled misdemeanors are subjective definitions with arbitrary punishments, just like the designs and functions of houses, cars, toys, furniture, and numerous other commodities are subject to personal preferences and changes. Because of this artificial process, drug addiction, (forbidden) gambling, and prostitution are not crimes per se. On the contrary, it is the reactions of social members (particularly those who belong to the command class) that make these behaviors criminalized or decriminalized. So just like Howard Becker argues, a few people are always trying to create a “better” world for others. These “moral entrepreneurs” or “moral crusaders” normally “have strong humanitarian overtones.” With such an

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A female police officer leads a woman away during a raid of an entertainment center suspected of being a front for prostitution, drug trafficking, and gambling on July 18, 2006, in Shenzhen, Guangdon Province, China. According to state media, male and female prostitution, both of which are illegal in China, are nonetheless widespread. (Getty Images)

ambition to “improve” human societies, “moral entrepreneurs” (as if chaperons of the public) will usually advocate the idea that if social members “do what is right it will be good for them.” Second, in addition to questioning the fairness and soundness of the process of criminalization, Schur and sociologists of deviance also believe that drug abuse, (impermissible) gambling, prostitution, and other consumer-driven misconducts will be stigmatized more easily and more frequently than certain serious offenses (such as corporate or financial crimes and environmental pollution). With respect to this phenomenon, the following three processes identified by Daniel Dotter seem to be very useful for sociologists to analyze the variations of stigmatization: 1. The process of meaning-creation (or creating social definitions) is a practice that will allow peo-

ple (above all, the authority figures) to allocate disapproving, contemptuous, or even demonic meanings to any behaviors that are rejected by most people or will make the majority of people feel uncomfortable, such as demonstrating backstage behaviors in front-stage regions (e.g., reading pornography in the library), getting involved in animal sex, deserting from public safety-related positions (such as some New Orleans policemen who abandoned their jobs after the city was hit by Hurricane Katrina), and using fabricated documents or other discrediting information to gain jobs, admission to college, etc. 2. The process of boundary maintenance is a course that will enable members of mainstream society to share and safeguard the negative meanings given out to deviant behaviors. 3. The process of categorization is a path that will discourage normal people of conventional society 175

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from contacting with deviants or delinquents, which will cause the latter to be isolated, both economically and socially, from mainstream society.

Consumer-Driven Crimes and Social Harms Viewing drug addiction, illegal gambling, prostitution, and other consumer-driven misdemeanors as victimless crimes or harmless deviant behaviors is not a position shared by all sociologists. As a matter of fact, some sociologists have argued that drug abuses, (unlawful) gambling, prostitution, and other consumer-driven transgressions do cause harms to a society. Because of those harms (whether they are direct or indirect), consumer-driven misconduct, just like serious offenses, must be criminalized and controlled. In terms of social harms, the idea of the Van Dijk chain reaction is extremely helpful for the public to understand the ripple effects of consumer-driven misbehavior. First, according to the hypothesis of the Van Dijk chain reaction, many crime victims will become offenders because the experience of victimization may generate the desires to compensate or retaliate: a person who lost a $20 bill may try to “earn” the bill from others, a student who lost his textbooks may try to “borrow” the books from a bookstore, a hurricane victim who lost his furniture may try to “replace” them by looting an unguarded department store, a child who was sexually molested may become a child molester when he or she gets older, and so forth. Marcus Felson summarizes these linkages between victimization experiences and restoration attempts as follows: “1. A precrime situation leads to 2. Incident A, followed by 3. The aftermath of incident A, which creates the precrime situation for 4. Incident B, followed by 5. The aftermath of incident B, which creates the precrime situation for 6. Incident C.” If the idea of the Van Dijk chain reaction is applied to the evaluation of the possible impacts of consumer-propelled offenses, then the harms brought on by drugs, illegal gambling, and prostitution to a society will be obvious. For drug abusers, the precrime situations will include, but not be limited to, lacking time and energy to work (or find jobs) while facing the urgent need for money to buy drugs. These situa-

tions, in turn, may lead to interpersonal or property crimes such as robbery, auto vehicle theft, burglary, embezzlement, fraud, or larceny. For people who gamble illegally (especially compulsively), the precrime situations will include, but not be restricted to, the urgent need for money to pay back gambling debts, loans, or usuries. These situations, again, may lead to violent or property crimes such as extortion, auto vehicle theft, burglary, embezzlement, check fraud, or larceny. For prostitutes, the precrime situations will include, but not be confined to, spreading sexually transmitted diseases (particularly HIV) to their customers or undermining married customers’ families. These situations, in turn, will create severe public health problems to a society (e.g., in Sudan, Thailand, and some African and Southeast Asian countries, hundreds of thousands of prostitutes are HIV carriers). Such precrime conditions will also destabilize marriage and family relationships and turn some families into dysfunctional or broken homes (which are usually associated with poverty and violence). Dysfunctional or broken homes then become the main sources of runaways, throwaways, and juvenile gangs who are responsible for numerous cases of vandalism, drive-by shootings, drug dealing, arson, assault, and other violent and property crimes. In summary, from the angle of the Van Dijk chain reaction, drugs, (illicit) gambling, prostitution, and other consumer-driven misconducts are not merely related to individual fantasies or personal habits. On the contrary, these offenses, more often than not, will pave the way for certain people to become involved in crimes, particularly felonies. Given that innocent people might be hurt as well as the costs connected with such serious crimes (such as building new penitentiaries) will be shared by every law-abiding member of a society, consumerinduced offenses accordingly have to be penalized and regulated. References Adler, Patricia A., and Peter Adler, eds. Constructions of Deviance: Social Power, Context, and Interaction. 5th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2006.

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Becker, Howard S. Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: Free Press, 1966. Briggs, Freda, ed. From Victim to Offender: How Child Sexual Abuse Victims Become Offenders. St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1995. Clinard, Marshall B., Richard Quinney, and John Wildeman. Criminal Behavior Systems: A Typology. 3rd ed. Cincinnati: Anderson, 1994. Dabney, Dean A. Crime Types: A Text/Reader. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2004. Doerner, William G., and Steven P. Lab. Victimology. 4th ed. Cincinnati: Anderson, 2005. Dotter, Daniel. Creating Deviance: An Interactionist Approach. Lanham, MD: AltaMira, 2004. Felson, Marcus. Crime and Everyday Life. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002. Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Doubleday, 1959. ———. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. 1963. Reprint, New York: Touchstone, 1986. Lombroso, Cesare, and Guglielmo Ferrero. Criminal Woman, the Prostitute, and the Normal Woman. Translated and introduced by Nicole Hahn Rafter and Mary Gibson. 1893. Reprint, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004. Meier, Robert F., and Gilbert Geis. Victimless Crime? Prostitution, Drugs, Homosexuality, Abortion. Los Angeles: Roxbury, 1997. O’Brien, Jodi. The Production of Reality: Essays and Readings on Social Interaction. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge, 2006. Rubington, Earl, and Martin S. Weinberg, eds. Deviance: The Interactionist Perspective. 9th ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2005. Schur, Edwin M. Crimes without Victims: Deviant Behavior and Public Policy, Abortion, Homosexuality, Drug Addiction. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965. Schur, Edwin M., and Hugo Adam Bedau. Victimless Crimes: Two Sides of a Controversy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1974.

Criminal Copyright Infringement: Pirating of Electronics, Music, and Computer Software Prapon Sahapattana The violation of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner by using copyrighted material is called copyright infringement, and the person who does

this act is called an infringer. Due to the development of digital technology, various types of copyrighted materials such as books, music, movies, and computer software can be stored in an electronic format. These materials that are kept in digital format are different from those formatted as paper, tape, and vinyl in that they can be transferred and distributed using less time and space. Computer software as well as books, music, and motion pictures in digital format can be transferred via a network, especially the Internet, that can reach receivers almost instantly. The materials that are recorded on compact discs (CDs) take little space, are lightweight, and are easy and fast to reproduce. The quality of the copies of these digital materials are virtually exactly the same as the original ones. Basically, owners of the copyrights have to invest a large amount of money, time, creative thinking, etc., in order to produce copyrighted works, whereas infringers of copyrights incur very little cost to reproduce the original works. There is, however, the small cost incurred for nonintellectual products such as material or media to store the work. Consequently, the prices of these illegal products are extremely low compared to the copyrighted products. Unauthorized reproduction and distribution of these illegal products is usually called piracy, and this term is commonly applied to the deliberate infringement of copyright both for commercial and noncommercial purposes. The profit gained from the trading of pirated products is large, and the protection against unauthorized use in different countries is not guaranteed but rather is determined by the laws of each country. Violations of digital copyrighted materials, especially music, computer software, and movies, continue worldwide. Music Piracy Music piracy can be found in three categories: simple piracy, counterfeits, and bootlegs. Simple piracy is the unauthorized copying of the original music recording for commercial profit. The package of pirated copies is usually not similar to the original one, and the pirated copies are frequently found in the form of compilations of an artist or a collection of a specific genre (for example, dance tracks). 177

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Counterfeits are the pirated copies in which packages are intended to be similar to the original in order to make buyers believe they are receiving an original product. Bootlegs are the recordings of music from live or broadcast performances for commercial purposes without permission of the copyright owners (i.e., artists, composers, and record companies). It is estimated that infringers sold 1.1 billion discs of pirated music worldwide in 2003, with a sales value of US$4.5 billion. These sales increased 4 percent from 2002. The global sales of illegal music discs from 2000 to 2003 show the increase in music piracy. The ratio of illegal to legal music copies sold also shows the increase of the global piracy rate from 2000 to 2003. The ratio was one to five in 2000, and when the illegal music copies sold comparatively increased, the ratio became one to three in 2003. The top ten countries that were blamed for failing to protect and enforce music copyrights were Brazil, China, Mexico, Paraguay, Poland, Russia, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, and Ukraine. Online music piracy by home users also causes a large amount of loss, which causes serious damage to the music industry. Home music piracy causes copyrighted music record sales to drop by 20 percent every year. The leaders of online music piracy, KaZaA and Grokster, are estimated to be responsible for 2.6 billion downloads of copyrighted music files every month. Globally, these peer-to-peer networking programs have 278 million people signed up to participate. The primary reasons for the increased growth in the music piracy business are the development of the Internet, the widespread availability of CD-R or equipment for replication of CDs, and high-speed burners. Music can now be downloaded using peer-to-peer services. These services are freely available on the Internet. Moreover, the price of CD-R has dropped dramatically in the last six years, and it is possible for any computer home user to possess this technology, while a CD-R laboratory (e.g., rows of high-speed CD burners) is widely available for commercial use. Software Piracy Software piracy is the unauthorized copying or distribution of a copyrighted software program. When

a computer user buys a licensed software package, the program is licensed for use by one user or at one computer site at a time. The user is not the owner but rather a licensed user and is not allowed to give a copy to other people. Software piracy can be grouped into five categories. End-user piracy. In this category, a computer user does the copyright violation. This user might be a home user or a company employee who makes a copy or distributes the software without permission from the copyright owner. Client-server overuse. This occurs when the number of users using a copyrighted software program, usually within a local area network, exceeds the number allowed by the license. Internet piracy. Software is easy to distribute over a network, and if it is transferred via the Internet, the number of people who can receive the illegal copies of software is large. The common websites that make pirated software available include free-download websites, websites that allow the user to download illegal copies of software for the exchange of upload programs from users, Internet auction sites, and peer-to-peer networks. Hard-disk loading. This happens when the sellers of new computers load illegal copies of software onto the hard disks to increase the value of the products. Software counterfeiting. This type of violation is found in illegal commercial piracy. The copyrighted software is duplicated and sold with packages that are made to resemble the copyrighted products. It is estimated that more than US$50 billion was spent for commercial packaged software around the world to use on personal computers (PCs) in 2003, but the software that was installed in the same year was valued at almost US$80 billion. This means that about US$30 billion, or 36 percent, of pirated software was used in 2003. However, the software piracy rates around the world were lower in 2002 (39 percent) than in 1994 (59 percent). The trend of software piracy rates around the world from 1994 to 2002 also decreased. The rates from this period were as follows: 1994 (49 percent), 1995 (46 percent), 1996 (43 percent), 1997 (40 percent), 1998 (38 percent), 1999 (36 percent), 2000 (37 percent), 2001 (40 percent), and 2002 (39 percent).

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These rates were calculated from the volume of software pirated as a percent of total software installed on computers. The retail software revenue estimated losses to piracy throughout the world from 1994 to 2002 fluctuated from US$12 billion in 1994 to about US$13 billion in 2002. The top ten countries that had the highest software piracy rates in 2003 were China, Vietnam, Ukraine, Indonesia, Russia, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Paraguay. At the other end of the spectrum, the bottom ten countries that had the lowest rates in 2003 were the United States, New Zealand, Denmark, Austria, Sweden, Belgium, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia. There were many reasons behind the increase in software piracy, including the slowing down of economic conditions; the increasing number of computer users, especially home users and small business users; and the increasing availability of pirated software on the Internet, particularly from peer-topeer networks. Studies show that when the economy slows down, the rate of software piracy increases due to the decreasing power of users to purchase.

for transmission, transmitted, and publicly performed online, and these transactions are considered piracy if they are done without permission from the copyright owners. Digital motion pictures are easily compressed and uploaded for direct download to play on a computer. This downloadable format of digital movies is illegally offered and distributed to other users on the Internet. Moreover, they can be transmitted to users to view in real time, which is called streaming media. Generally, digital motion pictures in DVD are protected from being copied by using an encryption process, but unfortunately software to decrypt and make illegal copies of motion pictures onto a computer is widely available. The Asian Pacific region had the highest motion picture piracy rate in 2003, with 84 percent of the total seizures of pirated optical discs around the world, while China, Malaysia, and Taiwan are among the notable hubs for optical disc piracy in this region.

Movie Piracy For piracy in the movie industry, it is estimated that the U.S. motion picture industry loses, in potential revenue, more than $3 billion every year due to copyright violations. This does not include the loss due to the illegal downloading of movies from the Internet. Movie piracy in digital format can be found in two main categories. Piracy in hard goods. This includes the illegal sale, distribution, or trading of copies of motion pictures in various formats. The format that is a major threat to the motion picture industry is the one kept in optical discs, which includes laser discs (LDs), digital versatile discs (DVDs), and video compact discs (VCDs). In 2000, more than 20 million pirated optical discs were seized worldwide. Illegal copies of motion pictures are also found in other formats such as videocassettes. These hard goods are illegally sold on various websites, including online auctions and by using e-mail solicitations. Internet piracy. Motion pictures in digital format can be sold, traded, leased, distributed, uploaded

References American Federation of Musicians. “Online Music Piracy,” http://www.afm.org/public/departments/ leg_issues_05.php. Business Software Alliance. “Types of Piracy,” http://www.bsa.org/usa/antipiracy/Types-ofPiracy.cfm. Eighth Annual BSA Global Software. “Piracy Study: Trends in Software Piracy, 1994–2002,” June 2003, http://www.caast.com/resources/2003_global _study.pdf. First Annual BSA and IDC Global Software. “Piracy Study: July 2004,” http://www.caast.com/ resources/IDC_Global_Software_Piracy_Study _2004.pdf. IFPI. “Global Sales of Pirate Music CD Top 1 Billion; One in 3 Discs Is Illegal; Pirate Sales at US$4.6 Billion,” http://www.ifpi.org/content/ section_news/20030710.html. ———. “Music Pirate Sales Hit Record 1.1 Billion Discs but Spread of Fake CD Trade Slows,” http://www.ifpi.org/content/section_news/ 20040722.html. ———. “What Is Piracy?” http://www.dontbuycds .org/piracy.htm. Motion Picture Association of America. “AntiPiracy,” http://www.mpaa.org/piracy.asp. Business Software Alliance. “Seventh Annual BSA Global Software Piracy Study,” June 2002, http://www.bsa.org/resources/upload/BSA179

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Seventh-Annual-Global-Software-PiracyStudy.pdf. United States Copyright Office. “Copyright Law of the United States of America and Related Laws Contained in Title 17 of the United States Code 501,” http://www.copyright.gov/title17/ 92chap5.html. ———. “International Copyright,” http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl100.html. Webopedia. “Software Piracy,” http://sbc.webopedia .com/TERM/S/software_piracy.html.

Criminal Motor Vehicle Theft and Trafficking Georgios A. Antonopoulos In early December 1996, the attendees of an international conference held in Warsaw and organized by the United Nations (UN) recognized that the theft and trafficking of motor vehicles, including cars, trucks, and motorcycles, had increased in the 1990s and had proven to be a lucrative international business for the groups involved. There have been a number of reasons for the presence and flourishing of this trade. These include: 1. The demand for motor vehicles made in the Western world and simultaneously the inability of the people in poorer countries to afford these motor vehicles. 2. The collapse of the former Soviet bloc and the relaxation in border controls. 3. The ownership of motor vehicles in the industrially advanced and generally richer world, which has increased considerably. 4. The lack of legislation, the discrepancies and differences in legislation, lenient legislation in relation to motor vehicle trafficking in a large number of countries, inadequate law enforcement, and the generally low risks associated with the crime. 5. Corruption.

Modus Operandi Motor vehicle theft and trafficking groups are composed of a number of members who perform specific duties that may differ according to the context and time of the operations. There is usually an individual managing the whole operation. Moreover, each group usually has members who steal the

motor vehicles, mechanics who disassemble and assemble the vehicles and change vehicle identity, vehicle document forgers, drivers who drive the motor vehicles to other provinces or to the transit or destination countries, and sellers who many times are owners of legitimate motor vehicle businesses. In many instances, one individual may handle two duties. The motor vehicle theft and trafficking groups are generally cooperating individuals in various countries. However, there are a number of motor vehicle theft and trafficking groups that are organized along ethnic lines, some of them being very coherent. There are basically four ways of stealing a motor vehicle: 1. By duplicating the vehicle’s keys. Car attendees outside nightclubs are sometimes involved in the duplication of keys used for the theft of luxurious cars (Porsche, Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Audi) in Greece. 2. By stealing the motor vehicles from garages, car parks, or streets. 3. By not returning rental motor vehicles. 4. By robbing owners of their motor vehicles. This is a very popular practice on the roads and highways of Italy.

In cases where the vehicle stays in the country, the identity of the vehicle is changed, and it is introduced to the market as a secondhand car. In the case of trafficking the vehicle out of the country, there are a variety of methods. The stolen motor vehicles are driven to the borders and then into the transit or destination countries. This is a method of trafficking through borderlines with absent or inadequate control. Another way of trafficking motor vehicles is by disassembling and carrying them to the transit or destination country in other vehicles or even in luggage. In Nigeria, there are a number of chop shops where car mechanics, also known as supermechanics, can disassemble and assemble any car and reintroduce it to the market. A very popular way of trafficking stolen motor vehicles out of source countries is by transporting them by ship to the transit or destination country and finally by shipping stolen vehicles in containers among legal commodities. In a large number of cases, and specifically in those cases

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where a certain degree of sophistication is needed, fraudulent motor vehicle and driver documents are used. Up to one-third of Mercedes-Benz, Audi, BMW, and other luxury cars in the city of Kaliningrad in Russia had been stolen in the West. The major international trafficking routes of the stolen vehicles are: • From European Union (EU) member states and specifically Italy, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany to Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union. • From EU member states and specifically Greece to Southeastern Europe. • From EU member states to the Middle East and the Far East. • From EU member states, and specifically the United Kingdom and Spain, to Africa. • From Japan to Russia and countries of Southeast Asia. • From the United States and Canada to Central and South America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa.

The reaction of the international law enforcement community to the theft and trafficking of motor vehicles, embodied primarily in the exchange of information on the issues and on specific cases, has been intensifying. The General Secretariat of Interpol, for instance, developed a stolen motor vehicle database including the national motor vehicle theft and trafficking records of more than eighty countries. References Antonopoulos, G. A. “Albanian Organised Crime: A View from Greece.” Crime and Justice International 19(77) (2003): 5–9. Europol. “An Overview on Motor Vehicle Crime from a European Perspective—January 2004.” Europol report, 2004, http://www.europol.europa .eu/publications/SeriousCrimeOverviews/2004/ OverviewMotorVehicleCrime2004.pdf. Gant, F., and P. Graborsky. “The Stolen Vehicle Parts Market.” Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 215 (2001): 1–6. Gerber, J., and M. Killias. “The Transnationalization of Historically Local Crime: Auto Theft in Western Europe and Russian Markets.” European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 11(2) (2003): 215–226. Interpol. “Vehicle Crime,” 2005, http://www.interpol .int/Public/Vehicle/Default.asp. Parker, G. L. The Japanese Police System Today: A Comparative Study. Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2001. Royal Canadian Mounted Police. “Organised Crime and Automobile Theft,” 1998, http://www .rcmp.ca.

The trend that can be observed is that the internationally trafficked motor vehicles follow the route from richer to poorer countries. Linkage to Other Criminal Activity Motor vehicle theft and trafficking represents a chain of criminal activities. Apart from the actual theft of the motor vehicle, the trafficking groups commit vehicle certificate forgery, threat and violence against owners of motor vehicles, corruption of law enforcement and customs officials, and money laundering. Motor vehicle theft and trafficking are also connected to a number of illicit trades. Intelligence units suggest that motor vehicle theft is committed to finance other criminal activities. Organized crime groups in Mexico steal motor vehicles and use them to transport drugs to the United States, and Albanian police informers have argued that a number of Albanian luxury car thieves were exchanging the cars with heroin and cocaine at the Greek-Albanian borders in the early 1990s. Finally, an arrested Lebanese ethnic group involved in theft and trafficking of motor vehicles in Canada brought to light the funneling of large amounts of money to a terrorist group in Lebanon.

Criminal Trafficking and Trade in Counterfeit Consumer Products Vesna Markovic Introduction Each year billions of dollars’ worth of consumer products are counterfeited and sold in markets worldwide. The expanding global economy and open international borders allow these items to be moved across borders with relative ease. Criminals take products with brand names and duplicate them, often without ensuring quality or safety, in an attempt to pass them off as the real product. Counterfeiters depend on brand loyalty in order to sell 181

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Chinese enforcement officers examine packets of counterfeit brand cigarettes seized from a warehouse in Shenyang in northeastern China’s Liaoning province on March 9, 2005. (AFP/Getty Images)

their knockoff products no matter what the price per unit. Many people are aware of counterfeit products such as designer apparel, watches, handbags, sunglasses, and other such accessories as well as CDs that can be found in flea markets for as little as $5. Counterfeit products include, but are not limited to, computer software, CDs, DVDs and other electronic goods and equipment; automotive parts; tobacco; cigarettes; alcohol; apparel; toiletries (shampoo, soap, perfume, etc.); and pharmaceutical products. A Global Problem It is believed that 5–7 percent of world trade is composed of counterfeit consumer products. Worldwide estimates range from $350 billion to $450 billion a year earned from the trafficking of counterfeit consumer products. The problem is more prevalent in certain regions of the world,

such as in China and parts of South America, but it also affects many countries worldwide. The Brazilian Federal Revenue Secretariat, for example, estimates that the amount of counterfeit products manufactured in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay alone nets $1.5 billion a year. It is not known how many products made it into the United States undetected. However, in 2003, U.S. Customs and Border Protection seized $94 million worth of counterfeit consumer products, a majority of which were manufactured and shipped from China: Product Cigarettes Apparel Handbags, wallets, backpacks DVDs, VHSs, and VCDs Consumer electronics

Value $41.7 million $14 million $11.5 million $7.3 million $3.8 million

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Watches Footwear Toys/Games Sunglasses Headwear Other goods

$3.4 million $2.6 million $1.5 million $1.3 million $1.3 million $5.7 million

Consumer product counterfeiting takes advantage of the global economy as well as exploits countries that are economically unstable by manufacturing and transporting products at minimal cost. There are several stages that occur between the process of making the products and the time they are available for public consumption. Some groups are involved in all stages of consumer product counterfeiting, while others specialize in capital, production, distribution, or the eventual sale of products. Products can be manufactured in one country and then shipped to another country. Also, the parts may be manufactured in one country and sent to another country, where they are assembled and possibly even shipped to a third country for distribution. In some cases, particularly in counterfeit apparel, knockoffs are produced in one country and shipped to their destination, where the designer labels are then sewn on to avoid detection during shipment. Counterfeiters like to use many countries as transshipment points in order to disguise the origination point of the shipments. The transshipment points often consist of countries with lax or lessstringent customs control. Products are sometimes shipped in cargo by themselves or hidden among legitimate shipments, and in some cases legitimate products, which are oftentimes stolen, are mixed in with shipments of counterfeit goods. The counterfeit consumer products are shipped via air, land, and sea. They are often shipped using different routes to avoid detection, although there are some central hubs, such as Antwerp, that are often used as transit points, and there are also areas in which warehouses are maintained to store inventory. The sale of counterfeit consumer products has expanded with the advent of the Internet. Some counterfeiters have created websites to sell their products directly to the consumer, while others use Internet auction sites to sell their counterfeit products. Some websites will offer wholesale prices on

brand name products that are counterfeits. Other more common avenues for the sale of counterfeit consumer products are flea markets, local stores, and street vendors. Street vendors and flea markets tend to mark down prices on counterfeit products depending on their quality, while some of the better-quality products are sold for near the price of the genuine product. Even though there is no quality control over the manufacture of counterfeit products, they are often still knowingly bought by consumers who are willing to sacrifice quality to avoid paying high prices for merchandise. Besides health and safety risks to consumers, companies suffer losses in revenue, which includes money spent to increase difficulty of counterfeiting their products (protection of logos by using 3D logos or holograms), loss in tax revenue for governments, and loss of jobs in certain industries. While many industries and governments suffer losses because of product counterfeiting, criminals not only reap economic benefits but are also at low risk of being punished. Penalties for counterfeiting often consist of fines and rarely lead to lengthy prison terms, which only serves to encourage this type of crime. Selling counterfeit products can be more profitable than the sale of drugs in many cases pound for pound, while the penalties for drug trafficking are more than twice as harsh. Conclusion Consumer product counterfeiting often works in conjunction with other types of organized criminal activities. Many routes used to ship counterfeit consumer products are already established routes that are often used for drug trafficking, arms trafficking, cigarette smuggling, and even human trafficking, although counterfeiters like to change routes to avoid detection. Money laundering is also a prevalent phenomenon in consumer product counterfeiting. Illegal profits from consumer product counterfeiting need to be given an appearance of legitimacy and are therefore laundered. References Hopkins, David M., Lewis T. Kontnik, and Mark T. Turnage. Counterfeiting Exposed: How to Protect 183

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Your Brand and Market Share. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003. Phillips, Tim. Knockoff: The Deadly Trade in Counterfeit Goods. London: Kogan Page, 2005. Union des Fabricants. “Union des Fabricants Pour La Protection Internationale De la Propriété Industrielle et Artistique,” 2003, www.unifab.com. U.S. Customs and Border Protection. “U.S. Customs and Border Protection Announces Intellectual Property Rights Seizure Data,” 4 January 2004, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news _releases/archives/2004_press_releases/012004/ 01142004_5.xml.

Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime: The Rise and Evolution of International Drug Cartels Gary Potter Drug cartels are composed of independent drug trafficking organizations that have pooled their resources in order to cooperate with each other. Drug cartels are often incorrectly conceived of as single organized crime groups with thousands of members, wide geographical scope, and vertical control of the drug business from the point of harvest to the point of retail sales on the streets. Nothing could be further from the truth. Drug cartels are merely associations of many smaller organized crime groups into a loose confederation of business associates. Some of the syndicates in a cartel may produce raw materials. Others may have wellestablished modalities for transportation. Still others may have money laundering operations in place or may have important political and law enforcement connections to facilitate the creation of corrupt relations. Drug trafficking groups may decide to enter into a cartel relationship for any number of reasons. Most commonly, smaller independent syndicates enter into a franchise relationship with a larger, betterorganized, and more stable syndicate. Another reason for the creation of a drug cartel is to bring together traffickers with differing strengths in the various aspects of the drug trade. In this arrangement, each of the independent syndicates realizes that it has a weakness that is compensated for by

other syndicates. An organization with strong connections to the growers of a particular plant may need to align with another organization possessing skilled chemists to convert that plant into a highquality drug. Still other organizations may be skilled in smuggling, and yet other criminal networks may have access to buyers in another country. Occasionally, independent drug syndicates come together into a cartel because of a need for highly specialized services. For example, opium-growing warlords in the Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, Thailand) of Southeast Asia established working relationships with various Chinese organized crime groups in Hong Kong and Taiwan because they needed to move their product to markets worldwide and needed to launder their profits, and a financial structure adequate to the task was not available in the Golden Triangle. In these cases, drug cartels provide references and contacts for the establishment of contractual arrangements related to specific tasks. Finally, a more contemporary form of drug cartel operations involves a simple exchange between independent criminal organizations in which a good or service is exchanged for another. An example of this is the relationship between Colombian cocaine syndicates and drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. The Colombians contract with the Mexicans to move their cocaine into the United States. In return for this service, Mexican organizations take half of the load they are smuggling as their fee and distribute it to smaller Mexican drug trafficking organizations in the United States for retail sale. Colombian Cocaine Cartels Colombian drug trafficking organizations handle 75 percent of the world’s cocaine. Colombia’s role as a cocaine producer is geographically determined. It shares borders with Peru and Bolivia, major coca leaf growers. In addition, Colombia is close to its major cocaine market, the United States, only a two and a half-hour flight from Miami. Finally, Colombia is the only country in South America with both a Caribbean and Pacific Ocean coastline, opening up a variety of options for maritime and air smuggling routes. Coca leaves are transported to Colombia from Peru and Bolivia along remote mountain trails.

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Leaves are delivered to hundreds of locations where the rudimentary process of converting them into coca paste is accomplished. The coca paste is then carried in light aircraft to cocaine-producing facilities in the Colombian interior, where it is processed into cocaine hydrochloride, the white crystalline powder, that, after being cut, is sold to cocaine users. Colombian cocaine cartels did much of their own smuggling in the 1970s and 1980s, using maritime shipping and both private and commercial aircraft. But by the 1990s, they had subcontracted the distribution of cocaine to Mexican drug traffickers. The cocaine was moved from Colombia to Mexico, where it was turned over to Mexican organizations for transport to the United States. By the 1990s, most cocaine entering the United States was coming through Mexico. Recently, Colombian drug cartels have made the smuggling process easier by adding chemical compounds to cocaine hydrochloride to produce black cocaine, which is undetectable by standard chemical tests or drug-sniffing canines. Some Colombian cartels continue to be active in the United States. These cartels establish cells in specific geographic areas. Typically, these cells are structured around familial relations or longtime friendships. This arrangement impedes attempts by investigators to infiltrate a cell. Cells are structurally compartmentalized with a well-defined division of labor. Each cell specializes in a different aspect of the cocaine trade in the geographic location where it is found. Some cells transport drugs. Some are responsible for storing cocaine for future sale. Some cells are engaged in money laundering and have no contact with the drug itself. Others are involved in the actual wholesale trading of cocaine to retail drug networks. Cells are made up of ten employees who have no knowledge about the membership, location, or activities of other cells. Cell structure is characterized by a chain of command in which the head of each cell reports to a regional director for the drug trafficking network operating with the cartel structure, and only to that individual. The regional director, in turn, reports to a designated individual in Colombia. Colombian cartels make use of the most sophisticated communications technologies. Particularly

A beagle with the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) is trained to detect contraband materials. The CBP is a branch of the Department of Homeland Security. (Department of Homeland Security/James Tourtellotte)

important are state-of-the-art encryption devices that translate communications into indecipherable codes. Encryption technology not only hides information about drug transactions but also hides financial information related to money laundering. The Medellin Cartel The first major Colombian cartel appeared in the mid-1970s, headquartered in Medellin and led by the Ochoa brothers (Fabio, Jorge, and Juan David), Carlos Lehder, Pablo Escobar, and Jose Rodriguez Gacha. The Medellin cartel dominated the cocaine trade in New York and Miami. The name “Medellin cartel” is somewhat misleading. The Medellin cartel was never a single drug trafficking organization but rather a loose organizational confederation of many drug syndicates operating out of Medellin. It was Lehder who introduced the idea of moving cocaine on small private aircraft from a transshipment point. In 1976, he bought a sizable portion of 185

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the Bahamian island of Norman’s Cay, only 225 miles southeast of Miami. He built an airstrip as a refueling spot for the aircraft that flew cocaine from Colombia and then on to the United States. The tendency of some of the Medellin cartel’s associates to use violence as a method of dispute settlement eventually led to the cartel’s downfall. Cartel members were responsible for the 1984 assassination of Rodrigo Lara Bonilla (Colombia’s minister of justice) and a subsequent attack on the Colombian Supreme Court. The Colombian government, in response, extradited Lehder to the United States in February 1987. He was convicted of cocaine trafficking and sentenced to 135 years in a federal prison, a sentence that was reduced in return for his cooperation in the prosecution of Panamanian dictator Manuel Noreiga. Medellin cartel violence continued, however, marked by the 1989 bombing of an Avianca commercial airliner that killed 110 people, among them 2 police informants. Additionally, Escobar also placed bounties of $1,000–$3,000 on police officers in Colombia. In June 1991, Escobar turned himself in to Colombian authorities but escaped confinement in July 1992. In December 1993, Escobar was shot to death by Colombian police at a residence in Medellin after a nationwide manhunt. Escobar’s demise, of course, did not lead to the demise of Medellin drug trafficking networks. Smaller, more decentralized, and more profuse networks have filled any gap created by the removal of Escobar and Lehder from the scene. The Ochoa brothers continue to be active participants in large-scale cocaine trafficking. The Cali Cartel In the 1980s, cocaine trafficking groups based in Cali, a city 200 miles south of Medellin, gained prominence in the cocaine market. The Cali cartel was not a single organizational entity but rather a confederation of syndicates sharing resources and cooperating with each other. Cali cartel members shunned publicity, avoided violence, and posed as ostensibly legitimate businessmen. They used sophisticated business techniques to manage their operations and avoid arrest. Thousands of contract employees were used as surrogates to handle the

actual cocaine trafficking. Every aspect of the business was insulated from other aspects. The leaders of the Cali cartel included the Rodriguez-Orejuela brothers (Gilberto and Miguel), Jose Santacruz-Londono, “Pacho” HerreraBuitrago, and Victor Julio Patino-Fomeque. Several Cali leaders were under indictment in the United States in the 1990s, but the Colombian constitution forbade their extradition. Under pressure from President Bill Clinton’s administration, the Colombians used information developed by U.S. investigations to indict the Cali cartel’s leadership in Colombia. Much like their brethren in Medellin, the old networks of the Cali cartel have reorganized as smaller, more diffuse and decentralized, and more prolific drug networks, still very much tied to the legitimate business community of Cali. Colombian Heroin Syndicates One reason that the Colombian cartels passed off much of their wholesaling business to Mexican drug organizations is the increasing Colombian role in the production and sale of heroin. Starting in the late 1980s and increasing in the 1990s, Colombian cartels have expanded into the growing and smuggling of high-grade heroin, supplying 65 percent of the U.S. heroin market. By growing their own opium, Colombian drug organizations have reduced their reliance on Peruvian and Bolivian coca leaf suppliers. The opium poppy grows exceptionally well along the eastern slopes of the Central Andean Mountains in Colombia. Opium growers in Colombia work under contract to a drug cartel. The cartel supplies the growers with seeds and agricultural supplies, and the grower agrees to sell the opium gum to the cartels. Chemists process the opium gum into morphine base and then into heroin. Because heroin is smuggled in small quantities, the methods for smuggling are virtually unlimited. Some smugglers use hollowed-out shoes or sew it into the lining of their clothes, some hide it in other shipments of commercial goods, and others simply swallow it after wrapping it condoms. The Colombian heroin trade is dominated by a series of new smaller drug cartels operating independently of the cocaine cartels. The Colombian

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heroin networks, unlike their cocaine trafficking counterparts, still direct most of their business to the United States. Contemporary Colombian Cartels At the new millennium, the Cali cartel no longer dominates the cocaine market. Law enforcement efforts against the Medellin and Cali cartels had the effect of further segmenting and decentralizing the drug trade in Colombia, making it harder than ever to control. A number of veteran drug traffickers who had operated under the aegis of the Cali cartel have become significant powers in their own right. As of 2002, much of the cocaine traffic in Colombia is centered in the northern Valle del Cauca region, of which Cali is the capital city. Cocaine traffickers in this region operate independently of each other and have passed some of the major responsibilities for cocaine smuggling and wholesaling on to drug trafficking syndicates in Mexico. Among the new drug organizations in this region are the Henao-Montoya syndicate, the MontoyaSanchez organization, and the Urdinola-Grajles network. These groups are closely allied with rightwing death squads and paramilitary units in the region under the control of Carlos Castano. In Cali, Victor Patino-Fomeque, a Cali cartel leader, continues to direct a drug syndicate from prison. The Cali-based Herrera-Vasquez organization moves large quantities of cocaine to the United States via Central America and Mexico. The Herrera-Vasquez organization also launders drug money destined for Colombia through Panama and Mexico. In Bogotá, “Juvenal” Bernal-Madrigal provides transportation services for Mexican Colombian traffickers. He is responsible for multiton shipments of cocaine and the transportation of large amounts of drug money from Colombia to Mexico. Finally, in Medellin, the Ochoa brothers are also back in the cocaine business. Mexican Drug Cartels Mexican drug syndicates have been trafficking marijuana and heroin for decades. In the 1990s they entered the cocaine market, first as surrogates for and then as partners of Colombian syndicates.

Mexico’s 2,000-mile-long border with the United States, much of which is in isolated rural areas with rugged terrain, makes it an obvious transshipment site for drugs. Its extensive coastal and inland mountain systems create perfect havens for growing marijuana and opium poppies. Additionally, there is an enormous flow of legitimate commerce across the U.S.-Mexican border every day. In 1999, 295 million people, 88 million automobiles, and 4.5 million trucks and rail cars entered the United States from Mexico. That volume of commerce creates many opportunities for drug smuggling. Mexico is also a haven for drug trafficking because of widespread corruption in its law enforcement and judicial systems and the lack of resources available to Mexican police. In the 1980s, Mexican drug syndicates acted as transshipment agents for Colombian organizations. By the 1990s, Mexican traffickers were paid 50 percent of each shipment. This arrangement allowed them to enter the wholesale cocaine business. By 1995, Mexican cartels dominated the wholesale cocaine market in the midwestern and western states. Mexican cartels are compartmentalized and have a vertical chain of command emanating from Mexico. Mexican cartels have surrogates throughout the United States who manage day-to-day activities. Unlike other drug syndicates that have insulated their home-base operations by granting greater autonomy to cells in foreign countries, Mexican syndicates still retain a system whereby Mexican-based leaders provide specific instructions to their foreign-based operatives on such issues as warehousing drugs, transportation services, and money laundering. Two-thirds of the cocaine sold in the United States is transshipped from Mexico. Cocaine comes into Mexico from Colombia by air or boat. It is transported by truck to repositories in Juarez or Guadalajara. From these repositories, cocaine is driven across the border, most commonly to Los Angeles, Chicago, and Phoenix. Surrogates in those cities have contractual arrangements with trucking companies to move the cocaine across the country to smaller warehousing facilities closer to the point of sale. Individuals working in these stash houses 187

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U.S. Customs Patrol Officers remove hundreds of pounds of marijuana in burlap backpacks from the desert near the Mexican border. (Department of Homeland Security)

guard the supplies and make arrangement for its distribution by wholesalers. Mexican cartels also play a large role in the U.S. methamphetamine market. They engage in the large-scale production of methamphetamine, operating clandestine laboratories in Mexico and California capable of producing hundreds of pounds of the drug. Mexican heroin makes up about 29 percent of the U.S. heroin supply. Mexican cartels produce six metric tons of heroin a year for sale in the United States. Because of crude refining methods, Mexican heroin is frequently dark in color and sticky or gummy (like tar), resulting in its name of black-tar heroin. Like many criminal organizations in the early stages of establishing control of an illicit market, Mexican syndicates engage in widespread violence. Examples include the 1998 killings of 22 people in Baja California Norte carried out by rival drug traffickers and the 300 people murdered in Tijuana in

1998, 75 percent of which were attributable to drug trafficking disputes. Major Mexican cartels include the ArellanoFelix organization, based in Tijuana, that moves multiton quantities of cocaine and marijuana and significant amounts of heroin and methamphetamine. The Caro-Quintero syndicate is based in Sonora and specializes in trafficking in cocaine and marijuana. The Juarez Cartel is heavily involved in the trafficking of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. The Amezcua-Contreras organization is based in Guadalajara. It is a massive methamphetamine trafficking syndicate and a major supplier of precursor chemicals to other methamphetamine syndicates. This syndicate controls much of the legitimate trade in chemicals in Mexico as well. Dominican Drug Organizations The Dominican Republic is one of the poorest countries in the world. Dominican drug traffickers

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began as retail cocaine dealers in immigrant communities in the United States. The most famous of these communities was the Washington Heights area of New York City. In the mid-1970s, Dominican immigrants moved into this community and began handling Colombian-supplied cocaine. Soon, their trafficking activities had spread into New Jersey, Connecticut, and some of the affluent suburbs of New York. In the 1990s, Dominican traffickers entered the wholesale cocaine market by offering Colombian suppliers a better deal than Mexican syndicates: a smuggling fee of only 25 percent of the load. Using drug distribution systems already established in immigrant communities, two major Dominican drug syndicates emerged. One, operating out of the Dominican Republic, provides stash sites for cocaine shipments. Cocaine is transported into the Dominican Republic in small boats or by airdrops. Dominican traffickers then smuggle the drugs into Puerto Rico in boats, repackage the drugs, and ship them to the continental United States in containerized maritime cargo ships or on routine commercial air flights. Once in New York City, the cocaine is distributed by a second syndicate of ethnic Dominicans that operates along the East Coast. Dominican syndicates rotate members in the United States. Typically, they move operatives in for a two-year stay and then retire them to the island.

able to work in close collusion with police, the military, politicians, and businessmen to spawn a massive drug and sex trade empire in the region. Drug trade profits are the source for most new commercial and business investments in the region. Heroin production is dominated by ethnic drugtrafficking armies operating mostly in Burma’s remote opium-producing region. The drug-trafficking armies had begun as insurgent groups, often supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). But over the years, these armies have primarily engaged in heroin trafficking and in other illicit and lucrative economic activities, including gem smuggling, illegal logging, and timber smuggling. As a result of its continuing political repression, the military regime in Burma has negotiated treaties with most of these armies that allow the regime to fight any social or political changes in the country in return for a carte blanche to drug traffickers. Ethnic Chinese criminal organizations and some Thai criminal networks act as brokers, financial backers, and transporters in the Southeast Asian heroin trade. Operating out of major regional commercial centers in Bangkok, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan and using a wide array of interchangeable front companies and legitimate businesses, Chinese and Thai criminal networks also arrange financing and transportation of drugs, routing drugs through many different ports—largely by commercial shipping—to their final destination.

Southeast Asian Heroin Cartels The opium-growing regions of Burma and Laos have made Southeast Asia the second-largest source region for the world’s supply of heroin. Cultivating the opium poppy is still the economic mainstay of the many hill tribes living in isolated, rural, impoverished areas of Southeast Asia. Heroin is often smuggled on fishing boats down the Gulf of Thailand and then transferred to the major international maritime shipping centers of Singapore and Hong Kong. In addition to Thailand, Cambodia is being increasingly utilized as a transshipment route for heroin. Massive criminal organizations, virtually immune from law enforcement interference because of widespread corruption in the governments and business communities of Southeast Asia, have been

References Eskridge, Chris. “The Mexican Cartels: A Challenge for the 21st Century.” Criminal Organizations 12(1/2) (1998): 5–15. Jackall, R. Wild Cowboys: Urban Marauders and the Forces of Order. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997. Kline, H. Colombia: Democracy under Assault. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995. Renard, R. The Burmese Connection: Illegal Drugs and the Making of the Golden Triangle. Boulder: Rienner, 1996. Schaffer, E. “Mexico’s Internal State Conflict over the War on Drugs.” Criminal Organizations 10(3) (Spring 1996): 14–16. Zabludoff, S. “Colombian Narcotics Organizations As Business Enterprises.” Transnational Organized Crime 3(2) (1998): 20–49. 189

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Fuel Racketeering, Motor-Fuel Tax Fraud, and Illegal Export Smuggling Joseph Serio As with other taxed products such as cigarettes and alcohol, motor fuel is a commodity that is manipulated, transported, and smuggled as part of criminal efforts to generate illicit profits through the evasion of taxes. Not limited to the United States, motor fuel is illegally moved across jurisdictions around the world, including Canada and Mexico. Major Fraud Schemes Motor fuel, which includes gasoline, diesel fuel, and kerosene, is transported from terminals and other storage facilities to market. Taxes are applied to the gasoline at the terminal when the motor fuel is being loaded into tankers. Nontaxable motor fuel is dyed at this point in the transportation chain. As the fuel moves through the terminal, the owner of the fuel becomes liable for payment of the tax. All persons eligible as owners of the fuel are registered with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) prior to taking possession of the fuel. Terminal operators must be registered with the IRS also. One common approach in defrauding the government of fuel taxes is called the daisy chain scheme, which, in its essentials, involves making it appear that the motor fuel has passed through a series of wholesale distributors before reaching the retail pump. Fuel sales are, in fact, paper transactions, and the fuel never moves from the storage facility until the last participant in the daisy chain sells the fuel to a retail outlet. At some point in the chain of transactions, one company, having a valid IRS fuel tax form, would raise the invoice price of the fuel when it sells the fuel to a company without the form, thereby giving the appearance of having paid the federal and state taxes as required by law. This company, commonly referred to as a burn company or butterfly company, is frequently little more than a mail box address whose purpose is to insulate all other daisy chain companies from detection by appearing to be responsible for the taxes. Each wholesale distributor appears to be invoiced by the company above it in the chain, with each invoice reflecting a slightly higher price per

gallon than the price paid by the seller. The price increases incrementally, giving the appearance of a series of legitimate transactions. This series of links in the daisy chain creates a phony paper trail used to divert investigators from the beneficiary operators of the fraudulent activity. The burn companies are designated as the taxation point for all companies in the chain. The front firms are later placed in bankruptcy. Motor fuel bootlegging takes the daisy chain idea a step further. Taxpayers scheming to divert tax payments into their own coffers take advantage of the difference in tax rates between jurisdictions. They simply move the fuel from the high tax rate area to the low tax rate area and pocket the difference. Given the tens of millions of gallons of fuel that are moved each day, the profits on this scheme are significant. A third approach to evading payment of motor fuel taxes is known as cocktailing. As the name suggests, this method of tax evasion entails mixing new motor fuel with old motor fuel or even other substances such as cleaning agents or unrefined fuel products. There are two reasons that this approach is attractive to bootleggers and smugglers. The lowgrade additives used to extend the motor fuel are not part of the official fuel-reporting system and are not taxed. The second reason is that some of the fluids used to extend the motor fuel are actually regulated waste materials. An individual may get paid by the government to dispose of the waste materials and, instead of disposing of them, uses them in the motor fuel, thus in essence getting paid twice. Investigations across the United States reveal the mixing of non-motor fuel petroleum products such as kerosene, jet fuel, and hazardous materials with legal diesel. For many years, elements of the motor vehicle fuel industry in several states have been invaded by various organized crime operations that seek to take advantage of legitimate fuel businesses as well as the motoring public by engaging in daisy chain operations, bootlegging, or extending motor vehicle fuel with inexpensive, tax-free, non-motor vehicle petroleum products. These non-motor vehicle petroleum components can be purchased from the refineries and then mixed with motor vehicle fuel and sold as motor vehicle fuel. The incentive for

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financial gain is high in that the components are relatively inexpensive compared to motor vehicle fuel, highway use taxes are not paid on these products, and sales taxes collected at the pump are not paid. The criminals simply disappear or change their names. The distribution operation resurfaces and operates with the same individuals using a different business name. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Russian and Italian organized criminal elements have been the most visible groups perpetrating these frauds, as portrayed in the media. However, this activity is engaged in by both large and small groups and is not dependent on ethnic identity or nationality. One major fuel component that is not subject to the tax at the terminal is aviation fuel. Most aviation fuel is a special grade of kerosene. The IRS allows undyed jet fuel to be removed from terminals without payment of taxes if it is determined that the fuel is destined for use as a fuel in an aircraft. This exemption is generally allowed if the buyer of the jet fuel at the terminal certifies in writing that the jet fuel will be used as a fuel in an aircraft. If the jet fuel is later diverted from aircraft use, the seller of the jet fuel at that time is liable for the taxes. The incentive to divert jet fuel from aircraft use is that the jet fuel can readily be used in on-road diesel trucks. The unscrupulous seller can add on a tax to the fuel sold to the buyer that the seller himself never paid to the government. In addition to daisy chaining, bootlegging, cocktailing, and diverting aviation fuel, some schemes are built on simpler, more direct approaches. For example, tax evaders may simply falsify records to show that taxes have been paid on fuel to state or federal governments when, in fact, the owed tax is pocketed. Smuggling is an approach sometimes employed to evade payment of any and all taxes.

of dollars annually for individual states. Businesses paying full taxes are at a competitive disadvantage when bootlegged products show up in the marketplace. This also adversely impacts the ability of many businesses to maintain business investments and job growth. With less than 200 fuel compliance officers, the IRS is tasked with performing all fuel compliance activities throughout the country, including inspection of 1,400 fuel terminals and periodic border checks. Understandably, authorities are hesitant to enforce strict adherence to inspection protocols, as any additional interruption in the flow of international traffic will be costly to both the United States and its neighboring countries. Inspection of a single truck, for example, can take time, as the transport manifest and cargo must be reviewed and, if necessary, a sample of the cargo analyzed to ensure that it matches the description on the manifest. In addition to border crossings, the existence of numerous official and unofficial ports means that smugglers and bootleggers have considerable options regarding the transport of the motor fuel, while the government has limited resources with which to address the problem. Although the exact magnitude of the problem cannot be determined, the illegal activities of organized crime are believed to inflict billions of dollars of losses on the U.S. economy in the form of lost tax revenue that would be earmarked primarily for highway repair and reconstruction. In one of the largest cases of fuel tax evasion in the country, one organized crime group netted $140 million in unpaid taxes. This activity is pervasive in the United States and across international borders.

Cross-border Activity Motor fuel fraud in the United States frequently involves multiple states and sometimes crosses international borders. The motor fuel tax disparity with neighboring states—and between the United States, Canada, and Mexico—encourages bootlegging across borders and results in lost revenues for the state concerned, amounting to tens of millions

References Committee on Finance. “Statement of Kevin M. Brown, Commissioner, Small Business/SelfEmployed Division, Internal Revenue Service, before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate,” 14 April 2005, http://finance.senate.gov/ hearings/testimony/2005test/kbtest041405.pdf. Committee on Ways and Means. “Statement of Joseph R. Brimacombe, Deputy Director, Compliance Policy, Small Business and Self Employed Operating Division, Internal Revenue Service, New Carrolton, Maryland,” 17 July 2003, 191

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http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?form mode=view&id=675. Department of Transportation. “Joint Federal/State Motor Fuel Tax Compliance Project,” 23rd Steering Committee Meeting, Washington, D.C., 7 October 2003, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ policy/23scmin1.htm. Internal Revenue Service. “Excise Tax Fraud,” http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/article /0,id=117521,00.html. Laborers Network. “Mob Figures Sentenced for Roles in $77 Million ‘Red Daisy’ Fuel Tax Evasion Scheme,” http://www.thelaborers.net/LOCALS/ LU1001/pagano_sentencing_news_release.htm.

Gambling: Numbers and Bookmaking David Whelan Gambling involves wagering, or betting, on games of chance, the outcome of sports contests or other events. Its roots have been evident in the histories of almost every society. Over time, great arguments have developed over whether or not gambling has more to do with skill or more to do with luck. Even more controversy has been created over whether or not gambling is a crime, an immoral vice, or a social recreation. There are many forms of gambling, and its legal status in the United States has shifted over time, based on politics and public sentiment. In some states, legal gambling has taken the form of lotteries, casino gambling, and pari-mutuel wagering on horse racing, dog racing, jai alai, and (in the United States, only in the state of Nevada) college and professional athletic contests. Other varieties include bingo, card games and charitable gaming, slot machines, video games, and raffles. In other U.S. states, many forms of gambling have been prohibited by law and are considered illegal. Depending upon where state legislatures draw the line, the law has helped to distinguish gambling as a form of organized crime from gambling that is recreational in nature. In the United States during the nineteenth century, gambling and drinking were closely associated. Many people did not engage in one and not the other. During the Prohibition period, many gambling operations were shut down but were successfully moved to secret locations and maintained

through corruption. Organized criminal networks ran most of these activities. Gambling was legalized in Nevada in the 1930s, and through the influence of organized crime, casino gambling became popular in Las Vegas as early as the 1940s. In the mid-1970s, Atlantic City, New Jersey, started to build casinos after local voters gave their approval. Over the years, Las Vegas has had its share of problems with organized crime figures trying to infiltrate and ultimately own and operate their own casinos. New Jersey, in the middle of both New York and Philadelphia crime families, established widespread controls over the gaming industry that remain in place in an effort to keep organized crime out. Gambling casinos have moved far beyond their beginnings in Nevada and New Jersey. In 1988 the U.S. Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, which allowed Native American tribes to operate casinos on their land. Many other states have legalized riverboat gambling, and thousands of offshore Internet gambling websites provide online betting opportunities for anyone with a credit card, giving consumers a wide range of gambling choices. Gambling, with its long association with organized crime, is an area in which governments have not involved themselves very much. It is an activity that almost resists intervention. Playing the Numbers The numbers or policy game is nothing more than a lottery based on some system of selecting the winning numbers. It is a game rich in geographic, racial, and ethnic history in the United States. In the 1840s in New York City, the crimeinfested Five Points’ most popular form of wagering was policy gambling, private lotteries in which players tried to guess which numbers would be selected in a daily drawing. Historically, the number has been based on the total daily sales of the New York Stock Exchange, or, more recently, the total mutual handle of a local or designated racetrack. A total mutual handle is the entire amount of money bet at the racetrack that particular day and always appears in a daily

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Evidence from the Brooklyn, New York, District Attorney’s office for the arrest of ten men in an illegal sports gambling operation, including $300,000 in cash and sports schedules, March 26, 2006. The operation allegedly ran in excess of $45 million annually. (Ramin Talaie/Corbis)

newspaper. Typically, the last three numbers of the total mutual handle are the number. The exact system may vary in different locations, but the idea is to keep the game as legitimate as possible despite the involvement of organized crime bankers. In the numbers game, it is possible to play any number containing three digits or any combination of those digits. In either a straight bet or combination bet, the payout odds have remained the same for several decades, about 600 to 1. Simple math will prove that a ten-cent bet only pays $60. In any policy organization, there are several key players, including collectors, controllers, and bankers. Collectors, or policy writers, accept a player’s money, note the number, and turn in the bets to the controller. They are also responsible for paying off any winners. Controllers, often called route men, handle all bets and betting slips and work with a banker, or policy operator. The banker could either be an individual organized crime

member or a group of associates. The bank provides financial backing, determines odds, and compensates the collectors and controllers. While state lotteries have taken some business away from numbers operators, there is still big business in the small bets that are the foundation of policy gambling. The chance to get rich quick is appealing to those in poor neighborhoods who don’t have the funds for racetracks or casinos. Despite the fact that much of the money that is bet goes into the pockets of gamblers, many people trust the local numbers banker more than they trust the state, and the continued popularity of the game is based on the fact that it is easy and inexpensive. Making Book The list of people who make their living as gamblers begin with the bookmaker, or bookie. Bookmakers are involved in the business of taking bets but do not like risking their money. They run their operation 193

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much like a legitimate enterprise in that they want to make money without risking serious losses. The bookmaker agrees to take bets from potential customers. If they win, they are paid a certain sum of money. If they lose, the bookmaker keeps the amount of their bets. Since the bookmaker is running a business, the purpose in accepting bets is to make money, and they usually do. A bookmaker may specialize in either horse or sports bets, but the vast majority will take bets on any sporting event. With the introduction of offtrack betting, much of the bookmaker’s business is now related to college and professional team sports. However, there are still bookies who will accept wagers personally or by telephone. Many will operate from an outside location or a fixed inside spot. As part of a large organization, the bookmakers do not actually risk their own money in bookmaking activities but are merely an instrument of crime networks that have agents take the bets and make payoffs to the winning bettors when necessary. In order for everyone to come out ahead, local bookies will often lay off bets with one or more gambling operatives. This happens when a large amount of money is bet on a particular game. The bookmaker wants to spread out the amounts of money bet in order to guard against any large losses. In a large organized group, the bookmaker may be a network of several people or several groups of people. They may employ additional people to work for them in some capacity, for example, runners who bring the bets in or collectors who remind bettors when they need to pay up. The support and reinforcement of an organized crime group is usually a trademark of these types of operations. References Albanese, Jay. Organized Crime in Our Times. 4th ed. Cincinnati: Anderson, 2004. Anbinder, Tyler. Five Points. New York: Free Press, 2001. Barlett, Donald L., and James B. Steele. “Wheel of Misfortune.” Time 160(25) (16 December 2002): 44–56. Pace, Denny F. Concepts of Vice, Narcotics, and Organized Crime. 3rd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1991.

The Global Sex Trade: Commercial Sex, Pornography, and International Sex Tourism, a Multibillion-Dollar Industry Rob D. Hanser, Walonda Wallace, and Kaine Jones The global sex trade has experienced meteoric notoriety as an industry of ill repute. The sex industry was, at one time, simply a fringe market industry that was seemingly more of a nuisance than a serious threat to public order, safety, and health. However, this industry has emerged as a major causal factor in a multitude of global social ills. Globally speaking, this industry operates on the purest of supply-and-demand principles, and the resources for meeting this demand, whether human or otherwise, is shifted from one location to another to meet market demand. On the other hand, if the supply cannot be shipped to the demand, a vigorous underground marketing system exists to entice the demand to come to the supply. It is as if the sex trade has assumed the identity of an ordinary and quite normal sector of the economy. Sex Trade Industrialization Throughout the last thirty years, the rapidly growing sex trade has become highly industrialized worldwide. This process of industrialization, in both the legal and illegal forms of activity, generates profit that amounts to billions of dollars. This has led to a market of sexual exchanges in which millions of women and children have become indentured into the industry to service the demands of a hungry and never-ending chasm of sexual desire and demand. Furthermore, tacit approval has been given for this industry since few, if any, government officials stepped in to intervene. Indeed, in many countries it has been found that the money generated by the general tourism industry alone is enough to substantially improve a nation’s economy. Having an active sex industry creates a multiplier effect in the standard tourist industry services (hotels, plane fares, restaurants, and so forth). Thus, this industry generates a substantial amount of revenue, both directly from the sex business itself and from the residual income from foreigners who visit these areas. Further still, legalities may not generally be an issue,

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Commercial Sex, Pornography, and International Sex Tourism, a Multibillion-Dollar Industry

because many of the activities may be legal in the host country. Sexual tourism involves travel to foreign countries for the explicit purpose of engaging in commercial sex acts. This has become one of the most profitable aspects of the tourism industry. For instance, in Thailand an average of 5.1 million sex tourists visit each year, and 450,000 local customers buy sex routinely within the country’s borders. The Southeast Asian sex industry began during the Vietnam War. During that war, U.S. servicemen were stationed not just in Vietnam but also in neighboring Thailand and the Philippines. During this time there was a predictable boom in prostitution activity, which established the need of infrastructure for the future development of the sex tourism industry. Government policies that encouraged this activity due to the economic benefits that were reaped contributed to the growth of this industry. It is from this point that the sex industry became firmly entrenched in this area, and once these economies became dependent on this type of revenue, the only answer was to bring the demand to the supply. Today the sex tourism industry has grown globally to include parts of Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. The common denominator for each of these regions where sex tourism occurs is that the area is remarkably poverty-ridden. In many cases the industry will utilize trafficked women and children to meet the demand created by the international market. However, the use of trafficked women into the area is for another reason as well: security of the commodity. Often the women trafficked into a given area will not know the native language of the area, and this serves to impair their chance for escape from the activity. Likewise, any visas or other identification can be removed, and there is almost no way that anyone can trace the women if they do not have sufficient time to talk and give details. Thus, those who are caught in this situation are socially isolated as well. Many sex tourism agencies and businesses will market themselves and even provide guides to customers. Travel packages can be arranged through the Internet. This growth and popularity of sex tourism is largely due to the opening of country borders, easier and more affordable access to trans-

portation, and the advent of the World Wide Web. Sex tourist industries thrive in areas where there is weak law enforcement, anonymity, and the freedom from social constraints found in most developed countries. Global Prostitution and the Trafficking of Women and Children The trafficking of women and children for prostitution and forced labor is one of the fastest-growing areas of international criminal activity and one that is of increasing concern. Most often, the route of trafficking has been from less-developed countries to industrialized and more affluent nations. Because trafficking is an underground organized criminal enterprise, it is difficult to get exact statistics on the extent of the problem. However, by all estimates it is thought that at least 800,000–900,000 individuals are trafficked each year. The majority of these victims are thought to still come from Southeast Asia, particularly Myanmar, India, Thailand, and Cambodia. The former Soviet Union is thought to be a growing source of trafficking for prostitution and the sex industry, and these individuals are found in the sex industries throughout Europe. While women and children are trafficked from other areas of the world, the activity is much lighter than in the areas just mentioned. Regardless, women and children trafficked for the globalized sex industry usually end up in large cities, vacation and tourist areas, or near military bases, where the demand is highest. Women and children who are trafficked into prostitution and pornography are usually involved in the most exploitative forms of these commercial sex operations. Sex trafficking operations tend to occur in highly visible venues such as street prostitution as well as in more underground locations such as closed-brothel systems that operate out of residential homes. Sex trafficking operations also occur in a mixture of public and private locations such as massage parlors, spas, and other fronts for prostitution. Women and children who may start off by dancing and stripping in clubs are often coerced into more exploitative situations of prostitution and pornography. Traffickers acquire their victims in a number of ways. Sometimes women are kidnapped outright in one country and taken forcibly to 195

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another. In other cases, victims are lured with phony job offers. Traffickers entice victims to migrate voluntarily with false promises of wellpaying jobs in foreign countries as au pairs, models, dancers, domestic workers, etc. Traffickers advertise these jobs as well as marriage opportunities abroad in local newspapers. Russian crime gangs have been reported to use marriage agency databases and matchmaking parties to find victims. In some cases, traffickers approach women or their families directly with offers of lucrative jobs elsewhere. After providing transportation and false documents to get victims to their destination, traffickers subsequently charge fees that ensure that the victim is indentured to their service indefinitely. While there is no single victim stereotype, a majority of trafficked women are under the age of twenty-five, with many in their mid to late teens. The fear of infection with HIV among customers has driven traffickers to recruit younger women and girls under the misperception that these victims will be too young to have been infected by a sexually transmitted disease. This is of course a false presumption but nonetheless generates a demand for this type of sex activity. In some areas of the world, the exploitation of children has occurred at a level that has been politically embarrassing. This has been especially true throughout various parts of Southeast Asia. Children in Cambodia, Thailand, India, and Myanmar have been found to be at particularly high risk of being exploited. In other areas of the world, trafficking of children for the sex industry has also been detected in various sections of Europe. Indeed, Russian, Ukrainian, Balkan, and Albanian groups have been found to be active in Greece and other areas of East and Southeast Europe. Much of this trafficking is the residue of war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina and the instability of many East European nations following the fall of the Soviet Union. The number of women and children trafficked for sex slavery in and around the Baltic region is estimated to be 5,000–10,000 or more. The hotels, houses, and other businesses involved with this industry demonstrate how this form of organized crime is linked with the licit economy.

Global Pornography The worldwide flow of pornography has expanded at a phenomenal rate in the last few years. Some areas of the world have been found to be associated with the manufacture of pornography. In Asia, Japan has been identified as the most active area for the commercial production of child pornography. It is the production of pornography with adolescent subjects that seems to be most common. Japan also produces millions of erotic comics that are targeted at its youth subculture. These comics are available in vending machines in most Japanese cities. Japanese child pornography is thought to denote a certain interest in sex with Japanese girls, who are often depicted in school uniforms. The reasons for this cultural preference are not clear, but the prevalence of these portrayals among this type of pornography is undeniable. Japanese child pornography is distributed in Asia and throughout the world. This pornography is occasionally found and confiscated by law enforcement officials in California and also in Canada. Japanese child pornography also has been found to exist on the Internet. The Japanese Yakuza have traditionally controlled this and other segments of the Japanese sex industry. Another source of child pornography distributed throughout the world has occurred in various areas of Thailand, to which tourists travel in search of sex with minors. Until just a few years ago, a substantial part of the demand for this activity was generated by tourists from the Netherlands and Sweden who visited Thailand. Some of this type of erotic and illegal material has replaced that which has been generated in Eastern Europe. Child pornography criminal rings exist in numerous parts of the world, and the industry has generated strong public concern. Many cases have been detected in Europe and North America, demonstrating a sophisticated and far-reaching network of electronic technology that may or may not be linked to major organized crime syndicates in other areas of the world. Child pornography rings have been detected in Germany and the Netherlands, with arrests and extraditions being made to the United States. However, these activities are not always in league with syndicated organized criminal groups but rather typically consist of a handful of actors who work together as a

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matter of mutual convenience and necessity. This activity has been collaborative in nature with members who are in California and other parts of the United States. Thus, the business has been found to incorporate criminal members who work in tandem on both sides of the Atlantic. At this point, it is unclear as to the magnitude of this industry. Health Risks of the International Sex Industry Victims of the illicit sex industry are often subjected to cruel mental and physical abuse in order to keep them in servitude. These forms of abuse often include beatings and physical torture as well as sexual assault, forced drug use to ensure dependence, starvation, confinement, and seclusion. Once victims are brought into destination countries, their passports and other identification papers are often confiscated. Victims are forced to have sex, often unprotected, with large numbers of partners and to work unsustainably long hours. Many victims suffer mental breakdowns and are exposed to sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV. They are often denied medical care if they should become severely ill. A victim may simply be killed so that the criminal pimp will not risk law enforcement detection by taking the victim to a doctor. Because of this risk and the lack of even minimal medical care, the trade in women for the international commercial sex industry is considered a major public health threat. Many of the young girls and women who are abducted and trafficked have only limited knowledge of HIV prevention. These victims are not in a position to ensure that protective behaviors are employed during sexual activity with their clients, and thus these women are at an inflated daily risk of exposure to sexually transmitted diseases. Once they become infected, oftentimes their captor will then send them home, where they carry the infection into their family and community of origin. References Antonopoulos, G. A. “The Financial Exploitation of the Sexuality of Migrant Children in Greece.” Crime & Justice International 20(83) (2004): 19–22.

David, F., and P. Monzini. Human Smuggling and Trafficking: A Desk Review on the Trafficking in Women from the Philippines. Vienna: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2000. Hanser, R. “Immigration and Crime in Europe.” Crime & Justice International 18(62) (2002): 7–9. Miko, F. T. Trafficking in Persons: The U.S. and International Response. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2004, http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/ other/RL30545.pdf. Poulin, R. “Globalization and the Sex Trade: Trafficking and the Commodification of Women and Children.” Canadian Women Studies 22(3–4) (2003): 38–43. Singer, M. HIV and Other Risks of the Transnational Commercial Sex Trade: Assessing Social and Cultural Factors. New Haven, CT: Center for Interdisciplinary Research on AIDS, 2004, http://cira.med.yale.edu/research/project_page.asp ?projID=234. “Types of Sex Trafficking.” Polaris Project, 2003, http://humantrafficking.com/humantrafficking/Res earch_Tools/TopicSearch/Traffickers/Types_of _Traf.htm. Webb, D. “Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: A Trafficking Dilemma.” Crime & Justice International 18(62) (2002): 5–7.

The Historical Involvement of Organized Crime in Labor Racketeering Don Liddick Limiting competition in the business world by coercive means and extorting revenue generated from legitimate and illicit commerce is the prototypical organized crime activity. The impact on credit structures, distribution facilities, and industry in general is immense. The legacy of industrial racketeering is the systematic restraint of trade, the pillaging of union benefit funds, and the laundering of illicit revenue through otherwise legitimate business and financial institutions. The cost to consumers and the business community is immeasurable. Moreover, there appears to be no limit to the commercial activities preyed upon by organized criminals. A partial list of legitimate industries infiltrated by organized crooks includes advertising, appliances, automobiles, banking, coal, construction, pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment, florists, meat, 197

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seafood, dairy products, groceries, cheese, olive oil, fruit, garments, import-export businesses, insurance, liquor, news services, newspapers, oil, paper products, radio, ranching, real estate, restaurants, scrap metal, shipping, steel, television, theaters, and transportation. Impact on Trade and Labor Unions Labor racketeering involves the creation and control of employer trade associations and the infiltration of labor unions. Markets particularly susceptible to the racketeer are those where labor costs are significant competitive factors, the market is characterized by many undercapitalized firms that are vulnerable to labor strife, and the given industry is in a local rather than a national product market. Employer or trade associations are used by owners to restrain trade by limiting production, stabilizing competition, and raising commodity prices. If uncooperative owners attempt to cut prices, the racketeer steps in with convincing, albeit coercive, arguments to fix prices. Intimidation of union leaders and partnerships with corrupt trade unionists inhibit free trade, a process facilitated when organized criminals hold positions as union officials. As officials in union locals, extortionists control and exploit workers, collecting dues and stealing pension fund monies. Corrupt union officials typically sell out the rank and file by engaging in sweetheart contracts with employers, where savings from phony contracts are split between union officials and employers. On the other hand, owners are victimized by racketeers when they are threatened with a strike or picket to extract so-called strike insurance as the price of doing business. Industrial racketeering in the United States first developed in a significant way by the turn of the twentieth century. An early example of the restraint of trade was the newspaper wars that raged in many American cities. In Chicago, a circulation battle between the Tribune and the Examiner involved the hiring of underworld thugs to physically oppose delivery of newspapers. In those early years, racketeering was perhaps greatest on the New York City waterfront. The New York State Crime Commission uncovered criminality on the Brooklyn docks and concluded that organized criminals con-

trolled the waterfront from the 1930s through the 1950s. An indebted labor force was used to extort payoffs from the shipping firms, while the dockworkers were exploited by loan-sharks, gamblers, and corrupt union officers. Called the shape-up, only those workers willing to kick back a portion of their wages to the hiring boss were permitted to work on any given day. By controlling both labor unions and industries essential to the port, organized criminals steered contracts to mob-controlled enterprises that also conveniently served as money laundering vehicles for illicit proceeds from gambling, prostitution, and loan-sharking. In 1954 the New York State Waterfront Commission forced the expulsion of the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) from the American Federation of Labor (AFL). However, the ILA eventually prevailed over the new union, the International Brotherhood of Longshoremen, and reentered the AFL. After the infamous racketeer Albert Anastasia was murdered in 1957, his brother Anthony wielded great power in the ILA and consolidated the Brooklyn locals in conjunction with future crime bosses Vito Genovese and Carlo Gambino. From the 1960s through the mid-1970s, the power of the Waterfront Commission was largely circumscribed, and in 1978 a federal investigation revealed that New York City mobsters affiliated with the ILA had established themselves in the port of Miami. Of course, racketeering is in no way limited to waterfront industries. In the 1920s, Lepke Buchalter and Jacob Shapiro maintained complete control over New York City’s garment industry, extorting at least $15 million from garment manufacturers and associated industries. Buchalter also extorted union membership fees and monies from the flour-trucking and baking companies and established dominance over the fur industry, the shoe trade, the taxicab business, and the poultry market, often in partnership with infamous associates such as Bugsy Siegel, Meyer Lansky, and Lucky Luciano. Joseph “Socks” Lanza, who organized the Fulton Fish Market workers into the United Seafood Workers’ Union, collected tribute from every retailer and wholesaler at the Fulton Market. Racketeering in fish was an enterprise that enriched Lanza with $20 million per year and raised the price of fish nationwide. Despite a two-year

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Louis “Lepke” Buchalter, facing front, seated with Emanuel “Mendy” Weiss, and Phillip “Little Farvel” Cohen, who shield their faces, and Louis Capone, in a Kings County courtroom during jury selection in August of 1941. Buchalter was deeply involved in extortion of the Garment industry and Labor unions in the New York area. (Library of Congress)

prison sentence served for violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, Lanza maintained control of the Fulton Fish Market until his death in 1968. Industrial racketeering was in no way limited to New York City. In Chicago in the 1920s, some fifty rackets were openly flourishing in a diverse range of occupations and industries such as candy jobbers, garage owners, glazers, bootblacks, and physicians. By 1931, racketeering dominated by the Al Capone organization produced $200 million in illegal profits. Racketeering profits in other cities in this era included $100 million in Philadelphia, $75 million in Detroit, $50 million in Los Angeles, and $25 million each in Pittsburgh and Cleveland. One of the more notorious union infiltrations was that of the International Alliance of Theatrical,

Stage Employees, and Motion Picture Operators (IATSE). George Brown and William Bioff, with the backing of Frank Nitti, Lepke Buchalter, Lucky Luciano, Longie Zwillman, and other mobsters from midwestern and eastern U.S. power syndicates, took over the IATSE with the objective of extorting as much as possible from theater owners with the threat of strikes and shutdowns. The IATSE eventually won the right to represent 12,000 Hollywood employees, placing Bioff and his associates in a position to collect more than $1 million from the major Hollywood movie studios between 1936 and 1940. Another infamous racketeer in the 1930s was Arthur Fleggenheimer, a.k.a. Dutch Schultz. Schultz managed an extortion racket in the New York City restaurant industry 199

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from 1932 to 1936. Employers were forced to join the Metropolitan Restaurant and Cafeteria Association and sign contracts with one of two locals controlled by Schultz. Although the restaurant owners were forced to pay into the association, they ultimately saved money because sweetheart contracts were arranged and true unionization was thwarted. Consumers and the restaurant workers were the losers, as prices were fixed, wages were frozen, and the rank and file were exploited. The attractiveness of the scheme for the Schultz syndicate was that it also controlled the restaurant employers’ association in such a way that not only the workers but also the employers were victims of extortion. Industrial racketeering in recent years has expanded, while government efforts to suppress the restraint of trade has met with limited success at best. Modern racketeers, in collusion with government officials, have infiltrated numerous industrial sectors and overwhelmed the regulatory role of the government, most notably in the construction industry, the shipment of goods, and those economic zones involving the protection of the environment. Modern racketeering and organized crime are responsible for unsafe and overpriced buildings, spoiled food, higher prices on countless goods, exploited workers, and a poisoned environment. Other Industries Vulnerable to Racketeering An industry unable to break the grip of organized crime is garment manufacturing. Due largely to a decrease in overseas competition and a cheap supply of labor from illegal aliens, the number of garment sweatshops has rapidly increased in New York City. Trucking firms, many of which are controlled by organized crime, finance and set up sweatshops favored by 7th Avenue manufacturers. At the expense of exploited workers, including many children, trucking outfits elevate cartage rates, 7th Avenue jobbers produce clothing more cheaply, and retailers mark up clothing that has been produced with minimal overhead. Manufacturers cannot switch to trucking firms with lower rates because the market is controlled. Deregulation has ensured that 90 percent of trucking in the New York City region is not subject to Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulations.

The construction industry in New York City has been dominated by organized criminals since at least the 1920s. In 1922, the Lockwood Commission found extensive union extortion of builders and contractors and collusive arrangements among contractors and suppliers. The commission also reported that contractors and suppliers had substantially eliminated competition by forming cartels. Seventy years later, the New York State Organized Crime Task Force found that the New York City construction industry had not changed and concluded that the industry’s susceptibility to racketeer domination had not lessened. The infiltration of labor unions by racketeers, the structure of collective bargaining, the competitive market, and the high cost of construction delays were cited as causes. The construction industry is still characterized by extortion, bribery, theft from building sites, sabotage of construction sites, bid rigging, and various frauds related to billing, pension funds, tax evasion, and performance bonds. The scope of organized crime’s power is exemplified by the fact that for many years, any major construction project in New York City was subject to a 2 percent tax by organized racketeers. The most infamous and noteworthy example of organized crime’s infiltration of a labor union is the Teamsters. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, Stablemen, and Helpers of America was founded and given an AFL charter in 1898. The first Teamsters president, Cornelius P. Shea, was indicted for extorting money from team owners. Shea was followed by Dan Tobin, who controlled the union for the next forty years. The first significant infiltration of organized crime into the union may have occurred in 1941, when Jimmy Hoffa, at that time the negotiating chairman of the Central States Driver’s Council, called on racketeers to muscle Denny Lewis and the CIO out of Detroit. Although Dave Beck was elected president of the Teamsters in 1951, it was Hoffa and his supporters who were running the union by the mid1950s. By that time, Hoffa had developed relationships with many organized crime figures, including Morris Dalitz in Las Vegas, Sam Giancana and Paul Dorfman in Chicago, Nick Civella in Kansas City, and Tony Provenzano in New York. At this time,

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Jimmy Hoffa went from an impoverished childhood to the leadership of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, which he helped make the largest and wealthiest labor union in the world. Much of his success was due to his involvement in organized crime. He served several terms in prison, and disappeared in 1975. (Library of Congress)

Hoffa helped establish the Michigan Conference of Teamsters Welfare Fund and the Central States Health and Welfare Fund. Through Allen Dorfman, the son of a local union president and former Al Capone associate, the Central States Pension Fund became easy plunder for the mob. As administrator of the pension fund, Dorfman engineered the funneling of hundreds of millions of dollars to organized crime real estate investments in southern Florida, resorts in southern California, and hotels and casinos in Las Vegas. Attempts at Reform The McClellan Committee hearings, spearheaded by soon-to-be attorney general Robert Kennedy,

brought corruption in the Teamsters Union into the light in the late 1950s. Former Teamsters president Dave Beck was convicted in 1959 for violating federal income tax laws, while Hoffa was eventually convicted of jury tampering in 1964. Governmental reform efforts had little impact, however, as laborleasing schemes, phony contracts, and sweetheart deals continued to characterize union-employer relationships. Asset managers and service providers for unions paid themselves exorbitant salaries while billing for nonexistent or unnecessary administrative fees. Fund trustees drafted bylaws that ensured the accumulation of large cash reserves so that payments could be directed to organized crime businesses for fictitious services. Meanwhile, organized crime associates and friends were placed on the union payroll for no-show jobs. Racketeers in need of a loan for licit and illicit business ventures could always depend on the Central States “bank.” After Hoffa’s disappearance in 1975, the Teamsters came under close scrutiny by the Special Investigations Staff (SIS) of the Department of Labor as well as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). A large number of questionable loans had been made to companies on the verge of bankruptcy, and $418 million in pension fund loans went to seven entities controlled by three men with organized crime connections. With the fraudulent manipulation of the Central States, Southeast, and Southwest Areas Pension Funds as their target, federal investigators equipped with the new Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) found themselves in a good position to break the hold that racketeers had over the Teamsters. Unfortunately, the opportunity to reform pension fund mismanagement and theft was largely squandered as the IRS refused to coordinate with the Department of Labor by unexpectedly revoking the pension fund’s tax-exempt status, and the Department of Labor undercut the SIS by ordering investigators not to pursue a third-party investigation. Ultimately, the government failed to attain an enforceable agreement, so when the fund’s taxexempt status was reinstated, the union’s board of trustees soon discontinued their cooperation and laid aside the intended reforms. 201

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Corruption in the Teamsters continued through the presidencies of Frank Fitzsimmons, Roy Lee Williams, and Jackie Presser. Williams would reveal that he deferred to mob power by stating that he dared not interfere with the affairs of powerful locals such as Anthony Provenzano’s Local 560 in New Jersey. Williams, Dorfman, and Chicago organized crime boss Joey Lombardo were convicted in 1982 of conspiring to bribe U.S. Senator Howard Cannon of Nevada for his influence in blocking or delaying the deregulation of trucking freight rates. A month later, Dorfman was murdered. Abuses in the Teamsters Union continued under the presidency of Presser, who eventually became an FBI informant. Presser’s information led to seventy convictions, and law enforcement successes against the Teamsters mounted in the 1980s. The first significant application of the federal RICO statute occurred in 1984 when Provenzano’s Local 560 was placed under a trusteeship. The Teamsters and the government also negotiated important consent decrees meant to direct the legal investment of pension fund monies. A recent Teamsters president, Ron Carey, was praised by some for cleaning up the union, yet his own reelection was invalidated in late 1997 by a federal overseer. Carey’s campaign manager Jere Nash and campaign consultants Martin Davis and Michael Ansara pled guilty to charges involving donation swaps with the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The scheme involved a diversion of money from the ailing Teamsters’ treasury to the DNC, the AFL-CIO, and various political advocacy organizations. In return, those groups would steer money back to the Carey campaign through an organization called, ironically, Teamsters for a Corruption Free Union. Carey was subsequently prohibited from running in the rerun election, and James Hoffa Jr. was elected to the Teamsters presidency in 1998. References Block, Alan A. The Business of Crime: A Documentary Study of Organized Crime in the American Economy. New York: Westview, 1991. ———. East Side-West Side: Organizing Crime in New York, 1930–1950, Somerset, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1983.

Jacobs, James B., Christopher Panarella, and Jay Worthington. Busting the Mob: United States v. Cosa Nostra. New York: New York University Press, 1994. ———. Gotham Unbound: How New York City Was Liberated from the Grip of Organized Crime. New York: New York University Press, 1999. Moldea, Dan E. The Hoffa Wars: The Rise and Fall of Jimmy Hoffa. New York: Spi Books, 1993. Neff, James. Mobbed Up: Jackie Presser’s High-Wire Life in the Teamsters, the Mafia, and the FBI. New York: Grove/Atlantic, 1989. Nelli, Humbert. The Business of Crime: Italians and Syndicate Crime in the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. U.S. Senate Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce. Report No. 307. Kefauver Committee, “Third Interim Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime In Interstate Commerce,” 1951, Washington, D.C.

Illegal Gambling and Loan-Sharking David Whelan There are many people in various levels of law enforcement who believe that gambling is the basis of most organized crime income. Illegal gambling incorporates a variety of activities not approved by states or countries. The most common forms of illegal gambling in the United States are the numbers game (an illegal lottery) and sports gambling (wagering on college and professional sports contests). In the United States, each state regulates gambling. Typically, the common office and bar pools for events such as the Super Bowl (American football championship), World Series (American baseball championship), World Cup, or Final Four (college basketball championship) are perceived as purely recreational and insignificant to law enforcement. Crime occurs when a bookmaker, or third person, gets a percentage of the bets. Gambling laws are meant to discourage the organized criminal group from getting involved in this kind of activity. Sports Gambling Placing an illegal bet on a game is not something that is hard to do. Sports bookmaking operations, legal in Las Vegas, will take bets if someone makes

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them personally. It is estimated that $2.25 billion is spent on legalized sports bets. Money bet illegally on sports is estimated to be much higher. Internet gambling services, located on Caribbean islands, are a toll-free telephone call away. Any gambling website based in Europe allows someone to bet via the Internet. While there is no current federal law against making a bet online, taking a sports bet over the Internet is illegal. Making a bet this way is much easier and faster, which is why Internet gambling services have increased their revenues to an estimated $12 billion, with more than half of that revenue coming from U.S. gamblers. Illegal sports gambling is not new, and organized crime has its place in the history of sports swindles. Nearly one year after the heavily favored Chicago White Sox lost the 1919 World Series to the Cincinnati Reds, eight Chicago players were indicted after a grand jury investigation into rumors that the series had been fixed. The Black Sox Scandal was reportedly financed by organized crime. Between 1951 and 1995, the integrity of college athletics in the United States was shaken on five separate occasions by disclosures that student athletes had participated in basketball point-shaving schemes coordinated by organized crime members and associates. Point-shaving is winning by a small margin or losing by a greater margin than the established betting line point spread on a game. Point Spreads The basis of most sports gambling is the point spread, or line. A point spread is a handicap, in the form of points, added by oddsmakers, to the score of teams in games with high probabilities of predictable outcomes that are the object of betting. Simply stated, to make a football or basketball game more attractive to bettors, sports bookmakers in Las Vegas (where sports gambling is legal) establish a number of points, given or taken, on either of the teams involved. The points are added to, or deducted from, the team’s final score. Newspapers, magazines, Internet sites, and television and radio that focus on handicapping sporting events have assisted in making the point spread popular. Most major media outlets carry the latest

line, making this information immediately available. The final line is not usually made available until a day or two before a game because there are several variables that could possibly affect the outcome that might not be known until just before game time (e.g., injury reports, ineligible players, disciplinary action, etc.). The Loanshark Organized crime has moved to make loan-sharking a profitable business that complements illegal gambling and other criminal enterprises. The legal name for loan-sharking in the United States is “usury,” and the loan shark may also be known as a shylock. Loan-sharking is lending money to individuals and businesses at extremely high interest rates. It developed from the practice of salary lending in the late 1800s, when money was loaned against future salaries at excessive interest rates. The interest rate is now set by law to ensure that customers are not exploited by banks or other lenders, but the loan shark pays no attention to those rates for any type of loan, short- or long-term. In the annals of organized crime history, there have been loan sharks who operated independently but did not last long. The loan shark who is associated with an organized crime network has more credibility, more money to lend, and more ways to enforce collection of the debt. There is usually no collateral necessary to obtain a loan from a shylock, but there is always the fear of physical violence to secure payment. Money that is used for loan-sharking will usually flow from the upper levels of organized crime leadership to the street lender. The street lender pays a certain amount of interest per week for the organization money and then distributes or lends it to others for higher rates of weekly interest. Clients are normally acquaintances or those recommended by friends, since the nature of the business is often secretive. It is not unusual for a loan shark to accept stolen property as repayment for a loan, as long as the property has equal or greater value. Those who borrow money from a loan shark will usually do so because they have no other monetary source. Often, they are having difficulty in terms of their cash flow because of overwhelming gambling 203

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debt, business losses, family illness, divorce, or some other crippling economic misfortune. Conversely, there are illegal businesses, such as drug trafficking and bookmaking, that often require a dependable supply of available cash. The guaranteed success of the loan shark is found in weekly interest payments, known as vigorish or simply the vig. It is a lasting percentage in any gambling or loan-sharking activity, evident primarily in sports gambling in which players must bet a fixed percentage higher than they will be paid off if their bet is a winner. For example, vigorish is often set at 10 percent, so a bettor who wins a $10 bet receives $10, but a bettor who loses a $10 bet pays $11, which is the loss of $10 plus the $1 vigorish. The same type of arrangement is in place for those who borrow money from loan sharks. However, the interest can be compounded weekly or daily. Many borrowers will keep up the vigorish payments if nothing else and pay the principal at more suitable intervals. It is also possible to make weekly payments covering both principal and interest if the borrower chooses to do so. Simple economics will dictate that just paying the vig will spread out the amount of the original loan to the disadvantage of the borrower. There are those who believe that the mob’s influence in loan-sharking is vastly overstated. There is conflicting evidence to suggest that loan-sharking is the doorway to extensive amounts of organized criminal activity, including gambling, money laundering, receiving and selling stolen property, drug sales, prostitution, and racketeering. This illustrates how unlawful profits can be utilized in creating more illegal money, which allows organized criminal networks to thrive and continue to grow.

References Abt, Vicki, James F. Smith, and Eugene M. Christiansen. The Business of Risk: Commercial Gambling in Mainstream America. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1985. Albanese, Jay. Organized Crime in Our Times. 4th ed. Cincinnati: Anderson, 2004. Kenney, Dennis J., and James O. Finckenauer. Organized Crime in America. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995.

Illegal Trading in Diamonds, Gems, and Precious Metals Daniel Mabrey In a world of floating currency rates, counterfeit goods, and sharp swings in inflation, transnational criminal organizations, just like multinational corporations, are always on the lookout for opportunities to protect the value of their financial resources. Transnational criminal organizations also need to transfer their assets in a way that is undetectable and leaves no audit trail or evidence of transactions. Some of the best assets for protecting the value of wealth and ease of value transfer are precious metals and gemstones. These two features make gold, silver, platinum, diamonds, and tanzanite highly desirable to transnational criminal organizations. Diamonds, Gems, and Precious Metals Gold and other precious metals have long been used by transnational criminal organizations for financial transactions that are untraceable by authorities. Gold is desirable because it can be melted, smelted, or deposited in an account with no questions asked; has no serial number; is hard to trace; can be converted to cash anywhere in the world; offers potential anonymity; and, most importantly, keeps its high value. Gold is especially preferred in countries whose currency is low in value or even worthless. Diamonds and gemstones are becoming more popular with transnational criminal organizations, especially groups from Israel and Belgium and groups that conduct activities in Africa. Precious stones such as diamonds, tanzanite, lapis lazuli, rubies, emeralds, sapphires, and tourmaline are of particular interest to transnational criminal organizations because they are lightweight, keep their high value, do not set off security alarms such as metal detectors at airports, can be easily transported, are difficult to trace, and are exempt from traditional monetary and financial controls. An added bonus is that the markets for these commodities are very closely knit, are hard to penetrate, and allow for small amounts to be sold with a minimum risk of detection by outside monitors.

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Financing Armed Conflicts and Terrorism Precious stones are regulated by international, regional, and national oversight bodies, but the immense value of these stones and their widespread presence throughout Africa have led to a secondary market free from regulation and quality assurance. In these secondary markets flow the majority of the precious stones that are illegally collected and sold by transnational criminal organizations, mercenary armies, warlords, and terrorist organizations. Many of these illegal diamonds are considered to be conflict diamonds, also known as blood diamonds, and are rough diamonds that are controlled or used by rebel groups or their allies to finance armed conflicts against political or social opponents, particularly in Africa. In Sierra Leone, a West African country, more than 75,000 deaths have been attributed to blood diamonds. Rebel groups in this region are known to have committed numerous atrocities, including amputations, rapes, kidnappings, and murders, in their competition for control over the diamond trade. Tens of thousands of people, including children as young as two years old, have had their limbs amputated by these rebel groups, and boys as young as seven years old have been abducted from their homes and forced to fight with the groups. Conflict diamonds, at their peak in 1999, constituted less than 4 percent of the world’s diamond sales, although it is unknown how many human rights violations and deaths the conflict has caused. Terrorist organizations in particular have invested in diamonds and jewels as a safer commodity than cash. Hezbollah has been involved with conflict diamonds and other jewels since its inception in the early 1980s. Hezbollah, along with Afwâj al-Muqâwmat al-Lubnâniyya (AMAL), used diamonds and other gems as a means of financial gain, buying the gems at cheap prices and reselling them in the diamond markets for a significantly increased price. Al-Qaeda has been involved with the illegal gem and gold trade since the mid-1990s. In 1998, following the bombing of two U.S. embassies in East Africa, the U.S. government froze approximately $220 million in gold that the Taliban had stored in the Federal Reserve System. After this, al-Qaeda

decided to liquidate its wealth and began using commodities to store its finances. The terrorist group used rough diamonds to raise funds for individual cells around the world, hide money targeted by financial sanctions, launder profits of criminal activity, and convert cash into valuable and easily transportable commodities. According to the United Nations (UN), al-Qaeda invested between $30 million and $300 million in precious metal and stone commodities. The group regularly used diamonds and gemstones as a medium for weapons and traded opium and heroin for gold. Al-Qaeda group was involved with Africa’s illicit diamond and jewel trade as well as Afghanistan’s emerald fields. Although it began using diamonds and other jewels as a means to make money, the group eventually used it as a means to hide its finances and would pay above-market prices on diamonds. In preparation for the 11 September 2001 attack, al-Qaeda spent more than ten months monopolizing the diamond trade and paid well over the asking price for the jewels to ensure that its finances would be safe. International Control Measures The increase in illegal trading in precious stones and metals has increased dramatically in the last fifteen years, and the international community is struggling to keep up with the level of trading and the associated criminal acts involved in these operations. Since 1998, there have been five major legal documents passed relevant to regulating and controlling the illegal trading of precious stones and metals. In 1998 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1173, a sanction against diamonds from Angola, and Resolution 1176, a sanction against diamonds from the Sierra Leone rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF). In 2000, two pieces of legislation were passed. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1306, which banned all countries from importing any rough diamonds from Sierra Leone until a certification process was designed with the Diamond High Council. The other piece of legislation passed in 2000, the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), involved forty-three participating 205

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countries (as of May 2002) that participated in a volunteer-only program to guarantee that member countries do not trade in or purchase conflict diamonds. All shipments that cross international boundaries are required to be transported in a tamper-resistant container and be accompanied by a government-validated Kimberly Process Certificate. The certificate is resistant to forgery with a unique number and includes information describing the shipment’s content. Only members of the KPCS can import and export diamonds with each other. In other words, nonmember countries cannot participate in the diamond trade with member countries. Although not perfect, the program has been considered a huge step toward validating diamond sales. The countries that make up the KPCS account for 99.8 percent of all global production of rough diamonds. All buyers and sellers must attach the following statement on all rough and polished diamond shipments: “The diamonds herein invoiced have been purchased from legitimate sources not involved in funding conflict and in compliance with United Nations resolutions. The seller hereby guarantees that these diamonds are conflict-free, based on personal knowledge and/or written guarantees provided by the supplier of these diamonds.” The KPCS was implemented following the public’s knowledge of the human rights violations associated with conflict diamonds. The KPCS has had difficulty in enforcement because it is completely voluntary and lacks government monitoring. In 2001, the United States passed the Clean Diamond Act, which strives to guarantee that all imported diamonds are from legitimate sources. The Tucson Protocol of 2002 outlines steps to determine what changes should be made to prevent possible abuses in the trading of tanzanite. It also suggested implementing a system of warranties in writing that the tanzanite bought, sold, cut, polished, set, or otherwise traded came from legitimate sources, and all traders should use this system of warranties to guarantee the sources of the stone. This warranty is similar to the warranty required by the KPCS. The Tucson Protocol has had some difficulty in its enforcement because it is completely voluntary and lacks government monitoring.

Conclusion The illegal trade in diamonds and precious metals will continue to be the commodity of choice for terrorists and organized crime groups for the foreseeable future because of the ease of acquisition and liquidity. These items provide a means for laundering money and transferring assets across borders. Given the success that terrorist groups such as alQaeda, the Taliban, and Hezbollah have had in the recent past, it is unlikely that current efforts will be sufficient to stem the illegal trade in diamonds and precious stones. References Campbell, Greg. Blood Diamonds. Boulder: Westview, 2004. Ehrenfeld, Rachel. Funding Evil: How Terrorism Is Financed—and How to Stop It. Los Angeles: Bonus Books, 2005. Farah, Douglas. Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror. New York: Broadway Books, 2004. Global Witness. “For a Few Dollar$ More: How al Qaeda Moved into the Diamond Trade,” 17 April 2003.

International Trafficking of Men, Women, and Children Sharon Anne Melzer International trafficking of men, women, and children continues to increase and globalize, resulting in the continued growth of organized crime and gross violations of human rights. This criminal activity has increased social costs, undermined and corrupted governments, broken down social systems, and damaged public health. With minimal risks, ample human capital, and profitable markets, human trafficking has become a substantial revenue source for organized crime. Victims enter into the trafficking rings by various methods, including kidnapping, being sold, and falling victim to deceptive recruiting practices and promises of employment in other countries. To combat the growth and globalization of this criminal activity, the international community has improved the effectiveness of international treaties and cooperation between states.

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Moreover, governments have begun to provide services for victims, launch public awareness campaigns, and place a stronger emphasis on the importance of criminal prosecution and punishment. Defining International Human Trafficking Trafficking in human beings is defined by the 2000 United Nations (UN) Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.” “Modern-day slavery” and the “white-slave trade” are additional terms associated with the trafficking of humans. However, human trafficking is not synonymous with human smuggling, which is the consensual movement of people across international borders that ends when individuals arrive in the destination country. Men, women, and children are trafficked for sexual exploitation, forced marriages, organ harvesting, or forced labor such as agricultural work, domestic servitude, maid services, factory work (sweatshops), and begging. Traffickers exploit children by forcing them to become camel jockeys or enter into military service, domestic servitude, forced marriages, pornography, or prostitution. Magnitude of International Human Trafficking The trafficking of humans, which is a form of organized crime, has become an estimated $7 billion industry for criminals worldwide and an epic concern for governments. The U.S. Department of State estimated that 600,000 to 800,000 humans are trafficked internationally each year. Several hundreds of thousands of additional victims are

trafficked within their own countries. An estimated 50,000 individuals are trafficked into the United States annually, and estimates place 200,000 to half a million of illegally trafficked sex workers in the European Union (EU) member states. The multibillion-dollar industry may be the thirdlargest source of revenue for organized crime. The profits have also led to the expansion in transnational organized crime, the weakening of domestic and international law, and the increased corruption of governments. Traffickers move victims from economically disadvantaged areas to more affluent countries, and no country is immune to trafficking rings and victimization. Asia, especially Southeast Asia, is the largest source for trafficking victims, and the former Soviet Union has become the second largest. Other source regions include Eastern Europe, the Caribbean, Latin America, and Africa. Destination regions include North America, Western Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. This multifaceted problem contributes to criminal activity, victimization, health concerns, and the breakdown of societies. With low risks and high profits, human trafficking is appealing to organized crime and stimulates criminal activities, such as money laundering, document forgery, drug trafficking, prostitution, and the corruption of governmental officials. While in the custody of traffickers, victims are susceptible to myriad human rights violations and are forced to participate in criminal activities. Moreover, trafficking has broken down social fabrics and structures. The separation of the child from the parent may harm the moral and nurturing development, and removal of family and community members may hamper the traditional flow of knowledge and culture that is passed down from one generation to the next. Additionally, trafficking activities may deprive a region of human capital or deprive an individual access to education, thus limiting his or her future opportunities. If the victim does return to his or her society, the society may ostracize the victim for activities, atrocities, and behaviors he or she may have committed. For example, families or communities may reject victims sold into child soldiering who return home with severe psychological traumas or violent behaviors, or who committed atrocities against their communities. 207

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Techniques Used by Traffickers The trafficking of victims involves recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, and receipt of a person. Recruitment occurs in a victim’s home country, often by people the victim knows or through advertisements promising work in other countries. There are four primary methods of recruiting female victims. First, recruiters and traffickers promise women means of legitimate employment working as, for example, nannies, dancers, or seamstresses. Second, women consent to working in labor and sex industries but are misled about the nature of the work or the working conditions. Third, recruiters simply abduct victims, sometimes by first drugging them. Fourth, husbands, parents, and relatives sell women and children to traffickers. Transportation of victims can occur by land, sea, or air and occurs internationally and domestically. Transporting victims across land and sea can be dangerous, inhumane, and deadly. Moving individuals by land may include walking over mountains or deserts for days or being locked in the back of cars and trucks. Sea transports include boarding unsafe boats, being smuggled in cargo containers, or being forced to swim across the border. Transporting individuals by air is more humane, but the costs and risks of detection are increased. Victims may legally enter the destination country with their own passports or illegally by using another person’s passport, perhaps the passport of a previous victim. Entering a country with a legitimate artistic or entertainer visa, so that the victim may work in the entertainment and hospitality industries, is another technique used. However, traffickers force the victims into the sex and labor industries. Regardless of the method of entry, once victims arrive in the destination country, the trafficker seizes their passports and restricts their freedoms. Transferring, harboring, and receipt of persons can occur when victims arrive in the destination country. Victims are held captive in small, crowded, and unsanitary conditions; sold to other persons; and forced into service. Throughout the process, victims are threatened, beaten, raped, tortured, and deprived of food, sanitation, medical care, freedom of movement, and basic human rights.

Traffickers use the threat of deportation to compel individuals into submission, avoid detection, and reduce the risk of contacting authorities for assistance. Furthermore, victims are often told that they need to repay debts or buy back their passports, for which they are usually charged exorbitant fees, before they can be freed. If victims are close to paying off the debt, traffickers may sell the victims to a new owner, forcing the victims to begin working off the new debt. Traffickers frequently rape females, especially those sold into the sex industries, as a means of preparing them for their expected services. However, virgins are spared from the initial rape because of their economic value. Victims of the sex industry experience severe physical and psychological traumas, are forced to serve multiple clients daily, and are exposed to HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases. If the victim becomes pregnant, she may be expected to serve clients well into her pregnancy or shortly after giving birth. Also, pregnant victims are sometimes forced to have abortions, which are usually conducted in an unsafe environment. Victims of the forced labor industry are exposed to long workdays and unhealthy conditions, and they are often forced to work every day. Victims who gain their freedom by purchase, escape, or rescue face more challenges, both within the destination countries and their home countries. Within the destination country, victims may be detained as illegal immigrants, may face deportation, may be denied appropriate medical and psychological services, may have difficulty obtaining official travel documents, and may have language barriers. However, repatriation could expose the victim to other hardships and dangers. Victims may be left at their home country’s border without support. Home countries may be in a state of civil war, may prosecute victims for illegal migration, or may not provide needed medical and psychological services. Traffickers may locate and recapture victims. Organized crime and traffickers may retaliate against victims and their families who have assisted in investigations or prosecutions. Families and communities may excommunicate victims, especially those forced into the sex industry.

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The International Community Numerous factors such as weak laws, the globalization of the world’s economy, civil and regional unrest, illiteracy, ignorance, the subordination of women in societies, and economic crisis facilitate human trafficking. Economics and the push-pull factor play an important role in this criminal activity: trafficking routes lead away from lessdeveloped countries and toward industrialization. High demands for labor in the manufacturing, pornography, prostitution, and domestic industries perpetuate the cycle of criminality and victimization. Globalization of the economy, increased demand for personal services, increase in unemployment of women, increase in open borders, and deregulations in movement of human capital, especially via the Internet, are other factors that have led to the increase of human trafficking. The international community has attempted to curtail human trafficking activities by sharing information, increasing cooperation between states, enacting laws domestically, and supporting international conventions and treaties. As early as 1904, international treaties and agreements were signed to combat white slavery, and in 1949 several agreements were combined into the United Nations (UN) Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons. In 2000, The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, which supplements the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, was adopted by the General Assembly. The protocol was intended to be a comprehensive weapon to combat trafficking and has three main purposes: the prevention of trafficking in persons, with specific attention toward women and children; protecting and assisting victims, with respect to human rights; and promoting cooperation among nations. The UN has taken additional steps to protect children through the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and through the UN Convention’s Second Optional Protocol, which prohibits the sale and sexual exploitation of children. The United States has taken a lead role in eradicating the trafficking in humans internationally and domestically by participating in international information sharing and media campaigns and has

passed the Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, which amends the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. While the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery, law enforcement agencies have to rely on several criminal, immigration, and labor laws to confront human trafficking. The act consolidated many laws, and its purpose is to combat this problem domestically and internationally, establish protective measures for victims, and encourage the prosecution of traffickers. The law established the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons within the U.S. Department of State, which publishes the annual Trafficking in Persons Report. Information for the report is compiled worldwide, and the report serves as a diplomatic tool to encourage the international community to reduce this crime and increase cooperation. The European Union (EU) has created legislation aimed at eliminating the trafficking in humans and the sexual exploitation of children. The Treaty on the European Union (Title VI, Provisions on police and judicial cooperation in judicial and criminal matters) states that citizens within the member states shall experience a feeling of safety, especially within the areas of freedom and judicial systems, and this objective is met by combating crimes, especially the trafficking in humans and offenses against children. References Enck, Jennifer L. “The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime: Is It All That It Is Cracked Up to Be? Problems Posed by the Russian Mafia in the Trafficking of Humans.” Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 30(2) (2003): 369–394. European Union. “EU Legislation Being Adopted against Trafficking in Human Beings and the Sexual Exploitation of Children,” October 2005, http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc _centre/crime/trafficking/wai/doc_crime_human _trafficking_en.htm. Hyland, Kelly E. “Protecting Human Victims of Trafficking: An American Framework.” Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 16 (2001): 29–75. Miko, Francis T., and Grace Park. “Trafficking in Women and Children: The U.S. and International Response.” CRS Report for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 209

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2002, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/ 9107.pdf. Raviv, Tal. “International Trafficking in Persons: Focus on Women and Children—The Current Situation and the Recent International Legal Response.” Cardozo Women’s Law Journal 9 (2003): 659–670. Stoecker, Sally. “The Rise in Human Trafficking and the Role of Organized Crime.” Demokratizatsiya 8(1) (2000): 129–131. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Trafficking in Human Beings,” 2004, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/trafficking_human _beings.html. U.S. Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2004.

Murder for Hire: Assassination and Contract Killings Robert D. Hanser, Walonda Wallace, and Kaine Jones Contract killing and murder share many similarities but at the same time are quite different from one another. With the act of murder, there is usually a perpetrator and a victim. A criminal act of murder is committed either through premeditation or in the heat of the moment. In contract killing, a criminal act of murder also occurs. However, in this case the instigator or solicitor (the person who wishes to have someone killed) solicits a third party to carry out the murder. In this form of murder, the contract killer as well as the instigator share in the culpability of the crime, although the motives for each may be quite different. Indeed, the truest form of contract killing is exactly that, a contract. Thus, it is as much a business transaction as it is a murder. In most cases, solicitors will not or cannot conceive any notion of why they share in the culpability of the murder or attempted murder. Often the solicitor’s (instigator’s) rationale is the argument that he or she did not physically commit the act and therefore is not culpable. In the eyes of the law, though, the solicitor is just as bad as the contract killer. However, solicitors do not see themselves as murderers. Rather, they see themselves as normal peo-

ple making a business deal and do not feel compelled to take responsibility for their actions. R. E. Blackshaw examined contract murders that were solicited and attempted (both successful and unsuccessful attempts). He discovered that the motives behind individuals who hire third-party persons to kill do not correlate with the expectations of mainstream society. The view of mainstream society is that most if not all contract killings are under the realm of a criminal network (the Mafia or some other sect of organized crime). Nonetheless, this is not at all the case. While there are a substantial amount of contract killings that are tied into some sect of the criminal underworld, it is not the main circumstance in which contract killings occur. According to Blackshaw, contract killers are solicited by an individual who is in an intimate relationship and is looking to resolve some dispute within the relationship such as custody issues, an unwanted love triangle, life insurance payouts, or property settlements. Cited Reasons for Contract Killing There are in fact several reasons found that pertain to why a person would hire a contract killer. Two main motives for why people contract out to a killer are dissolution of the relationship and money or financial gain. These two motives for contracting out to a killer are based on research performed by Jenny Mouzos and John Venditto in Australia. In their study, the most frequent motive for contract murders was dissolution of a relationship. The cases involving dissolution of a relationship generally entail an intimate partner who is overwhelmingly controlling of the other intimate partner. A present or former intimate partner in this case normally hires the contract killer. The motive of the instigator is to prevent the intimate partner from engaging in another relationship with another person. However, if the intimate partner has already entered into another relationship, the motive is vengeance. On the other hand, an intimate partner will solicit a contract killer to dispose of a present partner in order to be with another partner. Yet another reason for a partner to solicit a contract killer is to resolve custody issues that have arisen from the dissolution of the relationship.

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The second most frequent motive for contract killing involves money or financial gain. This usually includes a beneficiary arranging the murder of a third party in an attempt to accelerate the process of a payout from either a last will and testament or an insurance policy. The contract killer in these cases tends to require a higher payment compared to other motives, and oftentimes the contract killer is more experienced in his work. Methods of Effecting a Contracted Murder It would appear that there is a distinct and appropriate set of methods to employ when hiring a contract killer. According to Mouzos and Venditto, there were three methods in which an instigator (solicitor) and a third-party killer cross paths. The first method is the instigator proclaims that he or she is in need of a contract killer. In this method, there is usually an acquaintance or friend of the instigator who will play the role of middle man by seeking out the contract killer for the instigator and following through with the finalization of the contract. The second method entails the instigator seeking out a contract killer without the assistance of anyone and brokering a contract with a contract killer. The third method involves the instigator seeking out someone who is not considered to be a contract killer but is simply a violent criminal by nature and soliciting that individual into a contract to kill. The next issue in contract killing is of course the payment for the task at hand. It has been said that a price cannot be put on a human life. However, in the mind of a contract killer, that price ranges from as low as $500 to as high as $100,000. S. Piper and J. Black studied contract killers in Brushy Mountain State Prison in Tennessee. Through this research, a revelation became apparent pertaining to the disparate cost range of contracting out to a killer. There are a lot of nonviolent and violent criminals simply taking on the task of contract killing who are in fact not contract killers. Indeed, in a substantial amount of cases, they are not too familiar with the act of murder. It appears that the amateur contract killer will purportedly commit murder for the low-end rate and a professional contract killer will quote a much higher price. Piper and Black mention that the average contract killer is indeed an amateur and is

sometimes playing the role of a contract killer simply as a means to an end. For instance, Black met one contract killer who in the past was a drug dealer and was simply trying to get his finances in order to get back into the business of drug dealing. As in any business, there are professionals and there are amateurs. However, there appears to be no difference in the business of contract killing. Also, the perception of contracting as being solely a tool of criminal networks is proven to be false as well. Thus, contract killings may be generated by jilted lovers just as frequently as they are generated among organized crime members. It would appear, then, that contract killing is a crime that has no clear or mandatory associational boundaries. Rather, it is a crime that is appropriate when the confluence of perpetrator variables is conducive to this crime and when the target is seen as susceptible. References Black, Joey, and David Fisher. Joey the Hitman: The Autobiography of a Mafia Killer. New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2002. Blackshaw, R. E. Criminological Aspects of Contract Assassination. Unpublished master’s thesis, La Trobe University, 1996. Carlo, Philip. The Ice Man: Confessions of a Mafia Contract Killer. New York: St. Martin’s, 2006. Mouzos, J., and J. Venditto. Contract Killings in Australia. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2003. Piper, S., and J. Black. “To Die For.” Tennessee Alumnus Magazine 79(3) (1999): 1.

Nontraditional Organized Crime: Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs Don Liddick Outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs) are a continuing organized crime threat. Most gangs are small and unorganized, but a few have evolved into large transnational criminal organizations. Members of OMGs perpetrate many crimes, including the international traffic in women and children, organized prostitution, murder for hire, trafficking in guns, insurance frauds, loan-sharking, motorcycle and automobile theft, gambling, truck hijacking, 211

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Motorcycle gangs first appeared in the western United States following World War II. Many veterans returning from the War could not easily adjust to civilian life, and some bonded together to form clubs that engaged in various activities on the fringes of the law. Motorcycles became a symbol of their rebelliousness and outlaw spirit. In 1946, several biker groups raided the town of Hollister, California, bringing the gangs to national attention. Nevertheless, even the largest such gangs were virtually unknown outside of California until the late 1960s. Law enforcement provided renewed interest in motorcycle gangs in 1965 when the attorney general of California included the activities of the Hells Angels in his annual report. Increased media coverage and several popular Hollywood movies boosted the gangs into even greater prominence, and veterans returning from Vietnam provided new marginalized recruits. Motorcycle gangs, like other organized crime groups, cashed in on the increased demand for illicit drugs in the 1960s. Facilitated by drug trafficking, several OMGs had emerged as highly structured and somewhat disciplined criminal organizations by the early 1970s.

Los Angeles County Undersheriff William Stonich speaks at a news conference in Monterey Park, California, on December 3, 2003. Stonich announced that Federal agents recently raided Hells Angels motercycle hangouts across the West and made more than thirty arrests after a twoyear undercover investigation netting guns, illegal drugs, and stolen military explosives. (Stefano Palterea/AP/Wide World)

arson, forgery of government documents, extortion, the fencing of stolen goods, theft from U.S. military bases, and narcotics trafficking (especially methamphetamine, cocaine, and steroids). While many hundreds of groups operate around the globe, the largest and most sophisticated groups at present are the Hells Angels, the Outlaws, the Pagans, and the Bandidos. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has estimated that the Hells Angels, the most significant OMG, has more than sixty chapters in thirteen countries.

Organizational Structure OMGs are significant criminal organizations, partly due to their formal and hierarchical authority structure. Unlike organized crime in general, OMGs actually resemble formal organizations, complete with specialized units and written bylaws. Members pay weekly dues, and local chapters relinquish a percentage to the national headquarters of the given club. The largest gangs have a mother club that has authority over chapters in different regions. The president of the mother club is the national president and has authority over all members in all chapters. The vice president of the mother club takes over if the president cannot serve. Territorial or regional representatives handle problems that local chapters are unable to resolve. The formal authority structure continues with a national secretary-treasurer who handles the club’s money and is responsible for collecting dues from local chapters. The secretary-treasurer also records minutes of club meetings and drafts new club bylaws. Typically, there is also a position at the national level

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for an enforcer who makes sure that the president’s orders are followed. Local chapters have the positions of president, vice president, secretary-treasurer, sergeant at arms, and road captain. The sergeant-at-arms is the local equivalent of the enforcer. Road captains coordinate club runs and provide security for outings. Written bylaws govern matters such as membership, punishments for breaking club rules, and codes of behavior during outings. In addition to the formal authority structure and rules noted above, the most significant OMGs often have informal leaders emerge who may have as much functional power as elected officers. Similarly, the formal structure of the club may be separate from its economic structure, which tends to be decentralized. Illicit enterprises such as narcotics trafficking usually involve independent groups of OMG members and nonmember associates who operate autonomously in relation to the formal club authority structure. Each member of a motorcycle gang may have from four to ten nonmember associates who in turn have their own network of accomplices. Structurally, each club member may be a semi-independent operator of illegal activities, with his own gang of accomplices. Nonmember associates may be used to insulate club members from criminal involvement and are usually required to pay a percentage of their profits to official members as a kind of licensing fee. Criminal Activity Outlaw motorcycle gangs often compete with one another in the distribution of narcotics and the operation of other illegal enterprises. Gang wars are not uncommon. On the other hand, they have also been known to coordinate their criminal activities with other organized crime groups, including La Cosa Nostra. For example, the New York Hells Angels operated a night club in cooperation with the Gambino crime family, and Italian American gangsters in Cleveland have used Hells Angels members as contract killers. Cooperation between OMGs and other organized criminals is most prevalent in the realm of narcotics trafficking. In conjunction with Mexican drug cartels, OMGs in the United States are the single most significant state side distributors of methamphetamine.

A penchant for violent behavior is the trademark of OMGs and the source of the fear they generate. No crime or behavior can be too outrageous for club members. In addition, gangs have become more dangerous in recent years as the sophistication of their weaponry has increased. Police raids have resulted in the seizure of antitank weapons, plastic explosives, remote control detonators, and bulletproof vests. Although much of the violence is random and impulsive, other violence is instrumental and functional, aimed at the protection of drug territories, intimidating witnesses, and facilitating extortion or contract murders. The problems presented by OMGs are especially severe in Canada. The Hells Angels is the largest group, but others include the Outlaws, the Bandidos, the Rockers, the Evil Ones, the Red Devils, the Vagabonds, and Satan’s Guards. The gangs are involved in drug trafficking, money laundering, murder, fraud, theft, prostitution, telemarketing fraud, and trafficking in illegal weapons and contraband. Between 1994 and 2003, biker wars in Quebec alone caused 100 deaths, 84 bombings, 130 reported cases of arson, and 9 missing persons. Some of the chapters are well-organized and international in scope, with sophisticated security equipment and heavy weapons. They use puppet clubs and street gangs to gather information, provide security, and shield themselves from law enforcement. Originally the Pissed Off Bastards of Bloomington, the Hells Angels are the largest and most notorious of outlaw motorcycle clubs. A raid on Hollister, California, over the weekend of 4 July 1946 first brought the club to national attention. This event established outlaw biker traditions such as the annual Fourth of July run and the image of the onepercenter (pride in being on the margins of society). The Hells Angels are also well-known for their security stint at the Rolling Stones “Gimme Shelter” concert in Oakland in 1969. One club member stabbed and killed a concertgoer but was acquitted at trial. At present, the club has chapters all over the world, including the United States, Canada, England, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Australia. Some aging members of the Hells Angels have given up their cutoff jackets and Harleys for threepiece suits and Mercedes. Clubhouses in New York 213

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and California are large buildings or complexes guarded with surveillance equipment and military weaponry. The club insignia is a winged skull. Other major motorcycle gangs have essentially copied the Hells Angels in organizational structure and operating style. The Outlaws have forty chapters with about 400 members in the United States, Canada, and Australia. The group originated in Chicago in the 1950s but is now headquartered in Detroit. In the United States, members are found from Florida to New York and as far west as Oklahoma. The Outlaws are involved in numerous criminal activities including extortion, contract murder, car theft, and drug trafficking. In 1974, members of the Outlaws killed three Hells Angels, precipitating a feud between the two OMGs that is ongoing. The club mascot for the Outlaws is a skull over crossed pistons known as “Charlie,” copied from Marlon Brando’s jacket in the movie The Wild Ones. The Bandidos are the third-largest and fastestgrowing OMG in the United States but also have transnational dimensions. The group has at least 300 members and twenty-two chapters, with international posts in Australia and Marseilles, France. The gang was established in 1966 and began trafficking heroin in 1975. Presently the Bandidos are more heavily involved in cocaine and methamphetamine distribution. This OMG is bureaucratically structured with four vice presidents, one of whom serves as president. Activities are centered in Texas. Their mascot is the Frito Bandido. References Barger, Ralph, Keith Zimmerman, and Kent Zimmerman. Hell’s Angel: The Life and Times of Sonny Barger and the Hell’s Angels Motorcycle Club. New York: Harper Paperbacks, 2001. Criminal Intelligence Service (CIS) Canada. Annual Reports, http://www.cisc.gc.ca/webpage/index _b_e.htm. McGuire, Phillip. “Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs: Organized Crime on Wheels.” National Sheriff 37(2) (1986): 68–75. Potter, Gary W., and Michael D. Lyman. Organized Crime. 3rd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003. Sher, Julian, and William Marsden. Angels of Death: Inside the Biker Gangs’ Crime Empire. New York: Carroll and Graf, 2006.

———. The Road to Hell: How the Biker Gangs Are Conquering Canada. Toronto: Knopf Canada, 2003. Veno, Arthur. The Brotherhoods: Inside the Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs. Crows Nest, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2004.

The Relationship between Legitimate and Illegal Markets Clotilde Champeyrache From Watertight to Intertwined Markets Quite often, and particularly in the economic literature, legal and illegal markets are considered as two watertight spheres functioning like two closed circuits with their own rules and procedures and separated by a clear dividing line between the agents who abide by the law and those who do not. Starting illegal activities is supposed to be the result of an arbitration of individuals who are supposed to reject legality as a whole. Obviously, an economic actor cannot exert all his economic functions exclusively on illegal markets. A closer look at reality shows that legitimate and illegal markets, if they do not blend, mingle with each other and are strongly intertwined. Clear evidence of this assertion is given by the observation of the consumption patterns of an economy: even a superficial attempt to take them into consideration makes clear that we cannot compartmentalize the two spheres according to a mere legality/illegality criterion. In fact, the most blatant proof of entanglement of legal and illegal markets lies in the mere fact that criminals include in their consumption basket legal goods and services, and noncriminals do the same with illegal goods and services. Therefore, incomes—gained on legal or illegal markets— are not totally allocated within their sphere of origin, and legal and illegal markets are not completely autonomous. This phenomenon of intertwined spheres can be further exemplified through the crossing of two elements: the nature of production (legal or illegal process of production) and the type of use (once again, legal or illegal) that is made of the purchased good or service. We then obtain four categories of

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The Relationship between Legitimate and Illegal Markets

relationships, and two of them connect legal and illegal markets. On the one hand, indeed, when a legal good or service is produced it can be consumed in a legal way, such as in the case of food, housing, or clothes consumption, but also in an illegal way: legal chemical products can be used as components for terrorist weapons; a transportation service can serve to carry drugs, or any other illegal good, from one place to another. In these cases, legal goods are integrated to a process of production that takes place on illegitimate markets. On the other hand, goods and services banned by the law may be used by noncriminals as well as by criminals: counterfeited handbags, watches, and clothes are overtly used just in the same way as perfectly legal equivalent items would have been used. On the contrary, some illegal goods are also illegally used and consumed, such as in the case of forged identity papers. A Multiplicity of Interactions and an Increasingly Blurred Dividing Line The empirical elements described above can be generalized, systematized, and inserted in a more global scheme, which takes the shape of a classic Keynesian circuit but with two economic sectors: the legal one and the illegal one. Such a circuit aims at representing ex ante the monetary flows that circulate—as counterparts to goods and services— among the major macroeconomic aggregates: production, income, consumption, taxes, governmental spending, investment, and savings. G. M. Rey has elaborated a representation of such a circuit, even adding a third sector corresponding to the infiltration of criminals in legitimate businesses. Among the identified monetary flows, those going from the legal to the illegal sector and those going from the illegal to the legal sector are of high interest to our topic. As far as flows toward the illegal sphere are concerned, two categories emerge. First, part of the legal aggregate income (which also accounts for the produced wealth in the legal economy) flows to the illegal income. This occurs mainly through forced transfers whenever organized criminals resort to extortion on legitimate businesses. Second, part of the aggregate legal income is spent on

illegal goods consumption such as drugs, prostitution, gambling, etc. Three types of monetary flows take the opposite direction, entering the legal sector although coming from the illegal one. First, illegal production is partly dependent on the legal sector, as some intermediary goods necessary for the realization of illegal products are bought on legal markets. Second, the aggregate criminal income is not wholly spent on illegal markets for goods and services. It is also partly dedicated to legal consumption, as criminals, just like noncriminals, spend money for food, clothes, housing, and so on. Last but not least, part of the criminal income is also saved and invested on legitimate markets. This is a first step toward criminal infiltration in the legal economy. It also reflects the hardships encountered by criminals in terms of lasting and safe investment in illegitimate markets. Even highprofitability markets such as the market for drugs can become saturated, and there is a huge difference between investing in legal or illegal activities: only in the legal sphere will your investment be guaranteed and your property rights over it properly enforced. The final effect on the economy of all these interactions between legal and illegal markets is not easy to determine. Its global sign—positive or negative—will depend mostly on the following two factors. The first factor is the criminals’ propensity for legal consumption (i.e., the higher it is, the more it will compensate the leak in the circuit of the legal economy that illegality entails). The second consideration is the degree of integration that exists between the legal and illegal systems of production (i.e., the quantity and value of legal goods and services that are required in the illegal process of production). The more they are integrated, the more an increase in the production of illegal goods will entail a rise in the level of the aggregate demand for legal products and thus, rather paradoxically, a growth of the legal sector. Conclusion In a context in which an extension of the illegal markets can have positive effects on the functioning of legal markets, the dividing line separating 215

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legality from illegality seems more and more blurred. The devices adopted to fight against organized crime are harder to define and implement, and they may not even find the necessary social consensus to back this fight and make it more effective. References Hopkins, David M., Lewis T. Kontnik, and Mark T. Turnage. Counterfeiting Exposed: How to Protect Your Brand and Market Share. Indianapolis: Wiley, 2003. Naylor, R. T. Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002. Rey, G. M. “Relazione introduttiva.” Pp. 3–50 in Relazione della XI legislatura (9 marzo 1993–18 febbraio 1994), vol. 2, edited by Camera dei Deputati. Roma: Commissione parlamentare antimafia, 1995. Savona, Ernesto. European Money Trails. Abingdon, Oxford, UK: Routledge, 1999.

The RICO Statute: An Overview Catherine D. Griffis The Organized Crime Control Act became U.S. law on 15 October 1970. Title IX of the act is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. RICO provides extended penalties for criminal acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal enterprise and is intended to eliminate the influence of organized crime on interstate commerce. One of the first successful applications of the RICO statute came in the case of “Lefty Guns” Ruggiero and his Mafia associates. Ruggiero was later immortalized by Al Pacino in the 1997 film Donnie Brasco. History of RICO From its inception, the RICO statute was specifically designed to target members of the Mafia. The statute’s author, G. Robert Blakely, became obsessed with fighting crime at a very young age after seeing the 1931 movie Little Caesar. The film featured a character named Rico whose story was based loosely on that of real-life mobster Al Capone. While Blakely often stated that the movie

inspired him to become a crime fighter, he has never confirmed or denied whether the name was more than just a coincidence. Blakely went on to become one of the nation’s most well-known experts on organized crime. His career encompassed teaching posts at the law schools of both Notre Dame and Cornell University. He also held an office in the U.S. Department of Justice’s Organized Crime Division as well as served as chief counsel to the U.S. Subcommittee on Criminal Law and Procedures. Many experts contend that despite his long and distinguished career, Blakely’s greatest contribution to law enforcement was the RICO statute. Blakely’s statute holds that any person or organization who commits a combination of two or more crimes within a ten-year period can be charged with racketeering if the prosecution feels that those crimes were committed with a similar purpose or result. Racketeering is a general term for any crime committed under RICO, with the word itself based on the Mafia term “rackets” for business schemes. As a result, the general definition of racketeering causes RICO to cover a wide range of criminal activity. In total, thirty-five crimes (twenty-seven federal and eight state) fall under its domain. Individuals found guilty of racketeering can be fined upwards of $25,000 and/or sentenced to twenty years in prison. Thus, the RICO statute allows prosecutors to seek longer jail sentences for individuals charged with committing multiple crimes in pursuit of a single goal. In addition, the guilty party must forfeit all earnings and economic interest in any business considered to be part of the larger racketeering organization. Another key element of the RICO statute is that it makes no distinction between the guilt of an individual and the guilt of the organization with whom he or she is associated. Prior to the development of RICO, the criminal prosecution of organized crime was limited to the trial and conviction of single members of an organization. There was no way to go after an organization in its entirety. However, the RICO statute outlaws criminal enterprises, which are legally defined as any association of individuals that engages in racketeering activities. Therefore, if one member of an organization is

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The RICO Statute: An Overview

found guilty of murder or bribery, any person found to be associated with the same organization can be prosecuted for violating the RICO statute. RICO’s provision against criminal enterprises destroyed one of the most popular defense options for Mafia bosses and members of organized crime groups. According to the statute, neither party can plead innocent due to the lack of physical involvement in a crime. Blakely’s motive behind the inclusion of the provision was the eradication of the merry-go-round effect of prosecuting single members of an organization. According to Blakely, the problem with targeting single offenders is that once the person is convicted, it is only a matter of time before he or she is back on the streets committing the same crimes. On the other hand, if the law targets the organization, then it removes the element of crime in the first place since the organization is the ultimate facilitator. RICO and the Mafia Despite the obvious advantages offered by RICO in the fight against organized crime, lawmakers failed to enforce it for almost a decade. A number of legal analysts were disappointed in the delayed implementation of the RICO statute, but the loudest demonstrations came from Blakely himself. He argued that the lack of interest in RICO stemmed from a lack of knowledge about the statute’s provisions. Blakely felt it was his responsibility to help the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other law enforcement agencies better understand the possibilities for prosecution presented by RICO, so he began lecturing at various institutions including the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, and the U.S. State’s Attorney’s Office in New York. In 1979, Blakely created a summer training seminar for law enforcement at Cornell University. The seminar catered to agents at both the federal and state levels and was intended to create a cooperative learning environment. The larger hope was that federal and state agencies would understand that they could no longer work independently of each other in pursuit of organized crime. Another reason for the delay in RICO’s proper enforcement stemmed from the FBI’s lack of expe-

rience in new investigative techniques. J. Edgar Hoover’s administration encouraged agents to maintain a physical and moral distance from members of organized crime. This strategy made the FBI overly reliant on mob informants, who were often inaccurate and unpredictable. Agents had little knowledge of who the high-ranking members were in any organization. By 1970, the FBI was still using outdated investigative methods to infiltrate low-level gambling rings and had nothing but minor arrests to show for its efforts. The FBI was unable to make its first major arrest under the RICO statute until 1981 and the case of Ruggiero. The Ruggiero case stemmed from six years of investigative work by Joseph Pistone, an undercover FBI agent whose alias was Donnie Brasco. Pistone lived as Brasco from 1976 on, making friends with members of the Bonanno family including Ruggiero and another mobster named Sonny Black. The information that Pistone supplied to the FBI led to a RICO indictment of Ruggiero, Black, and several other members of Ruggiero’s crew. All the defendants in the case were later tried and convicted except for Black, who disappeared before the trial began. His body was found more than a year later near Staten Island. Authorities speculated that Black’s murder was revenge for his friendship with Pistone. In 1985, following the Ruggiero conviction, a number of other RICO indictments were handed down. The most notable of these convictions were those of Genovese family head Anthony Salerno, Gambino boss Paul Castellano, and Bonanno head Phillip Rasteli. New Uses for RICO While the 1980s marked one of the most successful periods of Mafia prosecution under RICO, it was also the era in which attorneys began testing the statute’s boundaries. Specifically, civil litigation lawyers discovered that Section 1964 of the RICO statute allows civilian claims to be filed by any person who suffers a financial loss as a result of a RICO violation. In other words, defendants convicted under RICO could be held responsible for making monetary reparations to their victims. Furthermore, any person who succeeded in establishing a civil 217

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J. Edgar Hoover founded the Federal Bureau of Investigation and served as its director for 49 years. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Library)

claim would automatically receive a judgment in the amount of three times the cost of actual damages as well as attorney’s fees. By the end of the 1980s, RICO became one of the most commonly asserted claims in the federal courts. RICO can be broadly applied to a number of civil cases due to its inclusion of mail and wire fraud as one of the thirty-five crimes covered in the statute. The breadth of activity that is prosecutable under mail and wire fraud is fairly extensive by most standards, and attorneys were quick to capitalize on the statute’s loophole. The federal courts and the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to limit RICO’s scope during the 1990s, but little has been accomplished. Today’s RICO carries less weight in Mafia prosecutions and is instead used to finan-

cially penalize individuals and organizations on a civilian level.

References Alito, Samuel. The RICO Racket. Washington, DC: National League Center for the Public Interest, 1989. Blakey, G. Robert. Rackets Bureaus: Investigation and Prosecution of Organized Crime. Washington, DC: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Assistance Administration, 1978. Floyd, John E. RICO State by State: A Guide to Litigation under the State Racketeering Statutes Chicago: Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association, 1998. Kelly, Robert J. The Upperworld and the Underworld: Case Studies of Racketeering and

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Business Infiltrations in the United States. New York: Kluwer Academic, 1999.

Trafficking in Persons and Human Organs Georgios A. Antonopoulos Introduction Recent years have seen the focus of the international community on the trafficking in persons and human organs despite the long history of the phenomenon. The human body has become a commodity just as with drugs, arms, and cigarettes. Currently, it is estimated that there are about 27 million people who have been trafficked for various purposes. Individuals are trafficked in Western Europe to work under exploitative conditions, teenagers from Pakistan are bought from their parents and sold in Persian Gulf countries where they work as servants, deliberately injured and mutilated children from Cambodia are used as beggars by traffickers, and in poor countries networks target individuals to buy and traffic one of their kidneys or their liver, skin, heart valves, corneas, tendons, arms, and legs. Article 3(a) of the 2000 United Nations (UN) “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children” states that “trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons, by the means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.” It is difficult to determine accurately the scale of trafficking in persons and human organs in any context and have a clear picture as to the numbers of people or organs trafficked due to the nature of trafficking and the lack of antitrafficking legislation

in a number of countries, underreporting, and discrepancies in statistical reports. Moreover, in respect to human organs trafficking in particular, there is no available data on transplant sharing in some countries that are important to the human organs trade (e.g., South Africa). The Context of Trafficking in Persons and Human Organs There are three necessary elements for the trafficking in persons and human organs: supply, demand, and impunity. 1. Supply. Trafficking in persons (and human organs) must be seen as part of the wider migration nexus in the world. There are push and pull factors, with the push factors being very strong: poverty, armed political and religious conflicts, unstable political conditions, repression of minority ethnic groups, environmental degradation, and the low status of women in a number of countries. It is no surprise that the people and human organs trafficked follow the same routes as migrants, from poor to rich countries. 2. Demand. There is a large demand for cheap labor, for women from different counties for the prostitution scene, and for human organs due to the huge increase of kidney-transplant waiting lists since the early 1990s and the spread of transplant technologies that led to the scarcity of transplantable organs. 3. Impunity. In a great number of countries, there are no laws against trafficking in persons or human organs. In other countries where such laws exist, these are inadequate or are not rigorously enforced.

It should be noted, however, that the trafficking of persons in particular is also facilitated by the rigid legal framework that excludes a very large number of migrants from a number of transit and all destination countries. The Social Organization of Trafficking in Persons The trafficking in persons is committed by groups with varied coherence depending on their ethnic background. Members of the Albanian trafficking 219

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groups, for instance, tend to be strongly linked to each other and to a leader. There is a division of duties or roles in trafficking groups, although many times the duties that each member has to carry out differ from operation to operation, from time to time, and from place to place. Generally, these roles are: 1. The leaders. Not all groups have leaders, as there are many trafficking groups whose members associate and cooperate when there is an opportunity for quick cash only. 2. The recruiters. These individuals are concerned with the recruitment of cheap labor and with women and children for the prostitution scene. 3. The transporters. These individuals are concerned with transferring or at least assisting men, women, and children in reaching the destination country. 4. The scouters. These individuals are usually local people with the responsibility of providing specific information about investigations by the police, the port police, and the army. 5. The enforcers. These individuals are responsible for the safeguarding of the trafficking groups’ benefits. 6. The document vendors. These individuals provide the real or false documents necessary for the journey. 7. The corrupt public officials. The corrupt public officials are those who either provide assistance during the smuggling process (e.g., employees in embassies and consulates in source countries or employees of the authorities in destination countries) or others who are being bribed to turn a blind eye to the exploitation of persons (e.g., corrupt police officers).

There are various methods of recruitment that largely depend on the opportunities that exist for each trafficking network to recruit men, women and children: 1. Deception. This takes the form of either false promise of employment for men and women or false promise of marriage for women only. In some cases (e.g., child trafficking in Africa), deception may take the form of false promise of education. 2. Recruitment of prostitutes. This applies to women only. Not all women who are introduced to com-

mercial sex are deceived as to the sector of employment they are promised. The trafficking groups recruit prostituted women. However, what these women are not aware of is the degree of exploitation to which they will be subjected. 3. Purchase or rent from relatives, boyfriends, and friends. This applies to women and children. 4. Kidnapping or abduction. 5. Payment of debt. This applies to smuggled migrants who do not have the funds to pay prior to their journey and are therefore introduced to hard labor to pay off their debts to the smugglers.

Just as it is difficult to establish the exact total number of trafficked people in the world, it is difficult to establish the exact number of the trafficked people by country of origin. The majority of the victims of trafficking are young or generally healthy people from poor counties of Africa, Asia, South and Central America, and the former Eastern bloc who are either able to work long hours or introduced to the commercial sex scene. There are legal and illegal ways of transporting men, women, and children used by trafficking groups: on foot; by car, truck, or bus; by sea vessels; or even by plane. There are a variety of methods, both violent and nonviolent, with which the traffickers control their victims. These include confiscation of passports or other legal documents; threats; beatings; rape (when it comes to trafficked women and children); imprisonment in houses, apartments, and other lodgings; isolation; making victims dependent on drugs; deprivation of food and water; and continuous surveillance. There are also cases in which Nigerian trafficked women were made submissive under the threat of Voodoo practices enforced on them by Nigerian sangomas. The ultimate form of controlling the trafficked individuals is their sale from one trafficking group to another. This practice is advantageous for the trafficking business, as not only do the traffickers manage to avoid prosecution but they also prolong the debt bondage between them and their victims. There is some estimation as to the profits of the trafficking networks from this shameful trade. P. Monzini, for example, suggests that an individual or a group involved in trafficking of women and

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Trafficking in Persons and Human Organs

Chief kidney surgeon Dr. S.P. Trivedi of the Bombay Hospital is led by police from the city court in Bombay on January 22, 2004. Trivedi was arrested for interstate human organ trafficking, allegedly paying agents who would find impoverished donors willing to sell a kidney. (AFP/Getty Images)

children for commercial sex can make about US$122,000 from one woman in a year. However, this amount needs to be treated cautiously, as some forms of trafficking, and specifically the trafficking of women and children for commercial sex, are closely related to other sectors of the nighttime economy such as bars, clubs, and massage parlors. The Social Organization of Trafficking in Human Organs Similar to the trafficking of persons, there are a number of actors in the human organs trade. Apart from the buyers of the transplantable organs and the sellers, there are the brokers, the individuals who serve as intermediaries to the whole process, and, of course, the surgeons, transplant units, organs banks, and public and private hospitals

where the operations take place. There are cases, however, in which the roles are not clear or in which one individual has two roles. For instance, a surgeon may also be a broker. There are a variety of methods for the recruitment of donors, including formal and informal consensual contracts, coerced contracts, kidnapping or abduction, and murder. Theft of organs from individuals receiving routine operations, from executed or alive prisoners in China and from cadavers elsewhere in the world (e.g., Brazil) and without the consent of the relatives, is also commonplace. When there are consensual contracts, the donors are lured with money, housing, and other benefits; reduced prison sentences; or traveling documents and fares necessary for migration. Unlike the trafficking of persons to be introduced to hard labor or the prostitution 221

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scene in the transit or destination countries, the victims of trafficking in human organs need not be completely healthy. They can be undernourished or malnourished individuals and, according to N. Scheper-Hughes, many times may be “very dead” or in a “dead/not quite dead status known as brain death.” The vast majority of the trafficking in human organs victims come from poor countries of Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America. The countries that are major sources of organs are Romania, Moldova, South Africa, Ukraine, Peru, Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Philippines, India, Russia, and China. The whole deal of a human organ transplantation including travel and accommodation arrangements can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. However, the organ sellers get only a small part of it, although there are differences between countries. An American kidney seller, for instance, receives about $30,000, whereas an Iraqi seller receives as little as $750 to $1,000. The Relationship between Trafficking in Persons and Human Organs and Other Illegal Activities and Trades Trafficking in persons and human organs is interdependent on a variety of criminal activities integral to the trafficking business itself: deception, abduction, and sale or rent of human beings in the recruitment stage; falsification of legal documents, production of illegal documents, and illegal entry during the transportation stage; rape, illegal stay, and physical and psychological violence during the exploitation stage; and theft and murder. In addition, there are offenses committed in relation to the working hours and conditions, and there is also a relationship between trafficking in persons and corruption and money laundering. Finally, trafficking in persons is related to other illicit trades such as smuggling of migrants, drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking. In respect to human organs, trafficking is increasingly connected to heroin trafficking groups who see another arena for profit. Conclusion The trafficking in persons and human organs is an extremely serious issue and highlights the fact that the human body has become another commodity

exploited by individuals or organized crime groups. The introduction of a strong legal framework of trafficking in persons and human organs throughout the world and the upholding of this framework by a sensitized and determined law enforcement apparatus and the relevant governmental and nongovernmental organizations are needed. Very importantly, however, there is a huge need to reduce the economic differences between the poor and rich countries, which makes people either fall prey to individuals and groups who introduce them into exploitative working conditions, slavery, and prostitution or make them resort to desperate measures such as selling themselves or their body parts. References Antonopoulos, G. A., and J. A. Winterdyk. “Techniques of Neutralizing the Trafficking of Women: A Case Study of an Active Trafficker in Greece.” European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 13(2) (2005): 136–147. Chaudhary, V. “Argentina Uncovers Patients Killed for their Organs.” British Medical Journal 304 (1992): 1073–1074. Coburn, A. “Oi Sklavoi tou 21ou Eona” [The 21st Century Slaves]. National Geographic (Greek Edition) (September 2003): 40–63. International Organization for Migration. “New International Organization for Migration Figures on the Global Scale of Trafficking.” Trafficking in Migrants Quarterly Bulletin 23 (2001): 1–6, http://www.old.iom.int/documents/publication/ en/tm_23.pdf. Monzini, P. “Trafficking in Women and Girls, and the Involvement of Organized Crime, with Reference to the Situation in Central and Eastern Europe.” Paper presented at the 1st Annual Conference of the European Society of Criminology, Lausanne, Switzerland, 6–8 September 2001. Ruggiero, V. “Criminals and Service Providers: Cross-National Dirty Economies.” Crime, Law and Social Change 28 (1997): 27–38. Scheper-Hughes, N. “Commodity Fetishism in Organs Trafficking.” Body and Society 7(2–3) (2001): 31–62. ———. “The Global Traffic in Human Organs.” Current Anthropology 41(2) (2000): 191–211. ———. “The New Cannibalism: A Report on the International Traffic in Human Organs.” New Internationalist 300 (April 1998): 14–17, http://www.newint.org/issue300/trade.html.

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Trafficking in Stolen Art, Antiques, and Cultural Property

———. “Organs without Borders.” Foreign Policy (January/February 2005): 26–27, http://www .foreignpolicy.com/Ning/archive/archive/146/ PN146.pdf. ———. “Parts Unknown: Undercover Ethnography of the Organs-Trafficking Underworld.” Ethnography 5(1) (2004): 29–73. ———. “Rotten Trade: Millennial Capitalism, Human Values, and Global Justice in Organs Trafficking.” Journal of Human Rights 2(2) (2003): 197–226. United Nations. “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,” 2000, http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/ Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/ convention_%20traff_eng.pdf. Williams, P. “Human Commodity Trafficking: An Overview.” Pp. 1–10 in Illegal Immigration and Commercial Sex: The New Slave Trade, edited by P. Williams. London: Frank Cass, 1999. Zhang, S., and K. Chin. “Enter the Dragon: Inside Chinese Human Smuggling Organizations.” Criminology 40(4) (2002): 737–768.

Trafficking in Stolen Art, Antiques, and Cultural Property Edgar Tijhuis One of the most diverse and international types of organized crime is the trade in stolen art and antiquities. This trade includes both recognized articles that are known to have been stolen and unknown objects that are illegally excavated from archaeological sites. The way in which this trade is practiced varies considerably among different countries around the globe, and the type of perpetrators involved also varies accordingly. In general, the trade in stolen art and antiquities is sometimes linked with that in fakes in forgeries. A significant proportion of stolen objects are trafficked to various countries to be sold, and several legal instruments have been introduced in an attempt to counter this illegal trade. The Scope of the Problem The extent of the trade in stolen art and antiquities can only be roughly estimated from several key

sources of data. The private Art Loss Register records stolen and missing objects, primarily from Europe and the United States. Each year more than 10,000 objects are added to this database. Most thefts occur in domestic dwellings (54 percent) followed by museums (12 percent), galleries (12 percent), churches (10 percent), commercial premises (4 percent), public institutions (3 percent), warehouses and storage facilities (2 percent), and other places (3 percent). The art squad of the Italian police provides additional figures. Between the squad’s foundation in 1969 and 2001, it recorded 630,000 thefts. Stolen objects are recorded in a database that contains more than 1.1 million objects. Since 1969, 180,000 works of art and 360,000 antiquities have been recovered. Other cases further illustrate the extent of the problem. In Mali, a survey of 125 square miles found 834 archaeological sites, of which 45 percent had been looted, 17 percent badly. In Pakistan, a survey of Charsadda District showed that nearly half of the Buddhist shrines, stupas, and monasteries had been badly damaged or destroyed by illegal excavations. The Trade in Stolen Art and Antiquities The trade in stolen art can be divided into several categories. First, there is the theft of precious works of art from museums. Although this represents only a minor proportion of all thefts, it often involves works of art with significant artistic and monetary value. An example is the 1990 theft from the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston. Among the items stolen were a number of famous paintings by Rembrandt, Vermeer, Degas, and Manet, valued at around $300 million. Second, there are thefts from churches, temples, and other religious places. Paintings, Buddha statues, religious icons, and other objects are stolen in large quantities. Third, there are thefts from libraries and similar institutions. Rare books, manuscripts, and prints cut from old books are the main objects involved. Finally, the fourth and largest category consists of thefts from private collections and galleries. This usually involves the theft of paintings and antiques. The trade in illegally excavated antiquities is at least as diverse as the trade in stolen art. Culturally 223

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rich countries are losing part of their cultural heritage to the art markets of countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, and Japan. Apulian vases from Italy, Nok statues from Nigeria, ceramics from China, and many types of antiquities from tombs in Peru are examples of the objects illegally excavated and trafficked to so-called market countries. Since the 2003 war with the United States, Iraq has become one of the most intensely plundered countries. Antiquities from hundreds of archaeological sites around the country are trafficked abroad to markets in Europe and North America. Since 2003, the Task Force to Fight Illicit Trafficking in Cultural Property Stolen in Iraq coordinates efforts to recover stolen objects from Iraq. Interlinked with the trade in stolen art and antiquities is the trade in fakes and forgeries. Fakes are works of art made to resemble existing ones, whereas known artists pass off forgeries as original works. Works of modern art are frequently faked or forged. However, old masters may also be forged or faked, as can be illustrated with the case of one of the best-known forgers, Eric Hebborn. His drawings infiltrated some of the world’s most prestigious museums for several decades. In 1996, Hebborn published a book in which he outlined his methods. A week after it was published, he was killed in Rome. Antiquities are faked and forged in all source countries. They are often trafficked to market countries together with authentic objects. The Criminals Involved in the Traffic of Stolen Art and Antiquities The types of criminals involved in the traffic of stolen art and antiquities are diverse. In some countries, professional and long-lasting networks of thieves, middlemen, and dealers can be found. Such networks, for example, traffic art and antiquities from Italy to Switzerland and other market countries. A similar situation exists with antiquities from Peru, trafficked to the United States. Furthermore, art and antiquities in French museums and castles are trafficked to Belgium and the Netherlands. Criminals who are not related to the illegal art trade often perpetrate large thefts from museums and private collections in market countries such as

Protesters rush the room where Sothebys intends to auction an ancient Chinese vase on May 2, 2000, at a Hong Kong hotel. The Protesters demanded that the sale of the vase, a very rare hexagonal ceramic which was looted during the 1860 Opium War, should be halted. Despite the interruption, the sale of the vase was completed for 19 million HK (USD 2.4 million) dollars. (AFP/Getty Images)

the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Scandinavian countries. As a result of their unfamiliarity with the art trade, these criminals are often caught and prosecuted. In African countries, loose networks of thieves and middlemen often sell stolen and illegally excavated objects to dealers from market countries in Europe. Many antiquities from Africa are destined for Belgium and France. Antiquities from Asia are primarily destined for the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Netherlands. International Legal Instruments Several international legal instruments have been adopted to counter the trade in stolen art and

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antiquities. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) adopted the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of an Armed Conflict in 1954. In 1970, the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property was adopted by UNESCO and provided a legal instrument against the illegal trade in general. Finally, in 1995, the Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects provided uniform provisions of civil law to complement the earlier UNESCO treaties. In addition to international instruments of law, the United States assists a number of foreign countries through bilateral treaties. Cyprus, Italy, Mali, and Cambodia as well as a number of South American countries have entered into agreements with the United States. Within the European Union (EU), specific legislation has been adopted for the restitution of illegally exported art and antiquities between member states. All international and bilateral legal instruments depend on effective national legislation to define the kind of objects that are protected and the procedures that need to be followed in case of export or import of art and antiquities. There are also specialized law enforcement agencies to deal with this illegal trade. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for example, has a specialized unit for art thefts. This unit

collaborates with both local and foreign law enforcement agencies. The most important foreign agencies are the art squad of the French and Italian police forces and the metropolitan police in London. The French art squad consists of more than 30 officers based in Paris. The Italian art squad is the largest in the world and includes more than 150 officers. Both the Italian and French police have their own databases that are used to trace stolen art in the same way as the private Art Loss Register. The art squad of the metropolitan police in London consists of 3 or 4 officers and focuses on the greater London area. Most other market countries for art and antiquities lack specialized law enforcement units to deal with the traffic of stolen art and antiquities.

References Atwood, Roger. Stealing History: Tomb Raiders, Smugglers, and the Looting of the Ancient World. New York: St. Martin’s, 2004. Brodie, Neil, Jenny Doole, and Colin Renfrew. Trade in Illicit Antiquities: The Destruction of the World’s Cultural Heritage. Oxford, UK: Oxbow, 2001. Conklin, John. Art Crime. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994. Schick, Jürgen. The Gods Are Leaving the Country. Bangkok: White Orchid, 1998. Watson, Peter. Sotheby’s Inside Story. London: Bloomsbury, 1998.

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B. Financial Crimes, Fraud, and Money Laundering

Computer Intrusions and Intellectual Property Theft Vidisha Barua Computer intrusions and intellectual property theft encompass issues such as copyright and trademark violations, theft of trade secrets, computer hacking, theft of computer and high-tech components, and Internet fraud. Intrusion is an event of unauthorized entry or attempted entry to an information system. Intellectual property theft involves counterfeiting or piracy of intellectual property such as patents, trademarks, copyrights, service marks, trade dress, and trade secrets. Computer intrusions have facilitated the age-old crime of intellectual property theft by making it possible to transfer or copy files electronically and by intruding into the protected information of the intellectual property owners. Cybercrimes Computer intrusion plays a key role in the commission of cybercrimes in the world today. Earlier, with a limited number of computer systems monitored by certain institutes or corporations, it was not very easy to hack or intrude into a computer or information system. This has changed over the years, and today systems are well-connected and have become far more accessible throughout the world. This gives opportunities to hackers to access and manipulate data in any given computer system. Geographical distribution of systems also makes it difficult to regularly monitor access to each system and to authenticate legitimate users.

Intruders do not belong to one set category. While some operate individually, others operate in organized groups. They can operate either with a criminal intent or to gain access and spy into systems of national security or for economic gains through intellectual property theft. Still others, especially the individual intruders, do it generally for the thrill or challenge of breaking into or gaining access to somebody else’s computer system, and this could be a result of an obsessive-compulsive behavior. The organized groups, as opposed to the individual intruders, generally have a definite strategy and objective that could be either to disturb the national security or to reap economic gains. Intellectual property theft poses a clear danger to the economy and the health, safety, and security of nations. The increasing value of intellectual property coupled with the ease and low cost of copyright infringement have significantly increased the harsh consequences of intellectual property theft. Intellectual property rights violations, especially those involving the sale of counterfeit or illegally manufactured products, strike at the very foundation of international trade, destabilize the legitimate market, and cause momentous revenue losses to genuine and legitimate industries. Digitization and the Internet boom have further enabled the intellectual property rights infringers to effortlessly pirate, copy, and illegally distribute trade secrets, trademarks, copyrights, and logos. The United States is hard hit by counterfeiting and other forms of copyright, trademark, and patent infringements because it is the world leader in the

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creation and export of intellectual property, primarily in motion pictures, computer software, sound recording, and book publishing. The Motion Pictures Association of America (MPAA) and its international counterpart the Motion Pictures Association (MPA) on behalf of its member companies direct a comprehensive international antipiracy program. Established in 1976, the program actively pursues the implementation and strengthening of existing copyright protection legislation. It assists local governments and law enforcement authorities in the investigation and prosecution of piracy cases, initiates civil litigation on behalf of its member companies against copyright infringers, and conducts educational outreach programs regarding the harmful effects of piracy. The MPA/MPAA estimates that the U.S. motion picture industry loses in excess of $3 billion annually in potential worldwide revenue as a result of piracy. This figure does not include Internet piracy losses, as these are hard to keep track of. However, there is no doubt that Internet piracy causes untold damages to the motion picture industry. To battle the problem, in 2000 the MPA launched more than 60,000 investigations into suspected pirate activities and more than 18,000 raids against piracy operations in coordination with local authorities around the world. The MPAA/MPA directs its worldwide antipiracy activities from headquarters in Encino, California. Its regional offices are located in Brussels (Europe, Middle East, and Africa), Mexico (Latin America), Canada, and Hong Kong (Asia/Pacific). An International Concern According to International Intellectual Property Alliance estimates, in 2002 the U.S. core copyright industries accounted for an estimated 6 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product ($626.6 billion). The core industries are those that primarily produce and distribute copyright materials. These include newspapers, book publishing, recording, music, periodicals, motion pictures, radio and television broadcasting, and computer software (including business application and entertainment software). In 2002, copyright industries achieved foreign sales and exports estimated at $89.26 billion, surpassing other major industry sectors such

as chemicals and related products, food and live animals, motor vehicles, parts and accessories, and aircraft and other equipment sectors. With computer intrusions facilitating the infringement of intellectual property rights, the two issues are now addressed together by several governments. In the United States, the Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (CHIP) program has met with considerable success. This complements the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) in the Criminal Division of the Justice Department. The CHIP program requires prosecutors to focus on all intellectual property right violations and cybercrimes. In addition, CHIP prosecutors are expected to develop public awareness programs and provide training to other prosecutors and law enforcement agencies regarding high-tech issues. Most countries have brought laws protecting intellectual property rights up to international standards, but given the complexities inherent in these laws, few are focusing as much as they should on enforcing them. The dimension of cybercrimes in intellectual property theft is relatively new, and not all countries have adequately addressed this issue so far. Intellectual property violations and computer intrusions are flourishing because of ineffective laws, weak enforcement, inadequate resources devoted to investigations and prosecutions, corrupt government officials, and uninformed or inadequately trained law enforcement officers. East and Southeast Asia are primary regions where intellectual property rights violations are flourishing. Ukraine, Israel, Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay are other countries where such illegal activities are doing well. References Albanese, Jay S. Combating Piracy: Intellectual Property Theft and Fraud. Somerset, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006. Britz, Marjie T. Computer Forensics and Cyber Crime: An Introduction. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003. Collie, Byron S. “Intrusion Investigation and PostIntrusion Computer Forensic Analysis,” http://www.usyd.edu.au/su/is/comms/security/ intrusion_investigation.html#Def. 227

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Fernandez, Justin. Counterfeiting and the Theft of Intellectual Property. New York: Chelsea House, 2002. International Intellectual Property Alliance. “IIPA’s New Economic Study Reveals the Copyright Industries Continues to be a Driving Force in the U.S. Economy,” 7 October 2004, http://www.iipa .com/pressreleases/2004_Oct7_Siwek.pdf. Motion Picture Association of America. “AntiPiracy,” 2005, http://www.mpaa.org/piracy.asp. Poltorak, Alexander I., and Paul J. Lerner. Essentials of Intellectual Property. Indianapolis: Wiley, 2002. Tech Law Journal. “Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Violations,” 2005, http://www.techlawjournal .com/crime/20001228exc.asp.

Credit, Insurance, and Securities Fraud and Fraudulent Bankruptcies Vidisha Barua Credit, insurance, and securities fraud and fraudulent bankruptcies are all white-collar crimes. Whitecollar crimes are those crimes committed mostly in the course of a person’s occupation and especially by someone who already has access to money and is greedy for more. Edwin Sutherland coined the term “white-collar crime” to refer to those crimes committed by white-collar officials occupying high positions as opposed to the simpler crimes committed by blue-collar workers or street crimes. Credit Fraud Credit frauds mostly involve identity thefts in which the fraudulent person uses secret, privileged information of another to get credit. In case one loses a credit card or anything that has personal information on it, it is advisable to close accounts related to that information so that somebody else can not misuse it. Often, however, the identity thief hunts down personal information to commit credit fraud. It is important to place fraud alerts on credit reports and review these reports regularly so that any new accounts opened without the legitimate user’s knowledge can be detected. Insurance Fraud Insurance frauds can be of two kinds. The most common form is filing false insurance claims. This

drains the insurance industry of a lot of money. However, some insurance frauds are carried out by insurance companies themselves. This could include diverting premiums where funds meant to cover claims are used for other purposes, bribery of company officials, and misrepresentation of facts by insurance company officers, directors, employees, agents, and brokers for their personal gain or to prevent regulators from taking certain actions. The Coalition against Insurance Fraud (CAIF) in the United States has estimated that health care fraud alone costs Americans $54 billion a year. Securities Fraud Securities fraud involves a crime in which securities investing or trading laws have been violated. Security fraud mostly comprises of insider trading. It also involves manipulation of stocks and other fraudulent activities in the securities market. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 recognized insider trading as a crime. As defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), insider traders are stockholders, directors, officers, or any recipients of information not publicly available who take advantage of such limited disclosure for their own benefit. These frauds can only be carried out by insiders, those who are privy to privileged information, unless they give this information to an outsider who becomes a beneficiary of this information. Nevertheless, insider trading cannot be carried out without the cooperation of an insider. The SEC has determined that insiders have a fiduciary duty not only to refrain from trading on their private information but to disclose it as well. The Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC), a joint project with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), has reported that most Internet fraud complaints originate from online auctions although the amount involved is not as much as that in securities fraud carried out in the financial markets. Internet fraud involving stock information, however, is the second most common form of investment fraud, amounting to losses of more than $10 billion a year in the United States. Fraudulent Bankruptcies Bankruptcy is a rehabilitation process to help those

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who have genuinely suffered losses due to frauds of others or because of situations beyond their control. However, this process is vitiated by those who try to take advantage of this system and abuse it by fraudulent means. Fraudulent bankruptcies represent a growing problem all over the world, causing huge losses to the economy. Fraudulent bankruptcies generally include bankruptcy filings that people do to escape personal liabilities. Sometimes people fraudulently sell their assets just before filing bankruptcy so that the assets cannot be liquidated. In other cases, people even succeed in concealing their assets. In the United States, an analysis of an FBI bankruptcy fraud investigations revealed that the most common scheme utilized in fraudulent bankruptcy filings indeed involved the concealment of a debtor’s assets. The concealment of assets encompasses approximately 70 percent of bankruptcy fraud in the United States. This prevents these assets from being liquidated and transferred to creditors to pay the debt. Corporations practice this on a larger scale. The company owner often transfers assets to family members or other businesses. This gives a false picture of the assets of the company and greatly affects the liquidation of debts. Despite several regulations and enforcement operations, the concealment of a debtor’s assets remains the most significant problem area within bankruptcy fraud worldwide. Besides concealment of assets, bankruptcy fraud also involves schemes to include petition mills, multiple filings, false statements, trustee fraud, attorney fraud, forged filings, embezzlement, credit card fraud, and bust-outs. Petition mills and multiple filings are the most common bankruptcy fraud schemes after concealment of assets. Conclusion Credit, insurance, and securities fraud and fraudulent bankruptcies involve a huge drain of the economy, and people need to be more alert to these frauds. Since these are not violent crimes, they are often given a callous treatment until a person or a corporation is affected. More proactive and quick reactive measures are needed to tackle this worldwide problem. It is easier in present times to carry on these activities across borders. Therefore, coun-

tries should come together to fight these frauds in a spirit of cooperation. References “Bankruptcy Fraud.” Federal Bureau of Investigation Economic Crimes Unit, http://www .fbi.gov/whitecollarcrime/bankruptcy_fraud/about. htm. Cho, Jang Y., and Michael K. Shaub. “The Consequences of Insider Trading and the Role of Academic Research.” Business and Professional Ethics Journal 10(4) (1991): 83–98. Coalition Against Insurance Fraud. “Annual Report 2004,” http://www.insurancefraud.org/annual _report04_set.html. “Internet Securities Fraud: Old Trick, New Medium.” 2001 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 0006, http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/ 2001dltr0006.html. Rosoff, Stephen M., Henry N. Pontell, and Robert H. Tillman. Profit without Honor. 3rd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2004. “SEC: Next Please.” Economist, 24 January 1987, 27. “Securities Fraud.” InvestorWords.com, http://www .investorwords.com/4441/securities_fraud.html.

Foreign Economic Espionage: Theft of Trade and High-Tech Secrets Oliver Hemmerle Discussions of espionage usually start with the hint that intelligence is the oldest or second-oldest profession. Whereas this is usually a game of words, it is perfectly true for economic espionage, the theft of trade and of high-tech secrets. Transfer of technology is a driving force in the development of mankind, and this transfer becomes espionage when it is done without the consent of the owner of trade or technological secrets. The history of the human race could be seen as an ongoing story of legal and illegal forms of such transfer, with the illegal forms being labeled by the victimized party as theft or espionage. Commercial versus Political and Military Espionage Purely industrial espionage of one manufacturer stealing the ideas of another for the purpose of 229

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making a profit is different than the espionage committed by state-sponsored organizations to gain an economic, political, or military advantage of one nation vis-à-vis another nation. Industrial espionage can take place on a national or international level. The first case usually involves theft for commercial purposes, whereas in the second case the economic aspect is often surpassed by the political and military implications. To illustrate these theoretical concepts it might be useful to look at some historical examples of economic espionage or theft. The production methods of porcelain in China were a well-kept secret in the seventeenth century. There had been European adventures and merchants to China organizing large exports of Chinese porcelain to Europe, which reached millions of pieces in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As the Chinese carefully kept the production secret, Europeans had to reinvent the craft. European production started in about 1710, but due to the lack of sophisticated intelligence the Chinese could still rely on revenues of this trade well into the late eighteenth century. The European espionage attempts in this case were purely economic, because porcelain as a luxury item did not have any military implications. This classical example for the discovery of high-tech secrets would be the famous enigma. During World War II, the apparatus to transform messages into codes not readable to an outsider was not a secret as such. Early forms of this apparatus had been even offered commercially in the interwar period. The espionage part of it was the cracking of the code by the British with substantial aid of Polish and French scientists, spies, and soldiers. This was kept secret from the Germans during the war, with the result that the Germans completely trusted in this system and thereby gave away valuable information to the Allies. This mixture of intelligence and rediscovery of a hightech secret by the Allies had large implications for military aspects of the war and—probably even more important—for the economic warfare, as the cracking of the code allowed the Allies to protect their military convoys through the Atlantic against German U-boats, thereby allowing a continuous supply from the United States to both Britain and the Soviet Union.

Historical Overview The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s was a watershed for economic espionage. Before discussing the recent developments of foreign economic espionage, we have to look back to the period beginning immediately at the end of World War II and ending in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The race for economic and technological espionage started even before the common enemies Germany and Japan surrendered in May and August 1945. The Americans, the Russians and—to a lesser degree—the British and the French troops had special search parties to get as much information as possible about the technological developments made in Nazi Germany during the war. High on the wanted list were both matériel and German scientists concerned with developments, especially in the atomic and rocket fields. At Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Americans showed their superiority over the Soviet Union in atomic technology, but Stalin got much information out of the Manhattan Project by scientists with a communist ideology. Just four years later, by a combination of espionage and its own research, the Soviet Union was able to catch up with the Americans, which led to the second Red Scare in the United States and was instrumental in the happenings of the McCarthy era. Later, the Soviets became leaders in the space race by sending the first satellite into orbit. The lack of U.S. spies within the Soviet Union meant that the United States could not rely on technological espionage and had to develop things by themselves. Due to technological and economic superiority, the United States won the space race at last and, nearly as a by-product, landed on the moon. This setting was not changed in the 1970s and 1980s. The Soviets never again surpassed the United States economically or technologically. The economic espionage capabilities of the Soviets and of their allies were excellent. They saved uncountable rubles by stealing Western trade secrets, from microchips to a Soviet-style imitation of the Space Shuttle program. Nevertheless, the West tried to protect its secrets from the East with the Coordinating Committee for East West Trade Policy (CoCom), which was supported by Japan, Aus-

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Ethel (left) and Julius Rosenberg ride to seperate prisons following their espionage convictions on March 29, 1951. The Rosenbergs were convicted of conspiring to share secrets of the U.S. nuclear weapons program with the Soviets and were executed on June 19, 1953. (Library of Congress)

tralia, and practically all North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states. CoCom limited the Western export of high-tech (e.g., aerospace and computer technology) products to the Eastern bloc, whereby especially dual-use products (i.e., products with a civilian and potential military use), were banned from export out of the Western bloc. The Soviets were highly successful in smuggling such restricted items, as was especially highlighted by the Schalck-Golodkowski case that was made public during the reunification of Germany in 1989–1990. Schalck-Golodkowski had organized for the communist East German government the massive by-passing of CoCom regulations in the trade with West Germany. The Soviets undoubtedly won the economic espionage war but lost the Cold War because they did not have the economic and technological potential to make perfect use of the stolen trade secrets. This was seen by the Ronald Reagan administration in the early 1980s,

which engaged in another arms race and thereby forced the Soviet Union to further overstretch its economic potential. To a certain degree, this U.S. policy also relied on economic espionage. The United States stole few trade secrets from the Soviet Union but did, both openly and secretly, use knowledge of the disastrous economic situation of the Eastern bloc as a basis for its arms race policy. When the Cold War ended (but before 9/11), intelligence agencies looked for new tasks to justify the spending of large amounts of taxpayers’ money on state-sponsored spies. Especially the United States in the early years of Bill Clinton’s presidency, Great Britain and France tried to reconfigure their secret services this way in the 1990s. In Paris, a school for and against economic espionage opened to teach the tools of economic espionage and of counterintelligence at an academic level. Rumors remain that the French secret service provided French enterprises during business negotiations with foreign countries with the offers given by nonFrench contractors to the potential buyer, thereby allowing the French enterprise to outbid the nonFrench rival and get the deal. Whereas this was a sort of ungentlemanly behavior among Western nations, the ongoing economic espionage activities of the secret services of emerging post-Soviet nations and of China had a more profound political impact. But the main problem of economic and high-tech espionage was the desire of rogue countries such as Libya, Iran, and pre-2003 Iraq to get technologies usable for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Western nations therefore tried to establish a strong nonproliferation regime in the tradition of the Cold War CoCom system. Legislation in all Western countries was tightened in the 1980s and 1990s, whereby the international debate on legal and illegal proliferation of poison gas production facilities from German enterprises to Libya (“Auschwitz-in-the-sands”) was a cornerstone in the development of public opinion awareness. The Nonproliferation Problem The nonproliferation regime has several levels. It starts with strong legislation and—even more important—tough implementation of such regulations within the Western and technologically highly 231

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developed world. Nevertheless, illegal exports will take place, and the openness of Western university systems provides most major states worldwide with the technological intelligentsia (scientists) necessary for the use of such technologies. (Nuclear scientists from the former Soviet Union who became unemployed after the end of the Cold War and offered their services for money were a special problem. NATO states created special employment programs to get these scientists off the freeemployment market.) The second level of such a nonproliferation regime will be containment by international treaties. This is especially applicable to the nuclear field, as in the case of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (i.e., international control of the civilian-only use of nuclear capabilities by the member states). The test case for this is the ongoing Iran debate. The 1991 war against Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait led to the WMD disarmament program controlled by the United Nations (UN). This was in fact an attempt to reverse the effects of decades of Western negligence and Iraqi technological espionage and theft. It failed, as Iraq sabotaged the UN inspectors (labeled as “spies” by the Iraqi propaganda) but— unknown to Western intelligence until after 2003— succeeded at the same time, as Iraq after the IranIraq War and the war of 1991 did not have the economic capabilities to restart its WMD programs on a large scale. Libya seems to be a more successful case of Western trade restrictions, because Libya after years of economic UN sanctions gave up its WMD programs and even invited the Americans to control this complete reversal of policy. The nonproliferation question will be the most important aspect of foreign economic and technological counter-espionage for decades to come. Conclusion The theft of trade and high-tech secrets will have the potential of altering fair competitiveness between enterprises of different nationalities. Getting or losing a deal by means of economic espionage may directly influence people getting or losing their jobs by foul play of this kind. Another version of economic espionage is the plagiarism of technology, which is first bought and then copied.

An example of this is the high-tech Transrapid train sold by Germany to China, whereby China announced its own development of such a train technology just months after delivery of the German train to China. Some economical theoreticians try to establish competitive intelligence as a legitimate tool for a sort of preemptive marketing strategy and for more aggressive market research. Some enterprises have already established competitive, commercial, or market intelligence departments using legal forms of information gathering. A new field of economic espionage can be seen with the coming of age of information warfare (i.e., the form of electronic espionage to control vital infrastructures of an adversary by penetration of the relevant computer systems). Gains in this field are traditional information gathering, but it could easily amount to sabotage once the penetration is used for such purposes (blocking of communication and transport networks with massive economic consequences). But even this aspect is not really new. During World War I, World War II, and the Cold War, the enemy was always blamed for economic sabotage, be it by sanctions or blockades or by sabotage attacks on industrial sites. The Eastern bloc communist dictatorships overplayed this foreign sabotage motive in a ridiculous way for the propagandistic purpose of distracting from their own economic failures. References Budden, Michael Craig. Protecting Trade Secrets under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act: Practical Advice for Executives. Westport, CT: Quorum, 1996. Cornwall, Hugo. The Industrial Espionage Handbook. London: Century, 1991. Eells, Richard, and Peter R. Nehemkis. Corporate Intelligence and Espionage. New York: Macmillan, 1984. Ham, Peter van. Managing Nonproliferation Regimes in the 1990s. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993. Harris, J. R. Industrial Espionage and Technology Transfer: Britain and France in the Eighteenth Century. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1998. Ishaq, Mohammed. The Politics of Trade Pressures: American-Soviet Relations, 1980–88. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999.

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Lux, Christian, and Thorsten Peske. Competitive Intelligence und Wirtschaftsspionage. Wiesbaden: Gabler, 2002. Noehrenberg, Eric H. Multilateral Export Controls and International Regime Theory: The Effectiveness of COCOM. Sinzheim: ProUniversitate-Verlag, 1995. Schalck-Golodkowski, Alexander. Deutsch-deutsche Erinnerungen. Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2001. Seiffert, Wolfgang, and Norbert Treutwein. Die Schalck-Papiere: DDR-Mafia zwischen Ost und West. Vienna: Zsolnay, 1991. Tuck, Jay, and Karlhans Liebl, eds. Direktorat T: Industriespionage des Ostens. Heidelberg: Kriminalistik Verlag, 1988. Ulfkotte, Udo. Marktplatz der Diebe: Wie die Wirtschaftsspionage deutsche Unternehmen ausplündert und ruiniert. Munich: Bertelsmann, 1999.

Global Efforts to Combat Money Laundering: The Egmont Group and the Financial Action Task Force Laura Ferola The Egmont Group Since 1995, a number of financial intelligence units (FIUs), national organisms charged with collecting information on suspected operations and disseminating it to the proper authorities, began working together in an informal organization known as the Egmont Group (named for the location of the first meeting, held at the Egmont-Arenberg Palace in Brussels, Belgium). The group was created by a joint initiative undertaken by the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement NetWork and the Belgian Cellule de traitement des informations financières et la prévention du blanchiment de capitaux with the aim of gaining an efficacious fight against money laundering, at national and international levels, by the implementation of an international information exchange system by means of communication offices. In particular, the Egmont Group’s priorities are focused on fostering and promoting the widest effective cooperation and information exchange between FIUs on the basis of reciprocity or mutual agreement, improving expertise and capabilities of

personnel of FIUs, assisting countries to establish and develop the FIUs, promoting sharing of expertise, and organizing meetings in order to establish common lines and operative solutions. Main Operative Instruments In order to stimulate information exchange and overcome the obstacles preventing cross-border information sharing, particular emphasis was devoted to the policies set forth in the “Principles of Information Exchange between Financial Intelligence Units from Money Laundering Cases.” This document, annexed to the “Statement of Purpose of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units” (adopted in Madrid on 24 June 1997 and revised at The Hague on 13 June 2001 and, most recently, at Guernsey on 23 June 2004) describes the work accomplished so far as well as the group’s current goals within the framework of national and international anti–money laundering efforts. Therefore, the group foresees thirteen essential principles to be observed in order to encourage international cooperation between FIUs in cases involving money laundering while counterbalancing the fundamental principles of confidentiality and bank secrecy (principles A.1–4). To this aim, homogeneous information exchange is encouraged in order to allow exchanged data to be used by other domestic law enforcement or financial supervisory agencies. In addition, national legal standards and privacy laws shall not be conceived so as to inhibit the exchange of information between or among FIUs (principles B.5–8). On the grounds of principles C.9–10, FIUs should be able to exchange information freely with other FIUs on the basis of reciprocity or mutual agreement and consistent with procedures understood by the requested and requesting parties. The requesting FIU may not transfer information shared by a disclosing FIU to a third party or make use of the information in an administrative, investigative, prosecutorial, or judicial purpose without the prior consent of the FIU that disclosed the information (principles D.11–12). According to principle E.13, all information exchanged by FIUs must be subjected to strict controls and safeguards to ensure that the information is 233

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used only in an authorized manner, consistent with national provisions on privacy and data protection. The FATF: Structure and Tasks The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), created by the G-7 Summit in 1989, is an intergovernmental body that sets standards and promotes policies exclusively devoted to combating money laundering and terrorist financing. It currently has thirtythree members (thirty-one countries and governments and two international organizations) and more than twenty observers. Notwithstanding that it is allocated at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the FATF does not become formally part of any international organization. It is an independent group of international experts and representatives from national governments that updates its tasks every five years. The presidency is a oneyear position and is assisted by a steering group that is divided in to three branches (Working Group I for legal affairs, Working Group II for financial issues, and Working Group III for external relations). The FATF does not promote the adoption of international legally binding rules but rather promotes only soft law instruments. Indeed, its main goal is the establishment of standards in the form of recommendations that could be endorsed by national authorities and applied internationally in a consistent manner. This is because countries have different legal and financial systems, so all cannot take identical measures to achieve the common objective, especially over matters of detail. The recommendations therefore “set minimum standards for action for countries to implement the detail according to their particular circumstances and constitutional frameworks.” The Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering In 1990, the FATF adopted the so-called Forty Recommendations, which refers to the juridical and repressive national orders as well as to the regulation of the international financial system. The original FATF Forty Recommendations were drawn up as an initiative to combat the misuse of financial systems by those laundering drug

money, but in light of the new typologies and strategies adopted by criminals to launder dirty money, the recommendations were revised and updated in 1996 and, more recently, in 2003. The new comprehensive framework for combating money laundering and terrorist financing is based on a key element: a common definition. To this aim, Recommendation No. 1 invites countries to criminalize money laundering on the basis of the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) and on the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000). Moreover, Recommendation No. 1 foresees that countries should apply the crime of money laundering to all serious offenses, which are punished by a minimum penalty of more than six months imprisonment with a view to including the widest range of predicate offenses. Whichever approach is adopted, each country should at a minimum include a range of offenses within each of the designated categories of offenses, indicated in the annexed glossary that includes several forms of human rights violations, and should adopt efficacious measures for confiscation (Recommendation Nos. 2–3). With regard to customer due diligence and record keeping (Recommendation Nos. 4–12), the FATF calls upon national financial institutions to not invoke bank secrecy to inhibit implementation of the recommendations and to establish high standards to verify the identity of their customers (the know-your-client, or KYC, principle), especially when they establish business relations, when they carry out transactions, when there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, or when the financial institution has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data. Additional cautions have been required vis-à-vis politically exposed persons (i.e., those who have covered or are presently involved in their country’s foreign governmental, judicial, or military tasks) such as the establishment of appropriate risk management systems to determine whether the customer is a politically exposed person, obtaining senior management approval for establishing business relationships with such customers, taking reason-

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Hong Kong Chief Secretary Donald Tsang (second from right) speaks at the start of a plenary meeting in Hong Kong held by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering on January 30, 2002. Over 300 delegates from over 55 jurisdictions took part in the three-day meeting to review how much governments and banks have done to stop terrorist funding since the September 11 attacks. (Reuters/Corbis)

able measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds, and conducting enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship. Customer due diligence and record-keeping criteria should also be applied to designated nonfinancial businesses and professions such as casinos, real estate agents, dealers in precious metals or stones, lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals, and accountants. As far as reporting of suspicious transactions and compliance is concerned (Recommendation Nos. 13–16), whereas a financial institution, or the abovementioned designated nonfinancial businesses and professions, suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity or are related to terrorist financing, it should be required, directly by law or regulation, to report promptly its suspicions to the FIUs, which should be implemented in all the countries.

While Recommendation Nos. 17–20 set forth measures to deter terrorist financing on the grounds of the Special Eight Recommendations, in October 2004 a ninth recommendation was added. These Nine Special Recommendations were established in an effort to restrict the ability of “terrorists and their supporters access to the international financial system.” Recommendations no. 21–22 deal with the measures to be taken with respect to the noncooperative countries and territories (NCCTs); those countries that do not comply or insufficiently comply with the recommendations and that object to special initiatives for reducing their weaknesses in anti–money laundering systems by the FATF. Countries are asked to implement competent authorities and adopt adequate supervision measures to effectively control financial and monetary institutions as well as nonfinancial businesses and 235

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professions that can be easily involved in money laundering (Recommendation Nos. 23–32). Furthermore, rules to prevent the unlawful use of legal persons by money launderers are fixed (Recommendation Nos. 33–34). In particular, countries that have legal persons who are able to issue bearer shares should take appropriate measures to ensure that they are not misused for money laundering and should be able to demonstrate the adequacy of those measures. Countries should also ensure that accurate and timely information on express trusts, including information on the settler, trustee, and beneficiaries, can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities. Finally, systems of international cooperation in administrative and judicial matters as well as matters concerning mutual legal assistance and extradition, notwithstanding the absence of dual criminality, should be enhanced. Finally, countries should take “expeditious action in response to requests by foreign countries” (Recommendation 38) to freeze, seize and confiscate property laundered, proceeds from money laundering or predicate offenses, and fight financial support to terrorism (Recommendation Nos. 35–40). Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing In the extraordinary meeting held in Washington, D.C. on 29–30 October 2001, the FATF expanded its mandate to counteract terrorism financing by adoption of the Eight Special Recommendations. These instruments are characterized by their essentiality and specificity and are complementary to the Forty Recommendations. In this framework, countries are invited to immediately ratify and implement fully the 1999 UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism as well as the UN resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of the terrorist acts financing, particularly the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1373 (Recommendation No. 1). Among the different measures to be taken, the FATF invites states to provide penal sanctions against terrorism financing, terrorist acts, and terrorist organizations, ensuring that such offenses are

designated as money laundering predicate offenses (Recommendation No. 2). Funds or other assets of terrorists or of those who finance terrorist organizations should be frozen without delay, and efficacious proceedings to report suspicious transactions related to terrorism to the competent authorities must be implemented as well as systems to furnish the greatest possible measure of assistance for mutual legal assistance or information exchange between countries (Recommendation Nos. 3–4). According to Recommendation Nos. 5–6, countries are also called on to ensure that persons or legal entities, including agents, that provide a service for the transmission of money or value, including transmission through an informal money or value transfer system or network, should be licensed or registered and subject to all the FATF recommendations, and this must be applied also to banks and nonbank financial institutions. Financial institutions, including money remitters, should be required to include accurate and meaningful originator information (name, address, and account number) on funds transfers (Recommendation No. 7). Finally, countries should review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to entities that can be abused for the financing of terrorism, in particular nonprofit organizations (Recommendation No. 8). These special standards were followed by the Action Plan against Terrorist Financing that called for the completion of a self-assessment exercise by all FATF members by 31 December 2001, including the issuance of the additional FATF Guidance for Financial Institutions in Detecting Terrorist Financing.

References Bantekas, Ilias. “The International Law of Terrorist Financing.” American Journal of International Law 97 (April 2003): 315–332. Egmont Group. “Information Paper on Financial Intelligence Units and the Egmont Group,” September 2004, http://www.egmontgroup.org/ info_paper_final_oct_2004.pdf. ———. “Statement of Purpose of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units,” 23 June

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2004, http://www.egmontgroup.org/statement _of_purpose.pdf. FATF-GAFI. “The 40 Recommendations,” http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/28/0,3343,en _32250379_32236930_33658140_1_1_1_1,00 .html#r33. Guymon Donigan, CarrieLyn. “International Legal Mechanisms for Combating Transnational Organized Crime: The Need for a Multilateral Convention.” Berkeley Journal of International Law 18 (2000): 53–101. Hetzer, Wolfgang. “Money Laundering and Financial Markets.” European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 11(3) (2003): 264–277. Johnston, Barry R., and Oana M. Nedelescu. “The Impact of Terrorism on Financial Markets.” IMF Working Paper, Monetary and Financial Systems Department, International Monetary Fund, March 2005, http://www.internationalmonetary fund.com/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp0560.pdf. Kem, Alexander. The Legalization of the International Anti–Money Laundering Regime: The Role of the FATF. Working Paper No. 177. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, ESCR Centre for Business Research, 2000. Martin, Gill, and Geoff Taylor. “Preventing Money Laundering or Obstructing Business?” British Journal of Criminology 44(4) (July 2004): 582– 594. Shelley, Louise. “Transnational Organized Crime and Seized Assets: Moral Dilemmas concerning the Disposition of the Fruits of Crime.” Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 7 (2000): 35–50. Zagaris, Bruce, and Sheila M. Castilla. “Constructing an International Financial Enforcement Subregime: The Implementation of Anti–Moneylaundering Policy.” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 3 (1993): 871–965.

Health Care Fraud: An Emerging Criminal Enterprise Roe A. Roberts Globally, health care and health care fraud are big business. In 2003, U.S. health care costs reached $1.7 trillion. As a result, health fraud has become an important contributor to budget shortfalls in the health care sectors of many countries.

To understand health fraud, it is important to understand what it is, who commits it, how governments are responding to it, and what it costs. Common types of health care insurance fraud in developed countries include billing for services that aren’t provided, billing for unnecessary services, and billing for services that are performed by lesser or unqualified personnel. Fraudulent schemes common in both developed and developing countries include promoting untested and potentially harmful treatments to vulnerable patients and selling counterfeit drugs and other regulated devices. These schemes victimize patients, providers, and private and government insurers. In 2003, a survey by the National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association (NHCAA) found that the United States had recovered, or prevented, losses of $503 million due to its antifraud activities. However, an estimated $51 billion was still lost due to fraud. Other U.S. agencies put losses as high as $170 billion each year. The perpetrators of health care fraud range from trusted health care professionals to large crime syndicates. Even if the fraud is identified, it is still difficult to recoup losses. In 2001, Allstate insurance company sought legal redress against individuals engaged in fraudulent activity against their company. In 2004, Allstate was awarded $30.81 million. In February 2005, Allstate reported that it had only recovered $5.24 million. These types of fraud occur in all countries and in all areas of health. Additional associated crimes such as money laundering, grand larceny, and falsifying business records often occur along with health care fraud. Attempts to Control Health Care Fraud Many countries are attempting to eliminate health care fraud. Australia set up a fraud tip line, noting that each year millions of dollars are lost due to fraud against health, welfare services, and payments. In 2004, New York’s Attorney General’s Office indicted six people and five corporations for carrying out a scheme involving the submission of fraudulent personal injury claims to insurance carriers. According to New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, “Ambulance chasing has evolved . . . [in]to a sophisticated multi-faceted criminal enterprise.” Accident victims may find themselves 237

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Workers destroy fake and outdated drugs in Beijing, China, on January 18, 2007. (Getty Images)

pawns in insurance frauds wherein medical mills concoct phony injury claims. The Government and Health Care Fraud Section of the U.S. Attorney General’s Office focuses on fraudulent billings, frauds directed against government agencies and programs, and claims of adulterated food products. Many countries pass laws aimed at criminalizing health fraud, and the United States has passed several statutes making any fraud perpetrated against public or private health insurance payers a federal criminal offense. Many argue that deceptive advertising poses a more immediate threat than other types of financial fraud to people who already suffer from the economic, physical, and psychological impacts of serious health conditions. In 2001, the director of the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Bureau of Consumer Protection reported that in spite of federal and state enforcement actions, unsupported, or overly extravagant, health claims were still common

advertising gimmicks. Between 1997 and 2001, the FTC filed twenty-seven cases against companies that used bogus or misleading advertising to market unproven health products. The FTC started Operation Cure All seeking to reduce the Internet distribution of fraudulent products claiming to cure a wide variety of ailments. When the operation started, more than 1,600 websites were found to be making questionable health claims about their products. Fraudulent health claims are not limited to flyby-night Internet companies. ICN Pharmaceutical’s chief executive officer and chairman of the board were charged by the Securities and Exchange Commission with deliberately misleading investors about one of the company’s drugs. In 2003, the FTC filed or settled seventeen enforcement actions targeting products that generated more than $1 billion in consumer sales each year. Private companies in many countries also attempt to expose health fraud. The Canadian

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Health Care Anti-Fraud Association was founded in 2000 to expose fraud and educate the public. In the United States, the National Council Against Health Fraud (NCAHF) jointly sponsors a weekly e-mail newsletter with Quackwatch that is designed to alert consumers as to the most current fraudulent activities. The newsletter recently reported on a rent-a-patient scheme that crossed forty-five state lines and involved participation by several outpatient surgery clinics, medical management companies, and thirty-four individuals. This scheme involved performing unnecessary procedures on people who had been recruited off the street and cost insurance companies more than $1 billion.

and-a-half-year period. Health care fraud threatens the economic and physical health of all countries, and only by working together can countries help control this burgeoning fraud. Education, vigilance, and prosecution are the most effective ways to combat health fraud.

International Cooperation Aimed at Ending Health Fraud Internationally, some countries are working in concert to combat health care fraud. In 1998, the United States, Canada, and Mexico signed an agreement acknowledging that health fraud poses a threat to all citizens living near the Mexican-U.S. and Canadian-U.S. borders, as fraudulent health products and treatments originating in one country are often marketed to residents of the other country. In many parts of the world, counterfeit drugs and other regulated medical devices have become a growing problem. It is estimated that U.S., Japanese, and European Union (EU) companies lose $80 billion each year due to drug counterfeiting and piracy. The early warning bells were sounded at the 1985 World Health Organization (WHO) Conference of Experts on the Rational Use of Drugs. By 1999, WHO had received 771 reports of counterfeit drugs from different countries. Both developed and developing countries are working to stem the tide of counterfeit drugs. Nigeria created the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), charging it with a number of tasks including responding to fake drugs and other similar fraudulent activities. The NAFDAC works closely with international agencies such as the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) and WHO. The NAFDAC has been successful in confiscating and destroying about $10 billion (Nigerian currency value) worth of fake drugs and substandard products over a four-

References Barrett, Steven. “Insurance Fraud and Abuse: A Very Serious Problem.” 15 February 2005, http://www.quackwatch.org/02Consumer Protection/insfraud.html. Beale, J. H. “FTC’S Beales Testifies on Campaign to Combat Health Fraud and the Elderly.” Congressional Testimony, Federal Trade Commission, 10 September 2001, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/09/healthfraud.htm. CNN. “Drug Maker’s Chairman Milan Panic, Others Charged in Suit over Liver Drug,” 12 August 1999, http://money.cnn.com/1999/08/12/ companies/icn/. Coris. “Healthcare Fraud,” http://www.corisweb .org/article/archive/300/. Fishman, T. C. “Manufaketure.” New York Times, 9 January 2005. FTC. “Federal Trade Commission Attacks $1 Billion In Deceptive Health Marketing since December.” FTC, Office of Public Affairs 10 July 2003, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/07/diethealth.htm. ———. “FTC and FDA Announce the Adoption of an International Agreement to Combat Health Fraud.” FTC, Office of Public Affairs, 10 December 1998, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/ 1998/12/health.htm. Legal Information Institute. “White-Collar Crime: An Overview,” http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/ white_collar.html#list_h1. NCAHF. “Consumer Health Digest #05-07.” National Council Against Health Fraud, 15 February 2005, http://www.ncahf.org/digest05/0507.html. ———. “Consumer Health Digest #5-16.” National Council Against Health Fraud, 19 April 2005, http://www.ncahf.org/digest05/05-16.html. New York State Attorney General. “State Uses Organized Crime Statute in Auto Fraud Fight.” Press release, of Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, 24 August 2004, http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/ 2004/aug/aug24a_04.html. NHCAA. “Health Care Fraud a Serious and Costly Reality for All Americans,” April 2005, http://www.hcinsight.com/docs/papers/NHCAA%2 0White%20Paper%20on%20Fraud.pdf. 239

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Office of the Actuary. “Highlights: National Health Expenditures, 2003.” Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2005, http://www.cms.hhs .gov/NationalHealthExpendData/02_National HealthAccountsHistorical.asp. U.S. Criminal Code. Title 18, Part I, Chapter 63, subsection 1347. Added to Pub. L. 104–191, Title II, §242(a)(1), 21 August 1996, 110 Stat. 2016.

Identity Theft, Fraud, and Criminal Activity Rob Hanser, Jeffrey P. Rush, and Vanessa Trowel In 1998, the U.S. Congress passed the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, which specifically criminalized the act of identity theft. Identity theft has emerged as a new threat that seems to exist in epidemic proportions. Much of this is due to the advent of the Internet and the proliferation of various forms of technological communication. While the act of identity theft itself is not new, the frequency of its occurrence increased quite dramatically with the various Internet technologies that developed during the 1990s and beyond. Furthermore, these technological developments have made this form of criminal activity much more convenient and much more lucrative for identity thieves. Thus, the crime of identity theft became a priority concern to law enforcement agencies around the nation, and this led to the need for a specific category of criminal law to address this phenomenon. Specifically, the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act acts against anyone who “knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law.” According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), “Identity theft occurs when someone uses your personal information without your permission to commit fraud or other crimes.” Thieves obtain victims’ identities in a number of ways. The FTCs publication “Take Charge: Fighting Back against Identity Theft” identifies the following methods that are commonly utilized:

• Stealing records or information while on the job or bribing an employee who has access to corporate records. • Through the theft of a victim’s mail (including bank and credit card statements, credit card offers, new checks, and tax information). • Through the collection of discarded materials in a victim’s everyday garbage. • By capturing credit or debit card information in a data storage device through a practice known as skimming. They may swipe your card for an actual purchase or attach the device to an ATM machine where you may enter or swipe your card. • Theft of the victim’s wallet or purse. • Through the use of personal information from e-mail or phone communications with the victim by posing as legitimate companies and claiming that the victim’s account has some form of technical problem. This practice is sometimes referred to as phishing online or pretexting by phone.

In many cases, victims losses may include not only out-of-pocket financial losses but also substantial additional financial costs associated with trying to restore their credit report and their reputation in the community and correcting erroneous information for which the criminal is responsible. With this personal information about the victim, the criminal simply takes over that individual’s identity to engage in a wide variety of crimes. This can range from the generation of false loan applications and credit card applications to simply stealing the money from a person’s bank account. Indeed, the identity thief typically has any number of opportunities and in many cases may be able to utilize those opportunities for an extended period of time. All too often, the victim is unaware of what has happened until a significant loss has occurred. At this point, the laborious and time-consuming process of repairing the damage ensues. The Crime of Fraud Fraud is essentially a form of misrepresentation of the truth to obtain some form of benefit. While this is not a legal or official definition, it nonetheless captures the essence of the basic crime of fraud. However, when examining fraud from a legal per-

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Private citizens attend a free community shred to combat identity theft. Sponsored by local crime-prevention organizations and retailers, the event allowed consumers to dispose of sensitive documents securely. (PRNewsFoto/Shred-it)

spective (which is quite naturally the point at issue for criminal justice agencies), it becomes clear that there are numerous types of fraud that may have a variety of definitions. Financial institution fraud occurs when a person knowingly misrepresents facts to induce a business or organization that manages money, credit, or capital to perform a financial activity. One example of this type of fraud would be credit card and debit card fraud. Identity theft likewise falls within this category, demonstrating the interrelated nature of identity theft and fraud. Gaming fraud occurs when a person or an institution misrepresents the true odds of winning an event. This is particularly true when anything of value is placed at risk and the target victim is misled as to the actual chances of the winning outcome of the event. Examples of this type of fraud would include sports tampering and the placement and claiming of false bets during legal gambling events.

Insurance fraud is a misrepresentation in the indemnity against any possible loss. This type of fraud can occur by either party (the provider company or the individual insured) and can involve misrepresentation of the value of the insured property, the circumstance under which the property was lost or destroyed (e.g., arson), or the amount of damage or loss that has been incurred. This type of fraud can include the inflation of claims by individuals who are insured, the insured misrepresenting facts on an insurance application (particularly life or health insurance), and the staging or fake production of accidents and injuries. Investment fraud occurs when deceptive practices involving the use of capital (the target victim’s capital) to create more money, either through income-producing methods or through additional risky ventures that are expected to reap further capital gains. One example of this type of fraud is Ponzi/Pyramid schemes in which the criminal 241

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operator promises high financial returns or dividends that are not available through traditional investments. Rather than actually investing the victim’s funds, the criminal pays dividends to the initial victim investors by using the investments from victims who subsequently join the investment scheme. This type of fraudulent scheme tends to collapse when new investors cannot be found frequently enough to continue the payment of dividends to previous investors. Lastly, confidence fraud includes the reliance on another’s discretion or breach in a relationship of trust that results in financial loss to the victim. This typically includes a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment. Auction fraud and Nigerian letter frauds are categorized as confidence fraud schemes. Because of their frequency and their international nature, the Nigerian letter fraud schemes have drawn the attention of law enforcement agencies around the world. According to the FBI, these letters are mailed from Nigeria and offer “the recipient the opportunity to share in a percentage of millions of dollars that the author, a self-proclaimed government official, is trying to transfer illegally out of Nigeria.” These letter schemes are also frequently conducted via e-mail transmission and disseminated to persons all around the globe. Prevalence of Internet-Based Fraud In 2000, the United States established the Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC), which is tasked with compiling complaints of Internet fraud and with data collection and storage of such reported incidents. The IFCC likewise coordinates victims and information with all relevant law enforcement agencies to assist in combating this frequently occurring criminal activity. During 2002 alone, the IFCC received more than 75,000 complaints—a threefold increase from the previous year—and referred 48,252 of these fraud complaints. The total dollar loss from all referred cases of fraud in 2002 was $54 million, an increase from the $17 million reported in 2001, with a median dollar loss of $299 per complaint. These amounts demonstrate how prevalent and lucrative this type of criminal activity can be.

The IFCC has found that Internet auction fraud has been the most frequently reported offense, comprising 46 percent of referred complaints. In 2002, the nondelivery of merchandise and payment accounted for 31 percent of complaints, while credit card and debit card fraud made up nearly 12 percent of complaints. However, among those victims who reported a dollar loss, the highest median dollar losses involved Nigerian letter fraud ($3,864), identity theft ($2,000), and check fraud ($1,100) complainants. It would appear that the perpetrators of Internet fraud are overwhelmingly male (roughly 79 percent), and more than half of these criminals resided in one of five states: California, New York, Florida, Texas, and Illinois. While most of these criminals resided in the United States (76.7 percent), criminal perpetrators were also represented abroad, with most of these criminal activities originating from Nigeria (5.1 percent), Canada (3.5 percent), South Africa (2.0 percent), Romania (1.7 percent), and only a handful of other countries around the world. Lastly, it would appear that the use of electronic e-mail and web pages are the two most common means by which fraudulent contact was established between the criminal and the victim. Altogether, roughly 66 percent of complainants reported that they had e-mail contact with the perpetrator, and 18.7 percent reported having contact via web page. Conclusion Identity theft and fraud are crimes that have changed in nature and frequency during the past few years. Technological advances in electronic communications have created numerous convenient and lucrative mechanisms for criminals to complete these two types of crimes. Because of the ease and efficiency as well as the prevalence of this type of criminal activity, law enforcement agencies around the world have had to update training and investigative techniques, while governmental bodies have found the need to update legal categories associated with these crimes. Thus, as the world benefits from the ever-advancing technological age, the criminal offender finds a world of illicit opportunities that have made the advent of the informa-

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tion age as much a bane as a boon for those who are victimized through this form of criminal activity. References Crouch, J. “A Basic Course on Computer Crimes, Counterfeiting, & Forgery (Including Identity Theft) and Credit Card Fraud.” Presented during the 2005 workshop at the Institute of Law Enforcement, Monroe, Louisiana, Institute of Law Enforcement. Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Common Fraud Schemes,” 2005, http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/ fraud/fraudschemes.htm. Federal Trade Commission. “Take Charge: Fighting Back against Identity Theft,” June 2005, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/idtheft /idt04.shtm. Friedrichs, David O. Trusted Criminals. New York: Thomson Wadsworth, 2004. National White Collar Crime Center. IFCC 2002 Internet Fraud Report: January 1, 2002– December, 31, 2002. Washington, DC: National White Collar Crime Center, 2003, http://www.ic3 .gov/media/annualreport/2002_IFCCReport.pdf. United States Congress. “The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998,” http://frweb gate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 105_cong_public_laws&docid=publ318.105.

International Money Laundering Control: Law Enforcement Issues Mathieu Deflem and Kyle Irwin Money laundering involves activities to conceal the existence, illegal source, or illegitimate application of income and purposely attempts to make such income legitimate. A money laundering scheme involves three phases: placement, layering, and integration. In the placement stage, money is deposited in a financial institution through a front operation that provides a pseudolegitimate source for the money. Next, layering involves a transfer of illegitimate income through international wire transfers across different accounts. Finally, integration is accomplished by reintroducing the funds in legitimate economic activities. Organized crime and money laundering have a special connection due to the technical sophistication and relation to drug trafficking that each holds. Various interna-

tional regimes have been instituted to suppress money laundering activities, alongside of which law enforcement responses have been devised. Global Regimes against Money Laundering International policies to suppress money laundering have been instituted in various forms. At a bilateral level, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties among various countries allow for agreements on a broad range of measures such as the sharing of evidence, the locating and identifying of persons, and the execution of requests for searches or seizures. Bilateral treaties can be executed because many countries have passed similar laws criminalizing money laundering. Extending the activities among nations, international governmental bodies have also regulated money laundering. In 1988, the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances criminalized money laundering associated with drug trafficking. Also in 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, consisting of bank and government representatives from eleven major industrialized nations, drafted the “Statement of Principles on Money Laundering,” which specified ethical standards for banks. Among the standards is the socalled know your customer (KYC) rule, urging banks to get to know the true identity of their clients so that money launderers can be detected. In 1989, the authorities of the G-7 nations set up the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money laundering. The FATF established a list of recommendations that encourages nations to criminalize money laundering and adopt measures to seize assets tied to such activities. Although the FATF recommendations are not legally binding, they have in the meantime been extended to twenty-six nations with advanced capitalist economies. Regional conventions, mostly in Europe, have also been agreed upon. In 1990, the Council of Europe agreed on the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation from Proceeds of Crime that criminalized all money laundering activities and urged greater transparency in relevant financial transactions. In 1991, the European Union (EU) specified an additional directive, the 243

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Prevention of the Use of Financial Systems for the Purpose of Money Laundering, that extends the prohibition of money laundering to all organized criminal activities. The Role of Law Enforcement The fact that a criminal activity is formally prohibited and criminalized by law or international convention is insufficient in establishing an effective prohibition regime. Laws and regulations also need to rely on specialized enforcement agencies. With respect to crimes with important international dimensions, such as in the case of money laundering, additional enforcement issues are posed at an international level. Because it is a hidden and technically sophisticated crime that often transcends the boundaries of national jurisdiction, money laundering is not easily policed with conventional means of law enforcement. Within nations, money laundering is the subject of law enforcement activities both as part of existing police responsibilities and as a function of new specialized agencies. In the United States, for instance, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) engage in operations against money laundering as part of their existing duties. The DEA launches major operations against the money laundering capabilities of important drug-trafficking organizations. In the FBI, the Financial Crime Section oversees a Money Laundering Unit whose primary purpose is to identify, disrupt, and dismantle money laundering operations, especially in terms of the FBI’s programs against white-collar crimes, organized crime, and drug and violent crimes. The FBI also maintains liaisons with other federal, state, and local agencies and oversees specialized task forces to address domestic and international money laundering matters. In the current era of globalization, where crimes of money laundering often cross jurisdictional borders, relevant law enforcement strategies should transcend borders as well. National money laundering laws have important international law enforcement dimensions. From the U.S. viewpoint, money laundering activities are conceived as threats to international security, whereby the governments in

some countries are seen as unable to withstand the risks or avoid the temptation of illegitimate monetary transactions in their economies. U.S. law enforcement agencies have responded to this situation by setting up sting operations in vulnerable foreign countries, often without the consent of the governments of those countries. In 1992, for example, law enforcement agencies of the United States and the United Kingdom unilaterally devised a sting operation in the Caribbean island of Anguilla. Having set up several front companies and bank accounts, undercover agents sought out the business of money launderers over a period of five years. Besides transnational operations unilaterally conducted by an agency of one nation and cooperative efforts among law enforcement agencies representing a limited number of countries, there are also multilateral enforcement strategies against money laundering. The Basel Committee’s Statement of Principles of 1988 already emphasized the need for nations across the world to comply with money laundering laws and to cooperate with law enforcement. As a result, specialized units have been established in national and international law enforcement and security communities to adequately police money laundering measures. The 1991 directive of the EU, for instance, led to the creation of Financial Intelligence Units to exchange information with one another. At the international level, special attention must go to the efforts against money laundering overseen by the International Criminal Police Organization, better known as Interpol. An international cooperative structure of police agencies currently representing 182 nations across the world, Interpol has devoted special attention to financial crimes with an important international dimension, including money laundering. Because Interpol is not a police force but rather a cooperative structure among existing national police agencies across the world, the organization has primarily acted to urge its members to enact measures to identify, trace, and seize the assets of money laundering operations and to exchange information among one another concerning these matters. Finally, private institutions also play a role in the enforcement of money laundering policies. Specif-

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Russian-born billionaire Arkadi Gaydamak is escorted by bodyguards to a press conference in Tel Aviv, Israel, on January 4, 2006. Gaydamak is wanted by INTERPOL in connection with the “Angolagate” arms-for-oil scandal in which he is accused of money laundering. (AFP/Getty Images)

ically, because many national and international policies concerning money laundering involve transactions via banks, these financial institutions take part in the effective enforcement of money laundering policies. The financial world has been called into the service of the law enforcement community, and money laundering measures often hold banks accountable for enhanced record keeping. Generally, banks have been willing to play this role of law enforcement agent because compliance with regulations allows them to maintain their reputation and respectability. Nevertheless, sometimes banks have been less than cooperative in reporting illegal activities. Suspicious transactions can go unreported because banks profit from any monetary transaction whether legal or illegal. Although efficiency in means of policing is an important consideration in many law enforcement

activities, especially those involving important high-tech dimensions as in the case of money laundering, less is known about the effectiveness of law enforcement operations. While some law enforcement operations have been successful in cracking down on specific instances of money laundering, the proportion of such successful strategies relative to the total number and profitability of money laundering schemes on a global scale may be small. From the viewpoint of those participating in organized crimes involving millions of dollars, any loss due to expanded legal controls and law enforcement may be considered a negligible cost of doing business. Money Laundering Control since 9/11 Since the events of 11 September 2001, law enforcement measures against money laundering 245

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have been expanded and modified. Law enforcement agencies presently focus not only on money laundering involving offshore practices through wire transfers but also on cash-based forms of money laundering. Such cash forms of money laundering have been found to be more prevalent in cases involving certain international terrorist groups. Expanded law enforcement capacities since 9/11 are supported by new pieces of legislation. Specifically, the U.S. Patriot Act includes a separate section devoted to international money laundering and terrorism that seeks to strengthen both anti–money laundering and counterterrorism enforcement efforts. The act has broadened the reach of relevant law enforcement activities and encourages cooperation among financial institutions, financial regulators, and law enforcement. Like the Patriot Act, international regulations have likewise begun to focus on the nexus between terrorism and money laundering. On 28 September 2001, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution involving a multitude of measures concerning the financing of terrorism. References Cuellar, Mariano-Florentino. “The Mismatch between State Power and State Capacity in Transnational Law Enforcement.” Berkeley Journal of International Law 22 (2004): 15–57. Daley, Madelyn J. “Effectiveness of United States and International Efforts to Combat International Money Laundering.” Saint Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic Law Journal (2000): 175–204. Joyce, Elizabeth. “Expanding the International Regime on Money Laundering in Response to Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Corruption.” Pp. 79–97 in Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice, edited by Philip Reichel. London: Sage, 2005. Sheptycki, James. “Policing the Virtual Launderette: Money Laundering and Global Governance.” Pp. 134–176 in Issues in Transnational Policing, edited by J. W. E. Sheptycki. London: Routledge, 2000. Zagaris, Bruce. “The Merging of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financial Enforcement Regimes after September 11, 2001.” Berkeley Journal of International Law 22 (2004): 123–157.

Money Laundering and the Global Financial System Edgar Tijhuis Money Laundering and the Global Financial System Money laundering is crucial to many types of organized crime. As long as the scale and scope of organized crimes are limited, money laundering usually remains a local affair. Cash-based businesses such as bars, casinos, restaurants, travel agencies, and construction agencies can launder much of the proceeds of racketeering, gambling, and drug dealing. At some point, the local laundering no longer suffices. It may be that the proceeds are simply too large or that the transnational character of the crime demands that the laundering move to another level. The laundering will then take place within the global financial system. Whether the laundering takes place locally or globally, the basic mechanism remains the same. First of all, funds are moved from a direct association with the criminal activity that generated them. Thereafter, the origins of the money are disguised to confuse and frustrate any investigative activity seeking to connect the illicit funds with particular individuals. Finally, the funds are made available to the criminal enterprise once again but now in the legitimate economy. In technical terms, these stages are usually called placement, layering, and integration. The Global Financial System The financial institutions and regulations that are active on an international level together make up the global financial system. The main actors in the global financial systems are international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for International Settlements, and the World Bank and national agencies and government departments such as central banks and finance ministries as well as private institutions (banks and hedge funds). As far as money laundering is concerned, globally operating banks are the most important actors. They can facilitate the laundering of money in different ways. One of them is the laundering through

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bank secrecy jurisdictions and offshore banking centers. Illicit funds are then placed in accounts in these jurisdictions, for example, in a numbered bank account. The funds in such an account can be invested in an international business corporation (IBC). An IBC is an offshore corporation that is not permitted to engage in business within the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated. The name of the beneficial owner of such a corporation is usually confidential, and the IBC is often exempt from local taxes. The IBC can lend the money back to the original owner. In this way, he can convert the money to his own use in a legal way. Furthermore, he will pay interest on the loan, thereby taking more money into his offshore account. Partly due to the advantages of the bank secrecy jurisdictions and banking centers for money laundering purposes, these jurisdictions and territories have attracted investments and deposits out of proportion to their economies and population. Examples are jurisdictions such as Panama, Aruba, the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Hong Kong, and Macau. These jurisdictions have huge concentrations of corporations, banks, insurance companies, and registrations of vessels. Although bank secrecy jurisdictions are often used for money laundering purposes, this should not obscure the fact that some banks in heavily regulated markets such as the United States and the United Kingdom have been involved in major money laundering activities. Furthermore, a range of banks can be mentioned that were registered in bank secrecy jurisdictions but had branches all over the world and were known for money laundering and other illegal services. Examples from the past are the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), the Nugan Hand Bank, Banco Ambrosiano, and the European Union Bank of Antigua. The money laundering that takes place through the bank secrecy jurisdictions and banks is not restricted to the laundering of proceeds of organized crime. Alternative types of laundering include, for example, the laundering and dispersion of funds from intelligence agencies to foreign opposition movements, terrorists, arms dealers, and organized criminals. The laundering of funds from

charities destined for terrorists or outlawed opposition movements is a global phenomenon. Finally, bribes often need to be laundered before the recipients can use them in the legitimate economy. The Effects of Money Laundering The effects of money laundering can be diverse, depending on the scale of the laundering on the one hand and the country or market within which the laundering takes place on the other hand. Money laundering can change the demand for money and stimulate exchange and interest rate volatility. It harms the collection of taxes and decreases the value of economic statistics. Furthermore, it has a contaminating effect on particular transactions or sectors and behavioral expectations of market actors and country-specific distributional effects on asset price bubbles. An example of the serious impact that money laundering can have occurred in the mid-1990s, when widespread money laundering schemes orchestrated by Mafia and Albanian crime groups led to a crisis in Albania that destabilized the economy and disrupted the lives of millions who were ruined financially in the aftermath. The solvency of Albanian banks eroded as public confidence collapsed following disclosure of the fraudulent schemes. Initiatives to Fight Money Laundering in the Global Financial System Since at least the 1980s, there have been a number of initiatives to protect the global financial system from money laundering. In 1988, the United Nations (UN) Convention against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (The Vienna Convention) was adopted. The treaty required its signatory states to criminalize the laundering of drug money and to confiscate it where found. In 1989, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money laundering was established. This task force is an intergovernmental body that has helped to establish anti–money laundering policies in its member states as well as in nonmember states notorious for money laundering practices. Besides the FATF, there are a number of other international initiatives. Examples are the 247

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U.S. Senator John Kerry addresses reporters on October 1, 1992, in Washington, D.C., about the release of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Terrorism’s report on the Bank of Credit and Commerce International’s (BCCI) illegal financial dealings. BCCI officials were indicted in 1991 amid allegations of fraud and money laundering in support of drug dealers and terrorists. (AFP/Getty Images)

Global Programme against Money Laundering, the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, and the Eastern and Southern Africa anti-money laundering (AML) groups. Since 9/11, money laundering has attracted a great deal more attention than in the past. Many jurisdictions have strengthened their internal regulations with respect to money laundering. Furthermore, while money laundering techniques become more sophisticated, so too does the technology to fight it. With modern information technologies, financial transactions can be far better and more efficiently monitored than in the past.

Corruption. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003. Block, A. A., and C. A. Weaver. All Is Clouded by Desire: Global Banking, Money Laundering and International Organized Crime. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004. Blum, J. A., M. Levi, T. Naylor, and P. Williams. Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering. Vienna: UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, 1998. Kelly, R. J., J. Maghan, and J. D. Serio. Illicit Trafficking: A Reference Handbook. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005. Naylor, T. Hot Money and the Politics of Debt. New York: Linden, 1987.

References Beare, M., ed. Reflections on Transnational Organized Crime, Money Laundering and 248

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Offshore Financial Services: Bank Secrecy Jurisdictions and Offshore Banking Edgar Tijhuis Bank Secrecy Jurisdictions and Offshore Banking Bank secrecy jurisdictions and offshore banking services are essential for many types of organized crime. The cornerstone product offered by every offshore haven is a legal system that protects against unwanted and unauthorized disclosure of financial matters. Bank secrecy means that by law, bank employees are prohibited from revealing information concerning a customer’s account. This prohibition is buttressed by criminal sanctions including fines and imprisonment. Today, more than ninety jurisdictions offer themselves as providers of bank secrecy. On the upper hand of the range there are secrecy jurisdictions that have signed mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) and that regularly and routinely cooperate in money laundering investigations. On the other extreme are jurisdictions that assert their complete unwillingness to cooperate with any foreign investigation. Banks or other financial institutions operating offshore are institutions that, while legally domiciled in one jurisdiction, conduct business solely (or primarily) with nonresidents. These institutions are often exempt from a wide range of regulations normally imposed on onshore institutions: their transactions are often tax-exempt, they are not encumbered by reserve requirements, they are free of interest rate restrictions, and often, though not always, exempt from regulatory scrutiny with respect to liquidity or capital adequacy. Besides the offshore banks, international business corporations (IBCs) are an important product of bank secrecy jurisdictions. In its ideal form, an IBC is an offshore corporation that is not permitted to engage in business within the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated. IBCs can be found in Panama, Hong Kong, Costa Rica, and numerous other jurisdictions. In each jurisdiction, the IBCs have local characteristics, but a number of basis elements are usually present. One of these is the preservation of confidentiality of the beneficial owner of the company. Another is the exemption

from local corporate taxation and stamp duty, provided that the company engages in no local business. (Annual agent’s fees and company registration taxes are still payable, which are normally a few hundred U.S. dollars per year.) Recently, international initiatives have tried to limit the latter characteristic, but it is still found in many jurisdictions. Another characteristic is the ability to issue shares in bearer or registered form as well as an abrogation of any requirements to appoint local directors or officers. Bank Secrecy Jurisdictions and Organized Crime Bank secrecy jurisdictions can be found all over the world. However, a small group of jurisdictions are responsible for the majority of both legitimate and illegitimate transactions in bank secrecy jurisdictions. Switzerland is one of the most important banking centers in the world. It has a long history of financial privacy that can be traced back to the Middle Ages. The Swiss Constitution, the Banking Law, and the Penal Code provide a solid legal foundation for maintaining the strict standards of confidentiality. The Bahamas are a vital bank secrecy jurisdiction and, besides banking, are known for the registration of foreign vessels. Bermuda is known for its large number of captive insurance companies as well as being the domicile for offshore funds. The British Virgin Islands is estimated to be home to the largest number of offshore companies. The Cayman Islands allegedly has the largest value of assets under management (AUM) in offshore funds and is also the strongest presence in the U.S. securitization market. Gibraltar is not known for a particular specialization but is well represented in all types of offshore banking and connected services. Jersey is a dominant player in the European securitization market and the European Real Estate Investment Trust (REID) market. Luxembourg is believed to be the largest offshore Eurobond issuer, although no official statistics confirm this. Besides the bank secrecy jurisdictions and offshore banking centers mentioned above, there is a large group of less-important jurisdictions spread around the world. Other bank secrecy jurisdictions 249

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United States Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes Daniel Glaser announces the release of millions of dollars of North Korean money frozen in the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) of Macau on March 14, 2007, as part of a deal to dismantle North Korea’s Nuclear program. In September of 2005, The U.S. Treasury accused BDA of helping North Korea circulate counterfeit currency and launder funds from narcotics and weapons trafficking. (AFP/Getty Images)

in Europe are Liechtenstein, Andorra, Cyprus, and Guernsey. The bank secrecy jurisdictions in the Caribbean are Anguilla, Antiqua, Aruba, Barbados, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Turks and Caicos Islands, Panama, Costa Rica, and Belize. In Asia, a number of islands are considered bank secrecy jurisdictions: Hong Kong, Vanuatu, Cook Island, Western Samoa, Macau, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, and Labuan. In the Middle East, Bahrain, Dubai, and Lebanon are listed as bank secrecy jurisdictions. African bank secrecy jurisdictions are Liberia, Mauritius, and the Seychelles. As far as organized crime is concerned, bank secrecy jurisdictions have several functions. Among the most important functions is the laundering of proceeds from organized crimes. Almost any type

of organized crime depends on the successful laundering of its proceeds as soon as a certain scale is reached. Drug trafficking is the best-known example, but the same goes for many other crimes. This is not to say, however, that money laundering is primarily a phenomenon to be found in bank secrecy jurisdictions. Probably by far the most illicit funds are laundered in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the United States. Besides money laundering, other crimes are committed through bank secrecy jurisdictions. Capital flight, tax evasion, and insurance frauds are among the most important types of crimes. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Swiss aggressively protected their bank secrecy against all foreign law enforcement requests. This encouraged

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organized crime figures to buy control of several Swiss private banks and use them to manage money and hide assets. One of the banks that fell under mob control was the Exchange and Investment Bank of Geneva, which was purchased by two associates of Meyer Lansky. From the 1960s onward, numerous banks have been connected with money laundering and other crimes committed through bank secrecy jurisdictions. Among them are the Nugan Hand Bank, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), the Banco Ambrosiano, and the European Union Bank of Antigua. Besides money laundering, tax evasion is the most important crime that is often committed through bank secrecy jurisdictions. In some cases, tax evasion and typical organized crimes go hand in hand. Cigarette smuggling largely consists of tax evasion. Switzerland has been a major cigarette smuggling center for decades for this reason. As Switzerland does not enforce tax laws of other states, cigarette smuggling operations have been organized through Switzerland and have supplied numerous European countries with vast amounts of untaxed cigarettes. Legitimate Functions of Bank Secrecy Jurisdictions Bank secrecy is not something inherently illegal, and the same goes for bank secrecy jurisdictions. Bank secrecy has its roots in common law and is an important dimension of both personal and corporate privacy. In the section above, a number of legitimate functions and products of bank secrecy jurisdictions were mentioned to which can be added avoidance of forced heirship provisions, derivates trading, exchange control trading vehicles, stock market listing vehicles, and trade finance vehicles. References Block, A. A., and C. A. Weaver. All Is Clouded by Desire: Global Banking, Money Laundering and International Organized Crime. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004. Blum, J. A. “Offshore Money.” Pp. 57–84 in Transnational Crime in the Americas: An InterAmerican Dialogue Book, edited by T. Farer. New York: Routledge, 1999.

Blum, J. A., M. Levi, T. Naylor, and P. Williams. Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering. Vienna: UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, 1998. Doggart, C. Tax Havens and Their Uses. London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002. Kochan, N. The Washing Machine: How Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Soils Us. Mason, OH: Thomson Texere, 2005. Sofus, B. Offshore Finance and Money Laundering: The Politics of Combating Parasitic State Strategies. Oslo: Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture, University of Oslo, 2003.

The Process of Money Laundering: Placement, Layering, and Integration Marilyn B. Peterson The money laundering process routinely includes three stages: placement, layering, and integration. Placement of the money is necessary if it is cash derived from drug sales or other illegal activities. The money must be put (placed) into the financial system for further use. The money may then be moved through various accounts, persons, or companies (layered) to confuse its path from the illegal source. Once that path has become long and diffused enough, the money can be used (integrated), as it then appears to have come from a legal rather than an illegal source. Placement The placement phase can reflect several models. The most straightforward model is for the person making the illegal profits to deposit the cash into one or more bank accounts. The U.S. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 was enacted to combat this type of placement. It requires currency transaction reporting for cash transactions over $10,000. Thus, if someone places over $10,000 into an account (or removes greater than $10,000 from an account), the financial institution is supposed to file a Currency Transaction Report with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. This $10,000 threshold is also in place for persons purchasing goods or services with greater than that amount in cash. In that instance, an IRS Form 8300 (reported cash payments over $10,000 received in a trade or business) must be filed. 251

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It is due to this $10,000 threshold that a phenomenon called smurfing came into money laundering parlance. Smurfing, named after the small blue cartoon characters, is where the person generating the large amounts of cash wants to create distance between that generation and the placement of the cash while avoiding having a Currency Transaction Report filed on the deposit of large amounts. Numerous individuals and numerous accounts may be used, with the deposits broken into amounts significantly below the $10,000 limit. But depositing cash into bank accounts is not the only way to place cash. Cash can be used to purchase monetary instruments including postal money orders, cashier’s checks (also called teller’s checks), bank money orders, or certified checks. While postal money orders and bank money orders have a limit on their face value (generally no more than $1,000), multiple money orders can be purchased (again keeping under the total of $10,000) without currency reports being generated. And, since there are many post office branches and banks available to the potential placer of cash, tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars can be converted from cash into monetary instruments in any given day. Those monetary instruments can then be deposited to an account without tripping the $10,000 threshold. Another alternative to the holder of cash is wiring money, either through banks or through wire remitters such as Western Union or MoneyGram. There are thousands of outlets for wire remitters in locations as diverse as grocery stores and drug stores. The money can be wired to any account at any bank in the United States or in a foreign country. There is, however, a drawback to using electronic transfer mechanisms: in addition to Bank Secrecy Act requirements, they are regulated by the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, which requires identification data on the customer be gathered for any transaction over $3,000. Although this data is not forwarded to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, people who wish to be anonymous in their financial transaction will keep their transactions under the $3,000 level. And, some of the wire remittance companies have instituted their own threshold at $2,000 and require identification over that level.

A third way to place currency is to have it bulk shipped or carried out of the country to be placed into a foreign bank. Bulk movements may be done by packing currency into luggage or on one’s person, or it can be shipped inside items or even mailed through an express mail service. It is in the placement stage that the money is most vulnerable to money laundering investigators’ attention. In 1996, Suspicious Activity Reporting was put into effect. It required banks to look at transactions occurring as possibly reflecting illegal activity. The threshold on these reports, initially, was $5,000, half that of the currency reporting. And, these reports were to be filed not just on currency transactions but also on wire transfers and all types of checks. After 2001, suspicious transaction reports were required for casinos, money service businesses (including the U.S. Postal Service, money order sellers, wire remitters, and currency exchange houses), and securities and commodities brokers. The threshold on money service business suspicious activity reports is $2,000. Layering The layering phase is where money laundering investigations become complex and challenging. Any of the monies placed into the financial system can be moved through various business or personal accounts to make the trail confusing and difficult to follow. These accounts may be in the name of the generator of the funds but are more likely to be in the names of nominees (persons who may be associates, friends, or relatives who are willing to move the money on the person’s behalf) or of shell companies (entities that exist on paper only). The theory behind layering is that with each move, the monies are distanced from their illegal source, and persons trying to follow the trail may give up looking after tracking a certain number of moves. The movement mechanism can be by check, wire, or other form of monetary instrument. In some instances, launderers will use different forms of movement to confuse the matter further (e.g., going from cash to checks to wires to checks to money orders to cash). This phase may include movements within a city or state, or they may be worldwide. Monies moving among countries require more diligence and time in fol-

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lowing. Some moves are impossible to follow, as the countries to which they have been moved do not share financial information. Integration The integration phase is where the money can be used for the benefit of the originator. When nominees are used to purchase property on behalf of the illegal funds originator, that property is available for use or is present as an investment for later claim. Funds that have gone through a longer layering phase must be brought back, through some device, to the originator. One device used is a loan or loan back. These allow the originator to claim a legitimate source of the funds (some front company or related company may be used to make the loan) and can then pay back the loan, possibly writing off the interest, while the money is, in fact, going back to his shell or related company. Another device used to bring the funds back is as commissions to the originator from some foreign country or a payment for some goods or services provided (allegedly but not in reality) by the originator’s company. References “Report on Money Laundering Typologies, 2003– 2004.” Paris, France: Financial Action Task Force Secretariat, 2005, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ dataoecd/19/11/33624379.pdf. FinCen. “The SAR Activity Review Trends, Tips & Issues.” Issue 4, August 2002.

Money Laundering, Tax Evasion, and Financial Havens Sean Patrick Griffin A study published in 2004 concluded that America’s largest corporations were increasingly funneling profits earned in the United States to tax havens throughout the world. The estimated annual cost to the U.S. Treasury in lost tax revenue was $10 billion to $20 billion. The complicated matter of distinguishing between the legal practice of tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion continues to play out in the public and private arenas. American companies have opted to incorporate in offshore havens, such

A protester holds a poster at a rally in New Britain, Connecticut, on July 29, 2002, outside the Stanley Works factory with a picture of John Trani, Stanley Works chairman and CEO. The rally was held to protest the announced attempt by Stanley to reincorporate in Bermuda. (BobChild/Associated Press)

as those in the Caribbean, to sharply lower their tax burden without compromising the benefits of doing business in the United States. For instance, one large corporation supposedly moved to Bermuda, and its tax burden went from approximately $40 million to $27,653 (technically an annual fee rather than a tax). The move, however, is nothing of the sort. Rather, it is simply a paper transaction and does not require anything beyond establishing a mailing address in the haven. Therefore, the firm will not even establish an office in Bermuda, according to the company’s chief financial officer, who also stated that the firm simply pays a service organization there to accept mail. Significantly, according to David Cay Johnston, since “companies 253

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that move to Bermuda usually keep their main offices in the United States, they continue to have all the security provided by the American government, the legal system and the courts.” Another firm, a Connecticut-based tool-making company, reincorporated in Bermuda, joining the recent list of U.S. firms relocating to escape taxes. The issue was prominently featured in the news and sparked a supposed outcry from politicians who claimed that such moves were unpatriotic. Importantly, the issues of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and offshore havens date back generations, and the Caribbean has been the focus of much of this history. Indeed, several Caribbean countries routinely find themselves, among approximately a dozen nations, listed on an international blacklist of havens. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a Paris-based group established by the United States and other G-7 powers in 1989, maintains the list. An appearance on the blacklist has practical consequences, such as affecting a company’s ratings and related international financing deals. Brief History In the late 1930s, the U.S. Congress created the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. submitted a report to President Franklin D. Roosevelt that listed the major and unprecedented devices used to beat the income tax. Number one was the creation of “foreign personal holding corporations in The Bahamas, Panama, Newfoundland, and other places where taxes are low and corporation laws lax.” Morgenthau pointed out the difficulty of gathering information on Bahamian companies (owned by Americans) that were “organized through foreign lawyers, with dummy incorporators and dummy directors, so that the names of the real parties in interest do not appear.” In testimony before the committee, Morgenthau criticized the many “ingenious lawyers and accountants” who were very well paid to construct methods for their clients to avoid taxes. Tax evasion schemes depended largely on the use of controlled foreign corporations, partnerships, or trusts. It soon became clear that money was being funneled at an increasing pace to offshore countries

and newly formed companies in order to avoid domestic taxes. Some of the earliest examples involved currency moving through Panama, the Netherlands Antilles, and the Bahamas. Over time, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) identified some red flags for agents to discern when investigating these schemes, such as a license to operate in a foreign country, a domestic corporation borrowing from a foreign corporation, the liquidation of foreign corporations, and the transfer of assets to a foreign corporation. A tax attorney provided one infamous example of how his clientele would construct a framework for evading taxes. First, the taxpayer would place his money in a Bahamas central trust because there was no income tax or estate tax in the Bahamas, and a trust was essentially the same as a corporation (it was a separate legal entity that could sell an asset in the United States with no tax). Adding to the scam, the taxpayer could connect with a distributing company in the Netherlands Antilles, which could earn interest in the United States without a tax under any circumstances. This would result in the perfect scenario for the taxpayer. He could take losses and deductions in the United States and take gains and profits abroad under a tax treaty. By the early 1980s, the U.S. Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations concluded “that the use of so-called ‘secret’ offshore facilities has become so pervasive that it challenges basic assumptions regarding the ability of federal and state authorities to enforce the laws.” Furthermore, according to the subcommittee, some Caribbean nations were so corrupt that they essentially offered themselves as crime havens. Almost all tax havens are characterized by strict rules of bank secrecy and little, if any, taxes. The strict secrecy associated with banks also applies to the activities and ownership of corporations. In addition, there is often no income, profit, capital gains, gift, inheritance, estate, or withholding taxes in offshore havens. Although such nations tax imports and some real estate property, this has little effect on those who own or use those countries’ many banks or corporations. Thus, for a small initial cost and an annual fee, one may own a bank or company that can receive and disburse large sums of money in

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complete secrecy and without the threat of taxation. These advantages, of course, are available to bank depositors as well. Even though offshore tax havens may provide legitimate investment opportunities for American citizens wishing to avoid taxes, a practice recognized as lawful by U.S. courts, it is the evasion of taxes by using tax haven countries that now concerns law enforcement authorities. Tax havens may be used to hide income or to misrepresent the nature of transactions in order to put the taxpayer in a more favorable position. For tax evaders, offshore havens guarantee that paper trails will be blocked. Although the proximity of places such as the Bahamas to the United States was once a key factor in drawing tax evaders and others seeking to hide assets (e.g., drug traffickers and money launderers), the pervasive trend toward electronic transfers and other technological advances has diminished geography as the crucial lure. Offshore havens, including those in the Caribbean, have benefited from the explosion in technologies. This has caused a great deal of grief among U.S. regulators since such banks may not have vaults or tellers, and do not transact business in the local currency. Offshore banks transfer funds electronically, often using correspondent banks in the United States. The IRS has attempted to investigate credit card transactions in the United States that were billed to bank accounts in Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, and the Cayman Islands. While Americans can legally move their assets offshore, they are required to notify the IRS of those transactions and to pay taxes on their income worldwide. As Johnston succinctly stated, “Some Caribbean countries offer an alluring tax haven, however, because they impose no income tax and do not generally cooperate with I.R.S. efforts to track down incomes. But Americans who shelter income offshore face the problem of putting their money to use. That is where a credit card or charge card billed to an account at a Caribbean bank comes in handy, investigators say. Banks in tax refuges issue MasterCards and Visa cards, which can be used anywhere to draw cash and to pay expenses. The bill is then paid automatically from the bank in the tax-haven country, leaving no

record of income or spending except for the transaction reports from the networks that MasterCard, Visa and American Express operate.” Summary Tax-evading American citizens and corporations are not the only ones exploiting the permissive offshore infrastructure that places a premium on secrecy. Organized criminals necessarily have to hide their ill-gotten gains and have found Caribbean nations and, to a lesser extent, others receptive to their business. Oftentimes, such money laundering operations have included the complicity of various casino gaming institutions. Small island nations with little economic vitality beyond the tourism industry will no doubt continue to embrace their banking systems, even if they are commonly used for money laundering and tax evasion. References Block, Alan A. Masters of Paradise: Organized Crime and the Internal Revenue Service in the Bahamas. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991. Block, Alan A., and Frank Scarpitti. “Casinos and Banking: Organized Crime in the Bahamas.” Deviant Behavior 7 (1986): 301–312. Browning, Lynnley. “Foreign Tax Havens Costly to U.S., Study Says.” New York Times, 27 September 2004. Johnston, David Cay. “I.R.S. Seeks Names of Wealthy Clients Who Used Tax Shelters.” New York Times, 20 June 2003. ———. “Taking Aim at Tax Havens, I.R.S. Seeks Credit Card Slips.” New York Times, 20 October 2000. ———. “U.S. Companies File in Bermuda to Slash Tax.” 18 February 2002, http://www.law.wayne .edu/McIntyre/text/in_the_news/david_cay _burmuda.pdf. Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance. Hearings: Part I. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (Los Angeles District). “Initial Proposed Targets for Project Decode.” Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office 1973. U.S. Senate. “Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies.” Statement of Harry Margolis. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, September 2002. 255

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Walsh, Sharon. “A Case Study in the Elusiveness of Offshore Banks.” Washington Post, 14 November 1999. Workman, Douglas J. “The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of Criminally Evading Income Taxes.” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 73 (1982): 675–706.

Money Laundering: Typologies, Methods, and Current Trends Marilyn B. Peterson Because of the strong interest in money laundering and international finance, current trends, methods, and typologies of money laundering are compiled and published on a regular basis by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), and by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Treasury Department in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. These and other organizations regularly provide additional special reports. The typologies and methods of money laundering are important for investigators to note because these methods may serve as indicators of possible money laundering that may occur. It is generally accepted that the three primary phases of money laundering are placement, layering, and integration. The methods used may focus on one of these phases or may run through two or all three phases. Systems and Instruments Money laundering methods relate to the types of systems and monetary instruments used to launder. Some of the systems and instruments include: • Banks • Money service businesses (check cashers, money order sellers, currency exchange houses, wire remitters) • Casinos • Post offices • Nonprofit organizations • Bulk currency smuggling • Trade-based money laundering • Informal value transfer systems

• • • • • • • •

Insurance products Stock and commodities sector Wire transfers Cashier’s checks or teller’s checks Correspondent bank accounts Shell banks and accounts Nominees Automated teller machine (ATM) deposits and withdrawals • Financial facilitators

To some degree, each of these systems and instruments are seen as being currently in use in the following reports. The FATF 2004 report focused on five areas: the use of wire transfers and nonprofit organizations (NPOs) by those seeking to launder money and, in particular, the latter’s links to terrorist financing; the potential use of the insurance sector to launder money; laundering by politically exposed persons (PEPs); and the use of money laundering gatekeepers (facilitators) who are primarily attorneys and accountants. The FinCEN report on suspicious activities in 2004 included the use of correspondent bank accounts by persons in East European countries to launder funds, possible food stamp fraud and money laundering, the use of foreign ATMs to circumvent Currency and Monetary Instrument Report (CMIR) filings, and the presentation of third-party checks at foreign banks as a way to launder funds. The 2004 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report focused on terrorist financing, tradebased money laundering, bulk cash movements, politically exposed people and money laundering, human trafficking related to money laundering, and fraud and money laundering. The following are ways in which the abovementioned systems or instruments have been or are currently being used to launder funds. Banks can be used to launder money in a number of ways, sometimes with the assistance of bank officials and sometimes not. They are often critical to the placement and layering stages of money laundering and play an important role in reporting currency transactions over $10,000 and suspicious

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activities over $5,000. People wishing to launder money can use checking accounts, cashier’s checks, bank money orders, wire transfers, safe deposit boxes, and other devices. Bank directors, managers, tellers, or other officials may assist the money launderer by not filing Currency Transaction Reports or Suspicious Activity Reports. Money can be moved in and out of the country through internal bank transfers (among branches), which are not covered by Bank Secrecy Act requirements. Money service businesses, including money order sellers, currency exchange houses, wire remitters, and check cashers, are used to more anonymously complete financial transactions. A person can send or receive money through wire transfer, can buy money orders with cash, can convert dollars into another form of currency, and can cash checks for a fee (a percentage of the face of the check). One example of money laundering through a check casher was seen when large (more than $100,000) checks, made out to a company, were cashed in a check casher, and the currency was then taken to casinos to be put into play or given to co-conspirators. Money exchange businesses have also been used in the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE) system, which is a way to move drug profits back to South America. Casinos can be used to convert illegal cash into clean currency or a check after buying in initially with currency. They can also be used to move money if the casino has a site in another state or country. Post offices may be used to send funds, often by express mail, to another location and are also sellers of both domestic and international money orders. These have been used to launder funds and continue to be used for this purpose in spite of the U.S. Postal Service taking several steps to lessen money laundering through its products. Nonprofit organizations (NPOs) may be used to raise funds that are later diverted to crime, such as terrorism, or may be used as a conduit of funds from one country to another. The latter was reported by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in its 2004 report. An overriding concern for terrorism resulted in the examination of the practice to use NPOs to raise and distribute money

for use by terrorist groups. The Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), U.S. Department of the Treasury, cites numerous organizations suspected of being tied to terrorist activity. Other entities, including banks, have been seen to be involved in terrorism-related money laundering. For example, a Lebanese bank was found to be involved in a $2 billion fraud and money laundering enterprise along with Al-Shaheed, a front organization for Hezbollah, a designated terrorist group. Bulk currency smuggling is used to move funds from location to location. It may be carried by individuals (sometimes known as mules) or may be mailed or shipped. When shipped, it is often packaged inside other goods that may be hollow or may contain secret compartments. In one example of bulk currency smuggling, U.S. drug enforcement officers broke an international money laundering and drug trafficking organization in October 2004 that included $4.4 million in cash and quantities of methamphetamine, marijuana, heroin, and cocaine. The money was carried across the border and laundered through remitter services, businesses, and foreign bank accounts. Trade-based money laundering is where goods change hands in support of money laundering. The goods may be overpriced or underpriced, depending on who needs to be paid. If individual A owes individual B $100,000, individual A may sell individual B $200,000 worth of merchandise for only $100,000, thus paying the debt. Informal value transfer systems (IVTS) are money conduits operated outside the traditional banking system by trusted individuals, usually of the same ethnicity as the parties wishing to move funds. These trusted individuals agree to move money or something of similar value to another location, often in another country. The system, also called hawala, hundi, or fei ch’ien, dates back centuries and is not only used to move illegal monies; governments have also used this informal banking system to get aid to areas that had no formal banking system available to receive funds. In instances where money needs to be moved both ways, no actual currency may be moved. Instead, accounts are kept of who has moved what and if any is owed in return. Their use allows the sender and receiver 257

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FBI agents guard the entrance to the Holy Land Foundation on December 5, 2001, in Richardson, Texas. The Holy Land Foundation disputed claims made by the U.S. government that it used charitable donations to fund Hamas and their goal was to destroy Israel. (Getty Images)

to possibly avoid currency exchange charges, tax liabilities, and government reporting while allowing them to preserve their anonymity. The purchase of insurance products with criminal profits (single payment premium) from brokers has also been reported as a money laundering technique. These policies may also be surrendered early to receive the clean monies for further use. The stock market and commodities market can also be used to launder funds. In these cases, illegal monies can be invested for further growth. Most securities brokers will no longer accept cash as a way of lessening the potential for money laundering, but the use of this sector is of concern to federal authorities, who now require brokers to fill out Suspicious Activity Reports on potentially illegal transactions. Wire transfers, where money is sent through a bank or a wire remittance service from one point to

another, are a quick way to move money and were used by several of the terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks on New York and Virginia. Because billions of wire transactions occur each day, it may be simple to hide money laundering transactions done through wires. Repeated wiring of funds from point to point may create a deliberately confusing audit trail to disguise the source and destination of funds. While Suspicious Activity Reports should be filed on wire transfers as on other types of unusual transactions, few are actually filed, and thus there is a limited amount of information known on patterns or indicators of suspicious wire transfers. Moreover, it was established in the investigation into the 9/11 attacks that the amounts wired were relatively small and would not be flagged by a system that generally looks for large transactions. Structuring (breaking down into smaller amounts to avoid flagging) wire transfers is also done. Also, a money

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launderer can initiate a wire from a country or deploy one to a country that does not require the financial institution to keep records on the originator or beneficiary of the wire. Cashier’s checks, also known as teller’s checks, are a monetary instrument used widely by money launderers because the origin of the funds is not required to be annotated on the face of the check, thus the origin may appear anonymous. Methods of Laundering Funds Many news outlets have reported the charges of money laundering against politically exposed persons (PEP)s. PEPs are individuals who are or have been in a prominent public position in a country. Some of these individuals have accepted monies in return for political favors and have then hidden those funds by laundering through shell companies (companies that exist only on paper for the purpose of holding assets in a covert manner) or nominees (family members or friends who hold title to property on behalf of another individual). One example of this type of money laundering was when a former inspector general of police in Africa was arraigned in April 2005 for theft, corruption, and money laundering amounting to $100 million. He had used seven companies as proxies to hide the funds. In another case, a former East European prime minister was found guilty of seven counts of money laundering after he and his associates obtained a controlling interest in a Caribbean bank and transferred millions of dollars through correspondent accounts in the United States. Funds identified include more than $145 million in Guernsey and more than $87 million in Antigua and Barbados. Correspondent bank accounts are accounts established at a bank in one country to allow customers of a bank in another country to do business in the first country. These are a common banking system device but can also be used to launder funds, particularly if the out-of-country correspondent bank has customers who would not be legal customers in, for example, the United States. Also, the second bank may have similar banking arrangements with banks in other countries that would not be permitted, due to their practices, to be correspondent banks on U.S. banks.

Shell banks and accounts are used to hide the legal owner of funds or mask their ownership. Shell banks may exist only in post office boxes or on paper, and it is now illegal for shell banks offshore to have correspondent bank accounts with U.S. banks. Nominee activity falls into the same category as the nominee: either a real person or a business entity is doing business on behalf of an obscured owner. The use of ATMs to deposit illicit drug proceeds in the United States followed by withdrawals of significant amounts from ATMs in the drug supplier’s country of origin has been on the increase in recent years. Individuals can deposit currency into an account through an ATM and avoid teller questions that would generate a Currency Transaction Report. The money, now placed into the system, can then be used by removing it from the account, either through another ATM or in person, at foreign branches of the bank. Current Trends Over the past several years, the trend of using financial and legal professionals as gatekeepers or facilitators has emerged. These specialized professionals give advice or even participate in helping to hide illegal profits. Such individuals may be respected members of their work sector and may charge up to 15–20 percent for assisting in money laundering. Human trafficking has emerged as a growing concern over the past few years, with 800,000 to 900,000 persons smuggled across international borders worldwide in 2001. People are sold, purchased, enslaved, and then exploited for sex or labor purposes. The United States is a major destination for these unfortunate people. In one instance, Cambodian children were taken from their families, represented as orphans to immigration authorities, and then placed with U.S. families through adoption. In reality, their parents sold the children. The adoption agency made large amounts of money on the children and was then structuring its financial transactions to avoid having Bank Secrecy Act forms filed on them. In another case, Mexican women were smuggled into Arizona, ostensibly for legitimate employment, but were 259

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later shipped to New Jersey to work as prostitutes. The smugglers kept all their profits, using some to purchase real estate using nominees (the names of others who were not party to the transaction) to hide their identities. Fraud and money laundering has been an ongoing trend. Fraudsters use remitters, banks, postal money orders, check cashers, and other systems to launder their profits. In one international fraud scheme, people were encouraged to invest for a high return. The resultant funds were then wired from the United Kingdom to the United States and from the United States to Australia. The victims lost about $5 million. FinCEN has identified several money laundering trends in its Suspicious Activity Report filings between 1996 and 2004: • The use of correspondent bank accounts aggregating to almost $4 billion. • Possible food stamp fraud including food stores receiving large volumes of food stamp–related electronic credits and making large cash withdrawals from their accounts. • The use of U.S.-dollar third-party checks to launder funds, presented to banks located overseas, even though both the payee and payer appear unconnected to the area where these checks appear. Some of these checks have reflected black market currency deals, payment for smuggled or diverted goods, tax evasion, unlicensed or unregistered hawala or informal fund transfer business or settlement, terrorist financing, fraud, bribery, or corrupt payments.

The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (2004) reported dozens of countries considered to be major money laundering countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Canada, Cayman Islands, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Guernsey, Haiti, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macau, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand,

Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. It should be noted that most countries with a viable economic system are listed here because where there is a reasonable amount of money flowing, there is money laundering. References Krayniak, John, and Marilyn Peterson. “Blood Money Lab Case Highlights Nationwide Medicaid Fraud Units.” The White Paper 14(2) (March/April (2000). Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering. Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2003– 2004. 26 February 2004, http://www.fatf-gafi .org/dataoecd/19/11/33624379.PDF. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. FinCEN Advisory: Informal Value Transfer Systems. March 2003, http://www.fincen.gov/advis33.pdf. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues. August 2004, http://www.fincen.gov/sarreviewissue7.pdf. U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of the Treasury. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2004, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes. March 2005, http:// www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/vol2/html/. Online Nigeria. “Nigeria’s Ex-Police Chief Charged,” 4 April 2005, http://nm.onlinenigeria.com/ templates/?a=975&z=12. PR Newswire Association LLC. “Fortress Global Uncovers Evidence of Rampant Money Laundering for Terrorist Activity and a Massive Cover-Up of a $2 Billion Fraud at One of Lebanon’s Largest Banks,” 28 March 2005. U.S. Departments of Justice. “Assessment of U.S. Activities to Combat Trafficking in Persons,” August 2003, http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/23598.pdf.

Organized Theft Rings: Interstate Theft and Transportation of Stolen Property Robert D. Hanser, Jeffrey P. Rush, Deborah L. Pace, and Jai-Shon Lexing Organized crime exists to make money, and one of its many income-producing activities involves organized theft rings. In recent years, organized groups of thieves have begun to prey upon retail stores and wholesalers as they seek to smuggle

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large amounts of products out of these stores in an effort to sell them for a profit. The impact of this new activity is far-reaching and important because of its economic and social impact on retailers as well as consumers. Already, the U.S. Congress and other government officials have called for laws to restrict these crime rings as retailers throughout the country are scrambling for new ways to protect themselves against these criminals, whose methods of operation have become ever more complicated in the past few years. Organized Retail Theft Rings Organized retail theft rings, in their purest definition, are groups that make plans and execute those plans in order to steal large amounts of valuable goods from any variety of retail stores. Organized theft rings have taken the time-tested idea of shoplifting, mass-produced this type of crime, and targeted specific types of merchandise to maximize resale of the product, thereby cheating retailers out of millions of dollars worth of goods. This naturally serves as a cost that is ultimately passed on to the American consumer through higher retail prices designed to offset the shrinkage in company profits. Since 9/11, retailers and security officials have seen an increase in activity of these organized theft rings. Much of this can be attributed to the fact that many of the security personnel who would normally attack such a problem are currently involved in counterterrorism activities. Organized crime rings themselves are composed of many different ethnic groups, but there has been a marked increase in Middle Eastern organized crime rings that have their hands muddied in terrorist monies and activities. Criminals involved in this activity are often professionals who have made their living by stealing and participating in largescale shoplifting exercises. They can be recruited by the crime rings to execute these large-scale plans in many areas. L. Mart’nez notes that many of them are recruited by and work for established rings of Middle Eastern fences who funnel the illgotten profits into terrorist organizations. Security InfoWatch states that “in addition to the theft/ re-sale schemes, Middle Eastern fences have been found to be involved in both the planning and exe-

cution of large-scale burglaries of consumer goods. The burglaries take months to plan and involve such sophisticated techniques as rooftop entry, cut phone lines, and lookouts with cell phones and walkie-talkies on foot and in cars.” Sophisticated crime is not new, but this phenomenon of organized retail theft has caused a heightened sense of awareness among consumers and retailers alike. Even more interesting and surprising is that this type of crime can have an affiliation with extremist terrorist groups. Organized retail theft rings make their profits from the sale of stolen goods. The CSO Glossary for security executives describes organized retail theft as “formal criminal networks that profit from stolen goods.” Because organized theft rings must resell their stolen goods in order to make a profit, this impacts the makeup of certain groups. Retail theft rings have historically made their profits by stealing items from jewelry and apparel stores, but this is no longer necessarily the case. In the 1980s, when small-town jewelry stores typically kept within their stores thousands of dollars worth of diamonds and gold, this seemed a likely target for these organized thieves. Organized retail theft rings also employ specialists who know how to identify an easily resalable item. In addition to that, they must know exactly how to resell the items without getting caught by the police. For a variety of reasons, many crime rings have shifted from the obvious choices of jewelry and apparel and have started to steal things such as over-the-counter drugs, clothes, and baby products. A July 2005 article by Margaret Webb Pressler in the Washington Post shows that the problem has reached a level of national prominence and requires intervention. “At CVS, the diabetic test strips and the perfume are now behind locked glass cabinets, with a bell to ring for service. Nearly all over-the-counter medicines are behind Plexiglas panels that customers must reach over to get their Advil or Pepcid. And most razors and refills are in clunky, noise-making dispensers that won’t let you put back what you take out.” Because of the changing nature of retail theft, the retailer must be more prepared to adapt—and adapt quickly—to the necessary changes in security and 261

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Cans of powdered baby formula are locked behind glass at a Chicago, Illinois pharmacy on June 7, 2005. Powdered baby formula is one of many consumer goods stolen and transported across the U.S. (Getty Images)

safety. There are other products that have become popular for the retail thieves, including many expensive products for babies that can be easily resold without much skepticism. The problem that retailers and police encounter in this instance is the fact that the changing nature of criminal activity has criminals becoming stealthier and much more difficult to arrest. Another problem that exacerbates this type of criminal activity involves the policies of the retail stores. Aside from the ease in which some stores display their items so as to sell more products or not make the customers feel like thieves is the lack of prosecution. Many retail stores have specific policies against prosecution, fearing the potential of a lawsuit more than prosecuting the criminal. Criminals know this and specifically target these

stores. The criminals also know the quality of the employees hired by many of these stores and target those stores as well. Many retail stores hire young individuals, provide little or no training, and pay minimum wage. Thus, stores are seen as choice targets simply due to the manner in which the retail business tends to operate. Economic Impact and Retail Victimization The overall economic impact of organized retail crimes has escalated greatly in the last ten years. The Retail Industry Blog states that in July 2005, losses from organized theft topped the already high number of $25 billion annually, with no real sign of slowing down in the near future. Joseph Larocca, vice president for loss prevention for the National Retail Federation (NRF), noted that “retailers are

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losing billions of dollars each year to organized retail crime, but beyond the financial losses, we are seeing this form of crime become increasingly violent. Organized crime does not only affect a retailer’s bottom line, it also affects the safety and security of their employees and customers.” According to the report released by Larocca and his agency, almost 75 percent of business executives polled in their study said that their company had been a victim of a major retail theft crime. That number in itself is startling because it shows the widespread impact that this sort of thing can have on the economy as a whole. Nearly half of those in the same poll indicated that the problem had occurred in some small or large scale over the past year in relation to their company. The importance of this widespread retail victimization should not be understated, particularly when considering the consumer. When companies lose large amounts of money through organized theft rings or to individual criminal actors, the companies will make up for these losses. Naturally, as noted earlier, the loss will be shifted to the consumer. This, in effect, has a profound impact on the economy as a whole. In addition, consumers run the risk of coming across these stolen goods in their search for a better price. In an ever-changing economy in which much of the commerce is done through online stores and through popular auction sites such as eBay, Inc., it is more and more likely for stolen goods to end up in the hands of consumers who consequently have no idea that their items have illicit origins. Conclusion Like so many regular criminals, organized retail theft criminals change in response to the changing economic times and the responses (or lack thereof) of the police and the retail establishment. Whether it is committed by highly skilled professionals or organized amateurs, retail theft is changing significantly. Law enforcement, private security, and the retail establishment must change as well. The organized and transnational nature of retail crime requires us to become more interested in and involved with retail crime and its criminals. The failure to do so has significant consequences for everyone.

References Association of Food, Beverage, and Consumer Companies. Correspondence, 8 September 2003, http://gmabrands.com/industryaffairs/docs/ correspondence.cfm?DocID=1203. CSO. “Glossary,” 2002, http://www.csoonline.com/ glossary/term.cfm?ID=1337. Fisher, R. J., and G. Gion. Introduction to Private Security. 7th ed. Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2004. Food Marketing Institute. “Organized Retail Crime,” http://www.fmi.org/loss/ORT/. ———. “Organized Retail Theft: Most Frequently Shoplifted Items in Rank Order,” http://www .fmi.org/loss/ORT/top50_shoplifted_items.pdf. Mart’nez, L. “Combating Organized Retail Theft in 2005.” Security Info Watch, 2005, http://www .securityinfowatch.com/article/article.jsp ?siteSection=467&id=3230. Pressler, Margaret Webb. “Retail Gangs: A New Breed of Thieves.” Washington Post, 31 July 2005. Vargas, Melody. “Organized Retail Crime, a Growing Trend,” 17 September 2005, http://retailindustry .about.com/b/a/203293.htm.

Product Counterfeiting Operations of Organized Criminal Groups Vesna Markovic Product counterfeiting has grown exponentially over the past ten to twenty years. Any product that is manufactured will shortly thereafter be reproduced and sold on the black market for a fraction of the cost. The payoff is large, and the risk of lengthy prison terms, compared with drug trafficking, is much less. The ease of producing products and poor enforcement in certain regions have also led to the increase in product counterfeiting. In addition, there is a great demand for these products. It is for these reasons that many organized criminal groups have turned to consumer product counterfeiting. Audio/Video Counterfeiting One of the most popular items counterfeited include audio and video discs. The counterfeiting of CDs and DVDs has become a booming business. With such a high demand for the products, organized crime groups have cashed in on this expanding illegal market. According to the U.S. Depart263

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ment of State, “the Motion Picture Association of America . . . estimates that the U.S. motion picture industry loses more than $3.5 billion annually in potential worldwide revenue due to piracy.” The demand for cheaper movies and songs has also led to websites that allow sharing of software, movies, TV shows, songs, etc., and can be used to illegally reproduce audio and video discs. As soon as a new CD or DVD hits stores, there are copies already being sold on the streets. Movies that have just been released in theaters also make their way onto the black market. In some cases, organized crime groups set up cameras inside a theater and record a movie. In many of the counterfeit videos, you can hear people in the theater laughing, talking, and even getting up in the middle of the movie. In a few instances, the camera has fallen off of the tripod and been replaced without missing a beat. There may also be subtitles present in some of the recordings, because many of the recordings are made in foreign countries such as China. These counterfeit movies are of lower quality. In some cases the video is in another format, such as DIVX, that cannot be watched on a regular DVD player. The criminal groups engaged in this type of enterprise also make high-quality copies of movies that are almost indistinguishable from the real thing. After the groups obtain the videos, they take them to various locations where the videos are burned to DVDs and in many cases packaged with an exact color-printed cover as if you bought a real copy of the video. These DVDs are then exported worldwide. Organized crime groups in China have a large business in counterfeit products. In one case, more than 150 Special Task Force (STF) police in Hong Kong raided ten locations of the Wo Shing Wo organized crime syndicate. These locations included warehouses and retail storefronts. The STF arrested eighteen suspects, seizing 128 DVD and CD burners and more than 100,000 printed discs. This operation had the capability of producing more than 11 million discs a year and making an estimated US$8 million in profits. Software Counterfeiting Various types of software have quickly become targets of consumer product counterfeiting. This has

made computer software some of the most counterfeited goods worldwide. The high price of computer software has created a great demand for them from consumers on the black market. Much of the software is pirated, while some is counterfeit. The difference between counterfeit products and pirated products is that counterfeiters attempt to pass off the product as the real thing, while software pirates do not. Counterfeiters take advantage of the high prices of software to make a huge profit. Like counterfeit CDs and DVDs, software is copied using CD-R or DVD-R burners. Counterfeiters will also copy trademarks, including difficult-to-reproduce holograms, to make the product look authentic. A large percentage of software sold on auction websites is counterfeit, according to the Business Software Alliance (BSA). Software may also be sold through spam mails. The e-mail will, in many cases, redirect you to a website selling the software at reduced prices. In some cases, the items will be sold in store fronts and often from street vendors. Clothing and Accessories Another major piece of the industry is the counterfeiting of clothing and accessories. The higher the original price of a product, the greater the chances of it being reproduced. This is what makes designer apparel and designer accessories, including handbags, watches, sunglasses, and jewelry, such an attractive target for counterfeiters. Brand names such as Louis Vuitton are some of the most counterfeited brands in the world. Almost 66 percent of items seized by British Customs consisted of counterfeit clothing and accessories. Of those seized, 18 percent were counterfeit Louis Vuitton, 11 percent Burberry, and 11 percent Nike. Many times the products will be manufactured in one country and then shipped to another country for further distribution or resale. In many cases, apparel is shipped separately from the fake designer tags and then assembled at a transshipment point or in the country of destination. This is done to avoid the scrutiny of customs officials. Some of the merchandise is even being sold on web auction sites and being passed off as the original products.

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A woman shops in a counterfeit DVD shop in Shanghai, China, on May 26, 2006. (Getty Images)

Counterfeiting Worldwide Although product counterfeiting is a worldwide phenomenon, many regions have cornered the market on these products. While some regions, such as Asia, comprise a significant proportion of production of counterfeit goods, other areas are largely consumers of these goods. Following are more examples of the widespread nature of counterfeiting: • A large segment of the consumer market in Kosovo is largely comprised of counterfeit goods. • Police in Northern Ireland seized more than US$11 million of counterfeit goods in 2002. • A sting operation in the United States led to the arrests of forty-three individuals linked to a Korean organized crime group. They illegally imported millions of dollars’ worth of counterfeit designer goods. • Police in Italy linked the Mafia to numerous illegal operations that were counterfeiting software and

compact discs. More than 24 million CDs were produced illegally by this mob-fronted operation each year and distributed throughout Europe. • The Russian Mafiya is also involved in counterfeiting products including software, videos, music, and currency. The Federal Service for Intellectual Property, Patents and Trademarks in Russia estimates that more than US$3 billion in counterfeit goods is sold in Russia each year. The Russian Ministry of Interior estimates that 68 percent of video products and 64 percent of audio products sold in Russia are counterfeit. • The Lebanese Mafia and other organized crime groups are known to operate in the Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay) and are involved in consumer product counterfeiting, among other things. The Tri-Border Area is also a leading importer of counterfeit products from China and other Asian countries. • A large majority of counterfeit goods seized in the United States are from China. Japan reports that 265

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96 percent of counterfeit goods seized, particularly brand name knockoffs, are from China. • Polish police report that they seized more than US$33 million in counterfeit goods, particularly brand names such as Reebok, Adidas, Nike, Levi’s, and Nivea.

Conclusion Although this entry examined only a portion of global counterfeiting, the trends are alarming. Counterfeiting affects companies with loss in revenue, potential damage of reputation of products, and increased cost of production; the government affected by loss in taxable items sold; and the public is harmed due to losses of jobs and higher-priced goods for consumers. Item such as electronic goods and equipment, automotive parts, tobacco, cigarettes, alcohol, apparel, toiletries (shampoo, soap, perfume, etc.), and pharmaceutical products are among those being counterfeited. Globalization and the underground nature of these networks make it difficult for law enforcement to contain the problem. The demand for low-cost products that this seemingly harmless crime provides makes it such a profitable industry. This is a growing industry that the United Nations estimates to be generating $350 billion to $450 billion each year and showing no signs of slowing down. References Lowe, Peter. “The Scope of the Counterfeiting Problem.” International Criminal Police Review (1999): 476–477. Noble, Ronald K. “The Links between Intellectual Property Crime and Terrorist Financing.” Testimony before the United State House Committee on International Relations, 108th Congress, 16 July 2003. Nystedt, Dan. “DVD Pirating Ring Busted in Hong Kong.” IDG News Service, 11 August 2005, http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,122190page,1/article.html. Ungoed-Thomas, Jon. “Designer Fakes ‘Are Funding Al Qaeda.’” Sunday Times, 20 March 2005. U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs (USINFO). “Chinese, U.S. Authorities Cooperate to Convict Counterfeiters,” 20 April 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/ 2005/Apr/21-61764.html.

Securities Fraud and Stock Manipulation Schemes Sean Patrick Griffin Securities Fraud Research has documented the rampant fraud in the securities industry since its inception, and media outlets have covered both individual cases and industry-wide activities. Indeed, this topic has been covered both in the United States and Canada (famous for its mining stocks) for decades. Although the term “securities fraud” can encompass numerous illicit activities (e.g., failure to disclose, unauthorized trading, refusal to execute orders, etc.), there are essentially two key types of stock fraud: insider trading and market manipulation, each with its own variants. Unfortunately, there are no valid statistics available to compare the difference in prevalence and significance of these types of stock fraud. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defines insider traders as stockholders, directors, officers, or any recipients of information not publicly available who take advantage of such limited disclosure for their own benefit. Insider trading gained notoriety in the 1980s when the likes of Michael Milken and Ivan Boesky became household names. The high-profile scandals were serious enough to result in the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs inquiry titled “Improper Activities in the Securities Industry.” Following the insider trading cases of the 1980s, the most commonly discussed frauds were market manipulations concentrated in the penny-stock industry. Stock Manipulation Schemes Manipulation is traditionally defined as a series of transactions that involve the buying or selling of a security in order to create a false or misleading appearance of active trading or to raise or lower the price to induce the purchase or sale by others. It goes without saying that brokers who have a stake in a particular stock might be inclined to make misleading or false assertions to prospective clients. Oftentimes, this is done in order to create the impression that the price of a stock is soon to rise,

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Caricature of J.P. Morgan as a bull blowing bubbles labeled “inflated values” for which people are clamoring, from a 1901 issue of Puck magazine. Morgan helped to create enormous trusts and monopolies during his lifetime, allowing him to manipulate the market to his advantage. (Library of Congress)

and thereby such actions create an artificial demand for it (i.e., artificial inflation). There are many ways that broker-dealers manipulate markets, either upward or downward. Most frequently, market manipulation involves a brokerage firm purchasing large volumes of stock in a small (or sham) company that frequently is owned by the brokerage firm itself. The brokerage firm, which owns the overwhelming majority of shares, drives up the worthless stock by cold-calling scores of unsuspecting investors. At some predetermined point (i.e., price), the brokerage firms’ insiders dump their shares, leaving the public with worthless stocks and the brokers with ill-gotten gains. Of course, the investing public cannot be allowed to sell their shares, or the scam would not work. Thus, the criminal firm simply refuses to execute sell orders on behalf of its clients. The firm’s sales representatives are ordered to either hang up when a client

calls who wants to sell or not to answer the phone during selling times. Although market manipulation can take place in virtually any securities exchange, it takes place most commonly in the penny-stock industry. Penny Stocks In general, penny stocks are considered those securities not listed on a recognized exchange. They are thus traded over the counter (OTC), and information about them is only available on the pink sheets. Pink sheets refer to a weekly list of firms trading in OTC stocks along with their price quotes on securities. The National Quotation Bureau, a private firm headquartered in Jersey City, New Jersey, publishes the list, which is printed on pink paper. With respect to market manipulation, there is a key reason that offenders target the pink sheets and the OTC market: lack of serious regulations. For example, to get 267

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onto the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ), a company is required to have a minimum of several million in assets and just slightly less in shareholders’ equity. Perhaps more importantly, for a stock to be listed on NASDAQ it must have at least two market makers (i.e., broker-dealers who regularly buy or sell a particular security). The reason for this is obvious: a single market maker can with ease and virtual impunity illegally manipulate a security’s price. Pink-sheet firms and the stocks they trade are only required to be registered with the SEC. NASDAQ securities average nine market makers per security, thus promoting competitiveness, while the pink sheet stocks typically have only one. Thus, pink sheet firms are thought by a proportion of analysts and examiners to represent the true bottom feeders of the securities world. Penny-stock market manipulations such as those above are frequently referred to as pump-and-dump schemes and are often run out of boiler rooms. Boiler Rooms The contemporary penny-stock boiler room depends on a large workforce of telephone solicitors who are often deliberately chosen for their lack of experience in, and knowledge of, the securities industry. Many, in fact, quickly leave once they realize they are part of a criminal enterprise. Boiler rooms may operate out of homes, warehouses, and any number of places, but they are most often operated in offices. Salespeople sit at desks cold-calling potential investors, typically reading off of a script and relying on a board listing the day’s stock offerings. Boiler rooms are run by high-octane managers whose sole responsibility is to keep their sales representatives relentlessly on task, snaring unsophisticated people and talking them into giving them money for nothing but a dream, as one former stock scammer and boiler room phenom stated. It is the relentless pressure by the managers on the callers-solicitors and theirs, in turn, on the unsophisticated credulous public that is at the heart of the penny-stock swindle. Some of these criminal boiler rooms gained infamy for their flamboyance. One firm gained notoriety for its motto “Never hang up the phone until the customer buys or

dies.” Another firm became the premise for the 2000 film Boiler Room starring Ben Affleck, while several other real-life scenarios were portrayed in the popular HBO series The Sopranos. The End Game Market manipulation, particularly in unregulated markets such as those listed on the pink sheets, is fairly simplistic. Importantly, successful, long-term manipulation schemes such as those that wind up as news headlines and subplots for the mass media require the artful assistance of accountants (to shield the scammer from regulatory bodies and hide money from investors and regulators), lawyers (to fend off regulatory, civil, and criminal attacks and for public relations), clearing firms (to provide the guise of credibility), and banks (to house illicit proceeds). Furthermore, there have been numerous documented cases involving violence and the corruption of regulatory authorities. Thus, these are commonly organized criminal conspiracies in the truest sense. References Black’s Law Dictionary. Abridged 6th ed. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1991. Griffin, Sean Patrick, and Alan A. Block. “PennyWise: Accounting for Fraud in the Penny Stock Industry.” Pp. 97–120 in Contemporary Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice: Essays in Honor of Gilbert Geis, edited by Henry N. Pontell and David Shichor. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000. North American Securities Administrators Association. The NASAA Report on Fraud and Abuse in the Penny Stock Industry. Report submitted to the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, 1989. Ratner, David. Securities Regulation in a Nutshell. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1978. Stevenson, Robert J. The Boiler Room and Other Telephone Sales Scams. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998. United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs. Fraud in the Micro-Capital Markets including Penny Stock Fraud. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997.

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Tax Evasion and Trust Schemes Sudhansu Rath There is a difference between income tax avoidance and tax evasion. Tax avoidance is an attempt to legally reduce the amount of tax, manipulating the tax structure to one’s own advantage by not disclosing information fully to the tax authorities. On the other had, tax evasion means avoiding the payment of taxes due by illegal means. To reduce their tax liabilities, taxpayers such as individuals, firms, trustees, and other entities deliberately misrepresent the actual state of their affairs to the tax authorities. Tax evasion implies efforts by taxpayers for dishonest tax reporting such as underdeclaring income, profits, or gains or overstating deductions. Illegal Income and Abusive Tax Schemes Income earnings through illegal means (e.g., from gambling, theft, drug trafficking, etc.) must be reported as income at the time of filling an annual tax return. This is a mandatory requirement in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code of the U.S. government. Usually, taxpayers avoid the inclusion of illegal income on their income tax returns because they fear that it might serve as an admission of guilt. Tax evasion is considered a crime in most countries, and the offenders are subject to fines or even imprisonment. In Switzerland, forging documents for the purpose of evading taxes is considered a crime. Abusive tax schemes are designed and implemented in an effort to evade taxes. To make the tax assessment process complex and to confuse the tax authorities, multiple flow-through entities are used. This involves multilayer transactions to conceal the true nature and ownership of the taxable income or assets. Use of trusts, limited liability partnerships, international business companies, foreign financial accounts, offshore credit and debit cards, etc., facilitate the success of abusive tax schemes. In the postglobalization era, abusive tax schemes are proliferating through offshore components. Abusive domestic and foreign trust arrangements are structurally fixed in these tax schemes from the outset. These schemes take advantage of and

manipulate the financial secrecy laws of some foreign countries or jurisdictions. Sophisticated arrangements through the availability of credit cards or debit cards issued from offshore financial institutions facilitate the process. Additionally, depositing unreported cash into a bank account in a tax haven country for the purposes of avoiding taxation is also considered tax evasion. There are many other forms of abusive tax schemes involving numerous domestic and foreign trusts, nominees, partnerships, etc. In the abusive foreign trust schemes, the taxpayer shifts business and assets over to a trust and operates as if he or she is no longer in control of the business or its assets. After transferring funds to a domestic trust, an attempt is made to pass the income and expenses to one or more foreign trusts in the chosen tax haven country. The modus operandi of the process is as follows. A taxpayer deliberately splits his business into two trusts. One trust will be in charge of the daily operation (i.e. the business trust), and the other one will be the equipment trust. Equipment is leased back from the equipment trust to the business trust at inflated rates. Income reported on the business trust tax returns thereby gets reduced. The income of the equipment trust is distributed to the first foreign trust to avoid paying income tax. All or most of the income of that foreign trust then gets shifted to the second foreign trust. That foreign trust’s income is based in a country where there is no need to file a tax return in order to comply with the existing law. A bank account is then opened in either the name of the second foreign trust or as an international business corporation (IBC). In actual practice, the tax avoider controls the business invisibly, possessing the assets and evading taxes by strategically forming trusts in the domestic country and abroad. The second business trust, or IBC, makes a loan to the original party (the tax avoider), and the amount gets transferred back to the borrower’s (tax avoider’s) domestic country’s bank account. Because the amount is considered a loan, a tax exemption applies. This scheme leaves no evidence that fraudulent activity has taken place. In the United States, all income, whether derived in the United States or 269

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abroad, is taxable. However, foreign investors are subjected to U.S. tax only on income having sufficient connection to the United States. Transfer Price Transfer price is fixed by a taxpayer for sharing resources and to sell or buy from partners. It is different from a price, which is set in the market for exchange of goods and services between the buyers and sellers. Multinational companies use transfer prices for sales and other transfers of goods and services within their corporate groups. Identification of the amount of income of the U.S. member of a multinational enterprise and the amount that properly is the income of the foreign member of the same multinational enterprise is very difficult in view of income shifting and transfer pricing. Due to heterogeneous tax rates and the various tax systems in different countries, a multinational corporation may have a strong incentive to shift income, deductions, or tax credits among commonly controlled entities so that it might result in a reduced overall tax burden. Such a shifting of items between commonly controlled entities is likely to be accomplished in the context of artificial transfer price fixation for transactions between group members. Deliberately evading or failing to declare income is a criminal offense and subject to prosecution. Abusive tax avoidance scams, as cited above, can subject the offender to potentially severe penalties including heavy fines and imprisonment. Reference Allworth, J. S. “Taxation and Integrated Financial Markets: The Challenges of Derivatives and Other Financial Innovations.” International Tax and Public Finance 5 (1998): 507–534. Ault, H. “Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and the Division of the International Tax Base.” Tax Law Review 47 (Spring 1992): 565–608. Barlett, Donald, and James B. Steele. The Great American Tax Dodge: How Spiraling Fraud and Avoidance Are Killing Fairness, Destroying the Income Tax, and Costing You. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. Braithwaite, V. A. Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2003.

Jones, John A. “Carry On Discriminating.” European Taxation 2 (1996): 159–162. Watson, Camilla E. Tax Procedure and Tax Fraud in a Nutshell. 3rd ed. Eagan, MN: Thomson West, 2006.

Trade, Banking, and Financial Institution Fraud Vidisha Barua Trade, banking, and financial institution fraud are white-collar crimes. White-collar crimes are those crimes committed mostly in the course of a person’s occupation. Edwin Sutherland coined the term “white-collar crime” to refer to those crimes committed by white-collar officials occupying high positions as opposed to the simpler crimes committed by blue-collar workers or street crimes. It is interesting that while the white-collar crimes are committed by people who are usually in a position of trust and violate the trust of the public, such crimes still manage to be viewed more favorably than the more rustic violent or petty blue-collar crimes. Most international trade is fraught with fraud. Cargo fraud, banking swindles, product counterfeiting, intellectual property theft, cybercrimes, and piracy are all on the rise. With increasing competition, more and more companies are outsourcing key functions, which is also contributing to the rise in fraud. Banking and financial institution frauds only add color and dimension to these. These frauds are highly sophisticated, complex, and involve larger sums than violent crimes that are perceived as more legally punishable by the masses. As a result, new scams are constantly coming to light. Trade, banking, and financial institution fraud today affects almost all organizations regardless of their size of operation. Trade Fraud The Commercial Crime Services (CCS), the anticrime division of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris, helps companies avoid the harmful consequences of falling prey to trade crime and fraud. The CCS maintains databases on

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criminal methods and activities, carries out investigations, and works with law enforcement agencies. In 2004, the CCS set up Fraudnet, a global legal network specializing in fraud. Nonprofit and London-based, Fraudnet protects companies from a wide range of crimes affecting businesses including money laundering and cybercrime, carries out investigations, and assists victims to recover losses. According to a news release of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC) estimates that counterfeiting results in more than $200 billion in lost jobs, taxes, and sales every year. In addition, the criminal organizations responsible for these acts have been linked to organized crime, drug smuggling, and child and slave labor abuses. Trade fraud is one of the primary enforcement areas of ICE under which it identifies and targets illicit trade practices that negatively impact the United States. Besides counterfeiting and intellectual property theft, trade fraud also involves in-bond diversions. “In-bond” is a term applied to the status of merchandise admitted provisionally to a country without payment of duties, either for storage in a bonded warehouse or for transshipment to another point where duties will eventually be imposed. Inbond diversion occurs when an importer enters inbond merchandise, allegedly intended only for export, into the commerce of the transit country, thereby illegally circumventing duty payments. According to ICE, in-bond diversion is probably the biggest single trade fraud threat in the United States. To address this problem, the Commercial Fraud and Intellectual Property Rights Unit has joined with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to target high-risk commodities such as textiles, tobacco, and liquor for intensive inspection and surveillance. This initiative has led to an increase in seizures, penalties, and arrests for fraud. Bank and Financial Institution Fraud Bank and financial institution frauds involve trade fraud, among other frauds. The illicit proceeds of crimes such as trade fraud are legitimized by bank and financial institution frauds, thus hitting at the very integrity of these institutions. The statute 18

USCS Chapter 63, Section 1344, defines bank fraud as an act or attempted act of false or fraudulent representation designed to obtain monetary gain or assets from a financial institution. An individual found guilty of violating this statute can be fined and/or imprisoned. While bank or financial fraud is treated as a separate crime under the laws of certain countries such as the United States, in certain other countries such as India it is dealt with broadly under the general crime of fraud. The penalty level also varies from country to country. In the United States, the penalty for bank fraud is a fine of not more than $1 million or imprisonment of not more than thirty years, or both. The United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have a similar level of penalty. In China, bankers have been executed for fraudulent activity. On the other hand, in India bank or financial institution fraud is not even recognized as a crime and is given the same treatment as any other petty fraud. These frauds are tried by investigating agencies and dealt with under the general fraud provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. An expert committee presented a report on the legal aspects of bank frauds to the governor of the Reserve Bank of India in 2001 along with an illustrative bill on financial frauds. Many kinds of fraudulent activities constitute a bank or financial institution fraud. Frequently, bank frauds are carried out by or in collusion with bank employees. Oftentimes, a high official in the bank who is not necessarily dishonest and who is authorized to buy or sell shares or invest on behalf of the bank may, in hopes of higher returns, make a bad decision and lose a large amount of the bank’s money. To cover this up, he or she indulges in further speculation, leading to even more losses. This kind of activity is called desperate dealing. Forgery and embezzlement are some of the other frauds common in banks and financial institutions. Forgery can be done both by bankers and outsiders and sometimes in collusion with each other. A simple instance can be the case of a stolen check that the thief then cashes by forging the signature of the person entitled to it. More sophisticated frauds carried out in collusion with bank officials include forging papers for a fraudulent loan or releasing 271

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Stockbroker Ketan Parekh (center), chairman of Madhavpura Mercantile Cooperative Bank, is led to court by Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) agents on April 9, 2001, in South Bombay. Parekh was arrested on charges of defrauding the state run Bank of India to a tune of 1.37 billion rupees (28 million USD). (AFP/Getty Images)

money illegally and forging signatures of those bank officials who are honest and whose signatures are required for such release of funds. Embezzlement basically involves the fraudulent diversion of funds that had been legally placed in the custody of the embezzler or his or her employer. Embezzlement can be carried out only by bank officials who have access to the funds and fraudulently divert these for their personal benefit. Usually embezzlements in banks are collectively carried out by those in management positions. These show deviant behavior of the organization itself and erode public faith. There are also instances of fraudulent banks and financial institutions that mislead the masses. These banks and financial institutions may be illegal or unlicensed. Investing in these or trusting them with life’s savings can

only lead to complete devastation for the individual. It is important to watch out for these fraudulent entities that completely corrode public faith in the system. Financial fraud as proposed by the expert committee in India that presented a report on the legal aspects of bank frauds to the governor of the Reserve Bank of India means and includes any of the following acts committed by a person or with her or his connivance, or by her or his agent, in dealing with any bank or financial institution or any other entity holding public funds: • The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true. • The active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact.

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• A promise made without any intention of performing it. • Any other act fitted to deceive. • Any act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent.

Whoever acquires, possesses, or transfers any proceeds of financial fraud or enters into any transaction that is related to proceeds of fraud, either directly or indirectly, or conceals or aids in the concealment of the proceeds of financial fraud commits financial fraud. Conclusion Trade, bank, and financial frauds are complex and operate under similar conditions, bringing into play similar white-collar games of the frauds. Although often perceived as less legally culpable, these criminals are more morally culpable, as the basic incentive for the commission of these crimes is satisfying the greed of those who already have position and power. These crimes cross all international boundaries, with a common practice being to deposit illegal funds in Swiss banks, and need the attention of the international community, and stricter laws need to be put in place worldwide.

References Block, Alan, and Sean P. Griffin. “Transnational Financial Crime: Crooked Lawyers, Tax Evasion, and Securities Fraud.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 18 (4 November 2002): 381–393. Doyle, Charles. Cybercrime: An Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute and Related Federal Criminal Laws. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science, 2006. “The Illustrative Bill on Financial Frauds in India.” Report presented on 31 August 2001 by the Expert Committee set up by the Reserve Bank of India to look into the legal aspects of bank frauds in India. Johnstone, P., and J. Haines. “Future Trends in Financial Crime.” Journal of Financial Crime 6 (3 January 1999): 269–275. Middlemiss, Jim. “White-Collar Fraud: The New Organized Crime.” Bottom Line (March 1998): 17. Salinger, Lawrence M. Encyclopedia of White-Collar & Corporate Crime. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004. U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement. “Ice Recognized by Louis Vuitton for Combating Trade Fraud,” 24 February 2005, http://www.ice .gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/award022405 .htm. ———. “Suspicious Activity Reports: A Critical Tool for Financial Investigators.” The Cornerstone Report 2(2) (August 2005), http://www.ice.gov/ doclib/pi/cornerstone/pdf/cornerstone_08_05.pdf.

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Section III The Global Impact of Organized Crime Hua-Lun Huang

What Is Organized Crime? Organized crime has been an important matter for the American government during the past nine decades. As early as 1915, the city government of Chicago established a commission to identify the major qualities of institutionalized crime. Since that early attempt, several committees were created to help the federal government evaluate the potential threats that institutionalized and organized crime groups in general and the Italian Mafia syndicates in particular have presented. Based on the reports of these ad hoc government commissions (especially the Kefauver Committee of 1951), some criminologists and sociologists argue that there are powerful and resourceful criminal associations in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and other large cities. These illegitimate associations, as exemplified by the Italian Mafia crime families, were involved in intimidation, extortion, loansharking, money laundering, illegal gambling, and many other interpersonal and property crimes. Because of these involvements, several criminological theories and conceptual models have been proposed to explicate the formation and development of organized crime enterprises. Although criminologists and sociologists have proposed different theories to examine the issue of organized crime in the past several decades—for example, the ethnic succession thesis proposed by Francis Ianni—it seems quite evident that organized crime is a gang phenomenon. In this regard, the two concepts of supergang and corporate gang formulated by George Knox appear to be very help-

ful for professionals as well as amateurs in identifying the defining characteristics of organized crime. The first idea, supergang, refers to the condition that organized crime groups have behavioral codes and are hierarchical and influential. Because of these features, organized crime groups can systematically and effectively become involved in largescale rackets such as drug trafficking and human smuggling. The second notion, corporate gang, indicates that organized crime members are not desperate, irrational, or lunatic persons. Instead, compared with ordinary street gang members, organized crime figures are mindful of their social images. Because of these concerns, organized crime characters usually maintain a low profile in their lives and act as lawful entrepreneurs or investors. Worldwide Impact Brought about by Organized Crime In terms of the possible impact caused by organized crime-related activities on the modern world, the following three problems seem to be especially noteworthy. The first problem is that in a number of developing or war-torn countries, some young girls and boys (above all, those from poor families) and jobless young women have been recruited, abducted, or sold by elements linked to transnational prostitution rings. These commodity-like children and women then are transported (legally or illegally) to economically advanced countries (such as France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to become sex workers. 275

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Because of this supply-and-demand relationship, some nations (such as China, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam, etc.) where no adequate laws are enacted to protect women and children have become havens for organized crime enterprises and hot spots for the sex slave trade. In addition to the forced sex trade, some people (particularly people in their twenties) from economically underdeveloped countries have been enticed by organized crime groups, which have connections with human smuggling rings, to go to industrialized nations (particularly the United States) supposedly to make a fortune, as exemplified by the illegal immigrants from China and other countries who want to go to America to become rich. These unregulated population migrations, of course, have brought public order problems (auto vehicle thefts, burglaries, drug trafficking, prostitution, robbery, sexual assaults, etc.) to the adopted societies. Finally, in some countries and areas of the modern world, organized crime activities have become a part of daily life. Because of this routinization, normalization, or institutionalization process, the roles of law enforcement agents, to an extent, are replaced by organized crime figures. This phenomenon can be clearly seen from Yiu-Kong Chu’s idea of Triadisation, which shows that the criminal activ-

ities directed by the Triad societies have penetrated into every corner of the Hong Kongese society since the 1950s. References Chin, Ko-Lin. Smuggled Chinese: Clandestine Immigration to the United States. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999. Chu, Yiu-Kong. The Triad As Business. New York: Routledge, 2000. Finckenauer, James O., and Elin Waring. Russian Mafia in America: Immigration, Culture, and Crime. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998. Ianni, Francis A. Black Mafia: Ethnic Succession in Organized Crime. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974. King, Gilbert. Woman, Child for Sale: The New Slave Trade in the 21st Century. New York: Chamberlain, 2004. Kyle, David, and Rey Koslowski. Global Smuggling: Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. Knox, George W. An Introduction to Gangs. 5th ed. Peotone, IL: New Chicago School Press, 2000. Lyman, Michael D., and Gary W. Potter. Organized Crime. 3rd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003. Malarek, Victor. The Natashas: Inside the New Global Sex Trade. New York: Arcade Publishing, 2004.

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Criminal Infiltration of Legitimate Businesses and Industries Clotilde Champeyrache Introduction According to some estimates released in 2000 by the Confcommercio, the confederation of Italian tradesmen, the Italian Mafia organizations exerted their control over 20 percent of the commercial structures and 15 percent of the industrial enterprises of the peninsula. But not only in Italy are there proofs of criminal infiltration in legitimate businesses. Thus, in 1996 the Russian parliament issued a report indicating that 40 percent of private enterprises, 60 percent of public enterprises, and 85 percent of commercial banks were in the hands of organized crime. In Russia, both wholesale and retail trades as well as coal mining and construction are under the control of organized crime. Peter Reuter studied the infiltration of La Cosa Nostra from New York in the garment industry, the Fulton Fish Market, and the air cargo, construction, shipping, and waste-hauling industries. In Hong Kong, the Triads control a wide range of activities: the construction industry, entertainment, street hawking, minibus services, wholesale fish markets, interior decoration, and the film industry. Only the poorest countries seem immune to this phenomenon. Why Criminals Enter Legitimate Businesses Among the reasons criminals choose not to confine themselves to illegality but also to enter legitimate businesses, two seem particularly relevant. The

first is that property rights in illegitimate businesses are in essence uncertain. For example, if a lab for drug refining is seized by the authorities or by concurrent criminals, there is no possibility to claim compensation or restitution. In such a context, criminals enter legitimate businesses so as to diversify their activities and make their productive investments relatively safer. The second reason links the infiltration in legitimate businesses to the excess in financial capacities stemming from the drug market. This market has reached a level of saturation and competitiveness that makes any supplementary investment counterproductive. Organized crime has to find another outlet for its funds and thus uses legitimate businesses. Obviously, these two explanations are not mutually exclusive and can combine. Ways to Infiltrate Legitimate Businesses In countries and times when the judicial devices against criminal infiltration are nonexistent or inefficacious, organized crime can easily create ex nihilo its own legitimate enterprises. Whenever repression is more accentuated, criminals resort to less-identifiable means. Taking over already-existing legal businesses violently through extortion or more subtly through money lending becomes the main way of access to legal markets. A Typology of Infiltrated Legitimate Businesses It has often been said that the main reason criminal organizations enter legitimate activities is that such 277

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activities allow them to exploit economies of scale and scope related to the illegal businesses. The tangible presence of organized crime within the legal economy in fact proves consistent with more various purposes. According to the usefulness that those enterprises represent with respect to organized crime’s activities, a typology of the infiltrated legitimate businesses can be drawn that is made of five types of enterprises: 1. Money laundering enterprises. This is the most commonly known type. Organized crime uses legal businesses and trades—in particular bars, restaurants, and nightclubs—to make dirty money circulate and to declare legitimate incomes that in reality come from illegal activities. 2. Cover enterprises. This type of business allows for integration between legal and illegal activities. Although the enterprise is formally legitimate, it is used for illegal activities. Some inputs are indeed commonly needed in both legal and illegal activities. The transportation sector is emblematic of this: legitimate transportation enterprises are infiltrated by criminals because they need to carry their illegal goods (such as drugs) from the production to the consumption places. It is also safer to exert direct control over these enterprises than to subcontract with noncriminals. This type of enterprise is common in warehousing and communications. 3. Enterprises in quest for profits. Criminals also enter and/or infiltrate legitimate businesses in an attempt to generate and maximize their profits. This occurs on competitive or on public and controlled sectors. Such is the case of the building industry in relation to public works, especially in southern Italy. Such enterprises allow for a diversification of the criminals’ portfolio and therefore introduce a new type of investment with different risks and returns as compared to traditional investments in illegal activities. 4. Enterprises that allow for the control over territories. Part of the strength of the criminal organizations such as the Mafia lies in their capacity to control their territories of implantation, and one effective way to exert such control is to provide jobs to the local populations. This is why organized

crime often favors legal activities that are laborintensive. Their role of employer in turn confers to the criminals investing in legal businesses a social legitimacy—especially in territories plagued by underdevelopment and a high rate of unemployment—that is extremely difficult but compulsory to undermine when it comes to involving citizens in the fight against criminality. 5. Enterprises as part of a criminal welfare system. This aspect has pretty often been neglected in the literature about organized crime and legitimate businesses. It nonetheless is of a fundamental importance for the durability from one generation to another of some criminal organizations. Thanks to the gains they obtain on legitimate markets, criminal organizations can choose to give money to their members in jail and, mostly, to their relatives so as to compensate the loss of income due to the imprisonment of one of the family members. Moreover, legal businesses owned by criminals can hire these persons once they are set free, or, as it happened in Italy, they can provide job opportunities for prisoners asking for a semiliberty regime (work release) that involves partial confinement while transitioning into the external environment. Lastly, and once again the Italian case is blatant, organized criminals can use their legitimate businesses as tools to pervert the legal welfare system. Persons fictively hired and then fired for supposedly technical reasons are in this way granted access to social devices including reinsertion programs and financial help.

In concrete terms, although presented as distinct, these five motivations to enter legal activities frequently overlap. For example, the building industry in Sicily represents for the Mafia a source of profit as well as a perfect opportunity to control its territory of implantation. Main Consequences of Criminal Infiltration Legitimate businesses, once infiltrated by criminals, often share common features. These markets are characterized by a large number of small firms and an inelastic demand for the product. Both the level of product differentiation and the barriers to entry are low. Lastly, the infiltrated firms usually

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The partially-built town of Casalnuovo, comprising fifty buildings and over 300 apartments, was built using funds from the La Camorra crime organization, photographed in 2007. The development was impounded by police and faces an uncertain future. (AFP/Getty Images)

resort to unskilled labor and do not invest much in technology. The infiltration of criminals in legal activities is most often characterized by durability: once criminals get hold of these activities, they hardly ever abandon them. This durability is all the more guaranteed in that legal Mafia-owned enterprises tend to expel noncriminal entrepreneurs from the infiltrated markets. The economic competition between criminals and noncriminals is indeed clearly in favor of the former as they benefit from three comparative advantages: the systematic resort to intimidation or violence, wage compression, and easy access to financial resources at low cost thanks to the profits made on illegal markets. On the whole, in zones where organized crime is heavily present in legitimate businesses, economic and social development is hampered, and the normal functioning of the economy undergoes profound disruptions.

Hints for a Typology of Organized Crime If we consider the behavior of different types of organized crime in terms of infiltration in legitimate businesses, we can distinguish features that permit us to establish a typology. The first clear distinction is between organized criminals who do and who do not cross the dividing line that separates legality from illegality. Not every criminal organization tends to invest in legal activities: banditry leans on a total rejection of social order and therefore will never try to take part in anything that has to do with legitimacy. Among those who participate in legitimate businesses, another distinction can be made between criminal organizations that do so on a temporary basis and those that, on the contrary, choose to cumulate legal and illegal activities in the long run. Individuals can gather and accomplish a criminal design on a temporary basis as a transitional phase. Infiltration in legitimate businesses then appears as a first step toward legality. This is 279

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commonly the case of ethnic criminality in foreign countries with migrants working at the margin of legality before obtaining immigration papers. It also may be the case in countries new to capitalism, such as the United States at the time of John D. Rockefeller (1839–1937). Conversely, the choice not to abandon illegal businesses while infiltrating legitimate businesses is typical of the Mafia. References Arlacchi, P. Mafia Business: The Mafia Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Gambetta, D., and P. Reuter. “Conspiracy among the Many: the Mafia in Legitimate Industries.” Pp. 116–139 in The Economics of Organized Crime, edited by G. Fiorentini and S. Peltzman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Reuter, P. Disorganized Crime: The Economics of the Visible Hand. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983.

Economic, Political, and Social Impact of Transnational Organized Crime Robert Hanser and Nathan Moran Transnational organized crime poses many threats to the domestic United States as well as the international community. Such threats include challenges to institutional order, political pressure, economic coercion, and the outputs corresponding with these threats. Each of these has destructive potential that can disturb the international order. Institutional Threats Threats to institutional stability are closely related to economic threats. According to R. W. Lee, the causes of these threats can be attributed to “the disintegration of hostile power blocs, technological advances in transportation and communications, and diminished government controls over flows of goods, services, and money.” Changes to the global economy and the heightened use of the Internet have also been facilitated by an increase in the amount of legal transactions that are taking place transnationally, thus allowing the organizations to

expand transnationally with a degree of economic protection. As a result of increased transnational activity, the amount of money being made by transnational organized crime organizations is increasing exponentially compared to that of nation-states and countries. In Latin American countries such as Colombia, the amount of money being accumulated by drug traffickers easily compares with the budgets of many governments. The result is that drug traffickers have a strong influence on the direction and investment future of Latin American economies. As is well documented in Colombia, Mexico, and numerous other countries, the drug money of the various cartels has permeated the top political leaders and economies of those nations. In countries that are currently transitioning toward democracy from more authoritarian forms of government (e.g., Russia and the former Soviet bloc), the organized crime groups are almost indistinguishable from legitimate state operations and organizations. In these countries, corruption is rampant within central governmental institutions such as the cabinet, the legislature, the economic ministries, the security services, and the military. This results in large quantities of illegal exports along with dollar flight. Political Threats and Agendas Do transnational organized crime organizations maintain political agendas? Political agendas are usually reserved for terrorist organizations in the pursuit of political change or disorder. Indeed, a group’s ultimate pursuit, whether motivated by monetary wealth, power, ideology, or religion, is the key distinction between a transnational crime organization and a terrorist organization. However, the face of organized crime is changing. The new transnational organized crime groups seek to exercise some degree of institutional power in order to further their economic interests, which distinguishes them from terrorist organizations that pursue political interests. For transnational organized crime groups to conduct their businesses and ensure that the state does not repress their activities too much, they metaphorically wage war against governmental institutions that are designed

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to repress the activities of the organized crime group. These governmental institutions include political parties, the judiciary, law enforcement, and legislative agendas. It is important to note, however, that transnational organized crime groups do not intend to debilitate all aspects of government but only those aspects that create friction in their pursuit of profit. The more decentralized a state becomes, the more amenable the state is to wide-scale corruption, principally because with a decentralized system there is less accountability (although there is some debate about this contention). Conversely, transnational organized crime activities can contribute to decentralization by introducing corruption and other illicit activities. In some areas of the globe, transnational organized crime groups have sponsored both individuals and parties to run in elections (e.g., in Colombia). This type of sponsorship usually comes in the form of legitimate persons donating to the party of their choice. In this instance, the transnational organized crime group is funding the political organization in all of its major endeavors, and some funding comes from outside persons in order to provide an aura of legitimacy. In Colombia, for instance, drug traffickers and paramilitary organizations colluded with one another to create the Department of Middle Magdalena in the early 1990s. In another Colombian example, drug kingpin Pablo Escobar launched the separatist movement Antioquia Rebelde in 1993 in opposition to the government of Bogotá. Italian organized crime would prefer that Italy be split into three independent federations, which would allow for the devolution of power, or a decentralization of power. In Russia, Mafiya gangs and political bosses have set up a scheme to establish an independent republic in the Urals. The result of influence in a nation’s economy and political leaders is a perversion of government and its products at all levels. Transnational crime organizations are vying to control points of entry into select countries in order to facilitate an enhanced and more efficient trafficking process. This is done by undermining and corrupting people in high political positions. As discussed earlier, transnational organized crime groups have supported can-

didates for public office for the purposes of increasing political influence. Indeed, the person receiving the campaign contribution may not have the slightest clue as to where the funding for his campaign is coming from (e.g., former U.S. vice president Al Gore received contributions from a Buddhist Temple). A prime example of this activity comes from the 1994 presidential election in Colombia in which presidential candidate Ernesto Samper’s campaign managers received a donation of $6 million from the Cali cartel. According to Lee, “the candidate himself approved of the arrangement, and even promised a quid pro quo to respect the rights of traffickers and to grant them lenient surrender terms if and when he assumed the presidency.” Andres Pastrana, the opposition candidate, was also offered a contribution from the Cali cartel (although the amount is unknown) but refused to accept the offer. This large amount of Cali dollars, which were used to pay for advertising and political rallies, possibly was the key difference between the two candidates when it came time to vote. According to Lee, during the first round of the elections “the two candidates were in a virtual dead heat . . . but Samper edged out a victory by a razor-thin margin of less than 2 percent of the votes cast in the second round.” This example and numerous others like it provide evidence of the destructive abilities of transnational organized crime groups within government, especially with regard to the rule of law and the sanctity of the democratic process. Large transnational crime organizations can increase the level of violence against state institutions either directly or indirectly. For example, the Medellin cartel has assassinated high-level officials and politicians, has committed numerous bombings, and has kidnapped members of wealthy and politically powerful families. The terror campaigns of the Mafia in Italy are another example. This use of violence by transnational organized crime groups is intended to weaken the political structure of the country to the point that it reduces law enforcement pressure on criminal organizations and their leadership. According to one source, the large drug cartels of Latin America rely more heavily on bribery and corruption rather than violence to 281

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maintain a profitable enterprise. This sentiment is summed up succinctly in a quote by Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela, the Cali leader, when he said, “We don’t kill judges or ministers; we buy them.” Threats to Political Stability: Transnational Organized Crime Activities, Civil Conflicts, and Extreme Public Lawlessness The threats mentioned above can contribute to the deliberate entropy of political systems. In a different way, the activities of transnational organized crime groups can become merged with the civil conflicts within a country and the support for separatist movements. Examples of this type of activity include Myanmar (formerly Burma) and Afghanistan, where the transnational trafficking of drugs and arms has contributed to the destabilization of governments. In both Colombia and Peru, narcoterrorists tax the production and shipment of narcotics, which furthers their objective of toppling the democratic government and introducing socialism to the country by increasing the amount of funding available for narcoterrorist activities. According to an official Colombian report, in Colombia alone it is estimated that insurgent groups are making between $400 million and $500 million per year, which leads many to believe that the narcoguerrillas are a legitimate cartel. In Russia, organized crime and transnational organized crime groups have contributed to political instability in a number of ways (recall the desire to create an independent republic in the Urals). According to Lee, the largest threat to Moscow’s control of organized crime is the breakaway Chechen state. Although the Chechens have a cease-fire agreement that began in 1996, “the Chechen state survives largely because of donations from ethnic Chechen criminal organizations operating in other parts of Russia, and the republic itself has been a haven for criminal activities ranging from heroin refining and trafficking to the smuggling of weapons and nuclear materials.” Another challenge to political stability is the extreme public lawlessness and criminal threats to the legitimacy of government. These types of activities can provoke the citizenry to backlash against the criminal organization in the form of establish-

ing extremist movements or authoritarian forms of government to control the burgeoning transnational organized crime problem. In Russia, for example, the extreme level of organized crime and transnational organized crime activity has generated a sense of longing for some of the older forms of authoritarian rule. Supporters of the former Soviet system voted overwhelmingly for General Alexander Lebed, secretary of the Russian Security Council during 1996. Lebed’s views on law and order lead many to believe that he was a believer in an authoritarian form of government rather than in Russia’s nascent democracy. On the basis of this, President Boris Yeltsin removed Lebed from office in late 1996. Yeltsin stated that during this era, Russia was a “superpower of crime” and “the biggest mafia state in the world.” This extreme level of lawlessness and organized crime activity is what led to the election of Vladimit Zhirinovsky and his Liberal Democratic Party in the December 1993 parliamentary elections. Zhirinovsky’s political platform included executions of criminal gang leaders by firing squad on the spot, with little time for trial. Zhirinovsky’s time in office was short-lived, for in 1995 his Liberal Democratic Party lost half its electoral strength in the Duma elections, although the Communist Party significantly increased its electoral strength. The cause for this loss of political power has been attributed to the willingness of Zhirinovsky and his party to directly confront the problem of organized crime with real and severe consequences, thus causing the organized crime groups to take political action (e.g., corruption) with other, less confrontational political leaders and coalitions. Threats to Economic Stability There is mixed evidence as to the effect of transnational organized crime on the economies of various nations and states throughout the world. What evidence there is points to both the positive and negative effects that arise from illicit transnational organized crime activities. Positive effects include increased employment opportunities, an infusion of foreign money into the economy, and increased opportunities for the poor. An example of this is Latin America, where drug traffickers have

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invested money into such industries as construction, real estate, and local commerce. Indeed, profits from transnational organized crime activity that are invested in legitimate business have positive effects on both the local and global economies. Some negative aspects of transnational organized crime activity include the economic costs of direct organized crime involvement in the public and private sectors. Aside from direct costs such as weakened law enforcement and violence against business persons, official corruption drives away investments and investment opportunities, which places the future of any country’s economic stability and security in serious peril. Between 1991 and 1996, foreign investment in Russia was twenty-two times less than foreign investments in China ($7 billion compared to $156 billion), even though Russia is twice as large geographically and twice as wealthy per capita. Protection rackets, another direct cost, also seriously hamper the economic growth of Russia insofar as these payments increase the price of goods and services by an average of 30 percent. Indirect costs include illegal businesses that displace legal businesses, exemplified by the development of Russia’s shadow economy. This shadow economy doubled in size between 1994 and 1996, while the licit economy depreciated by 10 percent. In the Andes mountain region of South America, money from narcotics trafficking assists in sectors of the economy such as construction and real estate. However, according to Lee, “the overvaluation of domestic currencies discourages legal manufacturing by making imports cheaper and exports dearer.” The problem is that countries such as Colombia will increasingly become dependent upon illegal exports for its government support, which means that transnational organized crime groups can essentially legitimize their illegal activities. References Caballera, M. C. “La guerilla biollionaria.” Cambio 16, 6 July 1998, 28–31. Cartwright, G. Dirty Dealing: Drug Smuggling on the Mexican Border and the Assassination of a Federal Judge—An American Parable. El Paso, TX: Cinco Puntos, 1998.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. Russian Organized Crime. Washington, DC: CSIS, 1997. Circules, E. El imperio delinquent la Havana. Havana: Casa delinquent las Americas, 1993. Clawson, P., and R. W. Lee III. The Andean Cocaine Industry. New York: St. Martin’s, 1996. Farer, T., ed. Transnational Crime in the Americas. New York: Routledge, 1999. Friman, H. R., and P. Andreas, eds. The Illicit Global Economy and State Power. Boston: Rowan and Littlefield, 1999. Gamarra, E. A. “Transnational Criminal Organizations in Bolivia.” Pp. 171–192 in Transnational Crime in the Americas, edited by Tom Farer. New York: Routledge, 1999. Handelman, S. Comrade Criminal: Russia’s New Mafia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995. Helleiner, E. “State Power and the Regulation of Illicit Activity in Global Finance.” Pp. 53–90 in The Illicit Global Economy and State Power, edited by H. R. Friman and P. Andreas. Boston: Rowan and Littlefield, 1999. Ispravnikov, V. O., and V. V. Kulikov. Tenevaya Ekonomika v Rossii: Inoi Put I Tretya Sila. Moscow: Rossiiskii Ekonomicheskii Zhurnal, Fond za Ekonomicheskaya Gramonost’, 1997. Jamieson, A. “Mafia and Institutional Power in Italy.” International Relations 2 (1994): 23. ———. “Transnational Italian Organized Crime.” Transnational Organized Crime 1(2) (1996): 151– 165. Jansen, M. B. “Ultranationalism in Post-War Japan.” Political Quarterly 27 (1956): 141–151. Lee, R. W., III. “Transnational Organized Crime: An Overview.” Pp. 1–38 in Transnational Crime in the Americas, edited by T. Farer. New York: Routledge, 1999. Maingot, A. P. The Decentralization Imperative and Caribbean Criminal Enterprises. Pp. 143–170 in Transnational Crime in the Americas, edited by T. Farer. New York: Routledge, 1999. McCoy, A. The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade. Brooklyn, NY: Lawrence Hill, 1991. Merton, R. K. “Social Structure and Anomie.” American Sociological Review 3 (1938): 672–682. Mueller, G. O. W. Transnational Crime: An Experience in Uncertainties. Pp. 3–18 in Organized Crime: Uncertainties and Dilemmas, edited by S. Einstein and M. Amir. Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, 1999.

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Richards, J. R. Transnational Criminals Organizations, Cyber Crime, and Moneylaundering. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1999. Sabia, D. “International Terrorism and the United States: The Troubling Case of Latin America.” Pp. 228–240 in International Criminal Justice: Issues in a Global Perspective, edited by D. Rounds. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2000. Shelly, L. I. “Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism.” Pp. 25–52 in The Illicit Global Economy and State Power, edited by H. R. Friman and P. Andreas. Boston: Rowan and Littlefield, 1999. Smith, Peter H. “Semiorganized International Crime: Drug Trafficking in Mexico.” Pp. 193–216 in Transnational Crime in the Americas, edited by T. Farer. New York: Routledge, 1999. Thoumi, F. E. “The Impact of the Illegal Drug Industry on Colombia.” Pp. 117–143 in Transnational Crime in the Americas, edited by T. Farer. New York: Routledge, 1999. United States Agency for International Development. Maintaining Country Progress in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States. Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 1997. Walker, W. O., III. “The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: U.S. Drug Policy and Colombian State Stability.” Pp. 143–172 in The Illicit Global Economy and State Power, edited by H. R. Friman and P. Andreas. Boston: Rowan and Littlefield, 1999. Ward, R. H. “The Internationalization of Criminal Justice.” Pp. 267–332 in Boundary Changes in Criminal Justice Organizations, vol. 2, edited by C. M. Friel. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2000. Yokoyama, M. “Development of Japanese Drug Control Laws toward Criminalization.” Journal of Law and Politics 28(3) (1991): 1–21.

Environmental Crime: The Illegal Storage and Disposal of Hazardous and Toxic Waste Arthur Holst Environmental crime is an act that is committed with the intent to harm or with the potential to cause such harm to an ecological or biological system for the purpose of securing business or some kind of personal advantage and is in violation of

state or federal laws. Another definition describes environmental crime as the intentional, knowing, reckless, or even criminally negligent violations of the environmental laws or regulations pertaining to a particular topic. Background One of first and most widely known instances that recognized the need for environmental controls occurs in 1894 when venture capitalist William Love was determined to build a hydropower-harvesting canal near Niagara Falls, New York. After digging a large ditch for that project, it was abandoned due to lack of investors. For a while, the ditch was used by locals for entertainment purposes such as ice-skating until 1947, when the Occidental Chemical Company purchased the land and the surrounding area. After owning the land for a few years, the Occidental Chemical Company began dumping chemicals into the ditch. Locals did not complain because the company was the largest employer in the area. In 1970, the surrounding creeks, sewers, and water supplies became contaminated, and members of the community became seriously ill. The area is still currently being decontaminated, and the estimated cost for the entire project is $250 million. During the mid-1970s to mid-1980s, the focus of many environmental groups shifted from animal and endangered species protection to solid waste management and, more notably, recycling the materials needed to properly dispose of solid wastes. Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal With such a shortage of available sites for dumping and with the population of the United States ever growing, the storage and disposal of hazardous waste is becoming more and more federally regulated because of increased instances of illegal dumping and disposal. Also, the mounting quantity of hazardous waste causes a shortage in the availability of disposal systems for such toxic wastes. According to a December 2000 White House report, illegal dumping generates up to $12 billion of worldwide criminal destruction and revenue. Many instances of dumping involve the discharging of items that a person or company did not know to be noxious. Solid waste, which is different than

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A bulldozer pushes soil away from one of the tanks used to hold toxic waste in Love Canal, New York, on May 23, 1980, two days after the Environmental Protection Agency agreed to relocate several families from the area. (Getty Images)

toxic waste, can be described as “any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from community activities.” Toxic or hazardous waste, which is known by the government as B3 waste, is any dangerous or toxic material that due to its characteristics, concentration, or amount either directly or indirectly may damage or pollute the living environment or endanger human health. This B3 waste and other toxic wastes are characterized by one or more of the following criterion. The wastes can be explosive, inflammable, reactive, infectious, toxic, or corrosive. The wastes can come from specific or nonspecific sources and from expired chemical material, spill, discarded packaging, disposal of products, and many other instances.

When it comes to the storage of toxic wastes before they can be disposed of, there are certain rules and regulations that need to be observed in order to not contaminate the environment or cause a chemical accident. After waste is produced, an employer can only store waste in a storage facility for up to ninety days. The particular storage facility must be a flood-free warehouse and must be declared geologically stable. It is also considered illegal for storage providers to not keep accurate records on the type, characteristics, quantity, time of production, and time of delivery for every ounce of waste stored. After storage in the temporary facility, all wastes must proceed to an incineration station where proper destruction techniques must be employed. Most citations for illegality of storage occur at this stage in the process. It is very expensive and time-consuming to reduce chemical or gaseous waste products to 99.9999 percent destruction and removal efficiency, as per the federal regulation. 285

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The most important part of hazardous and toxic waste disposal is the transportation to and delivery into a designated landfill. Each landfill must be specifically designed for a specific type of waste to minimize cross-contamination effects in case of accidental leakage or contact with human life. The specific government policies for the landfill sites require flood-free areas with soil permeability of 1 × 10–7 centimeters per second. The areas must be spatially planned to allow for adequate land area, must be geologically stable, and cannot be a catchment (reservoir or basin) used for drinking water. Each landfill must be constructed using a doubleliner system with runoff control, leachate collection and treatment, a water well monitor, and a final or top liner that is approved by the Environmental Impact Management Agency. When a landfill is full or no longer able to be used, it is to be covered by layers of soil, and subsequent use is never to be used for settlement or other general facilities. Conclusion Because the federal regulations are so specific and strict, many businesses knowingly dump illegally all over the world. Because of the sheer size, oceans are one of the most popular dumping grounds for toxic waste. It is not uncommon for large companies to deliberately travel out into the far reaches of an ocean and dump large amounts of hazardous materials directly into the water to save money by avoiding destruction costs. Another popular method of illegal dumping involves mislabeling containers with harmless products or materials that actually contain hazardous materials. An example includes marking barrels as “recyclable scrap paper” that actually contain used needles and syringes. In 1972, Congress enacted the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, also known as the Ocean Dumping Act, to prohibit extraneous dumping in the ocean that could potentially destroy human health and marine environments. Currently, ocean dumping cannot occur by law unless a permit is issued under the Ocean Dumping Act. References Asia-Pacific Centre for Environmental Law (APCEL). Faculty of Law, National University of

Singapore. “Government Regulation Regarding the Management of Hazardous and Toxic Waste,” http://sunsite.nus.edu.sg/apcel/dbase/indonesia/ regs/inrhaz.html. Environmental Protection Agency. “Ocean Dumping and Dredged Material Management,” 2005, www.epa.gov/owow/oceans/regulatory/ dumpdredged/dumpdredged.html. Schmidt, Charles W. “Environmental Crimes: Profiting at the Earth’s Expense.” Environmental Health Perspectives 112(2) (February 2004): A96–103.

Global Crime Victimization: Impact on Social Order and Democracy Hua-Lun Huang From Domestic to Global Crimes Before the twin towers of the World Trade Center were devastated by two hijacked civilian planes in September 2001, the subject of global crime seemed to attract little, if any, attention from law enforcement officials, criminologists, and sociologists of crime. Instead, researchers who tried to identify the root causes of criminal behaviors usually focused attention on the crime issues of a certain country. With such a concentration on domestic crimes (i.e., unlawful acts within a given sovereign territory), the possible relationships between crimes and socioeconomic, cultural, demographic, ecological, and other criminogenic factors were, more often than not, the research subjects for students. Concentration on domestic crimes also made the great majority of criminological theories middle-range theories because these theories can only be applied to micro- or mesolevel causes of criminal (or delinquent) behaviors. Finally, the focus on domestic crimes resulted in some investigative writers publishing biographies of notorious criminals, especially of serial killers and of career thieves, or analyzing the life-course trajectories shared by most chronic offenders and career criminals. The focus on domestic crimes as mainstream subjects for criminologists and criminal justice experts in the past several decades did not change remarkably until 9/11. This catastrophic case vividly showed the U.S. government and Western

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scholars that the dangers and threats posed by international criminals, especially international terrorists, are far more destructive than any crimes perpetrated by teenagers, gang members, or individual offenders. Based on this new perception of the salience of global crimes, numerous books and articles on fundamentalist Islamic movements, piracy, the transnational sex trade, and other intercontinental crimes were published during the short period of 2002 to the present. Factors Conducive to the Spread of International Criminal Acts International or global crime, as stated above, have increasingly become popular topics in criminology and criminal justice since 2001. This trend motivates criminologists and criminal justice professionals to examine the many issues related to transnational crimes (especially organized ones). Of these issues, the problem of how the social order of sovereign states (particularly the social order of highly industrialized counties, which, to a significant degree, is related to global order) could be destabilized or undermined by transnational (organized) crime activities seems to be an exceptionally critical one. In this regard, the following political, legal, and socioeconomic factors tend to pave the way for transnational criminals to cause chaos or situations that will enhance collective fear in some vulnerable countries. First, in terms of political factors, one of the most important barriers to cooperation among governments at the international level in the fight against transnational criminal activities is the issue of national sovereignty. For the great majority of modern states, national sovereignty is an absolute and sacred right (i.e., national sovereignty cannot be shared with or challenged by any countries). Because sovereignty is indivisible and includes the elements of holiness, completeness, and purity, many intergovernmental activities necessary for suppressing transnational crimes (such as sharing intelligence or coordinating police forces of different nations) would be considered violations of this sacrosanct right. This situation can be clearly seen from the following two examples of relationships between or among countries:

1. Asymmetrical power relationships. In many circumstances, weaker (or underdeveloped) states usually do not want to cooperate with stronger (or developed) nations lest sovereignty is violated. This condition can be exemplified by the interactions between American and Mexican police, which frequently are short of trust and full of conflict. 2. Hostile relationships brought about by ideologies, religious beliefs, competitions for natural resources, or terrorist movements. In some regions of the world, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for governments of sovereign nations to work together because of different ideologies, dissimilar religious beliefs, disputes over the monopolies of natural (including land and oceanic) resources, or distinct stances toward terrorist movements. These ideological, religious, economic, and sociopolitical causes of intergovernmental hostility can be represented respectively by the following modern examples: the diplomatic antagonisms between the American and the Cuban governments, the military conflicts between the Indian and the Pakistani governments, the competitions between the Chinese and the Japanese governments for the exploitation of oil fields of the East China Sea, and the disputes between the Japanese and the North Korean governments over the whereabouts of those Japanese who were abducted by North Korean agents in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s.

Given that unequal power and hostile relationships will provide abundant opportunities for outlaws who run their businesses at the global level to take advantage of, it is not surprising that some murder or serious financial fraud or money laundering cases in America, Canada, Japan, Russia, Taiwan, and several industrialized European countries remain unsolved for years. Besides efforts to protect national sovereignty, the second possible factor that will prevent governments from taking coordinated steps to deal with global crime-related issues is the lack of an internationally recognized law. Creating laws to regulate people’s behaviors has a long history in human societies (e.g., the Ten Commandments promulgated by Moses). Despite the fact that laws have served as instruments of peacemaking for many centuries, 287

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humans, at least thus far, have not developed any laws that are universally or globally accepted. Because of this heterogeneity in laws as well as legal systems, violent and property crimes implicating two or more countries (e.g., piratical activities, drug trafficking, and human smuggling) will usually involve many highly controversial issues such as jurisdiction, distribution of adjudicative power, extradition process, definition of criminal behavior, type of punishment, police corruption, and so forth. All of these controversies, just like the issue of national sovereignty, become loopholes or obstacles that hinder governments in stopping or investigating transnational crime movements. Finally, in terms of socioeconomic factors such as language, it is not unusual for transnational criminals to run their businesses in a country where a different language is used (for instance, the Russian/ Colombian drug gangs in America, the Nigerian/ Pakistani con game rings in Taiwan, and the Islamic radical/terrorist groups in the United Kingdom). This means that language differences create a barrier for the authorities in investigating or taking precautious steps against transnational criminal activities. In addition to language, numerous nations tend to hold a passive (if not negative) attitude toward international police cooperation due to financial constraints, poverty, underdeveloped infrastructure, or other social problems. Even worse is that the American government defines some countries as rogue states because of abusing civil rights, suppressing democratic movements, or allegedly supporting terrorist movements. Thus, despite their important geopolitical positions in fighting against global crimes, these so-called evil countries are usually isolated by international powers and, to an extent, become shelters for transnational criminals. Global Crimes’ Impact on Social Order and Democracy Given the advantaged factors for transnational criminals to establish or expand their businesses, it is quite obvious that no country in the modern world can be totally exempt from the influence and invasion of global crime. This phenomenon strongly implies that many industries (especially

tourist, recreation, aviation, yacht-manufacturing, and insurance industries, which have to depend on stable social order to develop) to varying degrees will be disturbed by contract killings, arms trafficking, money laundering, identity theft, credit card fraud, human smuggling, terrorist bombings, and other transnational crimes. The disruption of these industries, in turn, will make numerous people lose their jobs, face financial crisis, or quit their businesses. All of these, of course, will threaten social order and become serious problems for a society. To handle the issue of unstable social order (which can be typified by the social order of New Orleans right after the city was overwhelmed by Hurricane Katrina in August 2005), the authorities usually have to carry out many emergency measures (such as martial law or forced evacuations) to restore social order. Such emergency measures, however, may justify the practice of curtailing civil rights and give law enforcement officials unbridled power in the name of national security or intelligence collection. With this justification and delegation, it is very likely that the democratic procedure and system will be weakened, while dogmatism and monism may become the governing philosophies of the government. One of the best examples of this is when in 2003, the George W. Bush administration unilaterally sent troops to Iraq without getting approval from the United Nations. References Agnew, Robert. “Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime and Delinquency.” Pp. 113–124 in Criminological Theories: Bridging the Past to the Future, edited by Suzette Cote. 1992. Reprint, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002. Akers, Ronald L. Deviant Behavior: A Social Learning Approach. 3rd ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1985. Benson, Michael. Crime and the Life Course: An Introduction. Los Angeles: Roxbury, 2002. Burnett, John S. Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas. New York: Dutton, 2002. Delisi, Matt. Career Criminals in Society. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005. Hagan, John, and Ruth D. Peterson, ed. Crime and Inequality. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995.

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Hood, Ralph W., Jr., Peter C. Hill, and W. Paul Williamson. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism. New York: Guilford, 2005. Katz, Michael B., ed. The “Underclass” Debate: Views from History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. Merton, Robert. Social Theory and Social Structure. Enlarged ed. New York: Free Press, 1968. Miethe, Terance D., and Robert F. Meier. Crime and Its Social Context: Toward an Integrated Theory of Offenders, Victims, and Situations. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. Olsen, Jack. “I”: The Creation of a Serial Killer. New York: St. Martin’s, 2002. Piquero, Alex, and Paul Mazerolle. Life-Course Criminology: Contemporary and Classic Readings. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2000. Roth, Mitchel. “Comparative Overview of Policing, Courts, and Corrections.” Pp. 235–254 in Handbook of Transnational Crime & Justice, edited by Philip Reichel. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004. Steffensmeier, Darrell J., and Jeffery T. Ulmer. Confessions of a Dying Thief: Understanding Criminal Careers and Illegal Enterprise. New Brunswick, NJ: Aldine Transaction, 2004.

Internet Extortion and Information Security Mathieu Deflem and Brian Hudak In the current age of computers and the Internet, crimes can take on forms that are digital in kind. Cybercrimes include attacks on computer security threatening the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of digital data, or they involve the execution of traditional offenses, such as theft and fraud, by means of computers and computerized networks. Among the latter kind of cybercrime is Internet extortion (also referred to as digital extortion or cyberextortion). Extortion refers to the making of a particular demand on a person under threat of causing harm. The object of the extortion demand is often of a monetary nature but can also include nonfinancial considerations, such as sexual favors or discretionary actions. Extortion activities are typically directed at wealthy individuals or at organizations that have considerable assets. Most nations across the world have laws against extor-

tion, with punishments varying with the degree of seriousness of the circumstances of the offense. Types of Internet Extortion At least five types of Internet extortion can be identified. First, an information system or digital technology, such as the Internet or a computer network, can be used as a medium of extortion. For example, in the mid-1990s, a case was exposed whereby a man visited an online chatroom posing as a woman to engage in sexual banter with other visitors. The man would then also pose as the woman’s husband and threaten the other visitors with bodily harm should they not pay a certain amount of money. Because the extortionist did not hide his identity, he was easily discovered and brought to trial. Other such Internet extortion schemes involve deliberate attempts to hide one’s identity and the source of communications, for instance by looping and weaving messages through various servers or by establishing e-mail accounts that are anonymous or based on fraudulent credit card information. An extortionist can also use encryption methods to communicate in secrecy with the targeted victim on public forums such as a computer bulletin board. Second, in other extortion plots, the digital technology may become the target of the threat. The technology itself may be valuable to the victim because of the information and data that it contains or, as in the case of the websites, because it is a source of income or represents an important element in a person’s or organization’s public image. Extortion threats have been reported whereby the owners of websites were threatened with having their posted information deleted. On other occasions, the web pages were already disabled, after which a threat was made to have the website restored. Another manifestation of this form of Internet extortion is website defacement, whereby a website is transformed into pages that contain obscenities or a web link pointing to a competing organization. A related method of Internet extortion is a denial-of-service attack that makes websites unusable. In February 2004, for example, such attacks were launched against the website of the Recording Industry Association of America with a demand 289

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to stop prosecuting people who share music on the Internet. When the demand was not met, the website became temporarily inaccessible. Internet gambling sites have been among the preferred targets of denial-of-service attacks. In 2003, for example, some individuals e-mailed the operator of the Bet Costa Rica International Sportsbook website, which receives about $2 billion in bets every year. The e-mailers demanded $40,000 under threat of disabling the site. In a third form, the digital technology can be used as a medium for the disclosure of embarrassing or harmful information about the victim. The worldwide popularity of the Internet has made it possible for information about people and institutions to be available to a global community of spectators. Extortion cases are known whereby celebrities were threatened to have embarrassing pictures posted online unless payments were made. Fourth, a digital information system can be used as a means of enabling payments or for concealing payments that are part of an extortion plot. In traditional forms of extortion, the moment that payment is made typically exposes the extortionist to the victim, who might have solicited the help of law enforcement authorities. With the Internet, however, online payments can be made that involve electronic transfers to various accounts in multiple jurisdictions. Fifth, digital technologies can be used as additional instruments in an extortion scheme. The Internet contains a lot of information about people, oftentimes posted without their knowledge, and such information can be easily gathered with the help of search engines and software packages. It is relatively easy for an extortionist to find out embarrassing details about a potential victim. Characteristics of Internet Extortion Internet extortion schemes are observed in many parts of the world. Especially at a more organized level, Internet extortion has been repeatedly discovered in the East European countries that have only relatively recently seen their economies move to a free market model. The resulting enhanced opportunities of legitimate economic conduct have also brought about new means for illegitimate

enterprises. In most advanced-capitalist nations of the world, however, these opportunities have long existed and have fueled an individualist culture that besides many legitimate actions also facilitates extortion. Internet extortion is thus a truly global phenomenon. The perpetrators of Internet extortion can be singular individuals as well as organized crime groups. For example, a group of hackers who had unsuccessfully tried to extort the credit card company Visa, demanding several million dollars in return for credit card information they had stolen, upon their arrest turned out to be a relatively small group of people in their late teens and early twenties. Similarly, the members of a Russian extortion gang, which had demanded several thousands of dollars from owners of gambling websites, were discovered to be just three people, one of whom was a twentyone-year old college student. On a more organized level, some cyberextortionists function as information merchants who conduct a veritable business in the sale of information and extortion schemes to obtain substantial monetary profits. The response to extortion threats by the targeted victims also differs. A few years ago when a gambling website received an extortion threat a week before a major sports event, the company that owned the site decided not to pay the extortionists, resulting in a two-day period of denial-of-service attacks that disabled the site. But other site owners have given in to the extortion demands. The gambling site MVP Sportsbook, for instance, paid extortionists a sum of money that was asked for because it was judged financially beneficial to do so relative to losing revenue from a disabling of the site. Regulation and Enforcement Policies Like other cybercrimes, Internet extortion has been subject to legal regulation and law enforcement control. Existing laws on extortion can be applied to Internet extortion schemes, but many countries have passed separate laws concerning extortion involving digital technologies. In the United States, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (1996), for instance, criminalizes any act of extortion involving computerized means. Other legal means to suppress extortion involve the application

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Defendants Shaun Harrison (right) and Saverio Mondelli appear in a Los Angeles courtroom on February 26, 2007. The two were accused of plotting to extort money from the operators of MySpace.com after they hacked into the site and accessed personal information belonging to MySpace users. (Associated Press)

of regulations related to extortion cases, such as by means of copyright laws that protect information and on the basis of confidentiality clauses that prohibit revealing certain kinds of information. From a policy viewpoint, the popularity of the Internet and its spread across the globe pose special problems of law enforcement related to the technological sophistication and international nature of many cybercrimes. Many nations have developed explicit criminal codes against cybercrimes. Accompanying these new laws are law

enforcement units specializing in cybercrimes and other high-technological offenses that have been set up within the police and security services of many nations. International cooperation among these law enforcement units in extortion cases can rely on Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties that specify cooperation in various aspects of investigation and prosecution. An important challenge for law enforcement in the case of Internet extortion is to retrieve the identity and location of the perpetrator. Encryption of 291

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electronic messages enhances the difficulties in tracing the source of Internet extortion. And, as is the case with all forms of extortion, the victims of Internet extortion schemes are not always willing to report the offense and reveal their vulnerability. Preventive measures are therefore in order to protect against potential extortion schemes in cyberspace. References Bednarski, Gregory M. “Enumerating and Reducing the Threat of Transnational Cyber Extortion against Small and Medium Size Organizations.” InformationWeek, September 2004, http://www .informationweek.com/1005/report.htm. Deflem, Mathieu, and John E. Shutt. “Law Enforcement and Computer Security Threats and Measures.” Pp. 200–209 in The Handbook of Information Security, 3 vols., edited by Hossein Bidgoli. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2005. Denning, Dorothy E., and William E. Baugh Jr. “Hiding Crimes in Cyberspace.” Pp. 107–131 in Cybercrime: Law Enforcement, Security and Surveillance in the Information Age, edited by Douglas Thomas and Brian D. Loader. London: Routledge, 2000. Grabosky, Peter, and Russell G. Smith. “Telecommunication Fraud in the Digital Age: The Convergence of Technologies.” Pp. 29–43 in Crime and the Internet, edited by David S. Wall. London: Routledge, 2001. Grabosky, Peter, Russell G. Smith, and Gillian Dempsey. Electronic Theft: Unlawful Acquisition in Cyberspace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Strategic Alliances between Organized Crime Groups Kelly Hignett Increasing transnational links between gangs from different ethnic backgrounds and geographical locations marked the development of organized crime in the late twentieth century. This led to speculation about the existence of a pax mafiosa, the idea that most major criminal organizations were now operating in close alliance with one another to the extent that there were regular international summit meetings held between highranking gang leaders.

Global Criminal Alliances While this scenario rather overstates the case, it is true that in recent years criminal organizations have proven very effective in establishing strategic alliances and increasing levels of cooperation with one another. The increasingly transnational nature of organized crime in the early twenty-first century requires the globalization of criminal networks if markets are to be utilized to their fullest potential. Very often, organized crime groups in one country or region set up alliances with other groups operating abroad in order to expand their influences into new markets or create new methods of committing crimes. Gangs tend to target countries that have a high demand for the products or services they supply or that provide a source of products or services they can then distribute in or through their home territories. The increase in transnational alliances between organized crime groups both reflects and perpetuates the move away from the traditional mafia model (that of a highly centralized, hierarchical, and closely knit method of group organization) and in favor of gangs who operate as looser, less formalized networks. This is true even of organizations that have previously been largely insular or ethnically closed, such as Chinese Triads or Japanese Yakuza groups. Throughout history, organized criminal gangs would operate largely in one specific territorial region, and membership would usually be confined to a single nationality, ethnic group, or even (most commonly, in the case of Italian crime groups) to family members or blood relations. Thus, any international linkages would be largely confined to ethnic communities established outside of the territorial base (for example, the expansion of Chinese, Russian, and Italian organized criminals in the United States through émigré communities). However, recent changes in the scope and scale of criminal operations have led to a less exclusive approach. As criminal groups have expanded into new markets and new territories, they have become increasingly willing to co-opt, or ally with, other groups with specific skills or knowledge that prove profitable. The establishment of alliance systems between criminal gangs allows them to work across national

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borders with greater flexibility. This enables them to overcome many limitations on the influence they can have outside of their home territories and also allows more powerful gangs to co-opt potential rivals, although there is always a danger that their rivals will then gain in strength and attempt a challenge for control of markets and distribution on their own merits. This can be illustrated by the rise of Albanian gangs in Europe. Albanian criminals were contracted by foreign gangs to act as local overseers for marketing and distribution in many regions, but they increased their influence to such an extent that they became a force in their own right and in some cases were able to push their rivals out. Transnational alliances between criminal organizations vary in a number of ways. Some networks are formed on a one-off or short-term, mutually convenient basis and disintegrate after both sides have reaped the benefits, but others are formed and operate over a medium or longer term. Some are far more cohesive than others. While an alliance may be formed between gangs focused on achieving a single goal or concerning a single criminal market, others are much more broadly focused. Many alliances begin as small-scale, shortterm tactical agreements, but if they prove effective then they tend to display an inherent capacity for growth. Gangs that form an alliance to traffic cocaine from Colombia to Europe may then use this network to diversify operations into dealing other drugs or even use the route established to broaden their focus into arms smuggling or people trafficking. In addition, alliances between different criminal organizations are not always clearly defined and may shift over time. Some groups that work together may specialize in different aspects of the operation, working together in a loose-knit and fluid fashion with little formal structure, while other alliances have clear leaders and demonstrate considerable central control. Many gangs operating transnationally today use locally staffed networks of couriers to transport and distribute their products. This kind of alliance can be beneficial in allowing gangs to expand and blend their operations into a new environment while circumventing law enforcement and national regulations. Forging alliances such as these allows

transnational crime groups to carry out criminal activities in other regions with a relatively low profile, avoid detection by authorities, and reduce the risks of arrest, infiltration, and loss of profits. Using local criminals may well attract less attention than an influx of foreign outsiders and thus reduces the risk of detection by law enforcement. In addition, the use of locally based criminal groups in foreign territories allows for the exploitation of their specialized knowledge of local territories, customs, and connections. Such alliances are generally mutually beneficial. For example, Chinese gangs organizing the smuggling of illegal immigrants from Beijing through Russia into Europe and even the United States have been known to subcontract part of the operation or form alliances with Russian gangs that are in a better position to ensure the safe transport of the human cargo, as they have contacts who can organize transport and accommodation in exchange for a cut of the profits. Turkish gangs involved in smuggling heroin to Germany have established links with Hungarian criminals who can arrange transport and storage of the drugs en route to Germany in exchange for receiving a certain amount of heroin themselves, which they can then distribute on the Hungarian market for a profit. Transnational Alliances and Drug Trafficking Since the 1980s, alliances have been in operation between Colombian drug cartels and the Italianbased Sicilian Mafia. These alliances opened up the European drug market to Colombian cocaine, proving profitable to both sides. Alliances formed between Colombian gangs and Russian-based organized crime have also proved mutually beneficial by ensuring the establishment of trafficking routes used to transport arms to Marxist guerrilla groups in South America and also providing a steady supply of Colombian cocaine into the territories of the former Soviet Union. Nigerian-based organized gangs are known to operate drug distribution networks from strategic locations across the globe, overseeing the trafficking of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana to Europe and the United States on a massive scale. This would not be possible without alliances formed with gangs in these territories who oversee transit and distribution. 293

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The Russian Mafiya is known to cooperate with Italian Mafia gangs operating in Italy, elsewhere in Europe, and in the United States. Gangs from Albania, China, and Nigeria are also known to have established a presence in Italy. Chechen criminals are known to have set up local bases in Germany. Albanian gangs have established strong links with Italian, Greek, Turkish, and South American groups in order to expand their drug trafficking networks. The Colombian cartels have entered into strategic alliances with Russian, Italian, and Mexican gangs and are believed to have established networks in virtually every European country. Drug suppliers in Turkey have forged alliances with ethnic Turks throughout Europe, with bases established in the Netherlands, Germany, and Britain. The Turks also often recruit couriers from criminal gangs based in Central Europe to assist in the trafficking and distribution of drugs along the Balkan Routes, which clearly illustrates the benefits of using transnational criminal alliances. For example, Turkish organizers may use Bulgarian or Albanian couriers to assist with the transport of heroin from producers in Afghanistan to distributors in Germany. Chinese Triads and Japanese Yakuza gangs have begun expanding their operations into the Russian Far East by establishing working relations with, or subcontracting to, smaller Russian gangs in many cases. Conclusion The recent growth in strategic alliances between criminal organizations is broadly representative of the changing nature of organized crime. The changing international climate and increased globalization in the late twentieth century generated political and economic conditions that were favorable in enabling criminal groups to operate on an increasingly transnational basis. This led to increased opportunities for the expansion of criminal markets. However, no alliances are permanently fixed, and in the longer term many of the alliances in operation today are likely to prove transient. While criminal organizations are showing an increasing willingness to cooperate, each organization remains primarily driven by the desire to secure its own position and maximize the profitabil-

ity of its operations. As such, criminal organizations will only form and maintain alliances with other such groups as long as it is beneficial to them. Gang violence, rivalry, and the settling of scores remains a considerable method of control in the criminal underworld, particularly at street level as rival gangs vie for prominence. As markets become saturated and as opportunities for expansion slow, there is likely to be a shifting of alliances between established criminal organizations as they fight to maintain their position in the global hierarchy. References Adamoli, Sabrina, et al. Organized Crime around the World. Monsey, NY: Willow Tree, 1998. Galeotti, Mark. Global Crime Today: The Changing Face of Organised Crime. Abingdon, Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2005. Robinson, Jeffrey. The Merger: The Conglomeration of International Organised Crime. New York: Overlook, 2002. Sterling, Claire. Crime without Frontiers: The Worldwide Expansion of Organized Crime and the Pax Mafiosa. London: Little, Brown, 1994. Williams, Phil, ed. Combating Transnational Crime. London: Frank Cass, 2001. ———. “Transnational Criminal Organizations: Strategic Alliances.” Washington Quarterly 18(1) (1995): 57–72.

Transnational Crime and Its Impact on International Security Kelly Hignett Introduction The post–Cold War era has seen a substantial revision of the international security agenda. Traditionally, concepts of international security in the twentieth century were largely state centered. The state has historically been considered as the primary guarantor of security, both of its territory and the citizens contained within that territory, from any outside threat. As a result, until recently the international security agenda has focused primarily on issues of military security. However, the end of the Cold War, the emergence of newer nonmilitary threats, and increasing globalization have led to a broadening and deepening of the twenty-first-

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century security agenda, which has necessitated a shift toward a more collective perception of security and has thus placed this narrow, state centric concept of security under increasing scrutiny. A Threat to Global Security Transnational organized crime has been described as one of the defining issues of international security in recent years. In 1997, Kofi Annan, the United Nations (UN) secretary general, stated that “government authority and civil society are increasingly threatened by transnational networks of crime, narcotics, money laundering and terrorism . . . to both industrialised and developing countries, [and] this is an issue of growing concern in which international cooperation is essential.” Today, transnational crime is viewed as more than simply the organization of criminal acts across geographical borders. It is seen as a threat to the stability of the nation-state and the international community. The threat posed by organized crime has been highly politicized both at the national and international levels. As a result, today transnational organized crime is recognized as a serious threat to international security, both by individual nationstates and international organizations such as the UN. Criminals today are increasingly taking advantage of gaps in technology and communications to strengthen transnational networks. Thus, in recent years increasing connections between previously insular criminal groups have become apparent. Many illicit markets dominated by criminal organizations today are global in scope and thus require transnational networking if the criminals are to utilize them to the fullest possible advantage. Consequently, many states and even geographical regions today are affected by criminal operations that are actually based outside of their borders. For example, the global trafficking of narcotics means that operations cover long distances, originating in Africa and Asia and traveling through networks established in the former Soviet Union, Europe, and even on into North America. This level of operation clearly requires a high level of transnational cooperation between criminal organizations in at least three continents and numerous individual states.

The Impact of Globalization In the late twentieth century, organized crime groups were willing and able to take advantage of changing circumstances such as the expansion and globalization of trade, increased ease and availability of travel, improved transport and communications, and increased technology. Many of the advances used by legitimate businesses also proved favorable in expanding criminal networks. Globalization has bought about greatly increased cooperation and sophistication among previously closed or largely insular criminal gangs. This has seen a move away from the traditionally closed and hierarchically structured criminal organizations in favor of looser and more fluid networks. Mobility has become a defining feature of transnational organized crime in the twenty-first century, and this has given criminals a much wider selection of operational bases (often based outside their country of origin), while increased transport and communications on a global level gives these networks the ability to work more closely together. This allows criminal organizations to broaden their operational base without immediately bringing them into competition with rival gangs. How Does Transnational Organized Crime Threaten International Security? Transnational crime threatens international security in a number of ways and on a number of different levels. The growth of transnational organized crime undermines the sovereignty and autonomy of the nation-state. By its very nature, transnational organized crime displays no respect for state borders, and the large-scale illegal movement of goods and people across state borders weakens border control and thus violates the principle of state sovereignty. The increase in globalization and the opening of state borders in recent years have provided far greater opportunities for transnational criminal operations than ever before. For example, the lowering of internal borders in the countries of the European Union (EU) has made cross border links between criminal gangs operating in Europe easier. In addition, the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that opened borders 295

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U.S. President George H.W. Bush attends the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA) initializing ceremony in October 1992. The agreement opened borders not just to legitimate trade but to an increase in transnational crime as well. (George Bush Library)

between Canada, the United States, and Mexico was also accompanied by increased transnational links between criminal groups in the region. The development of transnational crime can threaten democracy by undermining political institutions and the rule of law, even in states with a well-established democratic tradition. In addition, organized crime has been shown to undermine the very process of democratization in newly democratized and transition states, as evidenced in the states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism during 1989–1991, and in many Latin American states. High levels of organized crime often lead to a higher level of violence and lawlessness in society, which threatens the physical security of citizens and can lead to the undermining of their confidence in the ability of the state to protect them.

The development of transnational crime also undermines the bases of the market economy. Organized criminal groups fail to play by the rules of the market, which may then undermine the ability of others to do so. Their use of illegitimate means and underhanded tactics also enables them to force legitimate competitors out of the market. Again, this is particularly relevant in transition countries where the unstable economic system may be more vulnerable to penetration by organized crime. Following the collapse of communism in Russia and Eastern Europe, organized crime was able to use the state-controlled privatization process to buy into the legitimate economy and thus increase its power and influence. Many organized crime syndicates today buy into legitimate business to act as front companies and facilitate the laundering of money from their illegal activities,

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and the increasing transnational nature of criminal operations means that criminal organizations now invest outside of their national base. Today, it is estimated that organized crime accounts for around 8 percent of the global economy (with the global drug industry accounting for more than 2 percent of this), a figure that is the equivalent of a large developing country. On a national scale, the economic activities of organized crime can also undermine the state’s ability to collect revenues through the illegal smuggling and supply of commodities, such as the illegal smuggling of cigarettes. One of the consequences of globalization is greater economic independence between states, so even illicit activities conducted on a national basis can have an impact far beyond the national borders of the state in question. In addition, many of the markets dominated by transnational crime today, such as the illegal trading of arms and nuclear weapons, are detrimental to international security. Growth in trafficking in black market arms in recent years means that organized criminals are able to make substantial profits by supplying weapons to countries under UN embargoes, assisting groups involved in civil conflict, and even supplying arms to terrorist groups. It is known that Russian-based criminal organizations have supplied arms to guerrilla groups in Colombia in exchange for a supply of Colombian cocaine. The U.S. government has estimated that military equipment worth several hundred million dollars is sold to countries under UN embargoes every year, which undermines the use of sanctions and embargoes enforced by the international community, and the majority of this market is linked to organized crime. This also contributes to the escalation of regional instability and civil war, as occurred in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. The traffic in nuclear materials and technology is less common than the trade in conventional arms but can also provide a profitable market for criminal groups, and cases linking organized crime with the provision of these materials to countries such as Libya, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan have been uncovered in the past. This is an area of increasing concern to governments. In addition, there are growing concerns that cooperation

with criminal gangs is providing terrorist and guerrilla groups with access to money laundering facilities, illegal arms, and possibly chemical and nuclear materials, and this can only increase the serious threat already posed to the security of both specific states and regions and to security on a global scale. Evidence suggests that since the decline in state sponsorship for terrorism following the end of the Cold War, organized criminal activities have become a major revenue source for terrorist groups worldwide. The trafficking and distribution of illegal drugs has been closely linked with the financing of terrorist activities in many cases, and as the drug market is dominated by organized crime, this proves to be another security concern. What Is the Best Way to Tackle the Threats Posed by Transnational Crime? A sustained campaign against transnational crime requires a coordinated and cooperative international response. The transboundary nature of international organized crime today means that it is no longer sufficient to attempt to tackle the problem on a unilateral basis. Thus, within the international community there is a commonly recognized need for a better-integrated and more coherent use of instruments in fighting transnational crime. Organized crime has traditionally been seen as a law enforcement issue, but the increasingly transnational nature of criminal operations means that in many ways the traditional demarcation between national security and law enforcement has eroded to an extent. Today, the most effective policy measures against organized crime generally combine cooperation among foreign governments, law enforcement, and financial institutions. Transnational organized crime will remain primarily a law enforcement issue in the foreseeable future. However, in response to increasing transnational links between organized criminals, emphasis has been placed on increasing the working relationship between law enforcement agencies on a bilateral and a multilateral basis. For example, while the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has previously operated almost exclusively as a domestic agency, there are now more than 300 FBI officers posted abroad in U.S. embassies, while FBI 297

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operatives in the United States have established direct cooperation with domestic police forces in more than thirty countries. Despite these successes, however, collaboration among law enforcement agencies has proven highly problematic. Huge differences of interest remain among national law enforcement agencies. This is particularly true in developing countries where the competition for state funding may be fierce, thus exacerbating rivalry. In many cases, law enforcement agencies are reluctant to liaise across national borders, and certainly not with the same ease and fluidity that the criminals do. There is also a need for more advanced international legal harmonization, as many states do not even share a commonly accepted definition of organized crime, which makes coordinated efforts problematic. There is a recognized need to improve the effectiveness of international organizations, such as Interpol, in response to the increasingly transnational nature of crime. Since the elevation of transnational crime onto the international security agenda, there has been a clear increase in collaboration between nationstates in their efforts to fight the phenomenon. However, much of this collaboration is limited to a bilateral basis, which although useful for specific cases needs to be supplemented by increased multilateral cooperation in order to gain real understanding of many of the transnational crime networks operating today. The further development of effective cross-governmental policies aimed to tackle the underlying problems and instabilities that can encourage organized crime in vulnerable areas is necessary. Financial and economic measures against crime also need to be taken on a transnational level, as this reduces the possibilities for organized criminals to process proceeds from their activities and disguise the illegal origins of their wealth (for example, through money laundering). Further measures need to be taken to prevent the penetration of the banking industry and financial sector by

organized crime. Unfortunately, however, many of those countries most at risk are the ones that are attractive to the criminal element, such as offshore banking centers in the Caribbean. Conclusion The globalization of criminal markets and the development of transnational crime networks clearly require a more coordinated international response. The growth in transnational crime proves a clear threat to international security, and it is now more important than ever before that a comprehensive, coordinated approach on an international level is made to tackle the growing challenge posed by transnational organized crime in the twenty-first century. References Annan, K. Renewing the United Nations: A Program for Reform. Report of the Secretary General, UN General Assembly, 51st Session, Agenda item 168, A/51/950, 14 July 1997, http://www.nyo.unep.org/ pdfs/a51950.pdf. Castle, A. “Transnational Organized Crime and International Security.” Working Paper 19, University of British Columbia, http://www.iir .ubc.ca/site_template/workingpapers/webwp19 .pdf. “The Defining Issue of the 21st Century?” Arrow I Ltd., http://www.arrowi.co.uk/orgcrime.html. “International Crime Threat Assessment.” 2000, http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/ documents/pub45270/pub45270index.html. Makarenko, T. “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism.” Global Crime 6(1) (February 2004): 129–145, http://www .silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/ Makarenko_GlobalCrime.pdf. “The New Threat of Organised Crime and Terrorism.” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Moniter, 19 June 2000, http://www.janes.com/ security/international_security/news/jtsm/ jtsm000619_1_n.shtml. Williams, P., ed. Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and Responses. London: Frank Cass, 2001.

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B. Transporter Crime and Smuggling Networks and Piracy

Attacks on Commercial Vessels: Piracy in the Malacca Strait and South China Sea Hua-Lun Huang Premodern Piracy of East and Southeast Asia For many centuries, piracy has been a problem for the coastal people of East and Southeast Asia. As early as the Han dynasty of China (202 B.C–A.D. 220), chaotic socioeconomic situations caused by political suppression, peasant revolts, and civil wars had driven tens of thousands of littoral people of East and South China to take refuge in islands off the coast. Surviving on those undeveloped islands was difficult, and some of these boat people looted civilian vessels or even imperial ships to get food and other requisite economic resources. Even after the Han dynasty, some drifters, rural outcasts, bankrupt peasants, and other marginalized people of coastal provinces (especially, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong) continued to turn to piracy to escape political persecution and to acquire subsistence resources. This seagoing movement was especially evident in the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and the first half of the Qing dynasty (1644–1820) when international trade had begun to take shape. In the meantime, the imperial governments of China carried out a coastal evacuation policy that not only prohibited coastal people from doing businesses with any foreign countries (for Ming and Qing governments, all foreign countries were barbarian, backward, and uncivilized nations) but also from living along the coastline or emigrating. During this period, numerous people

of the coast still got involved in foreign trades because of the enormous economic and commercial benefits that resulted from such businesses. However, people who took part in these underground economic activities would be punished (sometimes executed) if they were discovered and arrested by local officials. Because of this unfavorable environment, some of the flourishing businessmen (such as Wang Zhi, Xu Hai, Xu Dong, Zhang Lian, Li Dan, Lin Dao Qian, Lin Feng, Mao Lie, and Zheng Zhi-Long) became capitalists-cumpirates who used piracy to protect their businesses and to accumulate capital. Piracy of East and Southeast Asia in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries Piracy in East and Southeast Asia became well organized in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Nevertheless, piratical incidents in this area appeared to be fading by the 1840s. One of the most important reasons for this change is that before the Sino-British Opium War of 1840, British diplomats and merchants, under the backing of the British Royal Navy, continually asked the Qing government to terminate its coastal evacuation policy and open China’s huge market to the world, especially to the United Kingdom. In response, the Qing government took a no-tolerance stance toward the opium trade and destroyed several thousand tons of opium imported from British India. Because of this conflict, the Royal Navy initiated what the Chinese historians call the Opium War of 1840. With premodern weapons 299

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and training, the Chinese Navy was almost eliminated. Facing the superior military power of the Royal Navy, the Qing government recruited several thousands (perhaps even more) pirate-sailors into the Chinese Navy hoping that the maritime battle experiences of the pirates could weaken the British naval power. From this incorporation, numerous pirates from Guangdong, Fujian, and the other coastal provinces could obtain stable jobs. Secure jobs, to an extent, discouraged coastal people from developing or participating in pirate rings. The maritime condition in East and Southeast Asia changed again in the 1850s and 1860s as East and South China experienced several large-scale rebellions including, among others, the Heavenly Kingdom of Peace and Tranquility movement led by Hong Xiu-Quan and the Nien revolts. These uprisings not only enticed large numbers of lowerclass people to join bandit armies or secret associations (such as the White Lotus sects, Triad societies, and the Green Gang) but also compelled many unemployed people to become pirates, which plundered unarmed vessels in the East China Sea and oceans of Southeast Asia for decades of years. Piracy of East and Southeast Asia in the Twentieth Century Pirates (especially Chinese pirates) were still active in the East China Sea and the oceans of Southeast Asia at the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly the 1920s and 1930s. The onset of the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) dramatically transformed this situation. In 1937, an unexpected event in North China triggered comprehensive clashes between China and Japan. With better-trained soldiers and far more advanced military equipment, the Japanese military took only six months before forcing the Nationalist government to retreat to Southwest China. Additionally, the control of coastal provinces of China by the seemingly insurmountable Japanese Navy significantly reduced pirate incidents in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. This maritime peace became even more evident in the early 1940s as Hong Kong and most Southeast Asian countries became occupied by Japan.

Modern South China Sea Is an Ideal Place for Piracy After World War II, the maritime situation of the East China Sea and the South China Sea entered a new age. During the postwar years, intensive patrols on the East China Sea by the U.S. 7th Fleet remarkably reduced incidents of piracy. On the other hand, the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca appeared to provide pirates with plentiful opportunities for attacks on commercial ships, yachts, and oil tankers. This sharp contrast may be explained by the three concepts of motivated offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable guardians against a violation advanced by Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson. According to Cohen and Felson, people are more likely to become victims of crime if they carry valuable articles and are not protected by capable guardians (especially those who have weak or no ability to defend themselves). By dividing each of the three concepts into high/low categories, Pamela Wilcox, Kenneth Land, and Scott Hunt suggest that there are eight different types of criminal opportunity structure: 1. high supply of motivated offenders + high supply of target + low supply of capable guardians 2. high supply of motivated offenders + high supply of target + high supply of capable guardians 3. high supply of motivated offenders + low supply of target + low supply of capable guardians 4. high supply of motivated offenders + low supply of target + high supply of capable guardians 5. low supply of motivated offenders + high supply of target + low supply of capable guardians 6. low supply of motivated offenders + high supply of target + high supply of capable guardians 7. low supply of motivated offenders + low supply of target + low supply of capable guardians 8. low supply of motivated offenders + low supply of target + high supply of capable guardians

According to this typology, the criminal opportunity structure of the South China Sea—above all, the triangular area of Hong Kong, Luzon, and Hainan Island (HLH area)—and the Malacca Strait obviously can be characterized as the first variety: high supply of motivated offenders + high supply of target + low supply of capable guardians.

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A visit, board, search, and seizure team from the USS Carter Hall prepares to board the cargo dhow M.S.V. Al-Kausar, suspected to be a pirate vessel, in the Indian Ocean on January 28, 2006. The waters in and around the Strait of Malacca are among the last remaining havens for piracy in the modern age. (Department of Defense)

First, in terms of motivated offenders, many Indonesian, Thai, Vietnamese, Malaysian, Filipino, and Chinese fishermen, organized crime groups, and even custom officials are allegedly involved in piracy. Second, in terms of suitable targets, the South China Sea (especially the Strait of Malacca) is the world’s busiest sea area. More than 18,000 vessels of above 10,000 tons pass through this region each year. Third, in terms of capable guardians, the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait are excellent places for pirates to rob or hijack ships because these parts of international waters are largely not monitored by governments within this area. In addition, the withdrawal of the Russian Navy from Vietnam in the early 1990s and the departure of the U.S. Navy from the Philippines in the mid-1990s might also have contributed to the increase in piratical cases in the South China

Sea and the Strait of Malacca during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Typologies of Piracy in the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca: Expressive and Instrumental Piracies Based on the pirate history of the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca in the past half century, piracy in this region can be classified as expressive piracy (i.e., piracy used to realize nonpersonal goals) and instrumental piracy (i.e., piracy employed to pursue personal benefits). Expressive piracy can be further divided into three typologies: ideological piracy, sovereignty-motivated piracy, and terrorist-involved piracy. Instrumental piracy can also be divided into three typologies: state agent–involved piracy, organized crime group– directed piracy, and amateur piracy. 301

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Expressive Piracy I: Ideological Piracy First, ideological piracy means that piracy becomes a measure of belief struggle, as it is used by noncommunist countries in a fight against the communist nations, or vice versa. This can be exemplified by those pirate activities of the 1950s engaged in by the navy of the Republic of China (i.e., Taiwan). In 1949, the Nationalist government of China was overthrown by the communists and retreated to Taiwan. In an attempt to retake its power and to bring down the communist government, the navy of the Nationalist government, under the auspices of the United States, intercepted or assaulted any ships heading for Mainland China. Expressive Piracy II: Sovereignty-Motivated Piracy Unlike ideological piracy, which aims to cause the downfall of the communist regimes, the underlying incentive of sovereignty-motivated piracy is to expand the scope of territorial waters. This phenomenon can be demonstrated by many cases of illegitimate interception and detainment of cargo ships by the navy of the People’s Liberation Army of China during the 1990s in the international waters of the South China Sea. Many people believe that these anti-international law acts manifest the Chinese communist government’s intention to show that the South China Sea is China’s territorial sea. Expressive Piracy III: Terrorist-Involved Piracy The third category of expressive piracy, terroristinvolved piracy, mainly has something to do with the terrorist movements of Southeast Asia. Since the 9/11 incident, extreme Islamic groups of Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, just like Osama bin Laden and his associates, seek every possible chance to attack Westerners (particularly Americans). The weakly safeguarded South China Sea seems to have become a new base for these terrorists to camouflage their activities while consolidating their muscle. Instrumental Piracy I: State Agent–Involved Piracy Regarding instrumental piracy, there are reports that some Chinese, Vietnamese, Malaysian, and Indonesian customs and coast guard officials have

become involved in armed robbery, looting, and other violent crimes on the high seas. Such state agent–involved piracy appears to be inspired by material gains. Instrumental Piracy II: Organized Crime Group–Directed Piracy Another kind of instrumental piracy is organized crime group–directed piracy. This type of piracy usually involves the business of phantom ships. This phenomenon is probably due to the finding that phantom ship–related businessmen usually have connections with corrupt government officials. Such patron-client relationships allow organized crime bosses to engage in highly sophisticated piratical acts while keeping those acts at a low profile. Instrumental Piracy III: Amateur Piracy Amateur piracy refers to those pirate activities involving fishermen of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. These fishermen became part-time pirates primarily because of poverty (low incomes) or greed (the desire to increase incomes). References Chung, Vu Kim. “Shady Indonesian and Other Global Business Interests behind New-Age Piracy,” 1999, http://www.geocities.com/ Yosemite/7915/9903/Pirate_Killings_Increase .html. Cohen, Lawrence E., and Marcus Felson. “Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach.” American Sociological Review 44(4) (1979): 588–608. Gary, Jim, Mark Monday, and Gary Stubblefield. Maritime Terror: Protecting Yourself, Your Vessel, and Your Crew against Piracy. Boulder, CO: Sycamore Island Books, 1999. Huang, Shu-Fang. Guo Ji Fa Shang Hai Dao Xing Wei Zhi Yan Jiu: Jian Lun Nan Hai Hai Dao Wen Ti (A Research on Piratical Activities from the Perspective of International Law, Including the Piratical Issues of South China Sea). Master’s thesis, National Chengchi University, 1999. Luft, Gal, and Anne Korin. “Terrorism Goes to Sea.” Foreign Affairs 83(6) (2004): 61–71. Murray, Dian H. Pirates of the South China Coast, 1780–1810. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987.

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Su, Liao. Min Guo Fei Huo Lu (Collected Works of Bandit-Related Disasters during the Republican Era). Jiangsu, China: Jiangsu Ancient Books, 1996. Wilcox, Pamela, Kenneth C. Land, and Scott A. Hunt. Criminal Circumstance: A Dynamic Multicontextual Criminal Opportunity Theory. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2003. Zheng, Guang-Nan. Zhong Guo Hai Dao Shi (History of the Chinese Pirates). Shanghai: East China University of Science and Technology Press, 1999.

Drugs, Guns, and Armed Conflict Gary Potter The end of the Cold War had a distinctly destabilizing effect on much of the world. Conflicts that had been held in check by superpower control of surrogates and the balance of terror between the United States and the Soviet Union now broke out around the world. Wars in the former Yugoslavia, Africa (Rwanda, Somalia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, and Liberia), Colombia, and Asia (Afghanistan, Chechnya, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and East Timor) broke out in the 1990s. Economies and political systems that had previously been regulated by the United States, Europe, and the Eastern bloc became fractured: economies became weaker, and governmental institutions eroded. Weak states began to proliferate. In some cases, those governments became failed states where governments had virtually no control over what happened in their territory or became captured states and sanctuaries for arms trafficking, drug trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking, and the panoply of organized crime activities. Weak states are not only havens for organized crime activities, they are also focal points for regional military conflicts or new wars. The inability of the state to raise sufficient funding through taxation to support effective law enforcement or a competent military along with the organizational weakness of the state encourage the growth of regional warlords, guerrilla armies, terrorist groups, and private armies serving corporations and large landowners. The result, as has been seen

in Colombia, the Balkans, Africa, and parts of Asia, has been armed conflict. Weak states and new wars have two vital implications for organized crime. First, they are havens for all manner of illicit activities. Drug trafficking in particular thrives in many of these areas such as Myanmar (opium), Colombia (opium and cocaine), and Afghanistan (opium). Second, they are all markets for arms traffickers. In those states where drugs and armed conflict coincide, drug and arms have become currencies of exchange creating a new and robust international arms-for-drugs trade. The Arms Trade One of the newest and most profitable organized crime enterprises is arms trafficking. Organized crime has always, to a limited degree, dealt in weapons, mostly weapons for personal use or for organizational requirements. But today organized crime deals in large-scale weapons procurement and supply. While syndicates of the past may have supplied a few “clean” handguns, today’s illicit entrepreneurs provide spare parts for large weapons systems; small arms, including assault rifles, and manportable antitank and antiaircraft weapons; and ammunition for both small arms and larger artillery and armor systems. In some cases, international organized crime groups have also gained access to larger military systems that have been placed on the black market for resale. A basic and fundamental aspect of the arms trade is that organized crime syndicates are no longer serving the needs of individual patrons. Their customers, their clients, and to a large degree their sponsors are nation-states, the entities that are supposed to control organized crime. For example, in the late twentieth century, millions of dollars’ worth of illegal weaponry including helicopters and fighter aircraft was sold to clients in Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia. Syndicate arms brokers acquired weaponry in many ways and many locations, but much of it is military equipment came from the United States. It is clear that those clients organized crime was serving were not participants in your local numbers syndicate. The clients were governments or factions within those governments. It is equally clear that such large-scale arms trafficking could not 303

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occur without at least tacit approval by governments of source nations, such as the United States. The largest market for illegal contraband from the United States is the international market for firearms, munitions, and defense-related technologies. Illegal trafficking in U.S.-manufactured firearms creates enormous problems for other countries and is often regarded as the most serious organized crime in many parts of the world. Firearms from U.S. gun companies are used to supply narcotics traffickers, organized crime groups, insurgents, and terrorists worldwide. Simply put, organized criminals operating in the arms trade do so with explicit state sanction at both ends of the trade. In addition, arms trafficking requires a new and different modality of supply and smuggling. There is a clear and discernible difference between smuggling a suitcase full of cocaine and smuggling tanks, aircraft, and helicopters. In order to accomplish this task, organized crime syndicates have to redefine themselves. In this case, they redefine themselves either as employees of legitimate corporations or as those corporations themselves. Almost all illicit arms transfers are accomplished through gray market transactions. The gray market in arms is dominated and controlled by large companies that provide both the cover and the means to make the transfers. Gray market arms trafficking involves the use of the legitimate export licensing process, which requires a legitimate arms brokering company. A transfer of arms in the gray market simply involves one of four techniques: (1) fraudulent documents, issued by the company, may be used to disguise the actual customer; (2) fraudulent documents may disguise the military nature of the goods; (3) false declarations by the company may hide the actual identity of the supplier; and (4) the arms transfer may be disguised as humanitarian aid. All of these techniques require the participation of legitimate businesses involved in the weapons trade because they are all part of the normal exporting process. Furthermore, a legitimate company must be involved because the arms trade depends on both normal and legal modalities of payment and transportation. These multimilliondollar transactions are a normal part of international commerce.

In addition to the enormous profits involved, the arms trade is important to organized crime because it fundamentally changes the nature of organized crime. Instead of initiating criminal enterprise, organized criminals now become functionaries or professionals available for hire by international corporations or are those corporations themselves. In addition, instead of being in an adversarial position with governments, organized crime is operating at the behest of those governments and frequently as temporary employees of those governments. Guns for Drugs Examples of the trade of arms for drugs are legion, but a few examples should make the point. In Brazil, Luiz Fernando Da Costa operated a lucrative arms-for-cocaine operation through the 1990s. Da Costa purchased large weapons caches in Paraguay. His syndicate traded guns to Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels in Colombia in exchange for cocaine. Russian organized crime groups have also opened a lucrative trade in guns for both drugs and trafficked women in Brazil. The women are transported to Europe and Israel to work in brothels owned by Russian organized groups. Cocaine is transported for sale in Europe. The women and drugs are paid for with AK-47 and AR-15 semiautomatic rifles shipped into Brazil from Russia. Another good example of this trade involves Albanian organized crime groups and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the Balkans. Heroin, primarily obtained from Turkish traffickers, is traded for guns and women. The arms were used to fuel the new wars in the Balkans, while the heroin and women were traded to organized crime groups in Western Europe. The KLA is supported by organized crime revenues, particularly from heroin and human trafficking, with the tacit support of the United States and its allies in Europe. The multibillion-dollar narcotics trade in the Balkans played a major role in financing the war in Kosovo in the late 1990s. Other examples abound. In Afghanistan, the war against Russia waged by the mujahideen was to a large part financed by the heroin trade, with drugs moving out of Afghanistan through Pakistan and

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arms moving back in through the same routes, all with the tacit approval of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the U.S. government. To a large degree, the same heroin-for-arms trade helped to finance the activities of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. And, of course, the notorious cocainefor-guns operation that funded Ronald Reagan’s secret war against Nicaragua in the 1980s has been the subject of numerous congressional investigations and journalistic exposés. The combination of political and economic instability, weak states, and new wars creates both an environment within which organized crime can flourish and a huge market for organized crime’s goods and services. References Boyes, R., and E. Wright. “Drug Money Linked to the Kosovo Rebels.” Times (London), 24 March 1999. Kaldor, M. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1999. Kominek, J. “Albanian Organised Crime Finds a Home in the Czech Republic.” Jane’s Intelligence Review 14 (10 October 2002): 34–35. Library of Congress. Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2003. Mouzos, J. International Traffic in Small Arms: An Australian Perspective. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1999. Ruggiero, V. “War Markets: Corporate and Organized Criminals in Europe.” Social and Legal Studies 5 (1966): 5–20. Smucker, P., and T. Butcher. “Shifting Stance over KLA Has Betrayed Albanians.” Daily Telegraph, 6 April 1999.

Human Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants and Illegal Aliens: A Global Overview Don Liddick Introduction Trafficking in people has several transnational criminal dimensions, including alien smuggling in which persons willingly contract with criminals to

be smuggled into wealthier nations, usually in North America and Western Europe, and trafficking human beings as commodities in which people, especially women and children, are deceived or coerced into being transported across national borders for the purposes of prostitution, pornography, forced labor, and outright slavery. Criminal organizations smuggle more than 1 million people a year from poor to wealthier nations, yielding $3.5 billion in illicit profits. Modern technological advances that speed up travel and political and economic changes that have eliminated borders facilitate the traffic in persons, while the coupling of destitute women and children in poor countries with the endless demand for illicit sex in wealthier ones creates the ideal market for transnational pimps. A Growing Enterprise By all accounts, the smuggling of migrants is a large and growing trade, driven by asymmetry between the number of people who want to emigrate and limitations placed on immigration by governments in destination countries. Criminal organizations that specialize in trafficking persons operate with near impunity because only a few recipient countries, such as the United States, have criminalized the practice. Moreover, the entire business of alien smuggling is facilitated by the corruption of immigration and other government officials in source and destination countries. Although the smuggling of Chinese people to Europe and the United States has received the most attention, authorities believe that Chinese migrants comprise only 20 percent of those in a global pipeline that stretches from China, India, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka, and the Sudan to Latin America and recipient countries in Europe and North America. Standard fees charged by alien smugglers range from a few hundred dollars for Central Americans to more than $40,000 for Chinese nationals. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) recently estimated that as many as 5 million undocumented illegal aliens reside in the United States, the majority coming from Central America. Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the problem of illegal migrations has increasingly taken on national security dimensions. 305

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People seeking to emigrate from poor countries face many obstacles, including travel and living expenses, restrictive immigration policies in destination countries, and difficulties in finding legitimate work. In those cases where would-be migrants do not knowingly contract with smugglers, traffickers prey on women through ostensibly reputable modeling, employment, and marriage agencies that promise to assist them with travel and placement. In many cases, syndicates simply kidnap young women and children from countries such as China, Burma, Laos, and Vietnam and smuggle them into Bangkok to work in brothels. And of course, many destitute parents sell their children to traffickers out of desperation. Whether women and children are lured by false promises, are kidnapped, are sold, or are smuggled across borders voluntarily with the knowing intent of working as prostitutes, these victims are isolated, manipulated, and subjected to threats and violence upon arrival at their destination. Involuntary servitude and control are also maintained by the significant fee owed to traffickers, who see to it that coerced laborers are exploited and rendered incapable of paying down their debt. Even if prostitutes overcome their fear of local enforcers, their status as illegal immigrants and purveyors of illicit sex are significant disincentives for turning to law enforcement for protection. The Role of Government and Law Enforcement The role of corrupt government and law enforcement officials in facilitating the global traffic in persons cannot be overstated. A common practice is for immigration officials to sell visas. Traffickers have been known to buy false or altered passports from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs or through companies connected to Interpol. Traffickers in Central and Eastern Europe typically use work permits, tourist visas, and entertainment visas to bring women to Western Europe, where they are forced to work as prostitutes. Travel agencies, employment agencies, marriage services, adoption services, and entertainment companies are widely used as fronts for human traffickers, who use contacts with embassy officials to rubber-stamp visas. When visas

expire, women are given aliases and a visa for a different country, making it possible to rotate them on a transnational circuit of strip clubs and brothels in order to evade law enforcement and provide fresh faces for customers. In some cases, the participation of corrupt public officials and police is far more serious than the passive acceptance of bribes and involves direct management of smuggling and related prostitution enterprises. Police have also been known to threaten the parents of young runaway prostitutes in their homes, demanding that the pimp be reimbursed for lost revenue. Even when officials are not corrupt, lack of resources and the legislative approach to the problem inhibit deterrence. By focusing on the illegal immigration dimension of human trafficking, lawmakers provide a disincentive method for victims to report human rights violations and other crimes to the police. When witnesses do come forward, little protection in the form of witness protection against organized criminals is provided. The Global Sex Industry Trafficking in women and children for the purpose of prostitution and pornography is closely aligned with the smuggling of migrants. With the collapse of communism in the early 1990s, the trafficking of women from Eastern Europe to Western Europe increased precipitously. Some 500,000 foreign women work as prostitutes in West European countries. However, few countries or regions are immune: women from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet bloc are smuggled to destinations around the globe, Thai women are shipped to Japan, Nigerians and Albanians are smuggled to Italy, and Dominican women are smuggled to work as prostitutes in Austria, Curacao, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Italy, the Netherlands, Panama, Puerto Rico, Spain, Switzerland, and Venezuela. The U.S. government estimates that 700,000 women and children are transported across national boundaries every year in what amounts to a modern-day slave trade. Overall, the global prostitution industry generates tens of billions of dollars annually. Regionally, Asia remains the most notorious area for commercial sexual activity. Both the Yakuza and

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Thai and British national Onijira Chitprasert, also known as “Angela Miller,” is escorted by Thai police during a press conference at the Crime Suppression Division in Bangkok on June 5, 2006. Onijira was arrested in Thailand and charged with human trafficking linked to prostitution in the United Kingdom. (AFP/Getty Images)

Chinese Triads are heavily involved in trafficking women and children out of Asia. In just a few months in 1988, more than 6,000 children were kidnapped in Thailand for use in Bangkok’s brothels or for export to the Middle East, Europe, and North America. India is a favorite destination for tourists seeking sex with children, and organized crime syndicates centered in Bombay traffic women and children to Pakistan, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Sri Lanka, and other Middle Eastern destinations with protection from Indian law enforcement and government officials. Israel is a common destination for women smuggled out of Eastern Europe and Russia. Child prostitution is a growing problem in many Latin and Central American countries, although the limited available information suggests that the traffic is primarily domestic. In Brazil, traffickers lure juvenile females to

remote mining towns with the promise of restaurant jobs, but they are then forced into prostitution to serve the large peasant labor force. In Africa, Nigerian syndicates export women to Germany, Italy, and Belgium, while children ages eight to fifteen are kidnapped in Togo and Benin and sold to brothels in richer nations such as Nigeria, Gabon, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea. In Europe, women and children from the former Soviet states and Russia have perhaps become the largest source of trafficked persons. Criminal organizations in the Balkans and Russian Mafiya gangs are notorious for the Eastern to Western Europe smuggling of persons for the sex trade. In 1997, police in Milan, Italy, uncovered a transnational prostitution organization that auctioned partially clad women for about $1,000. In North America, tremendous demand for prostitutes and pornography is met 307

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primarily by Chinese Triads and Tongs who import women and children from throughout Asia. The exploitation of children for illegal commercial purposes may be even more pronounced than the traffic in women. Not all children are used as prostitutes. Handicapped children in Cambodia are reportedly used as beggars. If the children are healthy, traffickers mutilate them in order to elicit sympathy and greater donations. Demand for child prostitutes is nevertheless prodigious, driven by the growth in global tourism and the exploitation of computer networks by pedophiles. Fear of HIV also shifts many consumers to child prostitutes, who are less likely to be infected. Transnational criminal networks meet the demand, exploiting migrants and buying children from desperate parents in impoverished nations. Estimates of the number of children used for the purpose of commercial sex include 650,000 in the Philippines, 200,000 in Thailand, 400,000 in India, 2 million in Brazil, and 300,000 in the United States. The problem is present and growing in Benin, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Kenya, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sicily, and Sri Lanka. Sexual tourism is a significant industry in countries such as Thailand and Sri Lanka, where there are permissive attitudes toward pedophilia. Customers from overseas visit these child sex markets that are promoted as part of the Southeast Asian tourist trade. Human Rights Abuses In addition to obvious exploitation, trafficking in persons has manifested a number of additional human rights abuses. Illegal migrants are transported in appalling conditions and have been found suffocated in containers, drowned on poor vessels, and left stranded by criminals who take their money and fail to deliver. Once transported, many migrants are indentured and forced into slavery as workers in brothels and sweatshops. Chinese Snakeheads who transport Chinese nationals to the United States use enforcers during transportation and at destination sites to ensure that payment is made and illegal labor services are extracted. Some Chinese migrants transported to New York City are

kept shackled in basements. The victims have little legal recourse, since their immigration status is illegal and the threat of retribution from violent traffickers is considerable. With no legal protection, adult and child prostitutes are typically isolated, abused, and raped. Nations such as Burma and Thailand that openly promote prostitution as a component of their tourism industry deal with the medical consequences of the trade in brutal fashion. Burma routinely executes prostitutes infected with HIV. In one documented case, twenty-five Burmese women who were kidnapped and sold into slavery in Thailand and subsequently contracted HIV working as prostitutes were injected with cyanide by health officials to help thwart the spread of the disease. The role of organized crime in alien trafficking and the transnational sex industry is significant. Organized criminals are attracted to the trafficking of persons as commodities for a number of reasons. First, start-up costs and overhead for the business is relatively low compared to the profits that can be made. As commodities, women and children are quite durable, can be used and reused, and can be traded among organizations so that customers can sample new prostitutes. In addition, there is little risk involved because penalties for trafficking in persons are small in many countries, enforcement is sporadic or nonexistent, and government officials are easily compromised through bribery. Trafficking in women and children for the purpose of pornography is very profitable, with less overhead costs than in previous years because of the capacity to produce, reproduce, and transmit digital images via computers. Many organized crime groups involved in human trafficking are relatively small and are formed specifically to meet the demand for illegal migration services and demand for sex domestically. These smaller groups tend to be very adaptive and even fluid in their operations. Police in Houston, Texas, discovered Vietnamese gangs that moved about the region like nomads, employing Korean women as prostitutes and exploiting situations where opportunities arose. In many instances, however, well-established transnational crime organizations facilitate the smuggling of people and their

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Maritime Smuggling of Migrants

exploitation for illicit commercial purposes. Chinese Triads, the Japanese Yakuza, and Russian Mafiya gangs are particularly well known for their role in illegal migrations and commercial sex. These larger human trafficking and illicit sex operations are usually diversified in their criminal activities. For example, Yakuza gangs manage gambling enterprises and sell methamphetamine from their brothels, while the Ravna Gora crime organization in the former Yugoslavia combines its alien trafficking operations with arms smuggling. In another documented case, a crime group that traded tiger bones and skins to Japanese and Chinese buyers developed a sideline enterprise of supplying foreign brothels with Russian women. Typically, large transnational human smuggling operations include forgery workshops to create false visas and other documents, significant funds for bribes as well as the necessary contacts to foster official corruption, operation centers and hideouts in transit countries, and the ability to adapt their methods and transport routes in response to market dynamics and risk. The criminal networks move migrants illegally across borders by land, air, and sea. Smuggling migrants by ocean-going cargo ships is especially attractive to organized criminals because of relatively easy logistics, the ability to transport greater numbers of people in a single shipment, and a greater profit margin since false document and bribery requirements are relatively low.

involved in the selling of body parts, and the practice is apparently quite common in Russia.

Trafficking of Human Organs Human smuggling is linked to a separate but related transnational criminal activity, the traffic in human body parts. The exportation of organs utilizing false documents has been confirmed in Argentina, Brazil, Honduras, Mexico, and Peru, typically with European buyers. The Camorra, based in Naples, places Mexican, Thai, and European children into secret clinics to have organs removed. Authorities report that in Honduras, handicapped children are legally adopted and then sold like spare parts, if not for prostitution then for the value of their organs. A Guatemalan police official has claimed that children in that country are sold to Americans as organ donors for $20,000. Nigerian 4-1-9 criminal syndicates have also been

Maritime Smuggling of Migrants Georgios A. Antonopoulos

References Kyle, David, and Rey Koslowski. “Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives.” Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. Pomodoro, Livia. “Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation of Women and Children.” Transnational Organized Crime 4(3–4) (1998): 237–242. “Special Focus on Modern Slavery: Trafficking in Women and Children.” Trends in Organized Crime 3(4) (1998): 3–66. “Trafficking in Persons Report.” Trends in Organized Crime 6(2) (2000): 32–43. U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims. “Deadly Consequences Of Illegal Alien Smuggling,” 24 June 2003, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/ hju87993.000/hju87993_0.HTM. U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Corrections, and Victims’ Rights. “Alien Smuggling/Human Trafficking: Sending a Meaningful Message of Deterrence,” 25 July 2003, http://judiciary.senate .gov/hearing.cfm?id=873. Williams, Phil. “Trafficking in Women and Children: A Market Perspective.” Transnational Organized Crime, Special Issue: Illegal Immigration and Commercial Sex—The New Slave Trade 3–4 (1997): 145–170.

Introduction Irregular migration has been linked with the smuggling of migrants, a phenomenon with a long history that intensified in the 1990s. The 2000 United Nations (UN) “Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air” states that “smuggling of migrants shall mean the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.” Smuggling is often confused with trafficking of migrants. Trafficking involves the smuggling of migrants, which is 309

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the first stage of the trafficking process. However, smuggling itself does not involve the exploitation of the smuggled individuals, and it is an offense against the legal framework of migration of the transit and destination countries and the public order. There are three elements in the smuggling of migrants nexus, namely push, pull, and facilitating factors, many of which correspond to an extent to the demand, supply, and impunity elements in trafficking: 1. Push factors. These include the bad socioeconomic conditions in a large number of African, Asian, East European, and Latin American countries; undemocratic regimes; wars and civil conflicts; corruption; environmental deterioration; and demographic pressures. 2. Pull factors. These include the financial and political stability of the destination countries and the demand for cheap labor in the industrially advanced world. 3. Facilitating factors. These include the media; the advancement of transportation means; the opening up of the economy and the mobility of capital, labor, and commodities; the geographic proximity of some source and transit or destination countries; historic or colonial links; and the existence of social networks among migrant communities. The role of the rigid legal framework of destination and transit countries or international entities such as the European Union (EU) should not be overlooked, as this is why the prospective migrants seek the assistance of migrant smugglers to enter the destination country.

Maritime Smuggling In general terms, there are three ways in which migrants can be smuggled: by land, by sea, and by air. Recently, the maritime smuggling of migrants has become the trend in human smuggling, a trend with a huge toll in human lives. There are a number of reasons for this trend, including bigger profits for the migrant smugglers because maritime smuggling involves a larger number of migrants per operation and can reach several hundreds. Another reason is that many maritime smuggling incidents do not require a great deal of sophistication due to

the lack of need for members of a particular smuggling group to be operating in the destination or transit country. Apart from these reasons, it is the extremely long coastline of a number of destination and transit countries that make rigorous and effective policing impossible. For instance, Greece serves as both a transit and destination country, with a coastline reaching 16,000 km and approximately 3,000 inhabited and uninhabited islands. In addition, there are areas such as the Mediterranean Sea where the maritime movement is so big that authorities are prevented from exercising full control. Finally, sea borders are not practically a clear line between countries like the land borders but instead constitute an area legally crossed according to the right of innocent passage, an internationally recognized navigational right. As with the trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants by all means of conveyance, it is impossible to provide an accurate estimation of smuggled-by-sea migrants throughout the world. This is due to a variety of reasons, including the hidden nature of maritime smuggling of migrants, the consequent underreporting of smuggling activities, the methods of recording data on the maritime smuggling of migrants, and due to the authorities (primarily in the transit countries) turning a blind eye to migrant smuggling activities, considering them as a way of diverting a large number of migrants out of their country. Smuggling Routes and Modus Operandi Generally, the maritime smuggling of migrants, just as the smuggling of migrants by land or air, follows the pattern of migration from poor to rich countries. The most important routes for the maritime smuggling of migrants are: 1. From Northern African countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt) to Mediterranean members of the EU and specifically Spain, Italy, and Greece. 2. From Eastern Mediterranean countries (Syria, Lebanon) to Cyprus and Greece. 3. From the west coast of Turkey and the Dardanelles to the Greek islands of the Aegean Sea and mainland Greece and to Italy.

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A craft with thirty-two African immigrants is escorted by a Guardia Civil vessel into port on Tenerife, one of the Spanish Canary Islands, on March 16, 2006. (AFP/Getty Images)

4. From Albania to Italy via the Otranto Straits in the Adriatic. 5. From Albania to the Greek island of Corfu and the Greek northwestern mainland (in the early 1990s). 6. From Baltic States to Finland, Sweden, and Denmark. 7. From the Indian Ocean region to Italy via the Suez Canal. 8. From western Africa to the Canary Islands. 9. From eastern Africa to countries of the Arab peninsula. 10. From Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic to the United States. 11. From Ecuador to Guatemala and Mexico. 12. From China to Japan and the United States. 13. From China, Indonesia, and the Philippines to Australia.

In a number of cases, however, there is another type of migrant smugglers, namely the individual small or medium-sized vessel owner who sees the opportunity for easy cash. Networks of acquaintances are very important for the maritime smuggling of migrants. The smugglers have a number of modus operandi for the maritime smuggling of migrants:

As with the smuggling of migrants and the trafficking in persons in general, groups commit the maritime smuggling of migrants with varied coherence.

1. The smugglers use large and medium-sized ships to transport large numbers of undocumented migrants, and in some cases migrants are smuggled along with the legal cargo in shipping containers. Sometimes, when the coast is in sight, the smugglers transfer the migrants to small sea vessels (usually lifeboats). 2. The smugglers provide small sea vessels to the migrants, who are received by members of the network on the mainland shore or islands of the transit destination country to be forwarded to the inner areas of the country or the neighboring 311

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countries. This happens in short journeys only for which the smugglers can train one of the migrants in the driving of the vessel. 3. The smugglers transport the migrants with sea vessels (usually rubber speedboats or fishing boats) and drop them on the mainland shores or islands of the transit or destination country. This is probably the most popular method of short- and medium-distance maritime smuggling of migrants. 4. Relatively recently, authorities discovered that a number of migrants are smuggled by luxury yachts, as this type of vessel rarely raises suspicion on the part of the authorities. 5. Finally, a number of migrants are smuggled in sea vessels from fishing boats to passenger ships, with or without the captain or employees of the vessel knowing of the presence of undocumented migrants on board.

It is not possible to provide an accurate estimation of the profits that smugglers obtain from the maritime smuggling of migrants, primarily because we do not know the exact number of migrants smuggled. What we do know, however, is when migrants come from countries distant from the destination countries or when there are additional operational risks for smugglers, migrants can pay tens of thousands of dollars. Given that migrants from China pay US$30,000– 45,000 each to get to the United States, a large vessel with undocumented Chinese migrants can bring the smuggling group about US$6 million. The maritime smuggling of migrants, especially in long-distance journeys, is generally interdependent on the falsification or counterfeiting of documents necessary for migration, and it is also connected to police and coast guard corruption, money laundering, and illicit trades such as the smuggling of drugs and firearms and the trafficking in human beings. As mentioned earlier, the smuggling of migrants is the first stage of the trafficking in persons business. In a number of cases, smuggled migrants act as carriers of elicit commodities, primarily drugs and firearms, to pay off their debt to migrant smugglers. Conclusion Bilateral and multilateral agreements have been signed against the maritime smuggling of migrants,

and an enforcement approach has already been adopted in seas where the smuggling of migrants has been flourishing. For instance, the Italian Coast Guard has been intensifying the patrols at the Otranto Straits, and in the context of Operation Ulysses, ships from several countries have been patrolling the Mediterranean Sea and the maritime frontier of the Canaries with the power to intercept suspect vessels. Rigorous and coordinated law enforcement is necessary for the apprehension and prosecution of smugglers. However, the protection of the victims of smuggling should become the priority, and the issues in relation to both supply of irregular migrants and demand for migrants in the transit or destination countries as well as research on the social organization of maritime smuggling of migrants should be addressed. References Dobovšek, B. Round Table on Organised Crime (Collection of Reports). Ljubljiana: Ministry of the Interior, 2004. Fekete, L. “Monitoring Maritime Border Controls.” European Race Bulletin 45/46 (2003/2004): 1–6. ICMPD. “The Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue.” ICMPD Newsletter, 1–4 June 2005. Kyle, D., and Z. Liang. Migrants Merchants: Human Smuggling from Ecuador and China. Working paper No. 43. San Diego: Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies, 2001. Pugh, M. Europe’s Boat People: Maritime Cooperation in the Mediterranean. Chaillot paper No. 41. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2000. Schloenhardt, A. “Trafficking in Migrants: Illegal Migration and Organised Crime in Australia and the Asia Pacific Region.” International Journal of the Sociology of Law 29 (2001): 331–378. Tailby, R. “People Smuggling: Recent Trends and Changing Responses.” Paper presented at the 4th National Outlook Symposium on Crime in Australia, New Crimes or New Responses, convened by the Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 21–22 June 2001. United Nations. “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Signed at Montego Bay, Jamaica, 10 December 1982. United Nations. “Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime,” 2000, www.uncjin.org/ Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_ 2/convention_smug_eng.pdf.

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Organized Crime, the Russian Military, and Nuclear Smuggling

Organized Crime, the Russian Military, and Nuclear Smuggling Mark Galeotti Introduction Behind its image of disciplined unity, the Soviet military was rife with corruption and embezzlement. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the ensuing years of chaos and transition, the loss of the armed forces’ prestige and esprit de corps, and the dramatic decline in soldiers’ real incomes all served to dramatically push many within the security apparatus into even more serious and organized criminality. Organized Crime and the Russian Military In 1994, journalist Dmitri Kholodov wrote in the newspaper Moskovskii komsomolets that the “Russian army is sliding down into a world of organized crime.” Shortly thereafter, while investigating claims that commandos from the elite 16th Spetsnaz (Special Designation) Brigade were working as gunmen for local gangs, he was killed by a booby trap bomb. This case exemplified the way that the problem had assumed two distinct forms: organized crime gangs operating with soldiers and also gangs that grew up inside the security forces, not just the regular military but also the police, paramilitary security units, and even the intelligence agencies that have succeeded the Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) secret police. This was the product of a decline in the effectiveness, morale, and discipline of the security forces dating back to the late 1980s. When President Vladimir Putin was elected in 2000, he promised to restore their standards of living, but only in 2005 did the first tentative improvements begin to become visible. Meanwhile, though, an army captain was still earning no more than a municipal bus driver, and the armed forces had become mired in a long-term, unpopular, and dangerous counterinsurgency war in the southern republic of Chechnya. The prospect of serving in Chechnya and alarm at the poor conditions endured by all soldiers led to high levels of draft evasion, which became so widespread that in many regions courts began offering petty offenders the choice of conscription

instead of prison. In this context, it is hardly surprising that discipline became a serious problem, and many within the ranks turned to crime. Criminal groupings within the security forces will usually have links with corrupt local politicians and other gangs operating in their vicinity but are organizationally separate. They tend to be rather more specialized than civilian gangs, exploiting particular assets at their disposal and usually embezzling state resources. Unofficial estimates have put the armed forces’ total losses to embezzlement at 12–17 percent of the total defense budget. However, their main role within Russia’s complex underworld is as facilitators and suppliers, providing a range of services and resources to the mainstream Mafiya. Military transport and routes are, for example, favored by smugglers, as they can pass through border controls and internal checks with impunity. The Border Troops have become infamous for this, as has the 201st Motor Rifle Division, based in the Central Asian republic of Tajikistan, many of whose officers use supply convoys to bring drugs into Russia on their return journeys. On an even grander scale, naval supply convoys to and from the Kaliningrad exclave, a Russian territory bordering Lithuania and Poland, regularly sail to St. Petersburg packed with cars stolen in Germany and the Low Countries and return with drugs intended for Europe. There is also growing evidence that military bases and secure compounds offer a degree of extraterritorial sanctuary to Mafiya operations. This has been happening in Kaliningrad since the early 1990s, but it became much more widespread in the latter half of the decade. Industry sources have linked military compounds in Vladikavkaz and Mozdok with major operations counterfeiting branded cigarettes, for example, while chemical weapons bases in the St. Petersburg regions have been used since around 1998 to manufacture synthetic drugs, many for export westward. Nuclear Traffickers? The criminalization of the security forces has led to a massive hemorrhage of conventional military weapons both into the hands of Russian organized crime and into the global illegal arms trade. Some 30,000 weapons disappear from police and military 313

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stocks each year, and a large proportion of the weapons used by Chechen rebels in their struggle against Russian forces come precisely from their arsenals. Some are sold individually or in small opportunistic trades, but others are dealt on a bulk basis and go to armed insurgent movements and other nonstate forces. Along with weapons, corrupted and criminalized members of the security forces also provide skills. One of the allegations that Kholodov was investigating when he was killed was that the 16th Brigade’s training grounds were also being used to instruct criminal gunmen. Given this active involvement in the sale of weapons and military expertise, it is not surprising that the 1990s saw fears within the international community that a criminalized military would begin selling weapons of mass destruction to the world’s terrorists and rogue states. These concerns have, fortunately, proven misplaced. This reflects the relatively narrow market for such weapons, the perceived risks involved in the trade, and security measures taken by the Russians with international— and especially U.S.—pressure and assistance. Such cases of nuclear smuggling that there have been have tended to be opportunistic, small-scale, and related to low-level radioactive materials rather than high-grade or weaponized stocks. Furthermore, they tend to be linked to scientific or other civilian workers rather than to soldiers. According to a confidential Russian report from 2004, soldiers accounted for less than 5 percent of any such thefts. Russian organized crime has not only benefited immensely from the protection, weapons, and skills it can buy from corrupted members of the security forces but has also infected the security forces. Although they represent only a small fraction of the Mafiya, organized criminal groupings within the police and security apparatus are disproportionately important in the way they further undermine public confidence in the state, create alternative chains of command, and have access to specialized and dangerous powers, weapons, and skills. However, despite their enthusiastic engagement in the sale of weapons and military expertise, criminals within and linked to the Russian military have to date not had the desire or opportunity to traffic weapons of mass destruction or their secrets.

References Galeotti, Mark. “Organised Crime and Russian Security Forces: Mafiya, Militia and Military.” Journal of Conflict Security & Development 1(2) (2001): 103–111. Kholodov, Dmitri. “I sluzhba tam pokazhetsiya medom.” Moskovskii komsomolets, 20 June 1994. Lee, Rensselaer. Smuggling Armageddon. London: Palgrave, 2000. Turbiville, Graham. “Organized Crime and the Russian Armed Forces.” Transnational Organized Crime 1(4) (1995): 63–64.

Snakeheads and Human Migrant Smuggling: China’s Fujian Province Robert D. Hanser, Walonda Wallace, and Kaine Jones Human smuggling in China has evolved into a worldrenowned $8 billion illegal enterprise. Individuals who traffic and trade in Chinese human flesh are referred to as Snakeheads, and their source of operation, originating in China’s Fujian Province, has extended to a number of areas around the world. According to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), more than 50,000 Chinese migrants are smuggled into the United States on a yearly basis. However, before proceeding any further, one key distinction should be made clear. The terms “trafficking” and “smuggling” are often used interchangeably as if they are identical concepts, but in fact they are not. While smuggling and trafficking of humans are similar in some respects, those who are smuggled have given their consent to be smuggled. They are volunteers in the process who have sought out their transportation. Trafficking of victims, on the other hand, either is devoid of consent or, if consent is given, it is obtained through coercion, deception, or abusive intimidation. Smuggled individuals seek better education, political asylum, adequate living conditions, and increased job opportunities from their journey to the Golden Mountain (a name many Chinese have given to the United States, which is a carryover from the era when Chinese migrated to work in the gold mines of the western United States during the gold rush era). The incentives to migrate to other countries are often referred to as pull factors

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Snakeheads and Human Migrant Smuggling: China’s Fujian Province

because they encourage or pull at the desires of the individual migrant to have a better life. Furthermore, rampant unemployment and low earnings serve as push factors in that they discourage the individual from staying in her or his current geographical location. China’s growing number of unemployed is a push factor. The Chinese government estimated that 200 million rural farmers would be unemployed in 2000. Unemployment increases the competition for jobs while decreasing wages. As an example, the average per capita income in the PRC is approximately US$3,460, compared with an average per capita income of $30,200 in the United States. Thus, between the discouraging pushes of the geographical areas that they find themselves in and the luring pulls of the envisioned good life abroad, it is no wonder that many Chinese desire to emigrate from the PRC. Further still, with corruption and the pervasive abuse of discretionary power within China’s communist government, many Chinese nationals have sought avenues to rid themselves of their devastating circumstances. This is particularly true now that the PRC is becoming more Westernized, especially in urban areas of the nation. The Process of Human Smuggling Potential migrants face an array of hardships, both seen and unseen, regarding the smuggling process. Candidates voluntarily search for local smugglers, or Snakeheads. Indeed, family and friends may help would-be emigrants in obtaining the resources and connections to effect their departure from their native land. Once contact is made with a highranked member of the Snakehead group, candidates are either accepted or rejected. The local smuggler will typically require a certain amount of initial collateral, which can range between US$1,000 and US$3,000, to ensure that the individual is genuine, committed, and sincere in the desire to leave the country. From this point, a Snakehead member in China acquires the names, telephone numbers, and addresses of a potential immigrant’s relatives in New York and Fuzhou. The rest of the sum owed the smugglers is usually required of the relatives within seven days of the illegal’s arrival in the

United States. Typically, the newly arrived illegal immigrant pays off the relatives within three to three and a half years, at 3 percent interest. In total, the entire process typically ranges somewhere between $30,000 and $35,000. Paying off $30,000 to $35,000 in less than four years means paying approximately $10,000 a year, or $800 a month. This is a very high amount that leaves little for the Chinese immigrant to live on. Furthermore, the long and rigorous journey can take up to an estimated eighty-nine days with detours throughout several countries including Africa and Europe. Vehicles of transportation may include airplanes, boats, trains, trucks, and automobiles. Typical destination countries include Japan, Australia, Canada, and Europe. Upon arrival into the new host country, the Chinese refugee is then held captive in safe houses until all money is received by the Snakehead. However, the drawback to migrating and working in the United States is that higher wages are accompanied by a higher cost of living. Indeed, the relatively low wages earned by illegal aliens are generally insufficient to provide minimal creature comforts to immigrants who are trying to pay off enormous smuggling debts. Once in the United States, these individuals can expect to earn only $3 to $4 an hour as a worker in a restaurant or garment factory, and they will often be expected to work eighty or ninety hours a week to pay off debts. Essentially, these illegal immigrants find themselves trapped in a downward economic cycle that tends to bury them further and further in debt or, in the best-case scenario, only allows them to break out after years of essential slavery. Involvement of Organized Crime and Street Gangs Chinese organized crime group such as Triads, Tongs, and Snakeheads engage in human smuggling only as a means of adding to their extensive illicit profit-making objectives. These same groups also deal in a variety of other forms of crime. Through an intricate network, Triads are able to take on more subtle roles in carrying out human smuggling operations. Every member of the organization is involved with this illegal activity in some 315

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shape, form, or fashion. Snakeheads, which are usually of Taiwanese ethnicity, conduct their operations in a more businesslike manner. Many of them are business owners who take part in industrial dealings by controlling what is distributed throughout the surrounding area. Furthermore, Chinese street gangs, especially those located within the United States, are also associated with human smuggling in some aspect. These groups have started to control and manage human smuggling operations in their entirety. The Fuk Ching Chinese street gang has taken part in numerous smuggling procedures that have stretched from New York to Atlanta, Georgia. Chinese organized crime groups have exemplified just how diverse and extensive their operations are by the various entry points and focus points of business that they choose when plying their smuggling trade. As an example, the Atlanta area has noted the development of Chinese girls and women involved in the sex industry due to the fact that immigration has increased through the Caribbean and South America to evade detection. Chinese street gangs work in league with Snakeheads to smuggle these women into this industry and to help oversee the day-to-day business operations. There have even been suggestions that the Japanese Yakuza are branching into the PRC. The Yakuza have been implicated in the smuggling of Chinese workers into Japan for cheap labor and in the smuggling of women from the PRC into Japan to work in the sex industry. In 1993, three members of the Yamaguchi-gumi (the largest band of Yakuza) were arrested while attempting to smuggle 145 Chinese into Japan. Therefore, it would appear that there are even links between ethnic Chinese organized crime and ethnic Japanese organized crime, at least in Korea and Taiwan. A prime example of the impact that human smuggling has had not only on the inhabitants of China but on many across the globe is the Golden Venture incident. This incident exposed human smuggling and its ugly truths. The Golden Venture was a carrier ship for Chinese migrants and ended its journey off the shore of Rockaway Beach in Queens, New York. U.S. authorities discovered and detained roughly 300 immigrants. Several had

drowned in the frigid waters, others swam to safety, and the remainder who stayed behind on the ship were later rescued. As a result of this terrible event, nationals were set free on bond, deported, or incarcerated, and thirty of the passengers were granted political asylum. This became an important incident because it demonstrated the complexity and skill of various organized crime syndicates, in this case the Chinese syndicates. The PRC has taken steps to crack down on human smuggling operations. By placing banners around villages and condemning the act of human smuggling, authorities hope to deter villagers from migrating out of China. The PRC has established stipulations such as thorough security checks at borders, seizing identification cards to avert locals from traveling out of the country, and increasing fines for people who attempt to illegally emigrate. In a more concentrated effort to end human smuggling, the PRC has sent out reports on the advances they have made pertaining to the issue. This is done to shape and mold the perceptions of those looking from the outside in. The PRC has worked in tandem with other countries to help end the human smuggling. The PRC has also passed and revised laws, including a revision of Article 318 of the Criminal Law of 1997. This law is focused on smugglers, Snakeheads, and all those involved in human smuggling. The PRC has also made it a priority to improve the networking ability of its various police and investigative branches so that mutual compliance can be maintained on a multinational level. Consumer Deception Associated with Smuggling Illegal migration into the United States seems to have more disadvantages than advantages. Chinese migrants are often lured by the preconceived notion that higher wages make for a better living within the United States. But they frequently fail to adequately account for the sharp increases in the cost of living. As though the cost of living is not hard enough on immigrants, they also have to deal with paying off debts to the smugglers. This situation can become a burden, being that immigrants are frequently placed in an intractable position. Not only do they have to work long hours on minimum-wage jobs, but language bar-

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Arming He, a passenger from the Golden Venture freighter, speaks at a media conference at the Museum of Chinese in the Americas on April 26, 2006, in New York City. The Golden Venture, carrying roughly 300 smuggled immigrants, ran aground off the shore of Queens, New York, in 1993. (Getty Images)

riers and deficient job skills can cause them to remain stuck in their economic plight. As illegal immigrants struggle to make a living in the United States, they still find a way to send money home to their loved ones. This act of love serves as a driving force in their dreams of making it to the United States one day. However, there is an ironic and bittersweet twist to the relationship between the smuggler and the immigrant victim. This is the fact that many of the immigrants remain dependent on the Snakehead network even after they have paid their own debt off because they wish to bring their loved ones to this country, and if they complain about the practices of the Snakeheads, they themselves face deportation. Thus, these individuals remain perpetually dependent on the very people who have traditionally exploited them throughout their entire ordeal to achieve the just-out-of-reach myth of the Golden Mountain. References David, F., and P. Monzini. Human Smuggling and Trafficking: A Desk Review on the Trafficking in

Women from the Philippines. Vienna: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2000. Kwong, P. Forbidden Workers: Illegal Chinese Immigrants and American Labor. New York: New Press, 2000. Mabrey, John. “Human Smuggling from China.” Crime and Justice International 19(17) (2003): 5–10. Orphant, M. “Human Contraband: The Asian Connection,” 2 September 1999, http://www .friends-partners.org/partners/stop-traffic/ 1999/0374.html. Smith, Paul J. “Human Smuggling: Chinese Migrant Trafficking and the Challenge to America’s Immigration Tradition.” Crime and Justice International 19(17) (1997): 19–22. United States Department of State. “Where Do the Migrants Originate? A Brief Overview of Chinese Migration,” http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/east _asia_pacific/chinese_human_smuggling/ originate.html. ———. “Why Do They Leave Their Homes?” http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/east_asia_pacific/ chinese_human_smuggling/why_leave.html. 317

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C. Illegal Drugs, Trade, and Trafficking

Drug Production and Trafficking in the Western Hemisphere: The Andean Region of South America Rob Hanser and Nathan Moran When considering drug production and trafficking within the Andean region, there are some common distinctions and generalizations that should be noted. First, in defining the Andean region, it should be noted that this is typically held to consist of the area largely found within the borders of three key nations: Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. Second, the drug that is trafficked, for the most part, is cocaine. Thus, the typical discussion of drug production and trafficking in the Andean region will tend to focus on the production and trafficking of cocaine within the area comprised of the nations of Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. Over the past few years, the drug-production problem in the Andean region has changed dramatically, in large part due to successful antidrug campaigns in Peru and Bolivia. Until recently, most coca was grown in Peru and Bolivia, and coca base was shipped to Colombia for processing and distribution. However, the effective implementation of drug-crop eradication and various interdiction operations have severely blunted the effectiveness of the drug dealing cartels in Colombia. Furthermore, extensive economic development programs have been started in Peru and Bolivia, and this has reduced the lure of coca cultivation among the rural poor of both of these nations.

Despite these programs, drug traffickers have found the nation of Colombia to still be an effective region in which to continue the coca production industry. This has resulted in the nation of Colombia having the dubious distinction of being the world’s largest producer of coca. Further compounding this problem is the fact that control of Colombia’s vast coca-growing regions is maintained by various guerrilla paramilitary groups. These groups are well organized and well entrenched within the jungles of Colombia, and they have severely hindered the ability of the Colombian government and military to adequately control the flow of cocaine out of the country. These guerrilla groups operate with near impunity and have proven to be a serious threat to internal security within the country. Because of the impact that these groups have had, the United States has recently made funds to combat this drug trade more fluid in regard to the manner in which they are used by the Colombian government in Bogotá. This reflects the fact that the Colombian military’s new priority is an offensive against the Marxist-inspired Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). This fluidity in funding has been designed to allow the Colombian military to engage in a joint role against the drug trade on the one hand and extremist group violence on the other. Although the warfare continues and although these groups are able to continue their drugproduction activities, data from the United Nations

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(UN) Office on Drugs and Crime indicates that peasant farmers are able to earn more from new legitimate farming incentives than they typically could by raising the coca crop. This has perhaps been one of the most effective approaches in stemming cocaine production and trafficking activities. As an example, farmers in Peru who specialize in producing palm oil have been reported to earn three to four times as much as farmers who continue to grow coca. Likewise, rural farmers in Colombia who have shifted to coffee and other cash crops have, on average, made about 50 percent more than their counterparts growing coca. Similar to these two examples, it has been noted that efforts to engage farmers in the forest management industry has had slow but positive outcomes in the nation of Bolivia. In fact, it has been estimated that there has been successful reclamation of more than 200,000 hectares of territory in the Andean region that has been converted from coca crop production to legal crop harvesting. This has bolstered the governmental economy, destabilized the drug traffickers, and provided a new sense of hope to many of the rural in the Andes. In fact, official reports from each of these countries indicate that less than 0.1 percent of the total territory that is open to cultivation is actually utilized for illicit purposes. Thus, there is hope that the Andean region can indeed largely eradicate the incentive for coca production within these areas in the longterm. Total Area under Cultivation In 2004, it was found that an estimated 27,700 hectares of coca bush were under cultivation in the nation of Bolivia. This amounted to an increase of 17 percent of the previous year’s estimate. However, even with this increase, the nation of Bolivia represents no more than 18 percent of the overall world production of cocaine. This has been touted as an improvement since Bolivia was reported to produce nearly 25 percent of the entire worldwide supply of cocaine just ten years earlier. During this same year in Colombia, it was estimated that approximately 80,000 hectares of coca was cultivated. Unlike in Bolivia, this represents a decrease of 6,000 hectares from the previous year.

This notes a trend in Colombia toward ever-continuing decreases in cocaine production, with a total decline of roughly half of all the cocaine production in Colombia during 2000–2004. This decrease has been the result of sustained aerial spraying and manual eradication that the government of Colombia (with the aid of U.S. support) has vigorously pursued. Colombia has also invested heavily in alternate agricultural and industrial development programs as an incentive for farmers to refrain from producing the crop. In Peru, coca cultivation reached 50,300 hectares in 2004, which is a 14 percent increase over the previous year. Despite this increase, coca cultivation in Peru remained below the level registered in the mid-1990s, when coca cultivation rose well above 100,000 hectares. Total Cocaine Production It is estimated that between 2003 and 2004, global cocaine production rose by roughly 2 percent. Cocaine production in Peru and Bolivia increased due to larger acreages of coca-planting area. Another key reason for this growth revolves around improved coca leaf production that was derived from improved field practices. Research in Peru has found that farmers in that country may be improving yields in the areas that are still under cultivation. From these estimates, it has been determined that the value of coca leaf production in Bolivia had reached $240 million in 2004. This equates to roughly 3 percent of the country’s total gross domestic product. In Peru, the coca leaf production industry is believed to generate $304 million, and in Colombia the overall amount generated was estimated at $315 million. All totaled, these numbers indicate that the Andes region is responsible for generating more than $850 million worth of illicit business within the global economy on an annual basis. Internal Production and Use within the Andes Region Within the three Andes region nations discussed, farmers typically cultivate the coca plants from coca seeds, small seedlings, or cuttings from other coca 319

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Illegal Drugs, Trade, and Trafficking

A crop sprayer destroys fields of poppies destined to become heroin in Cañon de las Hermosas in the central Andes region of Colombia. Sustained spraying of coca and poppy crops by the Colombian government has proven a significant, if temporary, weapon against illegal cultivation. (Getty Images)

plants. These plants may take as long as two years to fully mature depending on the specific method used to grow the coca and the type of cocaine that is grown. However, there is no true market for coca leaf in these three nations given the fact that the drug plant is so readily available within the region. Indeed, many farmers find it quite easy and convenient to simply grow the coca plant on their own farms. These farmers often then manufacture the coca-based product and sell it independently. Even though there is no actual market for the coca leaf within this region of the Andes, this does not mean that cocaine products do not have a niche. In fact, although it is commonly touted that cocaine use and addiction is not a problem within these countries, it has been found that this is more a myth than a true portrayal of the state of drugs and drug use in these countries. During the 1990s, many cocaine dealers in this area (particularly in Colombia) found that their profits were threatened

by a variety of antidrug efforts and therefore resorted to using their own populations as a source of revenue. Often, the less potent and inferior plants in the region of Colombia were used, and this product was mixed with tobacco to produce a product known as bazuco, which is simply a cigarette that provides a quick and intense high to the user. Bazuco is also fairly addictive and does leave the user with a craving for more of the drug. The production of this drug increased during the late 1990s and the early part of the twenty-first century but is not often a source of international concern because it is not specifically sought by drug consumers in the United States and elsewhere. Bazuco traffickers made a point of specifically targeting the marijuana-using population within Colombia and even went so far as to provide this drug for free or as a bonus when customers made illicit drug purchases from their dealers. This drug has been found to be fairly dangerous due to a vari-

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ety of impurities that are often included within the product. Lastly, the introduction of bazuco has created a surge in the number of drug addicts in Colombia. This has also resulted in an increase in drug-related health effects and an increased need for interventions for the addicted population within Colombia. Thus, the production and using habits of persons in Colombia have changed in the past decade, and bazuco does seem to impair at least a certain segment of the population in this region of the Andes, resulting in further social costs to the governmental coffers of Colombia. Trafficking and Extremist Unrest in the Andes The three nations of the Andean region are still confronted with networks of drug and arms trafficking. Indeed, small-arms trafficking, the purchase of explosives, and personal rocket launchers have been found to be a serious problem in the region, as extremist and rebel groups have been active in these purchases from organized crime and extremist groups from Russia, Ireland, and other far-flung areas of the world. This trafficking of small arms is likewise linked to the trafficking of drugs, since many of the same criminals engage in sundry types of criminal activity and also since these same groups seem to be perpetually interested in the acquisition of firearms. Furthermore, pressures in Peru and Colombia continue from domestic discontent and the threat of insurgency, and international criminal networks continue to be linked with these illegal financial resources. Given the success of antidrug operations in Peru and Bolivia during the first part of the 1990s, ever more elements of cocaine production moved to Colombia from former, more dispersed areas. With the defeat of the cocaine cartels in Colombia during the late 1990s, the industry moved into multiple new locations and ventures. This also entailed the use of new allies, namely FARC and the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC), rebel paramilitary organizations that have waged a perpetual guerrilla war against the government of Colombia. Initially, FARC saw substantial revenue from its tax payments extracted from coca producers, as did the AUC at a later point. Over time,

however, FARC reportedly became more directly involved in various stages of coca production, increasing coca production by a third in the demilitarized zone over which it had exclusive control. This area was ceded over to FARC on a temporary basis by the Colombian government as a means of establishing the groundwork for further peace negotiations. The area is nearly the size of some small countries and has been used as a convenient base of operation where crimes such as kidnapping and various forms of paramilitary drills, exercises, and practices have been conducted. Thus, the trafficking of cocaine is ingrained into the Andean culture and region despite recent successes to eradicate the coca crop. Furthermore, extremist and revolutionary groups in this region rely on the crop as a critical source of revenue to finance their military campaigns against national governments within the Andes region. This then means that countries such as Colombia and Peru must not only battle drug lords who traffic the drug but also must effectively battle revolutionaries who are difficult enough to quell without funding and who now are better armed than ever with their stream of income from the cocaine trade. Indeed, it is estimated that FARC has nearly two years’ supply cocaine stored so that when seizures affect their crop in Colombia or elsewhere, the flow and the price of the product will remain stable in the United States. With this amount of surplus revenue on hand, it is highly unlikely that the cocaine trade will be completely eradicated from the Andean region during the next fifteen to twenty years. Conclusion It is clear that overall cocaine production in the Andes nations of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia has been reduced substantially during the past four to five years. Much of the success in reducing overall production has largely occurred within the nation of Colombia due to vigorous antdrug efforts. Cocaine production has actually increased in Peru and Bolivia despite the successes in Colombia. Nevertheless, the overall net total of trafficking cocaine has decreased when taken as a whole. Regardless of this, the recent involvement of revolutionaries and extremist groups in the production and trafficking of 321

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The Global Cocaine Trade: Coca Cultivation, Cocaine Production, and Distribution Robert D. Hanser, Jeff Rush, and Joseph Byrnes

within proximity of the Andes Mountain region of South America. As is commonly known, it is the Andes region that is well suited for the growing of coca. Typically, most of the cocaine has been grown in Peru and Bolivia, and Colombia has taken on the role of manufacturer and refiner of the product. From Colombia, much of the cocaine product was shipped to Europe and the United States for consumption. What many do not realize is that during the past twenty years, the cocaine problem in Colombia has also continued to worsen due to the increased potency of the drug over time. This potency exceeds what even the Colombian and Andes region peoples are accustomed to, and this has actually led to increased drug addiction problems in Colombia, including a rise in the demand for cocaine addiction treatment facilities. Because of concentrated international initiatives against global drug smuggling, Colombia has experienced a substantial decrease in coca cultivation, where coca bush cultivation is reported to have declined by roughly 16 percent, from 102,000 hectares in 2002 to 86,000 hectares in 2003. This is Colombia’s third straight year of decreasing cultivation. Cultivation levels have also been reported to be decreasing in Bolivia and in Peru as well, although to a lesser extent. However, research in Peru indicates that farmers in this country may be improving yields in the areas that are still under cultivation. Farmers cultivate the coca plants from coca seeds, small seedlings, or cutting from other coca plants. These plants may take as long as two years to fully mature, depending on the method used to grow the coca and the type of cocaine grown. Consistent evidence points toward the fact that cultivation techniques are being improved to hide crops. For instance, satellite images in Bolivia reveal that farmers are now interspersing their coca crop with other legal crops to camouflage the coca plant. This in not a new or complicated approach, but it is thwarting the rapid efforts of officials cracking down on the cocaine drug trade.

For the most part, the main source of the international cocaine trade is located in South America and largely originates from the nations of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. These three countries are

The Manufacture of Cocaine Coca is a flowering shrub that stands roughly three to six feet tall at its ideal height for cultivation. Each of these shrubs yields no more than four

the drug makes the industry even more difficult to conquer. Further still, this involvement demonstrates the lack of stability within these three countries, making for an uncertain future in the drug war within the Andean region of South America. References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime. 7th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003. Colombia Trade News. “The Factors in the History of Colombia’s Trouble,” 2004, http://www.coltrade .org/about/factors.asp. Gentleman, J. A. The Regional Security Crisis in the Andes: Patterns of State Response. Washington, DC: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2001. Hanser, R. “Drug Treatment Programs in Colombia.” Pp. 159–162 in Annual Editions: Drugs, Society, and Behavior, edited by H. T. Wilson. Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Duskin, 2004. Moran, N. R. “Emerging Trends: Transnational Drug Production and Trafficking.” Crime and Justice International 18(63) (2002): 5–8. Moran, N., and R. Hanser. “Terror for Profit: The IRA-FARC connection.” INTERSEC 14(2) (2004): 44–47. Perez-Gomez, A. “Drug Consumption and Drug Treatment in a Drug-Producing Country: Colombia between Myth and Reality—A View from the Inside.” Pp. 173–181 in Drug Treatment Systems in International Perspective, edited by H. Klingemann and G. Hunt. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Trend in Reduction in Colombia Continues, but New Statistics in Bolivia and Peru Warrant Close Monitoring,” 2005, http://www.unis .unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2005/unisnar904 .html. ———. World Drug Report: Volume 1. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004.

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ounces of leaves that are 1 percent cocaine by weight. The leaves are then pulverized, soaked in a solution of alcohol and benzol, and dried. The liquid is drained from the leaves, sulfuric acid is added, and then the solution is again shaken. Sodium carbonate is added, and this is washed with kerosene and chilled, the process leaving crystals of crude cocaine that is known as coca paste. The cocaine paste is converted to a base yellow powder, and it is at this point that the product is about 66 percent pure. The cocaine base is converted into cocaine hydrochloride through a process of treating the product with ether, acetone, and hydrochloric acid. One kilo of cocaine base is able to be converted to one kilo of cocaine hydrochloride, a white crystalline powder that is about 95 percent pure. Investigative fieldwork on Colombian cocainebase manufacturers reveal that they require approximately 1 metric ton of fresh leaf (the equivalent of 260 kilograms of dry leaf) to produce 1 kilogram of 100 percent pure cocaine base. However, Bolivian manufacturers require 386 kilograms of dry leaf to produce 1 kilogram of cocaine base, and Peruvian manufacturers require 400 kilograms of dry leaf. Scientific fieldwork also confirmed that cocaine manufacturers in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia are able to convert 1 kilogram of cocaine base into an equal amount of finished cocaine hydrochloride. The bulk of Colombian base laboratories are located in the eastern lowlands and southern rain forest. These areas of the country are Colombia’s primary coca cultivation regions. Most coca farmers in Colombia process their own leaf into cocaine base, doing so at laboratories located near their own coca fields. The location of the base laboratories in the vicinity of the coca fields is not surprising, considering that approximately 1 metric ton of fresh coca leaf is required to produce 1 kilogram of cocaine base. The Cocaine Trade and Organized Criminal and Extremist Groups The rise of Colombia to international notoriety as the leading cocaine capitol of the world was due largely to the business of the Cali and Medellin cartels. These two cartels were defeated and destroyed after a long and protracted fight that the government of Colombia conducted with the support of exten-

sive aid from the United States. Much of this is old news during the second millennium, giving way to changes in the drug trade that have switched from urban and flashy leadership to a new group of traffickers who operate in smaller groups and are much more mobile with interlinked international networks. These groups engage in arms and people smuggling, money laundering, and extortion and typically work hand-in-hand with revolutionary guerrilla groups in Colombia. Much of the coca production has been relocated to the Amazon jungle region of Colombia due to the remoteness of the terrain and the inability of law enforcement to interfere. Within these jungle regions, revolutionary groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) continue their armed conflict with the government of Colombia. In order to arm and finance their army, FARC has been known to be involved in the cocaine trade as well. This group has approximately 18,000 armed men and women and is receiving hundreds of millions of dollars annually by protecting coca crops and through extortion and ransom money for kidnappings. This group is a well-organized and complex terrorist network with international connections. In fact, these connections have even been found to exist with other terrorist groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA). FARC is heavily armed and well financed through illegal drug trafficking activities, and it serves as a substantial source of muscle for South American organized crime groups and for the drug cartels. Additionally, this group may be involved with American street gangs in a variety of enterprises. Colombian criminal organizations are still heavily involved in smuggling cocaine from Colombia to the United States. These organizations also control much of the wholesale distribution throughout the northeastern United States. However, during the late 1990s and later, Mexican traffickers have successfully taken an increasing portion of the market, smuggling the drug from Mexico over land into the United States. Mexican organized crime tends to thus control most of the drug smuggling activities throughout the western section of the United States. Since the mid-1990s, Mexican drug transportation groups have received up to 50 percent of the 323

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Colombian cocaine that they move to the United States as compensation for the services in the trafficking process. The major Mexican drug trafficking groups increasingly have capitalized on this payment-in-product arrangement to expand their own wholesale cocaine distribution networks in the United States. In fact, Mexican trafficking groups now dominate the wholesale distribution of cocaine in the western and midwestern United States. Colombian traffickers, however, continue to control the supply of cocaine at its source and dominate the wholesale cocaine markets in the eastern United States and in Europe. Worldwide Trafficking Trends The majority of cocaine seizures occur in North and South America. In 2002, a full 55 percent of all cocaine seizures across the world were made in South America. Roughly 32 percent of all worldwide seizures occurred in North America, and another 13 percent of all global seizures were made in Europe. However, the world’s major cocaine trafficking route continues to be from Colombia straight to the United States. The cocaine is smuggled through surrounding countries in the Caribbean or Central America or from Mexico. To demonstrate how the demand in the United States fuels the international cocaine industry, consider that in 2002 in the nation of Venezuela, 72 percent of all cocaine seized was destined for the United States. Further still, Central American countries report that 80–85 percent of all seized cocaine was destined for the United States. While the trafficking and seizure trends have remained fairly stable in North America, there have been increased demands in Western Europe. This reflects an underlying shift in the trafficking of cocaine and demonstrates that the market exists on a worldwide basis if the traffickers can simply meet the demand. Furthermore, research shows that trafficking seizures also rose in conjunction with a consistent rise in cocaine use in Western Europe. Throughout the late 1990s and the early part of the second millennium, Spain and the Netherlands have reported the highest cocaine seizures in Europe. These two countries are often identified by other European countries as being the primary

shipping points from which the drugs emanate. These two countries accounted for more than half of all cocaine seizures in Europe during 2002. Furthermore, significant increases in cocaine seizures were reported in France, Germany, Italy, and numerous East European nations. Trafficking across countries within Europe is increasing. Most of the cocaine seized in Italy transits through Spain or the Netherlands, and Germany consistently finds that cocaine traveling within its borders transits through the Netherlands. Also, prior to their inclusion into the European Union, many of the Eastern European countries had already been immersed in the drug trade. Likewise, due to their less-stable border and governmental conditions, there have been direct cocaine shipments into these countries from South America with the ultimate destination being other neighboring European nations. Poland has noted that the nation of Turkey is an important transit point for cocaine found in the Polish market, with ultimate destinations being Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. From each of these examples, it is clear that drug smuggling is a vibrant industry within the confines of the European continent. Trafficking through Africa has been found to occur from South America with the ultimate destination most frequently being Europe. African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, and the Republic of South Africa all report heavy trafficking. Furthermore, given the number of countries reporting, it is apparent that cocaine must be trafficked within the continent as well, although data from this area of the world is very difficult to obtain in a reliable manner. To further illustrate this point, it should be noted that between 1999 and 2002 there were fifty-two nations reporting seizures of cocaine, which was double the number of countries from the earlier 1990s. Thus, the cocaine trade must be growing intracontinentally in Africa, with the largest seizures being reported in the nations of South Africa and Nigeria. Cocaine trafficking throughout the continent of Asia is lower than in other areas of the world. The number of countries in Asia that reported cocaine

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seizures rose from an average of ten in the 1980s to a current number of eighteen during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Interestingly, of all the cocaine seized in Asia during 2002, roughly 70 percent of it was in the Middle East, most notably Israel, followed by Syria and Lebanon. Cocaine trafficking was noted in Japan, Thailand, and China but at much lower levels, and there have been very few discovered attempts to manufacture cocaine in the East Asian nations. With respect to seizures worldwide, European countries reported roughly 45 metric tons of seizures during 2002. This is compared with 106 metric tons in the United States alone, whereas Japan had a mere .02 metric tons of seized cocaine. Colombia, unsurprisingly, had the largest bulk of cocaine seized, with 119 metric tons being discovered and confiscated. This provides a general picture of how truly varied the trafficking activity may be on the worldwide scene. Consumer Demand for Cocaine The effects of the demand upon the supply that is generated is a major factor in cocaine distribution. As long as there is a healthy demand, drug abusers will pay, and therefore some criminal organization will fill the gap to meet the demand. Currently, worldwide cocaine consumption is estimated to affect more than 13 million people. This is roughly .3 percent of the entire world population between fifteen and sixty-four years of age. Most cocaine continues to be consumed in North and South America, but it is North America that generates the largest demand for the drug, with roughly 48 percent of the entire consuming population (6.38 million) being in North America. South America accounts for about another 2.3 million consumers, which is about 17.6 percent of the entire worldwide consumer population. Europe has roughly 3.3 million cocaine consumers, and this accounts for about a fourth of the global cocaine-using population. It is interesting to note that more than 90 percent of all of Europe’s cocaine users are in Western Europe, with the highest prevalence rates being found in Spain, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the emergence of crack cocaine has become an issue of

concern in Europe. Out of twenty-nine European countries reporting on cocaine, sixteen had noted trends in crack cocaine that had developed. More than 60 percent of these were West European countries. For the most part, crack cocaine is more concentrated within a few locations in Europe, but there is concern that it is spreading throughout the continent. The general upward trend in the use of cocaine since the late 1990s has been triangulated by student school surveys conducted in Spain, France, Ireland, and the Netherlands. Much of the increase in cocaine consumption has been found in Southern and Western Europe. Throughout the remainder of Europe, cocaine was reported as stable. This has particularly been true in Germany, which in the past had noted problems with increased consumption of cocaine. Other European countries have seen either stable numbers or a decline in the rate of consumption. In Africa, cocaine use had risen sharply during the 1990s but began to stabilize during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Out of fourteen countries reporting cocaine consumption, only six reported increases in consumption, while other countries reported decreases. It would appear that most of the cocaine consumption in Africa is in the western and southern sections of the continent, and it is also largely found in urban environments. South Africa is perhaps the primary cocaine market in Africa, but despite this, only about 8 percent of the demand for drug treatment is cocaine-related in South Africa. In Namibia, the proportion of people treated for cocaine abuse declined from about 6 percent of those desiring services for drug treatment to about 3 percent. Lowered levels of consumption and treatment demand have likewise been noted in Mozambique, Botswana, Kenya, and Rwanda. A somewhat confused picture of the cocaine demand has developed in northern Africa, with Morocco seeing an increase in cocaine use among many of its more affluent youths. In Asia, cocaine use is so low that this region is not even considered a substantial business outlook among organized crime syndicates. This is not to say that cocaine is not trafficked in Asia, of course, but 325

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Crack cocaine confiscated by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. (U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency)

it does denote the fact that organized crime does not find the market sustainable enough to invest in business opportunities through the trafficking of cocaine. Rather, it would appear that Asian countries have a different set of drugs of choice, somewhat similar to the United States, whose illicit drug of choice is cocaine. Much of this may be due to historical or cultural variables, especially when considering the fact that opium is so prevalent in many Asian countries. Furthermore, as was mentioned earlier, very little cultivation of cocaine has occurred in most Asian countries. Thus, the manufacture and trafficking of this drug seems to not be a noteworthy activity among these countries. Globally speaking, the increase in cocaine use does not seem to be due to changes in cocaine activity. Rather, cocaine prices have remained sta-

ble around the world, and cocaine availability has also been perceived by drug users to have been stable as well. Regardless of this, it would appear that overall, cocaine cultivation, manufacture, and distribution are still big business. However, it is also clear that the organized crime effort to traffic cocaine has gone through a period of downsizing, with some takeovers and acquisitions having occurred in this area of illicit business. There is an increased connection with the cocaine drug trade and a variety of organized crime syndicates, mostly in various areas of Latin America. Likewise, the recent realization that some extremist groups are involved in the business denotes the danger that the cocaine trade represents for the world in terms of both human health and international safety and security. As long as the trade remains so lucrative,

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The Global Opium Trade: Cultivation, Production, and Distribution

this developing connection among organized crime, the cocaine trade, and extremist groups is likely to continue indefinitely into the future. References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime. 7th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003. Colombia Trade News. “The Factors in the History of Colombia’s Trouble,” 2004, http://www.coltrade .org/about/factors.asp. Drug Enforcement Administration. “The Drug Trade in Colombia: A Threat Assessment,” March 2002. Eskridge, C. The Mexican Cartels and Their Integration into Mexican Socio-political Culture. Huntsville, TX: Office of International Criminal Justice, 2001. Hanser, R. “Drug Treatment Programs in Colombia.” Pp. 159–162 in Annual Editions: Drugs, Society, and Behavior, edited by H. T. Wilson. Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Duskin, 2004. Ministry of National Security. Dent Made in Suppression of Cocaine Trade. London: JIS, 2005, http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/2005/01/31/ suppression.shtml. Moran, N., and R. Hanser. “Terror for Profit: The IRA-FARC Connection.” INTERSEC 14(2) (2004): 44–47. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report: Volume 1. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004.

The Global Opium Trade: Cultivation, Production, and Distribution Robert D. Hanser, Walonda Wallace, and Kaine Jones The cultivation and production of opium and its derivatives is a process that has existed since ancient times. There has been a variety of cultural, legal, and economic considerations that have affected government policies related to opium in many nations. In some countries, opium may be part of the very fabric of the history and culture of that region. In other countries, the use of opium may generally be considered both illegal and immoral. Thus, there exists a great range of reactions to the opium trade from the international community.

The Manufacturing of Opium and Heroin The opium poppy is the source for opium and heroin. This plant requires a hot and dry climate. Growers simply scatter the seeds across a field, and within roughly three months the poppy is usually mature. When mature, the green budlike stem is topped with a flower, and the petals of the flower will gradually wither and fall away, leaving a small green pod that is full of poppy seeds. Growers will obtain the milky-white fluid within this pod just before the pod fully matures. This fluid dries and hardens into a dark brown waxy or gummy substance. This substance is raw opium. This raw opium is further gathered by scraping the fluid from the inside of the pod. Naturally, this process is quite labor intensive. The raw opium is then put through a series of processes that dissolve it and refine the product into solidified morphine. This morphine is heated at 185 degrees for six hours, at which point the product is refined into an impure heroin product. This process of heating is exacting, and there is little room for error. In fact, this process can be dangerous and result in a lab explosion if it is not followed precisely. From this point, the product is treated with water and chloroform to remove impurities, and then the product is further refined through an additional heating process using sodium carbonate and alcohol. The product is then dissolved in alcohol, and hydrochloric acid is added until the product emerges as small white flakes. The flakes are dried under pressure, resulting in the final product typically known as heroin. Before the 1990s, heroin was often diluted significantly to be roughly 5 percent pure heroin product. Mexican heroin often has impurities as a result of this process that cause the product to have a brown or black oily appearance, sometimes referred to as black tar. Drug traffickers prior to the 1990s would use products such as lactose, flour, or cornstarch to dilute the heroin because these products dissolve well when heated. However, there has been a noticeable trend to not dissolve heroin. During the 1990s and well into the second millennium, heroin has made it to the United States that is up to 90 percent pure. This means that heroin is being cut less and less, and users are able to smoke and snort heroin to get a pleasurable sensation. 327

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The smoking of opium as a drug goes back thousands of years. The Sumerians called it the “joy plant” and it was used to treat many ailments from calming nerves to alleviating pain. (Ash Sweeting/Courtesy of The Senlis Council)

The opiates, and more specifically heroin, continue to be the main problem drugs worldwide. As an indicator of how the opiates impact the global drug market, consider that two-thirds of the treatment demand in Asia, Europe, and Oceania is related to opiate addiction. These three continental regions account for nearly three-fourths of the entire world population. Furthermore, even though cocaine is in such strong demand in the United States, opiates still account for 28 percent of all treatment drugs of choice, whereas cocaine accounts for only 23 percent of such requests. More than half of the world’s opiate users (7.8 million) are in Asia. The majority are in countries that are in the same general region as Afghanistan, where more than half of the opiate use is heroin. The total number of opiate users in Europe (4 million), on the other hand, is roughly one-quarter of the world’s opiate-abusing population. Roughly

one-fifth of the world’s opiate users (2.5 million) reside in North America. Between North and South America, the United States accounts for up to 90 percent of the world’s heroin users. South America has the lowest use of heroin among all of the continents, reflecting the cultural emphasis of the cocaine industry in that region of the world. Opiate use in Africa is below the global average, and heroin use tends to occur in those urban areas that serve as transshipment locations for international trafficking to other areas of the world. There are a handful of regions around the world where heroin tends to be cultivated. These include the Golden Triangle, the Golden Crescent, Mexico, and more recently Colombia. Each of these source regions is in competition with one another, but the two Asian regions dominate the market on the continent of Asia. These regions of opium and heroin production have their own markets that

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they tend to cater to, and all four have the climate that is necessary to maximize growing potential for the poppy plant. The Golden Triangle The Golden Triangle is located within the countries of Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos. The overwhelming majority of the heroin from the Golden Triangle comes out of Myanmar. Also, as with the cocaine industry, there is a strong connection between extremist or guerrilla groups and the opium industry in Burma. Indeed, until 1989 the Shan United Army (SUA) had been known to be instrumental in controlling the production and distribution of heroin from this region. The SUA was at one time simply an insurgent militant group, but over time it has increasingly focused its efforts on funding through the opium trade. In 1989, the SUA and other insurgent groups involved in the trafficking of heroin were largely displaced by combined efforts by the governments of Myanmar, the United States, and Thailand. However, this did nothing more than create a power vacuum that resulted in another guerrilla group, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), rising to power in the region. The UWSA is headquartered on the Chinese border in the southern section of the Yunnan Province and uses heroin trafficking as a means of funding its fight against control by the government of Myanmar. This group will often charge illegal taxes (nothing less than unabridged extortion) and fees that are levied against opium growers and heroin traffickers. Similar to the actions of FARC in Colombia, the funds from this drug industry provide weapons and munitions to further the group’s interests. The USWA has within its ranks roughly 15,000 to 20,000 members who are well armed with modern ground-toair missiles and communications equipment. To further demonstrate the complicated nature of the warring factions and their impact on opium trafficking in the region, it should be noted that the UWSA reached an agreement in 2000 with the governments of Myanmar and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC has agreed to provide sophisticated weapons and military training to the UWSA in exchange for its agreement to relocate its

activities into the Thai-Myanmar border region and out of China. Essentially, the PRC bought off the drug lords to encourage them to exit the boundaries of the country. Regardless of the political developments in the region and despite the increased sophistication of military arms possessed by trafficking groups, the methods of transportation that are used to get the opium to refineries along the Thai-Burmese border remain crude even to this day. Transportation is usually via animal-drawn carts through rugged terrain. Thailand remains the primary transit point from Southeast Asia for heroin that is destined for the worldwide market. In Thailand, much of the drug trafficking activity is controlled by ethnic Chinese, who dominate this part of the world heroin market. These Chinese organized crime groups, known as Triads, have links to Hong Kong, and from there the heroin will be subject to worldwide dissemination. The heroin destined for the United States often goes through this route but is destined for other Chinese in the United States who are members of organized crime syndicates known as Tongs. The Triads and Tongs have been found to engage in a variety of crimes on both sides of the Pacific Rim. Within the United States, Tongs and Chinese gangs have been found to be active in both the heroin trafficking and human smuggling industries in New York, Los Angeles, and Seattle as well as in Toronto, Canada. The Golden Crescent The Golden Crescent is located in Southwest Asia and includes the nations of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Southwest Asian opium is grown in remote mountain areas and is mostly transported to crude laboratories near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. Most of these laboratories are located in Northwest Pakistan. The refined heroin leaves Pakistan through several routes: over land to Iran, by sea through Karachi to the Arabian Gulf and on to Europe, and by air through Islamabad. Before and during the 1990s, the majority of the heroin produced in the Golden Crescent originated in Afghanistan. However, in 1998 the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban movement controlled most of the country, and Afghanistan emerged as the 329

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world’s second-largest producer of heroin. In 2001 the Taliban banned further growing of poppies within Afghanistan even though the trade was so enormously profitable. The Taliban, desiring to follow the edicts of Islam, noted that the growing of poppies was a sin against the teachings of Islam. However, shortly after the terrorist tragedy on 11 September 2001, the Taliban instructed farmers to begin growing poppies. Since the collapse of the Taliban, the growing of poppy has become a mainstay of the economy, and a new increase in the heroin industry has been observed in Eastern Europe, undoubtedly fueled by the developments in Afghanistan. It has been estimated that almost 90 percent of the heroin sold in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan. The United Nations views the illegal trade in opium and its derivatives as a continually expanding enterprise. Two-thirds of the Afghan poppy farmers have noted intentions of cultivating the poppy on a full-time basis. In 2003, it was estimated that farmers and traffickers made an estimated income of $2.3 billion, which is equal to half of the entire country’s gross national product from annual goods and services. Although the profit is huge, few Afghanis actually profit from this trade. Nearly 70 percent of the population earns less than US$1 per day. The average Afghani lives only fortythree years, and Afghanistan has one of the highest rates in the world for the number of children who die before the age of five. Given the stark deprivation of Afghanistan, it is no surprise that since the Taliban fell from power in 2001, opium production in the country has increased dramatically. Within three years after the Taliban was displaced, cultivation of poppy spread to twenty-eight out of thirtytwo provinces in Afghanistan. A discussion of the heroin trade in the Golden Crescent in general, and Afghanistan in particular, would not be complete without mentioning the power that the Afghan warlords have over the drug trade in the region. These factious groups control a drug trade that supplies 10 million drug users throughout Asia and Europe constituting roughly two-thirds of all opiate abusers worldwide. In 2003, profits from international criminal gangs involved with the Afghan opium industry were estimated to

be around $30 billion. Because of the growing strength of these groups and also because of associated health effects—there is an ever-increasing HIV/AIDS population in central Asia, Eastern Europe, and Russia as a result of this drug—neighboring countries have been supportive of the Afghani government’s efforts to stem the trade. Iran has even joined in this effort, but its military and police units are out-equipped by warlord traffickers whose troops are reported to be equipped with antiaircraft missiles, night-vision goggles, and satellite telephone systems. The arms for these traffickers are state of the art, and the traffickers are often well trained in the use of their equipment. The Afghani government, in consortium with other surrounding countries and the support of countries abroad (the United Kingdom and the United States), has committed to fighting this trafficking so that the nation can become stabilized. The United Nations has developed an international program to eradicate Afghan poppy cultivation. The European Union has earmarked substantial funds for its own war on opium that comes from the Golden Crescent. The results of these efforts are yet to be seen, but it would appear from similar attempts in other nations (Thailand and Pakistan) that the nation of Afghanistan may be embroiled in this conflict for several years to come. Mexico For generations, opium has been grown in remote areas of Mexico’s Sierra Madre region. This area first developed as a major heroin cultivation and production region during the 1970s to cater to the ever-growing demand generated by the United States. Trafficking organizations are now firmly in place in these areas and are involved in all phases of the heroin manufacture and distribution process. Opium gum is collected by poor workers in isolated mountain farms and is transported by pack animal to nearby mountain villages. Often, village middlemen sell the opium to a drug trafficking organization leader who is responsible for moving drugs to an established laboratory for further processing. Mexican couriers then transport the heroin to the members of the drug trafficking group who are in the United States.

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Mexican heroin is commonly referred to as black tar or brown heroin because of its coloration due to the impurities that are in the product. This heroin is less refined than standard heroin; is quick, easy, and cheap to manufacture; and requires less equipment and expertise. Since less equipment is involved, Mexican drug manufacturers can evade law enforcement detection much more easily by packing up their mobile cooking camps. Furthermore, since the process is less complicated, more experienced individuals are not needed and thus costs are lower. While the standard white heroin of the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent may approach nearly 100 percent purity, Mexican black tar is usually only about 65–85 percent pure. Furthermore, the poppy is not a native plant to the region even though it has been present for generations in Mexico. The poppy had been exported from China by Chinese immigrants to the United States during the railroad and gold mining eras. Eventually, due to various legal developments that occurred in the United States, control over the heroin trade passed from the Chinese in the United States to Mexican dealers in the 1930s. Poppy fields in Mexico are difficult to detect due to the small size of the fields and the ability of Mexican farmers to camouflage their activities. But the primary challenge to detecting poppy in Mexico has to do more with the general corruption within the country’s government. In fact, it is well known that many of the most active and accomplished heroin traffickers have previously been police officers. Although the United States is active in fighting this drug trade and thwarting the corruption in Mexico, graft runs deep and generally prevents officials from stopping the activity of drug families in Mexico. As soon as one is stopped, there is another that is all too willing to fill the ranks. Colombia The advent of heroin cultivation, production, and trafficking in Colombia is a relatively new development, historically speaking, when compared to the other three sources of heroin. Poppy plants have been found to do very well in the Andes Mountain region of Colombia, and just as with the cocaine industry, poor peasant farmers have found that the

poppy is a lucrative source of income that dwarfs most other activities. The most significant areas of opium poppy cultivation in Colombia fall along the eastern section of the Andes Mountains. Opium poppy cultivation in this mountainous region accounts for the majority of Colombia’s total opium output. The opium-growing fields are located at elevations that range from 1,500 to 3,500 meters in height along the tops of the Andes Mountain range. Much of the Colombian heroin destined for markets in the United States is smuggled out of Colombia through international airports in Bogotá and Cali. During the 1990s, tactics of smuggling usually included persons carrying the product in hidden areas on their person or in their luggage or personal items. This method of transport could only move small amounts of the drug and was generally a risky process. Recently, traffickers have stepped up the amount that individuals carry by devising suitcases with compartments sewn inside the lining and the clothing packed therein. Also, these traffickers are increasingly using boats and personal planes to move the drug to the United States. In the United States, Colombian heroin is popular because it is much purer than Mexican heroin. In fact, it has been estimated that Colombian heroin meets up to 70 percent of the demand on the East Coast of the United States. Worldwide Trends It is clear that opium, in the form of heroin, is a drug with a strong international demand. Heroin abuse trends in Eastern Europe and the United States continue to rise at a rapid rate. The demand in Asia is somewhat stable but, given the millions of heroin abusers, will remain indefinitely. In China, the rate of consumption continues to rise, further demonstrating that the heroin cultivation and trafficking industry will continue to have a stable user demand for several more years. Indeed, it would seem that the demand has encouraged the industry to extend beyond the traditional growing zones of the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent to other areas that were previously well known such as Mexico and Colombia. Indications such as these demonstrate that organized cultivation, production, and trafficking will continue well into the twenty-first century. 331

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References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime. 7th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003. Eskridge, C. The Mexican Cartels and Their Integration into Mexican Socio-political Culture. Huntsville, TX: Office of International Criminal Justice, 2001. Moran, N. “Emerging Trends: Transnational Drug Production and Trafficking.” Crime & Justice International 18(3) (2002): 5–7. Drug Enforcement Administration. “The Drug Trade in Colombia: A Threat Assessment,” March 2002. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report: Volume 1. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004. Young, R. “World in Brief: Wiping out Opium.” Crime & Justice International 18(3) (2002): 19.

Mexican Organized Crime: Drug Cartels Michael A. Van Aelstyn The 2,000-mile-long border between the United States and Mexico has just thirty-eight points of entry. Much of the terrain along the border is rugged and isolated, which makes for easy transshipment of drugs directly across the border with a low risk of being caught. Mountains cover most of Mexico’s terrain. This makes for excellent havens for growing and producing drugs. Production and Trafficking The primary drugs that are smuggled across the U.S.-Mexican border are marijuana, heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine. Both marijuana and opium are grown naturally in Mexico, and at one time Mexico supplied almost 95 percent of the marijuana consumed in the United States. Today, Mexico supplies less than half of all marijuana to the United States. However, almost two-thirds of all cocaine is shipped through Mexico before it enters the United States. Approximately 80 percent of this cocaine originates in Colombia and arrives in Mexico by air or boat and is then shipped by truck into the United States. About one-third of all heroin that enters the United States is developed from opium poppy plants grown in Mexico. Mexican heroin is usually of the black tar variety. Mexico has also more

recently developed itself as a market for methamphetamine. The production of methamphetamine is not dependent upon nature to produce good yields but rather is developed strictly from precursor chemicals. In Mexico, the government does not closely regulate the importation of these chemicals, which are imported from companies located in China, India, and the United States. Many clandestine labs in Mexico are capable of producing hundreds of pounds of this drug each year. The number of people who cross the border into the United States each day makes it very difficult to control the movement of drugs into the country. It is estimated that 295 million people, 88 million vehicles, and 4.5 million trucks cross the U.S.Mexican border annually. Of those numbers, only 1 in 10 vehicles gets stopped, and less than that get searched. During the 1980s, drug smuggling was conducted by drug syndicates providing services to Colombian cartels for a cost of $1,000–2,000 per kilo of cocaine. Because this organization was assuming the greatest risk, Mexican drug traffickers wanted more of the share of the profits. Within a short period of time, Mexican cartels were receiving up to 50 percent of the total cocaine profits for their smuggling services. This generation of wealth allowed the Mexican drug cartels to take over as wholesale suppliers. Mexican cartels also took over the wholesale market in the midwestern and western United States, leaving the Colombian cartels with the markets in the eastern United States. Cartels Currently, there are seven major Mexican based cartels. In addition, many Colombian cartels are associated with these drug syndicates. These major cartels are the Arellano-Felix Brothers, the Amezcua-Contreras Brothers, Caro-Quintero, Gulf Cartel, Joaquin Guzman-Loera, the Juarez cartel, and the Zambada-Garcia cartel. These cartels are able to operate openly because of the widespread corruption that exists in the Mexican law enforcement community and judicial system. Arellano-Felix Brothers The Arellano-Felix Brothers cartel, based in Tijuana, Mexico, is also known as the Tijuana cartel.

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Mexican Organized Crime: Drug Cartels

U.S. Border Patrol aircraft fly over the U.S.-Mexican border searching for illegal immigrants and drug smugglers. (U.S. Customs & Border Protection)

This group, considered to be one of the most violent drug cartels in Mexico, is linked to hundreds of murders. The cartel was originally headed by Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo. Gallardo was incarcerated in 1989 for the kidnapping and killing of Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent Enrique Camarena. Benjamin Arellano-Felix took over as head of the cartel after the arrest of his uncle. After the arrest of Gallardo, Benjamin, with the help of three of his brothers—Ramon, Eduardo, and Javier—was able to produce the most powerful Mexican drug cartel in operation. Benjamin and Ramon were on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) ten most wanted list, with rewards of $2 million each for information leading to either of their arrests. Both men faced life imprisonment and fines as high as $27 million. On 10 February 2002, Ramon was shot and killed by Mexican police in Mazatlan, Mexico. Just four weeks later, on 9 March, Benjamin was arrested and is currently serving life in prison in the United States.

The family is originally from the state of Sinaloa in Mexico and moved to Monterrey when the oldest of the boys was able to attend college. Both Benjamin and Ramon attended college and graduated with university degrees and had learned to speak perfect English. In the early 1980s, the family moved to Tijuana. Initially, the family became involved in the smuggling of cigarettes and alcohol to and from Mexico. With the realization of more profit, they turned to drugs. The vast amounts of money produced from drugs led to various money laundering schemes in both Mexico and the United States. The family has also conducted multiple kidnappings and murders and has bribed police officials to do countersurveillance. It is estimated that the Arellano-Felix cartel spent an average of $1 million a week on bribes of public officials. The presence of the cartel is still strong in Tijuana but has slowly diminished as the other five brothers and four sisters spread themselves out to avoid capture. Currently, the DEA, under Operation United 333

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Eagles, has taken down additional members of the cartel. In August 2006, Javier was arrested by U.S. drug agents while fishing off the Mexican coast. He is currently being held in San Diego pending arraignment. His brother Eduardo remains at large. Amezcua-Contreras Founded by Jesus Amezcua-Contreras and run by his two brothers Luis and Adan, the AmezcuaContreras organization is based in Guadalajara, Mexico. The primary means of income is the production, distribution, and trafficking of methamphetamine and ephedrine, the precursor drug used to produce methamphetamine. Jesus and Luis were arrested in 1998, and Adan was arrested in May 2001. The organization continues to operate. Caro-Quintero The Caro-Quintero organization is based in Sonora, Mexico, and was founded by Rafael CaroQuintero, who was also incarcerated for the involvement in the murder of Camarena. At the time of his incarceration, Rafael passed the leadership role to his brother Miguel. Miguel, with the help of brothers Jorge and Genaro, continued to run the organization until Miguel’s arrest in December 2001. The Caro-Quintero cartel operates in Sonora and Hermosilla and is engaged in the cultivation, production, and distribution of marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine. Joaquin Guzman-Loera This organization was founded by Joaquin GuzmanLoera after he established himself as a trafficker for Miguel Felix-Gallardo. He has been incarcerated in Mexico since 1993, and the organization is currently run by his brother, Arturo. The primary source proceeds have been established through the shipment of cocaine for Colombian cartels. In addition, the organization also traffics in marijuana and heroin. The Guzman-Loera organization was also known for the drug smuggling tunnel between Agua Prieta, Mexico, and Douglas, Arizona. Juarez Cartel The Juarez cartel was originally founded by Amado Carrillo-Fuentes (a.k.a. “Lord of the Skies”)

because of the planeloads of cocaine smuggled into Mexico from Colombia. Carrillo-Fuentes avoided capture and incarceration but died on 4 July 1997 during a plastic surgery operation to change his appearance. At the time of his death, his net worth was suspected to be approximately $17 billion. Carrillo-Fuentes was one of the premier cocaine smugglers in Mexico and had multiple ties with the Colombian cartels. In addition to cocaine, the Juarez cartel traffics in heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine. The daily operations are headed by Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes. The organization is still based in Juarez, Mexico, but the cartel also has smaller bases in Guadalajara, Hermosillo, and Torreon. Gulf Cartel Juan Garcia-Abrego was head of the Gulf cartel until his arrest on 14 January 1996 and subsequent imprisonment. He is currently serving eleven life sentences for drug trafficking. During the reign of Garcia-Abrego, the cartel earned $10–20 billion annually. The cartel was then turned over to Osiel Cardenas-Guillen, who ran the organization until his arrest on 14 March 2003. The Gulf cartel is considered to be one of the largest operating in Mexico. Zambada-Garcia One of the newest cartels was founded by Ismael Zambada-Garcia (a.k.a. “El Mayo”). Zambada operates out of Mazatlan, Mexico, and controls much of the Pacific Coast of Mexico. He is known to have alliances with almost every known Mexican cartel. Zambada deals almost exclusively in cocaine. Mayo founded his cartel in February 2002 when Ramon Arellano-Felix was shot and killed. Zambada is known to have close ties to the Juarez cartel. The U.S. government has a $5 million reward for information that leads to the arrest of Zambada. Conclusion These drug cartels are currently still operating in Mexico. However, recent increases in law enforcement in the areas of operation of each cartel have greatly reduced the strength, stability, and operational capability of many of these organizations.

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Social and Economic Impact of the Drug Trade: A Global Perspective

References Lyman, M. D., and G. W. Potter. Drugs in Society: Causes, Concepts, and Control. 4th ed. Cincinnati: Anderson, 2003. Public Broadcasting System. “Frontline: The Other Drug War,” 2000, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/frontline/shows/other/. Soto, Onell R., and Debbi Farr Baker. “Eldest Arellano-Felix Brother Arraigned in San Diego.” San Diego Union Tribune, 18 September 2006, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/metro/2006 0918-1504-bn18arraign.html. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. “Statement by James S. Milford, Acting Deputy Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Drug Caucus regarding Anti-Narcotics Cooperation with the Government of Mexico,” 29 October 1997, http://fas.org/irp/congress/ 1997_hr/s971029m.htm.

Social and Economic Impact of the Drug Trade: A Global Perspective Rob Hanser and Meghan K. Smith The drug trade is one of the most lucrative operations of any organized crime venture in the world. From these operations come a variety of social costs due to accidents and worker absenteeism, health problems and addictions, dysfunctional lifestyles associated with recurring drug use, and of course criminal violence. Estimations of the worldwide economic costs of drug use and abuse reach $110 billion annually, as the income for these drug trafficking organizations accounts for over 40 percent of their activities. The drug trade is a very complex system that consists of numerous localized groups that occasionally work in tandem when such coordination is mutually beneficial. However, the social and economic impact of the drug trade can be better understood by examining the corollary issues surrounding the trade, issues that include national and international conflicts, traffickingrelated violence, and human misery related to adverse health effects.

Regional Drug Trafficking Groups As Funding Sources for Regional Militant Groups and Terrorists Among the most well-known groups that reap the benefits of the drug trade while simultaneously producing great social and economic costs within their region of the world are the Colombian cartels. While the social impact of the cocaine trade has caused health problems for the United States and even for the nation of Colombia itself, with interventions for the addicted population being a costly and recurring problem for each of these countries (particularly the United States), it is the associated paramilitary interventions that also generate huge costs to both governments. Indeed, the War on Drugs and the resultant military funds allocated to fighting the cocaine trade has totaled in the billions (U.S. dollars) and demonstrates that the economic impact affects both developing countries (e.g., Colombia) and superpowers (e.g., United States) alike. Likewise, the guerrilla operations of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have continued to be a serious threat to the internal security of Colombia, and it is the cocaine trade itself that is the major source of income generated by FARC. Thus, Colombia has been wracked by the impact of various social, economic, and military costs associated with the international drug trade. Likewise, Chinese Tongs and Triads have generated huge profits from their activities in the drug trade. Indeed, the Chinese secret societies make more money in one year than all of the U.S. currency in circulation today. This exceeds the gross national product of numerous nations around the world. Furthermore, as with the FARC in Colombia, the profits generated from the opium trade have been used to fund a militant guerrilla group along the border of China and Maynmar. This group, known as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), uses heroin trafficking as a means of funding its fight against control by the government of Myanmar. The funds from the drug industry protection and trafficking rackets have allowed this rebel group to purchase weapons and munitions that fuel further violence in the region. Other organized crime groups, such as Nigerian syndicates, have served as the glue between 335

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Colombian and Chinese organized drug producers and markets in Europe. In Colombia, Ecuador, and Brazil, Nigerian drug traffickers are active in the shipment of cocaine to Europe. And Nigerian criminal groups have also had long-standing business with heroin growers in Southeast and Southwest Asia. This is particularly true in Thailand and Pakistan, where they have established and maintained contacts with opium growers and distributors. These interrelationships demonstrate how syndicates in different regions of the world are interconnected and how the drug trade and its social and economic impact are carried beyond localized regions into the entire global market community. This also demonstrates how the drug trafficking industry has further contributed to the mayhem and social instability found in many nations throughout Africa. Nigerian organized crime that is funded by such interrelationships continues to put money in the pockets of warlords in countries such as Somalia and the Congo, leading to more of the violence and social unrest that have become characteristic of that continent. Thus, the human misery and social costs in such countries are intertwined with political unrest, economic instability, and militant violence that cripples the entire continent. The drug trade is infamous for creating problems and tensions across the world, with crime, terrorism, and corruption being directly correlated. Terrorist organizations need income to fund their attacks and activities. Drug trafficking is a source of income for many terrorist groups. In Afghanistan, the Taliban taxes the production and transportation of opium, thus providing them with a huge income source. This income helps the Taliban purchase weapons for military operations and terrorist acts. In addition, al-Qaeda’s activities may be funded by the drug trade, although direct empirical evidence linking Osama Bin Laden to the Afghan opium trade has not surfaced. Negative Health Impact on Local Populations One primary social concern for most countries combating the drug problem has to do with the impact that drug use has had on the health of those who consume these substances. One way of assess-

ing the negative health impact of illicit drug use is to generate a clear criterion for problem drugs. For policy purposes, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) typically consider a problem drug to be one that leads to some sort of treatment demand. The term “problem drug” is not dependent upon the number of persons who use the drug. For instance, although cannabis is the most widely used drug throughout the world, it is not considered a major drug threat that governments place on high priority. This is ostensibly due to the fact that this drug has less social and economic impact than other drugs such as cocaine and heroin. Regardless of how one defines a problem drug, there is clearly a health impact on those who develop a drug problem. Indeed, one socially devastating effect that the drug trade brings to individuals, those related to them, and the local community comes in the way of the addictions that are created. These health effects and the corresponding need for treatment have affected countries that are both source countries (such as Colombia) and those known to be primary importers of illicit drug trade products (such as the United States). Likewise, the addicted population tends to have an inflated risk of health problems due to the debilitating effects of drug abuse on the body and due to the risky lifestyles (and high-risk behaviors) that are frequently associated with the addicted population. As would be expected, there is also an inflated risk of premature death among this population, and this tends to increase as the addict continues to use throughout her or his life. Worldwide, there are 5.3 million drug-injecting abusers, and of those 200,000 are expected to die from their drug abuse on an annual basis. Drug abuse is also a great cause of disease, such as HIV, when abusers share and reuse needles. Indeed, it is the intravenous use of heroin and cocaine that has been shown to be a primary causal factor in the spread of HIV. Offenders who are intravenous drug users are at increased risk of contracting a host of other diseases and illnesses (such as tuberculosis and various strains of hepatitis) due to the sharing of injection equipment that is contaminated with microorganisms that spread the infection. The proportion of AIDS cases among intravenous drug

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users has remained consistent and accounts for approximately 25–29 percent of recently diagnosed cases in most industrialized nations. Naturally, the resultant medical care and other costs associated with HIV/AIDS are quite substantial and have greatly impacted many Western countries (such as the United States) and many countries throughout the continent of Africa. Economic Costs of Drug Abuse Treatment When individuals use drugs, they are less likely to go to school, stay in school, and get an education, and as a result they are reliant on their addictions and the crimes they must commit to keep the drugs coming. Likewise, there is an unknown but common erosion of families that have drug addicted members, particularly if the addict is the primary caretaker of children. Relapse rates do tend to be high, and it is common for addicts to remain in recovery for most of their lives. In the process, many addicts may destroy their bonds with their families of origin, their spouses, and their own children. The economic impact upon societies can be great indeed when one considers the amount of court resources, treatment facilities, and prison beds that are provided for drug offenders throughout the world. Collateral damage likewise results when drug offenders have children but are unable to care for them while the drug offenders are in treatment facilities or are serving a court-ordered sentence. This incurs an added cost to any country that must then assume the responsibility for providing foster services or other forms of aid in raising the children. Furthermore, the social costs associated with female drug users who are pregnant is astounding and creates a long-term (lifelong for the child) detrimental effect with untold costs associated with the harm done to the fetus. Lastly, a disproportional amount of drug offenders suffer from various forms of mental disorder. In fact, it is common for those with mental illness to essentially medicate their illness with either stimulant or narcotic drugs as a means of stabilizing various forms of anxiety or depression. On the other hand, certain drugs (particularly crack cocaine and heroin) can cause serious bouts of depression that can be permanent or can lead to acts of suicide. It

has been found that a disproportionate amount of the drug-abusing population suffer from anxietyrelated, depressive, or personality disorders. These co-occurring disorders have resulted in ever more complicated treatment needs that, in turn, create the need for more expensive treatment programs. Conclusion As has been demonstrated, the drug trade has directly and indirectly contributed to much of the human suffering and misery that occurs around the world. Given the violence associated with the industry, the displacement of income that results, and the corrupting effect that it can have on local governments, there is little doubt that the drug trade has had a devastating impact globally. This illicit industry creates tensions from one continent to another while aiding terrorist organizations that cause further strife and uncertainty for the international community. At the same time, turf battles and the fight for drug-production territory has displaced poor families and farming peasants from their homes in many less-developed nations, while this same trade has been noted to be a root cause of family breakup, homelessness, and crimes of desperation among the addicted populations in the more developed nations of the world. It is thus clear that the negative impact of the drug trade affects almost all regions of the world, with the negative effects being similar to one another in some regions while in other regions incurring different forms of cost. Yet it is likewise clear that organized crime syndicates will always provide goods and services that are in demand. Thus, the drug industry is a direct result of the social demand for these illicit products, and as irony would have it, it is typically the more developed countries that generate the greatest demand for these illicit substances. It is also the developed countries that tend to express coordinated concern and antitrafficking initiatives. Thus, the very nations that most seek to counter this industry are the nations with populations that generate the greatest demand for the industry. It is within this paradox that the continued impact of the drug trade will thrive in the global environment, and it is within this same contradiction that

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strife and conflict associated with this trade will continue around the world.

References American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders DSM-IVTR (Text Revision). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 2000. Committee on International Relations. “Combating International Crime in Africa.” 1998, http:// commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/ hfa50884.000/hfa50884_0.HTM. Gentleman, J. A. The Regional Security Crisis in the Andes: Patterns of State Response. Washington, DC: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2001. Hanser, R. “Drug Treatment Programs in Colombia.” Pp. 159–162 in Annual Editions: Drugs, Society, and Behavior, edited by H. T. Wilson. Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Duskin, 2004. Hanson, G. R., P. J. Venturelli, and A. E. Fleckenstein. Drugs and Society. 7th ed. Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett, 2002. Inciardi, J. A. The War on Drugs: Heroin, Cocaine, Crime, and Public Policy. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield, 1986. LASACT. Assessment and Treatment of Co-Occuring Disorders: Alcohol, Other Drug Abuse and Mental Illness. Baton Rouge: Louisiana Association of Substance Abuse Counselors and Trainers, 2004. McNeece, C. A., D. W. Springer, and E. M. Arnold. “Treating Substance Abuse Disorders.” Pp. 131– 170 in Treating Adult and Juvenile Offenders with Special Needs, edited by J. B. Ashford, B. D. Sales, and W. H. Reid. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2000. Open Society Institute. “International Harm Reduction Development Program,” 2005, http://www.soros.org/initiatives/ihrd/about. Perl, Raphael F. Drug Control: International Policy and Approaches. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2003, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/ IB88093.pdf. ———. “Taliban and the Drug Trade.” CRS Report for Congress, 5 October 2001, http://fpc.state.gov/ documents/organization/6210.pdf. United Nations. “International Narcotics Control Board Examines Economic Impact of Illicit Drugs,” 2002, http://www.unis.unvienna .org/unis/pressrels/2002/nar767.html. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “The Social Impact of Drug Abuse,” March 1995,

http://www.unodc.org/pdf/technical_series_199503-01_1.pdf. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report: Volume 1. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004. United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. “International Demand Reduction Initiatives,” 31 May 2002, http://www.state .gov/p/inl/rls/fs/10647.htm.

Violence, Drugs, and Organized Crime Michael A. Van Aelstyn Drugs generate estimated revenues of approximately $400 billion annually. Much of these profits are used to expand illegal markets, subsidize wars and regional conflict, and provide financing to certain terrorist groups. Every country in the world has exposure to and has been influenced by organized crime. Many different organized crime groups operate throughout the world. Most of these criminal groups generate a large portion of their income through the trafficking and distribution of illicit drugs. Violent Business The business of illicit drug sales is a highly profitable venture for organized criminal groups that are willing to take the risk associated with the drug industry. The drug trade is a growing industry using illicit activities to generate huge profits. Selling drugs is often a violent business. Violence overshadows all aspects of the trade: protection of the drug shipment and refining facilities, intimidation of customers as well as competitors, enforcement of the repayment of debts, resolving disputes, and eliminating the competition and the killing of informants, to name a few. Violence is present in both drug trafficking and drug transactions. When a problem arises during a drug transaction, neither the seller nor the buyer can seek the help of law enforcement. The problem must be settled out of court, either by the victim or the offender, and this often results in a violent confrontation. Organized crime, ranging from the Mafia to street gangs, is responsible for the majority of violent drug trafficking. According to the

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U.S. Department of Justice, “the Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported that in 2005, 4.0% of the 14,860 homicides in which circumstances were known were narcotics related. Murders that occurred specifically during a narcotics felony, such as drug trafficking or manufacturing, are considered drug related.” Drugs and Arms Trafficking Drugs are frequently sold or traded in exchange for weapons and firearms. Inexpensive high-quality military-style weapons from Central and Eastern Europe and Russia continue to fuel the drug trade. The firearms industry was initially dominated by independent dealers, but both Italian and Russian organized crime groups have taken part in this market to increase profits and acquire additional weapons. Firearms are frequently used in violent acts within the drug industry. Countries in Latin America, South America, and the Caribbean are some of the primary supporters of the illegal arms trade. Organized criminal groups purchase weapons to protect their growing drug cartels. These organizations spend hundreds of millions of dollars annually to purchase illegal arms and have these weapons trafficked to designated countries. Links to Terrorists It has been alleged that drug trafficking organizations and terrorist groups are closely linked. Terrorist groups are frequently linked with the illicit drug trade as a means to generate profits to pay for future operations, arms purchases, and infrastructure expenses. Terrorist groups frequently operate in specific drug-producing regions or countries throughout the world. This allows terrorists to exercise a certain amount of control over the drug industry in that region. With improved transportation and modern communication technology, terrorist groups are expanding their areas of operation to a more global arena. Organized crime groups will maintain drug trafficking operations in a region, while the terrorist group may have control over the territory where the drugs are cultivated, produced, and transported. In many instances, the drug traffickers transport the drugs with little interference from government or

law enforcement personnel due to protection from terrorist groups. The terrorist groups may also control the smuggling routes, provide protection to processing facilities and traffickers, and benefit from multiple methods of taxation on the drugs that the organized crime groups control. Both groups profit significantly from this operational alliance. There are many terrorist organizations operating throughout the world. The U.S. Department of State has identified twelve of these organizations as having a direct involvement in international drug trafficking: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), Sendero Luminoso (SL, Shining Path), alQaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), Hezbollah, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers). Although these terrorist organizations operate in different parts of the world, many operate primarily in drug-producing countries. The primary drug-producing countries are located in South America (Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru), Southwest Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran) and Southeast Asia (Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand). Terrorists are not the only organizations that pose a threat of violence in the drug industry. However, terrorists do employ violence with a far different agenda than organized criminal syndicates. Terrorists typically operate for political gain, whereas most organized crime groups operate for profit. This difference in operational motives has the same violent result: loss of life. Drug Countries Afghanistan is home to many Taliban and al-Qaeda extremists and is currently the world’s largest cultivator and supplier of opium. From 1997 to 2000, the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan produced 96 percent of the opium poppy in that country. Opium is the precursor plant for the production of morphine, heroin, and all other narcotic-based drugs. The money produced from opium production currently accounts for half of Afghanistan’s gross national product (GNP). The average farmer in 339

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Afghan children work in a poppy field collecting opium resin. (Ash Sweeting/Courtesy of The Senlis Council)

Afghanistan can make twenty-seven times more money on an acre of opium poppies than on an acre of wheat. Much of the money that Afghanistan farmers are making through opium cultivation is being spent on luxury items that were not available before, such as cell phones and sport utility vehicles. Farmers have the option between poverty and prosperity, and most are choosing prosperity at the hands of organized crime and local and regional warlords, who take a significant cut from the trade. Another problem is that the flow of drug profits is fueling economies around the world. In turn, the drug profits are surfacing as payoffs for government officials and so-called drug candidates and are giving much more power and freedom to organized crime. Once in power, many corrupt government and law enforcement officials are pushing for an increase in violence that is linked with organized crime as a method to benefit their own political agenda. Organized criminal groups deal in drugs that generate the largest financial reward. Heroin and

cocaine are the most lucrative drugs available on the black market. Almost 80 percent of the cocaine supply in the United States originates in Colombia. However, most of this cocaine is transported through Mexico into the United States. Colombia has the distinction of being the world’s most active cocaine-producing country. The Cali cartel of Colombia has the reputation as one of the financially strongest and most violent drug cartels in the world. Besides the Cali cartel, there are many other drug cartels operating in Colombia, and every cartel is known to use violence to protect its investment of cocaine. In addition to heroin and cocaine, there has been a large increase in the global trafficking of methamphetamine because of the simplicity and low cost of producing the drug. Conclusion Organized crime and drug-related violence and corruption threaten both national and economic security and stability. This violence will continue as

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long as the global demand for illicit drugs and the profits generated from their sale remains high. In the past few years, there has been an increase in concern for law enforcement measures to stem the growth of organized crime. Since 9/11, this problem has become a major international security concern because of the alleged links with certain terrorist organizations. Stopping organized crime at its source will greatly reduce global violence and cross-border drug trafficking as well as benefit many countries economically and socially with a dramatic reduction in overall crime. References National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign. “Drugs and Terror: Just the Facts; The Links between the Drug Trade, Drug Traffickers and Terrorists,”

http://www.drugstory.org/pdfs/drugsterror _factsheet.pdf. Oscapella, E. “The Relationship between Illegal Drugs and Firearms.” Literature review conducted for the Department of Justice Canada, July 1998, http://www.cfc-cafc.gc.ca/pol-leg/reseval/publications/reports/1998/summaries/dg_sum _e.asp. U.S. Department of Justice. “Statement of Asa Hutchinson Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration before the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information,” 13 March 2002, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/ cngrtest/ct031302.html. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics. “Drugs and Crime Facts,” http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dcf/ duc.htm.

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D. Non-State Actors: International Criminals and Terrorists .

Drug Trafficking, Transnational Crime, and International Terrorist Groups Alex Schmid Historically, a fanatical sect of Ismaili Shiite Muslims active between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries in Syria and Iran provides the first known link between drugs and terrorist crimes. The very name “assassins” is thought to derive from the Arabic hashishin, the drug they reportedly used before engaging on their murderous missions of assassination by dagger. Until this day, some terrorists (e.g., in Kashmir) are fired up by drugs as they are sent to commit acts of terrorism. In the mid-1980s, the term “narcoterrorism” came into vogue in the Americas. As a slogan, it served to delegitimize the political aspirations of guerrillas, but the term was also used to implicate certain communist regimes in subverting Western societies by creating drug problems in their midst. Originally, narcoterrorism referred to the recourse to terrorist tactics by drug traffickers in Peru and Colombia. Today, the term enjoys a certain revival in the United States, where it is used either to refer to the use of profits from drug trade by insurgents to further their political objectives or serves to suggest an ominous alliance between certain organized crime and terrorist groups. The concept of narcoterrorism is often utilized by those who wish to incorporate the War on Drugs into the War on Terror. While the propaganda value of the term is high, its analytical value is dubious due to the multiple meanings attached to the term and due to the fact

that organized crime groups are very diverse in character, as are terrorist groups. Generalizations across space and time and the assumption of narcoterrorism as a singular global phenomenon are misleading. In September 2003, the United Nations (UN) Security Council noted in its Resolution 1373 “the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials.” The task of investigating and verifying (or falsifying) this close connection empirically has only just begun. While instances of close connections can be found in a number of cases, the question yet to be answered is whether these are the proverbial tip of an iceberg or exceptions to the rule that there are few if any close connections. The Financing of Terrorism State sponsorship for terrorism declined after the Cold War, and this has made insurgents (guerrillas and terrorists) look for alternative sources of income. Today’s funding of terrorists is quite diverse: 1. Domestic. Individual and corporate, voluntary contribution, or coercive extortion. 2. Diaspora-migrant communities. Voluntary contribution or coercive extortion. 3. Coethnic and coreligious support: Donations and contributions from people with religious or ethnic affinity.

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groups, it has been asserted by an Interpol analyst that legal fund-raising is still the main source of income for terrorist groups. However, the cultivation, trafficking, and sale of illicit narcotic drugs is such a lucrative business that insurgent groups in at least thirty countries are involved in it: Latin America: Colombia, Peru, Mexico Asia: Afghanistan, Tajikistan, India, Kashmir, (northeastern states), Myanmar, Philippines, AzerbaijanArmenia, Chechnya, Georgia (Adjaria, Abkhazia) Europe: Yugoslavia (Kosovo), Turkey, Northern Ireland Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Senegal (Casamance), Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Congo-Brazzaville, Chad, Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Somalia, Comoros (Anjouan) Pakistani police officials display a selection of seized weapons to media representatives during a press conference in Lahore on December 24, 2004. Security forces arrested four alleged terrorists in a raid and recovered rocket launchers, bullets, explosive material, and 50 kilos of Hashish. (AFP/Getty Images)

In a number of cases, those engaged in combating insurgencies have also been implicated in illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs. A recent American list, however, linked only fifteen terrorist groups and conglomerates (in the case of Kashmir and al-Qaeda) to narcotic drugs:

4. State-sponsorship. Patron states supporting terrorist group to engage an inimical state. 5. Public and private donors. Individual financiers who support terrorist-controlled welfare; social and religious organizations. 6. Low-level crime and organized crime. Fraud, illegal production and smuggling of drugs, document forgery, smuggling, kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, money laundering, racketeering, and smuggling of and trafficking in human beings. 7. Investments and legitimate business. Money earned (e.g., from publications) is used to acquire enterprises and engage in trade, with profits being used to finance terrorism. 8. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and community organizations. Terrorist organizations set up front organizations that receive funds from sister NGOs in other countries or infiltrate established community organizations that receive grants.

While drug trafficking is probably still the main source of income for transnational organized crime

1. FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) 2. ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, National Liberation Army), Colombia 3. AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia) 4. Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), Peru 5. Tri-Border Islamic Groups (Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil) 6. Al-Qaeda (global) 7. PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), Turkey 8. IJ (Islamic Jihad), Palestine 9. IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) 10. Hezbollah, Lebanon 11. Abu Sayyaf, the Philippines 12. LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Tamil Tigers), Sri Lanka 13. ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty), Spain 14. Real IRA (Real Irish Republican Army), Northern Ireland 15. Kashmiri militant groups 343

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The total value of the global illicit drug trade of the world amounts to about $200 billion, priced at the retail level. Yet at the import and export levels, it is only in the range of $10–20 billion. One-third of the world’s illicit drug market is estimated to be in the United States. Of the $35 billion in annual cocaine sales in the United States, only about $150 million goes to the point where it is produced. In the case of heroin, only about 0.5 percent of the retail price goes to the producer country. While hundreds of millions of dollars might still stay in countries such as Colombia and Afghanistan, the part of that money going to the terrorists is likely to be much smaller. Unfortunately, terrorism is a relatively cheap activity (the 9/11 attacks might have cost $500,000 or less). Even small percentages of drug monies can go a long way in financing deadly attacks such as those of 11 March 2004 in Madrid. In that particular attack, seventy pounds of Moroccan hashish were bartertraded against high-velocity dynamite with a gang of Spanish criminals in Asturias. Certain links between drug trafficking and the financing of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are most visible as in the case of Colombia, where both the left-wing FARC and the right-wing AUC rely heavily on the cultivation, taxing, or trafficking of cocaine. On the other hand, the evidence in open sources for al-Qaeda’s involvement in drug trafficking is much thinner and less convincing. Al-Qaeda is quite exceptional in that it cooperates with twenty to thirty associated terrorist groups. Whether it cooperates with organized crime groups is not clear. It should be kept in mind that cooperation with organized crime groups is not as widespread as generally thought even among organized crime groups themselves. One pilot study conducted by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime surveying forty organized crime groups in sixteen countries found that in 35 percent of the cases, there was some level of cooperation with transnational organized crime groups outside of the country where the survey of the criminal group itself was conducted. However, the data of the pilot study also indicate that in a surprisingly high number of cases (30 percent), there was no evidence of cooperation with other criminal groups, not even within the country.

When it comes to the nature and frequency of links between terrorist groups and organized crime groups, we can turn to a recent Canadian government study for the best available open-source evidence as of mid-2004. Based on forty country reports, this study found only limited evidence of cooperation between organized crime groups and terrorist groups. It distinguished between five types of cooperation or linkages: operational, logistical, financial, political, and ideological. Respondents were asked to indicate whether such links between terrorist groups and organized criminal groups had been observed in their country. Out of forty respondents, twenty-five did not report the presence of such cooperation in their country. Thirteen respondents, on the other hand, indicated that they had observed some form of cooperation between terrorist groups and organized crime groups. The study noted that the nature of the links between the two types of groups seemed to be primarily logistical and financial, denoting the presence of alliances of convenience. The links tended to become more operational, the study found, in those relatively fewer instances where there were also some ideological and political links between two groups. Conclusion On the whole, it would appear that it is not prudent to lump organized crime groups and terrorist groups together. There are linkages, yes, but there are also important motivational and operational differences between terrorist groups and organized crime groups. A UN Expert Group meeting held in February 2004 in Cape Town concluded that the available responses from member states indicated that terrorist groups are frequently involved in other crimes, particularly illegal drug trafficking, smuggling of migrants, falsification of travel and identity documents, trafficking in firearms and other exploitation of illegal markets, among other things, to support their activities. However, the data surveyed by these experts did not provide strong evidence of organizational links between terrorist groups and organized criminal groups. The main contemporary problem in this area, it appears, is that terrorist groups develop in-house

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capabilities for conducting activities traditionally associated in organized crime for the preparation as well as the continuation of terrorist activities. Yet terrorism—that criminal mix of atrocities, politics, and propaganda—should not be confused with profit-driven organized crime. The danger of infiltration and treason and the danger of losing political credibility stands in the way of close cooperation from the point of view of terrorist organizations, while drug-trafficking organized crime groups are hesitant to engage in close connections with terrorist groups for fear of extortion as well as hostile takeovers of their lucrative business. References Dandurand, Yvon, and Vivienne Chin. “Links between Terrorism and Other Forms of Crime.” Report submitted to Foreign Affairs, Canada, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Vancouver, International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, April 2004. Dishman, Chris. “Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation.” Pp. 59–72 in Terrorism in Perspective, edited by Pamela L. Griset and Sue Mahan. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003. Ehrenfeld, Rachel. Narcoterrorism. New York: Basic Books, 1990. Europol. “Financial Crime Group.” Intelligence Bulletin, No. 3, February 2001. Fleischauer, Jan. “Puzzlearbeit im Schattenreich.” SPIEGEL Special Issue, Terror: Der Krieg des 21 2 (2004): 36–39. Kleiman, Mark A. R. “Illicit Drugs and the Terrorist Threat: Causal Links and Implications for Domestic Drug Control Policy.” Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 20 April 2004 (RL 32334). LaVerle, Berry. Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2003. Okan Aysu. “Financing of Terrorism: A Few Case Studies.” conference presentation, Financial Action Task Force Conference (Group of Eight), Oslo, Norway, 6–7 December 2000. Petrakis, Gregory J. “Organised Crime and the Financing of Terrorist and Guerrilla Movements.” Pp. 119–133 in Countering Terrorism through International Cooperation, edited by Alex P. Schmid. Milan: ISPAC, 2001. Schmid, Alex P. “Links between Terrorism and Other Forms of Crime: The Case of Narcoterrorism.” Paper prepared for the Expert

Group Meeting on the Nature of the Links between Terrorism and other Forms of Crime, Cape Town, South Africa, 24–27 February 2004. United Nations Expert Group. “Increasing Synergies in the Delivery of Technical Assistance to Address Terrorist Involvement in Other Forms of Crime.” Cape Town, UNODC/ISS, Document 13 (b) rev. 3, 27 February 2004. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Crime Trends: Results of a Pilot Study of 40 Selected Organized Crime Groups in 14 Countries. Vienna: UNODC, 2002. Wardlaw, Grant. “Linkages between the Illegal Drugs Traffic and Terrorism.” Paper prepared for the conference on International Drugs: Threat and Response. Washington, D.C., Defense Intelligence College, 2–3 June 1987. Woolls, Daniel. “Spain Still Hunts Bombing Masterminds.” Associated Press, 2 July 2004.

Financial Networks of Global Terrorism Marilyn Peterson Acts of international terrorism require resources and planning. Preincident surveillance and intelligence gathering, communications, travel, weapons, safe houses, and other protocols must be supported. The conventional wisdom prior to 2002 was that terrorism was an expensive undertaking, possibly funded by criminal activities including narcotics trafficking. It was also hypothesized that the alQaeda network received its funding from the personal fortune of Osama bin Laden. Government officials estimated that al-Qaeda operations were spending about $30 million per year prior to the 2001 attacks on U.S. soil. In 1999, the United Nations (UN) recommended the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which made recommendations that countries adopt criminal offenses for terrorism and terrorism financing; develop measures to identify, freeze, or seize funds used for terrorist financing; enter into mutual assistance agreements with other countries to cooperate on these matters; require financial institutions to identify their customers and report suspicious transactions; supervise money service businesses; and enhance cross-border detection of currency smuggling. 345

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In the wake of 9/11, U.S. officials were even more determined to know how terrorists are funded. Since then, efforts have been made not only to identify financial networks used by the terrorists but also to eliminate funding available to all terrorist networks so that another attack would be less likely. It has been established that the total cost of the nineteen hijackers’ project was around $400,000, a small amount in comparison to the $500 billion that is transacted by wire each day. It has further been established that their transactions were not of a nature to attract attention, either by the bankers who were unwitting conduits or by the regulators who look for suspicious activity. In fact, not one Suspicious Activity Report was filed on a transaction by the hijackers prior to 9/11, although some were filed when the hijackers’ names were released to banks after the attack. The largest sum of money moved was about $70,000; most of the wires were much smaller. Post-9/11 financial retribution was swift. By 24 September 2001, President George W. Bush signed an Executive Order stating that certain persons and groups were barred from transactions or dealings with U.S. citizens in or outside of the United States, that those groups could not receive donations from U.S. citizens, and that the government had blocked any property they held in the United States. Thirteen persons were named, including bin Laden, as were eleven designated terrorist groups, one charity, and two businesses. Terrorist Funding and the Movement of Money The sources of terrorist funding have been criminal, legal, and diverted legal. For example, the profits to Hezbollah from cigarette smuggling in the United States between 1996 and 2000 were estimated at US$1.5 million. Narcoterrorism in South America is part of the drug production, processing, and smuggling industry there. It has been reported that the Tri-Border Area where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet has been the site of planning conferences for Hezbollah and Hamas, two Middle Eastern terrorist groups. Of the nineteen hijackers involved in the 9/11 attacks, one was receiving a

paycheck from a military agency in his home country, and another worked briefly in a U.S. gas station. The diverted funds have come from charitable institutions that collected money for child care, relief, and redevelopment while passing on some of those funds, if not all, to terrorist organizations. The Office of Foreign Asset Control maintains the “Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons” list that is updated regularly and contains the names of all individuals (along with all known aliases), companies, and organizations that are tied to terrorism or narcotics trafficking. A number of organizations including educational centers, trusts, humanitarian organizations, foundations for relief and development, benevolence associations, relief funds, and other foundations have been listed as being tied to terrorism. The mechanisms of terrorist funding have been presumed and sometimes verified. One suspected method of terrorist funding was the informal banking system known as hawala in which a trusted person in one country (known as a hawaladar) contacts a similar person in another and arranges for the transfer of funds from a customer in country A to a customer in country B. These transfers occur outside the regulated banking environment. It was not until the U.S. Patriot Act that these individuals were required to register in the United States and submit federal forms such as currency transaction and Suspicious Activity Reports. The methods used by the 9/11 terrorists, however, did not include any use of hawaladars. Another means of moving money is through bulk cash transfer. This can be effected through carrying the cash on a person, carrying it in luggage, mailing it through express mail services, or even shipping it inside other objects including children’s toys, stereo equipment, or other hollowed-out objects. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), some of the hijackers used bulk cash as a method to transfer funds. The FBI testified in a case against a nonprofit organization that a key terrorist associate kept shoeboxes with different currencies in his apartment. Methods used did involve a number of traditional banking procedures. Wire transfers were used, along with automated teller machine (ATM)

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Workers pan for diamonds in a government controlled diamond mine near Kenema, Sierra Leone, on June 15, 2001. Diamonds are easy to transport and difficult to trace, making them an ideal currency for revolutionary or terrorist groups. (Getty Images)

cards and bank accounts at banks with branches in several countries. The wires were from banks outside the United States (primarily Germany and the Middle East). A typical personal account seldom, if ever, receives a wire transfer, and overseas wires are less frequent. Several of the ATM cards had multiple unrelated users, which is also unusual. The use of ATM cards or credit cards from a bank in another country is unusual, but in this day of instant travel, it has become less so. Another way to move money is through trafficking in precious metals and gems. Diamonds, because of their value, size, and weight, are the easiest to transport, and there have been some reports of some mining operations in Africa providing diamonds to be sold on the black market. A potential link between Hezbollah and Lebanese diamond trafficking in West Africa has been noted. It has been reported that about half of the groups designated as terrorist organizations by the

U.S. Department of State have ties to drug trafficking. In Asia and South America, the decline of government support for guerrilla and terrorist groups has resulted in their increased reliance on funding received from drug trafficking. In some instances, the groups receive income from protection rackets involving growers, laboratories, landing fields, and transportation brokers. In some instances, the terrorist groups have moved from being ideology driven to being profit driven. The Financial Action Task Force The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) established nine recommendations on terrorist financing for all countries to follow, including: • Ratification and implementation of the 1999 United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373. 347

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• • • •

Criminalizing the financing of terrorism. Freezing and confiscating terrorists’ assets. Reporting suspicious actions related to terrorism. Cooperating with other countries to exchange this information. • Requiring financial institutions to include accurate information regarding the originator of funds. • Having nonprofit institutions guard against being used by terrorist groups.

The member agencies of the FATF have expressed concern that nonprofit organizations are being used as a conduit for terrorist financing. It noted that these organizations attract public support, have access to large amounts of funds, and can be cash-intensive. In some countries, no regulations are in place regarding the management of these organizations and their expenditures of funds. In one reported instance, a registered charity was purported to be involved in child welfare with religiousdenomination ties. Investigators found that the group was associated with terrorist publications. In another reported instance, a group of foundations sent more than $160 million overseas. They believed that the funds were raised within an immigrant community to support terrorist acts. U.S. Patriot Act Under Title III of the U.S. Patriot Act of 2001, several changes and additions were made to the laws and regulations regarding money laundering for the purpose of strengthening U.S. measures to prevent, detect, and prosecute international money laundering and terrorist financing. When the act became law on 26 October 2001, it imposed new requirements on banks and other parts of the financial services industry and gave federal agencies improved powers to investigate financial transactions. Section 312 of the law calls for enhanced due diligence of correspondent as well as private banking accounts. Correspondent accounts are those used by banks in one country to provide access to financial transactions in another country to their customers. Thus, if a bookstore in Belgium wanted to purchase an order of books from a publisher in New York and the order required the bookstore to

furnish a check for the books in U.S. dollars on a U.S. bank, the owner could go to a bank in Belgium that had a correspondent relationship with a bank in the United States and have that check drawn. The enhanced work requires the bank to ascertain if the bank in the other country is, in fact, a bank and not a shell bank operating on paper only. It must identify the owners of the bank and also look at other banks with which it may have correspondent relationships. Finally, the transactions of the bank are to be scrutinized to identify any that may relate to money laundering. Section 313 of the law prohibits U.S. banks from extending correspondent accounts to foreign shell banks. Private banking accounts are those established by generally wealthy individuals (the normal minimum in the account is $1 million) whose ownership of the account may be shielded by the use of an employee or agent of a financial institution acting as a liaison between the owner of the account and the bank. The enhanced due diligence that is required tasks the bank to give enhanced scrutiny to the transactions to the account if they are to the benefit of a government official (politically exposed person) and might reflect activity indicative of corruption. Section 325 deals with another banking service used by money launderers and terrorists: concentration accounts. These accounts are established by an individual but give the right to make payments in and out of the account to several individuals. In the past, the bank did not track the names of those using the account, and thus people could use accounts not tied to them or their identification numbers for transactions. The law now prohibits customers from using this method to move funds without tagging the transaction as relating to the customer. It also prohibits bank employees from letting the customer know that the transaction can be thus tagged. Section 326 requires verification of a customer’s identity, maintaining lists of all customers and checking customers’ names against lists of terrorists to make certain the new customer is not involved in terrorism. Section 328 requests international cooperation on the identification of originators of wire transfers (the person or company sending money by wire).

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Conclusion The attention given to terrorist financing in the United States remains significant. The Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, established within the U.S. Department of the Treasury, is tasked with gathering and analyzing data from the law enforcement, intelligence, and financial communities on how terrorists obtain, store, move, and use money. It may also take action to freeze assets; bar foreign jurisdictions and financial institutions identified as corrupt from doing business in the U.S. financial system; end vulnerabilities in the U.S. system through developing and enforcing regulations on terrorist financing and money laundering; encourage the adoption and use of counterterrorist financing and anti–money laundering standards in the international environment; find and return assets illegally taken by officials in places such as Haiti, Liberia, and Iraq; and work with the private financial sector to detect and address vulnerabilities in its system. The U.S. Treasury reported that $9 million in terrorist assets worldwide were blocked in 2004, bringing the total blocked since 2001 to a little under $150 million. This office works closely with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and the Office of Foreign Asset Control. As the war against terrorism continues, so too will efforts to disrupt terrorist groups by cutting off their supply of funds. This may be an effective way to prevent and deter terrorist actions.

References Berry, L., et al. “A Global Overview of Narcotics— Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups.” Federal Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., May 2002. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering. “The Financial Action Task Force Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing,” 2003, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/28/ 0,3343,en_32250379_32236930_33658140 _1_1_1_1,00.htmlhttp://www1.worldbank.org/ finance/html/amlcft/docs/Ref_Guide_EN/v2/ 15-AX05_EN_v2.pdf. ———. “Report on Money Laundering Typologies

2003–2004,” 2004, http://www.fatfgafi.org/dataoecd/19/11/33624379.PDF. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. The SAR Activity Review Trends, Tips & Issues, Issue 7, August 2004, http://www.fincen.gov/ sarreviewissue7.pdf. Moorham, Mark. “Detecting Terrorist Financing.” American Banker, 24 September 2004. Murphy, Maureen. “International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, Title III of P.L. 107-56.” Federal Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 4 December 2001. Prados, Alfred B., and Christopher M. Blanchard. “Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues.” Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Updated 8 December 2004, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32499.pdf. Roth, John, Douglas Greenburg, and Serena Wille. Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report to the Commission. Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004, http://www.9-11commission.gov/ staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph .pdf. United Nations. “United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,” 9 December 1999, http://untreaty.un.org/English/ Terrorism/Conv12.pdf. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. “UNDOC Model Terrorist Financing Bill 2003,” www.imolin.org/imolin/tfbill03.html. United States vs. Benevolence International Foundation, Inc and Enaam Arnaout. Case Number 02 Cr. 0414, United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, April 2002. U.S. Congress. “Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering Investigations: Who Investigates and How Effective Are They?” Testimony of Michael F. A Morehart, Section Chief, Terrorist Financing Operations Section, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources of the Committee of Government Reform, House of Representatives, 11 May 2004, http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/ 7/257/2422/27jan20051230/www.access.gpo.gov/co ngress/house/pdf/108hrg/97396.pdf. U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of the Treasury. “National Money Laundering Strategy,” 2003, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/ enforcement/publications/ml2003.pdf. 349

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U.S. Department of State. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2005. Washington, DC: Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2005. U.S. Department of the Treasury. “Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities,” Updated 2 October 2006, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ key-issues/protecting/docs/guidelines _charities.pdf. ———. “Office of Foreign Asset Control Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons,” Updated 15 June 2007, http://www.treas.gov/ offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/. U.S. General Accounting Office. “Investigations of Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering, and Other Financial Crimes.” GAO-04-464R, Financial Crimes Investigations, 20 February 2004, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04464r.pdf. ———. Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use of Alternative Financing Mechanisms. November 2003, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04163.pdf. White House. “Executive Order on Terrorist Financing: Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism.” 24 September 2001, www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2001/09/20010924–1.html.

Has Al-Qaeda Acquired Nuclear Weapons? The State of Existing Knowledge Frank Shanty Various claims and accusations, with varying degrees of validity, have surfaced over the past several years as to whether or not al-Qaeda has acquired nuclear weapons. The Threat This investigation into whether or not al-Qaeda has acquired nuclear weapons is necessary for three primary reasons. First, the black market purchase of nuclear matériel from a financial standpoint is a very costly endeavor. If some of the allegations are true, specifically that Osama bin Laden purchased two or several suitcase-size atomic demolition munitions (ADMs) from sources in Chechnya and

hired the technical expertise to make them operational, then huge sums of money were involved. Some statements claim US$30 million and two tons of No. 4 grade heroin with a potential street value of US$700 million were involved. If true, this elevation by al-Qaeda from conventional to nuclear arms could have been financially realized in Afghanistan, a country that produces 87 percent of the world’s opium. Secondly, if indeed bin Laden exchanged two tons of heroin to the Chechen mafia, or another entity, for portable nuclear devices, then we have to assume that at some point these devices may not only be operational but may be deployed to a Western country, most likely the United States. This adds a whole new dimension to the global and destructive potential of al-Qaeda and affiliate groups and adds a new concern to present thinking relative to national defense and international security. Finally, since the end of the Cold War, tensions have been mounting over concerns that organized criminals and extremist groups could gain access to nuclear weapons or matériel. In fact, many government officials believe that the threat of a nuclear event is more severe now than at any previous period. Historical Background Since 11 September 2001, top U.S. officials consider a nuclear attack on America a very real possibility. On 15 December 2003, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, during an interview with commentator Armstrong Williams, stated that a major concern is “the possibility of . . . terrorists acquiring deadlier weapons to use against us, . . . a biological weapon of some kind, or even a nuclear weapon. . . . Its one of the most important problems we face today, because I think that is the major threat.” In an attempt to understand this issue and why al-Qaeda may be interested in acquiring catastrophic weapons, it becomes necessary to revisit some recent history, specifically the events that took place in Afghanistan following the Soviet defeat. Toward the end of the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, many members of the Afghan-Arab alumni, originally recruited primarily through the Maktab al-Khalimat (Afghan Service Bureau), an

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Has Al-Qaeda Acquired Nuclear Weapons? The State of Existing Knowledge

organization set up by bin Laden and Abdallah Azzam, a former activist in the Palestinian struggle with Israel, to recruit, train, direct, and otherwise support mujahideen (holy warriors) efforts to combat the invading Soviet forces, evolved into alQaeda (the base). Primarily through the efforts of bin Laden, this newly formed network of Afghan freedom fighters was formed to continue the jihad (holy war) struggle throughout various countries by mujahideen nationals who participated in the Soviet-Afghan war. Mind-set and Metamorphosis Bin Laden, al-Qaeda’s principal sponsor and driving force, presents his views of the Soviet defeat as follows: “Those who carried out the jihad in Afghanistan did more than was expected of them because with very meager capacities they destroyed the largest military force (the Soviet Army) and in so doing removed from our minds this notion of stronger nations. We believe that America is weaker than Russia.” Thus, this victory over a militarily superior force in the mountains of Afghanistan would not only expand bin Laden’s strategic focus but would also enable him to expand his strategic depth and thus his destructive capability. This was to be accomplished through an alignment with other like-minded and equally dangerous individuals and terrorist organizations that today comprise an international web of terror whose sole raison d’être is jihad on a global scale: an asymmetric battle between the forces of true Islam and what were judged to be corrupt secular states, including the Western world. This fight will be waged against individuals, nations, and ideologies that directly threaten the core tenets of Islam as viewed through the eyes of extremist elements such as the Taliban, al-Qaeda, Hizb-i-Islami, and other ideologically similar groups. During the 1990s, this network of Islamic fundamentalists underwent a metamorphosis, both organizationally and ideologically. Around 1992, alQaeda sought to increase its destructive capability by attempting to acquire biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear matériel and weapons. This ambition was addressed by bin Laden in an interview with Hamid Mir, a Pakistani correspondent, on 7 November 2001. Several international news

outlets carried the interview. During the interview exchange, bin Laden, in a question relating to his attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), specifically chemical and nuclear matériel, stated the following: “I wish to declare that if America used chemical or nuclear weapons against us then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as deterrent.” He would not divulge how or through whom he acquired this capability. Whether this pronouncement is true or false has been the subject of much political debate, controversy, and heightened anxiety in the post-9/11 world. Claims and Counterclaims This was not the first time bin Laden publicly addressed the WMD issue. In 1999 he gave an interview to Rahimullah Yusufzai, another seasoned Pakistani journalist. During that interview, which was published by Time magazine, bin Laden made the following statement: “Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims.” In still another interview conducted by Hamid Mir, al-Qaeda’s second in command Dr. Ayman alZawahiri stated that “if you have $30 million, go to the black market in Central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of . . . smart briefcase bombs are available.” He further stated that “they have contacted us, we sent our people to Moscow, to Tashkent, to other Central Asian states and they negotiated, and we purchased some suitcase bombs.” In November 1998 al-Watan alArabi, a London-based Arab daily, claimed that bin Laden, through his contacts with the Chechen mafia, was able to procure twenty tactical nuclear devices for arms, money, and heroin. According to Carey Sublette, “Nearly all of the claims that have circulated since then about bin Laden’s nuclear capabilities are derived directly from this report.” In an article titled “Multi-track Microproliferation: Lessons from Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaeda” 351

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Osama bin Laden (left) sits with his adviser Ayman al-Zawahiri during an interview with Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir (not pictured) in an image supplied by the Pakistani newspaper Dawn in November of 2001. (Reuters/Corbis)

in the October–December 1999 issue of the journal Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, author Gavin Cameron of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies provides the following rebuttal: “Interestingly, the allegation that Bin Laden’s group had succeeded in acquiring an ADM is similar to a claim made by the Chechen separatists that they too had a nuclear weapon.” He further elaborates that “supposedly, in the summer of 1994, Dzhokhar Dudayev, leader of the Chechen forces, privately warned the U.S. that he possessed two such weapons and would transfer them to Libya unless the U.S. recognized Chechnya’s independence.” According to Cameron, based on Dudayev’s claim “the U.S. sent an undercover team to investigate the allegations, but the Chechens were unable to show the team the weapons. . . . The available evidence suggests that

the Chechens did not acquire a nuclear-yield weapon of any variety.” If the Chechens were able to obtain one or several nuclear devices, why, with an ongoing conflict with the Russian Federation, would the Chechens release such valuable weapons to al-Qaeda or Taliban forces? If, as some claim, this exchange did take place, an interesting follow-up to this could possibly lead to an inquiry into the exact relationship between the Chechen insurgents and extremists in Afghanistan. According to Rensselaer Lee, consultant in international affairs for the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), evidence reveals that contacts between Chechen and Afghan resistance fighters have been extensive, including Chechen use of al-Qaeda training facilities in Afghanistan and monetary support. “Whether the Chechens had any nuclear weapons to sell, however, is unlikely. Gaps in intelligence

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Table 1 The Suitcase Nukes Controversy Timeline April 1995

Russian media reports claim Chechen rebels have “a number” of small nuclear devices (Atomic Demolition Munitions or ADMs)

January 1996

Monterey Institute of International Studies reports that the KGB had a number of small nuclear devices in the 1970s and 1980s.

Sept. 1996

Lebed forms commission to review security of Russia’s nuclear arsenal.

Oct. 17, 1996

Yeltsin fires Lebed.

May 1997

Lebed tells U.S. congressional delegation that 84 of 132 “suitcase sized” bombs are missing.

Sept. 7, 1997

60 Minutes airs Lebed interview in which he claims that more than 100 suitcase nukes are missing out of a total of 250. Russian PM calls allegations “absurd,” Yeltsin’s press secretary attributes comments to Lebed’s political aspirations.

Sept. 10, 1997

MINATOM: “No such weapons exist.” GRU: suitcase nukes were never produced.

Sept. 13, 1997

Head of Investigative Commission: No Russian units have ADMs; any such devices are appropriately stored.

Sept. 22, 1997

Alexei Yablokov, Yeltsin’s former environmental and health advisor, claims, in letter to Novaya Gazeta, to have met the designers of the suitcase nukes and that they were built for the KGB.

Sept. 25, 1997

Lt. Gen. Igor Valynkin, in charge of protecting Russia’s nuclear weapons, claims ADMs are too expensive to build and maintain; impossible for KGB to have its own nuclear devices. Former Head of the KGB: “KGB had no use for nuclear weapons.” Russian National Security Advisor: “No record of such devices.”

Sept. 27, 1997

MINATOM: suitcase nukes “never existed, and do not exist.”

Dec. 1997

Russian Defense Minister tells Rep. Weldon: “Yes we did build them . . . they will be destroyed by 2000.”

Aug. 4, 1998

Former GRU Col. Lunev claims that man-portable nuclear devices were built for Soviet special operations forces and that they may have been hidden in the U.S.

Oct. 3, 1998

Yablokov, in U.S. Congressional testimony, claims KGB was primary user for “terroristic” purposes but may no longer be in existence. Lebed, on NBC, claims there may be as many as 500 devices or as few as 100.

August 1999

Terrorism analyst Yossef Bodansky claims bin Laden has “several” suitcase nuclear devices.

Federal Security Service: no information on KGB possessing such devices.

Nov. 5, 2001

Lunev claims that bin Laden has obtained several suitcase devices.

Jan. 17, 2002

Russian Atomic Energy Minister: “all of these [miniature nuclear devices] are registered . . . it is technically impossible for them to find their way into the hands of terrorists.”

Source: David Smigielski, “A Review of the Suitcase Nuclear Bomb Controversy,” Policy Update, RANSAC, September 2003, http://www.ransac.org/Documents/suitcasenukes090103.pdf.

reporting and the evident common hatred of both sides toward the West may tend to inflate commentary on the issue.” Since the early 1990s, there have been dozens if not hundreds of media reports citing bin Laden’s quest and in many instances successful acquisition of nuclear weapons or matériel, specifically portable nuclear devices or suitcase nukes. Most of these reports are simply restatements of earlier published reports. The controversy surrounding suitcase nukes arose in May 1997 when former secretary of Russia’s Security Council General Alexander Lebed, now deceased, was debriefing a U.S. congressional panel headed by Pennsylvania Republican Curt Weldon. During this session, Lebed told the delegation that there were eighty-four one-kiloton suitcase-size nuclear devices missing from Russia’s nuclear arsenal. According to Dr. Bruce Blair of the Center for

Defense Information, Lebed made this discovery “after conducting an exhaustive inventory of Russian nuclear weapons in the 1990s.” In a subsequent interview with 60 Minutes, an American news program, Lebed not only repeated these claims but also raised the number of missing weapons to one hundred. He went on to say that he is unaware of their present location. The Russian Defense Ministry along with other senior Russian officials denied these claims and went on to assert that no such weapons were ever manufactured. Table 1 provides a time line of events relative to this ongoing controversy. On 1 October 1997, CNN reported that “after repeated denials from top Russian officials, Boris Yeltsin’s former environmental safety adviser, Alexei Yablokov, appeared to give some credence to Lebed’s claim. Yablokov said the military may not 353

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have a record of the portable nuclear bombs, which he said were made in the 1970s for ‘terrorist purposes’ for the Soviet KGB, the former Russian secret police and intelligence agency.” In November 2001 another unconfirmed report surfaced (see Table 1). CBS News reported on 5 November 2001 that Colonel Stanislav Lunev, a former Soviet intelligence officer who is currently in the U.S. Department of Justice Witness Protection Program, stated the following, “I know from intelligence information that he [bin Laden] has obtained several devices from former Soviet Union, technical nuclear devices.” It is important to note that according to Pennsylvania’s Curt Weldon, the Russian government has since conceded that these devices were indeed produced. Additionally, two recent works by Dr. Paul L. Williams, former consultant to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and an earlier work by Yossef Bodansky, director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare for the U.S. House of Representatives, ignited a national controversy regarding the nuclear capability of al-Qaeda following the events of 9/11. These three works have been selected for analysis because they provide declarations that have generated much public debate on this issue. The claim made by Bodansky in Table 1 was cited in his 1999 book Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War On America and is the subject of this inquiry. In this study, Bodansky claims that in October 1998 an unnamed senior Arab official stated that “Osama bin Laden has acquired tactical nuclear weapons from the Islamic republics of Central Asia established after the collapse of the Soviet Union.” He goes on to state that this information is “shared by Russian intelligence and several Arab intelligence services based on recent evidence of bin Laden’s quest for nuclear weapons. . . . Bin Laden’s emissaries paid the Chechens $30 million in cash and gave them two tons of Afghan heroin worth about $70 million in Afghanistan and at least ten times that on the streets of Western Europe and the United States.” Bodansky explains that bin Laden has also hired a team of nuclear experts and engineers to make these weapons operational.

The problem with Bodansky’s account of events is his lack of specific source information. He provides a list of news agencies and another list citing the names of specific periodicals and newspapers. He provides his reasons for this (to protect the identity and thereby the safety of his informants) in his section titled “A Note on Sources and Method.” The book is an information-packed and well-written work. However, it is very difficult if not impossible to research the sources of the assertions claimed in this book. Hence, one must treat this information as anecdotal and therefore unsubstantiated. Additional source problems were encountered, albeit of a different kind, upon reviewing two of Dr. Williams’ works, Osama’s Revenge: The Next 9/11; What the Media and the Government Haven’t Told You, and his most recent publication, The Al Qaeda Connection: International Terrorism, Organized Crime and the Coming Apocalypse. While both publications provide a great deal of source information, some of the cited material did not correspond to various assertions and claims attributed to these sources. For example, in his most recent work, The Al Qaeda Connection, in the chapter titled, “The Loose Nukes,” Williams states that “the celebrated Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir maintained not only that the story of the sale of the suitcase nukes was true but also that he had visited laboratories in Afghanistan, where al Qaeda scientists and technicians worked to maintain and upgrade the weapons.” He cites as his source an interview between Greta Van Sustern, host of the FOX News nightly program On the Record, and Mir conducted on 22 March 2002. A transcript of this interview occurring on that date could not be found. However, an interview between Van Sustern and Mir was conducted on this particular show on 22 March 2004. During this interview Mir said that on 8 November 2001, both bin Laden and Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri claimed to be in possession of “small suitcase nuclear bombs.” When asked by Van Sustern for specific details, Mir said that “when the Taliban regime was collapsed in December 2001, just a few weeks after my interview with both of them, then Afghanistan was a free country, and I got the opportunity to move in different parts of Afghanistan.

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And there was a lot of evidence that—in different mountain areas of Afghanistan, the Taliban and the al-Qaeda, both of them had established many nuclear labs, in which they were trying to—they were trying to test their chemical weapons. And on some places, some material was confiscated. And that material indicated that they were trying to make bombs, but they were not able to make big bombs.” According to the transcript of this interview, there was no mention, as Williams asserts, that Mir claimed the sale to be true, only that a claim had been made by bin Laden, al Zawahiri, and “some people.” Furthermore, Mir referred to the testing of chemical weapons, not nuclear weapons, in these mountain laboratories. He was nonspecific on the material that was confiscated. Williams cites several media accounts that are questionable and refers to sources (e.g., the Jerusalem Post and al-Watan al-Arabi) that cannot be corroborated. What Do We Know Empirically? At this point in time we know that it is impossible to determine with any degree of accuracy the present nuclear capability of bin Laden and his alQaeda organization. We also know through U.S. congressional testimony, court records, and documents recovered by U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan that bin Laden has the desire and the capability and has been attempting to purchase nuclear matériel since the early to mid-1990s, possibly as early as 1992 when he was residing in Sudan. According to published studies by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), RAND, and other reputable research organizations, his attempts often involved scams whereby al-Qaeda purchased a bogus substance called red mercury and other radiological waste. For example, the CNS examined the available evidence in detail and produced its findings in a 23 September 2002 report titled “Suitcase Nukes: A Reassessment.” The conclusions drawn from this study cited that the likelihood that any portable nuclear devices went missing during the chaos preceding the collapse of the Soviet Union or in the aftermath of its collapse is relatively low. A second conclusion drawn from this study was that in the event these

devices were somehow stolen or confiscated by an unknown entity, their effectiveness would be low if not nonexistent due to the fact that they need continued maintenance. David Smigielski, in another report issued by the Russian American Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) in September 2003, concludes that “it is difficult to draw any solid conclusions from the statements made over the past seven years. . . . Until further transparency on the state of the Russian tactical nuclear arsenal is achieved, examining past claims and allegations may be the only way to understand the possible truths about the status of Russia’s suitcase nuclear weapons.” At the beginning of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, physical evidence in the form of documents was obtained by U.S. and Coalition forces and various news outlets in Kabul. Additionally, according to Lee, “several containers were found that apparently contained insignificant amounts of radioactive material, but ‘their value for weapons was zero,’ says a U.S. government official.” This information may lend some support to the theory that al-Qaeda may possess some radiological or nuclear matériel that could be used to assemble a crude radiological dispersion device (RDD), but the available open-source information provides no evidence that supports the theory that al-Qaeda was successful in acquiring an off-the-shelf nuclear device. RAND also corroborates this conclusion. While much of this information has been generated by various national and international news organizations and cannot be corroborated, the alarm has been sounded in the corridors of the U.S. Congress and in U.S. and foreign intelligence agencies. While no senior official of the U.S. government has publicly acknowledged that any of these attempts at acquisition have been successful, a 2005 RAND report by Sara Daly and coauthors stated that “a consensus exists among U.S. government officials that al Qaeda has actively pursued the acquisition of nuclear weapons.” Additionally, in December 2004 a report titled “Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces” was issued to the U.S. Congress by the National Intelligence Council (NIC), an investigative panel representing 355

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various U.S. intelligence services. One of the major findings of this report was “that undetected smuggling has occurred, and we are concerned about the total amount of material that could have been diverted or stolen in the last 13 years.” The report also cites instances where terrorists have made a number of attempts to infiltrate sites containing nuclear matériel and further elaborates that Chechen groups “were spotted at several major railroad stations in the Moscow region, apparently interested in a special train used for transporting nuclear bombs.” Summary and Concluding Remarks In summary, this is what we know regarding this controversy. First, Soviet suitcase-sized ADMs do or did exist. They were produced most likely for the KGB (now the FSB), Russian Special Forces (Spetsnaz), and possibly the Soviet military intelligence during the Cold War. We also know that with the disintegration of the Soviet empire the economy basically collapsed, thereby creating a security vacuum at Russian and former Soviet Union satellite state nuclear weapons sites and laboratories. Many scientists and those charged with providing security to the former Soviet nuclear arsenal became either unemployed or were compelled to work for very diminished wages, oftentimes not being paid at all. One can speculate what this would do to the morale of those charged with providing high-level security. We also must keep in mind that the border regions between Afghanistan—that is, the Central Asian states that were part of the former Soviet Union—are extremely porous and that based on past events, our efforts at monitoring the movements and activities of al-Qaeda had not brought much success. There is also evidence that suggests that al-Qaeda had some contact with Pakistani nuclear scientists, although the substance of these meetings remains in the category of speculation. We absolutely know that there are significant intelligence gaps related to al-Qaeda’s WMD activities. While there have been many claims by knowledgeable writers that bin Laden does indeed possess such devices and is therefore nuclear capable, at this writing no convincing primary source data have been uncovered to support this view. There

are, however, a number of pieces of anecdotal evidence to support the belief that an ongoing effort to acquire this capability probably does exist. Finally, there is the possibility that more convincing primary source evidence does exist in the classified literature. The Lunev statement to CBS News in November 2001 implies that this may be the case. Based on the current state of knowledge concerning this matter, the prudent response to this issue is to assume that bin Laden has been or soon will be successful in acquiring some nuclear matériel and to continue to strengthen all possible defenses accordingly. References ”Al Qaeda’s No. 2 Claims to Have Nukes.” China Daily, 22 March 2004. Allen, Mike. “Chemical, Nuclear Arms Still Major Threat, Cheney Says. Vice President Decries Cheap Shot Journalism.” Washington Post, 17 December 2003. Blair, Bruce G. “What If Terrorists Go Nuclear?” Center for Defense Information (CDI), 26 September 2001, updated 1 October 2001, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/nuclear.cfm. Bodansky, Yossef. Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America. Rocklin, CA: Prima, 1999. Cameron, Gavin. “Multi-track Microproliferation: Lessons from Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaeda.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 22(4) (October– December 1999): 277–309. “Case Study: Al Qaida in Afghanistan.” Chapter 3 in Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President. 31 March 2005, http://counterterror.typepad .com/the_counterterrorism_blog/2005/03/ final_report_on.html. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. “Chart: Al Qaida’s WMD Activities.” Prepared by Weapons of Mass Destruction Research Program. Outside Publications by CNS Staff. Updated 13 May 2005, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/sjm_cht.htm. Daly, Sara, et al. “Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor: Implications of Three Case Studies for Combating Nuclear Terrorism.” Documented briefing. Report prepared for the U.S. Air Force and issued by the RAND Corporation, 2005.

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Haran, Yael. “Bin Laden Has Several Nuclear Suitcases.” Reproduced from the Jerusalem Post Report, 25 October 1999, http://www.cdn-friendsicej.ca/isreport/septoct99/binladen.html. HomelandSecurityUS.Net. “Osama and His Possession of Nuclear Weapons.” 30 March 2004, http://www.homelandsecurityus.net/osama%20pos ts/osamaposts/osama_and_his_possession_of _nucl.htm. “Lebed: Small Nuclear Weapons May Be in Wrong Hands.” CNN (Moscow), 1 October 1997. Lee, Rensselaer. Nuclear Smuggling and International Terrorism: Issues and Options for U.S. Policy. United States Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 22 October 2002, http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL31539.pdf. “Lost Nuclear Bombs?” Reuters, 5 September 1997, http://www.vanderbilt.edu/radsafe/9709/msg00163 .html. Maitra, Ramtanu. “Afghan Drug Problem Solved, Praise the Laudanum.” Asia Times Online, 16 November 2005, http://www.atimes.com/ atimes/Central_Asia/GK16Ag01.html. National Intelligence Council. “Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces,” December 2004, http://www.globalsecurity .org/wmd/library/report/2005/russiannucfac _nic_dec2004.htm. “Nuclear Terror?” CBS News, 5 November 2001, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/11/05/ archive/printable317014.shtml. Paddock, Richard C. “Lebed Soldiers on with Missing Bomb Claims.” Moscow Times, 10 September 1997. Parrish, Scott. “Are Suitcase Nukes on the Loose? The Story behind the Controversy.” Report issued by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, November 1997, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/ reports/lebedlg.htm. “Reports Link Bin Laden, Nuclear Weapons.” alWatan al-Arabi, 13 November 1998. Shanker, Thom. “A Nation Challenged: Bin Laden; U.S. Analysts Find No Sign Bin Laden Had Nuclear Arms.” New York Times, 26 February 2002. Smigielski, David. “A Review of the Suitcase Nuclear Bomb Controversy.” Policy Update, RANSAC, September 2003, http://www.ransac .org/Documents/suitcasenukes090103.pdf. Sokov, Nikolai. “Suitcase Nukes: Permanently Lost Luggage.” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International

Studies, 13 February 2004, http://cns.miis .edu/pubs/week/040213.htm. ———. “Suitcase Nukes: A Reassessment.” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 23 September 2002, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020923.htm. Spyer, Jonathan. “The al Qaeda Network and Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) 8(3) (September 2004): 29–45, http://meria.idc .ac.il/journal/2004/issue3/spyer.pdf. Sublette, Carey. “Could al-Qaeda Go Nuclear?” 18 May 2002, http://nuclearweaponarchive .org/News/IslamicTerrorBombs.html. United States of America vs. Usama bin Laden. Indictment 98 Cr., United States District Court Southern District of New York, Day 7. Jamal Ahmed Mohamed Al-Fadl under crossexamination. See also Al-Fadl’s testimony from days 3 and 4. Van Sustern, Greta. Interview with Hamid Mir. On the Record, Fox News, 22 March 2004. Williams, Paul L. The Al Qaeda Connection: International Terrorism, Organized Crime and the Coming Apocalypse. Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2005. ———. Osama’s Revenge: The Next 9/11, What the Media and the Government Haven’t Told You. Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2004. Yusufzai, Rahimulla, “Wrath of God.” Time (Asia) 153(1) (11 January 1999), http://www.time.com/ time/asia/asia/magazine/1999/990111/ osama1.html.

Organized Crime, Nonstate Actors, and Weak or Failed States Daniela Irrera To discuss the growth of organized crime activities and their connections to the state inevitably involves a broader discussion about the crisis of the sovereignty of modern nation-states and the rise of nonstate actors. Since the post–World War I period, states were considered to be the only actors able to rule the international system and to determine global policy. Then, between the two world wars and especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall, things changed. New actors (movements, groups, 357

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associations, international organizations) began to increase their presence and their influence. They are nonstate actors because they don’t belong to any national institution or play a political role, yet they represent the interests of civil society. They have been able to impose new attitudes and strategies on the states. The problems, which were handled in the past on the level of state competence (security, environment, migrations, health, etc.), began to require a global response, involving other people and organizations as well. On the one hand, the challenges that nationstates had to face from these positive actors produced positive effects, contributing to more representation, democratization, and awareness about several important issues (peace, human rights, gender equality, etc.). In this case, reduced sovereignty was accepted by states in order to achieve a higher goal. On the other hand, however, a nonstate actor could have a less positive goal. For example, illegal groups, which do not belong to any state yet, at the same time, represent particular interests, have the same capacity to influence politics and institutions by reducing state sovereignty, but in a negative way. Organized crime is one of the most dangerous of these actors. In the last few years, clans and other criminal groups have been able to make their activities and their methods more sophisticated to gain more profits, going beyond national borders and legislation. The challenges they have posed to traditional nation-states have caused several reactions and struggles. Facing organized crime, the state has two choices: it can decide to fight in order to win, or it can surrender and compromise. The decision is strictly dependent on structural conditions, socioeconomic variables, and historical contexts. The Nation-State and Its Sovereignty Crisis At the end of the Thirty-Year War (1618–1648), a long period of conflict and military operations between the most important European countries, representatives of the winning countries met in Westphalia with the aim of signing a treaty and establishing a peaceful compact for all of Europe. The agreement should have been able to stop hegemonic attempts by any state, and to guarantee new borders and alliances, but in the subsequent

period, despite the peace agreement, wars and divisions spread over the whole continent once again. Nonetheless, this geopolitical asset succeeded in clarifying some important principles, and it settled the relationships between citizens and their governors, defining the modern nation-state in its constituent elements: the territory, the people, and the government. The nation-state, as established by the Westphalia Treaty, became the dominant political arrangement and through the centuries expanded its sovereignty, in the sense defined by Hugo Grotius: “That power is called sovereign, whose actions are not subject to the control of any other power, so as to be annulled at the pleasure of any other human will.” In the period between the two world wars and during the Cold War, the nation-state remained the most important actor within the international system, determining foreign policy and global decision making. But in the 1960s and 1970s, something changed. Following popular ferment in the social, cultural, economic, and even political fields, states had to recognize that new and different actors were evolving, imposing their requirements in the international arena and demanding to be involved. Globalization contributed to the rise of these actors, making problems more widespread and more difficult to solve by individual entities and requiring a collective approach to problem resolution. In this sense, globalization had a democratizing effect: the states now governed as members of regional or international organizations and shifted their decision making to a supranational level. In doing so, states sought to guarantee their citizens a higher level of security, better living conditions, and greater political stability. Without losing its constituent elements or its traditional functions, the state tacitly agreed to transfer part of its sovereignty in order to achieve a superior goal. However, globalization did not produce only positive effects: it instigated differences among states and among the continents that increased fragmentation, separatism, and national struggles. States were not sufficiently prepared—especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall—to face these new issues. Thus, the result was a sovereignty crisis: traditional political and normative powers were less

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The peace conference at Munster on October 14, 1648, where the Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War and initiated the era of the Nation-State. In the post–Cold War period many Nation-States are under attack by organized criminal groups and violent non-state actors. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

effective, borders could be more easily crossed, and more citizens wanted to be involved than in the past. The state, still important within the global system, is not disappearing, for it continues to remain as the most solid and implemented political management system, yet it appears to be necessary to go beyond the traditional elements of the state in order to face modern challenges. The Rise of Nonstate Actors International organizations, lobbies, corporations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and nonprofit organizations can be considered nonstate actors that have posed these challenges. They have members and an internal management structure but no territory. They are autonomous but not sov-

ereign. Since the 1960s, they have, with their stance and behaviors, been able to influence international policies. Some of them are extremely powerful: the United Nations (UN), the European Economic Community (EEC), and later the European Union (EU), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to name a few. Others are important in specific fields (Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch in the area of human rights, Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund regarding the environment). Such organizations involve many people internationally, and their high participation in decision making has led some scholars to say that group policy is no longer made only by sovereign states but also with the help of such different types of actors. 359

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One logical evolution from this globalization of issues and problems is that the traditional nationstate may retreat in the face of other actors, reducing, in small or large quantity, its sovereignty. By working with positive nonstate actors, retreat as a mechanism fosters the accomplishment of major goals and contributes to introducing democracy and pluralism, but with negative actors, results will necessarily be different. Criminal clans, terrorist groups, and paramilitaries can be considered such nonstate actors. They are usually based in a state but have no borders, yet they do have an internal structure, represent some interests (even if illegal or subversive), are autonomous, and, by pursuing their aims, are able to influence the global system. But, of course, they do this in a negative way. Nonstate actors, however, must dialogue with national institutions in order to function, and at the same time, they challenge legal systems and rules. In this situation, the retreat of the state and the rise of these actors produce detrimental effects, first of all on the state itself and subsequently on the whole international system. Even though the fact is rarely reported by the international media or discussed in debates, for several years transnational organized crime has postured itself silently for dangerous global threats. Transnational Organized Crime The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, signed in Palermo, Sicily, on 14 December 2000, defined for the first time what a criminal group is: “a structured group of three or more persons existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with the Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” (Article 3). On that occasion, politicians, police officers, experts, and scholars faced the problem of organized crime by articulating its identities, resources, and links. However, organized crime is not a recent problem brought about by globalization but rather an old menace that exploited the changes within the system and thus became more modern and sophisticated. In this sense, criminal groups have simply modified

their behavior: the most advanced transactions and money laundering mechanisms applied to traditional customs and codes now produce more rapid and efficient results, going beyond national borders and legislation. In this way, organized crime has become transnational, with each powerful group managing to propel itself into an international arena without losing its traditional identity. Such groups are thus internationally active in illegal markets: selling and buying drugs, weapons, and nuclear materials and trafficking in illegal immigration, prostitution, organs, cigarettes, and stolen cars. Some criminal groups have been practically eradicated in their own countries (for example, Italian clans, the Colombian cartels, and the Italian American Mafia). Others such as the Russian, Ukrainian, and Molvavian Mafiya developed after the fall of the Berlin Wall or became more sophisticated after the Balkan Wars (as with the Serbian, Kosovar, Macedonian, and Montenegro groups and the Bulgarian, Romanian, and Hungarian clans). Some of these entities such as the Nigerian Mafia appear to be very young. Others (such as the Chinese Triads and the Japanese Yakuza) are based in specific geographical areas. These represent some of the most notorious internationally organized crime groups. All of these groups are interested in the most lucrative business (drug trafficking), yet each one is specialized in a particular field, concentrating in the producer areas (South America and Southeast Asia), the transit areas (Central Europe, the Balkan Route, and the Near East), or in the consumer areas (the United States and Europe). Poor economies, weak institutions, and ethnic conflicts are favorable breeding grounds for their exploitation. Several currents of organized crime have been analyzed, and specific characteristics and principles have been illuminated. • Organized crime is first of all an organization, including several members loyal to the group, and that organization is lasting. In other words, while the Sicilian Mafia, the Neapolitan Camorra, and the Calabrese ‘Ndragheta are fairly eradicated nowadays, in Italian history they were able over the years to maintain their families and leaders.

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• Particular networks and relations are always expected to be honored in organized crime. These relations and networks may be internal or external. With internal relations, every group has a rigid hierarchy, starting from the upper level (the boss) to the lower level (the executives), where functions and responsibilities are strictly assigned. The Sicilian Mafia is a good example of this principle, but so are the Russian and Ukrainian clans. Regarding external relations, alliances are formed with other groups. This arrangement is usually called pax mafiosa, where two or more criminal groups work together in order to better exploit illegal markets, sharing the risks and mutually gaining more profits. In such alliances, functions and responsibilities need to be clearly assigned in advance, as, for example, in the Sacra Corona Unita active in the Italian region of Campania that works together with Montenegran and Albanian clans on cigarette smuggling and drug trafficking in the Adriatic Sea. If for any reason these relations and networks are not honored, the situation leads to war, both internal (among families) and external (among different groups). • In organized crime, ethnicity determines the above-mentioned relations, especially for internal relations. This means that every group originates from a specific territory and belongs to a specific people sharing the same language, history, and customs. For this reason, clans are usually able to reach consensual agreement and to recruit new members. It means also that only people with the same ethnic origins can enter the group. No foreigner is accepted. This characteristic is true among the Central and South European and Balkan criminal groups and the Serbian, Kosovar, Albanian, and Bulgarian clans. • Organized crime can be considered an entrepreneurial actor because it has an economic goal: to gain money by exploiting illegal trafficking. Its behavior is ruled by strict economic laws. Groups monitor markets in order to discover where the demand is greatest. Then, they offer their goods, asking their price. Finally, they put their profit money in a bank. The mechanism is similar to that of any normal financial transaction. The main differences are that markets and goods are illegal, customers are unauthorized and subversive,

money is laundered through offshore banking institutions (for example, in Switzerland, Cyprus, Lebanon, or the Caribbean), and the financial dimensions of the transactions are transnational. Every criminal group demonstrates these behaviors, even if some represent an older tradition (for example, the Colombian cartels). • In doing business, organized crime necessarily meets up with other actors and entities (finance, industry, public administration, justice systems, and politics). In other words, even if transnational organized crime is able to go beyond national legislation, it inevitably interacts with the state and its institutions and officers. It needs them in order to engage in its business activities. How to join with the state and manage these interactions depends mostly on the state chosen.

Transnational Organized Crime’s Challenge to the State It is clear that states have to struggle with organized crime. They can fight it through their national legislation or through international conventions as most states certainly do. Those states that have a long-standing problem of criminal activity have developed several counterattack means: laws and regulations, police officer codes, and specialized agencies, such as the Italian Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (DIA) or the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). These solutions are usually part of a broader strategy of forming agreements between two or more states. Such agreements are established in order to control frontiers and borders, enact cooperation among police officers, and promote UN Conventions and Declarations. They have created EU regulations and international or European police organizations such as Europol and Interpol. Unfortunately, in some cases organized crime is not opposed by the states, and therefore it can interact with them. How it interacts depends on the health of the state. Within the states, what is public (institutions, funds, taxes, etc.) is clearly separated from what is private. The two dimensions cannot be merged together, and nobody who has a public charge can act for a personal or private benefit. But if the state retreats in the face of an illegal actor on an illegal 361

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issue, this separation becomes increasingly less clear. The retreat can be gradual: beginning from the lower level (i.e., a public administrative officer illegally accepting money in doing his or her job), to the middle level (i.e., a private company benefiting from public funds or engaging in vote management in local political elections), to the upper level (i.e., politicians and party leaders involved in illicit affairs). Corruption is defined as the act of a public charge to gain a private benefit and is the mode used by organized crime to spread throughout the state and reach its apex. The most serious results are evident when every sector and every institution of a state have become corrupted. In other words, the state has become privatized. While the political dimension here is very important, the economic dimension should also be addressed. When regular productive capacity is reduced and competent national institutions are unable to manage resources on their own, the fiscal system becomes inefficient or nonexistent. In such a case, the most likely probability is an economy where any resource and activity, legal or illegal, will be accepted to maintain survival. This grave situation is often associated with total corruption. Fragmented political and economic contexts, with neither cohesion nor autonomy, represent the best ground on which an organized crime group may enter the state, gain a footing, and conquer it. Taxonomy of Criminalization The above situation—and its several local versions—has been analyzed from many aspects, each one emphasizing state vulnerability and gradations of criminalization: • Weak states. In the first step in the criminalization process, criminal groups prey on state weaknesses when institutions are able to function but in a less efficient way. For example, this occurred in the postcolonization period of African states. • Fragile states. Here, one step worse, not only are the political and institutional dimensions lacking, but the economic and financial ones are lacking too, as in Central Europe after the fall of communism and in certain Latin American countries.

• Kleptocratic states. Increased vulnerability to criminalization is evident where illegal activities produce the most significant or the only economic resource and are necessary to guarantee services to the citizens, as in Serbia and Kosovo. • De-structured states. With such a chaotic situation, institutions in some sectors are not able to function at all and retreat completely in the face of organized crime groups. In other words, they accept being replaced by criminals, as is happening in Russia and other former Soviet Republics such as Moldova and Transnistria. • Captured states. Criminal overtaking increases further, as in some sectors institutions are replaced by organized crime groups. • Mafia states. Merging of criminal elements with the corrupted state, a crime group is able to corrupt and manage political activity and combine with the political system, which has abandoned its legitimate functions. • Failed states. With the total absence of legitimate state characteristics, institutions and public services are no longer existent, and criminal organizations, in effect, replace the legitimate governance of the state. This definition has often been used to describe Colombia.

Conclusion Corrupted states do not seem destined to disappear. Corruption is a phenomenon that affects many nation-states, even the most powerful, but clearly the criminalization process requires specific preconditions and variables that are observable in particular circumstances. It is necessary for organized crime to affect both dimensions of a state—the political and the economic—in order to completely overtake it. Weak institutions unable to play their role, nonrepresentative party leaders, ineffective bureaucracies, and a lack of citizen confidence in the state constitute the first set of preconditions for the criminalization process. Privatization of public resources and funds in conjunction with the lack of a regular economy constitute the final set of preconditions. Civil wars, paramilitary organizations, and brutal nationalists may be considered as other variables that can expedite this process.

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Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime in Comparative Perspective

In some cases, only institutions in corrupt states obey criminals, but in most cases corrupted states are aware of their criminal actors and connive with them (for example, in Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Russia, and Colombia). What is worse, corrupted states continue to be considered as states—because they have territory, people, and government—while they cooperate with clans and other criminal groups, facilitating illegal activities and sharing revenues. In other words, criminalized states remain accepted as full members of the international community, together with those states that try to fight against organized crime. Unless their functioning is curtailed and the proliferation of them is reduced, they pose one of the most dangerous threats to the future of peace in the international community and in the world. References Allum, F., and R. Siebert, eds. Organized Crime and the Challenge to Democracy. London: Routledge, 2003. Armao, F. Le mafie in una prospettiva cosmopolitica. P. 248 in “Manuale di Relazioni Internazionali,” edited by J. G. Ikenberry and V. E. Parsi. Bari: Laterza, 2001. Barak, G. Crimes by the Capitalist State. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. Berdal, M., and M. Serrano. Transnational Organized Crime & International Security. London: Lynne Rienner, 2002. Bull, H., and A. Watson, eds. The Expansion of International Society. Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1984. Buzan, B. People, States & Fear. 2nd rev. ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1991. Camilleri, J. A., and J. Falk. The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1992. Camilleri, J. A., A. P. Jarvis, and A. J. Paolini, eds. The State in Transition: Reimagining Political Space. Boulder, Lynne Reinner, 1995. Della Porta, D. Social Movements, Political Violence and the State. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995. Findlay, M. The Globalization of Crime: Understanding Transitional Relationships in Context. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Fiorentini, G., and S. Zamagni. The Economics of Corruption and Illegal Markets. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 1999.

Friedrichs, D. State Crime. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1998. Friman, R., and P. Andreas, eds. The Illicit Global Economy and State Power. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999. Heyman, J. M. C. States and Illegal Practices. Oxford, UK: Berg, 1999. Jackson, R. H. Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990. Kaldor, M. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1999. Lupsha, P. A. “Transnational Organized Crime versus the Nation-State.” Transnational Organized Crime 2(1) (1996): 21–48. Migdal, J. S. Strong Societies and Weak States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. Milnar, Z. Globalization and Territorial Identities. Aldershot, UK: Gower, 1992. Rose-Ackerman, S. Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Strange, S. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Wendt, A. “Collective Identity Formation and the International State.” American Political Science Review 88(2) (1994): 384–396. Williams, P. “Transnational Crime and Corruption.” Pp. 235–256 in Issues in World Politics, edited by B. White, R. Little, and M. Smith. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.

Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime in Comparative Perspective Rohan Gunaratna and Arabinda Acharya The extraordinarily coordinated and synchronized attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States on 11 September 2001 demonstrated how terrorism has mutated into new forms with deadlier manifestations. The threat of terrorism today is not only in the weapons that the terrorists can yield but also in their ability to procure and use those weapons. This has changed the entire complexion of conflict in the twenty-first century. In the new paradigm, the nation-state is confronted by armed movements and criminal networks, their activities largely financed by crime. As contemporary warfare involves terrorists, guerril363

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las, bandits, or robbers—not so much regular armies—there is a possibility that the distinction between terrorism, organized crime, and warfare would disappear, especially in the context of asymmetric conflicts. The evolving combination of terrorism and transnational crime is fast becoming one of the most defining and threatening aspects of conflicts today. The nexus (or alliance) between the two has made the objectives, methodology, and organizational structure of respective entities increasingly undistinguishable. However, the terrorist and criminal nexus must be understood in a utilitarian perspective. Even as the terrorists and criminals leverage on each other’s capabilities, these interactions are only for mutual convenience and temporary, usually devoid of any long-range strategic importance. Hence, conflating the crime-terror nexus to a point where it loses any clear meaning can be problematic both conceptually and from a counterterrorism perspective. The Context As in a commercial enterprise, access to finance and means of transfer are crucial for sustenance of the terrorist organizations and vital in the formulation and implementation of their activities. All terrorists require some income besides armaments and other types of support to survive. The groups need to have enough capital to buy and keep support; pay for arms, recruitment, training, and travel; build a propaganda base; and even pay for safe haven. According to one estimate, Osama bin Laden paid more than US$100 million to the Taliban during the five years he was in Afghanistan. The same was the case when he was in Sudan, where his organization provided important financial support to its host state. A successful terrorist group must necessarily be able to build and maintain an effective financial infrastructure to generate funding, means of laundering those funds, and then ways to make the funds available for committing terrorist acts. The end of the Cold War saw a marked decline in the state funding of terrorism worldwide. The terrorist groups then began to rely on a variety of sources for funding and logistical support, exploit-

ing front organizations, legitimate business, and nongovernmental organizations as well as relying on self-financing criminal activities such as kidnapping, narcotics, and even petty crimes. Like criminal entrepreneurs, many terrorist groups now break into high-risk, high-profit criminal ventures such as narcotrafficking, human smuggling, extortion, protection rackets, and credit card frauds as well as illicit sale of gold, diamonds, and other precious gems. Transnational terrorist groups have also mastered skills in the transborder movement of funds through diverse means. These include use of credit or debit cards, wire transfers, and even cash smuggling (both by couriers or bulk cash shipments). The groups are also known to be making extensive use of underground banking networks (particularly the hawala system) and unregulated offshore jurisdictions. This cross-border movement of capital has been especially facilitated by the process of globalization. With information age technology, it has become rather easy for the money manipulators to penetrate institutions and states for criminal financial transactions. It is in the realm of financial logistics that terrorism and organized crime converge. The convergence has enabled the terrorists to tap into vast resources generated by organized crime. Consequently, even the small and insignificant terrorist groups are now able to exercise disproportionate leverage. The New Dynamic Prior to 9/11, however, organized crime and terrorism were often considered in isolation. Consequently, very little had been written on this subject. However, the criminality and terrorism nexus is not new. One of the oldest manifestations of terrorism was in the nature of crimes committed by armed brigands known as the Thugees who were active in Western India for about four centuries until they were ruthlessly eliminated by the British. The most obvious manifestation of the symbiosis between terrorism and organized crime has been the drug trade, which is also one of the oldest criminal enterprises. What has now changed is the increasing entanglement and expanding scale and scope of the relationship that has enabled both transnational

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criminals and the terrorists to threaten vital national and international interests. Both terrorists and organized crime syndicates supplement each other to bridge the gaps in their respective capabilities. The relationship benefits both. Terrorists gain resources as well as expertise in money laundering and money transfer techniques. Terrorist groups also use assets or personnel of drug cartels to enhance, support, conceal, or conduct terrorist activities. The groups that have used the narcotics trade to further their political objectives include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the 19th of April Movement (M-19) in Columbia, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru, the Contras in Nicaragua, the Omega 7 in Cuba, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its factions the Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah in the Middle East, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the ETA Basque in Spain, Kurdish and Armenian rebels and the right wing Gray Wolves of Turkey, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, the United WA State Army, the Burmese Communist Party in Myanmar, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Similarly, criminal entrepreneurs benefit from terrorists’ military skills and networking. For example, well-known drug trafficker Joseph Murray used his extensive criminal contacts to obtain munitions (estimated at US$1.7 million in 1984) including rockets, rifles, and hand grenades for the Provincial Irish Republican Army (PIRA). The PIRA and Murray did not share a similar ideology; rather, their association was based on expectations of mutual gain. Murray obtained weapons for the PIRA to make a profit, and the PIRA used Murray to obtain weapons. Similarly, Omega 7, the Cuban terrorist group, collected money from drug cartels in exchange for information including surveillance notes and photographs about individuals identified by the traffickers. In addition to exchange of information, FARC also provided for the use of hidden airfields by traffickers against protection payments. A combination of mutual expertise also lets both have greater access to fraudulent documents such as passports and customs papers and access to the illegal weapons market.

Factors Contributing to the Crime-Terror Nexus Crime syndicates and terrorists tend to thrive in areas of lawlessness with ineffective governance that are further destabilized by war and internal conflict. In recent years, however, a number of new factors have contributed to the growing synergy among terrorism and crime. With changes in the global economy and its technology infrastructure, globalization has altered the dynamics of both legitimate and illegitimate business. As conflicts translated into armed confrontations, the demand-supply asymmetries involving weapons, information, skills, and other controlled goods spurred the trading of these goods in the gray market. These changes have had enormous impact on objectives, organizational structures, tactics, and weaponry for the terrorist groups. It is now possible for individual terrorists, terrorist groups, and their support networks to operate in a relatively unregulated environment. This facilitation is most manifest in the realms of terrorist financing in which it is now possible for small groups and even private individuals to fund terrorism at a level previously maintained by their state sponsors. Similarly, by exploiting advances in technology, finance, communications, and transportation in pursuit of their illegal endeavors, crime syndicates have now become criminal entrepreneurs. Thus, both the criminals and terrorists have been remarkably successful in exploiting to their advantage the enormous discrepancies in regulation in a globalized world. The globalization of financial, commercial, transportation, and communications networks has enabled buyers and sellers to locate each other, identify points of common interest, and establish terms of cooperation. Globalization has also facilitated cross-border population transfers. This has led to huge migrant populations in most of the developed countries. Migrant communities often provide a support base not only for organized crime but also for the terrorist groups. In many instances, the migrant settlements are the ultimate destination for illicit commodities or laundered profits generated by criminal networks. For terrorist groups such as LTTE, the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI), and the PIRA, 365

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these are the primary generators of revenue collected either voluntarily or through coercion. Similarly, financial market liberalization, technobanking, diffusion of industries across borders, and the international spread of consumer goods (trade flows) have also facilitated networking among the terrorists and the criminals. Demand for and cross-boundary movement of labeled consumer goods in computer software, compact discs, videos, clothes, and various pharmaceuticals products, for example, has increased the propensity of counterfeiting and piracy. The criminal enterprise has been able to embed illicit products in vast amounts of imports and exports that now characterize international trade. Criminals have also latched on to the Internet to extend the spread of their enterprise. Credit card frauds using information obtained from misuse of the Internet is one example. Another example is innovative financial fraud scams such as those being conducted by Nigerian criminal groups. Modern technology and the information revolution moreover have helped metamorphose hierarchical entities—both criminal and terrorist—into cellular structures. Within the groups, the terrorist cells have grown smaller and hence more amorphous and autonomous. Increasingly, the funding is being generated locally through a combination of legitimate and criminal activities. At the same time, the crime syndicates have become global mafiosi comprising major criminal conglomerates increasingly working in alliance with one another. They have become more decentralized and fluid. This has made their leadership easily replaceable and hence dispensable, thus ensuring continued and uninterrupted operations. The Nexus or Convergence With an overall decrease of state financial support for terrorism in the last two decades combined with interdiction of terrorist finances and regulation and control of charitable and other nongovernmental front organizations, terrorist groups are increasingly taking to crime to generate funds to sustain their activities. But terrorist groups using the crime route to raise money are not an entirely new development. In the past, many terrorist organizations

have engaged in low-level local crime to finance their activities. Groups such as the IRA and the German Red Army Faction raised money by robbing banks, while groups such as the PKK used extortion. FARC in Colombia collected taxes from people who cultivated or processed illicit drugs on lands that were under its control. The Lebanese Hezbollah and Colombia’s AUC trafficked in drugs themselves, while others in many parts of the world such as the Abu Sayaff Group use ransom money raised through hostage-taking operations. But what we find today is a convergence between the terrorist groups and organized criminal networks to the extent that a single entity simultaneously exhibits criminal and terrorist characteristics. For example, the Chechen terrorists may primarily be interested in creating an independent state, but they might as well be interested in maintaining the degree of instability so that they can continue engaging in extremely lucrative criminal activities. Many Irish factions may be less interested in having a peace settlement, as it may deprive them the profits obtained from criminal activities. Similarly, most members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) appear to be primarily interested in profiting from the regional drug trade, although at the same time they remain devoted to promoting a militant and extremist view of Islam. This trend is symptomatic of a growing overlap of objectives among the terrorists and the criminals. While the criminal enterprises are getting interested in influencing the political environment of the target states, the terrorist groups look to creating an environment conducive to the exploitation of opportunities provided by criminal activities. The nexus or convergence between the terrorist organization and transnational crime is derived from the symbiotic relationship between the terrorists and the criminals, a dynamic that allows both entities to profit financially. This nexus includes one of shortterm and long-term agreements. It is usually meant for exchange of expertise (money laundering, counterfeiting, or bomb making) or for operational support (access to smuggling routes). A study of the criminal and terrorist organizations undertaken by the Library of Congress found the nexus (association) of the two entities in three broad patterns. As

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the study concluded, the first form of contact between the two is alliances for mutual benefit. In this, the terrorists enter agreements with transnational criminals solely to gain funding without engaging directly in commercial activities or compromising their ideology. Then the terrorists get directly involved in organized crime, removing the middleman but maintaining the ideological premise of their strategy. Ultimately, the ideology gets replaced with the profit motive. Although the study found the second pattern to be the most prevalent, it suggested nevertheless a natural progression from the first category toward the third. The most obvious convergence between the two entities has been in the field of transnational smuggling operations involving drugs, illegal arms, and humans. In the drug trade, for example, there has been a well-organized web of drug cartels and terrorist groups (Colombia), narcotics and arms (Cuba and Mexico), and money laundering (Panama). Drugs and terrorism frequently share common grounds of geography, money, and violence. Interaction within this web is often based on expectations of mutual benefit. Organizations that launder money for drug traffickers also launder money for arms traffickers and terrorists. Even without the expectations of mutual benefit, the interaction takes place for profit. In the drug trade (narcoterrorism), terrorist groups or associated individuals not only aid or abet drug trafficking endeavors by providing security but also may cultivate, manufacture, transport, or distribute narcotic substances themselves in order to finance their terrorist activities. The money derived from the narcotics trade provides them with a degree of autonomy, flexibility, and relative freedom from scrutiny. In effect, money from the narcotics trade has helped fill the void left by the state sponsors. Conversely, terrorists also see narcotics as a weapon system aimed at weakening their enemy. Not only does it pay for itself, but the huge profits in hard currency get into the banking system and the main economic arteries of the target societies through money laundering. Drugs go to the target countries, where they corrupt and kill. For the terrorists, the drug trade is a unique dynamic that not only weakens and harms future generations of the

enemy but also provides a mechanism for generating proceeds that finance liberation movements, and the drug distribution routes are also used for trafficking illegal weapons bought on the black market. There are instances in which criminal organizations run the drug trafficking operation, while the terrorist groups control the territory where the drugs are cultivated, processed, and transported. This has been the way with terrorist groups such as FARC and the Lebanese Hezbollah. The erstwhile Taliban regime directly taxed and derived financial gain from Afghanistan’s rampant opium trade. According to the 2000 report of the Observatoire Geopolitique des Drouges, about 80 percent of the Taliban’s financial resources, estimated at $75 million, was derived from its tariffs on opium and heroin. Even though the Taliban’s spiritual leader Mullah Mohammed Omar prohibited poppy cultivation in July 2000, the administration managed to profit from opium’s scarcity that led to a sharp increase in prices in 2001. The drug trade funds a significant part of the economies of Syria and Lebanon. It is also no secret that while Damascus has funded terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Beirut continues to host numerous terrorist groups including Hezbollah and Hamas. Additionally, the strategic alliance between the IMU, the Afghan drug mafia, and Central Asian criminal groups was to ensure that drug shipments transit safely between Afghanistan and the Russian Federation and the Caucasus. In addition to their involvement in the narcotics trade, terrorist groups have also engaged in other crimes such as fraud and human trafficking to raise money. The LTTE amassed huge payoffs from human smuggling. Thai criminal networks help facilitate smuggling of small arms into Sri Lanka and the Indonesian conflict zones of Aceh, Sulawesi, and Maluku to arm terrorist groups. In Albania, which is considered a terrorist transit point, organized crime rings help smuggle terrorists from the Black Sea to Western Europe. Bosnia is also a transit point for Islamic extremists, and the operation is facilitated by extensive links among criminal elements in Bosnia, Russia, Albania, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, Austria, Germany, and Italy. These links also 367

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help criminal groups to gain access to state-controlled arms stockpiles, which end up as weaponry for the terrorists and insurgents. Victor Bout, an ex-KGB officer turned criminal, supplied arms to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, the Revolutionary United Front (RYF) of Sierra Leone, and the Taliban. Under the cover of a legal business organization called Transavia Export Cargo set up in 1993 in Belgium, Bout could traffic in light weaponry, antiaircraft equipment, munitions, tanks, and even helicopter parts in many countries (e.g., Afghanistan, Angola, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, and South Africa). Points of Convergence: Organizational, Operational, and Tactical Terrorists and persons engaged in organized crime are rational actors, operating clandestinely against the state (except where the state is in complicity or actively engaged in the criminal activity). Both use violence or the threat thereof as a means to achieve their objectives. Some of the tactics used by both are the same, such as bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, attempts at intimidation and coercion, and extortion (either in the form of protection money or revolutionary taxes). While criminal activities provide funds to the terrorist organizations, organized crime syndicates use terrorist tactics such as bombings and kidnappings to add credibility to their extortionist demands. For example, in a series of attacks, the Colombian drug cartels assassinated Lara Bonilla (April 2004), bombed the U.S. embassy in Bogotá (November 1984), and threatened to kill U.S. citizens in retaliation for seizure of drugs by Colombia’s special antinarcotics unit. Subsequently, in association with the terrorist group M-19, the drug syndicates raided the Colombian Palace of Justice, assassinating eleven judges and destroying a large number of documents pertaining to Colombian nationals awaiting extradition to the United States. Similarly, in the 1990s, the Italian Mafia in response to the government’s anti-Mafia drive responded with terror attacks against the Uffizi Gallery in Florence and the St. John Lateran Church in Rome. In many cases, criminal and terrorist groups have also developed the capacity to simultaneously

engage in criminal and terrorist activities on their own. Here the point of convergence is the operational tactics in which the two entities learn from each other’s expertise but operate separately. This is manifested in criminal groups using terror tactics to influence the political process and terrorists engaging in organized crime to replace or recoup financial support from state sponsors. In recent times, terrorism and organized crime also have organizational and functional similarities. Both have assumed networked structures resembling modern business enterprises organized into small cells without a central command. This has enabled them to become more amorphous and discreet. Both groups exploit modern technologies (computing, telecommunications, and the Internet) to plan and coordinate their activities from around the world. Both often use similar methods (underground financial networks, human couriers) to make, move, and launder money. Their support and recruitment bases now overlap. For example, the Chechen diaspora in Russia, which had been the backbone of the Chechen criminal network, turned to terrorism by providing support to carry out attacks in Moscow and Volgondonsk. Ethnic Albanians in Europe running prostitution and drug rings had links with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Similarly, there has been a significant increase in the recruitment of criminals in prisons into terrorist organizations. Many members of the Palestinian terrorist groups are being recruited from internment camps in Jordan. In the Caucasus, prison converts are considered assets for terrorist groups because of their ability to blend easily into their societies, which enables them to stay out of law enforcement scrutiny. Richard Reid, the infamous Shoe Bomber, was a criminal who converted in a British prison. Jose Padilla, the so-called Dirty Bomber, was exposed to Islam in a U.S. prison. Christian Ganczarski, a German convert who coordinated logistics for the Djerba bombing in April 2002, and Pierre Richard Robert, implicated in terrorist attacks in Morocco, were recruits with criminal backgrounds. Common experience in prison generates a level of trust that can easily translate into common ventures.

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Often, crimes committed by both of these entities differ only in motive and not in substance. Here, the points of convergence are where the resources of the terrorists or the profits of transnational criminals mix. To make money, both terrorist organizations and crime syndicates delve into check, credit card, and debit card frauds; frauds in commercial loan transactions; counterfeiting; computer intrusion and wire transfers; smuggling such as transactions involving conflict diamonds (guns-for-diamond trade); and CD and video piracy. The money generated from criminal activity is combined with legitimate accounts to mask criminality in funds transactions. Terrorist groups also abuse charitable organizations, shell companies, and offshore trusts. In many offshore centers such as Antigua, the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Labuan (Malaysia), Malta, Mauritius, Vanuatu, there are minimal regulations on international business companies and trust arrangements. This helps the promoters mask their true identity and the value, nature, and location of their assets, thereby creating opportunities for criminal money laundering and financing of terrorist activities (reverse money laundering). Both organized criminals and terrorist groups are adept at circumventing the guidelines for reporting suspicious transactions that leads to law enforcement investigations, as demonstrated from the fact that the 9/11 plotters took great care to move money through regular banking channels in small amounts to avoid detection. Motivational and Ideological In certain cases criminal groups have displayed distinct political motivations that often go beyond obstructions of legal and judicial processes aimed against crime. The organized crime syndicates seek direct involvement in the political processes and institutions of a state, especially in the economic sector. The political-criminal groups in Russia and Albania, for example, seek to control the weak political structures in their respective areas. Similarly, criminal terrorists use political grievances to justify what would normally be regarded as purely criminal acts. Here the point of convergence is an interchangeable membership and recruitment base. In a sense, these entities are terrorists during the day and criminals at night.

Geographical The bases of operations for the two also converge in areas with little governmental controls, weak law enforcement, and open borders. One such area is in the Russian Far East, where relative lack of central control from Moscow has enabled transnational criminals and terrorist groups to heavily infiltrate governmental and law enforcement structures. Similarly, the terrorist groups in Myanmar sustain on a thriving drug trade along the Golden Triangle, comprising vastly unpoliced areas in southern China, Laos, and to a lesser extent northern Thailand. Another significant manifestation of this is the emergence of geographic pockets of specialized criminal activity supporting the spread of both transnational crime and terrorism. Specific areas in Russia, for example, are considered to be reliable sources of small arms, while Algerian-based criminal groups are known specialists in producing counterfeit documentation. Points of Divergence The crime and terrorism nexus, however, need not be conflated unduly. For one thing, terrorist groups are not entirely dependent on criminal activities but instead have diversified portfolios for raising money. Although there is some common ground between organized crime and terrorism and an overlap of modus operandi, there are several important differences. Terrorism is usually a mixture of politics, ideology, propaganda, and warfare. Terrorists often see themselves as political actors. Political ideology, radical religious viewpoints, alienation, or revenge usually drive the terrorists, not necessarily a desire for financial gain. Organized crime, on the other hand, shuns publicity, does not usually confront the state, and while trying to infiltrate the political establishment for logistical reasons has generally no political ambitions. Organized crime groups are essentially criminal entrepreneurs, pragmatic rather than ideological, and their political activities are almost invariably intended to protect their illegal activities. Furthermore, many criminal acts are demand and supply driven such as the drug trade, which has a strong demand component, while there is no international demand for terrorism. For the terrorists, money is a means to an end, not an end in 369

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itself. Besides, terrorist victimization is generally less discriminate, in which case more often than not innocent civilians are the targets. Often, the association of terrorist groups with criminal organizations may erode their support base. This has been more pronounced in cases where the terrorist group is involved in the drug trade. For example, the diaspora support for Omega 7 in Cuba declined once the group’s involvement with the drug trade was known, even to the extent that former supporters began to cooperate with law enforcement authorities against Omega 7. Indulgence in some form of crime such as the illicit narcotics trade may also violate a terrorist group’s religious or political beliefs. Some groups have managed to get around the problem with their own interpretation of the religious text, as with Sunni Taliban and the Shiite extremists of Hezbollah. For them, even though Islam forbids consuming drugs such as opium, it nevertheless permits producing and selling them. As discussed earlier, the Taliban’s decree against poppy cultivation was a tactical move to garner more revenue with increasing prices. The trend that is now increasingly emerging is some form of terrorists and criminal hybrids. These combine a political agenda and quest for power with a desire to make profits through illegal activities and a willingness to use significant levels of violence. Cooperation takes place between the criminal enterprises and terrorist organizations, such as the Madrid bombings case where the attacks were carried out by a strange mix of longtime extremists and radicalized gangsters. The danger lies in the fact that for most of the terrorist groups that need independent funding and need to be self-financing entities, crime is often the most obvious route. Crime is self-starting and requires no particular training or expertise. Conclusion As global counterterrorism efforts gained rapidly in scope and intensity, the terrorist groups developed new strategies not only to avoid attrition and interdiction but also to supplement their capabilities. In this, the terrorist groups have benefited immensely from their links with crime. This fatal combination of political and economic motivation and terrorist

and criminal strategies and tactics now poses an unprecedented and complex threat to international security. The terrorist use of organized crime has the potential to jeopardize terrorist finance interdiction strategies significantly. Alternatively, however, criminal enterprises provide opportunities for law enforcement infiltration. Conventionally, law enforcement’s response to crime has been within the context of respective domestic jurisdictions. But as the terrorist support base gets more and more embedded in criminal empires and terrorism begins to masquerade as organized crime, it is necessary that the knowledge of criminal operations be leveraged to understand evolving terrorist tactics. In the ultimate analysis, success of antiterrorist and anticrime strategies would depend on how the concerned agencies understand the new paradigm and calibrate their responses appropriately. References Farah, Douglas. Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror. New York: Broadway Books, 2004. Ianni, Francis A. J. Black Mafia: Ethnic Succession in Organized Crime. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974. Jost, P. M., and H. S. Sandhu. “The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and Its Role in Money Laundering,” 2000, http://www.interpol .int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/ hawala/default.asp. Kupperman, Rupert H. “A Dangerous Future: The Destructive Potential of Criminal Arsenals.” Harvard International Review 17(3) (Summer 1995): 46–49. Makarenko, Tamara. “A Model of Terrorist-Criminal Relations.” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 August 2003. ———. “Transnational Crime and Its Evolving Links to Terrorism and Instability.” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 November 2001. Naylor, R. Thomas. “From Cold War to Crime War: The Search for a New National Security Threat.” Transnational Organized Crime 1(4) (Winter 1995): 37–56. Schmid, Alex P., ed. Countering Terrorism through International Cooperation. Vienna, Austria: ISPAC, 2001. Williams, Phil, and Dimitri Vlassis, eds. Combating Transnational Crime, Concepts, Activities and Responses. London: Frank Cass, 2001.

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Underground Commerce: Black Markets

Underground Commerce: Black Markets Georgios A. Antonopoulos Black markets, also known as criminal, illegal, irregular, or underground markets, are markets in which specific goods or services are provided contrary to the regulations, rules, and laws of and embargos on specific contexts, be it a region, a country, a locality, or even a much smaller and highly regulated setting such as a prison. Black markets have the ability to function effectively within the established price system that is defined by supply and demand. There are a number of reasons that black markets emerge and consolidate, including: 1. Commodities and services are not available in the legal market or are in short supply, and the potential customer is willing to pay high prices to get them. For example, the number of people requiring kidney transplants in Australia is about 2,000, while the kidney transplants performed each year total only 400. This results in a waiting period of about three years. 2. Commodities and services are available in the legal market but for a much higher price than their real value. In this case, a number of people would be served by the black market. However, it is very likely that many will continue being served by the legal market. Fraud is used in the process of exploiting an otherwise legitimate process.

Black markets have a very long history throughout the world. However, it is the black markets of the early twentieth century that received media attention and fed the public imagery about the black market itself as well as about organized crime. The alcohol black market in the United States during the Prohibition era in the 1920s is probably the most famous example. In January 1919, the U.S. government introduced via the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution the prohibition of the manufacture, distribution, and sale of alcohol. The Volstead Act that followed (October 1919) set the scene for enforcement. Prohibition presented the criminal organizations of the time with great opportunities for huge profits, and one of the most famous criminals of all time, Al Capone, is said to have built an empire of crime around the alcohol

black market. Black markets also flourished during World War II in those countries involved in the war due to rationing. Citizens were issued ration books for essential commodities such as cheese, meat, rice, fish, eggs, sugar, clothing, petrol, etc. The term “black market,” as opposed to other relevant terms, was likely coined and was extensively used in Britain during World War II. Nature and Extent of Black Markets Nowadays, there are black markets of commodities such as human organs; drugs and medicine, including methadone; arms; nuclear material; personal data; motor vehicles; oil, fuel, and gasoline; clothing; tobacco; ivory; flora and fauna; alcohol; gold and silver; gems; artwork; food; CD and DVDs; software; books; tickets for music and sporting events; pornographic material; and currency. There are also black markets for services such as labor, adoptions, prostitution, gambling, and loan-sharking. Some of the commodities and services available on the black market possess more advantages for the black marketers. For instance, diamonds are small and durable, are easily exchanged with other commodities, and are extremely difficult to trace. Of great importance in that respect is the risks taken and the punishment in case of apprehension. For example, in some countries there is no legal framework against the trafficking of human beings, which reduces significantly the risks for the actors of black markets in prostitution and labor. According to J. Bermomeu, the black markets that existed after World War I are different than those in existence today in the sense that “the former bridge a supply gap on essential goods whereas the latter form in response to a demand gap and tax-evasion motives on products deemed to be socially nefarious.” Black markets are dynamic and are affected by a number of socioeconomic factors. Contexts in transition are vulnerable to the establishment of black markets. The size, importance, and functionality of black markets differ by locality, country, or other spatial context as well as by temporal contexts. However, the greater the control, regulation, or taxation on a given commodity, service, or economy as a whole, the greater the possibility for the establishment of a black market. The significance of the black 371

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A truckload of beer bound for Chicago is confiscated and later destroyed because it violated the War Prohibition Act, introduced as a temporary measure to conserve grain during World War I. Nationwide prohibition of alcohol was enacted in the United States in 1920, giving rise to rampant bootlegging and illicit production. (Library of Congress)

market sometimes may even surpass the crime-andjustice framework. In the former Soviet Union, hiring labor outside the household and buying a commodity with the intent to resell for profit were serious crimes not only because they undermined regulations but also because they were considered acts essential to a capitalist system. There are numerous estimates of the size of specific black markets throughout the world. For instance, the estimated size of the CD black market is US$4.6 billion a year, that of drugs reaches US$900 billion a year, the counterfeit products black market reaches US$630 billion a year, and the arms black market reaches US$10 billion a year. Moreover, the black market in endangered animals is worth US$6 billion per year. However, one needs to be extremely cautious with these estimations due to: 1. Black markets involving economic activities that go unrecorded in the official statistics.

2. Some data reflects the product of seizures by the authorities of black market commodities or arrests of individuals involved in black markets of any kind. This data, however, merely reflects the intensity and success of law enforcement operations. 3. Discrepancies in official reports. 4. Some countries not offering any statistics (even rudimentary). 5. Some other countries hiding the extent of their legitimate businesses when it comes to specific commodities, something that makes an attempt to measure the extent of the black market futile. For instance, in relation to the arms black market, governments frequently underreport the legitimate arms trade business for political, national, and strategic reasons.

Black markets have a number of features and internal economic characteristics also present in the legal markets such as sellers and buyers, quality

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Underground Commerce: Black Markets

specifications, prices, profits, and contract enforcement. Perhaps another similarity between black and legal markets is that certain skills are required by some of the actors such as those in the distribution of resources. However, black markets have a set of distinct features: 1. Heavy restrictions on the part of the state, the regulator, or the supplier. 2. Clandestine and covert methods. This is why T. Naylor suggests that “the essence of a black market transaction is summed up by the fact that ‘black’ is not a color, it is the absence of light.” 3. The frequent presence of “multifaceted organizational entities, in respect of their sociological composition and their use of resources,” according to P. Arlacchi. 4. The absence of formal mechanisms regulating the whole market structures and functioning, property rights, contract enforcement, and access to public goods. 5. A large part of the costs associated with the whole business is related to the actors and the lubrication of specific parts of the whole exchange network (e.g., payments for loyalty and silence rather than the acquisition of the commodity to be sold). 6. Invisible and informal exchange networks instead of formal and impersonal ones. 7. Large profits from black markets are laundered.

According to S. MacKenzie, black markets can be distinguished in four groups depending on the status (legal, illegal) of the commodity or the service at each stage of the market, namely source, transportation, and destination. These groups are: 1. From illicit source to illicit transportation to illicit destination (illicit→illicit→illicit, e.g., drugs). 2. From illicit source to illicit transport to licit destination (illicit→illicit→licit, e.g., antiquities). 3. From licit source to illicit transport to illicit destination (licit→illicit→illicit, e.g., cigarettes). 4. From licit source to illicit transport to licit destination (licit→illicit→licit, e.g., gems).

The organization of the black markets (i.e., the distribution exchange) varies in nature depending on the needs of the markets and the nature or the quantity of the product. For instance, tourists bring

clothes from their holiday destinations to their country and sell them to interested buyers. These people act as importers and distributors. Largescale black markets usually require a longer chain of distribution, with individuals having specific duties. However, it is common for individuals to have more than one duty within the same chain. A black market can be closed and not visible to the public, such as that involving nuclear weapons, or open and highly visible. Some black markets of commodities can be closed or open depending on the circumstances, the tax consciousness of the general public, and the commodity concerned. There are some black markets that are more tolerated than others, as they are less stigmatized, are not socially condemned, and are not the focus of persistent law enforcement. This depends on whether the particular black market provides a link between two sets of legal activities such as, for instance, producing and consuming alcohol or cigarettes. The Role of Corruption, Violence, and the Legal Sector in Black Markets Systematic corruption has been an integral part of black markets, and the actors of black markets, especially when it comes to large and persistent black markets, depend on corrupt public officials such as police and customs officers, coast guards, judges, prosecutors, etc. For instance, the levels of tobacco smuggling and in consequence the tobacco black market tend to be equivalent to the corruption levels of a country. There has also been a huge debate as to the role of violence in the black markets of any kind. Accounts of criminal organizations involved in black markets emphasize the use of force or violence on the part of the criminal organization or many times individuals in their attempt to safeguard their interests, as property rights cannot be enforced by the law. Recent academic accounts, however, suggest that overt violence jeopardizes the market by attracting unnecessary attention on the part of law enforcement agencies. According to D. Hobbs and G. Pearson, this is a sign of “market dysfunction and instability,” and is therefore “bad for business.” According to M. E. Beare, “governments, the media, and the public appear to be most comfortable with a moral order that is divided with a 373

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degree of certainty and clarity between the legitimate and the illegitimate.” However, there are numerous examples proving that this clear boundary between the legal and black markets does not exist. L. Joossens and M. Raw suggest, for instance, that large tobacco companies “turn a blind eye” to cigarette smuggling and in fact sometimes encourage it as a “market entry strategy” as a way to open markets to specific brands, introduce cheaper cigarettes, stimulate consumption, and eventually increase market share as well as put pressure on governments to reduce or not to increase taxation on cigarettes. Legal businesses are also involved in the transportation and warehousing of products before they are introduced into the black market, and many times legal businesses are used as outlets for the sale of black market commodities. Conclusion Black markets are potentially disruptive to the state and society that impose laws and regulations exactly because the black market undermines those laws and regulations. Some black markets, such as that of the arms trade, create strategic and military imbalance, and some others such as that of flora and fauna, pose a danger to endangered species. However, the level of relative disruption and threat is extremely difficult to establish. References Arlacchi, P. “Some Observations on Illegal Markets.” Pp. 203–215 in The New European Criminology, edited by V. Ruggiero, N. South, and I. Taylor. London: Routledge, 1998. Beare, M. E., ed. Critical Reflections on Transnational Organised Crime, Money Laundering, and Corruption. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003. Bertomeu, J. The Economics of Black Markets. Working Paper, Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, 2004. Halstead, B., and P. Wilson. “‘Body Crime’: Human Organ Procurement and Alternatives to the International Black Market.” Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 30 (1991): 1–8.

Hess, H. “The Other Prohibition: The Cigarette Crisis in Post-War Germany.” Crime, Law & Social Change 25 (1996): 43–61. Joossens, L., and M. Raw. “Cigarette Smuggling in Europe: Who Really Benefits?” Tobacco Control 7 (1998): 66–71. Lankenau, S. E. “Smoke ’Em If You Got ’Em: Cigarette Black Markets in U.S. Prisons and Jails.” Prison Journal 81(2) (2001): 142–161. MacKenzie, S. “Organised Crime and Common Transit Networks.” Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 233 (2002): 1–6. Naim, M. “Broken Borders.” Newsweek, 24 October 2005, 56–66. Naylor, T. “Loose Cannons: Covert Commerce and Underground Finance in the Modern Arms Black Market.” Crime, Law & Social Change 22 (1995): 1–57. ———. “Predators, Parasites, or Free-market Pioneers: Reflections on the Nature and Analysis or Profit-Driven Crime.” Pp. 35–54 in Critical Reflections on Transnational Organised Crime, Money Laundering, and Corruption, edited by M. E. Beare. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003. ———. “The Underworld of Gold.” Crime, Law & Social Change 25 (1996): 191–241. ———. Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance and the Underworld Economy. Rev. ed. New York: Cornell University Press, 2004. Pearson, G., and D. Hobbs. Middle Market Drug Distribution. Home Office Research Study 227. London: Home Office, 2001. Reuter, P. Disorganised Crime. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983. Tailby, R. “The Illicit Market in Diamonds.” Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 218 (2002): 1–6. Von Lampe, K. “The Trafficking of Untaxed Cigarettes in Germany: A Case Study of the Social Embeddedness of Illegal Markets.” Pp. 141–161 in Upperworld and Underworld in Cross-Border Crime, edited by P. C. van Duyne, K. von Lampe, and N. Passas. Nijmegen, Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2002. Warchol, G. L. “The Transnational Illegal Wildlife Trade.” Criminal Justice Studies 17(1) (2004): 57–73. Wright, R. Organised Crime. Cullompton, UK: Willan, 2006.

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Combating Transnational Organized Crime: Technical and Legal Issues Anna Jonsson Transnational Organized Crime Organized crime is not a recent phenomenon, as the Italian and American experiences would suggest. However, as an effect of modernization, globalization, and Europeanization, the phenomenon of organized crime has moved to become transnational and even a threat to national sovereignty. Since the early 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, transnational organized crime has been perceived as a growing security problem. This and the diminishing military threat have led to transnational organized crime becoming an important part of most states’ security doctrine. The illegal transnational activity causing the most concern is the trafficking in drugs, weapons, persons, and weapons of mass destruction components, followed by money laundering and corruption. Taken together, all these activities pose severe threats to democracies and open societies all over the world. Traditionally, organized crime has been profit driven and hence has sought to profit from its target (i.e., the state and its institutions) rather than destroying it. However, in the beginning of the twenty-first century, there are signs that transnational organized crime and various terrorist organizations are joining forces. In particular, the end of the Cold War led to a gradual decline of state financing for insurgent and terrorist organizations. This in turn led many

such groups to become involved in organized crime for the purpose of financing their operations. The international efforts to counter terrorist financing after 9/11 have further accelerated this trend. Taken together, this has caused the international community to adopt new conventions and establish new organizations in order to combat transnational organized crime. The main goal of these international initiatives has been to eliminate legislative discrepancies and make cooperation between states more efficient. International Instruments Until 2000, the main multilateral instrument in the fight against organized crime was the 1988 United Nations (UN) Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. This convention is mainly a law enforcement instrument that aims to ensure cooperation among law enforcement agencies of the member states. The UN Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) promotes adherence to and the implementation of the convention. The UNDCP also assists in the drafting of national legislation on the topic. In 1994, during the World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime, the UN member states adopted the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime. This declaration aimed to further improve the national and international responses to transnational organized crime, and it pointed out the need for a generally accepted definition of organized crime. In addition, the ministerial conference asked the Commission on Crime 375

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Prevention and Criminal Justice to investigate the possibilities of drawing up a convention against organized crime. In 1995, the Buenos Aires Declaration on Prevention and Control of Organized Transnational Crime was adopted in order to promote national and regional actions against transnational organized crime. In 2000, the UN adopted the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Subsequently adopted were the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air, and Sea; and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. These instruments provide definitions of what constitutes an organized criminal group and a transnational crime. In addition, the convention requires that ratifying states adopt legislation that criminalizes participation in an organized criminal group. In general, states that have ratified the convention take it upon themselves to create domestic criminal offenses to combat the problem and to adopt frameworks for mutual legal assistance, extradition, law enforcement cooperation, and technical assistance and training. The convention deals with some of the major activities in which transnational organized crime is commonly involved, such as money laundering, corruption, and the obstruction of investigations or prosecutions. In October 2004, the Council of Europe (CoE) had forty-six member states covering the vast territory of Europe and the former Soviet Union, Central Asia not included. The CoE has drafted a number of conventions of relevance for combating transnational organized crime, such as the 1957 European Convention on Extradition and its protocols, the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and its protocols, and the 1970 European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments. More recently, the CoE has adopted conventions aiming to meet the new security threats, such as the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. In addition, the CoE has adopted both a civil and

criminal convention on corruption and a convention on laundering and the search, seizure, and confiscation of the proceeds from crime. The latter came into effect in 1993. The European Committee on Crime Problems (ECCP) is responsible for overseeing and coordinating the CoE’s activities in the field of crime prevention and crime control. In addition, the CoE is responsible for several programs for assisting and evaluating legislative projects in member states. During the 1990s, the Octopus Project was established in order to assist Central and East European states in their efforts to combat corruption and organized crime. A final conference was held in the end of 2000. In May 1999, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) was set up by Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. GRECO was established to monitor the observance of the Guiding Principles in the Fight against Corruption and the implementation of international legal instruments adopted in pursuance of the CoE’s Programme of Action against Corruption. The European Union (EU), with its freedom of movement for persons, services, capital, and goods, provides abundant opportunities for transnational organized crime. It is especially loopholes in national legislation that provide opportunities for this illegal activity. Measures needed to combat transnational organized crime and connect to justice and home affairs fall generally under the third pillar, and in general member states are unwilling to surrender sovereignty and powers to the EU within this field. New European bodies such as Europol and Eurojust have been created to enhance cooperation against organized crime. In addition, several framework decisions have been adopted in a variety of areas such as trafficking in human beings, cybercrime, and confiscation of proceeds of organized crime. These aim to establish common definitions and to harmonize national legislation, in particular through defining proportionate and dissuasive penal sanctions. Other international organizations such as the G7, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and

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Development (OECD), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have adopted guidelines, agreements, and declarations recognizing the threat of and the need to combat transnational organized crime by focusing on, among other things, money laundering and corruption. Another important organization in this context is the Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS has thirty-six member states and brings together the countries of the Western Hemisphere to strengthen cooperation and advance common interests. During the 1990s the focus was put on illicit drugs and related crimes, and in 1996 the OAS member states adopted the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. Unilaterally, the United States has taken a leading role in supporting national governments overseas in building the capacity to counter transnational organized crime. Difficulties with Combating Organized Crime The measures taken thus far, in particular the 2000 UN convention on Transnational Organized Crime, have proven an important tool in the harmonization of legal systems and cooperation between law enforcement agencies. However, largely due to the above-mentioned reluctance to compromise on sovereignty related issues, the cooperation even among industrialized countries with a view to combating organized crime have failed to stem the dramatic growth of transnational organized crime. Among other things, it has opened law enforcement academies in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia as well as offices of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in a number of countries. In addition to problems on an international level, security and law enforcement institutions on a national level are largely structured for combating traditional security threats, in particular those of the Cold war era. Processes of reform are under way in numerous countries, yet national law enforcement systems continue to face important structural obstacles to successfully adapting to new security threats such as transnational organized crime. In conclusion, transnational organized crime was recognized as a serious threat in the late 1990s. In

the beginning of the twenty-first century, additional measures are still needed in order to combat transnational organized crime and the threat that it poses to most states. The measures taken so far have aimed to improve law enforcement, especially by striving for a harmonization of legislation and the enhancement of the principle of mutual recognition. The phenomenon of transnational organized crime requires increasing cooperation between and within states in terms of law enforcement, mutual assistance, and information sharing. Since these are issues very much related to national sovereignty, there are several technical issues that still need attention. References Adamoli, Sabrina, Andrea De Nicola, Ernesto U. Savona, and Paola Zoffi. Organised Crime around the World. Helsinki: Heuni, 1998. Cloud, Morgan. “Organized Crime, RICO, and the European Union.” Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 27(243) (2000): 243–267. Rees, Wyn. “Transnational Organized Crime, Security and the EU.” Pp. 112–125 in Organized Crime and the Challenge to Democracy, edited by F. Allum and R. Siebert. London, Routledge, 2003. Solomon, Joel S. “Forming a More Secure Union: The Growing Problem of Organized Crime in Europe As a Challenge to National Sovereignty.” Dickens Journal of International Law 13 (Spring 1995): 623–648.

The Concept and Role of International Financial Intelligence Units Marilyn Peterson The term “financial intelligence unit” (FIU) came into being in the 1990s when FinCEN, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, began supporting the development of these units in countries around the world. As of May 2005, there were ninety-four FIUs around the world. Financial intelligence is gleaned through the analysis of financial data and may provide leads for investigations, may support developing recommendations for further 377

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Senior Intelligence Specialist Kim Owens of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) speaks with U.S. President George W. Bush at Tysons Corner, Virginia, on November 7, 2001. Bush announced that day that authorities shut down the U.S. offices of two Islamic financial networks accused of financing the terrorists responsible for the September 11 suicide attacks. (AFP/Getty Images)

investigation, or may assist to develop indicators of crime activity. FinCEN is the official FIU for the United States. As part of its mission, it provides training and technical assistance, through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Egmont Group, to countries that want to help stem the flood of illegal money laundering. Concept and Mission Typically, an FIU has a mission to collect reports on suspicious financial transactions and investigate money laundering. However, some FIUs are analytic in nature and do not have investigative responsibilities, instead serving as a clearinghouse and sharing information with federal, state, and local

agencies with money laundering investigation and prosecution authorities. This is the FinCEN model. In other examples, the organization is responsible for both collecting and investigating and may not share data due to privacy restrictions. This is the FinTRAC model used in Canada. FIUs serve in the point role for collecting, storing, and sharing financial intelligence (information that has been gathered on financial transactions that may reflect some type of criminal activity). They may take on other roles, including both tactical and strategic analysis of data to support information sharing, investigations, and prosecutions. Their staffs may also fill a liaison function. The Egmont Group’s definition of a financial intelligence unit is “A central, national agency

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responsible for receiving (and, as permitted, requesting), analyzing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of financial information (i) concerning suspected proceeds of crime, or (ii) required by national legislation or regulation, in order to counter money laundering.” The Egmont Group was formally created in 1997 to foster international cooperation among established financial intelligence units and to assist and advise FIUs under development. There are ninety-four countries with operational FIUs, as defined by the Egmont Group: Albania, Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Bulgaria, Canada, Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guernsey, Hong Kong, China, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Korea, Republic of, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. The specifics of the unit’s name and, for some, web access are found at the Egmont website. Information Collection and Analysis The types of information collected in FIUs varies but at a minimum may include the data typically collected on U.S. Suspicious Activity Reports (SARS), U.S. Department of Treasury form 90– 22.47, that are completed by bank personnel in the United States in cases where money laundering or other illegal activity is suspected. Similar forms are also completed by money service businesses, casinos, and securities and futures brokers. All of these

reports are confidential and are available only to law enforcement personnel in the course of an investigation. The FIUs may review these forms for patterns of suspicious activity, using indicators to flag ones that may reflect particular criminal activity. Most often, the data are stored in computerized settings that allow retrieval of information based on names, identifiers, and bank data. The documents are analyzed using standard financial analytical techniques and protocols. Staff members are trained in these techniques, often through FinCEN or the Egmont Group. The FATF also provides yearly reports of typologies and methods of laundering money that can be used as a basis of comparison for the data. The FIUs are also in place to share this information among countries represented in the Egmont Group. They may be restricted from providing information relating to suspicious transactions to any agencies other than their own national prosecutorial authorities or to their foreign counterpart FIUs. Thus, through FinCEN, law enforcement in the United States may be able to access SAR-type information in other countries within Egmont. References Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. Department of the Treasury. “International FIUs,” http://www.fincen.gov/int_fius.html. Forget, Louis. Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2004. Nestmann, Mark. Big Brother Goes Global: Financial Intelligence Units Proliferate, Worldwide. Phoenix, AZ: Asset Protection International, 1998. World Bank. “The Financial Intelligence Unit,” http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/html/amlcft/ docs/Ref_Guide_EN/v2/07-Ch07_EN_v2.pdf.

The Criminal Intelligence Process and Organized Crime Marilyn Peterson Criminal intelligence is information that has been collected and analyzed to gain greater understanding of the operations of a criminal group or activity. 379

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The data used can be gathered from a variety of sources, both open and discreet. It may not carry the weight of evidentiary data but, when assembled, can provide its users with confidence that there is sufficient basis on which to act. The criminal intelligence process is considered a cycle that may repeat itself as necessary as additional information is both sought and utilized. The cycle includes planning, collection, data evaluation, collation and compilation, analysis, dissemination, and feedback. The Criminal Intelligence Process Cycle The planning phase is one in which the collector or analyst looks at what the eventual consumer’s requirements are: what that person needs and how the person plans to use it. For example, if a police manager asked for an intelligence report on an outlaw motorcycle gang that was scheduled to have an event within the local jurisdiction, several types of data might be of highest importance: the group’s history of violence, criminal activities associated with the group, its size, its leadership, and if there were other outlaw motorcycle groups in the area with which they might clash if they travel to that location. This information would help managers plan staffing requirements, give them an estimate of what potential negative activity might occur, and help them develop efforts to mitigate any negative impact. Collecting data is what keeps the intelligence process moving. In the twenty-first century, information is available from a variety of both open and discreet sources. In the open-source environment, there are reports published by other criminal justice and government agencies, newspaper accounts, broadcast journalism reporting, journal and magazine articles, and court documents. Data are gathered by police from physical surveillance, search warrants, and subpoenas as well as interviews and testimony. Police and government files are examples of sources that are not open but are also not covert. Covert sources might include undercover operations, informants, and electronic surveillance. Because there is such a spectrum of sources of data, it is important to evaluate the data as it is collected or collated. Evaluation usually keys on three

issues: reliability of the source, validity of the data, and need for secrecy regarding the existence of the data. The U.S. standards for evaluation are found in the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit’s File Guidelines. Those guidelines show four levels of source reliability from (A) reliable (the source has been reliable in the past) to (D) unknown reliability (the reliability of the source is unknown at present). Data validity is graded from (1) confirmed by an independent source to (4) authenticity of data not yet determined. Without judging reliability or validity, the information used as a basis for a decision may be suspect but not labeled as such. Decisions that are made based on suspect information may be faulty. Evaluation is often done by the collector of the data, who is the most informed about its source. Otherwise, the evaluation is done at the stage where the information is submitted to an analyst for inclusion in a database. The fourth step in the process is collation, or compiling the data into formats that provides ease in retrieving or rearranging them into patterns to support this work. This work is most often done in computers today, with relational databases and text-mining capabilities greatly enhancing the ability of investigators and analysts to find the nuggets in the myriad data. These systems are key to criminal information sharing and have the ability to share data instantaneously. The fifth step is analysis, the heart of the intelligence function. This is where the data are arranged into meaningful patterns and connections. The resultant knowledge is what earns the term “intelligence.” As practiced in the United States, the types of analysis that have been used mosy widely in organized crime investigations have been telephone record analysis and link analysis. Telephone record analysis uses the records of the calls made (not the conversations) to determine common callers, times of day called, lengths of calls, and other patterns. When these calls surround a known criminal act, other conspirators in that act may be uncovered. Link analysis shows the connections or associations of individuals, organizations, and businesses that are reasonably suspected of being tied to criminal activity. Using surveillance, telephone records, informants, and other data, the associa-

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tions are extracted and converted to graphic form. These charts help investigators understand the complexities of relationships and can also be used in court. Alternately, looking at an organized crime investigation and establishing who the key figures are, law enforcement can target those individuals for investigation and prosecution to dismantle the crime group. Analytic products should always include recommendations for action. Recommendations may be either tactical (suggest further investigation, collecting certain data, prosecution, or even ending an investigation) or strategic (targeting a particular group before it gains a larger following, eliminating criminal profits, working in joint efforts with other agencies, etc.). Dissemination is passing along the intelligence to those who need to know it when they need to know it. It can be as simple as forwarding the report to a police supervisor, or it can be as broad as releasing a public report on street gangs, money laundering, or organized crime. Several agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), now have sites on the Internet on which they post their public reports. The final step in the intelligence process is feedback, or reevaluation. This is where the consumers of the intelligence get to provide the developers of the products with comments on how helpful it was to their work or how future products might be made more helpful. In some cases, the recommendations made in the intelligence product include gathering further data to incorporate into future products on this topic. Then, the criminal intelligence process begins anew. Conclusion The types of criminal analysis methods used are dependent upon the data collected. In organized crime cases, surveillance information, informant data, and telephone records might be the most common data types. In today’s environment, financial records might also be obtained showing the methods used to hide or launder criminal profits. The process and the methods remain the same across the types of crimes being investigated, and the intelligence process supports all aspects of police work.

References Godfrey, E. Drexel, and Douglas R. Harris. The Basic Elements of Intelligence. Washington, DC: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1971. Global Intelligence Working Group and International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts. Law Enforcement Analytic Standards. Washington, DC: Global Intelligence Working Group, 2004. Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit. File Guidelines. Sacramento, CA: Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, 2002. Peterson, Marilyn B., Bob Morehouse, and Richard Wright. Intelligence 2000: Revising the Basic Elements. Lawrenceville, NJ: International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts and Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, 2001.

Current International Efforts to Combat Organized Crime Robert Hanser and Kenneth D. Richbourg Organized crime is a major business that creates profit through illegitimate means. Approximately 1–2 percent of the gross domestic product is accounted for by organized crime. The annual income of many organized crime syndicates and conglomerates exceeds that derived by most of the major industries in the United States. Organized crime is an international business that affects every country in the world and is based on every continent. The threats of organized crime are farreaching, and no area of international affairs will be unaffected, as political and economic systems and the social fabric of numerous countries will weaken under the increased financial power of international organized crime. Organized crime can destabilize major economies, as occurred in Japan and Italy, as shown in the 1990s, but the costs are even more devastating for transitional states. Transnational organized crime is a global problem, and a global solution is needed. The efforts of several countries are needed to produce effective enforcement to counter transnational organized crime. With the efforts of every country, transnational organized crime can be crippled and reduced. 381

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Organized Crime Protocols The United Nations (UN) has been engaged in a variety of efforts to strengthen international cooperation to fight organized crime for several decades. In 2000 the UN adopted The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, which was signed by more than 120 countries. This is the first universal convention to specify an all-inclusive framework to combat transnational organized crime and will represent a legal foundation for global measures in the future. The convention is a legally binding instrument with a series of measures against transnational organized crime. States that ratified this instrument have given sanction to these objectives and have agreed to work in tandem with one another. The measures include the establishment of domestic criminal offenses to combat the problem and the implementation of new sweeping frameworks for mutual legal support, extradition, law enforcement cooperation, and technical support and training. This convention will make it difficult for organized crime groups to take advantage of the loopholes and gaps in national law and jurisdiction problems. The convention combats organized crime and some of the activities that transnational organized crime is involved in. Two protocols were added to attack particular areas that were of extra concern. The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants deals with the growing problem of organized criminal groups that smuggle migrants, often at high risk to the migrants and at great profit for the offenders. The Protocol against Trafficking in Persons deals with the problem of modern slavery in which the desire of people to seek a better life is taken advantage of by organized criminal groups often involved in the sex trade. The protocols also commit countries that ratify them to making the basic subject of the protocol a criminal offense and to adopt other measures, such as control on travel documents, to combat the problem. A third protocol that deals with illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, parts, and components and ammunition was added in 2001. The combination of the convention and the protocols will target not only the individuals but also the business of organized crime.

Financial Crimes and Money Laundering According to the UN, more than $1 trillion is laundered through international financial systems. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has been given the task of examining money laundering trends and techniques, reviewing the existing actions, and setting up new measures to combat money laundering. In 2003, the task force was revised to include terrorist funding. The FATF completed a review of its mandate and proposed changes that were adopted in May 2004. The new mandate provides for six objectives: 1. Continue the international standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. 2. Support global action to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. 3. Include stronger cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank. 4. Increase membership in the FATF. 5. Enhance relationships between FATF and regional bodies and nonmember countries. 6. Intensify its study of the techniques and trends in money laundering and terrorist financing.

The FATF objectives have provided a commonality of purpose to govern the share of financial information internationally and to track specific types of financial flow that occur across national borders. If progress is to continue, member countries must change their domestic laws to allow greater sharing of financial information, criminalize certain types of activities, and improve efforts to identify and track terrorist-related accounts. There is a tendency for organized crime syndicates to target countries with weak or ineffective laws because it is easier to transfer funds to those countries. The organized crime then becomes deep-rooted and can create a wide range of macroeconomic consequences. These could include unpredictable changes in the demand for money, risk to the security of financial institutions and systems, contamination effects on legal financial transactions, and increased instability of capital flows and exchange rates due to unprecedented crossborder transfers. The European Communities Studies Association defines four types of international cooperation:

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transnational organized crime extradition, mutual assistance in the investigation and prosecution of criminal offices, transfer of criminal proceedings, and transfer of the enforcement of criminal justice. Results from these studies have led to improved relationships between police and judicial authorities in the areas of prevention, investigation, prosecution, court proceedings, and enforcement. Furthermore, member states have started to provide Europol with operational data that strengthens Eurpol’s ability to serve as a consolidated repository of knowledge among various police agencies throughout the continent of Europe. Similar to the Europol concept is the creation of an agency named Eurojust that is empowered with prosecutorial powers in regard to cross-border and multijurisdictional crimes. Eurojust is comprised of national prosecutors or magistrates who are vested with a variety of powers to prosecute multijurisdictional criminals. In 2000, the European Union (EU) decided to set up the Provisional Judicial Cooperation Unit. This unit has two objectives: to improve cooperation between the competent authorities of the member states with regard to investigations and prosecutions in relation to serious crime, specifically organized crime, and to stimulate and improve the coordination of investigations and prosecutions in the member states, taking into account any request or information communicated under provisions adopted within the framework of the treaties. EU leaders agreed on a pan-EU arrest warrant at the Laeken European Summit in 2001, and the framework was approved on 13 June 2002. The warrant covers all crimes, but for thirty-two specified crimes, according to Europol, “the EU has abolished a requirement that the offense must be recognized as a crime in both member states.” Some of the items on the list are murder; terrorism; participation in a criminal organization; sexual exploitation of children and child pornography; cybercrime; illicit trafficking in people; illicit trafficking of weapons, explosives, nuclear material, and drugs; kidnapping; hostage taking; illicit trade in art or cultural treasures; rape; corruption; and fraud. This list is ongoing and encompasses most businesses in which organized crimes are involved.

In October 2001, Europol signed an agreement with Slovenia that allows law enforcement cooperation and the exchange of personal, strategic, and operational information and signed similar agreements with Poland, Hungary, and Estonia. Europol and Interpol also signed an agreement to establish and maintain the exchange of operational, strategic, and technical information. The agreement included the coordination of activities such as the development of common standards, action plans, training, and scientific research. Europol then signed an agreement with the EU’s Lisbon drug agency to begin the exchange of technical and strategic information. The agreement is limited to drug-related matters, money laundering, and diversion of chemical precursors. Europol also signed agreements with the United States in December 2001. The EU signed an agreement with Japan to increase cooperation with law enforcement agencies. Agreements were also signed with Norway, Iceland, and the Czech Republic to cooperate in the exchanging of information about organized crime. The European Parliament approved a program that would investigate all organized crime. The name of this program is the Joint Investigation Teams, and it is made of two or more people of the member states. The Joint Investigation Teams do not have the power to arrest or detain but do have the power to investigate and report to the council for a decision to be made. Another proposal has been made to form a border police of Europe. The border police would control all ports, shores, and crossing points to stop illegal immigration. The International Organized Crime Center of the United States The United States has been committed to combating organized crime for years. The United States has made Washington, D.C., the home of the International Organized Crime Center (IOCC). The agency focuses on identifying and dismantling global criminal enterprises whose activities and influences affect the United States both at home and overseas. The mission of the IOCC is to serve as the coordination point for U.S. resources dedicated to investigation and intelligence gathering regarding international organized crime groups, to 383

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identify and assess the structure and criminal portfolio of those international organized crime groups deemed to pose a threat, and to establish policy and procedures designed to coordinate and support domestic and extraterritorial investigative activities aimed at the disruption, dismantlement, and prosecution of international organized crime groups and enterprises. In October 2000, the United States enacted the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. The goals of this act are to prevent human trafficking overseas, protect victims and help them rebuild their lives within the United States with support from both federal and state governments, and prosecute traffickers of humans under stiff federal penalties. The law is very detailed in its definitions and encompasses all the means that traffickers use to coerce their victims. This law issues more than 5,000 victims a T visa to live in the United States. The United States and Europol signed an agreement in 2001 to cooperate in the sharing of personal data and related information to combat transnational organized crime. Terrorism is an issue that is receiving widespread attention, especially in law enforcement. Terrorism is not typically defined as organized crime, but recent anti–organized crime laws have added terrorism as targets. Since many terrorist groups get their funding though most of the same means as organized crime, the laws that focus on the illegal activities will directly threaten the financial power of these groups. The UN passed the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Funds that requires parties to take steps to prevent and offset the financing of terrorists, whether direct or indirect, through groups claiming to have charitable, social, or cultural goals or that also engage in such illicit activities as drug trafficking or gun running. This convention commits states to hold those who finance terrorism criminally, civilly, or administratively liable for such acts. The convention also provides for the identification, freezing, and seizure of finances allocated for terrorist activities as well as for the sharing of the forfeited funds with other states on a case-by-case basis. Banks will no longer be able to claim secrecy to justify refusing to cooperate. The EU adopted a directive of freezing the funds and a prohibition on providing funds, assets,

financial services, and economic resources to individuals or groups linked to terrorist organizations. Since 9/11, the amount of assets frozen throughout the EU is estimated to vary between 40 million euros to more than 100 million euros. These issues will not only affect terrorists but also traditional organized crime as well. Conclusion The threat of international organized crime has been increasing. The problems affect every country and have the ability to destabilize entire regions both economically and politically. The efforts to combat this growing problem must involve international collaboration and must involve the cooperation of every country possible. Individual countries cannot succeed in defeating this growing threat, as the fluid nature of organized crime will circumvent such attempts that are restricted to limited pockets of the global arena. More programs must be created that integrate both foreign and domestic aspects from inside and outside the various national governments if this type of crime is to be effectively contained and ultimately eliminated. References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime: Activities and Extent. Pp. 1068–1074 in Encyclopedia of Criminology, vol. 2, edited by R. A. Wright and J. M. Miller. New York: Routledge, 2005. Bruggeman, W. “Political and Law Enforcement Initiatives: Recent Police and Judicial Cooperation,” December 2002, http://www.ecsanet .org/ecsaworld6/contributions/session1/ Bruggeman.doc. DuStasio, J. “International Organized Crime Center.” International Organized Crime 51(5) (September 2003): 2–8, http://www.usdoj.gov/ usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5105.pdf. European Union. “Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters: Provisional Judicial Cooperation Unit,” March 2002, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/ en/lvb/l33132.htm. Europol. “2002 EU Organised Crime Report,” http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=EU OrganisedCrimeSitRep2002. Global Policy Forum. Over 120 Nations Sign UN Convention against Organized Crime. United Nations Press Release, 15 December 2000, http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/law/1219.htm.

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Jackson, James K. The Financial Action Task Force: An Overview. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2004. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Measures by the International Community and Japan to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,” November 2000, http://72.14.209.104/search?q=cache:R0B6vbaS3Z QJ:www.mofa.go.jp/policy/i_crime/measure0011 .html+Measures+by+the+International+Comm unity+and+Japan+to+Combat+Transnational+Org anized+Crime&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us. Moran, N. R. Organized Crime: The Law. Pp. 1111– 1114 in Encyclopedia of Criminology, vol. 2, edited by R. A. Wright and J. M. Miller. New York: Routledge, 2005. National Institute of Justice. “Global Crime Issues,” http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/international/global _crime.html. Shelley, L. “Threat from International Organized Crime and Terrorism.” Congressional Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, 1 October 1997, http://www.fas.org/irp/ congress/1997_hr/h971001ls.htm. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and Its Protocols,” November 2000, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime _cicp_convention.html.

Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties Clive Harfield Inability to recover cross-border fugitives to justice undermines state sovereignty. Thus states, whether they be nation-states or constituent members of a confederation such as the United States or Australia need a mechanism by which criminal suspects who have fled their jurisdiction can be brought before the proper authorities to face trial. With increased global travel and communication, it is also the case that while a suspect might be located within the domestic jurisdiction, crucial evidence of the crime or the proceeds of the crime might be in a foreign jurisdiction. To preserve the sovereign authority of criminal jurisdictions and because domestic and international sovereignty law dictates that no state or national law enforcement authority can unilaterally carry out its

functions within the territorial jurisdiction of another state or nation, states have developed a corpus of mutual legal assistance law that seeks to achieve three outcomes: the recovery of suspects (known as extradition or rendition), the securing of evidence, and the recovery of criminal proceeds. This legislative framework comprises bilateral treaties or multilateral conventions supported by domestic legislation in those jurisdictions where legal tradition dictates that domestic legislation is required to give domestic effect to treaty obligations. Extradition Not surprisingly, given that it affects individual liberty, the greater part of mutual legal assistance treaty and case law is devoted to extradition. Numerous protections are in place, particularly in circumstances where a state is being asked to surrender one of its own citizens who has committed a crime abroad rather than a foreign national who has fled to the requested state to escape his or her own domestic authorities. The constitutions of many states prohibit extradition of their own citizens to a foreign state, in which circumstance the legal principle of aut dedere, aut judicare applies: extradite or prosecute within the criminal justice system of the requested state on behalf of the requesting foreign state. Implementation of this principle necessitates that the requesting state transfer proceedings, witnesses, and physical evidence to the requested state. The political and logistical preference of requesting states is generally for extradition rather than the application of extradition and prosecution. Protections for the accused include extradition only when the act in question is a crime in both the requesting and requested states (double criminality), extradition only when the accused has not already faced trial elsewhere on the same facts (non bis in idem), prosecution only for the offenses for which extradited (speciality), and a prohibition on extradition for political offenses, the interpretation of which can be a matter of diplomatic dispute but generally allows for extradition of terrorist suspects. Occasionally, nontreaty protections also apply. Case law (Soering v. UK, 1989) establishes that signatories to the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights may not extradite to a state where the death 385

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Adolf Eichmann stands trial for crimes against humanity in Jerusalem, Israel, in 1961. Eichmann was kidnapped by Israeli operatives in Argentina in May of 1961 in order that he be brought to trial, an act loudly decried as a violation of Argentina’s sovereignty. (Library of Congress)

penalty is likely to be imposed regardless of any extradition treaty into which they have entered. In law, there can be no extradition except where the state parties have agreed to a treaty. Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court (United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 1991; United States v. AlvarezMachain, 1992) has held that where an extradition treaty does not expressly prohibit one party from unilaterally entering the territory of another in order to detain a national of that state and remove that person to the United States for trial (an action contrary to customary international law on jurisdiction), then such a course of action is considered lawful in U.S. domestic law even if a treaty was extant. Such a defiantly broad interpretation undermines the concept of extradition. Extradition treaties, by their very nature, tend to be bilateral. There is a regional European conven-

tion on extradition opened for signature in 1957. (The expert committee drafting this instrument also recommended a complementary instrument of evidential assistance that was subsequently opened for signature in 1958.) Mutual Legal Assistance Mutual legal assistance agreements covering evidential assistance and asset recovery can take three forms that are equally common: a bilateral treaty, a specific multilateral mutual legal assistance convention (MLAC), or a multilateral crime suppression convention (for instance, the UN conventions against drugs and organized crime, the European cybercrime convention) that contains supplementary mutual legal assistance articles within it for signatory parties to utilize in the absence of any other specific mutual legal assistance treaty.

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Typically, the assistance afforded by an MLAC will include the service of court documents, interviewing and taking statements from witnesses, searching for and seizing physical evidence, and the transfer of convicted prisoners to testify. The 2000 European Union MLAC includes provisions for video testimony, joint investigation teams, controlled deliveries, and telephone interception. Most EU states have also fully adopted the provisions of the Schengen Convention (1990), which, among other aids, makes conditional provision for spontaneous cross-border covert surveillance and overt hot pursuit across borders to arrest fugitives in the act of fleeing. The EU’s integrated framework of supranational economic laws has provided a basis upon which to develop a framework of EU instruments concerning justice and home affairs. The concept of mutual legal assistance is being superseded by that of mutual recognition, which underpins the European Arrest Warrant by which principle an arrest warrant issued in one EU state is directly enforceable in another without recourse to extradition procedures. Negotiations are under way to establish a European Evidence Warrant within the same principle to replace the Letters Rogatory (also called Commissions Rogatoire) by which extradition and mutual legal assistance requests are made. Treaty law prescribes the content of extradition and mutual legal assistance requests. EU member states can now directly transmit requests between domestic courts. Elsewhere, request transmission is via central authorities, although some treaties make provision for urgent transmission via Interpol followed by formal transmission through central authorities. Diplomatic protocols aside, the benefits of mutual legal assistance are not necessarily equal. Adopting an aggressive bilateral strategy, the United States has, in some cases, been able to negotiate asymmetrical bilateral treaties more to the benefit of the United States than to the other party. Europe’s regional, multilateral approach establishes minimum norms that member states may augment bilaterally if they wish. Whichever strategy is adopted, extradition and MLATs are not actionable in international law and thus are only as

effective as a signatory party’s willingness and capability to meet its treaty obligations. References Council of Europe. Convention on Cyber Crime. European Treaty Series 185, 2001, Articles 16–21 and 25. ———. Convention on Extradition. European Treaty Series 24, 1957. ———. Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. European Treaty Series 30, 1959. European Union. “Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and Surrender Procedures between Member States.” Official Journal of the EU, L 190/1, 18 July 2002. ———. “Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.” Official Journal of the EU, C 197/1, 12 July 2000. ———. Schengen Convention, 19 June 1990. International Legal Materials, 1991, 84. Paust, John, Jean Fitzpatrick, and Jon Van Dyke. International Law and Litigation in the US. St. Paul, MN: West Group, 2000. Soering v. UK. 11 European Human Rights Reports 439, 1989. United Nations. “Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,” 1988. ———. “Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,” 2000, Articles 14 and 18–19. United States v. Alvarez-Machain. 504 U.S. 655 (1992) remanded, 971 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1992). United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. 494 U.S. 259, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990).

Human Smuggling and Trafficking: The Limitations of Official Statistics Georgios A. Antonopoulos Large socioeconomic differences between the developing and the industrially advanced world as well as political changes in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa in the 1990s transformed our world. A large number of people have been moving from East to West and from South to North in search of a better future. Two forms of organized crime that took advantage of the migratory movements and of the strict legal framework of migration in the receiving countries as well as the strict legal framework of 387

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migration of the European Union (EU) have been human smuggling and trafficking. Human smuggling plays an extremely important role in irregular migration. In previous years there were hundreds of thousands of migrants who were smuggled, and there are an estimated 100,000 Chinese migrants being smuggled every year in the Western world. On the other hand, human trafficking is responsible for a large number of women and children who have been forcibly introduced into prostitution and for individuals working in the most exploitative conditions around the world. Despite the fact that the international literature on the topic has increased rapidly and significantly about both human smuggling and human trafficking, reflecting the increase in these lucrative global trades, accurate hard data on them is impossible to find. Although human smuggling and trafficking have some common features, notably the smuggling of people, they are functionally different. Defining Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking There is often confusion as to what smuggling and trafficking are, although the 2000 “Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants” and the 2000 “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish the Trafficking in Persons” supplementing the United Nations (UN) convention against transnational organized crime clearly distinguish between the two. Human smuggling—in contrast to human trafficking—does not involve the exploitation of the smuggled individual and is an offense against public order, whereas human trafficking is an offense against the person. As with all official statistics, official statistics on human smuggling and human trafficking possess a number of limitations, and this constitutes an obstacle toward a better understanding of the phenomena in the local as well as the international context. The Common Limitations of Official Statistics on Human Smuggling and Trafficking The first common limitation of official statistics on human smuggling and trafficking is that in a number of countries, especially in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa, there are no specific offenses of

human smuggling and trafficking. Hence, there are no official statistics on human smuggling and trafficking, something that does not allow the authorities and nongovernmental organizations to even provide an estimate of the phenomenon. Second, in a number of countries where official statistics on human smuggling and trafficking are collected, these are mixed with each other and with data on undocumented migrants, something that limits not only our efforts toward a more integrated understanding of both human smuggling and trafficking but also adequate responses to them. Third, the official statistics on both human smuggling and human trafficking are based on arrests and consequently miss a large number of smuggling and trafficking activities. Police authorities from a number of countries, for instance, have estimated that the proportion of facilitated illegal entries ranges from 30 percent to 80 percent, and in the United Kingdom the estimate of trafficked women and children for commercial sex in the year 2000 ranged between 142 and 1,420. The lack of incentive on the part of individuals smuggled or trafficked to provide information about their passive or active involvement in a smuggling or trafficking operation due to fear of the authorities or fear of reprisal by organized criminals involved in smuggling and trafficking is an important reason for this. In addition, there are no items about human smuggling and human trafficking in the self-report studies and victimization surveys. Even if there were such items, a large number of victims as well as offenders would be missed because of their illegal status being undocumented or because of smuggled or trafficked individuals being in prison. The official statistics on human smuggling and trafficking miss a large number of offenders operating in more than one country, something that provides a distorted picture of the human smuggling and trafficking networks. Given that the smuggling and trafficking networks operate in more than one country, arresting individuals in one country means little when it comes to the social organization of human smuggling or human trafficking, which could assist us in designing a better policy against these trades. There is evidence that there are Pakistani, Syrian, Kurdish, and Turkish smugglers involved in a well-

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A group of Chinese women being held as illegal immigrants walk toward a mess hall at the Ilan detention center in northeastern Taiwan on April 14, 2004. (AFP/Getty Images)

coordinated effort smuggling Asian migrants into Europe. Arresting a Turkish smuggler in Europe does not contribute much to an accurate picture of the network and specifically an image of the social organization of the trade. Fourth, the official statistics on both human smuggling and human trafficking depend largely on whether these activities are high priorities in the operational agenda of the police, which many times is a result of the difficulty of prosecuting offenders or the recording practices, and these are often facilitated by the media focus on these activities, the geographical location of a country, or the existence of special bodies against human smuggling and human trafficking. Fifth, official statistics miss the patterns of human smuggling in the country as they focus on the smuggling of migrants into a receiving country and at the same time neglect the smuggling of migrants from an initially receiving country into the

neighboring countries as well as the incidence of internal smuggling. For example, Swiss statistics focus on the smuggling of humans into Switzerland and neglect the smuggling of humans from Switzerland to Germany. Similarly, official statistics on human trafficking completely neglect the trafficking of women and children between new members of the EU. Sixth, the official statistics aggregate a number of nationalities that are different into single groups. For example, they aggregate Kurdish smugglers into either Turkish or Iraqi smugglers. On the other hand, smugglers from Kosovo, who are Albanians, are classified as nationals from the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro. Finally, an important limitation of the official statistics on both human smuggling and trafficking is the availability and distribution of statistics regarding these operations on the international level, which tends to occur on an ad hoc basis. Some 389

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countries regard information about human smuggling and trafficking as classified, and some others adopt a policy of restricted availability and distribution that does not allow for the use of the statistics by different parties. There is no attempt toward the adjustment of the data relating to human smuggling and human trafficking on the population of each country. The Limitations of Official Statistics on Human Smuggling First, official statistics on human smuggling do not indicate whether trafficking was involved. After arrival in the destination (or transit) country, a number of migrants are often forced to work under exploitative conditions or are introduced into the sex trade in order to pay off their debts due to the cost of counterfeit documents and transportation. However, this pattern is something that is not captured by the official statistics. Second, the official statistics are limited only to the presentation of the nationality of apprehended individuals accused of smuggling as well as on seized means of transportation that were used in smuggling operations. Consequently, they neglect other important aspects of human smuggling such as the nationalities of the smuggled migrants. Third, in a number of countries the official statistics on human smuggling are not available for the whole year. In Greece, for example, official statistics are available for only eight months per year, namely from January to August, for no apparent reason. Consequently, they do not provide any information from September to December, which may be a season of more intense human smuggling. Fourth, official statistics on human smuggling in a large number of countries are not able to account for apprehended smugglers but rather for people apprehended under the suspicion of being involved in human smuggling. There are a large number of cases in which an individual—be it a truck driver, a bus driver, or a vessel captain—may smuggle an individual or a number of individuals into a country or out of the country without knowing it. In the port areas throughout Europe there are many migrants, and the reason behind this concentration is that there are numerous opportunities for these migrants to sneak onto a ship bound for the West. In the last few years, individuals helping

undocumented migrants without the intent of personal gain were arrested. In a large number of the cases, the driver of the vehicle was not aware of the presence of migrants in their vehicles. However, when the authorities found out, the driver was arrested. Other times, it may be the case that the drivers give a lift to a migrant without knowing that he or she is undocumented. Indeed, in Switzerland from 1998 to 2001 human smuggling with intent of personal gain could be proven in only 8.3 percent of the cases. However, the statistics do not differentiate between these two forms of arrestees. The Limitations of Official Statistics on Human Trafficking In regard to human trafficking, there are three concepts that need to be taken into consideration: consent, deceit, and force. Not all trafficked individuals are trafficked without their consent. There is evidence, for instance, that a number of prostitutes from Eastern Europe are consensually trafficked to be introduced to the sex trade in West European countries. Although they were not aware of the degree of exploitation they would be subjected to by the traffickers, these women are different than women who were deceived by having been promised employment or marriage. Second, official statistics on human trafficking are not able to provide information about the sector of employment to which trafficked individuals are introduced (e.g. sex trade, factories, agriculture, etc.). This is very difficult sometimes due to differences in legislation. For example, although Greece has a law against trafficking, there are provisions against the trafficking for commercial sex but not for labor trafficking. Third, the official statistics on human trafficking depend to an extent on the collection by existing trafficking victim support organizations. However, these organizations do not have the same needs, power, and influence in every country, and two or more different organizations may support a single victim, something that affects the validity of the trafficking data. Conclusion The official statistics are not able to provide adequate information about human smuggling and human trafficking due to a number of pragmatic

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and logistic limitations. What is recommended is an improved operational definition for both human smuggling and trafficking, the improvement of the collection and presentation of official statistics, and additional research on the social organization of both human smuggling and human trafficking. References Federal Office of Police. Human Smuggling: The Sinister Side of Migration. Bern: Federal Office of Police, 2003. Jandl, M. “Estimates of the Numbers of Illegal and Smuggled Immigrants in Europe.” Presentation at the 8th International Metropolis Conference, Metropolis, Canada, 17 September 2003. Kelly, L., and L. Regan. Stopping Traffic: Exploring the Extent of, and Responses to, Trafficking in Women for Sexual Exploitation in the UK. Police Research Series Paper No. 125. London: Home Office, 2000. Laczko, F. “Human Trafficking: The Need for Better Data,” 2002, www.migrationinformation.org. Makkai, T. “Critique of Papers on Human Trafficking.” PNI workshop, UN Crime Commission, Vienna, Austria, 15 May 2003. McCulloch, H. “Assessing the Involvement of Organised Crime in Human Smuggling and Trafficking.” Pp. 55–59 in Resource Material Series No. 62, edited by UNAFEI. Tokyo: UNAFEI, 2004. Savona, E. U., A. di Nicola, and G. da Col. “Dynamics of Migration and Crime in Europe: New Patterns of an Old Nexus.” Pp. 62–91 in Migration and Crime: Proceedings of the International Conference on “Migration and Crime: Global and Regional Problems and Responses,” Courmayeur Mont Blanc, Italy, 5–8 October 1996, edited by A. P. Schmided. Milano: ISPAC, 1998. United Nations. “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly: 52.55. United Nations Convention against Organized Crime,” http:// www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/res5525e.pdf.

International Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking Anna Jonsson and Dominika Borg In the beginning of the twenty-first century, the trafficking in human beings has become one of the

fastest-growing criminal businesses in the world. Yet human trafficking has engaged the international community for more than a century. International attention was first focused on the issue in the early 1900s as women from Europe and North America were sold as sexual slaves abroad. In 1904 the International Agreement for the Suppression of the “White Slave” Traffic was ratified. Initially, it was the antiprostitution movement that acknowledged the problem of trafficking of white women and children for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Following the adoption of the 1904 agreement, several protocols and other agreements were adopted. However, in 1949 the United Nations (UN) adopted the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, the most complete treaty addressing the question up to that time. Still, it was considered inefficient due to its weak enforcement mechanisms and the lack of political will to adequately address the problem. The 1949 convention gave emphasis to antiprostitution and the law enforcement approach but was not rights based. International Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking Traditionally, efforts to combat human trafficking have focused on trafficking of women and to some extent children for the purpose of sexual exploitation and forced labor. As a result, the majority of the international instruments adopted by the League of Nations and the UN in the first half of the twentieth century, which aimed to combat human trafficking, dealt with trafficking in persons for sexual purposes, although there were some international agreements addressing slavery and forced labor. The issue of human trafficking received renewed attention during the 1970s mainly through the work of a growing women’s human rights movement and due to factors such as the spread of HIV, rapidly-growing migration flows, the large amount of money involved, and the problems connected to all this. Additionally, in the 1990s, the phenomenon gained new attention as new security threats such as organized crime and terrorism became an important part of several states’ security doctrines. 391

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In addition, human trafficking with the purposes of forced labor or to sell body organs for transplantation has increasingly gained international attention. The period between the 1970s and 2000 can be described as heavily influenced by the women’s rights movement. During this period, several instruments addressing human trafficking for sexual purposes were adopted. For example, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which was adopted in 1979, forbids human trafficking. The CEDAW has an optional protocol stipulating the right of individuals or groups to submit individual complaints to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. In 1989 the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child was drafted, and as of now the convention is ratified by all of the world’s states except for Somalia, East Timor, and the United States. The convention entered into force in September 1990. One of the obligations of the contracting states is to refrain from and actively suppress all forms of sexual exploitation of children. The convention’s Article 35 advises all contracting states to take all necessary measures to prevent the abduction of, the sale of, or the traffic in children for any purpose or in any form. In 1999, the International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention. Forced labor as well as child prostitution fall under its scope. The document has been ratified by more than 100 states. In addition, there is the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography, which furthers the protection provided by the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The protocol entered into force in January 2002. Several other international agreements and conventions of relevance for the fight against human trafficking have been adopted such as those adopted by the ILO. However, it was not until 2000 that a new treaty dealing exclusively with human trafficking was adopted. In 2000, the UN adopted the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Subsequently, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the Conven-

tion against Transnational Organized Crime, was adopted. These instruments provide an international definition of human trafficking. The law enforcement approach to human trafficking precedes the human rights approach, and the raison d’être of the protocol is to provide for a legal response to the increase of transnational organized crime. These instruments require the countries that chose to become contracting parties to criminalize trafficking in human beings. In addition, they establish a framework for international cooperation, including various forms of assistance in the conduct of investigations and prosecutions as well as provisions for the extradition of offenders. The protocol also criminalizes phenomena such as forced labor, forced military service, and involuntary organ removal. In its report to the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the UN high commissioner set out a number of human rights principles and recommendations in the area of trafficking in human beings. These recommendations are concerned with the rights of protection of the victim and hence fill a gap left by the UN protocol. In addition to these international instruments, there are several regional instruments. Regional Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking The European Union (EU) strives to suppress trafficking among its member states as well as in and through neighboring countries such as Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova. The EU Council of Ministers has adopted a framework decision on combating trafficking in human beings and on combating sexual exploitation of children and child pornography. It has also adopted a directive on short-term residence permits for trafficked victims who cooperate with the competent authorities. The framework decision, as opposed to the directive, does not have direct effect in the legal orders of the member states. This means that the framework decision will have to be implemented by the adoption of national laws meeting the standards of the framework decision. At about the same time as the UN protocol against trafficking was opened for signature, the Ministerial Council of the Organization for Secu-

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Moroccan UNICEF representative Olivier Degreef (left) and the Moroccan minister for Women and Children’s Affairs, Nezha Chekrouni, conduct a press conference on October 22, 2001, to announce the opening of the Arab-Africa forum on the sexual exploitation of children. (AFP/Getty Images)

rity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) adopted a decision stressing the need for the OSCE to step up its activities for combating trafficking in human beings. The declaration is politically binding on its members. In addition, the OSCE and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) have put together the OSCE AntiTrafficking Guidelines. As a result, OSCE field operations have begun to employ full-time antitrafficking advisors, especially in regard to operations in the Balkans. In May 2005 the CoE’s Committee of Ministers adopted the Council of Europe Convention against Trafficking in Human Beings. The convention was opened for signature of member states in mid-May 2005. The convention aims to combat the trafficking in human beings in all its forms, national or

international, and whether or not it is linked with organized crime. The convention is based on the nondiscrimination principle. It adopts a human rights perspective, and its main focus is on victim protection, as opposed to the UN convention and protocol, which focus on the law enforcement perspective. In Asia, instruments concerning the combating of trafficking in human beings include the Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution, signed in January 2002 and drafted by the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Another example of a regional initiative is the Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, adopted by the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). In addition to these documents, there are 393

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a number of international, regional, and national programs to combat trafficking in human beings. Civil Society The number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved on an international level is plentiful. In addition, there is the Global Program against Trafficking in Human Beings, launched by the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention in March 1999. The program consists of policyoriented research and technical cooperation in relation to smuggling and trafficking in human beings. It manages a series of cooperation projects in selected individual countries. There is a project for almost every continent but unfortunately not for every affected region. The UN General Assembly frequently holds sessions on how to counter trafficking in persons, especially children. In 2001, the Second World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children (the Yokohama Congress) was organized. During its sessions, the congress adopted the Yokohama Global Commitment 2001 that expresses support toward efforts to promote the interests of children and their inherent right to be protected from all forms of sexual exploitation. The document also encourages states to follow the standards enshrined in international instruments such as the above-mentioned UN protocol against trafficking in persons. In conclusion, international efforts to combat human trafficking have moved from focusing on trafficking for sexual purposes to also include forced labor and involuntary removal of organs. Thus far, the law enforcement perspective has dominated the international instruments adopted, but in the beginning of the twenty-first century, the human rights perspective is gaining ground. The problem of human trafficking has also entered national politics to a larger degree than before, mainly due to the new security threats that the world is facing. References Bruch, Elizabeth M. “Models Wanted: The Search for an Effective Response to Human Trafficking.” Stanford Journal of International Law 40(1) (2004): 1–46.

Kanics, Jyothi, Gabriele Reiter, and Bärbel Heide Uhl. “Trafficking in Human Beings—A Threat under Control? Taking Stock Four Years after Major International Efforts Started.” Helsinki Monitor 1 (2005): 53–67. McGill, Craig. Human Traffic: Sex, Slaves & Immigration. London: Vision, 2003.

International Initiatives Dealing with the Abuse and Trafficking of Illegal Drugs Robert D. Hanser, Walonda Wallace, and Kaine Jones The total number of drug users around the world is estimated to be around 185 million people, which is roughly the equivalent of 3 percent of the entire world population. Beyond this, there are clear drugs of choice among the worldwide drug-abusing population, with cannabis being the most widely used substance (nearly 150 million people), amphetamines being the second most used substance (roughly 30 million people), and a variety of opiates being the third most popular drug (15 million people). Furthermore, the United Nations (UN) estimates that narcotics trafficking alone is a $400 billion a year business. Over the past decade, a number of laws and methods have been proposed around the globe for controlling the international drug market. However, these controls have encountered shortcomings in their implementation. Some of the problems noted are not so much related to the design of the strategy but more to the high levels of corruption in countries that produce and export most of these illegal drugs. Likewise, many of the newer democracies around the world lack the legal infrastructure to implement effective programs. Because of the corruption involved and due to the inability of weak governments to exercise control over markets within their borders, there is a clear need for international cooperation and coordination. This becomes apparent when it is considered that the international drug market itself destabilizes many of these countries. Thus, for some nations, drug-fighting initiatives are part and parcel of the national security initiatives that may exist.

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Priority Drugs and Social Policy Beyond national security, the primary source of concern for most countries combating the drug problem has to do with the adverse health effects to citizens. These health effects are frequently costly and tragic and are thus the common criteria in determining whether a particular drug is more of a priority when compared to other drugs. One way of assessing the negative health impact of illicit drug use is to generate a clear criterion for prioritizing problem drugs. For policy purposes, the European Union (EU) and the UN typically consider a problem drug to be one that leads to some sort of treatment demand. The term “problem drug” is not dependent upon the number of persons who use the drug. For instance, although cannabis is the most widely used drug throughout the world, it is not considered the main problem drug with which policymakers are concerned. Rather, from a global perspective it is opiates that are considered the most problematic. This category of drugs accounts for the largest treatment demands: 67 percent in Asia, 61 percent in Europe, and 47 percent in Oceana. In the Americas, it is cocaine that is the primary concern, with the drug accounting for 60 percent of the treatment demand in South America and 29 percent of the treatment demand in North America. Within the United States, however, a trend has emerged in which treatment demands are more frequent for heroin than cocaine; and in Africa, cannabis remains the primary drug problem and represents 65 percent of the treatment demand. The Two-Pronged Approach in International Drug Fighting When combating any drug problem, nations typically employ a two-pronged approach that consists of supply reduction and demand reduction. Countries seldom use one approach exclusively, but there have been periods in history in which some countries place more emphasis on one approach than the other. An example of this would be the supply reduction programs that the United States implemented in Colombia during the well-known War on Drugs. As a further extension of this campaign, a program known as Plan Colombia was

signed into law in the United States in 2000. This was a $1.3 billion military assistance–focused initiative to provide emergency supplemental drugfighting assistance to Colombia. The program grants authority for the State and Defense Departments to supply assistance to Colombia for both drug trafficking and insurgency purposes, since many organized crime and terrorist groups in Colombia are financed from drug profits. For instance, U.S.-supplied helicopters and intelligence could be used to support military operations against guerrillas financed by drugs as well as against drug traffickers themselves. Under this initiative, drug control approaches include the following: expansion of efforts to reduce foreign production at the source, expansion of interdiction and enforcement activities to disrupt supply lines, and expansion of efforts to reduce worldwide demand, expansion of economic disincentives for international drug trafficking. Reducing the supply source of illicit drugs is an important component in the fight against drug abuse as the government seeks to limit the cultivation, production, trafficking, and distribution of drugs at their very source. This element of U.S. international drugcontrol strategy is to help host governments seize illicit narcotics before they reach America’s borders. A related imperative is to attack and disrupt large aggregates of criminal power, to immobilize their top leaders, and to sever drug traffickers’ ties to the economy and to the political hierarchy. Training of foreign law enforcement personnel constitutes a major part of such endeavors. Currently, the Department of State funds antinarcotics law enforcement training programs for foreign personnel from more than seventy countries. Other efforts to reduce the supply of drugs might include encouraging farmers who cultivate crops such as opium or coca to switch to other profitable crops and to look toward other sources of income. Common approaches to achieving this goal include alternative development programs, community development, natural resource management, and income-generating projects. Naturally, many supply-reduction programs are multinational in scope, thus regional cooperation is common between governments so that uniform response 395

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can be given to cases of cross-border trafficking. Services may include exchange of military or law enforcement personnel and trainers, physical resources, and monetary aid. Drug Demand In response to the international drug demand, the U.S. Department of State sponsors and funds numerous international demand reduction initiatives. Drug-demand reduction efforts seek to lower the use and abuse of drugs among consumers around the world. The strategy has been adopted in a number of regions around the world. This is different from supply-reduction programs that have been touted by the United States during the War on Drugs era. Supply reduction utilizes law enforcement to stop the flow and trafficking of drugs. The demand-reduction strategy utilizes prevention and treatment to seek a reduction of drug abuse. The need for demand-reduction efforts is clear given the social costs that are associated with their use. The overall health of community populations, economic stability, and even governmental authority can be compromised by an excessive demand for drugs. Because some countries are so overwhelmed with such a demand, the United States provides a wide range of assistance to aid these countries in reducing drug demands within their own borders. This aid can actually be quite important in establishing that country’s political, social, and economic stability, particularly in those countries that have been overwhelmed by drug problems. Countries such as Colombia and Afghanistan are prime examples. For example, the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has a demandreduction program that is designed to assist nations with their own drug-control strategies. During this process, the INL integrates numerous techniques such as training and assistance, treatment programs for addicted populations, public awareness campaigns, and evaluative research of those programs that are implemented. Harm Reduction Harm-reduction efforts are seen as a compromise between strict enforcement efforts and outright

legalization. This approach acknowledges that people will continue to use drugs regardless of the law or constraint that is implemented. Harm reductionists therefore desire to reduce as much of the harm to the drug abuser and the community as possible. Other related adjunct treatment programs and intervention services are often also included within the overall array of drug treatment services. The provision of these additional services is likely to increase the overall prognosis of the drug offender and is therefore a viable approach to making communities safe. Thus, this array of services can aid the drug offender while also improving the overall state of the community. Research does not show that harm-reduction programs are likely to increase drug use. In fact, these programs have been found to reduce HIV prevalence, reduce multiple use of the same needle when injecting drugs, and provide an easy point for disadvantaged groups to obtain services. The Open Society Institute notes several successful studies on programs in the United States, Eastern Europe, South America, and Southeast Asia and supports more than 200 projects in twenty-three countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. While projects are tailored to local conditions and client needs, the majority of projects encompass a needle-exchange component. The Need for International Collaboration In order to have any kind of an effective international initiative that addresses both the abuse and the trafficking of drugs, governments must work together. Furthermore, these governments must have reliable reporting systems so that progress can be measured, for better or worse. Government members of the UN report annually on drug abuse trends among the general population under their jurisdiction. This information is typically provided within the framework of a five-category scale denoting if there is a large increase, some increase, no noticeable change, some decrease, or a large decrease. For those countries that do not have adequate drug abuse monitoring programs, their reports are based mainly on the perceptions of administrators over their major drug control agencies. Regardless of the limitations of these data col-

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A needle exchange volunteer gives needles to an addict on August 19, 2005, in Odessa, Ukraine. This program, run by a local NGO called “A Way Home,” is intended to mitigate the impact of illegal drug use on the HIV/AIDS epidemic. (Getty Images)

lection techniques, these reports are integral to the ability of nations to work in tandem to thwart the international drug trade. These data are integrated into the multilateral drug control system, which is considered the most comprehensive database on drug abuse and trafficking. The multilateral drug control system fosters cooperation between numerous nations around the world. Its legal framework has evolved over time through a series of international drug conventions held by the UN. Compliance with this system is fairly universal, with the scope of control over drugs broadening during the past few decades. This drug control system is a result of the UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS), which resulted in innovative shifts in policy. These shifts included a parity of approach between demand and supply policies, the focus on improving and standardizing methodolo-

gies for the collection and analysis of drug-related law, the cross-disciplinary and holistic approach to the drug problem, and a greater sharing of the burden for drug-control efforts among countries in unilateral partnerships. These latest developments are important because they reflect the commitment of the UN to the problems associated with drug abuse and drug trafficking and also signify the standardization of drug-fighting techniques throughout the world. Such cooperative efforts are expected to improve our knowledge of the global drug problem and our ability to reduce the spread of drug abuse. These developments also indicate that the global community is now open to a more diversified range of options in dealing with the drug problem, with alternative demand-reduction and treatment strategies coming into vogue throughout the worldwide community. 397

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References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime. 7th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003. Colombia Trade News. “The Factors in the History of Colombia’s Trouble,” 2004, http://www .coltrade.org/about/factors.asp. Eskridge, C. The Mexican Cartels and Their Integration into Mexican Socio-political Culture. Huntsville, TX: Office of International Criminal Justice, 2001. Moran, N. “Emerging Trends: Transnational Drug Production and Trafficking.” Criminal Justice International 18(63) (2002): 5–7. Open Society Institute. “International Harm Reduction Development Program,” 2005, http://www.soros.org/initiatives/ihrd/about. Perls, R. “Drug Control: International Policy and Approaches,” 2003, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/ IB88093.pdf. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report: Volume 1. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004. United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. “International Demand Reduction Initiatives,” Washington, D.C., 31 May 2002, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/10647.htm. Young, R. “United States Proposes More Andean Drug Interception Flights.” Crime & Justice International 18(63) (2002): 11–13.

The 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) Christopher D. Ram Introduction The 2000 United Nations (UN) Convention against Transnational Organized Crime was negotiated among UN member states during 1999–2000 and is designated the Palermo Convention in accordance with UN custom as a result of the international conference, held in Palermo, Italy, during 12–15 December 2000, at which the convention and its first two protocols were first opened for signature. The convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, to which the official text is annexed. Having obtained the necessary forty ratifications by mid2003, the convention came into force on 29 Sep-

tember 2003 and is now also found in the U.N. Treaty Series (UNTS #39574). The convention is the first comprehensive international legal instrument dealing with measures against organized crime. It represents the response of the international community to the spread of organized criminal groups, which have globalized and diversified in much the same ways—and for many of the same reasons—as legitimate commercial entities. It is comprehensive in the sense that it addresses almost any form of criminal activity if it involves some element of transnationality and an organized criminal group. This is a significant expansion on the previous global treaties containing crime-control elements, which were limited to specific and narrowly defined subject matter such as trafficking in narcotic drugs or included individual criminalization and prosecution requirements to enforce other policies such as environmental objectives. Faced with criminal groups diversifying into illicit trafficking of a range of illicit commodities, including human beings, economic crimes such as fraud and money laundering, and other transnational crimes, a more comprehensive response was needed, and the 2000 convention was developed. Treaty making depends on consensus among sovereign countries, and consensus on stronger international cooperation requirements tends to become more difficult as the scope of the underlying subject matter of the treaty increases. In this sense, the convention, which applies to a wide range of offenses and conduct associated with organized crime, can be seen as a major step forward from the earlier narcotics and terrorism conventions, all of which oblige states to cooperate only with respect to specific criminal offenses. Attempts to negotiate a comprehensive antiterrorism convention have been stalled for some time over the lack of consensus with respect to a definition of terrorism (and whether the actions of states can be terrorism), even in the wake of the 2001 attacks against the United States, although in early 2005 the secretary-general of the United Nations (UN) made a significant attempt to move the process forward (A/59/2005, paragraph 91). Consensus on the 2000 Palermo Convention only

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The 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention)

A man takes a picture of a large black-and-white photo showing Italian police escorting Mafia boss Vito Vitale to jail in 1998, during a visit to a mafia documentation center in Corleone south of Palermo in Sicily December 13, 2000. Anticrime campaigners from around the world descended on Corleone as part of events connected to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. (Reuters/Corbis)

became possible when language linking organized criminal groups to the pursuit of some “financial or other material benefit,” thereby excluding purely political terrorist groups, was incorporated. The adoption of comprehensive, multilateral legal measures as opposed to bilateral and regional ad hoc and subject-specific agreements and arrangements has several major advantages but is not without controversy, especially in the United States, where it is sometimes attacked as an erosion on national sovereignty. Countries effectively give up some of their domestic autonomy over crime in exchange for measures that permit more effective cooperation with other countries in transnational crime cases. The convention standardizes domestic criminal offenses and procedures to simplify international cooperation, places cooperation on a more concrete legal footing, and induces countries that

might not otherwise have done so to take strong measures against domestic and transnational organized crime. Despite concerns, there is broad consensus that the convention and its protocols are a significant step forward. This includes the United States, which supported the convention process and was a major contributor to both the negotiations and subsequent efforts to promote and assist ratification, although at the time of writing (early 2005) it had not yet ratified the new treaty. The success of the convention, if it continues, may lead to further treaty developments. Since its adoption, a further comprehensive legal instrument, the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption, has been negotiated, adopted, and opened for signature and ratification. In the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, the forum in which much of the preparatory work for 399

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the 2000 convention took place, there has been discussion of other topics, including cybercrime, kidnapping, theft of cultural property, and trafficking in human organs, but there has not been sufficient consensus to support a resolution calling for the negotiation of any further legal instruments. The structure of the convention package itself provides a framework for further protocols where the subject matter involves organized crime and would fit within the scope of the existing convention. Where the subject matter may involve transnational crime unrelated to organized criminal groups, a separate convention would be needed. This was the approach taken with respect to corruption in 2001– 2003, and it would likely be taken with respect to cybercrime and other forms of nonorganized transnational crime should treaties in those areas be developed in the future. Generally, the development of further treaties will proceed only as and when it becomes clear that a sufficient number of countries support the process and are close enough to agreeing on content to make the effort likely to succeed. Historical Background The process that produced the 2000 convention illustrates both the mechanics and pace of international lawmaking. In developing international treaties, consensus must be reached on the need for a treaty, and support must emerge for the specific provisions it will ultimately contain. Common understandings must be reached across differences in custom, law, and approaches to crime and society that are much broader than those found within individual states, and this usually takes more time and effort than domestic lawmaking. More than 100 of the UN’s 189 member states at the time (there are now 191, Switzerland and East Timor having joined since the process concluded) actively participated in the convention negotiations. Following informal discussions that began in the early 1990s, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution (GA/RES49/159) calling on the Commission for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to formally seek the views of countries on a possible convention. Proposals and draft texts began to circulate among countries, and the first comprehen-

sive text was submitted to the General Assembly in 1996 (GA/RES/51/120). The General Assembly then established a group of experts to develop a preliminary draft text, and this took place in April 1998. An informal preparatory committee held in Buenos Aires from 31 August to 4 September 1998 reviewed the text and proposed its completion by the end of 2000. The process up to 1998 built international consensus in support of the new convention, developed a draft text, and produced the structure of a parent convention containing general measures, to be accompanied by a series of subordinate instruments, or protocols, to deal with specific types of crime (UN document A/AC.254/3). In December 1998, the General Assembly established an openended intergovernmental ad hoc committee for the elaboration of the convention and three protocols (GA/RES/53/111), and negotiations began in Vienna in January 1999. Agreement was reached on the convention in July 2000 and on the first two protocols in October 2000. These instruments were adopted by the General Assembly in November 2000 (GA/RES/55/25) and declared open for signature starting at a conference set for Palermo, Italy, the following month. A further session, held in February–March 2001, was needed to finalize a third (firearms trafficking) protocol, and it was adopted and opened for signature in May 2001 (GA/RES/55/255). In addition to finalizing the convention and its three protocols, the committee also adopted a series of notes on the meaning and interpretation of the instruments, for inclusion in the travaux préparatoires, that were also transmitted to the General Assembly with the relevant resolutions (A/55/383/Add.1 and A/55/383/Add.3). Status of the Treaties The signing of a treaty signifies that a country intends to become a party, but no country is actually bound until it ratifies or accedes to the treaty and the treaty is in force. The final provisions for the convention and its protocols all provide that each instrument is to come into force on the nintieth day after the fortieth country ratifies or accedes to it, and with the Palermo Conference of December 2000 this process began. The convention came into

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force on 29 September 2003; the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, came into force on 25 December 2003; and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air, and Sea came into force on 28 January 2004. On 3 July 2005, the third (firearms trafficking) protocol entered into force. The number of signatures and ratifications and lists of the parties to the treaties can be obtained on-line from the UN Treaty Office in New York or the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna (www.un.org or www.unodc.org). Content of the Convention The stated purpose of the convention (Article 1) is “to promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime more effectively.” The scope requirements, dealt with in Articles 2 (definitions) and 3 (scope) ensure broad application. Under Article 3, the convention applies to “the prevention, investigation and prosecution” of three groups of offenses: • The four offenses specifically established by the convention: participation in an organized criminal group (Article 5), laundering proceeds of crime (Article 6), corruption (Article 8) and obstruction of justice (Article 23). • Any other “serious crime” as defined in Article 2, subparagraph (b). • Where the countries concerned are also parties to a protocol, any further offenses established by that protocol.

In all of these cases, the convention will only apply if the offense is “transnational in nature” and if it “involves an organized criminal group.” The meaning of “transnational in nature” (Article 3, paragraph 2) includes offenses committed in more than one state and offenses committed in only one state if they are prepared, planned, directed, or controlled or have substantial effects in other states or if they are committed by an organized criminal group that is active in more than one state. To be an organized criminal group, a group must have at least three members and take some action in concert for the purpose of committing a serious crime or other offense covered by the convention.

The offense must also be for the purpose of obtaining some “financial or other material benefit,” a requirement intended to exclude some terrorist groups. Groups would only be excluded, however, if completely dissociated with benefits. Activities such as crimes committed for terrorist fund-raising and terrorist acts committed by conventional organized criminal groups would arguably still trigger application of the convention. The agreed notes for the travaux préparatoires also specify that “financial or other material benefit” should be interpreted broadly as including sexual gratification and gives the activities of child pornographers and pedophile rings as an example (A/55/383/Add. 1, paragraph 3). Two additional points dealing with scope and application should be noted. The first is that specific provisions in the convention or a protocol may also set additional conditions for application. Early requests for mutual legal assistance, for example, can be based on mere “reasonable grounds to suspect” transnational elements since foreign assistance will often be needed to establish transnationality, whereas the language governing the extradition of accused offenders later in the process sets a higher standard (Article 18, paragraph 1, and Article 16). The second point is that the provisions governing application are the tests for seeking cooperation from another country and are not requirements for domestic implementation. The purpose of the convention is to ensure that parties have offenses to use against domestic organized crime in order to support the international framework, not to criminalize transnational organized crime as a distinct offense. The involvement of organized crime and transnationality should not be elements of domestic offenses or prosecutions, and parties are therefore required to establish domestic offenses irrespective of transnationality or the involvement of an organized criminal group (Article 34). Once it applies, the convention provides a wide range of cooperation measures. The provision governing mutual legal assistance (Article 18) is the longest in the convention, refers to the “widest measure” of assistance, and includes the gathering and transfer of most kinds of evidence, including by electronic “video conference” means where possible. 401

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Bank secrecy or the fact that a country treats the offense as a fiscal offense may not be used to block assistance requests. In addition, more specific cooperation is also provided for the tracing, seizure, confiscation, and disposal of proceeds of offenses covered by the convention (Articles 12–14). Parties are also required to extradite offenders, and where the offender is a national who cannot be extradited for constitutional reasons, parties are required to prosecute the offender themselves (aut dedere aut judicare). The text also requires states that cannot extradite their nationals to ensure that they have sufficient jurisdiction to prosecute, even where the offense was committed elsewhere (Article 15, paragraph 3, and Article 16, paragraph 10). Other forms of investigative powers, such as electronic surveillance and controlled delivery, must be established unless inconsistent with the basic principles of a country’s legal system (Article 20), and countries are encouraged to engage in other forms of law enforcement cooperation, such as the exchange of liaison officers (Article 27). Measures to protect and assist victims, witnesses, and persons who cooperate with law enforcement and to prevent organized crime are also required (Articles 25–26 and 30–31). A key element of the treaty is that parties that have resources and expertise agree to assist those who lack them, both with training and technical assistance (Article 29). Relationship between the Convention and Protocols The relationship between the convention and its protocols is set out in Article 37 of the convention and Article 1 of each of the protocols. The intention was to create a basic framework in the parent convention and then to establish additional provisions for specific types of crime in subordinate protocols, to which countries could agree and implement separately. This means that the protocols are not in themselves complete treaties. To deal with a case of migrant smuggling, for example, law enforcement would use the protocol for specific types of cooperation, such as assistance in validating or verifying travel documents used by smugglers. More general cooperation, such as obtaining foreign evidence and the extradition of accused smugglers, falls under the

convention. To make this work, the convention specifies that no country can become a party to any protocol unless it is also a party to the convention itself, and each protocol specifies that all offenses established by the protocol shall be regarded as offenses established in accordance with the convention. Provisions of the convention also apply to the protocols, mutatis mutandis, and provisions of both the convention and protocol must be interpreted together in a consistent manner. Content of the Protocols Three protocols were developed concurrently with the convention: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air, and Sea; and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition. These follow the same basic pattern of the convention, in each case supplementing the general provisions already established there. Parties to each protocol are required to criminalize the basic conduct proscribed by that protocol and other related conduct, to take appropriate preventive and other measures, and to provide specific forms of cooperation in addition to those required by the convention, such as the tracing of firearms or the verification of travel or identity documents. The three primary offenses established by the protocols are trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, and the illicit manufacturing of or trafficking in firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition. All three protocols also require the criminalization of related conduct, including attempts and organizing or directing others to commit the primary offenses, and some of the protocols also establish other related offenses, such as tampering with firearm serial numbers or production of illicit travel documents. Beyond this, further requirements are specific to each protocol, dealing with subjects such as the disposal of confiscated firearms and the support and assistance of victims of trafficking in persons. Further information about the convention and its protocols can be obtained from various UN sources. The texts of all General Assembly resolutions and

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related documents can be found at www.un.org. This includes the resolutions leading up to the negotiations, the adoption and official texts of the treaties, and subsequent resolutions calling on member states to ratify and fully implement them. Documents relating to the negotiations themselves, materials in support of efforts to ratify and implement the treaties, and information about the ongoing work of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the conferences of parties to the treaties can be found at the site of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) at www.unodc.org. References McClean, David. The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Oxford Commentaries on International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

United Nations. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility—Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. New York: United Nations Publications, 2004. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Legislative Guides for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto. New York: United Nations Publications, 2005. ———. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto. New York: United Nations Publications, 2004. United Nations. “Protocol against The Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,” July 2005, http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/ pressrels/2005/uniscp517.html.

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F. National and International Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies

Australian Crime Commission Henry Prunckun The Commonwealth government established the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) on 1 January 2003 to deal with national criminal threats and organized criminal activity. Its creation was the result of the amalgamation of the former National Crime Authority (established in 1984 to combat organized crime), the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (established in 1981 to provide a national criminal intelligence service), and the Office of Strategic Assessments (established in 1994 to provide strategic intelligence on emergent criminal issues). Through the ACC’s creation, the Commonwealth government acknowledged that a single agency approach was required to deal with organized crime. Investigative Powers The ACC’s authority to conduct law enforcement operations is derived from the Commonwealth Australian Crime Commission Act of 2002. Under this act, the ACC has seven functions: “(1) to collect, correlate, analyse and disseminate criminal information and intelligence and to maintain a national database of that information and intelligence; (2) to undertake, when authorised by the Board, intelligence operations; (3) to investigate, when authorised by the Board, matters relating to federally relevant criminal activity; (4) to provide reports to the Board on the outcomes of those operations or investigations; (5) to provide strategic

criminal intelligence assessments, and any other criminal information and intelligence, to the Board; (6) to provide advice to the Board on national criminal intelligence priorities; and, (7) such other functions as are conferred on the ACC by other provisions of this Act or by any other Act.” Corporate Structure The ACC is headquartered in Canberra and has regional offices in Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth, and Sydney. The ACC is headed by a board that comprises the commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (chair of the board), the secretary of the department, the chief executive officer (CEO) of the Australian Customs Service, the chairperson of the Australian Securities & Investments Commission, the director-general of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the commissioner from each state and territory police force, the chief police officer of the Australian Capital Territory; and the ACC’s chief executive officer. Operations The operations of the ACC are reviewed by the Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC) as a means of providing independent scrutiny. The IGC consists of the Commonwealth minister and a number of ministers of the Crown, one from each participating state and territory. The IGC’s role is to keep watch on the strategic direction set by the board and the ACC and to monitor their general work, intelligence operations, and criminal investigations. The IGC also acts as a conduit for the ACC to com-

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Australian Crime Commission

Chemical criminalist Ben Kwok displays ball bearings found at the scene of the 2005 Bali bombings at the Australian Federal Police forensics laboratory in Canberra. (Alan Porritt/Corbis)

municate (via written reports) to the Commonwealth, states, and territorial governments. On an operational level, the ACC is headed by the CEO, who is appointed by the governor-general of Australia. The CEO is responsible for both the organization’s corporate management and the coordination and control of its operations and investigations. The responsibility for the ACC’s day-to-day functions is delegated to directors and managers. The strength of the ACC as a national crimefighting agency comes not only from its integrated approach (i.e., combining national law enforcement, intelligence, and investigation functions) but also its coercive powers. These extraordinary powers are not available to Australian state and territorial police forces, as they are specifically provided under the ACC’s enabling act. These powers allow the ACC to conduct investigations that would not normally yield results using traditional law enforcement methods of inquiry.

The ACC Board must first authorize the use of coercive powers. Experienced legal practitioners, known as examiners, exercise these powers in relation to special operations and investigations. These powers include the ability to summon persons to appear and give evidence under oath or affirmation and to produce specific documents. The examinations are held in secret, and persons disclosing either information contained in their summon or the information that transpires during the examination commit an indictable offense. Persons failing to attend an examination, refusing to answer questions put to them at examination, or failing to produce summoned documents are also guilty of an indictable offense. Examples of the some of the ACC’s special investigations include an investigation into Southeast Asian organized crime groups alleged to have been importing heroin and engaged in the associated criminal activities of money laundering, tax fraud, 405

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National and International Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies

and violence and an investigation into firearms trafficking by several groups operating throughout Australia. Examples of ACC special intelligence operations include research into motor vehicle rebirthing and identity theft, and the results of both have led to the development of more comprehensive national responses. Emerging national crime targets are selected and prioritized on a regular basis. References Australian Crime Commission. Australian Crime Commission Annual Report, 2002–03. Canberra: Australian Crime Commission, 2003. ———. Australian Crime Commission Corporate Plan, 2003–04. Canberra: Australian Crime Commission, 2003. ———. Australian Crime Commission Determinations. Canberra: Australian Crime Commission, 2004. ———. Australian Crime Commission Profile. Canberra: Australian Crime Commission, 2003. ———. Australian Crime Commission Act 2002. Canberra: Commonwealth Government, 2004.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service Kelly Sundberg Background The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is Canada’s civilian security intelligence service. Launched on 16 July 1984 under the authority of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (CSIS Act), the CSIS took over the responsibility of national security intelligence from Security Service of Canada’s national police force, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The transfer of security intelligence activities from a police force to a civilian organization resulted in increased accountability to Parliament and a reduced risk of abuse of authority. The CSIS emerged from the 1981 Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (also referred to as the McDonald Commission). In the 1970s, the RCMP was accused of conducting investigations that, according to P. Rosen, were “not authorized or

provided for by law.” The most prominent acts that the RCMP committed that ultimately resulted in the establishment of the CSIS were the burning down of a barn to prevent a meeting of militant Quebec nationalists, a burglary and vandalism of a Montreal-based left-wing media outlet, and the theft of Parti Québécois membership lists. Public outrage over the RCMP’s actions ultimately caused the Canadian House of Commons to create a new civilian-based security intelligence service, the CSIS. Under the CSIS Act of 1984, the service’s operations, tactics, and finances are reviewed by the independent body known as the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC). The SIRC reports to the Canadian House of Commons every year through the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. Structure The CSIS is one of six government departments under the newly established umbrella department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC). When the PSEPC was created on 12 December 2003, the minister responsible for PSEPC (who also serves as the deputy prime minister) ultimately became responsible for the CSIS. The director of CSIS oversees the service’s overall operation and reports directly to the minister. The CSIS has five divisions (Operations, Human Resources, Secretariat, Administration and Finance, and Legal Services) and also manages the post-9/11 Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, which includes representatives from other government departments having a responsibility to national security. The Operations Division is responsible for carrying out the primary mandate of the CSIS. This division has three subbranches (Operations, Intelligence, Corporate), each having its own assistant director. Operations Branch The Operations Branch investigates and analyzes threats to national security arising from foreign governments involved in espionage activities against Canada as well as threats of serious violence that could affect the national security of

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Police stand guard as terror suspects arrive at court for a bail hearing on June 12, 2006, in Brampton, Ontario. Seventeen men were arrested for allegedly planning terrorist attacks in Canada, part of a sting operation by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. (AFP/Getty Images)

Canada. This branch is divided into four subgroups: Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Intelligence, Counter-Proliferation, and Human Source Management. Intelligence Branch The Intelligence Branch conducts security checks of government employees as well as those applying for refugee protection, immigrant status, or Canadian citizenship. This branch also provides support to other groups within the CSIS, produces intelligence reports, and liaises with foreign government security intelligence services on behalf of the government of Canada. This branch is divided into four subgroups: Security Screening, Research, Analysis and Production, Operations Support, and Foreign Liaison and Visits. Corporate Branch The Corporate Branch is responsible for the records and information systems of the CSIS, man-

ages the service’s scientific and technical needs, and oversees internal security. This branch is divided into three subgroups: Information Management, Scientific and Technical Services, and Internal Security. Responsibility The CSIS investigates and analyzes threats to Canada’s national security and reports intelligence concerns to the government of Canada. Specifically, the CSIS is responsible for Canada’s counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counterintelligence, security screening, and intelligence research, analysis, and production services. Because the CSIS is a civilian service and not a law enforcement agency, criminal intelligence matters are handled by the Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada (CISC) and the RCMP. Upon the request of the minister of foreign affairs or the minister of defense, the CSIS will engage in the collection of intelligence outside of Canada’s borders. 407

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The CSIS also conducts security clearances of government of Canada employees, with the exception of the RCMP, which conducts its own. In addition to employee screening, the CSIS assists Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) in the security review of immigrant, refugee, and citizenship applications. CSIS and the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, Canada has reviewed its own national security establishments and has taken major steps toward improving Canada’s ability to detect, deter, and manage threats of terrorism. In April 2004, the government of Canada established the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) within the CSIS’s national headquarters. Being the primary intelligence service within Canada, the CSIS is responsible for managing and overseeing the ITAC. The ITAC is comprised of representatives of other government organizations having a role in maintaining Canada’s national security. The ITAC facilitates increased information sharing and integrated intelligence analysis and assists justice and public safety professionals in making critical decisions and taking appropriate actions concerning the safety and security of Canada.

References Frost, Mike, and Michel Gratton. Spyworld: Inside the Canadian American Intelligence Establishments. Mechanicsburg, PA: Doubleday, 1994. Hamilton, Dwight, et al. Inside Canadian Intelligence: Exposing the New Realities of Espionage and International Terrorism. Toronto: Dundurn, 2006. Nikic, P. “Taking Threat Assessment to a New Level.” Royal Canadian Mounted Police Gazette 66(4) (December 2004), http://www.gazette .rcmp-grc.gc.ca/article-en.html?&lang _id=1&article_id=65. Rosen, P. “The Canadian Security Intelligence Service.” Canadian Library of Parliament, 84– 27E, September 2001, http://www.parl.gc.ca/ information/library/PRBpubs/8427-e.htm.

Caribbean Financial Action Task Force Steven Marin The Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), established in November 1992 in Kingston, Jamaica, is dedicated to limiting the use of money laundering as a tool by criminal elements to further their activities. Thirty states in the Caribbean have become members since the organization’s first meeting in Aruba in May of 1990. The CFATF was established one year after the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established at the G7 meeting in Paris in 1989 to combat the growing international threat of money laundering. The CFATF’s objective is the implementation of policies and procedures that will reduce or eliminate the process of money laundering and, after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, the financing of terrorism. As of 2005, CFATF membership includes Antigua, Anguilla, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, the Republic of Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, the Turk and Calcos Islands, Trinidad, Tobago, and Venezuela. The 1992 Kingston Declaration established the CFATF’s framework and laid out the main issues that the organization would be addressing. The acceptance and implementation of the FATF recommendations were of prime concern. Recommendations made in Aruba and Jamaica with CFATF input on the FATF model concerning detecting and prosecuting money launderers were key. Inclusion of the Organization of American States (OAS) recommendations and regulations concerning money laundering as well as the 1988 United Nations (UN) convention on money laundering were also integrated in the framework for the CFATF. Supporting the CFATF are cooperative and supporting nations that assist in the CFATF’s activities in the Caribbean. Canada, the Netherlands, France, Great Britain, the United States, and later Mexico and Spain, assist CFATF while at the same time are members of the FATF.

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The CFATF’s progress and compliance in the efforts to stop money laundering and the financing of terrorism include the self-assessment of implemented recommendations among the members of the organization and the mutual evaluation of members by other members. The coordination and participation in training and technological assistance programs, the conduct of biannual plenary meetings for technical representatives, and finally the annual ministerial meeting of the organization’s members make up the core of the CFATF’s activities. Since 1996, the CFATF has run typology exercises to help members develop methods to detect and respond to money laundering. The CFATF’s first full year of operation was completed in 1995. The organization’s primary goals for that period were the completion of selfassessments to monitor compliance of the recommendations set forth in the Kingston Declaration and to seek mutual cooperation among member states in the prevention and control of money laundering. Mutual evaluations started in the 1994– 1995 period were slated to be completed by 2000. The period 1995–1996 saw a continuation of the self-assessment and mutual evaluation programs begun the previous year, and the period 1996–1997 saw the adoption of three new members to the organization. By 1997 the CFATF had gained five more members, and by 2000 the mutual evaluation program was completed as scheduled. The implementation of the Caribbean Anti-Money Laundering program was also completed as well as a study of cyberspace and its impact on money laundering. The Caribbean Anti-Money Laundering Program, established in 1999–2000, helped members establish national financial intelligence units and also helped to modernize legislation of members’ governments to deal with money laundering. The Anti-Money Laundering Program was also helping train regulators to operate under internationally recognized standards in their efforts to seek out and prosecute money laundering suspects. The period 2001–2002 saw three more new members of the CFATF join. In October 2001 the CFATF ministerial meeting proposed and adopted a declaration to assist in the fight against terrorist financing and funding through the international financial sys-

tem as a result of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. One year later the CFATF formally expanded its mandate to include the effort to stop terrorist financing through the international financial markets, and 2005 marked the tenth full year of operation for the organization. References ”CFATF Annual Reports, 1994–2004.” Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, http://www.cfatf.org/ documentation/docadmin.asp?mcat=3. “CFATF Overview.” Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, http://www.cfatf.org/. “History of the FATF.” Financial Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/ 63/0,2340,en_32250379_32236836_34432255 _1_1_1_1,00.html. Mussington, David A., et al. Exploring Money Laundering Vulnerabilities through Emerging Cyberspace Technologies: A Caribbean-Based Exercise. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998.

Central Intelligence Agency Mike van Aelstyne History The United States has focused attention on foreign intelligence prior to the beginning of World War II in Europe. However, during World War II it became evident that the United States was in need of better intelligence that would monitor just how foreign countries were operating. Failure to predict the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 led to the development of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The OSS built a network of spies and informants that conducted covert operations in Europe, Africa, and Asia during 1942–1945. In 1945 President Harry S. Truman disbanded the OSS but in January 1946 established a new organization called the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). The following year the CIG became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the authorization of the National Security Act of 1947. The National Security Act placed the CIA in charge of coordinating the nation’s intelligence activities as well as evaluating any intelligence that 409

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Headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency in Langley, Virginia. (National Archives)

may have an adverse affect on national security. The National Security Act also placed the CIA under the direct supervision of Congress. The CIA became the first secret intelligence service to be elected by a democratically elected government. Mission The CIA’s main focus is to keep top U.S. officials aware of the key intelligence issues occurring around the world. This is done through the intelligence cycle, which is the process of collecting, analyzing, and passing along information to top U.S. government officials. The information is gathered through foreign intelligence and is given to the president of the United States in the president’s daily brief (PDB). The CIA gathers information for the president but does not make policy recommendations. The CIA is not a law enforcement agency but will assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on a number of issues dealing with counter-

intelligence such as organized crime, which is handled by the Crime and Narcotics Center. Intelligence Collection The CIA uses a variety of different informationgathering techniques to collect intelligence. The CIA will gather information through interception of foreign communications, known as COMINT. The CIA will often intercept electronic intelligence transmissions, referred to as ELINT. Human sources will disclose information through covert and overt collection techniques called HUMINT. Imagery intelligence, known as IMINT, is information from satellite photography. Measurement and signature intelligence is made up of nuclear, optical, radio-frequency, acoustics, seismic, and materials science and is referred to as MASINT. SIGINT is signal intelligence derived from the interception of signals. Another technique of information collection is through open-source information. Open-

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source information involves the reading and translating of foreign newspapers, magazines, and radio and television broadcasts. Another means of information collection is through operation officers who recruit foreign agents or spies. Organization The organizational structure of the CIA is divided into three directorates and five mission support offices under the authority of the director of central intelligence (DCI). The DCI is at the forefront of the intelligence community and is the head of the CIA. This position deals with public affairs, protocol, legal issues, research, and internal oversight. The three directorates are the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), the Directorate of Operations (DO), and the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T). The DI is in charge of analyzing all-source information and producing reports, briefings, and papers on key intelligence matters. The DO has the responsibility for collection of foreign intelligence. The DS&T has the responsibility of applying new technology concepts to intelligence problems. The DS&T deals with technology from the research phase through the design and application phase of production until the technology is put into use for intelligence-gathering information. The five mission support offices focus on information security, records management, training, communication, human resources, declassification, and protection of CIA personnel around the world. The number of people who work for the CIA is constantly in flux and is only known to top government officials. The CIA does recruit well-qualified people in nearly all fields of study: science, accountants, engineers, linguists, analysts, economists, and computer specialists. The budget of the CIA is also not directly reported so that the secrecy of certain programs is not compromised. References ”About CIA.” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/index.html. “History of the CIA.” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/history-of-thecia/index.html.

Warner, Michael, ed. Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution. Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-ofintelligence/csi-publications/books-andmonographs/Origin_and_Evolution.pdf.

Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada John A. Winterdyk Introduction Police agencies are charged with the responsibility to detect, apprehend, and investigate illegal activity. In order to perform this function, their duties include, among other responsibilities, the need to gather intelligence through a variety of proactive and effective means, defined under various federal and provincial statutes that ensure speed, flexibility, and creativity. In Canada, an affluent industrialized country with a market-oriented economic system, the prevalence of organized crime groups or serious crime issues is not dissimilar to most other Western countries that share a similar sociopolitical economic structure. In 1996, the Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada (CISC) reported that an estimated $20 billion (in Canadian currency) was generated through a wide range of organized criminal activity, with about half of it from the illicit drug trade. The CISC was established in 1970, and in 1976 it created the Automated Criminal Intelligence Information System (ACIIS), an online computer database. Staffing Requirements Today, as a federal organization based out of a central bureau in Ottawa, the CISC liaises with and collects information from its nine provincial bureaus. The provincial organizations operate independently while maintaining common service delivery standards. The territories are serviced by three of the provinces. The CISC uses the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Criminal Intelligence Directorate’s list of characteristics to differentiate organized crime from other crimes, which in essence is very similar to that found in most other Western nations. However, the notion of organized 411

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crime groups operating in isolation from the rest of society is misleading and inaccurate, as the difference between criminal organized activities and conventional society is somewhat nebulous. The CISC is comprised of two levels of membership. Level 1 membership is restricted to federal (i.e., the RCMP), provincial (e.g., the Ontario Provincial Police), and regional or municipal police services. Level 2 memberships are discretionally granted to police services or agencies responsible for the enforcement of federal or provincial statutes that are unable to meet the qualifications of Level 1 membership. The governing body of the CISC is the Executive Committee, which is chaired by the commissioner of the RCMP and is comprised of twenty-two leaders from Canada’s law enforcement community. The committee meets twice a year to identify and prioritize its goals and monitor issues. This process allows the organization to think globally but still be able to act locally and ensure a strong degree of integration among the various levels of law enforcement across the country. Staffing of the CISC is largely reliant on recruiting from municipal, provincial, and federal law enforcement agencies. Today, there are approximately 380 CISC members working at all levels of the organization, and the national and regional agencies provide a wide range of courses and workshops for its staff (e.g., informant handling to Internet gaming workshops). In addition to its regular employees, the Central Bureau also engages in two- to five-year secondment periods from other police departments and government agencies (e.g., Canada Border Services Agency, Correctional Services of Canada, and the Department of National Defense). Intelligence Analysis All law enforcement agencies provide their respective provincial bureaus with criminal intelligence and raw data related to organized crime issues. This data is used for analysis and dissemination through the ACIIS. Being a federal agency, the CISC is required by law to provide annual reports on its activities as they relate to organized crime. The report is available on CISC’s website at www.cisc.gc.ca. Over the

years, the national intelligence priorities have remained relatively constant. In 2004, they included Asian-based organized crime; East European-based organized crime; organized crime at marine ports, airports, and land border areas; outlaw motorcycle gangs (particularly the Hells Angels); and traditional (Italian-based) organized crime. Meanwhile, the CISC’s national monitored issues have also remained relatively consistent over the years. The monitored issues include Aboriginalbased organized crime, illicit movement of firearms, sexual exploitation of children, prison and street gangs, and technology and crime. In addition to identifying national priorities and monitored issues, the CISC’s annual reports also identify some of the key socioeconomic effects of organized crime in Canada. Among the issues identified in the 2004 annual report were violence or the threat of violence, the implications of the availability of illicit drugs including a recent growth in the number of marijuana-growing operations and methane labs, counterfeit goods, and insurance costs and money laundering. Although the CISC has been operational for approximately thirty years and there have been a number of notable successes, the national issues and monitored issues continue to plague Canadian society. What used to be largely a national or even regional problem has become increasingly more sophisticated and expansive in its scope. For example, RCMP Commissioner Guiliano Zaccardelli observed that “the days of these factions (i.e., organized crime groups) operating as independent, isolated units that would take violent steps to protect their turf are over.” In the meantime, the CISC and similar international counterparts need to develop better ways of measuring the nature, extent, and social relevance of organized crime. The research tools SLEIPNIR and PROOF represent such an initiative. As a participant of the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Units (CFSEUs), formed in 1977, the CISC and other law enforcement partners use the initiative for scoring and prioritizing organized crime at the national and international levels. In addition, there is an urgent need for greater cooperation and collaboration between the CISC and its foreign counterparts to work collectively and in an

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integrated manner so as to effectively combat the global nature of organized crime. References Brodeur, Jean-Paul. “Organized Crime: Trends in the Literature.” Paper presented at the Forum on Organized Crime, Ottawa, Canada, 27–28 September 1996. Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada. Annual Reports, www.cisalberta.ca/ciscreport.htm. Koenig, Daniel J. “Organized Crime: A Canadian Perspective.” Pp. 46–78 in Organized Crime: World Perspectives, edited by J. S. Albanese, D. K. Das, and A. Verma. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003. Ljunggren, David. “Web Getting Seamier: Organized Crime Tightens Grip.” Tribune, 22 September 2003, http://www.tribuneindia.com/ 2003/20030922/login/main1.htm.

Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, Italy Laura Ferola The Italian Anti-Mafia Investigation Department The Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (DIA, AntiMafia Investigation Department) was set up by law decree No. 345 of 29 October 1991, amended into law No. 410 of 30 December 1991, titled “Urgent Provisions for the Coordination of Intelligence and Investigative Activities in the Fight against Organized Crime.” The DIA is entrusted with the mission to carry out, in a coordinated manner, intelligence activities targeting organized crime and to conduct investigation exclusively concerning the Mafia, Mafia-related matters, and organized crime. The DIA operates within the Public Security Department of the Ministry of Interior and cooperates in close connection with the judiciary, foreign police agencies, and the police forces operating at a central and peripheral level. Indeed, the DIA staff currently totals approximately 1,500 units and includes investigators coming, in equal proportion, from the national security forces (the Polizia di Stato, the Carabinieri, and the Guardia di Finanza). The minister of the interior informs the Italian Parliament about the DIA’s activities every six

months and presents a yearly report on organized crime in order to inform the Italian government about achievements obtained in fighting the Mafia. Structure and Investigative Duties The DIA is headed by a director, selected among the highest-ranking officers of the national security forces, with specific experience in organized crime investigations. The structure of the DIA, outlined by law No. 410, comprehends, at a central level, a cabinet division and seven units (Inspection Office, Personnel Office, Information System, Training Office, Technical Support Office, Administration, and Accounting Office) subdivided into three branches. The first branch, Preventive Investigations, collects and analyzes information concerning criminal activities of Italian organized crime groups in Italy and abroad as well as foreign organized crime groups operating in Italy. The second branch, Criminal Investigations Activities, plans investigative activities and coordinates police operations. The third branch, International Investigation Relations, is entrusted with the implementation of bilateral and multilateral agreements to successfully fight organized crime at the international level. At the peripheral level, the DIA has twelve field offices and seven resident offices located in different cities in Italy. However, these bodies do not act on predetermined territorial jurisdiction since they are characterized by operational mobility and flexibility criteria of action. As regards its intelligence activities, the DIA focuses on the structure of criminal organizations, their national and international connections, their objectives and modus operandi, and the prevention and investigating of any other Mafia criminal activities. According to its provisional duties, the DIA’s investigative efforts focus mainly on criminal subjects rather than on single crimes and focuses its efforts on the analysis of organized crime rather than on individual crimes. Judicial Cooperation: The Anti-Mafia National Bureau A relevant part of the activities carried out by the DIA is devoted to cooperation with the magistrates 413

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employed in anti-Mafia investigations, in particular the Direzione Nazionale Antimafia (DNA, AntiMafia National Bureau). The latter was set up by Law No. 8 of 20 January 1992 under the aegis of the General Public Prosecutor’s Office based at the Court of Cassation, Italy’s Supreme Court. This body is headed by the national anti-Mafia public prosecutor, appointed directly by the Superior Council of the Bench, which is comprised of the judiciary and prosecutors but is independent from other branches of government and has the power to administer justice and enforce the law, and it has the duty of coordinating investigations related to organized crime at a national level by means of the DIA’s investigative resources. International Action As mentioned above, the DIA is specialized in Mafia-related offenses. Therefore, it has developed an extensive knowledge of the Mafia phenomenon, acquiring a leading role among those bodies, in Italy and abroad, that are responsible for the fight against organized crime. Indeed, during recent years, organized crime has increased in scope, intensity, and sophistication. The process of globalization—of trade, finance, communications, and information—has provided an environment in which many criminal organizations find it profitable and preferable to operate across national borders. In addition, the range of activities pursued by illegal groups has broadened significantly. As a natural consequence, organized crime, in particular the Mafia, has increased its influence in several different sectors, establishing illicit agreements with criminals abroad. In this framework, the DIA stimulated investigative activities at the international level, believing that cooperation among the law enforcement agencies of various countries represents an effective tool with which to counter Mafia expansion. In particular, the DIA takes part in the G8 Expert Working Group for the fight against East European organized crime, together with other national police forces (i.e., the U.S. FBI, the German BKA, the Russian GUBOP, the Canadian RCMP, the British NCIS, the French CRACO, and the Japanese

National Police), with the aim of promoting coordinated investigations and information exchange regarding international criminal organizations. References Calcaterra, Filippo. “L’attività ispettiva e le funzioni di controllo.” Amministrazione e contabilità dello Stato e degli Enti Pubblici 3 (June 1996): 309– 336. Di Marino, Gabriele, and Antonio Montanaro. “D.I.A.: una struttura di coordinamento con le caratteristiche di una ‘task-force’?” Rivista di polizia 12 (December 1998): 812–823. Fragola, Saverio Paolo. “I nuovi organi antimafia.” La giustizia penale 1(3) (Jaunary 1993): 36–64. Iannelli, Francesco, and Michele Roccheggiani. La D.I.A.: D.l. 29 ottobre 1991, n. 345. Milano: Giuffrè, 1995. La Torre, Antonio. “La giustizia penale italiana alle soglie del 2000.” Cassazione penale 5 (May 2000): 1452–1468. Mazzei, Antonio. “La polizia giudiziaria in Italia. Lineamenti storici e comparativi.” Nuova rassegna di legislazione, dottrina e giurisprudenza 7 (April 2002): 817–829. Militello, Vincenzo. “Partecipazione all’organizzazione criminale e standards internazionali d’incriminazione.” Rivista italiana di diritto e procedura penale 1–2 (June 2003): 184–223. Nunziata, Massimo. La Direzione Investigativa Antimafia detta super-procura: introduzione ed inquadramento delle nuove norme. Napoli: Loffredo, 1992. Pepino, Livio. “Spunti in tema di politica criminale e politica giudiziaria. Anomalie e paradossi del caso italiano.” Dei delitti e delle pene 2 (September 1993): 81–90. Salvi, Giovanni, “D.l. 20 novembre 1991, n. 367, convertito con modificazioni nella l. 20 gennaio 1992, n. 8. Coordinamento delle indagini nei procedimenti per reati di criminalità organizzata (Commento all’ art. 7—Funzioni del procuratore nazionale antimafia).” La legislazione penale 4(2) (December 1992): 724–735.

U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration Leonard A. Steverson The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is one of several federal law enforcement agencies in

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General Manuel Noriega is escorted down the aisle of a U.S. Air Force aircraft by agents from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in January of 1990. The former Panamanian leader was flown to the United States, where he was prosecuted for drug and racketeering violations. (Department of Defense)

the United States, among them the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Marshall’s Service, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Customs Service, the Secret Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. The DEA, which falls under the U.S. Department of Justice, is the arm of the U.S. government that is responsible for enforcing the nation’s controlled substances laws and policies. It attempts to accomplish its mission through instituting measures that control the growing, manufacturing, distributing, and trafficking of illicit drugs and putting into place measures to prevent drug use. The Evolution of the DEA The DEA evolved from previous federal agencies whose duty was to combat drugs and the accompanying social problems. In 1915, the Bureau of Internal Revenue was charged with this responsi-

bility, followed by other agencies over the next several decades, including the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC) and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN). It was the social changes of the 1960s, specifically the increase in the recreational use of illicit drugs in the nation, that prompted the government to respond by creating in 1968 the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), which was a synthesis of the previous two entities. Other measures promulgated in response to the burgeoning drug problem was the passage of the comprehensive Controlled Substances Act of 1970, which established drug control measures and the national drug control classification system, and the Diversion Control Program (originally dubbed the Compliance Program) of 1971, which sought to prevent the diversion of manufactured drugs into illegal markets. In 1973, President Richard Nixon declared an intensive war on drugs and, through a 415

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reorganization plan, oversaw the creation of an agency more dedicated to a serious crackdown on drug use and trafficking. The DEA was created that year. The DEA has evolved since its early beginnings and has made use of technological advancements in many areas, especially in regard to its intelligence capabilities and forensic laboratory services. Since its inception, the agency had focused on drugrelated intelligence. The DEA Intelligence Program was created to meet a number of specified goals: to collect and disseminate information about criminal matters involving drugs; to work closely with other agencies that collect or need drug intelligence; to increase the effectiveness of information gathering, exchange, and storage; and to continuously provide review of the program. The Mission and Responsibilities of the DEA The mission of the DEA to enforce laws related to controlled substances in the nation is accomplished through a number of strategies. The agency is responsible for investigating and prosecuting drug offenders on interstate and international levels with respect to the Controlled Substances Act. This includes drug-oriented gangs that terrorize people and communities. The DEA coordinates intelligence on a national level and obtains and disseminates drug-related information to involved officials on the local, state, federal, and international levels. The agency is also charged with performing drug seizures, asset forfeitures, crop eradication and crop substitution, and conducting training programs for foreign officials. In addition, the agency operates in a cooperative fashion with drug enforcement agencies in other nations and acts as a liaison with other organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and Interpol, that deal with drug enforcement policies. In an effort to combat organized crime, particularly in the form of drug trafficking, the DEA partners with local law enforcement agencies in the form of task forces. Beginning in 1982, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs), which presently consists of 775 agents, work with the local officials in the areas of street-level dealers, midlevel dealers, and major

drug traffickers. The OCDETFs have been most successful in intervening at midlevel drug activity. Another key initiative of the DEA in recent years is the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program, established in 1990. This program has thirty-one field offices and five partnerships on the Mexican border and is a collaborative effort with other areas that have been designated as the areas of highest drug production, distribution, or importation in the nation. Conclusion The DEA has nineteen field offices located in cities across the United States and forty-seven offices in other nations. It has grown in staff from 1,470 special agents in 1972 to a present special agent staff of 5,296. The agency continues to focus on financial and money laundering offenses, drug organizations, terrorism, collaboration with other law enforcement agencies, and outreach and public awareness and has begun new initiatives to counter Internet drug trafficking. References DeGrazia, Jessica. DEA: The War against Drugs. London: BBC Publishing, 1991. Lee, Gregory D. Global Drug Enforcement: Practical Investigative Techniques. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2003. Tonry, Michael, and Norval Morris, eds. Modern Policing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Europol Rob Hanser and Kim F. Sandifer Much of the attention surrounding organized criminal activity in Europe shortly followed the collapse of the Eastern bloc. During this time, a variety of criminal ventures emerged as a result of the new criminal opportunities stemming from political changes in the East European region. The European Police Office, more commonly known as Europol, is located in The Hague, Netherlands, and was established in 1992 partly in reaction to these social developments, but this agency did not become a fully functioning agency until later in

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1999. The main purpose of Europol is to exchange information of criminal activities within its member states. According to the 2005 Europol Convention, Europol facilitates the exchange of information between member states; obtains, collates, and analyzes information and intelligence; notifying the competent authorities of the member states without delay of information concerning them and of any connections identified between criminal offenses; aiding in investigations occurring within member states; and maintaining a computerized system of collected information. Europol does not itself have any true executive authority or power. Thus, officials of Europol do not have the authority to act upon information that is received. Rather, Europol is simply empowered to share the information with other law enforcement agencies. According to the Europol Convention, “Europol does not have an executive mandate and acts only through the coordination and the transmission of information under the control and the legal responsibility of the Member States concerned,” while “the national police forces supervise the arrests.” Indeed, the entire organization consists of just a little over 500 persons, but the size of Europol is not a critical issue since this agency is in constant contact with hundreds of different law enforcement organizations on a routine basis. Furthermore, each of these agencies has specific staff assigned to provide support and information directly to Europol, ensuring that the flow of information continues from the agency to Europol and back again from Europol to the agency when needed. The three highest-priority criminal activities that Europol is tasked with following are acts of terrorism, drug trafficking, and human smuggling. Each of these categories of criminal activity is often closely associated with organized criminal groups, and it is due to this that Europol is often at the center of detection efforts. Organized crime activity has been particularly problematic since the demise of the Eastern bloc, with activities involving automobiles, precious art, military weapons, and human sex workers. Europol provides extensive data information services, as it tracks a variety of known and sus-

pected terrorists within the European Union and abroad. Given the spate of terrorism around the world and the variety of terrorist activities in Europe itself during the past few years, this has become a central function of Europol. Because individual countries cannot effectively track numerous potential terrorists as they enter and exit the boundaries of other nations, Europol provides such a service that helps individual European Union (EU) countries to more effectively anticipate the future acts of different terrorist groups. Through the use of a pool of liaison officers and a variety of multilingual staff, Europol can aid the various nations of Europe in improving the collective security of the entire EU. With respect to drug trafficking, Europol again provides a critical service in the investigative process. Illegal drugs come from a variety of destinations including Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Further compounding the problem is the fact that there is a multiplicity of legal and illegal entry points within Europe. Likewise, the close proximity of Africa to the south (which serves as a pivotal midpoint for drug shipments into Europe) provides a large stretch of coastline along the Mediterranean where drugs can be easily smuggled. Thus, the coordinated efforts of tracking potential offenders from destination sources and their points of arrival hinge upon adequate information exchange and access to staff with fluency in a large variety of languages (both European and non-European). Europol provides this critical and highly specialized service. In addition, Europol has taken a lead position in combating human smuggling by providing a coordinated preventative response designed to address smuggling and trafficking from a number of areas of the world. Indeed, the issue of human smuggling and trafficking is one that is an ever-looming concern in the illicit global market. Immigration issues in Europe have become a serious concern as the EU seeks to consolidate information and improve the tracking of persons into and out of Europe. Europol provides an integral service in recording the flow of persons into various parts of the continent (and through multiple independent countries) and likewise tracks the origins of those entering. 417

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Problems with immigration into Europe, particularly regarding those associated with the illicit sex industry, have been noted to occur in a host of countries throughout the continent and also include the shuffling of victims between European nations within the boundaries of the EU. Europol provides invaluable resources to deal with this type of criminal activity because of the organization’s fluid and adept exchange of information from one area of EU member state to another. Europol has proven to be highly useful as a managerial information coordinator and provides quality intelligence support to the EU and the various law enforcement agencies throughout the continent. As noted, Europol serves as a form of information broker or central repository between different agencies but also provides extensive assistance in overcoming language barriers that may emerge between law enforcement agencies and the various nationalities and languages that may be involved with the investigative process. Because of the services of Europol, crime fighting is more effective and thus improves overall security on the continent of Europe and elsewhere around the world. References Europa. “Europol: European Police Office,” 2005, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/ l14005b.htm. European Union Legislation. “Trafficking of Human Beings: A Europol Perspective,” January 2004, http://209.85.165.104/search?q=cache:UR0Mfz7kx 3MJ:www.genevahumanitarianforum.org/record.p hp%3Fview%3Dlist%26type%3D10%26sortColu mn%3DsName%26sortDir%3DASC%26pageSize %3D25%26id%3D914%26PHPSESSID%3D7bf3 1ea668c49436a8b4f2e2364e2b7a+Trafficking+of+ Human+Beings:+A+Europol+Perspective&hl=en &ct=clnk&cd=4&gl=us. Europol. Europol Public Information: Legislation on Trafficking in Human Beings and Illegal Immigrant Smuggling, October 2005, http://www.europol.eu.int/publications/Other/Rep orts%202005/Legislation%20on%20THB%20and %20IIS%20Public.pdf. Hanser, R. “Immigration and Crime in Europe.” Criminal Justice International 18(62) (2002): 7–8, 25. ———. Multinational and Multicultural Law Enforcement around the World. Presentation at

Training Symposium on Thinking Globally & Acting Locally. Monroe, LA: Institute of Law Enforcement, 2005. Santiago, Michael. Europol and Police Cooperation in Europe, Vol. 11. Criminology Studies Series. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2000.

Federal Bureau of Investigation Mike Van Aelstyne History The Bureau of Investigation was originally developed in 1908 by Attorney General Charles Bonaparte under President Theodore Roosevelt’s Department of Justice. In 1935, under Director J. Edgar Hoover, a name change took place and the agency became the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The early history of the FBI was a very controversial topic for the American public. Controversy with the inception of the FBI as an investigative agency began with the public perception that this agency was going to be a national police force. The primary role of the FBI has always been to enforce federal laws. Previously, this role had been handled by local law enforcement personnel under local jurisdiction. In the beginning, the FBI focused attention on federal violations of national banking, bankruptcy, naturalization, antitrust, peonage, and land fraud. At present, the FBI investigates hundreds of different federal crimes, including organized crime. Organized Crime Organized crime came to the forefront of American society in the 1920s, during the Prohibition era. During this era, gangsters and organized crime members became a major public concern. Problems arose because gangsters were often in violation of federal law but were under local jurisdiction. The FBI handled these situations by developing creative solutions to help control the expanding enterprise of organized crime. The use of these creative solutions often involved arrests of notorious gangsters. However, these arrests were made on lesser charges than the crimes for which they were notorious.

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Newly commissioned FBI agents process a car for fingerprints under the watchful eye of an instructor in the 1960s. (National Archives and Records Administration)

The notoriety of the gangster era led to an upsurge in organized crime in the United States. The increase in crime and criminals brought forth an increase in law enforcement personnel. Since the development of organized crime in the United States, the FBI has been the chief investigative agency within the law enforcement community in the fight against organized crime. As technology and laws have changed, so has the strategy of the FBI to stop the organized crime enterprise. The FBI developed an Organized Crime Program that targets the entire criminal organization responsible for a variety of criminal activities. The FBI does not focus on key individuals within a criminal enterprise because removal of an individual is not destructive enough to destroy an entire organization. The FBI Organized Crime Program is based on a set of criteria that focuses on four issues:

1. Employ a methodology that yields maximum impact with limited counter–organized crime resources; 2. Pursue targets that have direct ties to national and international criminal enterprises and systematically dismantle such enterprises; 3. Remain flexible enough to pursue regional organized crime groups conducting racketeering activity; and 4. Ensure that targets are permanently dismantled or significantly disrupted.

The mission of the FBI’s Organized Crime Program is to “eliminate criminal enterprises which pose the greatest threat to the American Society.” The success of the mission will be accomplished through investigation and the use of criminal and civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Statute as well as 419

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Title 18 and Title 21 statutory jurisdictions. The FBI has generated experts that are proficient in the dismantling of major organized crime enterprises based on the training, experience, and expertise of the agents who handle organized crime cases. The expertise of FBI agents within the Organized Crime Section is divided among three units: La Cosa Nostra/Italian Organized Crime/Labor Racketeering Unit, the Eurasian Organized Crime Unit, and the Asian/African Criminal Enterprise Unit. Facts Currently, the FBI has fifty-six field offices located in major cities throughout the United States and a field office in Puerto Rico. Each field office is responsible for overseeing offices in smaller cities and towns known as resident agencies. In addition, the FBI has forty-four foreign liaison offices. Currently, the FBI employs about 28,000 people, and of that number roughly 12,000 are special agents who have the authority to carry firearms and make arrests. FBI special agent personnel utilize joint task forces of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies throughout the United States. The annual operating budget of the FBI is approximately $3 billion and is appropriated by the U.S. Congress. A portion of this amount is delegated accordingly to each of the thirteen divisions of the FBI. References Balcavage, Dynise, and Arthur Meier Schlesinger, eds. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Your Government Series. New York: Chelsea House, 2000. “FBI History.” Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/fbihistory.htm. “Organized Crime.” Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/ocshome.htm. Reebel, Patrick A., ed. Federal Bureau of Investigation: Current Issues and Background. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2002.

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Marilyn Peterson The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) was created in April 1990 as a subsection of

the U.S. Bureau of Customs, Department of the Treasury. It is headquartered in suburban Washington, D.C. FinCEN was delegated the responsibility for administering Title II of the Bank Secrecy Act, found at 31 U.S.C. 5311–5330 with regulations found at 31 C.F.R. Part 103. The U.S. Patriot Act of 2001 re-created FinCEN as a Treasury bureau in its own right. Its original mission was to provide a government-wide, multisource intelligence and analytic network. In 1994, regulatory responsibilities were added. FinCEN is organized into three branches that represent the primary functions of its organization: regulatory, analytic, and client liaison and services. FinCEN’s first role is to oversee compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970, which requires banks (including credit unions and savings banks) and others to file reports on cash transactions over $10,000. Millions of copies of reports filed under the BSA (14.2 million were filed in 2004 alone) come under the jurisdiction of FinCEN, which allows access to those reports, electronically, to thousands of law enforcement agencies across the United States. In addition to the BSA documents, beginning in 1996 varied Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) have been created and now must be filed. The first SARs were for banks only. However, money service businesses (sellers of traveler’s checks and money orders, check cashers, wire remitters, and currency exchanges) then fell under the requirement, and now casinos and securities and futures brokers must file. Filing requirements are expected to cover investment advisors, insurance companies, unregistered investment companies, and precious metals and stones and jewelry sellers in the future. FinCEN not only collects these forms, but its regulatory side can fine and otherwise mete out punishment to financial institutions that are in violation of the reporting requirements. The office works closely with leaders in the financial sector to keep them aware of new developments and ways they can comply. The U.S. Patriot Act expanded the scope of the BSA to include terrorist financing and gave FinCEN additional responsibilities relating thereto. In 2004, FinCEN became part of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI), which devel-

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Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

President George W. Bush meets with administration officials and U.S. attorneys to discuss the use and reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT ACT in the Roosevelt Room of the White House on January 3, 2006. The PATRIOT ACT expanded responsibilities of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). (White House)

ops and implements U.S. government strategies to combat terrorist financing domestically and internationally and also develops the National Money Laundering Strategy. In this role, it works with the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), the Treasury Office for Asset Forfeiture, IRS Criminal Investigations, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). FinCEN’s activities now include issuing, interpreting, and enforcing compliance with regulations implementing the BSA and key provisions of Title III of the U.S. Patriot Act; supporting and overseeing compliance examination functions delegated to other federal regulators; managing the collection, processing, storage, and dissemination of BSA data; maintaining government-wide access to the BSA data and connecting network users who might have overlapping interests; and conducting analysis in

support of policymakers, law enforcement, regulatory and intelligence agencies, and the financial industry. FinCEN distributes a number of publications, primarily through its website at www.fincen.gov. It publishes advisories for banks and other financial personnel on issues of interest from fraudulent use of monetary instruments to guidance on how to manage banking relationships.

References Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Annual Report 2004, January 2005, http://www .fincen.gov/fincenannualreport2004.pdf. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. “FinCEN Strategic Plan for the Fiscal Years 2003–2008,” 30 September 2003, http://www.fincen.gov/ strategicplan2003_2008.pdf. 421

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International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC) Vidisha Barua The International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC) is a nonprofit organization formed in 1978 and based in Washington, D.C. The IACC is aimed solely at combating product counterfeiting and piracy, and its focus is on intellectual property enforcement. The IACC strongly believes that counterfeiting and piracy activities are linked to organized crime. These activities cause economic harm, deceive consumers, pose unfair competition to legitimate businesses, and can be a danger to public health and safety. The IACC’s mission is to promote laws, regulations, and directives such that counterfeiting and piracy become unprofitable and undesirable. Toward that end, the IACC develops and conducts training for law enforcement officials, submits comments on intellectual property enforcement laws and regulations worldwide, and participates in global programs aimed at improving intellectual property enforcement standards. IACC Mandate The organization covers the protection of all kinds of intellectual property such as patents, trademarks, copyrights, service marks, trade dress, and trade secrets. The IACC recognizes that intellectual property theft not only can cause severe losses to the manufacturers but also can create acute health risks for the general public, especially in the pharmaceutical sector. The IACC both initiates actions and supports government actions leading to prosecution of counterfeiters and pirates. Toward the protection of intellectual property rights worldwide and providing a safer environment for its members, the IACC holds meaningful dialogues with various governments. IACC members come from the world of business and industry, ranging from autos, apparel, luxury goods, and pharmaceuticals to food, book publishing, software, and entertainment. The combined annual revenue of IACC members exceeds $650 billion. The IACC provides enforcement policy support to its members by focusing on the enforce-

ment provisions of international agreements. It also provides training and educational opportunities to its members with both U.S. and foreign enforcement officials. The narrow objective of the organization being intellectual property enforcement, it does not pursue rights acquisition issues such as trademark and patent registration applications. As for laws, the IACC pursues an agenda comprising both state and federal laws in the United States and an active training program for federal, state, and local law enforcement. At the international level, the IACC engages various U.S. government agencies and participates in programs for foreign officials that are sponsored by the U.S. government, the United Nations (UN), and other regional and intergovernmental organizations. Since 1999, the IACC has conducted training and participated in programs on six continents. The organization also gives opportunities to owners of intellectual properties to give specific pointers and suggestions to be incorporated in regional and international intellectual property agreements. The organization also facilitates the involvement of its members in training programs of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) as well as those provided by U.S. government agencies. Current Efforts The IACC is presently working on bringing together companies within the same industry in order to develop improved sector-specific anticounterfeiting strategies. For instance, the IACC helped the auto industry by bringing together ten global manufacturers to discuss common counterfeiting problems. In February 2003, the IACC formed an internal industry-based task force of intellectual property owners to address industry concerns arising from the reorganization of the U.S. Customs Service into the new Department of Homeland Security and to maintain intellectual property enforcement as a priority for border enforcement officials and agencies. Since October 2003, the IACC has been monitoring international news databases on a daily basis for media reports on seizures of counterfeit and pirated goods. This survey has so far (early 2005) resulted in the compilation of media reports of intellectual enforce-

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ment activity from approximately 850 different news articles from all over the world. The media reports cover products ranging from music to health-threatening consumable goods. The IACC has paid special attention to counterfeit products that pose health and safety risks to the public. In January 2005, the IACC produced White Paper: The Negative Consequences of International Intellectual Property Theft. The paper discusses in detail the problems faced due to counterfeit products released in the pharmaceutical sector, gives specific instances of serious health risks in the past, and explores the role played by traditional and online organized criminal syndicates in counterfeiting and piracy. The IACC has been active in tracking the increasing influx of terrorist organizations into the profitable world of criminal counterfeiting and piracy and is convinced that genuine and credible links exist. As per media reports, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had gathered strong evidence that the terrorists who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 financed their activities with counterfeit textile sales. References International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition. White Paper: The Negative Consequences of International Intellectual Property Theft. Washington, D.C., International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition, 2005, http://www.iacc .org/resources/IACC_WhitePaper.pdf. Nurton, James. “Why Counterfeiting Is Not So Harmless.” Managing Intellectual Property (September 2002): 43.

International Atomic Energy Agency Patit Paban Mishra After the end of World War II, the horrors of nuclear weapons received the attention of the United Nations (UN). The UN General Assembly passed a resolution creating the Atomic Energy Commission on 26 January 1946. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established on 29 July 1957 in Vienna. Since then, the IAEA has endeavored to check the proliferation of nuclear weapons so that humankind could avert the horrors

of nuclear conflagration. It has also verified the commitment of member states of the 1969 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Functioning from the Vienna International Centre, the IAEA Secretariat has 2200 staff drawn from 137 member countries. The present director-general is Mohamed ElBaradei, the Egyptian diplomat and Nobel Laureate for Peace in 2005. He shared this award with the IAEA for its role in checking the military use of nuclear energy and the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the safest way. By establishing safeguards, safety measures, and technical cooperation, the IAEA is very active. For the betterment of all people across the globe, the IAEA assists in cancer treatment, energy production, and water resource management by means of technical collaboration with many countries. The IAEA supervises nuclear safeguards in more than 900 plants in seventy-one countries. After the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl on 26 April 1986, the IAEA found the cause of the accident in the reactor’s design. A Chernobyl Forum was launched in February 2003 so that proper measures could be taken pertaining to health care and potential environmental consequences. The IAEA provides elaborate measures of safeguard for such materials as plutonium-239, uranium-233, and uranium-235. These materials are important in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In 2002, approximately 250 IAEA inspectors verified 52,000 tons of special fissionable material. The IAEA undertook its first task of inspection at a Norwegian research reactor in 1961. The agency had a nuclear verification office in Iraq in between 1991 and 2002. The IAEA is currently highlighting nuclear safeguards in countries such as Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, etc. The first nuclear power plant in Pakistan was commissioned in Karachi in 1971. The construction of the second plant at Chashma began in 1992 with help from China. Pakistan joined the IAEA in 1957. But, it is not a signatory country to NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The IAEA report titled Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Material Database of September 2006 gave a clean chit to Pakistan, as it was not involved in a single incident out of 827 incidents between 1993 and 2005. North Korea along 423

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with Iran and Iraq had come under criticism for developing weapons of mass destruction. North Korea joined the IAEA and the NPT in 1974 and 1985, respectively. The IAEA viewed with concern the development of a nuclear program by Pyongyang. The agency declared in April 1993 that North Korea was not abiding by the nuclear safeguard rules and referred the matter to the UN Security Council. In June 1994, North Korea withdrew from the IAEA. The country also announced that it was going to leave the NPT but reversed its decision. North Korea finally left the NPT in January 2003. The Board of Governors of the IAEA charged Pyongyang with violating nuclear safeguards and put the matter before the UN Security Council. North Korea was adamant and made a counteroffer that the United States should give up the antiNorth Korean policy and only then would North Korea give up is nuclear capability. In July 2006, North Korea even threatened that it would launch a nuclear strike against the United States. Although a member of the NPT, Iran is not cooperating fully with the IAEA. Iran has stressed that its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes only. In February 2006, the Board of Governors of the IAEA decided to report nuclear activities of Iran to the Security Council. Trafficking of radioactive materials and attempts at making a dirty bomb by terrorists would have fatal consequences for the whole of humanity. The IAEA has directed its activities to dangers of nuclear terrorism by assisting its member countries in measures pertaining to the safety of nuclear plants and materials. It is also giving them technical support. Since its inception, the IAEA has responded well to new challenges of global nuclear development. References Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies. Proliferation, Politics and the IAEA: The Issue of Nuclear Safeguards. Queenstown, MD: Aspen Institute, 1985. Fischer, David. History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997. “IAEA Lauds Pakistan’s Nuclear Command, Control Steps: Report.” Peninsula, 9 September 2006,

http://feeds.pakistannews.net/?rid=0525ec310c6b b427&cat=8c3d7d78943a99c7&f=1. International Atomic Energy Agency. The Nuclear Power Safety Programme of the IAEA. Information Series. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1981. Kalinowski, Martin B. International Control of Tritium for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament. Boca Raton, FL: Routledge, 2004. Mabry, Ralph T., and Joseph A. Yager. International Cooperation in Nuclear Energy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981. Mazzar, Michael J. North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation. New York: St. Martin’s, 1995. Nizamani, Haider K. The Roots of Rhetoric: Politics of Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000.

International Criminal Court Nathan Moran For centuries, jurists defined international law solely in terms of relations between states. World leaders acted with impunity because international law did not hold them accountable. But this has begun to change. The United Nations (UN) tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia address the legal responsibilities of individuals who have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. National courts, too, have exercised jurisdiction over world leaders, and some, such as former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, have been charged by courts in many countries. The International Criminal Court (ICC) takes this process even further. The ICC, which sits at The Hague in the Netherlands, acts as a world court and is distinguished from its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (1922–1946). The ICC is the principal judicial organ of the UN and operates under a statute similar to that of its predecessor, which is an integral part of the UN Charter. The ICC decides cases in accordance with international law and rules on disputes of a legal nature submitted to it by states. In addition, certain international organs and agencies are entitled to call upon the ICC for advisory opinions. The ICC was estab-

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The Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court (ICC) meets at The Hague in September 2004. Since its inception in 2002, the ICC has served as an international judicial body to prosecute war criminals worldwide. (ICCCPI/Wim Van Cappellen)

lished in 1946 under the UN Charter to be the principal judicial organ of the UN, and its basic instrument, the Statute of the Court, forms an integral part of the Charter. Functions of the Court The ICC has a dual role: (1) to settle in accordance with international law the legal disputes submitted to it by states, and (2) to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by duly authorized international organs and agencies. Composition The ICC is composed of fifteen judges elected to nine-year terms of office by the UN General Assembly and Security Council sitting independently of each other. It may not include more than one judge of any nationality. Elections are held every three years for one-third of the seats, and retiring judges may be reelected. The members of

the court do not represent their governments but rather are independent magistrates. The judges must possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices or be jurists of recognized competence in international law. The composition of the ICC should also reflect the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world (e.g., civil law, common law, etc.). When the ICC does not include a judge possessing the nationality of a state party to a case, that state may appoint a person to sit as a judge ad hoc for the purpose of the case. Cases between States The Parties Only states may apply to, and appear before, the ICC. The member states of the UN (at present numbering 192) are so entitled. 425

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Jurisdiction The ICC has jurisdiction to hear a dispute only if the states concerned have accepted its jurisdiction in one or more of the following ways: 1. By the conclusion between them of a special agreement to submit the dispute to the ICC. 2. By virtue of a jurisdictional clause (i.e., typically, when they are parties to a treaty containing a provision whereby, in the event of a disagreement over its interpretation or application, one of them may refer the dispute to the ICC). Several hundred treaties or conventions contain a clause to such effect. 3. Through the reciprocal effect of declarations made by them under the statute whereby each has accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC as compulsory in the event of a dispute with another state having made a similar declaration. The declarations of sixty-three states are at present in force, a number of them having been made subject to the exclusion of certain categories of dispute.

In cases of doubt as to whether the ICC has jurisdiction, it is the ICC itself that decides. Procedure The procedure followed by the ICC is defined in its statute and in the Rules of Court adopted by the ICC under the statute. The latest version of the rules was updated on 5 December 2000. The proceedings include a written phase in which the parties’ file and exchange pleadings and an oral phase consisting of public hearings at which agents and counsel address the ICC. As the ICC has two official languages (English and French), everything written or said in one language is translated into the other. After the oral proceedings, the ICC deliberates in private and then delivers its judgment at a public sitting. The judgment is final and without appeal. Should one of the states involved fail to comply with the ICC’s judgment, the other party may have recourse with the UN Security Council. The ICC discharges its duties as a full court but, at the request of the parties, may also establish a special chamber. The ICC constituted such a chamber for the first time in 1982, formed a second

in 1985, constituted two in 1987, and constituted two more in 2002. A Chamber of Summary Procedure is elected every year by the ICC in accordance with its statute. In July 1993, the ICC also established a seven-member chamber to deal with any environmental cases falling within its jurisdiction. Since 1946, the ICC has delivered seventy-six judgments on disputes concerning, among other issues, land frontiers and maritime boundaries, territorial sovereignty, the nonuse of force, noninterference in the internal affairs of states, diplomatic relations, hostage taking, the right of asylum, nationality, guardianship, rights of passage, and economic rights. Sources of Applicable Law The ICC decides in accordance with international treaties and conventions in force, international custom, the general principles of law, and, as subsidiary means, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified jurists. Advisory Opinions The advisory procedure of the ICC is open solely to international organizations. The only bodies at present authorized to request advisory opinions of the ICC are five organs of the UN and sixteen specialized agencies of the UN. On receiving a request, the ICC decides which states and organizations might provide useful information and gives them an opportunity to present written or oral statements. The ICC’s advisory procedure is otherwise modeled for contentious proceedings, and the sources of applicable law are the same. In principle, the ICC’s advisory opinions are consultative in character and are therefore not binding as such on the requesting bodies. Certain instruments or regulations can, however, provide in advance that the advisory opinion shall be binding. Since 1946, the ICC has given twenty-four advisory opinions concerning such matters as admission to UN membership, reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the UN, territorial status of SouthWest Africa (Namibia) and Western Sahara, judgments rendered by international administrative tribunals, expenses of certain UN operations, applicability of the UN Headquarters Agreement,

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International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)

the status of human rights, and the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. References Hudson, Manley O. The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920–1942. New York: London, 1972. Rosenne, Shabtai. The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920–1996, 3rd rev. ed. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Nijhoff, 1997. ———. The World Court: What It Is and How It Works. 5th rev. ed. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic, 1995.

International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) Leonard A. Steverson The International Criminal Police Organization, more commonly known as Interpol, is the largest law enforcement organization in the world. It is headquartered in France, has 184 member nations, and facilitates coordination and cooperation of policing agencies around the globe. Historical Overview The agency’s early roots can be found in the First National Criminal Police Congress held in Monaco in 1914. A precursor to Interpol, the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC) was formed in 1923 and headquartered in Vienna, Austria. From the onset, the agency was unconventional in that the members were police officials who were given the authority to correspond directly with each other on an international level without the oversight by governmental entities and without international guidelines for diplomatic conduct. In spite of the unconventional beginnings, Interpol was deemed legitimate, and the normal organizational requirements such as member application, dues, appointed delegates, and policy construction were met. The ICPC was disbanded in 1945 after the conflicts in Europe, but the organization was reestablished in 1946 by five pioneer police officers stationed in Paris. In 1956, the IPCP’s constitution was amended, and the name of the organization became the International Criminal Police Organi-

Police chiefs from four continents scan mug shots of major international criminals at an INTERPOL convention in Paris, 1959. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

zation, later shortened to Interpol. In 1971, the group was acknowledged by the United Nations (UN) as an official intergovernmental organization. The organization’s leadership structure is comprised of a president, a General Assembly, and an Executive Committee. The president serves a period of four years and is responsible for chairing the Executive Committee and making certain that the committee’s decisions are being carried out. The General Assembly, which meets once annually, consists of delegates selected from the member countries and is the primary decision-making arm of the organization. The Executive Committee, which meets three times per year, is charged with overall supervision of the implementation of the General Assembly’s decisions. Responsibilities and Functions Interpol has three primary functions: facilitation of police communications throughout the world, 427

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provision of information access for criminal investigation and crime prevention, and provision of field support services for law enforcement organizations. The first of these functions came about due to the need of police agencies worldwide to access information involving criminal activity. To meet this end, Interpol established a global police communications system called the I-24/7. This system is a global network that links the agency’s General Secretariat in France to the member nations National Central Bureaus (NCBs). Training and consultation services are also components of the I-24/7. Even member nations that lack the necessary technology are able to access the service due to a satellite service utilized by the organization. Regarding the access of crime information by member nations, Interpol also maintains several computer databases to assist the NCBs. These databases include information on terrorism suspects, child sexual abuse perpetrators, stolen items, and stolen or lost travel documentation. Other functions of this component include crime trend data and training in criminal justice methodology. Interpol also maintains a unit whose function is to provide public safety regarding threats to individuals and nations. Resources are provided to NCBs that counter bioterrorism, aviation and maritime crimes, and weapons of mass destruction. The agency’s Fusion Task Force, which was formed to combat terrorism after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, coordinates and distributes information on suspected terrorist activity. In addition, the Command and Coordination Center (CCC) investigates such crime activity priorities as fugitives from justice, terrorism, organized crime, drugs and drug trafficking, financial crimes, and crimes involving advanced technology. In case of a terrorist or natural disaster, the CCC works in conjunction with the agency’s Crisis Support Group through the establishment of incident responses and victim identification units. Interpol also maintains a color-coded system of emergency notification to alert NCBs of possible criminal activity in their areas. Additional Responsibilities In addition to Interpol’s involvement in the areas of crime mentioned above, the organization also pro-

vides NCB support for nonpriority crimes such as genocide, war crimes, human rights violations, environmental crime, and police corruption. Interpol’s role in the investigation and prevention of organized crime is concentrated primarily in the area of drug trafficking. This activity often involves the movement of drugs across international boundaries and normally entails some level of oversight by organized criminal groups. Drug trafficking is closely related to other forms of organized crime such as trafficking in persons, which involves the exploitation of people for sexual, labor, or other reasons. Organized prostitution rings, which frequently involve children, child pornography, and travel documentation counterfeiting, are also organized crime areas investigated by Interpol. References Deflem, Mathieu. Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Fooner, Michael. Interpol: Issues in World Crime and International Criminal Justice. New York: Plenum, 1989. Sullivan, Larry E., and Marie Simonetti Rosen, eds. Encyclopedia of Law and Enforcement. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004.

International Law Enforcement Academies Kelly Hignett In speaking before the United Nations (UN) General Assembly at its 50th Anniversary in 1995, U.S. president Bill Clinton called for the establishment of a network of International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs) throughout the world, a project designed to strengthen international cooperation against organized crime and terrorism. The political thinking behind this concept was largely a response to evidence suggesting that criminal organizations were increasingly operating internationally, on a regional if not a global basis, and that it was in the interests of the international community and of the United States in particular to encourage an increasingly cooperative approach to law enforcement in fighting organized crime.

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Today, ILEAs have been established in Europe, Asia, and Africa, with negotiations currently under way between the U.S. Department of State and the government of El Salvador over the future establishment of an academy in Latin America. The first ILEA opened in Budapest, Hungary, in 1995, followed by Bangkok, Thailand, in 1999 and Gabarone, Botswana, in 2001. A more academiccentered ILEA was also established in Roswell, New Mexico, in 2001. The ILEA in Budapest hosts participants from Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the former Soviet Union. ILEA Bangkok hosts participants from the Southeast Asia region and China (including Hong Kong and Macau), while ILEA Gabone hosts attendants from participating African nations. Each ILEA offers three types of programs: the core program (typically including fifty participants per program), more specialized training courses (typically including around thirty participants and running simultaneously with the core course), and regional seminars that focus on areas of particular relevance and significance for participating countries. ILEA Roswell focuses on the academic rather than the more practical aspects of law enforcement and runs an advanced management course, with around fifty participants per course. These are typically mid-senior-level law enforcement or criminal justice officials selected from graduates of the regional ILEA programs. Each ILEA core program comprises an intensive course aimed at both the personal and professional development of all participants. Typically, two or three countries are selected to participate in each core training session to minimize translation requirements. The program sessions are then conducted using simultaneous translation, thus eliminating any need for participants to speak a foreign language. A secondary aim of the ILEA is to create interaction among participants that will facilitate closer working ties and develop international cooperation in crime fighting, and countries chosen to attend sessions together often share international borders. It is hoped that attendance at the ILEA training centers will create opportunities for mutual respect and greater cross-border cooperation and information sharing.

The content of each training program largely centers on practical rather than technical training, and much emphasis is placed on the policing of organized crime. Sessions focus on developing skills such as effective leadership, personnel and financial management, human rights, ethics, the rule of law, and other contemporary law enforcement issues. The ILEA International Curriculum Committee meets to develop the course content on an annual basis, and representatives from each country attend with knowledge of particular crime problems, training needs, and police structure in their country. This allows for curriculum development to meet the needs and individual circumstances of participating countries. Statistics recently released by ILEA Budapest show that 80 percent of graduates report that they are offered promotion soon after completing the program, and 75 percent of these believe that the training they received at ILEA was instrumental in this. The programs offered by each ILEA are residential, with travel expenses, meals, lodging, and other costs all paid by the relevant ILEA at an estimated cost of $10,000 per student. The financing of the ILEA program is the result of sustained cooperation and a shared financial commitment to fighting international organized crime between the U.S. Department of State and the governments of the respective host countries. A yearly budget of approximately $19 million is allocated to the ILEAs by the U.S. Congress, and significant human resources are also invested in support of the ILEAs. The ILEAs are designed to increase social, political, and economic stability and advance democratic governance and the rule of law. The ILEA training programs aim to strengthen international cooperation against organized crime through the coordination, cooperation, and harmonization of legislation and law enforcement agencies; by supporting both regional partnerships in law enforcement between participating countries; by building links between U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies; and by developing improved strategic responses to organized crime through the provision of high-quality training and technical assistance. The ILEAs are responsive to both regional and international 429

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policing needs and have contributed considerably toward a more cooperative approach to fighting organized crime on an international level. References The International Law Enforcement Academy. Information booklet provided courtesy of the ILEA in Budapest, Hungary. U.S. Department of State. “International Law Enforcement Academies,” http://www.state.gov/ p/inl/ilea/.

National Crime Authority Henry Prunckun Background The National Crime Authority (NCA) was established in 1984 under the Commonwealth legislation National Crime Authority Act of 1984. Its creation heralded a shift in the way Australian law enforcement approached organized crime investigations, from a state-based approached to one where a federal agency oversaw investigations across states and in some cases internationally. Until the NCA was replaced by the Australian Crime Commission (ACC), which also amalgamated the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence and the Office of Strategic Assessments, it was Australia’s premier law enforcement agency tasked with combating sophisticated and systematic criminal activity. The NCA operated from 1 July 1984 until 31 December 2002. During its heyday, the NCA undertook investigations into a wide range of criminal activities that led to the arrest and conviction of numerous long-standing persons of interest. NCA investigations regularly resulted in the seizure of large amounts of heroin and marijuana in associated raids. Corporate Structure Although structured similar to the now ACC, the NCA’s predominate feature was that its corporate manager was a lawyer, not a law enforcer. Whereas the ACC is headed by a chief executive officer (with an extensive law enforcement background),

Two trained drug detector dogs from Australia sit during the hand-over ceremony at Bangkok Metropolitan Police Bureau on December 13, 2000, a gift from the Australian Government to Thailand authorities. With the establishment of the National Crime Authority in 1984 there was a marked shift in the focus of Australian law enforcement to a more international scope. (AFP/Getty Images)

the head (chairman) of the NCA was a barrister and solicitor. The NCA comprised three members (all legal practitioners), which included the chairman. The chairman also doubled as the NCA’s chief executive officer, and with the other members the chairman oversaw the NCA’s day-to-day management and administration. Together, the three members formulated NCA policy. Investigative Powers Like its successor (the ACC), the NCA had coercive powers, the first such law enforcement agency in Australia to exercise such authority. As such, the agency sometimes attracted the scorn of the Australian media, which referred to it as “the Star

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were instigated where there was no reported offense. For instance, intelligence might have unearthed a seemingly innocuous financial transaction. However, after further research, a pattern of financial transactions indicated a money laundering operation. Investigations would then result in charges being laid and, ultimately, criminal convictions obtained. In this way, the NCA was seen much like a royal commission rather than a police force. The NCA was the subject of one of Australia’s worst attacks on a law enforcement agency. On 2 March 1994, a letter bomb sent to the NCA’s Adelaide office exploded, killing Detective Sergeant Geoffrey Bowen (seconded from the Western Australia State Police) and causing NCA lawyer Peter Wallis to lose an eye. The explosion caused severe damage to the South Australian headquarters.

Chamber.” These coercive powers, if invoked, required persons summoned to give evidence before a hearing. If they either failed to attend the secret hearing, refused to answer questions at the hearing, or did not produce documents as summoned, they could face a prison sentence. The secret hearings could only be authorized if a reference was granted by a federal parliamentary committee set up to oversee the NCA’s operations (i.e., the Inter-Governmental Committee, or IGC). The reference system was formulated to limit the NCA’s access to these special coercive powers, restricting their use to specific cases that reflected the priorities of the IGC. In addition to its coercive powers, the NCA had its own general powers of investigation under the National Crime Authority Act as well as access to state and territorial police powers through the numerous police officers it had on fixed-term secondment. In the main, state police officers were seconded under section 58 of the National Crime Authority Act. A similar section (s49) allowed for other Commonwealth employees to be seconded, including officers of the Australian Federal Police. The NCA also had other means of collecting criminal information. These methods included the power to use listening devices (in relation to narcotics offenses under the Customs Act 1901) and agreements with the state and territories to obtain criminal intelligence from those jurisdictions. The NCA could also recruit informants who would supply confidential information for specific investigations. In all, the NCA’s ability to access a range of investigative powers made it a truly national law enforcement agency that could effectively combat organized crime. Its ability to use whichever power was most appropriate to the circumstance gave the NCA much of its strength, especially when it operated as a part of a task force. As a rule, the NCA tended to use its general investigative powers, coupled with criminal intelligence, to develop a case for IGC approval (i.e., a reference). Once obtained, the NCA would use its special powers.

National Criminal Intelligence Service (United Kingdom) Clive Harfield

Operations The success of the NCA’s operations was demonstrated by the fact that many of its investigations

The National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) is a relatively recent innovation within the history of British policing. It was also short-lived: the

References Australian Crime Commission. Australian Crime Commission Annual Report, 2002–03. Canberra: Australian Crime Commission, 2003. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority, Second Report. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986. ———. Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority, Third Report. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989. Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority. Third Evaluation of the National Crime Authority. Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 1998. ——— Who Is to Guard the Guards? An Evaluation of the National Crime Authority. Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 1991. Wilson, David, and Lindsay Murdoch, and edited by Bob Bottom. Big Shots: A Who’s Who in Australian Crime. Melbourne: Sun Books. 1985.

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British government replaced the NCIS in April 2006 with the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). Political impetus for a national criminal intelligence unit came when a 1990 parliamentary enquiry was told by the then home secretary that such a unit would be welcome. The prevailing key concern of Parliament was to relocate Interpol’s National Central Bureau in the UK from the headquarters of London’s Metropolitan Police Service to an organization that would service the needs of British policing as a whole and not just the needs of the capital’s police force. A National Criminal Intelligence Unit At the time there existed within the Home Office (a government department that oversees policing in England and Wales), a National Drugs Intelligence Unit. By 1992 this had become the NCIS, which in April 1998 ceased to be a department within the Home Office and was established as an independent agency funded by a levy from the police services in England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland (Police Act of 1997, Part I). Headed by a director-general and overseen by a service authority, from April 2002 the NCIS was reconstituted as a nonDepartmental government body, directly funded by but independent from the Home Office (Police and Criminal Justice Act 2001, Part 5). This administrative adjustment did not alter its primary business. Its statutory functions (Police Act of 1997, Section 2) are to “gather, store and analyse information in order to provide criminal intelligence” to the police forces of Great Britain and Northern Ireland “and other law enforcement agencies,” domestic and foreign. The NCIS’s mission is “to provide leadership and excellence in criminal intelligence to combat serious and organised crime.” It seconds staff from some twenty agencies including police forces and HM Customs and Excise as well as directly recruiting analysts and administrative personnel. The NCIS delivers four business areas: strategic overviews of organized crime, operational intelligence on the top few criminals (in the form of intelligence files for investigative agencies to follow up on), specialist services and intelligence coordination (including units for serious sex offenders, eco-

nomic crime, drugs, organized vehicle crime, West African organized crime, kidnappings and extortion, and football hooliganism), and knowledge products. Of the latter, the foremost is the National Intelligence Model, a business process for law enforcement now being emulated across the European Union (EU), which provides a template for intelligence-led policing and partnership working at local, regional, national, and international levels. Other products include strategic threat assessment reports (both for the public and for law enforcement’s eyes only) and procedures for standardizing law enforcement response across the United Kingdom. The NCIS is an intelligence agency only and does not investigate crimes with a view to prosecution. Investigations leading to prosecution are undertaken by the police and, in the case of organized crime, the National Crime Squad. The NCIS provides the gateway through which British law enforcement can access assistance from UK security and intelligence agencies and from foreign law enforcement agencies and through which foreign law enforcement agencies can access UK law enforcement assistance including investigative assistance. This is primarily achieved through the Schengen (Sirene), Europol, and Interpol bureaus that are co-located in the International Division at the NCIS headquarters in London. (The NCIS also has regional offices in Birmingham, Bristol, Glasgow, Manchester, and Wakefield.) This assistance comprises coordinated information and intelligence exchange. Formal mutual legal assistance requests must be directed to the UK Central Authority at the Home Office, and the NCIS can advise law enforcement agencies on both incoming and outgoing request procedures. Serious Organised Crime Agency In early 2004 the Home Office published a white paper proposing the amalgamation of the NCIS, its sister law enforcement agency the National Crime Squad (NCIS), and the investigation branches of HM Customs and Excise (HMCE) and the HM Immigration Service (HMIS). A bill to achieve this was tabled in Parliament at the end of November 2004, and the timescale envisaged is that the NCIS, the NCS, and the investigation branches of the

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Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair (right) and Home Secretary Charles Clarke (left) watch a video about victims of crime during the official launch of the Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) at No. 10 Downing Street in London on April 3, 2006. (AFP/Getty Images)

HMCE and HMIS was abolished and replaced by a single Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) on 3 April 2006. The political preference prevailing in 1997 that the collation and analysis of intelligence and law enforcement investigation leading to prosecution should be undertaken by separate agencies to prevent corruption has been superseded by a desire to overcome interagency conflicts of interest and promote a more coordinated approach to tackling organized crime. It is presumed, but has not yet been confirmed, that SOCA will assume all the intelligence functions of the NCIS.

References Home Affairs Select Committee. Practical Police Cooperation in the European Community. Session 1989–90, paragraph 141. ———NCIS. NCIS Pocket Guide 2002/2003. London: National Criminal Intelligence Service, 2002.

Ratcliffe, Jerry, ed. Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence. Annandale, Australia: Federation Press, 2004.

Serious Organised Crime Agency (United Kingdom) Clive Harfield In March 2004 the British government announced “the creation of a new organized crime agency to bring a new clarity of approach, with enhanced capabilities and skills.” The new agency became operational in April 2006 and has been formed by merging the National Crime Squad (NCS), the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), and parts of HM Customs and Excise and HM Immigration Service. It is the first law enforcement agency to have a criminal investigative remit across the three national and provincial criminal jurisdictions within 433

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the UK (England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland). Differences in criminal law among the three jurisdictions and a historical antipathy toward a national police force embedded in public and political opinion as early as the nineteenth century have militated against a national law enforcement agency being established previously. The first UK police agency founded to fight organized crime was the NCS of England and Wales, created in April 1998 alongside the National Criminal Intelligence Service that had a UK-wide remit. HM Customs and Excise in relation to excise evasion (taken to include the importation of illicit drugs) and HM Immigration Service in relation to illegal immigration had UK-wide remits. Organized crime in Scotland and Northern Ireland was investigated by police agencies within those separate jurisdictions. All the above law enforcement agencies collaborated in joint operations as necessary, supported with intelligence analyzed by the NCIS. The dividing line between institutional responsibilities was unclear in several areas, which occasionally led to operational difficulties and the simultaneous independent investigation of a single criminal network by several different teams in more than one agency. Additionally, HM Customs and Excise suffered a longterm series of failed major prosecutions resulting in numerous judicial enquiries into matters of integrity and effectiveness. A 2004 Home Office review of these institutional structures “found a general consensus that if we were starting again, we would not design the institutions in the way they have developed over time.” Accordingly, the decision was made to abolish the NCS and the NCIS, amalgamating these agencies into a single organization together with the investigative branches of HM Customs and Excise and HM Immigration Service, giving the new agency unprecedented criminal investigation authority throughout the United Kingdom. SOCA can institute criminal proceedings in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, with the Crown Prosecution Service prosecuting trials on its behalf. The different criminal jurisdictions operating in Scotland will require SOCA to report suspected crimes to the Procurator Fiscal for a determination about whether to proceed and prosecute.

Although dubbed the “British FBI” by the media, there is no place within the UK law enforcement infrastructure for an organization with the FBI’s remit. The functions of SOCA are “preventing and detecting serious organized crime” and “contributing to the reduction of such crime in other ways and to the mitigation of its consequences.” It will also gather, store, analyze, and disseminate information relevant to the prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, and reduction of crime. It may carry out such activities in relation to crime other than serious organized crime at the discretion of SOCA’s director-general. Such activity would be in support of other law enforcement agencies, either domestic or foreign. SOCA will work with foreign law enforcement agencies to fight transnational organized crime. (Responsibility for investigating fraud in excess of £1 million will remain with the Serious Fraud Office.) The amalgamation of police and nonpolice law enforcement agencies and the power to operate across three different criminal jurisdictions necessitates legislative and constitutional innovation. The investigative staff of SOCA will be either seconded from police forces and other agencies or directly appointed. To establish common status, none of the staff of SOCA will hold the office of constable (police), nor will customs officers and immigration officers transferring into SOCA retain their powers under existing relevant statutes. Instead, the director-general will designate certain staff, be they secondees or directly appointed, to have police, customs, or immigration powers as required. For the first time, it will be possible to invest an individual with all three sets of powers. Strategic oversight of SOCA is invested in a management board headed by a chairman. Operational control lies with the director-general. Sir Stephen Lander, formerly director of MI5, is the first chairman. Bill Hughes, previously director-general of the NCS, is the first director-general of SOCA. References Harfield, C. “SOCA: A Paradigm Shift in British Policing.” British Journal of Criminology 46(4) (2006): 743–761. British Secretary of State for the Home Department. “One Step Ahead: A 21st Century Strategy to

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Defeat Organized Crime,” Cm6167, March 2004, http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/ document/cm61/6167/6167.pdf.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Leonard A. Steverson The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the unit of the United Nations (UN) charged with combating illicit drugs, terrorism, and other criminal activity. It is headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and has twenty-one field offices and a liaison office in New York. The agency has approximately 500 members across the globe who develop and enforce drug control policies that are responsive to their individual needs. United Nations Forty-five countries that desired to make an organization whose focus it was to promote peace and political stability throughout the world formed the UN in 1945. Its predecessor, the League of Nations, was established in 1919 with a similar focus of achieving cooperation among member nations to avoid hostilities. However, when World War II broke out, the League of Nations dissolved. After the war, the UN was created in San Francisco, California, at the Conference on International Organization. The UN does not function as a world government that makes laws but rather is an organization that attempts to resolve international conflicts. The organization supports many departments, divisions, offices, funds, and programs. The UNODC, in the Programs and Funds Department, is charged with coordination among the member nations to combat the harmful social problems associated with illicit drugs. Its approach to dealing with this problem is to create a balanced approach by advocating measures to prevent production and trafficking of drugs and to promote prevention and treatment services for those addicted to the substances. UNODC’s Mandate The UNODC’s work program consists of three major pillars. The first of these is research and

analysis of substance abuse issues and the relationship of these concerns to policy and operational decisions. The second is the promotion of treaties and legislation among member nations to develop programs to counter drug activity, crime, and terrorism. The last pillar is cooperation among member states through field-based projects. The work program also seeks to obtain a number of outcomes. Interventions to achieve these outcomes include the use of international treaties by governments of the member nations to improve judicial cooperation; the use of measures taken to thwart drug production, drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, corruption, terrorism, and other forms of organized crime; the use of empirical evidence-based research to influence policy and decision making; and the use of greater understanding and knowledge of drug and crime issues to take action against these problems. The manufacture, distribution, and use of illicit substances have been determined by the UNODC as significant problems that result in increased personal health costs, lost wages, and family and community disorganization. An increase in violent activity has also been deemed a correlate of illegal drug activity. Drug cartels promote governmental and economic deviance as well as street violence, gang warfare, urban disorganization, and personal loss. The organization promotes economic and social policy strategies to member nations that will reduce the harmful effects of drug use and abuse. Programs to Combat International Crime and Terrorism A number of programs have been formulated by the UNODC to address its goals. The agency’s Global Program for Trafficking in Human Beings was created to thwart the rapidly growing problems of the smuggling of migrants for labor purposes and the trafficking of people for prostitution, slave labor, and the sex industry. The Global Program against Transnational Crime attempts to supply member states with information, data, training, and policy formation strategies to combat organized transnational criminal activity. The Global Program against Corruption focuses on helping member nations establish procedures to reduce corruption 435

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Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, briefs reporters on the “Afghan Opium Survey” at a press conference at UN Headquarters on November 23, 2005. (UN Photo/Paulo Filgueiras)

in government by implementing watchdog strategies. The Global Program against Terrorism assists members in enacting legislative policies designed to prevent and suppress terrorist activity and works in tandem with the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council, the Office of Legal Affairs, and local organizations. The UNODC also operates a Legal Advisory Program that provides assistance to member nations in the development of legal and structural frameworks for the successful execution of programs designed to fight drug problems and the accompanying criminal issues of terrorism, money laundering, and others. The UNODC’s Global Assessment Program is directly involved with initiatives designed to reduce the spread of HIV through the prevention of drug use. This program is responsible for supplying accurate and up-to-date statistical data on drug use as well as developing strategies to inhibit drug use through prevention and rehabilitation measures

using grassroots organizations, businesses, and governments. References Krasno, Jean E. The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004. United Nations. Basic Facts about the United Nations. Lanham, MD: Bernan, 2004. “United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.” Brochure, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/unodc_ brochure_2003.pdf.

Task Force to Fight Illicit Trafficking in Cultural Property Stolen in Iraq Edgar Tijhuis The Task Force to Fight Illicit Trafficking in Cultural Property Stolen in Iraq was created in 2003. The creation of the task force was recommended

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by the International Conference on Cultural Property Stolen in Iraq, held at the Interpol General Secretariat in Lyon, France, on 5 and 6 May 2003. The purpose of the task force is to function as a platform for the coordination of international exchange of law enforcement information on Iraqi stolen cultural property and the criminal networks involved in its trafficking. A list of detailed plans was drafted at the first meeting of the task force on 12–13 November 2003 in Lyon. The task force includes representatives of specialist operational law enforcement units from Iraq, Jordan, the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, and France. The Illicit Traffic in Cultural Property from Iraq The direct cause of the creation of the task force was the looting of the Iraq National Museum that took place during 8–16 April 2003. During this brief period, approximately 14,000–15,000 objects were stolen. A special team of U.S. investigators was sent in a week afterward. They discovered that the looting in fact consisted of three different parts. First of all, 40 objects were stolen from the public galleries, including famous objects such as the Bassetki Statue, the Sacred Vase of Warka, and the Mask of Warka. Second, from the museum’s aboveground storerooms, at least 3,138 jars, vessels, and pottery shards were looted. Third, from the basement of the museum, at least 13,864 objects were stolen, among them a third of the collection of cylinder seals. Although the looting of the Iraq National Museum was most prominently covered in the media, it was part of a wider pattern of looting that both preceded the invasion and continued afterward. During the uprisings at the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, nine out of thirteen regional museums were looted. Thereafter, widespread illegal digging, smuggling, and trade in Mesopotamian material started in what were once a more or less model country as far as the protection of its cultural heritage was concerned. Throughout the 1990s, the pace of illegal excavation in Iraq increased. The State Board of Antiquities was able to get money to put salvage teams on some major sites and thus

The director of the Iraqi National Museum rummages through papers with the hope of recovering museum documents following the 2003 looting of the museum by Iraqis in the wake of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by U.S.-led forces. (Department of Defense)

stop the looting in these areas. However, when the recent war started, the looters returned to the sites, drove off the guards, and embarked upon wholesale destruction. During the course of the present conflict in Iraq, the level of looting has increased. The Measures Taken by the Task Force Since the Interpol conference in May 2003, the task force had initiated, coordinated, and communicated a range of measures to combat the illicit trade in cultural property from Iraq. A list of endangered Iraqi artifacts likely to be the subject of illicit traffic was published. The objects on this list were also added to the CD-ROM of stolen works of art that is updated and disseminated by Interpol 437

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every three months. This CD-ROM contains about 20,000 stolen works of art from dozens of Interpol member states. In addition, the June 2003 edition of the “Most Wanted Works of Art” poster was entirely dedicated to losses from the Iraq National Museum. Furthermore, attention was drawn to the Red List of Iraqi antiquities at risk, drafted by the International Council of Museums (ICOM) and Interpol, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) set up a joint project to compile a list of experts (archaeologists), institutions, and fact witnesses (site guards) to make it easier for law enforcement agencies to find suitable contacts. Finally, the task force developed a standard report form to register crucial details in cases of certain theft, including the borders that were crossed, the countries transited, the means of smuggling that were used, the offenders involved, and the possible links to criminal networks. The second meeting of the task force was held on 30–31 May 2004 in Amman, Jordan, and was immediately followed by Interpol’s regional meeting to fight the illicit trafficking of cultural property stolen from Iraq. During these meetings, the results of the task force and all participating agencies were made known. First of all, about 5,000 objects that were stolen from the Iraq National Museum were recovered, most of them inside Iraq. Furthermore, numerous seizures of Iraqi cultural property were reported from other countries, mostly involving illicitly excavated cultural property. Of these, approximately 1,000 items were seized in the United States, 1,054 in Jordan, about 200 in Syria, 35 in Kuwait, and a number in Saudi Arabia. A number of case studies were presented that showed the types of objects involved in these seizures. Following the meeting in Amman, the task force continues to improve all the methods and policies to fight the illicit trade in cultural property from Iraq.

References Atwood, Roger. Stealing History: Tomb Raiders, Smugglers, and the Looting of the Ancient World. New York: St. Martin’s, 2004.

Bogdanons, Matthew. “The Casualties of War: The Truth about the Iraq Museum.” American Journal of Archaeology 109(3) (2005): 477–525. Gibson, McGuire. “Cultural Tragedy in Iraq: Report on the Looting of Museums, Archives and Sites.” IFAR Journal 6(1/2) (2004), http://www.ifar.org/ tragedy.htm. U.S. Department of State. “Ronald K. Noble, Secretary General of the ICPO-Interpol, Remarks Made at Interpol Meeting on Cultural Property Looting in Iraq.” Lyon, France, 6 May 2003, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/20777.htm.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Robert Hanser and M. Lea Lucuis On 1 March 2003, nearly eighteen months after the security of the United States was forever questioned, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was born. It began with the merger of numerous federal agencies including almost all of U.S. Customs, the immigration inspectors from the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, the agriculture border inspectors from the Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and the entire Border Patrol. For the first time in U.S. history, all agencies of the U.S. government with significant border responsibilities were brought under one roof. The CBP, which was created within the Department of Homeland Security, consists of many innovative programs with the primary focus of homeland security. The creation of the CBP has brought about many changes in our nation’s policies on security and terrorist threats while maintaining the traditional missions of the agencies that came together to form it. The CBP’s two main goals, known as the twin goals, are increasing security and facilitating legitimate trade and travel. One of the many changes made by the CBP was a significant increase in staffing and technology on the border with Canada. In 2003, the number of CBP inspectors along the northern border was increased to 2,600, up from 1,600 on 9/11. Technology was also added to the ports of entry on the northern border including but not limited to gates, signs, lights, and

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The U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) uses unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to detect illegal activities along the most rugged areas of the US-Mexico border. (Department of Homeland Security/James Tourtellotte)

remote camera surveillance systems along with sophisticated detection technology. The CBP further developed two programs that have aided in improving security without slowing legitimate trade and travel. These programs are known as NEXUS and Free and Secure Trade (FAST). NEXUS is a program developed to facilitate people through borders who are trusted travelers and pose no risk of terrorism. To be accepted into the NEXUS system, an application must be completed, background information and biometrics provided, and an interview conducted. Once all of these processes have been completed and the applicant has been accepted, a proximity card or SMART card is issued that allows the holder to wave the card upon approaching a border, where the person’s information and photo show up at the entry booth and he or she is thus waved right through. The FAST program aids with the transportation of cargo. Importers and the like can enroll in the program and, after completing the security criteria, will receive expedited clearance at the border. Another important program created was the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-

TPAT) that was launched in January 2002. The CTPAT is a partnership between the CBP and the trade community to implement security standards and best practices that better protect the entire supply chain against exploitation by terrorists. The C-TPAT is one of several extended border initiatives. Another extended border initiative is the Container Security Initiative (CSI). Through this program, bilateral partnerships have been created between the CBP and other governments to identify high-risk cargo containers and to prescreen them before they are loaded on vessels destined for the United States. Small teams of CBP personnel are stationed at the foreign CSI ports to identify and target high-risk containers that may pose a terrorist security risk. To further assist with the success of the extended border or Smart Border initiatives, a new rule was issued called the 24-hour rule that requires transmission of complete manifest information for sea cargo to U.S. Customs twentyfour hours in advance of landing. In October 2001, U.S. Customs, for the first time, developed the National Targeting Center 439

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whose priority mission is to detect and prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. Following this development, a comprehensive strategy was established for addressing one of the greatest threats faced by the CBP, that of nuclear and radiological terrorism. Detection dogs have also been trained to detect explosives and chemical weapons of mass destruction. These recent developments reflect the new challenges that face the CBP as a result of the recent antiterrorism initiatives that have been implemented via changes in U.S. security priorities. The creation of one agency for the nation’s border instead of four separate agencies has brought about many positive changes for the safety and security of the United States. The CBP will learn all it can from its legacy agencies and will bring new innovation to border management, and its creation has made America less vulnerable to the threat of international terrorism. The demands of the CBP will continue to be complicated, and the importance of this agency’s function will continue to become more critical. This issue is perhaps best illustrated by the words of Congressman Dave Camp, who noted that “as we continue the war against terror, we must realize

that the fight is not only in Iraq and far off countries. Winning the War on Terror begins by securing our homeland, and, most importantly, our borders. Inadequate border protection not only threatens the physical safety of our families, but our economic livelihood as well.”

References Ahern, J. P. “Homeland Security: Information Sharing and Enforcement in a Post 9-11 Environment,” 2003, http://www.globalsecurity .org. Arcy, Michael D., and Michael O’Hanlon. Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006. Bonner, R. C. “Securing America’s Borders while Safeguarding Commerce,” 2003, http://www .heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/ HL796.cfm. ———. “U.S. Customs and Border Protection Actions Taken since 9/11,” 2004, http:// jobfunctions.bnet.com/whitepaper.aspx? &docid=123884&promo=100511. Camp, Dave. “One Face at the Border,” 2003, http://camp.house.gov/press/pressrelease.aspx? NewsID=1133. USA IBP. US Customs Guide. Washington, DC: International Business Publications, 2006.

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G. Future Direction of Global Organized Crime and Its Control

Organized Crime Control: The Merger of International Law Enforcement and Intelligence Operations Amparo Pamela Fabe Introduction Transnational organized crime includes at least three characteristics: continuity of operations, practice of corruption, and a capability to inflict violence. Its increased scale of operations, territorial reach, and destructiveness potentially threaten the stability of the international order. Organized criminal groups cover various geographical areas: the United States (the American Mafia or La Cosa Nostra, which has also long operated in Canada), Mexico (the Juárez, Tijuana, Guadalajara, and Gulf cartels), Colombia (the Medellin and Cali cartels), Italy (the Sicilian Mafia or La Cosa Nostra, the Calabrian ’Ndrangheta, the Neapolitan Camorra, and the Sacra Corona Unita of Apulia), the former Soviet Union (hundreds of Russian and various Caucasian mafiyas), Turkey (a dozen or so TurcoKurdish clans), Hong Kong-Taiwan (the six Triads), and Japan (the Boryokudan, more often called the Yakuza). Smaller criminal organizations based in Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, Israel, Albania, Nigeria, and Jamaica engage in the smuggling and sale of controlled substances and illegal drugs. They also profit from other crimes such as smuggling illegal immigrants, white slavery, murder for hire, protection rackets and extortion, loan-sharking, currency and document counterfeiting, money laundering, arms trafficking, vehicle

theft, pillaging of financial institutions, and the pirating of properties protected by trademarks and copyrights. U.S. international crime-fighting strategy comprises two related imperatives. The primary imperative is to limit the availability of criminal goods and services that are legally proscribed or injurious to society. Counterorganization is one strategy. Counterorganization has shown tangible results, at least in Colombia. Consider, for example, the virtual destruction of the notorious Medellin cartel in the early 1990s, the more recent incapacitation of the Cali cartel leadership, and the successful prosecution of high-level Colombian officials and politicians for corrupt links to the Cali mob. The second imperative is containment. In Russia, this will mean improving the ability of law enforcement to detect and intercept stolen nuclear materials and nuclear contraband crossing national frontiers. A Transnational Threat Transnational organized crime poses a constant threat to democracy. The corruption and violent behavior associated with criminal elites impairs the mechanism of government. The need to stem the tide of transnational organized crime rests on multilateralism. Multilateralism is the aspiration that states agree that their behavior and their responses to the many aspects of transnational crime should be governed by shared principles, norms, and rules rather than by power alone. Governments, acting together, need to develop more effective countermeasures against transnational criminal actors. 441

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Measures can include improving cross-national police cooperation (especially East-West cooperation), sharing intelligence on criminals and crimes in progress, rationalizing and harmonizing national laws against serious criminal offenses, and increasing transparency in the international financial system. The United States and its Western partners must work to strengthen the administration of justice in states where defense mechanisms against drug-sponsored corruption and violence are weak. Helping governments to target, seize, and administer assets belonging to criminal figures is an essential aspect of counterorganization strategy. All countries should forge ties with Interpol, the world’s largest international police organization. Interpol was created in 1923 and currently has 186 member countries. It facilitates cross-border police cooperation and supports and assists all organizations, authorities, and services whose mission is to prevent or combat international crime. Interpol aims to facilitate international police cooperation even where diplomatic relations do not exist between particular countries. Countercrime initiatives must also be tailored to the specifics of illegal businesses. Economic crime in Russia can be eliminated by rationalizing tax codes and export control regulations. Fighting narcotics businesses requires breaking up large criminal cartels that export illicit drugs and also wiping out the cultivation and refining of these substances. An alternative strategy that would diminish the attractiveness of such businesses to criminal groups is simply to legalize the production and sale of drugs. International Measures to Combat Global Crime The response to organized crime is multilateral and varied. The United Nations (UN) strengthened international cooperation against transnational organized crime through the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program (UNCPCJP) and in five yearly Congresses on Crime Prevention. In 2002 U.S. President George W. Bush signed into law the Homeland Security Act. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a cabinetlevel department that is concerned with protecting America’s people from harm and its property from

damage. This department was established on 25 November 2002 in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff reported that the DHS had made significant strides protecting vital infrastructure and assets, preventing security breaches, ensuring safe travel and trade across U.S. borders, protecting privacy and civil liberties, and expanding critical partnerships at every level. The Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) serves as the nation’s nerve center for information sharing and domestic incident management, dramatically increasing the vertical coordination among federal, state, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector partners. Europol, which became operational on 1 January 1999, covers the European Union (EU). Europol’s role is to coordinate the investigation of forms of serious international crime where there are actual indications that an organized criminal structure is involved and when the interests of two or more member states are affected by the forms of crime in question in such a way as to require a common approach by the member states owing to the scale, sign, and consequences of the offenses concerned. Europol initially acted to prevent and combat unlawful drug trafficking, trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances, illegal immigrant smuggling, trade in human beings, and motor vehicle crime and then extended its mandate to include terrorism. Europol is dependent on national law enforcement agencies and Europol liaison officers for its information and intelligence. Its creation has also led to the development of national units responsible for the central coordination of intelligence in the field of organized crime. Intelligence exchange with Europol is conducted on a voluntary basis. A new development occurred under Article 30, Section 2(b), of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999, in which Europol is now in a position to request that member states carry out an investigation. Southeast Asia’s security agenda is focused on mitigating transnational organized crime on a multilateral basis in three areas: maritime piracy, heroin trafficking, and the illicit light arms trade. Maritime piracy involves a major criminal hijack: a well-resourced and well-planned international

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criminal activity using large gangs of highly trained and heavily armed operatives fully prepared to use firearms. The heroin trade is supported primarily by the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent. New road, river, and air routes have allowed traffickers to move their products to international markets with relative ease. Illicit arms are sourced from Cambodia. Thailand acts as the main transit area for light arms from Cambodia. Significant quantities are moved through ports in southern Thailand to Indonesia and the Philippines, either directly or via Malaysia. These threats have not only demonstrated a capacity to undermine institutional state capacity and legitimacy by encouraging elected officials to habitually work outside the regulatory framework provided by the rule of law but have also assumed significant strategic dimensions, both nationally and regionally. The growing seriousness with which Southeast Asian governments view this particular nonmilitary threat is reflected by the Manila Declaration, which was issued by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in February 1998. This collective statement affirmed transnational organized crime as a serious threat currently facing the association and committed its members to undertake concerted action against drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, and money laundering. A recommendation to add piracy and related maritime crime to this agenda of regional cooperation was made during the November 1999 intersessional meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Southeast Asia’s premier multilateral security organization. ARF and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific met on managing the consequences of terrorist attack (chemical, biological, and radiological) in June 2003. Australia has also worked with ARF states to highlight the importance of counterterror cooperation. Australian officers have called for the militaries of the region to establish closer relations, including increased information sharing and an effective counterterrorist program, to counter terrorist threats. References Den Boer, Monica. “Law-Enforcement Cooperation and Transnational Organized Crime in Europe.” Pp. 103–118 in Transnational Organized Crime

and International Security: Business as Usual? edited by Mats Berdal and Mónica Serrano. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002. Farer, Tom. Transnational Crime in the Americas: An Inter-American Dialogue Book. London: Routledge, 1999. Granada, Camilo. “The OAS and Transnational Organized Crime in the Americas.” Pp. 95–102 in Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: Business as Usual? edited by Mats Berdal and Mónica Serrano. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002. Vaughn, Bruce. “Australia’s Strategic Identity Post– September 11 in Context: Implications for the War against Terror in Southeast Asia.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 26(1) (2004): 94– 115. ———. The Unraveling of Island Asia? Governmental, Communal and Regional Instability. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004.

Organized Crime Studies: An Agenda for Future Research Amparo Pamela H. Fabe New Definition of Criminal Organizations The members of the European Union (EU) have reached a common understanding of organized crime and have achieved a common strategy to fight it. The main players involved in the strategy are the Directorate-General on Justice and Home Affairs of the European Commission, the Directorate-General on Justice and Home Affairs in the Council Secretariat, and the European Parliament. In December 1997, in a Joint Action that is binding upon the national legislatures of member states, Justice and Home Affairs defined a criminal organization as a “lasting, structured organization of more than two persons, acting in concert with a view to committing crimes or other offenses which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, whether such crimes are an end in themselves or a means of obtaining material benefits and, if necessary, of improperly influencing the operation of public authorities.” This definition expands the one used in the Europol Convention. An aspect of the Joint Action, found in Article 2, is 443

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the criminalization of the intention to commit the offenses concerned, regardless of whether the crimes are actually perpetrated. Changing Operations of Organized Crime Leaders of organized criminal groups establish corrupt relations with foreign leaders. The clearest examples are in the Western Hemisphere, where crime and degradation associated with the South American cocaine industry have metastasized to Central America and the Caribbean. Over the past decade, Colombia’s cocaine cartels have reached beyond their home base to cultivate ties with political leaders and top-level officials in a number of Central American and Caribbean countries, for example, Panama, the Bahamas, Antigua, the Turks and Caicos Islands, and even communist Cuba. The aim has been to enhance cocaine logistics and money flows to, for instance, obtain landing and refueling facilities, docking facilities, storage sites, permission to operate cocaine laboratories, and operate various financial and money laundering services. Colombian organizations are even rumored to have contributed funds to the 1994 presidential campaigns of Ernesto Perez Baladeres in Panama and Ernesto Zedillo in Mexico. The leaders of organized crime set up transnational strategic alliances. Like multinational corporations, criminal organizations increasingly seek partners abroad to maximize market opportunities, improve logistics, and reduce business exposure. This means relying on a foreign partner’s smuggling or money laundering networks and superior knowledge of local conditions. Archetypal examples of such cooperation include Colombia’s umbrella agreements with Italian crime syndicates to sell cocaine in Italy and Central Europe. Organized crime groups make legitimate investments in foreign countries. They are increasingly deploying financial assets outside their host milieux to hide criminal proceeds from the authorities and to facilitate business operations and enhance their legitimacy locally. Examples are legion. Mafia expert Alison Jamieson reports that the Sicilian Cuntrera-Caruana clan maintains a wine bar, an antique business, and a travel agency in the United Kingdom as covers for the importation of cannabis

from Kashmir and heroin from Thailand. Similarly, a leader of the Campania-based Camorra group in Naples owns five container companies in Marseille to facilitate the Camorra’s cigarette- and heroinsmuggling ventures. Cali organizations established an agricultural import-export firm in Prague and a Polish–Latin American club in Krakow, both as fronts for cocaine trafficking. The newer Japanese Yakuza members have gone international. They are better educated and better traveled, and an increasing number can speak English. In the post–World War II world, it was inevitable that the Yakuza would eventually follow the striking successes of Japan’s businessmen around the world. Convention against Transnational Crime There is an attempt at the United Nations (UN) to advocate the adoption of a convention specifically targeting transnational organized crime. While an increasing number of countries are likely to participate in such international efforts, there will always be countries whose governments are too corrupt or whose legal infrastructures are too primitive to allow them to actively participate in such arrangements. Effective Domestic Laws against Transnational Organized Crime The United States has two pieces of legislation against transnational organized crime: the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Taken together, these two laws created mandatory detention (without bond) for aggravated felons and expanded the definition of aggravated felonies to include all crimes of violence, any drug trafficking offense, any forgery, and some fraud. Virtually any crime that carries a sentence of one year or more results in a mandatory deportation hearing, in which the judge has little discretion. In addition, the antiterrorism act allows for the use of secret evidence against some noncitizens. Continuous Assessment of Criminal Groups The UN Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP) has done a survey on the assessment of

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Italian Carabinieri conduct a raid in the southern city of Naples on December 12, 2006. Naples police arrested more than 60 people across the country suspected of criminal association linked to international drug trafficking. The investigations are the result of collaboration with the judicial and police authorities of Spain, France, Germany, Ecuador, and Colombia. (AFP/Getty Images)

transnational organized crime. The main objectives of the UN Global Program on Organized Crime are to assess organized crime groups worldwide according to their level of dangerousness and societal threat and to provide member states and the international community with reliable information and analysis on the major and emerging transnational organized crime groups. The program was implemented from October 1999 to September 2004 covering West Africa and Central Asia. The program conducted a systematic assessment of the dangerousness and threats posed by transnational organized crime groups through the identification of the characteristics, resources, and strategies adopted by the criminal groups and the social, political, and economic context in which organized crime groups act, including the response of the

criminal justice system and law enforcement agencies and the criminal markets in which these criminal groups operate. The overall goal of the program is not only to build a body of knowledge on transnational organized crime but also to identify tools that would enable governments to adopt the most appropriate control measures to combat and prevent organized crime activities. The CICP has advanced the implementation of the UN Transnational Organized Crime Assessment Survey, which consists of a pilot survey of the most dangerous organized crime groups. The survey aims to analyze and assess the modus operandi of the major organized crime groups active in these countries, their international connections, their involvement in transnational criminal markets, and the prediction of their future trends. 445

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Evaluation of Multilateral Responses to Organized Crime There is a need to evaluate the multilateral responses to organized crime. The effectiveness of Europol, the CICP, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Homeland Security and the Organization of American States toward organized crime needs to undergo evaluation studies. An advisory panel composed of experts and scholars at the national and international levels can be appointed to test the validity of the assessment on a continuous basis. Transnational organized crime groups are now so multinational that no state can be fully responsible for their control. Moreover, even if one state cracks down on members of a particular group, those members can frequently find refuge in another country. The enforcement net, therefore, has too many holes. A successful policy must seek international harmonization in legislation combating crimes in the areas of banking, securities law, customs, and extradition in order to reduce the opportunities for criminal activity and minimize the infiltration of transnational organized crime groups into legitimate business. Extradition treaties and mutual legal assistance agreements among the broadest number of signatories would best protect against the ability of transnational criminals to elude detection. All nations must engage in a coordinated law enforcement campaign to ensure that criminals do not exploit differentiated enforcement strategies. International covenants established to address the human rights violations of individual countries should be attuned to the threats to human rights caused by international crime groups. Measures against transnational crime must be adopted at the national level as well as at the level of regional organizations and international organizations. Crime Prevention Policy by States A significant change in the approach to crime reduction arose from a push given by the U.S. government in 1994 through the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. The crime bill signaled a major shift in emphasis on the part of the U.S. government toward both crime prevention and the need for improvements in police and community relations. Funds were made available by

Congress to hire 100,000 police officers over the life of the bill, and support was provided to accelerate the adoption of community policing throughout the country. Japan’s High Conviction Rates Japan’s high conviction rates, or its astonishingly low acquittal rates, are heralded by journalists, scholars, and prosecutors. Japan’s criminal justice system ranks as one of the best in the world and offers as partial justification the fact that Japanese prosecutors enjoy a conviction rate of 99.9 percent. About 98 percent of Japanese prosecutor respondents believe that acquittals are rare because before charging, the prosecutor clarifies the truth and gathers sufficient evidence to convict. India and Pakistan The South Asian region is plagued with violence and crime. The conflict in Kashmir, sectarian and political violence in Pakistan, riots in Gujarat, and insurgency in Northeast India remain unabated. The origins of several interstate disputes in the region, including the China-India-Pakistan boundary question and the Pakistan-India-Bangladesh feuds over sharing river water, are rooted in the colonial demarcation of frontiers. The IndoPakistan frontier is too porous for security forces on either side to contain transborder terrorism or arms and drug trafficking. Similarly, it is virtually impossible to patrol the Indo-Bangladesh border and prevent Bangladeshi migrants from seeking better living conditions in India. Mass influx of illegal migrants can undermine a nation’s integral internal security, and the separatist unrest in the northeastern Indian state of Assam is evidence of that. The porous borders of the South Asian frontiers have also become a license for rival states to sponsor ethnic or terrorist violence across their frontiers through proxies or even by direct means. India has charged Pakistan with training and arming dissidents in the Indian Kashmir and Punjab, while Pakistan has accused New Delhi of aiding Sindhi separatism. Three of Pakistan’s provinces are restive about the domination of the fourth, Punjab. This strife has, in fact, done much to undermine the national

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structure and, in turn, has contributed to ethnic conflicts. Armed violence between government forces and militants of the Mohajirs and between militant Shias and Sunnis have turned Pakistan’s commercial capital and largest city, Karachi, into a dangerous place and thus an unattractive one for investors. Bloody sectarian violence has spread to Lahore and other Punjabi cities and among Afghans in northwestern Pakistan. The Baloch are as unhappy in Pakistan as are the Kashmiri Muslims in India. Pakistan’s countryside is unsafe. The Pakistani government has been unable to resolve the problem of those ethnic conflicts. The riots in Karachi and the gangs of armed men terrorizing the countryside in Sind are allegedly caused by India. Thus, there is an urgent need for the Pakistani government to resolve this ethnic problem. The country needs a political structure that will give due recognition to the various ethnic communities and at the same time strengthen their integration into a Pakistani state. And yet, since the inception of the state in 1947, no national government has given serious attention to this vital issue. There clearly needs to be a change in political awareness. The change must thus stem from changes in the attitudes of the educated minority and in particular in the country’s political, social, economic, and military leaders.

References Bernstein, Lee. The Greatest Menace: Organized Crime in Cold War America. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2002. Den Boer, Monica. “Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: Business As Usual?” Pp. 103–116 in Law-Enforcement Cooperation and Transnational Organized Crime in Europe, edited by Mats Berdal and Mónica Serrano. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002. Dubro, Alec, and David E. Kaplan. Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal Underworld. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. Farer, Tom. Transnational Crime in the Americas: An Inter-American Dialogue Book. London: Routledge, 1999. Granada, Camilo. “The OAS and Transnational Organized Crime in the Americas.” Pp. 95–102 in Law-Enforcement Cooperation and Transnational Organized Crime in Europe, edited by Mats Berdal and Mónica Serrano. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002. Johnson, David. The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Shelley, Louise. “Transnational Organized Crime: An Imminent Threat to the Nation-State.” Journal of International Affairs 48(2) (1995): 463–489. Shuia, Sharif. “Ethnicity and Conflict in India and Pakistan.” Contemporary Review 282(1646) (2003): 129–138, http://findarticles.com/p/ articles/mi_m2242/is_1646_282/ai_100141502.

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Appendix Directory of Major Organized Criminal Groups

Aboriginal-Based Criminal Groups, Canada Martin Kich Although the Aboriginal-based groups do not in themselves constitute a sophisticated criminal network, they have demonstrated a great willingness to use violence against their targets and their rivals. In fact, they have made inroads with the much more organized biker gangs and Asian gangs as enforcers. From their beginnings as prison gangs, the Aboriginal-based groups have become one of the major concerns of Canadian law enforcement from the local to the federal levels. Sociologists have hypothesized that the rise of these groups can be traced to the physical and sexual abuse that was endemic to the residential school system in which Aboriginal children were educated in the 1960s. In Ontario and Quebec, the Aboriginal-based groups have primarily concentrated on smuggling narcotics, firearms, and stolen goods across the U.S.Canadian border. In the major cities of Canada’s prairie provinces, the Aboriginal-based groups have operated largely as street gangs, exploiting the districts that they control. They first came to attention in Winnipeg but have spread to Calgary, Edmonton, Regina, and Saskatoon. In the 1990s, the groups began to establish a presence in smaller communities in the provinces and to aggressively recruit new members from the Native American reservations. Throughout the provinces, the major groups are the Indian Posse, the Native Syndicate, Redd Alert, and the Warriors. In addition, there are dozens of smaller groups, such

as the Deuce in Manitoba, seeking alliances with or affiliations within these major groups. Of all the prairie groups, the Indian Posse and the Redd Alert have come most frequently and violently into conflict. The unconstrained brutality of the groups has been exacerbated by their shifting alliances with many smaller groups. The uncertainties in these arrangements has created a very volatile mix that poses a great danger not only to the members of the groups and to the residents of the districts that the competing groups control but also increasingly to the general population of the broader communities in which they operate. Although only 10 percent of the population of the prairie provinces is Native American, Native Americans constitute just under 50 percent of the victims of violent crime and 50–80 percent of the inmates incarcerated in various types of juvenile facilities.

Albanian Mafia Martin Kich Albania is a small and relatively unknown nation on the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea, between the states of the former Yugoslavia to the north and east and Greece to the south. Conquered by Italy in 1939 shortly before Germany invaded Poland to begin World War II, Albania became a communist state following the expulsion of the Italians and Germans. For forty-seven years, the communist dictator Enver Hoxha kept the nation as isolated as any nation in the world, with the possible exception of North Korea. For a long while, Hoxha defied Soviet hegemony and 449

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Appendix: Directory of Major Organized Criminal Groups

allied himself instead with communist China. Under Hoxha, organized crime was officially suppressed as severely as it was in the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin, but in both states an underground economy was tolerated, and it was a small step from state accommodation of the black market to outright collusion between civil authorities and criminal gangs. Yet after Hoxha’s death in 1985, his successors failed to maintain the regime, and three conditions in Albania fostered the rapid growth of criminal organizations. First, the struggle for power in the new ostensibly democratic state caused political parties to procure muscle in much the same way as the Tammany political machine used the Irish street gangs in nineteenth-century New York. Second, the infusion of foreign aid from the European Union (EU) and the United States presented unprecedented opportunities for graft and thereby funded the expansion of the criminal gangs’ activities. Third, the opening of Albania’s borders created a sudden demand for all sorts of illicit trafficking, starting with the smuggling of the masses of people desperate to flee the political chaos to a better life in Italy. Initially allying itself with Italian Mafia families, the Albanian gangs quickly adopted the organizational structure and other efficiencies of the Mafia families. But lacking any history of operating within societies with stable representative governments and capitalistic economies, the Albanian Mafia proved murderously unpredictable and effectively challenged Turkish and Italian control of the traffic in narcotics and weapons between Europe and Asia and through the Balkans. Soon, the Albanians began to work their way into the distribution networks for narcotics in Central and Western Europe. Perhaps the most notorious of the Albanian Mafia’s activities has been its role in the growing white slavery networks in Central and Western Europe. Young people—and especially young women—from the former Soviet republics and the Eastern bloc nations have looked increasingly to the West for meaningful opportunities. Taking advantage of the eagerness and the naivete of many of these women, the Albanian Mafia has used a variety of ruses to dupe them into leaving their homes and then, by brutalizing them, has forced them into desperate existences as prostitutes shuttled among a network of brothels.

Alperon Crime Organization (Israel) Martin Kich As in Jazz Age Chicago, where Al Capone’s South Side gang was largely defined by its ongoing conflict with the North Siders led, in turn, by Dion O’Bannion, Hymie Weiss, and Bugs Moran, since the 1980s the Alperon crime organization has been defined by its ongoing conflict with the Abutbol-Rosenstein alliance. The prize in this case has been control of the gambling and extortion rackets in Israel. Like their predecessors in Chicago, the competing groups have tried to eliminate each other’s leadership and in the process have killed a large number of gangsters on each side as well as innocent bystanders. But whereas the submachine gun had been the weapon of choice in Chicago, the Israeli gangsters have increasingly shown a preference for explosives. The leadership of both Israeli gangs originally hailed from North Africa, but the membership in the gangs has been significantly supplemented by Russian, Belarussian, and Lithuanian émigrés to Israel, much hardened by their persecution by the Soviet government. The Alperon gang has been led by three brothers—Ya’akov, Moshe, and Nissim—and has been allied with the Abergil family. Unlike Capone, who commonly claimed that he was a used furniture dealer, the Alperons have operated the Alperon Brothers Debt Collecting Company, a minimal front for their loan-sharking and extortion operations. On the other side, after the 2002 assassination of Felix Abutbol in Prague, the Abutbols, led by Felix’s son Assi, have been somewhat overshadowed by their ally, Ze-ev “Wolf” Rosenstein. Because he has engineered attacks on each of the Alperon brothers, Rosenstein has himself become the target of repeated assassination attempts. The weaponry used against Rosenstein has escalated from guns to small bombs to shoulder-fired rockets to a very large bomb that destroyed half a city block. Although he has been wounded several times, Rosenstein has, by simply surviving, earned the nickname “the wolf with seven lives.” The Alperons actually include a dozen brothers and sisters and their offspring. In one of the strangest twists to the family’s checkered history, Musa Alperon has become a leading figure in the Likud Party, embarrassing not only Ariel Sharon and the

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other leaders of the party but also many members of his own family, which has long been staunchly aligned with the Labor Party.

Asian Gangs Martin Kich Historically, the most notorious Asian criminal gangs in the United States have been Chinese, whether American extensions of the Triads and Tongs or independent gangs that developed in the Chinatown districts of major cities. But in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the end of American military involvement in Indochina and the Khmer Rouge’s genocide in Cambodia led to unprecedented emigration from the nations of Indochina to the United States. Some of these new immigrants were undoubtedly involved in the black markets and other illicit activities that flourished throughout Indochina over the extended period of conflict, and most have been traumatized by war, atrocities, and political oppression. Indeed, the sense of desperation felt by many of these immigrants has been compounded by their status as political refugees who left their homelands in makeshift vessels or traveled over difficult jungle trails and who have often had very limited resources to drawn on in their new lives. It is therefore hardly surprising that some of these immigrants have been drawn toward criminal associations as they have struggled to establish themselves in the United States. The Indochinese gangs first formed in cities along the Pacific coast, where most refugees from Indochina first settled. In 2000, the Department of Justice estimated that membership in these gangs had reached 15,000. The more prominent West Coast gangs have included the Black Dragons, the Cheap Boys, the Natoma Boys, the Santa Ana Boys, the Street Killer Boys, and the Tiny Rascal Gangsters. Related female gangs include the Dirty Punks, the Pomona Girls, and the Wally Girls. By the early 1990s, however, as the refugees were dispersed into communities across the country, Vietnamese, Hmong, Cambodian, and Laotian gangs also established themselves in most major cities in other parts of the United States, especially in the Midwest. Initially, these gangs primarily targeted other refugees, but as members began to

move among the communities in which the refugees had settled, the scope of their operations began to expand dramatically. Vietnamese gangs in metropolitan Chicago include the Hung Mung, the Black Widows, the Local Boys, the Wolf Boys, and the Hung Ching, the latter of which has employed juveniles in narcotics distribution and home invasion sprees targeting suburban neighborhoods. Like the Vietnamese BTK gang, which has established a national presence, the Hung Mung has supplemented its own criminal activities by providing muscle to the Chinese Tongs. In Los Angeles, Vietnamese gangsters have been recruited formally into the predominantly African American gangs, the Bloods and the Crips. In Minneapolis and other cities of the upper Midwest, Hmong gangsters have themselves formed Bloods and Crips gangs.

Azerbaijani Groups Martin Kich As in much of the rest of the former Soviet Union, the transition to independence in Azerbaijan created an environment that fostered the growth of organized criminal gangs. The territorial conflicts with neighboring states, in particular Armenia, caused considerable displacement of the population while making weapons much more widely and readily available. The market-oriented reforms that followed the collapse of state control of the economy created opportunities for rapid accumulations and transfers of wealth, very often through partly or completely illicit schemes. The criminal gangs quickly became involved in the movement of all sorts of contraband, from industrial goods to foreign currencies and from arms to illegal narcotics. Indeed, the influence of the Azerbaijani gangs quickly spread across much of the Caucasus region and even to some of the far corners of the former Soviet Union. By the mid-1990s, the Azerbaijani gangs were thought to control four-fifths of the trade in illegal narcotics in Moscow and almost 40 percent of all of the illegal narcotics entering Russia. In Moscow and other large cities, the Azerbaijani gangs have engaged in sometimes spectacular gun battles with their rivals, mainly Chechen gangs. But in some instances, Slavic 451

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gangs used the conflicts among the various Caucasus gangs to considerable advantage, seizing territories after the Caucasus gangs had reduced each other. Under pressure from Russia, the Azerbaijani government officially joined the regional effort against narcotics trafficking, but it was widely believed that the traffickers were in fact funding much of the Azerbaijani military operations in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Balkan Crime Groups Martin Kich The most dramatic growth of organized crime in the Balkans has occurred as the former Yugoslavia fractured into the smaller nations of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia and into territories such as Bosnia and Kosovo that are likely too ethnically fragmented or too small to become viable nation-states. The disruptions in civil order in these states and the ready availability of weapons have combined to transform the former Yugoslavia into the major conduit for the traffic in counterfeited currency and goods, black market commodities and weapons, illegal immigrants, narcotics, and prostitutes from Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa into the nations of the European Union (EU). In many instances, these criminal groups have taken control of legitimate enterprises. For instance, in Macedonia, they now control three of the largest cigarette factories, which produce the bulk of the counterfeited name brand cigarettes smuggled into the EU. In Macedonia, in Kosovo, and in the autonomous regions of Herzegovina and Montenegro that remain connected to Serbia in a much-reduced Yugoslavian confederation, criminal groups have gained control of political parties and military units, and conflicts within and between these states have been exacerbated by competition for control of various criminal enterprises. Apologists for these strange alliances between governments and criminal groups have argued that the economic sanctions imposed on the former Yugoslavia created a need for all sorts of improvised and opportunistic economic arrangements. But the increasing control of criminal enterprises throughout the EU by Balkan crime groups has led the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) to turn its peacekeeping forces against those groups. These efforts have been very successful on the local level, but it remains to be seen whether they will have any substantive effect on the broader activities of these criminal groups.

Big Circle Boys Martin Kich In the 1980s, members of the Dai Huen Jai gangs emigrated from the Chinese mainland to Hong Kong and then to Chinese communities in Canada and the United States, where they became known as the Big Circle Boys. These gangs originated in the Red Guards, the cadres of young indoctrinated true believers whom Mao Tse-tung turned loose on supposed traitors within the Chinese bureaucracy and among Chinese intellectuals during the convulsive Cultural Revolution. After Mao’s death, however, the Red Guards were themselves persecuted for crimes against the Chinese state. They were reeducated in camps that stretched roughly in a large circle around the city of Guangzhou, thus the name by which they have become known outside of China. While many of the Big Circle Boys have illegally entered Canada and the United States, some have ironically gained legal entry as political refugees. The Big Circle Boys have established a reputation for tenacity, ruthless violence, and carefully conceived criminal operations against lucrative targets. In the 1970s, Hong Kong police estimated that the gangs were responsible for four out of five armed robberies of banks and bank couriers. In Canada, they have established themselves most conspicuously in Vancouver and Toronto. Crossing into the United States, they have become a significant presence in the New York underworld. They have continued to engage in selective armed robberies, but they have also engaged in narcotics and weapons smuggling. In the early 1990s, the Big Circle Boys became internationally notorious when an extensive network for smuggling Chinese into North America and Europe was uncovered. Estimated to generate tens of millions of dollars annually, the network was largely managed by two female members of the gang, King Fong Yue and Cheng Chui-Ping.

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Black Gangster Disciples James E. Seelye Jr. The Black Gangster Disciples is a major street gang based in Chicago. It was formed in 1969 when David Barksdale, president of the Disciple Nation, joined together with Larry Hoover, president of the Gangster Nation. In 1969, Barksdale grew tired of the violence that he felt was destroying the black community because of gang warfare. Much of the conflict was between his gang and Hoover’s Gangster Nation. Barksdale decided that the best way to continue would be to merge the two organizations, with Hoover sharing equal power. By offering Hoover shared governance in the newly formed gang, Barksdale knew that Hoover would do his part to end the bloodshed between the groups. The merger offered new opportunities for the gangs. They became active in community affairs. They opened and operated a gas station and two restaurants, took part in community cleanup programs, and enforced school truancy policies. They were also given a security contract for Wilson Junior College. They took part in the civil rights movement, marching with Reverend Jessie Jackson to facilitate the hiring of black contractors and with Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. On the other hand, while putting forth a good face in community affairs, the gang was active in the drug trade. Their leaders blame this on the flood of drugs available to the black community. Today, they are known to be involved in trafficking more than $100 million in drugs annually. Hoover was convicted of drug racketeering in 1997.

Born to Kill James E. Seelye Jr. The Vietnamese-American gang Born to Kill was formed in New York City in 1986 by David Thai. He borrowed the name from the slogan that some U.S. Marines chose to put on their helmets in Vietnam. Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, Born to Kill waged bloody wars with rival criminals in New York City’s Chinatown. Shootouts between Born to Kill and other gangs took place in gambling halls and restaurants and on crowded streets. Relatively new to Chinatown, the Vietnamese gang did not respect cer-

tain time-honored traditions of behavior. The gang consisted primarily of men born and raised in Vietnam. Unlike their leader Thai, who was in his midthirties when the gang started, most of its members were ten to fifteen years younger in age. Because so many members of the gang grew up in a war-torn country, the sense of fellowship that developed in the gang was welcome to them, and its numbers swelled. The gang became infamous for a number of reasons, including its seemingly imperviousness to deeply ingrained underworld rules. However, this is not to say that Born to Kill operated independently of other gangs, as it was also part of a vast criminal conspiracy. Although Thai was convicted of multiple murders in 1992, his gang continued. Part of their revenue came from the $13 million a year gleaned from the sale of counterfeit watches. Born to Kill’s network spread from New York to the West Coast, with an estimated membership in the tens of thousands.

Cambodian Crime Groups Martin Kich The political convulsions that have shaken Cambodia over the last four decades have created conditions in which organized criminal groups have been able to thrive. Between 1975 and 1978, under the Khmer Rouge, somewhere between one in seven and three in seven Cambodians were butchered by Pol Pot’s cadres or died from diseases related to forced labor and starvation. After the Vietnamese invaded the country in 1978, another 600,000 Cambodians crowded into refugee camps in Thailand or along the border with Thailand just inside Cambodia. The disruptions in Cambodian daily life, the destruction of social structures, the disintegration of civil authority, the ready availability of weapons, the hardening of attitudes toward violence, and the emergence of an underground economy among the ruins of legitimate economic institutions and enterprises all combined to encourage the growth of criminal organizations and to broaden the scope of their activities. Not surprisingly, Cambodian gangs have specialized in human trafficking. It has been estimated that between 80,000 and 100,000 Cambodian women have been trapped into miserable existences as prostitutes. 453

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The gangs have also used a variety of ruses to recruit prostitutes from Vietnam and from East European nations. In addition, they have provided about 90,000 coerced laborers to Thai industries and have provided about 30,000 women and children to Thai gangs controlling prostitution and begging in major Thai cities. Except when the Khmer Rouge brutally controlled the country, Cambodia has served as a major drug trafficking route. The opium and heroin produced in the Golden Triangle, a region including remote areas of northern Burma and Laos and southern China, has passed through Cambodia en route to both Europe and North America. Indeed, as production in Central Asia has been interrupted by the recurring conflicts in Afghanistan, the production from the Golden Triangle has become increasingly important and profitable. Although the United States and other Western nations have stressed the great need to control organized crime activities in Cambodia, they have ironically compounded the problem. In 2003, the United States deported more than 1,400 Cambodian-born criminals back to Cambodia. These deportees had served time in U.S. prisons for a broad spectrum of felony offenses, and when they returned to their homeland, many of them assimilated into existing criminal groups or formed new gangs.

police contacts. The second group was referred to as Automobile, which got its start in car theft and in running scams at the well-known Southern Port openair auto market, eventually taking control. The third was the Ostankinsky, specializing in the control of distribution networks of consumer goods. In an economy that experienced shortages in virtually all consumer goods, the landscape was ripe for earning tremendous amounts of money in a very short period of time. At the same time, private business was legalized in the Soviet Union, and extortion became the favored method of infiltrating companies. In the late 1980s and the 1990s, the Chechens were successful in pushing weaker groups out of prime territories and eventually taking control of a vast array of business entities including hotels, auto markets, auto repair shops, furniture distribution networks, and many others. In the disarray after the collapse of the Soviet Union and throughout the 1990s, Chechen groups engaged in massive bank frauds and infiltrated the military, stealing arms and establishing a foothold in narcotics trafficking. The Chechens are currently still active in narcotics trafficking and are believed to be involved in human trafficking.

Chinatown Gangs Martin Kich

Chechen Criminal Gangs Joseph Serio Chechen criminal organizations found their roots in Moscow in the early 1980s. Like many crime groups, their start was modest, based primarily on theft and fraud. At the time, there was no sophisticated organization to speak of. Rather, small groups of individuals began developing contacts in dormitories and hotels to facilitate their petty activities, the proceeds of which would be sold on the black market. Such locations were also ideal for running prostitutes. Russian police intelligence sources put the birth of the Chechen organized crime community at 1987. History of the formation of the Chechen criminal community typically focuses on three groups. First was the so-called Central group, which succeeded in pushing out Azeri competition from parts of Moscow and taking over its interests in the city as well as its

Today, when the Chinatowns in large North American and European cities are viewed as major cultural attractions and have been gentrified to attract and to accommodate tourists, it may be difficult to imagine that they were once slums into which poor Chinese immigrants were crowded in order to exploit their labor while restricting their political and social assimilation. The Chinese Exclusion Act (1883) not only halted Chinese immigration into the United States but also reduced Chinese Americans to a second-class status, extending the residency requirements for citizenship and prohibiting Chinese employment in certain industries such as mining. Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Chinatowns became crime-ridden and that criminal groups would organize to exploit the many opportunities for illicit enterprises.

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The Triads and Tongs have certainly had a presence in most Chinatowns, but local gangs have prospered by allying themselves with a Triad or Tong group or by playing Triad or Tong groups against each other. Such local gangs have included the Jackson Street Gang and the Joe Boys in San Francisco, the Asian Boyz in southern California, the Hip Sing and the On Leong in Chicago, and the Black Eagles, Chung Yee, the Flying Dragons, the Ghost Shadows, Liang Shan, and the White Eagles in New York City. These gangs have become involved in money laundering, trafficking in illegal immigrants, and narcotics distribution, but local rackets such as extortion, gambling, and prostitution have remained major sources of their income. Gang activities have become a broader public issue as Chinatowns have become more popular tourist destinations and tourists have sometimes gotten caught in the crossfire during conflicts between rival gangs. The most notorious of these incidents has been the so-called Golden Dragon Massacre in which an attempted hit on a member of the Wah Ching left several tourists and waiters at the restaurant dead. The great attention given to this incident caused the San Francisco Police Department to create a special unit devoted to Asian gangs and caused departments in other large cities to reallocate resources in order demonstrate their commitment to combating Asian crime.

Chinese Triads Martin Kich The Chinese Triads originated in opposition to the Manchu dynasty in China. Gradually, since the aim of fomenting political insurrection was itself criminal, it did not require much shifting of priorities for the Triads’ operations to first include and then gradually come to consist largely of apolitical criminal activities. The name of these criminal organizations derives from the symbol associated with them, a triangle surrounding a derivation of the Chinese character “hung,” representing the mystical union of heaven, Earth, and man. In fact, these groups were initially known as the Hung Mun or Hung Sect. They have subsequently also been known as the Sam Hop Wui, or the Heaven and Earth Association.

During the Nationalist period, the Triads operated freely in China and forged alliances with political and legitimate business interests. Indeed, they expanded their operations to the Chinese communities in the major cities of the Americas and Europe. When the communists under Mao Tse-tung seized control of Mainland China, the Triads retreated with the Nationalists to Taiwan, but their major base of operations became Hong Kong. After southeastern China became the center of the economic reforms enacted by Deng Xiaoping and after Hong Kong was transferred from British control to Chinese sovereignty, the Triads took advantage of the opportunities to return to the mainland. The increasing mobility of the Chinese population has allowed them to expand their operations into almost every urban center in the country. The Triads’ main sources of income in China, as elsewhere, have been cargo hijackings, drug trafficking, document forgeries, counterfeiting of consumer goods, protection rackets, gambling, and prostitution. Some of their criminal activities have developed in response to conditions specific to China. For instance, because of the shortage of women in many agricultural areas of China, the Triads have resorted to kidnapping women in the cities and selling them as wives to young farmers desperate to establish families. Although the Triads have been one of the major players in the international traffic in heroin, they have thus far resisted engaging in extensive drug trafficking in China, perhaps because of the extremely draconian penalties for doing so.

Colombian Drug Cartels Georgios A. Antonopoulos Two cartels have been dominating the drug trafficking scene of Colombia and have been starring in the drug market of the rest of world to a very large extent. The Medellin cartel in the 1980s and the Cali cartel of in the 1990s were named after the cities that were the center of their activities, cities with a great tradition in illicit trades since the nineteenth century. These cartels had an effect not only on the drug and crime scenes of the country but also on the financial, social, and political realms. The Medellin cartel rose 455

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to prominence when marijuana was replaced by cocaine as the main illegal commodity of Colombia. The cartel’s former leader, Pablo Escobar, was considered one of the most wanted criminals and one of the richest people in the world. Unlike the Sicilian Mafia or the Japanese Yakuza, the Colombian drug cartels have no code of honor or rituals of recruitment. Apart from drug trafficking, the Medellin and Cali cartels are involved in two other activities heavily related with the drug trade: money laundering and corruption. These cartels have also had a reputation of kidnapping and deadly violence. During the 1980s and 1990s a large number of journalists, law enforcement officials, members of the judiciary, and politicians were killed because they were seen as obstacles to the benefits of the cartels. It is also argued that there has been a link between the Medellin and Cali cartels and guerrilla groups in Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Ejercito Liberation de la Nacion (ELN), which were paid by the cartels to protect the establishment. Some evidence suggests that the cartels had established links with crime groups from North America, Europe, and Asia.

La Cosa Nostra (Sicilian Mafia) Italy Clotilde Champeyrache Although originally stemming from the rural parts of western Sicily, La Cosa Nostra (literally “our thing”) very quickly also spread in the cities and in the eastern region of the island. Palermo is the epicenter for this group, and the town of Catania now appears as the second main center. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, some local criminals organized in loose networks and offered themselves as middlemen providing services of private protection and of intermediation for transactions and contracts. La Cosa Nostra affiliates claimed to be men of peace, order, and honor intending to be the exclusive rulers over their territories. After World War II, the Mafiosi, then considered as antifascists, overtly entered the Sicilian political life—with some, such as Calogero Vizzini, becoming mayors—and initiated a cycle of huge

economic expansion thanks to the control over the rebuilding industry and the smuggling of cigarettes in the 1950s and over the narcotics trade since the 1960s. After the expansion of the Corleonesi faction in the 1970s and the Santapaola family in the 1980s, La Cosa Nostra suffered a period of defeats thanks to the confessions of high-ranking pentiti (government informants) dissociating from the criminal element, providing confessions that led to the maxitrial of 1986 in Palermo. Nevertheless, with the assassination of the judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in 1992 and the bombings in Florence and Milan in 1993, La Cosa Nostra, under the leadership of Bernardo Provenzano, has shown that it still can challenge the Italian state. Provenzano, who had been on the run for more than forty years, was captured by Italian authorities in April 2006. The “Boss of Bosses” as he is known was apprehended in a Sicilian farmhouse in the town of Corleone, a site made famous by the Godfather movies in 1972, 1974, and 1990. The lasting strength of La Cosa Nostra lies in its capacity to come to terms with the authorities and to impose subjection and omertà through the use or merely the threat of resorting to violence while committing offenses and controlling not only illegal but also legal activities such as tourism, transportation, the building industry, and waste recycling.

Dragon Syndicates Martin Kich Dragon Syndicates is another name for the Chinese Triads, a name popularized by Martin Booth’s muchacclaimed study The Dragon Syndicates: The Global Phenomenon of the Triads (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2000). Booth exhaustively describes the history of the Triads, building to what he believes is a gross underestimation of the threat that they now pose and will increasingly pose as the Chinese economy and Chinese influence throughout the world continues to expand. Despite the many inscrutably Chinese aspects of their operations, Booth also emphasizes how the Dragon Syndicates in some ways parallel the American criminal syndicates long dominated by the

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Italian American Mafia. In both criminal organizations, there is great importance placed on maintaining strict secrecy about the syndicate’s activities, on sustaining those connections within the syndicate that afford protection for one’s interests and person, and on demanding respect in proportion to one’s station within the criminal hierarchy and on retaliating against gestures of disrespect. On the other hand, Booth illustrates how the Dragon Syndicates have thoroughly infiltrated legitimate business, especially in Hong Kong, whereas the American syndicates have sought largely to exploit legitimate business.

East European-Based Criminal Groups Martin Kich Organized crime in Eastern Europe first came to international attention when the Russian Mafiya became an extragovernmental power shaping Russian life after the collapse of the Soviet Union and then extended its reach across Europe and to the United States. The Russian Mafiya had its origins in both the black market and the gulag. The black market existed throughout Soviet history to supply those goods that the state-controlled economy could not produce or could not produce in sufficient quantities. The prisoners in the gulag included substantial numbers of hardened criminals who were permitted to form gangs that preyed on other political prisoners. In this manner, the majority of the prisoners were doubly brutalized within the camps. The collapse of the Soviet regime created a power vacuum within Russia and the other former Soviet republics. The immediate successors to the Soviet regime were compelled to institute representative government and a free-market economy without any existing framework to support such comprehensive political or economic reforms. The criminal gangs stepped into the vacuum, exploiting the new freewheeling economic conditions to amass huge financial resources and demonstrating their capacity for ruthless violence in order to intimidate government officials and the nascent class of legitimate entrepreneurs. By the time the Russian government reasserted some civil control over the Russian econ-

omy and Russian society, the Russian Mafiya had inserted itself into every corner of Russian life. In addition, the opening of Russia’s borders allowed the Russian Mafiya to establish enclaves throughout Europe and in the United States. Typically, these enclaves would be established in districts that already contained a substantial population of Russian émigrés. But despite such attempts to blend in among other immigrants, the extraordinary brutality of the Russian Mafiya became infamous in both the criminal underworld and in the mainstream culture. In all of its incarnations, the Russian Mafiya has specialized in trafficking in stolen goods and human beings, in counterfeiting consumer goods and electronic media, and in producing pornography and managing extensive prostitution rings.

Fuk Ching Martin Kich Organized in the early 1980s, the Fuk Ching are based in the Chinese neighborhoods of New York City, where they have specialized in protection rackets and gambling. Aligned with the Tong called the Fukien American Association, the Fuk Ching have come to international attention because of their extensive involvement in human trafficking. They have established an extensive network to smuggle Chinese nationals illicitly into the cities of Canada and the United States. Most of the original members of the Fuk Ching as well as many of their subsequent recruits have originated in Fujian Province. The large numbers of impoverished farmers and laid-off industrial workers in Fujian Province have provided the Fuk Ching with an almost endless stream of clients desperate for the better life promised in the West. The most notorious associate of the Fuk Ching has been Cheng Chui Ping, known as the “Mother of All Snakeheads.” Although police on several continents were aware of her leading role in the smuggling network, it took them most of several decades to make a case against her. Likewise, although she has acquired considerable stature as a sort of folk antihero, she has compiled a long and very dubious record as a ruthless and largely self-serving criminal.

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Gang Crime (International Street and Prison Gangs) Martin Kich The most notorious street gangs have originated in the United States, in particular in California and Chicago. Among African American gangs, the Crips and the Bloods have been the most prominent. The Crips originated in southeastern Los Angeles in the late 1960s, and the Bloods were formed in Compton in reaction against the Crips’ expanding influence. Today, both the Crips and the Bloods have chapters in almost every major American city and in a large number of cities of more modest size as well as in most prisons nationwide. In California, the Latino street gangs have coalesced into two loose confederations, the Notenos (also known as the Nuestra Familia) and the Surenos, based respectively in the northern and the southern parts of the state. Both have expanded nationwide and have a strong presence in the prison system. In Chicago, the Latino gangs have likewise divided into rival alliances: the Folk Nation and the Peoples Nation. And, more recently, in the cities along the East Coast, the major Latino federations have become La Gran Raza (The Great Race) and La Gran Familia (The Great Family). Latino gangs with a reach beyond the borders of the United States include the Mexican Mafia, the PRM (Partido Revolucionario Mexicano) and the Mexicles (also based in Mexico), and the Neta Association (based in Puerto Rico). One of the newest phenomena among Latino gangs has been the formation of the socalled Stoner gangs in Southern California. These gangs have de-emphasized their Latino heritage and have instead embraced the street culture associated with heavy metal music. Caucasian gangs have tended to be supremicist. The most prominent both inside and outside of the prison system have been the Aryan Brotherhood and the Nazi Low-Riders. Georgian Mafiya Joseph Serio The current characteristics of Georgian criminal organizations grew out of two main factors. The first factor was massive corruption combined with exten-

sive shortages of goods during the Soviet era. As in all other regions of the Soviet Union, Georgia’s commodities distribution network was underdeveloped, and the command economy resulted in vast shortages in consumer goods. These conditions gave rise to a pervasive black market system, as access to goods and means of transport meant unimaginable profits. Organized crime groups and corrupt state officials filled the void left by the absence of a normal functioning market economy. The second factor was civil war. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, three major areas of Georgia were plunged into civil war: South Ossetia, Adjara, and Abkhazia. The weakened or nonexistent border controls in these areas have facilitated extensive trafficking activity, the movement of vast numbers of refugees and attendant criminality, and the continued corruption of law enforcement personnel throughout the country. Major organized criminal activity in the region today includes trafficking in illicit drugs, weapons, and human beings as well as the smuggling of legal products such as cigarettes, alcohol, hazelnuts, fruit, vegetables, and other consumer goods. In addition, control over shipping, port areas, manufacturing, import/export, and industrial concerns often falls into the hands of or is influenced by organized crime groups. Traditional organized crime activity is also widespread throughout the region and includes extortion, counterfeiting, and kidnap for ransom. These activities are controlled by a mosaic of ethnic clans that are the de facto governments of the regions. It is estimated that under former President Eduard Shevardnadze, the Georgian economy was 60–70 percent dependent on the black market and that the government collected only 10 percent of its taxes, one of the lowest in the former Soviet countries. Mikhail Saakashvili, a Columbia Law School graduate who came to power in 2003 and was elected president in 2004, has initiated a wide-reaching campaign against corruption and organized crime. Great Circle Triad Martin Kich Five of the six major Triads originated in China but relocated to Hong Kong after the communist

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takeover of the mainland. The sixth of the major Triads, the Great Circle Triad, reemerged in Shanghai, its traditional base, after the economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping began to transform the city into the hub of the free-market experiments in China. Indeed, as economic growth accelerated in southeastern China and as Hong Kong was transferred from British control to Chinese sovereignty, the five Triads based in Hong Kong began to expand their operations tentatively into Shanghai. The other five Triads have thus far managed to maintain a fragile truce with the Great Circle Triad. But indications of increasing tensions have led observers in law enforcement to predict that Shanghai may become the next site of the sort of dramatic organized crime wars that occurred in Jazz Age Chicago and in several different periods in New York City.

Jamaican Criminal Organizations: Shower Posse Martin Kich When the crack cocaine epidemic hit American cities in the 1980s, the leading street dealers were the Jamaican gangs, which seemed to appear out of nowhere. In his book Shower Posse: The Most Notorious Jamaican Criminal Organization (New York: Diamond, 2002), Duane Blake traces the rise of these criminal gangs, revealing the role that the U.S. government played in their formation and in the rapid expansion of their sphere of operations. The posses began in Jamaica as enforcement arms of the major political parties. The Shower Posse happened to be aligned with the Jamaican Labour Party, which in the late 1970s had U.S. backing. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) not only trained the Shower Posse in combat techniques but also provided it with a broad range of sophisticated weaponry. As the Shower Posse moved, like the other posses, into the extraordinarily lucrative traffic in narcotics, it received a good deal of protection from the CIA, working at cross-purposes against a broad range of law enforcement agencies including the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Thus, within just a few years, the Shower Posse was able to establish a strong base in the major cities of the Northeast and had

begun to expand its reach into the Midwest. The willingness of the members to employ ruthless violence both accelerated the expansion of the Shower Posse’s territory and proved to be its undoing. The body count created a great deal of media attention, and the resulting public furor made the Shower Posse a focal target of law enforcement.

Khalil Kharfan Organization Martin Kich The specialized operations of the Khalil Kharfan Organization demonstrate how sophisticated and complex the international traffic in illegal narcotics has become. A criminal enterprise formed by Lebanese immigrants to Colombia, the Khalil Kharfan Organization has concentrated exclusively on laundering the huge profits generated by the cocaine cartels. Based in Colombia but with major operations in the greater New York area, in Florida, and in Puerto Rico, this gang has laundered drug monies through financial institutions across the world, from Colombia to Switzerland, from Panama to Israel, and from Peru to Dubai. Law enforcement investigators in the state of New York eventually built a case against some of the gang’s operatives, seizing more than $1 million in illicit funds. But it was estimated that by that time the gang had likely laundered more than $100 million. The gang initially attracted media attention because of its intricate schemes and its cunning use of electronic technologies in its operations. Because of the gang’s Middle Eastern background and its extensive contacts in the Islamic world, it became a target of those agencies investigating the funding of terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda.

Kuratong Balaleng (Philippines) Patit Paban Mishra The Philippines faces a major problem from the network of organized crime groups, whose earnings amounting to 300 billion to 600 billion pesos ($US273 billion to US$543 billion) every year and account for a substantial portion of the country’s gross 459

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national product (GNP). Out of the crime groups operating in the Philippines with well-organized networks and high level connections, Pentagon, Kuratong Balaleng, Lexus, Red Scorpion, Rex “Wacky” Salud, and the P50-Million Gang are notable ones. The Kuratong Balaleng operating in the cities of Cagayan De Oro, Cebu, Dipolog, Mindanao, Metro Manila and Pagadian specializes in robbery, drug trafficking, holdups, and smuggling. The gang, founded by the Parojinog clan, originated from Ozamis in Misamis Occidental province. It was earlier known as Dragon and presently it goes by the name Francisco. The boss is Manuel Francisco, and the members currently number sixty-six (based on 2003 Philippine government estimates) and use sophisticated arms. Kuratong Balaleng became nationally known following a series of bank robberies in Metro Manila in the mid-1990s. In May 1995, eleven members were killed by a task force operating under the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission. In October 2003, four members of the gang were shot in a police encounter at Dagupan-San Fabian Road in Barangay Bonuan Binloc, Pangasinan. The director of the Dagupan City Police, Noli Taliño, knew that the gang leader, Diego Jabalon (alias Tata), was also involved in a robbery in Bataan. It was also believed that the group was behind the August looting of 3.5 million pesos from a Bank of Commerce vehicle on Perez Boulevard. The high profile and connections that the gang enjoys are evident from the fact that politicians are allegedly linked with the gang. It was alleged that Joseph Estrada, who was the head of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission at the time of his vice presidency, owned the 419 Club, a gambling joint on Wilson Street in San Juan. Former basketball star Arnie Tuadles was killed in that club by the Kuratong Balaleng. Latino Gangs Martin Kich According to the 1996 National Youth Gang Survey, 44 percent of gang members were Hispanic, compared to 35 percent who were African American, 14 percent who were Caucasian, 5 percent who were Asian, and 2 percent who were Native Americans, Pacific Islanders, and members of other ethnic

groups. It is therefore not surprising that Latino gangs are now not only larger but also more numerous than other ethnic gangs. Many of the Latino gangs have developed in California, and some of the larger gangs have subsequently expanded to other states and other regions of the country. In the early 1990s, law enforcement agencies estimated that there were 180,000 gang members in California, with 130,000 of them living in Los Angeles County. Numbering 95,000, Latinos constituted an increasing majority of the gang membership throughout the state, but especially in Los Angeles County. The Latino gangs first formed in the barrios in the 1920s. By the 1990s, the major Latino gangs had joined into two syndicates, the Nortenos based in northern California and the Surtenos based in southern California. The Nortenos include such gangs as Big Hazard, the Breed Street Gang, and the Silver Leaf Nortenos (SLN). The Surtenos include the Assassins, King Kobra, and Mara Salvatrucha. In the Midwest, the major Latino gangs have been based in Chicago and have coalesced into two syndicates, the Folk Nation and the Peoples Nation. In Texas, Mexican American gangs have proliferated, with the Mexican Mafia, the PRM (Partido Revolucionario Mexicano), and the Mexicles being the most prominent. In the eastern United States, the major syndicates are La Gran Raza (The Great Race) and La Gran Familia (The Great Family). In metropolitan New York and, in particular, in northern New Jersey, the Dominican gangs have become major players in the drug trade. In Miami and Dade County, Florida, the Cuban Mafia has built a strong base, having taken advantage of an alliance with Santo Trafficante’s Italian American Mafia family based in Tampa. In Puerto Rico, the Neta Association began as a prison gang, but it has spread beyond the island and beyond the prison walls.

Malina Organizatsia Martin Kich Brighton Beach has long been home to a large Russian American community, which since the 1920s

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has been rejuvenated by periodic infusions of immigrants that occurred whenever the Soviet Union relaxed restrictions on emigration. Since the late 1970s, these immigrants have included increasing numbers of criminals associated with gangs that coalesced into the Russian Mafiya after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Based in the Brighton Beach section of Brooklyn, the Malina Organizatsia is one of the major American gangs affiliated with the Russian Mafiya. Unlike most other gangs with this affiliation, however, the Malina Organizatsia is a multiethnic group, headed by Russian Americans but including associates from other ethnic groups. The Malina Organizatsia has engaged extensively in the protection rackets and drug trafficking. But its specialties have been credit card and tax fraud. In particular, the group has perfected the motor fuel tax fraud. Because of earlier scams involving retail outlets, federal and state gasoline taxes are now collected on the wholesale level. The Russian mobsters have created Byzantine networks of essentially fictitious wholesalers, skimming the tax revenues through companies that have then disappeared into a complex maze of supposed mergers and liquidations.

Marielito Gangs Martin Kich In 1980, a third major wave of Cubans emigrated from the island to the United States. Specifically, between 21 April and 10 November, the government of Fidel Castro permitted—and in many instances forced— some 125,000 Cubans to board an improvised fleet of boats in Mariel Harbor. Castro claimed that for humanitarian reasons, he was permitting political dissidents to emigrate. Critics countered that he was emptying his jails and insane asylums and mixing the former inmates with the dissidents. It was a murky business, because many dissidents had been sentenced to prison as common criminals or had been committed to asylums for being mentally unstable. It is estimated that the Marielito refugees included some 2,700 hardened criminals who have been repatriated or incarcerated. U.S. immigration authorities immediately detained some 1,300 who were eventu-

ally shipped back to Cuba. Another 1,400 have subsequently been convicted of crimes in U.S. courts and have served time in U.S. prisons. Significant Marielito criminal gangs exist in Las Vegas, Los Angeles, New York City, and Washington, D.C. For the most part, these gangs have aligned themselves with larger organized crime groups for whom they have worked as drug traffickers and enforcers.

Mexican Federation Martin Kich The four criminal organizations that have combined to form the Mexican Federation have a reach that extends into almost all corners of Mexico and beyond the borders north into the United States and south into Central and South America. Almost all of the leaders of the Mexican Federation have been indicted for crimes in the United States, but very few have ever been convicted or served terms in prison. Led by Miguel Caro Quintero, the Sonora Cartel is known for controlling much of the traffic in Colombian cocaine into California, Nevada, Arizona, and Texas. Quintero’s brother, Rafael, has been imprisoned for participating in the infamous murder of Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent Enrique Camarana in 1985. Based in Matamoros, the Gulf Group was led by Juan Garcia Abrego, one of the few leaders of the Mexican Federation to be arrested and extradited to the United States to face trial. The Gulf Group has distributed cocaine as far north in the United States as Michigan, New Jersey, and New York. Headed by three brothers—Benjamin Arellano, Francisco Javiar Arellano, and Ramon Arellano Felix—the Tijuana Organization has been the most conspicuously violent of the four organizations within the Mexican Federation. Blamed for countless murders in Mexico, including the assassination of Cardinal Juan Jesus-Posadas Ocampo, the Tijuana Organization has been linked to more than two dozen murders in the San Diego area as it has attempted to seize control of the traffic in methamphetamine. Benjamin Arellano was arrested by Mexican authorities in 2002. He is currently being held in a Mexican prison. That same year Ramon was killed in 461

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Mazatlan, a tourist site in Mexico. In August 2006 Francisco was captured by the U.S. Coast Guard off the coast of Mexico in international waters. The Juarez cartel has been headed by Amado Carillo Fuentes, probably the most significant individual in the Mexican Federation. Aligned with the Colombian Cartels, specifically the Rodriguez Orejeula group in Cali and the Ochoa brothers in Medellin, the Juarez Cartel has become notorious for transporting huge quantities of cocaine with its own fleet of 727s.

’Ndrangheta: The Calabrian Mafia (Italy) Henry Prunckun ’Ndrangheta is an Italian-based organized crime group with its roots in Calabria. The etymology of the word “’Ndrangheta” is not certain, as it is dialectical. General opinion is that it derives from the Greek, who once inhabited the area. Its pronunciation varies, as the word has been passed down through generations. In addition, several interpretations are attributed to the term, including heroism, virtue, courage, and loyalty. One view is that it means “society of men.” It is known in Italian as L’Onorata Societa (the Honored Society) and La Famiglia (The Family). ’Ndrangheta is a nonhierarchical organization based on family units rather than a command structure. The group is believed to have been formed somewhere around the eleventh century as a mutual protection arrangement among the peasant population in what was then a feudal society. It most likely evolved into a criminal group in the period leading up to the unification of Italy (1861). A strongly held view is that because the Bourbon dynasty, which ruled the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, employed Calabrian tax collectors for what was viewed as an unjust tax system, these collectors eventually turned away from the Bourbons and united as so-called honorable men, or mafiosi. These men modified the Bourbon tax system into an arrangement based on the concept of protection money. Bound by an ethical code (omertà), they subscribed to a tradition of mutual defense. Should one of its members suffer an injustice, a vendetta would equalize the situation. Paradoxically, these men were

both feared, due to the brutality they used in righting wrongs, and respected, for the “Robin Hood” values they represented. However, as honorable as these men might have started out, their unchecked power and influence ultimately resulted in them evolving into a complex international criminal phenomenon. Their goals were no longer to take a virtuous stance to injustice but rather to gain economic power through intimidation and violence. Today, ’Ndrangheta is reported to be involved in a wide range of illegal activities including drug trafficking, murder, bombings, counterfeiting, gambling, fraud, theft, labor racketeering, loan-sharking, alien smuggling, and kidnapping. Because membership of ’Ndrangheta is based mainly on immediate family members, blood relationships, and marriage, criminal investigations are difficult.

Neapolitan Camorra (Italy) Clotilde Champeyrache The first official written use of the word “Camorra” dates back to 1735. It refers to an urban Neapolitan criminal phenomenon fed by jails and often hardly distinguishable from diffuse illegality. Before the Italian unification, the Camorra could be assimilated to a sect of thieves with its own unwritten rules and rituals. After 1861, the Camorra discreetly but firmly took hold of all the empty spaces left by the young new state, especially in terms of mastering violence and private protection. After fascism and World War II, the Camorra seemed defeated. In fact, however, a new era was beginning with the smuggling of cigarettes on such a large scale that the Neapolitans got in touch with natives from Corsica, Marseilles, Genoa, and Sicily. Close links with the Sicilian Mafia were reinforced as Lucky Luciano, expelled from the United States, settled in Naples. The renewed control exerted by the Camorra over the regional economic and political life became blatant with the 1980 earthquake. By monopolizing the works for the rebuilding of the devastated city, the Camorra asserted itself as more and more entrepreneurial in order to mobilize and manipulate resources so as to gain power and profits.

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Its benefits increased dramatically as the association diversified its activities in both the illegal (extortion, morphine and heroin in partnership with the Sicilian Mafia, and cocaine on its own) sector and the legal sector (tourism, financial intermediation, real estate investment, the building industry, etc.). This change toward a more enterprise-oriented and rationalized structure was largely shaped by Raffaele Cutolo, who created the Nuova Camorra Organizzata in the mid1970s in overt conflict with the Nuova Famiglia led by the Nuvoletta, Bardolino, and Alfieri families. Since the 1980s, Carmine Alfieri has had the upper hand over the Cutolo and Nuvoletta families and has exerted power from jail.

Nigerian Criminal Organizations Georgios A. Antonopoulos Although the Nigerian criminal organizations are relatively new, they have established themselves as very powerful over the last fifteen years. Nigerian criminal organizations have been the result of and have benefited from a range of conditions prevalent in the Nigerian context such as the oil crisis in the 1980s and the extensive corruption and political instability of the country. A facilitating factor is also the size of the Nigerian immigrant community, which constitutes a reliable recruiting pool. There is a continuum of views in relation to the structure of the Nigerian criminal organizations. On the one end there is the view that Nigerian organized crime is based on large organizations with a hierarchical structure and a mafia-type leader, and on the other end there is the view that Nigerian organized crime is composed of a large number of small and flexible groups. What appears to be clearer, however, is that these groups are largely structured along an ethnic or tribal lineage. The Nigerian criminal organizations are involved in a quite diverse field of criminal activities including drug trafficking (specifically heroin and cocaine), forgery, counterfeiting of official documents and commodities such as CDs, money laundering, and trafficking of women and children for the financial exploitation of their sexuality. However, the Nigerian criminal organizations are world famous for their fraud scams and in particular their identity

fraud and advanced-fee scams. They work closely with other organized crime groups such as the Colombian cartels and African American drug dealers. The Nigerian criminal organization operate— apart of course from Nigeria—in a number of West African countries; in South Africa; in a large number of European countries including the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and Greece; and in the United States, Australia and South America.

Odessa Mafiya Martin Kich Based in the Brighton Beach district of Brooklyn, which has long had a Russian immigrant population, the Odessa Mafiya is the most powerful Russian American criminal organization. Established in the mid-1970s, it has expanded its operations from the greater New York metropolitan area to the Pacific coast. A very secretive organization, it has specialized in such blue-collar criminal enterprises as protection rackets, loan-sharking, and murder for hire. It is also believed to be extensively involved in counterfeiting and money laundering. In the Los Angeles area, the Odessa Mafiya has exploited the large Armenian immigrant population in the city of Glendale. Although the gang has recruited from among these immigrants, its illicit activities initially involved the intimidation and exploitation of the immigrant community. It has subsequently become involved in complex and extensive credit card and fuel tax frauds as well as in narcotics trafficking and kidnapping and murder for hire rings. The Odessa Mafiya has also established a significant presence in the San Francisco Bay area.

Pentagon Martin Kich In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Pentagon group initiated an insurgency in the southern Philippines, well ahead of that begun about a decade later by Abu Sayyaf, which has become infamous for its connections to al-Qaeda. In fact, the Pentagon group has in 463

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many ways provided a model for Abu Sayyaf and other subsequent groups. Part criminal gang and part terrorist group, the Pentagon gained international notoriety for its kidnapping and bombing sprees on Mindanao. Under pressure from other governments and its own constituencies, the Filipino government finally committed significant law enforcement and military forces to locating and annihilating the Pentagon. In February 2002, its leader, Faisal Marohombsar, was gunned down along with many other members of the group. It was such a significant event in the Philippines that President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was driven to the site of the killing in order to be photographed with Marohombsar’s corpse. Yet the widespread assumptions about the Pentagon’s eradication proved premature. Within months, surviving members of the group successfully executed several high-profile kidnappings for large ransoms and launched a guerrilla raid on a plantation operated by the Dole Corporation. Indeed, the Pentagon seems to have responded to Marohombsar’s death by fragmenting its membership into smaller groups under separate leaders. These smaller groups have taken names such as Diamond, Dragon, and the Suicide Bombers. Their leaders have assumed such aliases as Tigre, Tropical, Commander Mubarak, and Commander Wonderful.

off an underpaid, weak, and corrupt police force that has been ineffective in enforcing the law. The term “Mafiya” is rather misleading, as in terms of structure the Russian criminal organizations have very little in common with their Sicilian counterparts. Although it is difficult to provide an accurate figure, the Russian Mafiya consists of 7,000–8,000 criminal networks involving some 100,000 criminals. Some criminal networks are structured along ethnic lines such as the Chechens, the Georgians, and the Uzbeks, and some networks’ names often indicate the geographical location they come from (e.g., Solntsevskaya). The Russian Mafiya engages in a variety of activities including extortion; kidnapping; credit card fraud; counterfeiting of formal documents and goods; money laundering; gambling; prostitution; the trafficking of licit and illicit commodities such as agricultural products, oil, drugs, weapons and nuclear material; stolen vehicles; human organs; and women. However, what the Russian Mafiya is notorious for is contract killings. The activities of the Russian Mafiya are not limited only to Russia or the Commonwealth of Independent States but have also been taking place in a large number of countries of Eastern and Western Europe as well in America, Australia, and Japan.

Sacra Corona Unita Georgios A. Antonopoulos Russian Mafiya Georgios A. Antonopoulos The Russian Mafiya has been one of the most powerful criminal networks in the world. It is rooted in the phenomenon of the vory-v-zakone (thieves-inlaw), the prominent figures of the Soviet underworld, and in the stagnating Soviet economy during the Leonid Brezhnev era as well as on campaigns against alcohol in the Mikhail Gorbachev era. The Russian Mafiya feeds off the political and economic transitions that took place in Russia during the 1990s that blurred the boundaries between licit and illicit businesses and markets and the government and criminal groups and consequently allowed criminal groups to infiltrate government echelons as well as legal businesses including banks and the media. It also feeds

The Sacra Corona Unita (SCU, United Sacred Crown) is one of the four groups that are generally referred to as Italian organized crime by law enforcement agencies throughout the world. The SCU originates from Puglia, the area in southeastern Italy around the cities of Bari, Brindisi, Lecce, and Foggia. The group’s name has a religious connotation symbolizing the link of the beads in a rosary, just as the SCU is a connection between small organized crime groups of the area. It is the smallest and youngest of the Italian organized crime groups. Experts suggest that the SCU is the product of the early 1980s when members of the Camorra, the Neapolitan organized crime group, and the ’Ndranghetta, the Calabrian organized crime group, were imprisoned in the correctional facilities in Puglia. The SCU is involved in

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human smuggling, trafficking of women, arms trafficking, drug trafficking, money laundering, cigarette smuggling, the smuggling of stolen vehicles, and corruption, especially of the Italian political sphere. It is also involved in extortion by collecting money from smaller criminal groups operating in Puglia. The SCU cooperates with other Italian organized groups, and due to the geographic closeness of Puglia to the troubled and unstable area of the Balkans, a crossroad of a number of illicit trades and commodities, the group has established links with crime groups from the former Yugoslavia. In addition, there has been a strong link with Albanian groups both in Albania and Italy since the early 1990s. There is also some evidence that the SCU cooperates with Greek, Russian, Caribbean, and Latin American organized crime groups.

South African Crime Groups Martin Kich Before the collapse of the Afrikaner regime, organized crime in South Africa included three loosely defined groups. Gangs in the Western Cape created linkages with Asian gangs and engaged in drug trafficking. Right-wing paramilitary groups targeted antiapartheid activists, and in return the government largely ignored their other criminal activities. And the so-called Boere Mafia actively recruited rogue policemen and soldiers and controlled criminal enterprises in the South African countryside. In the postapartheid era, organized crime has increased exponentially in South Africa. Law enforcement agencies estimate that almost 200 criminal gangs emerged in the decade following black rule, with half of the gangs based in and around Johannesburg. The major sources of revenue for these gangs have been automobile theft, money laundering, and drug trafficking. The media attention to escalating criminality in South Africa has led to the formation of many vigilante groups, and in response the criminal gangs have consolidated into syndicates such as that among the Western Cape gangs known as the Firm. About three-quarters of the South African gangs have connections to criminal organizations in other parts of Africa, while one out of every six of the gangs

is thought to have links to criminal groups outside of Africa. The South African gangs have expanded their criminal activities to include the smuggling of diamonds and of military matériel and weapons as well as moving stolen and counterfeit commercial goods. On the other hand, in the first half decade of the twenty-first century, organized crime groups from other parts of Africa, in particular Nigeria, have made inroads into South Africa.

Sun Yee On Martin Kich The most important of the Hong Kong Triads, Sun Yee On has, by most estimates, between 50,000 and 65,000 members worldwide. In the United States, its major bases of operation are in San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York City, and Miami. The founder of the Triad is Heung Wah-yim, who has passed much of his power on to his son, Charles Heung. Heavily involved in the international traffic in heroin and methamphetamine, Sun Yee On has also invested heavily in the Hong Kong film industry, and not coincidentally, one of the staples of the Hong Kong studios has been films romanticizing gangsterism. Aligned with some of the Taiwanese Triads, Sun Yee On has reportedly made inroads into the Shanghai area by entering into partnerships with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). These partnerships have included upscale and very profitable brothels and nightclubs, with the Triads managing the operations and the PLA providing a shield against both law enforcement and other criminal organizations. Modeling their relationships with the PLA and the Chinese government on their longstanding arrangements with civil institutions and legitimate businesses in Hong Kong, the leadership of Sun Yee On has recruited Chinese soldiers and policemen into the Triad, and members of Sun Yee On have begun to infiltrate the Chinese civil bureaucracy. Sun Yee On has reputedly provided protection for Chinese officials visiting Hong Kong and other East Asian nations, and the Triad has reportedly made generous contributions to various Chinese causes, including relief efforts following such natural disasters as earthquakes and floods. 465

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Taiwan’s Triads Martin Kich The Taiwanese Triads have extensively infiltrated the Taiwanese government and many ostensibly legitimate business enterprises. Since the communist takeover of Mainland China, Taiwan has been ruled by the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalists). Because the leadership of the GMD, including Chiang Kaishek himself, had a long history of either belonging to or making close alliances with the Chinese Triads, it was inevitable that GMD rule would foster the growth of the triads in Taiwan. Indeed, the GMD has routinely used the Triads to get the vote out and to ensure the outcomes of elections, much as Tammany Hall used the Irish gangs in nineteenth-century New York. The arrangement has been profitable on both sides in Taiwan, with the Triads and their governmental associates annually looting as much as 30 percent of the tens of millions of dollars allocated to public works projects. In the private sector, corporate disputes have been arbitrated as frequently by the Triads as by the Taiwanese judiciary. United Bamboo is the largest and most notorious of the Taiwanese Triads. It was founded by the then adolescent sons of some of Chiang’s senior military officers. It concentrated initially on the protection rackets, loan-sharking, and gambling. In the 1980s, United Bamboo had as many as 40,000 members internationally, but law enforcement efforts against the Triad have reduced the current membership to about one-quarter of that number. The most infamous event linked to United Bamboo occurred in 1984 in San Francisco when one of its leaders, Chen Chi-li, also known as “Dry Duck,” personally assassinated a prominent Taiwanese dissident named Henry Liu.

established in the image of an honorable military association. The founder was Lieutenant-General Kot Siu Wong of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Army. General Kot set up the organization as part of a rearguard action to fight the advancing communist army of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung). Its headquarters was located at 14 Po Wah Road, Canton (a large industrial city close to Hong Kong and the provincial capital of Kwangyung). The organization was set up in haste in order to support the worsening Nationalist political stance as well as to prevent communist infiltration of both the Nationalist armed forces and its civil administration. Because of this, many of the newly recruited members had little idea of the traditions of Triad society in general and equally little knowledge of the specific organization they had joined. They were therefore simply referred to as “men of Number 14” or “14 Association.” After the communist victory in October 1949, the Triad Nationalists dispersed. Some followed Generalissimo Chiang into exile to the island of Formosa (Taiwan); some went to Hong Kong, Macao, and Thailand; and others went to America, Canada, Europe, and Australia. Once in Hong Kong, General Kot set about reorganizing his Triad society for what was hoped would be the reconquest of the mainland. However, Kot died in 1953, thus releasing his control of the organization and allowing it to drift. Self-interested branch leaders emerged and used the organization as a vehicle to further their personal agendas, using violence and intimidation to ultimately steer the association down the path of criminality. It was during this period that the prefix “K” was adopted. It was taken for the symbol for karat gold, a harder form of the local soft gold.

Tiendaomeng Crime Syndicate Martin Kich 14K (Hong Kong) Henry Prunckun Initially known as 14 Association, this Triad society was formed in China in 1947. Later, it assumed its current shortened name of 14K, or as it is known in Chinese, Sap Sie Kie. Viewed as the last Triad society to be formed on Mainland China, 14K was

Tiendaomeng is the third largest organized crime group in Taiwan. Including three dozen subgroups, Tiendaomeng has more than 600 members known to law enforcement. Organized in the mid-1980s by criminals doing time in Taipei Prison, Tiendaomeng’s first revenue-producing scheme was to control the sale of cigarettes in Taiwanese prisons. The syndicate

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aimed to unify all of Taiwan’s criminal gangs so that they could compete against gangs that had been transplanted from the Chinese mainland along with the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist) government. The gang has subsequently engaged extensively in the protection rackets and loan-sharking, but its specialty has become the operation of unlicensed casinos. The group’s two founders have since become upstanding citizens, with Yang Teng-kuei now operating a cable television station and Lo Fu-chu serving as a legislator. Indeed, although Tiendaomeng is still very much engaged in criminal activities, it has also invested heavily in legitimate enterprises such as construction companies, commodities firms, and dealers in imports and exports.

Turkish/Kurdish Gangs Georgios A. Antonopoulos The Turkish/Kurdish gangs are largely based on two pillars: (1) the hierarchically structured family clans in Turkey, which are based—just as with some other criminal organizations—on family or blood ties, and (2) the widespread official corruption in Turkey. The Turkish/Kurdish gangs are responsible for a great share of organized criminal activities in the countries in which they operate, especially heroin trafficking. It is very characteristic that Turkish/Kurdish gangs that deal in drug trafficking are reportedly responsible for more than 50 percent of the heroin smuggled into several European countries each year. Apart from drug trafficking, the Turkish/Kurdish gangs are heavily involved in human trafficking and smuggling, with all the offenses that are chained to this trade such as counterfeiting of legal documents and production of illegal documents. They are also involved in cigarette smuggling; currency counterfeiting; firearms and other offensive weapons smuggling, with many of these firearms and weapons ending up in the hands of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK); blackmail and extortion primarily of members of their community; and of course money laundering by investing in legal businesses such as restaurants, fast food shops, and travel agencies. The Turkish/Kurdish gangs have infiltrated the political life of Turkey as well, and there have been claims that serious orga-

nized criminals have conducted operations under the supervision of conveyors of the Turkish state. The Turkish/Kurdish gangs operate in Turkey, Greece, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and basically all countries in which there is a sizable Turkish/Kurdish community. They cooperate closely with local organized crime groups in the countries in which they operate, such as in Germany and the Netherlands, as well as with the Iraqi/Kurdish organized criminals, the Albanian organized criminals, Pakistani smugglers, Italian Mafia groups, and the Jamaican posses in Britain.

Turkish Mafia Martin Kich The Turkish Mafia operates openly in many parts of Turkey, and it clearly controls sizable towns such as Gebze, Kartal, and Pendik. The gangs have used widespread bribery and violent intimidation to discourage law enforcement and judicial efforts against them. The gangs’ major sources of revenue have been the traffic in heroin and in migrants. The heroin is shipped from Afghanistan to remote towns in eastern Turkey, and it is then distributed to most of the nations of Western Europe. For instance, an estimated 70 percent of the thirty tons of heroin annually entering the United Kingdom is handled by transplanted Turkish gangs. Similarly, the Turkish Mafia has competed successfully against Pakistani, Iranian, and Russian gangs to control much of the illegal migration from Central Asia into Southeastern Europe. Istanbul has become such a major way station that more than 200 gangs affiliated with the Turkish Mafia are engaged primarily in the traffic in human beings. It is estimated that as many as 250,000 illegal migrants are smuggled out of Istanbul each year.

Ukrainian Mafia Martin Kich When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Red Army left large stockpiles of small arms in the Ukraine. The Ukrainian Mafia first became prominent through its 467

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participation in the illicit international trade in those arms. Between 1992 and 1998, some $32 billion in military matériel disappeared from military depots in the Ukraine and ended up primarily in West Africa and Central Asia. Most notoriously, the Ukrainian Mafia used intermediaries in the Pakistani military to ship large amounts of arms to the Taliban as it began its insurgency against the Afghan government. It is believed that these arms were paid for by Taliban sympathizers within Saudi Arabia. From trafficking in arms, the Ukrainian Mafia entered into the international trade in illegal drugs, becoming a major player in the narcotics traffic from Central Asia to Central Europe. In Crimea, gangs affiliated with the Ukrainian Mafia have begun to plunder archaeological sites and to market the antiquities illicitly throughout the Western world. The reach of the Ukrainian Mafia has become as extended as its criminal enterprises have become diverse. In the Czech Republic, branches of the Ukrainian Mafia reportedly control prostitution. In Canada, branches are engaged in protection rackets aimed at small businesses.

Wah Ching Crime Syndicate Martin Kich In the mid-1960s, the Wah Ching crime syndicate began as a street gang in San Francisco’s Chinatown district. Over the next two and a half decades, the Wah Ching expanded its influence, becoming the preeminent Asian American criminal organization not just in San Francisco but also in the greater Los Angeles area. There it has divided into a dozen subgroups, each reportedly consisting of one hundred or more members. The Wah Ching’s major sources of revenue have been the protection rackets, loansharking, prostitution, gambling, narcotics trafficking, and murder for hire. It has acquired interests in such legitimate enterprises as restaurants and clubs, travel agencies, specialty retail outlets, and film and television production companies. The Wah Ching has aligned itself with Sun Yee On and 14K, the most powerful Triads based in Hong Kong. But in the late 1980s, the Wah Ching’s preeminence in California began to be challenged by transplants from another Hong Kong Triad, the Wo Hop To.

West African Gangs Martin Kich Organized crime in West Africa developed in the 1970s for a variety of reasons. The sudden infusion of oil wealth into the region’s economies created as many economic dislocations as opportunities. The transnational movement of populations resulted from natural disasters such as the Sub-Saharan droughts as well as shifting economic opportunities. Rapid urbanization and industrialization have created sprawling, poorly defined communities. Civil conflicts have made guns readily available and have broken down community mores. Moreover, the endemic corruption in many of the region’s political regimes has been exacerbated by large infusions of foreign aid, and the line between the licit and illicit has been very much blurred. The West African gangs have become the leading traffickers in Asian heroin to Europe and North America. In addition, they have created networks to move stolen and counterfeited goods, cigarettes, and diamonds and forced laborers and illegal migrants across borders. They have also engaged in credit card fraud, bank fraud, and money laundering. Nigerian gangs have become notorious worldwide as the originators of the funds transfer scams in which victims are promised huge sums for allowing large sums of unclaimed money to be transferred ostensibly into their bank accounts. Either the scammers simply empty the accounts of whatever monies they hold, or they very gradually increase the victim’s investment in the scam until the victim feels compelled to take what amounts to a substantial risk. While the West African gangs have not been as formally structured as criminal organizations in many other regions of the world, in the 1990s their reach became truly global.

Wo Group Martin Kich With a membership of 20,000, the Wo Group is one of the largest Triads based in Hong Kong, about 20 percent smaller than Sun Yee On and roughly the same size as the 14K Triad. The Wo Group includes twelve major subgroups: Wo Hop To, Wo Kao Chi,

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Wo Kwan Lok, Wo Lee Kwan, Wo Lee Wo, Wo On Lok (Shui Fong), Wo Shing Wo, Wo Shing Yee, Wo Sing Tong, Wo Yau Wo, Wo Yee Tong, and Wo Yung Yee. Of these subgroups, the oldest—and the oldest Triad group in all of Hong Kong—is Wo Shing Wo. Many of the other subgroups are located in Europe and North America. For instance, Wo Hop To has become one of the major Asian American gangs in San Francisco. Wo On Lok operates primarily in the Benelux nations. Indeed, even those subgroups that are still based primarily in Hong Kong have an international presence. For instance, Wo Shing Wo has a significant presence in Western and Central Europe, from Portugal to Germany. Each of the subgroups has developed a signature criminal enterprise. The Wo Hop To earns most of its revenue from extorting protection fees from small businessmen. The Wo On Lok is known for loan-sharking. The Wo Shing Yee has infiltrated the longshoremen’s union.

Yakuza Georgios A. Antonopoulos The Japanese Yakuza is one of the criminal organizations with the most ancient roots. There are two views about the history of the Yakuza. The first suggests that this group can be traced back to the seventeenth century’s kabuki-mono (mad or crazy ones), a group who were eccentric samurai in appearance, dress, and behavior. The second view suggests that

the Yakuza is the result partly of traditional Japanese cultural elements in association with the social and particularly economic context of the Edo era. There is no one Yakuza group but rather a number of hierarchically based and strictly rule-following organized crime groups (also referred to as Boryokundan), the most powerful one being the Yamagutsi-gumi. However, there are some freelance Yakuza. Although the Yakuza is rooted in Japanese society, a number of its members are not Japanese. The Yakuza follow specific rituals such as the cutting off of the small finger’s tip in a case of a wrongdoing. Unlike other criminal organizations, the Yakuza are not a secret society, and this is reflected in the group having offices as well as in physical features such as tattoos. The Yakuza is heavily involved in a number of criminal activities such as drug trafficking, gambling, protection rackets, blackmail, prostitution, pornography, firearms trafficking, money laundering through legitimate businesses and casinos in countries other than Japan, and corruption. It is suggested that Yakuza groups have had close ties with politicians since the 1930s. It is extremely rare that the Yakuza commit thefts and robberies, as these offenses are considered shameful. The Yakuza has made its presence known in geographical areas other than the Far East and Southeast Asia, including North America, Australia, and Russia. There is evidence that the Yakuza cooperate with Russian criminals, Colombian criminals, American crime groups including Italian Americans, Chinese Snakeheads, and Jamaican Yardies.

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Index Page ranges for main entries appear in boldface type. 14K, 68, 466 419 frauds, 62, 139, 242 “A Way Home” program, 397 (photo) Abadinsky, Howard, 45, 46–47 Abrego, Juan Garcia, 461 Abu Sayaff Group, 366 Abutol, Assie, 450 Abutol, Felix, 450 Adair, Johnny (“Mad Dog”), 147 Adler, Patricia, 174 Adler, Peter, 174 Afghan Service Bureau (Maktab alKhalimat), 350–351 Afghanistan, 103, 104, 282, 303, 304–305, 329–330, 339–340, 350–351, 367 Counter-Narcotics Law of, 603– 618Doc. Africa arms trafficking in, 64–65 Central and South Africa, 63–64 consumer demand for cocaine in, 325 drug trafficking in, 62–63, 324 East Africa, 60–61 heroin use in, 328 political chaos in, 64–65 transnational organized crime in, 2, 56, 60–66, 307 West Africa, 61–63 wildlife poaching in, 65 See also specific African countries African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003), 473–481Doc. Afwâj al-Muqâwmat al-Lubnâniyya (AMAL), 205 Agir pour les Femmes En Situation Précaire (AFESIP), 108 Agron, Evsei, 150 Albanese, Jay, 53, 63

Albania, 79, 82, 83, 115, 163, 181, 247, 367, 449–450 Albanian Mafia, 449–450 Alfieri, Carmine, 463 al Hassanein, Fatih, 87 Al-Kausar, 301 (photo) Alperon, Moshe, 450 Alperon, Musa, 450–451 Alperon, Nissim, 450 Alperon, Ya’akov, 450 Alperon crime organization, 450–451 al-Qaeda, 58, 64, 87, 103, 205, 305, 336, 344, 345 and nuclear weapons, 350–357 Al-Qaeda Connection, The (P. L. Williams), 354 al-Shaheed, 257 al Turabi, Hasan, 87 al-Watan al-Arabi, 351 al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 351, 352 (photo) American Mafia. See La Cosa Nostra Amezcua-Contreras, Adan, 334 Amezcua-Contreras, Jesus, 334 Amezcua-Contreras, Luis, 334 Amezcua Organization, 139 Amir, M., 34 Amsterdam Treaty on the European Union (1999), 119 Amuso, Vittorio, 12 Anastasia, Albert, 11, 198 Anastasia, Anthony, 198 Andabak, Ivan, 87 Andreano, R., 38 Anguilla, 94, 244 Annan, Kofi, 295 “Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces” (National Intelligence Council), 355–356

Ansara, Michael, 202 Anslinger, Harry J., 14 Antigua and Barbuda, 94 Antioquia Rebelde, 281 Anti-Slavery International, 167 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (1996), 444 Arellano-Felix, Benjamin, 333, 461 Arellano-Felix, Eduardo, 333, 334 Arellano-Felix, Javier, 333, 334, 461, 462 Arellano-Felix, Ramon, 333, 461 Argentina, xvii, 133, 134, 135, 156–157, 160 Arlacchi, P., 38, 373 Arms trafficking, 31–32, 297, 303–305 in Africa, 64–65 in the Caribbean, 94 and drug trafficking, 339 in Europe, 117 gray market arms trafficking, 304 nuclear trafficking in Russia, 313–314 in South America, 160–161 trading arms for diamonds (“blood diamonds”), 65 trading arms for drugs, 304–305 of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 32–33 Art Loss Register, 223 Aruba, 94–95 Aryan Brotherhood, 52 (photo) ASEAN Regional Forum (ASF), 443 Ashdown, Paddy, 86 Asia consumer demand for cocaine in, 325– 326 drug trafficking in, 324–325 and the global sex industry, 306–307 transnational organized crime in, xvi, 1– 2, 56–58, 66–71

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See also East Asia; Middle East; specific Asian countries Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), 393 Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 393 Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, 248 Asian gangs, 451 Asset Recovery Agency, 148 Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property (Adepi), 156 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 443 Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, 638–643Doc. Australia, 237, 271, 443 cannabis production in, 75 Criminal Code Act (1995), 643– 648Doc. drug trafficking in, 74–77, 78 human smuggling and trafficking in, 77– 78 law enforcement efforts against, 77, 77– 78 transnational organized crime in, 3, 58, 74–78 Australian Crime Commission (ACC), 77, 404–406, 430 corporate structure of, 404 creation of, 404 investigative powers of, 404 operations of, 404–407 Australian Customs Service (ACS), 77 Australian Federal Police (AFP), 77 Azerbaijani groups, 451–452 Azzam, Abdallah, 351 Babbar Khalsa International (BKI), 365 Bach, William, 142 Bahamas, 95, 249, 254, 255 Balkan crime groups, 452 Balkans, xvi, 304, 307 ethnic diversity of, 79–80 implications of for regional security, 82– 83 strategic geographical position of, 79 transnational organized crime in, 78–83 See also specific Balkan countries Bamboo Union Gangs, 70 Banco Ambrosiano, 247, 251 Bandidos, 214 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), 247, 251 Bank fraud, 271–273 desperate dealing, 271 embezzlement, 272 forgery, 271–272 Bank for International Settlements, 246

Bank of New York, 150 Bank secrecy jurisdictions, 247, 249–251 illegal functions of, 250 legal functions of, 251 and offshore banking, 249 and organized crime, 249–251 worldwide locations of, 249–250 Bank Security Act (BSA) (1970), 420 Bankruptcy fraud, 228–229 Banzer, Hugo, 133 Barakat, Assad Ahmad, 160 Barbados, 95 Barbara, Joseph, 15 Barbarossa, Aruch, 6 Barkan, Steve, 18 Barksdale, David, 453 Barros, Ademar de, 90 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 243, 244 Basque Fatherland and Liberty. See ETA Basque Separatists. See ETA Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 42 Bastille, the, 4 Beare, M. E., 373–374 Beck, Dave, 200, 201 Becker, Howard, 174–175 Bellomo, Librorio (“Barney”), 12 Bender, D. L., 97 Berger, Ronald, 18 Bermomeu, J., 371 Bermuda, 249, 253, 254 Bernal-Madrigal, “Juvenal,” 187 Bet Costa Rica International Sportsbook website, 290 Big Circle Boys, 452 Billings, R. N., 24 Bin Laden (Bodansky), 354 bin Laden, Osama, 87, 346, 351, 352 (photo), 355, 364 Bioff, William, 199 Black, J., 211 Black, Sonny, 217 Black Gangster Disciples, 453 Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE) system, 257 Black markets, 371–374 distinct features of, 373 MacKenzie’s grouping of, 373 nature and extent of, 371–373 reasons for their emergence and consolidation, 371 role of corruption, violence, and the legal sector in, 373–374 why caution is needed in estimating the size of, 372 Black Sox Scandal, 203 Blackshaw, R. E., 210 Blair, Bruce, 353 Blair, Tony, 433 (photo)

Blake, Duane, 459 Blakely, G. Robert, 24, 216, 217 Block, Alan, 10, 38 Bloods, 458 Bodansky, Yossef, 354 Boesky, Ivan, 266 Boiler Room, 268 Bolivia, xvi, xvii, 2, 59, 133, 135 drug trafficking in, 318–322 Bonanno, Joe, 13 Bonaparte, Charles, 418 Bonilla, Rodrigo Lara, 186 Booth, Martin, 456–457 Born to Kill, 453 Boryokudan. See Yakuza Bosnia, 82, 367 and the political-criminal nexus, 84–88 Bosnian Investment Organization (BIO), 87–88 Bosnian Party of Democratic Action (SDA), 84, 86, 87, 88 Boucher, Richard, 108 Bout, Victor, 368 Bovenkerk, Frank, 19 Brancato, Joseph, 12 Brazil, xvii, 63, 133, 134–135, 155–156, 160, 304, 307 illicit lottery (jogo do bicho [animal game]) of, 88–93, 134 See also Global cocaine trade British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 159–160 British Virgin Islands, 95, 249 Brighton Beach (New York), 460–461 Brown, George, 199 Broz, Josip. See Tito Bruno, A., 130 Brunwasser, M., 64 Bubiana Conservancy, 65 Buchalter, Louis (“Lepke”), 23, 198, 199, 199 (photo) Buenos Aires Declaration on Prevention and Control of Organized Transnational Crime (1995), 376 Bulgaria, 118 Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), 43, 45 Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), 144, 396 Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC), 415 Bureau of Internal Revenue, 415 Burkina Faso, 165 Burma, 189, 308 Bush, George H. W., 296 (photo) Bush, George W., 24, 288, 346, 378 (photo), 421 (photo), 442 Business Software Alliance (BSA), 264 Buss, Robin, 27

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Camacho, Marcos, 132 Camarana, Enrique, 333, 461 Cambodia, 69, 308, 454 child sex trafficking in, 107–110 Cambodian crime groups, 453–454 Cameron, Gavin, 352 Camorra, xvi, 1, 8–9, 360, 444, 462–463 etymology of the word camorra, 8 Camp, Dave, 440 Canada. See also Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada (CISC) Aboriginal-based criminal groups in, 141, 449 transnational organized crime in, 2, 59, 140–141 Canadian Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, 239 Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), 406–408 historical background of, 406 and the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC), 408 responsibilities of, 407–408 structure of, 406–407 Cannon, Howard, 202 Capone, Al, 10, 15, 21 (photo), 22, 36, 46, 199, 371, 450 Capone Louis, 199 (photo) Caracappa, Stephen, 171–172 Cardenas-Guillen, Osiel, 334 Carey, Ron, 202 Caribbean arms trafficking in, 94 drug trafficking in, 93, 97 human trafficking in, 94 money laundering in, 93 tax havens in, 254 transnational organized crime in, xvii, 2, 93–96 See also specific Caribbean countries Caribbean Anti-Money Laundering Program, 409 Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), 408–409 membership of, 408 Carlos Castano organization, 155 Caro-Quintero, Genaro, 334 Caro-Quintero, Jorge, 334 Caro-Quintero, Miguel, 334 Caro-Quintero, Rafael, 334 Carradore, Hugo Pedro, 90 Carrillo-Fuentes, Amado (“Lord of the Skies”), 334 Carrillo-Fuentes, Vicente, 334 Casalnuovo, 279 (photo) Casino, 22, 27 Castano, Carlos, 187 Castellano, Paul, 11, 217 Castro, Fidel, 461

Catena, Jerry, 11 Cawleti, James, 26 Cayman Islands, 95, 249 Cellule de traitement des informations financières et la prévention du blanchiment de capitaux, 233 Cengic, Hasan, 88 Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), 355 Center for Strategic and International Studies, 154, 158 Center for Transnational Crime and Corruption, 157 Central America drug trafficking in, 97 transnational organized crime in, xvii See also specific Caribbean countries Central Asian Republics (CARs) common problems among, 103–104 transnational organized crime in, 102– 107 See also specific Central Asian countries Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 108, 189, 305, 409–411, 459 headquarters of, 410 (photo) history of, 409–410 methods of collecting intelligence, 410– 411 mission of, 410 organization of, 411 Central Intelligence Group (CIG), 409 Central States Pension Fund, 201 Centrale Recherche Informatienest (CRI), 43, 45 Cerrah, Celalettin, 164 (photo) Chambliss, William, 10, 38 Chang, Iris, 73 Chavez, Caesar, 101 Chechen criminal gangs, 352, 366, 368, 454 Chechnya, 282, 313 Chekrouni, Nezha, 393 (photo) Cheney, Dick, 350 Chernobyl, 423 Chertoff, Michael, 24, 442 Chicago School of Sociology, 37 Chile, 133, 152 Chi-li, Chen (“Dry Duck”), 466 Chin, Ko-Lin, 33, 53 China, xvi, 66–68, 72, 271, 283, 299 counterfeit goods from, 182–193, 264, 265–266 crackdown on human smuggling by, 316 Narcotic Control Act (1997), 618– 623Doc. and the United Wa State Army (UWSA), 329 See also Triads Chinatown gangs, 454–455

Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), 73, 454 Chinese Six Companies (later Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association), 72 Chitpraesert, Onijira (“Angela Miller”), 307 (photo) Cholo culture, 121 Christie, Ian, 27 Chu, Yiu-Kong, 276 Cirillo, Dominick (“Quiet Dom”), 12 Civella, Nick, 200 Clark, Michael, 109 Clarke, Charles, 433 (photo) Clean Diamond Act (2001), 206 Clinard, Marshall, 173 Clinton, Bill, 428 Clockers, 27 Coalition against Insurance Fraud (CAIF), 228 Cohen, Lawrence, 300 Cohen, Phillip (“Little Farvel”), 199 (photo) Cold War, 230–231 Collor de Mello, Fernando, 134, 135 (photo) Colombia, xvi—xvii, 2, 59, 117, 133–134, 135, 152, 153–155, 280, 281, 282, 283, 303, 325 drug trafficking in, 93, 318–322, 324, 330, 340 and Nigerian criminal organizations, 62– 63 See also Drug cartels, Columbian; Global cocaine trade Colombia Criminal Code, Provisions Aimed at Combating Organized Crime and Enacting Other Provisions (21 February 1997), 552–559Doc. Colombo, Joe, 12 Comando Vermelho, 134 Commercial Crime Services (CCS), 270– 271 Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 375–376 Commission of the European Communities, communication to the Council and the European Parliament: “Developing a Strategic Concept on Tackling Organised Crime,” 648–655Doc. Commission on Organized Crime (1983), 19 Computer crime, 35, 226–227 computer intrusion, 226–227 intellectual property theft, 226–227 Internet-based fraud, 242 See also Internet extortion Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (1996), 290

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Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (CHIP) program, 227 Confidence fraud, 242 Confocommercio, 277 Congo, 56, 58, 64 Conklin, John, 18 Conspiracy theory, 38 Consumer-driven crimes (drugs [illegal], gambling, and prostitution), 173– 177 as deviant behaviors, 174–176 and social harms, 176 typologies of, 173 as victimless crimes, 173–174 Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), 146 Contraband smuggling, 159–160 Contract killing, 210–212 methods of, 211 reasons for, 210–211 Controlled Substances Act (1970), 415 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (1979), 392 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 528–539Doc. Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971), 31 Coordinating Committee for East West Trade Policy (CoCom), 230–231 Coppola, Francis Ford, 26 Copyright infringement, 177–180 See also Movie piracy; Music piracy; Software piracy Corallo, Anthony (“Tony Ducks”), 12 Cornyn, John, 99 Correa, Luiz, 156 Corruption, 362 Corruption Perception Study (Transparency International, 2004), 86 Costa, Antonio Maria, 436 (photo) Costello, Frank, 11 Council of Europe (CoE), 376 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed through Computer Systems (2002), 525–528Doc. Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (2005), 481–483Doc. Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, 393, 764–779Doc. Convention on Cybercrime, 517– 525Doc.

Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, 243, 560– 578Doc. Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 708–716Doc. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (2002), 483–490Doc. Counterfeiting, of consumer products, 160, 181–183, 263–266 audio/video, 263–264 avenues for selling counterfeit products, 183 clothing and accessories, 264 software, 264 Counter-Intelligence Service (KOS) (Yugoslavia), 84, 86 Credit fraud, 228 Cressey, Donald, 15, 19, 46 Crime-terror nexus, 363–370 factors contributing to, 365–366 points of convergence, 368–369 points of divergence, 369–370 Criminal Assets Boards, 148 Criminal intelligence process, 379–381 1. planning, 380 2. data analysis, 380–381 3. data collation/compilation, 380 4. data collection, 380 5. data evaluation, 380 6. dissemination, 381 7. feedback, 381 Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada (CISC), 411–413 and the Automated Criminal Intelligence Information System (ACIIS), 411 intelligence analysis efforts of, 412–413 membership of, 411 staffing of, 412 Criminal opportunity structure, 300 Crips, 458 Croatia, 80, 82, 84 Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ-BH), 84, 86, 87 CSO Glossary, 261 Cuba, 95, 367 Cushman, J. H., 31 Cutolo, Raffaele, 463 Cybercrimes. See Computer crime Cyprus, 151, 164 Da Costa, Luiz Fernando, 304 Dabney, Dean, 173 Dalitz, Morris, 200 Daly, Sara, 355 D’Aquila, Salvatore, 11 D’Arco, Alfonse (“Little Al”), 12

Davis, Martin, 202 Dayton Agreement (1995), 79, 80, 82, 85 DeFede, Joe, 12 Degreef, Olivier, 393 (photo) Democratic Republic of the Congo. See Congo Department of Middle Magdalena, 281 Dewey, Thomas, 14, 23 Diamonds (“blood diamonds,” “conflict diamonds”), gemstones, and precious metals, illegal trading in, 63, 204– 206, 347 and the financing of armed conflicts and terrorism, 205 international control measures against, 205–206 DiBella, Thomas, 12 DID syndrome, 126 DiFillippi, Joseph, 13 DiGregorio, Gaspare, 13 Direct Action Against Drugs (DAAD), 146 Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (DIA), 361, 413–414 cooperation of with the courts, 413–414 international work of, 414 investigative duties of, 413 structure of, 413 Direzione Nazionale Antimafia (DNA), 414 Diversion Control Program (1971), 415 Domash, Shelly Feuer, 126 Dominica, 95 Dominican Republic, 94, 95 See also Drug cartels, Dominican Donnie Brasco, 216 Dorfman, Allen, 201, 202 Dorman, Paul, 200 Dotter, Daniel, 175–176 Dragon Syndicates. See Triads Dragon Syndicates, The (Booth), 456–457 Drake, Francis, 6 Drug abuse cost of treatment for, 337 and mental disorders, 337 negative health impact of, 336–337 Drug cartels, xv, 184–189 Colombian, 30, 42, 116, 134, 139, 153, 155, 184–187, 293, 294, 323, 332, 335, 340, 367, 368, 444, 455–456 Dominican, 188–189 effect of on North America, 138–139 in Latin America, 281–282 Mexican, 30, 97, 139, 185, 187–188, 332–335 Southeast Asian, 189 Drug trafficking, xv, 30–3, 367 and arms trafficking, 321, 339 in Australia, 74–77 in the Caribbean, 93, 97

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in Central America, 97 in the Central Asian Republics (CARs), 104–107 countries involved in, 343 in Eastern Europe, 111–112 in Europe, 116 as funding source for regional militant groups and terrorists, 335–336 international initiatives dealing with, 394–398 in Latin America, xvi—xvii, 96–97 links to terrorists, 339 methods of transportation, 157–158 in Mexico, 97 in North Korea, 76 (photo), 142–143 (photo) in Northern Ireland, 145–148 primary drug-producing countries, 339– 340 “problem drugs,” 395 social and economic impact of, 335– 338 in South America (Andean region), 318–312 terrorist organizations involved in, 339, 343, 365 and transnational alliances, 293–294 in Turkey, 163 and violence, 338–341 and the Yakuza, 131 See also Global cocaine trade; Global opium trade; Narcoterrorism Drummond, João Baptista Vianna, 89, 90 Dudayev, Dzhokhar, 352 East Asia, transnational organized crime in, 57–58 See also specific East Asian countries East European-based criminal groups, 457 Eastern and Southern Africa anti-moneylaundering (AML) groups, 248 Eastern Europe collapse of socialism in, 113–114 drug trafficking in, 111–112, 324 fight against transnational organized crime in, 112–113 and the global sex industry, 306 Russian organized criminal groups in, 151 the term “Eastern Europe,” 110 transnational organized crime in, xvi, 1, 110–113 See also specific Eastern European countries Eastman, Monk, 15 Eboli, Tommy, 11 Economic espionage, 229–233 compared to political and military espionage, 229–230

historical examples of, 230 historical overview of, 230–231 and information warfare, 232 and the nonproliferation problem, 231– 232 and the plagiarism of technology, 232 Ecuador, 2, 63 Edelbacher, Maximilian, 39 Egmont Group, 233–234, 378, 378–379, 379 main operative instruments, 233–234 “Principles of Information Exchange between Financial Intelligence Units from Money Laundering Cases,” 233–234 Eichmann, Adolf, 386 (photo) Einstein, S., 34 El Salvador, 124 ElBaradei, Mohamed, 423 Electronic Funds Transfer Act (1978), 252 Emerging organized crime hypotheses, 18– 20 Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 201 Environmental crime, 284–286 Environmental Impact Management Agency, 286 Eppolito, Louis, 171–172 Escobar, Pablo, 153, 154 (photo), 185, 186, 281, 456 Estrada, Joseph, 460 ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna), 100–102, 148 Ethnic stereotyping, 20–22 Europe arms trafficking in, 117 consumer demand for cocaine in, 325 drug trafficking in, 116, 324 fight against transnational organized crime in, 118–120 human trafficking in, 118 illegal immigration to, 117–118 money laundering in, 117 transnational organized crime in, 58, 113–120, 307 vehicle trafficking in, 116–117 See also Eastern Europe; Western Europe; specific European countries European Bank of Antigua, 247, 251 European Committee on Crime Problems (ECCP), 376 European Communities Study Association, 382–383 European Convention on Extradition (1957), 376 European Convention on Human Rights (1950), 385 European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments (1970), 376

European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959), 376 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 376 European Police College, 120 European Police Office. See Europol European Union (EU), 58, 82, 83, 84, 110, 116, 119 (photo), 209, 225, 243, 295, 330, 376, 384, 387, 392, 395 Ad Hoc Group on Organized Crime, 118–119 CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization) program, 82 and the consistency of border security across Europe, 118 Council Decision of 22 December 2004 on Tackling Vehicle Crime with Cross-Border Implications, 599– 602Doc. Directive on the Prevention of the Use of Financial Systems for the Purpose of Money Laundering, 243–244 and the fight against transnational organized crime, 118–120 Justice and Home Affairs Council, 119 member states of, 114 membership criteria of, 118 and opportunities for transnational organized crime, 114–115, 151 Provisional Judicial Cooperation Unit, 383 and the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), 82 European Union—Russian Action Plan (2000), 118 Eurojust, 376, 383 Europol, 49, 58, 119–120, 361, 376, 383, 384, 416–418, 442 2005 Europol Convention, 417 Europol 155 (European Commission), 163 Evola, Natale, 13 Exchange and Investment Bank of Geneva, 251 Extortion, 289 in South America, 160 See also Internet extortion Extradition, 385–386 and the aut dedere, aut judicare principle, 385 Farah, D., 64 Farer, T., 31, 42 Farias, Paulo César, 134 Farrar, J., 97

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Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 2, 10, 24, 43, 45, 125, 138, 139, 150, 151, 172, 174, 212, 225, 244, 346, 418–420, 423 criteria for fighting against transnational organized crime, 126–127 Financial Crime Section, Money Laundering Unit, 244 history of, 418 impact of on La Cosa Nostra, 13 international work of, 297–298 mission of, 127 Organized Crime Program, 419–420 and RICO, 217 Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR), 339 Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), 415 Federal Revenue Secretariat (Brazil), 182 Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 238 Bureau of Consumer Protection, 238 Operation Cure All, 238 Felson, Marcus, 300 File Guidelines (Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit), 380 Film Asian organized crime films, 28 British organized crime films, 27 French organized crime films, 27–28 Italian organized crime films, 28 modern American organized crime films, 26–27 origin of organized crime films, 25–26 See also specific films Financial Action Task Force (FATF), xviii, 234, 243, 247, 254, 256, 378, 379, 382, 408 2004 report of, 256, 257 “Forty Recommendations” (on money laundering) (1990; rev. 1996, 2003), 234–236, 584–595Doc. “Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing” (2001), 236, 347–348, 595–599Doc. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), 256, 260, 349, 377, 378, 379, 420–421 Financial institution fraud, 241, 271–273 desperate dealing, 271 embezzlement, 272 forgery, 271–272 Financial intelligence units (FIUs), 233, 244, 377–379 concept and mission of, 378–379 countries with FIUs, 379 information collection and analysis, 379 Finckenauer, J. O., 20 Fitzsimmons, Frank, 202 Foundation to Aid Muslims in Bosnia, 87– 88

France, 58, 231 Francisco, Manuel, 460 Fraud, 240–242, 260, 270 See also specific types of fraud Fraudnet, 271 French Connection, 139 Fu-chu, Lo, 467 Fuentes, Amado Carillo, 462 Fujimore, Alberto, 134 Fuk Ching, 316, 457 Fuqua, Antoine, 27 G7, 234, 243, 376 G8 Expert Working Group, 414 Gabbard, Glen, 29 Gacha, Jose, 153, 185 Gaglioni, Gaetano, 12 Gaines, Larry, 18 Galante, Carmine, 13 Gallardo, Miguel Angel Felix, 333 Gallo, “Crazy” Joey, 11, 12 Gallo, Larry, 11 Gambino, Carlo, 11, 12, 198 Gambling, 16, 192–194, 202–203 bookmaking, 193–194, 202 Internet gambling, 192, 203 legal gambling, 192 playing the numbers, 192–193, 202 sports gambling, 202–203 Gaming fraud, 241 Ganczarski, Christian, 368 Garcia-Abrego, Juan, 334 Garduna, 8 Garrison, Jim, 24 Gaydamak, Arkadi, 245 (photo) General Framework Agreement for Peace. See Dayton Agreement Genovese, Vito, 11, 12 (photo), 198 Georgian Mafiya, 458 German Red Army Faction, 366 Germany, 1, 116, 151, 164 Ghana, 165 Giancana, Sam, 200 Gibraltar, 249 Gigante, Vincent (“Chin”), 11, 11–12, 17 Giuliani, Rudolph, 23, 24 Gjoni, Illir, 125 Glaser, Daniel, 250 (photo) Global Coalition for Africa, Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries, 498–500Doc. Global cocaine trade, 322–327 consumer demand for cocaine, 325–327 the manufacture of cocaine, 322–323 and organized criminal and extreme groups, 323–324 worldwide trafficking trends, 324–325 Global Congress/World Customs Organization Regional Forum on

Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (2004), 548–552Doc. Global financial system, 246 Global opium trade, 327–332 and Colombia, 331 and the Golden Crescent, 329–330 and the Golden Triangle, 184, 329 manufacturing of opium and heroin, 327–329 and Mexico, 330–331 opiate use in Asia, 328 opiate use in Europe, 328 worldwide trends in, 331 Global Programme against Money Laundering, 248 Globalization, 81, 295 and the crime-terror nexus, 365–366 and national states, 134–136, 358–359 Godfather films, 26 Godfather, The (film—1972), 22, 23 (photo), 26 Godfather, The (novel—Puzo), 22 Godson, R., 30 Golden Crescent, 76 Golden Dragon Massacre, 455 Golden Triangle, 76 Golden Venture incident, 316 Goodfellas, 22 Gore, Al, 281 Gottfredson, Michael, 37 Gotti, John, 11, 17 Gotti, John, Jr. (“The Dapper Don”), 11, 17, 41 (photo) Gray, Jim (“Doris Day”), 147 Great Britain. See United Kingdom Greece, 310, 390 Green, N., 143 Grenada, 95 Grey Wolves, 163 Griffin, Sean Patrick, 20 Griffith, D. W., 25 Grokster, 178 Grotius, Hugo, 358 Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), 376 Guadeloupe, 95 Guler, Muammer, 164 (photo) Guzman-Loera, Arturo, 334 Guzman-Loera, Joaquin, 334 HadDoc.k, Mark, 147 Hagan, Frank, 19 Hagar, 108 Haiti, 94, 95, 158 Haller, Mark, 16 Hamas, 161, 346, 367 Hannan, L., 61 Harrison, Shaun, 291 (photo) Hawaii, 131

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Hawkins, John, 6 Hays Code, 25–26 Hazardous and toxic waste disposal. See Environmental crime He, Arming, 317 (photo) Health care fraud, 237–239 attempts to control, 237–239 types of, 237 Hebborn, Eric, 224 Hells Angels, 138, 141, 212, 213–214 Hennessey, David, 21 Herbert, Asbury, 39 Hercegovacka Bank, 87 Hermann, M., 152 Herrera-Buitrago, “Pacho,” 186 Heung, Charles, 465 Hezbollah, xv, 58, 64, 161, 205, 257, 346, 347, 366, 367, 370 Hirschi, Travis, 37 HIV/AIDS, 197, 336–337 and child sex trafficking in Cambodia, 108 Hobbs, D., 373 Hoffa, Jimmy, 200–201, 201 (photo) Hoffa, Jimmy, Jr., 202 Holocaust, 55 Holy Land Foundation, 258 (photo) Homeland Security Act (2002), 442 Honduras, 124 Hong Kong, 67, 68, 264, 277 Hong Men. See Triads Hoover, J. Edgar, 24, 217, 218 (photo), 418 Hoover, Larry, 453 Hoxha, Enver, 449–450 Hughes, Bill, 434 Human/body part trafficking and smuggling, 33–34, 40, 107, 206–210, 219–222, 259–260, 305–309, 453– 454 in Australia, 77–78 in the Caribbean, 94 child sex trafficking in Cambodia, 107– 110 control of victims, 220 and coyotes, 98–99 and demand, 219 the distinction between smuggling and trafficking, 97–98, 207, 309–310, 314, 388 in East Africa, 61 in Europe, 117–118 and the exploitation of children, 308 harboring of victims, 208 and human rights abuses, 308–309 and impunity of traffickers, 219 international attempts to curtail, 209, 391–394 in Latin America, 97–100

the limitations of official statistics on, 387–391 magnitude of, 207 in Mexico, 98–99 push and pull factors, 219 receipt of victims, 208 recruitment of victims, 208, 220 relationship between trafficking and other illegal activities and trades, 222 role of government and law enforcement in, 306 roles of traffickers, 220 by the Snakeheads, 314–317 trafficking of human organs, 34, 221– 222, 309 trafficking of women and children for prostitution, 195–196 transferring of victims, 208 transportation of victims, 208, 220 UN definition of, 207 in West Africa, 165–167, 166 (photo) See also Maritime smuggling of migrants; West Africa, child trafficking in Hungary, 117 Hunt, Scott, 300 Hussein, Saddam, xiv palace of in Tikrit, Iraq, xiv (photo) Ianni, Francis, 275 ICN Pharmaceutical, 238 Identity theft, 40–41, 228, 240 methods of, 40 Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act (1998), 240 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (1996), 444 ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (1999), 392 Immigration illegal immigration to Europe, 117–118 illegal immigration to the United States, xvii Latino immigration to the United States, 120–121 Inciardi, James, 18 Independent Monitoring Commission, 148 India, 271, 272–273, 307, 446 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (1988), 192 Informal value transfer system (IVTS) (hawala, hundi, or fei ch’ien), 257– 258, 346, 364 Inquisition, the, 4, 8 Institute for National Strategic Studies, 153, 158 Institutional Republican Party (PRI), 133 Insurance fraud, 228, 241 Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC), 408

Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 190, 191, 201, 254, 255, 269 International Agreement for the Suppression of the “White Slave” Traffic (1904), 391 International Alliance of Theatrical, Stage Employees, and Motion Picture Operators (IATSE), 199 International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC), 160, 271, 422–423 2005 White Paper, 423 current efforts of, 422–423 mandate of, 422 International Association of Penal Law, 49 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 423–424 Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Material Database (2005), 423–424 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, Stablemen, and Helpers of America. See Teamsters International business corporation (IBC), 247, 249, 269–270 International Crime Threat Assessment (2000), xviii—xix International Criminal Court (ICC), xviii, 425 (photo), 424–427 advisory opinions of, 426–427 composition of, 425 functions of, 425 jurisdiction of, 426 procedure of, 426 sources of applicable law, 426 International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC), 427 International Criminal Police Organization. See Interpol International Intellectual Property Alliance, 160, 227 International Labour Organization (ILO), 167, 392 International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs), 428–430 International Curriculum Committee, 429 programs offered at, 429 International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA), 16, 17, 198 International Mafia, 156 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 246 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (U.S. Department of State), 84–85, 93, 156, 256, 260 International Organization for Migration, 94 International Organized Crime Center (IOCC), 383–384

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International Training Course (ITC) on Transnational Crime, 156 Internet extortion, 289–292 characteristics of, 290 regulation and enforcement policies, 290–292 types of, 289–290 Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC), 228, 242 Interpol, xviii, 43, 45, 111, 116, 156, 244, 427(photo), 343, 361, 383, 427–428, 442 functions of, 427–428 historical overview of, 427 I-24/7 system of, 428 responsibilities of, 427–428 structure of, 427 Investment fraud, 241–242 Ponzi/Pyramid schemes, 241–242 Iran, 88, 231, 424 Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law (1989), 623– 630Doc. Iran-Contra affair, 32, 305 Iraq, 224, 231, 232 Iraq National Museum, 437 Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), 146, 147 (photo) Irish People’s Liberation Organization (IPLO), 146 Irish Republican Army (IRA), xv, 101, 154, 323, 366. See also Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA); Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum, 223 Islamic Jihad, 367 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), 104, 105, 107, 366, 367 Israel, 307 Italy, 281, 381 Izetbegovic, Alija, 87 Jabalon, Diego (“Tata”), 460 Jamaica, xvii, 93, 95 James, Jesse, 46 Jamieson, Alison, 444 Japan, xvi, 68–69, 138, 196, 325, 381, 446 See also Yakuza Jelavic, Nikica, 81 (photo) Jenkins, Philip, 19 Jersey, 249 jogo do bicho (animal game), 88–93, 134 Johnson, Jerome, 12 Johnston, David Cay, 253–254, 255 Joint Investigation Teams, 383 Joossens, L., 374 Kai-shek, Chiang, 466 Karadzic, Radovan, 86 Karimov, Islam, 106–107

KaZaA, 178 Kazakhstan, 105 Kefauver, Estes, 22, 53 Kefauver Committee (1951), 15, 19, 22, 53, 136, 275 Kennedy, John F., 23, 24 assassination of, 24 Kennedy, Joseph P., 24 Kennedy, Robert F., 23, 24, 201 Kenney, D. J., 20 Kenya, 60, 61, 65 Kerry, John, 248 (photo) Khalil Kharfan Organization, 459 Khmer Rouge, 453 Kholodov, Dmitri, 313 Kidd, William, 6, 6 (photo) Kim, Jong-Il, 142, 144 Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), 205–206 King, Rodney, 172 Kingston Declaration (1992), 408 Kinji, Fukasaku, 28 Kitano, “Beat” Takeshi, 28 Knox, George, 275 Kodama, Yoshio, 129–130, 130 Kokang Chinese, 70 Kontraobavesajna Sluzba (KOS), 80 Korb, Larry, 127 Kosovo, 79, 80, 81, 265 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 304, 368 Kosovo War (1999), 79 Kuhn, Thomas S., 39 Kuratong Balaleng, 459–460 Kwok, Ben, 405 (photo) Kyrgyzstan, 105–106 La Cosa Nostra, xvii, 2, 10–14, 14–20, 136–137, 277 Bono family, 13 and the Castellammarese war, 11 Colombo family, 12–13 and the Commission case, 17 criminal activities of, 16–17 Gambino family, 11 Genovese family, 11–12 government and law enforcement efforts against, 17 Luchese family, 12 Murder, Inc. hit squad, 111 organizational structure of, 15–16 and outlaw motorcycle gangs, 213 and the Pizza Connection case, 17 as a prototype for organized crime development, 10–12 Labor racketeering, 197–202 impact of on trade and labor unions, 198–200 other industries vulnerable to, 200–201

LaBruzzo, Frank, 13 Lagos, 62 Land, Kenneth, 300 Lander, Stephen, 434 Lansky, Meyer, 15, 198 Lanza, Joseph (“Socks”), 198–199 Laos, 189 Larocca, Joseph, 262–263 Latin America drug trafficking in, 96–97 human smuggling and trafficking in, 97– 100 illicit sex trade in, 97–100 relationship between politics and transnational organized crime in, 132–136 terrorism in, 100–102 transnational organized crime in, xvi— xvii, 2, 96–102, 98 (photo), 282–283 See also Military dictatorships, in Latin America Latino gangs (U.S.), 460 Central American Latino gangs immigrating to the United States, 123–124 gang nations, 121–122 major syndicates, 460 prison gangs, 122–123, 458 street gangs, 120–122, 458 Leading Edge 2007 exercise, 33 (photo) League of Nations, 391, 435 Lebanon, 181, 367 Lebed, Alexander, 282, 353 Lee, R. W., 32, 280, 281, 282, 283 Lee, Rensselaer, 352–353, 355 Lee, Spike, 27 Legal businesses, infiltration of, 35, 277– 280 consequences of, 278–279 methods of, 277 reasons for, 277 typology of, 277–278 See also Money laundering Lehder, Carlos, 185–186 Leutar, Jozo, 87 Lewis, Denny, 200 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 365, 367 Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 156, 366–367 Libya, 231, 232 Little Caesar, 26, 216 Liu, Henry, 466 Loan-sharking, 203–202 Local Connection, 161 Lockwood Commission, 200 Logan, Bey, 28 Lombardo, Joey, 202 Lombardo, Robert, 20

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Lombroso, Cesare, 36–37, 36 (illustration), 173 Longworth, R. C., 78 Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 61, 368 Love, William, 284 Love Canal, New York, 284, 285 (photo) Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), 145, 147 Luchese, Gaetano (“Thomas”), 12 Luciano, Charles (“Lucky”), 11, 13, 14, 15, 198, 199, 462 Lunev, Stanislav, 354 Lusaka Agreement Task Force (LATF), 65 Luxembourg, 117, 249 M-19, 368 Maas, Peter, 31 Macedonia, 79, 81, 82 Macedonian Crisis (2001), 79 MacGregor, Robert Roy (“Rob Roy,” “Red MacGregor”), 4, 5 (photo) MacKenzie, S., 373 Mafia defining features of as a structured gang, 54 definition of in the Italian Penal Code, 133 traditional model of, 292 See also La Cosa Nostra; Mexican Mafia; Russian Mayifa; Sicilian Mafia; Turkish Mafia Magalhães, Felipe Santos, 91 Magliocco, Joseph, 12 Mali, 165, 223 Malina Organizatsia, 460–461 Maltz, Michael, 46 Mangano, Vincent, 11 Manhattan Project, 230 Manhunt (Maas), 31 Manila Declaration, 443 Mann Act (1910), 33 Mara 18 (18th Street gang), 124 Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13), 122 (photo), 124, 126 Maranzano, Salvatore, 13 Marcello, Carlos, 24 Marielito gangs, 461 Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (1972), 286 Maritime smuggling of migrants, 309–312 major routes of, 310–311 modus operandi of, 311–312 push, pull, and facilitating factors, 310 Markets, legal and illegal, 214–216 Marohombsar, Faisal, 464 Martin, J., 31, 31–32 Martinique, 95 Mart’nez, L., 261 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 51

Masseria, Giuseppe (“Joe the Boss”), 11 Massino, Joey, 13 McClellan, John, 22 McClellan Committee (1963), 15, 19, 22, 24, 201 McCord, Raymond, 147 McDonald Commission, 406 McIllwain, Jeffrey Scott, 20, 73 Mean Streets, 26–27 Media Watch, 61 Mello, Marcelo Pereira de, 91 Melville, Jean-Pierre, 28 Menem, Carlos, 134, 135 (photo) Mercosur, 157 Merton, R., 36, 37 Metropolitan Restaurant and Cafeteria Association, 200 Mexican Federation, 139, 461–462 Mexican Mafia, 123 Mexico, 133, 280 drug trafficking in, xvii, 97, 323–324, 330–331, 367 ETA in, 101 human trafficking and smuggling in, 98– 99 transnational organized crime in, xvii, 2, 58–59, 181 See also Drug cartels, Mexican Meza, Garcia, 133 Middle East, transnational organized crime in, 58, 261 See also specific Middle Eastern countries Military dictatorships, in Latin America, 132–133 Milken, Michael, 266 Miller, Roger, 18 Milosevic, Slobodan, 80–81, 82, 84, 86 Mir, Hamid, 354–355 Miranda, Mike, 11 Mirzoyev, Ghaffor, 106 Mladic, Ratko, 86 Mollen Commission, 171 Mondelli, Saverio, 291 (photo) Money laundering, xv, xvii—xviii, 34–35, 183, 243, 256–260, 278 in the Caribbean, 93 current trends in, 259–260 effects of, 247 in Europe, 117 and global drug markets, 34 global efforts to combat, 233–237 and the global financial system, 246– 248 law enforcement issues regarding, 243– 246 major money-laundering countries, 260 among Mercosur member countries, 157

methods of, 259 smurfing, 252 in South America, 160 stages/phases of (placement, layering, and integration), 243, 251–253, 256 systems and instruments of, 256–259 in Turkey, 163–164 Montenegro, 82 Montserrat, 95 Monzini, P., 220–221 Mooney, Micky, 146 Moors, C., 34 Moran, Bugs, 450 Moran, Nathan, 47 Morgan, Henry, 6 Morgan, J. P., 267 (caricature) Morgenthau, Henry, Jr., 254 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), 264 Motion Picture Association (MPA)/Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) anti-piracy program, 227 Motor fuel fraud, 190–191 bootlegging, 190, 191 cocktailing, 190 cross-border activity, 191 daisy chaining, 190 major fraud schemes, 190–191 Mouzos, Jenny, 210, 211 Movie piracy, 179 Internet piracy, 179 piracy in hard goods, 179 Mozambique, 64 Mueller, G. O. W., 30, 32, 34, 35 “Multi-track Microproliferation” (Cameron), 351–352 Murray, Joseph, 365 Music piracy, 177–178 bootlegs, 178 counterfeits, 178 simple piracy, 177–178 top ten countries failing to protect and enforce music copyrights, 178 Musketeers of Pig Alley, The, 25 Mussolini, Benito, 10 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs), xviii, 243, 249, 291, 386–387 MVP Sportsbook website, 290 Myanmar, 70, 282, 303, 329, 369 Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), 70 Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime, 375 Napolitano, Dominick (“Sonny Black”), 13 Narcoterrorism, 342, 367

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NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System), 268 Nash, Jere, 202 Nation-states and the sovereignty crisis, 358–359 taxonomy of vulnerability to criminalization, 363 National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), 239 National Council Against Health Fraud (NCAHF), 239 National Crime Authority (NCA), 430– 431 corporate structure of, 430 investigative powers of, 430–431 operations of, 431 National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), 431–432 National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), 120 National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association (NHCAA), 237 National Integrity Systems Study (Transparency International, 2004), 86 National Intelligence Council (NIC), 355– 356 National Intelligence Model, 432 National Islamic Front (NIF), 87 National Liberation Army (ELN), 101 National Quotation Bureau, 267 National Retail Federation (NRF), 262– 263 National Security Act (1947), 409–410 National Security Service (SNS) (Bosnian Croats), 87 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 368 National Youth Gang Survey (1996), 460 Navassa Island, 95 Naylor, R. Thomas, 169 Naylor, T., 373 Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 105 ‘Ndrangheta, xvi, 1, 9, 163, 360, 462 etymology of the name, 9, 462 Neo-Nazis, 54 Ness, Eliot, 29 (photo) Netherlands, 116, 324 Netherlands Antilles, 95, 254 New Jack City, 27 New Orleans, Louisiana, 288 New Orleans dockworkers dispute (1890), 21 New York State Crime Commission, 198 New York State Organized Crime Task Force, 200

New York State Waterfront Commission, 198 New Zealand, 3, 271 Nicaragua, 100 the “Taller Santa Rosa Arsenal” in, 100 Niger, 65 Nigeria, 2, 56, 61–63, 324 and drug trafficking, 62–63, 335–336 and vehicle theft and trafficking, 180– 181 Nigerian criminal organizations, 31, 56, 61–63, 139, 463 types of organizational structure, 62 Nitti, Frank, 199 Nixon, Richard, 415–416 Niyazov, Saparmurat, 106 Nonprofit organizations (NGOs), 257 Nonstate actors, 358, 359–360 Noriega, Manuel, 415 (photo) North America African-based groups in, 139 Asian gangs in, 138 consumer demand for cocaine in, 325 drug trafficking in, 324 heroin use in, 328 Jamaican gangs (posses) in, 140 transnational organized crime in, 136– 142, 307–308 See also Canada; United States North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1993), 295–296 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 86, 452 North Korea, 423–424 drug trafficking in, 142–145 Northern Ireland, 265 drug trafficking in, 145–148 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (1969), 423 Nugan Hand Bank, 247, 251 O’Bannion, Dion, 450 Observatoire Geopolitique des Drouges, 367 Occidental Chemical Company, 284 Ocean Dumping Act. See Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act Ochoa, Fabio, 153, 185, 186, 187 Ochoa, Jorge Luis, 153, 185, 186, 187 Ochoa, Juan David, 153, 185, 186, 187 Octopus Project, 376 Odessa Mafiya, 1, 150, 463 O’Dwyer, William, 14–15 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), 393 Office of Foreign Asset Control, 346, 349 Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 409

Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI), 420–421 Olson, W. J., 30 Omara, Mullah Mohammed, 367 Omega 7, 365, 370 Open Society Institute, 396 Operation United Eagles, 333–334 Opium War (1840), 299–300 Orejuela, Gilberto Rodriguez, 282 Orena, Vic, 13 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 376–377 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 377, 393 OSCE Guidelines, 393 Organization of American States (OAS), 377 Inter-American Convention against Corruption (1996), 377, 490– 498Doc. Resolution to Check Money Laundering (1996), 578–579Doc. Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Convention on Combating International Terrorism (1999), 717– 727Doc. Organized crime, 4–5, 13, 59 application of generic conceptualizations of to specific national circumstances, 47–51 and the ascension of U.S. political figures, 22–24 causation theories and concepts of organized criminal behavior, 35–38 characteristics and operational tactics of, 39–42 coalition theories of, 38 and conspiracy theory, 38 control theories of, 37 definition of, 10, 18–19, 43–47, 48, 125, 169, 275 and economic harm, 49–50 ethnic group involvement in, 18–20 film and television portrayal of, 25–29 international action against, 48 low social control theories of, 37 parasitic organized crime, 36 predatory organized crime, 35–36 regional profiles, 56–59 (see also specific regions) in the Renaissance and early modern period, 4–10 social disorganization theory of, 37 subcultural theories of, 37 symbiotic organized crime, 36 typology of, 279–280 universalizing the threat assessment of, 48–49

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worldwide impact of, 275–276 See also La Cosa Nostra; Organized crime groups; Transnational organized crime Organized Crime Agency of British Columbia, 141 Organized Crime Control Act (1970), 216 See also Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute Organized crime groups, xiv—xv,, 42, 360 approaches to the study of, 51–52 corporate gangs, 275 definition of, 133, 360, 443–444 economic benefits of, 54 features of, 54 as “prospering,” 128 strategic alliances between, 292–294 structure and functional organization of organized criminal groups, 51–53 structured gangs, defining features of, 54 supergangs, 275 traditional and nontraditional organized crime groups, 53–55 typologies of criminal groups’ functional establishment, 53 typologies of criminal groups’ structure, 52–53 typologies of nontraditional organized crime groups, 54–55 Organized Crime Impact Study (1998), 140 Organized crime studies, agenda for future research, 443–44 Organized Crime Task Force, 43, 44–45, 148 Organized retail theft rings, 260–263 economic impact of, 262–263 and retail victimization, 263 Osama’s Revenge (P. L. Williams), 354 Oswald, Lee Harvey, 24 Outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs), xvii, 2, 137–138, 141, 211–214 criminal activity of, 213–214 organizational structure of, 212–213 See also Bandidos; Hells Angels; Outlaws Outlaws, 214 Oviedo, Lino César, 160 Owens, Kim, 378 (photo) Padilla, Jose (the “Dirty Bomber”), 368 Pakistan, 63, 223, 423, 446–447 Palermo Convention (2000), xviii, 48, 108, 119, 120, 209, 234, 360, 376, 382, 392, 398–403, 682–792Doc. content of the convention, 401–402 content of the protocols, 402–403

historical background, 400 relationship between the convention and protocols, 402 status of the treaties, 400–401 Panama, 2, 254, 367 Paraguay, 133, 134, 135, 160 Parekh, Ketan, 272 (photo) Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK), 163, 366 Pastrana, Andres, 281 Patino-Fomeque, Victor Julio, 186, 187 Patterns of Global Terrorism (U.S. Department of State), 161 PBS Frontline, 153 Pearson, G., 373 Pennsylvania Crime Commission, 19, 38, 137 Pentagon group, 463–464 People Against Pablo Escobar (PEPES), 153 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 465 People’s Republic of China (PRC). See China Perez, Carlos Andrés, 134 Permanent Court of International Justice, 424 Persico, Carmine (“Junior”), 13 Peru, xvi, 59, 133, 155, 282 drug trafficking in, 318–322 See also Global cocaine trade Philippines, 70, 459–460 Ping, Cheng Chui (“Mother of All Snakeheads”), 452, 457 Pinochet, Augusto, 424 Piper, S., 211 Piracy and privateering, 4, 5–6, 20, 34 amateur piracy, 302 ideological piracy, 302 organized crime group—directed piracy, 302 piracy in the Malacca Strait and South China Sea, 299–303 sovereignty-motivated piracy, 302 state agent—involved piracy, 302 terrorist-involved piracy, 302 types of Renaissance-era pirates, 5–6 See also specific types of piracy Pistone, Joseph D. (Donnie Brasco), 13, 217 Plan Colombia, 395 Poland, 112, 116 Police officials, bribery and corruption of, 171–173 in Los Angeles, 172 in New Orleans, 172 in New York City, 171–172 Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), 145 Political-criminal nexus, xiii—xiv, 135–136

Pong Su incident, 143, 144 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 367 Portugal, 58 Potter, Gary, 19 President’s Commission on Organized Crime (1986), 138 Presser, Jackie, 202 Pressler, Margaret Webb, 261 Primeiro Comando da Capital, 135 Profaci, Joe, 12 Prohibition, 10, 15, 16, 21–22, 136, 192, 371, 418 Protection Act (2003), 109 Provenzano, Bernardo (“Boss of Bosses”), 456 Provenzano, Anthony, 200, 202 Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), 145, 146, 148, 365 Public Expenditure and Institution Review (World Bank, 2002), 85 Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), 406 Puerto Rico, xvii, 95 Putin, Vladimir, 313 Puzo, Mario, 22 Quackwatch, 239 Quintero, Miguel Caro, 461 Quintero, Rafael, 461 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute (1970), 15, 24, 202, 216–219, 419, 655– 666Doc. history of, 216–217 and the Mafia, 217 new uses for, 217–218 Racketeering, 16, 137, 216 See also Labor Racketeering Ramos, Carlos, 92 (photo) RAND, 355 Rastelli, Phillip (“Rusty”), 13, 217 Ravna Gora, 309 Raw, M., 374 Reagan, Ronald, 32, 305 Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), 146 Recording Industry Association of America website, 289–290 Red Hand Commandos (RHC), 147 Red Scare, 230 Reid, Richard (the “Shoe Bomber”), 368 Reina, Gaetano, 12 Republic of Korea. See South Korea Retail Industry Blog, 262 Reuter, Peter, 277 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), xv, 101, 148, 154–155, 304, 318, 321, 323, 335, 365, 366, 367

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Revolutionary United Front (RYF), 368 Rey, G. M., 215 Richie, Donald, 28 Riina, Salvatore, xvi Robert, Pierre Richard, 368 Rodrigues, V., 156 Rodriguez-Orejuela, Gilberto, 186 Rodriguez-Orejuela, Miguel, 186 Romano, A., 31, 31–32 Rondan Doyukai Company, 138 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 409 Rosen, P., 406 Rosenberg, Ethel, 231 (photo) Rosenberg, Julius, 231 (photo) Rosenstein, Ze-ev (“Wolf”), 450 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 141 Rubington, Earl, 174 Ruby, Jack, 24 Ruggiero, Benjamin (“Lefty Guns”), 13, 216, 217 Rush, G. E., 45 Russia, xvi, 58, 277, 280, 281, 282, 283, 369 the Russian military and organized crime, 313–314 tracking of nuclear and fissile material in, 32 See also specific Russian regions Russian Mafiya, xv, xvi, 1, 70, 118, 138, 148–152, 265, 281, 294, 307, 309, 313, 457, 464 in Asia, 151 in the Caribbean and Latin America, 151–152 in Colombia, 154 in Europe, 150–151 international reach of, 149–150 Solntsevskaya network of, 1, 150 in the United States, 150 Russo, Andrew, 13 Ryan, P. J., 45 Saakashvili, Mikhail, 458 SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution (2002), 393 Sacra Corona Unita (SCU), 163, 361, 464– 465 Saietta, Ignazio, 15 Saint Kitts and Nevis, 95 Saint Lucia, 95 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 96 Salerno, Anthony (“Fat Tony”), 11, 217 Salinas, Carols, 134 Samper, Ernesto, 281 Sampson, A., 31 Santacruz-Londono, Jose, 186 Santos, Nelson Pereira dos, 91

Satanic churches, 54 Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree, the Law of Combating Money Laundering (2003), 579–584Doc. Sayyaf, Abu, 463 Scalise, Frank, 11 Scarface, 27 Schaeffer Library of Drug Policy, 153 Schalck-Golodkowski case, 231 Schengen Agreement (1985), 58, 114 Schengen Convention (1990), 387 Scheper-Hughes, N., 222 Schiro, Cola, 13 Schultz, Dutch, 23, 199–200 Schur, Edwin, 174, 175 Sciacca, Paul, 13 Scorsese, Martin, 26, 27 Second World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children. See Yokohama Congress Securities Exchange Act (1934), 228 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 228, 238, 266 Securities fraud, 228, 266 insider trading, 228, 266 market manipulation, 228, 266–268 Security InfoWatch, 261 Serb Democratic Party (SDS), 84, 86 Serbia, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84 Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), 432–433, 433–435 as the “British FBI,” 434 Sex trade, 16–17, 194–197, 275–276, 306– 308 global pornography, 196–197 health risks of, 107 industrialization of, 194–195 sex tourism, 131, 195, 308 trafficking of women and children for prostitution, 195–196 and the Yakuza, 130–131 Shan United Army (SUA), 329 Shapiro, Jacob, 198 Sharipov, Humdin, 106 Shea, Cornelius P., 200 Shelley, L., 49 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 458 Shikita, M. T., 128 Shower Posse, 140, 459 Shower Posse (Blake), 459 Sicilian Mafia, xv, xvi, 1, 8, 10, 14, 139, 265, 277, 293, 360, 361, 368, 444, 456 in Canada, 141 etymology of the word “mafia,” 8, 10 Mafia leaders under house arrest (1971), 44 (photo) origin of, 8, 10 Siegel, Bugsy, 198 Siegel, Larry J., 10

Siegfried, J., 38 Sierra Leone, 205 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), 31 Single European Market, 114–115 Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), 300 Skinheads, 54, 55 (photo) Slave trade, 7, 33 Slovenia, 80, 82 Smigielski, David, 355 Snakeheads, 57–58, 68, 130, 308 and human migrant smuggling, 314– 317 Society for Threatened Peoples International, 86 (photo) Soering v. UK (1989), 385 Software piracy, 178–179 client-server overuse, 178 end-user piracy, 178 hard-disk loading, 178 Internet privacy, 178 software counterfeiting, 178–179 top ten countries with the highest software piracy rates, 179 Somalia, 60, 61 Sopranos, The, 26, 28–29, 268 South Africa, 2, 63, 64, 324 Proceeds of Crime Act (1996), 666– 674Doc. South African crime groups, 465 South America Andean region of, 318, 322 arms trafficking in, 160–161 consumer demand for cocaine in, 325 contraband smuggling in, 159–160 drug trafficking in, 318–322, 324 extortion in, 160 heroin use in, 328 money laundering in, 160 product piracy in, 160 terrorism in, 161 transnational organized crime in, 59, 152–158, 159–161, 283 Tri-Border Region (TBR) of, 159, 265 See also specific South American countries South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD), 157 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 393 South Korea, 69–70 Spain, 58, 324 Spitzer, Eliot, 237–238 Sri Lanka, 308 Stabilization and Association Agreement (European Union, 2003), 84 Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (1999), 82 Stalin, Josef, 450

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Stanislawski, B., 152 Stanley Foundation report, 127 State Security Service (SDB) (Yugoslavia), 84, 86 “Statement on Principles of Money laundering” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), 243, 244 Steenson, Gerald, 146 Steffensmeier, Darrell, 53 Stolen art and antiquities trade, 223–225 categories of, 223 criminals involved in, 224 and fakes, 224 and forgeries, 224 international legal instruments to counter, 224–225 scope of, 223 Stonich, William, 212 (photo) Sublette, Carey, 351 Sudan, 61 “Suitcase Nukes” (Center for Nonproliferation Studies), 355 Suitcase Nukes Controversy, 353–355 timeline of, 353 (table) Sun Yee On, xvi, 2, 465 Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), 252, 258, 379, 420 Sutherland, Edwin H., 37, 228, 270 Switzerland, 117, 132, 151, 249, 251, 269 Syria, 367 Taiwan, 70, 72, 73 Tajikistan, 103, 106 “Take Charge: Fighting Back against Identity Theft” (Federal Trade Commission), 240 Takenaka, Masahisa, 130 Taliban, 205, 305, 329–330, 336, 367, 368, 370 Tami, Pierre, 108 Tampere European Council, 119 Tanzania, 64 Taoka, Kazuo, 130 Tapia, Eusebio Arzalus (“Paticorto”), 101 Tarantino, Quentin, 27 Task Force to Fight Illicit Trafficking in Cultural Property Stolen in Iraq, 224, 436–438 Task Force on Organised Crime in the Baltic Sea Region, 120 Task Force on Organized Crime (1967), 136 Tax evasion compared to tax avoidance, 269 and offshore tax havens, 253–255 and trust schemes, 269–270 Tchen, John Kuo Wei, 73 Teamsters for a Corruption Free Union, 202

Teamsters Union, 16, 17, 200–202 Television broadcasting of the Kefauver and McClellan committee hearings, 22 representation of organized crime on, 28–29 Teng-kuei, Yang, 467 Terrorism, 55 and drug trafficking as a source of income, 336, 342–345, 364–365 financial networks of, 345–350 funding of, 342–343, 364 in Latin America, 100–102 links to drug trafficking, 339 in South America, 161 See also Crime-terror nexus; specific terrorist organizations Thai, David, 453 Thailand, 63, 70, 195, 196, 307, 308, 329 Theft of the Nation (Cressey), 15, 19, 46 Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), 87– 88 Thompson, David, 27 Thugees, 364 Tiendaomeng crime syndicate, 466–467 Tieri, Frank (“Funzi”), 11 Tito, 80, 84 Tobin, Dan, 200 Tongs. See Triads Torrio, Johnny, 15, 15 (photo) Trade fraud, 270–271 in-bond diversions, 271 Trafficking in Persons Report, 109 Trafficking Victims Protection Act (2000), 209, 384 Training Day, 27 Transnational organized crime, xiii, 360– 361, 441 activities of, 30–35 challenge of to the state, 361–362 characteristics and principles of, 360– 361 concept of, 42–43 economic, political, and social impact of, 280–284 factors conducive to the spread of, 287– 288 global reach of, xvi—xvii impact of on international security, 294–298 impact of on social order and democracy, 286–289 international efforts to combat, xviii, 297–298, 381–385, 441–443 and the need for a multilateral response to, 441–442, 446 and nonstate actors and weak or failed states, 357–363

and political agendas, 280–282 and the political-criminal nexus, xiii— xiv regional profiles of, 56–60 (see also specific regions) the rise of transnational criminal organizations, xiv—xv sources of financing, 169–170 technical and legal issues in combating, 375–377 threats of to institutional stability, 280 See also Arms trafficking; Computer crime; Drug trafficking; Human/body part trafficking; Legal businesses, infiltration of; Money laundering; Piracy and privateering Tramunti, Carmine, 12 Transavia Export Cargo, 368 Transparency International (TI), 86 Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism (1999), 702–708Doc. Treaty on European Union (1993), 114 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 232 Treaty of Westphalia, 358, 359 (illustration) Triads, xv, xvi, 2, 28, 31, 57–58, 67, 68, 115, 116, 277, 292, 294, 307, 308, 309, 315, 329, 335, 455, 458–459, 466 in Canada, 140 Chinese, 59 criminal Triads, 73 historical background of, 71–72 ideology-directed Triads, 73 mutual help-oriented Triads, 72 in North America, 138 revolution-involved Triads, 72–73 and Triadisation, 276 typologies of, 72–73 See also 14K; Sun Yee On; United Bamboo; Wo Group; Yakuza Trinidad and Tobago, 96 Tri-State Joint Soviet Émigré Organised Crime Project, 150 Trivedi, S. P., 221 (photo) Truman, Harry S., 409 Tsang, Donald, 235 (photo) Tse-tung, Mao, 452 Tsuchiya, Shinichi, 128 Tucson Protocol (2002), 206 Tudjman, Franjo, 84, 86 Turbeville, Graham, 100, 101 Turkey drug trafficking in, 163, 324 money laundering and reinvestment in, 163–164 organization of, 162–163 origins of, 162

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Index

Turkey continued transnational organized crime in, 162– 165 Turkish/Kurdish gangs, 162–164, 467 and the Albanian Connection, 163 Turkish Mafia, 467 Turkmenistan, 106 Turks and Caicos, 96 Ugljen, Nedzad, 88 Ukrainian Mafia, 467–468 Ulmer, Jeffrey, 53 Ulster Defense Association (UDA), 145, 146–147 Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), 145, 147 United Bamboo, 466 United Nations (UN), 42, 49, 167, 246, 266, 330, 344, 391, 394, 395, 435, 444 and organized criminals, 60–61 weapons of mass destruction disarmament program of, 232 See also UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); specific conventions, protocols, and resolutions following UN Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP), 444–445 UN Children’s Fund, 70 UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 399–400 UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (1975), 42 UN Convention against Corruption (2003), 399, 500–517Doc. UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988), 31, 234, 243, 247, 375, 630–638Doc. UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. See Palermo Convention UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 345, 384 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation and the Prostitution of Others (1949), 209, 391 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), 108, 209, 392 UN Convention’s Second Optional Protocol, 209 UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program (UNCPCJP), 442 UN Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), 375 UN Environmental Program, 65 UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS), 397

UN International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005), 539–548Doc. UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), 236, 737–745Doc. UN International Drug Programme, 31 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 319, 344, 394, 403, 435– 436 Global Assessment Program, 436 Global Program against Corruption, 435–436 Global Program against Terrorism, 436 Global Program against Trafficking in Human Beings, 394, 435 Global Program against Transnational Crime, 435 Global Program on Organized Crime, 445 Legal Advisory Program, 436 mandate of, 435 UN Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography (2002), 392, 758–764Doc. UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (2001), 376, 401 UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air, Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), 309, 376, 382, 388, 401, 751–758Doc. UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), 165, 207, 209, 219, 376, 382, 388, 392, 401, 745– 751Doc. UN Resolution 1173, 205 UN Resolution 1176, 205 UN Resolution 1306, 205 UN Resolution 1373, 342 UN Transnational Organized Crime Assessment Survey, 445 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of an Armed Conflict (1954), 225 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,

Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970), 225 UNICEF, 108, 167 Innocenti Research Centre, 165 Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (1995), 225 United Kingdom, 117, 231, 271 United Seafood Workers’ Union, 198–199 United Self-Defense Groups of Columbia (AUC), 321, 366 United States Asian organized crime in (Triads and Tongs), 71–74 Chinatowns in, 73–74 and cocaine, 324 and heroin, 328 historical impact of organized crime on, 20–25 illicit drug market in, 344 immigration to in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 20–21 impact of transnational organized crime on national security, 125–127 international crime-fighting strategy of (counterorganization and containment), 441 Italian organized crime groups in, 13 and the lack of non-Sicilian/Italian American organized crime data, 19–20 Latino gangs in, 120–125 as source of illegal firearms, 304 transnational organized crime in, xvii, 2, 58–59 United States Code, Title 18—Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 674–682Doc. United States v. Alvarez-Machain (1992), 386 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1991), 386 United Wa State Army (UWSA), 70, 329, 335 University of Pennsylvania, Department of Criminology, 52 Untouchables, The, 28 Uruguay, 133, 134, 135 U.S. Attorney General’s Office, Government and Health Care Fraud Section, 238 U.S. Bank Secrecy Act (1970), 251 U.S. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 67 U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), 415 U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 254 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 157 (photo), 158, 182, 185 (photo), 188 (photo), 271, 438–440

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Index

Container Security Initiative (CSI), 439 C-TPAT program, 439 FAST program, 439 National Targeting Center, 439–440 NEXUS program, 439 twin goals of, 438 use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 439 (photo) U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 442 Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), 442 U.S. Department of Justice, 172, 256, 339, 451 Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS), 227 U.S. Department of Labor, Special Investigations Staff (SIS), 201 U.S. Department of State, 71, 84–85, 93, 139, 142, 155, 161, 207, 263–264, 339, 396 Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 209 U.S. Department of the Treasury, 256 Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), 257 Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, 349 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 31–32, 69, 97, 153, 155, 156, 244, 361, 377, 381, 414–416 evolution of, 415–416 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program, 416 mission of, 416 Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs), 416 responsibilities of, 416 U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement NetWork, 233 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 99, 271 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 305 U.S. Marshal’s Service, 137 U.S. National Narcotics Intelligence Consumer Committee, 158 U.S. Patriot Act (2001), xviii, 246, 346, 348, 420 Title III of, 727–737Doc. U.S. Postal Service, 257 U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 266 U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 254

U.S. Supreme Court, 218, 386 U.S. Virgin Islands, 96 Uzbekistan, 103, 105, 106–107 Vaccarelli, Paolo (Paul Kely), 15 Valachi, Joseph, 15, 22, 136, 137 (photo) Van Dijk chain reaction hypothesis, 176 Vehicle theft and trafficking, 180–181 in Europe, 116–117 linkage to other criminal activity, 181 major international trafficking routes, 181 modus operandi, 180 reasons this trade is flourishing, 180 Vendidtto, John, 210, 211 Venezuela, xvi, 2, 101, 152, 324 Versailles Peace Agreement (1918), 80 Vetere, Eduardo, 42 Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (2003), 209 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (2000), 779–792Doc. Vietnam, 70–71 Vigil, J. D., 121 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (1994), 446 Visconti, Lucino, 28 Vitale, Vito, 399 (photo) Vizzini, Calogero, 456 Wah Ching crime syndicate, 468 Wah-yim, Hueng, 465 War on Drugs, 335, 395, 396 Waterfall, Charlie. See Ramos, Carlos Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 31, 32–34, 231 Weibert, Martin, 174 Weiss, Emanuel (“Mendy”), 199 (photo) Weiss, Hymie, 450 Weldon, Curt, 353, 354 West Africa, child trafficking in, 165–167 contributing factors, 165 major trafficking routes, 165 methods of recruitment and control, 166–167 West African gangs, 468 Western Europe drug trafficking in, 324 transnational organized crime in, 1 White-Bellflower project, 142 White-collar crime, 17, 137, 228, 270 Wilcox, Pamela, 300 Williams, P., 48 Williams, Paul L., 354 Williams, Roy Lee, 202

Witness Protection Program, 17 Wo Group, 468–469 Wo Shing Wo, 264 Women’s rights movement, 392 Wong, Kot Siu, 466 Woo, John, 28 Woodiwiss, Michael, 169 World Bank, 85, 246 World Health Organization (WHO) Conference of Experts on the Rational Use of Drugs (1985), 239 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 422 World Ministerial Conference on Organised Transnational Crime (1994), 48 Xi, Wan Ti (Hong Er), 72 Yablokov, Alexei, 353–354 Yacovelli, Joseph, 12 Yakuza, xvi, 2, 9, 57–58, 59, 68–69, 128– 132, 196, 292, 294, 306–307, 309, 316, 469 and the anti-Yakuza public climate in Japan, 131–132 etymology of the word yakuza, 9 historical development of, 128–130 major criminal enterprises of, 130–131 in North America, 138 origin of, 9 tattoos of, 129 (photo) Yardies, 1, 115 Yat-Sen, Sun, 72 Yeltsin, Boris, 282 Yokohama Congress (2001), 394 Yokohama Global Commitment 2001, 394 Young Muslims, 87 Yue, King Fong, 452 Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), 84, 86 Yugoslavia, 80, 84, 297, 303 Zaccardelli, Guiliano, 412 Zambada-Garcia, Ismael (“El Mayo”), 334 Zambia, 63–64, 65 Zamora, Jaime Paz, 135 (photo) Zedong, Mao, 67 Zhi Gong Tong, 72 Zhirinovsky, Vladimit, 282 Zicarelli, Joseph, 13 Zimbabwe, 65 Zwillman, Longie, 199

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Organized Crime

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Organized Crime From Trafficking to Terrorism Volume Two

Frank G. Shanty, Editor Patit Paban Mishra, Contributing Editor

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Copyright © 2008 by ABC-CLIO, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Organized crime : from trafficking to terrorism / Frank G. Shanty, editor, Patit Paban Mishra, contributing editor. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-1-57607-337-7 (hard copy : alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-1-59884-102-2 (ebook) 1. Organized crime. 2. Terrorism. I. Shanty, Frank, 1950– II. Mishra, Patit Paban. HV6441.O745 2007 364.1'06—dc22 2007017471 07

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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit http://www.abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, Inc. 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper. Manufactured in the United States of America

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Contents Introduction 471 Primary Source Documents 12. Establishing Provisions Aimed at Combating Organized

1. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption

Crime and Enacting Other Provisions

473

2. Council of Europe Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption

13. Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime

481

and on the Financing of Terrorism

3. Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption

552

14. Combating Money Laundering

483

4. Inter-American Convention against Corruption

490

5. Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries

560 578

15. The Law of Combating Money Laundering

579

16. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Forty Recommendations and Nine Special

498 6. United Nations Convention against Corruption

500

7. Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime

517

8. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and

Recommendations on Terrorist Financing

17. Council Decision of 22 December 2004 on Tackling Vehicle Crime with Cross-Border Implications

603 19. The Narcotic Drug Control Act

525

9. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora

528

539

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances

630

22. ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime

Regional Forum on Protection of Intellectual Property 548

623

21. United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in

11. The Global Congress/World Customs Organization Rights

618

20. The Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of Iran

10. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, United Nations, 2005

599

18. Government of Afghanistan Counter-Narcotics Law

Xenophobic Nature Committed through Computer Systems

584

638 23. Australia Criminal Code Act 1995

643

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Contents

24. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: “Developing a Strategic Concept on Tackling Organised Crime”

648

25. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 655

33. United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism

737

34. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Supplementing the United Nations Convention against

666

27. United States Code, Title 18—Crimes and Criminal

Organized Crime 2000

682

29. Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism 1999

Transnational Organized Crime

745

35. Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea

674

28. United Nations Convention against Transnational

702

30. Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism

727

Persons, Especially Women and Children,

26. South Africa Crime Act 1996

Procedure

32. USA Patriot Act (Title III)

708

and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

36. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography

758

37. Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings

764

38. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of

31. Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism 717

2000

779

Index I-1

Tables referenced in a document can be accessed by viewing the original source document.

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Primary Source Documents

Introduction This volume provides a compilation of national and international laws and treaties that have been adopted in an attempt to control, if not curtail, the nefarious activities of organized criminal groups and terrorist organizations. In the post-9/11 world, with so much attention being directed to a possible nexus between criminals and terrorists, the documents presented in this volume focus on terrorism as well as global organized crime. Criminal activity is as old as human civilization. To some degree it is extant in all historical periods, and thus it would be difficult to find a crime-free society or nation. In modern times or, more specifically, in the contemporary period, crime has played a pervasive role. With sophisticated communication systems and ample resources, crime with its continually expanding global reach poses a danger to human society and threatens national as well as international security. Compared to earlier periods, crime has become more organized and spans national borders. Structured criminal groups are engaging in a wide range of unlawful activities. These activities are not confined by borders, ethical considerations, or the impact on innocent persons. The sole motive of these groups is to achieve the nefarious goal of becoming rich by any means or, in the case of certain terrorist groups, to achieve specific political aims. Apart from getting a helping hand from state-of-the-art technology, organized criminal groups are aided by corrupt

officials, inadequate legislation, bank secrecy, economic and political instability, drug addiction, the lure of becoming rich, etc. In the post–Cold War period, the end of communism in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe along with the emergence of weak democracies has resulted in a proliferation of criminal groups. Crimes such as narcotics trafficking, money laundering, terrorist financing, human trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, and cyber crimes have become globalized. Modern channels of communication (satellite and cellular phones and e-mails) have become the preferred method of communication between members of various criminal entities. Doing business in a clandestine way, these criminal operators are engaged in legitimate business enterprises such as real estate, construction work, dock loading, licensed gambling, financial organizations, and trash dumping. These legitimate ventures often serve as fronts to hide illegal activities and profits. Drug production and trafficking and the abuse of these agents are global phenomena. The illegal drug trade involves the cultivation, production, and distribution of such substances as cannabis, heroin, and cocaine. The two most important areas for the cultivation of raw opium are the Golden Triangle of Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand and the Golden Crescent region of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. Drug abuse affects persons of all ages, classes, and ethnic groups. The consequences are generations of addicted individuals, increased rates of crime, and a significant rise in the number of people contracting

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the AIDS virus. Drug-related problems bring misery and hardship to millions of families and threaten the collective security of nations. The criminal groups engaged in the trafficking and distribution of illegal drugs generate billions of dollars in profits. Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Laos are major producers of illicit opium and heroin. Colombia is the largest supplier of illicit coca in the world. Apart from these drugs, there are also amphetamine-type stimulants, with clandestine laboratories operated by different crime groups. The menace from opiates and other illegal drugs could be attested by the fact that about 5 percent of the world’s population consumes these illicit products. Additionally, numerous studies have confirmed that the global trade in these substances spawns domestic and international instability by sustaining regional insurgencies and conflict. Open or porous borders, poverty, wars, ethnic conflicts, and gender discrimination are factors behind human trafficking. Organized crime groups have established a profitable business in this arena. Human trafficking generates billions of dollars annually. Trafficking in women and children for sex and forced labor is one of the most heinous crimes. The victim leads a life of misery that involves forced drug use, rape, starvation, and seclusion. Almost every country in the world is affected by human trafficking, and the majority of the victims are from Asia. A thriving sex industry exists in many parts of the world. The largest source for prostitution comes from the former Soviet Union and East European countries. The major traffickers are gangs emanating from China, Mexico, Russia, and Italy who possess local networks so as to provide victims with false documentation, transport, and safe harbor. Organized criminals need to hide their illegal profits so that the money can be used without any hindrance by government regulatory bodies and law enforcement. Through multiple transactions, money laundering transforms finances for criminal entrepreneurs. Illegal financial transactions total an estimated $300–500 billion per year. Inadequate legal provisions, bank secrecy, and lax financial regulations

make it easier for money launderers to achieve their ends. The international nature of illegal financial transactions has an adverse impact on the economy and society of a nation. The criminals use currency exchange and stock brokering organizations, shell corporations, and trading companies to launder their illegal profits. Money laundering to finance terrorist activities is another operation with devastating effects. While organized criminals are motivated primarily by financial gain, terrorists seek political influence and generally publicize their cause. In many instances, terrorist groups seek out unlawful enterprises to generate capital to sustain their activities and organizations. Terrorist funding also comes from individual contributors and social, cultural, and religious organizations. In the interdependent world of today, organized crime has posed a great danger to international financial markets. Apart from creating economic problems in a country, legitimate domestic and foreign businesses also suffer a great deal. Organized crime also hampers the normal political functioning of the state. Global organized crime can have a corrupting and damaging effect on state political institutions. The smuggling of nuclear materials has not occurred on a large scale, but a number of instances have occurred. Therefore, the potential for these weapons falling into the hands of criminals and terrorists cannot be ruled out. National and international regulatory bodies have responded to the nature and seriousness of organized crime. Anticrime legislation with stringent measures has been passed in national legislatures to combat organized criminal activity. Additionally, there are amendments to existing statutes so as to tackle the problem in a more effective way. There is also increasing cooperation among national, regional, and international associations. The United Nations, through it various agencies, is involved in checking the activities of organized crime. This volume provides scholars, the academic community, and the general reader with a compendium of international documents that address this very serious threat to global peace and security.

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1. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption The African Union took a measured step against corruption in its meeting held in Maputo on 11 July 2003. The preamble called for a better life for the African people, the strengthening of democratic institutions, and good governance. The member states would eradicate corruption and other related offenses in the public as well as the private sector. Legislative measures would be enacted in respective countries in order to criminalize corruption-related offenses such as extortion, bribery, and illicit enrichment. Article 22 called for the establishment of the Advisory Board on Corruption within the African Union. Source African Union, http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/ Documents/Treaties/Text/Convention%20on% 20Combating%20Corruption.pdf.

Preamble The Member States of the African Union: Considering that the Constitutive Act of the African Union recognizes that freedom, equality, justice, peace and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspiration of the African peoples; Further Considering that Article 3 of the said Constitutive Act enjoins Member States to coordinate and intensify their cooperation, unity, cohesion and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; Cognizant of the fact that the Constitutive Act of the African Union, inter alia, calls for the need to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights, consolidate democratic institutions and foster a culture of democracy and ensure good governance and the rule of law;

Aware of the need to respect human dignity and to foster the promotion of economic, social, and political rights in conformity with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and other relevant human rights instruments; Bearing in mind the 1990 Declaration on the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World and their Implications for Africa; the 1994 Cairo Agenda for Action Relaunching Africa’s Socioeconomic Transformation; and the Plan of Action Against Impunity adopted by the Nineteenth Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights in 1996 as subsequently endorsed by the Sixty fourth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held in Yaounde, Cameroon in 1996 which, among others, underlined the need to observe principles of good governance, the primacy of law, human rights, democratization and popular participation by the African peoples in the processes of governance. Concerned about the negative effects of corruption and impunity on the political, economic, social and cultural stability of African States and its devastating effects on the economic and social development of the African peoples; Acknowledging that corruption undermines accountability and transparency in the management of public affairs as well as socioeconomic development on the continent; Recognizing the need to address the root causes of corruption on the continent; Convinced of the need to formulate and pursue, as a matter of priority, a common penal policy aimed at protecting the society against corruption, including the adoption of appropriate legislative and adequate preventive measures; Determined to build partnerships between governments and all segments of civil society, in

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particular, women, youth, media and the private sector in order to fight the scourge of corruption; Recalling resolution AHG-Dec 126(XXXIV) adopted by the Thirty-fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in June 1998 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, requesting the Secretary General to convene, in cooperation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, a high level meeting of experts to consider ways and means of removing obstacles to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, including the fight against corruption and impunity and propose appropriate legislative and other measures; Further Recalling the decision of the 37th ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU held in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 2001 as well as the Declaration adopted by the first session of the Assembly of the Union held in Durban, South Africa in July 2002, relating to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) which calls for the setting up of a coordinated mechanism to combat corruption effectively.

“Corruption” means the acts and practices including related offences proscribed in this Convention; “Court of Law” means a court duly established by a domestic law; “Executive Council” means the Executive Council of the African Union; “Illicit enrichment” means the significant increase in the assets of a public official or any other person which he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her income. “Private Sector” means the sector of a national economy under private ownership in which the allocation of productive resources is controlled by market forces, rather than public authorities and other sectors of the economy not under the public sector or government; “Proceeds of Corruption” means assets of any kind corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible and any document or legal instrument evidencing title to or interests in such assets acquired as a result of an act of corruption;

Have agreed as follows:

Definitions 1. For the purposes of this Convention;

“Public official” means any official or employee of the State or its agencies including those who have been selected, appointed or elected to perform activities or functions in the name of the State or in the service of the State at any level of its hierarchy;

“Chairperson of the Commission” means Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union;

“Requested State Party” means a State Party requested to extradite or to provide assistance under this Convention;

“Confiscation” means any penalty or measure resulting in a final deprivation of property, proceeds or instrumentalities ordered by a court of law following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence or offences connected with or related to corruption;

“Requesting State Party” means a State Party making a request for extradition or assistance in terms of this Convention;

Article 1

“State Party” means any Member State of the African Union which has ratified or acceded to this Convention and has deposited its instruments of

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ratification or accession with the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union.

3. Transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs. 4. Promotion of social justice to ensure balanced socio-economic development. 5. Condemnation and rejection of acts of corruption, related offences and impunity.

2. In this Convention, the singular shall include the plural and vice versa. Article 2

Article 4 Objectives The objectives of this Convention are to: 1. Promote and strengthen the development in Africa by each State Party, of mechanisms required to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in the public and private sectors. 2. Promote, facilitate and regulate cooperation among the State Parties to ensure the effectiveness of measures and actions to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in Africa. 3. Coordinate and harmonize the policies and legislation between State Parties for the purposes of prevention, detection, punishment and eradication of corruption on the continent. 4. Promote socio-economic development by removing obstacles to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights. 5. Establish the necessary conditions to foster transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs.

Scope of Application 1. This Convention is applicable to the following acts of corruption and related offences:

Article 3 Principles The State Parties to this Convention undertake to abide by the following principles: 1. Respect for democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, the rule of law and good governance. 2. Respect for human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.

(a) the solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, by a public official or any other person, of any goods of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favour, promise or advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his or her public functions; (b) the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to a public official or any other person, of any goods of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favour, promise or advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his or her public functions; (c) any act or omission in the discharge of his or her duties by a public official or any other person for the purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or herself or for a third party; (d) the diversion by a public official or any other person, for purposes unrelated to those for which they were intended, for his or her own benefit or that of a third party, of any property belonging to the State or its agencies, to an independent agency, or to an individual, that such official has received by virtue of his or her position; (e) the offering or giving, promising, solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage to or by any person who directs or works for, in any capacity, a private sector entity, for himself or herself or for anyone else, for him or her to act, or refrain from acting, in breach of his or her duties;

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(f) the offering, giving, solicitation or acceptance directly or indirectly, or promising of any undue advantage to or by any person who asserts or confirms that he or she is able to exert any improper influence over the decision making of any person performing functions in the public or private sector in consideration thereof, whether the undue advantage is for himself or herself or for anyone else, as well as the request, receipt or the acceptance of the offer or the promise of such an advantage, in consideration of that influence, whether or not the influence is exerted or whether or not the supposed influence leads to the intended result; (g) illicit enrichment; (h) the use or concealment of proceeds derived from any of the acts referred to in this Article; and (i) participation as a principal, co-principal, agent, instigator, accomplice or accessory after the fact, or on any other manner in the commission or attempted commission of, in any collaboration or conspiracy to commit, any of the acts referred to in this article.

2. This Convention shall also be applicable by mutual agreement between or among two or more State Parties with respect to any other act or practice of corruption and related offences not described in this Convention. Article 5 Legislative and Other Measures For the purposes set forth in Article 2 of this Convention, State Parties undertake to: 1. Adopt legislative and other measures that are required to establish as offences, the acts mentioned in Article 4 paragraph 1 of the present Convention. 2. Strengthen national control measures to ensure that the setting up and operations of foreign companies in the territory of a State Party shall be subject to the respect of the national legislation in force.

3. Establish, maintain and strengthen independent national anticorruption authorities or agencies. 4. Adopt legislative and other measures to create, maintain and strengthen internal accounting, auditing and follow-up systems, in particular, in the public income, custom and tax receipts, expenditures and procedures for hiring, procurement and management of public goods and services. 5. Adopt legislative and other measures to protect informants and witnesses in corruption and related offences, including protection of their identities. 6. Adopt measures that ensure citizens report instances of corruption without fear of consequent reprisals. 7. Adopt national legislative measures in order to punish those who make false and malicious reports against innocent persons in corruption and related offences. 8. Adopt and strengthen mechanisms for promoting the education of populations to respect the public good and public interest, and awareness in the fight against corruption and related offences, including school educational programmes and sensitization of the media, and the promotion of an enabling environment for the respect of ethics.

Article 6 Laundering of the Proceeds of Corruption States Parties shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences: a) The conversion, transfer or disposal of property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of corruption or related offences for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of helping any person who is involved in the commission of the offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her action. b) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to property which is the proceeds of corruption or related offences;

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c) The acquisition, possession or use of property with the knowledge at the time of receipt, that such property is the proceeds of corruption or related offences;

Article 7 Fight against Corruption and Related Offences in the Public Service In order to combat corruption and related offences in the public service, State Parties commit themselves to: 1. Require all or designated public officials to declare their assets at the time of assumption of office during and after their term of office in the public service. 2. Create an internal committee or a similar body mandated to establish a code of conduct and to monitor its implementation, and sensitize and train public officials on matters of ethics. 3. Develop disciplinary measures and investigation procedures in corruption and related offences with a view to keeping up with technology and increase the efficiency of those responsible in this regard. 4. Ensure transparency, equity and efficiency in the management of tendering and hiring procedures in the public service. 5. Subject to the provisions of domestic legislation, any immunity granted to public officials shall not be an obstacle to the investigation of allegations against and the prosecution of such officials.

corruption or a related offence for the purposes of this Convention. 3. Any State Party that has not established illicit enrichment as an offence shall, in so far as its laws permit, provide assistance and cooperation to the requesting State with respect to the offence as provided in this Convention. Article 9 Access to Information Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures to give effect to the right of access to any information that is required to assist in the fight against corruption and related offences. Article 10 Funding of Political Parties Each State Party shall adopt legislative and other measures to: (a) Proscribe the use of funds acquired through illegal and corrupt practices to finance political parties; and (b) Incorporate the principle of transparency into funding of political parties.

Article 11 Private Sector State Parties undertake to:

Article 8 Illicit Enrichment 1. Subject to the provisions of their domestic law, State Parties undertake to adopt necessary measures to establish under their laws an offence of illicit enrichment. 2. For State Parties that have established illicit enrichment as an offence under their domestic law, such offence shall be considered an act of

1. Adopt legislative and other measures to prevent and combat acts of corruption and related offences committed in and by agents of the private sector. 2. Establish mechanisms to encourage participation by the private sector in the fight against unfair competition, respect of the tender procedures and property rights. 3. Adopt such other measures as may be necessary to prevent companies from paying bribes to win tenders.

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3. Notwithstanding the provision of paragraph I of this Article, a person shall not be tried twice for the same offence.

Article 12 Civil Society and Media State Parties undertake to: 1. Be fully engaged in the fight against corruption and related offences and the popularisation of this Convention with the full participation of the Media and Civil Society at large; 2. Create an enabling environment that will enable civil society and the media to hold governments to the highest levels of transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs; 3. Ensure and provide for the participation of Civil Society in the monitoring process and consult Civil Society in the implementation of this Convention; 4. Ensure that the Media is given access to information in cases of corruption and related offences on condition that the dissemination of such information does not adversely affect the investigation process and the right to a fair trial.

Article 13 Jurisdiction 1. Each State Party has jurisdiction over acts of corruption and related offences when: (a) the breach is committed wholly or partially inside its territory; (b) the offence is committed by one of its nationals outside its territory or by a person who resides in its territory; and (c) the alleged criminal is present in its territory and it does not extradite such person to another country. (d) when the offence, although committed outside its jurisdiction, affects, in the view of the State concerned, its vital interests or the deleterious or harmful consequences or effects of such offences impact on the State Party.

2. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised by a State Party in accordance with its domestic law.

Article 14 Minimum Guarantees of a Fair Trial Subject to domestic law, any person alleged to have committed acts of corruption and related offences shall receive a fair trial in criminal proceedings in accordance with the minimum guarantees contained in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and any other relevant international human rights instrument recognized by the concerned States Parties. Article 15 Extradition 1. This Article shall apply to the offences established by the State Parties in accordance with this Convention. 2. Offences falling within the jurisdiction of this Convention shall be deemed to be included in the internal laws of State Parties as crimes requiring extradition. State Parties shall include such offences as extraditable offences in extradition treaties existing between or among them. 3. If a State Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from a State Party with which it does not have such treaty, it shall consider this Convention as a legal basis for all offences covered by this Convention. 4. A State Party that does not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize offences to which this Convention applies as extraditable offences among themselves. 5. Each State Party undertakes to extradite any person charged with or convicted of offences of corruption and related offences, carried out on the

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territory of another State Party and whose extradition is requested by that State Party, in conformity with their domestic law, any applicable extradition treaties, or extradition agreements or arrangements existing between or among the State Parties. 6. Where a State Party in whose territory any person charged with or convicted of offences is present and has refused to extradite that person on the basis that it has jurisdiction over offences, the Requested State Party shall be obliged to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, unless otherwise agreed with the Requesting State Party, and shall report the final outcome to the Requesting State Party. 7. Subject to the provisions of its domestic law and any applicable extradition treaties, a Requested State Party may, upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant and are urgent and at the request of the Requesting State Party, take into custody a person whose extradition is sought and who is present in its territory, or take other appropriate measures to ensure that the person is present at the extradition proceedings. Article 16 Confiscation and Seizure of the Proceeds and Instrumentalities of Corruption 1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative measures as may be necessary to enable: (a) its competent authorities to search, identify, trace, administer and freeze or seize the instrumentalities and proceeds of corruption pending a final judgement; (b) confiscation of proceeds or property, the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds, derived, from offences established in accordance with this convention; (c) repatriation of proceeds of corruption.

2. The Requested State Party shall, in so far as its law permits and at the request of the Requesting State Party, seize and remit any object: (a) which may be required as evidence of the offence in question; or (b) which has been acquired as a result of the offence for which extradition is requested and which, at the time of arrest is found in possession of the persons claimed or is discovered subsequently.

3. The objects referred to in clause 2 of this Article may, if the Requesting State so requests, be handed over to that State even if the extradition is refused or cannot be carried out due to death, disappearance or escape of the person sought. 4. When the said object is liable for seizure or confiscation in the territory of the Requested State Party the latter may, in connection with pending or ongoing criminal proceedings, temporarily retain it or hand it over to the Requesting State Party, on condition that it is returned to the Requested State Party. Article 17 Bank Secrecy 1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures necessary to empower its courts or other competent authorities to order the confiscation or seizure of banking, financial or commercial documents with a view to implementing this Convention. 2. The Requesting State shall not use any information received that is protected by bank secrecy for any purpose other than the proceedings for which that information was requested, unless with the consent of the Requested State Party. 3. State Parties shall not invoke banking secrecy to justify their refusal to cooperate with regard to acts of corruption and related offences by virtue of this Convention.

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4. State Parties commit themselves to enter into bilateral agreements to waive banking secrecy on doubtful accounts and allow competent authorities the right to obtain from banks and financial institutions, under judicial cover, any evidence in their possession.

6. Nothing in this Article shall prevent State Parties from according one another more favourable forms of mutual legal assistance allowed under their respective domestic law.

Article 18

International Cooperation In the spirit of international cooperation, State Parties shall:

Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance 1. In accordance with their domestic laws and applicable treaties, State Parties shall provide each other with the greatest possible technical cooperation and assistance in dealing immediately with requests from authorities that are empowered by virtue of their national laws to prevent, detect, investigate and punish acts of corruption and related offences. 2. If two or several State Parties have established relations on the basis of uniform legislation or a particular regime, they may have the option to regulate such mutual relations without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention. 3. State Parties shall co-operate among themselves in conducting and exchanging studies and researches on how to combat corruption and related offences and to exchange expertise relating to preventing and combating corruption and related offences. 4. State Parties shall co-operate among themselves, where possible, in providing any available technical assistance in drawing up programmes, codes of ethics or organizing, where necessary and for the benefit of their personnel, joint training courses involving one or several states in the area of combating corruption and related offences. 5. The provisions of this Article shall not affect the obligations under any other bilateral or multilateral treaty which governs, in whole or in part, mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.

Article 19

1. Collaborate with countries of origin of multinationals to criminalise and punish the practice of secret commissions and other forms of corrupt practices during international trade transactions. 2. Foster regional, continental and international cooperation to prevent corrupt practices in international trade transactions. 3. Encourage all countries to take legislative measures to prevent corrupt public officials from enjoying ill-acquired assets by freezing their foreign accounts and facilitating the repatriation of stolen or illegally acquired monies to the countries of origin. 4. Work closely with international, regional and sub regional financial organizations to eradicate corruption in development aid and cooperation programmes by defining strict regulations for eligibility and good governance of candidates within the general framework of their development policy. 5. Cooperate in conformity with relevant international instruments on international cooperation on criminal matters for purposes of investigations and procedures in offences within the jurisdiction of this Convention.

Article 20 National Authorities 1. For the purposes of cooperation and mutual legal assistance provided under this Convention, each State Party shall communicate to the Chairperson of the Commission at the time of signing or depositing its instrument of ratification,

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the designation of a national authority or agency in application of offences established under Article 4 (1) of this Convention.

by including the active and passive bribery of domestic and foreign arbitrators and jurors as criminal offenses.

2. The national authorities or agencies shall be responsible for making and receiving the requests for assistance and cooperation referred to in this Convention.

Source Council of Europe, http://www.justice.gov.sk/dwn/r6/05/ dbpk_tp_dpa.rtf.

3. The national authorities or agencies shall communicate with each other directly for the purposes of this Convention. 4. The national authorities or agencies shall be allowed the necessary independence and autonomy, to be able to carry out their duties effectively. 5. State Parties undertake to adopt necessary measures to ensure that national authorities or agencies are specialized in combating corruption and related offences by, among others, ensuring that the staff are trained and motivated to effectively carry out their duties. Article 21

The member States of the Council of Europe and the other States signatory hereto, Considering that it is desirable to supplement the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS No. 173, hereafter “the Convention”) in order to prevent and fight against corruption; Considering also that the present Protocol will allow the broader implementation of the 1996 Programme of Action against Corruption, Have agreed as follows: Chapter I—Use of Terms Article 1—Use of Terms For the purpose of this Protocol:

Relationship with Other Agreements Subject to the provisions of Article 4 paragraph 2, this Convention shall in respect to those State Parties to which it applies, supersede the provisions of any treaty or bilateral agreement governing corruption and related offences between any two or more State Parties.

2. Council of Europe Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption The Council of Europe Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption entered into force on 1 February 2005. This protocol augments the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption

1. The term “arbitrator” shall be understood by reference to the national law of the States Parties to this Protocol, but shall in any case include a person who by virtue of an arbitration agreement is called upon to render a legally binding decision in a dispute submitted to him/her by the parties to the agreement. 2. The term “arbitration agreement” means an agreement recognised by the national law whereby the parties agree to submit a dispute for a decision by an arbitrator. 3. The term “juror” shall be understood by reference to the national law of the States Parties to this Protocol but shall in any case include a lay person acting as a member of a collegial body which has the responsibility of deciding on the guilt of an accused person in the framework of a trial. 4. In the case of proceedings involving a foreign arbitrator or juror, the prosecuting State may apply the

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definition of arbitrator or juror only in so far as that definition is compatible with its national law.

Chapter II—Measures to Be Taken at National Level Article 2—Active Bribery of Domestic Arbitrators Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the promising, offering or giving by any person, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage to an arbitrator exercising his/her functions under the national law on arbitration of the Party, for himself or herself or for anyone else, for him or for her to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her functions. Article 3—Passive Bribery of Domestic Arbitrators Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the request or receipt by an arbitrator exercising his/her functions under the national law on arbitration of the Party, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage for himself or herself or for anyone else, or the acceptance of an offer or promise of such an advantage, to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her functions. Article 4—Bribery of Foreign Arbitrators Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the conduct referred to in Articles 2 and 3, when involving an arbitrator exercising his/her functions under the national law on arbitration of any other State. Article 5—Bribery of Domestic Jurors Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the conduct referred to in Articles 2 and 3, when

involving any person acting as a juror within its judicial system. Article 6—Bribery of Foreign Jurors Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the conduct referred to in Articles 2 and 3, when involving any person acting as a juror within the judicial system of any other State. Chapter III—Monitoring of Implementation and Final Provisions Article 7—Monitoring of Implementation The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) shall monitor the implementation of this Protocol by the Parties. Article 8—Relationship to the Convention 1. As between the States Parties the provisions of Articles 2 to 6 of this Protocol shall be regarded as additional articles to the Convention. 2. The provisions of the Convention shall apply to the extent that they are compatible with the provisions of this Protocol. Article 9—Declarations and Reservations 1. If a Party has made a declaration in accordance with Article 36 of the Convention, it may make a similar declaration relating to Articles 4 and 6 of this Protocol at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 2. If a Party has made a reservation in accordance with Article 37, paragraph 1, of the Convention restricting the application of the passive bribery offences defined in Article 5 of the Convention, it may make a similar reservation concerning Articles 4 and 6 of this Protocol at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. Any other reservation made by a Party, in accordance with

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Article 37 of the Convention shall be applicable also to this Protocol, unless that Party otherwise declares at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Convinced of the need to pursue, as a matter of priority, a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against corruption, including the adoption of appropriate legislation and preventive measures;

3. No other reservation may be made.

Emphasising that corruption threatens the rule of law, democracy and human rights, undermines good governance, fairness and social justice, distorts competition, hinders economic development and endangers the stability of democratic institutions and the moral foundations of society;

3. Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption entered into force on 1 July 2002. The Criminal Law Convention on Corruption is a comprehensive document that covers active and passive bribery of public, private, and state officials, both domestic and foreign. The convention also addresses influence trading, money laundering, and accounting offenses that are tied to and covered by Articles 2 through 12 of this instrument. Article 19 refers to “proportionate and dissuasive sanctions and measures, including . . . deprivation of liberty.” This document also includes provisions for protection of witnesses, “gathering of evidence,” and the “confiscation of proceeds.” International cooperation among the parties is also addressed. Source Council of Europe, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/ Treaties/Html/173.htm.

Preamble The member States of the Council of Europe and the other States signatory hereto, Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members; Recognising the value of fostering co-operation with the other States signatories to this Convention;

Believing that an effective fight against corruption requires increased, rapid and well-functioning international co-operation in criminal matters; Welcoming recent developments which further advance international understanding and cooperation in combating corruption, including actions of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation, the Organisation of American States, the OECD and the European Union; Having regard to the Programme of Action against Corruption adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in November 1996 following the recommendations of the 19th Conference of European Ministers of Justice (Valletta, 1994); Recalling in this respect the importance of the participation of non-member States in the Council of Europe’s activities against corruption and welcoming their valuable contribution to the implementation of the Programme of Action against Corruption; Further recalling that Resolution No. 1 adopted by the European Ministers of Justice at their 21st Conference (Prague, 1997) recommended the speedy implementation of the Programme of Action against Corruption, and called, in particular,

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for the early adoption of a criminal law convention providing for the co-ordinated incrimination of corruption offences, enhanced co-operation for the prosecution of such offences as well as an effective follow-up mechanism open to member States and non-member States on an equal footing; Bearing in mind that the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe decided, on the occasion of their Second Summit held in Strasbourg on 10 and 11 October 1997, to seek common responses to the challenges posed by the growth in corruption and adopted an Action Plan which, in order to promote co-operation in the fight against corruption, including its links with organised crime and money laundering, instructed the Committee of Ministers, inter alia, to secure the rapid completion of international legal instruments pursuant to the Programme of Action against Corruption; Considering moreover that Resolution (97) 24 on the 20 Guiding Principles for the Fight against Corruption, adopted on 6 November 1997 by the Committee of Ministers at its 101st Session, stresses the need rapidly to complete the elaboration of international legal instruments pursuant to the Programme of Action against Corruption; In view of the adoption by the Committee of Ministers, at its 102nd Session on 4 May 1998, of Resolution (98) 7 authorising the partial and enlarged agreement establishing the “Group of States against Corruption—GRECO”, which aims at improving the capacity of its members to fight corruption by following up compliance with their undertakings in this field, Have agreed as follows: Chapter I—Use of Terms Article 1—Use of Terms For the purposes of this Convention:

a. “public official” shall be understood by reference to the definition of “official”, “public officer”, “mayor”, “minister” or “judge” in the national law of the State in which the person in question performs that function and as applied in its criminal law; b. the term “judge” referred to in sub-paragraph a above shall include prosecutors and holders of judicial offices; c. in the case of proceedings involving a public official of another State, the prosecuting State may apply the definition of public official only insofar as that definition is compatible with its national law; d. “legal person” shall mean any entity having such status under the applicable national law, except for States or other public bodies in the exercise of State authority and for public international organisations.

Chapter II—Measures to Be Taken at National Level Article 2—Active Bribery of Domestic Public Officials Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the promising, offering or giving by any person, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage to any of its public officials, for himself or herself or for anyone else, for him or her to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her functions. Article 3—Passive Bribery of Domestic Public Officials Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the request or receipt by any of its public officials, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage, for himself or herself or for anyone else, or the acceptance of an offer or a

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promise of such an advantage, to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her functions. Article 4—Bribery of Members of Domestic Public Assemblies Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the conduct referred to in Articles 2 and 3, when involving any person who is a member of any domestic public assembly exercising legislative or administrative powers. Article 5—Bribery of Foreign Public Officials Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the conduct referred to in Articles 2 and 3, when involving a public official of any other State. Article 6—Bribery of Members of Foreign Public Assemblies Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the conduct referred to in Articles 2 and 3, when involving any person who is a member of any public assembly exercising legislative or administrative powers in any other State. Article 7—Active Bribery in the Private Sector Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally in the course of business activity, the promising, offering or giving, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage to any persons who direct or work for, in any capacity, private sector entities, for themselves or for anyone else, for them to act, or refrain from acting, in breach of their duties. Article 8—Passive Bribery in the Private Sector Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as

criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, in the course of business activity, the request or receipt, directly or indirectly, by any persons who direct or work for, in any capacity, private sector entities, of any undue advantage or the promise thereof for themselves or for anyone else, or the acceptance of an offer or a promise of such an advantage, to act or refrain from acting in breach of their duties. Article 9—Bribery of Officials of International Organisations Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the conduct referred to in Articles 2 and 3, when involving any official or other contracted employee, within the meaning of the staff regulations, of any public international or supranational organisation or body of which the Party is a member, and any person, whether seconded or not, carrying out functions corresponding to those performed by such officials or agents. Article 10—Bribery of Members of International Parliamentary Assemblies Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the conduct referred to in Article 4 when involving any members of parliamentary assemblies of international or supranational organisations of which the Party is a member. Article 11—Bribery of Judges and Officials of International Courts Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the conduct referred to in Articles 2 and 3 involving any holders of judicial office or officials of any international court whose jurisdiction is accepted by the Party.

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Article 12—Trading in Influence Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the promising, giving or offering, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage to anyone who asserts or confirms that he or she is able to exert an improper influence over the decision-making of any person referred to in Articles 2, 4 to 6 and 9 to 11 in consideration thereof, whether the undue advantage is for himself or herself or for anyone else, as well as the request, receipt or the acceptance of the offer or the promise of such an advantage, in consideration of that influence, whether or not the influence is exerted or whether or not the supposed influence leads to the intended result. Article 13—Money Laundering of Proceeds from Corruption Offences Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the conduct referred to in the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Products from Crime (ETS No. 141), Article 6, paragraphs 1 and 2, under the conditions referred to therein, when the predicate offence consists of any of the criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 to 12 of this Convention, to the extent that the Party has not made a reservation or a declaration with respect to these offences or does not consider such offences as serious ones for the purpose of their money laundering legislation. Article 14—Account Offences Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as offences liable to criminal or other sanctions under its domestic law the following acts or omissions, when committed intentionally, in order to commit, conceal or disguise the offences referred to in Articles 2 to 12, to the extent the Party has not made a reservation or a declaration:

a. creating or using an invoice or any other accounting document or record containing false or incomplete information; b. unlawfully omitting to make a record of a payment.

Article 15—Participatory Acts Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law aiding or abetting the commission of any of the criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention. Article 16—Immunity The provisions of this Convention shall be without prejudice to the provisions of any Treaty, Protocol or Statute, as well as their implementing texts, as regards the withdrawal of immunity. Article 17—Jurisdiction 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction over a criminal offence established in accordance with Articles 2 to 14 of this Convention where: a. the offence is committed in whole or in part in its territory; b. the offender is one of its nationals, one of its public officials, or a member of one of its domestic public assemblies; c. the offence involves one of its public officials or members of its domestic public assemblies or any person referred to in Articles 9 to 11 who is at the same time one of its nationals.

2. Each State may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, declare that it reserves the right not to apply or to apply only in specific cases or conditions the jurisdiction rules laid down in paragraphs 1 b and c of this article or any part thereof.

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3. If a Party has made use of the reservation possibility provided for in paragraph 2 of this article, it shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction over a criminal offence established in accordance with this Convention, in cases where an alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him to another Party, solely on the basis of his nationality, after a request for extradition. 4. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised by a Party in accordance with national law. Article 18—Corporate Liability 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that legal persons can be held liable for the criminal offences of active bribery, trading in influence and money laundering established in accordance with this Convention, committed for their benefit by any natural person, acting either individually or as part of an organ of the legal person, who has a leading position within the legal person, based on: —a power of representation of the legal person; or —an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person; or —an authority to exercise control within the legal person;

as well as for involvement of such a natural person as accessory or instigator in the above-mentioned offences. 2. Apart from the cases already provided for in paragraph 1, each Party shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a legal person can be held liable where the lack of supervision or control by a natural person referred to in paragraph 1 has made possible the commission of the criminal offences mentioned in paragraph 1 for the benefit of that legal person by a natural person under its authority. 3. Liability of a legal person under paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exclude criminal proceedings

against natural persons who are perpetrators, instigators of, or accessories to, the criminal offences mentioned in paragraph 1. Article 19—Sanctions and Measures 1. Having regard to the serious nature of the criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention, each Party shall provide, in respect of those criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 to 14, effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions and measures, including, when committed by natural persons, penalties involving deprivation of liberty which can give rise to extradition. 2. Each Party shall ensure that legal persons held liable in accordance with Article 18, paragraphs 1 and 2, shall be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions. 3. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable it to confiscate or otherwise deprive the instrumentalities and proceeds of criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention, or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds. Article 20—Specialised Authorities Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure that persons or entities are specialised in the fight against corruption. They shall have the necessary independence in accordance with the fundamental principles of the legal system of the Party, in order for them to be able to carry out their functions effectively and free from any undue pressure. The Party shall ensure that the staff of such entities has adequate training and financial resources for their tasks. Article 21—Co-operation with and between National Authorities Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure that public authorities, as well

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as any public official, co-operate, in accordance with national law, with those of its authorities responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal offences: a. by informing the latter authorities, on their own initiative, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 to 14 has been committed, or b. by providing, upon request, to the latter authorities all necessary information.

Article 22—Protection of Collaborators of Justice and Witnesses Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to provide effective and appropriate protection for: a. those who report the criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 to 14 or otherwise co-operate with the investigating or prosecuting authorities; b. witnesses who give testimony concerning these offences.

Article 23—Measures to Facilitate the Gathering of Evidence and the Confiscation of Proceeds 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary, including those permitting the use of special investigative techniques, in accordance with national law, to enable it to facilitate the gathering of evidence related to criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 to 14 of this Convention and to identify, trace, freeze and seize instrumentalities and proceeds of corruption, or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds, liable to measures set out in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 19 of this Convention. 2. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its courts or other competent authorities to order that bank, financial or commercial records be made

available or be seized in order to carry out the actions referred to in paragraph 1 of this article. 3. Bank secrecy shall not be an obstacle to measures provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article. Chapter III—Monitoring of Implementation Article 24—Monitoring The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) shall monitor the implementation of this Convention by the Parties. Chapter IV—International Co-operation Article 25—General Principles and Measures for International Co-operation 1. The Parties shall co-operate with each other, in accordance with the provisions of relevant international instruments on international cooperation in criminal matters, or arrangements agreed on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation, and in accordance with their national law, to the widest extent possible for the purposes of investigations and proceedings concerning criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention. 2. Where no international instrument or arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 is in force between Parties, Articles 26 to 31 of this chapter shall apply. 3. Articles 26 to 31 of this chapter shall also apply where they are more favourable than those of the international instruments or arrangements referred to in paragraph 1. Article 26—Mutual Assistance 1. The Parties shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual assistance by promptly processing requests from authorities that, in conformity with their domestic laws, have the

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power to investigate or prosecute criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention.

grounds on which the requested Party may refuse extradition.

2. Mutual legal assistance under paragraph 1 of this article may be refused if the requested Party believes that compliance with the request would undermine its fundamental interests, national sovereignty, national security or public order.

5. If extradition for a criminal offence established in accordance with this Convention is refused solely on the basis of the nationality of the person sought, or because the requested Party deems that it has jurisdiction over the offence, the requested Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution unless otherwise agreed with the requesting Party, and shall report the final outcome to the requesting Party in due course.

3. Parties shall not invoke bank secrecy as a ground to refuse any co-operation under this chapter. Where its domestic law so requires, a Party may require that a request for co-operation which would involve the lifting of bank secrecy be authorised by either a judge or another judicial authority, including public prosecutors, any of these authorities acting in relation to criminal offences. Article 27—Extradition 1. The criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between or among the Parties. The Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty to be concluded between or among them. 2. If a Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Party with which it does not have an extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition with respect to any criminal offence established in accordance with this Convention. 3. Parties that do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognise criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention as extraditable offences between themselves. 4. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the requested Party or by applicable extradition treaties, including the

Article 28—Spontaneous Information Without prejudice to its own investigations or proceedings, a Party may without prior request forward to another Party information on facts when it considers that the disclosure of such information might assist the receiving Party in initiating or carrying out investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention or might lead to a request by that Party under this chapter. Article 29—Central Authority 1. The Parties shall designate a central authority or, if appropriate, several central authorities, which shall be responsible for sending and answering requests made under this chapter, the execution of such requests or the transmission of them to the authorities competent for their execution. 2. Each Party shall, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, communicate to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe the names and addresses of the authorities designated in pursuance of paragraph 1 of this article. Article 30—Direct Communication 1. The central authorities shall communicate directly with one another.

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2. In the event of urgency, requests for mutual assistance or communications related thereto may be sent directly by the judicial authorities, including public prosecutors, of the requesting Party to such authorities of the requested Party. In such cases a copy shall be sent at the same time to the central authority of the requested Party through the central authority of the requesting Party. 3. Any request or communication under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article may be made through the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol). 4. Where a request is made pursuant to paragraph 2 of this article and the authority is not competent to deal with the request, it shall refer the request to the competent national authority and inform directly the requesting Party that it has done so. 5. Requests or communications under paragraph 2 of this article, which do not involve coercive action, may be directly transmitted by the competent authorities of the requesting Party to the competent authorities of the requested Party. 6. Each State may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe that, for reasons of efficiency, requests made under this chapter are to be addressed to its central authority. Article 31—Information The requested Party shall promptly inform the requesting Party of the action taken on a request under this chapter and the final result of that action. The requested Party shall also promptly inform the requesting Party of any circumstances which render impossible the carrying out of the action sought or are likely to delay it significantly.

4. Inter-American Convention against Corruption The Inter-American Convention against Corruption, adopted at the third plenary session held on 29 March 1996, calls on states to criminalize acts of corruption, specifically the bribery of domestic and foreign government officials and illicit enrichment. Article VI addresses the specific acts of corruption and applies these acts to “solicitation” as well as “acceptance” on the part of the official whether “directly or indirectly.” Bribes can take many forms (e.g., money, gifts, favors, or promises). Additionally, states are required to enact legislation to criminalize acts of corruption as specified in this instrument. In an effort to eliminate acts of corruption, the convention calls on all parties to cooperate with each other in matters relating to extradition, bank secrecy laws, and technical assistance. Source Organization of American States, Office of International Law, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-58.html.

Preamble THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, CONVINCED that corruption undermines the legitimacy of public institutions and strikes at society, moral order and justice, as well as at the comprehensive development of peoples; CONSIDERING that representative democracy, an essential condition for stability, peace and development of the region, requires, by its nature, the combating of every form of corruption in the performance of public functions, as well as acts of corruption specifically related to such performance; PERSUADED that fighting corruption strengthens democratic institutions and prevents distortions in the economy, improprieties in public

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administration and damage to a society’s moral fiber;

HAVE AGREED to adopt the following

RECOGNIZING that corruption is often a tool used by organized crime for the accomplishment of its purposes; CONVINCED of the importance of making people in the countries of the region aware of this problem and its gravity, and of the need to strengthen participation by civil society in preventing and fighting corruption; RECOGNIZING that, in some cases, corruption has international dimensions, which requires coordinated action by States to fight it effectively; CONVINCED of the need for prompt adoption of an international instrument to promote and facilitate international cooperation in fighting corruption and, especially, in taking appropriate action against persons who commit acts of corruption in the performance of public functions, or acts specifically related to such performance, as well as appropriate measures with respect to the proceeds of such acts; DEEPLY CONCERNED by the steadily increasing links between corruption and the proceeds generated by illicit narcotics trafficking which undermine and threaten legitimate commercial and financial activities, and society, at all levels; BEARING IN MIND the responsibility of States to hold corrupt persons accountable in order to combat corruption and to cooperate with one another for their efforts in this area to be effective; and

Inter-American Convention against Corruption Article I Definitions For the purposes of this Convention: “Public function” means any temporary or permanent, paid or honorary activity, performed by a natural person in the name of the State or in the service of the State or its institutions, at any level of its hierarchy. “Public official”, “government official”, or “public servant” means any official or employee of the State or its agencies, including those who have been selected, appointed, or elected to perform activities or functions in the name of the State or in the service of the State, at any level of its hierarchy. “Property” means assets of any kind, whether movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and any document or legal instrument demonstrating, purporting to demonstrate, or relating to ownership or other rights pertaining to such assets. Article II Purposes The purposes of this Convention are:

DETERMINED to make every effort to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption in the performance of public functions and acts of corruption specifically related to such performance,

1. To promote and strengthen the development by each of the States Parties of the mechanisms needed to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption; and 2. To promote, facilitate and regulate cooperation among the States Parties to ensure the effectiveness of measures and actions to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption in the perfor-

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mance of public functions and acts of corruption specifically related to such performance.

Article III

9.

Preventive Measures For the purposes set forth in Article II of this Convention, the States Parties agree to consider the applicability of measures within their own institutional systems to create, maintain and strengthen: 1. Standards of conduct for the correct, honorable, and proper fulfillment of public functions. These standards shall be intended to prevent conflicts of interest and mandate the proper conservation and use of resources entrusted to government officials in the performance of their functions. These standards shall also establish measures and systems requiring government officials to report to appropriate authorities acts of corruption in the performance of public functions. Such measures should help preserve the public’s confidence in the integrity of public servants and government processes. 2. Mechanisms to enforce these standards of conduct. 3. Instruction to government personnel to ensure proper understanding of their responsibilities and the ethical rules governing their activities. 4. Systems for registering the income, assets and liabilities of persons who perform public functions in certain posts as specified by law and, where appropriate, for making such registrations public. 5. Systems of government hiring and procurement of goods and services that assure the openness, equity and efficiency of such systems. 6. Government revenue collection and control systems that deter corruption. 7. Laws that deny favorable tax treatment for any individual or corporation for expenditures made in violation of the anticorruption laws of the States Parties. 8. Systems for protecting public servants and private citizens who, in good faith, report acts of cor-

10.

11.

12.

ruption, including protection of their identities, in accordance with their Constitutions and the basic principles of their domestic legal systems. Oversight bodies with a view to implementing modern mechanisms for preventing, detecting, punishing and eradicating corrupt acts. Deterrents to the bribery of domestic and foreign government officials, such as mechanisms to ensure that publicly held companies and other types of associations maintain books and records which, in reasonable detail, accurately reflect the acquisition and disposition of assets, and have sufficient internal accounting controls to enable their officers to detect corrupt acts. Mechanisms to encourage participation by civil society and nongovernmental organizations in efforts to prevent corruption. The study of further preventive measures that take into account the relationship between equitable compensation and probity in public service.

Article IV Scope This Convention is applicable provided that the alleged act of corruption has been committed or has effects in a State Party. Article V Jurisdiction 1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses it has established in accordance with this Convention when the offense in question is committed in its territory. 2. Each State Party may adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses it has established in accordance with this Convention when the offense is committed by one of its nationals or by a person who habitually resides in its territory.

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3. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses it has established in accordance with this Convention when the alleged criminal is present in its territory and it does not extradite such person to another country on the ground of the nationality of the alleged criminal. 4. This Convention does not preclude the application of any other rule of criminal jurisdiction established by a State Party under its domestic law. Article VI Acts of Corruption 1. This Convention is applicable to the following acts of corruption: a. The solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, by a government official or a person who performs public functions, of any article of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage for himself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his public functions; b. The offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to a government official or a person who performs public functions, of any article of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage for himself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his public functions; c. Any act or omission in the discharge of his duties by a government official or a person who performs public functions for the purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or for a third party; d. The fraudulent use or concealment of property derived from any of the acts referred to in this article; and e. Participation as a principal, coprincipal, instigator, accomplice or accessory after the fact, or in any other manner, in the commission or attempted commission of, or in any collaboration or conspiracy to commit, any of the acts referred to in this article.

2. This Convention shall also be applicable by mutual agreement between or among two or more States Parties with respect to any other act of corruption not described herein. Article VII Domestic Law The States Parties that have not yet done so shall adopt the necessary legislative or other measures to establish as criminal offenses under their domestic law the acts of corruption described in Article VI(1) and to facilitate cooperation among themselves pursuant to this Convention. Article VIII Transnational Bribery Subject to its Constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system, each State Party shall prohibit and punish the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, by its nationals, persons having their habitual residence in its territory, and businesses domiciled there, to a government official of another State, of any article of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage, in connection with any economic or commercial transaction in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of that official’s public functions. Among those States Parties that have established transnational bribery as an offense, such offense shall be considered an act of corruption for the purposes of this Convention. Any State Party that has not established transnational bribery as an offense shall, insofar as its laws permit, provide assistance and cooperation with respect to this offense as provided in this Convention.

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Article IX Illicit Enrichment Subject to its Constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system, each State Party that has not yet done so shall take the necessary measures to establish under its laws as an offense a significant increase in the assets of a government official that he cannot reasonably explain in relation to his lawful earnings during the performance of his functions. Among those States Parties that have established illicit enrichment as an offense, such offense shall be considered an act of corruption for the purposes of this Convention. Any State Party that has not established illicit enrichment as an offense shall, insofar as its laws permit, provide assistance and cooperation with respect to this offense as provided in this Convention. Article X Notification When a State Party adopts the legislation referred to in paragraph 1 of articles VIII and IX, it shall notify the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, who shall in turn notify the other States Parties. For the purposes of this Convention, the crimes of transnational bribery and illicit enrichment shall be considered acts of corruption for that State Party thirty days following the date of such notification. Article XI Progressive Development 1. In order to foster the development and harmonization of their domestic legislation and the attainment of the purposes of this Convention, the States Parties view as desirable, and undertake to consider, establishing as offenses under their laws the following acts:

a. The improper use by a government official or a person who performs public functions, for his own benefit or that of a third party, of any kind of classified or confidential information which that official or person who performs public functions has obtained because of, or in the performance of, his functions; b. The improper use by a government official or a person who performs public functions, for his own benefit or that of a third party, of any kind of property belonging to the State or to any firm or institution in which the State has a proprietary interest, to which that official or person who performs public functions has access because of, or in the performance of, his functions; c. Any act or omission by any person who, personally or through a third party, or acting as an intermediary, seeks to obtain a decision from a public authority whereby he illicitly obtains for himself or for another person any benefit or gain, whether or not such act or omission harms State property; and d. The diversion by a government official, for purposes unrelated to those for which they were intended, for his own benefit or that of a third party, of any movable or immovable property, monies or securities belonging to the State, to an independent agency, or to an individual, that such official has received by virtue of his position for purposes of administration, custody or for other reasons.

2. Among those States Parties that have established these offenses, such offenses shall be considered acts of corruption for the purposes of this Convention. 3. Any State Party that has not established these offenses shall, insofar as its laws permit, provide assistance and cooperation with respect to these offenses as provided in this Convention.

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Article XII Effect on State Property For application of this Convention, it shall not be necessary that the acts of corruption harm State property. Article XIII Extradition 1. This article shall apply to the offenses established by the States Parties in accordance with this Convention. 2. Each of the offenses to which this article applies shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offense in any extradition treaty existing between or among the States Parties. The States Parties undertake to include such offenses as extraditable offenses in every extradition treaty to be concluded between or among them. 3. If a State Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it does not have an extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition with respect to any offense to which this article applies. 4. States Parties that do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize offenses to which this article applies as extraditable offenses between themselves. 5. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the Requested State or by applicable extradition treaties, including the grounds on which the Requested State may refuse extradition.

the offense, the Requested State shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution unless otherwise agreed with the Requesting State, and shall report the final outcome to the Requesting State in due course. 7. Subject to the provisions of its domestic law and its extradition treaties, the Requested State may, upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant and are urgent, and at the request of the Requesting State, take into custody a person whose extradition is sought and who is present in its territory, or take other appropriate measures to ensure his presence at extradition proceedings. Article XIV Assistance and Cooperation 1. In accordance with their domestic laws and applicable treaties, the States Parties shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual assistance by processing requests from authorities that, in conformity with their domestic laws, have the power to investigate or prosecute the acts of corruption described in this Convention, to obtain evidence and take other necessary action to facilitate legal proceedings and measures regarding the investigation or prosecution of acts of corruption. 2. The States Parties shall also provide each other with the widest measure of mutual technical cooperation on the most effective ways and means of preventing, detecting, investigating and punishing acts of corruption. To that end, they shall foster exchanges of experiences by way of agreements and meetings between competent bodies and institutions, and shall pay special attention to methods and procedures of citizen participation in the fight against corruption.

6. If extradition for an offense to which this article applies is refused solely on the basis of the nationality of the person sought, or because the Requested State deems that it has jurisdiction over

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Article XV

Article XVII

Measures regarding Property 1. In accordance with their applicable domestic laws and relevant treaties or other agreements that may be in force between or among them, the States Parties shall provide each other the broadest possible measure of assistance in the identification, tracing, freezing, seizure and forfeiture of property or proceeds obtained, derived from or used in the commission of offenses established in accordance with this Convention.

Nature of the Act For the purposes of articles XIII, XIV, XV and XVI of this Convention, the fact that the property obtained or derived from an act of corruption was intended for political purposes, or that it is alleged that an act of corruption was committed for political motives or purposes, shall not suffice in and of itself to qualify the act as a political offense or as a common offense related to a political offense.

2. A State Party that enforces its own or another State Party’s forfeiture judgment against property or proceeds described in paragraph 1 of this article shall dispose of the property or proceeds in accordance with its laws. To the extent permitted by a State Party’s laws and upon such terms as it deems appropriate, it may transfer all or part of such property or proceeds to another State Party that assisted in the underlying investigation or proceedings.

Article XVIII Central Authorities 1. For the purposes of international assistance and cooperation provided under this Convention, each State Party may designate a central authority or may rely upon such central authorities as are provided for in any relevant treaties or other agreements. 2. The central authorities shall be responsible for making and receiving the requests for assistance and cooperation referred to in this Convention.

Article XVI Bank Secrecy 1. The Requested State shall not invoke bank secrecy as a basis for refusal to provide the assistance sought by the Requesting State. The Requested State shall apply this article in accordance with its domestic law, its procedural provisions, or bilateral or multilateral agreements with the Requesting State. 2. The Requesting State shall be obligated not to use any information received that is protected by bank secrecy for any purpose other than the proceeding for which that information was requested, unless authorized by the Requested State.

3. The central authorities shall communicate with each other directly for the purposes of this Convention. Article XIX Temporal Application Subject to the constitutional principles and the domestic laws of each State and existing treaties between the States Parties, the fact that the alleged act of corruption was committed before this Convention entered into force shall not preclude procedural cooperation in criminal matters between the States Parties. This provision shall in no case affect the principle of non-retroactivity in criminal law, nor shall application of this provision interrupt existing statutes of limitations relating to

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crimes committed prior to the date of the entry into force of this Convention.

provisions and is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.

Article XX

Article XXV

Other Agreements or Practices No provision of this Convention shall be construed as preventing the States Parties from engaging in mutual cooperation within the framework of other international agreements, bilateral or multilateral, currently in force or concluded in the future, or pursuant to any other applicable arrangement or practice.

Entry into Force This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the second instrument of ratification. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the second instrument of ratification, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or accession.

Article XXI Article XXVI Signature This Convention is open for signature by the Member States of the Organization of American States. Article XXII Ratification This Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States.

Denunciation This Convention shall remain in force indefinitely, but any of the States Parties may denounce it. The instrument of denunciation shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States. One year from the date of deposit of the instrument of denunciation, the Convention shall cease to be in force for the denouncing State, but shall remain in force for the other States Parties. Article XXVII

Article XXIII Accession This Convention shall remain open for accession by any other State. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States.

Additional Protocols Any State Party may submit for the consideration of other States Parties meeting at a General Assembly of the Organization of American States draft additional protocols to this Convention to contribute to the attainment of the purposes set forth in Article II thereof.

Article XXIV Reservations The States Parties may, at the time of adoption, signature, ratification, or accession, make reservations to this Convention, provided that each reservation concerns one or more specific

Each additional protocol shall establish the terms for its entry into force and shall apply only to those States that become Parties to it.

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Article XXVIII Deposit of Original Instrument The original instrument of this Convention, the English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, which shall forward an authenticated copy of its text to the Secretariat of the United Nations for registration and publication in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. The General Secretariat of the Organization of American States shall notify its Member States and the States that have acceded to the Convention of signatures, of the deposit of instruments of ratification, accession, or denunciation, and of reservations, if any.

5. Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries Corruption in government and the private sector is an international problem that requires strategies that focus on prevention, the enactment and enforcement of laws, and education. The twenty-five points cited below are an attempt by the Global Coalition for Africa to address this growing threat to national, regional, and international security. Source Respondanet, http://www.respondanet.com/english/ anti_corruption/publications/documents/africa.htm.

We, Ministers and representatives of Government, the list of which is annexed hereto, having met under the auspices of the Global Coalition for Africa in Washington DC on February 23, 1999, Concerned about the devastating effects of corruption on the social, economic and political foundations of nations, and on their economic and social development and efforts to eradicate poverty;

Desirous of launching a concerted and collaborative effort to combat corrupt practices and thereby contribute to the global fight against corruption; Acknowledging that anti-corruption efforts, to be successful, require political will at the highest level and committed leadership at all levels, and must involve civil society; Determined to eliminate corruption through effective preventive and deterrent measures including strict enforcement of legislation, rules and regulations; Aware that good governance, accountability and transparency are necessary to counter corruption; Mindful of the UN General Assembly resolution on actions against corruption and other collective regional efforts to combat corruption such as those by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Organization of American States (OAS); Now therefore do agree that Governments should: 1. Demonstrate the leadership and political will to combat and eradicate corruption in all sectors of government and society by improving governance and economic management, by striving to create a climate that promotes transparency, accountability and integrity in public as well as private endeavors, and by restoring popular confidence in the government. 2. Establish budgetary and financial transparency and strong financial management systems. 3. Eliminate unnecessary government regulations that negatively affect economic activity; and establish simple, readily available regulatory procedures with clear criteria and deadlines. 4. Enact and enforce criminal laws which will deal effectively with corruption offenses by imposing severe penalties on individuals convicted of corruption or corrupt practices, and on business

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entities found to be involved in such practices. Enact and enforce criminal and civil laws that provide for the recovery, seizure, forfeiture or confiscation of property and other assets acquired through corruption. 5. Eliminate conflicts of interest by adopting and enforcing effective national laws, guidelines, ethical regulations or codes of conduct for public officials, which include rules on conflict of interest and requirements for the regular disclosure of financial interests, assets, liabilities, gifts and other transactions. 6. Undertake necessary administrative reforms to restore the morale and integrity of the public service, for example by ensuring merit-based recruitment and promotion policies and procedures and providing adequate benefits, including remuneration and pension schemes. 7. Promote transparency in procedures for public procurement and the sale or licensing of economic rights and interests by eliminating bureaucratic red tape, by providing for open and competitive bidding for government contracts, by the prohibition of bribery, and by adopting procedures for resolving challenges to the award of contracts or the sale or licensing of economic rights. 8. Adopt revenue collection systems that eliminate opportunities for tax evasion, and reform regulatory processes that facilitate customs duties evasion, especially in regard to international business transactions. 9. Require companies and organizations to maintain adequate and accurate financial books and records, and to adhere to internationally accepted standards of accounting. 10. Establish and enforce self-regulating codes of conduct for different professions, including those in the private sector. 11. Promote standards for corporate governance and the protection of shareholder rights. 12. Prohibit individuals found guilty of corruption from bidding on public contracts or otherwise doing business with governments. Publish details of companies that are found to have, or whose

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subsidiaries, agents or representatives are found to have, engaged in corrupt practices, and bar them from bidding on public contracts or otherwise doing business with the government for a period of time specified in national legislation. Ensure that anti-corruption agencies are autonomous, independent, governed by a clear body of law, and effectively empowered to initiate and pursue investigations of corruption, and provide for the prosecution of offenders in accordance with investigations and due process. Establish other accountability and oversight mechanisms, including as appropriate inspector general and audit offices. Adopt legislative mechanisms and procedures for the public to submit complaints of corruption and corrupt practices, including the protection of witnesses and whistle blowers. Facilitate the involvement and participation of civil society, on a continuous basis, in the formulation, execution and monitoring of anti-corruption reform programs. Restore and maintain the independence of the judiciary and ensure adherence to high standards of integrity, honesty and commitment in the dispensation of justice through, among other things, adopting a judicial code of conduct. Guarantee the public’s right to information about corruption and corrupt activities through protection of the freedom of the press and effective parliamentary oversight and scrutiny. Adopt cooperative arrangements at the regional and/or sub-regional level which provide for the mutual exchange of ideas, information, best practices, intelligence and experiences for the purpose of minimizing risks of cross-border corruption including international business transactions. Facilitate the cooperative investigation of cases involving corruption by rendering mutual legal assistance in obtaining evidence, documents, articles, records and witness statements. Provide assistance in the investigation, recovery, seizure, freezing, forfeiture and confiscation of property in respect of the proceeds of corruption

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as well as the reciprocal enforcement of forfeiture and other such orders. 22. Apply reciprocal obligations for the extradition of those accused or convicted of corruption offenses. 23. Take preventive measures, including the shortterm harmonization of relevant laws, regulations and procedures, for example those relating to taxes, customs tariffs and duties, and public procurement. 24. Establish government-to-government mechanisms to monitor implementation of these principles, including a mutual reporting and evaluation process. 25. Consider the elaboration and adoption of an African convention for combating corruption based on the foregoing principles, and encourage the establishment of a global anti-corruption convention.

6. United Nations Convention against Corruption The United Nations Convention against Corruption is a stand-alone document. Its focus is on public- and private-sector corruption, and it addresses measures to “promote effective practices aimed at the prevention of corruption.” Some of these measures, enumerated in Chapter 2, provide guidance to states in matters relative to hiring practices, remuneration, training in appropriate “standards of conduct,” financial disclosures, and the establishment of administrative protocols that specifically address matters relating to “conflict of issues.” Additionally, the convention calls on all states to adopt legislation that criminalize offenses such as the act of bribery or the acceptance of such by national or international public officials. This convention also addresses bribery-related offenses that occur in the private sector and the laundering of money, as in the proceeds of crime. The convention calls on all states to cooperate with each other

and the international community both in the prevention of and the ongoing fight against corruption. Source United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www .unodc.org/unodc/crime_convention_corruption.html.

Preamble The States Parties to this Convention, Concerned about the seriousness of problems and threats posed by corruption to the stability and security of societies, undermining the institutions and values of democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardizing sustainable development and the rule of law, Concerned also about the links between corruption and other forms of crime, in particular organized crime and economic crime, including moneylaundering, Concerned further about cases of corruption that involve vast quantities of assets, which may constitute a substantial proportion of the resources of States, and that threaten the political stability and sustainable development of those States, Convinced that corruption is no longer a local matter but a transnational phenomenon that affects all societies and economies, making international cooperation to prevent and control it essential, Convinced also that a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach is required to prevent and combat corruption effectively, Convinced further that the availability of technical assistance can play an important role in enhancing the ability of States, including by strengthening capacity and by institution-building, to prevent and combat corruption effectively,

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Convinced that the illicit acquisition of personal wealth can be particularly damaging to democratic institutions, national economies and the rule of law, Determined to prevent, detect and deter in a more effective manner international transfers of illicitly acquired assets and to strengthen international cooperation in asset recovery,

Taking note with appreciation of multilateral instruments to prevent and combat corruption, including, inter alia, the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, adopted by the Organization of American States on 29 March 1996, 1. the Convention on the Fight against Corruption involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union, adopted by the Council of the European Union on 26 May 1997, 2. the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, adopted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development on 21 November 1997, 3. the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 27 January 1999, 4. the Civil Law Convention on Corruption, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 4 November 1999, 5. and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the African Union on 12 July 2003,

Acknowledging the fundamental principles of due process of law in criminal proceedings and in civil or administrative proceedings to adjudicate property rights, Bearing in mind that the prevention and eradication of corruption is a responsibility of all States and that they must cooperate with one another, with the support and involvement of individuals and groups outside the public sector, such as civil society, non-governmental organizations and community-based organizations, if their efforts in this area are to be effective, Bearing also in mind the principles of proper management of public affairs and public property, fairness, responsibility and equality before the law and the need to safeguard integrity and to foster a culture of rejection of corruption, Commending the work of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in preventing and combating corruption,

Welcoming the entry into force on 29 September 2003 of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime Have agreed as follows: Chapter I

Recalling the work carried out by other international and regional organizations in this field, including the activities of the African Union, the Council of Europe, the Customs Cooperation Council (also known as the World Customs Organization), the European Union, the League of Arab States, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Organization of American States,

General Provisions Article 1 Statement of Purpose The purposes of this Convention are: (a) To promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption more efficiently and effectively;

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(b) To promote, facilitate and support international cooperation and technical assistance in the prevention of and fight against corruption, including in asset recovery; (c) To promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and public property.

Article 2 Use of Terms For the purposes of this Convention: (a) “Public official” shall mean: (i) any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a State Party, whether appointed or elected, whether permanent or temporary, whether paid or unpaid, irrespective of that person’s seniority; (ii) any other person who performs a public function, including for a public agency or public enterprise, or provides a public service, as defined in the domestic law of the State Party and as applied in the pertinent area of law of that State Party; (iii) any other person defined as a “public official” in the domestic law of a State Party. However, for the purpose of some specific measures contained in chapter II of this Convention, “public official” may mean any person who performs a public function or provides a public service as defined in the domestic law of the State Party and as applied in the pertinent area of law of that State Party; (b) “Foreign public official” shall mean any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; and any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or public enterprise; (c) “Official of a public international organization” shall mean an international civil servant or any person who is authorized by such an organization to act on behalf of that organization; (d) “Property” shall mean assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal doc-

uments or instruments evidencing title to or interest in such assets; (e) “Proceeds of crime” shall mean any property derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence; (f) “Freezing” or “seizure” shall mean temporarily prohibiting the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of property or temporarily assuming custody or control of property on the basis of an order issued by a court or other competent authority; (g) “Confiscation”, which includes forfeiture where applicable, shall mean the permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority; (h) “Predicate offence” shall mean any offence as a result of which proceeds have been generated that may become the subject of an offence as defined in article 23 of this Convention; (i) “Controlled delivery” shall mean the technique of allowing illicit or suspect consignments to pass out of, through or into the territory of one or more States, with the knowledge and under the supervision of their competent authorities, with a view to the investigation of an offence and the identification of persons involved in the commission of the offence.

Article 3 Scope of Application 1. This Convention shall apply, in accordance with its terms, to the prevention, investigation and prosecution of corruption and to the freezing, seizure, confiscation and return of the proceeds of offences established in accordance with this Convention. 2. For the purposes of implementing this Convention, it shall not be necessary, except as otherwise stated herein, for the offences set forth in it to result in damage or harm to state property.

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Article 4 Protection of Sovereignty 1. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States. 2. Nothing in this Convention shall entitle a State Party to undertake in the territory of another State the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions that are reserved exclusively for the authorities of that other State by its domestic law.

measures referred to in this article. That collaboration may include participation in international programmes and projects aimed at the prevention of corruption. Article 6 Preventive Anti-Corruption Body or Bodies 1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, ensure the existence of a body or bodies, as appropriate, that prevent corruption by such means as: (a) Implementing the policies referred to in article 5 of this Convention and, where appropriate, overseeing and coordinating the implementation of those policies; (b) Increasing and disseminating knowledge about the prevention of corruption.

Chapter II Preventive Measures Article 5 Preventive Anti-Corruption Policies and Practices 1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, develop and implement or maintain effective, coordinated anticorruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability. 2. Each State Party shall endeavour to establish and promote effective practices aimed at the prevention of corruption. 3. Each State Party shall endeavour to periodically evaluate relevant legal instruments and administrative measures with a view to determining their adequacy to prevent and fight corruption. 4. States Parties shall, as appropriate and in accordance with the fundamental principles of their legal system, collaborate with each other and with relevant international and regional organizations in promoting and developing the

2. Each State Party shall grant the body or bodies referred to in paragraph 1 of this article the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, to enable the body or bodies to carry out its or their functions effectively and free from any undue influence. The necessary material resources and specialized staff, as well as the training that such staff may require to carry out their functions, should be provided. 3. Each State Party shall inform the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations of the name and address of the authority or authorities that may assist other States Parties in developing and implementing specific measures for the prevention of corruption. Article 7 Public Sector 1. Each State Party shall, where appropriate and in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, endeavour to adopt, maintain and strengthen systems for the recruitment, hiring, retention, promotion and retirement of civil

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servants and, where appropriate, other non-elected public officials: (a) That are based on principles of efficiency, transparency and objective criteria such as merit, equity and aptitude; (b) That include adequate procedures for the selection and training of individuals for public positions considered especially vulnerable to corruption and the rotation, where appropriate, of such individuals to other positions; (c) That promote adequate remuneration and equitable pay scales, taking into account the level of economic development of the State Party; (d) That promote education and training programmes to enable them to meet the requirements for the correct, honourable and proper performance of public functions and that provide them with specialized and appropriate training to enhance their awareness of the risks of corruption inherent in the performance of their functions. Such programmes may make reference to codes or standards of conduct in applicable areas.

2. Each State Party shall also consider adopting appropriate legislative and administrative measures, consistent with the objectives of this Convention and in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to prescribe criteria concerning candidature for and election to public office. 3. Each State Party shall also consider taking appropriate legislative and administrative measures, consistent with the objectives of this Convention and in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to enhance transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public office and, where applicable, the funding of political parties. 4. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, endeavour to adopt, maintain and strengthen systems that promote transparency and prevent conflicts of interest.

Article 8 Codes of Conduct for Public Officials 1. In order to fight corruption, each State Party shall promote, inter alia, integrity, honesty and responsibility among its public officials, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system. 2. In particular, each State Party shall endeavour to apply, within its own institutional and legal systems, codes or standards of conduct for the correct, honourable and proper performance of public functions. 3. For the purposes of implementing the provisions of this article, each State Party shall, where appropriate and in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, take note of the relevant initiatives of regional, interregional and multilateral organizations, such as the International Code of Conduct for Public Officials contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution 51/59 of 12 December 1996. 4. Each State Party shall also consider, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, establishing measures and systems to facilitate the reporting by public officials of acts of corruption to appropriate authorities, when such acts come to their notice in the performance of their functions. 5. Each State Party shall endeavour, where appropriate and in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to establish measures and systems requiring public officials to make declarations to appropriate authorities regarding, inter alia, their outside activities, employment, investments, assets and substantial gifts or benefits from which a conflict of interest may result with respect to their functions as public officials.

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6. Each State Party shall consider taking, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, disciplinary or other measures against public officials who violate the codes or standards established in accordance with this article.

2. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, take appropriate measures to promote transparency and accountability in the management of public finances. Such measures shall encompass, inter alia: (a) Procedures for the adoption of the national budget; (b) Timely reporting on revenue and expenditure; (c) A system of accounting and auditing standards and related oversight; (d) Effective and efficient systems of risk management and internal control; and (e) Where appropriate, corrective action in the case of failure to comply with the requirements established in this paragraph.

Article 9 Public Procurement and Management of Public Finances 1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, take the necessary steps to establish appropriate systems of procurement, based on transparency, competition and objective criteria in decision-making, that are effective, inter alia, in preventing corruption. Such systems, which may take into account appropriate threshold values in their application, shall address, inter alia: (a) The public distribution of information relating to procurement procedures and contracts, including information on invitations to tender and relevant or pertinent information on the award of contracts, allowing potential tenderers sufficient time to prepare and submit their tenders; (b) The establishment, in advance, of conditions for participation, including selection and award criteria and tendering rules, and their publication; (c) The use of objective and predetermined criteria for public procurement decisions, in order to facilitate the subsequent verification of the correct application of the rules or procedures; (d) An effective system of domestic review, including an effective system of appeal, to ensure legal recourse and remedies in the event that the rules or procedures established pursuant to this paragraph are not followed; (e) Where appropriate, measures to regulate matters regarding personnel responsible for procurement, such as declaration of interest in particular public procurements, screening procedures and training requirements.

3. Each State Party shall take such civil and administrative measures as may be necessary, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to preserve the integrity of accounting books, records, financial statements or other documents related to public expenditure and revenue and to prevent the falsification of such documents. Article 10 Public Reporting Taking into account the need to combat corruption, each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, take such measures as may be necessary to enhance transparency in its public administration, including with regard to its organization, functioning and decision-making processes, where appropriate. Such measures may include, inter alia: (a) Adopting procedures or regulations allowing members of the general public to obtain, where appropriate, information on the organization, functioning and decision-making processes of its public administration and, with due regard for the protection of privacy and personal data, on decisions and legal acts that concern members of the public;

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(b) Simplifying administrative procedures, where appropriate, in order to facilitate public access to the competent decision-making authorities; and (c) Publishing information, which may include periodic reports on the risks of corruption in its public administration.

Article 11 Measures Relating to the Judiciary and Prosecution Services 1. Bearing in mind the independence of the judiciary and its crucial role in combating corruption, each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system and without prejudice to judicial independence, take measures to strengthen integrity and to prevent opportunities for corruption among members of the judiciary. Such measures may include rules with respect to the conduct of members of the judiciary. 2. Measures to the same effect as those taken pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article may be introduced and applied within the prosecution service in those States Parties where it does not form part of the judiciary but enjoys independence similar to that of the judicial service. Article 12 Private Sector 1. Each State Party shall take measures, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to prevent corruption involving the private sector, enhance accounting and auditing standards in the private sector and, where appropriate, provide effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative or criminal penalties for failure to comply with such measures. 2. Measures to achieve these ends may include, inter alia:

(a) Promoting cooperation between law enforcement agencies and relevant private entities; (b) Promoting the development of standards and procedures designed to safeguard the integrity of relevant private entities, including codes of conduct for the correct, honourable and proper performance of the activities of business and all relevant professions and the prevention of conflicts of interest, and for the promotion of the use of good commercial practices among businesses and in the contractual relations of businesses with the State; (c) Promoting transparency among private entities, including, where appropriate, measures regarding the identity of legal and natural persons involved in the establishment and management of corporate entities; (d) Preventing the misuse of procedures regulating private entities, including procedures regarding subsidies and licences granted by public authorities for commercial activities; (e) Preventing conflicts of interest by imposing restrictions, as appropriate and for a reasonable period of time, on the professional activities of former public officials or on the employment of public officials by the private sector after their resignation or retirement, where such activities or employment relate directly to the functions held or supervised by those public officials during their tenure; (f) Ensuring that private enterprises, taking into account their structure and size, have sufficient internal auditing controls to assist in preventing and detecting acts of corruption and that the accounts and required financial statements of such private enterprises are subject to appropriate auditing and certification procedures.

3. In order to prevent corruption, each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with its domestic laws and regulations regarding the maintenance of books and records, financial statement disclosures and accounting and auditing standards, to prohibit the following acts carried out for the purpose of committing any of

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the offences established in accordance with this Convention: (a) The establishment of off-the-books accounts; (b) The making of off-the-books or inadequately identified transactions; (c) The recording of non-existent expenditure; (d) The entry of liabilities with incorrect identification of their objects; (e) The use of false documents; and (f) The intentional destruction of bookkeeping documents earlier than foreseen by the law.

4. Each State Party shall disallow the tax deductibility of expenses that constitute bribes, the latter being one of the constituent elements of the offences established in accordance with articles 15 and 16 of this Convention and, where appropriate, other expenses incurred in furtherance of corrupt conduct.

(d) Respecting, promoting and protecting the freedom to seek, receive, publish and disseminate information concerning corruption. That freedom may be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided for by law and are necessary: (i) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (ii) For the protection of national security or ordre public or of public health or morals.

2. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the relevant anti-corruption bodies referred to in this Convention are known to the public and shall provide access to such bodies, where appropriate, for the reporting, including anonymously, of any incidents that may be considered to constitute an offence established in accordance with this Convention. Article 14

Article 13 Participation of Society 1. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures, within its means and in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, to promote the active participation of individuals and groups outside the public sector, such as civil society, non-governmental organizations and community-based organizations, in the prevention of and the fight against corruption and to raise public awareness regarding the existence, causes and gravity of and the threat posed by corruption. This participation should be strengthened by such measures as:

Measures to Prevent Money-Laundering 1. Each State Party shall:

(a) Enhancing the transparency of and promoting the contribution of the public to decision-making processes; (b) Ensuring that the public has effective access to information; (c) Undertaking public information activities that contribute to non-tolerance of corruption, as well as public education programmes, including school and university curricula;

(a) Institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions, including natural or legal persons that provide formal or informal services for the transmission of money or value and, where appropriate, other bodies particularly susceptible to money-laundering, within its competence, in order to deter and detect all forms of moneylaundering, which regime shall emphasize requirements for customer and, where appropriate, beneficial owner identification, record-keeping and the reporting of suspicious transactions; (b) Without prejudice to article 46 of this Convention, ensure that administrative, regulatory, law enforcement and other authorities dedicated to combating money-laundering (including, where appropriate under domestic law, judicial authorities) have the ability to cooperate and exchange information at the national and international levels within the conditions prescribed by its domestic law and, to that end, shall consider

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the establishment of a financial intelligence unit to serve as a national centre for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding potential money-laundering.

2. States Parties shall consider implementing feasible measures to detect and monitor the movement of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments across their borders, subject to safeguards to ensure proper use of information and without impeding in any way the movement of legitimate capital. Such measures may include a requirement that individuals and businesses report the cross-border transfer of substantial quantities of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments. 3. States Parties shall consider implementing appropriate and feasible measures to require financial institutions, including money remitters: (a) To include on forms for the electronic transfer of funds and related messages accurate and meaningful information on the originator; (b) To maintain such information throughout the payment chain; and (c) To apply enhanced scrutiny to transfers of funds that do not contain complete information on the originator.

4. In establishing a domestic regulatory and supervisory regime under the terms of this article, and without prejudice to any other article of this Convention, States Parties are called upon to use as a guideline the relevant initiatives of regional, interregional and multilateral organizations against money-laundering. 5. States Parties shall endeavour to develop and promote global, regional, subregional and bilateral cooperation among judicial, law enforcement and financial regulatory authorities in order to combat money-laundering.

Chapter III Criminalization and Law Enforcement Article 15 Bribery of National Public Officials Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) The promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; (b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.

Article 16 Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and Officials of Public International Organizations 1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the promise, offering or giving to a foreign public official or an official of a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other undue advantage in relation to the conduct of international business. 2. Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the solicitation or acceptance by a

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foreign public official or an official of a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. Article 17 Embezzlement, Misappropriation or Other Diversion of Property by a Public Official Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally, the embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion by a public official for his or her benefit or for the benefit of another person or entity, of any property, public or private funds or securities or any other thing of value entrusted to the public official by virtue of his or her position. Article 18 Trading in Influence Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) The promise, offering or giving to a public official or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an undue advantage for the original instigator of the act or for any other person; (b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an undue advantage.

Article 19 Abuse of Functions Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the abuse of functions or position, that is, the performance of or failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his or her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity. Article 20 Illicit Enrichment Subject to its constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system, each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, illicit enrichment, that is, a significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income. Article 21 Bribery in the Private Sector Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally in the course of economic, financial or commercial activities: (a) The promise, offering or giving, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage to any person who directs or works, in any capacity, for a private sector entity, for the person himself or herself or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her duties, act or refrain from acting; (b) The solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage by any person who directs or works, in any capacity, for a private sector entity, for the person himself or herself or for

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another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her duties, act or refrain from acting.

mission of any of the offences established in accordance with this article.

2. For purposes of implementing or applying paragraph 1 of this article:

Article 22 Embezzlement of Property in the Private Sector Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally in the course of economic, financial or commercial activities, embezzlement by a person who directs or works, in any capacity, in a private sector entity of any property, private funds or securities or any other thing of value entrusted to him or her by virtue of his or her position. Article 23 Laundering of Proceeds of Crime 1. Each State Party shall adopt, in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) (i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of helping any person who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her action; (ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime; (b) Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system: (i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property is the proceeds of crime; (ii) Participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the com-

(a) Each State Party shall seek to apply paragraph 1 of this article to the widest range of predicate offences; (b) Each State Party shall include as predicate offences at a minimum a comprehensive range of criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention; (c) For the purposes of subparagraph (b) above, predicate offences shall include offences committed both within and outside the jurisdiction of the State Party in question. However, offences committed outside the jurisdiction of a State Party shall constitute predicate offences only when the relevant conduct is a criminal offence under the domestic law of the State where it is committed and would be a criminal offence under the domestic law of the State Party implementing or applying this article had it been committed there; (d) Each State Party shall furnish copies of its laws that give effect to this article and of any subsequent changes to such laws or a description thereof to the Secretary-General of the United Nations; (e) If required by fundamental principles of the domestic law of a State Party, it may be provided that the offences set forth in paragraph 1 of this article do not apply to the persons who committed the predicate offence.

Article 24 Concealment Without prejudice to the provisions of article 23 of this Convention, each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally after the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with this Convention without having participated in such offences, the concealment or

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continued retention of property when the person involved knows that such property is the result of any of the offences established in accordance with this Convention.

4. Each State Party shall, in particular, ensure that legal persons held liable in accordance with this article are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.

Article 25 Article 27 Obstruction of Justice Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) The use of physical force, threats or intimidation or the promise, offering or giving of an undue advantage to induce false testimony or to interfere in the giving of testimony or the production of evidence in a proceeding in relation to the commission of offences established in accordance with this Convention; (b) The use of physical force, threats or intimidation to interfere with the exercise of official duties by a justice or law enforcement official in relation to the commission of offences established in accordance with this Convention. Nothing in this subparagraph shall prejudice the right of States Parties to have legislation that protects other categories of public official.

Article 26

Participation and Attempt 1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, in accordance with its domestic law, participation in any capacity such as an accomplice, assistant or instigator in an offence established in accordance with this Convention. 2. Each State Party may adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, in accordance with its domestic law, any attempt to commit an offence established in accordance with this Convention. 3. Each State Party may adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, in accordance with its domestic law, the preparation for an offence established in accordance with this Convention. Article 28

Liability of Legal Persons 1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, consistent with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for participation in the offences established in accordance with this Convention. 2. Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, the liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative. 3. Such liability shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural persons who have committed the offences.

Knowledge, Intent and Purpose As Elements of an Offence Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of an offence established in accordance with this Convention may be inferred from objective factual circumstances. Article 29 Statute of Limitations Each State Party shall, where appropriate, establish under its domestic law a long statute of limitations period in which to commence proceedings for any offence established in accordance with this Convention and establish a longer statute of

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limitations period or provide for the suspension of the statute of limitations where the alleged offender has evaded the administration of justice. Article 30 Prosecution, Adjudication and Sanctions 1. Each State Party shall make the commission of an offence established in accordance with this Convention liable to sanctions that take into account the gravity of that offence. 2. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish or maintain, in accordance with its legal system and constitutional principles, an appropriate balance between any immunities or jurisdictional privileges accorded to its public officials for the performance of their functions and the possibility, when necessary, of effectively investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating offences established in accordance with this Convention. 3. Each State Party shall endeavour to ensure that any discretionary legal powers under its domestic law relating to the prosecution of persons for offences established in accordance with this Convention are exercised to maximize the effectiveness of law enforcement measures in respect of those offences and with due regard to the need to deter the commission of such offences. 4. In the case of offences established in accordance with this Convention, each State Party shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with its domestic law and with due regard to the rights of the defence, to seek to ensure that conditions imposed in connection with decisions on release pending trial or appeal take into consideration the need to ensure the presence of the defendant at subsequent criminal proceedings. 5. Each State Party shall take into account the gravity of the offences concerned when considering

the eventuality of early release or parole of persons convicted of such offences. 6. Each State Party, to the extent consistent with the fundamental principles of its legal system, shall consider establishing procedures through which a public official accused of an offence established in accordance with this Convention may, where appropriate, be removed, suspended or reassigned by the appropriate authority, bearing in mind respect for the principle of the presumption of innocence. 7. Where warranted by the gravity of the offence, each State Party, to the extent consistent with the fundamental principles of its legal system, shall consider establishing procedures for the disqualification, by court order or any other appropriate means, for a period of time determined by its domestic law, of persons convicted of offences established in accordance with this Convention from: (a) Holding public office; and (b) Holding office in an enterprise owned in whole or in part by the State.

8. Paragraph 1 of this article shall be without prejudice to the exercise of disciplinary powers by the competent authorities against civil servants. 9. Nothing contained in this Convention shall affect the principle that the description of the offences established in accordance with this Convention and of the applicable legal defences or other legal principles controlling the lawfulness of conduct is reserved to the domestic law of a State Party and that such offences shall be prosecuted and punished in accordance with that law. 10. States Parties shall endeavour to promote the reintegration into society of persons convicted of offences established in accordance with this Convention.

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Article 31 Freezing, Seizure and Confiscation 1. Each State Party shall take, to the greatest extent possible within its domestic legal system, such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of: (a) Proceeds of crime derived from offences established in accordance with this Convention or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds; (b) Property, equipment or other instrumentalities used in or destined for use in offences established in accordance with this Convention.

2. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to enable the identification, tracing, freezing or seizure of any item referred to in paragraph 1 of this article for the purpose of eventual confiscation. 3. Each State Party shall adopt, in accordance with its domestic law, such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to regulate the administration by the competent authorities of frozen, seized or confiscated property covered in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article. 4. If such proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted, in part or in full, into other property, such property shall be liable to the measures referred to in this article instead of the proceeds. 5. If such proceeds of crime have been intermingled with property acquired from legitimate sources, such property shall, without prejudice to any powers relating to freezing or seizure, be liable to confiscation up to the assessed value of the intermingled proceeds. 6. Income or other benefits derived from such proceeds of crime, from property into which such proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted or from property with which such

proceeds of crime have been intermingled shall also be liable to the measures referred to in this article, in the same manner and to the same extent as proceeds of crime. 7. For the purpose of this article and article 55 of this Convention, each State Party shall empower its courts or other competent authorities to order that bank, financial or commercial records be made available or seized. A State Party shall not decline to act under the provisions of this paragraph on the ground of bank secrecy. 8. States Parties may consider the possibility of requiring that an offender demonstrate the lawful origin of such alleged proceeds of crime or other property liable to confiscation, to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with the fundamental principles of their domestic law and with the nature of judicial and other proceedings. 9. The provisions of this article shall not be so construed as to prejudice the rights of bona fide third parties. 10. Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the measures to which it refers shall be defined and implemented in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the domestic law of a State Party. Article 32 Protection of Witnesses, Experts and Victims 1. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures in accordance with its domestic legal system and within its means to provide effective protection from potential retaliation or intimidation for witnesses and experts who give testimony concerning offences established in accordance with this Convention and, as appropriate, for their relatives and other persons close to them. 2. The measures envisaged in paragraph 1 of this article may include, inter alia, without prejudice to

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the rights of the defendant, including the right to due process: (a) Establishing procedures for the physical protection of such persons, such as, to the extent necessary and feasible, relocating them and permitting, where appropriate, non-disclosure or limitations on the disclosure of information concerning the identity and whereabouts of such persons; (b) Providing evidentiary rules to permit witnesses and experts to give testimony in a manner that ensures the safety of such persons, such as permitting testimony to be given through the use of communications technology such as video or other adequate means.

3. States Parties shall consider entering into agreements or arrangements with other States for the relocation of persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

measures, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to address consequences of corruption. In this context, States Parties may consider corruption a relevant factor in legal proceedings to annul or rescind a contract, withdraw a concession or other similar instrument or take any other remedial action. Article 35 Compensation for Damage Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with principles of its domestic law, to ensure that entities or persons who have suffered damage as a result of an act of corruption have the right to initiate legal proceedings against those responsible for that damage in order to obtain compensation. Article 36

4. The provisions of this article shall also apply to victims insofar as they are witnesses. 5. Each State Party shall, subject to its domestic law, enable the views and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of criminal proceedings against offenders in a manner not prejudicial to the rights of the defence. Article 33 Protection of Reporting Persons Each State Party shall consider incorporating into its domestic legal system appropriate measures to provide protection against any unjustified treatment for any person who reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the competent authorities any facts concerning offences established in accordance with this Convention. Article 34 Consequences of Acts of Corruption With due regard to the rights of third parties acquired in good faith, each State Party shall take

Specialized Authorities Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, ensure the existence of a body or bodies or persons specialized in combating corruption through law enforcement. Such body or bodies or persons shall be granted the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental principles of the legal system of the State Party, to be able to carry out their functions effectively and without any undue influence. Such persons or staff of such body or bodies should have the appropriate training and resources to carry out their tasks. Article 37 Cooperation with Law Enforcement Authorities 1. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to encourage persons who participate or who have participated in the commission of an offence established in accordance with this Convention to supply information useful to competent authorities for investigative and evidentiary purposes and to provide factual, specific help to competent

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authorities that may contribute to depriving offenders of the proceeds of crime and to recovering such proceeds. 2. Each State Party shall consider providing for the possibility, in appropriate cases, of mitigating punishment of an accused person who provides substantial cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of an offence established in accordance with this Convention. 3. Each State Party shall consider providing for the possibility, in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, of granting immunity from prosecution to a person who provides substantial cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of an offence established in accordance with this Convention. 4. Protection of such persons shall be, mutatis mutandis, as provided for in article 32 of this Convention. 5. Where a person referred to in paragraph 1 of this article located in one State Party can provide substantial cooperation to the competent authorities of another State Party, the States Parties concerned may consider entering into agreements or arrangements, in accordance with their domestic law, concerning the potential provision by the other State Party of the treatment set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article. Article 38 Cooperation between National Authorities Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to encourage, in accordance with its domestic law, cooperation between, on the one hand, its public authorities, as well as its public officials, and, on the other hand, its authorities responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal offences. Such cooperation may include:

(a) Informing the latter authorities, on their own initiative, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the offences established in accordance with articles 15, 21 and 23 of this Convention has been committed; or (b) Providing, upon request, to the latter authorities all necessary information.

Article 39 Cooperation between National Authorities and the Private Sector 1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to encourage, in accordance with its domestic law, cooperation between national investigating and prosecuting authorities and entities of the private sector, in particular financial institutions, relating to matters involving the commission of offences established in accordance with this Convention. 2. Each State Party shall consider encouraging its nationals and other persons with a habitual residence in its territory to report to the national investigating and prosecuting authorities the commission of an offence established in accordance with this Convention. Article 40 Bank Secrecy Each State Party shall ensure that, in the case of domestic criminal investigations of offences established in accordance with this Convention, there are appropriate mechanisms available within its domestic legal system to overcome obstacles that may arise out of the application of bank secrecy laws. Article 41 Criminal Record Each State Party may adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to take into consideration, under such terms as and for the

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purpose that it deems appropriate, any previous conviction in another State of an alleged offender for the purpose of using such information in criminal proceedings relating to an offence established in accordance with this Convention.

4. Each State Party may also take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences established in accordance with this Convention when the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him or her.

Article 42

5. If a State Party exercising its jurisdiction under paragraph 1 or 2 of this article has been notified, or has otherwise learned, that any other States Parties are conducting an investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding in respect of the same conduct, the competent authorities of those States Parties shall, as appropriate, consult one another with a view to coordinating their actions.

Jurisdiction 1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences established in accordance with this Convention when: (a) The offence is committed in the territory of that State Party; or (b) The offence is committed on board a vessel that is flying the flag of that State Party or an aircraft that is registered under the laws of that State Party at the time that the offence is committed.

2. Subject to article 4 of this Convention, a State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when: (a) The offence is committed against a national of that State Party; or (b) The offence is committed by a national of that State Party or a stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in its territory; or (c) The offence is one of those established in accordance with article 23, paragraph 1 (b) (ii), of this Convention and is committed outside its territory with a view to the commission of an offence established in accordance with article 23, paragraph 1 (a) (i) or (ii) or (b) (i), of this Convention within its territory; or (d) The offence is committed against the State Party.

3. For the purposes of article 44 of this Convention, each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences established in accordance with this Convention when the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite such person solely on the ground that he or she is one of its nationals.

6. Without prejudice to norms of general international law, this Convention shall not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by a State Party in accordance with its domestic law. Chapter IV International Cooperation Article 43 International Cooperation 1. States Parties shall cooperate in criminal matters in accordance with articles 44 to 50 of this Convention. Where appropriate and consistent with their domestic legal system, States Parties shall consider assisting each other in investigations of and proceedings in civil and administrative matters relating to corruption. Article 48 Law Enforcement Cooperation 1. States Parties shall cooperate closely with one another, consistent with their respective domestic legal and administrative systems, to enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement action to combat the offences covered by this Convention. States Parties shall, in particular, take effective measures:

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(a) To enhance and, where necessary, to establish channels of communication between their competent authorities, agencies and services in order to facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of information concerning all aspects of the offences covered by this Convention, including, if the States Parties concerned deem it appropriate, links with other criminal activities; (b) To cooperate with other States Parties in conducting inquiries with respect to offences covered by this Convention concerning: (i) The identity, whereabouts and activities of persons suspected of involvement in such offences or the location of other persons concerned; (ii) The movement of proceeds of crime or property derived from the commission of such offences; (iii) The movement of property, equipment or other instrumentalities used or intended for use in the commission of such offences; (c) To provide, where appropriate, necessary items or quantities of substances for analytical or investigative purposes; (d) To exchange, where appropriate, information with other States Parties concerning specific means and methods used to commit offences covered by this Convention, including the use of false identities, forged, altered or false documents and other means of concealing activities; (e) To facilitate effective coordination between their competent authorities, agencies and services and to promote the exchange of personnel and other experts, including, subject to bilateral agreements or arrangements between the States Parties concerned, the posting of liaison officers; (f) To exchange information and coordinate administrative and other measures taken as appropriate for the purpose of early identification of the offences covered by this Convention.

2. With a view to giving effect to this Convention, States Parties shall consider entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements on direct cooperation between their law enforcement agencies and, where such agreements or

arrangements already exist, amending them. In the absence of such agreements or arrangements between the States Parties concerned, the States Parties may consider this Convention to be the basis for mutual law enforcement cooperation in respect of the offences covered by this Convention. Whenever appropriate, States Parties shall make full use of agreements or arrangements, including international or regional organizations, to enhance the cooperation between their law enforcement agencies. 3. States Parties shall endeavour to cooperate within their means to respond to offences covered by this Convention committed through the use of modern technology.

7. Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime The information revolution of the twenty-first century has dramatically altered the means by which governments, businesses, and private-sector organizations and individuals conduct business and engage in dayto-day activities. Electronic mailing via the Internet is but one example of how advances in communication technology have altered and enhanced our capability to send and receive vital information. Unfortunately, these capabilities that enhance our lives have also enabled criminal entrepreneurs to span national and international borders, thereby increasing their ability to engage in traditional as well as nontraditional criminal activity. At present, national laws and the agencies assigned to enforce them are not equipped to deal with this phenomenon. Hence, to enhance global security and protect ordinary citizens, regional and international cooperation among governments and privatesector institutions is needed. The Convention on Cybercrime is a step in that direction. Source Council of Europe, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/ Treaties/Word/185.doc.

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Preamble The member States of the Council of Europe and the other States signatory hereto, Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members; Recognising the value of fostering co-operation with the other States parties to this Convention; Convinced of the need to pursue, as a matter of priority, a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against cybercrime, inter alia, by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering international co-operation; Conscious of the profound changes brought about by the digitalisation, convergence and continuing globalisation of computer networks; Concerned by the risk that computer networks and electronic information may also be used for committing criminal offences and that evidence relating to such offences may be stored and transferred by these networks; Recognising the need for co-operation between States and private industry in combating cybercrime and the need to protect legitimate interests in the use and development of information technologies; Believing that an effective fight against cybercrime requires increased, rapid and well-functioning international co-operation in criminal matters; Convinced that the present Convention is necessary to deter action directed against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer systems, networks and computer data as well as the misuse of such systems, networks and data by providing for the criminalisation of such conduct, as described in this Convention, and the adoption of powers sufficient for effectively combating such criminal offences, by facilitating

their detection, investigation and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable international co-operation; Mindful of the need to ensure a proper balance between the interests of law enforcement and respect for fundamental human rights as enshrined in the 1950 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 1966 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other applicable international human rights treaties, which reaffirm the right of everyone to hold opinions without interference, as well as the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, and the rights concerning the respect for privacy; Mindful also of the right to the protection of personal data, as conferred, for example, by the 1981 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. Considering the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 1999 International Labour Organization Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention; Taking into account the existing Council of Europe conventions on co-operation in the penal field, as well as similar treaties which exist between Council of Europe member States and other States, and stressing that the present Convention is intended to supplement those conventions in order to make criminal investigations and proceedings concerning criminal offences related to computer systems and data more effective and to enable the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence; Welcoming recent developments which further advance international understanding and cooperation in combating cybercrime, including

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action taken by the United Nations, the OECD, the European Union and the G8; Recalling Committee of Ministers Recommendations No. R (85) 10 concerning the practical application of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters in respect of letters rogatory for the interception of telecommunications, No. R (88) 2 on piracy in the field of copyright and neighbouring rights, No. R (87) 15 regulating the use of personal data in the police sector, No. R (95) 4 on the protection of personal data in the area of telecommunication services, with particular reference to telephone services, as well as No. R (89) 9 on computerrelated crime providing guidelines for national legislatures concerning the definition of certain computer crimes and No. R (95) 13 concerning problems of criminal procedural law connected with information technology; Having regard to Resolution No. 1 adopted by the European Ministers of Justice at their 21st Conference (Prague, 10 and 11 June 1997), which recommended that the Committee of Ministers support the work on cybercrime carried out by the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) in order to bring domestic criminal law provisions closer to each other and enable the use of effective means of investigation into such offences, as well as to Resolution No. 3 adopted at the 23rd Conference of the European Ministers of Justice (London, 8 and 9 June 2000), which encouraged the negotiating parties to pursue their efforts with a view to finding appropriate solutions to enable the largest possible number of States to become parties to the Convention and acknowledged the need for a swift and efficient system of international co-operation, which duly takes into account the specific requirements of the fight against cybercrime; Having also regard to the Action Plan adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe on the occasion of their Second Summit

(Strasbourg, 10 and 11 October 1997), to seek common responses to the development of the new information technologies based on the standards and values of the Council of Europe; Have agreed as follows: Chapter I—Use of Terms Article 1—Definitions For the purposes of this Convention: a. “computer system” means any device or a group of interconnected or related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a program, performs automatic processing of data; b. “computer data” means any representation of facts, information or concepts in a form suitable for processing in a computer system, including a program suitable to cause a computer system to perform a function; c. “service provider” means: i. any public or private entity that provides to users of its service the ability to communicate by means of a computer system, and ii. any other entity that processes or stores computer data on behalf of such communication service or users of such service; d. “traffic data” means any computer data relating to a communication by means of a computer system, generated by a computer system that formed a part in the chain of communication, indicating the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service.

Chapter II—Measures to Be Taken at the National Level Section 1—Substantive Criminal Law Title 1—Offences against the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of Computer Data and Systems

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Article 2—Illegal Access Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right. A Party may require that the offence be committed by infringing security measures, with the intent of obtaining computer data or other dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer system that is connected to another computer system. Article 3—Illegal Interception Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the interception without right, made by technical means, of non-public transmissions of computer data to, from or within a computer system, including electromagnetic emissions from a computer system carrying such computer data. A Party may require that the offence be committed with dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer system that is connected to another computer system. Article 4—Data Interference 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the damaging, deletion, deterioration, alteration or suppression of computer data without right. 2. A Party may reserve the right to require that the conduct described in paragraph 1 result in serious harm. Article 5—System Interference Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the serious hindering without right of the functioning of a computer system by inputting, transmitting, damaging,

deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing computer data. Article 6—Misuse of Devices 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right: a. the production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making available of: i. a device, including a computer program, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in accordance with the above Articles 2 through 5; ii. a computer password, access code, or similar data by which the whole or any part of a computer system is capable of being accessed, with intent that it be used for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in Articles 2 through 5; and b. the possession of an item referred to in paragraphs a.i or ii above, with intent that it be used for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in Articles 2 through 5. A Party may require by law that a number of such items be possessed before criminal liability attaches.

2. This article shall not be interpreted as imposing criminal liability where the production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making available or possession referred to in paragraph 1 of this article is not for the purpose of committing an offence established in accordance with Articles 2 through 5 of this Convention, such as for the authorised testing or protection of a computer system. 3. Each Party may reserve the right not to apply paragraph 1 of this article, provided that the reservation does not concern the sale, distribution or otherwise making available of the items referred to in paragraph 1 a.ii of this article.

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Title 2—Computer-Related Offences Article 7—Computer-Related Forgery Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right, the input, alteration, deletion, or suppression of computer data, resulting in inauthentic data with the intent that it be considered or acted upon for legal purposes as if it were authentic, regardless whether or not the data is directly readable and intelligible. A Party may require an intent to defraud, or similar dishonest intent, before criminal liability attaches. Article 8—Computer-Related Fraud Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right, the causing of a loss of property to another person by: a. any input, alteration, deletion or suppression of computer data; b. any interference with the functioning of a computer system, with fraudulent or dishonest intent of procuring, without right, an economic benefit for oneself or for another person.

Title 3—Content-Related Offences Article 9—Offences Related to Child Pornography 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right, the following conduct: a. producing child pornography for the purpose of its distribution through a computer system; b. offering or making available child pornography through a computer system; c. distributing or transmitting child pornography through a computer system;

d. procuring child pornography through a computer system for oneself or for another person; e. possessing child pornography in a computer system or on a computer-data storage medium.

2. For the purpose of paragraph 1 above, the term “child pornography” shall include pornographic material that visually depicts: a. a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; b. a person appearing to be a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; c. realistic images representing a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

3. For the purpose of paragraph 2 above, the term “minor” shall include all persons under 18 years of age. A Party may, however, require a lower agelimit, which shall be not less than 16 years. 4. Each Party may reserve the right not to apply, in whole or in part, paragraphs 1, sub-paragraphs d. and e, and 2, sub-paragraphs b. and c. Title 4—Offences Related to Infringements of Copyright and Related Rights Article 10—Offences Related to Infringements of Copyright and Related Rights 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the infringement of copyright, as defined under the law of that Party, pursuant to the obligations it has undertaken under the Paris Act of 24 July 1971 revising the Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the WIPO Copyright Treaty, with the exception of any moral rights conferred by such conventions, where such acts are committed wilfully, on a commercial scale and by means of a computer system. 2. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as

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criminal offences under its domestic law the infringement of related rights, as defined under the law of that Party, pursuant to the obligations it has undertaken under the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (Rome Convention), the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, with the exception of any moral rights conferred by such conventions, where such acts are committed wilfully, on a commercial scale and by means of a computer system. 3. A Party may reserve the right not to impose criminal liability under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article in limited circumstances, provided that other effective remedies are available and that such reservation does not derogate from the Party’s international obligations set forth in the international instruments referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article. Title 5—Ancillary Liability and Sanctions Article 11—Attempt and Aiding or Abetting 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, aiding or abetting the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with Articles 2 through 10 of the present Convention with intent that such offence be committed. 2. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, an attempt to commit any of the offences established in accordance with Articles 3 through 5, 7, 8, and 9.1.a and c. of this Convention. 3. Each Party may reserve the right not to apply, in whole or in part, paragraph 2 of this article.

Article 12—Corporate Liability 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that legal persons can be held liable for a criminal offence established in accordance with this Convention, committed for their benefit by any natural person, acting either individually or as part of an organ of the legal person, who has a leading position within it, based on: a. a power of representation of the legal person; b. an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person; c. an authority to exercise control within the legal person.

2. In addition to the cases already provided for in paragraph 1 of this article, each Party shall take the measures necessary to ensure that a legal person can be held liable where the lack of supervision or control by a natural person referred to in paragraph 1 has made possible the commission of a criminal offence established in accordance with this Convention for the benefit of that legal person by a natural person acting under its authority. 3. Subject to the legal principles of the Party, the liability of a legal person may be criminal, civil or administrative. 4. Such liability shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural persons who have committed the offence. Article 13—Sanctions and Measures 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 through 11 are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, which include deprivation of liberty. 2. Each Party shall ensure that legal persons held liable in accordance with Article 12 shall be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal

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or non-criminal sanctions or measures, including monetary sanctions.

ii. does not employ public communications networks and is not connected with another computer system, whether public or private, that Party may reserve the right not to apply these measures to such communications. Each Party shall consider restricting such a reservation to enable the broadest application of the measures referred to in Articles 20 and 21. [. . .]

Section 2—Procedural Law Title 1—Common Provisions Article 14—Scope of Procedural Provisions 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish the powers and procedures provided for in this section for the purpose of specific criminal investigations or proceedings. 2. Except as specifically provided otherwise in Article 21, each Party shall apply the powers and procedures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article to: a. the criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 through 11 of this Convention; b. other criminal offences committed by means of a computer system; and c. the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence.

3. a. Each Party may reserve the right to apply the measures referred to in Article 20 only to offences or categories of offences specified in the reservation, provided that the range of such offences or categories of offences is not more restricted than the range of offences to which it applies the measures referred to in Article 21. Each Party shall consider restricting such a reservation to enable the broadest application of the measure referred to in Article 20. b. Where a Party, due to limitations in its legislation in force at the time of the adoption of the present Convention, is not able to apply the measures referred to in Articles 20 and 21 to communications being transmitted within a computer system of a service provider, which system: i. is being operated for the benefit of a closed group of users, and

Chapter III—International Co-operation Section 1—General Principles Title 1—General Principles Relating to International Co-operation Article 23—General Principles Relating to International Co-operation The Parties shall co-operate with each other, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, and through the application of relevant international instruments on international co-operation in criminal matters, arrangements agreed on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation, and domestic laws, to the widest extent possible for the purposes of investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences related to computer systems and data, or for the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence. Title 2—Principles Relating to Extradition Article 24—Extradition 1. a. This article applies to extradition between Parties for the criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 through 11 of this Convention, provided that they are punishable under the laws of both Parties concerned by deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of at least one year, or by a more severe penalty. b. Where a different minimum penalty is to be applied under an arrangement agreed on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation or an extradition treaty, including the European

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Convention on Extradition (ETS No. 24), applicable between two or more parties, the minimum penalty provided for under such arrangement or treaty shall apply. 2. The criminal offences described in paragraph 1 of this article shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between or among the Parties. The Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty to be concluded between or among them. 3. If a Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Party with which it does not have an extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition with respect to any criminal offence referred to in paragraph 1 of this article. 4. Parties that do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognise the criminal offences referred to in paragraph 1 of this article as extraditable offences between themselves. 5. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the requested Party or by applicable extradition treaties, including the grounds on which the requested Party may refuse extradition. 6. If extradition for a criminal offence referred to in paragraph 1 of this article is refused solely on the basis of the nationality of the person sought, or because the requested Party deems that it has jurisdiction over the offence, the requested Party shall submit the case at the request of the requesting Party to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution and shall report the final outcome to the requesting Party in due course. Those authorities shall take their decision and conduct their investigations and proceedings in the same manner as for any other offence of a comparable nature under the law of that Party.

7. a. Each Party shall, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, communicate to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe the name and address of each authority responsible for making or receiving requests for extradition or provisional arrest in the absence of a treaty. b. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall set up and keep updated a register of authorities so designated by the Parties. Each Party shall ensure that the details held on the register are correct at all times. Title 3—General Principles Relating to Mutual Assistance [. . .] Article 32—Trans-Border Access to Stored Computer Data with Consent or Where Publicly Available A Party may, without the authorisation of another Party: a. access publicly available (open source) stored computer data, regardless of where the data is located geographically; or b. access or receive, through a computer system in its territory, stored computer data located in another Party, if the Party obtains the lawful and voluntary consent of the person who has the lawful authority to disclose the data to the Party through that computer system.

Article 33—Mutual Assistance in the Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data 1. The Parties shall provide mutual assistance to each other in the real-time collection of traffic data associated with specified communications in their territory transmitted by means of a computer system. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, this assistance shall be governed by the conditions and procedures provided for under domestic law. 2. Each Party shall provide such assistance at least with respect to criminal offences for which real-

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time collection of traffic data would be available in a similar domestic case. Article 34—Mutual Assistance Regarding the Interception of Content Data The Parties shall provide mutual assistance to each other in the real-time collection or recording of content data of specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system to the extent permitted under their applicable treaties and domestic laws.

8. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed through Computer Systems On 7 November 2002, the Council of Europe adopted an additional protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime. This protocol addresses ethnic and racial discrimination and Internet dissemination of racist and xenophobic material. The protocol also calls for international cooperation and appeals to all parties to “adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary” to criminalize the distribution of this material. Source Council of Europe, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/ Treaties/Html/189.htm.

The member States of the Council of Europe and the other States Parties to the Convention on Cybercrime, opened for signature in Budapest on 23 November 2001, signatory hereto; Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members; Recalling that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights;

Stressing the need to secure a full and effective implementation of all human rights without any discrimination or distinction, as enshrined in European and other international instruments; Convinced that acts of a racist and xenophobic nature constitute a violation of human rights and a threat to the rule of law and democratic stability; Considering that national and international law need to provide adequate legal responses to propaganda of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems; Aware of the fact that propaganda to such acts is often subject to criminalisation in national legislation; Having regard to the Convention on Cybercrime, which provides for modern and flexible means of international co-operation and convinced of the need to harmonise substantive law provisions concerning the fight against racist and xenophobic propaganda; Aware that computer systems offer an unprecedented means of facilitating freedom of expression and communication around the globe; Recognising that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and is one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every human being; Concerned, however, by the risk of misuse or abuse of such computer systems to disseminate racist and xenophobic propaganda; Mindful of the need to ensure a proper balance between freedom of expression and an effective fight against acts of a racist and xenophobic nature;

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Recognising that this Protocol is not intended to affect established principles relating to freedom of expression in national legal systems; Taking into account the relevant international legal instruments in this field, and in particular the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocol No. 12 concerning the general prohibition of discrimination, the existing Council of Europe conventions on co-operation in the penal field, in particular the Convention on Cybercrime, the United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 21 December 1965, the European Union Joint Action of 15 July 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning action to combat racism and xenophobia; Welcoming the recent developments which further advance international understanding and cooperation in combating cybercrime and racism and xenophobia; Having regard to the Action Plan adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe on the occasion of their Second Summit (Strasbourg, 10–11 October 1997) to seek common responses to the developments of the new technologies based on the standards and values of the Council of Europe;

xenophobic nature committed through computer systems. Article 2—Definition 1. For the purposes of this Protocol: “racist and xenophobic material” means any written material, any image or any other representation of ideas or theories, which advocates, promotes or incites hatred, discrimination or violence, against any individual or group of individuals, based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, as well as religion if used as a pretext for any of these factors. 2. The terms and expressions used in this Protocol shall be interpreted in the same manner as they are interpreted under the Convention. Chapter II—Measures to Be Taken at National Level Article 3—Dissemination of Racist and Xenophobic Material through Computer Systems 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right, the following conduct: distributing, or otherwise making available, racist and xenophobic material to the public through a computer system.

Have agreed as follows: Chapter I—Common Provisions Article 1—Purpose The purpose of this Protocol is to supplement, as between the Parties to the Protocol, the provisions of the Convention on Cybercrime, opened for signature in Budapest on 23 November 2001 (hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”), as regards the criminalisation of acts of a racist and

2. A Party may reserve the right not to attach criminal liability to conduct as defined by paragraph 1 of this article, where the material, as defined in Article 2, paragraph 1, advocates, promotes or incites discrimination that is not associated with hatred or violence, provided that other effective remedies are available. 3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2 of this article, a Party may reserve the right not to apply paragraph 1 to those cases of discrimination for which, due to

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established principles in its national legal system concerning freedom of expression, it cannot provide for effective remedies as referred to in the said paragraph 2. Article 4—Racist and Xenophobic Motivated Threat 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right, the following conduct: threatening, through a computer system, with the commission of a serious criminal offence as defined under its domestic law, (i) persons for the reason that they belong to a group, distinguished by race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, as well as religion, if used as a pretext for any of these factors, or (ii) a group of persons which is distinguished by any of these characteristics. Article 5—Racist and Xenophobic Motivated Insult 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right, the following conduct: insulting publicly, through a computer system, (i) persons for the reason that they belong to a group distinguished by race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, as well as religion, if used as a pretext for any of these factors; or (ii) a group of persons which is distinguished by any of these characteristics. 2. A Party may either: a. require that the offence referred to in paragraph 1 of this article has the effect that the person or group of persons referred to in paragraph 1 is exposed to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or

b. reserve the right not to apply, in whole or in part, paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 6—Denial, Gross Minimisation, Approval or Justification of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative measures as may be necessary to establish the following conduct as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right: distributing or otherwise making available, through a computer system to the public, material which denies, grossly minimises, approves or justifies acts constituting genocide or crimes against humanity, as defined by international law and recognised as such by final and binding decisions of the International Military Tribunal, established by the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, or of any other international court established by relevant international instruments and whose jurisdiction is recognised by that Party. 2. A Party may either a. require that the denial or the gross minimisation referred to in paragraph 1 of this article is committed with the intent to incite hatred, discrimination or violence against any individual or group of individuals, based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, as well as religion if used as a pretext for any of these factors, or otherwise b. reserve the right not to apply, in whole or in part, paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 7—Aiding and Abetting Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and without right, aiding or abetting the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with this Protocol, with intent that such offence be committed.

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Chapter III—Relations between the Convention and This Protocol Article 8—Relations between the Convention and This Protocol 1. Articles 1, 12, 13, 22, 41, 44, 45 and 46 of the Convention shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to this Protocol. 2. The Parties shall extend the scope of application of the measures defined in Articles 14 to 21 and Articles 23 to 35 of the Convention, to Articles 2 to 7 of this Protocol. Chapter IV—Final Provisions Article 9—Expression of Consent to Be Bound 1. This Protocol shall be open for signature by the States which have signed the Convention, which may express their consent to be bound by either: a. signature without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval; or b. subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, followed by ratification, acceptance or approval.

2. A State may not sign this Protocol without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval, or deposit an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, unless it has already deposited or simultaneously deposits an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of the Convention. 3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.

9. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora

international agreement that was adopted in an effort to regulate the trade in all species of wild fauna and flora that are presently facing extinction or may face that inevitability in the future without legislation to protect and regulate their trade. Enforcement measures are addressed in Article VIII. Article XII provides for the appointment of a secretariat. This individual, appointed by the United Nations Environment Program, will oversee the provisions of this convention and, “where appropriate, make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the present Convention.” Source Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/ text.shtml.

Signed at Washington, D.C., on 3 March 1973 Amended at Bonn, on 22 June 1979 The Contracting States, Recognizing that wild fauna and flora in their many beautiful and varied forms are an irreplaceable part of the natural systems of the earth which must be protected for this and the generations to come; Conscious of the ever-growing value of wild fauna and flora from aesthetic, scientific, cultural, recreational and economic points of view; Recognizing that peoples and States are and should be the best protectors of their own wild fauna and flora; Recognizing, in addition, that international cooperation is essential for the protection of certain species of wild fauna and flora against overexploitation through international trade; Convinced of the urgency of taking appropriate measures to this end; Have agreed as follows:

The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora is an

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Article I Definitions For the purpose of the present Convention, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) “Species” means any species, subspecies, or geographically separate population thereof; (b) “Specimen” means: (i) any animal or plant, whether alive or dead; (ii) in the case of an animal: for species included in Appendices I and II, any readily recognizable part or derivative thereof; and for species included in Appendix III, any readily recognizable part or derivative thereof specified in Appendix III in relation to the species; and (iii) in the case of a plant: for species included in Appendix I, any readily recognizable part or derivative thereof; and for species included in Appendices II and III, any readily recognizable part or derivative thereof specified in Appendices II and III in relation to the species; (c) “Trade” means export, re-export, import and introduction from the sea; (d) “Re-export” means export of any specimen that has previously been imported; (e) “Introduction from the sea” means transportation into a State of specimens of any species which were taken in the marine environment not under the jurisdiction of any State; (f) “Scientific Authority” means a national scientific authority designated in accordance with Article IX; (g) “Management Authority” means a national management authority designated in accordance with Article IX; (h) “Party” means a State for which the present Convention has entered into force.

Article II

trade. Trade in specimens of these species must be subject to particularly strict regulation in order not to endanger further their survival and must only be authorized in exceptional circumstances. 2. Appendix II shall include: (a) all species which although not necessarily now threatened with extinction may become so unless trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival; and (b) other species which must be subject to regulation in order that trade in specimens of certain species referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph may be brought under effective control.

3. Appendix III shall include all species which any Party identifies as being subject to regulation within its jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing or restricting exploitation, and as needing the cooperation of other Parties in the control of trade. 4. The Parties shall not allow trade in specimens of species included in Appendices I, II and III except in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention. Article III Regulation of Trade in Specimens of Species Included in Appendix I 1. All trade in specimens of species included in Appendix I shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Article. 2. The export of any specimen of a species included in Appendix I shall require the prior grant and presentation of an export permit. An export permit shall only be granted when the following conditions have been met:

Fundamental Principles 1. Appendix I shall include all species threatened with extinction which are or may be affected by

(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of export has advised that such export will not be detrimental to the survival of that species;

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(b) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that the specimen was not obtained in contravention of the laws of that State for the protection of fauna and flora; (c) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that any living specimen will be so prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment; and (d) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that an import permit has been granted for the specimen.

3. The import of any specimen of a species included in Appendix I shall require the prior grant and presentation of an import permit and either an export permit or a re-export certificate. An import permit shall only be granted when the following conditions have been met: (a) a Scientific Authority of the State of import has advised that the import will be for purposes which are not detrimental to the survival of the species involved; (b) a Scientific Authority of the State of import is satisfied that the proposed recipient of a living specimen is suitably equipped to house and care for it; and (c) a Management Authority of the State of import is satisfied that the specimen is not to be used for primarily commercial purposes.

4. The re-export of any specimen of a species included in Appendix I shall require the prior grant and presentation of a re-export certificate. A reexport certificate shall only be granted when the following conditions have been met: (a) a Management Authority of the State of re-export is satisfied that the specimen was imported into that State in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention; (b) a Management Authority of the State of re-export is satisfied that any living specimen will be so prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment; and

(c) a Management Authority of the State of re-export is satisfied that an import permit has been granted for any living specimen.

5. The introduction from the sea of any specimen of a species included in Appendix I shall require the prior grant of a certificate from a Management Authority of the State of introduction. A certificate shall only be granted when the following conditions have been met: (a) a Scientific Authority of the State of introduction advises that the introduction will not be detrimental to the survival of the species involved; (b) a Management Authority of the State of introduction is satisfied that the proposed recipient of a living specimen is suitably equipped to house and care for it; and (c) a Management Authority of the State of introduction is satisfied that the specimen is not to be used for primarily commercial purposes.

Article IV Regulation of Trade in Specimens of Species Included in Appendix II 1. All trade in specimens of species included in Appendix II shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Article. 2. The export of any specimen of a species included in Appendix II shall require the prior grant and presentation of an export permit. An export permit shall only be granted when the following conditions have been met: (a) a Scientific Authority of the State of export has advised that such export will not be detrimental to the survival of that species; (b) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that the specimen was not obtained in contravention of the laws of that State for the protection of fauna and flora; and (c) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that any living specimen will be so pre-

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pared and shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.

3. A Scientific Authority in each Party shall monitor both the export permits granted by that State for specimens of species included in Appendix II and the actual exports of such specimens. Whenever a Scientific Authority determines that the export of specimens of any such species should be limited in order to maintain that species throughout its range at a level consistent with its role in the ecosystems in which it occurs and well above the level at which that species might become eligible for inclusion in Appendix I, the Scientific Authority shall advise the appropriate Management Authority of suitable measures to be taken to limit the grant of export permits for specimens of that species. 4. The import of any specimen of a species included in Appendix II shall require the prior presentation of either an export permit or a reexport certificate. 5. The re-export of any specimen of a species included in Appendix II shall require the prior grant and presentation of a re-export certificate. A re-export certificate shall only be granted when the following conditions have been met: (a) a Management Authority of the State of re-export is satisfied that the specimen was imported into that State in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention; and (b) a Management Authority of the State of re-export is satisfied that any living specimen will be so prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.

6. The introduction from the sea of any specimen of a species included in Appendix II shall require the prior grant of a certificate from a Management Authority of the State of introduction. A certificate shall only be granted when the following conditions have been met:

(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of introduction advises that the introduction will not be detrimental to the survival of the species involved; and (b) a Management Authority of the State of introduction is satisfied that any living specimen will be so handled as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.

7. Certificates referred to in paragraph 6 of this Article may be granted on the advice of a Scientific Authority, in consultation with other national scientific authorities or, when appropriate, international scientific authorities, in respect of periods not exceeding one year for total numbers of specimens to be introduced in such periods. Article V Regulation of Trade in Specimens of Species Included in Appendix III 1. All trade in specimens of species included in Appendix III shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Article. 2. The export of any specimen of a species included in Appendix III from any State which has included that species in Appendix III shall require the prior grant and presentation of an export permit. An export permit shall only be granted when the following conditions have been met: (a) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that the specimen was not obtained in contravention of the laws of that State for the protection of fauna and flora; and (b) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that any living specimen will be so prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.

3. The import of any specimen of a species included in Appendix III shall require, except in circumstances to which paragraph 4 of this Article applies, the prior presentation of a certificate of origin and, where the import is from a State which

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has included that species in Appendix III, an export permit. 4. In the case of re-export, a certificate granted by the Management Authority of the State of reexport that the specimen was processed in that State or is being re-exported shall be accepted by the State of import as evidence that the provisions of the present Convention have been complied with in respect of the specimen concerned. Article VI Permits and Certificates 1. Permits and certificates granted under the provisions of Articles III, IV, and V shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Article. 2. An export permit shall contain the information specified in the model set forth in Appendix IV, and may only be used for export within a period of six months from the date on which it was granted. 3. Each permit or certificate shall contain the title of the present Convention, the name and any identifying stamp of the Management Authority granting it and a control number assigned by the Management Authority. 4. Any copies of a permit or certificate issued by a Management Authority shall be clearly marked as copies only and no such copy may be used in place of the original, except to the extent endorsed thereon. 5. A separate permit or certificate shall be required for each consignment of specimens. 6. A Management Authority of the State of import of any specimen shall cancel and retain the export permit or re-export certificate and any corresponding import permit presented in respect of the import of that specimen.

7. Where appropriate and feasible a Management Authority may affix a mark upon any specimen to assist in identifying the specimen. For these purposes “mark” means any indelible imprint, lead seal or other suitable means of identifying a specimen, designed in such a way as to render its imitation by unauthorized persons as difficult as possible. Article VII Exemptions and Other Special Provisions Relating to Trade 1. The provisions of Articles III, IV and V shall not apply to the transit or transhipment of specimens through or in the territory of a Party while the specimens remain in Customs control. 2. Where a Management Authority of the State of export or re-export is satisfied that a specimen was acquired before the provisions of the present Convention applied to that specimen, the provisions of Articles III, IV and V shall not apply to that specimen where the Management Authority issues a certificate to that effect. 3. The provisions of Articles III, IV and V shall not apply to specimens that are personal or household effects. This exemption shall not apply where: (a) in the case of specimens of a species included in Appendix I, they were acquired by the owner outside his State of usual residence, and are being imported into that State; or (b) in the case of specimens of species included in Appendix II: (i) they were acquired by the owner outside his State of usual residence and in a State where removal from the wild occurred; (ii) they are being imported into the owner’s State of usual residence; and (iii) the State where removal from the wild occurred requires the prior grant of export permits before any export of such specimens; unless a Management Authority is satisfied

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that the specimens were acquired before the provisions of the present Convention applied to such specimens.

4. Specimens of an animal species included in Appendix I bred in captivity for commercial purposes, or of a plant species included in Appendix I artificially propagated for commercial purposes, shall be deemed to be specimens of species included in Appendix II.

Article VIII Measures to Be Taken by the Parties 1. The Parties shall take appropriate measures to enforce the provisions of the present Convention and to prohibit trade in specimens in violation thereof. These shall include measures: (a) to penalize trade in, or possession of, such specimens, or both; and (b) to provide for the confiscation or return to the State of export of such specimens.

5. Where a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that any specimen of an animal species was bred in captivity or any specimen of a plant species was artificially propagated, or is a part of such an animal or plant or was derived there from, a certificate by that Management Authority to that effect shall be accepted in lieu of any of the permits or certificates required under the provisions of Article III, IV or V.

2. In addition to the measures taken under paragraph 1 of this Article, a Party may, when it deems it necessary, provide for any method of internal reimbursement for expenses incurred as a result of the confiscation of a specimen traded in violation of the measures taken in the application of the provisions of the present Convention.

6. The provisions of Articles III, IV and V shall not apply to the non-commercial loan, donation or exchange between scientists or scientific institutions registered by a Management Authority of their State, of herbarium specimens, other preserved, dried or embedded museum specimens, and live plant material, which carry a label issued or approved by a Management Authority.

3. As far as possible, the Parties shall ensure that specimens shall pass through any formalities required for trade with a minimum of delay. To facilitate such passage, a Party may designate ports of exit and ports of entry at which specimens must be presented for clearance. The Parties shall ensure further that all living specimens, during any period of transit, holding or shipment, are properly cared for so as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.

7. A Management Authority of any State may waive the requirements of Articles III, IV and V and allow the movement without permits or certificates of specimens which form part of a travelling zoo, circus, menagerie, plant exhibition or other travelling exhibition provided that:

4. Where a living specimen is confiscated as a result of measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article:

(a) the exporter or importer registers full details of such specimens with that Management Authority; (b) the specimens are in either of the categories specified in paragraph 2 or 5 of this Article; and (c) the Management Authority is satisfied that any living specimen will be so transported and cared for as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.

(a) the specimen shall be entrusted to a Management Authority of the State of confiscation; (b) the Management Authority shall, after consultation with the State of export, return the specimen to that State at the expense of that State, or to a rescue centre or such other place as the Management Authority deems appropriate and consistent with the purposes of the present Convention; and

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(c) the Management Authority may obtain the advice of a Scientific Authority, or may, whenever it considers it desirable, consult the Secretariat in order to facilitate the decision under sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph, including the choice of a rescue centre or other place.

5. A rescue centre as referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article means an institution designated by a Management Authority to look after the welfare of living specimens, particularly those that have been confiscated. 6. Each Party shall maintain records of trade in specimens of species included in Appendices I, II and III which shall cover: (a) the names and addresses of exporters and importers; and (b) the number and type of permits and certificates granted; the States with which such trade occurred; the numbers or quantities and types of specimens, names of species as included in Appendices I, II and III and, where applicable, the size and sex of the specimens in question.

7. Each Party shall prepare periodic reports on its implementation of the present Convention and shall transmit to the Secretariat: (a) an annual report containing a summary of the information specified in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 6 of this Article; and (b) a biennial report on legislative, regulatory and administrative measures taken to enforce the provisions of the present Convention.

8. The information referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article shall be available to the public where this is not inconsistent with the law of the Party concerned. Article IX Management and Scientific Authorities 1. Each Party shall designate for the purposes of the present Convention:

(a) one or more Management Authorities competent to grant permits or certificates on behalf of that Party; and (b) one or more Scientific Authorities.

2. A State depositing an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall at that time inform the Depositary Government of the name and address of the Management Authority authorized to communicate with other Parties and with the Secretariat. 3. Any changes in the designations or authorizations under the provisions of this Article shall be communicated by the Party concerned to the Secretariat for transmission to all other Parties. 4. Any Management Authority referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article shall, if so requested by the Secretariat or the Management Authority of another Party, communicate to it impression of stamps, seals or other devices used to authenticate permits or certificates. Article X Trade with States Not Party to the Convention Where export or re-export is to, or import is from, a State not a Party to the present Convention, comparable documentation issued by the competent authorities in that State which substantially conforms with the requirements of the present Convention for permits and certificates may be accepted in lieu thereof by any Party. Article XI Conference of the Parties 1. The Secretariat shall call a meeting of the Conference of the Parties not later than two years after the entry into force of the present Convention. 2. Thereafter the Secretariat shall convene regular meetings at least once every two years, unless the

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Conference decides otherwise, and extraordinary meetings at any time on the written request of at least one-third of the Parties.

(a) international agencies or bodies, either governmental or non-governmental, and national governmental agencies and bodies; and (b) national non-governmental agencies or bodies which have been approved for this purpose by the State in which they are located. Once admitted, these observers shall have the right to participate but not to vote.

3. At meetings, whether regular or extraordinary, the Parties shall review the implementation of the present Convention and may: (a) make such provision as may be necessary to enable the Secretariat to carry out its duties, and adopt financial provisions; (b) consider and adopt amendments to Appendices I and II in accordance with Article XV; (c) review the progress made towards the restoration and conservation of the species included in Appendices I, II and III; (d) receive and consider any reports presented by the Secretariat or by any Party; and (e) where appropriate, make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the present Convention.

4. At each regular meeting, the Parties may determine the time and venue of the next regular meeting to be held in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article.

Article XII The Secretariat 1. Upon entry into force of the present Convention, a Secretariat shall be provided by the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme. To the extent and in the manner he considers appropriate, he may be assisted by suitable inter-governmental or nongovernmental international or national agencies and bodies technically qualified in protection, conservation and management of wild fauna and flora. 2. The functions of the Secretariat shall be:

5. At any meeting, the Parties may determine and adopt rules of procedure for the meeting. 6. The United Nations, its Specialized Agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as any State not a Party to the present Convention, may be represented at meetings of the Conference by observers, who shall have the right to participate but not to vote. 7. Any body or agency technically qualified in protection, conservation or management of wild fauna and flora, in the following categories, which has informed the Secretariat of its desire to be represented at meetings of the Conference by observers, shall be admitted unless at least onethird of the Parties present object:

(a) to arrange for and service meetings of the Parties; (b) to perform the functions entrusted to it under the provisions of Articles XV and XVI of the present Convention; (c) to undertake scientific and technical studies in accordance with programmes authorized by the Conference of the Parties as will contribute to the implementation of the present Convention, including studies concerning standards for appropriate preparation and shipment of living specimens and the means of identifying specimens; (d) to study the reports of Parties and to request from Parties such further information with respect thereto as it deems necessary to ensure implementation of the present Convention; (e) to invite the attention of the Parties to any matter pertaining to the aims of the present Convention; (f) to publish periodically and distribute to the Parties current editions of Appendices I, II and III together with any information which will facili-

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tate identification of specimens of species included in those Appendices; (g) to prepare annual reports to the Parties on its work and on the implementation of the present Convention and such other reports as meetings of the Parties may request; (h) to make recommendations for the implementation of the aims and provisions of the present Convention, including the exchange of information of a scientific or technical nature; (i) to perform any other function as may be entrusted to it by the Parties.

Article XIII International Measures 1. When the Secretariat in the light of information received is satisfied that any species included in Appendix I or II is being affected adversely by trade in specimens of that species or that the provisions of the present Convention are not being effectively implemented, it shall communicate such information to the authorized Management Authority of the Party or Parties concerned. 2. When any Party receives a communication as indicated in paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall, as soon as possible, inform the Secretariat of any relevant facts insofar as its laws permit and, where appropriate, propose remedial action. Where the Party considers that an inquiry is desirable, such inquiry may be carried out by one or more persons expressly authorized by the Party. 3. The information provided by the Party or resulting from any inquiry as specified in paragraph 2 of this Article shall be reviewed by the next Conference of the Parties which may make whatever recommendations it deems appropriate.

Article XIV Effect on Domestic Legislation and International Conventions 1. The provisions of the present Convention shall in no way affect the right of Parties to adopt: (a) stricter domestic measures regarding the conditions for trade, taking, possession or transport of specimens of species included in Appendices I, II and III, or the complete prohibition thereof; or (b) domestic measures restricting or prohibiting trade, taking, possession or transport of species not included in Appendix I, II or III.

2. The provisions of the present Convention shall in no way affect the provisions of any domestic measures or the obligations of Parties deriving from any treaty, convention, or international agreement relating to other aspects of trade, taking, possession or transport of specimens which is in force or subsequently may enter into force for any Party including any measure pertaining to the Customs, public health, veterinary or plant quarantine fields. 3. The provisions of the present Convention shall in no way affect the provisions of, or the obligations deriving from, any treaty, convention or international agreement concluded or which may be concluded between States creating a union or regional trade agreement establishing or maintaining a common external Customs control and removing Customs control between the parties thereto insofar as they relate to trade among the States members of that union or agreement. 4. A State party to the present Convention, which is also a party to any other treaty, convention or international agreement which is in force at the time of the coming into force of the present Convention and under the provisions of which protection is afforded to marine species included in Appendix II, shall be relieved of the obligations imposed on it under the provisions of the present Convention with respect to trade in specimens of

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species included in Appendix II that are taken by ships registered in that State and in accordance with the provisions of such other treaty, convention or international agreement. 5. Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles III, IV and V, any export of a specimen taken in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article shall only require a certificate from a Management Authority of the State of introduction to the effect that the specimen was taken in accordance with the provisions of the other treaty, convention or international agreement in question.

Parties present and casting an affirmative or negative vote. Parties abstaining from voting shall not be counted among the two-thirds required for adopting an amendment. (c) Amendments adopted at a meeting shall enter into force 90 days after that meeting for all Parties except those which make a reservation in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article.

2. The following provisions shall apply in relation to amendments to Appendices I and II between meetings of the Conference of the Parties:

6. Nothing in the present Convention shall prejudice the codification and development of the law of the sea by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea convened pursuant to Resolution 2750 C (XXV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations nor the present or future claims and legal views of any State concerning the law of the sea and the nature and extent of coastal and flag State jurisdiction. Article XV Amendments to Appendices I and II 1. The following provisions shall apply in relation to amendments to Appendices I and II at meetings of the Conference of the Parties: (a) Any Party may propose an amendment to Appendix I or II for consideration at the next meeting. The text of the proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Secretariat at least 150 days before the meeting. The Secretariat shall consult the other Parties and interested bodies on the amendment in accordance with the provisions of sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 2 of this Article and shall communicate the response to all Parties not later than 30 days before the meeting. (b) Amendments shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of Parties present and voting. For these purposes “Parties present and voting” means

(a) Any Party may propose an amendment to Appendix I or II for consideration between meetings by the postal procedures set forth in this paragraph. (b) For marine species, the Secretariat shall, upon receiving the text of the proposed amendment, immediately communicate it to the Parties. It shall also consult inter-governmental bodies having a function in relation to those species especially with a view to obtaining scientific data these bodies may be able to provide and to ensuring co-ordination with any conservation measures enforced by such bodies. The Secretariat shall communicate the views expressed and data provided by these bodies and its own findings and recommendations to the Parties as soon as possible. (c) For species other than marine species, the Secretariat shall, upon receiving the text of the proposed amendment, immediately communicate it to the Parties, and, as soon as possible thereafter, its own recommendations. (d) Any Party may, within 60 days of the date on which the Secretariat communicated its recommendations to the Parties under sub-paragraph (b) or (c) of this paragraph, transmit to the Secretariat any comments on the proposed amendment together with any relevant scientific data and information. (e) The Secretariat shall communicate the replies received together with its own recommendations to the Parties as soon as possible. (f) If no objection to the proposed amendment is received by the Secretariat within 30 days of the

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date the replies and recommendations were communicated under the provisions of sub-paragraph (e) of this paragraph, the amendment shall enter into force 90 days later for all Parties except those which make a reservation in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article. (g) If an objection by any Party is received by the Secretariat, the proposed amendment shall be submitted to a postal vote in accordance with the provisions of sub-paragraphs (h), (i) and (j) of this paragraph. (h) The Secretariat shall notify the Parties that notification of objection has been received. (i) Unless the Secretariat receives the votes for, against or in abstention from at least one-half of the Parties within 60 days of the date of notification under sub-paragraph (h) of this paragraph, the proposed amendment shall be referred to the next meeting of the Conference for further consideration. (j) Provided that votes are received from one-half of the Parties, the amendment shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of Parties casting an affirmative or negative vote. (k) The Secretariat shall notify all Parties of the result of the vote. (l) If the proposed amendment is adopted it shall enter into force 90 days after the date of the notification by the Secretariat of its acceptance for all Parties except those which make a reservation in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article.

3. During the period of 90 days provided for by sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph (l) of paragraph 2 of this Article any Party may by notification in writing to the Depositary Government make a reservation with respect to the amendment. Until such reservation is withdrawn the Party shall be treated as a State not a Party to the present Convention with respect to trade in the species concerned.

Article XVI Appendix III and Amendments Thereto 1. Any Party may at any time submit to the Secretariat a list of species which it identifies as being subject to regulation within its jurisdiction for the purpose mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article II. Appendix III shall include the names of the Parties submitting the species for inclusion therein, the scientific names of the species so submitted, and any parts or derivatives of the animals or plants concerned that are specified in relation to the species for the purposes of subparagraph (b) of Article I. 2. Each list submitted under the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall be communicated to the Parties by the Secretariat as soon as possible after receiving it. The list shall take effect as part of Appendix III 90 days after the date of such communication. At any time after the communication of such list, any Party may by notification in writing to the Depositary Government enter a reservation with respect to any species or any parts or derivatives, and until such reservation is withdrawn, the State shall be treated as a State not a Party to the present Convention with respect to trade in the species or part or derivative concerned. 3. A Party which has submitted a species for inclusion in Appendix III may withdraw it at any time by notification to the Secretariat which shall communicate the withdrawal to all Parties. The withdrawal shall take effect 30 days after the date of such communication. 4. Any Party submitting a list under the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall submit to the Secretariat a copy of all domestic laws and regulations applicable to the protection of such species, together with any interpretations which the Party may deem appropriate or the Secretariat may request. The Party shall, for as long as the species in question is included in Appendix III,

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Arbitration at The Hague, and the Parties submitting the dispute shall be bound by the arbitral decision.

submit any amendments of such laws and regulations or any interpretations as they are adopted. Article XVII Amendment of the Convention 1. An extraordinary meeting of the Conference of the Parties shall be convened by the Secretariat on the written request of at least one-third of the Parties to consider and adopt amendments to the present Convention. Such amendments shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of Parties present and voting. For these purposes “Parties present and voting” means Parties present and casting an affirmative or negative vote. Parties abstaining from voting shall not be counted among the twothirds required for adopting an amendment. 2. The text of any proposed amendment shall be communicated by the Secretariat to all Parties at least 90 days before the meeting. 3. An amendment shall enter into force for the Parties which have accepted it 60 days after twothirds of the Parties have deposited an instrument of acceptance of the amendment with the Depositary Government. Thereafter, the amendment shall enter into force for any other Party 60 days after that Party deposits its instrument of acceptance of the amendment.

10. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, United Nations, 2005 Since the events of 11 September 2001, there has been a growing concern in the international community that criminals or terrorists could acquire nuclear and radioactive munitions and material. The signatories to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism were deeply concerned about the increasing acts of terrorism globally in different forms. They were aware of the fact that nuclear terrorism would pose the greatest danger and that present legal provisions were not sufficient to deal with this potential threat. Article 2 criminalized the possession of radioactive material with the motive of causing death and injury or damaging property or the environment. Each country would take appropriate measures to punish the offender and cooperate with other countries by exchanging information. Source United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://untreaty .un.org/English/Terrorism/English_18_15.pdf.

Article XVIII

The States Parties to this Convention,

Resolution of Disputes 1. Any dispute which may arise between two or more Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of the provisions of the present Convention shall be subject to negotiation between the Parties involved in the dispute.

Having in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of good-neighbourliness and friendly relations and cooperation among States,

2. If the dispute can not be resolved in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, the Parties may, by mutual consent, submit the dispute to arbitration, in particular that of the Permanent Court of

Recalling the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations of 24 October 1995,

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Recognizing the right of all States to develop and apply nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and their legitimate interests in the potential benefits to be derived from the peaceful application of nuclear energy, Bearing in mind the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material of 1980, Deeply concerned about the worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, Recalling the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism annexed to General Assembly resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994, in which, inter alia, the States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed, including those which jeopardize the friendly relations among States and peoples and threaten the territorial integrity and security of States, Noting that the Declaration also encouraged States to review urgently the scope of the existing international legal provisions on the prevention, repression and elimination of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, with the aim of ensuring that there is a comprehensive legal framework covering all aspects of the matter, Recalling General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996 and the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism annexed thereto, Recalling also that, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 51/210, an ad hoc committee was established to elaborate, inter alia, an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism to supplement related existing international instruments,

Noting that acts of nuclear terrorism may result in the gravest consequences and may pose a threat to international peace and security, Noting also that existing multilateral legal provisions do not adequately address those attacks, Being convinced of the urgent need to enhance international cooperation between States in devising and adopting effective and practical measures for the prevention of such acts of terrorism and for the prosecution and punishment of their perpetrators, Noting that the activities of military forces of States are governed by rules of international law outside of the framework of this Convention and that the exclusion of certain actions from the coverage of this Convention does not condone or make lawful otherwise unlawful acts, or preclude prosecution under other laws, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 For the purposes of this Convention: 1. “Radioactive material” means nuclear material and other radioactive substances which contain nuclides which undergo spontaneous disintegration (a process accompanied by emission of one or more types of ionizing radiation, such as alpha-, beta-, neutron particles and gamma rays) and which may, owing to their radiological or fissile properties, cause death, serious bodily injury or substantial damage to property or to the environment. 2. “Nuclear material” means plutonium, except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80 per cent in plutonium-238; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotope 235 or 233; uranium containing the mixture of isotopes as occurring in nature other than in the form of ore or ore residue; or any material containing one or more of the foregoing;

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Whereby “uranium enriched in the isotope 235 or 233” means uranium containing the isotope 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio of the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in nature.

Article 2 1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally: (a) Possesses radioactive material or makes or possesses a device: (i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or (ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment; (b) Uses in any way radioactive material or a device, or uses or damages a nuclear facility in a manner which releases or risks the release of radioactive material: (i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or (ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment; or (iii) With the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an international organization or a State to do or refrain from doing an act.

3. “Nuclear facility” means: (a) Any nuclear reactor, including reactors installed on vessels, vehicles, aircraft or space objects for use as an energy source in order to propel such vessels, vehicles, aircraft or space objects or for any other purpose; (b) Any plant or conveyance being used for the production, storage, processing or transport of radioactive material.

4. “Device” means: (a) Any nuclear explosive device; or (b) Any radioactive material dispersal or radiationemitting device which may, owing to its radiological properties, cause death, serious bodily injury or substantial damage to property or to the environment.

2. Any person also commits an offence if that person:

5. “State or government facility” includes any permanent or temporary facility or conveyance that is used or occupied by representatives of a State, members of a Government, the legislature or the judiciary or by officials or employees of a State or any other public authority or entity or by employees or officials of an intergovernmental organization in connection with their official duties. 6. “Military forces of a State” means the armed forces of a State which are organized, trained and equipped under its internal law for the primary purpose of national defence or security and persons acting in support of those armed forces who are under their formal command, control and responsibility.

(a) Threatens, under circumstances which indicate the credibility of the threat, to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 (b) of the present article; or (b) Demands unlawfully and intentionally radioactive material, a device or a nuclear facility by threat, under circumstances which indicate the credibility of the threat, or by use of force.

3. Any person also commits an offence if that person attempts to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article. 4. Any person also commits an offence if that person: (a) Participates as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of the present article; or

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(b) Organizes or directs others to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of the present article; or (c) In any other way contributes to the commission of one or more offences as set forth in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of the present article by a group of persons acting with a common purpose; such contribution shall be intentional and either be made with the aim of furthering the general criminal activity or purpose of the group or be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the offence or offences concerned.

Article 3 This Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed within a single State, the alleged offender and the victims are nationals of that State, the alleged offender is found in the territory of that State and no other State has a basis under article 9, paragraph 1 or 2, to exercise jurisdiction, except that the provisions of articles 7, 12, 14, 15, 16 and 17 shall, as appropriate, apply in those cases. Article 4 1. Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international humanitarian law. 2. The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law are not governed by this Convention, and the activities undertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, are not governed by this Convention. 3. The provisions of paragraph 2 of the present article shall not be interpreted as condoning or making lawful otherwise unlawful acts, or precluding prosecution under other laws.

4. This Convention does not address, nor can it be interpreted as addressing, in any way, the issue of the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by States. Article 5 Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary: (a) To establish as criminal offences under its national law the offences set forth in article 2; (b) To make those offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of these offences.

Article 6 Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, including, where appropriate, domestic legislation, to ensure that criminal acts within the scope of this Convention, in particular where they are intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature and are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature. Article 7 1. States Parties shall cooperate by: (a) Taking all practicable measures, including, if necessary, adapting their national law, to prevent and counter preparations in their respective territories for the commission within or outside their territories of the offences set forth in article 2, including measures to prohibit in their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and organizations that encourage, instigate, organize, knowingly finance or knowingly provide technical assistance or information or engage in the perpetration of those offences; (b) Exchanging accurate and verified information in accordance with their national law and in the manner and subject to the conditions specified herein, and coordinating administrative and other

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measures taken as appropriate to detect, prevent, suppress and investigate the offences set forth in article 2 and also in order to institute criminal proceedings against persons alleged to have committed those crimes. In particular, a State Party shall take appropriate measures in order to inform without delay the other States referred to in article 9 in respect of the commission of the offences set forth in article 2 as well as preparations to commit such offences about which it has learned, and also to inform, where appropriate, international organizations.

2. States Parties shall take appropriate measures consistent with their national law to protect the confidentiality of any information which they receive in confidence by virtue of the provisions of this Convention from another State Party or through participation in an activity carried out for the implementation of this Convention. If States Parties provide information to international organizations in confidence, steps shall be taken to ensure that the confidentiality of such information is protected.

Article 8 For purposes of preventing offences under this Convention, States Parties shall make every effort to adopt appropriate measures to ensure the protection of radioactive material, taking into account relevant recommendations and functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Article 9 1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 2 when: (a) The offence is committed in the territory of that State; or (b) The offence is committed on board a vessel flying the flag of that State or an aircraft which is registered under the laws of that State at the time the offence is committed; or (c) The offence is committed by a national of that State.

2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when:

3. States Parties shall not be required by this Convention to provide any information which they are not permitted to communicate pursuant to national law or which would jeopardize the security of the State concerned or the physical protection of nuclear material. 4. States Parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of their competent authorities and liaison points responsible for sending and receiving the information referred to in the present article. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall communicate such information regarding competent authorities and liaison points to all States Parties and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Such authorities and liaison points must be accessible on a continuous basis.

(a) The offence is committed against a national of that State; or (b) The offence is committed against a State or government facility of that State abroad, including an embassy or other diplomatic or consular premises of that State; or (c) The offence is committed by a stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in the territory of that State; or (d) The offence is committed in an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act; or (e) The offence is committed on board an aircraft which is operated by the Government of that State.

3. Upon ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention, each State Party shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the jurisdiction it has established under its national law in accordance with paragraph 2 of the present article. Should any change take place, the State

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Party concerned shall immediately notify the Secretary-General. 4. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 2 in cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite that person to any of the States Parties which have established their jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1 or 2 of the present article. 5. This Convention does not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by a State Party in accordance with its national law. Article 10 1. Upon receiving information that an offence set forth in article 2 has been committed or is being committed in the territory of a State Party or that a person who has committed or who is alleged to have committed such an offence may be present in its territory, the State Party concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary under its national law to investigate the facts contained in the information. 2. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, the State Party in whose territory the offender or alleged offender is present shall take the appropriate measures under its national law so as to ensure that person’s presence for the purpose of prosecution or extradition. 3. Any person regarding whom the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of the present article are being taken shall be entitled: (a) To communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate representative of the State of which that person is a national or which is otherwise entitled to protect that person’s rights or, if that person is a stateless person, the State in the territory of which that person habitually resides; (b) To be visited by a representative of that State;

(c) To be informed of that person’s rights under subparagraphs (a) and (b).

4. The rights referred to in paragraph 3 of the present article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the State in the territory of which the offender or alleged offender is present, subject to the provision that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under paragraph 3 are intended. 5. The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present article shall be without prejudice to the right of any State Party having a claim to jurisdiction in accordance with article 9, paragraph 1 (c) or 2 (c), to invite the International Committee of the Red Cross to communicate with and visit the alleged offender. 6. When a State Party, pursuant to the present article, has taken a person into custody, it shall immediately notify, directly or through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the States Parties which have established jurisdiction in accordance with article 9, paragraphs 1 and 2, and, if it considers it advisable, any other interested States Parties, of the fact that that person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant that person’s detention. The State which makes the investigation contemplated in paragraph 1 of the present article shall promptly inform the said States Parties of its findings and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction. Article 11 1. The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present shall, in cases to which article 9 applies, if it does not extradite that person, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Those authorities shall

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take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the law of that State. 2. Whenever a State Party is permitted under its national law to extradite or otherwise surrender one of its nationals only upon the condition that the person will be returned to that State to serve the sentence imposed as a result of the trial or proceeding for which the extradition or surrender of the person was sought, and this State and the State seeking the extradition of the person agree with this option and other terms they may deem appropriate, such a conditional extradition or surrender shall be sufficient to discharge the obligation set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article. Article 12 Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any other measures are taken or proceedings are carried out pursuant to this Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in the territory of which that person is present and applicable provisions of international law, including international law of human rights. Article 13 1. The offences set forth in article 2 shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between any of the States Parties before the entry into force of this Convention. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be subsequently concluded between them. 2. When a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, the requested State Party may, at its option, consider this Convention as a legal basis for extradition in respect of the offences set forth in article 2.

Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State. 3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the offences set forth in article 2 as extraditable offences between themselves, subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State. 4. If necessary, the offences set forth in article 2 shall be treated, for the purposes of extradition between States Parties, as if they had been committed not only in the place in which they occurred but also in the territory of the States that have established jurisdiction in accordance with article 9, paragraphs 1 and 2. 5. The provisions of all extradition treaties and arrangements between States Parties with regard to offences set forth in article 2 shall be deemed to be modified as between States Parties to the extent that they are incompatible with this Convention. Article 14 1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings brought in respect of the offences set forth in article 2, including assistance in obtaining evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings. 2. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under paragraph 1 of the present article in conformity with any treaties or other arrangements on mutual legal assistance that may exist between them. In the absence of such treaties or arrangements, States Parties shall afford one another assistance in accordance with their national law. Article 15 None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be regarded, for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a political offence or as an

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offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence may not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives. Article 16 Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite or to afford mutual legal assistance if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition for offences set forth in article 2 or for mutual legal assistance with respect to such offences has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that person’s position for any of these reasons. Article 17 1. A person who is being detained or is serving a sentence in the territory of one State Party whose presence in another State Party is requested for purposes of testimony, identification or otherwise providing assistance in obtaining evidence for the investigation or prosecution of offences under this Convention may be transferred if the following conditions are met: (a) The person freely gives his or her informed consent; and (b) The competent authorities of both States agree, subject to such conditions as those States may deem appropriate.

2. For the purposes of the present article: (a) The State to which the person is transferred shall have the authority and obligation to keep the person transferred in custody, unless otherwise requested or authorized by the State from which the person was transferred;

(b) The State to which the person is transferred shall without delay implement its obligation to return the person to the custody of the State from which the person was transferred as agreed beforehand, or as otherwise agreed, by the competent authorities of both States; (c) The State to which the person is transferred shall not require the State from which the person was transferred to initiate extradition proceedings for the return of the person; (d) The person transferred shall receive credit for service of the sentence being served in the State from which he or she was transferred for time spent in the custody of the State to which he or she was transferred.

3. Unless the State Party from which a person is to be transferred in accordance with the present article so agrees, that person, whatever his or her nationality, shall not be prosecuted or detained or subjected to any other restriction of his or her personal liberty in the territory of the State to which that person is transferred in respect of acts or convictions anterior to his or her departure from the territory of the State from which such person was transferred. Article 18 1. Upon seizing or otherwise taking control of radioactive material, devices or nuclear facilities, following the commission of an offence set forth in article 2, the State Party in possession of such items shall: (a) Take steps to render harmless the radioactive material, device or nuclear facility; (b) Ensure that any nuclear material is held in accordance with applicable International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; and (c) Have regard to physical protection recommendations and health and safety standards published by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

2. Upon the completion of any proceedings connected with an offence set forth in article 2, or sooner if required by international law, any

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radioactive material, device or nuclear facility shall be returned, after consultations (in particular, regarding modalities of return and storage) with the States Parties concerned to the State Party to which it belongs, to the State Party of which the natural or legal person owning such radioactive material, device or facility is a national or resident, or to the State Party from whose territory it was stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained. 3. (a) Where a State Party is prohibited by national or international law from returning or accepting such radioactive material, device or nuclear facility or where the States Parties concerned so agree, subject to paragraph 3 (b) of the present article, the State Party in possession of the radioactive material, devices or nuclear facilities shall continue to take the steps described in paragraph 1 of the present article; such radioactive material, devices or nuclear facilities shall be used only for peaceful purposes; 3. (b) Where it is not lawful for the State Party in possession of the radioactive material, devices or nuclear facilities to possess them, that State shall ensure that they are placed as soon as possible in the possession of a State for which such possession is lawful and which, where appropriate, has provided assurances consistent with the requirements of paragraph 1 of the present article in consultation with that State, for the purpose of rendering it harmless; such radioactive material, devices or nuclear facilities shall be used only for peaceful purposes. 4. If the radioactive material, devices or nuclear facilities referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present article do not belong to any of the States Parties or to a national or resident of a State Party or was not stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained from the territory of a State Party, or if no State is willing to receive such items pursuant to paragraph 3 of the present article, a separate decision concerning its disposition shall, subject to paragraph 3 (b) of the present article, be taken

after consultations between the States concerned and any relevant international organizations. 5. For the purposes of paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the present article, the State Party in possession of the radioactive material, device or nuclear facility may request the assistance and cooperation of other States Parties, in particular the States Parties concerned, and any relevant international organizations, in particular the International Atomic Energy Agency. States Parties and the relevant international organizations are encouraged to provide assistance pursuant to this paragraph to the maximum extent possible. 6. The States Parties involved in the disposition or retention of the radioactive material, device or nuclear facility pursuant to the present article shall inform the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency of the manner in which such an item was disposed of or retained. The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency shall transmit the information to the other States Parties. 7. In the event of any dissemination in connection with an offence set forth in article 2, nothing in the present article shall affect in any way the rules of international law governing liability for nuclear damage, or other rules of international law. Article 19 The State Party where the alleged offender is prosecuted shall, in accordance with its national law or applicable procedures, communicate the final outcome of the proceedings to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, who shall transmit the information to the other States Parties. Article 20 States Parties shall conduct consultations with one another directly or through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with the assistance of international organizations as necessary, to ensure effective implementation of this Convention.

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Article 21 The States Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States. Article 22 Nothing in this Convention entitles a State Party to undertake in the territory of another State Party the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other State Party by its national law. Article 23 1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation within a reasonable time shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If, within six months of the date of the request for arbitration, the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice, by application, in conformity with the Statute of the Court. 2. Each State may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention or accession thereto, declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of the present article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by paragraph 1 with respect to any State Party which has made such a reservation. 3. Any State which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2 of the present article may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

11. The Global Congress/ World Customs Organization Regional Forum on Protection of Intellectual Property Rights In the following regional forum, held in Shanghai, China, during 22–23 November 2004, the Global Congress/World Customs Organization made recommendations to strengthen law enforcement efforts to combat counterfeiting relative to intellectual property rights. The congress sought to improve cooperation between the public and private sectors in the fight against global counterfeiting. Countries were also encouraged to strengthen their borders and promote cooperation and information exchange between state custom authorities. Source Global Congress, http://www.ccapcongress.net/Files/ Shanghai%20Initiative%20-%20Final.doc.

The Shanghai Initiative (Final) Preamble The Global Congress/World Customs Organization (WCO) Regional Forum on Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) was held in Shanghai, China from the 22nd to 23rd of November 2004. The participating international representatives invited by the WCO and the General Administration of Customs of People’s Republic of China carried out a thorough discussion on the impact of counterfeiting and piracy, countermeasures employed, the constraints and development of IPR protection, and enforcement cooperation between Customs, other agencies and the private sector. WHEREAS 1. As noted in the Outcomes Statement from the First Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and the Rome Declaration from the

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International Conference in Italy—the trade in counterfeits is a large and growing problem and requires governments at all levels to place a higher priority against it. 2. Widespread concern has been expressed regarding: • The negative social and economic impacts of counterfeiting and the demonstrated linkages with international organized crime groups; • The fact that many counterfeit products endanger the health, safety and security of consumers; • The potential for corruption emanating from the trade in counterfeit products;

3. The governments of the Asia/Pacific region, their agencies and private sector partners have identified counterfeiting as a major problem causing significant harm to national and business interests through the loss of tax and company revenues, diversion of government resources, higher costs for law enforcement and negative impacts on economic development, employment and investment; NOTING THE FOLLOWING FACTORS 1. The governments and customs administrations in the Asia-Pacific region have increased their attention on IPR protection and their cooperation with business resulting in improvements in combating the trade in counterfeit goods. 2. The economy in the Asia-Pacific region is growing rapidly and has become one of the most vigorous economies in the world. Maintaining this favourable environment is one of the most important responsibilities of governments, their agencies and departments. 3. With globalization, counterfeiting and piracy have become a major concern. The establishment and optimization of effective IPR legal protection and enforcement systems will play a significant and

unique role in promoting social wealth and economic development. 4. IPR border protection is one of the most important Customs’ responsibilities. In the framework of the WTO Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), customs in many countries are striving to establish and improve a more complete legal framework and enforcement system for IPR border protection. They are intensifying enforcement capabilities and improving the effectiveness of customs enforcement. 5. Customs and the private sector have the same goals and aspirations regarding IPR border protection. The effective customs-business cooperation in the areas of information exchange, training, and legal proceeding coordination plays an important role in facilitating IPR border protection. 6. The initiative of the World Customs Organization IPR Strategic Group in establishing an Asia Pacific Secretariat to co-ordinate efforts to assist Customs administrations improve their capacity to implement effective border measures against IPR crime; and to further enhance the partnership between rights holders, customs administrations and other competent national agencies throughout the Region. 7. A number of countries and regions have announced anti-counterfeit initiatives, the most recent being the European Commission which, in November 2004, adopted a strategy for the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) in third countries. The EC action plan focuses on vigorous and effective implementation and enforcement of existing IPR laws and providing technical cooperation and assistance to help third countries fight counterfeiting. The Commission will foster awareness raising of consumers in third countries and support the creation of publicprivate partnerships for enforcement.

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8. Encouraging progress has been made at the First Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting in Brussels, the International Conference in Rome, Italy and the Regional Forum in Shanghai in raising awareness of the counterfeit issue but there remains a strong need to engage all governments at the political and policy-maker levels on the issue; 9. The Global Congress Steering Committee has been established to improve levels of cooperation among international authorities and the private sector, and now must urgently develop the recommendations from Brussels, Rome and Shanghai into priorities and concrete action plans; 10. The World Customs Organization is planning to enhance its anti-counterfeit capabilities by broadening its capacity building programs and targeting counterfeit products under its security and facilitation initiative to secure the international supply chain; 11. Interpol has formally established an Intellectual Property Crimes Unit and is about to launch its pilot project in South America; 12. The World Intellectual Property Organization is enhancing its efforts to convince governments of the need for effective enforcement systems and the benefits of entrusting judges with special experience in dealing with intellectual property cases; 13. The private sector has made progress in identifying mechanisms to quantify the size and extent of the global counterfeit problem and its impacts on consumer health and safety and the growth of organized crime networks.

customs administrations from the Asia/Pacific region and global representatives from the public and private sectors to enhance cooperation and identify areas for improving synergy and action. In doing so, they built upon the recommendations arising from the First Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and the subsequent International Conference in Rome. All participating Asia Pacific countries considered the protection of IP rights as key to economic development and agreed to continue to enhance their efforts to make IP enforcement more effective. AND RECOMMENDS† Asia-Pacific Countries Legislation and Procedures

1. Improving understanding at the political and policy-making level of the serious consequences of the counterfeiting trade and the vital role that enforcement authorities in the region can play in fighting IP crime. 2. Encouraging countries to modernize their Customs legislation on border measures for IP protection, taking into account the WCO Model Law (published on the website www.wcoipr.org) to further enhance anti-counterfeit capabilities, specifically by: —Reducing or eliminating the requirement for IP owners to pay bonds for counterfeiting cases; —Facilitating further simplification of procedures for obtaining court orders; —Empowering customs officials to conduct in-depth investigations into counterfeiting and piracy cases;

3. Encouraging Customs—with the assistance of right owners where appropriate—to transfer more

CONCLUDES That the Global Congress/WCO Asia Pacific Regional Forum on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights provided an important venue for

†

The recommendations contained in the Shanghai Initiative are in addition to, or enhancements of, the recommendations in the Brussels Global Congress Outcomes Statement and the Rome Declaration.

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cases to the police and other competent authorities for investigation and criminal prosecutions.

illegal profits and relatively low risk costs associated with the counterfeiting and piracy trade;

4. Implementing protection for industrial products design and patents for inventions similar to the protection currently offered for trademarks.

12. Developing a comprehensive programme of IPR technical assistance and capacity building for enforcement authorities including the exploration of funding sources;

Risk Analysis, Information Sharing and Communication

5. Establishing channels for strengthening exchange of information between the customs administrations of the Asia-Pacific region and other foreign customs administrations to effectively share information concerning the infringing trade in counterfeit goods. 6. Expanding and promoting understanding, information-sharing and cooperation between customs, other enforcement agencies and the private sector to effectively facilitate combating IPR abuses; 7. Establishing a regular regional IPR forum to ensure that the relationship between business, customs and other enforcement authorities continues to develop; 8. Enhancing the role of the WCO Regional Intelligence Liaison Office (RILO) in the Asia/Pacific region to include coordinating customs information and intelligence gathering on counterfeiting and piracy and providing regular analyses and reports; 9. Designing protocols on the exchange of IPR information between customs authorities and rights holders and vice versa; Capacity Building

10. Providing advanced communication tools to customs to facilitate investigations; 11. Intensifying enforcement capabilities and sanctions particularly with respect to the enormous

13. Conducting a WCO exercise in the Asia-Pacific region to identify and intercept counterfeit and pirate products in containers. The WCO will manage the arrangements for sharing information via the Customs Enforcement Network; Internationally

14. Conducting a meeting of embassy attachés in Brussels as a means of exploring opportunities to increase political and policy-maker awareness of the serious consequences of the trade in counterfeit products; 15. Developing the WCO’s e-learning program on counterfeiting to provide national customs administrations with the latest strategies and knowledge on combating the illegal trade; 16. Sharing the results, as appropriate, of Interpol’s intellectual property crimes exercise, Operation Jupiter, in South America and identifying other potential countries where Operation Jupiter could be run; 17. Increasing the number of activities of the World Intellectual Property Organization to facilitate the exchange of information between law enforcement agencies and to render advice and assistance to Governments on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights including by developing and making use of practical training scenarios; 18. Securing private and public sector financial support for the OECD to finalize its plans to conduct an extensive research project on the global counterfeit trade;

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19. Establishing a study group to investigate and recommend how enforcement authorities and business can best harness the new inspection and security technologies to improve IPR border control capabilities.

12. Establishing Provisions Aimed at Combating Organized Crime and Enacting Other Provisions Among the Latin American nations, Colombia had taken the most important steps against money laundering. The profit-making cocaine and heroin trade had made severe inroads into the economy of Colombia. Dollars accrued from drug smuggling were exchanged for pesos in Colombia. Narcoticsrelated foreign currency was also smuggled out of the country and deposited in other Latin American countries. The Criminal Code of 21 February 1997 criminalized money laundering proceeds connected with crimes such as drug trafficking, extortion, and kidnapping. Article 2 stipulated the closure of organizations that were engaged in criminal activities. Penalties for violation of these drug laws may also include imprisonment, fine, house arrest, disqualification from public office, or rights forfeiture. Source United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/legal_library/co/legal_ library_2001-06-01_2001-41.html.

E/NL.2001/41 LAW No. 365 of 1997 THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC DECREES Article 1 Article 42, paragraph 4, of the Criminal Code shall read as follows:

“4. Prohibition of the pursuit of an occupation, trade, craft, business or enterprise.” Article 2 The Code of Criminal Procedure shall have an article 61A, reading as follows: “ARTICLE 61A: Revocation of the legal personality of companies and organizations devoted to the pursuit of criminal activities or closure of their premises or establishments open to the public. At any stage in the course of proceedings, if the judicial officer deems it a proven fact that juridical persons, companies or organizations have been devoted entirely or partly to the pursuit of criminal activities, that officer shall order the competent authority, subject to the fulfilment of the relevant established legal requirements, to revoke the legal personality thereof or to close premises or establishments thereof that are open to the public.” Article 3 Article 44 of the Criminal Code shall read as follows: “ARTICLE 44: Length of sentence The maximum length of the sentence shall be as follows: —Long-term imprisonment, up to sixty (60) years; —Short-term imprisonment, up to eight (8) years; —House arrest, up to five (5) years; —Forfeiture of rights and disqualification from public office, up to ten (10) years; —Prohibition of the pursuit of an occupation, trade, craft, business or enterprise, up to five (5) years; —Loss of parental rights, up to fifteen (15) years.”

Article 4 Article 58 of the Criminal Code shall read as follows:

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“ARTICLE 58: Prohibition of the pursuit of a business, enterprise, occupation, trade or craft In the case of an offence involving abuse of a function relating to pursuits of a business, enterprise, occupation, trade or craft, or violation of the obligations deriving from such pursuit, the judge, in awarding sentence, may disqualify the offender from continued pursuit of the business, enterprise, occupation, trade or craft in question for a period of up to five (5) years.” Article 5 The Criminal Code shall have an article 63A, reading as follows:

Any person who, without having taken part in the commission of an offence, acquires, possesses, converts or transfers movable or removable property derived directly or indirectly from an offence, or who performs some other act to disguise or conceal the illicit origin of such property, shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of one (1) to five (5) years and a fine of five (5) to five hundred (500) times the statutory minimum monthly wage, provided that the act does not constitute a separate, more serious, offence. If the act in question relates to property with a value greater than one thousand (1,000) times the statutory minimum monthly wage, the custodial sentence shall be increased by a proportion of from one third to one half.”

“ARTICLE 63A: Aggravation of the offence through place of commission If the punishable act was directed or committed, entirely or in part, from within a place of imprisonment by an inmate, or entirely or in part outside the national territory, the sentence shall be increased by up to one half, provided that such circumstance does not constitute a separate punishable act or ingredient thereof.” Article 6 Article 176 of the Criminal Code shall have an additional clause, reading as follows: “ADDITIONAL CLAUSE: If assistance is provided for the purpose of evading prosecution or interfering in the investigation of the punishable acts of extortion, illicit enrichment, kidnapping with extortion, or trafficking in narcotic drugs or toxic or psychotropic substances, the penalty imposed shall be a term of imprisonment of four (4) to twelve (12) years.” Article 7 Article 177 of the Criminal Code shall read as follows:

“ARTICLE 177: Receiving stolen goods

Article 8 Article 186 of the Criminal Code shall read as follows: “ARTICLE 186: Conspiracy to commit a crime When several persons conspire to commit a crime, each such person shall be liable, for this fact alone, to a term of imprisonment of three (3) to six (6) years. Such an offence committed in an uninhabited area or with the use of weapons shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment of three (3) to nine (9) years. When the conspiracy is aimed at the commission of offences of terrorism, drug trafficking, kidnapping with extortion, extortion or the formation of death squads, vigilante squads or bands of hired assassins, it shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment of ten (10) to fifteen (15) years and a fine of two thousand (2,000) to fifty thousand (50,000) times the statutory minimum monthly wage.

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The aforementioned penalty shall be doubled to tripled for any person who organizes, encourages, promotes, directs, leads, forms or funds a conspiracy or association to commit a crime.” Article 9 Book II, Title VII, of the Criminal Code shall have a Chapter Three entitled “Money-laundering”, containing the following articles:

if the performance of the acts concerned involved exchange or foreign trade transactions or the importation of goods into national territory. ADDITIONAL CLAUSE 3: The increase in penalty established in the preceding additional clause shall also apply in the case of the importation of smuggled goods into the national territory. ARTICLE 247 B: Failure to apply measures of control

“ARTICLE 247 A: Money-laundering Any person who acquires, guards, invests, transports, processes, has in safe keeping or administers property deriving directly or indirectly from activities involving extortion, illicit enrichment, kidnapping with extortion or revolt, or related to trafficking in narcotic drugs or toxic or psychotropic substances and who gives to property deriving from such activities the appearance of legality or legalizes it or conceals or disguises the true nature, origin, location, purpose or movement of such property or of title thereto, or performs any other act to conceal or disguise its illicit origin shall be liable, for such act alone, to a term of imprisonment of six (6) to fifteen (15) years and a fine of five hundred (500) to fifty thousand (50,000) times the statutory minimum monthly wage. The same penalty shall apply if the acts described in the preceding paragraph were performed in respect of property which, pursuant to the additional clause of article 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has been declared to be of illicit origin. ADDITIONAL CLAUSE 1: Money-laundering shall be a punishable offence even if the offence from which the property is derived or the acts punishable under the above-mentioned provisions were entirely or partly committed abroad. ADDITIONAL CLAUSE 2: The penalties established in this article shall be increased by a proportion of from one third (1/3) to one half (1/2)

Any employee or executive manager of a financial institution or savings and loans cooperative who, with the aim of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the money concerned, fails to apply any or all of the control mechanisms established by articles 103 and 104 of Decree No. 663 of 1993 for cash transactions shall be liable, for this act alone, to a term of imprisonment of two (2) to six (6) years and a fine of one hundred (100) to ten thousand (10,000) times the statutory minimum monthly wage. ARTICLE 247 C: Specific aggravating circumstances The custodial sentences specified in article 247 A shall be increased by a proportion of from one third to one half if the conduct in question is performed by a person belonging to an entity which is a juridical person, company or organization devoted to money-laundering and by a proportion of from one half to three quarters if it is performed by the chiefs, administrators or executives of such an entity. ARTICLE 247 D: Imposition of accessory penalties If the acts envisaged in article 247 A and 247 B were performed by an employer in any line of business, an administrator, employee, executive manager or intermediary in the financial, stock exchange or insurance sector, as the case may be,

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or a public servant in the discharge of his or her duties, in addition to the corresponding penalty there shall also be imposed the penalty of disqualification from public office or official duties, or prohibition of the pursuit of that person’s occupation, trade, craft, business or enterprise for a period of not less than three (3) and not more than five (5) years.” Article 10 Article 369 A, paragraph (d), of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall read as follows: “(d) Bringing of charges against the leaders of criminal organizations, accompanied by effective proofs of guilt.”

The judge shall determine the appropriate penalty, reducing the amount of the penalty by a proportion of one third (1/3) if the defendant enters a guilty plea. An early sentence may also be pronounced if, once the indictment order has been issued and before the date for a public hearing has been set, the defendant pleads guilty to all the charges listed therein. The penalty may then be reduced by one eighth (1/8).” Article 12 Article 37 B of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall read as follows: “ARTICLE 37 B: Common provisions

Article 11 Article 37 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall read as follows:

In the cases of articles 37 and 37 A of this Code the following provisions shall apply:

“ARTICLE 37: Early sentence

1. Concurrent reductions of penalty

After a decision defining the legal situation has been made enforceable and pending termination of the investigation, the defendant may request pronouncement of an early sentence.

The reduction of penalty established in article 299 of this Code may be accumulated with a reduction envisaged in article 37 or with the reduction indicated in article 37 A, but in no circumstances may the latter reductions be accumulated with each other.

In response to such request, the prosecutor may, if he or she deems it necessary, extend the preliminary investigation and examine evidence during a maximum period of eight (8) days. The counts of the indictment formulated by the prosecutor and their admission by the defendant shall be recorded in a record signed by all parties to such proceedings. The judicial proceedings shall be transmitted to the competent judge who, within a period of ten (10) working days, shall pronounce a sentence on the basis of the accepted facts and circumstances, provided that no violation of fundamental guarantees has taken place.

2. Equivalence to the indictment order The document containing the charges accepted by the defendant in the case of article 37 and the document containing the agreement referred to by article 37 A are equivalent to the indictment order. 3. Rupture of the unity of proceedings Where the proceedings involve several defendants or offences, partial agreements of pleas of guilt may be filed, in which case the unity of proceedings shall be deemed broken.

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4. Interest in recourse A sentence is appealable by the prosecutor, the Department of Public Prosecutions, the defendant and the defendant’s counsel, but by the latter two parties only in respect of the gravity of the sentence, the imposition of a conditional sentence or the extinction of ownership rights to property. 5. Exclusion of a third party with civil liability and of the party to civil proceedings If an early sentence is awarded in the circumstances envisaged in articles 37 or 37 A of this Code, the court order in question shall not determine matters of civil liability.” Article 13 Article 71 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall contain a new paragraph as follows: “6. Proceedings in respect of offences of conspiracy to commit a crime in the cases envisaged in article 186, paragraph 3, of the Criminal Code, as well as proceedings in respect of offences covered by articles 247 A and 247 B of the Criminal Code.” Article 14 Article 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall read as follows: “ARTICLE 340: Extinction of ownership rights Ownership of property acquired by means of illicit enrichment or causing financial loss to the Treasury or serious damage to social moral standards shall be declared to be extinguished by judicial sentence. For such purposes, the offences established in the National Narcotics Statute and its amending and supplementing provisions, as well as the offences of kidnapping, kidnapping with extortion, extortion, money-laundering and engaging in dummy operations, crimes against the social economic order, crimes against natural resources, the manufacture of and trafficking in

weapons and ammunition for the exclusive use of the military forces, misappropriation of public funds, bribery, influence peddling, rebellion, sedition and unlawful assembly are considered offences that cause serious damage to social moral standards. In all cases, the rights of third parties of good faith shall be safeguarded. Property and assets to which ownership rights have been extinguished shall, without exception, revert to the Fund for Rehabilitation, Social Investment and Organized Crime Control for allocation by the National Narcotics Board. ADDITIONAL CLAUSE: In criminal investigations and proceedings in respect of offences of extortion, kidnapping with extortion, engaging in dummy operations, money-laundering, offences covered by the National Narcotics Statute and its amending or supplementing provisions, the illicit enrichment of public servants or private persons, embezzlement of public funds, illicit interest in the conclusion of contracts, the conclusion of contracts in breach of legal requirements, the illegal issuing of currency or of assets or securities with equivalent value to currency, illicit engaging in monopolistic activities or activities relating to revenue taxation, theft of assets or equipment intended for national security and defence, crimes against property affecting State assets, improper use of privileged information or use of confidential or classified information, the declaration that movable or immovable property is of illicit origin is independent from the criminal responsibility of the accused and the abatement of the action or extinction of the penalty. In such cases extinction of ownership shall proceed in conformity with the provisions of the law governing such action in rem. Unless the proceedings conclude by demonstrating non-existence of the offence, the declaration that movable or immovable property is of illicit origin shall be made in the restraining order, in the order of proscription of the investigation, in the writ of termination of proceedings or in the sentence. In

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the same order, and with a view to furthering the process of extinction of ownership, there shall be issued an order for the attachment and seizure of property declared to be of illicit origin.”

liable to a term of imprisonment of six (6) to twenty (20) years and a fine of one hundred (100) to fifty thousand (50,000) times the statutory minimum monthly wage.

Article 15 Article 369 H of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall contain a paragraph as follows:

If the quantity of drugs in question is not greater than one thousand (1,000) grams of marijuana, two hundred (200) grams of hashish, one hundred (100) grams of cocaine or narcotic substance based on cocaine or twenty (20) grams of opium derivative, or two hundred (200) grams of methaqualone or synthetic drug, the penalty shall be a term of imprisonment of one (1) to three (3) years and a fine of two (2) to one hundred (100) times the statutory minimum monthly wage.

“ADDITIONAL CLAUSE: Any person convicted on charges of conspiracy to commit a crime aggravated by the circumstance of organizing, encouraging, promoting, directing, leading, forming or funding a conspiracy or association, in combination with a different offence, may have recourse to an early sentence or to a special hearing and may be eligible for a reduced sentence in return for entering a guilty plea or for effectively assisting the course of justice, but in no case may the penalty imposed be lower than that imposable without any reductions for the more serious offence.” Article 16 Article 508, paragraph 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall read as follows: “4. In the case of a prohibition on the pursuit of an occupation, trade, craft, business or enterprise, an issue shall be ordered to annul the document permitting such pursuit and the issuing authority shall be duly notified.” Article 17 Article 33 of Law No. 30 of 1986 shall read as follows: “ARTICLE 33: Any person not in possession of a licence issued by a competent authority who, except as provided by law governing the permitted dosage for personal consumption, introduces into the country, in transit or otherwise, or exports from it, transports, carries, stores, conserves, manufactures, sells, offers, acquires, finances or supplies in any capacity addictive drugs shall be

If the quantity of drugs in question is greater than the maximum limits established in the preceding paragraph but not greater than ten thousand (10,000) grams of marijuana, three thousand (3,000) grams of hashish, two thousand (2,000) grams of cocaine or narcotic substance based on cocaine, or sixty (60) grams of opium derivative, or four thousand (4,000) grams of methaqualone or synthetic drug, the penalty shall be a term of imprisonment of four (4) to twelve (12) years and a fine of ten (10) to one hundred (100) times the statutory minimum monthly wage.” Article 18 Article 34 of Law No. 30 of 1986 shall read as follows: “ARTICLE 34: Any person who illicitly uses movable or immovable property for the purpose of manufacturing, storing or transporting, selling or utilizing any of the drugs referred to in article 32 above or who authorizes or tolerates such use by others shall be liable to term of imprisonment of four (4) to twelve (12) years and a fine of one thousand (1,000) to fifty thousand (50,000) times the statutory minimum monthly wage, without prejudice to the provisions of articles 124 and 125 of Decree-Law No. 522 of 1971 (article 208,

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paragraph 5, and 214, paragraph 3, of the National Police Code). If the quantity of drugs in question is not greater than one thousand (1,000) grams of marijuana, three hundred (300) grams of hashish, one hundred (100) grams of cocaine or narcotic substance based on cocaine, twenty (20) grams of opium derivative or two hundred (200) grams of methaqualone or synthetic drug, the penalty shall be a term of imprisonment of one (1) to three (3) years and a fine of two (2) to one hundred (100) times the statutory minimum monthly wage. If the quantity of drug in question is greater than the maximum limits established in the preceding paragraph but not greater than ten thousand (10,000) grams of marijuana, three thousand (3,000) grams of hashish, two thousand (2,000) grams of cocaine or narcotic substance based on cocaine, sixty (60) grams of opium derivative or four thousand (4,000) grams of methaqualone or synthetic drug, the penalty shall be a term of imprisonment of three (3) to eight (8) years and a fine of ten (10) to eight hundred (800) times the statutory minimum monthly wage.” Article 19 Article 40 of Law No. 30 of 1986 shall read as follows: “ARTICLE 40: In the order imposing a protective measure of custody in respect of any of the offences established in articles 33, 34 or 43 of this Law, the judicial officer shall decree the seizure and attachment of property belonging to the accused which has not already been confiscated in connection with the punishable act in an amount deemed sufficient to guarantee payment of the fine stipulated in those articles and shall appoint a depositary. Once seizure and attachment have been decreed, both their execution and the procedures for contesting such action and decision-taking on such recourse shall proceed in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The sentence delivered shall order the sale of any property seized and attached as part of proceedings, for which purpose regard shall be had to the procedures laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure.” Article 20 Article 43 of Law No. 30 of 1986 shall read as follows: “ARTICLE 43: Any person who illegally introduces into the country, or exports from it, transports or has in his possession elements which may be used for processing cocaine or any other addictive drug such as the following: ethyl ether, acetone, ammonium, potassium permanganate, carbonate light, hydrochloric acid, sulphuric acid, thinners, solvents and other substances which, according to pre-established criteria of the National Narcotics Board, are used for such purpose, shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of three (3) to ten (10) years and a fine of two thousand (2,000) to fifty thousand (50,000) times the statutory minimum monthly wage. Except as provided by article 54 of Decree-Law No. 099 of 1991, adopted as permanent legislation under article 1 of Decree-Law No. 2271 of 1991, once such elements have been established by expert opinion as belonging to the aforementioned category, they shall be placed by a judicial officer at the disposal of the National Narcotics Office, which may order their immediate utilization by an official entity, their sale for duly verified licit purposes, or their destruction in cases where they present a serious risk to public health or safety. In cases where the quantity of the substances concerned is not greater than triple those quantities indicated in the resolutions issued by the National Narcotics Office, the penalty shall be a term of imprisonment of two (2) to five (5) years and a fine of ten (10) to one hundred (100) times the statutory minimum monthly wage.”

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Article 21 The following additional clause is hereby added to article 209 of the Organizational Statute of the Financial System: “ADDITIONAL CLAUSE: In cases where the offending acts referred to in this article relate to provisions contained in Chapter XVI of the Third Part of the Organizational Statute of the Financial System, the fine imposable shall be up to fifty million pesos ($50,000,000) payable to the National Treasury. This amount shall be readjustable in the manner indicated in the first paragraph of this article. This fine may be renewable until such time as the requirement is met and shall be applied without prejudice to any penal sanctions imposed in respect of each offence committed. In addition, the head of the Bank Supervisory Authority may demand immediate dismissal of the offender and transmit such decision to all entities under the supervision of that Authority.” Article 22 The following paragraph is hereby added to article 211 of the Organizational Statute of the Financial System: “3. Provisions on the prevention of criminal conduct In cases where the offence referred to in the first paragraph of this article relates to the provisions contained in Chapter XVI of the Third Part of the Organizational Statute of the Financial System, the fine imposable shall be up to one thousand million pesos ($1,000,000,000).

implementation of internal reforms to be agreed with that supervisory body. The aforementioned amounts shall be readjustable in the manner indicated in the first paragraph of this article.” Article 23 Cooperatives Which Engage in Savings and Credit Activities In addition to high-level cooperatives [entidades Cooperativas de Grado Superior] which fall within the responsibility of the Bank Supervisory Authority, all cooperatives which engage in savings and credit activities shall also be governed by the provisions of articles 102 to 107 of the Organizational Statute of the Financial System. In the case of entities not supervised by the Bank Supervisory Authority, the National Administrative Department for Cooperatives (Dancoop) shall determine the lower threshold amounts for the reporting requirement for cash transactions. Furthermore, Dancoop shall prescribe rules governing, and shall collect, periodical reports on the number of cash transactions referred to in article 104 of the Organizational Statute of the Financial System, as well as monthly reports on the registration of multiple cash transactions referred to in article 103, paragraph 2, of that Statute undertaken by cooperative entities not supervised by the Bank Supervisory Authority. The obligations set out in this article shall enter into effect on the date specified by the National Government.

In addition, the head of the Bank Supervisory Authority may order the establishment awarded such fine to allocate an amount of up to one thousand million pesos ($1,000,000,000) for the

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13. Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism updates the 1990 Strasbourg Convention. This updated instrument incorporates provisions to prevent the financing of terrorist organizations and seeks to ensure “that logistical cells cannot find financial safe havens anywhere in Europe.” This convention calls for international cooperation by all parties. Source Council of Europe, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/ Treaties/Html/198.htm.

Preamble The member States of the Council of Europe and the other Signatories hereto,

Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ETS No. 141—hereinafter referred to as “the 1990 Convention”); Recalling also Resolution 1373(2001) on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations on 28 September 2001, and particularly its paragraph 3.d; Recalling the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1999 and particularly its Articles 2 and 4, which oblige States Parties to establish the financing of terrorism as a criminal offence; Convinced of the necessity to take immediate steps to ratify and to implement fully the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, cited above, Have agreed as follows:

Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members;

Chapter I—Use of Terms

Convinced of the need to pursue a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society;

Article 1—Use of Terms For the purposes of this Convention:

Considering that the fight against serious crime, which has become an increasingly international problem, calls for the use of modern and effective methods on an international scale; Believing that one of these methods consists in depriving criminals of the proceeds from crime and instrumentalities; Considering that for the attainment of this aim a well-functioning system of international cooperation also must be established; Bearing in mind the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and

a. “proceeds” means any economic advantage, derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, from criminal offences. It may consist of any property as defined in sub-paragraph b of this article; b. “property” includes property of any description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to or interest in such property; c. “instrumentalities” means any property used or intended to be used, in any manner, wholly or in part, to commit a criminal offence or criminal offences; d. “confiscation” means a penalty or a measure, ordered by a court following proceedings in rela-

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tion to a criminal offence or criminal offences resulting in the final deprivation of property; e. “predicate offence” means any criminal offence as a result of which proceeds were generated that may become the subject of an offence as defined in Article 9 of this Convention. f. “financial intelligence unit” (hereinafter referred to as “FIU”) means a central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as permitted, requesting), analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of financial information i. concerning suspected proceeds and potential financing of terrorism, or ii. required by national legislation or regulation,in order to combat money laundering and financing of terrorism; g. “freezing” or “seizure” means temporarily prohibiting the transfer, destruction, conversion, disposition or movement of property or temporarily assuming custody or control of property on the basis of an order issued by a court or other competent authority; h. “financing of terrorism” means the acts set out in Article 2 of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, cited above.

Chapter III—Measures to Be Taken at National Level Section 1—General Provisions Article 3—Confiscation Measures 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable it to confiscate instrumentalities and proceeds or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds and laundered property. 2. Provided that paragraph 1 of this article applies to money laundering and to the categories of offences in the appendix to the Convention, each Party may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, declare that paragraph 1 of this article applies a. only in so far as the offence is punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a maximum of more than one year. However, each Party may make a declaration on this provision in respect of the confiscation of the proceeds from tax offences for the sole purpose of being able to confiscate such proceeds, both nationally and through international cooperation, under national and international tax-debt recovery legislation; and/or b. only to a list of specified offences.

Chapter II—Financing of Terrorism Article 2—Application of the Convention to the Financing of Terrorism 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable it to apply the provisions contained in Chapters III, IV and V of this Convention to the financing of terrorism. 2. In particular, each Party shall ensure that it is able to search, trace, identify, freeze, seize and confiscate property, of a licit or illicit origin, used or allocated to be used by any means, in whole or in part, for the financing of terrorism, or the proceeds of this offence, and to provide cooperation to this end to the widest possible extent.

3. Parties may provide for mandatory confiscation in respect of offences which are subject to the confiscation regime. Parties may in particular include in this provision the offences of money laundering, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings and any other serious offence. 4. Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to require that, in respect of a serious offence or offences as defined by national law, an offender demonstrates the origin of alleged proceeds or other property liable

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to confiscation to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with the principles of its domestic law. Article 4—Investigative and Provisional Measures Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable it to identify, trace, freeze or seize rapidly property which is liable to confiscation pursuant to Article 3, in order in particular to facilitate the enforcement of a later confiscation. Article 5—Freezing, Seizure and Confiscation Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the measures to freeze, seize and confiscate also encompass: a. the property into which the proceeds have been transformed or converted; b. property acquired from legitimate sources, if proceeds have been intermingled, in whole or in part, with such property, up to the assessed value of the intermingled proceeds; c. income or other benefits derived from proceeds, from property into which proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted or from property with which proceeds of crime have been intermingled, up to the assessed value of the intermingled proceeds, in the same manner and to the same extent as proceeds.

Article 6—Management of Frozen or Seized Property Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure proper management of frozen or seized property in accordance with Articles 4 and 5 of this Convention. Article 7—Investigative Powers and Techniques 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its courts or other competent authorities to order that bank, financial or commercial records be made

available or be seized in order to carry out the actions referred to in Articles 3, 4 and 5. A Party shall not decline to act under the provisions of this article on grounds of bank secrecy. 2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable it to: a. determine whether a natural or legal person is a holder or beneficial owner of one or more accounts, of whatever nature, in any bank located in its territory and, if so obtain all of the details of the identified accounts; b. obtain the particulars of specified bank accounts and of banking operations which have been carried out during a specified period through one or more specified accounts, including the particulars of any sending or recipient account; c. monitor, during a specified period, the banking operations that are being carried out through one or more identified accounts; and, d. ensure that banks do not disclose to the bank customer concerned or to other third persons that information has been sought or obtained in accordance with sub-paragraphs a, b, or c, or that an investigation is being carried out.

Parties shall consider extending this provision to accounts held in non-bank financial institutions. 3. Each Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable it to use special investigative techniques facilitating the identification and tracing of proceeds and the gathering of evidence related thereto, such as observation, interception of telecommunications, access to computer systems and order to produce specific documents. Article 8—Legal Remedies Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that interested parties affected by measures under Articles 3, 4 and 5 and such other provisions in this

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Section as are relevant, shall have effective legal remedies in order to preserve their rights. Article 9—Laundering Offences 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally: a. the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is proceeds, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his actions; b. the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of, property, knowing that such property is proceeds; and, subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system; c. the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property was proceeds; d. participation in, association or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with this article.

2. For the purposes of implementing or applying paragraph 1 of this article: a. it shall not matter whether the predicate offence was subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the Party; b. it may be provided that the offences set forth in that paragraph do not apply to the persons who committed the predicate offence; c. knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of an offence set forth in that paragraph may be inferred from objective, factual circumstances.

3. Each Party may adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as an offence under its domestic law all or some of the acts referred to in paragraph 1 of this article, in

either or both of the following cases where the offender a. suspected that the property was proceeds, b. ought to have assumed that the property was proceeds.

4. Provided that paragraph 1 of this article applies to the categories of predicate offences in the appendix to the Convention, each State or the European Community may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, declare that paragraph 1 of this article applies: a. only in so far as the predicate offence is punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a maximum of more than one year, or for those Parties that have a minimum threshold for offences in their legal system, in so far as the offence is punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a minimum of more than six months; and/or b. only to a list of specified predicate offences; and/or c. to a category of serious offences in the national law of the Party.

5. Each Party shall ensure that a prior or simultaneous conviction for the predicate offence is not a prerequisite for a conviction for money laundering. 6. Each Party shall ensure that a conviction for money laundering under this Article is possible where it is proved that the property, the object of paragraph 1.a or b of this article, originated from a predicate offence, without it being necessary to establish precisely which offence. 7. Each Party shall ensure that predicate offences for money laundering extend to conduct that occurred in another State, which constitutes an offence in that State, and which would have constituted a predicate offence had it occurred domestically. Each Party may provide that the only

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prerequisite is that the conduct would have constituted a predicate offence had it occurred domestically. Article 10—Corporate Liability 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that legal persons can be held liable for the criminal offences of money laundering established in accordance with this Convention, committed for their benefit by any natural person, acting either individually or as part of an organ of the legal person, who has a leading position within the legal person, based on: a. a power of representation of the legal person; or b. an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person; or c. an authority to exercise control within the legal person,

as well as for involvement of such a natural person as accessory or instigator in the above-mentioned offences. 2. Apart from the cases already provided for in paragraph 1, each Party shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a legal person can be held liable where the lack of supervision or control by a natural person referred to in paragraph 1 has made possible the commission of the criminal offences mentioned in paragraph 1 for the benefit of that legal person by a natural person under its authority. 3. Liability of a legal person under this Article shall not exclude criminal proceedings against natural persons who are perpetrators, instigators of, or accessories to, the criminal offences mentioned in paragraph 1. 4. Each Party shall ensure that legal persons held liable in accordance with this Article, shall be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.

Article 11—Previous Decisions Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to provide for the possibility of taking into account, when determining the penalty, final decisions against a natural or legal person taken in another Party in relation to offences established in accordance with this Convention. Section 2—Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and Prevention Article 12—Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish an FIU as defined in this Convention. 2. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that its FIU has access, directly or indirectly, on a timely basis to the financial, administrative and law enforcement information that it requires to properly undertake its functions, including the analysis of suspicious transaction reports. Article 13—Measures to Prevent Money Laundering 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory or monitoring regime to prevent money laundering and shall take due account of applicable international standards, including in particular the recommendations adopted by the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF). 2. In that respect, each Party shall adopt, in particular, such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to: a. require legal and natural persons which engage in activities which are particularly likely to be used for money laundering purposes, and as far as these activities are concerned, to:

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i. identify and verify the identity of their customers and, where applicable, their ultimate beneficial owners, and to conduct ongoing due diligence on the business relationship, while taking into account a risk based approach; ii. report suspicions on money laundering subject to safeguard; iii. take supporting measures, such as record keeping on customer identification and transactions, training of personnel and the establishment of internal policies and procedures, and if appropriate, adapted to their size and nature of business; b. prohibit, as appropriate, the persons referred to in sub-paragraph a from disclosing the fact that a suspicious transaction report or related information has been transmitted or that a money laundering investigation is being or may be carried out; c. ensure that the persons referred to in sub-paragraph a are subject to effective systems for monitoring, and where applicable supervision, with a view to ensure their compliance with the requirements to combat money laundering, where appropriate on a risk sensitive basis.

3. In that respect, each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to detect the significant physical cross border transportation of cash and appropriate bearer negotiable instruments. Article 14—Postponement of Domestic Suspicious Transactions Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to permit urgent action to be taken by the FIU or, as appropriate, by any other competent authorities or body, when there is a suspicion that a transaction is related to money laundering, to suspend or withhold consent to a transaction going ahead in order to analyse the transaction and confirm the suspicion. Each party may restrict such a measure to cases where a suspicious transaction report has been submitted. The maximum duration of any suspension or

withholding of consent to a transaction shall be subject to any relevant provisions in national law. Chapter IV—International Co-operation Section 1—Principles of International Cooperation Article 15—General Principles and Measures for International Co-operation 1. The Parties shall mutually co-operate with each other to the widest extent possible for the purposes of investigations and proceedings aiming at the confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds. 2. Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to enable it to comply, under the conditions provided for in this chapter, with requests: a. for confiscation of specific items of property representing proceeds or instrumentalities, as well as for confiscation of proceeds consisting in a requirement to pay a sum of money corresponding to the value of proceeds; b. for investigative assistance and provisional measures with a view to either form of confiscation referred to under a above.

3. Investigative assistance and provisional measures sought in paragraph 2.b shall be carried out as permitted by and in accordance with the internal law of the requested Party. Where the request concerning one of these measures specifies formalities or procedures which are necessary under the law of the requesting Party, even if unfamiliar to the requested Party, the latter shall comply with such requests to the extent that the action sought is not contrary to the fundamental principles of its law. 4. Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the requests coming from other Parties in order to identify, trace, freeze or seize the proceeds and

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instrumentalities, receive the same priority as those made in the framework of internal procedures.

as it applies in respect of requests for search and seizure.

Section 2—Investigative Assistance

5. Each State or the European Community may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, declare that this article applies only to the categories of offences specified in the list contained in the appendix to this Convention.

Article 16—Obligation to Assist The Parties shall afford each other, upon request, the widest possible measure of assistance in the identification and tracing of instrumentalities, proceeds and other property liable to confiscation. Such assistance shall include any measure providing and securing evidence as to the existence, location or movement, nature, legal status or value of the aforementioned property. Article 17—Requests for Information on Bank Accounts 1. Each Party shall, under the conditions set out in this article, take the measures necessary to determine, in answer to a request sent by another Party, whether a natural or legal person that is the subject of a criminal investigation holds or controls one or more accounts, of whatever nature, in any bank located in its territory and, if so, provide the particulars of the identified accounts. 2. The obligation set out in this article shall apply only to the extent that the information is in the possession of the bank keeping the account. 3. In addition to the requirements of Article 37, the requesting party shall, in the request: a. state why it considers that the requested information is likely to be of substantial value for the purpose of the criminal investigation into the offence; b. state on what grounds it presumes that banks in the requested Party hold the account and specify, to the widest extent possible, which banks and/or accounts may be involved; and c. include any additional information available which may facilitate the execution of the request.

4. The requested Party may make the execution of such a request dependant on the same conditions

6. Parties may extend this provision to accounts held in non-bank financial institutions. Such extension may be made subject to the principle of reciprocity. Article 18—Requests for Information on Banking Transactions 1. On request by another Party, the requested Party shall provide the particulars of specified bank accounts and of banking operations which have been carried out during a specified period through one or more accounts specified in the request, including the particulars of any sending or recipient account. 2. The obligation set out in this article shall apply only to the extent that the information is in the possession of the bank holding the account. 3. In addition to the requirements of Article 37, the requesting Party shall in its request indicate why it considers the requested information relevant for the purpose of the criminal investigation into the offence. 4. The requested Party may make the execution of such a request dependant on the same conditions as it applies in respect of requests for search and seizure. 5. Parties may extend this provision to accounts held in non-bank financial institutions. Such

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extension may be made subject to the principle of reciprocity. Article 19—Requests for the Monitoring of Banking Transactions 1. Each Party shall ensure that, at the request of another Party, it is able to monitor, during a specified period, the banking operations that are being carried out through one or more accounts specified in the request and communicate the results thereof to the requesting Party. 2. In addition to the requirements of Article 37, the requesting Party shall in its request indicate why it considers the requested information relevant for the purpose of the criminal investigation into the offence. 3. The decision to monitor shall be taken in each individual case by the competent authorities of the requested Party, with due regard for the national law of that Party. 4. The practical details regarding the monitoring shall be agreed between the competent authorities of the requesting and requested Parties. 5. Parties may extend this provision to accounts held in non-bank financial institutions. Article 20—Spontaneous Information Without prejudice to its own investigations or proceedings, a Party may without prior request forward to another Party information on instrumentalities and proceeds, when it considers that the disclosure of such information might assist the receiving Party in initiating or carrying out investigations or proceedings or might lead to a request by that Party under this chapter.

Section 3—Provisional Measures Article 21—Obligation to Take Provisional Measures 1. At the request of another Party which has instituted criminal proceedings or proceedings for the purpose of confiscation, a Party shall take the necessary provisional measures, such as freezing or seizing, to prevent any dealing in, transfer or disposal of property which, at a later stage, may be the subject of a request for confiscation or which might be such as to satisfy the request. 2. A Party which has received a request for confiscation pursuant to Article 23 shall, if so requested, take the measures mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article in respect of any property which is the subject of the request or which might be such as to satisfy the request. Article 22—Execution of Provisional Measures 1. After the execution of the provisional measures requested in conformity with paragraph 1 of Article 21, the requesting Party shall provide spontaneously and as soon as possible to the requested Party all information which may question or modify the extent of these measures. The requesting Party shall also provide without delays all complementary information requested by the requested Party and which is necessary for the implementation of and the follow up to the provisional measures. 2. Before lifting any provisional measure taken pursuant to this article, the requested Party shall, wherever possible, give the requesting Party an opportunity to present its reasons in favour of continuing the measure. Section 4—Confiscation Article 23—Obligation to Confiscate 1. A Party, which has received a request made by another Party for confiscation concerning

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instrumentalities or proceeds, situated in its territory, shall: a. enforce a confiscation order made by a court of a requesting Party in relation to such instrumentalities or proceeds; or b. submit the request to its competent authorities for the purpose of obtaining an order of confiscation and, if such order is granted, enforce it.

2. For the purposes of applying paragraph 1.b of this article, any Party shall whenever necessary have competence to institute confiscation proceedings under its own law. 3. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this article shall also apply to confiscation consisting in a requirement to pay a sum of money corresponding to the value of proceeds, if property on which the confiscation can be enforced is located in the requested Party. In such cases, when enforcing confiscation pursuant to paragraph 1, the requested Party shall, if payment is not obtained, realise the claim on any property available for that purpose. 4. If a request for confiscation concerns a specific item of property, the Parties may agree that the requested Party may enforce the confiscation in the form of a requirement to pay a sum of money corresponding to the value of the property. 5. The Parties shall co-operate to the widest extent possible under their domestic law with those Parties which request the execution of measures equivalent to confiscation leading to the deprivation of property, which are not criminal sanctions, in so far as such measures are ordered by a judicial authority of the requesting Party in relation to a criminal offence, provided that it has been established that the property constitutes proceeds or other property in the meaning of Article 5 of this Convention.

Article 24—Execution of Confiscation 1. The procedures for obtaining and enforcing the confiscation under Article 23 shall be governed by the law of the requested Party. 2. The requested Party shall be bound by the findings as to the facts in so far as they are stated in a conviction or judicial decision of the requesting Party or in so far as such conviction or judicial decision is implicitly based on them. 3. Each State or the European Community may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, declare that paragraph 2 of this article applies only subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system. 4. If the confiscation consists in the requirement to pay a sum of money, the competent authority of the requested Party shall convert the amount thereof into the currency of that Party at the rate of exchange ruling at the time when the decision to enforce the confiscation is taken. 5. In the case of Article 23, paragraph 1.a, the requesting Party alone shall have the right to decide on any application for review of the confiscation order. Article 25—Confiscated Property 1. Property confiscated by a Party pursuant to Articles 23 and 24 of this Convention, shall be disposed of by that Party in accordance with its domestic law and administrative procedures. 2. When acting on the request made by another Party in accordance with Articles 23 and 24 of this Convention, Parties shall, to the extent permitted by domestic law and if so requested, give priority consideration to returning the confiscated property to the requesting Party so that it can give

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compensation to the victims of the crime or return such property to their legitimate owners.

b. the execution of the request is likely to prejudice the sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests of the requested Party; or c. in the opinion of the requested Party, the importance of the case to which the request relates does not justify the taking of the action sought; or d. the offence to which the request relates is a fiscal offence, with the exception of the financing of terrorism; e. the offence to which the request relates is a political offence, with the exception of the financing of terrorism; or f. the requested Party considers that compliance with the action sought would be contrary to the principle of “ne bis in idem”; or g. the offence to which the request relates would not be an offence under the law of the requested Party if committed within its jurisdiction. However, this ground for refusal applies to co-operation under Section 2 only in so far as the assistance sought involves coercive action. Where dual criminality is required for co-operation under this chapter, that requirement shall be deemed to be satisfied regardless of whether both Parties place the offence within the same category of offences or denominate the offence by the same terminology, provided that both Parties criminalise the conduct underlying the offence.

3. When acting on the request made by another Party in accordance with Articles 23 and 24 of this Convention, a Party may give special consideration to concluding agreements or arrangements on sharing with other Parties, on a regular or case-bycase basis, such property, in accordance with its domestic law or administrative procedures. Article 26—Right of Enforcement and Maximum Amount of Confiscation 1. A request for confiscation made under Articles 23 and 24 does not affect the right of the requesting Party to enforce itself the confiscation order. 2. Nothing in this Convention shall be so interpreted as to permit the total value of the confiscation to exceed the amount of the sum of money specified in the confiscation order. If a Party finds that this might occur, the Parties concerned shall enter into consultations to avoid such an effect. Article 27—Imprisonment in Default The requested Party shall not impose imprisonment in default or any other measure restricting the liberty of a person as a result of a request under Article 23, if the requesting Party has so specified in the request. Section 5—Refusal and Postponement of Co-operation Article 28—Grounds for Refusal 1. Co-operation under this chapter may be refused if: a. the action sought would be contrary to the fundamental principles of the legal system of the requested Party; or

2. Co-operation under Section 2, in so far as the assistance sought involves coercive action, and under Section 3 of this chapter, may also be refused if the measures sought could not be taken under the domestic law of the requested Party for the purposes of investigations or proceedings, had it been a similar domestic case. 3. Where the law of the requested Party so requires, co-operation under Section 2, in so far as the assistance sought involves coercive action, and under Section 3 of this chapter may also be refused if the measures sought or any other measures having similar effects would not be permitted under the law of the requesting Party, or, as regards the competent authorities of the requesting Party,

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if the request is not authorised by either a judge or another judicial authority, including public prosecutors, any of these authorities acting in relation to criminal offences. 4. Co-operation under Section 4 of this chapter may also be refused if: a. under the law of the requested Party confiscation is not provided for in respect of the type of offence to which the request relates; or b. without prejudice to the obligation pursuant to Article 23, paragraph 3, it would be contrary to the principles of the domestic law of the requested Party concerning the limits of confiscation in respect of the relationship between an offence and: i. an economic advantage that might be qualified as its proceeds; or ii. property that might be qualified as its instrumentalities; or c. under the law of the requested Party confiscation may no longer be imposed or enforced because of the lapse of time; or d. without prejudice to Article 23, paragraph 5, the request does not relate to a previous conviction, or a decision of a judicial nature or a statement in such a decision that an offence or several offences have been committed, on the basis of which the confiscation has been ordered or is sought; or e. confiscation is either not enforceable in the requesting Party, or it is still subject to ordinary means of appeal; or f. the request relates to a confiscation order resulting from a decision rendered in absentia of the person against whom the order was issued and, in the opinion of the requested Party, the proceedings conducted by the requesting Party leading to such decision did not satisfy the minimum rights of defence recognised as due to everyone against whom a criminal charge is made.

5. For the purpose of paragraph 4.f of this article a decision is not considered to have been rendered in absentia if:

a. it has been confirmed or pronounced after opposition by the person concerned; or b. it has been rendered on appeal, provided that the appeal was lodged by the person concerned.

6. When considering, for the purposes of paragraph 4.f of this article if the minimum rights of defence have been satisfied, the requested Party shall take into account the fact that the person concerned has deliberately sought to evade justice or the fact that that person, having had the possibility of lodging a legal remedy against the decision made in absentia, elected not to do so. The same will apply when the person concerned, having been duly served with the summons to appear, elected not to do so nor to ask for adjournment. 7. A Party shall not invoke bank secrecy as a ground to refuse any co-operation under this chapter. Where its domestic law so requires, a Party may require that a request for co-operation which would involve the lifting of bank secrecy be authorised by either a judge or another judicial authority, including public prosecutors, any of these authorities acting in relation to criminal offences. 8. Without prejudice to the ground for refusal provided for in paragraph 1.a of this article: a. the fact that the person under investigation or subjected to a confiscation order by the authorities of the requesting Party is a legal person shall not be invoked by the requested Party as an obstacle to affording any co-operation under this chapter; b. the fact that the natural person against whom an order of confiscation of proceeds has been issued has died or the fact that a legal person against whom an order of confiscation of proceeds has been issued has subsequently been dissolved shall not be invoked as an obstacle to render assistance in accordance with Article 23, paragraph 1.a; c. the fact that the person under investigation or subjected to a confiscation order by the authorities of the requesting Party is mentioned in the request

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both as the author of the underlying criminal offence and of the offence of money laundering, in accordance with Article 9.2.b of this Convention, shall not be invoked by the requested Party as an obstacle to affording any co-operation under this chapter.

Article 29—Postponement The requested Party may postpone action on a request if such action would prejudice investigations or proceedings by its authorities. Article 30—Partial or Conditional Granting of a Request Before refusing or postponing co-operation under this chapter, the requested Party shall, where appropriate after having consulted the requesting Party, consider whether the request may be granted partially or subject to such conditions as it deems necessary.

3. When serving judicial documents to persons abroad affected by provisional measures or confiscation orders issued in the sending Party, this Party shall indicate what legal remedies are available under its law to such persons. Article 32—Recognition of Foreign Decisions 1. When dealing with a request for co-operation under Sections 3 and 4, the requested Party shall recognise any judicial decision taken in the requesting Party regarding rights claimed by third parties. 2. Recognition may be refused if: a. third parties did not have adequate opportunity to assert their rights; or b. the decision is incompatible with a decision already taken in the requested Party on the same matter; or c. it is incompatible with the ordre public of the requested Party; or d. the decision was taken contrary to provisions on exclusive jurisdiction provided for by the law of the requested Party.

Section 6—Notification and Protection of Third Parties’ Rights Article 31—Notification of Documents 1. The Parties shall afford each other the widest measure of mutual assistance in the serving of judicial documents to persons affected by provisional measures and confiscation. 2. Nothing in this article is intended to interfere with: a. the possibility of sending judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad; b. the possibility for judicial officers, officials or other competent authorities of the Party of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the consular authorities of that Party or through judicial officers, officials or other competent authorities of the Party of destination, unless the Party of destination makes a declaration to the contrary to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Section 7—Procedural and Other General Rules Article 33—Central Authority 1. The Parties shall designate a central authority or, if necessary, authorities, which shall be responsible for sending and answering requests made under this chapter, the execution of such requests or the transmission of them to the authorities competent for their execution. 2. Each Party shall, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, communicate to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe the names and addresses of the authorities designated in pursuance of paragraph 1 of this article.

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Article 34—Direct Communication 1. The central authorities shall communicate directly with one another. 2. In the event of urgency, requests or communications under this chapter may be sent directly by the judicial authorities, including public prosecutors, of the requesting Party to such authorities of the requested Party. In such cases a copy shall be sent at the same time to the central authority of the requested Party through the central authority of the requesting Party. 3. Any request or communication under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article may be made through the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol). 4. Where a request is made pursuant to paragraph 2 of this article and the authority is not competent to deal with the request, it shall refer the request to the competent national authority and inform directly the requesting Party that it has done so. 5. Requests or communications under Section 2 of this chapter, which do not involve coercive action, may be directly transmitted by the competent authorities of the requesting Party to the competent authorities of the requested Party. 6. Draft requests or communications under this chapter may be sent directly by the judicial authorities of the requesting Party to such authorities of the requested Party prior to a formal request to ensure that it can be dealt with efficiently upon receipt and contains sufficient information and supporting documentation for it to meet the requirements of the legislation of the requested Party. Article 35—Form of Request and Languages 1. All requests under this chapter shall be made in writing. They may be transmitted electronically, or by any other means of telecommunication, provided that the requesting Party is prepared,

upon request, to produce at any time a written record of such communication and the original. However each Party may, at any time, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, indicate the conditions in which it is ready to accept and execute requests received electronically or by any other means of communication. 2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 of this article, translations of the requests or supporting documents shall not be required. 3. At the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, any State or the European Community may communicate to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe a declaration that it reserves the right to require that requests made to it and documents supporting such requests be accompanied by a translation into its own language or into one of the official languages of the Council of Europe or into such one of these languages as it shall indicate. It may on that occasion declare its readiness to accept translations in any other language as it may specify. The other Parties may apply the reciprocity rule. Article 36—Legalisation Documents transmitted in application of this chapter shall be exempt from all legalisation formalities. Article 37—Content of Request 1. Any request for co-operation under this chapter shall specify: a. the authority making the request and the authority carrying out the investigations or proceedings; b. the object of and the reason for the request; c. the matters, including the relevant facts (such as date, place and circumstances of the offence) to which the investigations or proceedings relate, except in the case of a request for notification; d. insofar as the co-operation involves coercive action:

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i. the text of the statutory provisions or, where this is not possible, a statement of the relevant law applicable; and ii. an indication that the measure sought or any other measures having similar effects could be taken in the territory of the requesting Party under its own law; e. where necessary and in so far as possible: i. details of the person or persons concerned, including name, date and place of birth, nationality and location, and, in the case of a legal person, its seat; and ii. the property in relation to which co-operation is sought, its location, its connection with the person or persons concerned, any connection with the offence, as well as any available information about other persons, interests in the property; and f. any particular procedure the requesting Party wishes to be followed.

2. A request for provisional measures under Section 3 in relation to seizure of property on which a confiscation order consisting in the requirement to pay a sum of money may be realised shall also indicate a maximum amount for which recovery is sought in that property. 3. In addition to the indications mentioned in paragraph 1, any request under Section 4 shall contain: a. in the case of Article 23, paragraph 1.a: i. a certified true copy of the confiscation order made by the court in the requesting Party and a statement of the grounds on the basis of which the order was made, if they are not indicated in the order itself; ii. an attestation by the competent authority of the requesting Party that the confiscation order is enforceable and not subject to ordinary means of appeal; iii. information as to the extent to which the enforcement of the order is requested; and

iv. information as to the necessity of taking any provisional measures; b. in the case of Article 23, paragraph 1.b, a statement of the facts relied upon by the requesting Party sufficient to enable the requested Party to seek the order under its domestic law; c. when third parties have had the opportunity to claim rights, documents demonstrating that this has been the case.

Article 38—Defective Requests 1. If a request does not comply with the provisions of this chapter or the information supplied is not sufficient to enable the requested Party to deal with the request, that Party may ask the requesting Party to amend the request or to complete it with additional information. 2. The requested Party may set a time-limit for the receipt of such amendments or information. 3. Pending receipt of the requested amendments or information in relation to a request under Section 4 of this chapter, the requested Party may take any of the measures referred to in Sections 2 or 3 of this chapter. Article 39—Plurality of Requests 1. Where the requested Party receives more than one request under Sections 3 or 4 of this chapter in respect of the same person or property, the plurality of requests shall not prevent that Party from dealing with the requests involving the taking of provisional measures. 2. In the case of plurality of requests under Section 4 of this chapter, the requested Party shall consider consulting the requesting Parties. Article 40—Obligation to Give Reasons The requested Party shall give reasons for any decision to refuse, postpone or make conditional any co-operation under this chapter.

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Article 41—Information 1. The requested Party shall promptly inform the requesting Party of: a. the action initiated on a request under this chapter; b. the final result of the action carried out on the basis of the request; c. a decision to refuse, postpone or make conditional, in whole or in part, any co-operation under this chapter; d. any circumstances which render impossible the carrying out of the action sought or are likely to delay it significantly; and e. in the event of provisional measures taken pursuant to a request under Sections 2 or 3 of this chapter, such provisions of its domestic law as would automatically lead to the lifting of the provisional measure.

2. The requesting Party shall promptly inform the requested Party of: a. any review, decision or any other fact by reason of which the confiscation order ceases to be wholly or partially enforceable; and b. any development, factual or legal, by reason of which any action under this chapter is no longer justified.

instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, by declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, declare that, without its prior consent, information or evidence provided by it under this chapter may not be used or transmitted by the authorities of the requesting Party in investigations or proceedings other than those specified in the request. Article 43—Confidentiality 1. The requesting Party may require that the requested Party keep confidential the facts and substance of the request, except to the extent necessary to execute the request. If the requested Party cannot comply with the requirement of confidentiality, it shall promptly inform the requesting Party. 2. The requesting Party shall, if not contrary to basic principles of its national law and if so requested, keep confidential any evidence and information provided by the requested Party, except to the extent that its disclosure is necessary for the investigations or proceedings described in the request.

3. Where a Party, on the basis of the same confiscation order, requests confiscation in more than one Party, it shall inform all Parties which are affected by an enforcement of the order about the request.

3. Subject to the provisions of its domestic law, a Party which has received spontaneous information under Article 20 shall comply with any requirement of confidentiality as required by the Party which supplies the information. If the other Party cannot comply with such requirement, it shall promptly inform the transmitting Party.

Article 42—Restriction of Use 1. The requested Party may make the execution of a request dependent on the condition that the information or evidence obtained will not, without its prior consent, be used or transmitted by the authorities of the requesting Party for investigations or proceedings other than those specified in the request.

Article 44—Costs The ordinary costs of complying with a request shall be borne by the requested Party. Where costs of a substantial or extraordinary nature are necessary to comply with a request, the Parties shall consult in order to agree to the conditions on which the request is to be executed and how the costs shall be borne.

2. Each State or the European Community may, at the time of signature or when depositing its

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Article 45—Damages 1. When legal action on liability for damages resulting from an act or omission in relation to cooperation under this chapter has been initiated by a person, the Parties concerned shall consider consulting each other, where appropriate, to determine how to apportion any sum of damages due. 2. A Party which has become subject of a litigation for damages shall endeavour to inform the other Party of such litigation if that Party might have an interest in the case. Chapter V—Co-operation between FIUs Article 46—Co-operation between FIUs 1. Parties shall ensure that FIUs, as defined in this Convention, shall cooperate for the purpose of combating money laundering, to assemble and analyse, or, if appropriate, investigate within the FIU relevant information on any fact which might be an indication of money laundering in accordance with their national powers. 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, each Party shall ensure that FIUs exchange, spontaneously or on request and either in accordance with this Convention or in accordance with existing or future memoranda of understanding compatible with this Convention, any accessible information that may be relevant to the processing or analysis of information or, if appropriate, to investigation by the FIU regarding financial transactions related to money laundering and the natural or legal persons involved. 3. Each Party shall ensure that the performance of the functions of the FIUs under this article shall not be affected by their internal status, regardless of whether they are administrative, law enforcement or judicial authorities. 4. Each request made under this article shall be accompanied by a brief statement of the relevant

facts known to the requesting FIU. The FIU shall specify in the request how the information sought will be used. 5. When a request is made in accordance with this article, the requested FIU shall provide all relevant information, including accessible financial information and requested law enforcement data, sought in the request, without the need for a formal letter of request under applicable conventions or agreements between the Parties. 6. An FIU may refuse to divulge information which could lead to impairment of a criminal investigation being conducted in the requested Party or, in exceptional circumstances, where divulging the information would be clearly disproportionate to the legitimate interests of a natural or legal person or the Party concerned or would otherwise not be in accordance with fundamental principles of national law of the requested Party. Any such refusal shall be appropriately explained to the FIU requesting the information. 7. Information or documents obtained under this article shall only be used for the purposes laid down in paragraph 1. Information supplied by a counterpart FIU shall not be disseminated to a third party, nor be used by the receiving FIU for purposes other than analysis, without prior consent of the supplying FIU. 8. When transmitting information or documents pursuant to this article, the transmitting FIU may impose restrictions and conditions on the use of information for purposes other than those stipulated in paragraph 7. The receiving FIU shall comply with any such restrictions and conditions. 9. Where a Party wishes to use transmitted information or documents for criminal investigations or prosecutions for the purposes laid down in paragraph 7, the transmitting FIU may not refuse its consent to such use unless it does so on

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the basis of restrictions under its national law or conditions referred to in paragraph 6. Any refusal to grant consent shall be appropriately explained. 10. FIUs shall undertake all necessary measures, including security measures, to ensure that information submitted under this article is not accessible by any other authorities, agencies or departments. 11. The information submitted shall be protected, in conformity with the Council of Europe Convention of 28 January 1981 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (ETS No. 108) and taking account of Recommendation No R(87)15 of 15 September 1987 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe Regulating the Use of Personal Data in the Police Sector, by at least the same rules of confidentiality and protection of personal data as those that apply under the national legislation applicable to the requesting FIU. 12. The transmitting FIU may make reasonable enquiries as to the use made of information provided and the receiving FIU shall, whenever practicable, provide such feedback. 13. Parties shall indicate the unit which is an FIU within the meaning of this article. Article 47—International Co-operation for Postponement of Suspicious Transactions 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to permit urgent action to be initiated by a FIU, at the request of a foreign FIU, to suspend or withhold consent to a transaction going ahead for such periods and depending on the same conditions as apply in its domestic law in respect of the postponement of transactions. 2. The action referred to in paragraph 1 shall be taken where the requested FIU is satisfied, upon justification by the requesting FIU, that:

a. the transaction is related to money laundering; and b. the transaction would have been suspended, or consent to the transaction going ahead would have been withheld, if the transaction had been the subject of a domestic suspicious transaction report.

Chapter VI—Monitoring Mechanism and Settlement of Disputes Article 48—Monitoring Mechanism and Settlement of Disputes 1. The Conference of the Parties (COP) shall be responsible for following the implementation of the Convention. The COP: a. shall monitor the proper implementation of the Convention by the Parties; b. shall, at the request of a Party, express an opinion on any question concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention.

2. The COP shall carry out the functions under paragraph 1.a above by using any available Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of AntiMoney Laundering Measures (Moneyval) public summaries (for Moneyval countries) and any available FATF public summaries (for FATF countries), supplemented by periodic self assessment questionnaires, as appropriate. The monitoring procedure will deal with areas covered by this Convention only in respect of those areas which are not covered by other relevant international standards on which mutual evaluations are carried out by the FATF and Moneyval. 3. If the COP concludes that it requires further information in the discharge of its functions, it shall liaise with the Party concerned, taking advantage, if so required by the COP, of the procedure and mechanism of Moneyval. The Party concerned shall then report back to the COP. The COP shall on this basis decide whether or not to carry out a more in-depth assessment of the position of the Party concerned. This may, but need not

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necessarily, involve, a country visit by an evaluation team. 4. In case of a dispute between Parties as to the interpretation or application of the Convention, they shall seek a settlement of the dispute through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their choice, including submission of the dispute to the COP, to an arbitral tribunal whose decisions shall be binding upon the Parties, or to the International Court of Justice, as agreed upon by the Parties concerned. 5. The COP shall adopt its own rules of procedure. 6. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall convene the COP not later than one year following the entry into force of this Convention. Thereafter, regular meetings of the COP shall be held in accordance with the rules of procedure adopted by the COP.

The disconnection clause is necessary for those parts of the Convention which fall within the competence of the Community/Union, in order to indicate that European Union Member States cannot invoke and apply the rights and obligations deriving from the Convention directly among themselves (or between themselves and the European Community/Union). This does not detract from the fact that the Convention applies fully between the European Community/European Union and its Member States on the one hand, and the other Parties to the Convention, on the other; the Community and the European Union Members States will be bound by the Convention and will apply it like any Party to the Convention, if necessary, through Community/Union legislation. They will thus guarantee the full respect of the Convention’s provisions vis-à-vis non-European Union Parties.” Appendix

Note by the Secretariat: See the Declaration formulated by the European Community and the Member States of the European Union upon the adoption of the Convention by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, on 3 May 2005: “The European Community/European Union and its Member States reaffirm that their objective in requesting the inclusion of a ‘disconnection clause’ is to take account of the institutional structure of the Union when acceding to international conventions, in particular in case of transfer of sovereign powers from the Member States to the Community. This clause is not aimed at reducing the rights or increasing the obligations of a non-European Union Party vis-à-vis the European Community/European Union and its Member States, inasmuch as the latter are also parties to this Convention.

a. participation in an organised criminal group and racketeering; b. terrorism, including financing of terrorism; c. trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling; d. sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children; e. illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; f. illicit arms trafficking; g. illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods; h. corruption and bribery; i. fraud; j. counterfeiting currency; k. counterfeiting and piracy of products; l. environmental crime; m. murder, grievous bodily injury; n. kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking; o. robbery or theft; p. smuggling; q. extortion; r. forgery; s. piracy; and

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t. insider trading and market manipulation.

14. Combating Money Laundering The Organization of American States at its eighth plenary session on 7 June 1996 signed a resolution to check money laundering. The meeting at Buenos Aires one year earlier had called for the establishment of an inter-American convention for combating money laundering. The resolution appealed to the member states to strengthen their domestic system and establish close international efforts to stop the practice of money laundering. Source Organization of American States, Department of International Legal Affairs, Office of Legal Cooperation, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga-res96/res-1396.htm.

AG/RES. 1396 (XXVI-O/96) (Resolution adopted at the eighth plenary session, held on June 7, 1996)

Laundering of Proceeds and Instrumentalities of Crime,” held in Buenos Aires on December 2, 1995, who, in order to carry out fully the mandate from the heads of state and government, called for establishment of a working group within the Organization of American States to consider the suggestion of an inter-American convention to combat money laundering and identify priorities for basic harmonization of national laws; REAFFIRMING that the transfer, exchange, and investment of illicit proceeds from drug trafficking and other illegal activities are serious crimes and a challenge to law enforcement and can jeopardize financial systems and trade; and BEARING IN MIND the work of CICAD, especially its decision at its nineteenth regular session, to convene for June 1996 the Group of Experts that developed the “Model Regulations concerning Laundering Offenses Connected to Illicit Drug Trafficking and Related Offenses,” so that it might propose a plan of action defining the role of CICAD in relation to the recommendations of the ministerial conference held in Buenos Aires in December 1995,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLVES: HAVING SEEN the Report of the Permanent Council on Money Laundering (AG/doc.3334/96 rev. 1); CONSIDERING: The decision reached by the heads of state and government at the Summit of the Americas, held in Miami in December 1994, on the need to “hold a working-level conference, to be followed by a ministerial conference, to study and agree on a coordinated hemispheric response, including consideration of an inter-American convention, to combat money laundering”; and The recommendation made by participants at the “Ministerial Conference concerning the

1. To receive with satisfaction the report of the Permanent Council on the activities of the Working Group on Money Laundering, which has been instructed to “study and agree on a coordinated hemispheric response, including consideration of an inter-American convention, to combat money laundering,” and to “identify priorities for basic harmonization of national laws” for that purpose. 2. To urge all governments to adopt as soon as possible, in accordance with their domestic laws, such measures as may be necessary to strengthen their legal, judicial, and administrative systems and to develop such mechanisms as may be required to establish close international cooperation, including the exchange of information and evidence, to put a

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stop to the money laundering and the proceeds and instrumentalities of this criminal activity. 3. To take note of the interest expressed by the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) in supporting the countries in the evaluation they are conducting to implement the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, as well as its interest in cooperating, in areas within its competence, with the working group set up by the Permanent Council to consider the proposal for an interAmerican convention to combat money laundering and to identify priorities for basic harmonization of national laws for that purpose. 4. To instruct the Group of Experts convened by CICAD at its nineteenth regular session to pay special attention to identifying priorities for basic harmonization of laws on this subject and submit a working procedure and other suggestions for appropriate action. 5. To instruct the Permanent Council’s Working Group on Money Laundering to continue consideration of an inter-American convention to combat money laundering. 6. To request the Permanent Council to submit a report on the implementation of this resolution to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh regular session.

15. The Law of Combating Money Laundering The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, one of the key allies of the United States and the world’s largest oil exporter, faced criticism following the events of 11 September 2001. Fifteen of the nineteen hijackers who participated in the events of that day were from Saudi Arabia. Abdullah ibn Abdulaziz as-Saud (1924–), the crown prince (1982–2005) and king of Saudi Arabia (2005–), was determined to stamp out

terrorist activities from his country. Money laundering has been the lifeblood for terrorists for financing their activities. Saudi Arabia, a victim of terrorist attacks, passed a law to check the illegal financing of terrorist organizations. Abdullah and his advisors were determined to stop the funding sources of terrorists. A Royal Decree, No. M/39, the Law of Combating Money Laundering, was passed on 23 August 2003. The financing of terrorism and terrorist acts were to be treated as criminal offenses. Harsh penalties, such as jail sentences of fifteen years and fines up to $1.8 million, were to be meted out to the offender. Source Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, http://www.saudiembassy .net/Country/Laws/MoneyLaundering2003.asp.

Article One The following terms and phrases, wherever mentioned in this Law, shall have the meanings following them, unless the context requires otherwise. Money laundering: Committing or attempting to commit any act for the purpose of concealing or falsifying the true origin of funds acquired by means contrary to Shari’ah or law, thus making them appear as if they came from a legitimate source. Funds: Assets or properties of whatever type, material or intangible, movable or immovable, along with the legal documents and deeds proving the ownership of the assets or any right pertaining thereto. Proceeds: Any funds obtained or acquired, through direct or indirect means, by committing a crime punishable pursuant to the provisions of this Law. Means: Anything used or prepared for use in any form for committing a crime punishable pursuant to the provisions of this Law.

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Financial and non-financial institutions: Any institution in the Kingdom undertaking one or more of the financial, commercial or economic activities such as banks, exchange bureaus, investment or insurance companies, commercial companies, sole proprietorships, vocational activities or any other similar activity specified by the implementing regulations of this Law. Transaction: Any disposal of funds, properties or proceeds in cash or in kind including, for example: deposit, withdrawal, transfer, sale, purchase, lending, exchange or use of safe deposit boxes and the like as specified by the implementing regulations of this Law. Criminal activity: Any activity constituting a crime punishable by Shari’ah or law including the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organizations. Preventive Seizure: Temporary ban on transport, transfer, exchange, disposal, movement, possession, or seizure of funds and proceeds, pursuant to an order issued by a court or a competent authority. Confiscation: Permanent dispossession and deprivation of funds, proceeds or means used in a crime, pursuant to a judiciary judgment issued by a competent court. Monitoring body: The governmental authority empowered to grant licenses to financial and nonfinancial institutions and to monitor and supervise these institutions. Competent authority: Any governmental agency entrusted, according to its jurisdiction, with combating money laundering transactions. Article Two Anyone who carries out any of the following acts shall be committing the crime of money laundering:

(a) Conducting any transaction involving funds or proceeds, with the knowledge that they are the result of a criminal activity or have an illegitimate or illegal source. (b) Transporting, acquiring, using, keeping, receiving, or transferring funds or proceeds, with the knowledge that they are the result of a criminal activity or have an illegitimate or illegal source. (c) Concealing or falsifying the nature of funds or proceeds or their source, movement or ownership, place or means of disposal, with the knowledge that they are the result of a criminal activity or have an illegitimate or illegal source. (d) Financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organizations. (e) Participating through agreement, assistance, incitement, providing of consultation and advice, facilitating, colluding, covering up or attempting to commit any of the acts specified in this article.

Article Three Anyone who carries out or participates in any of the acts specified in Article Two of this Law shall be committing a money laundering crime, including chairmen of the boards of directors of financial and non-financial institutions, board members, owners, employees, authorized representatives, auditors or their hired hands who act under these capacities, without prejudice to the criminal liability of the financial and non-financial institutions if that crime has been committed in their names or for their account. Article Four Financial and non-financial institutions shall not carry out any financial or commercial transaction or otherwise under a fake or unknown name. The identity of the clients shall be verified according to official documents, at the initiation of dealing with the clients or when concluding commercial deals whether directly or on the clients’ behalf. These institutions shall verify the official documents of the entities of corporate capacity that show the name of the institution, its address, names of proprietors and managers authorized to sign on its

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behalf and so forth, as provided for by the implementing regulations of this Law.

information to judicial or competent authorities upon request.

Article Five Financial and non-financial institutions shall keep—for a period of not less than ten years from the date of expiry of the transaction or of closing the account—all records and documents, for the purpose of clarifying financial, commercial and cash transactions, whether domestic or foreign as well as preserving the account files, commercial correspondence and photocopies of documents of personal identities.

Article Nine Financial and non-financial institutions as well as their staff and others who are bound by the provisions of this Law shall not alert the clients or allow for their alert or alert other related parties of suspicion regarding their activities.

Article Six Financial and non-financial institutions shall establish precautionary measures and internal monitoring to discover and suppress any of the crimes specified in this Law and comply with the instructions issued by the competent monitoring bodies in this regard. Article Seven Upon availability of sufficient indications and evidence indicating that a complex, huge or unusual deal and transaction have been performed or that a transaction raises doubt and suspicion concerning its nature and purpose, or is related to money laundering, financing of terrorism, terrorist acts, or terrorist organizations, financial and nonfinancial institutions shall promptly take the following measures: (a) Immediately reporting said transaction to the Financial Investigation Unit, provided for in Article Eleven of this Law. (b) Filing a report including all available data and information about the transactions and the parties involved, and providing the Investigation Unit with said report.

Article Eight As an exception to the provisions concerning banking confidentiality, financial and non-financial institutions shall submit documents, records and

Article Ten Financial and non-financial institutions shall introduce programs for combating money laundering transactions, provided that said programs include the following as a minimum: (a) Developing and implementing policies, plans, procedures and internal guidelines, including the appointment of competent officers at the higher administrative level for their implementation. (b) Introducing internal audit and control systems for monitoring the availability of basic requirements in the field of combating money laundering. (c) Preparing continuous training programs for the employees concerned, to acquaint them with the latest developments in the field of money laundering transactions and improve their abilities to recognize those transactions, their forms and ways of combating them.

Article Eleven A unit for combating money laundering shall be established under the name of “Financial Investigation Unit”. Part of its responsibility shall be receiving notifications, analyzing them and preparing reports regarding suspicious transactions in all financial and non-financial institutions. The implementing regulations of this Law shall specify the seat of this unit, its formation, powers, method of discharging its duties as well as its affiliation. Article Twelve The Financial Investigation Unit, upon establishment of suspicion, shall request the authority with jurisdiction as regard the

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investigation to apply preventive seizure to the funds, properties and means associated with the crime of money laundering, for a period not exceeding twenty days. Should there be a need for the preventive seizure to continue for a longer period, it shall be pursuant to a judicial order from the competent court. Article Thirteen Information disclosed by financial and nonfinancial institutions may be exchanged—according to the provisions of article (Eight) of this Law— between these institutions and the competent authorities, should this information be related to the violation of the provisions of this Law. The competent authorities shall abide by the confidentiality of this information and not disclose it, except as necessary for use in investigations or lawsuits pertinent to the violation of the provisions of this Law. Article Fourteen The implementing regulations of this Law shall specify the rules and procedures of the disclosure of cash and precious metals permitted to enter or leave the Kingdom and shall determine the amounts of money and weights required to be disclosed. Article Fifteen If a judgment confiscating funds, proceeds or means is rendered pursuant to the provisions of this Law, and they are not required to be destroyed, the competent authority shall dispose of them according to the law or share them with the countries that are signatories to agreements and treaties in force with the Kingdom. Article Sixteen Anyone who commits a crime of money laundering, as provided for in article (Two) of this Law, shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years and a fine not exceeding five million riyals or by either punishment, along with the confiscation of funds,

proceeds and means associated with the crime. Should the funds and proceeds be mixed with funds acquired from legitimate sources, said funds shall be subject to confiscation within the limits equivalent to the estimated value of the illegitimate proceeds. The competent court may exempt from these punishments the owner of the funds or proceeds subject of the criminal violation, the possessor or user if he notifies the authorities—prior to their knowledge—of the sources of the funds or proceeds and the identity of accomplices, without himself benefiting from their revenue. Article Seventeen The punishment of imprisonment shall be for a period not exceeding fifteen years and a fine not exceeding seven million riyals, if the crime of money laundering is coupled with one of the following cases: (a) The perpetrator commits the crime through an organized crime syndicate. (b) The perpetrator uses violence or weapons. (c) The perpetrator occupies a public post to which the crime is connected or exploits his authorities or powers in the commission of the crime. (d) Deceiving and exploiting women or minors. (e) Committing the crime through a correctional, charitable, or educational institution or in a social service facility. (f) Issuance of previous local or foreign judgments convicting the perpetrator, especially in similar crimes.

Article Eighteen Without prejudice to other laws, any of the chairmen of the boards of directors of financial and non-financial institutions, or board members, owners, managers, employees, authorized representatives, hired hands who act under these capacities, shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years and a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand riyals or by either

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punishment, if they violate any of the obligations specified in articles Four, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten of this Law. The punishment shall be applied to those performing the activity without obtaining the required licenses. Article Nineteen Upon referral by the competent authority and based on a judgment, a fine of not less than one hundred thousand riyals and not exceeding the value of funds subject of the crime may be imposed on financial and non-financial institutions whose responsibility is proven pursuant to the provisions of articles Two and Three of this Law. Article Twenty With exception to the punishments specified in this Law, anyone violating its provisions shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months and a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand riyals, or by either punishment. Article Twenty-One The punishments specified in this Law shall not apply to those who violate its provisions in good faith. Article Twenty-Two Information disclosed by financial and nonfinancial institutions may be exchanged between these institutions and the competent authorities in other countries which are signatories with the Kingdom to agreements and treaties in force or on the basis of reciprocity, pursuant to established legal procedures without violation of the provisions and customs related to business confidentiality of financial and non-financial institutions. Article Twenty-Three Upon request from a competent court or authority in another country which is a signatory with the Kingdom to an agreement or a treaty in force or on the basis of reciprocity, the judicial authority may order seizure of funds, proceeds or means

associated with a money laundering crime, according to the laws in force in the Kingdom. Upon request from a competent authority in another country which is a signatory with the Kingdom to an agreement or treaty in force or on the basis of reciprocity, the competent authority may order tracking of funds, proceeds or means associated with a money laundering crime, according to the laws in force in the Kingdom. Article Twenty-Four Any conclusive judicial judgment providing for the confiscation of funds, revenues or means related to money laundering crimes, issued by a competent court in another country which is a signatory to an agreement or treaty in force with the Kingdom or on the basis of reciprocity, may be recognized and enforced if the funds, proceeds or means provided for in this judgment may be subject to confiscation, according to the law in force in the Kingdom. Article Twenty-Five Chairmen of the boards of directors of financial and non-financial institutions, board members, owners, employees, hired hands, or their authorized representatives shall be exempted from criminal, civil or administrative liability which may result from the implementation of the duties provided for in this Law or upon infringement of any restriction imposed to ensure information confidentiality, unless their actions are proven to be in bad faith, with the intent to harm the transaction holder. Article Twenty-Six General courts shall have jurisdiction to decide on all crimes provided for in this Law. Article Twenty-Seven The Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution shall investigate and prosecute before general courts as to crimes provided for in this Law.

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16. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Forty Recommendations and Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing The Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) “Forty Recommendations” were adopted in April 1990 in an effort to provide comprehensive regulation and oversight to the international financial system. The recommendations were implemented to address the growing problem of money laundering. They were revised in 1996 and again in 2003. The “Nine Special Recommendations” on terrorist financing were adopted in October 2001 following the attacks of 11 September 2001. The “Forty Recommendations” are considered the international standard to assist countries in combating the crime of money laundering. Although these recommendations are not mandatory, countries are encouraged to institute legislative measures and enforcement protocols in order to comply with these recommendations, which serve as an international blueprint for the global community in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. Sources Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, “The Forty Recommendations,” http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ dataoecd/7/40/34849567.PDF, and “Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing,” http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/8/17/34849466.pdf.

The Forty Recommendations Introduction Money laundering methods and techniques change in response to developing counter-measures. In recent years, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)1 has noted increasingly sophisticated combinations of techniques, such as the increased use of legal persons to disguise the true ownership and control of illegal proceeds, and an increased use of professionals to provide advice and assistance in laundering criminal funds. These

factors, combined with the experience gained through the FATF’s Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories process, and a number of national and international initiatives, led the FATF to review and revise the Forty Recommendations into a new comprehensive framework for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF now calls upon all countries to take the necessary steps to bring their national systems for combating money laundering and terrorist financing into compliance with the new FATF Recommendations, and to effectively implement these measures. The review process for revising the Forty Recommendations was an extensive one, open to FATF members, non-members, observers, financial and other affected sectors and interested parties. This consultation process provided a wide range of input, all of which was considered in the review process. The revised Forty Recommendations now apply not only to money laundering but also to terrorist financing, and when combined with the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing provide an enhanced, comprehensive and consistent framework of measures for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF recognises that countries have diverse legal and financial systems and so all cannot take identical measures to achieve the common objective, especially over matters of detail. The Recommendations therefore set minimum standards for action for countries to implement the detail according to their particular circumstances and constitutional frameworks. The 1

The FATF is an inter-governmental body which sets standards, and develops and promotes policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. It currently has 33 members: 31 countries and governments and two international organisations; and more than 20 observers: five FATF-style regional bodies and more than 15 other international organisations or bodies. A list of all members and observers can be found on the FATF website.

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Recommendations cover all the measures that national systems should have in place within their criminal justice and regulatory systems; the preventive measures to be taken by financial institutions and certain other businesses and professions; and international co-operation. The original FATF Forty Recommendations were drawn up in 1990 as an initiative to combat the misuse of financial systems by persons laundering drug money. In 1996 the Recommendations were revised for the first time to reflect evolving money laundering typologies. The 1996 Forty Recommendations have been endorsed by more than 130 countries and are the international antimoney laundering standard. In October 2001 the FATF expanded its mandate to deal with the issue of the financing of terrorism, and took the important step of creating the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. These Recommendations contain a set of measures aimed at combating the funding of terrorist acts and terrorist organisations, and are complementary to the Forty Recommendations.2 A key element in the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism is the need for countries systems to be monitored and evaluated, with respect to these international standards. The mutual evaluations conducted by the FATF and FATF-style regional bodies, as well as the assessments conducted by the IMF and World Bank, are a vital mechanism for ensuring that the FATF Recommendations are effectively implemented by all countries.

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The FATF Forty and Nine Special Recommendations have been recognised by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as the international standards for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

Legal Systems Scope of the Criminal Offence of Money Laundering Recommendation 1

Countries should criminalise money laundering on the basis of United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (the Vienna Convention) and United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000 (the Palermo Convention). Countries should apply the crime of money laundering to all serious offences, with a view to including the widest range of predicate offences. Predicate offences may be described by reference to all offences, or to a threshold linked either to a category of serious offences or to the penalty of imprisonment applicable to the predicate offence (threshold approach), or to a list of predicate offences, or a combination of these approaches. Where countries apply a threshold approach, predicate offences should at a minimum comprise all offences that fall within the category of serious offences under their national law or should include offences which are punishable by a maximum penalty of more than one year’s imprisonment or for those countries that have a minimum threshold for offences in their legal system, predicate offences should comprise all offences, which are punished by a minimum penalty of more than six months imprisonment. Whichever approach is adopted, each country should at a minimum include a range of offences within each of the designated categories of offences.3 Predicate offences for money laundering should extend to conduct that occurred in another 3

See the definition of “designated categories of offences” in the Glossary (p. 597).

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country, which constitutes an offence in that country, and which would have constituted a predicate offence had it occurred domestically. Countries may provide that the only prerequisite is that the conduct would have constituted a predicate offence had it occurred domestically. Countries may provide that the offence of money laundering does not apply to persons who committed the predicate offence, where this is required by fundamental principles of their domestic law. Recommendation 2

Countries should ensure that: a) The intent and knowledge required to prove the offence of money laundering is consistent with the standards set forth in the Vienna and Palermo Conventions, including the concept that such mental state may be inferred from objective factual circumstances. b) Criminal liability, and, where that is not possible, civil or administrative liability, should apply to legal persons. This should not preclude parallel criminal, civil or administrative proceedings with respect to legal persons in countries in which such forms of liability are available. Legal persons should be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. Such measures should be without prejudice to the criminal liability of individuals.

Provisional Measures and Confiscation

without prejudicing the rights of bona fide third parties. Such measures should include the authority to: (a) identify, trace and evaluate property which is subject to confiscation; (b) carry out provisional measures, such as freezing and seizing, to prevent any dealing, transfer or disposal of such property; (c) take steps that will prevent or void actions that prejudice the State’s ability to recover property that is subject to confiscation; and (d) take any appropriate investigative measures. Countries may consider adopting measures that allow such proceeds or instrumentalities to be confiscated without requiring a criminal conviction, or which require an offender to demonstrate the lawful origin of the property alleged to be liable to confiscation, to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with the principles of their domestic law. Measures to Be Taken by Financial Institutions and Non-financial Businesses and Professions to Prevent Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Recommendation 4

Countries should ensure that financial institution secrecy laws do not inhibit implementation of the FATF Recommendations. Customer Due Diligence and Record-keeping Recommendation 5

Recommendation 3

Countries should adopt measures similar to those set forth in the Vienna and Palermo Conventions, including legislative measures, to enable their competent authorities to confiscate property laundered, proceeds from money laundering or predicate offences, instrumentalities used in or intended for use in the commission of these offences, or property of corresponding value,

Financial institutions should not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names. Financial institutions should undertake customer due diligence measures, including identifying and verifying the identity of their customers, when: • establishing business relations; • carrying out occasional transactions: (i) above the applicable designated threshold; or (ii) that are

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wire transfers in the circumstances covered by the Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VII; • there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing; or • the financial institution has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data.

The customer due diligence (CDD) measures to be taken are as follows: a) Identifying the customer and verifying that customer’s identity using reliable, independent source documents, data or information.4 b) Identifying the beneficial owner, and taking reasonable measures to verify the identity of the beneficial owner such that the financial institution is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is. For legal persons and arrangements this should include financial institutions taking reasonable measures to understand the ownership and control structure of the customer. c) Obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship. d) Conducting ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds.

Financial institutions should apply each of the CDD measures under (a) to (d) above, but may determine the extent of such measures on a risk sensitive basis depending on the type of customer, business relationship or transaction. The measures that are taken should be consistent with any guidelines issued by competent authorities. For higher risk categories, financial institutions should perform enhanced due diligence. In certain circumstances, where there are low risks, countries

may decide that financial institutions can apply reduced or simplified measures. Financial institutions should verify the identity of the customer and beneficial owner before or during the course of establishing a business relationship or conducting transactions for occasional customers. Countries may permit financial institutions to complete the verification as soon as reasonably practicable following the establishment of the relationship, where the money laundering risks are effectively managed and where this is essential not to interrupt the normal conduct of business. Where the financial institution is unable to comply with paragraphs (a) to (c) above, it should not open the account, commence business relations or perform the transaction; or should terminate the business relationship; and should consider making a suspicious transactions report in relation to the customer. These requirements should apply to all new customers, though financial institutions should also apply this Recommendation to existing customers on the basis of materiality and risk, and should conduct due diligence on such existing relationships at appropriate times. (See Interpretative Notes: Recommendation 5 and Recommendations 5, 12 and 16) Recommendation 6

Financial institutions should, in relation to politically exposed persons, in addition to performing normal due diligence measures:

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Reliable, independent source documents, data or information will hereafter be referred to as “identification data”.

a) Have appropriate risk management systems to determine whether the customer is a politically exposed person. b) Obtain senior management approval for establishing business relationships with such customers. c) Take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds.

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d) Conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship. Recommendation 7

Financial institutions should, in relation to crossborder correspondent banking and other similar relationships, in addition to performing normal due diligence measures: a) Gather sufficient information about a respondent institution to understand fully the nature of the respondent’s business and to determine from publicly available information the reputation of the institution and the quality of supervision, including whether it has been subject to a money laundering or terrorist financing investigation or regulatory action. b) Assess the respondent institution’s anti-money laundering and terrorist financing controls. c) Obtain approval from senior management before establishing new correspondent relationships. d) Document the respective responsibilities of each institution. e) With respect to “payable-through accounts”, be satisfied that the respondent bank has verified the identity of and performed on-going due diligence on the customers having direct access to accounts of the correspondent and that it is able to provide relevant customer identification data upon request to the correspondent bank. Recommendation 8

Financial institutions should pay special attention to any money laundering threats that may arise from new or developing technologies that might favour anonymity, and take measures, if needed, to prevent their use in money laundering schemes. In particular, financial institutions should have policies and procedures in place to address any specific risks associated with non-face to face business relationships or transactions. Recommendation 9

Countries may permit financial institutions to rely on intermediaries or other third parties to perform

elements (a)–(c) of the CDD process or to introduce business, provided that the criteria set out below are met. Where such reliance is permitted, the ultimate responsibility for customer identification and verification remains with the financial institution relying on the third party. The criteria that should be met are as follows: a) A financial institution relying upon a third party should immediately obtain the necessary information concerning elements (a)–(c) of the CDD process. Financial institutions should take adequate steps to satisfy themselves that copies of identification data and other relevant documentation relating to the CDD requirements will be made available from the third party upon request without delay. b) The financial institution should satisfy itself that the third party is regulated and supervised for, and has measures in place to comply with CDD requirements in line with Recommendations 5 and 10.

It is left to each country to determine in which countries the third party that meets the conditions can be based, having regard to information available on countries that do not or do not adequately apply the FATF Recommendations. Recommendation 10

Financial institutions should maintain, for at least five years, all necessary records on transactions, both domestic or international, to enable them to comply swiftly with information requests from the competent authorities. Such records must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions (including the amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity. Financial institutions should keep records on the identification data obtained through the customer due diligence process (e.g. copies or records of official identification documents like passports,

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identity cards, driving licenses or similar documents), account files and business correspondence for at least five years after the business relationship is ended.

• management of bank, savings or securities accounts; • organisation of contributions for the creation, operation or management of companies; • creation, operation or management of legal persons or arrangements, and buying and selling of business entities. e) Trust and company service providers when they prepare for or carry out transactions for a client concerning the activities listed in the definition in the Glossary.

The identification data and transaction records should be available to domestic competent authorities upon appropriate authority. Recommendation 11

Financial institutions should pay special attention to all complex, unusual large transactions, and all unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose. The background and purpose of such transactions should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings established in writing, and be available to help competent authorities and auditors. (See Interpretative Note on p. 597) Recommendation 12

The customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements set out in Recommendations 5, 6, and 8 to 11 apply to designated non-financial businesses and professions in the following situations: a) Casinos—when customers engage in financial transactions equal to or above the applicable designated threshold. b) Real estate agents—when they are involved in transactions for their client concerning the buying and selling of real estate. c) Dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones—when they engage in any cash transaction with a customer equal to or above the applicable designated threshold. d) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants when they prepare for or carry out transactions for their client concerning the following activities: • buying and selling of real estate; • managing of client money, securities or other assets;

Reporting of Suspicious Transactions and Compliance Recommendation 13

If a financial institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing, it should be required, directly by law or regulation, to report promptly its suspicions to the financial intelligence unit (FIU). Recommendation 14

Financial institutions, their directors, officers and employees should be: a) Protected by legal provisions from criminal and civil liability for breach of any restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or administrative provision, if they report their suspicions in good faith to the FIU, even if they did not know precisely what the underlying criminal activity was, and regardless of whether illegal activity actually occurred. b) Prohibited by law from disclosing the fact that a suspicious transaction report (STR) or related information is being reported to the FIU. Recommendation 15

Financial institutions should develop programmes against money laundering and terrorist financing. These programmes should include: a) The development of internal policies, procedures and controls, including appropriate compliance

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management arrangements, and adequate screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees. b) An ongoing employee training programme. c) An audit function to test the system. Recommendation 16

The requirements set out in Recommendations 13 to 15, and 21 apply to all designated non-financial businesses and professions, subject to the following qualifications: a) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants should be required to report suspicious transactions when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage in a financial transaction in relation to the activities described in Recommendation 12(d). Countries are strongly encouraged to extend the reporting requirement to the rest of the professional activities of accountants, including auditing. b) Dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones should be required to report suspicious transactions when they engage in any cash transaction with a customer equal to or above the applicable designated threshold. c) Trust and company service providers should be required to report suspicious transactions for a client when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage in a transaction in relation to the activities referred to Recommendation 12(e).

Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals, and accountants acting as independent legal professionals, are not required to report their suspicions if the relevant information was obtained in circumstances where they are subject to professional secrecy or legal professional privilege. (See Interpretative Notes: Recommendation 16 and Recommendations 5, 12, and 16).

Other Measures to Deter Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Recommendation 17

Countries should ensure that effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, whether criminal, civil or administrative, are available to deal with natural or legal persons covered by these Recommendations that fail to comply with antimoney laundering or terrorist financing requirements. Recommendation 18

Countries should not approve the establishment or accept the continued operation of shell banks. Financial institutions should refuse to enter into, or continue, a correspondent banking relationship with shell banks. Financial institutions should also guard against establishing relations with respondent foreign financial institutions that permit their accounts to be used by shell banks. Recommendation 19

Countries should consider the feasibility and utility of a system where banks and other financial institutions and intermediaries would report all domestic and international currency transactions above a fixed amount, to a national central agency with a computerised data base, available to competent authorities for use in money laundering or terrorist financing cases, subject to strict safeguards to ensure proper use of the information. (Modified 22 October 2004) Recommendation 20

Countries should consider applying the FATF Recommendations to businesses and professions, other than designated non-financial businesses and professions, that pose a money laundering or terrorist financing risk. Countries should further encourage the development of modern and secure techniques of money management that are less vulnerable to money laundering.

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Measures to Be Taken with Respect to Countries That Do Not or Insufficiently Comply with the FATF Recommendations Recommendation 21

Financial institutions should give special attention to business relationships and transactions with persons, including companies and financial institutions, from countries which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations. Whenever these transactions have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, their background and purpose should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings established in writing, and be available to help competent authorities. Where such a country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FATF Recommendations, countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures. Recommendation 22

Financial institutions should ensure that the principles applicable to financial institutions, which are mentioned above are also applied to branches and majority owned subsidiaries located abroad, especially in countries which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations, to the extent that local applicable laws and regulations permit. When local applicable laws and regulations prohibit this implementation, competent authorities in the country of the parent institution should be informed by the financial institutions that they cannot apply the FATF Recommendations.

controlling interest or holding a management function in a financial institution. For financial institutions subject to the Core Principles, the regulatory and supervisory measures that apply for prudential purposes and which are also relevant to money laundering, should apply in a similar manner for anti-money laundering and terrorist financing purposes. Other financial institutions should be licensed or registered and appropriately regulated, and subject to supervision or oversight for anti-money laundering purposes, having regard to the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing in that sector. At a minimum, businesses providing a service of money or value transfer, or of money or currency changing should be licensed or registered, and subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance with national requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Recommendation 24

Designated non-financial businesses and professions should be subject to regulatory and supervisory measures as set out below.

Regulation and Supervision Recommendation 23

Countries should ensure that financial institutions are subject to adequate regulation and supervision and are effectively implementing the FATF Recommendations. Competent authorities should take the necessary legal or regulatory measures to prevent criminals or their associates from holding or being the beneficial owner of a significant or

a) Casinos should be subject to a comprehensive regulatory and supervisory regime that ensures that they have effectively implemented the necessary antimoney laundering and terrorist-financing measures. At a minimum: • casinos should be licensed; • competent authorities should take the necessary legal or regulatory measures to prevent criminals or their associates from holding or being the beneficial owner of a significant or controlling interest, holding a management function in, or being an operator of a casino; • competent authorities should ensure that casinos are effectively supervised for compliance with requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

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b) Countries should ensure that the other categories of designated non-financial businesses and professions are subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensuring their compliance with requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. This should be performed on a risk-sensitive basis. This may be performed by a government authority or by an appropriate self-regulatory organisation, provided that such an organisation can ensure that its members comply with their obligations to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Recommendation 25

The competent authorities should establish guidelines, and provide feedback which will assist financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions in applying national measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and in particular, in detecting and reporting suspicious transactions. Institutional and Other Measures Necessary in Systems for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

money laundering and terrorist financing investigations. Countries are encouraged to support and develop, as far as possible, special investigative techniques suitable for the investigation of money laundering, such as controlled delivery, undercover operations and other relevant techniques. Countries are also encouraged to use other effective mechanisms such as the use of permanent or temporary groups specialised in asset investigation, and co-operative investigations with appropriate competent authorities in other countries. Recommendation 28

When conducting investigations of money laundering and underlying predicate offences, competent authorities should be able to obtain documents and information for use in those investigations, and in prosecutions and related actions. This should include powers to use compulsory measures for the production of records held by financial institutions and other persons, for the search of persons and premises, and for the seizure and obtaining of evidence. Recommendation 29

Competent Authorities, Their Powers and Resources Recommendation 26

Countries should establish a FIU that serves as a national centre for the receiving (and, as permitted, requesting), analysis and dissemination of STR and other information regarding potential money laundering or terrorist financing. The FIU should have access, directly or indirectly, on a timely basis to the financial, administrative and law enforcement information that it requires to properly undertake its functions, including the analysis of STR. (See Interpretative Note on p. 597) Recommendation 27

Countries should ensure that designated law enforcement authorities have responsibility for

Supervisors should have adequate powers to monitor and ensure compliance by financial institutions with requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, including the authority to conduct inspections. They should be authorised to compel production of any information from financial institutions that is relevant to monitoring such compliance, and to impose adequate administrative sanctions for failure to comply with such requirements. Recommendation 30

Countries should provide their competent authorities involved in combating money laundering and terrorist financing with adequate financial, human and technical resources. Countries should have in place processes to ensure that the staff of those authorities are of high integrity.

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Recommendation 31

Recommendation 34

Countries should ensure that policy makers, the FIU, law enforcement and supervisors have effective mechanisms in place which enable them to co-operate, and where appropriate co-ordinate domestically with each other concerning the development and implementation of policies and activities to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

Countries should take measures to prevent the unlawful use of legal arrangements by money launderers. In particular, countries should ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely information on express trusts, including information on the settlor, trustee and beneficiaries, that can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities. Countries could consider measures to facilitate access to beneficial ownership and control information to financial institutions undertaking the requirements set out in Recommendation 5.

Recommendation 32

Countries should ensure that their competent authorities can review the effectiveness of their systems to combat money laundering and terrorist financing systems by maintaining comprehensive statistics on matters relevant to the effectiveness and efficiency of such systems. This should include statistics on the STR received and disseminated; on money laundering and terrorist financing investigations, prosecutions and convictions; on property frozen, seized and confiscated; and on mutual legal assistance or other international requests for co-operation. Transparency of Legal Persons and Arrangements Recommendation 33

Countries should take measures to prevent the unlawful use of legal persons by money launderers. Countries should ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons that can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities. In particular, countries that have legal persons that are able to issue bearer shares should take appropriate measures to ensure that they are not misused for money laundering and be able to demonstrate the adequacy of those measures. Countries could consider measures to facilitate access to beneficial ownership and control information to financial institutions undertaking the requirements set out in Recommendation 5.

International Co-operation Recommendation 35

Countries should take immediate steps to become party to and implement fully the Vienna Convention, the Palermo Convention, and the 1999 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Countries are also encouraged to ratify and implement other relevant international conventions, such as the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and the 2002 Inter-American Convention against Terrorism. Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition Recommendation 36

Countries should rapidly, constructively and effectively provide the widest possible range of mutual legal assistance in relation to money laundering and terrorist financing investigations, prosecutions, and related proceedings. In particular, countries should: a) Not prohibit or place unreasonable or unduly restrictive conditions on the provision of mutual legal assistance.

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b) Ensure that they have clear and efficient processes for the execution of mutual legal assistance requests. c) Not refuse to execute a request for mutual legal assistance on the sole ground that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters. d) Not refuse to execute a request for mutual legal assistance on the grounds that laws require financial institutions to maintain secrecy or confidentiality.

Countries should ensure that the powers of their competent authorities required under Recommendation 28 are also available for use in response to requests for mutual legal assistance, and if consistent with their domestic framework, in response to direct requests from foreign judicial or law enforcement authorities to domestic counterparts. To avoid conflicts of jurisdiction, consideration should be given to devising and applying mechanisms for determining the best venue for prosecution of defendants in the interests of justice in cases that are subject to prosecution in more than one country. Recommendation 37

Countries should, to the greatest extent possible, render mutual legal assistance notwithstanding the absence of dual criminality. Where dual criminality is required for mutual legal assistance or extradition, that requirement should be deemed to be satisfied regardless of whether both countries place the offence within the same category of offence or denominate the offence by the same terminology, provided that both countries criminalise the conduct underlying the offence. Recommendation 38

There should be authority to take expeditious action in response to requests by foreign countries to identify, freeze, seize and confiscate property laundered, proceeds from money laundering or

predicate offences, instrumentalities used in or intended for use in the commission of these offences, or property of corresponding value. There should also be arrangements for coordinating seizure and confiscation proceedings, which may include the sharing of confiscated assets. Recommendation 39

Countries should recognise money laundering as an extraditable offence. Each country should either extradite its own nationals, or where a country does not do so solely on the grounds of nationality, that country should, at the request of the country seeking extradition, submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution of the offences set forth in the request. Those authorities should take their decision and conduct their proceedings in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a serious nature under the domestic law of that country. The countries concerned should cooperate with each other, in particular on procedural and evidentiary aspects, to ensure the efficiency of such prosecutions. Subject to their legal frameworks, countries may consider simplifying extradition by allowing direct transmission of extradition requests between appropriate ministries, extraditing persons based only on warrants of arrests or judgements, and/or introducing a simplified extradition of consenting persons who waive formal extradition proceedings. Other Forms of Co-operation Recommendation 40

Countries should ensure that their competent authorities provide the widest possible range of international co-operation to their foreign counterparts. There should be clear and effective gateways to facilitate the prompt and constructive exchange directly between counterparts, either spontaneously or upon request, of information relating to both money laundering and the

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underlying predicate offences. Exchanges should be permitted without unduly restrictive conditions. In particular: a) Competent authorities should not refuse a request for assistance on the sole ground that the request is also considered to involve fiscal matters. b) Countries should not invoke laws that require financial institutions to maintain secrecy or confidentiality as a ground for refusing to provide cooperation. c) Competent authorities should be able to conduct inquiries; and where possible, investigations; on behalf of foreign counterparts.

Where the ability to obtain information sought by a foreign competent authority is not within the mandate of its counterpart, countries are also encouraged to permit a prompt and constructive exchange of information with non-counterparts. Co-operation with foreign authorities other than counterparts could occur directly or indirectly. When uncertain about the appropriate avenue to follow, competent authorities should first contact their foreign counterparts for assistance. Countries should establish controls and safeguards to ensure that information exchanged by competent authorities is used only in an authorised manner, consistent with their obligations concerning privacy and data protection. Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing Recognising the vital importance of taking action to combat the financing of terrorism, the FATF has agreed these Recommendations, which, when combined with the FATF Forty Recommendations on money laundering, set out the basic framework to detect, prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism and terrorist acts. I. Ratification and Implementation of UN Instruments

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Countries should also immediately implement the United Nations resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts, particularly United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373. II. Criminalising the Financing of Terrorism and Associated Money Laundering

Each country should criminalise the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organisations. Countries should ensure that such offences are designated as money laundering predicate offences. III. Freezing and Confiscating Terrorist Assets

Each country should implement measures to freeze without delay funds or other assets of terrorists, those who finance terrorism and terrorist organisations in accordance with the United Nations resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts. Each country should also adopt and implement measures, including legislative ones, which would enable the competent authorities to seize and confiscate property that is the proceeds of, or used in, or intended or allocated for use in, the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organisations. IV. Reporting Suspicious Transactions Related to Terrorism

If financial institutions, or other businesses or entities subject to anti-money laundering obligations, suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are linked or related to, or are to be used for terrorism, terrorist acts or by terrorist organisations, they should be required to report promptly their suspicions to the competent authorities.

Each country should take immediate steps to ratify and to implement fully the 1999 United Nations

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V. International Co-operation

Each country should afford another country, on the basis of a treaty, arrangement or other mechanism for mutual legal assistance or information exchange, the greatest possible measure of assistance in connection with criminal, civil enforcement, and administrative investigations, inquiries and proceedings relating to the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organisations. Countries should also take all possible measures to ensure that they do not provide safe havens for individuals charged with the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organisations, and should have procedures in place to extradite, where possible, such individuals. VI. Alternative Remittance

Each country should take measures to ensure that persons or legal entities, including agents, that provide a service for the transmission of money or value, including transmission through an informal money or value transfer system or network, should be licensed or registered and subject to all the FATF Recommendations that apply to banks and non-bank financial institutions. Each country should ensure that persons or legal entities that carry out this service illegally are subject to administrative, civil or criminal sanctions. VII. Wire Transfers

Countries should take measures to require financial institutions, including money remitters, to include accurate and meaningful originator information (name, address and account number) on funds transfers and related messages that are sent, and the information should remain with the transfer or related message through the payment chain. Countries should take measures to ensure that financial institutions, including money remitters, conduct enhanced scrutiny of and monitor for

suspicious activity funds transfers which do not contain complete originator information (name, address and account number). VIII. Non-profit Organisations

Countries should review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to entities that can be abused for the financing of terrorism. Non-profit organisations are particularly vulnerable, and countries should ensure that they cannot be misused: by terrorist organisations posing as legitimate entities; to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, including for the purpose of escaping asset freezing measures; and to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes to terrorist organisations. IX. Cash Couriers

Countries should have measures in place to detect the physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments, including a declaration system or other disclosure obligation. Countries should ensure that their competent authorities have the legal authority to stop or restrain currency or bearer negotiable instruments that are suspected to be related to terrorist financing or money laundering, or that are falsely declared or disclosed. Countries should ensure that effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions are available to deal with persons who make false declaration(s) or disclosure(s). In cases where the currency or bearer negotiable instruments are related to terrorist financing or money laundering, countries should also adopt measures, including legislative ones consistent with Recommendation 3 and Special Recommendation III, which would enable the confiscation of such currency or instruments.

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Note: With the adoption of Special Recommendation IX, the FATF now deletes paragraph 19(a) of Recommendation 19 and the Interpretative Note to Recommendation 19 in order to ensure internal consistency amongst the FATF Recommendations. The modified text of recommendation 19 reads as follows:

• trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling; • sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children; • illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; • illicit arms trafficking; • illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods; • corruption and bribery; • fraud; • counterfeiting currency; • counterfeiting and piracy of products; • environmental crime; • murder, grievous bodily injury; • kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking; • robbery or theft; • smuggling; • extortion; • forgery; • piracy; and • insider trading and market manipulation.

Recommendation 19

Countries should consider the feasibility and utility of a system where banks and other financial institutions and intermediaries would report all domestic and international currency transactions above a fixed amount, to a national central agency with a computerised data base, available to competent authorities for use in money laundering or terrorist financing cases, subject to strict safeguards to ensure proper use of the information. Glossary In these Recommendations the following abbreviations and references are used: “Beneficial owner” refers to the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or the person on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted. It also incorporates those persons who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person or arrangement. “Core Principles” refers to the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Objectives and Principles for Securities Regulation issued by the International Organization of Securities Commissions, and the Insurance Supervisory Principles issued by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors.

When deciding on the range of offences to be covered as predicate offences under each of the categories listed above, each country may decide, in accordance with its domestic law, how it will define those offences and the nature of any particular elements of those offences that make them serious offences. “Designated non-financial businesses and professions” means:

“Designated categories of offences” means: • participation in an organised criminal group and racketeering; • terrorism, including terrorist financing;

a) b) c) d) e)

Casinos (which also includes internet casinos). Real estate agents. Dealers in precious metals. Dealers in precious stones. Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants—this refers to sole practitioners, partners or employed professionals within professional firms. It is not meant to refer to ‘internal’ professionals that are employees of other types of businesses, nor to professionals working for government agencies, who may already be subject to measures that would combat money laundering.

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cheques, money orders and bankers’ drafts, electronic money). 6. Financial guarantees and commitments. 7. Trading in: (a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, CDs, derivatives etc.); (b) foreign exchange; (c) exchange, interest rate and index instruments; (d) transferable securities; (e) commodity futures trading. 8. Participation in securities issues and the provision of financial services related to such issues. 9. Individual and collective portfolio management. 10. Safekeeping and administration of cash or liquid securities on behalf of other persons. 11. Otherwise investing, administering or managing funds or money on behalf of other persons. 12. Underwriting and placement of life insurance and other investment related insurance.9 13. Money and currency changing.

f ) Trust and Company Service Providers refers to all persons or businesses that are not covered elsewhere under these Recommendations, and which as a business, provide any of the following services to third parties: • acting as a formation agent of legal persons; • acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a director or secretary of a company, a partner of a partnership, or a similar position in relation to other legal persons; • providing a registered office; business address or accommodation, correspondence or administrative address for a company, a partnership or any other legal person or arrangement; • acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a trustee of an express trust; • acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a nominee shareholder for another person.

“Designated threshold ” refers to the amount set out in the Interpretative Notes. “Financial institutions” means any person or entity who conducts as a business one or more of the following activities or operations for or on behalf of a customer: 1. Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public.5 2. Lending.6 3. Financial leasing.7 4. The transfer of money or value.8 5. Issuing and managing means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, cheques, traveller’s 5

This also captures private banking. This includes inter alia: consumer credit; mortgage credit; factoring, with or without recourse; and finance of commercial transactions (including forfeiting). 7 This does not extend to financial leasing arrangements in relation to consumer products. 8 This applies to financial activity in both the formal or informal sector e.g. alternative remittance activity. See the Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VI. It does not apply to any natural or legal person that provides financial institutions solely with message or other support systems for transmitting funds. See the Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VII.

When a financial activity is carried out by a person or entity on an occasional or very limited basis (having regard to quantitative and absolute criteria) such that there is little risk of money laundering activity occurring, a country may decide that the application of anti-money laundering measures is not necessary, either fully or partially. In strictly limited and justified circumstances, and based on a proven low risk of money laundering, a country may decide not to apply some or all of the Forty Recommendations to some of the financial activities stated above. “FIU” means financial intelligence unit.

6

“Legal arrangements” refers to express trusts or other similar legal arrangements. “Legal persons” refers to bodies corporate, foundations, anstalt, partnerships, or associations, or any similar bodies that can establish a 9

This applies both to insurance undertakings and to insurance intermediaries (agents and brokers).

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permanent customer relationship with a financial institution or otherwise own property. “Payable-through accounts” refers to correspondent accounts that are used directly by third parties to transact business on their own behalf. “Politically Exposed Persons” (PEPs) are individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign country, for example Heads of State or of government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or military officials, senior executives of state owned corporations, important political party officials. Business relationships with family members or close associates of PEPs involve reputational risks similar to those with PEPs themselves. The definition is not intended to cover middle ranking or more junior individuals in the foregoing categories.

17. Council Decision of 22 December 2004 on Tackling Vehicle Crime with Cross-Border Implications Organized crime is responsible for a large percentage of stolen motor vehicles in the European Union (EU). The Council Decision of 22 December 2004 provides measures to deal with the cross-border implications of motor vehicle theft. This decision calls for mutual cooperation between all EU members in order to further the objectives as laid down by this decision. Specifically, it calls for mutual cooperation between the “national competent authorities” of each member state and the private sector. The term “national competent authorities” refers to “any national authorities designated by the Member States for the purposes of this Decision, and may include, as appropriate, police, customs, border guards and judicial authorities.” Article 8 addresses vehicle registration certificates recovery. Source EUR-Lex, Official Journal of the European Union, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_389/ l_38920041230en00280030.pdf.

“Shell bank” means a bank incorporated in a jurisdiction in which it has no physical presence and which is unaffiliated with a regulated financial group.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, “STR” refers to suspicious transaction reports. “Supervisors” refers to the designated competent authorities responsible for ensuring compliance by financial institutions with requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. “the FATF Recommendations” refers to these Recommendations and to the FATF Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 30(1)(a) and Article 34(2)(c) thereof, Having regard to the initiative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Having regard to the Opinion of the European Parliament, Whereas: (1) An estimated 1.2 million motor vehicles are stolen each year in the Member States of the European Union. (2) These thefts involve considerable damage amounting to at least EUR 15 billion per year.

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(3) A large proportion of these vehicles, estimated at 30 to 40%, are stolen by organised crime and then converted and exported to other States within and outside the European Union. (4) Besides causing material damage, this is also seriously damaging to citizens’ sense of justice and feeling of security. Vehicle crime may be accompanied by serious forms of violence. (5) Consequently, attainment of the objective in Article 29 of the Treaty, to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice, is hampered. (6) The Council has adopted a Resolution of 27 May 1999 on combating international crime with fuller cover of the routes used (1). (7) Vehicle crime may also be linked internationally to other forms of crime, such as trafficking in drugs, firearms and human beings. (8) Tackling vehicle crime is a matter for the law enforcement agencies of the Member States. However, a common approach involving—wherever practicable and necessary—cooperation between the Member States and law enforcement authorities of the Member States is necessary and proportional in order to address the cross-border aspects of this form of crime. (9) Cooperation between law enforcement authorities and vehicle registration authorities is of particular importance, as is the provision of information to the relevant parties. (10) Cooperation with Europol is equally important as Europol can provide analyses and reports on the matter. (11) The European Police College offers police forces in the Member States, via the European Police Learning Net (EPLN), a library function in the field of vehicle crime for consulting information and expertise. Via its discussion function, EPLN also provides the possibility of exchanging knowledge and experience. (12) The fight against vehicle crime will be intensified by an increase in the number of Member States acceding to the Treaty concerning a European Vehicle and Driving Licence Information System (EUCARIS) of 29 June 2000.

(13) A number of specific measures will need to be taken if vehicle crime with an international dimension is to be combated effectively,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 Definitions For the purposes of this Decision, the following definitions apply: 1. ‘Vehicle’ shall mean any motor vehicle, trailer or caravan as defined in the provisions relating to the Schengen Information System (SIS). 2. ‘National competent authorities’ shall mean any national authorities designated by the Member States for the purposes of this Decision, and may include, as appropriate, police, customs, border guards and judicial authorities.

L 389/28 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.12.2004 (1) OJ C 162, 9.6.1999, p. 1. Article 2 Objective 1. The objective of this Decision is to achieve improved cooperation within the European Union with the aim of preventing and combating crossborder vehicle crime. 2. Particular attention shall be given to the relationship between vehicle theft and the illegal car trade and forms of organised crime, such as trafficking in drugs, firearms and human beings. Article 3 Cooperation between National Competent Authorities 1. Member States shall take the necessary steps, in accordance with national law, to enhance mutual cooperation between national competent authorities

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in order to combat cross-border vehicle crime, such as by means of cooperation agreements. 2. Specific attention shall be given to cooperation with respect to export control, taking into account respective competences in the Member States. Article 4 Cooperation between Competent Authorities and the Private Sector 1. Member States shall take the necessary steps to organise periodic consultations, as appropriate, among national competent authorities, in accordance with national law, and may involve representatives of the private sector (such as holders of private registers of missing vehicles, insurers and the car trade) in such consultations with a view to coordination of information and mutual alignment of activities in this area. 2. Member States shall facilitate procedures, in accordance with national law, for a quick repatriation of vehicles released by national competent authorities following their seizure.

be notified to the General Secretariat of the Council for publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. Article 6 Issuing Alerts for Stolen Vehicles and Registration Certificates 1. Whenever a vehicle is reported stolen, Member States’ competent authorities shall immediately enter a stolen vehicle alert in the SIS, in accordance with national law, and, where possible, in Interpol’s Stolen Motor Vehicle database. 2. An alert in the search register shall, in accordance with national law, be immediately withdrawn by the Member State which issued it as soon as the reason for issuing an alert on the vehicle ceases to exist. 3. Whenever registration certificates are reported stolen, Member States’ competent authorities shall immediately enter an alert thereon in the SIS, in accordance with national law. Article 7

Article 5 Registration 1. Each Member State shall ensure that its competent authorities shall take the necessary steps to prevent abuse and theft of vehicle registration documents.

Vehicle Crime Contact Points 1. By 30 March 2005, Member States shall designate, within their law enforcement authorities, a contact point for tackling crossborder vehicle crime. 2. Member States shall authorise the contact points to exchange experience, expertise as well as general and technical information concerning vehicle crime on the basis of existing applicable legislation. Information exchange shall extend to methods and best practices of prevention of vehicle crime. Such exchanges shall not include exchanges of personal data.

2. The national vehicle registration authorities shall be informed by law enforcement authorities whether a vehicle, that is in the process of being registered, is known as having been stolen. Access to databases to that end shall take place with due respect to provisions of Community law. 30.12.2004 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 389/29

3. Information concerning the designated national contact points, including subsequent changes, shall

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Article 8

Article 11

Preventing Abuse of Vehicle Registration Certificates 1. In order to prevent abuse of vehicle registration certificates, each Member State shall, in accordance with national law, ensure that its competent authorities take the necessary steps to recover a vehicle owner’s or vehicle holder’s registration certificate if the vehicle has been seriously damaged in an accident (total loss).

Meeting of Contact Points and Annual Report to the Council Vehicle crime contact points shall hold a meeting at least once a year under the auspices of the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council. Europol shall be invited to participate in that meeting. The Presidency shall report to the Council on the progress of relevant practical cooperation among law enforcement authorities.

2. A registration certificate shall also be recovered, in accordance with national law, where, during a check by the law enforcement agency, it is suspected that there has been an infringement concerning the vehicle’s identity markings, such as the vehicle identification number.

Article 12 Evaluation The Council shall evaluate the implementation of this Decision by 30 December 2007. Article 13

3. Registration certificates shall be returned only following examination and positive verification of the vehicle’s identity, and in accordance with national law.

Entry into Effect

This Decision shall take effect on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Article 9 Europol Each Member State shall ensure that its law enforcement authorities keep Europol informed on vehicle crime perpetrators as necessary, within the scope of that mandate and tasks. Article 10 Promotion of Expertise and Training Member States shall take the necessary steps to ensure that national institutes responsible for the training of relevant law enforcement authorities promote in their curricula, where appropriate in cooperation with the European Police College, specialist training in the field of vehicle crime prevention and detection. Such training may include input from Europol, in accordance with its sphere of competence.

For those Member States in which the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the SIS have not yet been put into effect, the obligations of this Decision relating to the SIS shall take effect on the date on which those provisions start applying, as specified in a Council Decision adopted to that effect in accordance with the applicable procedures. Done at Brussels, 22 December 2004

For the Council The President C. VEERMAN L 389/30 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.12.2004

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18. Government of Afghanistan CounterNarcotics Law

1. To prevent the cultivation of opium poppy, cannabis plants, and coca bush, and prescribe penalties for persons engaging in these activities. 2. To regulate and control narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, chemical precursors, and substances and equipment used in the manufacture, production, or processing of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in order to prevent their use for illicit purposes and to ensure their use for medical, scientific, research and industrial purposes in accordance with the provisions of the law. 3. To prescribe penalties for persons engaging in and to prevent the cultivation, production, processing, acquisition, possession, distribution, manufacture, trade, brokering, importation, exportation, transportation, offering, use, storage, and concealment of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, and of the chemical precursors, other illicit substances, and equipment used for these illicit activities. 4. To coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the counter narcotics activities, policies, and programs of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 5. To encourage farmers to cultivate licit crops instead of opium poppy, coca bush, and cannabis plants. 6. To establish health centers for detoxification, treatment, rehabilitation, and harm reduction services for drug-addicted and drug dependent persons in order to reintegrate them into society. 7. To attract the cooperation and assistance of national and international organizations in the task of combating cultivation, trafficking and use of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and the chemical precursors used in their production, manufacturing, and processing.

Afghanistan is a part of the Golden Crescent, which includes Iran and Pakistan. After the fall of the Taliban regime, the new government of Afghanistan took steps to curb poppy cultivation and the illicit opium market, which has been a major corrupting force in the country since the Soviet invasion of 1979. The antinarcotics law passed by the government became a milestone in checking drug trafficking and production. However, since the U.S.-led Coalition invasion of that country in 2001, poppy cultivation has steadily increased. Although the cultivation and trafficking of opium are now illegal in Afghanistan, the country remains the world’s largest producer of that crop. Source Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter Narcotics, http://www.mcn.gov.af/eng/downloads/ documents/drug_law.pdf.

Chapter I General Provisions Article 1 Basis This Law is enacted pursuant to Article 7 of the Constitution of Afghanistan in order to prevent the cultivation of opium poppy, cannabis plants, and coca bush, and the trafficking of narcotic drugs, and to control psychotropic substances, chemical precursors, and equipment used in manufacturing, producing, or processing of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Article 2 Objectives The objectives of this Law are:

Article 3 Definitions Terms: The following terms have the following meanings in this law:

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1) “Narcotic Drug” means a plant, substance or preparation classified as such in the Tables annexed to this law. 2) “Analogue” means any substance which is not included in any of the Tables annexed to this law but whose chemical structure combination and whose psychotropic effects are similar to those of a substance included in the Tables annexed to this law. 3) “Controlled delivery” means allowing the transportation and passage of illicit or suspected consignments of prohibited articles, including drugs, precursors, analogues or substances substituted for them, equipment of clandestine laboratories, or laundered money into or through Afghanistan or one or more countries, with the knowledge and under the supervision of the competent law enforcement authorities, in efforts to identify persons and investigate and establish proof of criminal offenses. 4) “Dependence” is a condition in which the use of drugs is compulsive, and stopping gives rise to psychological and even physical disorders, which leads the person to continue using the drug. 5) “Detoxification treatment” means treatment intended to eliminate physical dependence on a drug. 6) “Drug abuse” and “illicit drug use” mean the use of any regulated drug without a medical prescription and medical instructions for non-scientific and non-medical purposes. 7) “Drug addict” means a person in a state of physical and/or psychic dependence on a drug. 8) “Industrial use” of a drug means its exclusive use in a manufacturing process. 9) “Medical prescription” means a written document signed by a physician or a person holding a medical license, issued for the medical treatment of a patient and authorizing the dispensing by a pharmacist to that person of a specific quantity of controlled drugs. 10) “Medical use” means the consumption or use of drugs controlled by this law under a medical prescription and in accordance with international conventions.

11) “Money-laundering” means the same concepts as defined under article 3 of the Law against Money-Laundering and Criminal Proceeds published in the Official Gazette No. 840 on 10.08.1383. 12) “Precursor” means a substance used in drug manufacture or processing and classified as such under Table IV of this law. 13) “Psychotropic substance” means a drug in one of the Tables annexed to the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. 14) “Regulated drugs” are defined as all plants and substances, including their chemical preparations and their derivatives, and chemical precursors that are listed in Tables 1–4, derived from the United Nations International Conventions on Drugs, attached to this law. 15) “Mixture” or “Compound” means any preparation that contains any detectable amount of a controlled or regulated drug substance under this law. 16) “Covert Operations” means the investigation of criminal offences by law enforcement agencies’ use of methods that include surveillance, the use of informants, undercover operations and the exchange of intelligence with appropriate law enforcement agencies or other organisations. 17) “Vehicle” means any mode of transportation used in drug-trafficking. 18) “Undercover Operations” means operations carried out in secret by the police in which the officers’ identities are concealed from third parties by the use of an alias and false identity so as to enable the infiltration of existing criminal groups in order to arrest suspected criminals. 19) “Surveillance” means the covert watching of a person or group of persons or the covert listening to their conversations over a period of time by a human being or through the use of technical devices. 20) “Secret or Electronic Surveillance” means surveillance authorized by a competent court in accordance with the provisions of law. This surveillance includes the following activities:

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• watching in private places using human or technical means; • interception of communications; • opening of mail; and, • inspection of bank accounts and records of other financial activity. 21) “Conspiracy” or “Complicity” means the same as defined under article 49 of the 1355 Penal Code published in the Official Gazette No. 347. 22) “Possession” means the ability to exert control over an object, including cases where a person is not in physical contact with the object, but has the power to exercise control over it, either directly or through others. 23) “Distribution” is the transfer or attempted transfer of possession from one person to another. 24) “Aid” or “abet” means the same as defined under article 39 of the 1355 Penal Code published in the Official Gazette No. 347. 25) “Attempt” means the same as defined under article 29 of the 1355 Penal Code published in the Official Gazette No. 347. 26) “Public official” shall mean any officer, employee, or person acting for, on behalf, or under the authority of a government agency. 27) “Official act” shall mean any decision or action on any matter, controversy, or legal proceeding by a public official. 28) “Bribe” shall mean corruptly giving, offering, or promising anything of value to any person or entity, directly or indirectly, with the purpose of: (1) influencing an official act; (2) influencing a public official to commit or omit any act in violation of his lawful duty; or (3) influencing witnesses, detection, investigation, or trial proceedings; (4) compelling any witness to be absent from any legal or court proceedings; (5) influencing any agency, commission, or officer authorized by the law to hear and record the testimony of witnesses. 29) “Weapon” means any beating or injuring tools and devices, firearms, and explosives capable of inflicting injury or destruction, or that can cause death.

Chapter II Classification and Regulation of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, and Chemicals Used in the Manufacture, Production, or Processing of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Article 4 Classification and Regulation of Narcotic Drugs 1. For purposes of this law, regulated drugs are defined as all plants and substances that are listed in Tables 1–3, including their chemical derivatives, and all chemical precursors that are listed in Table 4 of the Tables attached hereto. The regulated drugs covered by this law shall be classified in four tables: • Table 1: Prohibited plants and substances with no medical use; • Table 2: Strictly controlled plants and substances with a medical use; • Table 3: Controlled plants and substances with a medical use; • Table 4: Chemical precursors and other substances used in the illicit manufacture or processing of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

Article 5 Drug Regulation Committee 1) A Drug Regulation Committee is hereby established which shall be composed of five members with the following composition: a) One medical and one pharmaceutical expert from the Ministry of Public Health; b) Two experts from the Ministry of CounterNarcotics; c) One customs expert from the Ministry of Finance.

2) Members of the Drug Regulation Committee mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be appointed by their respective ministries for a period of four years. The Chairperson of the Drug Regulation Committee shall be appointed by the

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Minister of Counter-Narcotics from among its members.

under their commercial, scientific, or common name.

3) Decisions and regulations of the Drug Regulation Committee shall be made by a majority of its members and shall be recorded in a special book.

2. The Committee may not include an internationally controlled substance in a Table subject to a regime less strict than that required under the United Nations Conventions for the substance in question.

4) In case any member of the Drug Regulation Committee fails to carry out his/her duties in a satisfactory fashion, he/she can be removed from his membership in the Committee by the Minister of Counter Narcotics. 5) The administrative costs of the Drug Regulation Committee and those of its secretariat shall be paid directly from the budget of the Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Members of the Drug Regulation Committee shall be paid appropriate attendance fees by the Ministry of CounterNarcotics. 6) The Drug Regulation Committee shall prepare one quarterly and one annual report to the Minister of Counter Narcotics on its activities. The Minister may direct the Drug Regulation Committee to provide the necessary information in accordance with this Law and relevant regulations. 7) The Drug Regulation Committee will hereinafter be called the Committee. Article 6 Duties of the Committee 1. The classifications of the regulated drugs in Tables 1 through 4 shall be established and amended, in particular by new inclusions, deletions, or transfers from one Table to another, by the Committee, taking into account any amendments or additions ordered by the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Plants and substances shall be included under their international nonproprietary name or, failing this,

3. The Committee shall not transfer any substance from Table 1 to Table 2 or 3, except as provided in paragraph 1 of this Article. 4. Inclusions, deletions or transfers from one Table to another in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 above shall be valid when they are published in the official gazette. 5. Except as otherwise provided by this law, a preparation, compound, or mixture of any regulated drug shall be subject to the same regulations, prohibitions, and penalties as the regulated drug which it contains, and if it contains two or more regulated drugs it shall be subject to the conditions governing the most strictly controlled regulated drug that it contains. 6. A preparation, compound, or mixture containing a substance listed in Tables 2, 3 or 4 that is compounded in such a way as to present no, or a negligible, risk of abuse or diversion and from which the substance cannot be recovered by readily applicable means in a quantity liable to illicit use, abuse, or diversion may be exempt from certain of the control measures set forth in this law by decision of the Committee. 7. If the substances listed in Tables 2 and 3 and their preparations can be used in medicine they shall be subject to the provisions applicable to all substances and preparations intended for use in human or veterinary medicine to the extent that such provisions are compatible with those established in this law.

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person convicted of a narcotics or money laundering offense.

Chapter III Licensing, Cultivation, Production, Manufacture, Trade, Distribution, and Use of Plants, Substances and Preparations Listed in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 Article 7 Licenses 1. No person shall cultivate, produce, process, manufacture, trade, distribute, possess, supply, traffic, transport, transfer, acquire, purchase, sell, import, export, or transit, plants, substances and preparations listed in Tables 2 and 3 in the territory of Afghanistan, unless he has been licensed by the Committee. 2. No person may engage in any of the operations set forth in paragraph 1 of this article at any building or on any premises not expressly identified on a license issued under this Article, or separately licensed by the Committee for use by specially designated State enterprises, or exempt from licensing under this law. 3. The Committee may issue a license to cultivate, manufacture, distribute (including dispensing), import or export one or more of the plants, substances and preparations listed in Tables 1, 2 and 3 at the building or on the premises identified in the license. Such a license shall permit any of the operations set forth in the first paragraph of this article that are necessarily involved in the licensed activity. 4. A license to engage in the operations set forth in paragraph 1 of this article may be issued only if the use of the plants, substances and preparations in question is restricted to medical or scientific purposes. This license shall be valid for one year. Licensing shall be subject to verification of the character and professional qualifications of the applicant. A license may not be granted to any

5. The industrial production and use of a substance listed in Tables 1, 2 or 3 for other than medical or scientific purposes may be authorized by the Committee if the applicant satisfactorily shows that such production or use is necessary to a industrial process, he shall ensure that the products manufactured, other than another regulated drug subject to this Law, cannot be abused or produce harmful effects, and he shall ensure that any regulated drug included in this authorization and used in the composition of the products manufactured cannot be easily recovered. The person or entity so authorized shall destroy all quantities of the regulated drug included in this authorization that cannot be rendered harmless or sufficiently irretrievable and reports to the Committee the quantity of the regulated drug produced, used or destroyed. 6. A person can operate in places set forth in paragraphs 3 and 7 of this article which have been designated for the manufacture, distribution (including dispensing), importation or exportation of regulated drugs only when those places comply with the security standards established by the Committee. 7. State enterprises specially designated by the Committee to engage in the operations set forth in paragraph 1 of this article shall be required to apply for a license to use buildings and premises for such operations, and the Committee may issue such license in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 6 of this Article. 8. For the better implementation of this article, the Committee may establish regulations, in particular those governing applications for and the granting, content, scope, withdrawal and suspension of licenses.

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shall maintain a record of the importation as prescribed by the Committee.

Article 8 Possessing Needed Amounts of Narcotic Drugs 1. Authorized regulated drug manufacturers and distributors may hold the quantities of the various regulated drugs required for the smooth functioning of business. The distributors who only dispense regulated drugs are excepted from this provision. 2. The Committee shall establish for each year, taking into account the prevailing market conditions, the anticipated medical, scientific, research, and industrial needs for the regulated drugs in Tables 1, 2 and 3, and the anticipated lawful exports of such regulated drugs, the maximum quantities of these regulated drugs that shall be manufactured and the maximum quantities that each licensee and each specially designated State enterprise shall be entitled to manufacture. These limits may be changed during the year if necessary. 3. The Committee may establish and publish regulations and procedures for the implementation of this Article. Article 9 Exports and Imports 1. The export and import of substances on Tables 1, 2 and 3 shall be subject to separate authorization issued by the Committee. 2. This authorization shall be subject to the completion of a form which includes the requirements established by the Committee and the United Nations Economic and Social Council. 3. The Committee may authorize an importation of a substance listed in Tables 1, 2, or 3 only to meet legitimate medical, scientific, and industrial needs. The import authorization shall not be necessary in the event of a catastrophe or an emergency as determined by the Committee, but the importer

4. The Committee may authorize an exportation of a substance listed on Tables 1, 2, or 3 only to a country that maintains effective controls over the use of the regulated drug and only if the regulated drug is to be used for medical, scientific, or other legitimate purposes. 5. An authorization for the importation or exportation of a substance listed on Tables 1, 2, or 3 is not transferable. 6. An application for import or export authorization of a substance listed on Tables 1, 2, or 3 shall indicate the following: a) The name and address of the importer or exporter; b) The names and addresses of any consignee, if known; c) The international non-proprietary name of each substance or, failing this, the name of the substance in the tables of the international conventions; d) The pharmaceutical form and characteristics of each substance and, in the case of a preparation, its trade name; e) The quantity of each substance and preparation involved in the operation; f) The period during which the operation is to take place; g) The mode of transport or shipment; and h) The border custom house of the importation and exportation.

7. An import certificate or other documentation issued by the Government of the importing country shall be attached to the export application. 8. An import or export authorization shall contain, in addition to the expiration date and the name of the issuing authority, the same types of details as the application.

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9. The import authorization shall specify whether the import is to be effected in a single consignment or may be effected in more than one consignment, and shall establish the time in which the import of all consignments must be effected. 10. The export authorization shall also indicate the number and date of the import certificate issued by the Government of the importing country. 11. A copy of the export authorization shall accompany each consignment and the Committee shall send a copy to the Government of the importing country. 12. If the quantity of plants, substances or preparations actually exported is smaller than that specified in the export authorization, and is certified by the customs office, the Committee shall note that fact on the related document and on all official copies thereof. 13. Once the consignment has entered the national territory or when the period stipulated in the import authorization has expired, the Committee shall send the export authorization to the Government of the exporting country, with an endorsement specifying the quantity of each regulated drug actually imported. 14. Commercial documents such as invoices, cargo manifests, customs or transport documents and other shipping documents shall include the name of the plants and substances as set out in the tables of the international conventions and the trade name of the preparations, the quantities exported from the national territory or to be imported into it, and the names and addresses of the exporter, the importer and the consignee. 15. Exports from the national territory of consignments to the address or account of a person other than the person named in the import certificate issued by the Government of the importing country or in other documentation

demonstrating authorization for the import into that country shall be prohibited. This same provision shall apply to the importation of consignments into the national territory. 16. Exports from the national territory of consignments to a bonded warehouse shall be prohibited unless the Government of the importing country certifies on the import certificate or other authorization that it has approved such a consignment. 17. Imports to the national territory of consignments to a bonded warehouse shall be prohibited unless the Government certifies on the import certificate that it approves such a consignment. Withdrawal from the bonded warehouse shall require a permit from the authorities having jurisdiction over the warehouse. In the case of a consignment to a foreign destination, such withdrawal shall be treated as if it were a new export within the meaning of the present Article. The regulated drugs stored in the bonded warehouse may not be subjected to any process, which would modify their nature, nor may their packaging be altered without the permission of the authorities having jurisdiction over the warehouse. 18. A consignment entering or leaving the national territory which is not accompanied by a proper import or export authorization or does not comply with the authorization shall be detained by the competent authorities until the legitimacy of the consignment is established or until a court rules on its status. 19. The Committee shall specify those customs offices operating in the national territory that are to deal with the import or export of the regulated drugs listed in Tables 1, 2 and 3. 20. The transit of any consignment of plants, substances or preparations listed in Tables 1, 2 and 3 through the national territory shall be prohibited,

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whether or not the consignment is removed from the conveyance in which it is carried, unless a copy of the export authorization issued by the Government of the exporting country for such consignment is produced to the department designated by the Committee. 21. The route specified by the export license for a consignment which is in transit in Afghanistan shall not be changed. 22. An application for authorization to change the itinerary or the consignee shall be treated as if the export in question were from the national territory to the new country or consignee concerned. 23. No consignment of plants, substances and preparations in transit through the national territory may be subjected to any process that might change their nature, nor may its packaging be altered without the permission of the Committee. 24. If there is a conflict between the provisions of this article and those of an international agreement that Afghanistan has signed, the provisions of the international agreement prevail. 25. The provisions of this article shall not apply where the consignment in question is transported by air to another country. If the aircraft stops over or makes an emergency landing in the national territory, the consignment shall be treated as an export from the national territory to the country of destination only if it is removed from the aircraft. 26. Free ports and free trade zones shall be subject to the same controls and supervision as other parts of the national territory regarding the importation of plants, substances, or preparations listed in Tables 1, 2 and 3. 27. Transport companies and enterprises shall abide by the regulations of the Committee with regard to taking reasonable measures to prevent

the use of their means of transport for illicit trafficking in the regulated drugs covered by the present law, and shall also be required: • To submit cargo manifests in advance, whenever possible; • To keep the products in sealed containers having tamper-resistant, individually verifiable seals, and in which every kind of alteration should be easily discernable; • To report to the appropriate authorities, at the earliest opportunity, any suspicious consignments.

Article 10 Retail Trade and Distribution 1. Purchases of regulated drugs listed in Tables 2 and 3 for the purpose of professional supply may be made only from a private individual or state enterprise holding a license issued under this law. 2. Only the following persons and state entities may, without having to apply for a license, purchase and hold plants and regulated drugs listed in Tables 2 and 3 for their professional needs: • Pharmacists holding a license to practice when acting in the usual course of business as an agent or employee of a person or entity holding a valid license to distribute regulated drugs; • Pharmacists at a public or private hospital or health care institution that is licensed to distribute regulated drugs when acting in the usual course of business as an agent or employee of that hospital or health care institutions; • Pharmacists holding a license to practice in charge of public or private warehouses; • Hospitals or health care institutions without a pharmacist in charge, in emergency cases and unanticipated events provided that a qualified physician attached to the establishment who holds a license to practice and to dispense regulated drugs has agreed to take responsibility for the stocks in question; • Physicians, dental surgeons, and veterinary surgeons holding a license to practice and authorized

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to dispense regulated drugs, including the preparations included in a list drawn up by the Committee;

3. Physicians, dental surgeons, and veterinary surgeons holding a license to practice may, without having to apply for a drug distribution license, purchase and hold the needed quantities of preparations included in a list drawn up by the Committee. 4. Dental surgeons, midwives, and nurses holding a license to practice may, without having to apply for a license, purchase and hold for their professional activities quantities of preparations included in a list drawn up by the Committee. 5. The regulated drugs listed in Tables 2 and 3 may be prescribed to individuals and animals only in the form of pharmaceutical preparations and only on a medical prescription issued by one of the following professionals: • A physician holding a license to practice and to dispense regulated drugs; • A dental surgeon holding a license to practice and to dispense regulated drugs, for treatment of a dental nature; • A veterinary surgeon holding a license to practice and to dispense regulated drugs, for treatment of animals; • A nurse or midwife holding a license to practice for treatment connected with their professional duties and within the limits set by the competent authority.

7. The Committee, if the situation so requires and under such conditions as it may determine, may authorize, in all or part of the national territory, licensed pharmacists or any other licensed retail distributors to supply, without prescription, small quantities of therapeutic doses of pharmaceutical preparations containing one or more of the regulated drugs listed in Table 3. 8. The Committee shall establish regulations for the implementation of this Article, in particular the rules concerning the writing and filling of prescriptions for pharmaceutical preparations listed in Tables 2 and 3. Article 11 Private Institutions and State Enterprises 1. Private institutions and State enterprises holding licenses to engage in operations involving regulated drugs shall furnish to the Committee in respect of their activities: • Not later than 15 days after the end of each quarter, a quarterly report on the quantities of each substance and each preparation imported or exported, indicating the country of origin and the country of destination; • Not later than 5 May of each year, a report for the previous calendar year indicating: • The quantities of each substance and each preparation produced or manufactured; • The quantities of each substance used for producing preparations and other: • Other substances covered by the present legislation; and • Substances not covered by the present legislation; • The quantities of each substance and each preparation supplied for retail distribution, medical or scientific research or teaching; • The quantities of each substance and each preparation in stock as of 29 March of the year to which the information refers; • The quantities of each substance necessary for the new calendar year.

6. Pharmaceutical preparations listed in Tables 2 and 3 may be dispensed only by: • Dispensing pharmacists holding a license; • Pharmacists at public or private hospitals or health care institutions when such hospitals or institutions hold a license to dispense regulated drugs; • Physicians and veterinary surgeons holding a license to practice and authorized to dispense regulated drugs; • Nurses and midwives in the conduct of their professional duties.

2. The Committee shall establish procedures for the purchase of and placing orders for plants,

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substances and preparations listed in Tables 2, 3, and 4 required for the conduct of professional activities.

over the previous year and the total quantities withdrawn during the year, with those held at the time of the latest inventory.

3. The Committee shall establish procedures for any purchase, transfer, export, import or dispensing of plants, substances and preparations listed in Table 2, and all related transactions shall be recorded in accordance with regulations established by the Committee.

2. Licensees, pharmacists and persons authorized to dispense drugs through wholesale pharmacies or drugstores shall be required to make an inventory and calculate the balance as stipulated in paragraph 1 of this article.

4. Any person, private enterprise, or state enterprise holding, for professional purposes, any plants, substances and preparations listed in Tables 2, 3, and 4 shall be required to keep them under regulations established by the Committee so as to prevent theft or any other form of diversion. 5. Any person, private enterprise, State enterprise, medical or scientific institution engaged in any activity or operation involving plants, substances or preparations covered by the present law shall be controlled and monitored by regulations established by the Committee. Such control and monitoring shall extend to the compartments containing first-aid kits of public transport conveyances engaged in international travel. The Committee shall, in particular, arrange for inspectors or any other body legally empowered to conduct inspections to make ordinary inspections of the establishments, premises, stocks and records at least once every two years. Extraordinary inspections can be done at any time.

3. Any discrepancies noted in a balance or between the results of the balance and those of the inventory shall be immediately reported by the licensee, pharmacist or person authorized to dispense drugs to the Committee, which shall acknowledge receipt of the notification. 4. It shall be forbidden to distribute substances and preparations listed in Tables 2 and 3 unless they are enclosed in wrappers or containers bearing their name and, in the case of consignments of substances and preparations listed in Table 2, a double red band. 5. The outer wrappings of parcels described in paragraph 4 shall bear no information other than the names and addresses of the sender and the consignee. They shall be sealed with the sender’s mark. 6. The label under which a preparation is offered for sale shall indicate the names of the substances listed in Tables 1, 2 and 3 that it contains, together with their weight and percentage.

Article 12 Monitoring and Control 1. State enterprises, private enterprises, medical and scientific institutions and other persons referred to in Article 11 shall be required, at the beginning of each year, to make an inventory of the plants, substances and preparations listed in Tables 1, 2 and 3 held by them and to compare the total quantities in stock at the time of the previous inventory, calculated together with those entered

7. Labels accompanying packages for retail sale or distribution as described in paragraph 4 shall indicate the directions for use as well as the cautions and warnings necessary for the safety of the user. 8. If necessary, additional requirements in respect of packaging and labeling shall be stipulated by regulations established by the Committee.

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Article 13 Regulation of Substances (Precursors) in Table 4 1. The manufacture, distribution or trading of the substances listed in Table 4 shall be subject to the provisions of this article. 2. Import or export authorizations shall be refused if a consignment is possibly [?!!!] intended for the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. 3. Export or import consignments of substances listed in Table 4 annexed to this law shall be clearly labeled to show their contents. 4. Any person who, because of his job requirements, becomes aware of the economic, industrial, trade or professional secrets or trade processes of the substances listed on Table 4 annexed to this law shall be required to avoid disclosing the same to other people. 5. Manufacturers, importers, exporters, wholesalers and retailers shall be required to enter in a register established by the Committee any purchase or transfer of substances listed in Table 4. The entry shall be made with no blank spaces, erasures or overwriting. It shall indicate the date of the transaction, the name and the quantity of the product purchased or transferred and the name, address and occupation of the purchaser and seller. However, retailers shall not be required to enter the name of the purchaser. The registers shall be kept for ten years pursuant to regulations established by the Committee.

7. If there is strong evidence to warrant the suspicion that a substance listed in Table 4 is for use in the illicit manufacture of a narcotic drug, such substance shall be immediately seized pending the outcome of a judicial investigation. 8. The Committee shall submit to the Minister of Counter-Narcotics information on the import and export of precursor substances listed in Table 4. Article 14 Medical and Scientific Research and Teaching 1. For purposes of medical or scientific research, teaching or forensic work, the Committee may authorize, in accordance with a separate procedure and without requiring the licenses referred to in this Chapter, the cultivation, manufacturing, acquiring, importation, use, or possession of plants, substances and preparations in Tables 1, 2 and 3 in quantities not exceeding those strictly necessary for the purpose in question. 2. The applicant of the authorization referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall enter in a register, which he shall keep for 5 years, the quantities of plants, substances and preparations that he imports, acquires, manufactures, uses, and destroys. He shall also record the dates of the operations and the names of his suppliers. He shall furnish the Committee with an annual report on the quantities used or destroyed and those held in stock. The Committee shall be entitled to inspect registers maintained in accordance with this provision. Chapter IV

6. Manufacturers, importers, exporters, wholesalers and retailers of the substances listed in Table 4 shall be required to inform the appropriate police authority of any orders or transactions that appear suspicious, in particular by reason of the quantity of the substances being purchased or ordered, the repetition of such orders or purchases or the means of payment or transport used.

Offenses and Penalties Article 15 Drug Trafficking Offenses and Penalties 1. Any person who engages in the following acts without a license or authorization issued according

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to the provisions of this law has committed a drug trafficking offense and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of this law: (a) The production, manufacture, distribution, possession, extraction, preparation, processing, offering for sale, purchasing, selling, delivery, brokerage, dispatch, transportation, importation, exportation, purchase, concealment, or storage of any substance or mixture containing a substance listed in Tables 1 through 3 annexed to this law; (b) Any of the operations referred to in paragraph 1 of this article in relation to any chemicals or precursors listed in Table 4 for the illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.

Article 16 Drug Trafficking Penalties 1. Whoever commits a drug trafficking offense involving the following quantities of heroin, morphine, or cocaine, or any mixture containing those substances, shall be sentenced as follows: (i) Less than 10 grams, imprisonment for between 6 months and one year, and a fine of between 30,000 Afs and 50,000 Afs. (ii) Between 10 grams and 100 grams, imprisonment for between one and three years, and a fine of between 50,000 and 100,000 Afs. (iii) Between 100 grams and 500 grams, imprisonment for between three and five years, and a fine of between 100,000 Afs and 250,000 Afs. (iv) Between 500g and 1kg, imprisonment for between seven and ten years, and a fine of between 300,000 Afs and 500,000 Afs. (v) Between 1kg and 5kg, imprisonment for between ten and fifteen years, and a fine of between 500,000 Afs and 1,000,000 Afs. (vi) Over 5kg, life imprisonment, and a fine of between 1,000,000 Afs and 10,000,000 Afs.

2. Whoever commits a drug trafficking offense involving the following quantities of opium or any

mixture containing that substance shall be sentenced as follows: (i) Less than 10 grams, imprisonment for up to three months, and a fine of between 5000 Afs and 10,000 Afs. (ii) Between 10 grams and 100g, imprisonment between six months and one year, and a fine of between 10,000 Afs and 50,000 Afs. (iii) Between 100g and 500g, imprisonment for between one and three years, and a fine of between 50,000 and 100,000 Afs. (iv) Between 500g and 1kg, imprisonment for between three and five years, and a fine of between 100,000 Afs and 500,000 Afs. (v) Between 1kg and 5kg, imprisonment for between five and ten years, and a fine of between 500,000 Afs and 1,000,000 Afs. (vi) Between 5kg and 50kg, imprisonment for between ten and fifteen years, and a fine of between 700,000 Afs and 1,500,000 Afs. (vii) Over 50kg, life imprisonment and a fine of between 1,500,000 Afs and 5,000,000 Afs.

3. Whoever commits a drug trafficking offense involving the following quantities of the substances or any mixture containing substances listed in Tables 1 through 4, with the exception of heroin, morphine, cocaine, and opium, shall be sentenced as follows: (i) Less than 250 grams, imprisonment for up to three months, and a fine of between 5000 Afs and 10,000 Afs. (ii) Between 250 grams and 500g, imprisonment for between three months and six months and a fine of between 10,000 Afs and 50,000 Afs. (iii) Between 500g and 1 kg, imprisonment for between six months and 1 year, and a fine of between 50,000 Afs and 100,000 Afs. (iv) Between 1kg and 5kg, imprisonment for between one and three years, and a fine of between 100,000 Afs and 500,000 Afs. (v) Between 5kg and 10kg, imprisonment for between five and ten years and a fine of between 500,000 Afs and up to 1,000,000 Afs.

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(vi) Over 10kg, imprisonment for between ten and fifteen years, and a fine of between 1,000,000 Afs and 1,500,000 Afs.

4. Any person who, during the course of any of the offenses set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this article, directs, controls, organizes, finances, or guides three or more persons, shall be sentenced to penalties thrice as severe as the maximum penalties prescribed for that crime under the sub-paragraphs of paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this article, provided that the term of imprisonment does not exceed 20 years. Article 17 Aggregation of Amounts 1. If several persons are responsible for the commission of a drug trafficking offense, and the amounts of drugs trafficked by each of them is known, each of the offenders shall be punished under the provisions of this law pursuant to his share in the overall amount trafficked. 2. If several persons are responsible for the commission of a drug trafficking offense, but the share of each in the amount of drug trafficked is not known, each of them shall be sentenced to a penalty prescribed for the total amount trafficked.

lessee, manager, agent, employee, or mortgagee, and intentionally rents, leases, or makes available for use, with or without compensation, such a place for the purpose of cultivating, manufacturing, processing, storing, concealing, or distributing any substance or mixture listed in Tables 1 through 4, or participates in or obtains an income from such activity, shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment between 10 and 20 years and a fine of between 500,000 Afs. and 1,000,000 Afs. Article 20 Importation or Use of Equipment for Drug Trafficking 1. Whoever imports equipment or materials used in or for the production and processing of regulated drugs without having a license, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 5 to 10 years and a fine of between 100,000 and 500,000 Afs, and shall have the equipment or materials confiscated. 2. Whoever lawfully imports equipment or materials used in or for the production and processing of drugs but uses them in the illicit production or processing of the regulated drugs, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 10 to 15 years and a fine of between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Afs, and shall have the equipment or materials confiscated.

Article 18 Conspiracy, Aiding, Abetting, Facilitation, Incitement Any person who attempts, conspires, or engages in preparatory acts to commit any offense under this law shall be subject to the same penalties as the principal offender.

3. Whoever possesses or uses the equipment or materials referred to in paragraph 1 of this article for the illicit production or processing of regulated drugs, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 15 to 20 years and a fine of between 1,000,000 and 2,000,000 Afs, and shall have the equipment and materials confiscated.

Article 19

Article 21

Drug Laboratories, Manufacturing, and Storage Whoever without authorization under this law opens, maintains, manages, or controls any property, building, room, or facility, as an owner,

Drug-Related Corruption and Intimidation 1. Any public official who intentionally commits one of the following acts shall be sentenced to

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imprisonment for 5 to 10 years and shall be fined twice the amount of the bribe: (a) facilitating or assisting any offense under this law; (b) obstructing an official investigation of an offense under this law or obstructing a trial of any offense under this law, including by failing to carry out lawful obligations; or (c) directly or indirectly demanding, seeking, receiving, accepting, or agreeing to accept or receive a bribe in relation to drug trafficking or any official duty connected directly or indirectly to drug law enforcement,

A bribe-giver and a bribe-agent shall be sentenced to the same penalties as the bribe-taker. 2. Any person who threatens or intimidates another for the purpose of committing the following acts shall be sentenced to imprisonment between 5 and 8 years and fined between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Afs. (a) committing or facilitating an offense under this law; or (b) impeding a drug trafficking investigation or prosecution,

3. Any person who receives or accepts any benefit for the purpose of impeding or interfering with an investigation or criminal trial of a drug trafficking offense shall be sentenced to imprisonment for between 5 and 10 years, and shall relinquish the benefit. 4. Any person who threatens or seeks to intimidate any public official in connection with the detection of any drug trafficking offense, or an investigation or criminal trial of any drug trafficking offense, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for between 5 and 10 years, and a fine of between 1,000,000 Afs and 2,000,000 Afs. 5. Any person who injures any public official in connection with the detection, investigation or criminal trial of any drug trafficking offense, shall

be sentenced to imprisonment between 10 to 15 years, and a fine of between 1,000,000 Afs and 3,000,000 Afs. 6. Subject to the provisions of Chapter Seven of the Penal Code, the penalties set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this article shall be in addition to other penalties that an offender may be sentenced to for committing other criminal offenses. Article 22 Use of Weapons 1. Any person who uses, or causes the use of, any weapon during or in relation to any drug trafficking offense shall be punished by a term of five to ten years imprisonment, and a fine between 500,000 Afs and 1000,000 Afs. 2. Any person who carries or possesses any weapon, or causes another person to carry or possess any weapon, during or in relation to any drug trafficking offense shall be punished by a term of 3 to 5 years imprisonment, and a fine of between 500,000 Afs and 1,000,000 Afs. Article 23 Intimidation Leading to Drug-Related Offenses Any person who intentionally commits the following acts shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of between 5 and 8 years, and a fine of between 50,000 Afs and 200,000 Afs. (a) Compelling another by force or intimidation to cultivate, manufacture, distribute, possess, sell, transport, store, or use substances or any mixture containing substances on Tables 1 through 4; (b) Mixing substances on Tables 1 through 4 in food or drink intending that they be consumed by others; (c) Distributing or sells any substance or mixture containing substances on Tables 1 through 4 to a child or to a person with mental health problems;

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(d) Distributing any substance or mixture containing substances on Tables 1 through 4 in educational, military training, health or social service centers, or prisons; (e) Employing or using a child to commit a drug trafficking offense; or (f) Allowing the consumption of substances or any mixture containing substances on Tables 1 through 4 in restaurants, hotels, shops or any other premises.

2. Whoever plants or cultivates 1 jerib or more of opium poppy or coca bush shall, for each “beswa” (100 square meters) in excess of 1 jerib, be sentenced to imprisonment for 1 month and fine of 5,000 Afs, which penalty shall be in addition to the penalty prescribed in paragraph 1 of this article. 3. Whoever plants or cultivates less than 1 jerib of cannabis plants shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 3 to 9 months and a fine between 5,000 and 20,000 Afs.

Article 24 Illicit Prescription of Drugs Any person who intentionally commits the following acts shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of between 3 and 5 years, and a fine of between 50,000 Afs and 100,000 Afs. (a) Prescribing a regulated drug knowing it is to be used illegally; or (b) Selling and buying regulated drugs using fraudulent prescriptions,

Article 25 Prohibition on Cultivation 1. Planting or cultivating opium poppy and seeds, coca bush, and cannabis plants within Afghanistan is a criminal offense and prohibited. 2. The owners, occupiers, or cultivators of lands are obligated to destroy opium poppy, coco bush, and cannabis plants growing on their lands. If they fail to do so shall be punished pursuant to the provisions of Article 26. Article 26 Penalties for Cultivation 1. Whoever plants or cultivates less than 1 jerib of opium poppy or coca bush without having a license shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment between 6 months and 1 year and a fine between 10,000 Afs and 50,000 Afs.

4. Whoever plants or cultivates more than 1 jerib of cannabis plants, shall, for each beswa in excess of 1 jerib, be sentenced to imprisonment for 15 days and a fine of 2,500 Afs, which penalty shall be in addition to the penalty prescribed in paragraph 3 of this article. 5. Whoever encourages, causes, incites, or finances any person to plant or cultivate opium poppy, coca bush, or cannabis plants shall be sentenced to twice the penalties of the farmer in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this article. 6. Illicit opium poppy, coca bush, or cannabis plants shall be destroyed and any person associated with the cultivation or planting shall not be entitled to any compensation, in addition to the penalties set forth in this article. Article 27 Consumption of Illegal Drugs, and Treatment of Dependant Persons or Addicts 1. Any person who uses or possesses for the purpose of personal consumption any substance or mixture containing a substance listed in Tables 1 through 4, other than as authorized for medical treatment or by this law, shall be punished as follows: (a) Heroin, morphine, and cocaine, or any mixture containing those substances: 6 months to 1 year

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imprisonment and a fine between 20,000 to 50,000 Afs. (b) Opium or any mixture containing that substance: 3 months to 6 months imprisonment and a fine of between 10,000 Afs to 25,000 Afs. (c) Substances or any mixture containing substances listed in Tables 1 through 4, with the exception of those in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article: 1 month to 3 months imprisonment and a fine of between 5,000 Afs to 10,000 Afs. (d) Possession of more than 1 gram of heroin, morphine, or cocaine, or 10 grams of opium or hashish, shall be subject to the penalties set forth in Article 16.

2. If a medical doctor certifies that a person is addicted to an illegal drug substance listed in Tables 1 through 4, the court may exempt the person from imprisonment and fine. In this case, the court may require an addicted person to attend a detoxification or drug treatment center. 3. Detoxification or drug treatment centers shall report to the sentencing court through the office of the prosecutor every 15 days on the health condition of persons sentenced to detention and treatment. On the basis of the report received, the court can abrogate or extend the period of detention and treatment.

Article 28 Vehicles 1. Whoever without legal authorization intentionally carries, transports, or conceals more than 10 grams of heroin, morphine, or cocaine; or more than 20 grams of opium; or more than 100 grams of hashish or any other substance listed in Tables 1 through 4 in his vehicle shall have the vehicle confiscated, in addition to the punishment prescribed in this law. 2. Any vehicle owner who without legal authorization intentionally allows a vehicle to be used to carry, transport, or conceal more than 10 grams of heroin, morphine, or cocaine; or more than 20 grams of opium; or more than 100 grams of hashish or any other substance listed in Tables 1 through 4 shall be punished as an accomplice to the crime and shall have the vehicle confiscated. 3. Any vehicle seized in relation to a drugtrafficking offense shall be registered and officially handed over to the nearest customs office and following the completion of its confiscation in accordance with the provisions of the relevant law, it shall be placed on sale and the proceeds be deposited to the government treasury. [. . .]

4. Any person sentenced to a period of detention in a detoxification or drug treatment center shall receive credit on any sentence of imprisonment for the time served in the treatment center. 5. Any person in control of a vehicle while under the influence of any narcotic or psychotropic substance listed in Tables 1 through 3 shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of between six months and one year and a fine of 10,000 to 20,000 Afs.

19. The Narcotic Drug Control Act Laundered money has remained a major problem for the People’s Republic of China. These laundered funds emanate from corruption, smuggling, fraud, and drug trafficking. Regulatory measures were initiated by the People’s Bank of China and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. The Criminal Code of 1997 made money laundering an offense pertaining to organized crime, smuggling, and drug trafficking. A major effort was established to control

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narcotic drugs by enacting the Narcotic Drug Control Act. Article 3 of the act included under narcotic drugs: cannabis, opiates, cocaine, synthetic narcotic drugs, and medicinal plants with their preparations. Cultivation of narcotic plants along with distribution, import, and export of narcotic drugs were prohibited by Article 4. Punishment for the offender depended on the seriousness of the crime as per the provisions of Article 30. Source United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/legal_library/cn/legal _library_1997-11-19_1997-66.html.

Chapter II—The Cultivation of Narcotic Plants and the Production of Narcotic Drugs Article 5 Narcotic plant growing units should be approved by the Ministry of Public Health in concurrence with the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fishery and the State Bureau of Pharmaceutical Industry. The Ministry of Public Security should be notified of the approval. Narcotic drug producing units should be approved by the Ministry of Public Health in concurrence with the State Bureau of Pharmaceutical Industry. No unit or individual may be engaged in the production of narcotic drugs without authorization.

Chapter I—General Provisions Article 1 This Act is enacted in accordance with the Drug Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China to strengthen the control of narcotic drugs, assure the safety of narcotic drugs used in medical practice, education and scientific research. Article 2 The term “Narcotic drug” refers to those addictive substances that, when used continuously, can give rise to physical dependence. Article 3 The scope of narcotic drugs includes opiates, cocaine, cannabis, synthetic narcotic drugs and medicinal plants and their preparations assigned by the Ministry of Public Health that are liable to be abused. Article 4 The cultivation of narcotic plants and the production, distribution, importation and exportation of narcotic drugs are strictly controlled by the State, narcotic drugs are not to be used except for medical, educational or scientific purposes.

Article 6 The annual plan for the cultivation of narcotic plants should be approved by the Ministry of Public Health in concurrence with the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fishery. The annual plan for the production of narcotic drugs should be approved by the Ministry of Public Health in concurrence with the State Bureau of Pharmaceutical Industry and conveyed jointly to all institutions concerned, the cultivating or producing units are not allowed to alter the plans at liberty. In every cultivating or producing unit, a definite person should be nominated to assure the safekeeping of all finished products, intermediate products, opium poppy shells and seeds, they are not to be sold or used at liberty. Article 7 Quality control should be strengthened in the production of narcotic drugs, the quality of each product must comply with its national standard. Article 8 The plan for the development of a new narcotic drug must be submitted to the Ministry of Public Health for approval. When the research activities come to an end, the new product should be subjected to the procedures of New Drug

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Approval, in the mean time, the new product should be stored and used properly, diversion should be avoided.

balanced by the pharmaceutical managing institutions and approved by the health authorities of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities.

Chapter III—The Supply of Narcotic Drugs Article 9 Narcotic drugs should be supplied in a planned way according to the need in medical practice, education and scientific research. The plan for supply should be elaborated by an institution designated by the State Bureau of Pharmaceutical Industry and submitted to the Ministry of Public Health and the State Bureau of Pharmaceutical Industry for approval. Article 10 The setting of narcotic drug handling units should be submitted, by the health authorities of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities in concurrence with the pharmaceutical managing institutions, to the Ministry of Public Health and the State Bureau of Pharmaceutical Industry for approval. Narcotic drugs can only be supplied, in the basis of the fixed limited amounts, to those units qualified by the health authorities. No narcotic drugs should be supplied to any other units or individuals. Article 11 The supply of medicine opium poppy shells should be handled solely by those units authorized by the State Bureau of Pharmaceutical Industry and the pharmaceutical managing institutions of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities. Opium poppy shells should be distributed according to the plan jointly approved by the Ministry of Public Health and the State Bureau of Pharmaceutical Industry. Opium poppy shells can be dispensed by medical units and handling units assigned by health authorities above county level, pursuant to a physician’s prescription which bears the seal of a medical unit, but they are not to be sold at retail. The amount of opium poppy shells planned for the manufacture of formulated products should be

Article 12 Narcotic drugs must be stored in special warehouses or cabinets, special individual should be assigned to take charge of the distribution and transportation of narcotic drugs. Chapter IV—The Transportation of Narcotic Drugs Article 13 The transportation of opium must go through formalities by the holder of a licence issued by the Ministry of Public Health. Opium dispatched from the cultivating unit to the warehouse should be escorted by the consigner; opium dispatched from the warehouse to drug manufacturing enterprises should be escorted by the consignee. The number of escort must comply with the provision of the transport agency. The transport licence is provided exclusively by the Ministry of Public Health. Article 14 When the consignment is a narcotic drug other than opium, or is opium poppy shell, the words “Narcotic Drug” must be written clearly on the bill of transportation, and a seal used especially for narcotic drugs should be stamped on the bill of transportation. Article 15 Transport agencies should pay all attention and give priority to a consignment of narcotic drug or opium poppy shell, shorten their standing time on railway stations, wharves or airports. Open carriage should not be used for the transportation of narcotic drugs by train, the consignment should not be loaded on the surface of a cabin when it is transported by ship, and if it is transported by truck, it should be tightly covered and securely bundled.

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Article 16 Narcotic drugs lost on the way of transportation must be traced urgently, and the local Public Security and Public Health authorities should be informed immediately. Chapter V—The Importation and Exportation of Narcotic Drugs Article 17 The importation and exportation of narcotic drugs should be handled solely by foreign trade agencies assigned by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations. Annual plan for the importation and exportation of narcotic drugs should be submitted to the Ministry of Public Health for approval.

qualified may apply for a “Narcotic Drug Purchasing Card”, the application should be submitted to the local health authority and approved by the health authority at a higher level. The holder of a “Narcotic Drug Purchasing Card” may purchase narcotic drugs at a definite handling unit, provided that the amount of narcotic drug purchased does not exceed a specified limit. Educational and scientific research units in need of narcotic drugs should submit their application to the health authority at a higher level for approval. The criteria for the classification of narcotic drug purchasers and the corresponding limits are stipulated by the Ministry of Public Health.

Article 18 The importation of narcotic drugs for the purpose of medical treatment, education or scientific research should be approved by the Ministry of Public Health, no importation is permitted without a “Narcotic Drug Import Certificate”.

Article 22 Narcotic drugs should be purchased by sending a “Narcotic Drug Order” to the handling unit. The handling unit should check the seals and quantity carefully. The quarterly purchasing limit for various narcotic drugs is specified by the Ministry of Public Health.

Article 19 An import certificate issued by the competent authority of the importing country should be produced when an application for the exportation of a narcotic drug is submitted to the Ministry of Public Health, no exportation is permitted without a “Narcotic Drug Export Certificate”.

Article 23 Narcotic drugs can also be purchased by mail, but orders and bills should be mailed by registered post. The delivery note should be stamped with a seal used especially for narcotic drugs. An invoice stamped with such a seal can serve as a certificate for mailing narcotic drugs.

Article 20 Narcotic Drug Import (or Export) Certificate is provided exclusively by the Ministry of Public Health.

Article 24 Preparations falling into the scope of narcotic drugs under control must be purchased at handling units specialized in narcotic drugs. Preparations not included in the scope of control or not commercially available can only be prepared by medical units with the permission of health authorities above the county level.

Chapter VI—The Use of Narcotic Drugs Article 21 The use of narcotic drugs is restricted to medical treatment, education and scientific research. Medical units equipped with beds, capable of performing operations or those considered to be

Article 25 Medical personnel permitted to prescribe narcotic drugs must be of a vocational rank above

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“physician” and proved to be able to use narcotic drugs properly.

be used for narcotic drugs. Prescriptions of narcotic drugs should be reserved for three years.

Medical personnel specialized in planned birth surgery and proved to be able to use narcotic drugs properly are also entitled to prescribe narcotic drugs in the course of an operation.

Medical units are authorized to refuse an abuser’s illegal demand of narcotic drugs, any case of abuse should be reported to the local health authority timely.

Article 26 In each prescription of narcotic drugs, the quantity of injection prescribed should not exceed two usual daily doses; the quantity of tablets, tincture or syrup should not exceed three usual daily doses. Narcotic drugs should not be used continuously for a period longer than seven days. Prescriptions should be written neatly and distinctly and signed by the prescriber. The dispensing should be checked carefully, both the dispenser and the person who has checked the dispensing should put down their signature. All prescriptions should be registered. Medical personnel should not prescribe narcotic drugs for themselves.

Article 29 Narcotic drugs needed in case of emergency should be supplied immediately, but the quantity is limited to one single dose, formalities can be completed afterwards.

Article 27 Health authorities above the county level may issue a “Narcotic Drug Demanding Card” to a very ill patient if, according to the diagnosis, the use of narcotic drug is justifiable, the patient may then be supplied with narcotic drugs by the designated medical unit. As a result of increased consumption of narcotic drugs by patients holding “Narcotic Drug Demanding Card”, the quarterly supply of narcotic drugs may be increased if it is insufficient to meet the demand by the approval of health authority at a higher level. Article 28 Medical units should strengthen the control of narcotic drugs. Illegal use, storage, transfer or lending of narcotic drug is prohibited. Special individual should be assigned to take care of narcotic drugs, cabinets used for the storage of narcotic drugs must be locked, special accounting book, prescription paper and register book should

Chapter VII—Punishment Article 30 In case of an offence against this Act, or if one of the following conducts has been committed, all of the narcotic drug and the illicit income should be confiscated by the local health authority, and depending on how serious the case is, a fine equivalent to 5–10 times of the illicit income may be imposed, or the activities of the enterprise may be suspended until it has been consolidated, or its “Drug Manufacturer Certificate”, “Drug Handler Certificate” or “Drug Dispensing Certificate” shall be revoked: (1) Carry out the production of narcotic drugs without authorization or alter the plan of production so as to increase the variety of narcotic products; (2) Carry out the handling of narcotic drugs and opium poppy shells without authorization; (3) Carry out the supply of narcotic drugs to an unqualified unit or individual, or the quantity supplied exceeds the normal limit; (4) Carry out the dispensing and sale of narcotic preparations without authorization; (5) Carry out the importation or exportation of narcotic drugs without authorization; (6) Arrange the clinical trial of a new narcotic drug without authorization or carry out the production of a new narcotic drug without approval.

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Article 31 An administrative penalty should be imposed on the person directly responsible for the issue of an illegal prescription for other person or for oneself to gain access of narcotic drugs for abusing. Article 32 Illicit cultivation of opium poppy and dope taking should be punished pursuant to the relevant regulation stipulated by the public security institution. Article 33 Penal liability should be sought in case a crime is committed due to the illicit manufacture, trafficking or vending of narcotic drugs or opium poppy shells. Article 34 Any objection to the decision of an administrative penalty should be referred, within a period of 15 days counting from the date of notification of the penalty, to the institution at a higher level than the one who has made such a decision. The institution at a higher level should respond to the appeal within a period of 10 days counting from the date of receipt of the appeal. Any objection to the response should be referred to the People’s Court within a period of 15 days counting from the date of receipt of the response. In case the decision has not been enforced and the time limit for an appeal has elapsed, the People’s Court shall order its compulsory execution at the request of the institution that has made such a decision.

20. The Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law of Iran

ated a body called Headquarters, with the president as chairperson with full executive and judicial powers. The punishment for the offender was very severe. Apart from the usual fine or imprisonment, the guilty person could get thirty to seventy lashes for a second offense. For a fourth offense, the death sentence would be carried out either in public or on the premises of the offender’s house. Source United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/legal_library/ir/legal _library_1991-02-28_1991-3.html.

Article 1 The following acts are considered as crimes and the perpetrator shall be sentenced to the punishments prescribed hereunder. 1. Cultivating poppies, absolutely, and cannabis for the purpose of production of narcotics. 2. Importing, exporting and producing any kind of narcotics. 3. Keeping, carrying, purchasing, distributing and selling narcotic drugs. 4. Setting up or running places for the use of drugs. 5. Using drugs in any form or manner except for cases provided for by law. 6. Causing to escape or giving protection to drug offenders and perpetrators who are under prosecution or have been arrested. 7. Destroying or concealing evidence of offenders’ crimes.

Article 2 Anybody who cultivates poppies or cannabis for the purpose of producing narcotic drugs shall be sentenced, in addition to his crop being destroyed, to the following punishments for each time according to the amount of his cultivation:

The Parliament of Iran enacted legislation on 1 July 1989 in an attempt to eliminate the narcotics trade. The cultivation of opium poppies and the selling, transport, import, and export of narcotics were prohibited by this antinarcotics drug law. Article 33 cre-

1. The first time, a fine in an amount up to ten million rials in cash. 2. Second time, a fine in the amount of five to fifty million rials in cash, plus 30 to 70 lashes.

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3. Third time, a fine in the amount of ten to one hundred million rials in cash, plus 1 to 70 lashes together with two to five years of imprisonment. 4. Fourth time, death penalty.

Note: In the event that it is proved that cultivation of poppy or cannabis has taken place under the instruction of the landlord(s) or the tenant or their legal Deputies, the instructor who was the cause (of the crime), if he is in a higher position than the agent, shall be sentenced to the punishments prescribed in this Article, and the agent who took the charge of cultivation shall be condemned to a fine in the amount of one to three million rials in cash and fifteen to forty lashes. Article 3 Anybody who stores, conceals, carries the seeds or capsules of poppy or flowering or fruiting top of cannabis shall be sentenced to a fine in the amount of one hundred thousand to three million rials in cash as well as to one to seventy lashes. In the case of flowering or fruiting top of cannabis the intention of producing narcotics from them must be established. Article 4 Anybody who smuggles in or out, produces, distributes, deals in or puts on sale bhang, Indian hemp juice, opium and opium juice or opium residue (Shireh) shall be sentenced to the following punishments, taking into account the quantity of said materials: 1. Up to 50 grams, a fine in the amount of up to five hundred thousand rials in cash, plus up to fifty lashes. 2. More than fifty grams up to five hundred grams, a fine in the amount of four million to ten million rials in cash, plus twenty to seventy four lashes and one to five years of imprisonment. 3. More than five hundred grams to five kilograms, a fine in the amount of ten to forty million rials in cash, plus fifty to seventy four lashes and three to fifteen years of imprisonment.

4. More than five kilograms, death penalty and confiscation of property, excepting the provision of the normal living costs for the family of the convicted.

Note: If it is established that the perpetrator of the crime under paragraph 4 of this Article has committed the crime for the first time and has not succeeded in distributing or selling narcotic drugs he shall be sentenced to life imprisonment plus seventy four lashes and confiscation of property, excepting the provision of the normal living cost for his family. Article 5 Anyone who keeps, conceals, carries opium and other drugs mentioned in Article 4 shall be sentenced to the following punishments, taking into consideration the quantity of the drugs. 1. Up to fifty grams, a fine in the amount of up to two hundred rials in cash, plus up to thirty lashes. 2. More than fifty grams up to five hundred grams, a fine in the amount of three to seven million rials in cash, plus up to sixty lashes and six months to three years of imprisonment. 3. More than five hundred grams up to five kilograms, a fine in the amount of seven million to thirty million rials in cash plus forty to seventy four lashes and two to ten years of imprisonment. 4. More than five kilograms, a fine in the amount of thirty to fifty million rials in cash, plus ten to twenty five years of imprisonment, and in the event of recidivism, death penalty and confiscation of property, excepting the provision of the normal living cost for his family.

Article 6 The punishment of the perpetrator of the crimes mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the Articles 4 and 5 shall be increased for the second time to one and a half of the punishments set forth in each paragraph, and for the third time to twice as much as the punishments prescribed in each paragraph and in subsequent instances two and a half, three, three and a half . . . times as much as the punishments provided for in each paragraph.

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The punishment of whipping for the second time onwards shall be seventy four lashes at the maximum.

4. More than four grams up to fifteen grams, a fine in the amount of ten to twenty million rials in cash, plus three to eight years of imprisonment, and thirty to seventy four lashes. 5. More than fifteen up to thirty grams, a fine in the amount of twenty million to thirty million rials in cash, plus ten to fifteen years of imprisonment, and thirty to seventy four lashes. 6. More than thirty grams, death penalty and confiscation of property, excepting the provision of the normal living cost for the family of the convicted.

In the instances mentioned above, if as a consequence of recidivism of the crime the total of the narcotic drugs amounts to more than five kilograms, the perpetrator of the crime being a corruptor on earth, shall be sentenced to death penalty. The execution, should it be deemed appropriate, shall be carried out in the place of residence of the convicted and in public. Article 7 In case the perpetrator of the crimes mentioned in Articles 4 and 5 is an employee of the Government, Governmental companies, or Government affiliated agencies, organizations and companies, and he is not, according to employment laws, subject to dismissal from Government services, he shall be sentenced, for the first time to six months, for the second time to one year of dismissal from Government services, and for the third time to permanent expulsion. Article 8 Anyone who imports, produces, distributes, exports, deals in, puts on sale, keeps or stores, conceals and carries (or transports) heroin, morphine, codeine, methadone and other chemical derivatives of morphine, cocaine and also chemical extract of hashish or hashish oil, shall be sentenced to the following punishments, taking into account the amount of said drugs: 1. Up to five centigrams, a fine in the amount of two hundred up to five hundred thousand rials in cash, plus twenty to fifty lashes. 2. More than five centigrams up to one gram, a fine in the amount of one million to three million rials cash, plus thirty to seventy lashes. 3. More than one gram to four grams, a fine in the amount of four million to ten million rials in cash, plus two to five years of imprisonment, and thirty to seventy lashes.

Note 1

If it is established that the perpetrator of the crime under paragraph 6 of this Article has committed it for the first time and has not succeeded in distributing or selling the drugs the court shall sentence him to life imprisonment with seventy four lashes, and confiscation of his property, excepting the provision of the normal cost of living for his family. Note 2

In all the above cases, if the accused is an employee of the Government or Governmental companies or Government-affiliated companies and establishments, he shall be sentenced, in addition to the punishments mentioned in this Article, to permanent dismissal from government services. Article 9 The punishment of the perpetrator of the crimes set forth at paragraphs 1 to 5 of the Article 8 shall be for the second time one and a half of and for the third time twice as much as the punishment mentioned in each paragraph. The punishment of whipping for the second time onwards shall be seventy four lashes at the maximum. In the fourth time if the total of the narcotics as a result of repetition reaches thirty grams, the offender is considered as corruptor on earth and shall be sentenced to death penalty.

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The death sentence, if deemed appropriate, shall be carried out on the premises of his residence and in public. In case the total of the narcotics in the fourth time as a result of repetition does not reach thirty grams, the offender shall be condemned to a fine in the amount of twenty to thirty million rials in cash, with ten to fifteen years of imprisonment, plus thirty to seventy four lashes. Article 10 Drug addicts mentioned in Article 8 who carries or keep up to one gram of such drugs shall not be condemned to the punishments set forth in Articles 8 and 9. Article 11 The punishment of armed smuggling of narcotic drugs, subject matter of this Act, shall be death penalty, and the death sentence, if deemed appropriate, shall be carried out on the premises of the offender and in public. Article 12 Anyone who smuggles narcotic drugs into prisons, barracks, or rehabilitation centers for addicts, he shall be sentenced, as the case may be, to the maximum punishments mentioned in Articles 4 to 9, and in case the offender is a Government employee, he shall also be condemned to permanent expulsion from Government services. In the event that as a consequence of negligence or omission of the persons in charge, narcotic drugs are smuggled into such centers, the failing officers shall be sentenced, as the case may be, to the punishment of: a) Demotion; b) Temporary dismissal; c) Permanent dismissal.

Article 13 Anybody who uses his industrial, commercial service and residential units for storing, producing and residential units for storing, producing and

distributing narcotic drugs or make them available to others for such purposes, and also when the proprietor’s representative commits such acts on his permission or knowledge, the respective permit for and approval in principle concerning the operation of industrial units or the business license of the service and commercial unit shall be cancelled, and the unit(s) mentioned in this Article shall be confiscated in favor of the Government. Article 14 Anybody who establishes or runs a place for the use of narcotic drugs, he shall be sentenced to a fine in cash in an amount of five hundred thousand to one million rials, plus one to four years of imprisonment together with permanent removal from Government services. The punishment for recidivism of this offense shall be two to four times as much as the first one. Note: If the place mentioned in this Article is producing commercial or service units, in addition to the punishment provided in this Article, the approval in principle concerning and the permit for operation of the producing unit and also the business license of the service and commercial unit shall be suspended for the period of one year, and in case of recidivism of the crime the unit shall be confiscated in favor of the Government. Article 15 As of the date of the entry into force of this Act: a) All drug addicts mentioned in Article 8 are required to give up addiction within six months, and the (Anti-Drug Campaign) headquarters has the duty to take action, from the same date and in accordance to its plans and with due regard to priorities, with respect to introducing such drug addicts to rehabilitation centers. b) All the drug addicts referred to in Article 4 whose ages are under sixty are required to give up their addiction within six months. If after expiration of the prescribed deadline they have failed to do so, the public prosecutor shall send them to rehabili-

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tation centers, and such addicts shall remain in said centers until they get rid of their addiction. The implementation of this project and the respective programming shall be the duty of the head-quarters.

Article 16 After the expiry of the time limit provided in the above Article, the drug addicts referred to in the Article 8 shall be sentenced to the following punishments: 1. The first time, a fine in cash in the amount of five hundred thousand up to one million rials with four to twelve months of imprisonment. 2. The second time, a cash fine in the amount of one million to four million rials and one to three years of imprisonment. And if the offender is a Government employee, in addition to the cash fine and the imprisonment, he shall be permanently dismissed from Government offices. 3. The third time onwards, the punishment prescribed in paragraph 2 shall be two to four-fold, plus fifty lashes.

Article 17 The punishment of the drug addicts referred to in Article 4, subject of paragraph (b), Article 15, who after their treatment in rehabilitation centers resume their addiction shall be as follows: 1. The first time, a cash fine in the amount of five hundred thousand to one million rials, plus four to twelve months of imprisonment. 2. The second time, a cash fine in the amount of one million to four million rials with one to three years of imprisonment plus permanent dismissal from Government services. 3. The third time, the punishment stipulated in paragraph 2 shall be two to four-fold, plus fifty lashes.

Article 18 If it is established that a person has intentionally caused another person to be addicted to the drugs mentioned in Article 8, he shall be sentenced for the first time to five to ten years, and for the second time to ten to twenty years of

imprisonment, and in case of repetition to death penalty. Note 1

In the event that the offender is an employee of the Government, or Government affiliated companies and organizations, he shall be at the very first time also sentenced, in addition to the punishment of imprisonment, to permanent dismissal from Government services. Note 2

In the event that the offender causes members of his family, school, university students or the personnel of the disciplinary or Armed Forces to get addicted, he shall be sentenced for the first time to ten to twenty years of imprisonment and permanent dismissal from government services and for the second time to death penalty. Article 19 Non-addicts who use the narcotic drugs referred to in Article 4, shall be sentenced, proportionately, to ten to seventy four lashes or a fine of five thousand to thirty seven thousand rials, and the non-addicts who use the drugs mentioned in Article B, shall be condemned to twenty to seventy four lashes or a fine of ten thousand to thirty seven thousand rials. Article 20 Anybody who produces equipment and instrument for the use or production of narcotic drugs shall be sentenced to pay a fine of five times as much as the value of the equipment and tools or to five to twenty lashes. Article 21 Anybody, who gives protection to or causes to escape an offender subject of this Act, who is under prosecution or cooperates in securing protection for him or in causing him to escape, shall be sentenced to one-fifth to one half of the punishment of the crime, the perpetrator of which he has caused to escape or to whom he has given protection, unless he has had no ill intention in this

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connection. In the case of life imprisonment and death penalty, the offender shall be sentenced to four to ten years and ten to fifteen years of imprisonment, respectively. Note: In case the offender is a member of the disciplinary personnel, a prison guards or a member of the judiciary, in addition to the aforementioned punishment, he shall be subjected to permanent dismissal from Government services. Article 22 Anybody who extends protection or causes to escape an offender under this Act, in the process of arrest or after having been arrested, or gives protection to or causes to escape an offender subject of this Act or cooperates in this, shall be sentenced to one half of the punishment of the convicted or that of the principal offender. In the case of life imprisonment and death penalty, the accused shall be condemned to ten to twenty years of imprisonment respectively. Note 1

If the perpetrator of the offence is a member of the disciplinary or security forces or a prison guards or a member of the judiciary, he shall be sentenced to the punishment of the convicted or that of the principal offender as well as to permanent dismissal from government functions; except for the death penalty, in case the punishment shall be consisted of twenty five years of prison and permanent dismissal from Government services. Note 2

If the perpetrator of the crimes subject of this Act, who is not yet under prosecution, escapes or is given protection, the provider of protection or the person who has caused the offender to escape shall be condemned to one tenth to one fifth of the punishment of the principal offender. In case of life imprisonment and death penalty, the offender shall be sentenced to two to four years

and four to eight years of imprisonment respectively. Article 23 Anybody who intentionally destroys or conceals evidence of narcotic crimes shall be sentenced to one fifth to one half of the punishment of the principal offender. In case of life imprisonment the perpetrator of the crime shall be condemned to four to ten years of imprisonment, and in case of death penalty, he shall have to face eight to twenty years of imprisonment. Article 24 Any member of village Islamic Councils has as his duty, as soon as he learns of cultivation of poppies or cannabis in the rural area, to notify the matter in writing to the alderman and the closest Gendarmerie outpost or the Islamic Revolution Committee Corps. The heads of the outpost or of the committee are required to report, immediately and simultaneously, to their higher authorities in the country, province and state, and to be present, together with the alderman, district officer or the representative of the village Islamic Council, at the premises of the cultivation and destroy it and to draw up a process-verbal to be forwarded, along with the accused, to competent judicial authorities. Note: If the cultivation of poppies or cannabis is discovered in urban areas, the members of the municipality, the police, the committee or the Bassij members are required, as soon as they learn of the matter, to report it to the nearest Police station, the Committee or the Bassij outpost, and the concerned authorities shall take action together with the public Prosecutor’s representative, in accordance with the provisions of this Article. Article 25 If the persons referred to in Article 24 and the Note thereto refuse or fail, without any justifiable cause, to fulfill their duties, they shall be

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condemned for the first time to six months to one year of expulsion from Government functions, and for the second time, to permanent dismissal from Government services. Members of Islamic Councils also shall be, for the first time, for a period of six months up to one year, and for the second time, permanently divested of their membership of the Islamic Councils. Article 26 Whoever places, in an attempt to accuse another person, narcotic drugs and the tools and equipments of their use in a locality, shall be sentenced to the maximum punishment attaching to the same offence. Article 27 Anybody who, in an attempt to prosecute before judicial authorities intentionally, accuses another person, of any of the offences subject of this Act, shall be sentenced to twenty to seventy four lashes. Article 28 Any property earned through smuggling shall be confiscated by the Government. Article 29 The fines and other funds received through the enforcement of this Act shall be imbursed into a centralized account that will be opened with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance. Such funds shall be expended by approval of the Headquarters mentioned in Article 33 and the endorsement of the president. Article 30 Any vehicle transporting narcotic drugs shall be confiscated in favor of the Government, which shall be utilized by the approval of the Headquarters referred to in Article 33 and the endorsement of the president except for cases in which the transport of drugs has been affected without the knowledge or permission of the vehicle owner.

In the event that the driver allows, with or without the knowledge and permission of the owner, making false compartment for transportation of narcotic drugs, he shall be condemned, as the case may be, to one tenth to one half of the punishment of the principal offender, and in case of life imprisonment and death penalty, he shall be sentenced, respectively, to two to ten years, and four to twenty years of imprisonment; in addition, his driving license shall be withdrawn for a period of one to ten years; and in the event that during the transportation of the drugs the driver held no driving license, he shall also be sentenced, in addition to the above-mentioned punishment of driving without a license. In case of repetition of this offence drivers shall be deprived permanently of their licenses. Article 31 The accused who are not in a position to pay the entire or part of the cash fine under a sentence, shall have to be detained, ten days in exchange of each thousand toman, in half-covered or uncovered prisons in occupational training centers. If during their stay in such centers, the behavior of the convicted is satisfactory, at the discretion of the center’s authorities such stay shall be reduced to three days in exchange of each thousand toman. Article 32 The death sentences issued by virtue of this Act shall be final and enforceable after the endorsement of the Chairman of the Supreme Court or the Prosecutor General. In other cases, should the sentence be deemed probable, by the Chairman of the Supreme Court or the Prosecutor General, to contravene the law or the religious canon, or that the judge who pronounced the sentence is not competent, the Chairman of the Supreme Court or the Prosecutor General will be entitled to revise or quash the sentence; however, the existence of such entitlement shall not bar the sentence from being final and enforceable.

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Article 32 bis1 Should the chairman of the Supreme Court confirm the competence of the judges, prosecutors and the heads of the public prosecutors’ offices, they shall be entitled to pronounce sentences for the crimes referred to in Articles 16 and 17. Article 33 In order to fight against smuggling narcotic drugs, of any kind, and their production, trafficking and use, as well as other instances mentioned in the present Act, a headquarters, presided over by the president,2 shall be established, where all the related executive and juridical operations shall be centered. The members of this headquarters shall be consisted of the followings: 1. The president, who will act as the Chairman of the Headquarters. 2. The Prosecutor General 3. The Minister of Interior. 4. The Minister of Information. 5. The Minister of Health & Medical Education. 6. The Managing Director of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IPIB). 7. The Commander-In-Chief of the Islamic Revolution Committee Corps. 8. The Tehran Head of the Court and the Public Prosecutor’s office for Anti-Drug Campaign. 9. The Head of the Organization of Prisons and Penitentiaries. 10. The Minister of Education.3

Note: During the membership period of the Head of the Court and the Public Prosecutor’s office for Anti-Drug Campaign in the Headquarters, he will act independently.

1

Amended the “anti-narcotic Drugs law” approved in the Meeting of 1 July 1989 of the High Council of Distinguish. 2 Amended in the Meeting of 1 July 1989 of the High Council of Distinguish in conformity with the amendments of the constitutional law. 3 Amended in the Meeting of 1 July 1989 of the High Council of Distinguish.

Article 34 The Headquarters has the duty to have, within two months as the date of their notification, approved by the Headquarters the executive, financial, employment and by-laws as well as the organization and the job description of the Headquarters and its respective units, and to commence the enforcement of this Act. Article 35 Once this Act entered into force, the enforcement of all the laws inconsistent therewith shall be stopped, and the Headquarters shall exclusively carry out the Anti-Drug Campaign. Note: The proposal for the elimination of the Article 35 has been presented by the Anti-Drug Campaign Headquarters to the High Council of Distinguish.

21. United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances The increase in the production and demand for narcotics poses a serious danger to the welfare and health of humankind and has become an international security concern. Drug-related money laundering has also been one of the major organized criminal activities that helps finance terrorism. The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was a major step toward combating the global abuse of drugs. The member countries signed the convention in Vienna on 20 December 1988. Article 2 stipulated that the members would cooperate with each other and take necessary steps to check drug trafficking. The cultivation, production, manufacture, transport, import, and export of narcotics and psychotropic substances was criminalized. The property of the offender would be confiscated as per Article 5. The crime committed was included as an extraditable offense.

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Source United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf.

Final Act of the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Article 1 Definitions Except where otherwise expressly indicated or where the context otherwise requires, the following definitions shall apply throughout this Convention: a) “Board” means the International Narcotics Control Board established by the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and that Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961; b) “Cannabis plant” means any plant of the genus Cannabis; c) “Coca bush” means the plant of any species of the genus Erythroxylon; d) “Commercial carrier” means any person or any public, private or other entity engaged in transporting persons, goods or mails for remuneration, hire or any other benefit; e) “Commission” means the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations; f) “Confiscation”, which includes forfeiture where applicable, means the permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority; g) “Controlled delivery” means the technique of allowing illicit or suspect consignments of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, substances in Table I and Table II annexed to this Convention, or substances substituted for them, to pass out of, through or into the territory of one or more countries, with the knowledge and under the supervision of their competent authorities, with a view to

identifying persons involved in the commission of offences established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1 of the Convention; h) “1961 Convention” means the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961; i) “1961 Convention as amended” means the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961; j) “1971 Convention” means the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971; k) “Council” means the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations; l) “Freezing” or “seizure” means temporarily prohibiting the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of property or temporarily assuming custody or control of property on the basis of an order issued by a court or a competent authority; m) “Illicit traffic” means the offences set forth in article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2, of this Convention; n) “Narcotic drug” means any of the substances, natural or synthetic, in Schedules I and II of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and that Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961; o) “Opium poppy” means the plant of the species Papaver somniferum L; p) “Proceeds” means any property derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1; q) “Property” means assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets; r) “Psychotropic substance” means any substance, natural or synthetic, or any natural material in Schedules I, II, III and IV of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971; s) “Secretary-General” means the Secretary-General of the United Nations; t) “Table I” and “Table II” mean the correspondingly numbered lists of substances annexed to this

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Convention, as amended from time to time in accordance with article 12, u) “Transit State” means a State through the territory of which illicit narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and substances in Table I and Table II are being moved, which is neither the place of origin nor the place of ultimate destination thereof.

Article 2 Scope of the Convention 1. The purpose of this Convention is to promote co-operation among the Parties so that they may address more effectively the various aspects of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances having an international dimension. In carrying out their obligations under the Convention, the Parties shall take necessary measures, including legislative and administrative measures, in conformity with the fundamental provisions of their respective domestic legislative systems. 2. The Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States. 3. A Party shall not undertake in the territory of another Party the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other Party by its domestic law. Article 3 Offences and Sanctions 1. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally: a) i) The production, manufacture, extraction; preparation, offering, offering for sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever,

brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation or exportation of any narcotic drug or any psychotropic substance contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 Convention; ii) The cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant for the purpose of the production of narcotic drugs contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention and the 1961 Convention as amended; iii) The possession or purchase of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance for the purpose of any of the activities enumerated in i) above; iv) The manufacture, transport or distribution of equipment, materials or of substances listed in Table I and Table II, knowing that they are to be used in or for the illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances; v) The organization, management or financing of any of the offences enumerated in i), ii), iii) or iv) above; b) i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from any offence or offences established in accordance with subparagraph a) of this paragraph, or from an act of participation in such offence or offences, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an offence or offences to evade the legal consequences of his actions; ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from an offence or offences established in accordance with subparagraph a) of this paragraph or from an act of participation in such an offence or offences; c) Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system: i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property was derived from an offence or offences

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established in accordance with subparagraph a) of this paragraph or from an act of participation in such offence or offences; ii) The possession of equipment or materials or substances listed in Table I and Table II, knowing that they are being or are to be used in or for the illicit cultivation, production or iii) Publicly inciting or inducing others, by any means, to commit any of the offences established in accordance with this article or to use narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances illicitly; iv) Participation in, association or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with this article.

2. Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system, each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances for personal consumption contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 Convention.

ment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation or social reintegration. c) Notwithstanding the preceding subparagraphs, in appropriate cases of a minor nature, the Parties may provide, as alternatives to conviction or punishment, measures such as education, rehabilitation or social reintegration, as well as, when the offender is a drug abuser, treatment and aftercare. d) The Parties may provide, either as an alternative to conviction or punishment, or in addition to conviction or punishment of an offence established in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, measures for the treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation or social reintegration of the offender.

5. The Parties shall ensure that their courts and other competent authorities having jurisdiction can take into account factual circumstances which make the commission of the offences established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article particularly serious, such as: a) The involvement in the offence of an organized criminal group to which the offender belongs; b) The involvement of the offender in other international organized criminal activities; c) The involvement of the offender in other illegal activities facilitated by commission of the offence; d) The use of violence or arms by the offender; e) The fact that the offender holds a public office and that the offence is connected with the office in question; f) The victimization or use of minors; g) The fact that the offence is committed in a penal institution or in an educational institution or social service facility or in their immediate vicinity or in other places to which school children and students resort for educational, sports and social activities; h) Prior conviction, particularly for similar offences, whether foreign or domestic, to the extent permitted under the domestic law of a Party.

3. Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of an offence set forth in paragraph 1 of this article may be inferred from objective factual circumstances. 4. a) Each Party shall make the commission of the offences established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article liable to sanctions which take into account the grave nature of these offences, such as imprisonment or other forms of deprivation of liberty, pecuniary sanctions and confiscation. b) The Parties may provide, in addition to conviction or punishment, for an offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article, that the offender shall undergo measures such as treat-

6. The Parties shall endeavour to ensure that any discretionary legal powers under their domestic law relating to the prosecution of persons for

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offences established in accordance with this article are exercised to maximize the effectiveness of law enforcement measures in respect of those offences, and with due regard to the need to deter the commission of such offences. 7. The Parties shall ensure that their courts or other competent authorities bear in mind the serious nature of the offences enumerated in paragraph 1 of this article and the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 5 of this article when considering the eventuality of early release or parole of persons convicted of such offences. 8. Each Party shall, where appropriate, establish under its domestic law a long statute of limitations period in which to commence proceedings for any offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article, and a longer period where the alleged offender has evaded the administration of justice. 9. Each Party shall take appropriate measures, consistent with its legal system, to ensure that a person charged with or convicted of an offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article, who is found within its territory, is present at the necessary criminal proceedings. 10. For the purpose of co-operation among the Parties under this Convention, including, in particular, co-operation under articles 5, 6, 7 and 9, offences established in accordance with this article shall not be considered as fiscal offences or as political offences or regarded as politically motivated, without prejudice to the constitutional limitations and the fundamental domestic law of the Parties. 11. Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the description of the offences to which it refers and of legal defences thereto is reserved to the domestic law of a Party and that such offences shall be prosecuted and punished in conformity with that law.

Article 4 Jurisdiction 1. Each Party: a) Shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences it has established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, when: i) The offence is committed in its territory; ii) The offence is committed on board a vessel flying its flag or an aircraft which is registered under its laws at the time the offence is committed; b) May take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences it has established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, when: i) The offence is committed by one of its nationals or by a person who has his habitual residence in its territory; ii) The offence is committed on board a vessel concerning which that Party has been authorized to take appropriate action pursuant to article 17, provided that such jurisdiction shall be exercised only on the basis of agreements or arrangements referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9 of that article; iii) The offence is one of those established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, subparagraph c) iv), and is committed outside its territory with a view to the commission, within its territory, of an offence established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1.

2. Each Party: a) Shall also take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences it has established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, when the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him to another Party on the ground: i) That the offence has been committed in its territory or on board a vessel flying its flag or an

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aircraft which was registered under its law at the time the offence was committed; or ii) That the offence has been committed by one of its nationals; b) May also take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences it has established in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1, when the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him to another Party.

3. This Convention does not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by a Party in accordance with its domestic law.

Secretary-General, together with all supplementary information which may assist the Board in establishing an assessment and the Commission in reaching a decision. 4. If the Board, taking into account the extent, importance and diversity of the licit use of the substance, and the possibility and ease of using alternate substances both for licit purposes and for the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, finds: a) That the substance is frequently used in the illicit manufacture of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance; b) That the volume and extent of the illicit manufacture of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance creates serious public health or social problems, so as to warrant international action, it shall communicate to the Commission an assessment of the substance, including the likely effect of adding the substance to either Table I or Table II on both licit use and illicit manufacture, together with recommendations of monitoring measures, if any, that would be appropriate in the light of its assessment.

[. . .] Article 12 Substances Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances 1. The Parties shall take the measures they deem appropriate to prevent diversion of substances in Table I and Table II used for the purpose of illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, and shall co-operate with one another to this end. 2. If a Party or the Board has information which in its opinion may require the inclusion of a substance in Table I or Table II, it shall notify the SecretaryGeneral and furnish him with the information in support of that notification. The procedure described in paragraphs 2 to 7 of this article shall also apply when a Party or the Board has information justifying the deletion of a substance from Table I or Table II, or the transfer of a substance from one Table to the other. 3. The Secretary-General shall transmit such notification, and any information which he considers relevant, to the Parties, to the Commission, and, where notification is made by a Party, to the Board. The Parties shall communicate their comments concerning the notification to the

5. The Commission, taking into account the comments submitted by the Parties and the comments and recommendations of the Board, whose assessment shall be determinative as to scientific matters, and also taking into due consideration any other relevant factors, may decide by a two-thirds majority of its members to place a substance in Table I or Table II. 6. Any decision of the Commission taken pursuant to this article shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to all States and other entities which are, or which are entitled to become, Parties to this Convention, and to the Board. Such decision shall become fully effective with respect to each Party one hundred and eighty days after the date of such communication. 7. a) The decisions of the Commission taken under this article shall be subject to review by the Council

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upon the request of any Party filed within one hundred and eighty days after the date of notification of the decision. The request for review shall be sent to the Secretary-General, together with all relevant information upon which the request for review is based. b) The Secretary-General shall transmit copies of the request for review and the relevant information to the Commission, to the Board and to all the Parties, inviting them to submit their comments within ninety days. All comments received shall be submitted to the Council for consideration. c) The Council may confirm or reverse the decision of the Commission. Notification of the Council’s decision shall be transmitted to all States and other entities which are, or which are entitled to become, Parties to this Convention, to the Commission and to the Board. 8. a) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in paragraph 1 of this article and the provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended and the 1971 Convention, the Parties shall take the measures they deem appropriate to monitor the manufacture and distribution of substances in Table I and Table II which are carried out within their territory. b) To this end, the Parties may: i) Control all persons and enterprises engaged in the manufacture and distribution of such substances; ii) Control under licence the establishment and premises in which such manufacture or distribution may take place; ii) Require that licensees obtain a permit for conducting the aforesaid operations; iv) Prevent the accumulation of such substances in the possession of manufacturers and distributors, in excess of the quantities required for the normal conduct of business and the prevailing market conditions.

9. Each Party shall, with respect to substances in Table I and Table II, take the following measures:

a) Establish and maintain a system to monitor international trade in substances in Table I and Table II in order to facilitate the identification of suspicious transactions. Such monitoring systems shall be applied in close co-operation with manufacturers, importers, exporters, wholesalers and retailers, who shall inform the competent authorities of suspicious orders and transactions. b) Provide for the seizure of any substance in Table I or Table II if there is sufficient evidence that it is for use in the illicit manufacture of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance. c) Notify, as soon as possible, the competent authorities and services of the Parties concerned if there is reason to believe that the import, export or transit of a substance in Table I or Table II is destined for the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, including in particular information about the means of payment and any other essential elements which led to that belief. d) Require that imports and exports be properly labelled and documented. Commercial documents such as invoices, cargo manifests, customs, transport and other shipping documents shall include the names, as stated in Table I or Table II, of the substances being imported or exported, the quantity being imported or exported, and the name and address of the exporter, the importer and, when available, the consignee. e) Ensure that documents referred to in subparagraph d) of this paragraph are maintained for a period of not less than two years and may be made available for inspection by the competent authorities. 10. a) In addition to the provisions of paragraph 9, and upon request to the Secretary-General by the interested Party, each Party from whose territory a substance in Table I is to be exported shall ensure that, prior to such export, the following information is supplied by its competent authorities to the competent authorities of the importing country: i) Name and address of the exporter and importer and, when available, the consignee; ii) Name of the substance in Table I;

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iii) Quantity of the substance to be exported; iv) Expected point of entry and expected date of dispatch; v) Any other information which is mutually agreed upon by the Parties. b) A Party may adopt more strict or severe measures of control than those provided by this paragraph if, in its opinion, such measures are desirable or necessary.

Article 13 Materials and Equipment The Parties shall take such measures as they deem appropriate to prevent trade in and the diversion of materials and equipment for illicit production or manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and shall co-operate to this end. Article 14

11. Where a Party furnishes information to another Party in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10 of this article, the Party furnishing such information may require that the Party receiving it keep confidential any trade, business, commercial or professional secret or trade process. 12. Each Party shall furnish annually to the Board, in the form and manner provided for by it and on forms made available by it, information on: a) The amounts seized of substances in Table I and Table II and, when known, their origin; b) Any substance not included in Table I or Table II which is identified as having been used in illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, and which is deemed by the Party to be sufficiently significant to be brought to the attention of the Board; c) Methods of diversion and illicit manufacture.

13. The Board shall report annually to the Commission on the implementation of this article and the Commission shall periodically review the adequacy and propriety of Table I and Table II. 14. The provisions of this article shall not apply to pharmaceutical preparations, nor to other preparations containing substances in Table I or Table II that are compounded in such a way that such substances cannot be easily used or recovered by readily applicable means.

Measures to Eradicate Illicit Cultivation of Narcotic Plants and to Eliminate Illicit Demand for Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1. Any measures taken pursuant to this Convention by Parties shall not be less stringent than the provisions applicable to the eradication of illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotic and psychotropic substances and to the elimination of illicit demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances under the provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended and the 1971 Convention. 2. Each Party shall take appropriate measures to prevent illicit cultivation of and to eradicate plants containing narcotic or psychotropic substances, such as opium poppy, coca bush and cannabis plants, cultivated illicitly in its territory. The measures adopted shall respect fundamental human rights and shall take due account of traditional licit uses, where there is historic evidence of such use, as well as the protection of the environment. 3. a) The Parties may co-operate to increase the effectiveness of eradication efforts. Such cooperation may, inter alia, include support, when appropriate, for integrated rural development leading to economically viable alternatives to illicit cultivation. Factors such as access to markets, the availability of resources and prevailing socioeconomic conditions should be taken into account before such rural development programmes are

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implemented. The Parties may agree on any other appropriate measures of co-operation. b) The Parties shall also facilitate the exchange of scientific and technical information and the conduct of research concerning eradication. c) Whenever they have common frontiers, the Parties shall seek to co-operate in eradication programmes in their respective areas along those frontiers.

4. The Parties shall adopt appropriate measures aimed at eliminating or reducing illicit demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, with a view to reducing human suffering and eliminating financial incentives for illicit traffic. These measures may be based, inter alia, on the recommendations of the United Nations, specialized agencies of the United Nations such as the World Health Organization, and other competent international organizations, and on the Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline adopted by the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, held in 1987, as it pertains to governmental and non-governmental agencies and private efforts in the fields of prevention, treatment and rehabilitation. The Parties may enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements aimed at eliminating or reducing illicit demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. 5. The Parties may also take necessary measures for early destruction or lawful disposal of the narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and substances in Table I and Table II which have been seized or confiscated and for the admissibility as evidence of duly certified necessary quantities of such substances.

22. ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime The ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime calls for expanded efforts to fight many types of organized criminal activity, including “terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, trafficking in persons and piracy.” It calls for regional mutual cooperation in information exchange and in the area of law enforcement and training to enhance the capabilities of member states to more effectively combat criminal and terrorist activities. Source Association of Southeast Asian Nations, http://www.aseansec.org/16134.htm.

A. Background (a) The Mandate for ASEAN Cooperation in Combating Transnational Crime One of the fundamental principles of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as enshrined in the Bangkok Declaration of 8 August 1967 was “strengthening the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations.” ASEAN policies, plans, strategies and activities revolve around this principle. Transnational crime has the potential of eroding this central belief thereby affecting the political, economic and social well being of ASEAN. In recognizing the detrimental effects of transnational crime, ASEAN countries have taken concerted efforts to combat such crime since early 1970s. ASEAN’s initial efforts in combating transnational crime were focused on drug abuse and drug trafficking, the prevalent crime then, which affected the growth and vitality of ASEAN. With globalization, technological advancement and greater mobility of people and resources across national borders, transnational crime has become increasingly pervasive, diversified and organized. The region has to deal with many new forms of

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organized crimes that transcend national borders and political sovereignty such as terrorism, new types of drug abuse and trafficking, innovative forms of money laundering activities, arms smuggling, trafficking in women and children and piracy. The resolve of ASEAN’s Leaders in fighting illicit drugs, the prevalent transnational crime then, can be traced to the Declaration of ASEAN Concord of 24 February 1976. The ASEAN Leaders, in that landmark document, called for the “intensification of cooperation among member states as well as with the relevant international bodies in the prevention and eradication of the abuse of narcotics and the illegal trafficking of drugs.” Since then, all the ASEAN Summits have expressed concerns on narcotics abuse and illegal drug trafficking in the region. At the Fifth ASEAN Summit in December 1995 in Bangkok, the Leaders decided that “ASEAN shall further enhance cooperative efforts against drug abuse and illicit trafficking with special emphasis being given to demand reduction programs and information exchange and dissemination, with the aim of creating a drug-free ASEAN.” With transnational crime expanding in scope and becoming more organized, ASEAN’s Leaders have called for a comprehensive and coordinated approach in combating crime at the regional level. At the First Informal Summit in November 1996, the ASEAN Leaders called upon the “relevant ASEAN bodies to study the possibility of regional cooperation on criminal matters, including extradition.” At the Second Informal Summit in December 1997, they “resolved to take firm and stern measures to combat transnational crimes such as drug trafficking, trafficking in women and children as well as other transnational crime.” The ASEAN Leaders also adopted the ASEAN Vision 2020 at the Second Informal Summit which, among others, envisioned the evolution of agreed rules of behavior and cooperative measures to deal

with problems that can be met only on a regional scale, including drug trafficking, trafficking in women and children and other transnational crimes. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers have also called for closer cooperation and coordinated actions on tackling transnational crime among ASEAN countries. At the 29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Jakarta in July 1996, the Foreign Ministers recognized the need to focus attention on such crimes as narcotics trafficking, economic crimes, including money laundering, environmental crimes and illegal migration. They “share(d) the view that the management of such transnational issues are urgently called for so that they would not affect the long-term viability of ASEAN and its individual member nations.” At the 30th AMM in Subang Jaya in July 1997, the Foreign Ministers “stressed the need for sustained cooperation in addressing transnational concerns including the fight against terrorism, trafficking of people, illicit drugs and arms, piracy and communicable diseases.” The Foreign Ministers, at the 31st AMM in Manila in July 1998 reiterated the need for enhancing regional efforts against transnational crimes, such as illicit drug trafficking, terrorism, money laundering, and trafficking in women and children. At the meeting, the Ministers also signed the Joint Declaration for a Drug-Free ASEAN to eradicate the production, processing, traffic and use of illicit drugs in Southeast Asia by the year 2020. The ASEAN Finance Ministers echoed the sentiments of the ASEAN Leaders and the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on illicit drug trafficking when they signed the ASEAN Agreement on Customs at their inaugural meeting on 1 March 1997 in Phuket. The agreement, which apart from enhancing ASEAN cooperation in customs activities and expediting the early realization of AFTA, aims to strengthen cooperation in combating trafficking in narcotics and psychotropic

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substances, and will facilitate joint efforts in antismuggling and customs control. (b) Other Significant Developments Recognizing the urgency to tackle transnational crime from the regional dimension, the Philippines hosted the inaugural Meeting of the ASEAN Ministers of Interior/Home Affairs on Transnational Crime on 20 December 1997 in Manila. Apart from presenting an opportunity for the Interior and Home Ministers to exchange views on the transnational crime situation in ASEAN, the meeting also reflected on the detrimental impact of such on the Member Countries and the need for enhanced regional cooperation in fighting the crime. The highlight of the meeting was the signing of the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime by the Ministers. The document reflected ASEAN’s resolve in dealing with transnational crime and its intention to work together with the international community in combating transnational crime. The Declaration also established the basic framework for regional cooperation on fighting transnational crime. Accordingly, the ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Transnational Crime was to convene once every two years to coordinate activities of relevant bodies such as the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD) and the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police (ASEANAPOL). The Senior Officials Meeting Transnational Crime was to meet at least once in a year to assist the Ministers in accomplishing their task. The Declaration also outlined the following initiatives for regional cooperation on tackling transnational crime: 1. Hold discussions with a view to signing mutual legal assistance agreements, bilateral treaties, memorandum of understanding or other arrangements among Member Countries; 2. Consider the establishment of an ASEAN Centre on Combating Transnational Crime (ACTC), which will coordinate regional efforts against

3.

4.

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transnational crime through intelligence sharing, harmonization of policies and coordination of operations; Convene a high-level ad-hoc Experts Group within one year to accomplish the following with the assistance of the ASEAN Secretariat: a. ASEAN Plan of Action on Transnational Crime, b. Institutional Framework for ASEAN Cooperation on Transnational Crime; and, c. Feasibility study on the establishment of ACTC Encourage Member Countries to consider assigning Police Attaches and/or Police Liaison Officers in each other’s capital in order to facilitate cooperation for tackling transnational crime; Encourage networking of the relevant national agencies or organizations in Member Countries dealing with transnational crime to further enhance information exchange and dissemination; Expand the scope of Member Countries’ efforts against transnational crime such as terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, traffic in person and piracy, and to request the ASEAN Secretary General to include these areas in the work programme of the ASEAN Secretariat. Explore ways by which the Member Countries can work closer with relevant agencies and organizations in Dialogue Partner countries, other countries and international organizations, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies, Colombo Plan Bureau, INTERPOL and such other agencies, to combat transnational crime; Cooperate and coordinate more closely with other ASEAN bodies such as the ASEAN Law Ministers and Attorneys-General, the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police, the ASEAN Finance Ministers, the Directors-General of Immigration and the Directors-General of Customs in the investigations, prosecution and rehabilitation of perpetrators of such crimes.

The ASEAN Member Countries also participated in the first Asian Regional Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime held on 23–25 March 1998 in Manila. The meeting was a follow-up to the Naples Political Declaration and Global Plan of Action

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Against Transnational Crime adopted at the World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime held in Italy in November 1994. The meeting culminated with the adoption of a Manila Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Transnational Crime. The declaration reflects the concerns of the participating countries, including ASEAN, on the increase and expansion of transnational crimes and outlines the approaches to be undertaken, both at the national and regional levels, in fighting transnational crime. B. Objectives (a) General Objectives The general objective of the Action Plan is to encourage ASEAN Member Countries to expand their efforts in combating transnational crime at the national and bilateral levels to the regional level. As espoused in the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime, the overall focus of ASEAN collaboration will be to strengthen regional commitment and capacity to combat transnational crimes which include terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, trafficking in persons and piracy. This is in recognition of the fact that tackling transnational crime requires a concerted regional effort in view of its global dimension and pervasive nature. Besides, such efforts will assist in complementing and contributing to the national and bilateral efforts undertaken by Member Countries in combating such crime. (b) Specific Objectives The specific objectives of the Plan of Action are to urge the ASEAN Member Countries to: 1. Develop a more cohesive, regional strategy aimed at preventing, controlling and neutralizing transnational crime;

2. Foster regional cooperation at the investigative, prosecutorial, and judicial level as well as the rehabilitation of perpetrators; 3. Enhance coordination among ASEAN bodies dealing with transnational crime; 4. Strengthen regional capacities and capabilities to deal with sophisticated nature of transnational crime; and 5. Develop sub-regional and regional treaties on cooperation in criminal justice, including mutual legal assistance and extradition.

C. Programme of Action/Priorities In order to achieve the general and specific objectives, ASEAN Member Countries arc encouraged to: Information Exchange

1. Improve the ASEANAPOL regional database so as to further facilitate sharing and analysis of critical intelligence information, such as wanted and arrested persons, “modus operandi”, syndicates, and maritime offences; 2. Establish a regional repository to compile summaries of national laws of ASEAN Member Countries pertaining to transnational crime; 3. Conduct typology studies to determine trends and “modus operandi” of transnational crime in the ASEAN region; 4. Maximize the use of modern telecommunications technology in facilitating the exchange of data on, among others, criminals, methodologies, arrests, legal documents, requests for assistance, and ensure its restricted transmission; 5. Identify relevant contact persons in the policy, legal, law enforcement, and academic institutions of ASEAN Member Countries, and facilitate networking and lateral coordination among persons and agencies with similar functions;

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Legal Matters

6. Work for the criminalization in ASEAN Member Countries of specific transnational crimes, such as illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, piracy, arms smuggling and trafficking in persons; 7. Ensure the harmonization of relevant national policies among ASEAN Member Countries; 8. Develop multilateral or bilateral legal arrangements to facilitate apprehension, investigation, prosecution, and extradition, exchange of witnesses, sharing of evidence, inquiry, seizure and forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime in order to enhance mutual legal and administrative assistance among ASEAN Member Countries; 9. Study the possibility of creating a regional programme on witness protection; 10. Coordinate with the ASEAN Senior Law Officials Meeting on the implementation of the ASEAN Legal Information Network System: 11. Strengthen the mechanisms for effective protection of the integrity of travel documents and government control of the ingress/egress of transnational criminal personalities; 12. Seek to ratify and support existing international treaties or agreements designed to combat transnational crime. Law Enforcement Matters

13. Appoint Police Attaché or Police Liaison Officers, whenever feasible, in the capitals of ASEAN Member Countries; 14. Develop programmes for joint tactical exercises and simulations;

15. Develop an exchange programme among ASEAN officials in the policy, legal, law enforcement and academic fields; 16. Implement measures to ensure the protection of judges, prosecutors, witnesses, and law enforcement officials and personnel from retaliation by transnational criminal organizations; 17. Enhance cooperation and coordination in law enforcement, intelligence sharing, and in preventing the illegal trafficking and use of explosives, firearms, and other deadly weapons, as well as nuclear, chemical and biological materials. Training

18. Develop regional training programmes, and conduct regular conferences to enhance existing capabilities in investigation, intelligence, surveillance, detection and monitoring, and reporting. 19. Exchange “best practices” of relevant institutions in ASEAN Member Countries involved in the combat against transnational crime, including transfer of technologies. Institutional Capacity-Building

20. Establish the ASEAN Centre for Combating Transnational Crime (ACTC). 21. Rationalize the institutional framework on ASEAN cooperation in transnational crime by making the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime the highest policy-making body, with a supervisory role and consultative relations with relevant ASEAN institutions involved in the combat against transnational crime; 22. Promote the efficient networking of relevant national agencies/organizations in ASEAN Member Countries by creating inter-agency committees/task forces to enhance information exchange and dissemination;

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23. Strengthen institutional linkages with the various ASEAN mechanisms involved in combating transnational crime particularly the ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting, ASEAN Finance Officials Meeting, ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters, ASEAN Directors General of Customs, ASEAN Directors General for Immigration and ASEAN Chiefs of National Police. Extra-Regional Cooperation

24. Seek technical assistance from ASEAN Dialogue Partners and relevant specialized agencies of the United Nations and other international organizations, particularly with regard to training and acquisition of equipment. 25. Enhance information exchange with ASEAN Dialogue Partner, regional organizations, relevant specialized agencies of the United Nations and other international organizations, particularly towards the sharing of critical information on the identities, movements and activities of known transnational criminal organizations.

23. Australia Criminal Code Act 1995 The Australia Criminal Code Act 1995 is a comprehensive 613-page legal instrument. Cited below are two divisions (73 and 360) that comprise a portion of this document. Division 73 addresses people smuggling when one victim is abducted and smuggled into a foreign country and when groups of five or more victims are involved. This division also addresses the falsification of travel or identity documents that helps facilitate the crime of people smuggling. The possession and/or destruction of a person’s identification documents is also covered in this section. Division 360 deals with cross-border firearms trafficking and covers both the “disposal and acquisition of a firearm.” Source Commonwealth of Australia Law, http://www.comlaw .gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilation1.nsf/0/ D72BB78BACF1888DCA25719C0008E93A/$file/ CriminalCode1995_WD02_Version4.doc.

Act No. 12 of 1995 as amended This compilation was prepared on 27 June 2006

26. Urge ASEAN Dialogue Partners not yet party to existing international treaties against organized transnational crime, in its various forms, to accede to such agreements. 27. Promote interest and support in the international community for ASEAN initiatives against transnational crime through the participation of ASEAN Member Countries and the ASEAN Secretariat in relevant international conferences.

taking into account amendments up to Act No. 54 of 2006 Division 73—People Smuggling and Related Offences Subdivision A—People Smuggling Offences 73.1—Offence of People Smuggling (1) A person (the first person) is guilty of an offence if:

[. . .]

(a) the first person organises or facilitates the entry of another person (the other person) into a foreign country (whether or not via Australia); and (b) the entry of the other person into the foreign country does not comply with the requirements under that country’s law for entry into the country; and

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(c) the other person is not a citizen or permanent resident of the foreign country; and (d) the first person organises or facilitates the entry: (i) having obtained (whether directly or indirectly) a benefit to do so; or (ii) with the intention of obtaining (whether directly or indirectly) a benefit. Penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years or 1,000 penalty units, or both.

(2) Absolute liability applies to the paragraph (1)(c) element of the offence. (3) For the purposes of this Code, an offence against subsection (1) is to be known as the offence of people smuggling. 73.2—Aggravated Offence of People Smuggling (Exploitation Etc.) (1) A person (the first person) is guilty of an offence if the first person commits the offence of people smuggling in relation to another person (the victim) and any of the following applies: (a) the first person commits the offence intending that the victim will be exploited after entry into the foreign country (whether by the first person or another); (b) in committing the offence, the first person subjects the victim to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; (c) in committing the offence, the first person’s conduct: (i) gives rise to a danger of death or serious harm to the victim; and (ii) the first person is reckless as to the danger of death or serious harm to the victim that arises from the conduct. Penalty: Imprisonment for 20 years or 2,000 penalty units, or both.

(3) In this section:

forced labour means the condition of a person who provides labour or services (other than sexual

services) and who, because of the use of force or threats: (a) is not free to cease providing labour or services; or (b) is not free to leave the place or area where the person provides labour or services.

sexual servitude has the same meaning as in Division 270. slavery has the same meaning as in Division 270. threat means: (a) a threat of force; or (b) a threat to cause a person’s deportation; or (c) a threat of any other detrimental action unless there are reasonable grounds for the threat of that action in connection with the provision of labour or services by a person.

73.3—Aggravated offence of people smuggling (at least 5 people) (1) A person (the first person) is guilty of an offence if: (a) the first person organises or facilitates the entry of a group of at least 5 persons (the other persons) into a foreign country (whether or not via Australia); and (b) the entry of at least 5 of the other persons into the foreign country does not comply with the requirements under that country’s law for entry into that country; and (c) at least 5 of the other persons whose entry into the foreign country is covered by paragraph (b) are not citizens or permanent residents of the foreign country; and (d) the first person organises or facilitates the entry: (i) having obtained (whether directly or indirectly) a benefit to do so; or (ii) with the intention of obtaining (whether directly or indirectly) a benefit. Penalty: Imprisonment for 20 years or 2,000 penalty units, or both.

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(2) Absolute liability applies to the paragraph (1)(c) element of the offence. (3) If, on a trial for an offence against subsection (1), the trier of fact is not satisfied that the defendant is guilty of that offence, but is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of an offence against subsection 73.1(1), the trier of fact may find the defendant not guilty of an offence against subsection (1) but guilty of an offence against subsection 73.1(1), so long as the defendant has been accorded procedural fairness in relation to that finding of guilt. 73.4—Jurisdictional Requirement A person commits an offence against this Subdivision only if:

Subdivision B—Document Offences Related to People Smuggling and Unlawful Entry into Foreign Countries 73.6—Meaning of Travel or Identity Document (1) For the purposes of this Subdivision, a document is a travel or identity document if it is: (a) a travel document; or (b) an identity document.

73.7—Meaning of False Travel or Identity Document (1) For the purposes of this Subdivision, a travel or identity document is a false travel or identity document if, and only if:

(a) both: (i) the person is an Australian citizen or a resident of Australia; and (ii) the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs wholly outside Australia; or (b) both: (i) the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs wholly or partly in Australia; and (ii) a result of the conduct occurs, or is intended by the person to occur, outside Australia.

73.5—Attorney-General’s Consent Required (1) Proceedings for an offence against this Subdivision must not be commenced without the Attorney-General’s written consent. (2) However, a person may be arrested, charged, remanded in custody or released on bail in connection with an offence against this Subdivision before the necessary consent has been given.

(a) the document, or any part of the document: (i) purports to have been made in the form in which it is made by a person who did not make it in that form; or (ii) purports to have been made in the form in which it is made on the authority of a person who did not authorise its making in that form; or (b) the document, or any part of the document: (i) purports to have been made in the terms in which it is made by a person who did not make it in those terms; or (ii) purports to have been made in the terms in which it is made on the authority of a person who did not authorise its making in those terms; or (c) the document, or any part of the document: (i) purports to have been altered in any respect by a person who did not alter it in that respect; or (ii) purports to have been altered in any respect on the authority of a person who did not authorise its alteration in that respect; or (d) the document, or any part of the document: (i) purports to have been made or altered by a person who did not exist; or (ii) purports to have been made or altered on the authority of a person who did not exist; or (e) the document, or any part of the document, purports to have been made or altered on a date on

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which, at a time at which, at a place at which, or otherwise in circumstances in which, it was not made or altered.

(2) For the purposes of this Subdivision, a person is taken to make a false travel or identity document if the person alters a document so as to make it a false travel or identity document (whether or not it was already a false travel or identity document before the alteration). (3) This section has effect as if a document that purports to be a true copy of another document were the original document. 73.8—Making, Providing or Possessing a False Travel or Identity Document A person (the first person) is guilty of an offence if: (a) the first person makes, provides or possesses a false travel or identity document; and (b) the first person intends that the document will be used to facilitate the entry of another person (the other person) into a foreign country, where the entry of the other person into the foreign country would not comply with the requirements under that country’s law for entry into the country; and (c) the first person made, provided or possessed the document: (i) having obtained (whether directly or indirectly) a benefit to do so; or (ii) with the intention of obtaining (whether directly or indirectly) a benefit. Penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years or 1,000 penalty units, or both.

73.9—Providing or Possessing a Travel or Identity Document Issued or Altered Dishonestly or As a Result of Threats (1) A person (the first person) is guilty of an offence if: (a) the first person provides or possesses a travel or identity document; and (b) the first person knows that: (i) the issue of the travel or identity document; or

(ii) an alteration of the travel or identity document; has been obtained dishonestly or by threats; and (c) the first person intends that the document will be used to facilitate the entry of another person (the other person) into a foreign country, where the entry of the other person into the foreign country would not comply with the requirements under that country’s law for entry into the country; and (d) the first person provided or possessed the document: (i) having obtained (whether directly or indirectly) a benefit to do so; or (ii) with the intention of obtaining (whether directly or indirectly) a benefit. Penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years or 1,000 penalty units, or both.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a threat may be: (a) express or implied; or (b) conditional or unconditional.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1), dishonest means: (a) dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people; and (b) known by the defendant to be dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people.

(4) In a prosecution for an offence against this section, the determination of dishonesty is a matter for the trier of fact. 73.10—Providing or Possessing a Travel or Identity Document to Be Used by a Person Who Is Not the Rightful User A person (the first person) is guilty of an offence if: (a) the first person provides or possesses a travel or identity document; and (b) the first person intends that the document will be used to facilitate the entry of another person (the other person) into a foreign country, where the

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entry of the other person into the foreign country would not comply with the requirements under that country’s law for entry into the country; and (c) the first person knows that the other person is not the person to whom the document applies; and (d) the first person provided or possessed the document: (i) having obtained (whether directly or indirectly) a benefit to do so; or (ii) with the intention of obtaining (whether directly or indirectly) a benefit.

Part 9.4—Dangerous Weapons Division 360—Cross-Border Firearms Trafficking 360.1—Disposal and Acquisition of a Firearm (1) For the purposes of this Division, and without limitation, a person disposes of a firearm if any of the following applies: (a) the person sells the firearm (whether or not the person to whom the firearm is sold also acquires physical control of the firearm); (b) the person hires, leases or rents the firearm to another person; (c) the person passes physical control of the firearm to another person (whether or not the person to whom physical control is passed also acquires ownership of the firearm).

Penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years or 1,000 penalty units, or both.

73.11—Taking Possession of or Destroying Another Person’s Travel or Identity Document A person (the first person) is guilty of an offence if: (a) the first person takes possession of, or destroys, a travel or identity document that applies to another person (the other person); and (b) the first person does so intending to conceal the other person’s identity or nationality; and (c) at the time of doing so, the first person intends to organise or facilitate the entry of the other person into a foreign country: (i) having obtained, or with the intention of obtaining, whether directly or indirectly, a benefit to organise or facilitate that entry; and (ii) where the entry of the other person into the foreign country would not comply with the requirements under that country’s law for entry into the country. Penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years or 1,000 penalty units, or both.

(2) For the purposes of this Division, and without limitation, a person acquires a firearm if any of the following applies: (a) the person purchases the firearm (whether or not the person also acquires physical control of the firearm); (b) the person hires, leases or rents the firearm from another person; (c) the person obtains physical control of the firearm (whether or not the person also acquires ownership of the firearm).

360.2—Cross-Border Offence of Disposal or Acquisition of a Firearm (1) A person is guilty of an offence if:

73.12—Jurisdictional Requirement Section 15.2 (extended geographical jurisdiction— category B) applies to an offence against this Subdivision.

(a) in the course of trade or commerce among the States, between Territories or between a Territory and a State, the person engages in conduct that constitutes an offence against a firearm law; and (b) the primary element of the offence is: (i) the disposal of a firearm by the person; or (ii) the acquisition of a firearm by the person. Penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years or a fine of 2,500 penalty units, or both.

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(2) Absolute liability applies to the paragraph (1)(a) element of the offence. (3) In this section:

360.4—Concurrent Operation Intended This Division is not intended to exclude or limit the concurrent operation of any law of a State or Territory.

firearm means a firearm within the meaning of the firearm law concerned. firearm law means a law of a State or Territory which is prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this Division. 360.3—Taking or Sending a Firearm across Borders (1) A person is guilty of an offence if: (a) in the course of trade or commerce among the States, between Territories or between a Territory and a State, the person takes or sends a firearm from one State or Territory to another State or Territory; and (b) the person does so intending that the firearm will be disposed of in the other State or Territory (whether by the person or another); and (c) the person knows that, or is reckless as to whether: (i) the disposal of the firearm; or (ii) any acquisition of the firearm that results from the disposal; would happen in circumstances that would constitute an offence against the firearm law of that other State or Territory. Penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years or a fine of 2,500 penalty units, or both.

(2) In this section:

firearm means a firearm within the meaning of the firearm law mentioned in paragraph (1)(c). firearm law means a law of a State or Territory which is prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this Division.

24. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: “Developing a Strategic Concept on Tackling Organised Crime” The objective of this communication as set forth by the Commission of the European Communities is to outline a comprehensive strategy to deal with the growing problem of organized crime. At the outset, the commission addresses the inherent difficulty in developing such a comprehensive plan due to the definitional dilemma of what constitutes organized crime. This document addresses many initiatives such as “an enhanced ability to freeze and confiscate the proceeds of crime”; mutual cooperation, nationally as well as internationally; the exchange of information; an expansion of the scope and range of education and training programs; and the collection and dissemination of relevant data. This communication also stresses “social responsibility standards for the public and private sector to reduce crime opportunities.” Source EUR-Lex, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52005DC0232:EN:HTML.

Introduction 1. The European Council of 4/5 November 2004 asked the Council and the Commission, under The Hague Programme, to develop a strategic concept on tackling organised crime (OC) at EU-level with Union bodies such as Europol, Eurojust, CEPOL and the Police Chiefs. This Communication constitutes the Commission’s contribution to the development of this strategy.

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2. Since the Amsterdam Treaty’s entry into force, several EU action plans on combating OC have been adopted, the latest being the Millennium Strategy on the prevention and control of OC of 2000. On the Dutch Council Presidency’s initiative discussion began in 2004 leading to the adoption of Council conclusions on the development of a strategic concept on tackling OC on 2.12.2004. 3. Various legislative and non-legislative initiatives contributing to the prevention and fight against OC have been adopted at EU-level since the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice. Now time is needed to integrate the different tools and measures (preventive, criminal law and procedural law) taken at local, national or EU level and fill identified gaps. The Union should move to elaborate and implement a counter OC policy, with adequate financial support. 4. Since September 2001, the fight against terrorism became the focus of attention. Although links between OC and terrorism exist, OC continues to pose in itself a threat to society. OC undermines legitimate economies and is a destabilising factor for society’s social and democratic fabric. It is therefore welcome that the European Council put combating OC high on the agenda. In fighting this scourge all actors must balance efficient law enforcement and prosecution of OC, and the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. 5. To develop a strategic concept on tackling OC is a difficult task because the idea of OC remains complex despite several past initiatives defining “criminal organisation”. Also, the priority topics identified by the Council on 2.12.2004 are crosscutting, and include the knowledge base for reducing OC to prevention, law enforcement, judicial cooperation and external relations (cf. section 2). Measures proposed in the present context may therefore effect offences that are not, or not exclusively, OC-related. Conversely, initiatives which implement e.g. the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters, impact on

many forms of serious cross-border crime. A strategic approach will ensure effective cooperation between all relevant actors. 6. Due to the strategic concept’s broad scope priority-setting is inevitable within the Communication. Section 2 develops the objectives under the priority topics of the strategic concept on tackling OC. Some aspects are only covered summarily but set out in detail elsewhere. Section 3 summarises the follow-up to the mid-term evaluation of the Millennium Strategy, while section 4 points the way forward. Annex 1 lists the measures for implementing the strategic concept on tackling OC, and corresponding responsibilities with target dates and priority ratings. Annex 2 lists and summarises recently adopted Communications and Council conclusions which are relevant. Annex 3 details the follow-up to the mid-term evaluation of the Millennium Strategy. Priority Topics and Objectives Improve Knowledge of OC and Strengthen Information Gathering and Analysis 7. Technological evolution along with increasing globalisation provides new opportunities for OC groups. In order to prevent and counteract OC, knowledge about OC, OC groups and vulnerabilities of the licit sectors has to be gathered and updated to develop better tools, as stated in many of the strategic documents mentioned already, not least The Hague Programme. The future EU crime statistics system should collect information from law enforcement agencies and also quantitative information based on citizen and business surveys, as well as measuring crime and victimisation in specific groups to aid decision-making in different policy areas. This crime statistics system will be developed in collaboration with Member States, using, as needed, the Community Statistical Programme. Further development, testing and dissemination of a methodology for studies of economic sectors’ vulnerability to OC are also needed. On this basis the Commission intends to produce

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an annual or biennial EU crime report in the future. 8. The Hague Programme highlighted the need to develop an EU intelligence-led law enforcement mechanism to enable decision makers to define European law enforcement strategies based on thorough assessments. Availability of and access to information (cf. section 2.3.3.), production of European criminal intelligence and enhanced trust between law enforcement authorities at European and international level are its core elements. The Commission will present a Communication on an EU intelligence-led law enforcement policy in 2005. 9. Within this policy, a ‘European Criminal Intelligence Model’ should be developed to address issues such as coherent intelligence actions products and services of national and EU bodies active in the domain of Justice, Freedom and Security, the synchronisation of national threat assessments based on a common methodology, underpinned by sectoral vulnerability studies, the production of quantitative and qualitative information by the private sector and other relevant data from evolving European crime statistics. A key element of the Model will be a European OC threat assessment by Europol as requested in The Hague Programme based on synchronised national assessments. 10. OC-related research is currently funded under the 6th Research Framework Programme (RFP) and the Preparatory Action for Security Research. It is envisaged that OC-related research would be part of the new Security Research Programme and of other related areas in the proposed 7th RFP. Specific research projects to support policy development will also be possible through the AGIS programme, any successor under the Financial Perspectives (2007–2013), and studies funds.

Strengthen OC Prevention 11. An effective crime prevention policy goes beyond classical law enforcement cooperation to include good governance, transparency, accountability and social responsibility standards for the public and private sector to reduce crime opportunities. Some EU Member States have been innovative in using an administrative approach to prevent the penetration of legal markets by criminal organisations. The Council recently adopted recommendations that this approach merits further research and dissemination across the EU. At EU level, the Commission intends to develop a model for crime proofing legislation and new products and services which could be widely disseminated to avoid inadvertently creating new opportunities for OC. 12. One key tool by which OC infiltrates licit markets is corruption. Therefore further development and implementation of a comprehensive EU anticorruption policy including criminal law measures, promotion of ethics and integrity in public administration and improved monitoring of national anticorruption policies in the context of EU and international obligations and other standards is essential and also timely in order to effectively implement the UN Convention Against Corruption. Fostering public sector transparency is one of the Commission’s strategic objectives 2005– 2009 and a White Paper on a European Transparency Initiative will follow. 13. The Dublin Declaration recognised Public Private Partnerships as an effective tool for preventing crime in general, and OC in particular. The preparation and implementation of an EU Action Plan on Public Private Partnerships is a priority for the Commission in 2006, under The Hague Programme. 14. The prevention of human trafficking, a particularly serious crime involving severe human rights violations, is a primary aim. The Commission will submit a dedicated Communication on combating trafficking in human beings in 2005 which will take

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an integrated, human-rights oriented and victimcentred approach.

addressed shortly by the Commission as requested by the European Council of 16/17.12.2004.

15. Under the Structural Funds financial support for preventive measures has been available but was rarely used by Member States, contributing to the Commission’s proposal to set up a distinct Security and Safeguarding Liberties Framework Programme under the Financial Perspectives 2007–2013 to finance such measures.

19. Data retention for electronic communication services is an important element in the investigation of criminal offences involving the use of information technology. It requires a balance between effective law enforcement, the protection of fundamental rights and the financial burden which resulting obligations cause to service providers. To meet legal considerations the Commission will submit in 2005 a proposal for a directive as appropriate legal instrument.

Strengthen Tools and Improve Cooperation Strengthen Investigation of OC 16. Special investigation techniques have proven effective in police, customs’ and judicial investigation of cross-border OC. The 2000 Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) Convention and 2001 Protocol provide for these techniques although neither instrument has yet entered into force, hence the separate Framework Decision (FD) on the use of Joint Investigation Teams (JIT). Further work is needed to improve the use of JITs and other special investigation techniques. 17. To speed up and simplify the obtaining of evidence across borders, the Commission has proposed the European Evidence Warrant which would for certain types of evidence replace mutual legal assistance. In the medium term the principle of mutual recognition should be extended to cover all types of evidence. The Commission plans several initiatives on admissibility of evidence as explained in its Communication on the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters. These initiatives would enhance mutual trust by ensuring a fair balance between efficient prosecution and defence rights. The cross border use of intelligence as evidence is an additional theme requiring further study. 18. As well as the collection of evidence in the context of financial investigations (cf. section 2.3.2.), capturing, safeguarding and exchanging electronic evidence is an increasingly relevant issue to be

20. It is often essential to rely on witnesses or collaborators of justice in order to bring key figures of OC groups to justice. Building on two Council Resolutions, the Millennium Strategy suggested further work be done. The Council invited the Commission to work on a witness protection programme for terrorism. Europol developed two useful documents and the Commission is preparing a legal instrument on this. 21. Some EU Member States have created specialised investigation or prosecutorial services to deal with OC related offences. Such services are made up of multi-disciplinary expert teams for complex crime investigations. The Commission encourages all Member States to consider this approach. Strengthen Tools to Address Financial Aspects of OC 22. Financial gain drives OC. Removing the ability to launder criminal proceeds or to finance criminal activity would significantly impede the motivation and capacity of OC groups. Therefore an enhanced ability to freeze and confiscate the proceeds of crime is key to fighting and preventing such criminal activity. The Commission will therefore promote stronger financial investigation skills and appropriate legal instruments aiding rapid identification and tracing of illicit financial transfers and other transactions.

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23. Three FDs dealing with the freezing and confiscation of assets, including extended confiscatory powers have been agreed with one still subject to reservations. The FD on confiscation of crimerelated proceeds provides that in using extended confiscation powers, Member States may use noncriminal procedures. Its recitals also refer to the UN Convention on Transnational OC where State Parties may consider the possibility of requiring an offender to show the lawful origin of alleged proceeds of crime, including by reversing the onus and/or lightening the standard of proof. The Commission will review EU legislation on confiscation of criminal assets in this light. In addition, the Commission will explore standards on the return of confiscated or forfeited assets as compensation or restitution to identifiable victims of crime or charitable organisations. 24. The proposed third money laundering Directive strengthens existing Community antimoney laundering legislation by e.g. widening the definition of predicate offences and adding new categories of persons subject to reporting obligations. Yet, to ensure future commitment of financial institutions and others, it should be shown that anti-money laundering reporting generates worthwhile results. For this purpose, financial intelligence units must provide adequate feedback. 25. Organised criminals use the financial system of a Member State to integrate money from criminal activity carried out in another Member State. Europol seeks to identify links between such criminal activity and related transactions within the framework of the Analysis Work Files, e.g. the “SUSTRANS” project. All Member States should actively support this work, by providing high quality data to Europol. 26. The Protocol to the 2000 MLA Convention aims at facilitating cooperation in cross-border financial investigations. Due to the low rate of ratification of this Protocol its date of entry into force is uncertain. As the principle of mutual recognition

should progressively replace mutual legal assistance the Commission will need to consider new legislative proposals. Strengthen the Access to and Exchange of Information and Intelligence between Law Enforcement Authorities 27. The European Council stressed in The Hague Programme that strengthening freedom, security and justice requires an innovative approach to the cross-border exchange of law enforcement information. The action plan implementing The Hague Programme will further develop the Commission’s initiatives to implement the principle of availability for the exchange of law enforcement information, common standards for access to databases and interoperability of national and EU databases. National and EU databases should progressively use the same standards and compatible technologies to ensure the selective exchange of law enforcement data while taking into account the appropriate inter-linkages with international databases. Personal data protection and data security measures such as proportionality, integrity and confidentiality of data and effective legal remedies must proceed along with these extended possibilities. The Commission will submit a legislative proposal on this in 2005. 28. Intensive cooperation between national law enforcement authorities and with relevant EU bodies is necessary to the building of trust. Established information channels e.g. Europol’s Virtual Private Network or its Information System should be used and, where appropriate, supplemented by expert networks (cf. section 2.4.). Strengthen Inter-Institutional and CrossJurisdictional Cooperation 29. The Hague Programme stresses the need for intensified practical cooperation between police and customs authorities of Member States and with Europol and Eurojust. Prosecutors/judiciary and Eurojust must be involved at an early stage e.g. for wire-tapping or arrest warrants. Joint cus-

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toms, police and/or judicial operations should become a frequent tool of practical cooperation. Common structures of cooperation in internal border regions of the Union should be fostered. In addition, the Commission proposes funding joint EU operations systematically in the future under financial perspectives 2007–2013. The Committee on Internal Security envisaged in Article III-261, Constitutional Treaty, should facilitate the coordination of the action of Member States’ competent authorities, focusing on operational cooperation. 30. As a follow-up to the relevant Green Paper, the Commission will undertake an impact assessment and submit a White Paper on a legislative proposal to establish the European Public Prosecutor’s (EPP) Office from Eurojust, with responsibility for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgement offences against the Union’s financial interests under the future Constitutional Treaty and also for the possibility to extend the EPP’s powers to serious crime with a cross-border dimension. Improve Use of, and Strengthen, Existing Bodies 31. It is important to ratify and implement the relevant legal instruments regarding Europol and Eurojust, including the three protocols to the Europol Convention. The report on the implementation of the Eurojust Decision identified shortcomings, e.g. differences in the judicial powers of national members which hamper its effectiveness. 32. The potential of Eurojust and Europol in the fight against OC has yet to be fully exploited by Member States. Significant multilateral cases should be referred, and serious cross-border crime reported, to Eurojust. The flow of information to Europol is still insufficient. Ways of increasing the systematic forwarding of high quality, live investigative data by Member States must be developed. Implementation of the Europol Information System in all Member States will facilitate Europol’s access to information on OC.

33. Europol and Eurojust should be more closely involved in the investigation phase of cross-border OC cases and in JITs. The opportunities opened by existing legislation and the Constitutional Treaty with regard to their tasks should be used. More specifically, consideration should be given to enhanced coordination by Europol and Eurojust for complex cross-border operations and criminal investigations of serious and OC, providing logistical support, expertise and knowledge of best practice and enhanced use of the Europol/Eurojust agreement. 34. Training and systematic exchange programmes should be promoted via CEPOL with funding under the Community budget. The Commission has proposed that these activities grow in size and impact. 35. The Border Management Agency, though primarily tasked with improving the implementation of the Schengen acquis on control of persons at the external borders, should provide intelligence and play a role in the coordination of operations on illegal immigration-related OC in cooperation with Member States and Europol, and develop an integrated risk analysis model. Improve Legislation Where Needed 36. Offences related to transborder OC justify by their nature and potential impact consideration of a common basis in the Union to combat them. The most recent example is the proposal for a FD on the fight against OC to provide a harmonised definition of offences and penalties of different forms of participation in a criminal organisation. In the Commission’s view approximation of legislation should complement the mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters. When adopting the FD on the European Arrest Warrant the Council agreed “to continue, in accordance with Article 31(e) TEU, the work on approximation of the offences contained in Article 2(2)” thereof with a view to arriving at a mutual legal understanding among Member States. The Commission will

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therefore study the scope for further approximation of legislation in criminal matters e.g. in the fields of counterfeiting, illicit arms trafficking, fraud, especially tax fraud and identity theft, environmental crime, racketeering and extortion. Improve Monitoring and Evaluation 37. Several instruments currently provide evaluation of OC policy or contribute to it. They need refinement since The Hague Programme’s call for evaluation of the implementation, as well as of the effects of Union policies in the area of freedom, security and justice. The Commission regards this as of crucial importance and will present its views on evaluation, bearing in mind Article III-260 of the Constitutional Treaty in 2006. In the OC context, the future EU crime report and the EU OC Threat Assessments (cf. section 2.1.) will be important tools for an evaluation mechanism on OCrelated matters. Evaluations of customs cooperation, anti-corruption policies and fight against financial crime, already announced in respective Communications, should be given priority due to their horizontal impact. Strengthen Co-operation with Non-EU Countries and International Organisations 38. In this era of open borders and global integration and inter-dependence, the internal security of the EU is inseparably linked to external aspects of security. The external dimension of the EU’s response to OC, and other security threats, has developed considerably over recent years. Bi-lateral, regional and international initiatives need to be further refined. 39. Co-operation to tackle OC should be developed further with priority third countries through agreements and other instruments. Such cooperation should include the promotion of relevant EU benchmarks and international standards.

combat OC, particularly in those regions bordering the EU. 41. The EU should also fully support the development of multilateral approaches to combat OC, to ensure comprehensive ratification and implementation of international instruments, such as the UN Conventions on Transnational OC and Corruption, and the development of international standards and provisions in other fora such as the Council of Europe, G8, FATF, OSCE and OECD. 42. Direct cooperation between Europol, Eurojust on the one hand, and non-EU countries/bodies on the other, is essential for developing a European dimension to law enforcement and judicial cooperation beyond EU borders. Europol’s strategy on external relations 2004–2006 should be pursued further and Eurojust should develop its own external relations strategy. Setting Priorities for Tackling Specific Forms of OC at EU-Level and for Follow-up 43. Consensus was reached in the Council’s Multidisciplinary Group to analyse Europol’s OC Report, consult with Eurojust and Europol, and then forward the result to the relevant bodies of the Council with a view to identifying a limited number of yearly strategic priorities in the fight against OC. 44. The Hague Programme establishes that the Council should use the yearly OC threat assessments by Europol to establish such priorities as of 2006. In order to make it possible for Europol to fulfil this requirement, work on intelligence-led law enforcement must be taken further without delay. This will require significant efforts not only from Europol, but equally from Member States and competent EU bodies (cf. section 2.1.)

40. The EU should promote and support the development of regional approaches and cooperation to

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Summary of Follow-up to the Conclusions of the Mid-Term Evaluation Report on the Millennium Strategy 45. The conclusions of the mid-term evaluation of the Millennium Strategy identified six recommendations for further action. Dealing with drugs trafficking has been met with the Council’s adoption of a FD approximating legislation in the field of drug trafficking in October 2004. Follow-up work on the other five recommendations is underway. The Commission proposed legislation and adopted a White Paper on the exchange of information on convictions; a Communication on disqualifications will follow later in 2005. The proposal for a Third Money Laundering Directive includes a provision to prevent the use of large-scale cash payments for money laundering purposes. The development of comparable crime statistics is a long term project on which the Commission is engaged along with other stakeholders. It will present an Action Plan on EU Crime Statistics during 2005. A study has been launched on fiscal fraud. Its results are expected in July 2005. The Commission (OLAF) and Europol, within their respective legal frameworks will provide assistance to Member States in the format of a service platform for joint customs operations in 2005. Finally, the Commission is currently working on a proposal on the protection of witnesses and collaborators of justice. The Way Forward 46. This Communication spells out the strategic concept on tackling OC in terms of objectives. Annex 1 comprises a list of implementing actions within a 5 year perspective. Once adopted by the Council, the strategic concept on tackling OC should complement the action plan implementing The Hague Programme as it contributes to strengthening freedom, security and justice in the Union. Building and integrating the different elements for a European criminal intelligence model is the most important task ahead, and will require a shared effort by Member States and EU institutions and bodies.

47. The strategic concept should be considered a living document. The Commission is invited to present to the Council a yearly report on the implementation of The Hague programme (scoreboard) which would incorporate a progress report on the strategic concept. Alternatively, it could be evaluated separately in order for this evaluation to be tuned to the process of annually identifying strategic priorities in the fight against OC at EU level. 48. A specific evaluation of the strategic concept is recommended at the end of 2006 to provide a benchmark before implementation of the financial perspectives 2007–2013 and in view of the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty.

25. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was passed by the U.S. Congress and became law in October 1970. RICO was originally legislated to go after the Mafia and other organized criminal entities. The statute was designed to undermine and reduce the economic muscle of these groups. The purpose of this act was to protect organizations engaged in interstate commerce from being infiltrated by career criminals as well as organized criminal enterprises. Section 1962 (c) states, “It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” RICO has been successfully applied in criminal prosecutions as well as civil litigation. Persons convicted under this statute are subject to a fine, imprisonment, and forfeiture of assets.

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Source FindLaw, http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/casecode/uscodes/ 18/parts/i/chapters/96/toc.html.

Title 18—Crimes and Criminal Procedure Part I—Crimes Chapter 96—Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Section 1961. Definitions As used in this chapter— (1) “racketeering activity” means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891–894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1028 (relating to fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents), section 1029 (relating to fraud and related activity in connection with access devices), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1344 (relating to financial institution fraud), section 1425 (relating to the procurement of citizenship or nationalization unlawfully), section 1426 (relating to the reproduction of naturalization or citizenship papers), section 1427 (relating to the sale of naturalization or citizenship papers), sections 1461–

1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1542 (relating to false statement in application and use of passport), section 1543 (relating to forgery or false use of passport), section 1544 (relating to misuse of passport), section 1546 (relating to fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents), sections 1581–1591 (relating to peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), section 1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary instruments), section 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity), section 1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire), sections 2251, 2251A, 2252, and 2260 (relating to sexual exploitation of children), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2318 (relating to trafficking in counterfeit labels for phonorecords, computer programs or computer program documentation or packaging and copies of motion pictures or other audiovisual works), section 2319 (relating to criminal infringement of a copyright), section 2319A (relating to unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound recordings and music videos of live musical performances), section 2320 (relating to trafficking in goods or services bearing counterfeit marks), section 2321 (relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts),

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sections 2341–2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421–24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11 (except a case under section 157 of this title), fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), punishable under any law of the United States, (E) any act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, (F) any act which is indictable under the Immigration and Nationality Act, section 274 (relating to bringing in and harboring certain aliens), section 277 (relating to aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter the United States), or section 278 (relating to importation of alien for immoral purpose) if the act indictable under such section of such Act was committed for the purpose of financial gain, or (G) any act that is indictable under any provision listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B); (2) “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or possession of the United States, any political subdivision, or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof; (3) “person” includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property; (4) “enterprise” includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity; (5) “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity;

(6) “unlawful debt” means a debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity which was in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or which is unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal or interest because of the laws relating to usury, and (B) which was incurred in connection with the business of gambling in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or the business of lending money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or Federal law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate; (7) “racketeering investigator” means any attorney or investigator so designated by the Attorney General and charged with the duty of enforcing or carrying into effect this chapter; (8) “racketeering investigation” means any inquiry conducted by any racketeering investigator for the purpose of ascertaining whether any person has been involved in any violation of this chapter or of any final order, judgment, or decree of any court of the United States, duly entered in any case or proceeding arising under this chapter; (9) “documentary material” includes any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material; and (10) “Attorney General” includes the Attorney General of the United States, the Deputy Attorney General of the United States, the Associate Attorney General of the United States, any Assistant Attorney General of the United States, or any employee of the Department of Justice or any employee of any department or agency of the United States so designated by the Attorney General to carry out the powers conferred on the Attorney General by this chapter. Any department or agency so designated may use in investigations authorized by this chapter either the investigative provisions of this chapter or the investigative power of such department or agency otherwise conferred by law.

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Section 1962. Prohibited Activities (a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer. (b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. (c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.

(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section. Section 1963. Criminal Penalties (a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years (or for life if the violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes life imprisonment), or both, and shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law— (1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962; (2) any— (A) interest in; (B) security of; (C) claim against; or (D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over; any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962; and

(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection in violation of section 1962.

The court, in imposing sentence on such person shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed pursuant to this section, that the person forfeit to the United States all property described in this subsection. In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by this section, a defendant who derives profits or other proceeds from an offense may be fined not more than twice the gross profits or other proceeds. (b) Property subject to criminal forfeiture under this section includes— (1) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in land; and

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order outweighs the hardship on any party against whom the order is to be entered:

(2) tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests, claims, and securities.

(c) All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section. Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (1) that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section.

Provided, however, That an order entered pursuant to subparagraph (B) shall be effective for not more than ninety days, unless extended by the court for good cause shown or unless an indictment or information described in subparagraph (A) has been filed.

(d)(1) Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any other action to preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a) for forfeiture under this section— (A) upon the filing of an indictment or information charging a violation of section 1962 of this chapter and alleging that the property with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this section; or (B) prior to the filing of such an indictment or information, if, after notice to persons appearing to have an interest in the property and opportunity for a hearing, the court determines that— (i) there is a substantial probability that the United States will prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order will result in the property being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture; and (ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property through the entry of the requested

(2) A temporary restraining order under this subsection may be entered upon application of the United States without notice or opportunity for a hearing when an information or indictment has not yet been filed with respect to the property, if the United States demonstrates that there is probable cause to believe that the property with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this section and that provision of notice will jeopardize the availability of the property for forfeiture. Such a temporary order shall expire not more than ten days after the date on which it is entered, unless extended for good cause shown or unless the party against whom it is entered consents to an extension for a longer period. A hearing requested concerning an order entered under this paragraph shall be held at the earliest possible time, and prior to the expiration of the temporary order. (3) The court may receive and consider, at a hearing held pursuant to this subsection, evidence and information that would be inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. (e) Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall enter a judgment of forfeiture of the property to the United States and shall also authorize the Attorney General to seize all property ordered forfeited upon such terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper. Following the entry of an order declaring the property forfeited, the court may, upon application of the United States, enter such appropriate restraining orders or injunctions, require the execution of satisfactory

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performance bonds, appoint receivers, conservators, appraisers, accountants, or trustees, or take any other action to protect the interest of the United States in the property ordered forfeited. Any income accruing to, or derived from, an enterprise or an interest in an enterprise which has been ordered forfeited under this section may be used to offset ordinary and necessary expenses to the enterprise which are required by law, or which are necessary to protect the interests of the United States or third parties. (f) Following the seizure of property ordered forfeited under this section, the Attorney General shall direct the disposition of the property by sale or any other commercially feasible means, making due provision for the rights of any innocent persons. Any property right or interest not exercisable by, or transferable for value to, the United States shall expire and shall not revert to the defendant, nor shall the defendant or any person acting in concert with or on behalf of the defendant be eligible to purchase forfeited property at any sale held by the United States. Upon application of a person, other than the defendant or a person acting in concert with or on behalf of the defendant, the court may restrain or stay the sale or disposition of the property pending the conclusion of any appeal of the criminal case giving rise to the forfeiture, if the applicant demonstrates that proceeding with the sale or disposition of the property will result in irreparable injury, harm or loss to him. Notwithstanding 31 U.S.C. 3302(b), the proceeds of any sale or other disposition of property forfeited under this section and any moneys forfeited shall be used to pay all proper expenses for the forfeiture and the sale, including expenses of seizure, maintenance and custody of the property pending its disposition, advertising and court costs. The Attorney General shall deposit in the Treasury any amounts of such proceeds or moneys remaining after the payment of such expenses.

(g) With respect to property ordered forfeited under this section, the Attorney General is authorized to— (1) grant petitions for mitigation or remission of forfeiture, restore forfeited property to victims of a violation of this chapter, or take any other action to protect the rights of innocent persons which is in the interest of justice and which is not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter; (2) compromise claims arising under this section; (3) award compensation to persons providing information resulting in a forfeiture under this section; (4) direct the disposition by the United States of all property ordered forfeited under this section by public sale or any other commercially feasible means, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons; and (5) take appropriate measures necessary to safeguard and maintain property ordered forfeited under this section pending its disposition.

(h) The Attorney General may promulgate regulations with respect to— (1) making reasonable efforts to provide notice to persons who may have an interest in property ordered forfeited under this section; (2) granting petitions for remission or mitigation of forfeiture; (3) the restitution of property to victims of an offense petitioning for remission or mitigation of forfeiture under this chapter; (4) the disposition by the United States of forfeited property by public sale or other commercially feasible means; (5) the maintenance and safekeeping of any property forfeited under this section pending its disposition; and (6) the compromise of claims arising under this chapter.

Pending the promulgation of such regulations, all provisions of law relating to the disposition of property, or the proceeds from the sale thereof, or the remission or mitigation of forfeitures for violation of the customs laws, and the compromise of claims and the award of compensation to informers in respect of such forfeitures shall apply to forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under the provisions of this section,

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insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions hereof. Such duties as are imposed upon the Customs Service or any person with respect to the disposition of property under the customs law shall be performed under this chapter by the Attorney General. (i) Except as provided in subsection (l), no party claiming an interest in property subject to forfeiture under this section may— (1) intervene in a trial or appeal of a criminal case involving the forfeiture of such property under this section; or (2) commence an action at law or equity against the United States concerning the validity of his alleged interest in the property subsequent to the filing of an indictment or information alleging that the property is subject to forfeiture under this section. (j) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to enter orders as provided in this section without regard to the location of any property which may be subject to forfeiture under this section or which has been ordered forfeited under this section. (k) In order to facilitate the identification or location of property declared forfeited and to facilitate the disposition of petitions for remission or mitigation of forfeiture, after the entry of an order declaring property forfeited to the United States the court may, upon application of the United States, order that the testimony of any witness relating to the property forfeited be taken by deposition and that any designated book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material not privileged be produced at the same time and place, in the same manner as provided for the taking of depositions under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (l)(1) Following the entry of an order of forfeiture under this section, the United States shall publish notice of the order and of its intent to dispose of the property in such manner as the Attorney General may direct. The Government may also, to the extent practicable, provide

direct written notice to any person known to have alleged an interest in the property that is the subject of the order of forfeiture as a substitute for published notice as to those persons so notified. (2) Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in property which has been ordered forfeited to the United States pursuant to this section may, within thirty days of the final publication of notice or his receipt of notice under paragraph (1), whichever is earlier, petition the court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property. The hearing shall be held before the court alone, without a jury. (3) The petition shall be signed by the petitioner under penalty of perjury and shall set forth the nature and extent of the petitioner’s right, title, or interest in the property, the time and circumstances of the petitioner’s acquisition of the right, title, or interest in the property, any additional facts supporting the petitioner’s claim, and the relief sought. (4) The hearing on the petition shall, to the extent practicable and consistent with the interests of justice, be held within thirty days of the filing of the petition. The court may consolidate the hearing on the petition with a hearing on any other petition filed by a person other than the defendant under this subsection. (5) At the hearing, the petitioner may testify and present evidence and witnesses on his own behalf, and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing. The United States may present evidence and witnesses in rebuttal and in defense of its claim to the property and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing. In addition to testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall consider the relevant portions of the record of the criminal case which resulted in the order of forfeiture. (6) If, after the hearing, the court determines that the petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that—

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(A) the petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property, and such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property under this section; or (B) the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title, or interest in the property and was at the time of purchase reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section; the court shall amend the order of forfeiture in accordance with its determination.

(7) Following the court’s disposition of all petitions filed under this subsection, or if no such petitions are filed following the expiration of the period provided in paragraph (2) for the filing of such petitions, the United States shall have clear title to property that is the subject of the order of forfeiture and may warrant good title to any subsequent purchaser or transferee. (m) If any of the property described in subsection (a), as a result of any act or omission of the defendant— (1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; (2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party; (3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court; (4) has been substantially diminished in value; or (5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without difficulty; the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the value of any property described in paragraphs (1) through (5).

Section 1964. Civil Remedies (a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to:

ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons. (b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. Pending final determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper. (c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, except that no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962. The exception contained in the preceding sentence does not apply to an action against any person that is criminally convicted in connection with the fraud, in which case the statute of limitations shall start to run on the date on which the conviction becomes final. (d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United States.

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Section 1965. Venue and Process (a) Any civil action or proceeding under this chapter against any person may be instituted in the district court of the United States for any district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs. (b) In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district court of the United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice require that other parties residing in any other district be brought before the court, the court may cause such parties to be summoned, and process for that purpose may be served in any judicial district of the United States by the marshal thereof. (c) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding instituted by the United States under this chapter in the district court of the United States for any judicial district, subpenas issued by such court to compel the attendance of witnesses may be served in any other judicial district, except that in any civil action or proceeding no such subpena shall be issued for service upon any individual who resides in another district at a place more than one hundred miles from the place at which such court is held without approval given by a judge of such court upon a showing of good cause.

shall designate immediately a judge of that district to hear and determine action. Section 1967. Evidence In any proceeding ancillary to or in any civil action instituted by the United States under this chapter the proceedings may be open or closed to the public at the discretion of the court after consideration of the rights of affected persons. Section 1968. Civil Investigative Demand (a) Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that any person or enterprise may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary materials relevant to a racketeering investigation, he may, prior to the institution of a civil or criminal proceeding thereon, issue in writing, and cause to be served upon such person, a civil investigative demand requiring such person to produce such material for examination. (b) Each such demand shall— (1) state the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged racketeering violation which is under investigation and the provision of law applicable thereto; (2) describe the class or classes of documentary material produced thereunder with such definiteness and certainty as to permit such material to be fairly identified; (3) state that the demand is returnable forthwith or prescribe a return date which will provide a reasonable period of time within which the material so demanded may be assembled and made available for inspection and copying or reproduction; and (4) identify the custodian to whom such material shall be made available.

(d) All other process in any action or proceeding under this chapter may be served on any person in any judicial district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs. Section 1966. Expedition of Actions In any civil action instituted under this chapter by the United States in any district court of the United States, the Attorney General may file with the clerk of such court a certificate stating that in his opinion the case is of general public importance. A copy of that certificate shall be furnished immediately by such clerk to the chief judge or in his absence to the presiding district judge of the district in which such action is pending. Upon receipt of such copy, such judge

(c) No such demand shall— (1) contain any requirement which would be held to be unreasonable if contained in a subpena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in

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aid of a grand jury investigation of such alleged racketeering violation; or (2) require the production of any documentary evidence which would be privileged from disclosure if demanded by a subpena duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation of such alleged racketeering violation.

(d) Service of any such demand or any petition filed under this section may be made upon a person by— (1) delivering a duly executed copy thereof to any partner, executive officer, managing agent, or general agent thereof, or to any agent thereof authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on behalf of such person, or upon any individual person; (2) delivering a duly executed copy thereof to the principal office or place of business of the person to be served; or (3) depositing such copy in the United States mail, by registered or certified mail duly addressed to such person at its principal office or place of business.

(e) A verified return by the individual serving any such demand or petition setting forth the manner of such service shall be prima facie proof of such service. In the case of service by registered or certified mail, such return shall be accompanied by the return post office receipt of delivery of such demand. (f)(1) The Attorney General shall designate a racketeering investigator to serve as racketeer document custodian, and such additional racketeering investigators as he shall determine from time to time to be necessary to serve as deputies to such officer. (2) Any person upon whom any demand issued under this section has been duly served shall make such material available for inspection and copying or reproduction to the custodian desig-

nated therein at the principal place of business of such person, or at such other place as such custodian and such person thereafter may agree and prescribe in writing or as the court may direct, pursuant to this section on the return date specified in such demand, or on such later date as such custodian may prescribe in writing. Such person may upon written agreement between such person and the custodian substitute for copies of all or any part of such material originals thereof. (3) The custodian to whom any documentary material is so delivered shall take physical possession thereof, and shall be responsible for the use made thereof and for the return thereof pursuant to this chapter. The custodian may cause the preparation of such copies of such documentary material as may be required for official use under regulations which shall be promulgated by the Attorney General. While in the possession of the custodian, no material so produced shall be available for examination, without the consent of the person who produced such material, by any individual other than the Attorney General. Under such reasonable terms and conditions as the Attorney General shall prescribe, documentary material while in the possession of the custodian shall be available for examination by the person who produced such material or any duly authorized representatives of such person. (4) Whenever any attorney has been designated to appear on behalf of the United States before any court or grand jury in any case or proceeding involving any alleged violation of this chapter, the custodian may deliver to such attorney such documentary material in the possession of the custodian as such attorney determines to be required for use in the presentation of such case or proceeding on behalf of the United States. Upon the conclusion of any such case or proceeding, such attorney shall return to the custodian any documentary material so withdrawn which has not passed into the control of such court or grand jury through the introduction thereof into the record of such case or proceeding. (5) Upon the completion of—

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(i) the racketeering investigation for which any documentary material was produced under this chapter, and (ii) any case or proceeding arising from such investigation, the custodian shall return to the person who produced such material all such material other than copies thereof made by the Attorney General pursuant to this subsection which has not passed into the control of any court or grand jury through the introduction thereof into the record of such case or proceeding. (6) When any documentary material has been produced by any person under this section for use in any racketeering investigation, and no such case or proceeding arising therefrom has been instituted within a reasonable time after completion of the examination and analysis of all evidence assembled in the course of such investigation, such person shall be entitled, upon written demand made upon the Attorney General, to the return of all documentary material other than copies thereof made pursuant to this subsection so produced by such person. (7) In the event of the death, disability, or separation from service of the custodian of any documentary material produced under any demand issued under this section or the official relief of such custodian from responsibility for the custody and control of such material, the Attorney General shall promptly— (i) designate another racketeering investigator to serve as custodian thereof, and (ii) transmit notice in writing to the person who produced such material as to the identity and address of the successor so designated.

Any successor so designated shall have with regard to such materials all duties and responsibilities imposed by this section upon his predecessor in office with regard thereto, except that he shall not be held responsible for any default or dereliction which occurred before his designation as custodian.

(g) Whenever any person fails to comply with any civil investigative demand duly served upon him under this section or whenever satisfactory copying or reproduction of any such material cannot be done and such person refuses to surrender such material, the Attorney General may file, in the district court of the United States for any judicial district in which such person resides, is found, or transacts business, and serve upon such person a petition for an order of such court for the enforcement of this section, except that if such person transacts business in more than one such district such petition shall be filed in the district in which such person maintains his principal place of business, or in such other district in which such person transacts business as may be agreed upon by the parties to such petition. (h) Within twenty days after the service of any such demand upon any person, or at any time before the return date specified in the demand, whichever period is shorter, such person may file, in the district court of the United States for the judicial district within which such person resides, is found, or transacts business, and serve upon such custodian a petition for an order of such court modifying or setting aside such demand. The time allowed for compliance with the demand in whole or in part as deemed proper and ordered by the court shall not run during the pendency of such petition in the court. Such petition shall specify each ground upon which the petitioner relies in seeking such relief, and may be based upon any failure of such demand to comply with the provisions of this section or upon any constitutional or other legal right or privilege of such person. (i) At any time during which any custodian is in custody or control of any documentary material delivered by any person in compliance with any such demand, such person may file, in the district court of the United States for the judicial district within which the office of such custodian is situated, and serve upon such custodian a petition for an order of such court requiring the

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performance by such custodian of any duty imposed upon him by this section. (j) Whenever any petition is filed in any district court of the United States under this section, such court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter so presented, and to enter such order or orders as may be required to carry into effect the provisions of this section.

26. South Africa Crime Act 1996

(a) made by the defendant concerned not more than seven years before the fixed date; or (b) made by the defendant concerned at any time, if it was a gift— (i) of property received by that defendant in connection with an offence committed by him or her or any other person; or (ii) of property, or any part thereof, which directly or indirectly represented in that defendant’s hands property received by him or her in that connection, whether any such gift was made before or after the commencement of this Act;

“confiscation order”

Between $2 billion and $8 billion are laundered every year through South African organizations, with the money coming from narcotics, kidnapping, fraud, stolen vehicles, human trafficking, diamonds, etc. There is a close nexus between terrorist groups and criminal gangs. Money laundering became a criminal offense under the Proceeds of Crime Act, passed on 6 November 1996. According to Chapter V, Article 33, the penalties for illegal financial transactions are maximum imprisonment of thirty years and a fine, depending on the seriousness of the offense. The government passed subsequent amendments and acts to tackle the problem more effectively. There were also court cases challenging the provisions of earlier acts. Source United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/legal_library/za/legal _library_1998-09-27_1998-68.html.

means an order referred to in section 8 (1); “defendant” means a person against whom a prosecution for an offence has been instituted, irrespective of whether he or she has been convicted or not, and includes a person referred to in section 15 (1) (b); “fixed date” in relation to a defendant (a) if a prosecution for an offence has been instituted against the defendant, means the date on which such prosecution has been instituted; or (b) if a restraint order has been made against the defendant, means the date of such restraint order, whichever is the earlier date;

“interest” Chapter 1—Application of Act includes any right; 1. Definitions (1) In this Act, unless the context indicates otherwise—

“Minister” means the Minister of Justice;

“affected gift” “proceeds” means any gift—

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in relation to an offence, means any property or part thereof which was derived directly or indirectly as a result of (a) the commission in the Republic of such offence; or (b) any act or omission outside the Republic which, if it had occurred in the Republic, would have constituted such an offence, and includes any property representing property so derived;

“property” means money or any other movable, immovable, corporeal or incorporeal thing and includes any interest therein and all proceeds thereof; “realizable property” means property referred to in section 4; “restraint order” means an order referred to in section 16 (1); “superior court” means a provincial or local division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, and includes, for the purpose of sections 14 to 18, any judge thereof.

son who transfers or grants to any other person any interest in the property; (c) to anything received in connection with an offence shall be construed as a reference also to anything received both in that connection and in some other connection.

2. Persons Who Have Benefited from Crime For the purposes of this Act, a person has benefited from crime if he or she has at any time, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, received any payment or other reward in connection with any criminal activity carried on by him or her or by any other person. 3. Proceeds of Crime For the purposes of this Act, any payment or other reward received or held by the defendant or over which the defendant has effective control at any time, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, in connection with any criminal activity carried on by him or her or any other person, shall be his or her proceeds of crime. 4. Realizable Property (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), the following property shall be realizable in terms of this Act, namely— (a) any property held by the defendant concerned; and (b) any property held by a person to whom that defendant has directly or indirectly made any affected gift.

(2) In this Act, except where it is inconsistent with the context or clearly inappropriate, any reference (a) to a person who holds property shall be construed as a reference to a person who has any interest in the property, and— (i) if the estate of such person has been sequestrated, also to the executor of his or her insolvent estate; or (ii) if such person is a company or other juristic person which is being wound up, also to the liquidator thereof; (b) to a person who transfers property to any other person shall be construed as a reference to a per-

(2) Property shall not be realizable property if a declaration of forfeiture is in force in respect thereof. 5. Value of Property (1) For the purposes of this Act, the value of property, other than money, in relation to any person holding the property, shall be (a) where any other person holds an interest in the property

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(i) the market value of the property; less (ii) the amount required to discharge any encumbrance on the property; and (b) where no other person holds an interest in the property, the market value of the property.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), any reference in this Act to the value at a particular time of a payment or reward, shall be construed as a reference to (a) the value of the payment or reward at the time when the recipient received it, as adjusted to take into account subsequent fluctuations in the value of money; or (b) where subsection (3) applies, the value mentioned in that subsection, whichever is the greater value.

(3) If at the particular time the recipient holds (a) the property, other than cash, which he or she received, the value concerned shall be the value of the property at the particular time; or (b) property, or any part thereof, which directly or indirectly represents in his or her hands the property which he or she received, the value concerned shall be the value of the property, in so far as it represents the property which he or she received, at the relevant time.

6. Gifts (1) For the purposes of this Act, a defendant shall be deemed to have made a gift if he or she has transferred any property to any other person directly or indirectly for a consideration the value of which is significantly less than the value of the consideration supplied by the defendant. (2) For the purposes of section 10 (2) the gift which a defendant is deemed to have made shall consist of that share in the property transferred by the defendant which is equal to the difference between the value of that property as a whole and the consideration received by the defendant in return.

7. Conclusion of Proceedings against Defendant For the purposes of this Act, the proceedings contemplated in terms of this Act against a defendant shall be concluded when— (a) the defendant is acquitted or found not guilty of an offence; (b) subject to section 8 (2), the court convicting the defendant of an offence, sentences the defendant without making a confiscation order against him or her; (c) the conviction in respect of an offence is set aside on review or appeal; or (d ) the defendant satisfies the confiscation order made against him or her.

Chapter 2—Confiscation Orders 8. Confiscation Orders (1) Whenever a defendant is convicted of an offence the court convicting the defendant may, on the application of the public prosecutor, enquire into any benefit which the defendant may have derived from such offence or any related criminal activity and, if the court finds that the defendant has so benefited, the court may, in addition to any punishment which it may impose in respect of the offence, make an order against the defendant for the payment to the State of such amount as it may consider appropriate, which amount— (a) shall not exceed the value of the defendant’s proceeds of such offence or any related criminal activity as determined by the court in accordance with the provisions of this Act; or (b) if the court is satisfied that the amount which might be realized as contemplated in section 10 (1) is less than the value referred to in paragraph (a), shall not exceed an amount which in the opinion of the court might be so realized.

(2) A court convicting a defendant may, when passing sentence, indicate that it will hold an enquiry contemplated in subsection (1) at a later stage if

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(a) it is satisfied that such enquiry will unreasonably delay the proceedings in sentencing the defendant; or (b) the public prosecutor applies to the court to first sentence the defendant and the court is satisfied that it is reasonable and justifiable to do so in the circumstances.

rewards received by him or her at any time, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, in connection with the criminal activity carried on by him or her or any other person. (2) In determining the value of a defendant’s proceeds of crime the court shall (a) where it has made a declaration of forfeiture or where a declaration of forfeiture has previously been made in respect of property which is proved to the satisfaction of the court— (i) to have been the property which the defendant received in connection with the criminal activity carried on by him or her or any other person; or (ii) to have been property, or any part thereof, which directly or indirectly represented in the defendant’s hands the property which he or she received in that connection, leave the property out of account; (b) where a confiscation order has previously been made against the defendant leave out of account those proceeds of crime which are proved to the satisfaction of the court to have been taken into account in determining the amount to be recovered under that confiscation order.

(3) If the judicial officer who convicted the defendant is absent or for any other reason not available, any judicial officer of the same court may consider an application referred to in subsection (1) and hold an enquiry referred to in that subsection and he or she may in such proceedings take such steps as the judicial officer who is absent or not available could lawfully have taken. (4) No application referred to in subsection (1) shall be made without the written authority of the attorney-general concerned. (5) A court before which proceedings under this section are pending, may (a) in order to make a confiscation order (i) refer to the evidence and proceedings at the trial; (ii) hear such further oral evidence as the court may deem fit; (iii) direct the public prosecutor to tender to the court a statement referred to in section 11 (1) (a); and (iv) direct a defendant to tender to the court a statement referred to in subsection (3) (a) of that section; (b) subject to subsection (1) (b) or (3) (b) of section 11, adjourn such proceedings to any day on such conditions not inconsistent with a provision of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977), as the court may deem fit.

9. Value of Proceeds of Crime (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), the value of a defendant’s proceeds of crime shall be the sum of the values of the payments or other

10. Amounts Which Might Be Realized (1) For the purpose of section 8 (1) (b) or 11 (3) (a), the amount which might be realized at the time of the making of a confiscation order against a defendant shall be the amount equal to the sum of (a) the values at that time of all realizable property held by the defendant; and (b) the values at that time of all affected gifts made by the defendant, less the sum of all obligations (if any) of the defendant having priority and which the court may recognize for this purpose.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 5 (1) but subject to the provisions of section 6 (2), the value of an affected gift at the time of the making of the relevant confiscation order shall be

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(a) the value of the affected gift at the time when the recipient received it, as adjusted to take into account subsequent fluctuations in the value of money; or (b) here subsection (3) applies, the value mentioned in that subsection, whichever is the greater value.

(3) If at the time of the making of the relevant confiscation order the recipient holds (a) the property, other than cash, which he or she received, the value concerned shall be the value of the property at that time; or (b) the property, or any part thereof, which directly or indirectly represents in his or her hands the property which he or she received, the value concerned shall be the value of the property, in so far as it represents the property which he or she received, at the time.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (1), an obligation has priority at the time of the making of the relevant confiscation order (a) if it is an obligation of the defendant, where he or she has been convicted by a court of any offence (i) to pay a fine imposed before that time by the court; or (ii) to pay any other amount under any resultant order made before that time by the court; (b) if it is an obligation which (i) if the estate of the defendant had at that time been sequestrated; or (ii) where the defendant is a company or other juristic person, if such company or juristic person is at that time being wound up, would be payable in pursuance of any secured or preferment claim against the insolvent estate or against such company or juristic person, as the case may be.

(5) A court shall not determine the amounts which might be realized as contemplated in subsection (1) unless it has afforded all persons holding any interest in the property concerned an opportunity

to make representations to it in connection with the realization of that property. 11. Statements Relating to Proceeds of Crime (1) (a) The public prosecutor may or, if so directed by the court, shall tender to the court a statement in writing under oath or affirmation by him or her or any other person in connection with any matter which is being enquired into by the court under section 8 (1), or which relates to the determination of the value of a defendant’s proceeds of crime. (b) A copy of such statement shall be served on the defendant at least 14 days before the date on which that statement is to be tendered to the court. (2) (a) The defendant may dispute the correctness of any allegation contained in a statement referred to in subsection (1) (a), and if the defendant does so dispute the correctness of any such allegation, he or she shall state the grounds on which he or she relies. (b) In so far as the defendant does not dispute the correctness of any allegation contained in such statement, that allegation shall be deemed to be conclusive proof of the matter to which it relates. (3) (a) A defendant may or, if so directed by the court, shall tender to the court a statement in writing under oath or affirmation by him or her or by any other person in connection with any matter which relates to the determination of the amount which might be realized as contemplated in section 10 (1). (b) A copy of such statement shall be served on the public prosecutor at least 14 days before the date on which that statement is to be tendered to the court. (4) (a) The public prosecutor may admit the correctness of any allegation contained in a statement referred to in subsection (3) (a). (b) In so far as the public prosecutor admits the correctness of any allegation contained in such statement, that allegation shall be deemed to

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earliest time at which he or she held it, as a payment or other reward in connection with the offence or any related criminal activity committed by him or her; (b) any expenditure incurred by him or her since the beginning of the period contemplated in paragraph (a) was met out of payments received by him or her in connection with the offence or any related criminal activity committed by him or her; and (c) for the purpose of determining the value of any property (i) received by him or her at any time as a reward in connection with the offence or any related criminal activity committed by him or her or by any other person; or (ii) presumed in terms of paragraph (a) to have been received by him or her as a reward in connection with the offence or any related criminal activity committed by him or her, he or she received that property free of any other interest therein.

be conclusive proof of the matter to which it relates.

12. Presumptions Relating to Proceeds of Crime (1) For the purposes of an enquiry under section 8 (1) and, if it is found that the defendant did not at the fixed date, or since the beginning of a period of seven years before the fixed date, have legitimate sources of income sufficient to justify the interests in any property that the defendant holds, in determining whether the defendant has derived a benefit from an offence or related criminal activity, it shall be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that such interests form part of such a benefit. (2) For the purposes of an enquiry under section 8 (1) and, if it is found that a court had ordered the defendant to disclose any facts under section 16 (7) and that the defendant had without sufficient cause failed to disclose such facts or had, after being so ordered, furnished false information, knowing such information to be false or not believing it to be true, it shall be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, in determining (a) whether the defendant has derived a benefit from an offence, that any property to which the information relates, forms part of such a benefit; and (b) the value of his or her proceeds of crime, that any property to which the information relates, is held by the defendant as a payment or reward in connection with the offence or related criminal activity.

(3) For the purposes of an enquiry under section 8 (1) and, if it is found that a defendant has benefited from an offence in determining the value of his or her proceeds of crime, it shall be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary that

13. Effect of Confiscation Orders (1) A confiscation order made (a) by a magistrate’s court, other than a regional court, shall have the effect of a civil judgment of that court; (b) by a regional court shall have the effect of a civil judgment of the magistrate’s court of the district in which the relevant trial took place.

(2) Where a superior court makes a confiscation order—

(a) any property (i) held by him or her at any time at, or since, his or her conviction; or (ii) transferred to him or her at any time since the beginning of a period of seven years before the fixed date, was received by him or her at the

(a) the confiscation order shall have the effect of a civil judgment of that court; or (b) the presiding judge may direct the registrar of that court to forward a certified copy of the confiscation order to the clerk of the magistrate’s court designated by the presiding judge or, if no such court is designated, to the clerk of the magistrate’s court within the area of jurisdiction of which the offence concerned was committed, and, on receipt of the said copy of the confisca-

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tion order the clerk of the magistrate’s court concerned shall register the confiscation order whereupon it shall have the effect of a civil judgment of that magistrate’s court.

14. Procedure Where Person Absconds (1) If a person has absconded and the proceedings against him or her cannot be resumed within a period of six months due to his or her continued absence and the court is satisfied that (a) the person had been charged with an offence, that a restraint order had been made against him or her or that there would have been sufficient evidence for putting him or her on trial for an offence were it not for his or her absence; and (b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that a confiscation order would have been made against him or her, the court may, on the application by the Attorney-General or any public prosecutor authorized thereto in writing by him or her, enquire into any benefit the person may have derived from that offence or any related criminal activity.

(2) The court conducting an enquiry contemplated in subsection (1) may (a) if the court finds that the person referred to in that subsection has so benefited, make a confiscation order and the provisions of this Chapter shall, with the necessary changes, apply to the making of such order; (b) if a curator bonis has not been appointed in respect of any of the property concerned, appoint a curator bonis in respect of realizable property; and (c) authorize the realization of the property concerned in terms of Chapter 4.

(3) A court shall not exercise its powers under subsection (2) (a) and (c) unless it has afforded all persons having any interest in the property concerned an opportunity to make representations to it in connection with the making of such orders.

[. . .] Chapter 5—Offences 28. Money Laundering Any person who, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that property is or forms part of the proceeds of crime (a) enters into any agreement or engages in any arrangement or transaction with anyone in connection with that property, whether such agreement, arrangement or transaction is legally enforceable or not; or (b) performs any other act in connection with such property, whether it is performed independently or in concert with any other person, which has or is likely to have the effect (i) of concealing or disguising the nature, source, location, disposition or movement of the said property or its ownership or any interest which anyone may have in respect thereof; or (ii) of enabling or assisting any person who has committed or commits an offence, whether in the Republic or elsewhere— (aa) to avoid prosecution; or (bb) to remove or diminish any property acquired directly or indirectly as a result of the commission of an offence, shall be guilty of an offence.

29. Assisting Another to Benefit from Proceeds of Crime Any person who knowing, or having reasonable grounds to believe, that another person has obtained the proceeds of crime, enters into any agreement with anyone or engages in any arrangement whereby (a) the retention or the control by or on behalf of the said other person of the proceeds of crime is facilitated; or (b) the said proceeds of crime are used to make funds available to the said other person or to acquire property on his or her behalf or to benefit him or her in any other way, shall be guilty of an offence.

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30. Acquisition, Possession or Use of Proceeds of Crime Any person who acquires or uses or has possession of property knowing, or having reasonable grounds to believe, that it is or forms part of the proceeds of crime of another person, shall be guilty of an offence, unless such a person reports his or her suspicion or knowledge as contemplated in section 31. 31. Failure to Report Suspicion Regarding Proceeds of Crime (1) Any person who carries on a business or is in charge of a business undertaking who has reason to suspect that any property which comes into his or her possession or the possession of the said business undertaking forms the proceeds of crime, shall be obliged to report his or her suspicion and the grounds on which it rests, within a reasonable time to a person designated by the Minister and shall take all reasonable steps to discharge such obligation: Provided that nothing in this section shall be construed so as to infringe upon the common law right to professional privilege between an attorney and his or her client in respect of information communicated to the attorney so as to enable him or her to provide advice, to defend or to render other legal assistance to the client in connection with an offence under any law, of which he or she is charged, in respect of which he or she has been arrested or summoned to appear in court or in respect of which an investigation with a view to instituting criminal proceedings is being conducted against him or her. (2) Any person who fails to comply with an obligation contemplated in subsection (I) shall be guilty of an offence. (3) (a) No obligation as to secrecy and no other restriction on the disclosure of information, whether imposed by any law, the common law or any agreement, shall affect any obligation imposed by subsection (1). (b) No liability based on a breach of an obligation as to secrecy or any restriction on the disclo-

sure of information, whether imposed by any law, the common law or any agreement, shall arise from a disclosure of any information in compliance with any obligation imposed by subsection (1).

32. Misuse of Information, Failure to Comply with Order of Court, and Hindering Person in Performance of Functions (1) Any person who, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe (a) that information has been disclosed under the provisions of this Act; or (b) that an investigation is being, or may be, conducted as a result of such a disclosure, directly or indirectly alerts another or brings information to the attention of another which will or is likely to prejudice such an investigation, shall be guilty of an offence.

(2) Any person who intentionally refuses or fails to comply with an order of court made in terms of this Act, shall be guilty of an offence. (3) Any person who hinders a curator bonis, a police officer or any other person in the exercise, performance or carrying out of his or her powers, functions or duties under this Act, shall be guilty of an offence. 33. Penalties (1) Any person convicted of an offence contemplated in section 28, 29 or 30 shall be liable to a fine, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 30 years. (2) Any person convicted of an offence contemplated in (a) section 31, 32 (1) or (2) shall be liable to a fine, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 years; (b) section 32 (3) shall be liable to a fine, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years.

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[. . .] (3)

27. United States Code, Title 18—Crimes and Criminal Procedure (4)

Title 18, Part I, Chapter 47, of the United States Code addresses fraud and false statements. Sections 1028, 1030, and 1037 address various aspects of fraud. Section 1028 deals with fraud in reference to the production, possession, use, or transfer of false identification documents. This section also covers the material, equipment, or device used to produce such documents. Also addressed in this section is the use of another person’s identification with the intent to commit a criminal act. Sections 1030 and 1037 address computer-related fraud and applies to individuals who “having knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access” or an individual who “accesses a protected computer without authorization.”

(5)

(6)

Source FindLaw, http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/casecode/uscodes/ 18/toc.html.

(7)

Part I—Crimes Chapter 47—Fraud and False Statements Section 1028. Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Identification Documents, Authentication Features, and Information (a) Whoever, in a circumstance described in subsection (c) of this section— (1) knowingly and without lawful authority produces an identification document, authentication feature, or a false identification document; (2) knowingly transfers an identification document, authentication feature, or a false identification document knowing that such document or fea-

(8)

ture was stolen or produced without lawful authority; knowingly possesses with intent to use unlawfully or transfer unlawfully five or more identification documents (other than those issued lawfully for the use of the possessor), authentication features, or false identification documents; knowingly possesses an identification document (other than one issued lawfully for the use of the possessor), authentication feature, or a false identification document, with the intent such document or feature be used to defraud the United States; knowingly produces, transfers, or possesses a document-making implement or authentication feature with the intent such document-making implement or authentication feature will be used in the production of a false identification document or another document-making implement or authentication feature which will be so used; knowingly possesses an identification document or authentication feature that is or appears to be an identification document or authentication feature of the United States which is stolen or produced without lawful authority knowing that such document or feature was stolen or produced without such authority; knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law; or knowingly traffics in false authentication features for use in false identification documents, document-making implements, or means of identification; shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

(b) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) of this section is— (1) except as provided in paragraphs (3) and (4), a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 15 years, or both, if the offense is—

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property used or intended to be used to commit the offense; and (6) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, in any other case.

(A) the production or transfer of an identification document, authentication feature, or false identification document that is or appears to be— (i) an identification document or authentication feature issued by or under the authority of the United States; or (ii) a birth certificate, or a driver’s license or personal identification card;

(B) the production or transfer of more than five identification documents, authentication features, or false identification documents; (C) an offense under paragraph (5) of such subsection; or (D) an offense under paragraph (7) of such subsection that involves the transfer or use of 1 or more means of identification if, as a result of the offense, any individual committing the offense obtains anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more during any 1-year period; (2) except as provided in paragraphs (3) and (4), a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than three years, or both, if the offense is— (A) any other production, transfer, or use of a means of identification, an identification document, authentication feature, or a false identification document; or (B) an offense under paragraph (3) or (7) of such subsection; (3) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both, if the offense is committed— (A) to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a)(2)); (B) in connection with a crime of violence (as defined in section 924(c)(3)); or (C) after a prior conviction under this section becomes final; (4) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 25 years, or both, if the offense is committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331(1) of this title); (5) in the case of any offense under subsection (a), forfeiture to the United States of any personal

(c) The circumstance referred to in subsection (a) of this section is that— (1) the identification document, authentication feature, or false identification document is or appears to be issued by or under the authority of the United States or the document-making implement is designed or suited for making such an identification document, authentication feature, or false identification document; (2) the offense is an offense under subsection (a)(4) of this section; or (3) either— (A) the production, transfer, possession, or use prohibited by this section is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce, including the transfer of a document by electronic means; or (B) the means of identification, identification document, false identification document, or document-making implement is transported in the mail in the course of the production, transfer, possession, or use prohibited by this section.

(d) In this section— (1) the term “authentication feature” means any hologram, watermark, certification, symbol, code, image, sequence of numbers or letters, or other feature that either individually or in combination with another feature is used by the issuing authority on an identification document, document-making implement, or means of identification to determine if the document is counterfeit, altered, or otherwise falsified; (2) the term “document-making implement” means any implement, impression, template, computer file, computer disc, electronic device, or computer hardware or software, that is specifically configured or primarily used for making an identification document, a false identification document, or another document-making implement;

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(3) the term “identification document” means a document made or issued by or under the authority of the United States Government, a State, political subdivision of a State, a foreign government, political subdivision of a foreign government, an international governmental or an international quasi-governmental organization which, when completed with information concerning a particular individual, is of a type intended or commonly accepted for the purpose of identification of individuals; (4) the term “false identification document” means a document of a type intended or commonly accepted for the purposes of identification of individuals that— (A) is not issued by or under the authority of a governmental entity or was issued under the authority of a governmental entity but was subsequently altered for purposes of deceit; and (B) appears to be issued by or under the authority of the United States Government, a State, a political subdivision of a State, a foreign government, a political subdivision of a foreign government, or an international governmental or quasi-governmental organization; (5) the term “false authentication feature” means an authentication feature that— (A) is genuine in origin, but, without the authorization of the issuing authority, has been tampered with or altered for purposes of deceit; (B) is genuine, but has been distributed, or is intended for distribution, without the authorization of the issuing authority and not in connection with a lawfully made identification document, document-making implement, or means of identification to which such authentication feature is intended to be affixed or embedded by the respective issuing authority; or (C) appears to be genuine, but is not; (6) the term “issuing authority”— (A) means any governmental entity or agency that is authorized to issue identification docu-

ments, means of identification, or authentication features; and (B) includes the United States Government, a State, a political subdivision of a State, a foreign government, a political subdivision of a foreign government, or an international government or quasi-governmental organization; (7) the term “means of identification” means any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual, including any— (A) name, social security number, date of birth, official State or government issued driver’s license or identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number; (B) unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation; (C) unique electronic identification number, address, or routing code; or (D) telecommunication identifying information or access device (as defined in section 1029(e)); (8) the term “personal identification card” means an identification document issued by a State or local government solely for the purpose of identification; (9) the term “produce” includes alter, authenticate, or assemble; (10) the term “transfer” includes selecting an identification document, false identification document, or document-making implement and placing or directing the placement of such identification document, false identification document, or document-making implement on an online location where it is available to others; (11) the term “State” includes any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any other commonwealth, possession, or territory of the United States; and (12) the term “traffic” means— (A) to transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of, to another, as consideration for anything of value; or

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(B) to make or obtain control of with intent to so transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of.

(e) This section does not prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State, or of an intelligence agency of the United States, or any activity authorized under chapter 224 of this title. (f) Attempt and Conspiracy.—Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this section shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy. (g) Forfeiture Procedures.—The forfeiture of property under this section, including any seizure and disposition of the property and any related judicial or administrative proceeding, shall be governed by the provisions of section 413 (other than subsection (d) of that section) of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853). (h) Forfeiture; Disposition.—In the circumstance in which any person is convicted of a violation of subsection (a), the court shall order, in addition to the penalty prescribed, the forfeiture and destruction or other disposition of all illicit authentication features, identification documents, document-making implements, or means of identification. (i) Rule of Construction.—For purpose of subsection (a)(7), a single identification document or false identification document that contains 1 or more means of identification shall be construed to be 1 means of identification. Section 1030. Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers (a) Whoever—

(1) having knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access, and by means of such conduct having obtained information that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, or any restricted data, as defined in paragraph y. of section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with reason to believe that such information so obtained could be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation willfully communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains— (A) information contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or of a card issuer as defined in section 1602(n) of title 15, or contained in a file of a consumer reporting agency on a consumer, as such terms are defined in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.); (B) information from any department or agency of the United States; or (C) information from any protected computer if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign communication; (3) intentionally, without authorization to access any nonpublic computer of a department or agency of the United States, accesses such a computer of that department or agency that is exclusively for the use of the Government of the United States or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, is used by or for the Government of the United States and such conduct affects that use by or for the Government of the United States;

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(4) knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period; (5)(A)(i) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; (ii) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage; or (iii) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage; and (B) by conduct described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of subparagraph (A), caused (or, in the case of an attempted offense, would, if completed, have caused)— (i) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period (and, for purposes of an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the United States only, loss resulting from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more other protected computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value; (ii) the modification or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals; (iii) physical injury to any person; (iv) a threat to public health or safety; or (v) damage affecting a computer system used by or for a government entity in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security;

(6) knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics (as defined in section 1029) in any password or similar information through which a computer may be accessed without authorization, if— (A) such trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) such computer is used by or for the Government of the United States;

(7) with intent to extort from any person any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to cause damage to a protected computer; shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section. (b) Whoever attempts to commit an offense under subsection (a) of this section shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section. (c) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) or (b) of this section is— (1)(A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1) of this section which does not occur after a conviction for another offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph; and (B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1) of this section which occurs after a conviction for another offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph; (2)(A) except as provided in subparagraph (B), a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(5)(A)(iii), or (a)(6) of this section which does not occur after a conviction for another offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph; (B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(2), or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph, if— (i) the offense was committed for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain;

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(5)(A) if the offender knowingly or recklessly causes or attempts to cause serious bodily injury from conduct in violation of subsection (a)(5)(A)(i), a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both; and (B) if the offender knowingly or recklessly causes or attempts to cause death from conduct in violation of subsection (a)(5)(A)(i), a fine under this title or imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or both. (d)(1) The United States Secret Service shall, in addition to any other agency having such authority, have the authority to investigate offenses under this section. (2) The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall have primary authority to investigate offenses under subsection (a)(1) for any cases involving espionage, foreign counterintelligence, information protected against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, or Restricted Data (as that term is defined in section 11y of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(y)), except for offenses affecting the duties of the United States Secret Service pursuant to section 3056(a) of this title. (3) Such authority shall be exercised in accordance with an agreement which shall be entered into by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General.

(ii) the offense was committed in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State; or (iii) the value of the information obtained exceeds $5,000; and

(C) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(2), (a)(3) or (a)(6) of this section which occurs after a conviction for another offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph; (3)(A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(4) or (a)(7) of this section which does not occur after a conviction for another offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph; and (B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(4), (a)(5) (A)(iii), or (a)(7) of this section which occurs after a conviction for another offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph; (4)(A) except as provided in paragraph (5), a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(5)(A)(i), or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under that subsection; (B) a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(5)(A)(ii), or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under that subsection; (C) except as provided in paragraph (5), a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(5)(A)(i) or (a)(5)(A)(ii), or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under either subsection, that occurs after a conviction for another offense under this section; and

(e) As used in this section— (1) the term “computer” means an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device; (2) the term “protected computer” means a computer—

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(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Government, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a financial institution or the United States Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects that use by or for the financial institution or the Government; or (B) which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States; (3) the term “State” includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any other commonwealth, possession or territory of the United States; (4) the term “financial institution” means— (A) an institution, with deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; (B) the Federal Reserve or a member of the Federal Reserve including any Federal Reserve Bank; (C) a credit union with accounts insured by the National Credit Union Administration; (D) a member of the Federal home loan bank system and any home loan bank; (E) any institution of the Farm Credit System under the Farm Credit Act of 1971; (F) a broker-dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; (G) the Securities Investor Protection Corporation; (H) a branch or agency of a foreign bank (as such terms are defined in paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978); and (I) an organization operating under section 25 or section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act; (5) the term “financial record” means information derived from any record held by a financial institution pertaining to a customer’s relationship with the financial institution;

(6) the term “exceeds authorized access” means to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter; (7) the term “department of the United States” means the legislative or judicial branch of the Government or one of the executive departments enumerated in section 101 of title 5; (8) the term “damage” means any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information; (9) the term “government entity” includes the Government of the United States, any State or political subdivision of the United States, any foreign country, and any state, province, municipality, or other political subdivision of a foreign country; (10) the term “conviction” shall include a conviction under the law of any State for a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year, an element of which is unauthorized access, or exceeding authorized access, to a computer; (11) the term “loss” means any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service; and (12) the term “person” means any individual, firm, corporation, educational institution, financial institution, governmental entity, or legal or other entity. (f) This section does not prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State, or of an intelligence agency of the United States. (g) Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or

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other equitable relief. A civil action for a violation of this section may be brought only if the conduct involves 1 of the factors set forth in clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) of subsection (a)(5)(B). Damages for a violation involving only conduct described in subsection (a)(5)(B)(i) are limited to economic damages. No action may be brought under this subsection unless such action is begun within 2 years of the date of the act complained of or the date of the discovery of the damage. No action may be brought under this subsection for the negligent design or manufacture of computer hardware, computer software, or firmware. (h) The Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury shall report to the Congress annually, during the first 3 years following the date of the enactment of this subsection, concerning investigations and prosecutions under subsection (a)(5).

combination of such accounts or domain names, or (5) falsely represents oneself to be the registrant or the legitimate successor in interest to the registrant of 5 or more Internet Protocol addresses, and intentionally initiates the transmission of multiple commercial electronic mail messages from such addresses, or conspires to do so, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).

(b) Penalties.—The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) is—

Section 1037. Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Electronic Mail (a) In General.—Whoever, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly— (1) accesses a protected computer without authorization, and intentionally initiates the transmission of multiple commercial electronic mail messages from or through such computer, (2) uses a protected computer to relay or retransmit multiple commercial electronic mail messages, with the intent to deceive or mislead recipients, or any Internet access service, as to the origin of such messages, (3) materially falsifies header information in multiple commercial electronic mail messages and intentionally initiates the transmission of such messages, (4) registers, using information that materially falsifies the identity of the actual registrant, for five or more electronic mail accounts or online user accounts or two or more domain names, and intentionally initiates the transmission of multiple commercial electronic mail messages from any

(1) a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both, if— (A) the offense is committed in furtherance of any felony under the laws of the United States or of any State; or (B) the defendant has previously been convicted under this section or section 1030, or under the law of any State for conduct involving the transmission of multiple commercial electronic mail messages or unauthorized access to a computer system; (2) a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or both, if— (A) the offense is an offense under subsection (a)(1); (B) the offense is an offense under subsection (a)(4) and involved 20 or more falsified electronic mail or online user account registrations, or 10 or more falsified domain name registrations; (C) the volume of electronic mail messages transmitted in furtherance of the offense exceeded 2,500 during any 24-hour period, 25,000 during any 30-day period, or 250,000 during any 1-year period; (D) the offense caused loss to one or more persons aggregating $5,000 or more in value during any 1-year period; (E) as a result of the offense any individual committing the offense obtained anything of value aggregating $5,000 or more during any 1-year period; or

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(F) the offense was undertaken by the defendant in concert with three or more other persons with respect to whom the defendant occupied a position of organizer or leader; and (3) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both, in any other case.

(c) Forfeiture.— (1) In general.—The court, in imposing sentence on a person who is convicted of an offense under this section, shall order that the defendant forfeit to the United States— (A) any property, real or personal, constituting or traceable to gross proceeds obtained from such offense; and (B) any equipment, software, or other technology used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the commission of such offense. (2) Procedures.—The procedures set forth in section 413 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 853), other than subsection (d) of that section, and in Rule 32.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, shall apply to all stages of a criminal forfeiture proceeding under this section.

(d) Definitions.—In this section: (1) Loss.—The term “loss” has the meaning given that term in section 1030(e) of this title. (2) Materially.—For purposes of paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a), header information or registration information is materially falsified if it is altered or concealed in a manner that would impair the ability of a recipient of the message, an Internet access service processing the message on behalf of a recipient, a person alleging a violation of this section, or a law enforcement agency to identify, locate, or respond to a person who initiated the electronic mail message or to investigate the alleged violation. (3) Multiple.—The term “multiple” means more than 100 electronic mail messages during a 24hour period, more than 1,000 electronic mail messages during a 30-day period, or more than 10,000 electronic mail messages during a 1-year period.

(4) Other terms.—Any other term has the meaning given that term by section 3 of the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003.

28. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2000 The United Nations (UN) has been a vanguard in taking steps toward preventing organized crime. On 29 September 2003, the UN convention took a measured step in this direction. The convention was adopted by a resolution of the General Assembly on 15 November 2000. Signed by 147 members, the convention became operational in 2003. The majority of the members had signed it by December 2000. The reservation of some members was duly noted. The purpose of the convention, “to promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime,” is specified in Article 1, Source United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/ final_documents_2/convention_eng.pdf.

Article 1 Statement of Purpose The purpose of this Convention is to promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime more effectively. Article 2 Use of Terms For the purposes of this Convention: (a) “Organized criminal group” shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this

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Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit; (b) “Serious crime” shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty; (c) “Structured group” shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure; (d) “Property” shall mean assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets; (e) “Proceeds of crime” shall mean any property derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence; (f) “Freezing” or “seizure” shall mean temporarily prohibiting the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of property or temporarily assuming custody or control of property on the basis of an order issued by a court or other competent authority; (g) “Confiscation”, which includes forfeiture where applicable, shall mean the permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority; (h) “Predicate offence” shall mean any offence as a result of which proceeds have been generated that may become the subject of an offence as defined in article 6 of this Convention; (i) “Controlled delivery” shall mean the technique of allowing illicit or suspect consignments to pass out of, through or into the territory of one or more States, with the knowledge and under the supervision of their competent authorities, with a view to the investigation of an offence and the identification of persons involved in the commission of the offence; (j) “Regional economic integration organization” shall mean an organization constituted by sovereign States of a given region, to which its member States have transferred competence in respect of

matters governed by this Convention and which has been duly authorized, in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to it; references to “States Parties” under this Convention shall apply to such organizations within the limits of their competence.

Article 3 Scope of Application 1. This Convention shall apply, except as otherwise stated herein, to the prevention, investigation and prosecution of: (a) The offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this Convention; and (b) Serious crime as defined in article 2 of this Convention; where the offence is transnational in nature and involves an organized criminal group.

2. For the purpose of paragraph 1 of this article, an offence is transnational in nature if: (a) It is committed in more than one State; (b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another State; (c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one State; or (d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State.

Article 4 Protection of Sovereignty 1. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States. 2. Nothing in this Convention entitles a State Party to undertake in the territory of another State the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions that are reserved exclusively for the authorities of that other State by its domestic law.

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Article 5 Criminalization of Participation in an Organized Criminal Group 1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) Either or both of the following as criminal offences distinct from those involving the attempt or completion of the criminal activity: (i) Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious crime for a purpose relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining of a financial or other material benefit and, where required by domestic law, involving an act undertaken by one of the participants in furtherance of the agreement or involving an organized criminal group; (ii) Conduct by a person who, with knowledge of either the aim and general criminal activity of an organized criminal group or its intention to commit the crimes in question, takes an active part in: a. Criminal activities of the organized criminal group; b. Other activities of the organized criminal group in the knowledge that his or her participation will contribute to the achievement of the abovedescribed criminal aim;

(b) Organizing, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counselling the commission of serious crime involving an organized criminal group.

2. The knowledge, intent, aim, purpose or agreement referred to in paragraph 1 of this article may be inferred from objective factual circumstances. 3. States Parties whose domestic law requires involvement of an organized criminal group for purposes of the offences established in accordance with paragraph 1 (a) (i) of this article shall ensure that their domestic law covers all serious crimes involving organized criminal groups. Such States Parties, as well as States Parties whose domestic law requires an act in furtherance of the agreement

for purposes of the offences established in accordance with paragraph 1 (a) (i) of this article, shall so inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the time of their signature or of deposit of their instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to this Convention. Article 6 Criminalization of the Laundering of Proceeds of Crime 1. Each State Party shall adopt, in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) (i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of helping any person who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her action; (ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime; (b) Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system: (i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property is the proceeds of crime; (ii) Participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with this article.

2. For purposes of implementing or applying paragraph 1 of this article: (a) Each State Party shall seek to apply paragraph 1 of this article to the widest range of predicate offences;

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(b) Each State Party shall include as predicate offences all serious crime as defined in article 2 of this Convention and the offences established in accordance with articles 5, 8 and 23 of this Convention. In the case of States Parties whose legislation sets out a list of specific predicate offences, they shall, at a minimum, include in such list a comprehensive range of offences associated with organized criminal groups; (c) For the purposes of subparagraph (b), predicate offences shall include offences committed both within and outside the jurisdiction of the State Party in question. However, offences committed outside the jurisdiction of a State Party shall constitute predicate offences only when the relevant conduct is a criminal offence under the domestic law of the State where it is committed and would be a criminal offence under the domestic law of the State Party implementing or applying this article had it been committed there; (d) Each State Party shall furnish copies of its laws that give effect to this article and of any subsequent changes to such laws or a description thereof to the Secretary-General of the United Nations; (e) If required by fundamental principles of the domestic law of a State Party, it may be provided that the offences set forth in paragraph 1 of this article do not apply to the persons who committed the predicate offence; (f) Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of an offence set forth in paragraph 1 of this article may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.

Article 7 Measures to Combat Money-Laundering 1. Each State Party: (a) Shall institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for banks and nonbank financial institutions and, where appropriate, other bodies particularly susceptible to money laundering, within its competence, in

order to deter and detect all forms of money laundering, which regime shall emphasize requirements for customer identification, recordkeeping and the reporting of suspicious transactions; (b) Shall, without prejudice to articles 18 and 27 of this Convention, ensure that administrative, regulatory, law enforcement and other authorities dedicated to combating money-laundering (including, where appropriate under domestic law, judicial authorities) have the ability to cooperate and exchange information at the national and international levels within the conditions prescribed by its domestic law and, to that end, shall consider the establishment of a financial intelligence unit to serve as a national centre for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding potential money-laundering.

2. States Parties shall consider implementing feasible measures to detect and monitor the movement of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments across their borders, subject to safeguards to ensure proper use of information and without impeding in any way the movement of legitimate capital. Such measures may include a requirement that individuals and businesses report the cross-border transfer of substantial quantities of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments. 3. In establishing a domestic regulatory and supervisory regime under the terms of this article, and without prejudice to any other article of this Convention, States Parties are called upon to use as a guideline the relevant initiatives of regional, interregional and multilateral organizations against money-laundering. 4. States Parties shall endeavour to develop and promote global, regional, subregional and bilateral cooperation among judicial, law enforcement and financial regulatory authorities in order to combat moneylaundering.

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Article 8

Article 9

Criminalization of Corruption 1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:

Measures against Corruption 1. In addition to the measures set forth in article 8 of this Convention, each State Party shall, to the extent appropriate and consistent with its legal system, adopt legislative, administrative or other effective measures to promote integrity and to prevent, detect and punish the corruption of public officials.

(a) The promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; (b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.

2. Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences conduct referred to in paragraph 1 of this article involving a foreign public official or international civil servant. Likewise, each State Party shall consider establishing as criminal offences other forms of corruption. 3. Each State Party shall also adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence participation as an accomplice in an offence established in accordance with this article. 4. For the purposes of paragraph 1 of this article and article 9 of this Convention, “public official” shall mean a public official or a person who provides a public service as defined in the domestic law and as applied in the criminal law of the State Party in which the person in question performs that function.

2. Each State Party shall take measures to ensure effective action by its authorities in the prevention, detection and punishment of the corruption of public officials, including providing such authorities with adequate independence to deter the exertion of inappropriate influence on their actions. Article 10 Liability of Legal Persons 1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, consistent with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for participation in serious crimes involving an organized criminal group and for the offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this Convention. 2. Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, the liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative. 3. Such liability shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural persons who have committed the offences. 4. Each State Party shall, in particular, ensure that legal persons held liable in accordance with this article are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.

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Article 11 Prosecution, Adjudication and Sanctions 1. Each State Party shall make the commission of an offence established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this Convention liable to sanctions that take into account the gravity of that offence. 2. Each State Party shall endeavour to ensure that any discretionary legal powers under its domestic law relating to the prosecution of persons for offences covered by this Convention are exercised to maximize the effectiveness of law enforcement measures in respect of those offences and with due regard to the need to deter the commission of such offences. 3. In the case of offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this Convention, each State Party shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with its domestic law and with due regard to the rights of the defence, to seek to ensure that conditions imposed in connection with decisions on release pending trial or appeal take into consideration the need to ensure the presence of the defendant at subsequent criminal proceedings. 4. Each State Party shall ensure that its courts or other competent authorities bear in mind the grave nature of the offences covered by this Convention when considering the eventuality of early release or parole of persons convicted of such offences. 5. Each State Party shall, where appropriate, establish under its domestic law a long statute of limitations period in which to commence proceedings for any offence covered by this Convention and a longer period where the alleged offender has evaded the administration of justice. 6. Nothing contained in this Convention shall affect the principle that the description of the offences established in accordance with this Convention and of the applicable legal defences or

other legal principles controlling the lawfulness of conduct is reserved to the domestic law of a State Party and that such offences shall be prosecuted and punished in accordance with that law. Article 12 Confiscation and Seizure 1. States Parties shall adopt, to the greatest extent possible within their domestic legal systems, such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of: (a) Proceeds of crime derived from offences covered by this Convention or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds; (b) Property, equipment or other instrumentalities used in or destined for use in offences covered by this Convention.

2. States Parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to enable the identification, tracing, freezing or seizure of any item referred to in paragraph 1 of this article for the purpose of eventual confiscation. 3. If proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted, in part or in full, into other property, such property shall be liable to the measures referred to in this article instead of the proceeds. 4. If proceeds of crime have been intermingled with property acquired from legitimate sources, such property shall, without prejudice to any powers relating to freezing or seizure, be liable to confiscation up to the assessed value of the intermingled proceeds. 5. Income or other benefits derived from proceeds of crime, from property into which proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted or from property with which proceeds of crime have been intermingled shall also be liable to the measures referred to in this article, in the same manner and to the same extent as proceeds of crime.

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6. For the purposes of this article and article 13 of this Convention, each State Party shall empower its courts or other competent authorities to order that bank, financial or commercial records be made available or be seized. States Parties shall not decline to act under the provisions of this paragraph on the ground of bank secrecy.

order of confiscation issued by a court in the territory of the requesting State Party in accordance with article 12, paragraph 1, of this Convention insofar as it relates to proceeds of crime, property, equipment or other instrumentalities referred to in article 12, paragraph 1, situated in the territory of the requested State Party.

7. States Parties may consider the possibility of requiring that an offender demonstrate the lawful origin of alleged proceeds of crime or other property liable to confiscation, to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with the principles of their domestic law and with the nature of the judicial and other proceedings. 8. The provisions of this article shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of bona fide third parties.

2. Following a request made by another State Party having jurisdiction over an offence covered by this Convention, the requested State Party shall take measures to identify, trace and freeze or seize proceeds of crime, property, equipment or other instrumentalities referred to in article 12, paragraph 1, of this Convention for the purpose of eventual confiscation to be ordered either by the requesting State Party or, pursuant to a request under paragraph 1 of this article, by the requested State Party.

9. Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the measures to which it refers shall be defined and implemented in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the domestic law of a State Party.

3. The provisions of article 18 of this Convention are applicable, mutatis mutandis, to this article. In addition to the information specified in article 18, paragraph 15, requests made pursuant to this article shall contain:

Article 13 International Cooperation for Purposes of Confiscation 1. A State Party that has received a request from another State Party having jurisdiction over an offence covered by this Convention for confiscation of proceeds of crime, property, equipment or other instrumentalities referred to in article 12, paragraph 1, of this Convention situated in its territory shall, to the greatest extent possible within its domestic legal system: (a) Submit the request to its competent authorities for the purpose of obtaining an order of confiscation and, if such an order is granted, give effect to it; or (b) Submit to its competent authorities, with a view to giving effect to it to the extent requested, an

(a) In the case of a request pertaining to paragraph 1 (a) of this article, a description of the property to be confiscated and a statement of the facts relied upon by the requesting State Party sufficient to enable the requested State Party to seek the order under its domestic law; (b) In the case of a request pertaining to paragraph 1 (b) of this article, a legally admissible copy of an order of confiscation upon which the request is based issued by the requesting State Party, a statement of the facts and information as to the extent to which execution of the order is requested; (c) In the case of a request pertaining to paragraph 2 of this article, a statement of the facts relied upon by the requesting State Party and a description of the actions requested.

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4. The decisions or actions provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article shall be taken by the requested State Party in accordance with and subject to the provisions of its domestic law and its procedural rules or any bilateral or multilateral treaty, agreement or arrangement to which it may be bound in relation to the requesting State Party. 5. Each State Party shall furnish copies of its laws and regulations that give effect to this article and of any subsequent changes to such laws and regulations or a description thereof to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 6. If a State Party elects to make the taking of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article conditional on the existence of a relevant treaty, that State Party shall consider this Convention the necessary and sufficient treaty basis.

2. When acting on the request made by another State Party in accordance with article 13 of this Convention, States Parties shall, to the extent permitted by domestic law and if so requested, give priority consideration to returning the confiscated proceeds of crime or property to the requesting State Party so that it can give compensation to the victims of the crime or return such proceeds of crime or property to their legitimate owners. 3. When acting on the request made by another State Party in accordance with articles 12 and 13 of this Convention, a State Party may give special consideration to concluding agreements or arrangements on: (a) Contributing the value of such proceeds of crime or property or funds derived from the sale of such proceeds of crime or property or a part thereof to the account designated in accordance with article 30, paragraph 2 (c), of this Convention and to intergovernmental bodies specializing in the fight against organized crime; (b) Sharing with other States Parties, on a regular or case-by-case basis, such proceeds of crime or property, or funds derived from the sale of such proceeds of crime or property, in accordance with its domestic law or administrative procedures.

7. Cooperation under this article may be refused by a State Party if the offence to which the request relates is not an offence covered by this Convention. 8. The provisions of this article shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of bona fide third parties. 9. States Parties shall consider concluding bilateral or multilateral treaties, agreements or arrangements to enhance the effectiveness of international cooperation undertaken pursuant to this article.

Article 15 Jurisdiction 1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this Convention when:

Article 14 Disposal of Confiscated Proceeds of Crime or Property 1. Proceeds of crime or property confiscated by a State Party pursuant to articles 12 or 13, paragraph 1, of this Convention shall be disposed of by that State Party in accordance with its domestic law and administrative procedures.

(a) The offence is committed in the territory of that State Party; or (b) The offence is committed on board a vessel that is flying the flag of that State Party or an aircraft that is registered under the laws of that State Party at the time that the offence is committed.

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2. Subject to article 4 of this Convention, a State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when: (a) The offence is committed against a national of that State Party; (b) The offence is committed by a national of that State Party or a stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in its territory; or (c) The offence is: (i) One of those established in accordance with article 5, paragraph 1, of this Convention and is committed outside its territory with a view to the commission of a serious crime within its territory; (ii) One of those established in accordance with article 6, paragraph 1 (b) (ii), of this Convention and is committed outside its territory with a view to the commission of an offence established in accordance with article 6, paragraph 1 (a) (i) or (ii) or (b) (i), of this Convention within its territory.

3. For the purposes of article 16, paragraph 10, of this Convention, each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences covered by this Convention when the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite such person solely on the ground that he or she is one of its nationals. 4. Each State Party may also adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences covered by this Convention when the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him or her. 5. If a State Party exercising its jurisdiction under paragraph 1 or 2 of this article has been notified, or has otherwise learned, that one or more other States Parties are conducting an investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding in respect of the same conduct, the competent authorities of those

States Parties shall, as appropriate, consult one another with a view to coordinating their actions. 6. Without prejudice to norms of general international law, this Convention does not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by a State Party in accordance with its domestic law. Article 16 Extradition 1. This article shall apply to the offences covered by this Convention or in cases where an offence referred to in article 3, paragraph 1 (a) or (b), involves an organized criminal group and the person who is the subject of the request for extradition is located in the territory of the requested State Party, provided that the offence for which extradition is sought is punishable under the domestic law of both the requesting State Party and the requested State Party. 2. If the request for extradition includes several separate serious crimes, some of which are not covered by this article, the requested State Party may apply this article also in respect of the latter offences. 3. Each of the offences to which this article applies shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them. 4. If a State Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention the legal basis for extradition in respect of any offence to which this article applies.

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5. States Parties that make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall: (a) At the time of deposit of their instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval of or accession to this Convention, inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations whether they will take this Convention as the legal basis for cooperation on extradition with other States Parties to this Convention; and (b) If they do not take this Convention as the legal basis for cooperation on extradition, seek, where appropriate, to conclude treaties on extradition with other States Parties to this Convention in order to implement this article.

6. States Parties that do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize offences to which this article applies as extraditable offences between themselves. 7. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the domestic law of the requested State Party or by applicable extradition treaties, including, inter alia, conditions in relation to the minimum penalty requirement for extradition and the grounds upon which the requested State Party may refuse extradition. 8. States Parties shall, subject to their domestic law, endeavour to expedite extradition procedures and to simplify evidentiary requirements relating thereto in respect of any offence to which this article applies. 9. Subject to the provisions of its domestic law and its extradition treaties, the requested State Party may, upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant and are urgent and at the request of the requesting State Party, take a person whose extradition is sought and who is present in its territory into custody or take other appropriate measures to ensure his or her presence at extradition proceedings.

10. A State Party in whose territory an alleged offender is found, if it does not extradite such person in respect of an offence to which this article applies solely on the ground that he or she is one of its nationals, shall, at the request of the State Party seeking extradition, be obliged to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision and conduct their proceedings in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the domestic law of that State Party. The States Parties concerned shall cooperate with each other, in particular on procedural and evidentiary aspects, to ensure the efficiency of such prosecution. 11. Whenever a State Party is permitted under its domestic law to extradite or otherwise surrender one of its nationals only upon the condition that the person will be returned to that State Party to serve the sentence imposed as a result of the trial or proceedings for which the extradition or surrender of the person was sought and that State Party and the State Party seeking the extradition of the person agree with this option and other terms that they may deem appropriate, such conditional extradition or surrender shall be sufficient to discharge the obligation set forth in paragraph 10 of this article. 12. If extradition, sought for purposes of enforcing a sentence, is refused because the person sought is a national of the requested State Party, the requested Party shall, if its domestic law so permits and in conformity with the requirements of such law, upon application of the requesting Party, consider the enforcement of the sentence that has been imposed under the domestic law of the requesting Party or the remainder thereof. 13. Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connection with any of the offences to which this article applies shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings, including enjoyment of all the rights

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and guarantees provided by the domestic law of the State Party in the territory of which that person is present. 14. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person’s sex, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinions or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that person’s position for any one of these reasons. 15. States Parties may not refuse a request for extradition on the sole ground that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters. 16. Before refusing extradition, the requested State Party shall, where appropriate, consult with the requesting State Party to provide it with ample opportunity to present its opinions and to provide information relevant to its allegation. 17. States Parties shall seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements or arrangements to carry out or to enhance the effectiveness of extradition. Article 17 Transfer of Sentenced Persons States Parties may consider entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements on the transfer to their territory of persons sentenced to imprisonment or other forms of deprivation of liberty for offences covered by this Convention, in order that they may complete their sentences there.

Article 18 Mutual Legal Assistance 1. States Parties shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to the offences covered by this Convention as provided for in article 3 and shall reciprocally extend to one another similar assistance where the requesting State Party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the offence referred to in article 3, paragraph 1 (a) or (b), is transnational in nature, including that victims, witnesses, proceeds, instrumentalities or evidence of such offences are located in the requested State Party and that the offence involves an organized criminal group. 2. Mutual legal assistance shall be afforded to the fullest extent possible under relevant laws, treaties, agreements and arrangements of the requested State Party with respect to investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to the offences for which a legal person may be held liable in accordance with article 10 of this Convention in the requesting State Party. 3. Mutual legal assistance to be afforded in accordance with this article may be requested for any of the following purposes: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

Taking evidence or statements from persons; Effecting service of judicial documents; Executing searches and seizures, and freezing; Examining objects and sites; Providing information, evidentiary items and expert evaluations; (f) Providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and records, including government, bank, financial, corporate or business records; (g) Identifying or tracing proceeds of crime, property, instrumentalities or other things for evidentiary purposes; (h) Facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons in the requesting State Party;

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(i) Any other type of assistance that is not contrary to the domestic law of the requested State Party.

4. Without prejudice to domestic law, the competent authorities of a State Party may, without prior request, transmit information relating to criminal matters to a competent authority in another State Party where they believe that such information could assist the authority in undertaking or successfully concluding inquiries and criminal proceedings or could result in a request formulated by the latter State Party pursuant to this Convention. 5. The transmission of information pursuant to paragraph 4 of this article shall be without prejudice to inquiries and criminal proceedings in the State of the competent authorities providing the information. The competent authorities receiving the information shall comply with a request that said information remain confidential, even temporarily, or with restrictions on its use. However, this shall not prevent the receiving State Party from disclosing in its proceedings information that is exculpatory to an accused person. In such a case, the receiving State Party shall notify the transmitting State Party prior to the disclosure and, if so requested, consult with the transmitting State Party. If, in an exceptional case, advance notice is not possible, the receiving State Party shall inform the transmitting State Party of the disclosure without delay. 6. The provisions of this article shall not affect the obligations under any other treaty, bilateral or multilateral, that governs or will govern, in whole or in part, mutual legal assistance.

this article in lieu thereof. States Parties are strongly encouraged to apply these paragraphs if they facilitate cooperation. 8. States Parties shall not decline to render mutual legal assistance pursuant to this article on the ground of bank secrecy. 9. States Parties may decline to render mutual legal assistance pursuant to this article on the ground of absence of dual criminality. However, the requested State Party may, when it deems appropriate, provide assistance, to the extent it decides at its discretion, irrespective of whether the conduct would constitute an offence under the domestic law of the requested State Party. 10. A person who is being detained or is serving a sentence in the territory of one State Party whose presence in another State Party is requested for purposes of identification, testimony or otherwise providing assistance in obtaining evidence for investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings in relation to offences covered by this Convention may be transferred if the following conditions are met: (a) The person freely gives his or her informed consent; (b) The competent authorities of both States Parties agree, subject to such conditions as those States Parties may deem appropriate.

11. For the purposes of paragraph 10 of this article:

7. Paragraphs 9 to 29 of this article shall apply to requests made pursuant to this article if the States Parties in question are not bound by a treaty of mutual legal assistance. If those States Parties are bound by such a treaty, the corresponding provisions of that treaty shall apply unless the States Parties agree to apply paragraphs 9 to 29 of

(a) The State Party to which the person is transferred shall have the authority and obligation to keep the person transferred in custody, unless otherwise requested or authorized by the State Party from which the person was transferred; (b) The State Party to which the person is transferred shall without delay implement its obligation to return the person to the custody of the State Party from which the person was transferred as agreed beforehand, or as otherwise agreed, by the competent authorities of both States Parties;

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(c) The State Party to which the person is transferred shall not require the State Party from which the person was transferred to initiate extradition proceedings for the return of the person; (d) The person transferred shall receive credit for service of the sentence being served in the State from which he or she was transferred for time spent in the custody of the State Party to which he or she was transferred.

12. Unless the State Party from which a person is to be transferred in accordance with paragraphs 10 and 11 of this article so agrees, that person, whatever his or her nationality, shall not be prosecuted, detained, punished or subjected to any other restriction of his or her personal liberty in the territory of the State to which that person is transferred in respect of acts, omissions or convictions prior to his or her departure from the territory of the State from which he or she was transferred. 13. Each State Party shall designate a central authority that shall have the responsibility and power to receive requests for mutual legal assistance and either to execute them or to transmit them to the competent authorities for execution. Where a State Party has a special region or territory with a separate system of mutual legal assistance, it may designate a distinct central authority that shall have the same function for that region or territory. Central authorities shall ensure the speedy and proper execution or transmission of the requests received. Where the central authority transmits the request to a competent authority for execution, it shall encourage the speedy and proper execution of the request by the competent authority. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be notified of the central authority designated for this purpose at the time each State Party deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to this Convention. Requests for mutual legal assistance and any communication related thereto shall be transmitted to the central authorities designated by

the States Parties. This requirement shall be without prejudice to the right of a State Party to require that such requests and communications be addressed to it through diplomatic channels and, in urgent circumstances, where the States Parties agree, through the International Criminal Police Organization, if possible. 14. Requests shall be made in writing or, where possible, by any means capable of producing a written record, in a language acceptable to the requested State Party, under conditions allowing that State Party to establish authenticity. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be notified of the language or languages acceptable to each State Party at the time it deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to this Convention. In urgent circumstances and where agreed by the States Parties, requests may be made orally, but shall be confirmed in writing forthwith. 15. A request for mutual legal assistance shall contain: (a) The identity of the authority making the request; (b) The subject matter and nature of the investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding to which the request relates and the name and functions of the authority conducting the investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding; (c) A summary of the relevant facts, except in relation to requests for the purpose of service of judicial documents; (d) A description of the assistance sought and details of any particular procedure that the requesting State Party wishes to be followed; (e) Where possible, the identity, location and nationality of any person concerned; and (f) The purpose for which the evidence, information or action is sought.

16. The requested State Party may request additional information when it appears necessary for the execution of the request in accordance with

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its domestic law or when it can facilitate such execution. 17. A request shall be executed in accordance with the domestic law of the requested State Party and, to the extent not contrary to the domestic law of the requested State Party and where possible, in accordance with the procedures specified in the request. 18. Wherever possible and consistent with fundamental principles of domestic law, when an individual is in the territory of a State Party and has to be heard as a witness or expert by the judicial authorities of another State Party, the first State Party may, at the request of the other, permit the hearing to take place by video conference if it is not possible or desirable for the individual in question to appear in person in the territory of the requesting State Party. States Parties may agree that the hearing shall be conducted by a judicial authority of the requesting State Party and attended by a judicial authority of the requested State Party. 19. The requesting State Party shall not transmit or use information or evidence furnished by the requested State Party for investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings other than those stated in the request without the prior consent of the requested State Party. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the requesting State Party from disclosing in its proceedings information or evidence that is exculpatory to an accused person. In the latter case, the requesting State Party shall notify the requested State Party prior to the disclosure and, if so requested, consult with the requested State Party. If, in an exceptional case, advance notice is not possible, the requesting State Party shall inform the requested State Party of the disclosure without delay. 20. The requesting State Party may require that the requested State Party keep confidential the fact and substance of the request, except to the extent

necessary to execute the request. If the requested State Party cannot comply with the requirement of confidentiality, it shall promptly inform the requesting State Party. 21. Mutual legal assistance may be refused: (a) If the request is not made in conformity with the provisions of this article; (b) If the requested State Party considers that execution of the request is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security, order, public or other essential interests; (c) If the authorities of the requested State Party would be prohibited by its domestic law from carrying out the action requested with regard to any similar offence, had it been subject to investigation, prosecution or judicial proceedings under their own jurisdiction; (d) If it would be contrary to the legal system of the requested State Party relating to mutual legal assistance for the request to be granted.

22. States Parties may not refuse a request for mutual legal assistance on the sole ground that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters. 23. Reasons shall be given for any refusal of mutual legal assistance. 24. The requested State Party shall execute the request for mutual legal assistance as soon as possible and shall take as full account as possible of any deadlines suggested by the requesting State Party and for which reasons are given, preferably in the request. The requested State Party shall respond to reasonable requests by the requesting State Party on progress of its handling of the request. The requesting State Party shall promptly inform the requested State Party when the assistance sought is no longer required. 25. Mutual legal assistance may be postponed by the requested State Party on the ground that it

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interferes with an ongoing investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding.

executed, as well as the manner in which the costs shall be borne.

26. Before refusing a request pursuant to paragraph 21 of this article or postponing its execution pursuant to paragraph 25 of this article, the requested State Party shall consult with the requesting State Party to consider whether assistance may be granted subject to such terms and conditions as it deems necessary. If the requesting State Party accepts assistance subject to those conditions, it shall comply with the conditions.

29. The requested State Party:

27. Without prejudice to the application of paragraph 12 of this article, a witness, expert or other person who, at the request of the requesting State Party, consents to give evidence in a proceeding or to assist in an investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding in the territory of the requesting State Party shall not be prosecuted, detained, punished or subjected to any other restriction of his or her personal liberty in that territory in respect of acts, omissions or convictions prior to his or her departure from the territory of the requested State Party. Such safe conduct shall cease when the witness, expert or other person having had, for a period of fifteen consecutive days or for any period agreed upon by the States Parties from the date on which he or she has been officially informed that his or her presence is no longer required by the judicial authorities, an opportunity of leaving, has nevertheless remained voluntarily in the territory of the requesting State Party or, having left it, has returned of his or her own free will. 28. The ordinary costs of executing a request shall be borne by the requested State Party, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties concerned. If expenses of a substantial or extraordinary nature are or will be required to fulfil the request, the States Parties shall consult to determine the terms and conditions under which the request will be

(a) Shall provide to the requesting State Party copies of government records, documents or information in its possession that under its domestic law are available to the general public; (b) May, at its discretion, provide to the requesting State Party in whole, in part or subject to such conditions as it deems appropriate, copies of any government records, documents or information in its possession that under its domestic law are not available to the general public.

30. States Parties shall consider, as may be necessary, the possibility of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements that would serve the purposes of, give practical effect to or enhance the provisions of this article. Article 19 Joint Investigations States Parties shall consider concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements whereby, in relation to matters that are the subject of investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings in one or more States, the competent authorities concerned may establish joint investigative bodies. In the absence of such agreements or arrangements, joint investigations may be undertaken by agreement on a case-by-case basis. The States Parties involved shall ensure that the sovereignty of the State Party in whose territory such investigation is to take place is fully respected. Article 20 Special Investigative Techniques 1. If permitted by the basic principles of its domestic legal system, each State Party shall, within its possibilities and under the conditions prescribed by its domestic law, take the necessary

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measures to allow for the appropriate use of controlled delivery and, where it deems appropriate, for the use of other special investigative techniques, such as electronic or other forms of surveillance and undercover operations, by its competent authorities in its territory for the purpose of effectively combating organized crime. 2. For the purpose of investigating the offences covered by this Convention, States Parties are encouraged to conclude, when necessary, appropriate bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements for using such special investigative techniques in the context of cooperation at the international level. Such agreements or arrangements shall be concluded and implemented in full compliance with the principle of sovereign equality of States and shall be carried out strictly in accordance with the terms of those agreements or arrangements. 3. In the absence of an agreement or arrangement as set forth in paragraph 2 of this article, decisions to use such special investigative techniques at the international level shall be made on a case-by-case basis and may, when necessary, take into consideration financial arrangements and understandings with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction by the States Parties concerned.

administration of justice, in particular in cases where several jurisdictions are involved, with a view to concentrating the prosecution. Article 22 Establishment of Criminal Record Each State Party may adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to take into consideration, under such terms as and for the purpose that it deems appropriate, any previous conviction in another State of an alleged offender for the purpose of using such information in criminal proceedings relating to an offence covered by this Convention. Article 23 Criminalization of Obstruction of Justice Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) The use of physical force, threats or intimidation or the promise, offering or giving of an undue advantage to induce false testimony or to interfere in the giving of testimony or the production of evidence in a proceeding in relation to the commission of offences covered by this Convention; (b) The use of physical force, threats or intimidation to interfere with the exercise of official duties by a justice or law enforcement official in relation to the commission of offences covered by this Convention. Nothing in this subparagraph shall prejudice the right of States Parties to have legislation that protects other categories of public officials.

4. Decisions to use controlled delivery at the international level may, with the consent of the States Parties concerned, include methods such as intercepting and allowing the goods to continue intact or be removed or replaced in whole or in part. Article 21 Transfer of Criminal Proceedings States Parties shall consider the possibility of transferring to one another proceedings for the prosecution of an offence covered by this Convention in cases where such transfer is considered to be in the interests of the proper

Article 24 Protection of Witnesses 1. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures within its means to provide effective protection from potential retaliation or intimidation for

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witnesses in criminal proceedings who give testimony concerning offences covered by this Convention and, as appropriate, for their relatives and other persons close to them. 2. The measures envisaged in paragraph 1 of this article may include, inter alia, without prejudice to the rights of the defendant, including the right to due process: (a) Establishing procedures for the physical protection of such persons, such as, to the extent necessary and feasible, relocating them and permitting, where appropriate, non-disclosure or limitations on the disclosure of information concerning the identity and whereabouts of such persons; (b) Providing evidentiary rules to permit witness testimony to be given in a manner that ensures the safety of the witness, such as permitting testimony to be given through the use of communications technology such as video links or other adequate means.

3. States Parties shall consider entering into agreements or arrangements with other States for the relocation of persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article. 4. The provisions of this article shall also apply to victims insofar as they are witnesses. Article 25 Assistance to and Protection of Victims 1. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures within its means to provide assistance and protection to victims of offences covered by this Convention, in particular in cases of threat of retaliation or intimidation. 2. Each State Party shall establish appropriate procedures to provide access to compensation and restitution for victims of offences covered by this Convention.

3. Each State Party shall, subject to its domestic law, enable views and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of criminal proceedings against offenders in a manner not prejudicial to the rights of the defence. Article 26 Measures to Enhance Cooperation with Law Enforcement Authorities 1. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to encourage persons who participate or who have participated in organized criminal groups: (a) To supply information useful to competent authorities for investigative and evidentiary purposes on such matters as: (i) The identity, nature, composition, structure, location or activities of organized criminal groups; (ii) Links, including international links, with other organized criminal groups; (iii) Offences that organized criminal groups have committed or may commit; (b) To provide factual, concrete help to competent authorities that may contribute to depriving organized criminal groups of their resources or of the proceeds of crime.

2. Each State Party shall consider providing for the possibility, in appropriate cases, of mitigating punishment of an accused person who provides substantial cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of an offence covered by this Convention. 3. Each State Party shall consider providing for the possibility, in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, of granting immunity from prosecution to a person who provides substantial cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of an offence covered by this Convention.

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4. Protection of such persons shall be as provided for in article 24 of this Convention.

(c) To provide, when appropriate, necessary items or quantities of substances for analytical or investigative purposes; (d) To facilitate effective coordination between their competent authorities, agencies and services and to promote the exchange of personnel and other experts, including, subject to bilateral agreements or arrangements between the States Parties concerned, the posting of liaison officers; (e) To exchange information with other States Parties on specific means and methods used by organized criminal groups, including, where applicable, routes and conveyances and the use of false identities, altered or false documents or other means of concealing their activities; (f) To exchange information and coordinate administrative and other measures taken as appropriate for the purpose of early identification of the offences covered by this Convention.

5. Where a person referred to in paragraph 1 of this article located in one State Party can provide substantial cooperation to the competent authorities of another State Party, the States Parties concerned may consider entering into agreements or arrangements, in accordance with their domestic law, concerning the potential provision by the other State Party of the treatment set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article. Article 27 Law Enforcement Cooperation 1. States Parties shall cooperate closely with one another, consistent with their respective domestic legal and administrative systems, to enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement action to combat the offences covered by this Convention. Each State Party shall, in particular, adopt effective measures: (a) To enhance and, where necessary, to establish channels of communication between their competent authorities, agencies and services in order to facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of information concerning all aspects of the offences covered by this Convention, including, if the States Parties concerned deem it appropriate, links with other criminal activities; (b) To cooperate with other States Parties in conducting inquiries with respect to offences covered by this Convention concerning: (i) The identity, whereabouts and activities of persons suspected of involvement in such offences or the location of other persons concerned; (ii) The movement of proceeds of crime or property derived from the commission of such offences; (iii) The movement of property, equipment or other instrumentalities used or intended for use in the commission of such offences;

2. With a view to giving effect to this Convention, States Parties shall consider entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements on direct cooperation between their law enforcement agencies and, where such agreements or arrangements already exist, amending them. In the absence of such agreements or arrangements between the States Parties concerned, the Parties may consider this Convention as the basis for mutual law enforcement cooperation in respect of the offences covered by this Convention. Whenever appropriate, States Parties shall make full use of agreements or arrangements, including international or regional organizations, to enhance the cooperation between their law enforcement agencies. 3. States Parties shall endeavour to cooperate within their means to respond to transnational organized crime committed through the use of modern technology.

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Article 28 Collection, Exchange and Analysis of Information on the Nature of Organized Crime 1. Each State Party shall consider analysing, in consultation with the scientific and academic communities, trends in organized crime in its territory, the circumstances in which organized crime operates, as well as the professional groups and technologies involved. 2. States Parties shall consider developing and sharing analytical expertise concerning organized criminal activities with each other and through international and regional organizations. For that purpose, common definitions, standards and methodologies should be developed and applied as appropriate. 3. Each State Party shall consider monitoring its policies and actual measures to combat organized crime and making assessments of their effectiveness and efficiency. Article 29 Training and Technical Assistance 1. Each State Party shall, to the extent necessary, initiate, develop or improve specific training programmes for its law enforcement personnel, including prosecutors, investigating magistrates and customs personnel, and other personnel charged with the prevention, detection and control of the offences covered by this Convention. Such programmes may include secondments and exchanges of staff. Such programmes shall deal, in particular and to the extent permitted by domestic law, with the following: (a) Methods used in the prevention, detection and control of the offences covered by this Convention; (b) Routes and techniques used by persons suspected of involvement in offences covered by this

Convention, including in transit States, and appropriate countermeasures; (c) Monitoring of the movement of contraband; (d) Detection and monitoring of the movements of proceeds of crime, property, equipment or other instrumentalities and methods used for the transfer, concealment or disguise of such proceeds, property, equipment or other instrumentalities, as well as methods used in combating moneylaundering and other financial crimes; (e) Collection of evidence; (f) Control techniques in free trade zones and free ports; (g) Modern law enforcement equipment and techniques, including electronic surveillance, controlled deliveries and undercover operations; (h) Methods used in combating transnational organized crime committed through the use of computers, telecommunications networks or other forms of modern technology; and (i) Methods used in the protection of victims and witnesses.

2. States Parties shall assist one another in planning and implementing research and training programmes designed to share expertise in the areas referred to in paragraph 1 of this article and to that end shall also, when appropriate, use regional and international conferences and seminars to promote cooperation and to stimulate discussion on problems of mutual concern, including the special problems and needs of transit States. 3. States Parties shall promote training and technical assistance that will facilitate extradition and mutual legal assistance. Such training and technical assistance may include language training, secondments and exchanges between personnel in central authorities or agencies with relevant responsibilities. 4. In the case of existing bilateral and multilateral agreements or arrangements, States Parties shall strengthen, to the extent necessary, efforts to

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maximize operational and training activities within international and regional organizations and within other relevant bilateral and multilateral agreements or arrangements.

of crime or property confiscated in accordance with the provisions of this Convention; (d) To encourage and persuade other States and financial institutions as appropriate to join them in efforts in accordance with this article, in particular by providing more training programmes and modern equipment to developing countries in order to assist them in achieving the objectives of this Convention.

Article 30 Other Measures: Implementation of the Convention through Economic Development and Technical Assistance 1. States Parties shall take measures conducive to the optimal implementation of this Convention to the extent possible, through international cooperation, taking into account the negative effects of organized crime on society in general, in particular on sustainable development. 2. States Parties shall make concrete efforts to the extent possible and in coordination with each other, as well as with international and regional organizations: (a) To enhance their cooperation at various levels with developing countries, with a view to strengthening the capacity of the latter to prevent and combat transnational organized crime; (b) To enhance financial and material assistance to support the efforts of developing countries to fight transnational organized crime effectively and to help them implement this Convention successfully; (c) To provide technical assistance to developing countries and countries with economies in transition to assist them in meeting their needs for the implementation of this Convention. To that end, States Parties shall endeavour to make adequate and regular voluntary contributions to an account specifically designated for that purpose in a United Nations funding mechanism. States Parties may also give special consideration, in accordance with their domestic law and the provisions of this Convention, to contributing to the aforementioned account a percentage of the money or of the corresponding value of proceeds

3. To the extent possible, these measures shall be without prejudice to existing foreign assistance commitments or to other financial cooperation arrangements at the bilateral, regional or international level. 4. States Parties may conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements on material and logistical assistance, taking into consideration the financial arrangements necessary for the means of international cooperation provided for by this Convention to be effective and for the prevention, detection and control of transnational organized crime. Article 31 Prevention 1. States Parties shall endeavour to develop and evaluate national projects and to establish and promote best practices and policies aimed at the prevention of transnational organized crime. 2. States Parties shall endeavour, in accordance with fundamental principles of their domestic law, to reduce existing or future opportunities for organized criminal groups to participate in lawful markets with proceeds of crime, through appropriate legislative, administrative or other measures. These measures should focus on: (a) The strengthening of cooperation between law enforcement agencies or prosecutors and relevant private entities, including industry;

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(b) The promotion of the development of standards and procedures designed to safeguard the integrity of public and relevant private entities, as well as codes of conduct for relevant professions, in particular lawyers, notaries public, tax consultants and accountants; (c) The prevention of the misuse by organized criminal groups of tender procedures conducted by public authorities and of subsidies and licences granted by public authorities for commercial activity; (d) The prevention of the misuse of legal persons by organized criminal groups; such measures could include: (i) The establishment of public records on legal and natural persons involved in the establishment, management and funding of legal persons; (ii) The introduction of the possibility of disqualifying by court order or any appropriate means for a reasonable period of time persons convicted of offences covered by this Convention from acting as directors of legal persons incorporated within their jurisdiction; (iii) The establishment of national records of persons disqualified from acting as directors of legal persons; and (iv) The exchange of information contained in the records referred to in subparagraphs (d) (i) and (iii) of this paragraph with the competent authorities of other States Parties.

3. States Parties shall endeavour to promote the reintegration into society of persons convicted of offences covered by this Convention. 4. States Parties shall endeavour to evaluate periodically existing relevant legal instruments and administrative practices with a view to detecting their vulnerability to misuse by organized criminal groups. 5. States Parties shall endeavour to promote public awareness regarding the existence, causes and gravity of and the threat posed by transnational

organized crime. Information may be disseminated where appropriate through the mass media and shall include measures to promote public participation in preventing and combating such crime. 6. Each State Party shall inform the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations of the name and address of the authority or authorities that can assist other States Parties in developing measures to prevent transnational organized crime. 7. States Parties shall, as appropriate, collaborate with each other and relevant international and regional organizations in promoting and developing the measures referred to in this article. This includes participation in international projects aimed at the prevention of transnational organized crime, for example by alleviating the circumstances that render socially marginalized groups vulnerable to the action of transnational organized crime.

29. Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism 1999 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), formed after the breakup of the Soviet Union, faced various forms of terrorism that posed a danger to its stability and security. The member states met at the Belarus capital, Minsk, on 4 June 1999 to tackle the problem. Apart from defining terrorism in general terms, the convention used the term “technological terrorism” for nuclear and biological weapons. Antiterrorist units were to be formed. The member states agreed to cooperate and take necessary steps to combat terrorism. Source United Nations Treaty Collection, http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/csi_e.pdf.

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The States parties to this Treaty, in the person of their Governments, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

international organization, as well as the business premises or vehicles of internationally protected persons;

Aware of the danger posed by acts of terrorism,

Other acts classified as terrorist under the national legislation of the Parties or under universally recognized international legal instruments aimed at combating terrorism;

Bearing in mind the instruments adopted within the United Nations and the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as other international instruments, relating to combating the various manifestations of terrorism, Wishing to render one another the broadest possible assistance in increasing the effectiveness of cooperation in this field, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 For purposes of this Treaty, the terms used in it mean: “Terrorism”—an illegal act punishable under criminal law committed for the purpose of undermining public safety, influencing decisionmaking by the authorities or terrorizing the population, and taking the form of: Violence or the threat of violence against natural or juridical persons; Destroying (damaging) or threatening to destroy (damage) property and other material objects so as to endanger people’s lives; Causing substantial harm to property or the occurrence of other consequences dangerous to society; Threatening the life of a statesman or public figure for the purpose of putting an end to his State or other public activity or in revenge for such activity; Attacking a representative of a foreign State or an internationally protected staff member of an

“Technological terrorism”—the use or threat of the use of nuclear, radiological, chemical or bacteriological (biological) weapons or their components, pathogenic micro-organisms, radioactive substances or other substances harmful to human health, including the seizure, putting out of operation or destruction of nuclear, chemical or other facilities posing an increased technological and environmental danger and the utility systems of towns and other inhabited localities, if these acts are committed for the purpose of undermining public safety, terrorizing the population or influencing the decisions of the authorities in order to achieve political, mercenary or any other ends, as well as attempts to commit one of the crimes listed above for the same purposes and leading, financing or acting as the instigator, accessory or accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such a crime; “Facilities posing an increased technological and environmental danger”—enterprises, installations, plant and other facilities whose inoperability may lead to loss of human life, the impairment of human health, pollution of the environment or destabilization of the situation in a given region or a given State as a whole; “Special anti-terrorist units”—groups of specialists formed by the Parties in accordance with their national legislation to combat acts of terrorism; “Special items and supplies”—materials, machinery and vehicles, personal equipment for members of special anti-terrorist units including weapons and ammunition, and special items and equipment.

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Article 2 The Parties shall cooperate in preventing, uncovering, halting and investigating acts of terrorism in accordance with this Treaty, their national legislation and their international obligations. Article 3 1. Each of the Parties shall, on signing this Treaty or carrying out the domestic procedures required for its entry into force, indicate its competent authorities responsible for implementing the provisions of this Treaty. The Parties shall immediately notify the depositary of any changes with regard to their competent authority. 2. In implementing the provisions of this Treaty, the competent authorities of the Parties shall maintain direct relations with one another. Article 4 1. In cooperating in combating acts of terrorism, including in relation to the extradition of persons committing them, the Parties shall not regard the acts involved as other than criminal. 2. The nationality of a person accused of an act of terrorism shall be deemed to be his nationality at the time of commission of the act. Article 5 1. The competent authorities of the Party shall, in accordance with this Treaty, other international agreements and national legislation, cooperate and assist one another by: (a) Exchanging information; (b) Responding to enquiries regarding the conduct of investigations; (c) Developing and adopting agreed measures for preventing, uncovering, halting or investigating acts of terrorism, and informing one another about such measures;

(d) Adopting measures to prevent and halt preparations in their territory for the commission of acts of terrorism in the territory of another Party; (e) Assisting in assessing the condition of the system for physical protection of facilities posing an increased technological and environmental danger, and developing and implementing measures to improve that system; (f) Exchanging legislative texts and materials on the practice with respect to their application; (g) Sending, by agreement between interested Parties, special anti-terrorist units to render practical assistance in halting acts of terrorism and combating their consequences; (h) Exchanging experience on the prevention and combating of terrorist acts, including the holding of training courses, seminars, consultations and workshops; (i) Training and further specialized training of personnel; (j) Joint financing, by agreement between Parties, and conduct of research and development work on systems for and means of physically protecting facilities posing an increased technological and environmental danger; (k) Implementation on a contractual basis of deliveries of special items, technology and equipment for anti-terrorist activity.

2. The procedure for sending and executing requests for extradition, for the provision of legal aid in criminal cases and for the institution of criminal proceedings shall be determined by the international agreements to which the Parties concerned are parties. Article 6 The Parties shall, through joint consultations, jointly draw up recommendations for achieving concerted approaches to the legal regulation of issues relating to the prevention and combating of terrorist acts.

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Article 7 1. Cooperation under this Treaty shall be conducted on the basis of requests by an interested Party for assistance to be rendered, or on the initiative of a Party which believes such assistance to be of interest to another Party. 2. The request for the rendering of assistance shall be made in writing. In urgent cases requests may be transmitted orally, but must be confirmed in writing not later than 72 hours thereafter, including through the use of technical text transmission facilities. If doubt arises as to the genuineness or content of a request, additional confirmation may be requested. Requests shall contain: (a) The name of the competent authority requesting assistance and of the authority requested; a statement of the substance of the matter; the purpose of and justification for the request; and a description of the nature of the assistance requested; (b) Any other information that may be useful for the proper fulfilment of the request.

3. A request for the rendering of assistance transmitted or confirmed in writing shall be signed by the head of the requesting competent authority or his deputy and shall be certified by the seal of the competent authority. Article 8 1. The requested Party shall take all necessary measures to ensure the prompt and fullest possible fulfilment of the request. The requesting Party shall be immediately notified of circumstances that prevent or will substantially delay the fulfilment of the request. 2. If the fulfilment of the request does not fall within the competence of the requested competent authority, it shall transmit the request to an

authority of its State which is competent to fulfil it, and shall immediately so inform the requesting competent authority. 3. The requested Party shall be entitled to request additional information that is in its view needed for the proper fulfilment of the request. 4. In fulfilling a request, the legislation of the requested Party shall be applied; however, at the request of the requesting Party, its legislation may be applied if that does not contradict fundamental principles of the legislation of the requested Party or its international obligations. 5. If the requested Party considers that immediate fulfilment of the request may impede a criminal prosecution or other proceedings taking place on its territory, it may postpone fulfilment of the request or tie its fulfilment to compliance with conditions determined to be necessary following consultations with the requesting Party. If the requesting Party agrees that assistance shall be rendered to it on the proposed terms, it shall comply with those terms. 6. The requested Party shall at the request of the requesting Party take the necessary measures to ensure confidentiality of the fact that the request has been received, the content of the request and accompanying documents, and the rendering of assistance. If it is impossible to fulfil the request without maintaining confidentiality, the requested Party shall so inform the requesting Party, which shall decide whether the request should be fulfilled under those conditions. 7. The requested Party shall inform the requesting Party as soon as possible about the results of the fulfilment of the request.

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Article 9 1. The rendering of assistance under this Treaty shall be denied in whole or in part if the requested Party believes that fulfilment of the request may impair its sovereignty, security, social order or other vital interests or is in contravention of its legislation or international obligations. 2. The rendering of assistance may be denied if the act in relation to which the request was made is not a crime under the legislation of the requested Party. 3. The requesting Party shall be notified in writing of a refusal to fulfil a request in whole or in part, with an indication of the reasons for refusal listed in paragraph 1 of this Article. Article 10 1. Each Party shall ensure confidentiality of information and documents received from another Party if they are classified as restricted or the transmitting Party considers it undesirable that they should be made public. The level of security classification of such information and documents shall be determined by the transmitting Party. 2. Results of the fulfilment of a request obtained on the basis of this Treaty may not without the consent of the Party providing them be used for purposes other than those for which they were requested and provided. 3. Transmission to a third party of information obtained by one Party on the basis of this Treaty shall require the prior consent of the Party providing the information. Article 11 The competent authorities of the Parties shall exchange information on issues of mutual interest, including: (a) Materials distributed in the territory of their States containing information on terrorist threats,

terrorist acts in the course of preparation or committed and the identified intentions of given persons, groups of persons or organizations to commit acts of terrorism; (b) Acts of terrorism in the course of preparation that are directed against heads of State, internationally protected persons, staff of diplomatic missions, consular institutions and international organizations of the Parties and participants in State visits and international and national political, sporting and other activities; (c) Instances of illegal circulation of nuclear materials, chemical, bacteriological (biological) weapons or their components, highly toxic chemicals and pathogenic micro-organisms; (d) Terrorist organizations, groups and individuals that present a threat to the State security of the Parties and the establishment of contacts between terrorist organizations, groups or individuals; (e) Illegal armed formations employing methods of terrorist activity, their structure, members, aims and objectives; (f) Ways, means and methods of terrorist action they have identified; (g) Supplies and equipment that may be provided by the Parties to one another to the extent of their ability; (h) Practice with respect to the legal and other regulatory settlement of issues related to the subject of this Treaty; (i) Identified and presumed channels for the financing and illegal delivery to the territory of their States of weapons and other means of committing terrorist acts; (j) Terrorist encroachments aimed at violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Parties;

Other issues of interest to the Parties. Article 12 1. The Parties may, at the request or with the consent of the Party concerned, send representatives of their competent authorities, including special anti-terrorist units, to provide

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procedural, advisory or practical aid in accordance with this Treaty. In such cases, the receiving Party shall notify the other Party in writing of the place and time of and procedure for crossing its State border and the nature of the problems to be dealt with, and shall promote and facilitate the necessary conditions for their effective solution, including unimpeded carriage of persons and special items and supplies and cost-free accommodation, food and use of the transport infrastructure of the receiving Party. Any movement of a special anti-terrorist unit or of individual members of such a unit within the territory of the receiving Party shall be possible only with special permission from and under the control of the head of the competent authority of the receiving Party. 2. The procedure for the use of air, road, rail, river and maritime transport to provide aid shall be determined by the competent authorities of the Parties in agreement with the relevant ministries and departments of the receiving Party. Article 13 1. For purposes of the effective and timely provision of aid, the Parties shall, when special anti-terrorist units cross the State border, ensure accelerated conduct of the formalities established by national legislation. 2. At the border crossing point, the commanding officer of a special anti-terrorist unit shall present the nominal role of members of the group and list of special items and supplies certified by the competent authorities of the sending Party, together with an indication of the purposes of the Unit’s arrival in the territory of the receiving Party, while all members of the group shall present their national passports and documents confirming that they belong to competent authorities for combating terrorism.

3. Special items and supplies shall be exempt from customs duties and payments and must be either used during the operation for the provision of aid or removed from the territory of the receiving Party upon its conclusion. If special circumstances make it impossible to remove the special items and supplies, the competent authorities of the sending Party shall hand them over to the competent authorities of the receiving Party. Article 14 The decision on the procedure for conducting special measures under this Treaty shall be taken by the competent authority of the receiving Party, taking into account the views of the commanding officer of the incoming anti-terrorist unit of the other Party. If these views are not taken into account, the commanding officer shall be entitled to refuse to participate in the conduct of the special measure. Article 15 1. The receiving Party shall refrain from any claims against a Party providing aid, including with regard to compensation for damages arising out of death, bodily injury or any other harm caused to the lives, health and property of natural persons located in the territory of the receiving Party, and also to juridical persons and the receiving Party itself, if such harm was inflicted during the performance of activities associated with the implementation of this Treaty. 2. If a participant in the special anti-terrorist unit of the sending Party inflicts harm on some person or organization while performing activities associated with the implementation of this Treaty in the territory of the receiving Party, the receiving Party shall make compensation for the harm in accordance with the provisions of national legislation which would be applied in the case of harm being inflicted by members of anti-terrorist

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units of the receiving Party in similar circumstances. 3. The procedure for repayment of expenses incurred by the sending Party, including expenses associated with the loss or complete or partial destruction of imported special items and supplies, shall be established by agreement between the Parties concerned. 4. If one of the Parties considers the damage caused by the actions of the special anti-terrorist unit to be disproportionate to the purposes of the operation, the differences of opinion that arise shall be settled at the bilateral level by the Parties concerned. Article 16 For purposes of the implementation of this Treaty, the competent authorities of the Parties may where necessary hold consultations and working meetings. Article 17 The Parties may, by mutual agreement and on the basis of separate agreements, conduct joint exercises of special anti-terrorist units and, on a reciprocal basis, organize training for representatives of another Party in their national anti-terrorist detachments. Article 18 1. Materials, special items, technology and equipment received by the competent authorities of the Parties pursuant to this Agreement may be transferred to a third party only with the consent of and on the terms specified by the competent authority which provided such materials, special items, technology and equipment. 2. Information on the investigation methods of special anti-terrorist units and on the characteristics of special forces and of items and supplies used in providing aid under this Agreement may not be disclosed.

Article 19 The Parties concerned shall where necessary agree on the financial, organizational and technical and other conditions for the provision of assistance under this Agreement. Article 20 1. This Treaty shall not limit the right of the Parties to conclude bilateral international agreements on issues which are the subject of this Treaty, and shall not affect the rights and obligations of Parties arising out of other international agreements to which they are parties. 2. The competent authorities of the Parties may conclude with one another agreements that regulate in more detail the procedure for implementation of this Treaty. Article 21 Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of this Treaty shall be resolved through consultations and negotiations between the Parties.

30. Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism supplements existing treaties that focus on criminal and terrorist issues. The recent terrorist attacks in the United States, United Kingdom, and Spain have made it clear that stronger initiatives need to be taken to respond to this growing threat to international security. This convention calls for an increased emphasis on measures such as civil preparedness, protection of vulnerable facilities, and enhancing states’ cooperation with each other and internationally. Articles 5, 7, and 9 cover the offenses addressed in this instrument. Article 13 addresses support actions for the victims of terrorism.

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Source Council of Europe, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/ Treaties/Html/196.htm.

The member States of the Council of Europe and the other Signatories hereto, Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve greater unity between its members; Recognising the value of reinforcing co-operation with the other Parties to this Convention; Wishing to take effective measures to prevent terrorism and to counter, in particular, public provocation to commit terrorist offences and recruitment and training for terrorism;

Recognising that this Convention is not intended to affect established principles relating to freedom of expression and freedom of association; Recalling that acts of terrorism have the purpose by their nature or context to seriously intimidate a population or unduly compel a government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act or seriously destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation; Have agreed as follows:

Aware of the grave concern caused by the increase in terrorist offences and the growing terrorist threat; Aware of the precarious situation faced by those who suffer from terrorism, and in this connection reaffirming their profound solidarity with the victims of terrorism and their families; Recognising that terrorist offences and the offences set forth in this Convention, by whoever perpetrated, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and recalling the obligation of all Parties to prevent such offences and, if not prevented, to prosecute and ensure that they are punishable by penalties which take into account their grave nature; Recalling the need to strengthen the fight against terrorism and reaffirming that all measures taken to prevent or suppress terrorist offences have to respect the rule of law and democratic values, human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as other provisions of international law, including, where applicable, international humanitarian law;

Article 1—Terminology 1 For the purposes of this Convention, “terrorist offence” means any of the offences within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the Appendix. 2 On depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, a State or the European Community which is not a party to a treaty listed in the Appendix may declare that, in the application of this Convention to the Party concerned, that treaty shall be deemed not to be included in the Appendix. This declaration shall cease to have effect as soon as the treaty enters into force for the Party having made such a declaration, which shall notify the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of this entry into force. Article 2—Purpose The purpose of the present Convention is to enhance the efforts of Parties in preventing terrorism and its negative effects on the full enjoyment of human rights, in particular the right to life, both by measures to be taken at national level and through international co-operation, with due regard to the existing applicable multilateral or bilateral treaties or agreements between the Parties.

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Article 3—National Prevention Policies 1. Each Party shall take appropriate measures, particularly in the field of training of law enforcement authorities and other bodies, and in the fields of education, culture, information, media and public awareness raising, with a view to preventing terrorist offences and their negative effects while respecting human rights obligations as set forth in, where applicable to that Party, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other obligations under international law. 2. Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to improve and develop the co-operation among national authorities with a view to preventing terrorist offences and their negative effects by, inter alia: a. exchanging information; b. improving the physical protection of persons and facilities; c. enhancing training and coordination plans for civil emergencies.

3. Each Party shall promote tolerance by encouraging inter-religious and cross-cultural dialogue involving, where appropriate, nongovernmental organisations and other elements of civil society with a view to preventing tensions that might contribute to the commission of terrorist offences. 4. Each Party shall endeavour to promote public awareness regarding the existence, causes and gravity of and the threat posed by terrorist offences and the offences set forth in this Convention and consider encouraging the public to provide factual, specific help to its competent authorities that may contribute to preventing terrorist offences and offences set forth in this Convention.

Article 4—International Co-operation on Prevention Parties shall, as appropriate and with due regard to their capabilities, assist and support each other with a view to enhancing their capacity to prevent the commission of terrorist offences, including through exchange of information and best practices, as well as through training and other joint efforts of a preventive character. Article 5—Public Provocation to Commit a Terrorist Offence 1. For the purposes of this Convention, “public provocation to commit a terrorist offence” means the distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence, where such conduct, whether or not directly advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed. 2. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, as defined in paragraph 1, when committed unlawfully and intentionally, as a criminal offence under its domestic law. Article 6—Recruitment for Terrorism 1. For the purposes of this Convention, “recruitment for terrorism” means to solicit another person to commit or participate in the commission of a terrorist offence, or to join an association or group, for the purpose of contributing to the commission of one or more terrorist offences by the association or the group. 2. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish recruitment for terrorism, as defined in paragraph 1, when committed unlawfully and intentionally, as a criminal offence under its domestic law. Article 7—Training for Terrorism 1. For the purposes of this Convention, “training for terrorism” means to provide instruction in the

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making or use of explosives, firearms or other weapons or noxious or hazardous substances, or in other specific methods or techniques, for the purpose of carrying out or contributing to the commission of a terrorist offence, knowing that the skills provided are intended to be used for this purpose.

2. Each Party shall also adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence under, and in accordance with, its domestic law the attempt to commit an offence as set forth in Articles 6 and 7 of this Convention.

2. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish training for terrorism, as defined in paragraph 1, when committed unlawfully and intentionally, as a criminal offence under its domestic law.

Article 11—Sanctions and Measures 1. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to make the offences set forth in Articles 5 to 7 and 9 of this Convention punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties.

Article 8—Irrelevance of the Commission of a Terrorist Offence For an act to constitute an offence as set forth in Articles 5 to 7 of this Convention, it shall not be necessary that a terrorist offence be actually committed.

2. Previous final convictions pronounced in foreign States for offences set forth in the present Convention may, to the extent permitted by domestic law, be taken into account for the purpose of determining the sentence in accordance with domestic law.

Article 9—Ancillary Offences 1. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence under its domestic law:

3. Each Party shall ensure that legal entities held liable in accordance with Article 10 are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.

a. Participating as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in Articles 5 to 7 of this Convention; b. Organising or directing others to commit an offence as set forth in Articles 5 to 7 of this Convention; c. Contributing to the commission of one or more offences as set forth in Articles 5 to 7 of this Convention by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: i. be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of an offence as set forth in Articles 5 to 7 of this Convention; or ii. be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit an offence as set forth in Articles 5 to 7 of this Convention.

[. . .]

[. . .] Article 13—Protection, Compensation and Support for Victims of Terrorism Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to protect and support the victims of terrorism that has been committed within its own territory. These measures may include, through the appropriate national schemes and subject to domestic legislation, inter alia, financial assistance and compensation for victims of terrorism and their close family members. Article 14—Jurisdiction 1. Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in this Convention:

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a. when the offence is committed in the territory of that Party; b. when the offence is committed on board a ship flying the flag of that Party, or on board an aircraft registered under the laws of that Party; c. when the offence is committed by a national of that Party.

2. Each Party may also establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in this Convention: a. when the offence was directed towards or resulted in the carrying out of an offence referred to in Article 1 of this Convention, in the territory of or against a national of that Party; b. when the offence was directed towards or resulted in the carrying out of an offence referred to in Article 1 of this Convention, against a State or government facility of that Party abroad, including diplomatic or consular premises of that Party; c. when the offence was directed towards or resulted in an offence referred to in Article 1 of this Convention, committed in an attempt to compel that Party to do or abstain from doing any act; d. when the offence is committed by a stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in the territory of that Party; e. when the offence is committed on board an aircraft which is operated by the Government of that Party.

3. Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in this Convention in the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him or her to a Party whose jurisdiction is based on a rule of jurisdiction existing equally in the law of the requested Party. 4. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law.

5. When more than one Party claims jurisdiction over an alleged offence set forth in this Convention, the Parties involved shall, where appropriate, consult with a view to determining the most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution. Article 15—Duty to Investigate 1. Upon receiving information that a person who has committed or who is alleged to have committed an offence set forth in this Convention may be present in its territory, the Party concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary under its domestic law to investigate the facts contained in the information. 2. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, the Party in whose territory the offender or alleged offender is present shall take the appropriate measures under its domestic law so as to ensure that person’s presence for the purpose of prosecution or extradition. 3. Any person in respect of whom the measures referred to in paragraph 2 are being taken shall be entitled to: a. communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate representative of the State of which that person is a national or which is otherwise entitled to protect that person’s rights or, if that person is a stateless person, the State in the territory of which that person habitually resides; b. be visited by a representative of that State; c. be informed of that person’s rights under subparagraphs a. and b.

4. The rights referred to in paragraph 3 shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the Party in the territory of which the offender or alleged offender is present, subject to the provision that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under paragraph 3 are intended.

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5. The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 shall be without prejudice to the right of any Party having a claim of jurisdiction in accordance with Article 14, paragraphs 1.c and 2.d to invite the International Committee of the Red Cross to communicate with and visit the alleged offender. [. . .] Article 17—International Co-operation in Criminal Matters 1. Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings in respect of the offences set forth in Articles 5 to 7 and 9 of this Convention, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings. 2. Parties shall carry out their obligations under paragraph 1 in conformity with any treaties or other agreements on mutual legal assistance that may exist between them. In the absence of such treaties or agreements, Parties shall afford one another assistance in accordance with their domestic law. 3. Parties shall co-operate with each other to the fullest extent possible under relevant law, treaties, agreements and arrangements of the requested Party with respect to criminal investigations or proceedings in relation to the offences for which a legal entity may be held liable in accordance with Article 10 of this Convention in the requesting Party. 4. Each Party may give consideration to establishing additional mechanisms to share with other Parties information or evidence needed to establish criminal, civil or administrative liability pursuant to Article 10. Article 18—Extradite or Prosecute 1. The Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present shall, when it has jurisdiction in

accordance with Article 14, if it does not extradite that person, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that Party. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a serious nature under the law of that Party. 2. Whenever a Party is permitted under its domestic law to extradite or otherwise surrender one of its nationals only upon the condition that the person will be returned to that Party to serve the sentence imposed as a result of the trial or proceeding for which the extradition or surrender of the person was sought, and this Party and the Party seeking the extradition of the person agree with this option and other terms they may deem appropriate, such a conditional extradition or surrender shall be sufficient to discharge the obligation set forth in paragraph 1. Article 19—Extradition 1. The offences set forth in Articles 5 to 7 and 9 of this Convention shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between any of the Parties before the entry into force of this Convention. Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be subsequently concluded between them. 2. When a Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Party with which it has no extradition treaty, the requested Party may, if it so decides, consider this Convention as a legal basis for extradition in respect of the offences set forth in Articles 5 to 7 and 9 of this Convention. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested Party.

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3. Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognise the offences set forth in Articles 5 to 7 and 9 of this Convention as extraditable offences between themselves, subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested Party.

Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date of the expression of its consent to be bound by the Convention in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2. [. . .]

4. Where necessary, the offences set forth in Articles 5 to 7 and 9 of this Convention shall be treated, for the purposes of extradition between Parties, as if they had been committed not only in the place in which they occurred but also in the territory of the Parties that have established jurisdiction in accordance with Article 14. 5. The provisions of all extradition treaties and agreements concluded between Parties in respect of offences set forth in Articles 5 to 7 and 9 of this Convention shall be deemed to be modified as between Parties to the extent that they are incompatible with this Convention. [. . .] Article 23—Signature and Entry into Force 1. This Convention shall be open for signature by the member States of the Council of Europe, the European Community and by non-member States which have participated in its elaboration. 2. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval. Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. 3. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date on which six Signatories, including at least four member States of the Council of Europe, have expressed their consent to be bound by the Convention in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2. 4. In respect of any Signatory which subsequently expresses its consent to be bound by it, the

Article 25—Territorial Application 1. Any State or the European Community may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, specify the territory or territories to which this Convention shall apply. 2. Any Party may, at any later date, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, extend the application of this Convention to any other territory specified in the declaration. In respect of such territory the Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date of receipt of the declaration by the Secretary General. 3. Any declaration made under the two preceding paragraphs may, in respect of any territory specified in such declaration, be withdrawn by a notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. The withdrawal shall become effective on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date of receipt of such notification by the Secretary General. Article 26—Effects of the Convention 1. The present Convention supplements applicable multilateral or bilateral treaties or agreements between the Parties, including the provisions of the following Council of Europe treaties: —European Convention on Extradition, opened for signature, in Paris, on 13 December 1957 (ETS No. 24);

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—European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, opened for signature, in Strasbourg, on 20 April 1959 (ETS No. 30); —European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, opened for signature, in Strasbourg, on 27 January 1977 (ETS No. 90); —Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, opened for signature in Strasbourg on 17 March 1978 (ETS No. 99); —Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, opened for signature in Strasbourg on 8 November 2001 (ETS No. 182); —Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, opened for signature in Strasbourg on 15 May 2003 (ETS No. 190).

2. If two or more Parties have already concluded an agreement or treaty on the matters dealt with in this Convention or have otherwise established their relations on such matters, or should they in future do so, they shall also be entitled to apply that agreement or treaty or to regulate those relations accordingly. However, where Parties establish their relations in respect of the matters dealt with in the present Convention other than as regulated therein, they shall do so in a manner that is not inconsistent with the Convention’s objectives and principles.

5. The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, are not governed by this Convention, and the activities undertaken by military forces of a Party in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, are not governed by this Convention. Article 27—Amendments to the Convention 1. Amendments to this Convention may be proposed by any Party, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe or the Consultation of the Parties. 2. Any proposal for amendment shall be communicated by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to the Parties. 3. Moreover, any amendment proposed by a Party or the Committee of Ministers shall be communicated to the Consultation of the Parties, which shall submit to the Committee of Ministers its opinion on the proposed amendment. 4. The Committee of Ministers shall consider the proposed amendment and any opinion submitted by the Consultation of the Parties and may approve the amendment.

3. Parties which are members of the European Union shall, in their mutual relations, apply Community and European Union rules in so far as there are Community or European Union rules governing the particular subject concerned and applicable to the specific case, without prejudice to the object and purpose of the present Convention and without prejudice to its full application with other Parties.

5. The text of any amendment approved by the Committee of Ministers in accordance with paragraph 4 shall be forwarded to the Parties for acceptance.

4. Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of a Party and individuals under international law, including international humanitarian law.

Note by the Secretariat: See the Declaration formulated by the European Community and the Member States of the European Union upon the adoption of the Convention by the Committee of

6. Any amendment approved in accordance with paragraph 4 shall come into force on the thirtieth day after all Parties have informed the Secretary General of their acceptance thereof.

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Ministers of the Council of Europe, on 3 May 2005: “The European Community/European Union and its Member States reaffirm that their objective in requesting the inclusion of a ‘disconnection clause’ is to take account of the institutional structure of the Union when acceding to international conventions, in particular in case of transfer of sovereign powers from the Member States to the Community. This clause is not aimed at reducing the rights or increasing the obligations of a non-European Union Party vis-à-vis the European Community/European Union and its Member States, inasmuch as the latter are also parties to this Convention. The disconnection clause is necessary for those parts of the Convention which fall within the competence of the Community/Union, in order to indicate that European Union Member States cannot invoke and apply the rights and obligations deriving from the Convention directly among themselves (or between themselves and the European Community/Union). This does not detract from the fact that the Convention applies fully between the European Community/European Union and its Member States on the one hand, and the other Parties to the Convention, on the other; the Community and the European Union Members States will be bound by the Convention and will apply it like any Party to the Convention, if necessary, through Community/Union legislation. They will thus guarantee the full respect of the Convention’s provisions vis-à-vis non-European Union Parties.”

2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at Montreal on 23 September 1971; 3. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted in New York on 14 December 1973; 4. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted in New York on 17 December 1979; 5. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted in Vienna on 3 March 1980; 6. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February 1988; 7. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988; 8. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988; 9. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted in New York on 15 December 1997; 10. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted in New York on 9 December 1999.

Appendix 1. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970;

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31. Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), having fifty-seven countries as members, was set up in 1969 to look into the problems facing the member nations. The term “Islam” (meaning submission) has been sullied due to various terrorist organizations committing crimes in the name of Islam. The OIC in its ministerial meeting in 1999 adopted a resolution stating that a peaceful religion has been vilified due to the illegal activities of a handful of Muslims. The OIC spelled out areas of cooperation in preventing various forms of terrorist crimes. It clearly stipulated in Article 2 (Part I) that certain crimes such as aggression against the head of the state or king, murder, robbery, and acts of sabotage would not be considered political crimes even if the motive was political. However, the convention in the same articles differentiated between unlawful terrorist acts and the struggle of people against foreign occupation, colonialism, and aggression. Source Organization of the Islamic Conference, http://www .oic-oci.org/english/convenion/terrorism_convention.htm.

The Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Pursuant to the tenets of the tolerant Islamic Sharia which reject all forms of violence and terrorism, and in particular specially those based on extremism and call for protection of human rights, which provisions are paralleled by the principles and rules of international law founded on cooperation between peoples for the establishment of peace; Abiding by the lofty, moral and religious principles particularly the provisions of the Islamic Sharia as well as the human heritage of the Islamic Ummah.

Adhering to the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, its objectives and principles aimed at creating an appropriate atmosphere to strengthen cooperation and understanding among Islamic States as well as relevant OIC resolutions; Adhering to the principles of International Law and the United Nations Charter as well as all relevant UN resolutions on procedures aimed at eliminating international terrorism, and all other conventions and international instruments to which states acceding to this Convention are parties and which call, inter alia, for the observance of the sovereignty, stability, territorial, integrity, political independence and security of states, and nonintervention in their international affairs; Proceeding from the rules of the Code of Conduct of the Organization of Islamic Conference for Combating International Terrorism; Desiring to promote cooperation among them for combating terrorist crimes that threaten the security and stability of the Islamic States and endanger their vital interests; Being committed to combating all forms and manifestations of terrorism and eliminating its objectives and causes which target the lives and properties of people; Confirming the legitimacy of the right of peoples to struggle against foreign occupation and colonialist and racist regimes by all means, including armed struggle to liberate their territories and attain their rights to self-determination and independence in compliance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations; Believing that terrorism constitutes a gross violation of human rights, in particular the right to freedom and security, as well as an obstacle to the free functioning of institutions and socio-economic development, as it aims at destabilizing States;

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Convinced that terrorism cannot be justified in any way, and that it should therefore be unambiguously condemned in all its forms and manifestations, and all its actions, means and practices, whatever its origin, causes or purposes, including direct or indirect actions of States; Recognizing the growing links between terrorism and organized crime, including illicit trafficking in arms, narcotics, human beings and money laundering; Have agreed to conclude this Convention, calling on all Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to accede to it. Definition and General Provisions Article 1 For the purposes of this Convention: 1. “Contracting State” or “Contracting Party” means every Member State in the Organization of the Islamic Conference that has ratified or adhered to this Convention and deposited its instruments of ratification or adherence with the General Secretariat of the Organization. 2. “Terrorism” means any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honor, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States. 3. “Terrorist Crime” means any crime executed, started or participated in to realize a terrorist objective in any of the Contracting States or against its nationals, assets or interests or foreign facilities and nationals residing in its territory punishable by its internal law.

4. Crimes stipulated in the following conventions are also considered terrorist crimes with the exception of those excluded by the legislations of Contracting States or those who have not ratified them: a) Convention on “Offences and Other Acts Committed on Board of Aircrafts” (Tokyo, 14.9.1963). b) Convention on “Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft” (The Hague, 16.12.1970). c) Convention on “Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation” signed at Montreal on 23.9.1971 and its Protocol (Montreal, 10.12.1984). d) Convention on the “Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Persons Enjoying International Immunity, Including Diplomatic Agents” (New York, 14.12.1973). e) International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (New York, 1979). f) The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 and its related provisions on piracy at sea. g) Convention on the “Physical Protection of Nuclear Material” (Vienna, 1979). h) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation-Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal, 1988). i) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf (Rome, 1988). j) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (Rome, 1988). k) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (New York, 1997). l) Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the purposes of Detection (Montreal, 1991).

Article 2 a) Peoples struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-

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determination in accordance with the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime. b) None of the terrorist crimes mentioned in the previous article shall be considered political crimes. c) In the implementation of the provisions of this Convention the following crimes shall not be considered political crimes even when politically motivated: 1. Aggression against kings and heads of state of Contracting States or against their spouses, their ascendants or descendants. 2. Aggression against crown princes or vice-presidents or deputy heads of government or ministers in any of the Contracting States. 3. Aggression against persons enjoying international immunity including Ambassadors and diplomats in Contracting States or in countries of accreditation. 4. Murder or robbery by force against individuals or authorities or means of transport and communications. 5. Acts of sabotage and destruction of public properties and properties geared for public services, even if belonging to another Contracting State. 6. Crimes of manufacturing, smuggling or possessing arms and ammunition or explosives or other materials prepared for committing terrorist crimes.

Section II Foundations of Islamic Cooperation for Combating Terrorism Chapter I In the Field of Security Division I Measures to Prevent and Combat Terrorist Crimes Article 3 I. The Contracting States are committed not to execute, initiate or participate in any form in organizing or financing or committing or instigating or supporting terrorist acts whether directly or indirectly. II. Committed to prevent and combat terrorist crimes in conformity with the provisions of this Convention and their respective domestic rules and regulations the contracting States shall see to:

d) All forms of international crimes, including illegal trafficking in narcotics and human beings money laundering aimed at financing terrorist objectives shall be considered terrorist crimes.

(A) Preventive Measures: 1. Barring their territories from being used as an arena for planning, organizing, executing terrorist crimes or initiating or participating in these crimes in any form; including preventing the infiltration of terrorist elements or their gaining refuge or residence therein individually or collectively, or receiving hosting, training, arming, financing or extending any facilities to them. 2. Cooperating and coordinating with the rest of the Contracting States, particularly neighboring countries which suffer from similar or common terrorist crimes. 3. Developing and strengthening systems relating to detecting transportation, importing, exporting stockpiling, and using of weapons, ammunition and explosives as well as other means of aggression, killing and destruction in addition to strengthening trans-border and custom controls

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in order to intercept their transfer from one Contracting State to another or to other States unless they are intended for specific legitimate purposes. 4. Developing and strengthening systems related to surveillance procedures, securing borders, and land, sea and air passages in order to prevent infiltration through them. 5. Strengthening systems for ensuring the safety and protection of personalities, vital installations and means of public transport. 6. Re-enforcing protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular persons and missions; and regional and international organizations accredited in the Contracting State in accordance with the conventions and rules of international law which govern this subject. 7. Promoting security intelligence activities and coordinating them with the intelligence activities of each Contracting State pursuant to their respective intelligence policies, aimed at exposing the objectives of terrorist groups and organizations, thwarting their designs and revealing the extent of their danger to security and stability. 8. Establishing a data base by each Contracting State to collect and analyze data on terrorist elements, groups, movements and organizations and monitor developments of the phenomenon of terrorism and successful experiences in combating it. Moreover, the Contracting State shall update this information and exchange them with competent authorities in other Contracting States within the limits of the laws and regulations in every State. 9. To take all necessary measures to eliminate and prevent the establishment of webs supporting all kinds of terrorist crimes. (B) Combating Measures: 1. Arresting perpetrators of terrorist’s crimes and prosecuting them according to the national law or extraditing them in accordance with the provisions of this Convention or existing Conventions between the requesting and requested States.

2. Ensuring effective protection of persons working in the field of criminal justice as well as to witnesses and investigators. 3. Ensuring effective protection of information sources and witnesses on terrorist crimes. 4. Extending necessary assistance to victims of terrorism. 5. Establishing effective cooperation between the concerned organs in the contracting States and the citizens for combating terrorism including extending appropriate guarantees and appropriate incentives to encourage informing on terrorist acts and submitting information to help uncover them and cooperating in arresting the perpetrators.

Division II Areas of Islamic Cooperation for Preventing and Combating Terrorist Crimes Article 4 Contracting States shall cooperate among themselves to prevent and combat terrorist crimes in accordance with the respective laws and regulations of each State in the following areas: First: Exchange of Information

1. Contracting States shall undertake to promote exchange of information among them as such regarding: a) Activities and crimes committed by terrorist groups, their leaders, their elements, their headquarters, training, means and sources that provide finance and weapons, types of arms, ammunition and explosives utilized as well as other ways and means to attack, kill and destroy. b) Means of communications and propaganda utilized by terrorist groups, how they act, movement of their leaders, their elements and their travel documents.

2. Contracting States shall expeditiously inform any other Contracting State regarding available

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information about any terrorist crime perpetrated in its territory aimed at undermining the interests of that State or its nationals and to state the facts surrounding the crime in terms of its circumstances, criminals involved, victims, losses, devices and methods utilized to carry out the crime, without prejudicing investigation and inquiry requisites. 3. Contracting States shall exchange information with the other Parties to combat terrorist crimes and to inform the Contracting State or other States of all available information or data that could prevent terrorist crimes within its territory or against its nationals or residents or interests. 4. The Contracting States shall provide any other Contracting State with available information or data that will:

Third: Exchange of Expertise

1. Contracting States shall cooperate with each other to undertake and exchange studies and researches on combating terrorist crimes as well as exchange of expertise in this field. 2. Contracting States shall cooperate within the scope of their capabilities to provide available technical assistance for preparing programs or holding joint training sessions with one or more Contracting State if the need arises for personnel required in the field of combating terrorism in order to improve their scientific and practical potential and upgrade their performance standards. Fourth: Education and Information Field

The Contracting States shall cooperate in: 1. Promoting information activities and supporting the mass media in order to confront the vicious campaign against Islam, by projecting the true image of tolerance of Islam and exposing the designs and danger of terrorist groups against the stability and security of Islamic States. 2. Including the noble human values, which proscribe the practice of terrorism in the educational curricula of Contracting States. 3. Supporting efforts aimed at keeping abreast of the age by introducing an advanced Islamic thought based on ijtihad by which Islam is distinguished.

a) Assist in arresting those accused of committing a terrorist crime against the interests of that country or being implicated in such acts either by assistance, collusion, instigation, or financing. b) Contribute to confiscating any arms, weapons, explosives, devices or funds spent or meant to be spent to commit a terrorist crime.

5. The Contracting States undertake to respect the confidentiality of information exchanged between them and shall refrain from passing it to any nonContracting States or other parties without prior consent of the source country.

Chapter II

Second: Investigation

Each Contracting State pledges to promote cooperation with other contracting states and to extend assistance in the field of investigation procedures in terms of arresting escaped suspects or those convicted for terrorist crimes in accordance with the laws and regulations of each country.

In the Judicial Field Section I Extraditing Criminals Article 5 Contracting States shall undertake to extradite those indicted or convicted of terrorist crimes, requested for extradition by any of these countries

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in compliance with the rules and conditions stipulated in this Convention. Article 6 Extradition shall not be permissible in the following cases: 1. If the Crime for which extradition is requested is deemed by the laws enforced in the requested Contracting State as one of a political nature and without prejudice to the provisions of Article 2. paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Convention for which extradition is requested. 2. If the Crime for which extradition is sought relates solely to a dereliction of military obligations. 3. If the Crime for which extradition is requested, was committed in the territory of the requested Contracting State, unless this crime has undermined the interests of the requesting Contracting State and its laws stipulate that the perpetrators of those crimes shall be prosecuted and punished providing that the requested country has not commenced investigation or trial. 4. If the Crime has been the subject of a final sentence which has the force of law in the requested Contracting State. 5. If the action at the time of the extradition request elapsed or the penalty prescribed in accordance with the law in the Contracting State requesting extradition. 6. Crimes committed outside the territory of the requesting Contracting State by a person who was not its national and the law of the requested Contracting State does not prosecute such a crime if perpetrated outside its territory by such a person. 7. If pardon was granted and included the perpetrators of these crimes in the requesting Contracting State. 8. If the legal system of the requested State does not permit extradition of its national, then it shall be obliged to prosecute whosoever commits a terrorist crime if the act is punishable in both States by a freedom restraining sentence for a minimum period of one year or more. The nationality of the

person requested for extradition shall be determined according to the date of the crime taking into account the investigation undertaken in this respect by the requesting State.

Article 7 If the person requested for extradition is under investigation or trial for another crime in the requested State, his extradition shall be postponed until the investigation is disposed of or the trial is over and the punishment implemented. In this case, the requested State shall extradite him provisionally for investigation or trial on condition that he shall be returned to it before execution of the sentence issued in the requested State. Article 8 For the purpose of extraditing crime perpetrators according to this Convention, the domestic legislations of Contracting States shall not have any bearing as to their differences with respect to the crime being classified as a felony or misdemeanor, nor as to the penalty prescribed for it. Section II Rogatory Commission Article 9 Each Contracting State shall request from any other Contracting State to undertake in its territory rogatory action with respect to any judicial procedures concerning an action involving a terrorist crime and in particular: 1. To hear witnesses and testimonies taken as evidence. 2. To communicate legal documents. 3. To implement inquiry and detention procedures. 4. To undertake on the scene inspection and analyze evidence. 5. To obtain necessary evidence or documents or records or their certified copies.

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Article 10 Each Contracting State shall implement rogatory commissions related to terrorist crimes and may reject the request for implementation with respect to the following cases. 1. If the crime for which the request is made, is the subject of a charge, investigation or trial in the country requested to implement rogatory commission. 2. If the implementation of the request prejudices the sovereignty or the security or public order of the country charged with this mission.

Article 11 The request for rogatory mission shall be implemented promptly in accordance with the provisions of the domestic laws of the requested State and which may postpone its implementation until its investigation and prosecution procedures are completed on the same subject or until the compelling reasons that called for postponement are removed. In this case the requesting State shall be informed of this postponement. Article 12 The request for a rogatory commission related to a terrorist crime shall not be refused on the grounds of the rule of transaction confidentiality for banks and financial institutions. And in the implementation of the request the rules of the enforcing State are to be followed. Article 13 The procedure, undertaken through rogatory commission in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, shall have the same legal effect as if it was brought before the competent authority in the State requesting rogatory commission. The results of its implementation shall only be utilized within the scope of the rogatory commission.

Section III Judicial Cooperation Article 14 Each Contracting State shall extend to the other contracting parties every possible assistance as may be necessary for investigation or trial proceedings related to terrorist crimes. Article 15 If judicial competence accrues to one of the Contracting States for the prosecution of a subject accused of a terrorist crime, this State may request the country which hosts the suspect to prosecute him for this crime subject to the host country’s consent and providing the crime is punishable in that country by a freedom restraining sentence for at least one year or by a more severe sanction. In such a case the requesting State shall pass all investigation documents and evidence related to the crime to the requested State. Investigation or trial shall be conducted on the grounds of the case or cases brought by the requesting State against the accused in accordance with the legal provisions and procedures of the country holding the trial. Article 16 The request for trial on the basis of para (1) of the previous article entails the suspension of procedures of prosecution, investigation and trial in the territory of the requesting State except those relating to the requisites of cooperation, assistance or rogatory commission sought by the State requested to hold the trial procedures. Article 17 1. Procedures undertaken in either of the two States—the requesting State or the one where the trial is held—shall be subject to the law of the country where the procedure is executed and which shall have legal preeminence as may be stipulated in its legislation.

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2. The requesting State shall not bring to trial or retrial the accused subject unless the requested State refuses to prosecute him. 3. In all cases the State requested to hold trial shall inform the requesting country of its action with respect to the request for trial and shall communicate to it the results of its investigations or trial proceedings. Article 18 The State requested to hold trial may undertake all measures and procedures stipulated by its legislation regarding the accused both before and after the request for trial is received. Section IV Seized Assets and Proceeds of the Crime Article 19 1. If the extradition of a subject is decided, the Contracting State shall hand over to the requesting State the assets and proceeds seized, used or related to the terrorist crime, found in the possession of the wanted subject or with a third party.

provisionally if required for penal action implemented therein or hand them to the requesting State on condition that they shall be returned for the same purpose. Section V Exchange of Evidence Article 21 A Contracting State shall see to it that the evidence and effects of any terrorist crime committed on its territory against another Contracting State are examined by its competent organs and may seek assistance to that end from any other Contracting State. Moreover, it shall take every necessary step to safeguard the evidence and proof of their legal relevance. It may communicate, if requested, the result to the country whose interest were targeted by the crime. The State or States which have assisted in this case shall not pass this information to others. Part III Mechanism for Implementing Cooperation Chapter I

2. The material mentioned in the previous item shall be handed over even if the accused has not been extradited either due to his escape, death or any other reason after ensuring that these were connected with the terrorist crime. 3. The provisions contained in the two previous items shall not prejudice the rights of any of the Contracting States or bona fide from others with respect to the above-mentioned assets and proceeds. Article 20 The State requested to hand over the assets and proceeds may undertake all necessary custodial measures and procedures for the implementation of its obligation. It may also retain them

Extradition Procedures Article 22 The exchange of extradition requests between Contracting States shall be Undertaken directly through diplomatic channels or through their Ministries of Justice or their substitute. Article 23 A request for extradition shall be submitted in writing and shall include: 1. The original or an authenticated copy of the indictment, arrest order or any other instruments of identical weight issued in line with the condi-

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tions stipulated in the requesting State’s legislation. 2. A statement of the acts for which extradition is sought specifying the dates and places, where these acts were committed and their legal implications along with reference to the legal articles under which they fall as well as a copy of these articles. 3. Description, in as much detail as possible, of the subject wanted for extradition and any other information such as to determine his identity and nationality.

Article 24 1. The judicial authorities in the requesting State may approach the requested State by any channel of written communication and seek the preventive arrest of the wanted subject pending the arrival of the extradition request. 2. In this case the requested State may effect the preventive arrest of the wanted subject. However, if the request for extradition is not submitted together with the necessary documents listed in the above article, the subject whose extradition is sought may not be detained for more than thirty days as of the day of his arrest. Article 25 The requesting State shall send a request together with the documents listed in Article 23 of this Convention. If the requested State accepts the request as valid, its competent authorities shall implement it in accordance with its legislation and shall promptly notify the requesting State of the action undertaken. Article 26 1. In all cases stipulated in the two articles above, preventive detention shall not exceed sixty days after the date of arrest. 2. Temporary release may be effected during the period stipulated in the previous article and the requested State shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the wanted subject does not escape.

3. Release shall not prevent the re-arrest of the subject and his extradition if it was requested after his release. Article 27 If the requested State requires additional clarification to ascertain the conditions stipulated in this chapter, it shall notify the requesting State thereof and fix a date for provision of such clarifications. Article 28 If the requested State received a number of extradition requests from various countries related to the same or diverse acts, this State shall decide upon these requests bearing in mind the circumstances and in particular the possibility of subsequent extradition, date of receiving the requests, degree of the danger of the crime and where it was committed. Chapter II Measures for Rogatory Commissions Article 29 Rogatory Commission requests must specify the following: The competent authority that issued the request. Subject of the request and its reason. The identity and nationality of the person being the subject of the rogatory commission (as may be possible). Information on the crime requiring rogatory commission, its legal definition and penalty inflicted on its perpetrators along with maximum available information on its circumstances in order to ensure the efficient implementation of the rogatory commission.

Article 30 1. The request for rogatory commission shall be forwarded by the Ministry of Justice in the requesting State to the Ministry of Justice in the requested State and returned in the same way.

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2. In case of expediency, the request for rogatory commission shall be directly forwarded by the judicial authorities in the requesting State to the judicial authorities in the requested State. A copy of this rogatory commission shall also be sent at the same time to the Ministry of Justice in the requested State. The rogatory commission shall be returned together with the papers concerning its implementation in the way stipulated in the previous item. 3. The request for rogatory commission may be forwarded directly from the judicial authorities to the competent authority in the requested country. Answers may be sent directly through the said authority. Article 31 Requests for rogatory commission and accompanying documents shall be signed or stamped with the seal of a competent authority or that authorized by it. These documents shall be exempted from all formal procedures that could be required by the legislation of the requested State. Article 32 If the authority that received the request for rogatory commission was not competent enough to deal with it, it shall automatically transfer it to the competent authority in its country. If the request is forwarded directly the answer shall reach the requesting State in the same manner. Article 33 Any refusal for rogatory commission shall be explained. Chapter III Measures for Protecting Witnesses and Experts Article 34 If the requesting State deems that the appearance of the witness or expert before its judicial

authorities is of special importance, reference thereto shall be made in its request. The request or summons shall include an approximate statement in terms of compensation, travel expenses, accommodation and commitment to make these payments. The requested State shall invite the witness or expert and inform the requesting State about his/her reply. Article 35 1. No penalty nor coercive measure may be inflicted upon the witness or expert who does not comply with the summons even if the writ provides for such a penalty. 2. If the witness or expert arrives voluntarily to the territory of the requesting State, he shall be summoned according to the provisions of the internal legislation of this State. Article 36 1. A witness or expert may not be subjected to trial, detained or have his freedom restricted in the territory of the requesting State, for acts or court rulings that preceded his departure for the requesting State, irrespective of his nationality, as long as his appearance before the judicial authorities of the said State is based on a summons. 2. No witness or expert, whatever his nationality, appearing before the judiciary of the State in question on the basis of a summons, may be prosecuted or detained or have his freedom restricted in any way on the requesting State’s territory for other acts or court decisions not mentioned in the summons and predating his departure from the State from which he is requested. 3. The immunity privileges stated in this Article shall become invalid if a witness or expert remains on the requesting State’s territories for over thirty consecutive days despite his ability to return once his presence was no longer requested by the

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judiciary, or if he returns to the requesting State’s territories after his departure.

32. USA Patriot Act (Title III)

Article 37 1. The requesting State shall undertake all necessary measures to ensure the protection of a witness or expert from publicity that could endanger him, his family or his property as a result of his testimony and in particular:

The Patriot Act came into existence after the devastating terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The act received presidential assent on 26 October 2001. This most comprehensive legislation, running 342 pages, drew criticism from civil liberty groups for infringing upon some of the fundamental rights of Americans. Some conservative groups criticized the act as giving unprecedented power to the government. Some of the important provisions of the Act are Title II, “Enhanced Surveillance Procedures”; Title III, “International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001”; Title IV, “Protecting the Border”; and Title VIII, “Strengthening the Criminal Laws Against Terrorism.” Title III of the act strengthened government control over financial transactions in domestic and international circles. The act increased the scope of earlier forfeiture laws, made record keeping more stringent, emphasized information-sharing requirements, and imposed new penalties. The functioning of the shell banks in the United States was restricted. The money remitters not complying with licensing as well as registration could be prosecuted easily as per the provisions of the act.

a) To ensure confidentiality of the date and place of his arrival as well as the means involved. b) To ensure confidentiality of his accommodation, movements and locations where he may be found. c) To ensure confidentiality of the testimony and information given to the competent judicial authorities.

2. The requesting State shall provide necessary security required by the condition of the witness or expert and of his family, and circumstances of the case and types of expected risks. Article 38 1. If the witness or expert who is summoned to the requesting State is imprisoned in the requested State, he shall be provisionally transferred to the location of the hearing at which he is to testify according to conditions and times determined by the requested State.

Source Electronic Privacy Information Center, http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.html.

2. Transfer may be denied: a) If the witness or expert refuses. b) If his presence is necessary for undertaking criminal procedures in the territory of the requested State. c) If his transfer would prolong his imprisonment. d) If there are considerations militating against his transfer.

3. The transferred witness or expert shall remain in detention in the territory of the requesting State until he is repatriated to the requested state unless the latter requests his release.

Title III—International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001 Sec. 301. Short Title This title may be cited as the ‘International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial AntiTerrorism Act of 2001’. Sec. 302. Findings and Purposes (a) FINDINGS—The Congress finds that—

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(1) money laundering, estimated by the International Monetary Fund to amount to between 2 and 5 percent of global gross domestic product, which is at least $600,000,000,000 annually, provides the financial fuel that permits transnational criminal enterprises to conduct and expand their operations to the detriment of the safety and security of American citizens; (2) money laundering, and the defects in financial transparency on which money launderers rely, are critical to the financing of global terrorism and the provision of funds for terrorist attacks; (3) money launderers subvert legitimate financial mechanisms and banking relationships by using them as protective covering for the movement of criminal proceeds and the financing of crime and terrorism, and, by so doing, can threaten the safety of United States citizens and undermine the integrity of United States financial institutions and of the global financial and trading systems upon which prosperity and growth depend; (4) certain jurisdictions outside of the United States that offer ‘offshore’ banking and related facilities designed to provide anonymity, coupled with weak financial supervisory and enforcement regimes, provide essential tools to disguise ownership and movement of criminal funds, derived from, or used to commit, offenses ranging from narcotics trafficking, terrorism, arms smuggling, and trafficking in human beings, to financial frauds that prey on law-abiding citizens; (5) transactions involving such offshore jurisdictions make it difficult for law enforcement officials and regulators to follow the trail of money earned by criminals, organized international criminal enterprises, and global terrorist organizations; (6) correspondent banking facilities are one of the banking mechanisms susceptible in some circumstances to manipulation by foreign banks to permit the laundering of funds by hiding the identity of real parties in interest to financial transactions; (7) private banking services can be susceptible to manipulation by money launderers, for example corrupt foreign government officials, particularly if those services include the creation of offshore

accounts and facilities for large personal funds transfers to channel funds into accounts around the globe; (8) United States anti-money laundering efforts are impeded by outmoded and inadequate statutory provisions that make investigations, prosecutions, and forfeitures more difficult, particularly in cases in which money laundering involves foreign persons, foreign banks, or foreign countries; (9) the ability to mount effective counter-measures to international money launderers requires national, as well as bilateral and multilateral action, using tools specially designed for that effort; and (10) the Basle Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices and the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, of both of which the United States is a member, have each adopted international anti-money laundering principles and recommendations.

(b) PURPOSES—The purposes of this title are— (1) to increase the strength of United States measures to prevent, detect, and prosecute international money laundering and the financing of terrorism; (2) to ensure that— (A) banking transactions and financial relationships and the conduct of such transactions and relationships, do not contravene the purposes of subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, or chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91–508 (84 Stat. 1116), or facilitate the evasion of any such provision; and (B) the purposes of such provisions of law continue to be fulfilled, and such provisions of law are effectively and efficiently administered; (3) to strengthen the provisions put into place by the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (18 U.S.C. 981 note), especially with respect to crimes by non-United States nationals and foreign financial institutions; (4) to provide a clear national mandate for subjecting to special scrutiny those foreign jurisdictions, financial institutions operating outside of the

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United States, and classes of international transactions or types of accounts that pose particular, identifiable opportunities for criminal abuse; (5) to provide the Secretary of the Treasury (in this title referred to as the ‘Secretary’) with broad discretion, subject to the safeguards provided by the Administrative Procedure Act under title 5, United States Code, to take measures tailored to the particular money laundering problems presented by specific foreign jurisdictions, financial institutions operating outside of the United States, and classes of international transactions or types of accounts; (6) to ensure that the employment of such measures by the Secretary permits appropriate opportunity for comment by affected financial institutions; (7) to provide guidance to domestic financial institutions on particular foreign jurisdictions, financial institutions operating outside of the United States, and classes of international transactions that are of primary money laundering concern to the United States Government; (8) to ensure that the forfeiture of any assets in connection with the anti-terrorist efforts of the United States permits for adequate challenge consistent with providing due process rights; (9) to clarify the terms of the safe harbor from civil liability for filing suspicious activity reports; (10) to strengthen the authority of the Secretary to issue and administer geographic targeting orders, and to clarify that violations of such orders or any other requirement imposed under the authority contained in chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91–508 and subchapters II and III of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, may result in criminal and civil penalties; (11) to ensure that all appropriate elements of the financial services industry are subject to appropriate requirements to report potential money laundering transactions to proper authorities, and that jurisdictional disputes do not hinder examination of compliance by financial institutions with relevant reporting requirements;

(12) to strengthen the ability of financial institutions to maintain the integrity of their employee population; and (13) to strengthen measures to prevent the use of the United States financial system for personal gain by corrupt foreign officials and to facilitate the repatriation of any stolen assets to the citizens of countries to whom such assets belong.

Sec. 303. 4-Year Congressional Review; Expedited Consideration (a) IN GENERAL—Effective on and after the first day of fiscal year 2005, the provisions of this title and the amendments made by this title shall terminate if the Congress enacts a joint resolution, the text after the resolving clause of which is as follows: ‘That provisions of the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, and the amendments made thereby, shall no longer have the force of law’. (b) EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION—Any joint resolution submitted pursuant to this section should be considered by the Congress expeditiously. In particular, it shall be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976. Subtitle A—International Counter Money Laundering and Related Measures Sec. 311. Special Measures for Jurisdictions, Financial Institutions, or International Transactions of Primary Money Laundering Concern (a) IN GENERAL—Subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 5318 the following new section: ‘Sec. 5318A. Special measures for jurisdictions, financial institutions, or international transactions of primary money laundering concern’

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(a) INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-MONEY LAUNDERING REQUIREMENTS— ‘(1) IN GENERAL—The Secretary of the Treasury may require domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies to take 1 or more of the special measures described in subsection (b) if the Secretary finds that reasonable grounds exist for concluding that a jurisdiction outside of the United States, 1 or more financial institutions operating outside of the United States, 1 or more classes of transactions within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United States, or 1 or more types of accounts is of primary money laundering concern, in accordance with subsection (c). ‘(2) FORM OF REQUIREMENT—The special measures described in— ‘(A) subsection (b) may be imposed in such sequence or combination as the Secretary shall determine; ‘(B) paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (b) may be imposed by regulation, order, or otherwise as permitted by law; and ‘(C) subsection (b)(5) may be imposed only by regulation.

‘(3) DURATION OF ORDERS; RULEMAKING—Any order by which a special measure described in paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (b) is imposed (other than an order described in section 5326)— ‘(A) shall be issued together with a notice of proposed rulemaking relating to the imposition of such special measure; and ‘(B) may not remain in effect for more than 120 days, except pursuant to a rule promulgated on or before the end of the 120-day period beginning on the date of issuance of such order.

‘(4) PROCESS FOR SELECTING SPECIAL MEASURES—In selecting which special measure or measures to take under this subsection, the Secretary of the Treasury—

‘(A) shall consult with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, any other appropriate Federal banking agency, as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the Secretary of State, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the National Credit Union Administration Board, and in the sole discretion of the Secretary, such other agencies and interested parties as the Secretary may find to be appropriate; and ‘(B) shall consider— ‘(i) whether similar action has been or is being taken by other nations or multilateral groups; ‘(ii) whether the imposition of any particular special measure would create a significant competitive disadvantage, including any undue cost or burden associated with compliance, for financial institutions organized or licensed in the United States; ‘(iii) the extent to which the action or the timing of the action would have a significant adverse systemic impact on the international payment, clearance, and settlement system, or on legitimate business activities involving the particular jurisdiction, institution, or class of transactions; and ‘(iv) the effect of the action on United States national security and foreign policy.

‘(5) NO LIMITATION ON OTHER AUTHORITY—This section shall not be construed as superseding or otherwise restricting any other authority granted to the Secretary, or to any other agency, by this subchapter or otherwise. ‘(b) SPECIAL MEASURES—The special measures referred to in subsection (a), with respect to a jurisdiction outside of the United States, financial institution operating outside of the United States, class of transaction within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United States, or 1 or more types of accounts are as follows:

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‘(1) RECORDKEEPING AND REPORTING OF CERTAIN FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS— ‘(A) IN GENERAL—The Secretary of the Treasury may require any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency to maintain records, file reports, or both, concerning the aggregate amount of transactions, or concerning each transaction, with respect to a jurisdiction outside of the United States, 1 or more financial institutions operating outside of the United States, 1 or more classes of transactions within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United States, or 1 or more types of accounts if the Secretary finds any such jurisdiction, institution, or class of transactions to be of primary money laundering concern. ‘(B) FORM OF RECORDS AND REPORTS— Such records and reports shall be made and retained at such time, in such manner, and for such period of time, as the Secretary shall determine, and shall include such information as the Secretary may determine, including— ‘(i) the identity and address of the participants in a transaction or relationship, including the identity of the originator of any funds transfer; ‘(ii) the legal capacity in which a participant in any transaction is acting; ‘(iii) the identity of the beneficial owner of the funds involved in any transaction, in accordance with such procedures as the Secretary determines to be reasonable and practicable to obtain and retain the information; and ‘(iv) a description of any transaction.

any account opened or maintained in the United States by a foreign person (other than a foreign entity whose shares are subject to public reporting requirements or are listed and traded on a regulated exchange or trading market), or a representative of such a foreign person, that involves a jurisdiction outside of the United States, 1 or more financial institutions operating outside of the United States, 1 or more classes of transactions within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United States, or 1 or more types of accounts if the Secretary finds any such jurisdiction, institution, or transaction or type of account to be of primary money laundering concern. ‘(3) INFORMATION RELATING TO CERTAIN PAYABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNTS—If the Secretary finds a jurisdiction outside of the United States, 1 or more financial institutions operating outside of the United States, or 1 or more classes of transactions within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United States to be of primary money laundering concern, the Secretary may require any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency that opens or maintains a payable-through account in the United States for a foreign financial institution involving any such jurisdiction or any such financial institution operating outside of the United States, or a payable through account through which any such transaction may be conducted, as a condition of opening or maintaining such account—

‘(2) INFORMATION RELATING TO BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP—In addition to any other requirement under any other provision of law, the Secretary may require any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency to take such steps as the Secretary may determine to be reasonable and practicable to obtain and retain information concerning the beneficial ownership of

‘(A) to identify each customer (and representative of such customer) of such financial institution who is permitted to use, or whose transactions are routed through, such payable-through account; and ‘(B) to obtain, with respect to each such customer (and each such representative), information that is substantially comparable to that which the depository institution obtains in the ordinary course of business with respect to its customers residing in the United States.

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‘(4) INFORMATION RELATING TO CERTAIN CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNTS—If the Secretary finds a jurisdiction outside of the United States, 1 or more financial institutions operating outside of the United States, or 1 or more classes of transactions within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United States to be of primary money laundering concern, the Secretary may require any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency that opens or maintains a correspondent account in the United States for a foreign financial institution involving any such jurisdiction or any such financial institution operating outside of the United States, or a correspondent account through which any such transaction may be conducted, as a condition of opening or maintaining such account— ‘(A) to identify each customer (and representative of such customer) of any such financial institution who is permitted to use, or whose transactions are routed through, such correspondent account; and ‘(B) to obtain, with respect to each such customer (and each such representative), information that is substantially comparable to that which the depository institution obtains in the ordinary course of business with respect to its customers residing in the United States.

‘(5) PROHIBITIONS OR CONDITIONS ON OPENING OR MAINTAINING CERTAIN CORRESPONDENT OR PAYABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNTS—If the Secretary finds a jurisdiction outside of the United States, 1 or more financial institutions operating outside of the United States, or 1 or more classes of transactions within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United States to be of primary money laundering concern, the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, may prohibit, or impose conditions upon, the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or payable—through

account by any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency for or on behalf of a foreign banking institution, if such correspondent account or payable-through account involves any such jurisdiction or institution, or if any such transaction may be conducted through such correspondent account or payable-through account. ‘(c) CONSULTATIONS AND INFORMATION TO BE CONSIDERED IN FINDING JURISDICTIONS, INSTITUTIONS, TYPES OF ACCOUNTS, OR TRANSACTIONS TO BE OF PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN—

‘(1) IN GENERAL—In making a finding that reasonable grounds exist for concluding that a jurisdiction outside of the United States, 1 or more financial institutions operating outside of the United States, 1 or more classes of transactions within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United States, or 1 or more types of accounts is of primary money laundering concern so as to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to take 1 or more of the special measures described in subsection (b), the Secretary shall consult with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General. ‘(2) ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS—In making a finding described in paragraph (1), the Secretary shall consider in addition such information as the Secretary determines to be relevant, including the following potentially relevant factors: ‘(A) JURISDICTIONAL FACTORS—In the case of a particular jurisdiction— ‘(i) evidence that organized criminal groups, international terrorists, or both, have transacted business in that jurisdiction; ‘(ii) the extent to which that jurisdiction or financial institutions operating in that jurisdiction offer bank secrecy or special regulatory advantages to nonresidents or nondomiciliaries of that jurisdiction;

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‘(iii) the substance and quality of administration of the bank supervisory and counter-money laundering laws of that jurisdiction; ‘(iv) the relationship between the volume of financial transactions occurring in that jurisdiction and the size of the economy of the jurisdiction; ‘(v) the extent to which that jurisdiction is characterized as an offshore banking or secrecy haven by credible international organizations or multilateral expert groups; ‘(vi) whether the United States has a mutual legal assistance treaty with that jurisdiction, and the experience of United States law enforcement officials and regulatory officials in obtaining information about transactions originating in or routed through or to such jurisdiction; and (vii) the extent to which that jurisdiction is characterized by high levels of official or institutional corruption. ‘(B) INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS—In the case of a decision to apply 1 or more of the special measures described in subsection (b) only to a financial institution or institutions, or to a transaction or class of transactions, or to a type of account, or to all 3, within or involving a particular jurisdiction— ‘(i) the extent to which such financial institutions, transactions, or types of accounts are used to facilitate or promote money laundering in or through the jurisdiction; ‘(ii) the extent to which such institutions, transactions, or types of accounts are used for legitimate business purposes in the jurisdiction; and ‘(iii) the extent to which such action is sufficient to ensure, with respect to transactions involving the jurisdiction and institutions operating in the jurisdiction, that the purposes of this subchapter continue to be fulfilled, and to guard against international money laundering and other financial crimes. ‘(d) NOTIFICATION OF SPECIAL MEASURES INVOKED BY THE SECRETARY—Not later than 10 days after the date of any action taken by

the Secretary of the Treasury under subsection (a)(1), the Secretary shall notify, in writing, the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate of any such action. ‘(e) DEFINITIONS—Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, for purposes of this section and subsections (i) and (j) of section 5318, the following definitions shall apply:

‘(1) BANK DEFINITIONS—The following definitions shall apply with respect to a bank: ‘(A) ACCOUNT—The term ‘account’— ’(i) means a formal banking or business relationship established to provide regular services, dealings, and other financial transactions; and ’(ii) includes a demand deposit, savings deposit, or other transaction or asset account and a credit account or other extension of credit. ’(B) CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT—The term ‘correspondent account’ means an account established to receive deposits from, make payments on behalf of a foreign financial institution, or handle other financial transactions related to such institution. ’(C) PAYABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNT—The term ‘payable-through account’ means an account, including a transaction account (as defined in section 19(b)(1)(C) of the Federal Reserve Act), opened at a depository institution by a foreign financial institution by means of which the foreign financial institution permits its customers to engage, either directly or through a subaccount, in banking activities usual in connection with the business of banking in the United States.

‘(2) DEFINITIONS APPLICABLE TO INSTITUTIONS OTHER THAN BANKS—With respect to any financial institution other than a bank, the Secretary shall, after consultation with the appropriate Federal functional regulators (as defined in section 509 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), define by regulation the term ‘account’, and

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shall include within the meaning of that term, to the extent, if any, that the Secretary deems appropriate, arrangements similar to payablethrough and correspondent accounts. ‘(3) REGULATORY DEFINITION OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP—The Secretary shall promulgate regulations defining beneficial ownership of an account for purposes of this section and subsections (i) and (j) of section 5318. Such regulations shall address issues related to an individual’s authority to fund, direct, or manage the account (including, without limitation, the power to direct payments into or out of the account), and an individual’s material interest in the income or corpus of the account, and shall ensure that the identification of individuals under this section does not extend to any individual whose beneficial interest in the income or corpus of the account is immaterial’. ‘(4) OTHER TERMS—The Secretary may, by regulation, further define the terms in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), and define other terms for the purposes of this section, as the Secretary deems appropriate’. (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT—The table of sections for subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 5318 the following new item: ’5318A. Special measures for jurisdictions, financial institutions, or international transactions of primary money laundering concern’.

[. . .] Sec. 315. Inclusion of Foreign Corruption Offenses As Money Laundering Crimes Section 1956(c) (7) of title 18, United States Code, is amended— (1) in subparagraph (B)—

(A) in clause (ii), by striking ‘or destruction of property by means of explosive or fire’ and inserting ‘destruction of property by means of explosive or fire, or a crime of violence (as defined in section 16)’; (B) in clause (iii), by striking ‘1978’ and inserting ‘1978)’; and (C) by adding at the end the following: ‘(iv) bribery of a public official, or the misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of public funds by or for the benefit of a public official; ‘(v) smuggling or export control violations involving— ‘(I) an item controlled on the United States Munitions List established under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778); or ‘(II) an item controlled under regulations under the Export Administration Regulations (15 C.F.R. Parts 730–774); or

‘(vi) an offense with respect to which the United States would be obligated by a multilateral treaty, either to extradite the alleged offender or to submit the case for prosecution, if the offender were found within the territory of the United States;’; and

(2) in subparagraph (D)— (A) by inserting ‘section 541 (relating to goods falsely classified),’ before ‘section 542’; (B) by inserting ‘section 922(1) (relating to the unlawful importation of firearms), section 924(n) (relating to firearms trafficking),’ before ‘section 956’; (C) by inserting ‘section 1030 (relating to computer fraud and abuse),’ before ‘1032’; and (D) by inserting ‘any felony violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938,’ before ‘or any felony violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’.

[. . .] Sec. 318. Laundering Money Through a Foreign Bank Section 1956(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking paragraph (6) and inserting the following: ‘(6) the term ‘financial institution’ includes—

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‘(A) any financial institution, as defined in section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code, or the regulations promulgated thereunder; and ‘(B) any foreign bank, as defined in section 1 of the International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3101)’.

(1) being influenced in the performance of any official act; (2) being influenced to commit or aid in the committing, or to collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or (3) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of the official duty of such official or person, shall be fined in an amount not more than 3 times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value, or imprisoned for not more than 15 years, or both. A violation of this section shall be subject to chapter 227 of title 18, United States Code, and the provisions of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.

[. . .] Sec. 320. Proceeds of Foreign Crimes Section 981(a)(1)(B) of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ‘(B) Any property, real or personal, within the jurisdiction of the United States, constituting, derived from, or traceable to, any proceeds obtained directly or indirectly from an offense against a foreign nation, or any property used to facilitate such an offense, if the offense— ‘(i) involves the manufacture, importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance (as that term is defined for purposes of the Controlled Substances Act), or any other conduct described in section 1956(c)(7)(B); ‘(ii) would be punishable within the jurisdiction of the foreign nation by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year; and ‘(iii) would be punishable under the laws of the United States by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year, if the act or activity constituting the offense had occurred within the jurisdiction of the United States’.

[. . .] Sec. 329. Criminal Penalties Any person who is an official or employee of any department, agency, bureau, office, commission, or other entity of the Federal Government, and any other person who is acting for or on behalf of any such entity, who, directly or indirectly, in connection with the administration of this title, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity in return for—

Sec. 330. International Cooperation in Investigations of Money Laundering, Financial Crimes, and the Finances of Terrorist Groups (a) NEGOTIATIONS—It is the sense of the Congress that the President should direct the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of the Treasury, as appropriate, and in consultation with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to seek to enter into negotiations with the appropriate financial supervisory agencies and other officials of any foreign country the financial institutions of which do business with United States financial institutions or which may be utilized by any foreign terrorist organization (as designated under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act), any person who is a member or representative of any such organization, or any person engaged in money laundering or financial or other crimes. (b) PURPOSES OF NEGOTIATIONS—It is the sense of the Congress that, in carrying out any negotiations described in paragraph (1), the President should direct the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of the Treasury, as appropriate, to seek to enter into and further cooperative efforts, voluntary information exchanges, the use of letters rogatory, mutual legal assistance treaties, and international agreements to—

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(1) ensure that foreign banks and other financial institutions maintain adequate records of transaction and account information relating to any foreign terrorist organization (as designated under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act), any person who is a member or representative of any such organization, or any person engaged in money laundering or financial or other crimes; and (2) establish a mechanism whereby such records may be made available to United States law enforcement officials and domestic financial institution supervisors, when appropriate.

Subtitle B—Bank Secrecy Act Amendments and Related Improvements [. . .] Sec. 352. Anti-Money Laundering Programs (a) IN GENERAL—Section 5318(h) of title 31, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ‘(h) ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING PROGRAMS— ‘(1) IN GENERAL—In order to guard against money laundering through financial institutions, each financial institution shall establish anti-money laundering programs, including, at a minimum— ‘(A) the development of internal policies, procedures, and controls; ‘(B) the designation of a compliance officer; ‘(C) an ongoing employee training program; and ‘(D) an independent audit function to test programs.

‘(2) REGULATIONS—The Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the appropriate Federal functional regulator (as defined in section 509 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), may prescribe minimum standards for programs established under paragraph (1), and may exempt from the application of those standards any financial institution that is not subject to the provisions of the rules contained in part 103 of title 31, of the Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor rule thereto, for

so long as such financial institution is not subject to the provisions of such rules’.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect at the end of the 180-day period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act. (c) DATE OF APPLICATION OF REGULATIONS; FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT—Before the end of the 180-day period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall prescribe regulations that consider the extent to which the requirements imposed under this section are commensurate with the size, location, and activities of the financial institutions to which such regulations apply. Subtitle C—Currency Crimes and Protection Sec. 5332. Bulk Cash Smuggling into or out of the United States (a) CRIMINAL OFFENSE— (1) IN GENERAL—Whoever, with the intent to evade a currency reporting requirement under section 5316, knowingly conceals more than $10,000 in currency or other monetary instruments on the person of such individual or in any conveyance, article of luggage, merchandise, or other container, and transports or transfers or attempts to transport or transfer such currency or monetary instruments from a place within the United States to a place outside of the United States, or from a place outside the United States to a place within the United States, shall be guilty of a currency smuggling offense and subject to punishment pursuant to subsection (b). ‘(2) CONCEALMENT ON PERSON—For purposes of this section, the concealment of currency on the person of any individual includes concealment in any article of clothing worn by the individual or in any luggage, backpack, or other container worn or carried by such individual.

‘(b) PENALTY—

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‘(1) TERM OF IMPRISONMENT—A person convicted of a currency smuggling offense under subsection (a), or a conspiracy to commit such offense, shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years. ‘(2) FORFEITURE—In addition, the court, in imposing sentence under paragraph (1), shall order that the defendant forfeit to the United States, any property, real or personal, involved in the offense, and any property traceable to such property, subject to subsection (d) of this section. ‘(3) PROCEDURE—The seizure, restraint, and forfeiture of property under this section shall be governed by section 413 of the Controlled Substances Act. ‘(4) PERSONAL MONEY JUDGMENT—If the property subject to forfeiture under paragraph (2) is unavailable, and the defendant has insufficient substitute property that may be forfeited pursuant to section 413(p) of the Controlled Substances Act, the court shall enter a personal money judgment against the defendant for the amount that would be subject to forfeiture.

‘(c) CIVIL FORFEITURE— ‘(1) IN GENERAL—Any property involved in a violation of subsection (a), or a conspiracy to commit such violation, and any property traceable to such violation or conspiracy, may be seized and, subject to subsection (d) of this section, forfeited to the United States. ‘(2) PROCEDURE—The seizure and forfeiture shall be governed by the procedures governing civil forfeitures in money laundering cases pursuant to section 981(a)(1)(A) of title 18, United States Code. ‘(3) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN PROPERTY AS INVOLVED IN THE OFFENSE—For purposes of this subsection and subsection (b), any currency or other monetary instrument that is concealed or intended to be concealed in violation of subsection (a) or a conspiracy to commit such violation, any article, container, or conveyance used, or intended to be used, to conceal or transport the currency or other monetary instrument, and any other property used, or intended to be used, to facilitate the

offense, shall be considered property involved in the offense’.

33. United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism On 9 December 1999, the members of the United Nations signed a convention for combating the funding sources of terrorists. International cooperation was reiterated to prevent persons engaging in terrorist financing. The action of a person providing and collecting funds for terrorist activities will be treated as a criminal offense, and the member countries as per Article 5 should take appropriate measures. The offence is to be taken as an extraditable one. Source United Nations Treaty Collection, http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv12.pdf.

[. . .] Article 1 For the purposes of this Convention: 1. “Funds” means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit. 2. “State or governmental facility” means any permanent or temporary facility or conveyance that is used or occupied by representatives of a State, members of Government, the legislature or the judiciary or by officials or employees of a State or any other public authority or entity or by employees or officials of an intergovernmental organization in connection with their official duties.

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3. “Proceeds” means any funds derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence set forth in article 2.

Article 2 1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out: (a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex; or (b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

2. (a) On depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, a State Party which is not a party to a treaty listed in the annex may declare that, in the application of this Convention to the State Party, the treaty shall be deemed not to be included in the annex referred to in paragraph 1, subparagraph (a). The declaration shall cease to have effect as soon as the treaty enters into force for the State Party, which shall notify the depositary of this fact; (b) When a State Party ceases to be a party to a treaty listed in the annex, it may make a declaration as provided for in this article, with respect to that treaty.

3. For an act to constitute an offence set forth in paragraph 1, it shall not be necessary that the funds were actually used to carry out an offence referred to in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (a) or (b).

4. Any person also commits an offence if that person attempts to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article. 5. Any person also commits an offence if that person: (a) Participates as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 or 4 of this article; (b) Organizes or directs others to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 or 4 of this article; (c) Contributes to the commission of one or more offences as set forth in paragraphs 1 or 4 of this article by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: (i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 3 This Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed within a single State, the alleged offender is a national of that State and is present in the territory of that State and no other State has a basis under article 7, paragraph 1, or article 7, paragraph 2, to exercise jurisdiction, except that the provisions of articles 12 to 18 shall, as appropriate, apply in those cases. Article 4 Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary: (a) To establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the offences set forth in article 2; (b) To make those offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of the offences.

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Article 5 1. Each State Party, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, shall take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in its territory or organized under its laws to be held liable when a person responsible for the management or control of that legal entity has, in that capacity, committed an offence set forth in article 2. Such liability may be criminal, civil or administrative.

2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when: (a) The offence was directed towards or resulted in the carrying out of an offence referred to in article 2, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) or (b), in the territory of or against a national of that State; (b) The offence was directed towards or resulted in the carrying out of an offence referred to in article 2, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) or (b), against a State or government facility of that State abroad, including diplomatic or consular premises of that State; (c) The offence was directed towards or resulted in an offence referred to in article 2, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) or (b), committed in an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act; (d) The offence is committed by a stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in the territory of that State; (e) The offence is committed on board an aircraft which is operated by the Government of that State.

2. Such liability is incurred without prejudice to the criminal liability of individuals having committed the offences. 3. Each State Party shall ensure, in particular, that legal entities liable in accordance with paragraph 1 above are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal, civil or administrative sanctions. Such sanctions may include monetary sanctions. Article 6 Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, including, where appropriate, domestic legislation, to ensure that criminal acts within the scope of this Convention are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature. Article 7 1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 2 when: (a) The offence is committed in the territory of that State; (b) The offence is committed on board a vessel flying the flag of that State or an aircraft registered under the laws of that State at the time the offence is committed; (c) The offence is committed by a national of that State.

3. Upon ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention, each State Party shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the jurisdiction it has established in accordance with paragraph 2. Should any change take place, the State Party concerned shall immediately notify the Secretary-General. 4. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 2 in cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite that person to any of the States Parties that have established their jurisdiction in accordance with paragraphs 1 or 2. 5. When more than one State Party claims jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 2, the relevant States Parties shall strive to coordinate their actions appropriately, in particular concerning

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the conditions for prosecution and the modalities for mutual legal assistance. 6. Without prejudice to the norms of general international law, this Convention does not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by a State Party in accordance with its domestic law. Article 8 1. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, for the identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or allocated for the purpose of committing the offences set forth in article 2 as well as the proceeds derived from such offences, for purposes of possible forfeiture. 2. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, for the forfeiture of funds used or allocated for the purpose of committing the offences set forth in article 2 and the proceeds derived from such offences. 3. Each State Party concerned may give consideration to concluding agreements on the sharing with other States Parties, on a regular or case-by-case basis, of the funds derived from the forfeitures referred to in this article. 4. Each State Party shall consider establishing mechanisms whereby the funds derived from the forfeitures referred to in this article are utilized to compensate the victims of offences referred to in article 2, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) or (b), or their families. 5. The provisions of this article shall be implemented without prejudice to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.

Article 9 1. Upon receiving information that a person who has committed or who is alleged to have committed an offence set forth in article 2 may be present in its territory, the State Party concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary under its domestic law to investigate the facts contained in the information. 2. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, the State Party in whose territory the offender or alleged offender is present shall take the appropriate measures under its domestic law so as to ensure that person’s presence for the purpose of prosecution or extradition. 3. Any person regarding whom the measures referred to in paragraph 2 are being taken shall be entitled to: (a) Communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate representative of the State of which that person is a national or which is otherwise entitled to protect that person’s rights or, if that person is a stateless person, the State in the territory of which that person habitually resides; (b) Be visited by a representative of that State; (c) Be informed of that person’s rights under subparagraphs (a) and (b).

4. The rights referred to in paragraph 3 shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the State in the territory of which the offender or alleged offender is present, subject to the provision that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under paragraph 3 are intended. 5. The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 shall be without prejudice to the right of any State Party having a claim to jurisdiction in accordance with article 7, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b), or paragraph 2, subparagraph (b), to invite the

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International Committee of the Red Cross to communicate with and visit the alleged offender. 6. When a State Party, pursuant to the present article, has taken a person into custody, it shall immediately notify, directly or through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the States Parties which have established jurisdiction in accordance with article 7, paragraph 1 or 2, and, if it considers it advisable, any other interested States Parties, of the fact that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant that person’s detention. The State which makes the investigation contemplated in paragraph 1 shall promptly inform the said States Parties of its findings and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction. Article 10 1. The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present shall, in cases to which article 7 applies, if it does not extradite that person, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the law of that State. 2. Whenever a State Party is permitted under its domestic law to extradite or otherwise surrender one of its nationals only upon the condition that the person will be returned to that State to serve the sentence imposed as a result of the trial or proceeding for which the extradition or surrender of the person was sought, and this State and the State seeking the extradition of the person agree with this option and other terms they may deem appropriate, such a conditional extradition or surrender shall be sufficient to discharge the obligation set forth in paragraph 1.

Article 11 1. The offences set forth in article 2 shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between any of the States Parties before the entry into force of this Convention. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be subsequently concluded between them. 2. When a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, the requested State Party may, at its option, consider this Convention as a legal basis for extradition in respect of the offences set forth in article 2. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State. 3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the offences set forth in article 2 as extraditable offences between themselves, subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State. 4. If necessary, the offences set forth in article 2 shall be treated, for the purposes of extradition between States Parties, as if they had been committed not only in the place in which they occurred but also in the territory of the States that have established jurisdiction in accordance with article 7, paragraphs 1 and 2. 5. The provisions of all extradition treaties and arrangements between States Parties with regard to offences set forth in article 2 shall be deemed to be modified as between States Parties to the extent that they are incompatible with this Convention. Article 12 1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal or extradition

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proceedings in respect of the offences set forth in article 2, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings. 2. States Parties may not refuse a request for mutual legal assistance on the ground of bank secrecy. 3. The requesting Party shall not transmit nor use information or evidence furnished by the requested Party for investigations, prosecutions or proceedings other than those stated in the request without the prior consent of the requested Party. 4. Each State Party may give consideration to establishing mechanisms to share with other States Parties information or evidence needed to establish criminal, civil or administrative liability pursuant to article 5. 5. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under paragraphs 1 and 2 in conformity with any treaties or other arrangements on mutual legal assistance or information exchange that may exist between them. In the absence of such treaties or arrangements, States Parties shall afford one another assistance in accordance with their domestic law. Article 13 None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be regarded, for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a fiscal offence. Accordingly, States Parties may not refuse a request for extradition or for mutual legal assistance on the sole ground that it concerns a fiscal offence. Article 14 None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be regarded for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence may not be

refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives. Article 15 Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite or to afford mutual legal assistance, if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition for offences set forth in article 2 or for mutual legal assistance with respect to such offences has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that person’s position for any of these reasons. Article 16 1. A person who is being detained or is serving a sentence in the territory of one State Party whose presence in another State Party is requested for purposes of identification, testimony or otherwise providing assistance in obtaining evidence for the investigation or prosecution of offences set forth in article 2 may be transferred if the following conditions are met: (a) The person freely gives his or her informed consent; (b) The competent authorities of both States agree, subject to such conditions as those States may deem appropriate.

2. For the purposes of the present article: (a) The State to which the person is transferred shall have the authority and obligation to keep the person transferred in custody, unless otherwise requested or authorized by the State from which the person was transferred; (b) The State to which the person is transferred shall without delay implement its obligation to return the person to the custody of the State from which the person was transferred as agreed beforehand,

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(b) Measures requiring financial institutions and other professions involved in financial transactions to utilize the most efficient measures available for the identification of their usual or occasional customers, as well as customers in whose interest accounts are opened, and to pay special attention to unusual or suspicious transactions and report transactions suspected of stemming from a criminal activity. For this purpose, States Parties shall consider: (i) Adopting regulations prohibiting the opening of accounts the holders or beneficiaries of which are unidentified or unidentifiable, and measures to ensure that such institutions verify the identity of the real owners of such transactions; (ii) With respect to the identification of legal entities, requiring financial institutions, when necessary, to take measures to verify the legal existence and the structure of the customer by obtaining, either from a public register or from the customer or both, proof of incorporation, including information concerning the customer’s name, legal form, address, directors and provisions regulating the power to bind the entity; (iii) Adopting regulations imposing on financial institutions the obligation to report promptly to the competent authorities all complex, unusual large transactions and unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent economic or obviously lawful purpose, without fear of assuming criminal or civil liability for breach of any restriction on disclosure of information if they report their suspicions in good faith; (iv) Requiring financial institutions to maintain, for at least five years, all necessary records on transactions, both domestic or international.

or as otherwise agreed, by the competent authorities of both States; (c) The State to which the person is transferred shall not require the State from which the person was transferred to initiate extradition proceedings for the return of the person; (d) The person transferred shall receive credit for service of the sentence being served in the State from which he or she was transferred for time spent in the custody of the State to which he or she was transferred.

3. Unless the State Party from which a person is to be transferred in accordance with the present article so agrees, that person, whatever his or her nationality, shall not be prosecuted or detained or subjected to any other restriction of his or her personal liberty in the territory of the State to which that person is transferred in respect of acts or convictions anterior to his or her departure from the territory of the State from which such person was transferred. Article 17 Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any other measures are taken or proceedings are carried out pursuant to this Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in the territory of which that person is present and applicable provisions of international law, including international human rights law. Article 18 1. States Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of the offences set forth in article 2 by taking all practicable measures, inter alia, by adapting their domestic legislation, if necessary, to prevent and counter preparations in their respective territories for the commission of those offences within or outside their territories, including: (a) Measures to prohibit in their territories illegal activities of persons and organizations that knowingly encourage, instigate, organize or engage in the commission of offences set forth in article 2;

2. States Parties shall further cooperate in the prevention of offences set forth in article 2 by considering:

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(a) Measures for the supervision, including, for example, the licensing, of all money transmission agencies; (b) Feasible measures to detect or monitor the physical cross-border transportation of cash and bearer negotiable instruments, subject to strict safeguards to ensure proper use of information and without impeding in any way the freedom of capital movements.

3. States Parties shall further cooperate in the prevention of the offences set forth in article 2 by exchanging accurate and verified information in accordance with their domestic law and coordinating administrative and other measures taken, as appropriate, to prevent the commission of offences set forth in article 2, in particular by: (a) Establishing and maintaining channels of communication between their competent agencies and services to facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of information concerning all aspects of offences set forth in article 2; (b) Cooperating with one another in conducting inquiries, with respect to the offences set forth in article 2, concerning: (i) The identity, whereabouts and activities of persons in respect of whom reasonable suspicion exists that they are involved in such offences; (ii) The movement of funds relating to the commission of such offences.

4. States Parties may exchange information through the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). Article 19 The State Party where the alleged offender is prosecuted shall, in accordance with its domestic law or applicable procedures, communicate the final outcome of the proceedings to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, who shall transmit the information to the other States Parties.

Article 20 The States Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States. Article 21 Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, in particular the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law and other relevant conventions. Article 22 Nothing in this Convention entitles a State Party to undertake in the territory of another State Party the exercise of jurisdiction or performance of functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other State Party by its domestic law. Article 23 1. The annex may be amended by the addition of relevant treaties that: (a) Are open to the participation of all States; (b) Have entered into force; (c) Have been ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to by at least twenty-two States Parties to the present Convention.

2. After the entry into force of this Convention, any State Party may propose such an amendment. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the depositary in written form. The depositary shall notify proposals that meet the requirements of paragraph 1 to all States Parties and seek their views on whether the proposed amendment should be adopted. 3. The proposed amendment shall be deemed adopted unless one third of the States Parties

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object to it by a written notification not later than 180 days after its circulation. 4. The adopted amendment to the annex shall enter into force 30 days after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of such amendment for all those States Parties having deposited such an instrument. For each State Party ratifying, accepting or approving the amendment after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument, the amendment shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State Party of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval. Article 24 1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation within a reasonable time shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If, within six months from the date of the request for arbitration, the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice, by application, in conformity with the Statute of the Court. 2. Each State may at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention or accession thereto declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 1. The other States Parties shall not be bound by paragraph 1 with respect to any State Party which has made such a reservation. 3. Any State which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2 may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

34. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime This protocol was adopted in 2000 and entered into force in 2003. It supplements the United Nations (UN) Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. As stated in Article 2, the primary purposes for enacting this international instrument are “to prevent and combat trafficking in persons, paying particular attention to women and children; to protect and assist the victims of such trafficking, with full respect for their human rights; and to promote cooperation among States Parties in order to meet those objectives.” This document also calls for states to strengthen their borders, to cooperate with each other by exchanging information relative to criminal trafficking groups and travel documentation, and to adopt or strengthen relevant domestic legislation to prevent the unlawful trafficking in persons. Source United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/res5525e.pdf.

Preamble The States Parties to this Protocol,

Declaring that effective action to prevent and combat trafficking in persons, especially women and children, requires a comprehensive international approach in the countries of origin, transit and destination that includes measures to prevent such trafficking, to punish the traffickers and to protect the victims of such trafficking, including by protecting their internationally recognized human rights, Taking into account the fact that, despite the existence of a variety of international instruments containing rules and practical measures to combat the exploitation of persons, especially women and

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children, there is no universal instrument that addresses all aspects of trafficking in persons,

offences established in accordance with the Convention.

Concerned that, in the absence of such an instrument, persons who are vulnerable to trafficking will not be sufficiently protected,

Article 2

Recalling General Assembly resolution 53/111 of 9 December 1998, in which the Assembly decided to establish an open-ended intergovernmental ad hoc committee for the purpose of elaborating a comprehensive international convention against transnational organized crime and of discussing the elaboration of, inter alia, an international instrument addressing trafficking in women and children, Convinced that supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime with an international instrument for the prevention, suppression and punishment of trafficking in persons, especially women and children, will be useful in preventing and combating that crime, Have agreed as follows: I. General Provisions Article 1 Relation with the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 1. This Protocol supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. It shall be interpreted together with the Convention. 2. The provisions of the Convention shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to this Protocol unless otherwise provided herein. 3. The offences established in accordance with article 5 of this Protocol shall be regarded as

Statement of Purpose The purposes of this Protocol are: (a) To prevent and combat trafficking in persons, paying particular attention to women and children; (b) To protect and assist the victims of such trafficking, with full respect for their human rights; and (c) To promote cooperation among States Parties in order to meet those objectives.

Article 3 Use of Terms For the purposes of this Protocol: (a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs; (b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used; (c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in persons” even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;

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(d ) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.

Article 4 Scope of Application This Protocol shall apply, except as otherwise stated herein, to the prevention, investigation and prosecution of the offences established in accordance with article 5 of this Protocol, where those offences are transnational in nature and involve an organized criminal group, as well as to the protection of victims of such offences.

protect the privacy and identity of victims of trafficking in persons, including, inter alia, by making legal proceedings relating to such trafficking confidential. 2. Each State Party shall ensure that its domestic legal or administrative system contains measures that provide to victims of trafficking in persons, in appropriate cases: (a) Information on relevant court and administrative proceedings; (b) Assistance to enable their views and concerns to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of criminal proceedings against offenders, in a manner not prejudicial to the rights of the defence.

Article 5 Criminalization 1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences the conduct set forth in article 3 of this Protocol, when committed intentionally. 2. Each State Party shall also adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences: (a) Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system, attempting to commit an offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article; (b) Participating as an accomplice in an offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article; and (c) Organizing or directing other persons to commit an offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.

II. Protection of Victims of Trafficking in Persons Article 6 Assistance to and Protection of Victims of Trafficking in Persons 1. In appropriate cases and to the extent possible under its domestic law, each State Party shall

3. Each State Party shall consider implementing measures to provide for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims of trafficking in persons, including, in appropriate cases, in cooperation with non-governmental organizations, other relevant organizations and other elements of civil society, and, in particular, the provision of: (a) Appropriate housing; (b) Counselling and information, in particular as regards their legal rights, in a language that the victims of trafficking in persons can understand; (c) Medical, psychological and material assistance; and (d ) Employment, educational and training opportunities.

4. Each State Party shall take into account, in applying the provisions of this article, the age, gender and special needs of victims of trafficking in persons, in particular the special needs of children, including appropriate housing, education and care. 5. Each State Party shall endeavour to provide for the physical safety of victims of trafficking in persons while they are within its territory.

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6. Each State Party shall ensure that its domestic legal system contains measures that offer victims of trafficking in persons the possibility of obtaining compensation for damage suffered.

a victim of trafficking in persons is its national or had the right of permanent residence in its territory at the time of entry into the territory of the receiving State Party.

Article 7

4. In order to facilitate the return of a victim of trafficking in persons who is without proper documentation, the State Party of which that person is a national or in which he or she had the right of permanent residence at the time of entry into the territory of the receiving State Party shall agree to issue, at the request of the receiving State Party, such travel documents or other authorization as may be necessary to enable the person to travel to and re-enter its territory.

Status of Victims of Trafficking in Persons in Receiving States 1. In addition to taking measures pursuant to article 6 of this Protocol, each State Party shall consider adopting legislative or other appropriate measures that permit victims of trafficking in persons to remain in its territory, temporarily or permanently, in appropriate cases. 2. In implementing the provision contained in paragraph 1 of this article, each State Party shall give appropriate consideration to humanitarian and compassionate factors. Article 8 Repatriation of Victims of Trafficking in Persons 1. The State Party of which a victim of trafficking in persons is a national or in which the person had the right of permanent residence at the time of entry into the territory of the receiving State Party shall facilitate and accept, with due regard for the safety of that person, the return of that person without undue or unreasonable delay. 2. When a State Party returns a victim of trafficking in persons to a State Party of which that person is a national or in which he or she had, at the time of entry into the territory of the receiving State Party, the right of permanent residence, such return shall be with due regard for the safety of that person and for the status of any legal proceedings related to the fact that the person is a victim of trafficking and shall preferably be voluntary. 3. At the request of a receiving State Party, a requested State Party shall, without undue or unreasonable delay, verify whether a person who is

5. This article shall be without prejudice to any right afforded to victims of trafficking in persons by any domestic law of the receiving State Party. 6. This article shall be without prejudice to any applicable bilateral or multilateral agreement or arrangement that governs, in whole or in part, the return of victims of trafficking in persons. III. Prevention, Cooperation and Other Measures Article 9 Prevention of Trafficking in Persons 1. States Parties shall establish comprehensive policies, programmes and other measures: (a) To prevent and combat trafficking in persons; and (b) To protect victims of trafficking in persons, especially women and children, from revictimization.

2. States Parties shall endeavour to undertake measures such as research, information and mass media campaigns and social and economic initiatives to prevent and combat trafficking in persons.

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3. Policies, programmes and other measures established in accordance with this article shall, as appropriate, include cooperation with nongovernmental organizations, other relevant organizations and other elements of civil society. 4. States Parties shall take or strengthen measures, including through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, to alleviate the factors that make persons, especially women and children, vulnerable to trafficking, such as poverty, underdevelopment and lack of equal opportunity. 5. States Parties shall adopt or strengthen legislative or other measures, such as educational, social or cultural measures, including through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, to discourage the demand that fosters all forms of exploitation of persons, especially women and children, that leads to trafficking.

engaged in such trafficking, and possible measures for detecting them.

2. States Parties shall provide or strengthen training for law enforcement, immigration and other relevant officials in the prevention of trafficking in persons. The training should focus on methods used in preventing such trafficking, prosecuting the traffickers and protecting the rights of the victims, including protecting the victims from the traffickers. The training should also take into account the need to consider human rights and child- and gender-sensitive issues and it should encourage cooperation with nongovernmental organizations, other relevant organizations and other elements of civil society. 3. A State Party that receives information shall comply with any request by the State Party that transmitted the information that places restrictions on its use.

Article 10 Article 11 Information Exchange and Training 1. Law enforcement, immigration or other relevant authorities of States Parties shall, as appropriate, cooperate with one another by exchanging information, in accordance with their domestic law, to enable them to determine: (a) Whether individuals crossing or attempting to cross an international border with travel documents belonging to other persons or without travel documents are perpetrators or victims of trafficking in persons; (b) The types of travel document that individuals have used or attempted to use to cross an international border for the purpose of trafficking in persons; and (c) The means and methods used by organized criminal groups for the purpose of trafficking in persons, including the recruitment and transportation of victims, routes and links between and among individuals and groups

Border Measures 1. Without prejudice to international commitments in relation to the free movement of people, States Parties shall strengthen, to the extent possible, such border controls as may be necessary to prevent and detect trafficking in persons. 2. Each State Party shall adopt legislative or other appropriate measures to prevent, to the extent possible, means of transport operated by commercial carriers from being used in the commission of offences established in accordance with article 5 of this Protocol. 3. Where appropriate, and without prejudice to applicable international conventions, such measures shall include establishing the obligation of commercial carriers, including any transportation company or the owner or operator of any means of transport, to ascertain that all passengers are in possession of the travel

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documents required for entry into the receiving State.

IV. Final Provisions Article 14

4. Each State Party shall take the necessary measures, in accordance with its domestic law, to provide for sanctions in cases of violation of the obligation set forth in paragraph 3 of this article. 5. Each State Party shall consider taking measures that permit, in accordance with its domestic law, the denial of entry or revocation of visas of persons implicated in the commission of offences established in accordance with this Protocol. 6. Without prejudice to article 27 of the Convention, States Parties shall consider strengthening cooperation among border control agencies by, inter alia, establishing and maintaining direct channels of communication. Article 12 Security and Control of Documents Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, within available means: (a) To ensure that travel or identity documents issued by it are of such quality that they cannot easily be misused and cannot readily be falsified or unlawfully altered, replicated or issued; and (b) To ensure the integrity and security of travel or identity documents issued by or on behalf of the State Party and to prevent their unlawful creation, issuance and use.

Article 13 Legitimacy and Validity of Documents At the request of another State Party, a State Party shall, in accordance with its domestic law, verify within a reasonable time the legitimacy and validity of travel or identity documents issued or purported to have been issued in its name and suspected of being used for trafficking in persons.

Saving Clause 1. Nothing in this Protocol shall affect the rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law and, in particular, where applicable, the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees and the principle of non-refoulement as contained therein. 2. The measures set forth in this Protocol shall be interpreted and applied in a way that is not discriminatory to persons on the ground that they are victims of trafficking in persons. The interpretation and application of those measures shall be consistent with internationally recognized principles of non-discrimination. Article 15 Settlement of Disputes 1. States Parties shall endeavour to settle disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Protocol through negotiation. 2. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Protocol that cannot be settled through negotiation within a reasonable time shall, at the request of one of those States Parties, be submitted to arbitration. If, six months after the date of the request for arbitration, those States Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those States Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in accordance with the Statute of the Court. 3. Each State Party may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to this Protocol, declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 2 of this article. The

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other States Parties shall not be bound by paragraph 2 of this article with respect to any State Party that has made such a reservation.

information and other appropriate measures, including socio-economic measures, at the national, regional and international levels,

4. Any State Party that has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Recalling General Assembly resolution 54/212 of 22 December 1999, in which the Assembly urged Member States and the United Nations system to strengthen international cooperation in the area of international migration and development in order to address the root causes of migration, especially those related to poverty, and to maximize the benefits of international migration to those concerned, and encouraged, where relevant, interregional, regional and subregional mechanisms to continue to address the question of migration and development,

35. Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime This protocol entered into force in January 2004 and supplements the United Nations (UN) Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. As stated in Article 2, the primary purposes for enacting this international instrument are “to prevent and combat the smuggling of migrants, as well as to promote cooperation among States Parties to that end, while protecting the rights of smuggled migrants.” This document calls for states to strengthen their borders and to cooperate with each other by exchanging information relative to criminal trafficking groups, transit and destination points and routes, and fraudulent travel documentation. Overall, this document establishes an international protocol to prevent the unlawful exploitation of migrants and establishes provisions for their humane treatment. Source United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/res5525e.pdf.

Preamble The States Parties to this Protocol,

Declaring that effective action to prevent and combat the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air requires a comprehensive international approach, including cooperation, the exchange of

Convinced of the need to provide migrants with humane treatment and full protection of their rights, Taking into account the fact that, despite work undertaken in other international forums, there is no universal instrument that addresses all aspects of smuggling of migrants and other related issues, Concerned at the significant increase in the activities of organized criminal groups in smuggling of migrants and other related criminal activities set forth in this Protocol, which bring great harm to the States concerned, Also concerned that the smuggling of migrants can endanger the lives or security of the migrants involved, Recalling General Assembly resolution 53/111 of 9 December 1998, in which the Assembly decided to establish an open-ended intergovernmental ad hoc committee for the purpose of elaborating a comprehensive international convention against transnational organized crime and of discussing the elaboration of, inter alia, an international instrument addressing illegal trafficking in and transporting of migrants, including by sea,

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Convinced that supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime with an international instrument against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air will be useful in preventing and combating that crime, Have agreed as follows: I. General Provisions Article 1 Relation with the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 1. This Protocol supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. It shall be interpreted together with the Convention. 2. The provisions of the Convention shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to this Protocol unless otherwise provided herein. 3. The offences established in accordance with article 6 of this Protocol shall be regarded as offences established in accordance with the Convention.

entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident; (b) “Illegal entry” shall mean crossing borders without complying with the necessary requirements for legal entry into the receiving State; (c) “Fraudulent travel or identity document” shall mean any travel or identity document: (i) That has been falsely made or altered in some material way by anyone other than a person or agency lawfully authorized to make or issue the travel or identity document on behalf of a State; or (ii) That has been improperly issued or obtained through misrepresentation, corruption or duress or in any other unlawful manner; or (iii) That is being used by a person other than the rightful holder; (d ) “Vessel” shall mean any type of water craft, including non-displacement craft and seaplanes, used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water, except a warship, naval auxiliary or other vessel owned or operated by a Government and used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial service.

Article 4

Statement of Purpose The purpose of this Protocol is to prevent and combat the smuggling of migrants, as well as to promote cooperation among States Parties to that end, while protecting the rights of smuggled migrants.

Scope of Application This Protocol shall apply, except as otherwise stated herein, to the prevention, investigation and prosecution of the offences established in accordance with article 6 of this Protocol, where the offences are transnational in nature and involve an organized criminal group, as well as to the protection of the rights of persons who have been the object of such offences.

Article 3

Article 5

Use of Terms For the purposes of this Protocol:

Criminal Liability of Migrants Migrants shall not become liable to criminal prosecution under this Protocol for the fact of having been the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol.

Article 2

(a) “Smuggling of migrants” shall mean the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal

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established in accordance with paragraph 2 (b) and (c) of this article, circumstances:

Article 6 Criminalization 1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally and in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit: (a) The smuggling of migrants; (b) When committed for the purpose of enabling the smuggling of migrants: (i) Producing a fraudulent travel or identity document; (ii) Procuring, providing or possessing such a document; (c) Enabling a person who is not a national or a permanent resident to remain in the State concerned without complying with the necessary requirements for legally remaining in the State by the means mentioned in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph or any other illegal means.

2. Each State Party shall also adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences: (a) Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system, attempting to commit an offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article; (b) Participating as an accomplice in an offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 (a), (b) (i) or (c) of this article and, subject to the basic concepts of its legal system, participating as an accomplice in an offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 (b) (ii) of this article; (c) Organizing or directing other persons to commit an offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.

3. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as aggravating circumstances to the offences established in accordance with paragraph 1 (a), (b) (i) and (c) of this article and, subject to the basic concepts of its legal system, to the offences

(a) That endanger, or are likely to endanger, the lives or safety of the migrants concerned; or (b) That entail inhuman or degrading treatment, including for exploitation, of such migrants.

4. Nothing in this Protocol shall prevent a State Party from taking measures against a person whose conduct constitutes an offence under its domestic law. II. Smuggling of Migrants by Sea Article 7 Cooperation States Parties shall cooperate to the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress the smuggling of migrants by sea, in accordance with the international law of the sea. Article 8 Measures against the Smuggling of Migrants by Sea 1. A State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel that is flying its flag or claiming its registry, that is without nationality or that, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show a flag, is in reality of the nationality of the State Party concerned is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea may request the assistance of other States Parties in suppressing the use of the vessel for that purpose. The States Parties so requested shall render such assistance to the extent possible within their means. 2. A State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel exercising freedom of navigation in accordance with international law and flying the flag or displaying the marks of registry of another State Party is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea may so notify the flag State,

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request confirmation of registry and, if confirmed, request authorization from the flag State to take appropriate measures with regard to that vessel. The flag State may authorize the requesting State, inter alia: (a) To board the vessel; (b) To search the vessel; and (c) If evidence is found that the vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea, to take appropriate measures with respect to the vessel and persons and cargo on board, as authorized by the flag State.

3. A State Party that has taken any measure in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article shall promptly inform the flag State concerned of the results of that measure. 4. A State Party shall respond expeditiously to a request from another State Party to determine whether a vessel that is claiming its registry or flying its flag is entitled to do so and to a request for authorization made in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article. 5. A flag State may, consistent with article 7 of this Protocol, subject its authorization to conditions to be agreed by it and the requesting State, including conditions relating to responsibility and the extent of effective measures to be taken. A State Party shall take no additional measures without the express authorization of the flag State, except those necessary to relieve imminent danger to the lives of persons or those which derive from relevant bilateral or multilateral agreements. 6. Each State Party shall designate an authority or, where necessary, authorities to receive and respond to requests for assistance, for confirmation of registry or of the right of a vessel to fly its flag and for authorization to take appropriate measures. Such designation shall be notified through the Secretary-General to all other States Parties within one month of the designation.

7. A State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea and is without nationality or may be assimilated to a vessel without nationality may board and search the vessel. If evidence confirming the suspicion is found, that State Party shall take appropriate measures in accordance with relevant domestic and international law. Article 9 Safeguard Clauses 1. Where a State Party takes measures against a vessel in accordance with article 8 of this Protocol, it shall: (a) Ensure the safety and humane treatment of the persons on board; (b) Take due account of the need not to endanger the security of the vessel or its cargo; (c) Take due account of the need not to prejudice the commercial or legal interests of the flag State or any other interested State; (d ) Ensure, within available means, that any measure taken with regard to the vessel is environmentally sound.

2. Where the grounds for measures taken pursuant to article 8 of this Protocol prove to be unfounded, the vessel shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been sustained, provided that the vessel has not committed any act justifying the measures taken. 3. Any measure taken, adopted or implemented in accordance with this chapter shall take due account of the need not to interfere with or to affect: (a) The rights and obligations and the exercise of jurisdiction of coastal States in accordance with the international law of the sea; or (b) The authority of the flag State to exercise jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters involving the vessel.

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4. Any measure taken at sea pursuant to this chapter shall be carried out only by warships or military aircraft, or by other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect.

ability to prevent, detect and investigate the conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol and to prosecute those involved.

III. Prevention, Cooperation and Other Measures

2. A State Party that receives information shall comply with any request by the State Party that transmitted the information that places restrictions on its use.

Article 10

Article 11

Information 1. Without prejudice to articles 27 and 28 of the Convention, States Parties, in particular those with common borders or located on routes along which migrants are smuggled, shall, for the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Protocol, exchange among themselves, consistent with their respective domestic legal and administrative systems, relevant information on matters such as:

Border Measures 1. Without prejudice to international commitments in relation to the free movement of people, States Parties shall strengthen, to the extent possible, such border controls as may be necessary to prevent and detect the smuggling of migrants.

(a) Embarkation and destination points, as well as routes, carriers and means of transportation, known to be or suspected of being used by an organized criminal group engaged in conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol; (b) The identity and methods of organizations or organized criminal groups known to be or suspected of being engaged in conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol; (c) The authenticity and proper form of travel documents issued by a State Party and the theft or related misuse of blank travel or identity documents; (d ) Means and methods of concealment and transportation of persons, the unlawful alteration, reproduction or acquisition or other misuse of travel or identity documents used in conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol and ways of detecting them; (e) Legislative experiences and practices and measures to prevent and combat the conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol; and (f ) Scientific and technological information useful to law enforcement, so as to enhance each other’s

2. Each State Party shall adopt legislative or other appropriate measures to prevent, to the extent possible, means of transport operated by commercial carriers from being used in the commission of the offence established in accordance with article 6, paragraph 1 (a), of this Protocol. 3. Where appropriate, and without prejudice to applicable international conventions, such measures shall include establishing the obligation of commercial carriers, including any transportation company or the owner or operator of any means of transport, to ascertain that all passengers are in possession of the travel documents required for entry into the receiving State. 4. Each State Party shall take the necessary measures, in accordance with its domestic law, to provide for sanctions in cases of violation of the obligation set forth in paragraph 3 of this article. 5. Each State Party shall consider taking measures that permit, in accordance with its domestic law, the denial of entry or revocation of visas of persons

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implicated in the commission of offences established in accordance with this Protocol. 6. Without prejudice to article 27 of the Convention, States Parties shall consider strengthening cooperation among border control agencies by, inter alia, establishing and maintaining direct channels of communication. Article 12 Security and Control of Documents Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, within available means: (a) To ensure that travel or identity documents issued by it are of such quality that they cannot easily be misused and cannot readily be falsified or unlawfully altered, replicated or issued; and (b) To ensure the integrity and security of travel or identity documents issued by or on behalf of the State Party and to prevent their unlawful creation, issuance and use.

Article 13 Legitimacy and Validity of Documents At the request of another State Party, a State Party shall, in accordance with its domestic law, verify within a reasonable time the legitimacy and validity of travel or identity documents issued or purported to have been issued in its name and suspected of being used for purposes of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol. Article 14 Training and Technical Cooperation 1. States Parties shall provide or strengthen specialized training for immigration and other relevant officials in preventing the conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol and in the humane treatment of migrants who have been the object of such conduct, while respecting their rights as set forth in this Protocol.

2. States Parties shall cooperate with each other and with competent international organizations, non-governmental organizations, other relevant organizations and other elements of civil society as appropriate to ensure that there is adequate personnel training in their territories to prevent, combat and eradicate the conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol and to protect the rights of migrants who have been the object of such conduct. Such training shall include: (a) Improving the security and quality of travel documents; (b) Recognizing and detecting fraudulent travel or identity documents; (c) Gathering criminal intelligence, relating in particular to the identification of organized criminal groups known to be or suspected of being engaged in conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol, the methods used to transport smuggled migrants, the misuse of travel or identity documents for purposes of conduct set forth in article 6 and the means of concealment used in the smuggling of migrants; (d ) Improving procedures for detecting smuggled persons at conventional and non-conventional points of entry and exit; and (e) The humane treatment of migrants and the protection of their rights as set forth in this Protocol.

3. States Parties with relevant expertise shall consider providing technical assistance to States that are frequently countries of origin or transit for persons who have been the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol. States Parties shall make every effort to provide the necessary resources, such as vehicles, computer systems and document readers, to combat the conduct set forth in article 6. Article 15 Other Prevention Measures 1. Each State Party shall take measures to ensure that it provides or strengthens information

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programmes to increase public awareness of the fact that the conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol is a criminal activity frequently perpetrated by organized criminal groups for profit and that it poses serious risks to the migrants concerned. 2. In accordance with article 31 of the Convention, States Parties shall cooperate in the field of public information for the purpose of preventing potential migrants from falling victim to organized criminal groups. 3. Each State Party shall promote or strengthen, as appropriate, development programmes and cooperation at the national, regional and international levels, taking into account the socioeconomic realities of migration and paying special attention to economically and socially depressed areas, in order to combat the root socio-economic causes of the smuggling of migrants, such as poverty and underdevelopment. Article 16 Protection and Assistance Measures 1. In implementing this Protocol, each State Party shall take, consistent with its obligations under international law, all appropriate measures, including legislation if necessary, to preserve and protect the rights of persons who have been the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol as accorded under applicable international law, in particular the right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 2. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to afford migrants appropriate protection against violence that may be inflicted upon them, whether by individuals or groups, by reason of being the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol.

3. Each State Party shall afford appropriate assistance to migrants whose lives or safety are endangered by reason of being the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol. 4. In applying the provisions of this article, States Parties shall take into account the special needs of women and children. 5. In the case of the detention of a person who has been the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol, each State Party shall comply with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations where applicable, including that of informing the person concerned without delay about the provisions concerning notification to and communication with consular officers. Article 17 Agreements and Arrangements States Parties shall consider the conclusion of bilateral or regional agreements or operational arrangements or understandings aimed at: (a) Establishing the most appropriate and effective measures to prevent and combat the conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol; or (b) Enhancing the provisions of this Protocol among themselves.

Article 18 Return of Smuggled Migrants 1. Each State Party agrees to facilitate and accept, without undue or unreasonable delay, the return of a person who has been the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol and who is its national or who has the right of permanent residence in its territory at the time of return. 2. Each State Party shall consider the possibility of facilitating and accepting the return of a person who has been the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol and who had the right of

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permanent residence in its territory at the time of entry into the receiving State in accordance with its domestic law. 3. At the request of the receiving State Party, a requested State Party shall, without undue or unreasonable delay, verify whether a person who has been the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol is its national or has the right of permanent residence in its territory. 4. In order to facilitate the return of a person who has been the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol and is without proper documentation, the State Party of which that person is a national or in which he or she has the right of permanent residence shall agree to issue, at the request of the receiving State Party, such travel documents or other authorization as may be necessary to enable the person to travel to and reenter its territory. 5. Each State Party involved with the return of a person who has been the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol shall take all appropriate measures to carry out the return in an orderly manner and with due regard for the safety and dignity of the person. 6. States Parties may cooperate with relevant international organizations in the implementation of this article. 7. This article shall be without prejudice to any right afforded to persons who have been the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol by any domestic law of the receiving State Party. 8. This article shall not affect the obligations entered into under any other applicable treaty, bilateral or multilateral, or any other applicable operational agreement or arrangement that governs, in whole or in part, the return of persons who have been the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol.

36. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography The exploitation of the world’s children has been and continues to be a major international problem. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, adopted on 25 May 2000 and entered into force on 18 January 2002, was developed specifically to protect children from sexual exploitation. It calls for all ratifying states to institute child protection laws relative to child prostitution, child pornography, and the selling of children for the purposes of forced labor or organ transfer. Source Interpol, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/crc/treaties/ opsc.htm.

The States Parties to the present Protocol, Considering that, in order further to achieve the purposes of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the implementation of its provisions, especially articles 1, 11, 21, 32, 33, 34, 35 and 36, it would be appropriate to extend the measures that States Parties should undertake in order to guarantee the protection of the child from the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, Considering also that the Convention on the Rights of the Child recognizes the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development, Gravely concerned at the significant and increasing international traffic in children for the purpose of the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography,

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Deeply concerned at the widespread and continuing practice of sex tourism, to which children are especially vulnerable, as it directly promotes the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, Recognizing that a number of particularly vulnerable groups, including girl children, are at greater risk of sexual exploitation and that girl children are disproportionately represented among the sexually exploited, Concerned about the growing availability of child pornography on the Internet and other evolving technologies, and recalling the International Conference on Combating Child Pornography on the Internet, held in Vienna in 1999, in particular its conclusion calling for the worldwide criminalization of the production, distribution, exportation, transmission, importation, intentional possession and advertising of child pornography, and stressing the importance of closer cooperation and partnership between Governments and the Internet industry, Believing that the elimination of the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography will be facilitated by adopting a holistic approach, addressing the contributing factors, including underdevelopment, poverty, economic disparities, inequitable socio-economic structure, dysfunctioning families, lack of education, urbanrural migration, gender discrimination, irresponsible adult sexual behaviour, harmful traditional practices, armed conflicts and trafficking in children,

Noting the provisions of international legal instruments relevant to the protection of children, including the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, and International Labour Organization Convention No. 182 on the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, Encouraged by the overwhelming support for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, demonstrating the widespread commitment that exists for the promotion and protection of the rights of the child, Recognizing the importance of the implementation of the provisions of the Programme of Action for the Prevention of the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography and the Declaration and Agenda for Action adopted at the World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, held in Stockholm from 27 to 31 August 1996, and the other relevant decisions and recommendations of pertinent international bodies, Taking due account of the importance of the traditions and cultural values of each people for the protection and harmonious development of the child, Have agreed as follows:

Believing also that efforts to raise public awareness are needed to reduce consumer demand for the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, and believing further in the importance of strengthening global partnership among all actors and of improving law enforcement at the national level,

Article 1 States Parties shall prohibit the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography as provided for by the present Protocol. Article 2 For the purposes of the present Protocol:

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(a) Sale of children means any act or transaction whereby a child is transferred by any person or group of persons to another for remuneration or any other consideration; (b) Child prostitution means the use of a child in sexual activities for remuneration or any other form of consideration; (c) Child pornography means any representation, by whatever means, of a child engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities or any representation of the sexual parts of a child for primarily sexual purposes.

Article 3 1. Each State Party shall ensure that, as a minimum, the following acts and activities are fully covered under its criminal or penal law, whether such offences are committed domestically or transnationally or on an individual or organized basis: (a) In the context of sale of children as defined in article 2: (i) Offering, delivering or accepting, by whatever means, a child for the purpose of: a. Sexual exploitation of the child; b. Transfer of organs of the child for profit; c. Engagement of the child in forced labour;

(ii) Improperly inducing consent, as an intermediary, for the adoption of a child in violation of applicable international legal instruments on adoption; (b) Offering, obtaining, procuring or providing a child for child prostitution, as defined in article 2; (c) Producing, distributing, disseminating, importing, exporting, offering, selling or possessing for the above purposes child pornography as defined in article 2.

2. Subject to the provisions of the national law of a State Party, the same shall apply to an attempt to commit any of the said acts and to complicity or participation in any of the said acts.

3. Each State Party shall make such offences punishable by appropriate penalties that take into account their grave nature. 4. Subject to the provisions of its national law, each State Party shall take measures, where appropriate, to establish the liability of legal persons for offences established in paragraph 1 of the present article. Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, such liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative. 5. States Parties shall take all appropriate legal and administrative measures to ensure that all persons involved in the adoption of a child act in conformity with applicable international legal instruments. Article 4 1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 3, paragraph 1, when the offences are commited in its territory or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State. 2. Each State Party may take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 3, paragraph 1, in the following cases: (a) When the alleged offender is a national of that State or a person who has his habitual residence in its territory; (b) When the victim is a national of that State.

3. Each State Party shall also take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the aforementioned offences when the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him or her to another State Party on the ground that the offence has been committed by one of its nationals.

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4. The present Protocol does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with internal law. Article 5 1. The offences referred to in article 3, paragraph 1, shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties and shall be included as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty subsequently concluded between them, in accordance with the conditions set forth in such treaties. 2. If a State Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may consider the present Protocol to be a legal basis for extradition in respect of such offences. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State.

Article 6 1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings brought in respect of the offences set forth in article 3, paragraph 1, including assistance in obtaining evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings. 2. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under paragraph 1 of the present article in conformity with any treaties or other arrangements on mutual legal assistance that may exist between them. In the absence of such treaties or arrangements, States Parties shall afford one another assistance in accordance with their domestic law. Article 7 States Parties shall, subject to the provisions of their national law: (a) Take measures to provide for the seizure and confiscation, as appropriate, of: (i) Goods, such as materials, assets and other instrumentalities used to commit or facilitate offences under the present protocol; (ii) Proceeds derived from such offences; (b) Execute requests from another State Party for seizure or confiscation of goods or proceeds referred to in subparagraph (a); (c) Take measures aimed at closing, on a temporary or definitive basis, premises used to commit such offences.

3. States Parties that do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize such offences as extraditable offences between themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State. 4. Such offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between States Parties, as if they had been committed not only in the place in which they occurred but also in the territories of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with article 4. 5. If an extradition request is made with respect to an offence described in article 3, paragraph 1, and the requested State Party does not or will not extradite on the basis of the nationality of the offender, that State shall take suitable measures to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.

Article 8 1. States Parties shall adopt appropriate measures to protect the rights and interests of child victims of the practices prohibited under the present Protocol at all stages of the criminal justice process, in particular by: (a) Recognizing the vulnerability of child victims and adapting procedures to recognize their special needs, including their special needs as witnesses;

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(b) Informing child victims of their rights, their role and the scope, timing and progress of the proceedings and of the disposition of their cases; (c) Allowing the views, needs and concerns of child victims to be presented and considered in proceedings where their personal interests are affected, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law; (d) Providing appropriate support services to child victims throughout the legal process; (e) Protecting, as appropriate, the privacy and identity of child victims and taking measures in accordance with national law to avoid the inappropriate dissemination of information that could lead to the identification of child victims; (f) Providing, in appropriate cases, for the safety of child victims, as well as that of their families and witnesses on their behalf, from intimidation and retaliation; (g) Avoiding unnecessary delay in the disposition of cases and the execution of orders or decrees granting compensation to child victims.

2. States Parties shall ensure that uncertainty as to the actual age of the victim shall not prevent the initiation of criminal investigations, including investigations aimed at establishing the age of the victim. 3. States Parties shall ensure that, in the treatment by the criminal justice system of children who are victims of the offences described in the present Protocol, the best interest of the child shall be a primary consideration. 4. States Parties shall take measures to ensure appropriate training, in particular legal and psychological training, for the persons who work with victims of the offences prohibited under the present Protocol. 5. States Parties shall, in appropriate cases, adopt measures in order to protect the safety and integrity of those persons and/or organizations

involved in the prevention and/or protection and rehabilitation of victims of such offences. 6. Nothing in the present article shall be construed to be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused to a fair and impartial trial. Article 9 1. States Parties shall adopt or strengthen, implement and disseminate laws, administrative measures, social policies and programmes to prevent the offences referred to in the present Protocol. Particular attention shall be given to protect children who are especially vulnerable to such practices. 2. States Parties shall promote awareness in the public at large, including children, through information by all appropriate means, education and training, about the preventive measures and harmful effects of the offences referred to in the present Protocol. In fulfilling their obligations under this article, States Parties shall encourage the participation of the community and, in particular, children and child victims, in such information and education and training programmes, including at the international level. 3. States Parties shall take all feasible measures with the aim of ensuring all appropriate assistance to victims of such offences, including their full social reintegration and their full physical and psychological recovery. 4. States Parties shall ensure that all child victims of the offences described in the present Protocol have access to adequate procedures to seek, without discrimination, compensation for damages from those legally responsible. 5. States Parties shall take appropriate measures aimed at effectively prohibiting the production and dissemination of material advertising the offences described in the present Protocol.

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Article 10 1. States Parties shall take all necessary steps to strengthen international cooperation by multilateral, regional and bilateral arrangements for the prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution and punishment of those responsible for acts involving the sale of children, child prostitution, child pornography and child sex tourism. States Parties shall also promote international cooperation and coordination between their authorities, national and international non-governmental organizations and international organizations. 2. States Parties shall promote international cooperation to assist child victims in their physical and psychological recovery, social reintegration and repatriation. 3. States Parties shall promote the strengthening of international cooperation in order to address the root causes, such as poverty and underdevelopment, contributing to the vulnerability of children to the sale of children, child prostitution, child pornography and child sex tourism. 4. States Parties in a position to do so shall provide financial, technical or other assistance through existing multilateral, regional, bilateral or other programmes. Article 11 Nothing in the present Protocol shall affect any provisions that are more conducive to the realization of the rights of the child and that may be contained in: (a) The law of a State Party; (b) International law in force for that State.

Article 12 1. Each State Party shall, within two years following the entry into force of the present Protocol for that State Party, submit a report to the

Committee on the Rights of the Child providing comprehensive information on the measures it has taken to implement the provisions of the Protocol. 2. Following the submission of the comprehensive report, each State Party shall include in the reports they submit to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in accordance with article 44 of the Convention, any further information with respect to the implementation of the present Protocol. Other States Parties to the Protocol shall submit a report every five years. 3. The Committee on the Rights of the Child may request from States Parties further information relevant to the implementation of the present Protocol. Article 13 1. The present Protocol is open for signature by any State that is a party to the Convention or has signed it. 2. The present Protocol is subject to ratification and is open to accession by any State that is a party to the Convention or has signed it. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Article 14 1. The present Protocol shall enter into force three months after the deposit of the tenth instrument of ratification or accession. 2. For each State ratifying the present Protocol or acceding to it after its entry into force, the Protocol shall enter into force one month after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or accession. Article 15 1. Any State Party may denounce the present Protocol at any time by written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall thereafter inform the other States Parties to the

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Convention and all States that have signed the Convention. The denunciation shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General. 2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the State Party from its obligations under the present Protocol in regard to any offence that occurs prior to the date on which the denunciation becomes effective. Nor shall such a denunciation prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter that is already under consideration by the Committee on the Rights of the Child prior to the date on which the denunciation becomes effective. Article 16 1. Any State Party may propose an amendment and file it with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall thereupon communicate the proposed amendment to States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a conference of States Parties for the purpose of considering and voting upon the proposals. In the event that, within four months from the date of such communication, at least one third of the States Parties favour such a conference, the Secretary-General shall convene the conference under the auspices of the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by a majority of States Parties present and voting at the conference shall be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations for approval. 2. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 1 of the present article shall enter into force when it has been approved by the General Assembly and accepted by a two-thirds majority of States Parties. 3. When an amendment enters into force, it shall be binding on those States Parties that have accepted it, other States Parties still being bound by the provisions of the present Protocol and any earlier amendments they have accepted.

Article 17 1. The present Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations. 2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies of the present Protocol to all States Parties to the Convention and all States that have signed the Convention.

37. Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings Human trafficking is an important source of revenue for organized criminal groups in Europe. Human trafficking has no regard for the dignity of the person trafficked and violates his or her basic human rights. The Council of Europe has been proactive in its efforts to prevent the trafficking of human beings. The member countries of the Council of Europe called for combating human trafficking during its meeting in Warsaw, Poland, in May 2005 and sought international cooperation in the adoption of measures to eliminate it. As stated in Chapter II, Article 5, “Each Party shall take measures to establish or strengthen national co-ordination between the various bodies responsible for preventing and combating trafficking in human beings.” Additionally, there would be specific measures to prevent the trafficking of children. Article 17 stipulates promotion of gender equality. Offenders are subject to monetary sanctions as well as imprisonment. Source Council of Europe, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/ Treaties/Html/197.htm.

Preamble The member States of the Council of Europe and the other Signatories hereto,

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Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members;

Recommendation Rec (2002) 5 on the protection of women against violence;

Considering that trafficking in human beings constitutes a violation of human rights and an offence to the dignity and the integrity of the human being;

Bearing in mind the following recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: Recommendation 1325 (1997) on traffic in women and forced prostitution in Council of Europe member states; Recommendation 1450 (2000) on violence against women in Europe; Recommendation 1545 (2002) on a campaign against trafficking in women; Recommendation 1610 (2003) on migration connected with trafficking in women and prostitution; Recommendation 1611 (2003) on trafficking in organs in Europe; Recommendation 1663 (2004) Domestic slavery: servitude, au pairs and mailorder brides;

Considering that trafficking in human beings may result in slavery for victims; Considering that respect for victims’ rights, protection of victims and action to combat trafficking in human beings must be the paramount objectives; Considering that all actions or initiatives against trafficking in human beings must be nondiscriminatory, take gender equality into account as well as a child-rights approach; Recalling the declarations by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States at the 112th (14–15 May 2003) and the 114th (12–13 May 2004) Sessions of the Committee of Ministers calling for reinforced action by the Council of Europe on trafficking in human beings; Bearing in mind the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) and its protocols; Bearing in mind the following recommendations of the Committee of Ministers to member states of the Council of Europe: Recommendation No. R (91) 11 on sexual exploitation, pornography and prostitution of, and trafficking in, children and young adults; Recommendation No. R (97) 13 concerning intimidation of witnesses and the rights of the defence; Recommendation No. R (2000) 11 on action against trafficking in human beings for the purpose of sexual exploitation and Recommendation Rec (2001) 16 on the protection of children against sexual exploitation;

Bearing in mind the European Union Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings the European Union Council Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings and the European Union Council Directive of 29 April 2004 on the residence permit issued to thirdcountry nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities; Taking due account of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocol thereto to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children with a view to improving the protection which they afford and developing the standards established by them; Taking due account of the other international legal instruments relevant in the field of action against trafficking in human beings; Taking into account the need to prepare a comprehensive international legal instrument focusing on the human rights of victims of

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trafficking and setting up a specific monitoring mechanism, Have agreed as follows: Chapter I—Purposes, Scope, Nondiscrimination Principle and Definitions Article 1—Purposes of the Convention 1. The purposes of this Convention are: a. to prevent and combat trafficking in human beings, while guaranteeing gender equality b. to protect the human rights of the victims of trafficking, design a comprehensive framework for the protection and assistance of victims and witnesses, while guaranteeing gender equality, as well as to ensure effective investigation and prosecution; c. to promote international cooperation on action against trafficking in human beings.

2. In order to ensure effective implementation of its provisions by the Parties, this Convention sets up a specific monitoring mechanism. Article 2—Scope This Convention shall apply to all forms of trafficking in human beings, whether national or transnational, whether or not connected with organised crime. Article 3—Non-discrimination Principle The implementation of the provisions of this Convention by Parties, in particular the enjoyment of measures to protect and promote the rights of victims, shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. Article 4—Definitions For the purposes of this Convention: a. “Trafficking in human beings” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or

b.

c.

d. e.

receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs; The consent of a victim of “trafficking in human beings” to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used; The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in human beings” even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article; “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age; “Victim” shall mean any natural person who is subject to trafficking in human beings as defined in this article.

Chapter II—Prevention, Co-operation and Other Measures Article 5—Prevention of Trafficking in Human Beings 1. Each Party shall take measures to establish or strengthen national co-ordination between the various bodies responsible for preventing and combating trafficking in human beings. 2. Each Party shall establish and/or strengthen effective policies and programmes to prevent trafficking in human beings, by such means as: research, information, awareness raising and education campaigns, social and economic initiatives and training programmes, in particular for persons vulnerable to trafficking and for

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professionals concerned with trafficking in human beings. 3. Each Party shall promote a Human Rights-based approach and shall use gender mainstreaming and a child-sensitive approach in the development, implementation and assessment of all the policies and programmes referred to in paragraph 2. 4. Each Party shall take appropriate measures, as may be necessary, to enable migration to take place legally, in particular through dissemination of accurate information by relevant offices, on the conditions enabling the legal entry in and stay on its territory. 5. Each Party shall take specific measures to reduce children’s vulnerability to trafficking, notably by creating a protective environment for them. 6. Measures established in accordance with this article shall involve, where appropriate, nongovernmental organisations, other relevant organisations and other elements of civil society committed to the prevention of trafficking in human beings and victim protection or assistance. Article 6—Measures to Discourage the Demand To discourage the demand that fosters all forms of exploitation of persons, especially women and children, that leads to trafficking, each Party shall adopt or strengthen legislative, administrative, educational, social, cultural or other measures including: a. research on best practices, methods and strategies; b. raising awareness of the responsibility and important role of media and civil society in identifying the demand as one of the root causes of trafficking in human beings; c. target information campaigns involving, as appropriate, inter alia, public authorities and policy makers;

d. preventive measures, including educational programmes for boys and girls during their schooling, which stress the unacceptable nature of discrimination based on sex, and its disastrous consequences, the importance of gender equality and the dignity and integrity of every human being.

Article 7—Border Measures 1. Without prejudice to international commitments in relation to the free movement of persons, Parties shall strengthen, to the extent possible, such border controls as may be necessary to prevent and detect trafficking in human beings. 2. Each Party shall adopt legislative or other appropriate measures to prevent, to the extent possible, means of transport operated by commercial carriers from being used in the commission of offences established in accordance with this Convention. 3. Where appropriate, and without prejudice to applicable international conventions, such measures shall include establishing the obligation of commercial carriers, including any transportation company or the owner or operator of any means of transport, to ascertain that all passengers are in possession of the travel documents required for entry into the receiving State. 4. Each Party shall take the necessary measures, in accordance with its internal law, to provide for sanctions in cases of violation of the obligation set forth in paragraph 3 of this article. 5. Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to permit, in accordance with its internal law, the denial of entry or revocation of visas of persons implicated in the commission of offences established in accordance with this Convention.

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6. Parties shall strengthen co-operation among border control agencies by, inter alia, establishing and maintaining direct channels of communication. Article 8—Security and Control of Documents Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary: a. To ensure that travel or identity documents issued by it are of such quality that they cannot easily be misused and cannot readily be falsified or unlawfully altered, replicated or issued; and b. To ensure the integrity and security of travel or identity documents issued by or on behalf of the Party and to prevent their unlawful creation and issuance.

Article 9—Legitimacy and Validity of Documents At the request of another Party, a Party shall, in accordance with its internal law, verify within a reasonable time the legitimacy and validity of travel or identity documents issued or purported to have been issued in its name and suspected of being used for trafficking in human beings. Chapter III—Measures to Protect and Promote the Rights of Victims, Guaranteeing Gender Equality Article 10—Identification of the Victims 1. Each Party shall provide its competent authorities with persons who are trained and qualified in preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, in identifying and helping victims, including children, and shall ensure that the different authorities collaborate with each other as well as with relevant support organisations, so that victims can be identified in a procedure duly taking into account the special situation of women and child victims and, in appropriate cases, issued with residence permits under the conditions provided for in Article 14 of the present Convention.

2. Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to identify victims as appropriate in collaboration with other Parties and relevant support organisations. Each Party shall ensure that, if the competent authorities have reasonable grounds to believe that a person has been victim of trafficking in human beings, that person shall not be removed from its territory until the identification process as victim of an offence provided for in Article 18 of this Convention has been completed by the competent authorities and shall likewise ensure that that person receives the assistance provided for in Article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2. 3. When the age of the victim is uncertain and there are reasons to believe that the victim is a child, he or she shall be presumed to be a child and shall be accorded special protection measures pending verification of his/her age. 4. As soon as an unaccompanied child is identified as a victim, each Party shall: a. provide for representation of the child by a legal guardian, organisation or authority which shall act in the best interests of that child; b. take the necessary steps to establish his/her identity and nationality; c. make every effort to locate his/her family when this is in the best interests of the child.

Article 11—Protection of Private Life 1. Each Party shall protect the private life and identity of victims. Personal data regarding them shall be stored and used in conformity with the conditions provided for by the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (ETS No. 108). 2. Each Party shall adopt measures to ensure, in particular, that the identity, or details allowing the identification, of a child victim of trafficking are not made publicly known, through the media or by any other means, except, in exceptional circumstances,

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in order to facilitate the tracing of family members or otherwise secure the well-being and protection of the child. 3. Each Party shall consider adopting, in accordance with Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, measures aimed at encouraging the media to protect the private life and identity of victims through self-regulation or through regulatory or co-regulatory measures. Article 12—Assistance to Victims 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to assist victims in their physical, psychological and social recovery. Such assistance shall include at least: a. standards of living capable of ensuring their subsistence, through such measures as: appropriate and secure accommodation, psychological and material assistance; b. access to emergency medical treatment; c. translation and interpretation services, when appropriate; d. counselling and information, in particular as regards their legal rights and the services available to them, in a language that they can understand; e. assistance to enable their rights and interests to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of criminal proceedings against offenders; f. access to education for children.

2. Each Party shall take due account of the victim’s safety and protection needs. 3. In addition, each Party shall provide necessary medical or other assistance to victims lawfully resident within its territory who do not have adequate resources and need such help. 4. Each Party shall adopt the rules under which victims lawfully resident within its territory shall be

authorised to have access to the labour market, to vocational training and education. 5. Each Party shall take measures, where appropriate and under the conditions provided for by its internal law, to co-operate with nongovernmental organisations, other relevant organisations or other elements of civil society engaged in assistance to victims. 6. Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure that assistance to a victim is not made conditional on his or her willingness to act as a witness. 7. For the implementation of the provisions set out in this article, each Party shall ensure that services are provided on a consensual and informed basis, taking due account of the special needs of persons in a vulnerable position and the rights of children in terms of accommodation, education and appropriate health care. Article 13—Recovery and Reflection Period 1. Each Party shall provide in its internal law a recovery and reflection period of at least 30 days, when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person concerned is a victim. Such a period shall be sufficient for the person concerned to recover and escape the influence of traffickers and/or to take an informed decision on cooperating with the competent authorities. During this period it shall not be possible to enforce any expulsion order against him or her. This provision is without prejudice to the activities carried out by the competent authorities in all phases of the relevant national proceedings, and in particular when investigating and prosecuting the offences concerned. During this period, the Parties shall authorise the persons concerned to stay in their territory. 2. During this period, the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be entitled to the

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measures contained in Article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2. 3. The Parties are not bound to observe this period if grounds of public order prevent it or if it is found that victim status is being claimed improperly. Article 14—Residence Permit 1. Each Party shall issue a renewable residence permit to victims, in one or other of the two following situations or in both: a. the competent authority considers that their stay is necessary owing to their personal situation; b. the competent authority considers that their stay is necessary for the purpose of their co-operation with the competent authorities in investigation or criminal proceedings.

2. The residence permit for child victims, when legally necessary, shall be issued in accordance with the best interests of the child and, where appropriate, renewed under the same conditions. 3. The non-renewal or withdrawal of a residence permit is subject to the conditions provided for by the internal law of the Party. 4. If a victim submits an application for another kind of residence permit, the Party concerned shall take into account that he or she holds, or has held, a residence permit in conformity with paragraph 1. 5. Having regard to the obligations of Parties to which Article 40 of this Convention refers, each Party shall ensure that granting of a permit according to this provision shall be without prejudice to the right to seek and enjoy asylum. Article 15—Compensation and Legal Redress 1. Each Party shall ensure that victims have access, as from their first contact with the competent authorities, to information on relevant judicial and administrative proceedings in a language which they can understand.

2. Each Party shall provide, in its internal law, for the right to legal assistance and to free legal aid for victims under the conditions provided by its internal law. 3. Each Party shall provide, in its internal law, for the right of victims to compensation from the perpetrators. 4. Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to guarantee compensation for victims in accordance with the conditions under its internal law, for instance through the establishment of a fund for victim compensation or measures or programmes aimed at social assistance and social integration of victims, which could be funded by the assets resulting from the application of measures provided in Article 23. Article 16—Repatriation and Return of Victims 1. The Party of which a victim is a national or in which that person had the right of permanent residence at the time of entry into the territory of the receiving Party shall, with due regard for his or her rights, safety and dignity, facilitate and accept, his or her return without undue or unreasonable delay. 2. When a Party returns a victim to another State, such return shall be with due regard for the rights, safety and dignity of that person and for the status of any legal proceedings related to the fact that the person is a victim, and shall preferably be voluntary. 3. At the request of a receiving Party, a requested Party shall verify whether a person is its national or had the right of permanent residence in its territory at the time of entry into the territory of the receiving Party. 4. In order to facilitate the return of a victim who is without proper documentation, the Party of which that person is a national or in which he or she had the right of permanent residence at the time of

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entry into the territory of the receiving Party shall agree to issue, at the request of the receiving Party, such travel documents or other authorisation as may be necessary to enable the person to travel to and re-enter its territory. 5. Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to establish repatriation programmes, involving relevant national or international institutions and non governmental organisations. These programmes aim at avoiding re-victimisation. Each Party should make its best effort to favour the reintegration of victims into the society of the State of return, including reintegration into the education system and the labour market, in particular through the acquisition and improvement of their professional skills. With regard to children, these programmes should include enjoyment of the right to education and measures to secure adequate care or receipt by the family or appropriate care structures. 6. Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to make available to victims, where appropriate in co-operation with any other Party concerned, contact information of structures that can assist them in the country where they are returned or repatriated, such as law enforcement offices, non-governmental organisations, legal professions able to provide counselling and social welfare agencies. 7. Child victims shall not be returned to a State, if there is indication, following a risk and security assessment, that such return would not be in the best interests of the child. Article 17—Gender Equality Each Party shall, in applying measures referred to in this chapter, aim to promote gender equality and use gender mainstreaming in the development, implementation and assessment of the measures.

Chapter IV—Substantive Criminal Law Article 18—Criminalisation of Trafficking in Human Beings Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences the conduct contained in article 4 of this Convention, when committed intentionally. Article 19—Criminalisation of the Use of Services of a Victim Each Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its internal law, the use of services which are the object of exploitation as referred to in Article 4 paragraph a of this Convention, with the knowledge that the person is a victim of trafficking in human beings. Article 20—Criminalisation of Acts Relating to Travel or Identity Documents Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences the following conducts, when committed intentionally and for the purpose of enabling the trafficking in human beings: a. forging a travel or identity document; b. procuring or providing such a document; c. retaining, removing, concealing, damaging or destroying a travel or identity document of another person.

Article 21—Attempt and Aiding or Abetting 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences when committed intentionally, aiding or abetting the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with Articles 18 and 20 of the present Convention. 2. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences when committed intentionally, an attempt to commit the offences established in

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accordance with Articles 18 and 20, paragraph a, of this Convention. Article 22—Corporate Liability 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that a legal person can be held liable for a criminal offence established in accordance with this Convention, committed for its benefit by any natural person, acting either individually or as part of an organ of the legal person, who has a leading position within the legal person, based on: a. a power of representation of the legal person; b. an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person; c. an authority to exercise control within the legal person.

2. Apart from the cases already provided for in paragraph 1, each Party shall take the measures necessary to ensure that a legal person can be held liable where the lack of supervision or control by a natural person referred to in paragraph 1 has made possible the commission of a criminal offence established in accordance with this Convention for the benefit of that legal person by a natural person acting under its authority. 3. Subject to the legal principles of the Party, the liability of a legal person may be criminal, civil or administrative. 4. Such liability shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural persons who have committed the offence. Article 23—Sanctions and Measures 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 18 to 21 are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. These sanctions shall include, for criminal offences established in accordance with Article 18 when

committed by natural persons, penalties involving deprivation of liberty which can give rise to extradition. 2. Each Party shall ensure that legal persons held liable in accordance with Article 22 shall be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions or measures, including monetary sanctions. 3. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable it to confiscate or otherwise deprive the instrumentalities and proceeds of criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 18 and 20, paragraph a, of this Convention, or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds. 4. Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to enable the temporary or permanent closure of any establishment which was used to carry out trafficking in human beings, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties or to deny the perpetrator, temporary or permanently, the exercise of the activity in the course of which this offence was committed. Article 24—Aggravating Circumstances Each Party shall ensure that the following circumstances are regarded as aggravating circumstances in the determination of the penalty for offences established in accordance with Article 18 of this Convention: a. the offence deliberately or by gross negligence endangered the life of the victim; b. the offence was committed against a child; c. the offence was committed by a public official in the performance of her/his duties; d. the offence was committed within the framework of a criminal organisation.

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Article 25—Previous Convictions Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures providing for the possibility to take into account final sentences passed by another Party in relation to offences established in accordance with this Convention when determining the penalty. Article 26—Non-punishment Provision Each Party shall, in accordance with the basic principles of its legal system, provide for the possibility of not imposing penalties on victims for their involvement in unlawful activities, to the extent that they have been compelled to do so.

victim with his or her consent during criminal proceedings concerning the offence established in accordance with Article 18 of this Convention. Article 28—Protection of Victims, Witnesses and Collaborators with the Judicial Authorities 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to provide effective and appropriate protection from potential retaliation or intimidation in particular during and after investigation and prosecution of perpetrators, for: a. Victims; b. As appropriate, those who report the criminal offences established in accordance with Article 18 of this Convention or otherwise co-operate with the investigating or prosecuting authorities; c. witnesses who give testimony concerning criminal offences established in accordance with Article 18 of this Convention; d. when necessary, members of the family of persons referred to in subparagraphs a and c.

Chapter V—Investigation, Prosecution and Procedural Law Article 27—Ex Parte and Ex Officio Applications 1. Each Party shall ensure that investigations into or prosecution of offences established in accordance with this Convention shall not be dependent upon the report or accusation made by a victim, at least when the offence was committed in whole or in part on its territory. 2. Each Party shall ensure that victims of an offence in the territory of a Party other than the one where they reside may make a complaint before the competent authorities of their State of residence. The competent authority to which the complaint is made, insofar as it does not itself have competence in this respect, shall transmit it without delay to the competent authority of the Party in the territory in which the offence was committed. The complaint shall be dealt with in accordance with the internal law of the Party in which the offence was committed. 3. Each Party shall ensure, by means of legislative or other measures, in accordance with the conditions provided for by its internal law, to any group, foundation, association or nongovernmental organisations which aims at fighting trafficking in human beings or protection of human rights, the possibility to assist and/or support the

2. Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure and to offer various kinds of protection. This may include physical protection, relocation, identity change and assistance in obtaining jobs. 3. A child victim shall be afforded special protection measures taking into account the best interests of the child. 4. Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to provide, when necessary, appropriate protection from potential retaliation or intimidation in particular during and after investigation and prosecution of perpetrators, for members of groups, foundations, associations or non-governmental organisations which carry out the activities set out in Article 27, paragraph 3.

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5. Each Party shall consider entering into agreements or arrangements with other States for the implementation of this article. Article 29—Specialised Authorities and Coordinating Bodies 1. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure that persons or entities are specialised in the fight against trafficking and the protection of victims. Such persons or entities shall have the necessary independence in accordance with the fundamental principles of the legal system of the Party, in order for them to be able to carry out their functions effectively and free from any undue pressure. Such persons or the staffs of such entities shall have adequate training and financial resources for their tasks. 2. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure co-ordination of the policies and actions of their governments’ departments and other public agencies against trafficking in human beings, where appropriate, through setting up coordinating bodies. 3. Each Party shall provide or strengthen training for relevant officials in the prevention of and fight against trafficking in human beings, including Human Rights training. The training may be agency-specific and shall, as appropriate, focus on: methods used in preventing such trafficking, prosecuting the traffickers and protecting the rights of the victims, including protecting the victims from the traffickers. 4. Each Party shall consider appointing National Rapporteurs or other mechanisms for monitoring the anti-trafficking activities of State institutions and the implementation of national legislation requirements. Article 30—Court Proceedings In accordance with the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in particular Article 6, each Party shall

adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure in the course of judicial proceedings: a. the protection of victims’ private life and, where appropriate, identity; b. victims’ safety and protection from intimidation, in accordance with the conditions under its internal law and, in the case of child victims, by taking special care of children’s needs and ensuring their right to special protection measures.

Article 31—Jurisdiction 1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction over any offence established in accordance with this Convention, when the offence is committed: a. in its territory; or b. on board a ship flying the flag of that Party; or c. on board an aircraft registered under the laws of that Party; or d. by one of its nationals or by a stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in its territory, if the offence is punishable under criminal law where it was committed or if the offence is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any State; e. against one of its nationals.

2. Each Party may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, declare that it reserves the right not to apply or to apply only in specific cases or conditions the jurisdiction rules laid down in paragraphs 1 (d) and (e) of this article or any part thereof. 3. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction over the offences referred to in this Convention, in cases where an alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him/her to another Party, solely

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on the basis of his/her nationality, after a request for extradition.

latter so as to take the appropriate protection measures.

4. When more than one Party claims jurisdiction over an alleged offence established in accordance with this Convention, the Parties involved shall, where appropriate, consult with a view to determining the most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution.

2. The Parties to this Convention may consider reinforcing their co-operation in the search for missing people, in particular for missing children, if the information available leads them to believe that she/he is a victim of trafficking in human beings. To this end, the Parties may conclude bilateral or multilateral treaties with each other.

5. Without prejudice to the general norms of international law, this Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised by a Party in accordance with internal law. Chapter VI—International Co-operation and Co-operation with Civil Society Article 32—General Principles and Measures for International Co-operation The Parties shall co-operate with each other, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, and through application of relevant applicable international and regional instruments, arrangements agreed on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation and internal laws, to the widest extent possible, for the purpose of: —preventing and combating trafficking in human beings; —protecting and providing assistance to victims; —investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention.

Article 33—Measures relating to Endangered or Missing Persons 1. When a Party, on the basis of the information at its disposal has reasonable grounds to believe that the life, the freedom or the physical integrity of a person referred to in Article 28, paragraph 1, is in immediate danger on the territory of another Party, the Party that has the information shall, in such a case of emergency, transmit it without delay to the

Article 34—Information 1. The requested Party shall promptly inform the requesting Party of the final result of the action taken under this chapter. The requested Party shall also promptly inform the requesting Party of any circumstances which render impossible the carrying out of the action sought or are likely to delay it significantly. 2. A Party may, within the limits of its internal law, without prior request, forward to another Party information obtained within the framework of its own investigations when it considers that the disclosure of such information might assist the receiving Party in initiating or carrying out investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention or might lead to a request for cooperation by that Party under this chapter. 3. Prior to providing such information, the providing Party may request that it be kept confidential or used subject to conditions. If the receiving Party cannot comply with such request, it shall notify the providing Party, which shall then determine whether the information should nevertheless be provided. If the receiving Party accepts the information subject to the conditions, it shall be bound by them. 4. All information requested concerning Articles 13, 14 and 16, necessary to provide the rights conferred by these articles, shall be transmitted at the request of the Party concerned without delay

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with due respect to Article 11 of the present Convention. Article 35—Co-operation with Civil Society Each Party shall encourage state authorities and public officials, to co-operate with nongovernmental organisations, other relevant organisations and members of civil society, in establishing strategic partnerships with the aim of achieving the purpose of this Convention. Chapter VII—Monitoring Mechanism Article 36—Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 1. The Group of experts on action against trafficking in human beings (hereinafter referred to as “GRETA”), shall monitor the implementation of this Convention by the Parties. 2. GRETA shall be composed of a minimum of 10 members and a maximum of 15 members, taking into account a gender and geographical balance, as well as a multidisciplinary expertise. They shall be elected by the Committee of the Parties for a term of office of 4 years, renewable once, chosen from amongst nationals of the States Parties to this Convention. 3. The election of the members of GRETA shall be based on the following principles: a. they shall be chosen from among persons of high moral character, known for their recognised competence in the fields of Human Rights, assistance and protection of victims and of action against trafficking in human beings or having professional experience in the areas covered by this Convention; b. they shall sit in their individual capacity and shall be independent and impartial in the exercise of their functions and shall be available to carry out their duties in an effective manner; c. no two members of GRETA may be nationals of the same State;

d. they should represent the main legal systems.

4. The election procedure of the members of GRETA shall be determined by the Committee of Ministers, after consulting with and obtaining the unanimous consent of the Parties to the Convention, within a period of one year following the entry into force of this Convention. GRETA shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Article 37—Committee of the Parties 1. The Committee of the Parties shall be composed of the representatives on the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of the member States Parties to the Convention and representatives of the Parties to the Convention, which are not members of the Council of Europe. 2. The Committee of the Parties shall be convened by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. Its first meeting shall be held within a period of one year following the entry into force of this Convention in order to elect the members of GRETA. It shall subsequently meet whenever onethird of the Parties, the President of GRETA or the Secretary General so requests. 3. The Committee of the Parties shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Article 38—Procedure 1. The evaluation procedure shall concern the Parties to the Convention and be divided in rounds, the length of which is determined by GRETA. At the beginning of each round GRETA shall select the specific provisions on which the evaluation procedure shall be based. 2. GRETA shall define the most appropriate means to carry out this evaluation. GRETA may in particular adopt a questionnaire for each evaluation round, which may serve as a basis for the evaluation of the implementation by the Parties of the present Convention. Such a questionnaire shall be addressed to all Parties. Parties shall respond to

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this questionnaire, as well as to any other request of information from GRETA.

Party for the proper implementation of the present Convention.

3. GRETA may request information from civil society.

Chapter VIII—Relationship with Other International Instruments

4. GRETA may subsidiarily organise, in cooperation with the national authorities and the “contact person” appointed by the latter, and, if necessary, with the assistance of independent national experts, country visits. During these visits, GRETA may be assisted by specialists in specific fields.

Article 39—Relationship with the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime This Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations derived from the provisions of the Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against transnational organised crime, and is intended to enhance the protection afforded by it and develop the standards contained therein.

5. GRETA shall prepare a draft report containing its analysis concerning the implementation of the provisions on which the evaluation is based, as well as its suggestions and proposals concerning the way in which the Party concerned may deal with the problems which have been identified. The draft report shall be transmitted for comments to the Party which undergoes the evaluation. Its comments are taken into account by GRETA when establishing its report. 6. On this basis, GRETA shall adopt its report and conclusions concerning the measures taken by the Party concerned to implement the provisions of the present Convention. This report and conclusions shall be sent to the Party concerned and to the Committee of the Parties. The report and conclusions of GRETA shall be made public as from their adoption, together with eventual comments by the Party concerned. 7. Without prejudice to the procedure of paragraphs 1 to 6 of this article, the Committee of the Parties may adopt, on the basis of the report and conclusions of GRETA, recommendations addressed to this Party (a) concerning the measures to be taken to implement the conclusions of GRETA, if necessary setting a date for submitting information on their implementation, and (b) aiming at promoting co-operation with that

Article 40—Relationship with Other International Instruments 1. This Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations derived from other international instruments to which Parties to the present Convention are Parties or shall become Parties and which contain provisions on matters governed by this Convention and which ensure greater protection and assistance for victims of trafficking. 2. The Parties to the Convention may conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements with one another on the matters dealt with in this Convention, for purposes of supplementing or strengthening its provisions or facilitating the application of the principles embodied in it. 3. Parties which are members of the European Union shall, in their mutual relations, apply Community and European Union rules in so far as there are Community or European Union rules governing the particular subject concerned and applicable to the specific case, without prejudice to the object and purpose of the present Convention

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and without prejudice to its full application with other Parties. 4. Nothing in this Convention shall affect the rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law and, in particular, where applicable, the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees and the principle of non-refoulement as contained therein. Chapter IX—Amendments to the Convention Article 41—Amendments 1. Any proposal for an amendment to this Convention presented by a Party shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe and forwarded by him or her to the member States of the Council of Europe, any signatory, any State Party, the European Community, to any State invited to sign this Convention in accordance with the provisions of Article 42 and to any State invited to accede to this Convention in accordance with the provisions of Article 43. 2. Any amendment proposed by a Party shall be communicated to GRETA, which shall submit to the Committee of Ministers its opinion on that proposed amendment. 3. The Committee of Ministers shall consider the proposed amendment and the opinion submitted by GRETA and, following consultation of the Parties to this Convention and after obtaining their unanimous consent, may adopt the amendment. 4. The text of any amendment adopted by the Committee of Ministers in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article shall be forwarded to the Parties for acceptance. 5. Any amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article shall enter into force on

the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of one month after the date on which all Parties have informed the Secretary General that they have accepted it.

Note by the Secretariat: See the Declaration formulated by the European Community and the Member States of the European Union upon the adoption of the Convention by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, on 3 May 2005: “The European Community/European Union and its Member States reaffirm that their objective in requesting the inclusion of a ‘disconnection clause’ is to take account of the institutional structure of the Union when acceding to international conventions, in particular in case of transfer of sovereign powers from the Member States to the Community. This clause is not aimed at reducing the rights or increasing the obligations of a non-European Union Party vis-à-vis the European Community/European Union and its Member States, inasmuch as the latter are also parties to this Convention. The disconnection clause is necessary for those parts of the Convention which fall within the competence of the Community/Union, in order to indicate that European Union Member States cannot invoke and apply the rights and obligations deriving from the Convention directly among themselves (or between themselves and the European Community/Union). This does not detract from the fact that the Convention applies fully between the European Community/European Union and its Member States on the one hand, and the other Parties to the Convention, on the other; the Community and the European Union Members States will be bound by the Convention and will apply it like any Party to the Convention, if necessary, through Community/Union legislation. They will thus guarantee the full respect of the

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Convention’s provisions vis-à-vis non-European Union Parties.”

38. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 Human trafficking has become a lucrative business for organized crime. The United States has become determined to prevent and punish the perpetrators of this dastardly crime. The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 was passed by the 106th Congress of the United States on 28 October 2000. This legislation was enacted to combat human trafficking. The act is broken down into three divisions. Division A, “Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000,” establishes measures to prevent the trafficking of persons and to provide assistance to those victimized by this crime. Additionally, it sets forth prosecutorial measures to be taken against those involved in this activity. Section 111 addresses sanctions and penalties. The 108th Congress passed the Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 on 7 January 2003. The appropriated funds will continue to tackle the problem of human trafficking. Source U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10492.pdf.

Sec. 101. Short Title This division may be cited as the ‘Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000’. Sec. 102. Purposes and Findings (a) PURPOSES—The purposes of this division are to combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims. (b) FINDINGS—Congress finds that:

(1) As the 21st century begins, the degrading institution of slavery continues throughout the world. Trafficking in persons is a modern form of slavery, and it is the largest manifestation of slavery today. At least 700,000 persons annually, primarily women and children, are trafficked within or across international borders. Approximately 50,000 women and children are trafficked into the United States each year. (2) Many of these persons are trafficked into the international sex trade, often by force, fraud, or coercion. The sex industry has rapidly expanded over the past several decades. It involves sexual exploitation of persons, predominantly women and girls, involving activities related to prostitution, pornography, sex tourism, and other commercial sexual services. The low status of women in many parts of the world has contributed to a burgeoning of the trafficking industry. (3) Trafficking in persons is not limited to the sex industry. This growing transnational crime also includes forced labor and involves significant violations of labor, public health, and human rights standards worldwide. (4) Traffickers primarily target women and girls, who are disproportionately affected by poverty, the lack of access to education, chronic unemployment, discrimination, and the lack of economic opportunities in countries of origin. Traffickers lure women and girls into their networks through false promises of decent working conditions at relatively good pay as nannies, maids, dancers, factory workers, restaurant workers, sales clerks, or models. Traffickers also buy children from poor families and sell them into prostitution or into various types of forced or bonded labor. (5) Traffickers often transport victims from their home communities to unfamiliar destinations, including foreign countries away from family and friends, religious institutions, and other sources of protection and support, leaving the victims defenseless and vulnerable. (6) Victims are often forced through physical violence to engage in sex acts or perform slavery-like labor. Such force includes rape and other forms

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of sexual abuse, torture, starvation, imprisonment, threats, psychological abuse, and coercion. (7) Traffickers often make representations to their victims that physical harm may occur to them or others should the victim escape or attempt to escape. Such representations can have the same coercive effects on victims as direct threats to inflict such harm. (8) Trafficking in persons is increasingly perpetrated by organized, sophisticated criminal enterprises. Such trafficking is the fastest growing source of profits for organized criminal enterprises worldwide. Profits from the trafficking industry contribute to the expansion of organized crime in the United States and worldwide. Trafficking in persons is often aided by official corruption in countries of origin, transit, and destination, thereby threatening the rule of law. (9) Trafficking includes all the elements of the crime of forcible rape when it involves the involuntary participation of another person in sex acts by means of fraud, force, or coercion. (10) Trafficking also involves violations of other laws, including labor and immigration codes and laws against kidnapping, slavery, false imprisonment, assault, battery, pandering, fraud, and extortion. (11) Trafficking exposes victims to serious health risks. Women and children trafficked in the sex industry are exposed to deadly diseases, including HIV and AIDS. Trafficking victims are sometimes worked or physically brutalized to death. (12) Trafficking in persons substantially affects interstate and foreign commerce. Trafficking for such purposes as involuntary servitude, peonage, and other forms of forced labor has an impact on the nationwide employment network and labor market. Within the context of slavery, servitude, and labor or services which are obtained or maintained through coercive conduct that amounts to a condition of servitude, victims are subjected to a range of violations. (13) Involuntary servitude statutes are intended to reach cases in which persons are held in a condition of servitude through nonviolent coercion.

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

(19)

In United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), the Supreme Court found that section 1584 of title 18, United States Code, should be narrowly interpreted, absent a definition of involuntary servitude by Congress. As a result, that section was interpreted to criminalize only servitude that is brought about through use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion, and to exclude other conduct that can have the same purpose and effect. Existing legislation and law enforcement in the United States and other countries are inadequate to deter trafficking and bring traffickers to justice, failing to reflect the gravity of the offenses involved. No comprehensive law exists in the United States that penalizes the range of offenses involved in the trafficking scheme. Instead, even the most brutal instances of trafficking in the sex industry are often punished under laws that also apply to lesser offenses, so that traffickers typically escape deserved punishment. In the United States, the seriousness of this crime and its components is not reflected in current sentencing guidelines, resulting in weak penalties for convicted traffickers. In some countries, enforcement against traffickers is also hindered by official indifference, by corruption, and sometimes even by official participation in trafficking. Existing laws often fail to protect victims of trafficking, and because victims are often illegal immigrants in the destination country, they are repeatedly punished more harshly than the traffickers themselves. Additionally, adequate services and facilities do not exist to meet victims’ needs regarding health care, housing, education, and legal assistance, which safely reintegrate trafficking victims into their home countries. Victims of severe forms of trafficking should not be inappropriately incarcerated, fined, or otherwise penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked, such as using false documents, entering the country

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without documentation, or working without documentation. (20) Because victims of trafficking are frequently unfamiliar with the laws, cultures, and languages of the countries into which they have been trafficked, because they are often subjected to coercion and intimidation including physical detention and debt bondage, and because they often fear retribution and forcible removal to countries in which they will face retribution or other hardship, these victims often find it difficult or impossible to report the crimes committed against them or to assist in the investigation and prosecution of such crimes. (21) Trafficking of persons is an evil requiring concerted and vigorous action by countries of origin, transit or destination, and by international organizations. (22) One of the founding documents of the United States, the Declaration of Independence, recognizes the inherent dignity and worth of all people. It states that all men are created equal and that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights. The right to be free from slavery and involuntary servitude is among those unalienable rights. Acknowledging this fact, the United States outlawed slavery and involuntary servitude in 1865, recognizing them as evil institutions that must be abolished. Current practices of sexual slavery and trafficking of women and children are similarly abhorrent to the principles upon which the United States was founded. (23) The United States and the international community agree that trafficking in persons involves grave violations of human rights and is a matter of pressing international concern. The international community has repeatedly condemned slavery and involuntary servitude, violence against women, and other elements of trafficking, through declarations, treaties, and United Nations resolutions and reports, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and

Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery; the 1948 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man; the 1957 Abolition of Forced Labor Convention; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 50/167, 51/66, and 52/98; the Final Report of the World Congress against Sexual Exploitation of Children (Stockholm, 1996); the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995); and the 1991 Moscow Document of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. (24) Trafficking in persons is a transnational crime with national implications. To deter international trafficking and bring its perpetrators to justice, nations including the United States must recognize that trafficking is a serious offense. This is done by prescribing appropriate punishment, giving priority to the prosecution of trafficking offenses, and protecting rather than punishing the victims of such offenses. The United States must work bilaterally and multilaterally to abolish the trafficking industry by taking steps to promote cooperation among countries linked together by international trafficking routes. The United States must also urge the international community to take strong action in multilateral fora to engage recalcitrant countries in serious and sustained efforts to eliminate trafficking and protect trafficking victims.

Sec. 103. Definitions In this division: (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES—The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. (2) COERCION—The term ‘coercion’ means—

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(A) threats of serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; (B) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; or (C) the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process. (3) COMMERCIAL SEX ACT—The term ‘commercial sex act’ means any sex act on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person. (4) DEBT BONDAGE—The term ‘debt bondage’ means the status or condition of a debtor arising from a pledge by the debtor of his or her personal services or of those of a person under his or her control as a security for debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied toward the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined. (5) INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE—The term ‘involuntary servitude’ includes a condition of servitude induced by means of— (A) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that, if the person did not enter into or continue in such condition, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or (B) the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process.

(6) MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF TRAFFICKING—The term ‘minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking’ means the standards set forth in section 108. (7) NONHUMANITARIAN, NONTRADERELATED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE—The term ‘nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance’ means— (A) any assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, other than— (i) assistance under chapter 4 of part II of that Act that is made available for any program, project, or activity eligible for assistance under chapter 1 of part I of that Act; (ii) assistance under chapter 8 of part I of that Act; (iii) any other narcotics-related assistance under part I of that Act or under chapter 4 or 5 part II of that Act, but any such assistance provided under this clause shall be subject to the prior notification procedures applicable to reprogrammings pursuant to section 634A of that Act; (iv) disaster relief assistance, including any assistance under chapter 9 of part I of that Act; (v) antiterrorism assistance under chapter 8 of part II of that Act; (vi) assistance for refugees; (vii) humanitarian and other development assistance in support of programs of nongovernmental organizations under chapters 1 and 10 of that Act; (viii) programs under title IV of chapter 2 of part I of that Act, relating to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation; and (ix) other programs involving trade-related or humanitarian assistance; and

(B) sales, or financing on any terms, under the Arms Export Control Act, other than sales or financing provided for narcotics-related purposes following notification in accordance with the prior notification procedures applicable to reprogrammings pursuant to section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. (8) SEVERE FORMS OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS—The term ‘severe forms of trafficking in persons’ means— (A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or

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(B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. (9) SEX TRAFFICKING—The term ‘sex trafficking’ means the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act. (10) STATE—The term ‘State’ means each of the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and territories and possessions of the United States. (11) TASK FORCE—The term ‘Task Force’ means the Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking established under section 105. (12) UNITED STATES—The term ‘United States’ means the fifty States of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the territories and possessions of the United States. (13) VICTIM OF A SEVERE FORM OF TRAFFICKING—The term ‘victim of a severe form of trafficking’ means a person subject to an act or practice described in paragraph (8). (14) VICTIM OF TRAFFICKING—The term ‘victim of trafficking’ means a person subjected to an act or practice described in paragraph (8) or (9).

(b) APPOINTMENT—The President shall appoint the members of the Task Force, which shall include the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of Central Intelligence, and such other officials as may be designated by the President. (c) CHAIRMAN—The Task Force shall be chaired by the Secretary of State. (d) ACTIVITIES OF THE TASK FORCE—The Task Force shall carry out the following activities:

[. . .] Sec. 105. Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking (a) ESTABLISHMENT—The President shall establish an Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking.

(1) Coordinate the implementation of this division. (2) Measure and evaluate progress of the United States and other countries in the areas of trafficking prevention, protection, and assistance to victims of trafficking, and prosecution and enforcement against traffickers, including the role of public corruption in facilitating trafficking. The Task Force shall have primary responsibility for assisting the Secretary of State in the preparation of the reports described in section 110. (3) Expand interagency procedures to collect and organize data, including significant research and resource information on domestic and international trafficking. Any data collection procedures established under this subsection shall respect the confidentiality of victims of trafficking. (4) Engage in efforts to facilitate cooperation among countries of origin, transit, and destination. Such efforts shall aim to strengthen local and regional capacities to prevent trafficking, prosecute traffickers and assist trafficking victims, and shall include initiatives to enhance cooperative efforts between destination countries and countries of origin and assist in the appropriate reintegration of stateless victims of trafficking. (5) Examine the role of the international ‘sex tourism’ industry in the trafficking of persons and in the sexual exploitation of women and children around the world.

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(6) Engage in consultation and advocacy with governmental and nongovernmental organizations, among other entities, to advance the purposes of this division.

(e) SUPPORT FOR THE TASK FORCE—The Secretary of State is authorized to establish within the Department of State an Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking, which shall provide assistance to the Task Force. Any such Office shall be headed by a Director. The Director shall have the primary responsibility for assisting the Secretary of State in carrying out the purposes of this division and may have additional responsibilities as determined by the Secretary. The Director shall consult with nongovernmental organizations and multilateral organizations, and with trafficking victims or other affected persons. The Director shall have the authority to take evidence in public hearings or by other means. The agencies represented on the Task Force are authorized to provide staff to the Office on a nonreimbursable basis. Sec. 106. Prevention of Trafficking (a) ECONOMIC ALTERNATIVES TO PREVENT AND DETER TRAFFICKING—The President shall establish and carry out international initiatives to enhance economic opportunity for potential victims of trafficking as a method to deter trafficking. Such initiatives may include— (1) microcredit lending programs, training in business development, skills training, and job counseling; (2) programs to promote women’s participation in economic decisionmaking; (3) programs to keep children, especially girls, in elementary and secondary schools, and to educate persons who have been victims of trafficking; (4) development of educational curricula regarding the dangers of trafficking; and (5) grants to nongovernmental organizations to accelerate and advance the political, economic, social, and educational roles and capacities of women in their countries.

(b) PUBLIC AWARENESS AND INFORMATION—The President, acting through the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of State, shall establish and carry out programs to increase public awareness, particularly among potential victims of trafficking, of the dangers of trafficking and the protections that are available for victims of trafficking. (c) CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT—The President shall consult with appropriate nongovernmental organizations with respect to the establishment and conduct of initiatives described in subsections (a) and (b). Sec. 107. Protection and Assistance for Victims of Trafficking (a) Assistance for Victims in Other Countries— (1) IN GENERAL—The Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, in consultation with appropriate nongovernmental organizations, shall establish and carry out programs and initiatives in foreign countries to assist in the safe integration, reintegration, or resettlement, as appropriate, of victims of trafficking. Such programs and initiatives shall be designed to meet the appropriate assistance needs of such persons and their children, as identified by the Task Force. (2) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT—In establishing and conducting programs and initiatives described in paragraph (1), the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall take all appropriate steps to enhance cooperative efforts among foreign countries, including countries of origin of victims of trafficking, to assist in the integration, reintegration, or resettlement, as appropriate, of victims of trafficking, including stateless victims.

(b) Victims in the United States— (1) ASSISTANCE—

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(A) ELIGIBILITY FOR BENEFITS AND SERVICES—Notwithstanding title IV of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, an alien who is a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons shall be eligible for benefits and services under any Federal or State program or activity funded or administered by any official or agency described in subparagraph (B) to the same extent as an alien who is admitted to the United States as a refugee under section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. (B) REQUIREMENT TO EXPAND BENEFITS AND SERVICES—Subject to subparagraph (C) and, in the case of nonentitlement programs, to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Labor, the Board of Directors of the Legal Services Corporation, and the heads of other Federal agencies shall expand benefits and services to victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons in the United States, without regard to the immigration status of such victims. (C) DEFINITION OF VICTIM OF A SEVERE FORM OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS— For the purposes of this paragraph, the term ‘victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons’ means only a person— (i) who has been subjected to an act or practice described in section 103(8) as in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act; and (ii) (I) who has not attained 18 years of age; or (II) who is the subject of a certification under subparagraph (E).

(D) ANNUAL REPORT—Not later than December 31 of each year, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consultation with the Secretary of Labor, the Board of Directors of the Legal Services Corporation, and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies shall submit a report, which includes information on the number of persons who received benefits or other services under this paragraph in connection with programs or activities funded or administered by such

agencies or officials during the preceding fiscal year, to the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on International Relations, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate. (E) CERTIFICATION— (i) IN GENERAL—Subject to clause (ii), the certification referred to in subparagraph (C) is a certification by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, after consultation with the Attorney General, that the person referred to in subparagraph (C)(ii)(II)—(I) is willing to assist in every reasonable way in the investigation and prosecution of severe forms of trafficking in persons; and (II)(aa) has made a bona fide application for a visa under section 101(a)(15)(T) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by subsection (e), that has not been denied; or (bb) is a person whose continued presence in the United States the Attorney General is ensuring in order to effectuate prosecution of traffickers in persons. (ii) PERIOD OF EFFECTIVENESS—A certification referred to in subparagraph (C), with respect to a person described in clause (i)(II)(bb), shall be effective only for so long as the Attorney General determines that the continued presence of such person is necessary to effectuate prosecution of traffickers in persons. (iii) INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION DEFINED—For the purpose of a certification under this subparagraph, the term ‘investigation and prosecution’ includes—(I) identification of a person or persons who have committed severe forms of trafficking in persons; (II) location and apprehension of such persons; and (III) testimony at proceedings against such persons.

(2) GRANTS— (A) IN GENERAL—Subject to the availability of appropriations, the Attorney General may make grants to States, Indian tribes, units of local government, and nonprofit, nongovernmental victims’ service organizations to develop, expand, or strengthen victim service programs for victims of trafficking.

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(B) ALLOCATION OF GRANT FUNDS—Of amounts made available for grants under this paragraph, there shall be set aside— (i) three percent for research, evaluation, and statistics; (ii) two percent for training and technical assistance; and (iii) one percent for management and administration.

(C) LIMITATION ON FEDERAL SHARE— The Federal share of a grant made under this paragraph may not exceed 75 percent of the total costs of the projects described in the application submitted.

(c) TRAFFICKING VICTIM REGULATIONS— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General and the Secretary of State shall promulgate regulations for law enforcement personnel, immigration officials, and Department of State officials to implement the following: (1) PROTECTIONS WHILE IN CUSTODY— Victims of severe forms of trafficking, while in the custody of the Federal Government and to the extent practicable, shall— (A) not be detained in facilities inappropriate to their status as crime victims; (B) receive necessary medical care and other assistance; and (C) be provided protection if a victim’s safety is at risk or if there is danger of additional harm by recapture of the victim by a trafficker, including— (i) taking measures to protect trafficked persons and their family members from intimidation and threats of reprisals and reprisals from traffickers and their associates; and (ii) ensuring that the names and identifying information of trafficked persons and their family members are not disclosed to the public.

(2) ACCESS TO INFORMATION—Victims of severe forms of trafficking shall have access to information about their rights and translation services.

(3) AUTHORITY TO PERMIT CONTINUED PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES— Federal law enforcement officials may permit an alien individual’s continued presence in the United States, if after an assessment, it is determined that such individual is a victim of a severe form of trafficking and a potential witness to such trafficking, in order to effectuate prosecution of those responsible, and such officials in investigating and prosecuting traffickers shall protect the safety of trafficking victims, including taking measures to protect trafficked persons and their family members from intimidation, threats of reprisals, and reprisals from traffickers and their associates. (4) TRAINING OF GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL—Appropriate personnel of the Department of State and the Department of Justice shall be trained in identifying victims of severe forms of trafficking and providing for the protection of such victims.

(d) CONSTRUCTION—Nothing in subsection (c) shall be construed as creating any private cause of action against the United States or its officers or employees. (e) PROTECTION FROM REMOVAL FOR CERTAIN CRIME VICTIMS— (1) IN GENERAL—Section 101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)) is amended— (A) by striking ‘or’ at the end of subparagraph (R); (B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (S) and inserting ‘; or’; and (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ’(T)(i) subject to section 214(n), an alien who the Attorney General determines—’(I) is or has been a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons, as defined in section 103 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, ’(II) is physically present in the United States, American Samoa, or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or at a port of entry thereto, on account of such trafficking, ’(III)(aa) has complied with any reasonable

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request for assistance in the investigation or prosecution of acts of trafficking, or ’(bb) has not attained 15 years of age, and ’(IV) the alien would suffer extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm upon removal; and ’(ii) if the Attorney General considers it necessary to avoid extreme hardship—’(I) in the case of an alien described in clause (i) who is under 21 years of age, the spouse, children, and parents of such alien; and ’(II) in the case of an alien described in clause (i) who is 21 years of age or older, the spouse and children of such alien, if accompanying, or following to join, the alien described in clause (i)’.

(2) CONDITIONS OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS—Section 214 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1184) is amended— (A) by redesignating the subsection (l) added by section 625(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–208; 110 Stat. 3009– 1820) as subsection (m); and (B) by adding at the end the following: ‘(n)(1) No alien shall be eligible for admission to the United States under section 101(a)(15)(T) if there is substantial reason to believe that the alien has committed an act of a severe form of trafficking in persons (as defined in section 103 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000). ‘(2) The total number of aliens who may be issued visas or otherwise provided nonimmigrant status during any fiscal year under section 101(a)(15)(T) may not exceed 5,000. ‘(3) The numerical limitation of paragraph (2) shall only apply to principal aliens and not to the spouses, sons, daughters, or parents of such aliens’.

(3) WAIVER OF GROUNDS FOR INELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION—Section 212(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ‘(13)(A) The Attorney General shall determine whether a ground for inadmissibility exists with respect to a nonimmigrant described in section 101(a)(15)(T). ‘(B) In addition to any other waiver that may be available under this section, in the case of a nonimmigrant described in section 101(a)(15)(T), if the Attorney

General considers it to be in the national interest to do so, the Attorney General, in the Attorney General’s discretion, may waive the application of—’(i) paragraphs (1) and (4) of subsection (a); and ’(ii) any other provision of such subsection (excluding paragraphs (3), (10)(C), and (10(E)) if the activities rendering the alien inadmissible under the provision were caused by, or were incident to, the victimization described in section 101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I)’. (4) DUTIES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WITH RESPECT TO ‘T’ VISA NONIMMIGRANTS—Section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ‘(i) With respect to each nonimmigrant alien described in subsection (a)(15)(T)(i)— ’(1) the Attorney General and other Government officials, where appropriate, shall provide the alien with a referral to a nongovernmental organization that would advise the alien regarding the alien’s options while in the United States and the resources available to the alien; and ’(2) the Attorney General shall, during the period the alien is in lawful temporary resident status under that subsection, grant the alien authorization to engage in employment in the United States and provide the alien with an ‘employment authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate work permit’.

(5) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION—Nothing in this section, or in the amendments made by this section, shall be construed as prohibiting the Attorney General from instituting removal proceedings under section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1229a) against an alien admitted as a nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)(T)(i) of that Act, as added by subsection (e), for conduct committed after the alien’s admission into the United States, or for conduct or a condition that was not disclosed to the Attorney General prior to the alien’s admission as a nonimmigrant under such section 101(a)(15)(T)(i).

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(f) ADJUSTMENT TO PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS—Section 245 of such Act (8 U.S.C 1255) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ‘(l)(1) If, in the opinion of the Attorney General, a nonimmigrant admitted into the United States under section 101(a)(15)(T)(i)— ‘(A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of at least 3 years since the date of admission as a nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)(T)(i), ‘(B) has, throughout such period, been a person of good moral character, and ‘(C)(i) has, during such period, complied with any reasonable request for assistance in the investigation or prosecution of acts of trafficking, or ‘(ii) the alien would suffer extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm upon removal from the United States, the Attorney General may adjust the status of the alien (and any person admitted under that section as the spouse, parent, or child of the alien) to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

‘(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an alien admitted under section 101(a)(15)(T) who is inadmissible to the United States by reason of a ground that has not been waived under section 212, except that, if the Attorney General considers it to be in the national interest to do so, the Attorney General, in the Attorney General’s discretion, may waive the application of— ‘(A) paragraphs (1) and (4) of section 212(a); and ‘(B) any other provision of such section (excluding paragraphs (3), (10)(C), and (10(E)), if the activities rendering the alien inadmissible under the provision were caused by, or were incident to, the victimization described in section 101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I). ‘(2) An alien shall be considered to have failed to maintain continuous physical presence in the United States under paragraph (1)(A) if the alien has departed from the United States for any period in excess of 90 days or for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 days.

‘(3)(A) The total number of aliens whose status may be adjusted under paragraph (1) during any fiscal year may not exceed 5,000. ‘(B) The numerical limitation of subparagraph (A) shall only apply to principal aliens and not to the spouses, sons, daughters, or parents of such aliens. ’(4) Upon the approval of adjustment of status under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall record the alien’s lawful admission for permanent residence as of the date of such approval’.

(g) ANNUAL REPORTS—On or before October 31 of each year, the Attorney General shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees setting forth, with respect to the preceding fiscal year, the number, if any, of otherwise eligible applicants who did not receive visas under section 101(a)(15)(T) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by subsection (e), or who were unable to adjust their status under section 245(l) of such Act, solely on account of the unavailability of visas due to a limitation imposed by section 214(n)(1) or 245(l)(4)(A) of such Act. Sec. 108. Minimum Standards for the Elimination of Trafficking (a) MINIMUM STANDARDS—For purposes of this division, the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking applicable to the government of a country of origin, transit, or destination for a significant number of victims of severe forms of trafficking are the following: (1) The government of the country should prohibit severe forms of trafficking in persons and punish acts of such trafficking. (2) For the knowing commission of any act of sex trafficking involving force, fraud, coercion, or in which the victim of sex trafficking is a child incapable of giving meaningful consent, or of trafficking which includes rape or kidnapping or which causes a death, the government of the country should prescribe punishment commensurate with

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sons charged with other serious crimes (or, to the extent such extradition would be inconsistent with the laws of such country or with international agreements to which the country is a party, whether the government is taking all appropriate measures to modify or replace such laws and treaties so as to permit such extradition). (6) Whether the government of the country monitors immigration and emigration patterns for evidence of severe forms of trafficking in persons and whether law enforcement agencies of the country respond to any such evidence in a manner that is consistent with the vigorous investigation and prosecution of acts of such trafficking, as well as with the protection of human rights of victims and the internationally recognized human right to leave any country, including one’s own, and to return to one’s own country. (7) Whether the government of the country vigorously investigates and prosecutes public officials who participate in or facilitate severe forms of trafficking in persons, and takes all appropriate measures against officials who condone such trafficking.

that for grave crimes, such as forcible sexual assault. (3) For the knowing commission of any act of a severe form of trafficking in persons, the government of the country should prescribe punishment that is sufficiently stringent to deter and that adequately reflects the heinous nature of the offense. (4) The government of the country should make serious and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons.

(b) CRITERIA—In determinations under subsection (a)(4), the following factors should be considered as indicia of serious and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons: (1) Whether the government of the country vigorously investigates and prosecutes acts of severe forms of trafficking in persons that take place wholly or partly within the territory of the country. (2) Whether the government of the country protects victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons and encourages their assistance in the investigation and prosecution of such trafficking, including provisions for legal alternatives to their removal to countries in which they would face retribution or hardship, and ensures that victims are not inappropriately incarcerated, fined, or otherwise penalized solely for unlawful acts as a direct result of being trafficked. (3) Whether the government of the country has adopted measures to prevent severe forms of trafficking in persons, such as measures to inform and educate the public, including potential victims, about the causes and consequences of severe forms of trafficking in persons. (4) Whether the government of the country cooperates with other governments in the investigation and prosecution of severe forms of trafficking in persons. (5) Whether the government of the country extradites persons charged with acts of severe forms of trafficking in persons on substantially the same terms and to substantially the same extent as per-

[. . .] Sec. 111. Actions against Significant Traffickers in Persons (a) AUTHORITY TO SANCTION SIGNIFICANT TRAFFICKERS IN PERSONS— (1) IN GENERAL—The President may exercise the authorities set forth in section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) without regard to section 202 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) in the case of any of the following persons: (A) Any foreign person that plays a significant role in a severe form of trafficking in persons, directly or indirectly in the United States. (B) Foreign persons that materially assist in, or provide financial or technological support for or to, or provide goods or services in support of, activities of a significant foreign trafficker

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in persons identified pursuant to subparagraph (A). (C) Foreign persons that are owned, controlled, or directed by, or acting for or on behalf of, a significant foreign trafficker identified pursuant to subparagraph (A). (2) PENALTIES—The penalties set forth in section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) apply to violations of any license, order, or regulation issued under this section.

(b) REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IDENTIFICATION AND SANCTIONING OF SIGNIFICANT TRAFFICKERS IN PERSONS— (1) IN GENERAL—Upon exercising the authority of subsection (a), the President shall report to the appropriate congressional committees— (A) identifying publicly the foreign persons that the President determines are appropriate for sanctions pursuant to this section and the basis for such determination; and (B) detailing publicly the sanctions imposed pursuant to this section. (2) REMOVAL OF SANCTIONS—Upon suspending or terminating any action imposed under the authority of subsection (a), the President shall report to the committees described in paragraph (1) on such suspension or termination. (3) SUBMISSION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION—Reports submitted under this subsection may include an annex with classified information regarding the basis for the determination made by the President under paragraph (1)(A).

(c) LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES NOT AFFECTED—Nothing in this section prohibits or otherwise limits the authorized law enforcement or intelligence activities of the United States, or the law enforcement activities of any State or subdivision thereof. (d) EXCLUSION OF PERSONS WHO HAVE BENEFITED FROM ILLICIT ACTIVITIES OF TRAFFICKERS IN PERSONS—Section

212(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)) is amended by inserting at the end the following new subparagraph: ’(H) SIGNIFICANT TRAFFICKERS IN PERSONS— ‘(i) IN GENERAL—Any alien who is listed in a report submitted pursuant to section 111(b) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, or who the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe is or has been a knowing aider, abettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with such a trafficker in severe forms of trafficking in persons, as defined in the section 103 of such Act, is inadmissible. ‘(ii) BENEFICIARIES OF TRAFFICKING— Except as provided in clause (iii), any alien who the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe is the spouse, son, or daughter of an alien inadmissible under clause (i), has, within the previous 5 years, obtained any financial or other benefit from the illicit activity of that alien, and knew or reasonably should have known that the financial or other benefit was the product of such illicit activity, is inadmissible. ‘(iii) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN SONS AND DAUGHTERS—Clause (ii) shall not apply to a son or daughter who was a child at the time he or she received the benefit described in such clause’.

(e) IMPLEMENTATION— (1) DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY—The President may delegate any authority granted by this section, including the authority to designate foreign persons under paragraphs (1)(B) and (1)(C) of subsection (a). (2) PROMULGATION OF RULES AND REGULATIONS—The head of any agency, including the Secretary of Treasury, is authorized to take such actions as may be necessary to carry out any authority delegated by the President pursuant to

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‘(1) by threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against, that person or another person; ‘(2) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if the person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or ‘(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If death results from the violation of this section, or if the violation includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or the attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both.

paragraph (1), including promulgating rules and regulations. (3) OPPORTUNITY FOR REVIEW—Such rules and regulations shall include procedures affording an opportunity for a person to be heard in an expeditious manner, either in person or through a representative, for the purpose of seeking changes to or termination of any determination, order, designation or other action associated with the exercise of the authority in subsection (a).

(f ) DEFINITION OF FOREIGN PERSONS—In this section, the term ‘foreign person’ means any citizen or national of a foreign state or any entity not organized under the laws of the United States, including a foreign government official, but does not include a foreign state. (g) CONSTRUCTION—Nothing in this section shall be construed as precluding judicial review of the exercise of the authority described in subsection (a).

‘Sec. 1590. Trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor ‘Whoever knowingly recruits, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means, any person for labor or services in violation of this chapter shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If death results from the violation of this section, or if the violation includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or the attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both.

Sec. 112. Strengthening Prosecution and Punishment of Traffickers (a) TITLE 18 AMENDMENTS—Chapter 77 of title 18, United States Code, is amended— (1) in each of sections 1581(a), 1583, and 1584— (A) by striking ‘10 years’ and inserting ‘20 years’; and (B) by adding at the end the following: ‘If death results from the violation of this section, or if the violation includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or the attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both.’; (2) by inserting at the end the following: ’Sec. 1589.

‘Sec. 1591. Sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud or coercion

Forced labor

‘Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person—

‘(a) Whoever knowingly— ‘(1) in or affecting interstate commerce, recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means a person; or ‘(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1), knowing that force, fraud, or coercion

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described in subsection (c)(2) will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). ‘(b) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) is— ‘(1) if the offense was effected by force, fraud, or coercion or if the person transported had not attained the age of 14 years at the time of such offense, by a fine under this title or imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or both; or ‘(2) if the offense was not so effected, and the person transported had attained the age of 14 years but had not attained the age of 18 years at the time of such offense, by a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both.

‘(c) In this section: ‘(1) The term ‘commercial sex act’ means any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person. ‘(2) The term ‘coercion’ means— ‘(A) threats of serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; ‘(B) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; or ‘(C) the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process.

‘(3) The term ‘venture’ means any group of two or more individuals associated in fact, whether or not a legal entity.

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Index Page ranges for main entries appear in boldface type. 14K, 68, 466 419 frauds, 62, 139, 242 “A Way Home” program, 397 (photo) Abadinsky, Howard, 45, 46–47 Abrego, Juan Garcia, 461 Abu Sayaff Group, 366 Abutol, Assie, 450 Abutol, Felix, 450 Adair, Johnny (“Mad Dog”), 147 Adler, Patricia, 174 Adler, Peter, 174 Afghan Service Bureau (Maktab alKhalimat), 350–351 Afghanistan, 103, 104, 282, 303, 304–305, 329–330, 339–340, 350–351, 367 Counter-Narcotics Law of, 603– 618Doc. Africa arms trafficking in, 64–65 Central and South Africa, 63–64 consumer demand for cocaine in, 325 drug trafficking in, 62–63, 324 East Africa, 60–61 heroin use in, 328 political chaos in, 64–65 transnational organized crime in, 2, 56, 60–66, 307 West Africa, 61–63 wildlife poaching in, 65 See also specific African countries African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003), 473–481Doc. Afwâj al-Muqâwmat al-Lubnâniyya (AMAL), 205 Agir pour les Femmes En Situation Précaire (AFESIP), 108 Agron, Evsei, 150 Albanese, Jay, 53, 63

Albania, 79, 82, 83, 115, 163, 181, 247, 367, 449–450 Albanian Mafia, 449–450 Alfieri, Carmine, 463 al Hassanein, Fatih, 87 Al-Kausar, 301 (photo) Alperon, Moshe, 450 Alperon, Musa, 450–451 Alperon, Nissim, 450 Alperon, Ya’akov, 450 Alperon crime organization, 450–451 al-Qaeda, 58, 64, 87, 103, 205, 305, 336, 344, 345 and nuclear weapons, 350–357 Al-Qaeda Connection, The (P. L. Williams), 354 al-Shaheed, 257 al Turabi, Hasan, 87 al-Watan al-Arabi, 351 al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 351, 352 (photo) American Mafia. See La Cosa Nostra Amezcua-Contreras, Adan, 334 Amezcua-Contreras, Jesus, 334 Amezcua-Contreras, Luis, 334 Amezcua Organization, 139 Amir, M., 34 Amsterdam Treaty on the European Union (1999), 119 Amuso, Vittorio, 12 Anastasia, Albert, 11, 198 Anastasia, Anthony, 198 Andabak, Ivan, 87 Andreano, R., 38 Anguilla, 94, 244 Annan, Kofi, 295 “Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces” (National Intelligence Council), 355–356

Ansara, Michael, 202 Anslinger, Harry J., 14 Antigua and Barbuda, 94 Antioquia Rebelde, 281 Anti-Slavery International, 167 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (1996), 444 Arellano-Felix, Benjamin, 333, 461 Arellano-Felix, Eduardo, 333, 334 Arellano-Felix, Javier, 333, 334, 461, 462 Arellano-Felix, Ramon, 333, 461 Argentina, xvii, 133, 134, 135, 156–157, 160 Arlacchi, P., 38, 373 Arms trafficking, 31–32, 297, 303–305 in Africa, 64–65 in the Caribbean, 94 and drug trafficking, 339 in Europe, 117 gray market arms trafficking, 304 nuclear trafficking in Russia, 313–314 in South America, 160–161 trading arms for diamonds (“blood diamonds”), 65 trading arms for drugs, 304–305 of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 32–33 Art Loss Register, 223 Aruba, 94–95 Aryan Brotherhood, 52 (photo) ASEAN Regional Forum (ASF), 443 Ashdown, Paddy, 86 Asia consumer demand for cocaine in, 325– 326 drug trafficking in, 324–325 and the global sex industry, 306–307 transnational organized crime in, xvi, 1– 2, 56–58, 66–71

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Index

See also East Asia; Middle East; specific Asian countries Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), 393 Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 393 Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, 248 Asian gangs, 451 Asset Recovery Agency, 148 Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property (Adepi), 156 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 443 Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, 638–643Doc. Australia, 237, 271, 443 cannabis production in, 75 Criminal Code Act (1995), 643– 648Doc. drug trafficking in, 74–77, 78 human smuggling and trafficking in, 77– 78 law enforcement efforts against, 77, 77– 78 transnational organized crime in, 3, 58, 74–78 Australian Crime Commission (ACC), 77, 404–406, 430 corporate structure of, 404 creation of, 404 investigative powers of, 404 operations of, 404–407 Australian Customs Service (ACS), 77 Australian Federal Police (AFP), 77 Azerbaijani groups, 451–452 Azzam, Abdallah, 351 Babbar Khalsa International (BKI), 365 Bach, William, 142 Bahamas, 95, 249, 254, 255 Balkan crime groups, 452 Balkans, xvi, 304, 307 ethnic diversity of, 79–80 implications of for regional security, 82– 83 strategic geographical position of, 79 transnational organized crime in, 78–83 See also specific Balkan countries Bamboo Union Gangs, 70 Banco Ambrosiano, 247, 251 Bandidos, 214 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), 247, 251 Bank fraud, 271–273 desperate dealing, 271 embezzlement, 272 forgery, 271–272 Bank for International Settlements, 246

Bank of New York, 150 Bank secrecy jurisdictions, 247, 249–251 illegal functions of, 250 legal functions of, 251 and offshore banking, 249 and organized crime, 249–251 worldwide locations of, 249–250 Bank Security Act (BSA) (1970), 420 Bankruptcy fraud, 228–229 Banzer, Hugo, 133 Barakat, Assad Ahmad, 160 Barbados, 95 Barbara, Joseph, 15 Barbarossa, Aruch, 6 Barkan, Steve, 18 Barksdale, David, 453 Barros, Ademar de, 90 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 243, 244 Basque Fatherland and Liberty. See ETA Basque Separatists. See ETA Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 42 Bastille, the, 4 Beare, M. E., 373–374 Beck, Dave, 200, 201 Becker, Howard, 174–175 Bellomo, Librorio (“Barney”), 12 Bender, D. L., 97 Berger, Ronald, 18 Bermomeu, J., 371 Bermuda, 249, 253, 254 Bernal-Madrigal, “Juvenal,” 187 Bet Costa Rica International Sportsbook website, 290 Big Circle Boys, 452 Billings, R. N., 24 Bin Laden (Bodansky), 354 bin Laden, Osama, 87, 346, 351, 352 (photo), 355, 364 Bioff, William, 199 Black, J., 211 Black, Sonny, 217 Black Gangster Disciples, 453 Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE) system, 257 Black markets, 371–374 distinct features of, 373 MacKenzie’s grouping of, 373 nature and extent of, 371–373 reasons for their emergence and consolidation, 371 role of corruption, violence, and the legal sector in, 373–374 why caution is needed in estimating the size of, 372 Black Sox Scandal, 203 Blackshaw, R. E., 210 Blair, Bruce, 353 Blair, Tony, 433 (photo)

Blake, Duane, 459 Blakely, G. Robert, 24, 216, 217 Block, Alan, 10, 38 Bloods, 458 Bodansky, Yossef, 354 Boesky, Ivan, 266 Boiler Room, 268 Bolivia, xvi, xvii, 2, 59, 133, 135 drug trafficking in, 318–322 Bonanno, Joe, 13 Bonaparte, Charles, 418 Bonilla, Rodrigo Lara, 186 Booth, Martin, 456–457 Born to Kill, 453 Boryokudan. See Yakuza Bosnia, 82, 367 and the political-criminal nexus, 84–88 Bosnian Investment Organization (BIO), 87–88 Bosnian Party of Democratic Action (SDA), 84, 86, 87, 88 Boucher, Richard, 108 Bout, Victor, 368 Bovenkerk, Frank, 19 Brancato, Joseph, 12 Brazil, xvii, 63, 133, 134–135, 155–156, 160, 304, 307 illicit lottery (jogo do bicho [animal game]) of, 88–93, 134 See also Global cocaine trade British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 159–160 British Virgin Islands, 95, 249 Brighton Beach (New York), 460–461 Brown, George, 199 Broz, Josip. See Tito Bruno, A., 130 Brunwasser, M., 64 Bubiana Conservancy, 65 Buchalter, Louis (“Lepke”), 23, 198, 199, 199 (photo) Buenos Aires Declaration on Prevention and Control of Organized Transnational Crime (1995), 376 Bulgaria, 118 Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), 43, 45 Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), 144, 396 Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC), 415 Bureau of Internal Revenue, 415 Burkina Faso, 165 Burma, 189, 308 Bush, George H. W., 296 (photo) Bush, George W., 24, 288, 346, 378 (photo), 421 (photo), 442 Business Software Alliance (BSA), 264 Buss, Robin, 27

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Camacho, Marcos, 132 Camarana, Enrique, 333, 461 Cambodia, 69, 308, 454 child sex trafficking in, 107–110 Cambodian crime groups, 453–454 Cameron, Gavin, 352 Camorra, xvi, 1, 8–9, 360, 444, 462–463 etymology of the word camorra, 8 Camp, Dave, 440 Canada. See also Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada (CISC) Aboriginal-based criminal groups in, 141, 449 transnational organized crime in, 2, 59, 140–141 Canadian Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, 239 Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), 406–408 historical background of, 406 and the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC), 408 responsibilities of, 407–408 structure of, 406–407 Cannon, Howard, 202 Capone, Al, 10, 15, 21 (photo), 22, 36, 46, 199, 371, 450 Capone Louis, 199 (photo) Caracappa, Stephen, 171–172 Cardenas-Guillen, Osiel, 334 Carey, Ron, 202 Caribbean arms trafficking in, 94 drug trafficking in, 93, 97 human trafficking in, 94 money laundering in, 93 tax havens in, 254 transnational organized crime in, xvii, 2, 93–96 See also specific Caribbean countries Caribbean Anti-Money Laundering Program, 409 Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), 408–409 membership of, 408 Carlos Castano organization, 155 Caro-Quintero, Genaro, 334 Caro-Quintero, Jorge, 334 Caro-Quintero, Miguel, 334 Caro-Quintero, Rafael, 334 Carradore, Hugo Pedro, 90 Carrillo-Fuentes, Amado (“Lord of the Skies”), 334 Carrillo-Fuentes, Vicente, 334 Casalnuovo, 279 (photo) Casino, 22, 27 Castano, Carlos, 187 Castellano, Paul, 11, 217 Castro, Fidel, 461

Catena, Jerry, 11 Cawleti, James, 26 Cayman Islands, 95, 249 Cellule de traitement des informations financières et la prévention du blanchiment de capitaux, 233 Cengic, Hasan, 88 Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), 355 Center for Strategic and International Studies, 154, 158 Center for Transnational Crime and Corruption, 157 Central America drug trafficking in, 97 transnational organized crime in, xvii See also specific Caribbean countries Central Asian Republics (CARs) common problems among, 103–104 transnational organized crime in, 102– 107 See also specific Central Asian countries Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 108, 189, 305, 409–411, 459 headquarters of, 410 (photo) history of, 409–410 methods of collecting intelligence, 410– 411 mission of, 410 organization of, 411 Central Intelligence Group (CIG), 409 Central States Pension Fund, 201 Centrale Recherche Informatienest (CRI), 43, 45 Cerrah, Celalettin, 164 (photo) Chambliss, William, 10, 38 Chang, Iris, 73 Chavez, Caesar, 101 Chechen criminal gangs, 352, 366, 368, 454 Chechnya, 282, 313 Chekrouni, Nezha, 393 (photo) Cheney, Dick, 350 Chernobyl, 423 Chertoff, Michael, 24, 442 Chicago School of Sociology, 37 Chile, 133, 152 Chi-li, Chen (“Dry Duck”), 466 Chin, Ko-Lin, 33, 53 China, xvi, 66–68, 72, 271, 283, 299 counterfeit goods from, 182–193, 264, 265–266 crackdown on human smuggling by, 316 Narcotic Control Act (1997), 618– 623Doc. and the United Wa State Army (UWSA), 329 See also Triads Chinatown gangs, 454–455

Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), 73, 454 Chinese Six Companies (later Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association), 72 Chitpraesert, Onijira (“Angela Miller”), 307 (photo) Cholo culture, 121 Christie, Ian, 27 Chu, Yiu-Kong, 276 Cirillo, Dominick (“Quiet Dom”), 12 Civella, Nick, 200 Clark, Michael, 109 Clarke, Charles, 433 (photo) Clean Diamond Act (2001), 206 Clinard, Marshall, 173 Clinton, Bill, 428 Clockers, 27 Coalition against Insurance Fraud (CAIF), 228 Cohen, Lawrence, 300 Cohen, Phillip (“Little Farvel”), 199 (photo) Cold War, 230–231 Collor de Mello, Fernando, 134, 135 (photo) Colombia, xvi—xvii, 2, 59, 117, 133–134, 135, 152, 153–155, 280, 281, 282, 283, 303, 325 drug trafficking in, 93, 318–322, 324, 330, 340 and Nigerian criminal organizations, 62– 63 See also Drug cartels, Columbian; Global cocaine trade Colombia Criminal Code, Provisions Aimed at Combating Organized Crime and Enacting Other Provisions (21 February 1997), 552–559Doc. Colombo, Joe, 12 Comando Vermelho, 134 Commercial Crime Services (CCS), 270– 271 Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 375–376 Commission of the European Communities, communication to the Council and the European Parliament: “Developing a Strategic Concept on Tackling Organised Crime,” 648–655Doc. Commission on Organized Crime (1983), 19 Computer crime, 35, 226–227 computer intrusion, 226–227 intellectual property theft, 226–227 Internet-based fraud, 242 See also Internet extortion Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (1996), 290

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Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (CHIP) program, 227 Confidence fraud, 242 Confocommercio, 277 Congo, 56, 58, 64 Conklin, John, 18 Conspiracy theory, 38 Consumer-driven crimes (drugs [illegal], gambling, and prostitution), 173– 177 as deviant behaviors, 174–176 and social harms, 176 typologies of, 173 as victimless crimes, 173–174 Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), 146 Contraband smuggling, 159–160 Contract killing, 210–212 methods of, 211 reasons for, 210–211 Controlled Substances Act (1970), 415 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (1979), 392 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 528–539Doc. Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971), 31 Coordinating Committee for East West Trade Policy (CoCom), 230–231 Coppola, Francis Ford, 26 Copyright infringement, 177–180 See also Movie piracy; Music piracy; Software piracy Corallo, Anthony (“Tony Ducks”), 12 Cornyn, John, 99 Correa, Luiz, 156 Corruption, 362 Corruption Perception Study (Transparency International, 2004), 86 Costa, Antonio Maria, 436 (photo) Costello, Frank, 11 Council of Europe (CoE), 376 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed through Computer Systems (2002), 525–528Doc. Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (2005), 481–483Doc. Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, 393, 764–779Doc. Convention on Cybercrime, 517– 525Doc.

Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, 243, 560– 578Doc. Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 708–716Doc. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (2002), 483–490Doc. Counterfeiting, of consumer products, 160, 181–183, 263–266 audio/video, 263–264 avenues for selling counterfeit products, 183 clothing and accessories, 264 software, 264 Counter-Intelligence Service (KOS) (Yugoslavia), 84, 86 Credit fraud, 228 Cressey, Donald, 15, 19, 46 Crime-terror nexus, 363–370 factors contributing to, 365–366 points of convergence, 368–369 points of divergence, 369–370 Criminal Assets Boards, 148 Criminal intelligence process, 379–381 1. planning, 380 2. data analysis, 380–381 3. data collation/compilation, 380 4. data collection, 380 5. data evaluation, 380 6. dissemination, 381 7. feedback, 381 Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada (CISC), 411–413 and the Automated Criminal Intelligence Information System (ACIIS), 411 intelligence analysis efforts of, 412–413 membership of, 411 staffing of, 412 Criminal opportunity structure, 300 Crips, 458 Croatia, 80, 82, 84 Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ-BH), 84, 86, 87 CSO Glossary, 261 Cuba, 95, 367 Cushman, J. H., 31 Cutolo, Raffaele, 463 Cybercrimes. See Computer crime Cyprus, 151, 164 Da Costa, Luiz Fernando, 304 Dabney, Dean, 173 Dalitz, Morris, 200 Daly, Sara, 355 D’Aquila, Salvatore, 11 D’Arco, Alfonse (“Little Al”), 12

Davis, Martin, 202 Dayton Agreement (1995), 79, 80, 82, 85 DeFede, Joe, 12 Degreef, Olivier, 393 (photo) Democratic Republic of the Congo. See Congo Department of Middle Magdalena, 281 Dewey, Thomas, 14, 23 Diamonds (“blood diamonds,” “conflict diamonds”), gemstones, and precious metals, illegal trading in, 63, 204– 206, 347 and the financing of armed conflicts and terrorism, 205 international control measures against, 205–206 DiBella, Thomas, 12 DID syndrome, 126 DiFillippi, Joseph, 13 DiGregorio, Gaspare, 13 Direct Action Against Drugs (DAAD), 146 Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (DIA), 361, 413–414 cooperation of with the courts, 413–414 international work of, 414 investigative duties of, 413 structure of, 413 Direzione Nazionale Antimafia (DNA), 414 Diversion Control Program (1971), 415 Domash, Shelly Feuer, 126 Dominica, 95 Dominican Republic, 94, 95 See also Drug cartels, Dominican Donnie Brasco, 216 Dorfman, Allen, 201, 202 Dorman, Paul, 200 Dotter, Daniel, 175–176 Dragon Syndicates. See Triads Dragon Syndicates, The (Booth), 456–457 Drake, Francis, 6 Drug abuse cost of treatment for, 337 and mental disorders, 337 negative health impact of, 336–337 Drug cartels, xv, 184–189 Colombian, 30, 42, 116, 134, 139, 153, 155, 184–187, 293, 294, 323, 332, 335, 340, 367, 368, 444, 455–456 Dominican, 188–189 effect of on North America, 138–139 in Latin America, 281–282 Mexican, 30, 97, 139, 185, 187–188, 332–335 Southeast Asian, 189 Drug trafficking, xv, 30–3, 367 and arms trafficking, 321, 339 in Australia, 74–77 in the Caribbean, 93, 97

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in Central America, 97 in the Central Asian Republics (CARs), 104–107 countries involved in, 343 in Eastern Europe, 111–112 in Europe, 116 as funding source for regional militant groups and terrorists, 335–336 international initiatives dealing with, 394–398 in Latin America, xvi—xvii, 96–97 links to terrorists, 339 methods of transportation, 157–158 in Mexico, 97 in North Korea, 76 (photo), 142–143 (photo) in Northern Ireland, 145–148 primary drug-producing countries, 339– 340 “problem drugs,” 395 social and economic impact of, 335– 338 in South America (Andean region), 318–312 terrorist organizations involved in, 339, 343, 365 and transnational alliances, 293–294 in Turkey, 163 and violence, 338–341 and the Yakuza, 131 See also Global cocaine trade; Global opium trade; Narcoterrorism Drummond, João Baptista Vianna, 89, 90 Dudayev, Dzhokhar, 352 East Asia, transnational organized crime in, 57–58 See also specific East Asian countries East European-based criminal groups, 457 Eastern and Southern Africa anti-moneylaundering (AML) groups, 248 Eastern Europe collapse of socialism in, 113–114 drug trafficking in, 111–112, 324 fight against transnational organized crime in, 112–113 and the global sex industry, 306 Russian organized criminal groups in, 151 the term “Eastern Europe,” 110 transnational organized crime in, xvi, 1, 110–113 See also specific Eastern European countries Eastman, Monk, 15 Eboli, Tommy, 11 Economic espionage, 229–233 compared to political and military espionage, 229–230

historical examples of, 230 historical overview of, 230–231 and information warfare, 232 and the nonproliferation problem, 231– 232 and the plagiarism of technology, 232 Ecuador, 2, 63 Edelbacher, Maximilian, 39 Egmont Group, 233–234, 378, 378–379, 379 main operative instruments, 233–234 “Principles of Information Exchange between Financial Intelligence Units from Money Laundering Cases,” 233–234 Eichmann, Adolf, 386 (photo) Einstein, S., 34 El Salvador, 124 ElBaradei, Mohamed, 423 Electronic Funds Transfer Act (1978), 252 Emerging organized crime hypotheses, 18– 20 Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 201 Environmental crime, 284–286 Environmental Impact Management Agency, 286 Eppolito, Louis, 171–172 Escobar, Pablo, 153, 154 (photo), 185, 186, 281, 456 Estrada, Joseph, 460 ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna), 100–102, 148 Ethnic stereotyping, 20–22 Europe arms trafficking in, 117 consumer demand for cocaine in, 325 drug trafficking in, 116, 324 fight against transnational organized crime in, 118–120 human trafficking in, 118 illegal immigration to, 117–118 money laundering in, 117 transnational organized crime in, 58, 113–120, 307 vehicle trafficking in, 116–117 See also Eastern Europe; Western Europe; specific European countries European Bank of Antigua, 247, 251 European Committee on Crime Problems (ECCP), 376 European Communities Study Association, 382–383 European Convention on Extradition (1957), 376 European Convention on Human Rights (1950), 385 European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments (1970), 376

European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959), 376 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 376 European Police College, 120 European Police Office. See Europol European Union (EU), 58, 82, 83, 84, 110, 116, 119 (photo), 209, 225, 243, 295, 330, 376, 384, 387, 392, 395 Ad Hoc Group on Organized Crime, 118–119 CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization) program, 82 and the consistency of border security across Europe, 118 Council Decision of 22 December 2004 on Tackling Vehicle Crime with Cross-Border Implications, 599– 602Doc. Directive on the Prevention of the Use of Financial Systems for the Purpose of Money Laundering, 243–244 and the fight against transnational organized crime, 118–120 Justice and Home Affairs Council, 119 member states of, 114 membership criteria of, 118 and opportunities for transnational organized crime, 114–115, 151 Provisional Judicial Cooperation Unit, 383 and the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), 82 European Union—Russian Action Plan (2000), 118 Eurojust, 376, 383 Europol, 49, 58, 119–120, 361, 376, 383, 384, 416–418, 442 2005 Europol Convention, 417 Europol 155 (European Commission), 163 Evola, Natale, 13 Exchange and Investment Bank of Geneva, 251 Extortion, 289 in South America, 160 See also Internet extortion Extradition, 385–386 and the aut dedere, aut judicare principle, 385 Farah, D., 64 Farer, T., 31, 42 Farias, Paulo César, 134 Farrar, J., 97

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Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 2, 10, 24, 43, 45, 125, 138, 139, 150, 151, 172, 174, 212, 225, 244, 346, 418–420, 423 criteria for fighting against transnational organized crime, 126–127 Financial Crime Section, Money Laundering Unit, 244 history of, 418 impact of on La Cosa Nostra, 13 international work of, 297–298 mission of, 127 Organized Crime Program, 419–420 and RICO, 217 Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR), 339 Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), 415 Federal Revenue Secretariat (Brazil), 182 Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 238 Bureau of Consumer Protection, 238 Operation Cure All, 238 Felson, Marcus, 300 File Guidelines (Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit), 380 Film Asian organized crime films, 28 British organized crime films, 27 French organized crime films, 27–28 Italian organized crime films, 28 modern American organized crime films, 26–27 origin of organized crime films, 25–26 See also specific films Financial Action Task Force (FATF), xviii, 234, 243, 247, 254, 256, 378, 379, 382, 408 2004 report of, 256, 257 “Forty Recommendations” (on money laundering) (1990; rev. 1996, 2003), 234–236, 584–595Doc. “Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing” (2001), 236, 347–348, 595–599Doc. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), 256, 260, 349, 377, 378, 379, 420–421 Financial institution fraud, 241, 271–273 desperate dealing, 271 embezzlement, 272 forgery, 271–272 Financial intelligence units (FIUs), 233, 244, 377–379 concept and mission of, 378–379 countries with FIUs, 379 information collection and analysis, 379 Finckenauer, J. O., 20 Fitzsimmons, Frank, 202 Foundation to Aid Muslims in Bosnia, 87– 88

France, 58, 231 Francisco, Manuel, 460 Fraud, 240–242, 260, 270 See also specific types of fraud Fraudnet, 271 French Connection, 139 Fu-chu, Lo, 467 Fuentes, Amado Carillo, 462 Fujimore, Alberto, 134 Fuk Ching, 316, 457 Fuqua, Antoine, 27 G7, 234, 243, 376 G8 Expert Working Group, 414 Gabbard, Glen, 29 Gacha, Jose, 153, 185 Gaglioni, Gaetano, 12 Gaines, Larry, 18 Galante, Carmine, 13 Gallardo, Miguel Angel Felix, 333 Gallo, “Crazy” Joey, 11, 12 Gallo, Larry, 11 Gambino, Carlo, 11, 12, 198 Gambling, 16, 192–194, 202–203 bookmaking, 193–194, 202 Internet gambling, 192, 203 legal gambling, 192 playing the numbers, 192–193, 202 sports gambling, 202–203 Gaming fraud, 241 Ganczarski, Christian, 368 Garcia-Abrego, Juan, 334 Garduna, 8 Garrison, Jim, 24 Gaydamak, Arkadi, 245 (photo) General Framework Agreement for Peace. See Dayton Agreement Genovese, Vito, 11, 12 (photo), 198 Georgian Mafiya, 458 German Red Army Faction, 366 Germany, 1, 116, 151, 164 Ghana, 165 Giancana, Sam, 200 Gibraltar, 249 Gigante, Vincent (“Chin”), 11, 11–12, 17 Giuliani, Rudolph, 23, 24 Gjoni, Illir, 125 Glaser, Daniel, 250 (photo) Global Coalition for Africa, Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries, 498–500Doc. Global cocaine trade, 322–327 consumer demand for cocaine, 325–327 the manufacture of cocaine, 322–323 and organized criminal and extreme groups, 323–324 worldwide trafficking trends, 324–325 Global Congress/World Customs Organization Regional Forum on

Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (2004), 548–552Doc. Global financial system, 246 Global opium trade, 327–332 and Colombia, 331 and the Golden Crescent, 329–330 and the Golden Triangle, 184, 329 manufacturing of opium and heroin, 327–329 and Mexico, 330–331 opiate use in Asia, 328 opiate use in Europe, 328 worldwide trends in, 331 Global Programme against Money Laundering, 248 Globalization, 81, 295 and the crime-terror nexus, 365–366 and national states, 134–136, 358–359 Godfather films, 26 Godfather, The (film—1972), 22, 23 (photo), 26 Godfather, The (novel—Puzo), 22 Godson, R., 30 Golden Crescent, 76 Golden Dragon Massacre, 455 Golden Triangle, 76 Golden Venture incident, 316 Goodfellas, 22 Gore, Al, 281 Gottfredson, Michael, 37 Gotti, John, 11, 17 Gotti, John, Jr. (“The Dapper Don”), 11, 17, 41 (photo) Gray, Jim (“Doris Day”), 147 Great Britain. See United Kingdom Greece, 310, 390 Green, N., 143 Grenada, 95 Grey Wolves, 163 Griffin, Sean Patrick, 20 Griffith, D. W., 25 Grokster, 178 Grotius, Hugo, 358 Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), 376 Guadeloupe, 95 Guler, Muammer, 164 (photo) Guzman-Loera, Arturo, 334 Guzman-Loera, Joaquin, 334 HadDoc.k, Mark, 147 Hagan, Frank, 19 Hagar, 108 Haiti, 94, 95, 158 Haller, Mark, 16 Hamas, 161, 346, 367 Hannan, L., 61 Harrison, Shaun, 291 (photo) Hawaii, 131

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Hawkins, John, 6 Hays Code, 25–26 Hazardous and toxic waste disposal. See Environmental crime He, Arming, 317 (photo) Health care fraud, 237–239 attempts to control, 237–239 types of, 237 Hebborn, Eric, 224 Hells Angels, 138, 141, 212, 213–214 Hennessey, David, 21 Herbert, Asbury, 39 Hercegovacka Bank, 87 Hermann, M., 152 Herrera-Buitrago, “Pacho,” 186 Heung, Charles, 465 Hezbollah, xv, 58, 64, 161, 205, 257, 346, 347, 366, 367, 370 Hirschi, Travis, 37 HIV/AIDS, 197, 336–337 and child sex trafficking in Cambodia, 108 Hobbs, D., 373 Hoffa, Jimmy, 200–201, 201 (photo) Hoffa, Jimmy, Jr., 202 Holocaust, 55 Holy Land Foundation, 258 (photo) Homeland Security Act (2002), 442 Honduras, 124 Hong Kong, 67, 68, 264, 277 Hong Men. See Triads Hoover, J. Edgar, 24, 217, 218 (photo), 418 Hoover, Larry, 453 Hoxha, Enver, 449–450 Hughes, Bill, 434 Human/body part trafficking and smuggling, 33–34, 40, 107, 206–210, 219–222, 259–260, 305–309, 453– 454 in Australia, 77–78 in the Caribbean, 94 child sex trafficking in Cambodia, 107– 110 control of victims, 220 and coyotes, 98–99 and demand, 219 the distinction between smuggling and trafficking, 97–98, 207, 309–310, 314, 388 in East Africa, 61 in Europe, 117–118 and the exploitation of children, 308 harboring of victims, 208 and human rights abuses, 308–309 and impunity of traffickers, 219 international attempts to curtail, 209, 391–394 in Latin America, 97–100

the limitations of official statistics on, 387–391 magnitude of, 207 in Mexico, 98–99 push and pull factors, 219 receipt of victims, 208 recruitment of victims, 208, 220 relationship between trafficking and other illegal activities and trades, 222 role of government and law enforcement in, 306 roles of traffickers, 220 by the Snakeheads, 314–317 trafficking of human organs, 34, 221– 222, 309 trafficking of women and children for prostitution, 195–196 transferring of victims, 208 transportation of victims, 208, 220 UN definition of, 207 in West Africa, 165–167, 166 (photo) See also Maritime smuggling of migrants; West Africa, child trafficking in Hungary, 117 Hunt, Scott, 300 Hussein, Saddam, xiv palace of in Tikrit, Iraq, xiv (photo) Ianni, Francis, 275 ICN Pharmaceutical, 238 Identity theft, 40–41, 228, 240 methods of, 40 Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act (1998), 240 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (1996), 444 ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (1999), 392 Immigration illegal immigration to Europe, 117–118 illegal immigration to the United States, xvii Latino immigration to the United States, 120–121 Inciardi, James, 18 Independent Monitoring Commission, 148 India, 271, 272–273, 307, 446 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (1988), 192 Informal value transfer system (IVTS) (hawala, hundi, or fei ch’ien), 257– 258, 346, 364 Inquisition, the, 4, 8 Institute for National Strategic Studies, 153, 158 Institutional Republican Party (PRI), 133 Insurance fraud, 228, 241 Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC), 408

Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 190, 191, 201, 254, 255, 269 International Agreement for the Suppression of the “White Slave” Traffic (1904), 391 International Alliance of Theatrical, Stage Employees, and Motion Picture Operators (IATSE), 199 International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC), 160, 271, 422–423 2005 White Paper, 423 current efforts of, 422–423 mandate of, 422 International Association of Penal Law, 49 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 423–424 Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Material Database (2005), 423–424 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, Stablemen, and Helpers of America. See Teamsters International business corporation (IBC), 247, 249, 269–270 International Crime Threat Assessment (2000), xviii—xix International Criminal Court (ICC), xviii, 425 (photo), 424–427 advisory opinions of, 426–427 composition of, 425 functions of, 425 jurisdiction of, 426 procedure of, 426 sources of applicable law, 426 International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC), 427 International Criminal Police Organization. See Interpol International Intellectual Property Alliance, 160, 227 International Labour Organization (ILO), 167, 392 International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs), 428–430 International Curriculum Committee, 429 programs offered at, 429 International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA), 16, 17, 198 International Mafia, 156 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 246 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (U.S. Department of State), 84–85, 93, 156, 256, 260 International Organization for Migration, 94 International Organized Crime Center (IOCC), 383–384

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International Training Course (ITC) on Transnational Crime, 156 Internet extortion, 289–292 characteristics of, 290 regulation and enforcement policies, 290–292 types of, 289–290 Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC), 228, 242 Interpol, xviii, 43, 45, 111, 116, 156, 244, 427(photo), 343, 361, 383, 427–428, 442 functions of, 427–428 historical overview of, 427 I-24/7 system of, 428 responsibilities of, 427–428 structure of, 427 Investment fraud, 241–242 Ponzi/Pyramid schemes, 241–242 Iran, 88, 231, 424 Anti-Narcotic Drugs Law (1989), 623– 630Doc. Iran-Contra affair, 32, 305 Iraq, 224, 231, 232 Iraq National Museum, 437 Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), 146, 147 (photo) Irish People’s Liberation Organization (IPLO), 146 Irish Republican Army (IRA), xv, 101, 154, 323, 366. See also Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA); Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum, 223 Islamic Jihad, 367 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), 104, 105, 107, 366, 367 Israel, 307 Italy, 281, 381 Izetbegovic, Alija, 87 Jabalon, Diego (“Tata”), 460 Jamaica, xvii, 93, 95 James, Jesse, 46 Jamieson, Alison, 444 Japan, xvi, 68–69, 138, 196, 325, 381, 446 See also Yakuza Jelavic, Nikica, 81 (photo) Jenkins, Philip, 19 Jersey, 249 jogo do bicho (animal game), 88–93, 134 Johnson, Jerome, 12 Johnston, David Cay, 253–254, 255 Joint Investigation Teams, 383 Joossens, L., 374 Kai-shek, Chiang, 466 Karadzic, Radovan, 86 Karimov, Islam, 106–107

KaZaA, 178 Kazakhstan, 105 Kefauver, Estes, 22, 53 Kefauver Committee (1951), 15, 19, 22, 53, 136, 275 Kennedy, John F., 23, 24 assassination of, 24 Kennedy, Joseph P., 24 Kennedy, Robert F., 23, 24, 201 Kenney, D. J., 20 Kenya, 60, 61, 65 Kerry, John, 248 (photo) Khalil Kharfan Organization, 459 Khmer Rouge, 453 Kholodov, Dmitri, 313 Kidd, William, 6, 6 (photo) Kim, Jong-Il, 142, 144 Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), 205–206 King, Rodney, 172 Kingston Declaration (1992), 408 Kinji, Fukasaku, 28 Kitano, “Beat” Takeshi, 28 Knox, George, 275 Kodama, Yoshio, 129–130, 130 Kokang Chinese, 70 Kontraobavesajna Sluzba (KOS), 80 Korb, Larry, 127 Kosovo, 79, 80, 81, 265 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 304, 368 Kosovo War (1999), 79 Kuhn, Thomas S., 39 Kuratong Balaleng, 459–460 Kwok, Ben, 405 (photo) Kyrgyzstan, 105–106 La Cosa Nostra, xvii, 2, 10–14, 14–20, 136–137, 277 Bono family, 13 and the Castellammarese war, 11 Colombo family, 12–13 and the Commission case, 17 criminal activities of, 16–17 Gambino family, 11 Genovese family, 11–12 government and law enforcement efforts against, 17 Luchese family, 12 Murder, Inc. hit squad, 111 organizational structure of, 15–16 and outlaw motorcycle gangs, 213 and the Pizza Connection case, 17 as a prototype for organized crime development, 10–12 Labor racketeering, 197–202 impact of on trade and labor unions, 198–200 other industries vulnerable to, 200–201

LaBruzzo, Frank, 13 Lagos, 62 Land, Kenneth, 300 Lander, Stephen, 434 Lansky, Meyer, 15, 198 Lanza, Joseph (“Socks”), 198–199 Laos, 189 Larocca, Joseph, 262–263 Latin America drug trafficking in, 96–97 human smuggling and trafficking in, 97– 100 illicit sex trade in, 97–100 relationship between politics and transnational organized crime in, 132–136 terrorism in, 100–102 transnational organized crime in, xvi— xvii, 2, 96–102, 98 (photo), 282–283 See also Military dictatorships, in Latin America Latino gangs (U.S.), 460 Central American Latino gangs immigrating to the United States, 123–124 gang nations, 121–122 major syndicates, 460 prison gangs, 122–123, 458 street gangs, 120–122, 458 Leading Edge 2007 exercise, 33 (photo) League of Nations, 391, 435 Lebanon, 181, 367 Lebed, Alexander, 282, 353 Lee, R. W., 32, 280, 281, 282, 283 Lee, Rensselaer, 352–353, 355 Lee, Spike, 27 Legal businesses, infiltration of, 35, 277– 280 consequences of, 278–279 methods of, 277 reasons for, 277 typology of, 277–278 See also Money laundering Lehder, Carlos, 185–186 Leutar, Jozo, 87 Lewis, Denny, 200 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 365, 367 Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 156, 366–367 Libya, 231, 232 Little Caesar, 26, 216 Liu, Henry, 466 Loan-sharking, 203–202 Local Connection, 161 Lockwood Commission, 200 Logan, Bey, 28 Lombardo, Joey, 202 Lombardo, Robert, 20

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Lombroso, Cesare, 36–37, 36 (illustration), 173 Longworth, R. C., 78 Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 61, 368 Love, William, 284 Love Canal, New York, 284, 285 (photo) Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), 145, 147 Luchese, Gaetano (“Thomas”), 12 Luciano, Charles (“Lucky”), 11, 13, 14, 15, 198, 199, 462 Lunev, Stanislav, 354 Lusaka Agreement Task Force (LATF), 65 Luxembourg, 117, 249 M-19, 368 Maas, Peter, 31 Macedonia, 79, 81, 82 Macedonian Crisis (2001), 79 MacGregor, Robert Roy (“Rob Roy,” “Red MacGregor”), 4, 5 (photo) MacKenzie, S., 373 Mafia defining features of as a structured gang, 54 definition of in the Italian Penal Code, 133 traditional model of, 292 See also La Cosa Nostra; Mexican Mafia; Russian Mayifa; Sicilian Mafia; Turkish Mafia Magalhães, Felipe Santos, 91 Magliocco, Joseph, 12 Mali, 165, 223 Malina Organizatsia, 460–461 Maltz, Michael, 46 Mangano, Vincent, 11 Manhattan Project, 230 Manhunt (Maas), 31 Manila Declaration, 443 Mann Act (1910), 33 Mara 18 (18th Street gang), 124 Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13), 122 (photo), 124, 126 Maranzano, Salvatore, 13 Marcello, Carlos, 24 Marielito gangs, 461 Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (1972), 286 Maritime smuggling of migrants, 309–312 major routes of, 310–311 modus operandi of, 311–312 push, pull, and facilitating factors, 310 Markets, legal and illegal, 214–216 Marohombsar, Faisal, 464 Martin, J., 31, 31–32 Martinique, 95 Mart’nez, L., 261 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 51

Masseria, Giuseppe (“Joe the Boss”), 11 Massino, Joey, 13 McClellan, John, 22 McClellan Committee (1963), 15, 19, 22, 24, 201 McCord, Raymond, 147 McDonald Commission, 406 McIllwain, Jeffrey Scott, 20, 73 Mean Streets, 26–27 Media Watch, 61 Mello, Marcelo Pereira de, 91 Melville, Jean-Pierre, 28 Menem, Carlos, 134, 135 (photo) Mercosur, 157 Merton, R., 36, 37 Metropolitan Restaurant and Cafeteria Association, 200 Mexican Federation, 139, 461–462 Mexican Mafia, 123 Mexico, 133, 280 drug trafficking in, xvii, 97, 323–324, 330–331, 367 ETA in, 101 human trafficking and smuggling in, 98– 99 transnational organized crime in, xvii, 2, 58–59, 181 See also Drug cartels, Mexican Meza, Garcia, 133 Middle East, transnational organized crime in, 58, 261 See also specific Middle Eastern countries Military dictatorships, in Latin America, 132–133 Milken, Michael, 266 Miller, Roger, 18 Milosevic, Slobodan, 80–81, 82, 84, 86 Mir, Hamid, 354–355 Miranda, Mike, 11 Mirzoyev, Ghaffor, 106 Mladic, Ratko, 86 Mollen Commission, 171 Mondelli, Saverio, 291 (photo) Money laundering, xv, xvii—xviii, 34–35, 183, 243, 256–260, 278 in the Caribbean, 93 current trends in, 259–260 effects of, 247 in Europe, 117 and global drug markets, 34 global efforts to combat, 233–237 and the global financial system, 246– 248 law enforcement issues regarding, 243– 246 major money-laundering countries, 260 among Mercosur member countries, 157

methods of, 259 smurfing, 252 in South America, 160 stages/phases of (placement, layering, and integration), 243, 251–253, 256 systems and instruments of, 256–259 in Turkey, 163–164 Montenegro, 82 Montserrat, 95 Monzini, P., 220–221 Mooney, Micky, 146 Moors, C., 34 Moran, Bugs, 450 Moran, Nathan, 47 Morgan, Henry, 6 Morgan, J. P., 267 (caricature) Morgenthau, Henry, Jr., 254 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), 264 Motion Picture Association (MPA)/Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) anti-piracy program, 227 Motor fuel fraud, 190–191 bootlegging, 190, 191 cocktailing, 190 cross-border activity, 191 daisy chaining, 190 major fraud schemes, 190–191 Mouzos, Jenny, 210, 211 Movie piracy, 179 Internet piracy, 179 piracy in hard goods, 179 Mozambique, 64 Mueller, G. O. W., 30, 32, 34, 35 “Multi-track Microproliferation” (Cameron), 351–352 Murray, Joseph, 365 Music piracy, 177–178 bootlegs, 178 counterfeits, 178 simple piracy, 177–178 top ten countries failing to protect and enforce music copyrights, 178 Musketeers of Pig Alley, The, 25 Mussolini, Benito, 10 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs), xviii, 243, 249, 291, 386–387 MVP Sportsbook website, 290 Myanmar, 70, 282, 303, 329, 369 Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), 70 Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime, 375 Napolitano, Dominick (“Sonny Black”), 13 Narcoterrorism, 342, 367

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NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System), 268 Nash, Jere, 202 Nation-states and the sovereignty crisis, 358–359 taxonomy of vulnerability to criminalization, 363 National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), 239 National Council Against Health Fraud (NCAHF), 239 National Crime Authority (NCA), 430– 431 corporate structure of, 430 investigative powers of, 430–431 operations of, 431 National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), 431–432 National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), 120 National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association (NHCAA), 237 National Integrity Systems Study (Transparency International, 2004), 86 National Intelligence Council (NIC), 355– 356 National Intelligence Model, 432 National Islamic Front (NIF), 87 National Liberation Army (ELN), 101 National Quotation Bureau, 267 National Retail Federation (NRF), 262– 263 National Security Act (1947), 409–410 National Security Service (SNS) (Bosnian Croats), 87 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 368 National Youth Gang Survey (1996), 460 Navassa Island, 95 Naylor, R. Thomas, 169 Naylor, T., 373 Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 105 ‘Ndrangheta, xvi, 1, 9, 163, 360, 462 etymology of the name, 9, 462 Neo-Nazis, 54 Ness, Eliot, 29 (photo) Netherlands, 116, 324 Netherlands Antilles, 95, 254 New Jack City, 27 New Orleans, Louisiana, 288 New Orleans dockworkers dispute (1890), 21 New York State Crime Commission, 198 New York State Organized Crime Task Force, 200

New York State Waterfront Commission, 198 New Zealand, 3, 271 Nicaragua, 100 the “Taller Santa Rosa Arsenal” in, 100 Niger, 65 Nigeria, 2, 56, 61–63, 324 and drug trafficking, 62–63, 335–336 and vehicle theft and trafficking, 180– 181 Nigerian criminal organizations, 31, 56, 61–63, 139, 463 types of organizational structure, 62 Nitti, Frank, 199 Nixon, Richard, 415–416 Niyazov, Saparmurat, 106 Nonprofit organizations (NGOs), 257 Nonstate actors, 358, 359–360 Noriega, Manuel, 415 (photo) North America African-based groups in, 139 Asian gangs in, 138 consumer demand for cocaine in, 325 drug trafficking in, 324 heroin use in, 328 Jamaican gangs (posses) in, 140 transnational organized crime in, 136– 142, 307–308 See also Canada; United States North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1993), 295–296 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 86, 452 North Korea, 423–424 drug trafficking in, 142–145 Northern Ireland, 265 drug trafficking in, 145–148 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (1969), 423 Nugan Hand Bank, 247, 251 O’Bannion, Dion, 450 Observatoire Geopolitique des Drouges, 367 Occidental Chemical Company, 284 Ocean Dumping Act. See Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act Ochoa, Fabio, 153, 185, 186, 187 Ochoa, Jorge Luis, 153, 185, 186, 187 Ochoa, Juan David, 153, 185, 186, 187 Octopus Project, 376 Odessa Mafiya, 1, 150, 463 O’Dwyer, William, 14–15 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), 393 Office of Foreign Asset Control, 346, 349 Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 409

Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI), 420–421 Olson, W. J., 30 Omara, Mullah Mohammed, 367 Omega 7, 365, 370 Open Society Institute, 396 Operation United Eagles, 333–334 Opium War (1840), 299–300 Orejuela, Gilberto Rodriguez, 282 Orena, Vic, 13 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 376–377 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 377, 393 OSCE Guidelines, 393 Organization of American States (OAS), 377 Inter-American Convention against Corruption (1996), 377, 490– 498Doc. Resolution to Check Money Laundering (1996), 578–579Doc. Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Convention on Combating International Terrorism (1999), 717– 727Doc. Organized crime, 4–5, 13, 59 application of generic conceptualizations of to specific national circumstances, 47–51 and the ascension of U.S. political figures, 22–24 causation theories and concepts of organized criminal behavior, 35–38 characteristics and operational tactics of, 39–42 coalition theories of, 38 and conspiracy theory, 38 control theories of, 37 definition of, 10, 18–19, 43–47, 48, 125, 169, 275 and economic harm, 49–50 ethnic group involvement in, 18–20 film and television portrayal of, 25–29 international action against, 48 low social control theories of, 37 parasitic organized crime, 36 predatory organized crime, 35–36 regional profiles, 56–59 (see also specific regions) in the Renaissance and early modern period, 4–10 social disorganization theory of, 37 subcultural theories of, 37 symbiotic organized crime, 36 typology of, 279–280 universalizing the threat assessment of, 48–49

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worldwide impact of, 275–276 See also La Cosa Nostra; Organized crime groups; Transnational organized crime Organized Crime Agency of British Columbia, 141 Organized Crime Control Act (1970), 216 See also Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute Organized crime groups, xiv—xv,, 42, 360 approaches to the study of, 51–52 corporate gangs, 275 definition of, 133, 360, 443–444 economic benefits of, 54 features of, 54 as “prospering,” 128 strategic alliances between, 292–294 structure and functional organization of organized criminal groups, 51–53 structured gangs, defining features of, 54 supergangs, 275 traditional and nontraditional organized crime groups, 53–55 typologies of criminal groups’ functional establishment, 53 typologies of criminal groups’ structure, 52–53 typologies of nontraditional organized crime groups, 54–55 Organized Crime Impact Study (1998), 140 Organized crime studies, agenda for future research, 443–44 Organized Crime Task Force, 43, 44–45, 148 Organized retail theft rings, 260–263 economic impact of, 262–263 and retail victimization, 263 Osama’s Revenge (P. L. Williams), 354 Oswald, Lee Harvey, 24 Outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs), xvii, 2, 137–138, 141, 211–214 criminal activity of, 213–214 organizational structure of, 212–213 See also Bandidos; Hells Angels; Outlaws Outlaws, 214 Oviedo, Lino César, 160 Owens, Kim, 378 (photo) Padilla, Jose (the “Dirty Bomber”), 368 Pakistan, 63, 223, 423, 446–447 Palermo Convention (2000), xviii, 48, 108, 119, 120, 209, 234, 360, 376, 382, 392, 398–403, 682–792Doc. content of the convention, 401–402 content of the protocols, 402–403

historical background, 400 relationship between the convention and protocols, 402 status of the treaties, 400–401 Panama, 2, 254, 367 Paraguay, 133, 134, 135, 160 Parekh, Ketan, 272 (photo) Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK), 163, 366 Pastrana, Andres, 281 Patino-Fomeque, Victor Julio, 186, 187 Patterns of Global Terrorism (U.S. Department of State), 161 PBS Frontline, 153 Pearson, G., 373 Pennsylvania Crime Commission, 19, 38, 137 Pentagon group, 463–464 People Against Pablo Escobar (PEPES), 153 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 465 People’s Republic of China (PRC). See China Perez, Carlos Andrés, 134 Permanent Court of International Justice, 424 Persico, Carmine (“Junior”), 13 Peru, xvi, 59, 133, 155, 282 drug trafficking in, 318–322 See also Global cocaine trade Philippines, 70, 459–460 Ping, Cheng Chui (“Mother of All Snakeheads”), 452, 457 Pinochet, Augusto, 424 Piper, S., 211 Piracy and privateering, 4, 5–6, 20, 34 amateur piracy, 302 ideological piracy, 302 organized crime group—directed piracy, 302 piracy in the Malacca Strait and South China Sea, 299–303 sovereignty-motivated piracy, 302 state agent—involved piracy, 302 terrorist-involved piracy, 302 types of Renaissance-era pirates, 5–6 See also specific types of piracy Pistone, Joseph D. (Donnie Brasco), 13, 217 Plan Colombia, 395 Poland, 112, 116 Police officials, bribery and corruption of, 171–173 in Los Angeles, 172 in New Orleans, 172 in New York City, 171–172 Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), 145 Political-criminal nexus, xiii—xiv, 135–136

Pong Su incident, 143, 144 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 367 Portugal, 58 Potter, Gary, 19 President’s Commission on Organized Crime (1986), 138 Presser, Jackie, 202 Pressler, Margaret Webb, 261 Primeiro Comando da Capital, 135 Profaci, Joe, 12 Prohibition, 10, 15, 16, 21–22, 136, 192, 371, 418 Protection Act (2003), 109 Provenzano, Bernardo (“Boss of Bosses”), 456 Provenzano, Anthony, 200, 202 Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), 145, 146, 148, 365 Public Expenditure and Institution Review (World Bank, 2002), 85 Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), 406 Puerto Rico, xvii, 95 Putin, Vladimir, 313 Puzo, Mario, 22 Quackwatch, 239 Quintero, Miguel Caro, 461 Quintero, Rafael, 461 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute (1970), 15, 24, 202, 216–219, 419, 655– 666Doc. history of, 216–217 and the Mafia, 217 new uses for, 217–218 Racketeering, 16, 137, 216 See also Labor Racketeering Ramos, Carlos, 92 (photo) RAND, 355 Rastelli, Phillip (“Rusty”), 13, 217 Ravna Gora, 309 Raw, M., 374 Reagan, Ronald, 32, 305 Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), 146 Recording Industry Association of America website, 289–290 Red Hand Commandos (RHC), 147 Red Scare, 230 Reid, Richard (the “Shoe Bomber”), 368 Reina, Gaetano, 12 Republic of Korea. See South Korea Retail Industry Blog, 262 Reuter, Peter, 277 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), xv, 101, 148, 154–155, 304, 318, 321, 323, 335, 365, 366, 367

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Revolutionary United Front (RYF), 368 Rey, G. M., 215 Richie, Donald, 28 Riina, Salvatore, xvi Robert, Pierre Richard, 368 Rodrigues, V., 156 Rodriguez-Orejuela, Gilberto, 186 Rodriguez-Orejuela, Miguel, 186 Romano, A., 31, 31–32 Rondan Doyukai Company, 138 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 409 Rosen, P., 406 Rosenberg, Ethel, 231 (photo) Rosenberg, Julius, 231 (photo) Rosenstein, Ze-ev (“Wolf”), 450 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 141 Rubington, Earl, 174 Ruby, Jack, 24 Ruggiero, Benjamin (“Lefty Guns”), 13, 216, 217 Rush, G. E., 45 Russia, xvi, 58, 277, 280, 281, 282, 283, 369 the Russian military and organized crime, 313–314 tracking of nuclear and fissile material in, 32 See also specific Russian regions Russian Mafiya, xv, xvi, 1, 70, 118, 138, 148–152, 265, 281, 294, 307, 309, 313, 457, 464 in Asia, 151 in the Caribbean and Latin America, 151–152 in Colombia, 154 in Europe, 150–151 international reach of, 149–150 Solntsevskaya network of, 1, 150 in the United States, 150 Russo, Andrew, 13 Ryan, P. J., 45 Saakashvili, Mikhail, 458 SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution (2002), 393 Sacra Corona Unita (SCU), 163, 361, 464– 465 Saietta, Ignazio, 15 Saint Kitts and Nevis, 95 Saint Lucia, 95 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 96 Salerno, Anthony (“Fat Tony”), 11, 217 Salinas, Carols, 134 Samper, Ernesto, 281 Sampson, A., 31 Santacruz-Londono, Jose, 186 Santos, Nelson Pereira dos, 91

Satanic churches, 54 Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree, the Law of Combating Money Laundering (2003), 579–584Doc. Sayyaf, Abu, 463 Scalise, Frank, 11 Scarface, 27 Schaeffer Library of Drug Policy, 153 Schalck-Golodkowski case, 231 Schengen Agreement (1985), 58, 114 Schengen Convention (1990), 387 Scheper-Hughes, N., 222 Schiro, Cola, 13 Schultz, Dutch, 23, 199–200 Schur, Edwin, 174, 175 Sciacca, Paul, 13 Scorsese, Martin, 26, 27 Second World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children. See Yokohama Congress Securities Exchange Act (1934), 228 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 228, 238, 266 Securities fraud, 228, 266 insider trading, 228, 266 market manipulation, 228, 266–268 Security InfoWatch, 261 Serb Democratic Party (SDS), 84, 86 Serbia, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84 Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), 432–433, 433–435 as the “British FBI,” 434 Sex trade, 16–17, 194–197, 275–276, 306– 308 global pornography, 196–197 health risks of, 107 industrialization of, 194–195 sex tourism, 131, 195, 308 trafficking of women and children for prostitution, 195–196 and the Yakuza, 130–131 Shan United Army (SUA), 329 Shapiro, Jacob, 198 Sharipov, Humdin, 106 Shea, Cornelius P., 200 Shelley, L., 49 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 458 Shikita, M. T., 128 Shower Posse, 140, 459 Shower Posse (Blake), 459 Sicilian Mafia, xv, xvi, 1, 8, 10, 14, 139, 265, 277, 293, 360, 361, 368, 444, 456 in Canada, 141 etymology of the word “mafia,” 8, 10 Mafia leaders under house arrest (1971), 44 (photo) origin of, 8, 10 Siegel, Bugsy, 198 Siegel, Larry J., 10

Siegfried, J., 38 Sierra Leone, 205 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), 31 Single European Market, 114–115 Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), 300 Skinheads, 54, 55 (photo) Slave trade, 7, 33 Slovenia, 80, 82 Smigielski, David, 355 Snakeheads, 57–58, 68, 130, 308 and human migrant smuggling, 314– 317 Society for Threatened Peoples International, 86 (photo) Soering v. UK (1989), 385 Software piracy, 178–179 client-server overuse, 178 end-user piracy, 178 hard-disk loading, 178 Internet privacy, 178 software counterfeiting, 178–179 top ten countries with the highest software piracy rates, 179 Somalia, 60, 61 Sopranos, The, 26, 28–29, 268 South Africa, 2, 63, 64, 324 Proceeds of Crime Act (1996), 666– 674Doc. South African crime groups, 465 South America Andean region of, 318, 322 arms trafficking in, 160–161 consumer demand for cocaine in, 325 contraband smuggling in, 159–160 drug trafficking in, 318–322, 324 extortion in, 160 heroin use in, 328 money laundering in, 160 product piracy in, 160 terrorism in, 161 transnational organized crime in, 59, 152–158, 159–161, 283 Tri-Border Region (TBR) of, 159, 265 See also specific South American countries South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD), 157 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 393 South Korea, 69–70 Spain, 58, 324 Spitzer, Eliot, 237–238 Sri Lanka, 308 Stabilization and Association Agreement (European Union, 2003), 84 Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (1999), 82 Stalin, Josef, 450

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Stanislawski, B., 152 Stanley Foundation report, 127 State Security Service (SDB) (Yugoslavia), 84, 86 “Statement on Principles of Money laundering” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), 243, 244 Steenson, Gerald, 146 Steffensmeier, Darrell, 53 Stolen art and antiquities trade, 223–225 categories of, 223 criminals involved in, 224 and fakes, 224 and forgeries, 224 international legal instruments to counter, 224–225 scope of, 223 Stonich, William, 212 (photo) Sublette, Carey, 351 Sudan, 61 “Suitcase Nukes” (Center for Nonproliferation Studies), 355 Suitcase Nukes Controversy, 353–355 timeline of, 353 (table) Sun Yee On, xvi, 2, 465 Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), 252, 258, 379, 420 Sutherland, Edwin H., 37, 228, 270 Switzerland, 117, 132, 151, 249, 251, 269 Syria, 367 Taiwan, 70, 72, 73 Tajikistan, 103, 106 “Take Charge: Fighting Back against Identity Theft” (Federal Trade Commission), 240 Takenaka, Masahisa, 130 Taliban, 205, 305, 329–330, 336, 367, 368, 370 Tami, Pierre, 108 Tampere European Council, 119 Tanzania, 64 Taoka, Kazuo, 130 Tapia, Eusebio Arzalus (“Paticorto”), 101 Tarantino, Quentin, 27 Task Force to Fight Illicit Trafficking in Cultural Property Stolen in Iraq, 224, 436–438 Task Force on Organised Crime in the Baltic Sea Region, 120 Task Force on Organized Crime (1967), 136 Tax evasion compared to tax avoidance, 269 and offshore tax havens, 253–255 and trust schemes, 269–270 Tchen, John Kuo Wei, 73 Teamsters for a Corruption Free Union, 202

Teamsters Union, 16, 17, 200–202 Television broadcasting of the Kefauver and McClellan committee hearings, 22 representation of organized crime on, 28–29 Teng-kuei, Yang, 467 Terrorism, 55 and drug trafficking as a source of income, 336, 342–345, 364–365 financial networks of, 345–350 funding of, 342–343, 364 in Latin America, 100–102 links to drug trafficking, 339 in South America, 161 See also Crime-terror nexus; specific terrorist organizations Thai, David, 453 Thailand, 63, 70, 195, 196, 307, 308, 329 Theft of the Nation (Cressey), 15, 19, 46 Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), 87– 88 Thompson, David, 27 Thugees, 364 Tiendaomeng crime syndicate, 466–467 Tieri, Frank (“Funzi”), 11 Tito, 80, 84 Tobin, Dan, 200 Tongs. See Triads Torrio, Johnny, 15, 15 (photo) Trade fraud, 270–271 in-bond diversions, 271 Trafficking in Persons Report, 109 Trafficking Victims Protection Act (2000), 209, 384 Training Day, 27 Transnational organized crime, xiii, 360– 361, 441 activities of, 30–35 challenge of to the state, 361–362 characteristics and principles of, 360– 361 concept of, 42–43 economic, political, and social impact of, 280–284 factors conducive to the spread of, 287– 288 global reach of, xvi—xvii impact of on international security, 294–298 impact of on social order and democracy, 286–289 international efforts to combat, xviii, 297–298, 381–385, 441–443 and the need for a multilateral response to, 441–442, 446 and nonstate actors and weak or failed states, 357–363

and political agendas, 280–282 and the political-criminal nexus, xiii— xiv regional profiles of, 56–60 (see also specific regions) the rise of transnational criminal organizations, xiv—xv sources of financing, 169–170 technical and legal issues in combating, 375–377 threats of to institutional stability, 280 See also Arms trafficking; Computer crime; Drug trafficking; Human/body part trafficking; Legal businesses, infiltration of; Money laundering; Piracy and privateering Tramunti, Carmine, 12 Transavia Export Cargo, 368 Transparency International (TI), 86 Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism (1999), 702–708Doc. Treaty on European Union (1993), 114 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 232 Treaty of Westphalia, 358, 359 (illustration) Triads, xv, xvi, 2, 28, 31, 57–58, 67, 68, 115, 116, 277, 292, 294, 307, 308, 309, 315, 329, 335, 455, 458–459, 466 in Canada, 140 Chinese, 59 criminal Triads, 73 historical background of, 71–72 ideology-directed Triads, 73 mutual help-oriented Triads, 72 in North America, 138 revolution-involved Triads, 72–73 and Triadisation, 276 typologies of, 72–73 See also 14K; Sun Yee On; United Bamboo; Wo Group; Yakuza Trinidad and Tobago, 96 Tri-State Joint Soviet Émigré Organised Crime Project, 150 Trivedi, S. P., 221 (photo) Truman, Harry S., 409 Tsang, Donald, 235 (photo) Tse-tung, Mao, 452 Tsuchiya, Shinichi, 128 Tucson Protocol (2002), 206 Tudjman, Franjo, 84, 86 Turbeville, Graham, 100, 101 Turkey drug trafficking in, 163, 324 money laundering and reinvestment in, 163–164 organization of, 162–163 origins of, 162

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Turkey continued transnational organized crime in, 162– 165 Turkish/Kurdish gangs, 162–164, 467 and the Albanian Connection, 163 Turkish Mafia, 467 Turkmenistan, 106 Turks and Caicos, 96 Ugljen, Nedzad, 88 Ukrainian Mafia, 467–468 Ulmer, Jeffrey, 53 Ulster Defense Association (UDA), 145, 146–147 Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), 145, 147 United Bamboo, 466 United Nations (UN), 42, 49, 167, 246, 266, 330, 344, 391, 394, 395, 435, 444 and organized criminals, 60–61 weapons of mass destruction disarmament program of, 232 See also UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); specific conventions, protocols, and resolutions following UN Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP), 444–445 UN Children’s Fund, 70 UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 399–400 UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (1975), 42 UN Convention against Corruption (2003), 399, 500–517Doc. UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988), 31, 234, 243, 247, 375, 630–638Doc. UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. See Palermo Convention UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 345, 384 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation and the Prostitution of Others (1949), 209, 391 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), 108, 209, 392 UN Convention’s Second Optional Protocol, 209 UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program (UNCPCJP), 442 UN Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), 375 UN Environmental Program, 65 UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS), 397

UN International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005), 539–548Doc. UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), 236, 737–745Doc. UN International Drug Programme, 31 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 319, 344, 394, 403, 435– 436 Global Assessment Program, 436 Global Program against Corruption, 435–436 Global Program against Terrorism, 436 Global Program against Trafficking in Human Beings, 394, 435 Global Program against Transnational Crime, 435 Global Program on Organized Crime, 445 Legal Advisory Program, 436 mandate of, 435 UN Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography (2002), 392, 758–764Doc. UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (2001), 376, 401 UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air, Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), 309, 376, 382, 388, 401, 751–758Doc. UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), 165, 207, 209, 219, 376, 382, 388, 392, 401, 745– 751Doc. UN Resolution 1173, 205 UN Resolution 1176, 205 UN Resolution 1306, 205 UN Resolution 1373, 342 UN Transnational Organized Crime Assessment Survey, 445 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of an Armed Conflict (1954), 225 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,

Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970), 225 UNICEF, 108, 167 Innocenti Research Centre, 165 Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (1995), 225 United Kingdom, 117, 231, 271 United Seafood Workers’ Union, 198–199 United Self-Defense Groups of Columbia (AUC), 321, 366 United States Asian organized crime in (Triads and Tongs), 71–74 Chinatowns in, 73–74 and cocaine, 324 and heroin, 328 historical impact of organized crime on, 20–25 illicit drug market in, 344 immigration to in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 20–21 impact of transnational organized crime on national security, 125–127 international crime-fighting strategy of (counterorganization and containment), 441 Italian organized crime groups in, 13 and the lack of non-Sicilian/Italian American organized crime data, 19–20 Latino gangs in, 120–125 as source of illegal firearms, 304 transnational organized crime in, xvii, 2, 58–59 United States Code, Title 18—Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 674–682Doc. United States v. Alvarez-Machain (1992), 386 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1991), 386 United Wa State Army (UWSA), 70, 329, 335 University of Pennsylvania, Department of Criminology, 52 Untouchables, The, 28 Uruguay, 133, 134, 135 U.S. Attorney General’s Office, Government and Health Care Fraud Section, 238 U.S. Bank Secrecy Act (1970), 251 U.S. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 67 U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), 415 U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 254 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 157 (photo), 158, 182, 185 (photo), 188 (photo), 271, 438–440

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Index

Container Security Initiative (CSI), 439 C-TPAT program, 439 FAST program, 439 National Targeting Center, 439–440 NEXUS program, 439 twin goals of, 438 use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 439 (photo) U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 442 Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), 442 U.S. Department of Justice, 172, 256, 339, 451 Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS), 227 U.S. Department of Labor, Special Investigations Staff (SIS), 201 U.S. Department of State, 71, 84–85, 93, 139, 142, 155, 161, 207, 263–264, 339, 396 Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 209 U.S. Department of the Treasury, 256 Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), 257 Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, 349 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 31–32, 69, 97, 153, 155, 156, 244, 361, 377, 381, 414–416 evolution of, 415–416 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program, 416 mission of, 416 Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs), 416 responsibilities of, 416 U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement NetWork, 233 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 99, 271 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 305 U.S. Marshal’s Service, 137 U.S. National Narcotics Intelligence Consumer Committee, 158 U.S. Patriot Act (2001), xviii, 246, 346, 348, 420 Title III of, 727–737Doc. U.S. Postal Service, 257 U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 266 U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 254

U.S. Supreme Court, 218, 386 U.S. Virgin Islands, 96 Uzbekistan, 103, 105, 106–107 Vaccarelli, Paolo (Paul Kely), 15 Valachi, Joseph, 15, 22, 136, 137 (photo) Van Dijk chain reaction hypothesis, 176 Vehicle theft and trafficking, 180–181 in Europe, 116–117 linkage to other criminal activity, 181 major international trafficking routes, 181 modus operandi, 180 reasons this trade is flourishing, 180 Vendidtto, John, 210, 211 Venezuela, xvi, 2, 101, 152, 324 Versailles Peace Agreement (1918), 80 Vetere, Eduardo, 42 Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (2003), 209 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (2000), 779–792Doc. Vietnam, 70–71 Vigil, J. D., 121 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (1994), 446 Visconti, Lucino, 28 Vitale, Vito, 399 (photo) Vizzini, Calogero, 456 Wah Ching crime syndicate, 468 Wah-yim, Hueng, 465 War on Drugs, 335, 395, 396 Waterfall, Charlie. See Ramos, Carlos Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 31, 32–34, 231 Weibert, Martin, 174 Weiss, Emanuel (“Mendy”), 199 (photo) Weiss, Hymie, 450 Weldon, Curt, 353, 354 West Africa, child trafficking in, 165–167 contributing factors, 165 major trafficking routes, 165 methods of recruitment and control, 166–167 West African gangs, 468 Western Europe drug trafficking in, 324 transnational organized crime in, 1 White-Bellflower project, 142 White-collar crime, 17, 137, 228, 270 Wilcox, Pamela, 300 Williams, P., 48 Williams, Paul L., 354 Williams, Roy Lee, 202

Witness Protection Program, 17 Wo Group, 468–469 Wo Shing Wo, 264 Women’s rights movement, 392 Wong, Kot Siu, 466 Woo, John, 28 Woodiwiss, Michael, 169 World Bank, 85, 246 World Health Organization (WHO) Conference of Experts on the Rational Use of Drugs (1985), 239 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 422 World Ministerial Conference on Organised Transnational Crime (1994), 48 Xi, Wan Ti (Hong Er), 72 Yablokov, Alexei, 353–354 Yacovelli, Joseph, 12 Yakuza, xvi, 2, 9, 57–58, 59, 68–69, 128– 132, 196, 292, 294, 306–307, 309, 316, 469 and the anti-Yakuza public climate in Japan, 131–132 etymology of the word yakuza, 9 historical development of, 128–130 major criminal enterprises of, 130–131 in North America, 138 origin of, 9 tattoos of, 129 (photo) Yardies, 1, 115 Yat-Sen, Sun, 72 Yeltsin, Boris, 282 Yokohama Congress (2001), 394 Yokohama Global Commitment 2001, 394 Young Muslims, 87 Yue, King Fong, 452 Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), 84, 86 Yugoslavia, 80, 84, 297, 303 Zaccardelli, Guiliano, 412 Zambada-Garcia, Ismael (“El Mayo”), 334 Zambia, 63–64, 65 Zamora, Jaime Paz, 135 (photo) Zedong, Mao, 67 Zhi Gong Tong, 72 Zhirinovsky, Vladimit, 282 Zicarelli, Joseph, 13 Zimbabwe, 65 Zwillman, Longie, 199

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